

Applying the Principles of War

Nola M. Sleevei

ALTHOUGH CENTURIES and continents separated their lives, Sun Tzu, Napoleon Bonaparte and Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson employed, to varying degrees, the same basic principles of war. All were ingenious military commanders. Histories of their lives detail the characteristics that enabled them to become successful leaders. This article will discuss their similarities and the tactics they employed: deception, celerity (speed/swiftness), shaping the enemy and exploiting victory.

Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu's Chen clan ancestors were extremely active and influential in Chinese politics. Tales of the wiles with which the clan overthrew the reigning Qing family no doubt inspired Sun Tzu as he developed his principles of war. Sun Tzu's father, Chen Shu, received the title "Sun" in recognition of his notable military attainments. Sun Tzu assimilated and developed many of his military theories as a result of his father's and paternal family's influence. Sun Tzu placed great value on studying the art of war. The constant political unrest in China compelled Chen clan members to always be on guard and to seek opportunities for military advancement. Resolutely facing a life without tranquillity, Sun Tzu honed his warrior skills.

Helu, King of Wu, an experienced military commander and expansionist, positively impacted Sun Tzu's career. Helu recognized and capitalized on Sun Tzu's military knowledge, appointing him troop disciplinarian and assistant to General Wu Zixu, commander of Wu forces. In his position as collaborator with Wu, Sun Tzu gained opportunity to fully employ his principles of war. His successes ultimately won him the rank of general.

Napoleon

Napoleon exhibited signs of genius at an early age. Despite being young and deficient in most studies except mathematics, in 1783, Napoleon was selected

Their relentless pursuit of excellence through rigorous intellectual study of past military campaigns, terrain, tactics and the art of war prepared [Sun Tzu, Napoleon and Jackson] to fully exploit the principles of deception, celerity, shaping the enemy and exploitation of victory. Although each general had his own individual leadership style and stressed slightly different aspects of the principles of war, each agreed that warfare must be thoroughly studied and that prudent application of its basic principles to the fluid conditions of war ensures victory.

for transfer from the Brienne School to the Paris Royal Military Academy. Chevalier de Keralio, inspector and military tactics author, overruled suggestions that Napoleon should wait another year: "I perceive in him a spark of genius which cannot be too early fostered."¹ As further evidence of his mental superiority, in September 1785, at the age of 16, Napoleon was commissioned second lieutenant, royal corps of artillery. The average length of time required to "pass out" of the Royal Academy was from two to three years, but Napoleon "applied himself so assiduously" he received his commission after only one year.²

At 19, on his own initiative, Napoleon launched an intensive self-education period in which he consumed many books on military and political history. While attending the Paris Royal Military Academy, he had gained no formal knowledge of military history or tactics. His self-appointed course of study included 83 campaigns, foremost of which were the campaigns of Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Henri de Turenne, Eugene of Savoy and Frederick the Great.³ Napoleon



At 19, on his own initiative, Napoleon launched an intensive self-education period in which he consumed many books on military and political history. While attending the Paris Royal Military Academy, he had gained no formal knowledge of military history or tactics. His self-appointed course of study included . . . the campaigns of Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Henri de Turenne, Eugene of Savoy and Frederick the Great. . . . Napoleon also consciously trained his memory and analytical powers by writing a concise summary of each book he read. . . . his mind was trained and ready for his future as military commander and, eventually, emperor.

Napoleon Bonaparte circa the Italian Campaigns, 1796-1797

thoroughly read about these campaigns, convinced that only in this way could he master the secrets of the art of war.

Napoleon also consciously trained his memory and analytical powers by writing a concise summary of each book he read. When he received command of the Army of Italy in March 1796, his mind was trained and ready for his future as military commander and, eventually, emperor. "If I seem always ready to meet any difficulty, to face any emergency, it is because before undertaking any enterprise I have spent a long time thinking it out and seeing what might happen. It is not a guardian spirit that reveals to me suddenly and in secret what to say or to do in circumstances unexpected by others, it is my meditations, my thinking things out. . . ."⁴

As a youth, Napoleon lived in poverty. He was a *bousier*, or free pupil, at the schools he attended, and the "children of many noble and wealthy families" surrounding him were a constant reminder of his poverty.⁵ As the Army of Italy commander, Napoleon knew he could gain his soldiers' respect by procuring much-needed supplies for them. This motive does not appear his only one. His heart, not just his military mind, was touched by the appalling conditions under which they lived.⁶

"Stonewall" Jackson

Thomas Jonathan Jackson became constable of Lewis County, Virginia (West Virginia), at 18. His job "required both courage and determination, qualities that he soon showed that he possessed."⁷ A major portion of his duties involved collecting debts, and Constable Jackson became expert at outmaneuvering reluctant debtors. Once, Jackson grabbed the reins of the horse of a man who refused to pay up.


Jackson led the horse to a low stable door, forcing the man off his horse, enabling the county to take possession of the animal in lieu of cash.

Jackson possessed a steadfastness and determination reflected in one of his maxims: "You may be whatever you resolve to be."⁸ When accepted to West Point in 1842, Jackson's education was found deficient. A family friend inquired whether he could succeed and Jackson replied, "I am very ignorant, but I can make it up in study. I know I have the energy and I think I have the intellect."⁹ True to his word, "he made up in industry what . . . he had lacked in opportunity."¹⁰ Resolve and hard work enabled Jackson to finish his first year ranked 17th out of 59. In General Robert E. Lee's letter of recommendation for Jackson's promotion to lieutenant general in October 1862, he commented that Jackson "spares no exertion to accomplish his object."¹¹

Weak eyes forced Jackson to develop unique study and reading habits. While he was a professor of natural and experimental philosophy and artillery tactics at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), he read the next day's lesson by daylight, then mentally rehashed it in the evening. This extreme mental discipline prepared Jackson for the American Civil War during which he methodically and meticulously plotted maneuvers to mislead and mystify his enemies.

Jackson was not easily excitable. A VMI cadet related the calmness of artillery tactics instructor Major Jackson under "fire." During drill, mischievous cadets sometimes threw bricks or other objects onto the arsenal's roof. The objects often rolled accurately toward the professor. Although Jackson was often nicked by the falling missiles, "never a notice, a sign or the slightest regard was visible in his face or his actions."¹² Many instances are related about his

Jackson possessed a steadfastness and determination reflected in one of his maxims: "You may be whatever you resolve to be." When accepted to West Point in 1842, Jackson's education was found deficient. A family friend inquired whether he could succeed and Jackson replied, "I am very ignorant, but I can make it up in study. I know I have the energy and I think I have the intellect." True to his word, "he made up in industry what . . . he had lacked in opportunity." . . . In General Lee's letter of recommendation for Jackson's promotion to lieutenant general . . . he commented that Jackson "spares no exertion to accomplish his object."



Lieutenant General Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson

self-control during battle. For example, he could frequently be spotted writing orders atop his mount, Little Sorrel, oblivious to flying bullets. One such time, a cannon ball splintered a tree directly above him. Jackson did not react to the disturbance, remaining engrossed in writing a dispatch.¹³

Deception

Sun Tzu believed "All warfare is based on deception."¹⁴ Through deception, the intended place of battle remains questionable, thereby weakening and confusing the enemy. Uncertainty forces the opponent into psychological disadvantage, causing him to exert wider effort in battle preparation. The attacker can engage fewer troops when the foe is extended. "If he does not know where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares everywhere, he will be weak everywhere."¹⁵

Sun Tzu perceived deception as a powerful catalyst for creating change, reasoning that the most successful deceptive measures are usually simple and inconspicuous and that the commander with superior deceptive skills has a substantial advantage. "Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace; divinely mysterious, he is inaudible. Thus he is master of his enemy's fate."¹⁶

During the Jena Campaign, Napoleon sent cavalry commander Armand de Caulaincourt on a mission to detect Prussian intentions to fight. Caulaincourt used the ruse of a hunting trip to Compiègne as his cover. In another deceptive move to gain information, Napoleon sent engineer Colonel Blein, in full uniform, across Prussian lines. Blein was mistaken for a Saxon officer and allowed unmolested passage to "purchase maps" at the Leipzig Fair. After locating the general headquarters of the King of Prussia and the

Duke of Brunswick, Blein returned to Napoleon with dispositions of enemy forces.

A favorite Napoleonic deception tactic was to advance his army in divided columns. In the May 1800 Marengo Campaign, Napoleon's troops crossed the Alps in five columns, two of which contained the majority of soldiers. The total front was approximately 115 miles, reaching from the Var River to St. Gothard Pass. This divided approach into Italy successfully deceived General Baron Michael Friedrich von Melas concerning Napoleon's objective. Melas wrote reassuringly to a female friend in Pavia that she was safe from the French and need not evacuate her home. Within 12 hours, Napoleon and his main army were in town.

Deception was vital in Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign during the Civil War. Union troops were numerically superior and were distributed such that Jackson's force was often between them. He found deception useful in economizing time to outmaneuver converging enemy armies. To Jackson, "mystery was the key to success."¹⁷ Jackson frequently used circuitous marches to produce uncertainty in the enemy's mind. Confederate General Richard Taylor remarked, "I began to think that Jackson was an unconscious poet, and, as an ardent lover of nature, desired to give strangers an opportunity to admire the beauties of his valley."¹⁸

The meandering before the McDowell, West Virginia, engagement was typical. Jackson's destination was west. He marched east. Confusion regarding Jackson's position and destination is evident in official correspondence. On 9 May 1862, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton directed General Nathaniel P. Banks to determine enemy strength and positions, saying, "Opinions from Gen. [Irwin] McDowell and

Napoleon would "pursue the beaten foe without mercy after securing victory." . . . For example, initial success against the Austrians was followed by aggressive pursuit, leading to victory at Lodi, Italy. After the battle at Castiglione, Italy, Napoleon's "ruthless pursuit of a beaten enemy" led to a victory at Bassano. Subsequent battles proved Napoleon's tactics and exploitation of victory were sound as he continued to achieve spectacular successes.

Gen. [John C.] Fremont are contrary with respect to Jackson."¹⁹ On the same day, Major General E.A. Hitchcock reported, "The movements of Jackson are uncertain."²⁰ Union reconnaissance showed "the departure of Jackson, but not his destination."²¹

Maintaining extreme secrecy toward his own staff, generals and troops was characteristic of Jackson. Others were not convinced of the validity of Jackson's extreme reticence. For example, his staff concluded after the Romney, West Virginia, expedition that "If Gen. Jackson had been killed no one would have known what was to be done."²² When informed that this practice was unacceptable to his generals, Jackson replied, "If I can deceive my own friends I can make certain of deceiving the enemy."²³ Jackson realized that the least tidbit of information might give the enemy an advantage in a war in which there was a high rate of desertion, where friend and foe shared a common language, thus making it harder for spies to be easily detected.

Celerity

Sun Tzu, Napoleon and Jackson each relied on celerity to compensate for numerical inferiority. They also found it instrumental in promoting surprise and giving morale advantage to the attacker. For instance, Sun Tzu believed, "Speed is the essence of war," recognizing speed as essential in achieving surprise. "Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions."²⁴ Likewise, Napoleon highly valued time and believed the loss of it "irreparable in war."²⁵ He used celerity to gain the advantage of surprise. For example, a rapid flanking march toppled much of the allied forces' command structure at Ulm [Germany], in October 1805. Austrian commander General Karl Mack, completely surprised by Napoleon's arrival, "had never imagined that the French could envelop his right flank so swiftly."²⁶ Napoleon's sudden appearance threw General Karl

von Schwarzenberg and others off balance to such an extent they deserted Austrian forces. Mack was one of the few to regain composure and "try to buy time for other allied armies."²⁷

To Jackson, celerity was an indispensable element in many marches in order to soundly defeat enemy detachments and escape before reinforcements could arrive. Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign has "rarely been equaled for boldness of initiative and celerity of movement."²⁸

Jackson's swift movement at Kernstown, Virginia, created a misapprehension of his strength that struck fear into Union troops. Although the advantage gained was initially psychological, celerity secured a Southern strategic victory and produced fear for the safety of Washington in President Abraham Lincoln's and Stanton's minds. They greatly overestimated Jackson's strength and were certain of imminent attack. Jackson fostered this illusion by "the swift and deceptive dashes of his foot cavalry."²⁹

Jackson's use of celerity in the May 1863 flank march at Chancellorsville, Virginia, produced complete surprise resulting in Confederate victory. Jackson selected the route, ordering the cavalry to screen the march. Stragglers could expect to feel the bayonet of provost marshals. There would be no allowance for delay, although Jackson did enforce his usual order that the troops rest 10 minutes each hour. Jackson's exhortation to "Press on, press on" was issued repeatedly throughout the 8-hour march.³⁰ The element of surprise, bought by the exertion of celerity and deception, was intact when Jackson's corps attacked Brigadier General Joseph Hooker's rear forces.

Shaping the Enemy

Sun Tzu, Napoleon and Jackson each shaped the enemy to conform to their timing and conditions of battle. Each commander was careful not to allow the enemy to shape him. Shaping has both offensive and defensive characteristics. The offensive aspect of shaping centers on "attacking the enemy's strategy."³¹ Defensively, the object is, through troop disposition, to appear to be "without ascertainable shape."³²

Sun Tzu believed a wise commander refrained from solidifying plans until he has satisfactorily shaped his enemy. His tactics should be directed toward conforming the opposition's shape to his own plans. He believed the most effective methods of shaping the foe in each campaign are determined only through meticulous probing and observation, using close enemy contact, spies and agents and reconnaissance as essential shaping elements.³³ Sun Tzu perceived morale as another important factor in shaping the enemy, understanding that a commander who can capitalize on or create discouragement can

make the enemy more pliable.

Napoleon also excelled at shaping the enemy. One of the best examples is seen at the December 1805 battle of Austerlitz. Before the campaign, Napoleon had carefully studied the terrain. His reconnaissance was thorough and incessant. Several days before the battle, when enemy troops changed positions, dangerously intermixing their lines, Napoleon watched, adjusting his strategy as needed.

Napoleon also used psychological shaping tactics to weaken his enemy and prepare him for the decisive thrust. During the 1796 battle of Arcole, Austria, especially during the second and third days of battle, Napoleon consciously and systematically wore down his enemy, while waiting for the battle to become "ripe."³⁴ He knew "success in war depends on . . . sensing the psychological moment in battle."³⁵ Some fighting occurred on dikes 11 yards wide and 3 feet above the marshes of the Adige and Alpone rivers. On the second day, Napoleon "detected a slowness and hesitancy in [Austrian General Josef] Alvinzky's maneuvers."³⁶ He later discerned the Austrian army's low morale and its many raw recruits' exhaustion. He then detached a small flanking force of 25 guides and four trumpeters, and, with "great reinforcement of shouts and trumpet calls," they routed the opposition.³⁷

Jackson believed a commander's ability to shape his enemy depended largely on a thorough knowledge of his surroundings. Jackson valued knowledge of the theater's terrain as well as that in the areas where he expected to fight. Geographical familiarity enabled him to foresee and influence enemy maneuvers and strategies. Major Jedediah Hotchkiss wrote, "[I]n the preparations [Jackson] made for securing success . . . he was very particular in securing maps, and in acquiring topographical information. . . . I do not think he had an accurate knowledge of the Valley before the war."³⁸ Yet, his men said of Jackson, "He knew every hole and corner of the Valley as if he made it himself."³⁹

Hotchkiss, who after Jackson's death, served under generals A.P. Hill, R.S. Ewell and J.A. Early, recognized Jackson's outstanding ability to shape his enemy, saying that Jackson possessed "an unrivaled eye for terrain" and was "an expert at reconnaissance. . . . I was in no great battle subsequent to Jackson's death in which I did not see the opportunity which, in my opinion, he would have seized and have routed our opponents."⁴⁰

Jackson also had the ability to discern the enemy's morale, keenly using it to shape his enemy even when circumstances refracted other officers' judgment. The 1862 Battle of Malvern Hill, Virginia, one of the Seven Day's Battles fought to repulse North-

Sun Tzu perceived deception as a powerful catalyst for creating change, reasoning that the most successful deceptive measures are usually simple and inconspicuous and that the commander with superior deceptive skills has a substantial advantage. "Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace; divinely mysterious, he is inaudible. Thus he is master of his enemy's fate."

ern troops from the Richmond vicinity, was hard-fought with many losses on both sides. Reports to Jackson after the battle were filled with discouragement. Ewell, the last to report, stated he expected an attack by Major General George B. McClellan in the morning, adding bluntly that the demoralized Confederate troops could not face him successfully. Jackson, recognizing that by refusing to withdraw would effectively intimidate the Federals, shaped their already wounded morale into fear and hopelessness. Jackson assured his officers, "McClellan will clear out in the morning."⁴¹ Daybreak affirmed his assessment. McClellan had withdrawn to the banks of the James River. Major R. Dabney credited Jackson's "quick eye" with an ability to estimate "aright the discouragement of the enemy and strike the hesitating foe at the decisive moment."⁴²

Exploiting Victory

Exploiting victory was an integral principle of the art of war to Sun Tzu, Napoleon and Jackson. None was content to merely gain victories. They capitalized on resultant enemy demoralization and chaos. In fact, Sun Tzu stressed further action than just winning the battle. After winning battles and taking objectives, he said, failing "to exploit these achievements is ominous and may be described as 'wasteful delay.'"⁴³ The low morale and broken ranks of a defeated foe may be easily used to the victor's advantage, as momentum is already on his side. "Thus a victorious army is as a hundredweight balanced against a grain, a defeated army as a grain balanced against a hundredweight."⁴⁴

Napoleon would "pursue the beaten foe without mercy after securing victory."⁴⁵ General Francois Joseph Lefebvre referred to this trait as the "most original of Napoleonic warfare."⁴⁶ The first Italian Campaign exemplified Napoleon's views on exploiting victory. He relentlessly pursued the enemy, wringing everything possible from his victories. For example, initial success against the Austrians was followed by aggressive pursuit, leading to victory at Lodi, Italy, in May 1796. After the battle

at Castiglione, Italy, Napoleon's "ruthless pursuit of a beaten enemy" led to a victory at Bassano.⁴⁷ Subsequent battles proved Napoleon's tactics and exploitation of victory were sound as he continued to achieve spectacular successes.

Likewise, Jackson believed that "To move swiftly, strike vigorously and secure all the fruits of victory is the secret of successful war."⁴⁸ He exploited victory to reap both intangible and concrete benefits. As a result of Jackson's relentless exploitation and pursuit, the opposition greatly overestimated Southern strength. This misconception caused Northern troops to stay in the Valley after they had been ordered to reinforce McClellan at Richmond. As Jackson capitalized upon the momentum of victory, confidence and fearlessness permeated Southern morale.

One of Jackson's most famous exploits was the 38-mile overland engine relocation his forces conducted in exploitation of action that began at Martinsburg, West Virginia. Jackson formed a special unit to reinforce bridges, smooth roadbeds, assemble the strongest available horses and strip the 50-ton, coal-carrying locomotives of expendable weight. His force transported 14 engines from Martinsburg to Strasburg behind 40 horses and, at times, 200 soldiers.⁴⁹ On average, three days were required for each relocation. Admiring Virginians lined the route daily.⁵⁰ Jackson recognized that pursuit and securing the spoils of war required effort, skill and persistence.

Jackson had occasion to both laud and lament his cavalry in efforts "to carry out the pursuit" and exploit victories.⁵¹ Jackson ordered Colonel Flournoy of Ashby's cavalry to sweep forward after the victory at Front Royal, Virginia, to continue the Confederate momentum. The result was that 250 Virginian cavalrymen captured 600 Federal horsemen.⁵² Jackson declared "he had never, in all his experience of warfare, seen so gallant and effective a charge of cavalry."⁵³ However, later the same day, the same cavalrymen virtually stopped the Confederate momentum when they interrupted their pursuit to stop to plunder. Jackson then lamented, "Never have I seen an opportunity when it was in the power of cavalry to reap a richer harvest of the fruits of victory. Had the cavalry played its part in the pursuit, but a small portion of Bank's army would have made its escape to the Potomac."⁵⁴

Sun Tzu, Napoleon and Jackson each possessed unique characteristics that prepared them for leadership roles and battlefield command. Their relentless pursuit of excellence through rigorous intellectual study of past military campaigns, terrain, tactics and the art of war prepared them to fully exploit the principles of deception, celerity, shaping the enemy and exploitation of victory. Although each general had his own individual leadership style and stressed slightly different aspects of the principles of war, each agreed that warfare must be thoroughly studied and that prudent application of its basic principles to the fluid conditions of war ensures victory. **MR**

NOTES

1. Count De Las Cases, *Memoirs of the Early Life, Exile and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon*, vol. 1 (New York: Worthington Co., 1890), 78.
2. GEN Sir James Marshall Cornwall, *Napoleon as Military Commander* (London: Batsford Ltd., 1967), 16. See also endnote 26.
3. J. Christopher Herold, ed and tran, *The Mind of Napoleon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 224.
4. COL John Robert Elting and BG Vincent J. Esposito, "Comments on the Italian Campaigns," *A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars* (New York: Frederick Praeger, Inc., 1964).
5. Duchess Madame Junot D'Abantes, *Memoirs of Napoleon* (New York: Appleton, 1886), 31.
6. Lynn Montross, *War Through the Ages* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 103.
7. Mary Anna Jackson, *Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson* (Louisville, KY: Courier-Journal Job Printing Press, 1895), 28.
8. *Ibid.* 35.
9. Frank E. Vandiver, *Mighty Stonewall* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1957), 13.
10. James Power Smith, *With Stonewall Jackson in the Army of Northern Virginia* (Gaithersburg, MD: Zullo and VanSickle Books, 1982), 87.
11. John Selby, *Stonewall Jackson as Military Commander* (Great Britain: Batsford Ltd., 1968), 166.
12. Thomas Jackson Arnold, *Early Life and Letters of General Thomas J. Jackson* (New York: Fleming Revell, 1916), 327.
13. LTC G.F.R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, Vol. 1 (New York: Koneckey, 1898), 130.
14. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66.
15. *Ibid.* 98.
16. *Ibid.* 97.
17. Arnold, 335.
18. Henry Steele Commager, ed, *The Blue and the Gray* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), 154.
19. LTC Robert N. Scott, ed, *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Vol. 12, Series 1:3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1885), 150.
20. *Ibid.* 149.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Jedediah Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley* (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973), 126.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Tzu, 134.
25. MG J.F.C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961* (NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1961), 50.

26. Cornwall, 134. See also endnote 2.
27. Elting and Esposito, 50.
28. Jackson, 563.
29. Montross, 600.
30. Vandiver, 470.
31. Tzu, 145.
32. *Ibid.* 77.
33. *Ibid.* 100.
34. Elting and Esposito, 24.
35. Fuller, 46.
36. Elting and Esposito, 24.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Henderson, 416.
39. *Ibid.* 417.
40. Hotchkiss, x, xi, xxv.
41. Vandiver, 322.
42. Selby, 78.
43. Tzu, 142.
44. *Ibid.* 88.
45. Maurice Hutt, ed, *Napoleon* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1972), 158.
46. Cornwall, 127. See also endnote 2.
47. Elting and Esposito, 28.
48. Henderson, vol. 1, 420.
49. Lenoir Chambers, *Stonewall Jackson*, Vol. 1 (New York: William Morrow, 1959), 350.
50. *Ibid.*
51. Henderson, 433.
52. Selby, 78.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.* 230.

Nola M. Sleevi is Assistant Reference Librarian, Missouri Western State College, St. Joseph. She received a B.S. from Missouri Western State College, where she also received the annual James R. Jordan History Honors Award. She is currently a graduate student at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.