

THE POWER STRUGGLE OF THE DIADOCHOI IN BABYLON, 323 BC*

Abstract: Immediately after the death of Alexander the Great a fierce struggle for power ensued among the Diadochoi. It took more than a month before the final settlement was agreed on because the generals, all of them striving to get as much personal power as possible, did not easily reach a compromise. Moreover, the infantrymen were not prepared to accept just any decision the generals made. This paper analyses the decisions taken in the various stages leading to the Babylon settlement, including the complex problem of the distribution of offices, as well as the decision-making process. It shows how Perdikkas eventually achieved a very unstable supremacy after making many concessions, while some of the other Successors seem to have preferred a territorial power base in one of the satrapies.

The source material on the first month after the death of Alexander the Great is relatively abundant. Nonetheless, much is unclear and there has been a lot of scholarly debate. The last decades important progress has been made, especially thanks to the works of Errington¹, Anson², and Bosworth³. Bosworth's thorough analysis will definitely set the standard for many years to come. Thus, I do not need to deal with every aspect, and I shall concentrate on a few problems which centre around the power struggle of Alexander's generals who all tried to get the most advantageous position possible in the new political set-up.

* I would like to thank professors Hans Hauben, Leon Mooren, Willy Clarysse, Guido Schepens, and Hubert Meeus for their many useful remarks on earlier versions of this paper. They do not, however, agree with everything stated here, and any remaining flaws and errors are of course entirely my own.

Journal abbreviations are those of *L'année philologique*. The translations of Curtius and Justin are Yardley's (*Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander* [Penguin Classics], Middlesex 1984; *Justin, Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus* [Classical Resources, 3], Atlanta 1994); all other translations are from the Loeb Classical Library, unless stated otherwise.

¹ R.M. ERRINGTON, *From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323-320 B.C.*, *JHS* 90 (1970), p. 49-77.

² E.M. ANSON, *Craterus and the Prostaia*, *CPh* 87 (1992), p. 38-43.

³ A.B. BOSWORTH, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*, Oxford 2002, p. 29-63.

1. THE THREE STAGES OF THE BABYLON SETTLEMENT

R.M. Errington has shown the need for distinguishing three stages in the Babylon settlement⁴: the meeting immediately after Alexander's death and the *στάσις* of the phalanx (1.1); the compromise between nobles and cavalry on the one side and infantry on the other (1.2); and the final settlement (1.3)⁵. Many scholars have neglected his conclusions and confusion continues⁶. Bosworth does take the different stages into account, and consequently, his study is to my mind the first one to give a satisfactory solution for the distribution of the offices.

1.1. The first meeting and the *στάσις*

Alexander died on the 11th of June⁷. The next day the main officers and friends of the king met in the palace to discuss the succession. Our most detailed sources on the episode, Curtius and Justin, contradict each other on several important issues (cf. *infra*). Curtius is often reproached to have adapted his account to reflect Roman history of his own time⁸, but scholars do not agree on which time this exactly was. This inconclusiveness

⁴ According to A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 32-34, 'settlement' is a misnomer. He is right in stressing the instability of it, but instable as it was, it still was a settlement.

⁵ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 54. Cf. F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander in Babylon und die Reichsordnung nach seinem Tode* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 268), Wien 1970, p. 144-146, who, however, did not yet fully realise the extent of the reorganisation in the final settlement.

⁶ E.g. M. RATHMANN, *Perdikkas zwischen 323 und 320. Nachlassverwalter des Alexanderreiches oder Autokrat?* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 724), Wien 2005, p. 27-28, who sees contradictions concerning Krateros' position in Photius epitome of Arrian, but actually fails to distinguish between the second and the third stage.

⁷ L. DEPUYDT, *The Time of Death of Alexander the Great: 11 June 323 B.C. (-322), ca. 4:00-5:00 PM, Die Welt des Orients* 28 (1997), p. 117-135; T. BOIV, *Late Achaemenid and Hellenistic Babylon* (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 136), Leuven 2004, p. 116-117.

⁸ See the overview of J.E. ATKINSON, *Q. Curtius Rufus' 'Historiae Alexandri Magni'*, in ANRW II 34.4, p. 3471-3472; *id.*, *Originality and its Limits in the Alexander Sources of the Early Empire*, in A.B. BOSWORTH & E.J. BAYNHAM (edd.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, Oxford 2000, p. 319-324, who exaggerates Curtius' 'originality' concerning the events at Babylon: the account of the lustration is not implausible and if it contains details not found elsewhere, it is because Curtius' account is the most detailed one, cf. *infra*, n. 35. See also E.J. BAYNHAM, *Alexander the Great. The Unique History of Quintus Curtius Rufus*, Ann Arbor 1998, *passim*; D. SPENCER, *The Roman Alexander. Reading a Cultural Myth*, Exeter 2002, *passim*.

would seem to suggest that Curtius' adaptation was not substantial and rather subtle, and thus probably did not affect his account to a high extent. His narrative of events in Babylon does contain one set of considerations on Roman history, but this is clearly marked out as a digression⁹. The only problem seems to be in X 8.15-22 where Arrhidaios plays an implausibly active role and gives a very apt and well-considered speech. All other actions attributed to the king, such as the hearing of ambassadors¹⁰, might well have been executed by his counsellors in Arrhidaios' presence¹¹. Sharples' view that Curtius is reticent on Arrhidaios' condition is unwarranted: he does not indicate the problem explicitly, but it is clear enough from his account that Arrhidaios was incapable of acting independently¹². Martin's argument that the *ignotus* in X 7.1-2 must be an invention is not convincing either¹³. The easiest solution seems the most attractive to me: Arrhidaios was for Curtius the ideal compromise figure to give the reconciliatory speech in X 8.15-22 in which the historian could show his rhetorical talents. Given that the rest of his account is the most plausible

⁹ Curt. X 9.3-6; at 9.7 he writes: *Ceterum, ut at ordinem, a quo me contemplatio publicae felicitatis averterat, redeam* («But let me return to the narrative from which my reflections on our national prosperity diverted me»).

¹⁰ Curt. X 8.8.

¹¹ As was the case during later embassies at the court of Arrhidaios: Plut., *Phoc.* 33.7-12. T.R. MARTIN, *Quintus Curtius' Presentation of Philip Arrhidaeus and Josephus' Accounts of the Accession of Claudius*, *AJAH* 8 (1983), p. 167-168, argues that Arrhidaios' silence in answer to Meleagros' suggestion to kill Perdikkas (X 8.2) is a deliberate and highly appropriate attitude, but this need not be the case. I. SHARPLES, *Curtius' Treatment of Arrhidaeus*, in P.J. CONNOR (ed.), *Ancient Macedonia: An Australian Symposium*. Papers of the Second International Congress of Macedonian Studies, the University of Melbourne, 8-13 July 1991 [*Mediterranean Archaeology*, 7 (1994)], Sydney 1995, p. 53 n. 4, also considers X 8.6 as an instance of serious action on Arrhidaios' behalf, but it is not impossible for a mentally deficient or retarded person to answer a rather simple question. The image of an Arrhidaios leaving the meeting because he is frightened by the authority of the generals (*principum auctoritate contreritus* X 7.13) does not seem to suggest a king in full possession of his mental powers.

¹² I. SHARPLES, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 54: «The impression given by Curtius' account is one of reticence rather than ignorance». At p. 53 n. 4, he writes: «Note also that Curtius makes no mention of a regency for Arrhidaeus». It is clear, however, from X 10.1, where Perdikkas leads the meeting, that Arrhidaeus was incapable of doing so, and at X 10.4, Curtius does mention the regency: *Perdicca ut cum rege esset copiisque praeset, quae regem sequebantur*. If Arrhidaios did not suffer any deficiency, he could have commanded the royal army himself; now Perdikkas has to do so.

¹³ T.R. MARTIN, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 161-190. See the refutation by I. SHARPLES, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 56-58; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 35-38; E.M. ANSON, *Eumenes of Cardia. A Greek among Macedonians (Ancient Mediterranean and Medieval Texts and Contexts. Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity, 3)*, Boston 2004, p. 54 n. 17.

and cogent one¹⁴, there is no reason to conclude that the insertion of this invented speech has greatly affected the narrative of the events themselves.

The contents of the debates in the first meeting after Alexander's death preserved in Curtius (X 6-7.15) and Justin (XIII 2.4-14) are also regarded as largely fictitious by some scholars¹⁵. According to Hammond Curtius and Justin added «typically Roman race prejudice» to the speeches¹⁶. This need not be the case as it is clear to what extent most Macedonians disliked Alexander's orientalising policy¹⁷. Political tensions among the Macedonians themselves also played a part here: it had been Perdikkas' proposal to await the birth of Rhoxane's child and make it king if it should prove to be a boy. Perdikkas' opponents rejected the proposal not only because they objected to a half-Asian king, but also to thwart his plans, and the argument of the Asian descent of the child was a convenient pretext for doing so. McKenchie even argued that Curtius' account of the debates is simply a rhetorical elaboration of the traditional debate on the three constitutions (monarchy, oligarchy and democracy)¹⁸. His argument is far-fetched and has been convincingly rejected by others¹⁹.

¹⁴ Cf. R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 75: «we should be grateful that his intelligent and coherent account has survived».

¹⁵ R.N.H. BOERMA, *Justinus' boeken over de diadochen, een historisch commentaar. Boek 13-15 cap. 2 met een inleiding op de bronnen voor de periode 323-302 v.C.*, Amsterdam 1979, p. 276; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *A History of Macedonia III, 336-167 B.C.*, Oxford 1988, p. 101 n. 1.

¹⁶ N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 102 n. 1; cf. R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 107.

¹⁷ Cf. G. WIRTH, *Zur Politik des Perdikkas 323*, *Helikon* 7 (1967), p. 297 n. 56; A.B. BOSWORTH, *Alexander and the Iranians*, *JHS* 100 (1980), p. 7; W.S. GREENWALT, *Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia*, *Arethusa* 22 (1989), p. 39-42, especially 39 n. 80; J. ROISMAN, *Honor in Alexander's campaign*, in ID. (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden 2003, p. 293: «We cannot ascertain the authenticity of words put by later historians into the mouth of Alexander or others, but it can be safely assumed that the resentment toward what was seen as blurring the lines between conquered and conqueror was authentic and that it was used in people's rhetoric against the king or anyone else». Cf. K. GEUS, *Eratosthenes von Kyrene. Studien zur hellenistischen Kultur- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte* (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 92), München 2002, p. 85: «Die Frage, welche Stellung die Barbaren im Weltreich Alexanders einnehmen sollten, bewegte zur Zeit der Diadochen und Epigonen die Gemüter».

¹⁸ P. MCKENCHIE, *Manipulation of Themes in Quintus Curtius Rufus Book 10*, *Historia* 48 (1999), p. 44-60.

¹⁹ E.D. CARNEY, *The Trouble with Philip Arrhidaeus*, *AHB* 15 (2001), p. 68-69; A.B. BOSWORTH, *Plus ça change... Ancient Historians and their Sources*, *CIAnt* 22 (2003), especially p. 175-186.

Saying that Curtius and Justin do not hand down the precise words spoken at the meeting is to state the obvious, but the contents of the speeches they relate accord very well with the political set-up at the time of Alexander's death, and are completely consistent with both earlier and later events. Consequently, most scholars assume that both ancient authors provide a quite reliable account of the debates²⁰.

Curtius (X 6.1) says that those invited were the *corporis custodes*, the *principes amicorum* and the *duces copiarum*. The σωματοφύλακες, then, were certainly present, as were the highest commanders and the closest friends of the king. It is impossible, however, to determine exactly who belonged to the latter two groups. Whether the rank and file were also present at the meeting is disputed, since the sources present two different traditions on this matter. According to Justin (XIII 2.4-3.1), the leaders held a separate council in which they decided that Alexander was to be succeeded by his unborn child; afterwards they exacted an oath from the cavalrymen to make them accept this ordering. Subsequently, the infantry – incensed about not being heard – held a gathering where they acclaimed Arrhidaios king. In Diodorus' version (XVIII 2.2) there were also two separate councils, but he mentions the meeting of the infantrymen first. Diodorus must have switched the order of the assemblies: it is unthinkable that the leaders would have awaited the initiative of the common soldiers. Curtius (X 6.1) on the other hand, says that the king's companions summoned a private meeting where the common soldiers forced an entry, anxious to know what was going to happen. Scholarly opinion is

²⁰ W. SCHUR, *Das Alexanderreich nach Alexanders Tode*, *RhM* N.F. 83 (1934), p. 132; G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 293-294; J. SEIBERT, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* (*Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, 56), München 1969, p. 32-33; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 72-75; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 122 (especially for Justin; Curtius he deems less reliable); P. GOUKOWSKY, *Essai sur les origines du mythe d'Alexandre (336-270 av. J.-C.) I, Les origines politiques*, Nancy 1978, p. 193; L. MOOREN, *The Nature of the Hellenistic Monarchy*, in E. VAN 'T DACK et al. (edd.), *Egypt and the Hellenistic World*. Proceedings of the International Colloquium, Leuven 24-26 May 1982 (*Studia Hellenistica*, 27), Leuven 1983, p. 206 n. 2; W. HECKEL, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*, London 1992, p. 145-147; W.M. ELLIS, *Ptolemy of Egypt*, London 1994, p. 25; W.L. ADAMS, *The Successors of Alexander*, in L.A. TRITLE (ed.), *The Greek World in the Fourth Century: from the Fall of the Athenian Empire to the Successors of Alexander*, London 1997, p. 229; W. HUSS, *Ägypten in hellenistischer Zeit. 332-30 v.Chr.*, München 2001, p. 82; C. SCHÄFER, *Eumenes von Kardia und der Kampf um die Macht im Alexanderreich* (*Frankfurter Althistorische Beiträge*, 9), Frankfurt am Main 2002, p. 57; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 34-45 and *id.*, *art. cit.* (n. 19), p. 178-180.

divided on this issue: some prefer Justin and Diodorus, others Curtius²¹. Mooren has adduced strong arguments in support of Curtius' version²². The king's death must have caused great disturbance with the troops and it is not unlikely that they went to the palace in their distress. In Justin's account, the nobles arrived at a compromise quite easily, despite their very differing views and mutual distrust, while Curtius shows that they only closed ranks when they felt threatened by the resistance of the rank and file. The latter development is by far the most likely. Moreover, the version of Justin and Diodorus contains an inconsistency which makes it very implausible. After Meleagros had opposed to Perdikkas' proposal in the meeting of the nobles and — like the infantry — championed the cause of Arrhidaïos, the commanders would have chosen precisely him out of all possible candidates as ambassador who had to convince the soldiers to accept Alexander's unborn child as king. It is very unlikely that they lacked discernment to such an extent; consequently, the stories Justin and Diodorus give have to be rejected²³.

²¹ Justin and Diodorus: J.G. DROYSSEN *Geschichte des Hellenismus II, Geschichte der Diadochen*, 1877 (= München 1980), p. 5-7; P. JOUGUET, *L'impérialisme macédonien et l'hellénisation de l'orient (L'Évolution de l'Humanité)*, Paris 1926, p. 132; W. SCHWAN, *Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Großen II, Einzelfragen*, *Klio* 24 (1931), p. 309-310; P. CLOCHÉ, *La dislocation d'un empire. Les premiers successeurs d'Alexandre le Grand (323-281/280 avant J.-C.)*, Paris 1959, p. 11-12; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 78-79; R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 277; H. BENGTON, *Die Diadochen: die Nachfolger Alexanders des Großen*, München 1987, p. 16-17; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 101-102; A. SIMONETTI AGOSTINETTI, *Flavio Arriano: gli eventi dopo Alessandro (Centro Ricerche e Documentazione sull'Antichità Classica, Monografie 15)*, Roma 1993, p. 34; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 44-45.

Curtius: R. SCHUBERT, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Leipzig 1914, p. 110; M.J. FONTANA, *Le lotte per la successione di Alessandro Magno dal 323 al 315*, Palermo 1960, p. 16 n. 10; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 50-51; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 233-236; W.S. GREENWALT, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 20-21; E.M. ANSON, *The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly (330-315 B.C.)*, *Historia* 40 (1991), p. 236; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 146-147; W. HUSS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 82. According to F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 136, the army attended the meeting of the nobles, but they only proclaimed Arrhidaïos king at a later separate assembly. This view is certainly impossible: Diodorus/Justin and Curtius provide two distinct traditions here, only one of which can be correct: mixing both stories is unwarranted. P. BRIANT, *Antigone le Borgne. Les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'assemblée macédonienne (Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon, 152 – Centre de recherches d'histoire ancienne, 10)*, Paris 1973, p. 243, assumes that the soldiers stayed outside at the doors, because Curt. X 6.2 does not explicitly state that they entered. The following events, however, clearly imply that they were inside: see L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 234.

²² L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 233-236.

²³ Cf. M.J. FONTANA, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 16 n. 10: «Non è possibile infatti che i duci, che sapevano Meleagro contrario alle loro decisioni, inviassero proprio lui come ambasciatore

Heckel argues that Perdikkas had chosen Meleagros because of the influence the latter could exercise on the foot soldiers as their commander. This does not seem to be a sufficient reason, as Perdikkas' brother Alketas was also an infantry commander, and he would have been the obvious choice if being an infantry commander were the criterion by which the nobles chose their envoy. Heckel's counter-argument that the uprising of the troops against Perdikkas shows that Alketas did not have enough influence²⁴, is not convincing. Once Meleagros had whipped up the soldiers by encouraging them to appropriate a part of the booty, it probably became almost impossible to restrain them, no matter how big Alketas' influence might have been. Consequently, the conclusion that there was only one meeting, at which the soldiers were present, is the most plausible one. Curtius does not, however, provide any information on the number and nature of the troops present at the meeting.

It does not seem possible to identify Curtius' sources for his account of events at Babylon. Concluding that Curtius was the best source for many elements in the episode following Alexander's death, Errington suggested that he had based his narrative on Hieronymus of Cardia, but there is no tangible evidence²⁵. Hornblower, in her book on Hieronymus, contended that the Cardian did not deal with the events at Babylon in much detail²⁶. If Hieronymus was anything like the serious Thucydidean historian he is usually taken to be²⁷, he must have spent considerable

presso la falange»; G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 291: «Er wäre der einzige gewesen, der nicht hätte geschickt werden dürfen». According to W. SCHWAN, *art. cit.* (n. 21), p. 309-310, and R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 112, the fact that Meleagros was sent, proves that he did not champion Arrhidaïos' cause in the assembly of the commanders. This is less likely, however: see below, n. 38. I. SHARPLES, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 55 also thinks that Meleagros did not say anything in the first meeting, but while a simple error of name might account for the attribution of Nearchos' proposal to Meleagros, Nearchos will not have spoken for Arrhidaïos as he would thus undermine his own argument: Justin must have blended two speeches together.

²⁴ W. HECKEL, *On Attalos and Atalante*, CQ n.s. 28 (1978), p. 380.

²⁵ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 72-75.

²⁶ J. HORNBLOWER, *Hieronymus of Cardia* (Oxford Classical & Philosophical Monographs), Oxford 1981, p. 88-89. For a partial refutation of her argument: see E. BADIAN, 'The Ring and the Book', in W. WILL & J. HEINRICHS (edd.), *Zu Alexander d.Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*, vol. I, Amsterdam 1987, p. 605-606.

²⁷ For recent reiterations of this view see e.g. S. HORNBLOWER, in ID. (ed.), *Greek Historiography*, Oxford 1994, p. 43; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 169; B. BLECKMANN, *Fiktion als Geschichte. Neue Studien zum Autor der Hellenika Oxyrhynchia und zur Historiographie des vierten vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts* (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-historische Klasse III, 277), Göttingen 2006, p. 132. See, however, D. ASHERI, *Hieronymus of Cardia c. 364-?260 BC*, in N. WILSON

attention on events at Babylon as they were vital for a proper understanding of the early Successor history. Given that in the general outline of their narratives on Babylon Diodorus and Justin are much closer to each other than to Curtius, and that the correspondence between Diodorus and Justin is usually traced back to Hieronymus²⁸, he might not be the most likely candidate for being Curtius' source. All of this, however, should not be pressed too far.

From the outset Perdikkas tried to show off his close ties with Alexander²⁹. He had placed the king's throne clearly in view, with the royal diadem, robes and weapons displayed on it. Then, he also added the signet ring³⁰. After that, he took the floor and proposed to await the birth of

(ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece*, New York 2006, p. 359-360, who relievingly points out how uncertain our knowledge about Hieronymus actually is. Unfortunately, the recently published *P. Oxy.* LXXI 4808, a text on Hellenistic historians, hardly adds any certainty to our knowledge due to its lacunary state. Note, moreover, that the extant part of the papyrus has only the last part of the author's name: []μοσ[. The word Diadochoi seems certain, however, and the probable mention of Antigonos and Demetrios in the second column does suggest that the text indeed concerns Hieronymus. One would especially like to know the context of the words πρὸς χάριν (I 27), as this most likely was a statement concerning Hieronymus' objectivity. If the reading συνγρα[φεὺς καὶ ἀνήρ] σ[π]ουδαῖος[...] is correct, it might provide some justification for the view of Hieronymus as a Thucydidean author.

²⁸ Most extensively: F. REUSS, *Hieronymus von Kardia. Studien zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Berlin 1876 (= Aalen 1985), p. 23-35; J. HORNBLLOWER, *op. cit.* (n. 26), p. 65-67.

²⁹ R.M. ERRINGTON, *Alexander in the Hellenistic World*, in E. BADIEN (ed.), *Alexandre le Grand. Image et réalité (Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique, 22)*, Genève 1976, p. 138-139; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 81.

³⁰ For the most recent discussion of the problems concerning the signet ring, see M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 9-26. A further argument for the historicity of Alexander's giving of the ring to Perdikkas is provided by the *Liber de Morte* now that Bosworth's excellent analysis has shown it to be Ptolemaic propaganda: A.B. BOSWORTH, *Ptolemy and the Will of Alexander*, in ID. & E.J. BAYNHAM (edd.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, Oxford 2000, p. 207-241; see also E.J. BAYNHAM, *A Baleful Birth in Babylon. The Significance of the Prodigy in the Liber de Morte – An Investigation of Genre*, *ibid.*, p. 242-262. Since in a propaganda document Ptolemaios had no reason whatsoever to make up events which were of no significance to him, and on the contrary will have tried to embed his propagandistic inventions in as many facts as possible, the mention of the giving of the ring at *LDM* 112 would now seem to be a conclusive argument for its historicity. If the omission of the ring story in Arrian and Plutarch is indeed the consequence of Ptolemaios' silence on the matter in his *Alexander History* (thus most recently M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* [n. 6], p. 9-10) and not of the selection Arrian and Plutarch made, this also constitutes a further argument for the early date of Ptolemaios' *History*. As Bosworth's study of the *LDM* shows that it was written about 309/8, we have a *terminus ante quem* for determining when Ptolemaios thought it useful to conceal that Perdikkas had received the signet ring. There was indeed no reason to suppress the fact in or after 309 as Perdikkas had long been dead by that time, and we may well assume, then, that Ptolemaios wrote his history at the time of the struggle against Perdikkas.

Alexander's child and to make it king if it would prove to be a boy. Undoubtedly, he hoped to assume power as regent³¹.

Nearchos, however, argued that there was no point in awaiting an unborn child while Alexander already had a son by Barsine, namely Herakles, as we learn from Curtius³². According to Justin (XIII 2.6-7) this was Meleagros' idea, but it is clear that Curtius is correct. On the occasion of the mass marriage at Susa, Nearchos had married a daughter of Barsine³³. If his proposal were to be accepted, he would be married to a half sister of the king. Mehl considers Nearchos' intervention as part of the «Bestrebungen der makedonischen Großen, den Reichsverband zu lockern», because he interprets it as an attempt to undermine the possibility of a strong monarchy with Perdikkas as king³⁴. At that time, however, that possibility had not yet been considered. Nearchos simply wanted to develop a personal power base: as son-in-law of the queen mother he could be very influential at court³⁵. Although he vehemently defended his cause, he did not get any support³⁶. Boerma doubts that the Greek Nearchos attended the meeting, and deems it impossible that this proposal was uttered immediately after Perdikkas³⁷. Given Nearchos'

³¹ Curt. X 6.8-9 and Just. XIII 2.5; W. SCHUR, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 132. M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 31, is too enthusiastic about Perdikkas' good intentions when he interprets the nomination of Alexander IV as a proof of loyalty without even considering that Perdikkas might just have aimed at a long period of regency.

³² Curt. X 6.10-11.

³³ Arr., *Anab* VII 4.6.

³⁴ A. MEHL, *Seleukos Nikator und sein Reich*. I. Teil, *Seleukos' Leben und die Entwicklung seiner Machtposition* (*Studia Hellenistica*, 28), Lovanii 1986, p. 25.

³⁵ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 50 and 74; P.A. BRUNT, *Alexander, Barsine and Heracles*, *RFIC* 103 (1975), p. 31-32; D. OGDEN, *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death. The Hellenistic Dynasties*, London 1999, p. 47; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 38. According to P. MCKENCHIE, *art. cit.* (n. 18) p. 60, one should have no faith in Curtius unless another source confirms his statements. J.L. O'NEIL, *Political Trials under Alexander the Great and his Successors*, *Antichthon* 33 (1999), p. 29, endorses this view, but in a slightly more balanced way; cf. also J.E. ATKINSON, review of Bosworth, *op. cit.* (n. 3), *CR* n.s. 54 (2004), p. 158. Since Curtius' account is the only correct one on this particular matter, McKenzie's view is untenable; cf. n. 19. Moreover, it is *a priori* clear that such a method cannot be applied here. As Curtius provides the most elaborate account on the Babylon settlement we have, he must by definition have written things not to be found in any of the other preserved sources, but which certainly featured in some of the accounts which have not been handed down.

³⁶ Curt. X 6.12: *Nulli placebat oratio. (...) iamque prope ad seditionem pervenerant, Nearchos pervicacius tuente sententiam* [«Nobody liked Nearchus' suggestion (...) and, as Nearchus pressed his idea with greater insistence, they came close to rioting»].

³⁷ R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 106.

position under Alexander there is no reason to deny that he participated in the debates. To propose making a son — albeit a bastard — of Alexander king immediately after the idea to appoint an unborn son was brought forward, is logic itself.

These proposals provoked a fierce reaction from Meleagros. He rejected the possibility of having a half Asian (sc. Alexander's unborn child or Herakles) rule over Macedonians, and therefore suggested that Alexander's half-brother be chosen instead³⁸. His suggestion was probably inspired by personal ambition as well since the feeble-minded Arrhidaios would never have been able to exercise power: Meleagros could then claim the regency as he had supported the king from the very beginning³⁹.

Deeming neither of the aforementioned candidates suited to rule the Macedonian empire, Ptolemaios proposed that a council of those who were closest to the deceased king should take up the government, meeting at Alexander's throne⁴⁰. Justin (XIII 2.11-12) probably misrepresents

³⁸ Just. XIII 2.6-10. Determining Meleagros' attitude is difficult because the contradictions in the sources do not allow a clear conclusion. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 38-40, has shown that he was most likely the first one to recommend Arrhidaios. It is almost inconceivable that the army commanders would have discussed the candidacy of Herakles and Rhoxane's unborn child, while failing to consider Arrhidaios. Meleagros, then, was the one to push Alexander's half-brother forward, and he was followed by the infantrymen. According to P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 330-331, Arrhidaios was «le successeur déjà désigné»; this is endorsed by F.J. FERNANDEZ NIETO, *La designación del sucesor en el antiguo reino de Macedonia*, in V. ALONSO TRONCOSO (ed.), *ΔΙΑΔΟΧΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑΣ. La figura del sucesor en la realeza helenística (Gerión Anejos, 9)*, Madrid 2005, p. 39. There is, however, no trace of a designated successor in the sources, and their arguments fail to convince. The situation under the Antigonids is no proof for Argead practices. Curtius X 7.15 shows most of all that it was important to be of Argead descent, not that there was any additional designation of a successor among the Argead candidates. Even if the religious functions of the king are as important as Briant supposes, the military tasks were at least as important, and it is quite unlikely that Alexander would have appointed a successor who would never be able to command the army. Arrhidaios was to only Argead to survive Alexander's accession to the throne, and this might well have been because Alexander thought he would never be able to rule (A.B. BOSWORTH, *Conquest and Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great*, Cambridge 1988, p. 27-28; E.D. CARNEY, *art. cit.* [n. 19], p. 65-66; S. MÜLLER, *Maßnahmen der Herrschaftssicherung gegenüber der makedonische Opposition bei Alexander dem Großen [Europäische Hochschulschriften III, 974]*, Frankfurt am Main 2003, p. 34-43). That Arrhidaios did in fact come to the throne was the result of a crisis no one could have foreseen; he would never have become king under normal circumstances.

³⁹ R.A. BILLOWS, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State (Hellenistic Culture and Society, 4)*, Berkeley 1990, p. 53: «Meleagros, naturally, expected to wield actual power in Arrhidaios's name».

⁴⁰ Curt. X 6.13-15. According to P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 193, Ptolemaios only proposed this at a later time, namely the moment the nobles had to present a united front to

Ptolemaios' words here, making him suggest choosing one of Alexander's friends as king⁴¹. It is highly unlikely that Ptolemaios would have made such a proposal: he must have realized that they were not going to choose him, in which case it would become very difficult to develop a personal position of power. Whatever his ambition was, the appointment of a strong king could not have served it, unless he himself had been that king. Contrary to what some scholars think⁴², Ptolemaios' proposal was

Meleagros and the infantrymen (see below). Since both Justin and Curtius relate Ptolemaios' speech at this point, and it fits the logical course of the debate very well, his view seems unwarranted. W.L. ADAMS, *The Hellenistic Kingdoms*, in G.R. BUGH (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Cambridge 2006, p. 29, interprets Ptolemaios' proposal as a temporary solution, postponing the definite settlement until Rhoxane's child was born. Both in Justin and in Curtius, however, it is clear that he did not want to appoint a king and intended his solution to be — in theory — permanent. In practice, of course, he hoped to gain as much personal power as possible, as soon as possible in this way.

⁴¹ Some have held that Justin means that Ptolemaios wanted the satrapies to be distributed among Alexander's friends who would then also jointly rule the empire: thus G. WIRTH, review of Seibert, *op. cit.* (n. 20), *BO* 30 (1973), p. 411; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 193. A more likely interpretation is offered in the translations of Seel and Yardley: O. SEEL, *Pompeius Trogus. Weltgeschichte von den Anfängen bis Augustus im Auszug des Justin. Eingeleitet, übersetzt und erläutert*, Zürich 1972, p. 242; J.C. YARDLEY, *Justin. Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus* (APA. *Classical Resources*, 3), Atlanta, GA 1994, p. 124; cf. W. HECKEL, *The Politics of Distrust: Alexander and his Successors*, in D. OGDEN (ed.), *The Hellenistic World. New Perspectives*, London 2002, p. 82. They interpret the words *qui provincias regant, quibus bella mandentur* as being on the same level as *qui prae virtute regi suo proximi fuerint*. Justin, then, says that Ptolemaios claimed that it is better «to choose from those who stood close to their late king in personal qualities, who are the governors of provinces, who are entrusted with military campaigns» (trans. Yardley, adapted). The change of tense is to be explained by the fact that the king was dead, while the generals still held the government of the satrapies and the military commands. Justin does not mention any council, and it would have been impracticable to meet regularly for satraps who were scattered throughout the entire empire; Wirth's argument on the matter is unconvincing. R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 321, holds that Curtius has adapted his account to his own view on the events, but he does not say what this view would have been. It is much more likely that Trogus/Justin could not conceive the empire being governed by a council and therefore made Ptolemaios propose choosing a king from among Alexander's closest friends. I would like to thank dr. Gert Partoens for discussing this passage with me. Professor Mooren pointed out to me that since Justin does not expressly say that one man had to be chosen, he might well mean that the members of a council had to be elected. If this is what Justin wanted to say, his wording is extremely clumsy. To my mind the context does seem to suggest that the choice of a king is what he was talking about.

⁴² A. BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, *Histoire des Lagides I, Les cinq premiers Ptolémées (323-181 avant J.-C.)*, Paris 1903, p. 9; W. SCHUR, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 132; M.J. FONTANA *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 206; K. ROSEN, *Politische Ziele in der frühen hellenistischen Geschichtsschreibung*, *Hermes* 107 (1979), p. 465; A. MEHL, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 25; G. WIRTH, *Alexander, Kassander und andere Zeitgenossen. Erwägungen zum Problem ihrer Selbstdarstellung*, *Tyche* 4 (1989), p. 202.

not meant to weaken the unity of the empire⁴³; disbanding the territory Alexander had conquered, was unthinkable at that time⁴⁴. He might really have thought that it was possible to administer the empire in this way, but more likely the proposal was simply aimed at preventing anyone else from obtaining more power than he did — the best he could hope for in the given circumstances — or at least undermining Perdikkas' authority⁴⁵. If so, he was apparently successful, because more nobles approved of his suggestion than of Perdikkas', probably because most of them deemed it the best way to obtain a position of power since they could not all hope to become regent⁴⁶. The difference of opinion should not be interpreted as the manifestation of an ideological opposition between advocates and opponents of collegiate government: it was mere expediency with everyone adopting the point of view that was most suited to serve his personal ambition. Schäfer assumes that Ptolemaios might have acted «im Sinn des Perdikkas» because he suggested that the council should meet at Alexander's throne, the very throne on which Perdikkas had put the ring⁴⁷. This seems to be a shallow connection. Both men referred to Alexander in order to grant some legitimacy to their proposals, but Ptolemaios' proposition was almost diametrically opposed to Perdikkas': while the latter wanted to appoint a king, the former explicitly suggested not doing so. If Ptolemaios wanted to support Perdikkas, he would have agreed with him instead of making a counterproposal.

⁴³ Cf. P. JOUGUET, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 132; J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 32; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 74: «an implication which it is difficult to see»; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 232: «In Ptolemy's opinion Macedon and its empire could survive without a king»; M.B. HATZOPOULOS, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings I, A Historical and Epigraphic Study (Meletemata, 22)*, Athens 1996, p. 343-344.

⁴⁴ P. JOUGUET, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 131: «La pensée de partager l'Empire ne pouvait venir à l'esprit d'aucuns des grands chefs qui délibérèrent à Babylone, après la mort d'Alexandre. Si vives que fussent les ambitions de chacun, ces Macédoniens ne pouvaient songer à détruire l'œuvre de la Macédoine»; M.J. FONTANA *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 15 n. 5: «Era troppo presto ancora perchè il concetto dell'unità dell'impero potesse far nascere dubbi o tendenze separatistiche»; W.M. ELLIS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 24: «From our perspective, the division of the empire seems inevitable. It cannot be overstressed that this solution was unthinkable to the leaders who gathered in Babylon around the corpse of Alexander the Great».

⁴⁵ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 50-51 and 74-75: «Ptolemy's proposal was subtly aimed at undermining Perdikkas' pre-eminence» (p. 51).

⁴⁶ Curt. X 6.16: *Ptolomaeo quidam, pauciores Perdiccae adsentiebantur* («Some agreed with Ptolemy, fewer with Perdikkas»). Cf. L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 233: «For them, as for Ptolemy, it was above all a matter of getting as much as possible out of the actual political situation, and preventing others from getting more».

⁴⁷ C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 57.

Next, Aristonous proposed that Perdikkas should be appointed king⁴⁸. Despite the backing of the common soldiers, Perdikkas doubted whether to accept or not⁴⁹. Some scholars have argued that Curtius wanted to suggest a parallel with Tiberius' accession, as the latter also pretended to hesitate in order to be asked more pressingly; like Tiberius, Perdikkas was, in their view, unchallenged and had no reason to doubt⁵⁰. Perdikkas' position, however, was far from secure, and his wavering was well-advised. Curtius only mentions the resistance of Meleagros — who even tried to kill Perdikkas a little later (cf. *infra*) — and Ptolemaios, but there certainly were others who did not support Perdikkas, among whom were those who backed Ptolemaios' proposal⁵¹. Being a threat to their own power, it is not surprising that Perdikkas' kingship was opposed to by other nobles⁵². Furthermore, other important generals not present at Babylon, such as Antipatros, Antigonos and Krateros, were potential opponents⁵³. Thus, Perdikkas had to refuse the kingship to save both his position and his life⁵⁴. Meleagros then started stirring up the soldiers and

⁴⁸ Curt. X 6.16-17. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 43, doubts whether Aristonous actually made this proposal and he argues that «Curtius' account might reflect negative propaganda» here. It is clear, however, that Aristonous was one of Perdikkas' supporters, as Bosworth himself indicates; cf. R.M. ERRINGTON, *Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander*, *CQ* N.S. 19 (1969), p. 235-236 and W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 275-276. That Justin does not mention Aristonous' proposal is merely a matter of abbreviation; he leaves out some of the other speakers as well: see R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 278. Consequently, I see no reason to reject Curtius' account on this matter. *Pace* G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 288, *summa imperii* should rather be taken to mean supreme power than the highest office, and consequently we need not assume that Aristonous has changed his proposal during his speech.

⁴⁹ Curt. X 6.18: *Haerebat inter cupiditatem pudoremque et, quo modestius quod expectabat adpeteret, perviciacius oblaturus esse credebat* («Perdikkas wavered, wishing to do it but bashful, and he thought that the more diffident he was in seeking what he expected to be his the more insistently they would press it upon him»).

⁵⁰ E. BADIAN, *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford p. 263; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 51; J.E. ATKINSON, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3 and 4* (*London Studies in Classical Philology*, 4), Amsterdam 1980, p. 36; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 237 n. 144. That the opposition to Perdikkas is less clear in the other sources is, again, a consequence of the difference in extensiveness between Curtius and the other authors: cf. above, n. 35. The question whether Tiberius' position actually was that stable need not detain us here, but see D. SHOTTER, *Tiberius Caesar* (*Lancaster Pamphlets in Ancient History*), London 2004², p. 18-19.

⁵¹ Cf. R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 50-51.

⁵² Curt. X 6.18-22; cf. L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 236.

⁵³ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 49; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 31-32.

⁵⁴ Cf. R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 50-51; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 236-237; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 145; D. BRAUND, *After Alexander: the Emergence of the Hellenistic World, 323-281*, in A. ERSKINE (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*

prompted them to seize the booty⁵⁵. Apparently he was successful, because he found wide support with them⁵⁶.

The opposition of the soldiers eventually led to a compromise among the nobles⁵⁷. According to Curtius (X 7.8), they agreed that Perdikkas and Leonnatos would be 'tutor' for the unborn child, while Antipatros and Krateros would hold joint responsibility for the government of Europe. Justin (XIII 2.14) on the other hand, says that Perdikkas, Leonnatos, Antipatros and Krateros were all appointed 'tutor'. The first problem is to determine the meaning of 'tutor': it could either be regent or guardian, or both. This question need not detain us here. For the present purpose it is enough to know that it certainly meant regent, and that it might have included guardianship as well⁵⁸. Determining whether there were two or four 'tutores' is difficult, but the more detailed information given by Curtius seems more likely because Justin often makes mistakes in abbreviating, and this might be another instance of simplification in his account, changing two 'tutores' and two governors of Europe into four 'tutores'⁵⁹. Apparently the opposition among the nobles was strong enough to prevent that Perdikkas became the sole regent, despite the precarious situation. Another possibility is that the joint regency was a way to try to appease Meleagros and his supporters somewhat because having a colleague made it more difficult for Perdikkas to usurp the kingship, as he was planning to do according to Meleagros' claims⁶⁰. In any case, it is

(*Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World*), Oxford 2003, p. 22: «His whole stance as the guardian of Alexander's interests required hesitation, for Alexander's widow was pregnant and might produce a son and heir. As Alexander's champion Perdikkas could hardly seize the throne from the king's son: much better to be regent, if there were to be a son».

⁵⁵ Curt. X 6.20-24.

⁵⁶ Curt. X 7.1.

⁵⁷ W. SCHUR, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 132-133; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 52; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 236. Contra: I. SHARPLES, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 59-60.

⁵⁸ On this and related problems, see A. MEEUS, *Some Institutional Problems concerning the Succession to Alexander the Great*, forthcoming.

⁵⁹ F. GRANIER, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung. Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht* (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 13), München 1931, p. 59; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 101; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 44, prefer Justin's account. J.G. DROYSEN, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 6; W. ENSSLIN, *Die Gewaltenteilung im Reichsregiment nach Alexanders Tod*, *RhM* N.F. 74 (1925), p. 303; P. CLOCHÉ, *op. cit.* (n. 21) p. 11; M.J. FONTANA, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 18-19; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 49 n. 1 and 52-53; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 136; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 78; R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 110; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 234-235 follow Curtius.

⁶⁰ Curt. X 7.21. Cf. G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 288. W. ENSSLIN, *art. cit.* (n. 59), p. 303, explains the joint regency by the «Besorgnis vor einer straffen Zentralgewalt (...),

clear that Leonnatos was included into the regency in order to limit Perdikkas' powers. Why Antipatros and Krateros, both absent from Babylon, were included in the compromise is unclear⁶¹. The appointment of the governor of Europe does not seem a pressing concern at a time when a civil war is about to arise over the question of the succession to the throne.

The infantry, under Meleagros' direction, refused to recognise the settlement of the generals and revolted. Most nobles fled the city, along with the cavalry, but Perdikkas and a small circle of collaborators stayed within the walls and tried to come to terms with the soldiery⁶². His opponents sent a hit squad to kill Perdikkas, but he managed to escape⁶³.

1.2. The compromise

By means of diplomatic machinations, Perdikkas succeeded in reaching an agreement with the infantrymen, but it is unclear how much time it took⁶⁴. Arrhidaios (under the dynastic name of Philippos) and Alexander's unborn child — if it proved to be a boy — would be joint kings⁶⁵. The organisation of the government is highly debated as most scholars fail to distinguish this compromise from the final settlement⁶⁶. The nobles did not really reconcile themselves to the agreement reached with the infantry for the purpose of avoiding civil war, and reorganised the government again at a later stage (see 1.3). Most scholars, however, have neglected this, and assume that the final stage only consisted of a distribution of the

die in den Kreisen der Grossen alsbald sich zeigte», but it is highly unlikely that most nobles wanted a strong central government: cf *supra*, p. 50-51. Furthermore, a dual regency is no guarantee for a strong government because internal dissension might cause impairment.

⁶¹ According to R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 53, the nobles hoped to win Antipatros and Krateros over to their side by means of their appointment and also to get the support of the phalanx: especially Krateros was very popular with the infantrymen. P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 294 n. 34, assumes that they hoped to avoid a struggle for power in Europe by including this regulation in the compromise, but it is very doubtful whether that belonged to the concerns of the generals in Babylon at the time and whether it was a suitable means of doing so.

⁶² Curt. X 7.16-21; Diod. XVIII 2.4; Just. XIII 3.4-5.

⁶³ Curt. X 8.1-4; Just. XIII 3.7.

⁶⁴ See A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 46-49, who solves the contradictions in the sources very plausibly.

⁶⁵ Arr., *Succ.* F1a1; Curt. X 8.22-23; Diod. XVIII 2.4; Just. XIII 4.1-4.

⁶⁶ See R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 54 n. 42.

satrapies⁶⁷. Unfortunately no source gives each stage in its entirety and there are a few contradictions. The following table might bring some clarification: it lists all decisions at the point when they are mentioned in the sources, i.e. at the moment of the reconciliation with the phalanx on the one hand (1.2), and at the time of the satrapy distribution on the other hand (1.3)⁶⁸:

	compromise (1.2)	final settlement (1.3)
Perdikkas	A.3: χιλιαρχεῖν χιλιαρχίας ἧς ἦρχεν Ἡφαιστίων J.4.5: castrorum et exercitus et rerum cura	C.10.4: cum rege esse copiisque praesese D.2.4: ἐπιμελητῆς τῆς βασιλείας De.1: ἐπετρόπευον ⁶⁹ αὐτοῖς (=the kings) τὴν ἀρχήν De.4: ἡ Ἡφαιστίωνος χιλιαρχία H.: ἐπίτροπος καὶ ἐπιμελητῆς τῶν βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων
Krateros	A.3: προστάτης τῆς Ἀρριδαίου βασιλείας J.4.5: regiae pecuniae custodia	A.7: the administration of Europe, except for Thrace and the adjacent areas (*) De.4: ἡ κηδεμονία καὶ ὅση προστασία τῆς βασιλείας
Antipatros	A.3: στρατηγὸς τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην J.4.5: Macedoniae et Graeciae Antipater praepositur	A.7: the administration of Europe, except for Thrace and the adjacent areas (*) D.3.2(*) and De.3 (*): idem
Meleagros	A.3: ὑπαρχος Περδίκκου C.8.22: tertius dux J.4.5: castrorum et exercitus et rerum cura	

⁶⁷ The first scholars to recognize that there was a later reorganisation of the central government were R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 54, and F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 144-146: see above, n. 5.

⁶⁸ A. = Arr., *Succ.* F1a; Ap. = App., *Syr.* 57; C. = Curt. X; D. = Diod. XVIII; De. = Dexippus (*FGrH* 100) F8; H. = *Heidelberger Epitome* (*FGrH* 155) F1.2; J. = Just. XIII; L. = Libanius, *Or.* XI 79. The data of Diodorus, Dexippus and the *Heidelberger Epitome* clearly belong to the third stage as these authors only mention the final decisions: see below, 1.3.

⁶⁹ The verb takes the plural form because the subject is οἱ ἀμφὶ Περδίκκων, which should here be taken to mean simply 'Perdikkas', however.

compromise (1.2)	final settlement (1.3)
Seleukos	Ap.: ἡγεμὼν τῆς ἵππου τῆς ἐταιρικῆς D.3.4: ἔταξεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἵππαρχίαν τῶν ἐταίρων J.4.17: summus castrorum tribunatus L.: ἵππαρχος ὑπὸ Περδίκκου

(*) quoted in n. 112.

Apparently Leonnatos no longer held an office in the second settlement while in the earlier compromise of the nobles during the first meeting (1.1) he had been appointed ‘tutor’. The reason for this sudden setback seems to be beyond retrieval due to our summary sources.

Antipatros was confirmed in the office he already held under Alexander: στρατηγός of Europe⁷⁰. The respective positions of Perdikkas, Krateros and Meleagros are less clear, as is the interrelation between their offices. Arrian calls Perdikkas χιλιάρχος and Krateros προστάτης. These terms have been much debated, but no consensus has been reached⁷¹. As I shall argue elsewhere, Anson’s conclusion that προστασία means regency and possibly also guardianship seems the most probable solution⁷²; again, the question of the guardianship need not detain us here. The chiliarchy is the highest cavalry command, one of the most important military positions⁷³. The question to be dealt with

⁷⁰ H. BENGTON, *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit. Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht I* (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 26), München 1964², p. 15-56.

⁷¹ J. SEIBERT, *Das Zeitalter der Diadochen* (Erträge der Forschung, 185), Darmstadt 1983, p. 84-89, provides an excellent *status quaestionis* up to 1978. More recent literature includes: N.G.L. HAMMOND, *Some Macedonian Offices: 336-309 BC*, *JHS* 105 (1985), p. 156-160; W. HECKEL, *The Last Days and Testament of Alexander the Great. A Prosopographic Study* (*Historia Einzelschriften*, 56), Stuttgart 1988, p. 19-21 and ID., *The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire*, London 1992, p. 366-370; E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 2); P. BRIANT, *Sources gréco-hellénistiques, institutions perses et institutions macédoniennes: continuités, changements et bricolages*, in H. SANCISI-WEERDENBURG e.a. (edd.), *Continuity and Change*. Proceedings of the Last Achaemenid History Workshop, April 6-8, 1990 – Ann Arbor, Michigan (*Achaemenid History*, 8), Leiden 1994, p. 291-298; E.D. CARNEY, *Women and Basileia: Legitimacy and Female Political Action in Macedonia*, *CJ* 90 (1995), p. 372-375; G. SINATTI, *Epimeletes ed epimeleia in Diodoro Siculo XVIII-XX*, in B. VIRGILIO (ed.), *Studi Ellenistici 8* (*Bibliotheca di Studi Antichi*, 78), Pisa 1996, p. 97-122; A.W. COLLINS, *The Office of Chiliarch under Alexander and the Successors*, *Phoenix* 55 (2001), p. 259-283; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 51-53.

here is whether Justin's description of the offices of Perdikkas, Krateros, and Meleagros accords with the titles Arrian gives. Schachermeyr has pointed out that *regiae pecuniae custodia* does not exactly equal προστασία⁷⁴. I can see two possible explanations for Justin's wording. Either Trogus' source gave a list of the duties of the προστατής which was poorly summarised by Trogus/Justin or it might — more likely — have been a specification of the division of tasks between Perdikkas, Krateros, and Meleagros. Justin says that Perdikkas and Meleagros were also entrusted with the charge of the camp and the army. Arrian, too, ascribes a military function to Perdikkas: the chiliarchy. Justin calls Seleukos' chiliarchy in the final settlement (1.3) *summus castrorum tribunatus*⁷⁵, the supreme command of the camp, which accords — albeit not literally — with the common equation χιλιαρχία = *tribunatus militum*⁷⁶. The resemblance of this description to the *castrorum et exercitus cura* of Perdikkas, suggests that the latter paraphrase also refers to the chiliarchy in his case, and to a comparable military position for Meleagros (see below)⁷⁷. Besides the military function, Justin also mentions the *rerum cura*, as the manuscripts have it. Some, however, have emended this to *regum cura*⁷⁸, but most scholars reject the emendation for various reasons⁷⁹. The emendation is indeed unnecessary: since the Macedonians surely appointed regents the text is sound as it stands⁸⁰. Perdikkas and

⁷² E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 2); A. MEEUS, *art. cit.* (n. 58).

⁷³ A. MEEUS, *art. cit.* (n. 58); similar views have already been argued by E.R. BEVAN, *Note on the Command held by Seleukos, 323-321 B.C.*, *CR* 14 (1900), p. 396-398, and W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 366-370.

⁷⁴ F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 126; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 52. Attempts to explain the discrepancy between Arrian and Justin away, such as that of R. LAQUEUR, *Zur Geschichte des Krateros*, *Hermes* 54 (1919), p. 295-300, have proven unsuccessful.

⁷⁵ See below, p. 61-62, for Seleukos' appointment as χιλιαρχος.

⁷⁶ H.J. MASON, *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions. A Lexicon and Analysis* (*American Studies in Papyrology*, 13), Toronto 1974, s.v. χιλιαρχία 1.

⁷⁷ Cf. F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 140.

⁷⁸ The emendation originated with J.N. MADVIG, *Adversaria critica ad scriptores Graecos et Latinos II*, *Adversaria critica ad scriptores Latinos*, Copenhagen 1873 (= Hildesheim 1967), p. 623-625; O. Seel adopted it in the Teubner edition.

⁷⁹ R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 124 (taking care of Arrhidaios was not Perdikkas' task); W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 369 n. 4 (there was only one king, i.e. Arrhidaios); A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 51 (it is unlikely that Perdikkas would have included Meleagros in the guardianship).

⁸⁰ A. MEEUS, *art. cit.* (n. 58). J.N. MADVIG, *loc. cit.*, deemed XIII 4.5 (*castrorum et exercitus et rerum cura Meleagro et Perdiccae adsignatur*) and XIII 6.10 ([...] *Arridaeum et Alexandri Magni filium, quorum cura illi [= Perdikkas] mandata fuerat* [...]) contradictory. Maybe, then, the passages actually show that there was no distinction between

Meleagros, then, were regent together with Krateros, as Perdikkas and Leonnatos were supposed to share the regency in the very first compromise (1.1)⁸¹.

That Perdikkas was also a regent, explains why Arrian (*Succ.*, Fl1a 3) — or Photius — wrongly described the chiliarchy as ἐπιτροπή τῆς ζυμπάσης βασιλείας; this can only refer to the regency, while the chiliarchy merely was the supreme cavalry-command. The original text probably stated that Perdikkas held the ἐπιτροπή τῆς ζυμπάσης βασιλείας and was chiliarch at the same time, but Arrian/Photius misunderstood this and interpreted it as if Perdikkas held the ἐπιτροπή because he was chiliarch⁸². According to Curtius, Meleagros was *tertius dux*, while Arrian calls him ὑπαρχος Περδίκκου. The most likely solution in this reconstruction seems to be that his infantry command was inferior to Perdikkas' cavalry command⁸³. This would explain why Justin (XIII 4.17) labels the chiliarchy *summus castrorum tribunatus*. Errington argues that Meleagros merely was Perdikkas' deputy and that this was the most he could expect⁸⁴. It seems unlikely, however, that Perdikkas would have risked not reaching a compromise by refusing to acknowledge Meleagros as his peer — the phalanx might not have accepted that Perdikkas became regent

rerum cura and *regum cura*, although it should be noted — again — that both passages cannot be compared directly as XIII 4.5 belongs to the second stage while XIII 6.10 gives the result of the third stage. At XIII 6.10 the manuscript readings should be maintained: see R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 176-178. The wording *rerum cura* possibly originates from the same source as ἐπίτροπος καὶ ἐπιμελητὴς τῶν βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων and τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων in the *Heidelberger Epitome* (FGrH 155) F1.2 and 1.5: cf. K. ROSEN, *Die Reichsordnung von Babylon* (323 v. Chr.), *AClass* 10 (1967), p. 109 n. 107. See also Nepos, *Eum.*, 2.1-2 (*summa rerum tradita esset (...) Perdiccae (...) [et] liberi [Alexandri] in suam tutelam pervenissent*), 5.1 (*rerumque summa ad Antipatrum defertur*), and *Phoc.*, 3.4 (*regiis rebus praeerat*).

⁸¹ According to P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 80, Perdikkas and Leonnatos renounced the regency as a concession from their part, and Krateros would from now on be the sole regent. This view does not account for Justin's *rerum cura*.

⁸² E.R. BEVAN, *art. cit.* (n. 73), p. 398 also concluded, rightly, I think, that Photius blundered in his *epitome* of Arrian, although I cannot agree with his reconstruction of the original text, since he fails to distinguish the second and the third stage of the Babylon settlement. Cf. F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5) p. 140-141; A.W. COLLINS, *art. cit.* (n. 71), p. 276: «(...) There is a strong possibility that the gloss [scil. τὸ δὲ ἦν ἐπιτροπή τῆς ζυμπάσης βασιλείας] may be a confused description by Photius of the functions of Perdikkas' ἐπιμέλεια rather than those of his chiliarchy».

⁸³ Cf. W. SCHWAN, *art. cit.* (n. 21), p. 310; F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 139 n. 80 and 140-141; G. SINATTI, *art. cit.* (n. 71), p. 108 n. 34: «Associato al potere di Perdicca, ma già in posizione subordinata sul piano militare (ὑπαρχος Περδίκκου, secondo Arriano, FGrHist 156, F1,3), come comandante della fanteria macedone».

⁸⁴ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 56; cf. E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 57-58.

and Meleagros did not — and probably he had already decided to dispose of Meleagros as soon as he had the opportunity⁸⁵. It seems, then, that there were three regents among whom the tasks were divided: Perdikkas was to command the cavalry and Meleagros the infantry, while Krateros would be responsible for the treasury. However, given the confusion in the sources and the lack of information on the period between this stage and the final settlement (1.3), a definite and complete answer is impossible.

Yet Perdikkas had made these concessions only in order to reach a compromise. Undoubtedly, he did not plan this settlement to be permanent⁸⁶, so he immediately sought a way to get rid of Meleagros⁸⁷. After he had won the latter's confidence, they jointly organised a ritual purification of the army⁸⁸. This turned out to be a plot of Perdikkas and he had 30 — or 300 — soldiers who had supported Meleagros executed⁸⁹. Meleagros himself tried to escape in vain⁹⁰. Some scholars assume that Perdikkas killed Meleagros only after the final settlement (1.3) because Diodorus (XVIII 4.7) narrates his death then⁹¹. All sources, however, have the execution of Meleagros together with that of the soldiers and Diodorus is the only one to insert the distribution of the satrapies and the cancellation of the *Hypomnemata* before this event. It seems unlikely that Meleagros did not flee immediately when his supporters were executed and Perdikkas' scheming became evident. This suggests that the interval between the execution of the soldiers and the death of Meleagros indicated in the sources⁹² must have been very small and only means that they were not killed at the very same moment, as both events were separated by the duration of Meleagros' flight and subsequent capture. The

⁸⁵ Cf. n. 86.

⁸⁶ Cf. E. BADIAN, *A King's Notebooks*, *HSCPh* 72 (1967), p. 202: «Meleager's challenge had forced the marshals to patch up a compromise which they probably all knew would not last long»; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 52 and 55-56; E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 42-43.

⁸⁷ Curt. X 9.7.

⁸⁸ Justin (XIII 4.7) says that this was necessary *propter mortem regis*, while Curtius (X 9.11) links it to the civil strife: *probabilis causa videbatur praeterita discordia*.

⁸⁹ Arr., *Succ.* Fl44; Curt. X 9.7-19; Diod. XVIII 4.7; Just. XIII 4.7-8; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 54 with n. 95.

⁹⁰ Arr., *Succ.* Fl44; Curt. X 9.20-21; Diod. XVIII 4.7.

⁹¹ F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Die letzten Pläne Alexanders des Großen*, *JÖAI* 41 (1954), p. 121-122 and *id.*, p. 142; E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 202 n. 62; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 55 n. 96.

⁹² Arr., *Succ.* Fl44 (οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον); Curt. X 9.21 (mox); Diod. XVIII 4.7 (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα).

reason why Diodorus has changed the order is that he only gives the essentials of the different stages: a reconciliation between the phalanx on the one hand and the cavalry and the generals on the other hand came about and Perdikkas eventually became regent⁹³. He does not deem the regulations of the second stage (1.2) important as they did not exist very long — it is not clear how long exactly⁹⁴ — and he only narrates the actual outcome. He does not mention the prospective kingship of Rhoxane's child because it was as yet unborn and this regulation consequently did not affect reality at that time. Together with the final appointment of a regent, the satrapies were distributed and after that Perdikkas had the *Hypomnemata* cancelled. That is why Diodorus mentions these events together with Perdikkas' appointment and postponed his account of executions of the soldiers and the death of Meleagros⁹⁵. The problem is that this procedure has imperceptibly connected the second and third stages of the settlement in Diodorus' account.

1.3. The final settlement

After the mutineers had been executed, the generals reorganised the administration, calling an assembly to discuss the future. Again, it is impossible to determine who exactly attended this meeting, and the way in which the decisions were made is equally unclear. An analysis of the

⁹³ F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Zu Geschichte und Staatsrecht der frühen Diadochenzeit*, *Klio* 19 (1925), p. 443, and *id.*, p. 163, already noticed that this was the principle behind Diodorus' summary, albeit not entirely for the right reasons. See below, 1.3, for Perdikkas' appointment as sole regent.

⁹⁴ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 54 and A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 55, have aptly remarked that it might have been a matter of weeks: Perdikkas had to gain Meleagros' confidence, prepare his plot, and then organise the ritual purification which probably could not be performed on any given day. Aelian (XII 64), says that Alexander was left unburied for thirty days while the Diadochoi argued about the succession. That the king really was left unburied for such a long time in the Babylonian summer heath is rather unlikely, but the duration of the negotiations Aelian mentions might well be a round number close to the actual time period.

⁹⁵ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 57 n. 59; P. GOUKOWSKY, *ad* Diod. XVIII 3.1 (*Collection des Universités de France*); A. MEHL, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 20 with n. 55; E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 59, also prefer the chronology of Arrian and Curtius and situate the death of Meleagros before the final settlement. R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 54 n. 42 and A.W. COLLINS, *art. cit.* (n. 71), p. 277 n. 93 assume that the explanation for the divergence in Diodorus simply is confusion.

decisions is necessary to reconstruct the decision-making process and the struggle for power that influenced it.

1.3.1 *The decisions*

1.3.1.1 The satrapy distribution

The distribution of satrapies does not pose major problems⁹⁶. Most of the satraps from Alexander's time were confirmed, probably largely for the sake of convenience⁹⁷. There were a few new appointments, however. Ptolemaios replaced Kleomenes of Naukratis as satrap of Egypt while the latter became his ὑπαρχος, and Laomedon was appointed governor of Syria⁹⁸. Leonnatos obtained Hellespontine Phrygia, but Paphlagonia (which had belonged to the same province under Alexander) was given to Eumenes, together with Cappadocia. Peithon received the larger part of Media while Atropates, the former satrap and father-in-law of Perdikkas, retained the other part⁹⁹. Caria was given to Asandros and Thrace to Lysimachos. It is not quite certain whether Philotas' appointment over Cilicia was decided only now: the former satrap, Balakros, had died in 324 and it is not impossible that Philotas had already taken over the satrapy at that time¹⁰⁰. Two of the confirmed satraps also need

⁹⁶ For the most recent discussion: see W. HUSS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 86-89.

⁹⁷ Cf. J. KAERST, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* II, *Das Wesen des Hellenismus*, Leipzig 1926², p. 11; R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 55.

⁹⁸ According to W. SCHWAN, *art. cit.* (n. 21), p. 332, Laomedon had already been appointed satrap of Syria by Alexander because he was not present at Babylon in 323 and was not important enough to be awarded a satrapy if absent. However, we do not know whether Laomedon was at Babylon. In 326 he was still with the king, but after that nothing is known about his career under Alexander: W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 211. The satrap of Syria during Alexander's last years is also unknown. Schwan's argument about Laomedon's relative lack of importance is equally unconvincing: see below, 1.3.2. Most scholars assume that Laomedon was newly appointed in the Babylon settlement: see A.B. BOSWORTH, *The Government of Syria under Alexander the Great*, *CQ* n.s. 24 (1974), p. 63-64; W. HECKEL, *loc. cit.*; M. SARTRE, *D'Alexandre à Zenobie. Histoire du Levant antique. IV^e siècle avant J.-C. – III^e siècle après J.-C.*, Paris 2001, p. 92-93.

⁹⁹ H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, München 1926, II, p. 92.

¹⁰⁰ According to H. BERVE, *op. cit.* (n. 99), II p. 398, he was already appointed under Alexander and W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 329 and *id.*, *King and "Companions": Observations on the Nature of Power in the Reign of Alexander*, in J. ROISMAN (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden 2003, p. 201 n. 17, and M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 42, also consider this to be a possibility. A.B. BOSWORTH, *loc. cit.*, on the other hand, does assume that he was newly appointed in the Babylon settlement.

to be mentioned here: Antigonos in Greater Phrygia and Menandros in Lydia. The others are not relevant for an analysis of the power relations which determined the decision-making at Babylon.

1.3.1.2 The regency

Perdikkas' position does not really constitute a problem either¹⁰¹: he was confirmed as regent, as is clearly stated by Curtius (albeit in a somewhat clumsy phrasing), Diodorus, the *Heidelberger Epitome*, and the first paragraph of Photius' summary of Dexippus¹⁰². However, in the fourth paragraph the latter, whose account seems based on Arrian's¹⁰³, says Perdikkas still held the chiliarchy, but all other sources have Seleukos as chiliarch in this stage of the settlement. The contradiction, both internal and with an otherwise unanimous tradition, is already suspicious in itself. In his summary of Arrian Photius did not mention Perdikkas' position in the final stage, but that Dexippus differs from Arrian concerning the position of Krateros, to whom the Athenian still attributes the *προστασία*, proves that he has moved the offices of Perdikkas and Krateros from the second (1.2) to the third stage (1.3)¹⁰⁴. This is also apparent from the

¹⁰¹ See the table in 1.2.

¹⁰² The same conclusion is reached by E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 43; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 56-57; M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 26-29. The latter's argument, however, is flawed by his failure to distinguish between the three stages, resulting in the unwarranted use of elements from the first stage as evidence for the last stage. Cf. also W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 370: «In the almost three years that Perdikkas exercised power in Asia he did so as *prostates* or *epimeletes*, not as Chiliarch». He is indeed never called *chiliarch* after the Babylon settlement: see below, n. 106. Consequently, the view that Perdikkas at some point usurped the *προστασία* or part of it (thus most recently W. HECKEL, *art. cit.* [n. 41], p. 93 n. 26) should be abandoned.

¹⁰³ Although it seems to be generally accepted that Dexippus relied on Arrian alone for his history of the Successors, G. MARTIN, *Dexipp von Athen. Edition, Übersetzung und Begleitende Studien (Classica Monacensia, 32)*, Tübingen 2006, p. 154, remarks: «Über die Nähe zu Arrians Werk können wir also nichts Genaues sagen sagen». Photius' phrase καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διέξεσιν ἐν πολλοῖς, ὥς κἀν τούτοις, Ἀρριανῶ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον σύμφωνα γράφων (Dex. F1.8) actually shows that there were differences. These need not have been limited to matters of style and emphasis by Dexippos. He might well have used other sources too.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 42; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 49-50. The view of J.D. GRAINGER, *Seleukos Nikator. Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom*, London 1990, p. 18-20, that Seleukos was «the chiliarch's chiliarch», cannot stand because there was no other chiliarch. Similarly, A.W. COLLINS, *art. cit.* (n. 71), p. 278, claims that Perdikkas maintained the court chiliarchy and gave Seleukos the equestrian chiliarchy, but I will argue elsewhere that there was no such distinction: A. MEEUS, *art. cit.* (n. 58). Thus

structure of Dexippus' text as it stands in Photius' *Bibliotheca*. First, he deals with the organisation of the central government (F8.1), and there he is accurate: Arrhidaios and Alexander become king, with Perdikkas as regent. Then he discusses the distribution of satrapies (F8.2-7), and in the middle of that account he mentions the *προστασία* and the *χιλίαρχία*, two offices which belong to the central government. They are inserted where Krateros' position next to Antipatros should have been mentioned. Given this confused structure and the internal contradiction, Dexippus must be wrong here¹⁰⁵. Moreover, after Babylon Perdikkas' office is always referred to as *προστασία*, *ἐπιτροπή* or some description of it, and never as chiliarchy¹⁰⁶, and it is clear that he held more responsibility than commanding the cavalry: he was the highest official concerning all matters of state. Consequently, the other sources must be correct in stating that Seleukos now became chiliarch while Perdikkas held the regency.

1.3.1.3 The administration of Europe

Arrian is the only one to mention Krateros' new position: apparently the nobles reverted to their original plan (see 1.1) to appoint him governor of Europe together with Antipatros¹⁰⁷. Kanatsulis disputes this conclusion¹⁰⁸, but his arguments fail to convince. First of all, it is clear that

also A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 56: «There is, however, no suggestion that Seleucus held anything other than the position previously occupied by Hephaestion and Perdikkas, that is, the chiliarchy itself». According to F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 145-146, Dexippus is correct. He argues that the *προστασία* was modified in the final settlement, but now the nature of the office is clear thanks to the demonstration of Anson (*art. cit.* [n. 2]), this view is untenable.

¹⁰⁵ It is not the only blatant mistake in Dexippus' account: at 8.6 Seleukos is given Babylon, an appointment which actually belongs to the Triparadeisos settlement.

¹⁰⁶ App., *Syr.* 52: *προστατεύσαντος τῶν βασιλέων*; App., *Mithr.* 8: *τῆς ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ γενομένης γῆς ἐπιτροπεύων*; Arr., *Succ.* F1.30: *ἄρχων τῆς πάσης δυνάμεως*; Diod. XVIII 23.2: *παρέλαβε (...) τὴν τῶν βασιλέων προστασίαν*. Arrian's rather general description of military command can not refer to the chiliarchy, because he states it is the office Peithon and Arrhidaios held after Perdikkas, and they held the regency, but not the chiliarchy.

¹⁰⁷ Thus also R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 55: «(...) in the final settlement after Meleager's death they reverted to their original arrangement of making him share Europe with Antipater (...). Cf. Arr., *Succ.*, F19 on Antipatros and Krateros: (...) ἐν ἰσῃ μοίρᾳ ἄμφω τετάχθαι [...] they were appointed to the same province»].

¹⁰⁸ D. KANATSULIS, *Antipatros als Feldherr und Staatsmann nach dem Tode Alexanders des Großen, Makedonika* 8 (1968), p. 124-127.

Krateros no longer held the *προστασία*: Dexippus is wrong in stating the opposite, as argued above. Arrian (*Succ.* F1a7) is indeed the only source to mention Krateros' appointment, but — *pace* Kanatsulis — one cannot use Justin (XIII 4.5) to contradict him, because it refers to the second stage. That leaves Diodorus (XVIII 3.2) and Dexippus (F8.3), where Krateros is not mentioned alongside Antipatros as governor of Europe. It is more likely that Krateros was left out in Photius' summary of Dexippus than that he was added in the epitome of Arrian, as one rather expects elements to disappear in a summary than to be added¹⁰⁹. The displacement of Krateros' office from the second to the third stage might have caused the oversight or could be a consequence of it. Diodorus too, then, must have skipped Krateros' appointment in the third stage. If not, Krateros would have had no office in the final settlement, and it is unlikely that Perdikkas would not have tried to affect Krateros' actions by an official decision. There was, evidently, no guarantee that Krateros would obey, but it was at least worth trying to send him to Europe, in order to prevent him from coming to Babylon to contest Perdikkas' position. Probably, this was also what Perdikkas tried to achieve by cancelling the *Hypomnemata* (see below, 2) and that would be substantially easier if Krateros had already been appointed governor of Europe. That Krateros did not immediately leave for Europe after the Babylon settlement came about, does not provide any indication on his office; it simply means that he did not recognize the legitimacy of the decisions, if there was no other reason we are unaware of.

Under Alexander Antipatros had been in command of the entire European part of the Empire, including Thrace, as *στρατηγός*¹¹⁰. In his influential study on *strategia* in the Hellenistic age, Bengtson has argued that this situation remained unchanged in the Babylon settlement. Most scholars agree with him and assume therefore that Lysimachos' territory was part of Antipatros' province¹¹¹. This view does not find support in the

¹⁰⁹ Cf. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 58-59: Photius is generally reliable when copying lists, although sometimes an element is left out.

¹¹⁰ H. BENGTSON, *op. cit.* (n. 70), p. 26-29.

¹¹¹ H. BENGTSON, *op. cit.* (n. 70), p. 27-29 and 44-45; K. ROSEN, *art. cit.* (n. 80), p. 100-101; D. KANATSULIS, *art. cit.* (n. 108) p. 122-123; O. MÜLLER, *Antigonos Monophthalmos und "Das Jahr der Könige"* (Saarbrücker Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 11), Bonn 1973, p. 18; P. GOUKOWSKY, *ad* Diod. XVIII 18.4 (*Collection des Universités de France*); R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 55; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 43; F. LANDUCCI GATTINONI, *Lisimaco di Tracia. Un sovrano nella prospettiva del primo ellenismo*, Milano 1992, p. 102; H.S. LUND, *Lysimachos. A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*, London 1992, p. 54; O. SCHMITT, *Der Lamische Krieg* (Habelts Dissertationsdrucke. Reihe Alte

sources and Bengtson's arguments are not very convincing. All sources mentioning Antipatros (and Krateros) in the distribution of satrapies explicitly contrast the territory of Lysimachos and that of Antipatros and Krateros¹¹². As the lists of Arrian and Dexippus are very elaborate, it is reasonable to assume that they aim to be complete and precise. That Lysimachos' satrapy is always described as a separate province suggests that Lysimachos was not subordinate to Antipatros and Krateros. That Dexippus (F8.3) still calls Antipatros στρατηγός in the final settlement is not a very strong argument either. Dexippus is the only author to do so while Arrian (*Succ.*, F1a3) only mentions the title στρατηγός in the second stage of the settlement (1.2). Since Dexippus has moved the offices of Perdikkas and Krateros from the second to the third stage (see above) it is not unlikely that he did the same with Antipatros'. Furthermore, the question of the title might not be very relevant here: even with the same title his territory might have been reduced. Bengtson, however, argues against the sources that it would be impossible that Lysimachos had no superior while the satraps in Asia had to obey Perdikkas¹¹³. This view is based on the wrong premises that the chiliarch was grand vizier of Asia and that Perdikkas was appointed chiliarch in the final settlement. Actually there were two kings and one regent holding sway over one entire

Geschichte, 33), Bonn 1992, p. 52 n. 20; C. FRANCO, *Il regno di Lisimaco. Strutture amministrative e rapporti con le città* (*Studi Ellenistici*, 6 – *Bibliotheca di Studi antichi*, 71), Pisa 1993, p. 15; W. ORTH, *Die Diadochenzeit im Spiegel der historischen Geographie. Kommentar zu TAVO-Karte BV2 "Diadochenreiche (um 303 v.Chr.)"* (*Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients*, Reihe B, 80), Wiesbaden 1993, p. 20. Contra: A. SCHÄFER, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* III, Leipzig 1887², p. 352; J. KAERST, *op. cit.* (n. 97), p. 11; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 144-145; É. WILL, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique (323-30 av. J.C.)* I, Nancy 1979², p. 25; A. SIMONETTI AGOSTINETTI, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 48.

¹¹² Arr., *Succ.* F1a7: Τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην, Θράκης μὲν καὶ Χερρονήσου καὶ ὅσα Θράξιν σύνορα ἔθνη ἔστε ἐπὶ θάλασσαν τὴν ἐπὶ Σαλμυδησσὸν τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου καθήκοντα, Λυσιμάχῳ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐπετράπη· τὰ δὲ ἐπέκεινα τῆς Θράκης ὡς ἐπὶ Ἰλλυριοῦς καὶ Τριβαλλοῦς καὶ Ἀγριαῖνας καὶ αὐτὴ Μακεδονία καὶ ἡ Ἥπειρος ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη τὰ Κεραῦνια ἀνήκουσα καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες σύμπαντες Κρατερῷ καὶ Ἀντίπατρῳ ἐνεμήθη. Dexip. (*FGrH* 100) F8.3: Θράκης μὲν καὶ Χερρονήσου Λυσίμαχος· Ἀντίπατρος δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Μακεδόσι καὶ Ἑλλήσι καὶ Ἰλλυριοῖς καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ Ἀγριαῖσι καὶ ὅσα τῆς Ἥπειρου ἔξέτι Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ ἐκτέτακτο. Diod. XVIII 3.2: Κατὰ δὲ τὴν Εὐρώπην Λυσιμάχῳ μὲν ἐδόθη Θράκη καὶ τὰ συνορίζοντα τῶν ἐθνῶν παρὰ τὴν Ποντικὴν θάλασσαν, ἡ δὲ Μακεδονία καὶ τὰ πλησιόχωρα τῶν ἐθνῶν Ἀντίπατρῳ προσωρίσθη.

¹¹³ H. BENGTSON, *op. cit.* (n. 70), p. 44.

empire, and everyone – including Lysimachos, Antipatros and Krateros – was subordinate to them¹¹⁴.

After the peace treaty with Athens in 322 Antipatros indeed offered land in Thrace to the disenfranchised Athenians¹¹⁵, but this does not necessarily mean that he held sway over that territory. It was important for Antipatros and Lysimachos to entertain good mutual relations and according to Pausanias (I 10.1) they did; Lund has provided convincing arguments that the Periegete is right¹¹⁶. Lysimachos had to confront an uprising of the local king Seuthes who tried to preserve his autonomous position¹¹⁷, while Antipatros and Krateros had to concentrate entirely on Aitolia after the capitulation of the Athenians¹¹⁸. Consequently, they could not provide Lysimachos with direct military support, but they could aid him by sending colonists¹¹⁹. The presence of an Athenian settlement would help the governor in gaining control of his province as the settlers were, like Lysimachos, in hostile territory and thus shared the same fate¹²⁰. As this measure, then, might simply have been an attempt to help Lysimachos, it does not prove that Antipatros had any authority over Thrace. Since Bengtson's arguments are so inconclusive, it seems better to follow the sources in contrasting the territories of Antipatros and

¹¹⁴ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 56 n. 57. Diod. XVIII 3.1 describes Perdikkas' regency as ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονία: leadership of the whole.

¹¹⁵ Diod. XVIII 18.4-5; Plut., *Phoc.*, 28.7.

¹¹⁶ H.S. LUND, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 54-55; cf. F. LANDUCCI GATTINONI, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 102.

¹¹⁷ See J. KABAKČIEV, *Thrakien in den Plänen Philipp II. und Alexander III. (341-323 v.u.Z.)*, *Bulgarian Historical Review* 28 (2000), p. 18-19, for Seuthes' *de facto* autonomy during Alexander's last years. Cf. P. DELEV, *Lysimachus, the Getae, and Archaeology*, *CQ* N.S. 50 (2000), p. 384-386; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 269. H.S. LUND, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 22-28, discusses Lysimachos' troubles with Seuthes.

¹¹⁸ Diod. XVIII 24.

¹¹⁹ Cf. H.S. LUND, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 54.

¹²⁰ E.J. BAYNHAM, *Antipater and Athens*, in O. PALAGIA & S.V. TRACY (edd.), *The Macedonians in Athens 322-229 B.C.* Proceedings of an International Conference held at the University of Athens, May 24-26, 2001, Oxford 2003, especially p. 27-28. See also E. Poddighe, *Nel segno di Antipatro. L'eclissi della democrazia ateniese dal 323/2 al 319/8 a.C. (Collana del Dipartimento di Storia dell'Università degli Studi di Sassari, N.S. 2)*, Roma 2002, p. 71 n. 50: «Si deve ancora una volta ricordare che Antipatro dovette intervenire ripetutamente per mantenere il controllo della regione». Admittedly, the interpretation is hindered by the fact that there is no indication as to where and how the Athenian colonists were settled: see J. CARGILL, *Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century B.C. (Mnemosyne, Supplement 145)*, Leiden 1995, p. 37-38 and E.J. BAYNHAM, *loc. cit.* Cf. the colonisation policy of Philippos II in Thrace: Diod. XVI 71.2; J.R. ELLIS, *Population-Transplants by Philip II, Makedonika* 9 (1969), p. 9-17; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *A History of Macedonia II*, Oxford 1979, p. 660-662.

Krateros on the one hand and those of Lysimachos on the other. Perdikkas probably detached Thrace from Antipatros' province to create a buffer zone separating Antipatros and Krateros from Asia, as Schäfer already pointed out¹²¹. The respective titles of Antipatros, Krateros, and Lysimachos are unknown, but it is in any case clear that they all were subordinate to Perdikkas, the regent of the empire.

1.3.1.4 Alexander's funeral

After the organisation of the administration, Alexander's funeral remained to be dealt with. The exact decision the Successors made on this matter is disputed because, again, most scholars fail to distinguish the different moments. First, there is Alexander's wish, allegedly uttered on his deathbed, to be buried at the sanctuary of Ammon at Siwa¹²². Some scholars assume that this was not Alexander's desire and that the sources are influenced by Ptolemaic propaganda, aimed at legitimising Ptolemaios' possession of Alexander's body¹²³. Alexander probably was unable to speak during his last days¹²⁴, but he might well have indicated where he was to be entombed on an earlier occasion¹²⁵. It is not unlikely that this would have been in Siwa as Alexander's reverence for Ammon at the end of his life is very clear and he even considered the god to be his father¹²⁶. Moreover, Ptolemaios did not have the least interest in assert-

¹²¹ A. SCHÄFER, *loc. cit.* (n. 111). Cf. É. WILL, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 25; A. SIMONETTI AGOSTINETTI, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 48.

¹²² Curt. X 5.4; Just. XII 15.7. Diod. XVIII 3.5 and Just. XIII 4.6, only mention the decision of the Successors, and cannot be used as evidence for Alexander's wish.

¹²³ W.W. TARN, *Alexander the Great II, Sources and Studies*, Cambridge 1949, p. 355; cf. J. HORNBLOWER, *op. cit.* (n. 26), p. 41-42, N.G.L. HAMMOND, *The Macedonian State. Origins, Institutions, and History*, Oxford 1989, p. 25 n. 45 and R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 61 n. 19.

¹²⁴ Arr., *Anab.*, VII 26.1.

¹²⁵ Cf. E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 187: «We need not doubt the last wish of the dying King. Even if not uttered with his last breath, it would be well known from previous conversation».

¹²⁶ E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 186; A.B. BOSWORTH, *Alexander and Ammon*, in K. KINZL (ed.), *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory. Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday*, Berlin-New York 1977, p. 55-67; E.A. FREDRICKSMEYER, *Alexander's Religion and Divinity*, in J. ROISMAN (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden 2003, p. 270-278, especially 273. D. KIENAST, *Alexander, Zeus und Ammon*, in W. WILL & J. HEINRICHs (edd.), *Zu Alexander d.Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*, vol. I,

ing that Alexander wanted Ammon's sanctuary to be his last resting-place because eventually he did not bury Alexander there either¹²⁷. He entombed Alexander in Egypt, so we would expect him to say in his propaganda that that is what Alexander wanted. And indeed, he did just that: the *Liber de Morte* (108 and 119), a propaganda document of Ptolemaios maintaining that he was the only Successor to observe Alexander's will, states that Alexander wanted to be buried in Egypt¹²⁸. Diodorus (XVIII 28.3) says the following about Ptolemaios after the body snatch of 321:

Ἐκρίνε γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἰς μὲν Ἀμμῶνα μὴ παρακομίζειν,
κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκτισμένην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πόλιν (...) ἀποθέσθαι.
«He decided for the present not to send it to Ammon, but to entomb it
in the city that had been founded by Alexander himself (...)».

This passage seems to confirm that the original destination was Siwa, if it does not just refer to a change of Ptolemaios' plans¹²⁹. The embalming of the body by Egyptian and Babylonian priests is also a possible indication that Alexander wished to be buried at Siwa and not at Aigai¹³⁰. There is, then, no reason to deny that the Diadochoi decided to entomb Alexander at Siwa, complying with the king's last wish¹³¹. Some scholars, however, argue that Pausanias (I 6.3) disproves this view because he says that those who had to take the body to Aigai were persuaded by Ptolemaios to bring it to Egypt¹³². The decision to take it to Macedon,

Amsterdam 1987, p. 330-331, doubts that Alexander thought that Ammon was his father, but he does acknowledge the king's high reverence for the god and the resulting wish to be buried at Siwa.

¹²⁷ D. KIENAST, *art. cit.* (n. 126), p. 331: «Es wäre aber politisch nicht unbedenklich gewesen, erst zu propagieren, Alexander wolle beim Ammon bestattet werden, und sich dann über diesen letzten Wunsch des Königs einfach hinwegzusetzen (...)».

¹²⁸ A.B. BOSWORTH, *art. cit.* (n. 30), p. 219. Cf. the oracular response ordering to bury Alexander in Memphis in the Alexander Romance (III 34.1-5, ed. H. VAN THIEL, *Leben und Taten Alexanders von Makedonien. Der griechische Alexanderroman nach der Handschrift L [Texte zur Forschung, 13]*, Darmstadt 1974).

¹²⁹ According to J. HORNBLOWER, *op. cit.* (n. 26), p. 41: «Diodorus implies that the funeral cortège was destined for Alexandria in Egypt (...)». However, Diodorus clearly states that the original destination was Siwa, but that Ptolemaios decided not to bring the body there.

¹³⁰ Curt. X 10.13; M. PFROMMER, *Alexander der Große. Auf den Spuren eines Mythos (Zaberns Bildbände zur Archäologie. Sonderbände der Antiken Welt)*, Mainz am Rhein 2001, p. 92.

¹³¹ Diod. XVIII 3.5; Just. XIII 4.6; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 160 n. 516; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 13 n. 30.

¹³² M. CARY, *A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.C.*, London 1978 (=1951²), p. 13 n. 2; J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 98 and 111; P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 318; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 123), p. 25 n. 45; R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39),

however, was not taken in 323, but was a later order by Perdikkas, given well after the final settlement at Babylon had been reached¹³³.

Justin (XIII 4.6) has erroneously moved the decision concerning the burial at Siwa to the second stage, when Perdikkas made the compromise with the infantry (1.2). It is highly unlikely that the decision not to bury Alexander at Aigai was part of that agreement as the patriotically minded phalanx would never have accepted such a breach with tradition. Moreover, if there was a previous decision concerning Alexander's burial, the generals certainly would have rediscussed it for the final settlement, as they reconsidered all important issues at this stage, and the royal burial clearly was a matter of the highest interest: the one who controlled the body, could present himself as the true successor¹³⁴.

1.3.2 *The decision-making process*

The decision-making process leading to the final settlement should now be analysed as it is unclear whether we are facing a compromise or whether Perdikkas was able to impose his own will. Curtius (X 10.1), Diodorus (XVIII 3.1) and the *Heidelberger Epitome* ([FGrH 155] F1.2) state that Perdikkas held a council with the other leaders, but they are silent on the way the decisions came about. Plutarch (*Eum.*, 3.3) does not mention Perdikkas: he simply has the generals meeting in a council to distribute the satrapies. Justin (XIII 4.9) and Dexippus (F8.7), on the other

p. 61 n. 19; W.M. ELLIS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 35; A. BERNAND, *Alexandrie la Grande*, Paris 1998², p. 250.

¹³³ R. SCHUBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 182; E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 187; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 64-65; R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 125; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 160 n. 516; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 13 n. 30. Contra: N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 106 and *id.*, *op. cit.* (n. 123), p. 25; W.M. ELLIS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 35.

¹³⁴ R. SCHUBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 180-181: «Wer die Leiche besaß, hatte damit vor den andern Diadochen in dem Kampfe um die Herrschaft einen gewissen Vorsprung»; E. BADIAN, *op. cit.* (n. 50), p. 258; P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 130 and 318; W.S. GREENWALT, *Argaeus, Ptolemy II and Alexander's Corpse*, *AHB* 2 (1988), especially p. 41; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *Arms and the King. The Insignia of Alexander the Great*, *Phoenix* 43 (1989), p. 219-220; A. STEWART, *Faces of Power. Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics* (*Hellenistic Culture and Society*, 11), Berkeley 1993, p. 222 and *id.*, *Alexander in Greek and Roman Art*, in J. ROISMAN (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden 2003, p. 44; J. WHITEHORNE, *Cleopatras*, London 1994, p. 64-65; A. ERSKINE, *Life after Death: Alexandria and the Body of Alexander*, *G&R* 49 (2002), p. 171; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), pp. 59-60; O.B. RADER, *Grab und Herrschaft. Politischer Totenkult von Alexander dem Großen bis Lenin*, München 2003, p. 150-153.

hand, explicitly say that Perdikkas distributed the provinces. According to Arrian (*Succ.*, F1a 5) Perdikkas was in charge, acting ὡς Ἀρριδαίου κελεύοντος, which Appian (*Syr.* 52) phrases as ὑπὸ τῷ βασιλεῖ Φιλίπῳ; this is clearly a legalistic fiction. It does not seem to make sense to consider these differences between the ancient authors as meaningful¹³⁵; probably they simply are the result of the abbreviating activities of the writers. The only conclusion that can be reached on this basis is that there was a meeting and that Perdikkas, from that time onwards the only regent — evidently — made the appointments *de iure*.

Some scholars argue on the basis of Diodorus' text (XVIII 2.4) that the army assembly made or confirmed the decisions¹³⁶. There seems to be some misapprehension here. As I have tried to show above (p. 58-59), Diodorus (XVIII 2.4) has imperceptibly connected the second and third stages of the settlement. His account goes as follows:

(...) οἱ χαριέστατοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπεισαν αὐτοὺς ὁμονοῆσαι. Εὐθὺ δὲ βασιλέα κατέστησαν τὸν Φιλίππου υἱὸν Ἀρριδαῖον καὶ μετωνόμασαν Φίλιππον, ἐπιμελητὴν δὲ τῆς βασιλείας Περδίκκαν, ᾧ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸν δακτύλιον τελευτῶν ἐδεδώκει, τοὺς δὲ ἀξιολογωτάτους τῶν φίλων καὶ σωματοφυλάκων παραλαβεῖν τὰς σατραπείας καὶ ὑπακοῦειν τῷ τε βασιλεῖ καὶ τῷ Περδίκκᾳ.

«(...) The men most inclined toward conciliation persuaded the parties to come to an agreement. Straightaway they made Arrhidaeus, son of Philip, their king and changed his name to Philip; Perdikkas, to whom the king had given his ring as he died, they made regent of the kingdom; and they decided that the most important of the Friends and of the Bodyguard should take over the satrapies and obey the king and Perdikkas».

¹³⁵ Cf. R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 313. Contra: J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 29-35. Justin's use of words like *sortiri*, is — *pace* SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 30 — not to be taken literally: it was the term the Romans used for appointing someone to an office or province, which they happened to do by lot, and Trogus/Justin simply used it for the sake of variation, without caring for accuracy. If one were to take it literally, a contradiction would arise with his statement that Perdikkas attributed the satrapies: see R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 129. Cf. P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 137-138.

¹³⁶ J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 31-32; F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 142-143, 159 and 184; M.B. HATZOPOULOS, *op. cit.* (n. 43), p. 283-284. According to F. GRANIER, *op. cit.* (n. 59), p. 65-66, it is difficult to believe that the army assembly alone decided on the redistribution of satrapies, but on the basis of Diodorus (XVIII 2.4) he concludes that they must have had some part in it. Even if Diodorus' use of the plural ἔταξαν (Diod. XVIII 3.5) has any evidential value, it only proves that the decisions were taken by more than one person, but this might just as well have been the council of nobles as the army assembly.

At first sight this does indeed seem to be a single set of decisions, connected to the compromise between the phalanx and the cavalry and nobles where the army assembly evidently had its say (1.2). Other authors, however, do not mention a redistribution of satrapies before the final settlement. Moreover, Perdikkas' appointment as sole regent clearly belongs to the third stage. The imperceptible splice, then, has to be situated after Arrhidaios' appointment as king¹³⁷. Consequently, I see no reason to assume that the army assembly decided that the satrapies had to be distributed anew and that Perdikkas was to be the only regent¹³⁸.

While we can thus conclude that the distribution of satrapies was arranged in the council of nobles after the execution of Meleagros and his supporters, it remains to be seen whether it was a compromise or a unilateral decision of Perdikkas. It is hard to determine whether the distribution of territories was in Perdikkas' advantage. Justin (XIII 4.9) states that the measure allowed the regent to remove his rivals from court and present the appointments as favours on his part¹³⁹, but at the same time he provided his opponents with a territorial power base. Furthermore, after Meleagros' death many of the generals might have wanted to leave the court, looking for a safer place to try fulfilling their ambitions. On the other hand, Perdikkas' appointment as sole regent clearly constitutes a significant improvement in comparison to the two previous compromises (1.1 and 1.2), the more so since his two main rivals were cut off from direct access to Asia by the creation of the Thracian buffer. The decision to bury Alexander at Siwa, however, was less convenient for Perdikkas because Ptolemaios, as satrap of Egypt, would control that area and thus also the body¹⁴⁰. The fact that Perdikkas had to *de facto* degrade his

¹³⁷ Dexippus (*FGrH* 100) F8.1-2, and the *Heidelberger Epitome* (*FGrH* 155) F1.1-2, show a similar structure.

¹³⁸ Thus also P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 137-138 and 255-256; E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 61 n. 47.

¹³⁹ (...) *inter principes provincias dividit, simul ut et aemulos removeret et munus imperii beneficii sui faceret*. For the first element: see also Arrian (*Succ.*, F1a5). W.L. ADAMS, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 230; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 57, assume that removing rivals was indeed Perdikkas' aim.

¹⁴⁰ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 29), p. 142. R. SCHUBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 181-182, assumes that Siwa was considered neutral ground, but it is clear that in practice Ptolemaios would be the first to seize control of the tomb if it were located there. According to Aelian XII 64, there was a fierce debate because all the generals wanted that Alexander would be buried in their territory. That they all demanded this is certainly exaggerated, but we need not doubt that there actually was a debate. The Alexander Romance (III 34.1, ed. H. VAN THIEL, *op. cit.* [n. 128]) also mentions a debate concerning the place of

father-in-law Atropates by giving the larger part of his satrapy to Peithon, is also a possible indication that the regent was unable to impose his will on all matters.

The execution of the ringleaders responsible for the insurrection of the troops had certainly deterred the phalanx from further opposition to Perdikkas, but it is not sure whether the nobles were equally impressed. Possibly some even left his camp precisely because of this cruel and ruthless action, as Arrian says that from then on mutual suspicion reigned among the Diadochoi¹⁴¹. If all the nobles had united against Perdikkas, he could not have remained regent. However, he certainly had the support of the *somatophylax* Aristonous as well as of his brother Alketas and possibly also of Attalos¹⁴². Eumenes, who had remained neutral at first¹⁴³, might also have joined sides with Perdikkas now as he certainly showed himself a loyal partisan of Perdikkas later¹⁴⁴. The case of the bodyguard Peithon is less clear: he was the one who had taken the initiative to execute Perdikkas' proposal in the first meeting (1.1)¹⁴⁵, but possibly he had only done so in order to reach a compromise, without really belonging to the Perdikkas camp¹⁴⁶. Given the personal ambition he showed later on¹⁴⁷, it is less likely that he unconditionally sided with Perdikkas. Ptolemaios, another bodyguard, had manifestly been an opponent of Perdikkas from

burial, albeit between Persians and Macedonians, where Ptolemaios came up with the solution. W.M. ELLIS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 35, stresses that the other Diadochoi would not have wanted the king to be buried in a remote area only accessible to Ptolemaios, but it is clear that they did decide it nonetheless and Alexander's own wish definitely was a good reason to do so: see above. E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 187 argues that they had to make this decision because the governor of Macedon was an enemy in 323 while Ptolemaios was not. It is clear, however, that Ptolemaios was no friend of Perdikkas either: see above, p. 49-50, and below n. 148.

¹⁴¹ Arr., *Succ.*, F1a5: ἐξ ὧν Περδίκκας ὑποπτος ἐς πάντας ἦν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπόπτευν («For this he was suspected by all and was himself suspicious». Trans. Goralski).

¹⁴² See above, n. 48, for Aristonous; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 172, for Alketas; W. HECKEL, *art. cit.* (n. 24), p. 381, for Attalos. See also the detailed discussion by M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 32-50 on «die 'Großen' in Babylon und ihre 'Parteiung'». His list of Perdikkas' [ibid., p. 48] certainly includes too many names, however.

¹⁴³ Plut., *Eum.* 3.1-2; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 19 and 54. It cannot be ruled out that Eumenes' neutrality was just pretence in order to be able to promote Perdikkas' interests more efficiently.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 53, but I do not see why Seleukos' appointment as chiliarch should necessarily mean that he was part of the Perdikkas party.

¹⁴⁵ Curt. X 7.8.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. R.A. BILLOWS, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴⁷ See W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 277-279.

the beginning¹⁴⁸. Leonnatos, yet another bodyguard, will not have discarded his own ambitions in favour of Perdikkas¹⁴⁹. He and Ptolemaios certainly were not Perdikkas' only opponents, but how numerous the opposition was cannot be determined. In any case, it would not have been wise for Perdikkas not to make any concessions at all when he became sole regent¹⁵⁰. It is, then, rather unlikely that Perdikkas decided everything unilaterally.

Nevertheless, J. Seibert argues that Perdikkas acted omnipotently when distributing the satrapies¹⁵¹. Two of the new satraps were Greeks and according to him, these men could never have pressed their personal claims in a *synedrion* of Macedonians. Ptolemaios was the only satrap with the check of a ὑπαρχος, sc. Kleomenes, and Seibert assumes he would never have accepted this if he had had any input in the decision-making. Furthermore, Seibert argues that the satrapies were distributed according to a well-considered system. Given their Greek origin Laomedon, appointed over Syria, and Eumenes, satrap of Cappadocia, would never have been able to rise against the central government. The old satraps Antigonos (in Phrygia) and Menandros (in Lydia) were deliberately surrounded by new and unimportant men: Philotas (in Cilicia) and Asandros (in Caria). In Seibert's view the new appointment of Leonnatos (in Hellespontine Phrygia) also fits this scheme designed to exclude coalitions of the satraps against the central government. According to him the alternating ordering cannot have come about by mere coincidence.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. B. NIESE, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeroneia I, Geschichte Alexanders des Großen und seiner Nachfolger und der Westhellenen bis zum Jahre 281 v. Chr. (Handbücher der alten Geschichte, II 2)*, Gotha 1893, p. 195; G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17) p. 317; R.A. BILLOWS, *loc. cit.*; A. STEWART, *op. cit.* (n. 134), p. 214; W. HUSS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 83; D. BRAUND, *art. cit.* (n. 54), p. 23. Contra: A. BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, *op. cit.* (n. 42) p. 10; M.J. FONTANA, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 15 and 20; E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 187; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 57. J. ROISMAN, *Ptolemy and his Rivals in his History of Alexander, CQ N.S. 34* (1984), p. 380, argues that even if there was a rift between Ptolemaios and Perdikkas, it ended very soon in any case because Ptolemaios supported Perdikkas in the confrontation with Meleagros. It is clear, however, that there was a grave opposition between both men: see above, p. 49-50. They had indeed buried the hatchet in order to close ranks against Meleagros' party, but as soon as the rebels were eliminated they no longer had any reason to be friends.

¹⁴⁹ P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 164.

¹⁵⁰ G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 317; P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 138; R.M. ERRINGTON, *Geschichte Makedoniens. Von den Anfängen bis zum Untergang des Königreiches*, München 1986, p. 111; A. MEHL, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 21-22; E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 61; M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 27.

¹⁵¹ J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 27-38.

Furthermore, Seibert deems it a significant indication that not all the new satraps were important men who could press their claims to a satrapy and that not all were men distrusted by Perdikkas. Thus, he rejects these two interpretations of the ancient authors.

Seibert's arguments fail to convince. It is indeed unlikely that Greeks were able to successfully claim a satrapy on their own, but they might have been backed by one or more of the leading Macedonians. Thus, Ptolemaios might have stipulated for Laomedon's province: they were good friends, and a man like Ptolemaios will already have understood the strategical importance of Syria in the defence of Egypt before he resided there.

It is remarkable that Ptolemaios was the only satrap who had a ὑπαρχος, but it is not unlikely that he had to make some concessions in exchange for all the decisions to his advantage: the allotment of Egypt, according to Diodorus the best satrapy¹⁵², Laomedon's appointment in Syria — if he had procured it — and Alexander's burial at Siwa. Moreover, Perdikkas might have insisted on retaining Kleomenes in office for his competence in financial matters and his experience in the development of Alexandria — at least as a pretext¹⁵³. Furthermore, there were drawbacks for the other new satraps as well: Lysimachos' satrapy had to a large extent to be (re)conquered and he risked conflict with Antipatros and Krateros; Leonnatos received Hellespontine Phrygia, but Paphlagonia, belonging to the same province under Alexander, was given to Eumenes; the latter, in turn, still had to conquer Cappadocia; Peithon only got a portion of Media as Atropates retained the other part of it; Antipatros and Krateros had to share command, which might cause a power struggle¹⁵⁴. Ptolemaios, then, was certainly not the only one who had to make concessions.

It might have been difficult for Greeks to take personal initiatives against the central government, but there is no reason why Laomedon could not have concluded an alliance with Ptolemaios, and Eumenes —

¹⁵² Diod. XVIII 6.3: σατραπεία πασῶν ἀρίστη καὶ προσόδους ἔχουσα μεγάλη.

¹⁵³ H. KLOFT, *Kleomenes von Naukratis. Probleme eines hellenistischen Wirtschaftsstils*, GB 15 (1988), p. 217, calls Kleomenes an «Organisation- und Finanzgenie»; cf. G. LE RIDER, *Alexandre le Grand. Monnaie, finances et politique (Histoires)*, Paris 2003, p. 253: «Cléomène fut l'un de ces serviteurs qui permirent au Conquérant, par leur dévouement et leur ingéniosité, de réaliser un certain nombre de grands desseins»; B. LEGRAS, *Καθάπερ ἐκ παλαιοῦ. Le Statut de l'Égypte sous Cléomène de Naukratis*, in ID. & J.-C. COUVENHES (edd.), *Transferts culturels et politique dans le monde hellénistique*, Paris 2006, p. 83-101.

¹⁵⁴ R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 55.

if he did not yet belong to the Perdikkas party at that time¹⁵⁵ — might have joined his friend Antigonos¹⁵⁶. The new Macedonian satraps could attach themselves to such coalitions as well. Furthermore, it is not even certain that Philotas was indeed appointed at this time, and if so, it was probably because the previous satrap had died and had not yet been replaced¹⁵⁷. Moreover, Arrian (*Succ.* F 24.2) says that Philotas was a friend of Krateros, and Perdikkas would rather have chosen his own friends if he wanted to be sure they would not rise against him. It is also striking that most satraps simply remained in office: this does not suggest that Perdikkas had developed the kind of system Seibert assumes. For most newly appointed satraps it is possible that Perdikkas indeed nominated them in order to remove his most important rivals: Krateros, Eumenes, Leonnatos, Lysimachos, Peithon, Ptolemaios and maybe even Asandros. Though the conclusion that the new satraps were mainly rivals of Perdikkas cuts across Seibert's argument¹⁵⁸, it does seem to suggest at least some initiative on Perdikkas' behalf. However, it is also possible that — but for some exceptions — only the most important men were able to obtain a satrapal appointment, and these very men were of course also those whom Perdikkas distrusted.

Bosworth has also argued for Perdikkas' omnipotence in distributing the satrapies. In his view, Perdikkas had by the time of the final settlement strengthened his position to such an extent that no-one could oppose him¹⁵⁹. However, his argument seems to be based too much on Perdikkas' relationship with the phalanx which had indeed been gravely intimidated by the executions; the nobles might have been less impressed, and now that the rank and file had been placated, there was no more reason for them to concord with Perdikkas in all respects. There is no reason, then, to assume that they would not have pursued their own ambitions, and — as argued above — Perdikkas could not take the risk of becoming opposed to a large coalition of officers. The only way to avoid this was to make concessions.

Another important argument against Perdikkas' omnipotence is Pausanias' statement (I 6.2) that Ptolemaios was responsible for the partition of

¹⁵⁵ Thus e.g. K. ROSEN, *art. cit.* (n. 80), p. 98: «Erst im Verlauf der weiteren Entwicklung wurde er zum treuesten Anhänger des Perdikkas».

¹⁵⁶ R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 35 n. 60, for the friendship between Eumenes and Antigonos.

¹⁵⁷ See above, n. 100.

¹⁵⁸ J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 38.

¹⁵⁹ A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 56-58.

the empire in 'kingdoms', when opposing to those who wanted to make Arrhidaios king¹⁶⁰. Some scholars have taken Pausanias at face value, and conclude that Ptolemaios wanted to disband Alexander's empire¹⁶¹. The context of the passage, however, shows that Pausanias is misrepresenting the facts and that the passage is actually a garbled reference the events leading to the Babylon settlement. Τοῖς ἐξ Ἀριδαῖον τὸν Φιλίππου τὴν πᾶσαν ἄγουσιν ἀρχὴν situates the action before Arrhidaios was definitively recognised king. Furthermore, it happened before Ptolemaios went to Egypt. The statement cannot refer to Ptolemaios' proposal in the first meeting (1.1) as that was in no way related to any division of the territory¹⁶². Consequently, we are just facing the interpretation of Pausanias who concluded from hindsight that the distribution of satrapies actually meant the eventual break-up of Alexander's empire. The wording ἐς τὰς βασιλείας (...) τὰ ἔθνη νεμηθῆναι accords so well with Appian's (*Syr.*, 52) description of the satrapal division, ἐς σατραπείας ἐνεῖμαντο τὰ ἔθνη, that they must be talking about the same event and clearly share a single source¹⁶³. The only difference between both phrases is the word βασιλεῖαι in Pausanias, but this anachronistic use of the word is not uncommon in our sources on the age of the Successors¹⁶⁴; that Pausanias also says in I 6.3 that Perdikkas wanted to remove Ptolemaios from ἡ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλεία proves that he is making this mistake here because in 320 Ptolemaios was merely satrap of Egypt and not king. Thus, it would seem that according to Pausanias' source Ptolemaios, and not Perdikkas, was the main initiator of the distribution of satrapies. Unless Pausanias has

¹⁶⁰ I 6.2-3: Τελευτήσαντος δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῖς ἐξ Ἀριδαῖον τὸν Φιλίππου τὴν πᾶσαν ἄγουσιν ἀρχὴν ἀντιστὰς αὐτὸς μάλιστα ἐγένετο ἐς τὰς βασιλείας αἴτιος τὰ ἔθνη νεμηθῆναι. [3] Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐς Αἴγυπτον διαβάς (...) [«After the death of Alexander, by withstanding those who would have conferred all his empire upon Aridaeus, the son of Philip, he became chiefly responsible for the division of the various nations into the kingdoms. He crossed over to Egypt in person (...)»]. J. É. WILL, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 24; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 150 n. 466.

¹⁶¹ Thus recently e.g. N.G.L. HAMMOND, *The Nature of the Hellenistic States*, in *Ancient Macedonia VI. Papers Read at the Sixth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, October 15-19, 1996 (Institute for Balkan Studies, 272)*, Thessaloniki 1999, I, p. 483.

¹⁶² Contra: J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 32-33, who thinks that Pausanias simply misrepresents the proposal from the first meeting.

¹⁶³ This is all the more conspicuous as it is a strange phrasing which seems to suggest that the satrapies originated at this moment: see J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 31.

¹⁶⁴ F. BIZIERE, *Comment travaillait Diodore de Sicile*, *REG* 87 (1974), p. 373; N.L. COLLINS, *The Various Fathers of Ptolemy I*, *Mnemosyne* 50 (1997), 443 n. 24. For the satrapy distribution: Nepos, *Eum.* 2.1, who says that the *regna* were distributed among Alexander's friends.

conflated different moments mentioned in his source, this passage also provides another highly interesting insight in the debates for the final settlement, namely that even Arrhidaios' kingship was discussed again.

Some assume that his initiative for the distribution of satrapies is the reason why Ptolemaios is named first in all the lists¹⁶⁵. Probably he preferred having a territorial base of power to staying at court in order to have the best possible position to pursue his personal ambitions. This need not mean that he wanted to disband the empire, whether as an explicit objective or as predictable consequence of his action¹⁶⁶. If Ptolemaios was indeed the main instigator of the distribution, this supports the hypothesis that he stipulated for Laomedon's appointment.

All these elements together indicate that there probably were intense negotiations and that the final settlement with the satrapal division was the result of a compromise rather than of Perdikkas' omnipotence¹⁶⁷. Especially Ptolemaios tried to undermine Perdikkas' power; he obtained the burial of Alexander at Siwa and was the main instigator of the distribution of satrapies. Possibly he already planned to attack Perdikkas from his power base in Egypt, a country easy to defend¹⁶⁸. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that Perdikkas had already decided at this moment to remove Ptolemaios as soon as possible¹⁶⁹.

2. THE REJECTION OF ALEXANDER'S LAST PLANS

After the organisation of the administration comes an episode only known from Diodorus (XVIII 4.1-6): Perdikkas presented Alexander's last plans

¹⁶⁵ G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 317.

¹⁶⁶ W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 150 n. 466, thinks such a policy of «a wide distribution of power (...) would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the empire».

¹⁶⁷ As argued also by R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 57; F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 143; P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 132-141 and 255; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 81; R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 314-315; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 150; O. SCHMITT, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 52 n. 19; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 20.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. É. WILL, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 24: «Si ce renseignement (= Paus. I 6.2) est exact, il implique vraisemblablement que Ptolémée avait quelque idée derrière la tête, et l'on ne se trompera sans doute pas en pensant que ce fut sur sa demande, ou à la suite de ses intrigues, que l'Égypte lui fut attribuée»; W. HUSS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 97: «Höchstwahrscheinlich hatte sich Ptolemaios in der Umgebung des Alexandros befunden, als dieser sich im J. 332/31 in Ägypten aufgehalten hatte. Und vermutlich wird ihm bereits damals klar geworden sein, welche Chancen der Besitz dieses Landes eröffnen konnte».

¹⁶⁹ E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 61-62. According to Diodorus XVIII 14.2 Ptolemaios already knew that Perdikkas was going to try to remove him at the time of his arrival in Egypt. I hope to deal with this in a forthcoming study.

to the army assembly asking whether they should be executed. According to Badian this happened before the final settlement (1.3) because it was not possible to know which commands had to be distributed as long as the plans were not cancelled¹⁷⁰. It is more likely, however, that Perdikkas could only perform such a significant act¹⁷¹ once he had gained the supreme command. Moreover, it was essential for him to have Krateros' mission to Europe confirmed before he cancelled Alexander's instructions on the return to the motherland: it was of prime importance to him that Krateros would leave Asia as soon as possible and not return to Babylon¹⁷².

We do not know the complete contents of the *Hypomnemata* as Diodorus only mentions τὰ μέγιστα καὶ μνήμης ἄξια: the construction of a thousand large warships for the conquest of the West, the building of a road along the African coast all the way to the pillars of Herakles, the building of ports and docks; the erection of six temples of 1500 talents each; *synoikismoι*, transpositions of people from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia, and intermarriage in order to promote the unity of the empire; the completion of Hephaistion's funeral monument; and the construction of a tomb for Philip comparable to the largest Egyptian pyramid. The authenticity of the *Hypomnemata* has long been disputed, but I see no reason to doubt that they were real¹⁷³, regardless of the question

¹⁷⁰ E. Badian, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 202 n. 62; N.G.L. Hammond, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 104. Badian's argument that Diodorus has the *Hypomnemata* episode out of place because it disconnects the so-called 'Gazetteer of Empire' from the division of commands, is obviated by Diodorus' own statement on the reasons for giving the description of the empire (XVIII 5.1): it did not serve as background for the distribution of commands but as a pre-ambule to αἱ μέλλουσαι πράξεις.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Diod. XVIII 4.3 for the significance of the matter; E.M. Anson, *art. cit.* (n. 21), p. 238.

¹⁷² R.M. Errington, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 57 n. 59, also prefers to place the reading of the last plans after the satrapy distribution. A.B. Bosworth, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 59 n. 113, argues that the rejection of the *Hypomnemata* did not mean the renunciation of Krateros' commission to return to Europe. "Ἐκρίναν μηδὲν τῶν εἰρημένων συντελεῖν (XVIII 4.6) indeed only refers to «the specific proposals put to them», but we cannot conclude from Diodorus what all of these were as he only gives a selection (τὰ μέγιστα καὶ μνήμης ἄξια: XVIII 4.4), and the explicit connection of the last plans with Krateros' commissions (XVIII 4.1) suggests that these were part of the proposals put to the soldiers. Since Krateros first had to supervise the ship-building activities in Cilicia (A.B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander. Studies in Historical Interpretation*, Oxford 1988, p. 209-210, it is not surprising that his mission was included in the last plans (cf. *infra*).

¹⁷³ See especially A.B. Bosworth, *op. cit.* (n. 172), p. 185-211. J. Seibert, *Alexander der Große (Erträge der Forschung, 10)*, Darmstadt 1972, p. 7-10 and *id.*, *op. cit.* (n. 71), p. 91, provides a good overview of the debates.

whether the document Perdikkas read to the assembly was written by Alexander as such. Tarn pointed out that the completion of the monument for Hephaistion is an odd element: as the works were already in process, it is quite out of place in a list of plans¹⁷⁴. This observation is the basis of Badian's argument that Perdikkas was responsible for the compilation of the list he presented, containing a well-considered selection from Alexander's plans¹⁷⁵; Hephaistion's monument was then added to the list to prove that it were the king's actual plans, one of which happened to be in process already. Badian assumes that Perdikkas must have adapted the contents of the rest of the list as well¹⁷⁶, but this does not seem necessary: Alexander's plans were megalomaniacal enough¹⁷⁷. Perdikkas wanted the plans to be rejected¹⁷⁸, which has determined the selection process: he tried to present as many projects unpopular with the soldiers as possible. While all of this is not implausible, there might even be a simpler solution as the document with the last plans need not necessarily stem from Alexander's very last months: he might well have made some sort of list before the construction of Hephaistion's monument had started.

Krateros, whom Alexander had sent to Europe with 10,000 veterans in 324, was still in Cilicia when the king died¹⁷⁹. Diodorus (XVIII 4.1) says that the plans Perdikkas had cancelled were those Alexander had entrusted Krateros with in 324¹⁸⁰. By rejecting the plans, Perdikkas wanted to renounce Krateros' mission in Cilicia, so that he would no longer have any reason to stay in Asia and could leave for Europe immediately. Krateros evidently was not absolutely obliged to abide by a decision of the army assembly in Babylon: he could dispute the legitimacy of it since

¹⁷⁴ W.W. TARN, *op. cit.* (n. 123) p. 382; cf. E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 201: «(...) this is the one item in the *Hypomnemata* that cannot be made plausible as such: the completion of a building that had been under construction for eight months could hardly be an item in Alexander's projects».

¹⁷⁵ E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 200-201.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ Cf. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 172), p. 207. Contra: P.A. STADTER, review of Bosworth, *op. cit.* (n. 172), *AJP* 110 (1989), p. 378, who deems the account of the *Hypomnemata* irreconcilable with «the logistical genius indicated by Alexander's previous conquests» because of the impracticability of the plans which he consigns to the realm of «rhetoric, propaganda and fantasy».

¹⁷⁸ Diodorus XVIII 4.2.

¹⁷⁹ A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 172), pp. 208-209; N.G. ASHTON, *Craterus from 324 to 321 B.C.*, in *Ancient Macedonia V. Papers Read at the Fifth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, October 10-15, 1989 (Institute for Balkan Studies, 240)*, Thessaloniki 1993, I, p. 128-129.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 59.

a large part of the army was not in Babylon, but with him Cilicia. Nonetheless, the moral authority of the assembly at Babylon was high: an important part of the soldiers had rejected the plans, and his popularity with these very soldiers constituted Krateros' main asset¹⁸¹. Moreover Perdikkas wanted to avoid Antipatros' crossing to Asia after Krateros' arrival in Europe¹⁸². One of the instructions Alexander had given Krateros was to replace Antipatros as governor of Europe and send the latter to Asia with new recruits¹⁸³. Probably Perdikkas hoped that a struggle for the power in Europe would come about, which would possibly lead to the elimination of one of his rivals without him having to play an active part in it¹⁸⁴. Krateros, however, stayed in Asia until the summer of 322, when he set out to aid Antipatros in the Lamian War; crossing over to Europe immediately after the Babylon settlement would have implied recognition of Perdikkas' supremacy¹⁸⁵. Some scholars assume that Perdikkas also hoped to increase his popularity with the troops by cancelling the expensive plans and showing that he wanted to hear the army's opinion on important matters¹⁸⁶. This is certainly possible, but our ignorance concerning the context of the episode precludes any certitude on the matter.

3. THE OUTCOME OF THE BABYLON SETTLEMENT

The so-called balance of power — some even call it a triumvirate¹⁸⁷ — between Perdikkas, Krateros, and Antipatros seems to be absolutely out

¹⁸¹ A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 172), p. 209-210.

¹⁸² E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 202; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 191; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 128-129; N.G. ASHTON, *art. cit.* (n. 176), p. 129.

¹⁸³ Arr., *Anab.*, VII 12.4. N.G. ASHTON, *art. cit.* (n. 179), p. 126, suggests that Alexander possibly wanted to appoint Antipatros «overall commander, governor and king's representative in Asia — an essential post once the King had left for his western campaign»; cf. M. ZAHRT, *Versöhnen oder Spalten? Überlegungen zu Alexanders Verbanntendekret*, *Hermes* 131 (2003), p. 408. The Alexander testament, a forgery emanating from Ptolemaic propaganda (see above n. 27), seems to offer strong confirmation for this view. According to the testament Antipatros was to be governor of Western-Anatolia after Alexander's death: *Liber de Morte* 117; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 68), p. 28-29. It goes without saying that the testament would be all the more effective if it contained as many elements as possible corresponding to what Alexander actually wanted at the time of his death.

¹⁸⁴ E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 202; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 56; E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 61.

¹⁸⁵ N.G. ASHTON, *art. cit.* (n. 179), p. 129-130.

¹⁸⁶ F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 192-193; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 60.

¹⁸⁷ W.W. TARN, *Alexander's πομπήματα and the 'World-Kingdom'*, *JHS* 41 (1921), p. 4; W. ENSSLIN, *art. cit.* (n. 59), especially p. 298; G. De SANCTIS, *Perdicca, Studi*

of the question. Perdikkas, who had the best position to begin with, being the king's closest companion present in Babylon, immediately tried to gain supremacy while setting his main rivals against each other¹⁸⁸. He succeeded to a large extent as he was appointed sole regent and made Krateros and Antipatros share command in Europe. Bosworth argued that Perdikkas «carefully refrained from a direct challenge to Craterus and Antipater» because he did not dare to confront them¹⁸⁹, but appointing them over the same province must have come across as an attack¹⁹⁰. Perdikkas, thus, had been able to establish his supremacy after the initial resistance of the phalanx had been overcome, but his position was far from secure as nobody could predict the reaction of Antipatros and Krateros and as men like Ptolemaios and Leonnatos were not likely to acquiesce in his supremacy.

There is no trace of the separatist tendencies some scholars have argued for, especially in Ptolemaios' actions. He fiercely opposed Perdikkas, but nothing indicates that he — or any other officer for that matter — thought of disbanding the state¹⁹¹.

italiani di Filologia Classica N.S. 9 (1931), now in A. FERRABINO & S. ACCAME (edd.), *Gaetano De Sanctis. Scritti Minori V, 1931-1947 (Storia e Letteratura, 124)*, Roma 1983, p. 109-112; F. GRANIER, *op. cit.* (n. 59), p. 61-63; P. ROUSSEL, *Le démembrement de l'empire d'Alexandre*, in G. GLOTZ et al., *Histoire Ancienne II, Histoire Grecque IV, Alexandre et l'hellénisation du monde antique 1, Alexandre et le démembrement de son empire*, Paris 1938, p. 262; M. CARY, *op. cit.* (n. 132), p. 2-3; M.J. FONTANA, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 50; H. BENGTSON, *op. cit.* (n. 70), p. 63-81; M. FORTINA, *Cassandro, re di Macedonia*, Torino 1965, p. 15; K. ROSEN, *art. cit.* (n. 80), p. 95-99; O. MÜLLER, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 18; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 195; R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 75, 295 and 299; É. WILL, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 22-23; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 103; R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 56; J. SEIBERT, *Zur Begründung von Herrschaftsanspruch und Herrschaftslegitimierung in der frühen Diadochenzeit*, in ID. (ed.), *Hellenistische Studien. Gedenkschrift für Hermann Bengtson (Münchener Arbeiten zur Alten Geschichte, 5)*, München 1991, p. 87; O. MØRKHOLM, *Early Hellenistic Coinage. From the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea (336-188 B.C.)*, Cambridge 1991, p. 55; W. HECKEL, *art. cit.* (n. 41), p. 89; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 19.

¹⁸⁸ G. Wirth's conclusion [*art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 284; endorsed by M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 32 n. 99] «Perdikkas geht es darum, vorerst eine Instanz zu finden, Einzelpersonlichkeit oder Gremium, welche die Kräfte des Reiches zusammenzuhalten vermag», seems rather naïve. Rathmann (*ibid.*, p. 39) shows more sense of reality when writing on Lysimachos' position: «Da diese Satrapienzuweisung letztlich den politischen Spielraum des Antipatros und Krateros in Europa berührte (...), kann hierin eine bewusste Spitze des Perdikkas gegen Antipatros gesehen werden». This is, however, in contradiction to the views on the relationship between Perdikkas and Antipatros expressed *ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁸⁹ A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 58-60.

¹⁹⁰ A. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 353-354, already pointed this out; cf. R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 59.

¹⁹¹ Although it does not seem to be supported by the sources, the view that there were separatists among the Diadochoi still finds wide acceptance, but it is finally being abandoned

The conclusion that only one regent, being in supreme command of the entire empire, was appointed also disproves the view that Europe and Asia were considered to be two separate βασιλεῖαι¹⁹². It should now be clear that both kings were considered to hold sway over the entire empire¹⁹³. The joint kingship only emerged as a compromise between the phalanx and the nobles: it has no constitutional significance¹⁹⁴. If Arrhidaios stayed in Asia, this was because he was king of the entire Macedonian empire; there was no such thing as the council of regents for Alexander IV which Miltner concocted, and even if it did exist, the feeble-minded Arrhidaios would not have been part of it. That documents were dated by the years of Arrhidaios in Asia too, can only mean that his kingship covered that area as well. Likewise, the fact that both kings always stayed together, either in Asia or in Europe, can only mean that they were both kings of the entire empire, in spite of Miltner's ingenious explanations.

by some scholars: E.S. GRUEN, *The Coronation of the Diadochoi*, in J.W. EADIE & J. OBER (edd.), *The Craft of the Ancient Historian. Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr*, Lanham 1985, p. 253-271; E.D. CARNEY, *The Sisters of Alexander the Great: Royal Relics*, *Historia* 37 (1988), p. 402; H.S. LUND, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 51-52; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 246-247; W.L. ADAMS, *art. cit.* (n. 40), p. 28-35; A. MEEUS, *De territoriale ambities van de diadochen in de eerste jaren na de dood van Alexander de Grote (323-320 v.C.)*, forthcoming in *Koninklijke Zuidnederlandse Maatschappij voor Taal- en Letterkunde en Geschiedenis: Handelingen* 61 (2007).

¹⁹² This view has been argued most elaborately by F. MILTNER, *Die staatsrechtliche Entwicklung des Alexanderreiches*, *Klio* 26 (1933), p. 47-51, and H. BENGTON, *op. cit.* (n. 70), p. 63-81. It was endorsed most recently by W. HECKEL, *art. cit.* (n. 41), p. 89. M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 19-20 n. 53, provides good arguments against the view of a constitutionally defined 'Doppelkönigtum'. See also Diod. XVIII 41.5-7 and 50.2 where Antigonos, the στρατηγός of Asia, is clearly subordinate to the regents Antipatros and Polyperchon.

¹⁹³ On the status of the kings: see C. HABICHT, *Literarische und epigraphische Überlieferung zur Geschichte Alexanders und seiner ersten Nachfolger*, in *Akten des VI. Internationalen Kongresses für Griechische und Lateinische Epigraphik*. München 1972 (*Vestigia*, 17), München 1973, p. 370-377; W. HECKEL, *IG II² 561 and the Status of Alexander IV*, *ZPE* 40 (1980), p. 249-250; E. ARENA, *La titolatura regale nella macedonia ellenistica: i βασιλεῖς Filippo III e Alessandro IV nelle fonti letterarie ed epigrafiche (323-317 a.C.)*, in *Ancient Macedonia VI. Papers Read at the Sixth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, October 15-19, 1996* (*Institute for Balkan Studies*, 272), Thessaloniki 1999, I, p. 77-98; P. FUNKE, *Philippos III. Arrhidaios und Alexandros IV. "von Amun auserwählt"*, in V. ALONSO TRONCOSO (ed.), *op. cit.* (n. 38), p. 45-56. The possible adaptation of Persian elements at Arrhidaios' court would also indicate that he was considered king of both Europe and Asia: see S.A. PASPALAS, *Philip Arrhidaios at Court – An Ill-Advised Persianism? Macedonian Royal Display in the Wake of Alexander*, *Klio* 87 (2005), p. 72-101.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 238: «The compromise that was reached at Babylon (joint kingship of Philippos Arrhidaios and Rhoxane's son) was not so much a constitutional as a political one».

After more than a month of struggle between infantry and nobles, and among the nobles themselves, the Macedonian empire finally had a government it could move on with. However, it remained to be seen whether and how long everybody would be prepared to abide by the agreements.

B-3000 Leuven

Alexander MEEUS

Onderzoekseenheid Oude Geschiedenis

APPENDIX

OVERVIEW OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN IN THE THREE STAGES¹⁹⁵

(1.1) The first compromise of the nobles (Curt. X 7.8; Just. XIII 2.14)

- Alexander's child king if it would be a son
- Perdikkas and Leonnatos regent
- Antipatros and Krateros governor of Europe

(1.2) The compromise between nobles and phalanx

- Philippos III joint king with Alexander's child if it would be a son (Just. XIII 4.2-3; Arr., *Succ.*, F1a1[?])
- Perdikkas, Krateros, and Meleagros regent (προστάτης), with Perdikkas commanding the cavalry (being χιλίαρχος), Meleagros the infantry, and Krateros administering the finances (Just. XIII 4.5; Arr., *Succ.*, F1a3; Curt. X 8.22) [Dex. F8.4]
- Antipatros governor of Europe (Just. XIII 4.5; Arr., *Succ.*, F1a3)

(1.3) The final settlement of the nobles

- Philippos III joint king with Alexander's child if it would be a son (Dex. F8.1)
- Perdikkas sole regent (Diod. XVIII 2.4; Curt. X 10.4; Dex. F8.1; *Heidelberg Epitome* F1.2)
- Seleukos χιλίαρχος (Diod. XVIII 3.4; Just. XIII 4.7; App., *Syr.*, 57; Libanius, *Or.* XI 79)
- Antipatros and Krateros governor of Europe (Diod. XVIII 3.2; Arr. F1a7; Dex. F8.3)
- satrapy distribution (Diod. XVIII 3.1-3; Just. XIII 4.10-25; Curt. X 10.1-4; Arr., *Succ.*, F1a5-7; Dex. F8.2-7)
- Alexander's burial at Siwa (Diod. XVIII 3.5) [Just. XIII 4.6]

¹⁹⁵ If, according to the present reconstruction, a source mentions a decision in the wrong place, the reference is given between square brackets.