INSTITUTES OF ELENCTIC THEOLOGY

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VOLUME 1
FIRST THROUGH TENTH TOPICS

P U B L I S H I N G
P.O.BOX 817 • PHILLIPSBURG • NEW JERSEY 08865-0817

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The editor acknowledges permission from the following publishers to use excerpts from their publications:

Baker Book House, for material from Francis Turretin, *The Doctrine of Scripture*. Translated and edited by John W. Beardslee III. Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1981.

Harvard University Press, for material from the Loeb Classical Library.

Horace: Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica. Translated by H. Rushton Fairclough. 1929.

Juvenal and Persius. Translated by G.G. Ramsey. 1979.

Ovid: Fasti. Translated by James G. Frazer. 1976.

Prudentius. Translated by H.J. Thomson. 1949.

Hesiod. Translated by Hugh G. Evelyn-White. 1914.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*. Translated by H. Rackham. 1972.

_____. *De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinitatione*. Translated by William A. Falconer. 1971.

Pliny, *Natural History*. Translated by H. Rackham. 1967.

Virgil. Translated by H. Rushton Fairclough. 1974.

Seneca, *Moral Essays*. Translated by John W. Basore. 1970.

Manufactured in the United States of America.
Typesetting by Thoburn Press, Box 2459, Reston, Virginia 22090.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Turrettini, François, 1623-1687.
[Institutio theologiae elencticae. English]
Institutes of elenctic theology / by Francis Turretin ; translated by George Musgrave Giger ; edited by James T. Dennison, Jr.
p. cm.
Translation of: Institutio theologiae elencticae.
Contents: v. 1. First through tenth topics.
ISBN-10: 0-87552-451-6 (v. 1)
ISBN-13: 978-0-87552-451-1 (v. 1)
1. Reformed Church—Doctrines—Early works to 1800. 2. Theology, Doctrinal—Early works to 1800. 3. Catholic Church—Controversial literature—Early works to 1800. I. Giger, George Musgrave.
II. Dennison, James T., 1943- . III. Title.
BX9421.T7913 1992
230'.42—dc20 92-10128

To

SHARON LYNN

Quam pulchra es amica mea!
Quam pulchra es!
Quam pulchra es, et quam decora,
Carissima, in deliciis!

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TABLES OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLITERATION

GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS

*	Corrected citation
+	Citation cannot be identified or located as cited by Turretin
AA	Josephus, *Against Apion*. Translated by H.St.J. Thackeray. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926.
ACW	*Ancient Christian Writers*. New York: Newman Press, 1946- .
AJ	Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*. Translated by H.St.J. Thackeray, R. Marcus and L.H. Feldman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928-31.
ANF	Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, eds. *Ante-Nicene Fathers*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1969-73.
BT	I. Epstein, ed., *The Babylonian Talmud*. London: Soncino Press, 1935-52.
CCSL	*Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina*. Turnholt: Brepols, 1953- .
CG	Augustine, *City of God*. Translated by Demetrius B. Zema and Gerald G. Walsh. New York: Fathers of the Church, 1950-54.
CI	Augustine, *Christian Instruction*. Translated by John J. Gavigan. New York: Cima Publishing Co., 1947.
CR	*Corpus Reformatorum*. Berlin: C.A. Schwetschke, 1834- .
CSCO	*Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*. Paris: Reipublicae, n.d.
Cochrane	A.C. Cochrane, *Reformed Confessions of the 16th Century*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966.
FC	*Fathers of the Church*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.
Hefele	Charles J. Hefele, *A History of the Councils of the Church*. 5 vols. New York: AMS Press, 1883/1972.
ICR	John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. 2 vols. Edited by John T. McNeill. Translated by Ford L. Battles. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960.
JW	Josephus, *The Jewish War*. Translated by H.St.J. Thackeray. Cambridge University Press, 1926-29.

LCC	John Baillie, John T. McNeill and Henry P. Van Dusen, eds. *Library of Christian Classics*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953-66.
Lauchert	Friedrich Lauchert, *Die Kanones der Wichtigsten Altkirchlichen Concilien*. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1896/1961.
Mansi	Giovan D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum*. Paris: H. Welter, 1901-27.
NPNF1	Philip Schaff, ed. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1956.
NPNF2	Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, eds. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1952.
PG	Jacques Paul Migne. *Patrologiae . . . series Graeca*. Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1857-87.
PL	Jacques Paul Migne, *Patrologiae . . . series Latina*. Paris: Garnieri Fratres, 1878.
ST	Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*. 3 vols. New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947-48.
Schaff	Philip Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*. 3 vols. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1931.
Schroeder	*Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*. Translated by Henry J. Schroeder. St. Louis: Herder, 1941.
VD	Robert Bellarmine, "De Controversiis: Prima Controversia Generalis —De Verbo Dei," in *Opera Omnia*. Vol. 1. Neapoli: Josephum Giuliano, 1856.

HEBREW TRANSLITERATION TABLE

א	'	ל	l
ב	bh	מ	m
בּ	b	נ	n
ג	gh	ס	s
גּ	g	ע	‘
ד	dh	פ	ph
דּ	d	פּ	p
ה	h	צ	ts
ו	v	ק	q
ז	z	ר	r
ח	ch	שׂ	s
ט	t	שׁ	sh
י	y	ת	th
כ	kh	תּ	t
כּ	k		

GREEK TRANSLITERATION TABLE

α	a	σ, ς	s
β	b	τ	t
γ	g	υ	y
δ	d	φ	ph
ε	e	χ	ch
ζ	z	ψ	ps
η	ē	ω	ō
θ	th	ῥ	rh
ι	i	῾	h
κ	k	γγ	ng
λ	l	γκ	nk
μ	m	γξ	nx
ν	n	γχ	nch
ξ	x	αυ	au
ο	o	ευ	eu
π	p	ου	ou
ρ	r	υι	yi

Scripture Abbreviations

Old Testament

Genesis	Gen.
Exodus	Ex.
Leviticus	Lev.
Numbers	Num.
Deuteronomy	Dt.
Joshua	Jos.
Judges	Jdg.
Ruth	Ruth
1 Samuel	1 S.
2 Samuel	2 S.
1 Kings	1 K.
2 Kings	2 K.
1 Chronicles	1 Ch.
2 Chronicles	2 Ch.
Ezra	Ezr.
Nehemiah	Neh.
Esther	Est.
Job	Job
Psalms	Ps.
Proverbs	Prov.
Ecclesiastes	Ecc.
Song of Solomon	Cant.
Isaiah	Is.
Jeremiah	Jer.
Lamentations	Lam.
Ezekiel	Ezk.
Daniel	Dan.
Hosea	Hos.
Joel	Joel
Amos	Am.
Obadiah	Ob.
Jonah	Jon.
Micah	Mic.
Nahum	Nah.
Habakkuk	Hab.
Zephaniah	Zeph.
Haggai	Hag.
Zechariah	Zech.
Malachi	Mal.

Apocrypha

Tobit	Tob.
Judith	Jud.
Wisdom of Solomon	Wis. Sol.
Baruch	Bar.
1 Maccabees	1 Mac.
2 Maccabees	2 Mac.

New Testament

Matthew	Mt.
Mark	Mk.
Luke	Lk.
John	Jn.
Acts	Acts
Romans	Rom.
1 Corinthians	1 Cor.
2 Corinthians	2 Cor.
Galatians	Gal.
Ephesians	Eph.
Philippians	Phil.
Colossians	Col.
1 Thessalonians	1 Thess.
2 Thessalonians	2 Thess.
1 Timothy	1 Tim.
2 Timothy	2 Tim.
Titus	Tit.
Philemon	Philem.
Hebrews	Heb.
James	Jam.
1 Peter	1 Pet.
2 Peter	2 Pet.
1 John	1 Jn.
2 John	2 Jn.
3 John	3 Jn.
Jude	Jd.
Revelation	Rev.

EDITOR'S PREFACE

George Musgrave Giger's translation of Francis Turretin's *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae* was a labor of love. In response to a request from his friend Professor Charles Hodge of Princeton Theological Seminary, Giger wrote out an English translation of the *Institutio* which spanned eight thousand handwritten pages. Giger had served as classics professor at Princeton University (College of New Jersey) from 1847 to 1865. Here he labored in Greek and Latin. His Turretin manuscript was placed at the desk in the library of the seminary in order for students to examine the appropriate pages assigned in Dr. Hodge's systematic theology classes. Portions of the Giger translation have appeared in typescript previously. Yet the entire translation has never been printed, although numerous persons have pleaded this cause over the years. The present project is an attempt to give Giger his due.

Giger's translation is quite literal and faithful to the original. The strength of his work is the strict adherence to Turretin's style. There is not much periphrastic translating here. The scholastic style with its awkward phrasing, bulky subordinate clauses and stilted form is evident in Giger's rendition. For readers who wish to explore scholastic Latin terms as an aid to understanding Turretin's technical vocabulary, I heartily recommend Richard A. Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology* (Baker, 1985) and the "Glossary" compiled by Richard McKeon, *Selections From Medieval Philosophers* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), 2:422-506. Turretin was fond of using sentence fragments particularly when summarizing a series of points or subdividing several explanations of a main thought. Hence the reader should expect incomplete sentences throughout the translation. My editorial work on Giger's manuscript has attempted to preserve the fidelity of his translation while, at the same time, improving upon its readability. To that end, sentences have been shortened where possible, parentheses have been used (for what appear to be obvious asides in Turretin's arguments), some archaic phrases have been revised and more modern terms chosen. The reader must understand that some of the tinkering is subjective, based on my judgment of readability. However, I have always attempted to remain faithful to both the spirit of Giger's English and Turretin's Latin.

In the course of editing the English version, it became obvious that several matters needed to be addressed. First, the version Giger was using was the 1847 Edinburgh/New York edition. This was a reprint of the 1688-90 version with corrections in a few Scripture citations. So far as I have been able to determine, the text of this nineteenth-century version does not differ from the 1696 printing (which, in turn, was a reprint of the 1679-85 original version in three volumes), except in the matter of a few Scripture citations (this is also valid for the 1688-90 version which I have been able to examine). The 1679-85 version was reprinted in 1680-86 (also in three volumes). A "new edition checked for accuracy and enlarged in many places" appeared in 1682-88 (three volumes). This corrected

and enlarged version was reprinted in three volumes in 1688-90. The 1696 reprint of the 1679-85 version was the first to include the *encomium* of Melchoir Leydekker and the ode of Adrian Reeland. This version was again reprinted in 1701 (three volumes). There was another printing in 1734: a three-volume set of the *Institutio* and a four-volume set which added Turretin's *Disputationes* (as volume 4) in order to make up an *Opera*. This *Opera* was the basis of the complete Edinburgh/New York printing—volume 4 being released in 1848.

The version you are holding represents corrections and additions of various kinds to the 1847 edition. All Scripture quotations have been checked and corrected where necessary (* indicates a correction to the 1847 edition). In addition, Turretin frequently cites Scripture passages by chapter only. Hence, I have attempted to provide the appropriate verses of the chapter from the context of Turretin's remarks. Scripture quotations are based on the King James Version.

The second major consideration was the matter of Turretin's quotations from other authors. In view of Turretin's voluminous knowledge of classical authors, early church fathers, medieval Scholastics, Reformation authors, Arminians, Socinians and counter-Reformation Roman Catholic polemicists, it seemed wise to attempt to examine his citations and provide full bibliographical data for his sources. I felt that this would make Turretin even more useful to the reader who wishes to pursue the great Genevan's argument by means of the references cited.

Consequently, I have attempted to identify, verify, correct and fully cite all quotations (and some allusions) Turretin makes from other authors. The process of identification has generated a dictionary catalogue of personalities which numbers more than one thousand individuals. This dictionary, which will be included in volume 3 of our set, contains first name, last name, alternate names (if any), dates of birth and death, and reference to a dictionary or encyclopedia which contains an article on the career of that individual.

Verification of Turretin's quotations has necessitated extensive use of on-line bibliographical databases (i.e., the Library of Congress via OCLC), indexes and concordances (especially the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* [TLG] produced by the University of California at Irvine and the Latin language database developed by the Packard Humanities Institute of Los Altos, California) and the cooperation of numerous libraries. In the process of examining his citations, it became evident that Turretin sometimes paraphrased his source or perhaps quoted the source from memory. Hence, a minority of the citations are not literal quotations from the work cited. This has led to some problematic identifications on my part (noted with a ? in the citation).

Where possible, I have cited Turretin's sources with English editions of the work. For citations from the church fathers, the appropriate section of Migne's *Patrologiae Graecae* (PG) or *Patrologiae Latinae* (PL) have been provided. As per the original, citations have been incorporated into the body of the text, not relegated to footnotes. Corrections of Turretin's citations are indicated by an *. No doubt, many of these errors are due to typesetting mistakes, i.e., the result of transposition, misreading or outright error on the part of the original typesetter(s).

Citations have been entered in a way which accurately locates Turretin's quotation. Sometimes I have provided more information about book, chapter and section than he does, thus enabling the reader to find the precise location of the quotation. Greek and Hebrew words and phrases have been transliterated

according to the table in the front of this volume. Turretin used only unpointed Hebrew expressions. I have followed his custom in this regard and have not attempted to supply vowel points. Abbreviations for series, frequently cited works, books of the Bible, etc. will be found in the table of abbreviations.

About 4 percent of the citations have not been identified (indicated by a + beside Turretin's allusion). In some cases, I have not been able even to identify the work Turretin is citing from standard American, British and foreign union catalogues (i.e., National Union Catalogue, British Museum Catalogue, etc.). In other cases, I have not been able to locate the words he is citing (or a reasonable paraphrase thereof) in the place he indicates. In these cases, I have inserted the citation exactly as it is found in the 1847 edition. If any of my readers discovers sources (or corrections) for these citations, please contact me at Westminster Theological Seminary, 1725 Bear Valley Parkway, Escondido, CA 92027.

The publication of the *Institutio* will take three volumes. We will be following the divisions of the 1847 edition: topics 1-10 (volume 1), topics 11-17 (volume 2), topics 18-20 (volume 3). The third volume will also include indexes of subjects, Scripture, Hebrew, Greek, and proper names, as well as a translation of Benedict Pictet's "Funeral Oration"—one of the primary sources of information on the life of Turretin. I also plan to add a sketch of Turretin's remarkable career with comments on his influence. Finally, a complete bibliography of works cited by Turretin will be included together with OCLC numbers for ease of location. In this way, what Hodge, Giger and old Princeton found to be so useful may, by the grace of God, be made all the more so to the church and academy today.

Anno Domini 1992 *Dei Gratia*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First mention is due Dr. John H. Gerstner. While I was a student at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, Dr. Gerstner introduced me to Francis Turretin. The excerpts from the *Institutio* which Dr. Gerstner had prepared for his course on Turretin were sufficient to whet my appetite. It took many years for plans for the present project to mature and come together in the providence of God. Sharon Taylor, at the time Assistant to the Librarian at Princeton Theological Seminary, arranged for a photocopy of the Giger translation. Judy Ashcraft first labored to reduce the handwritten version to typescript via word processor. Anna Whitten completed the task and has continued to input corrections and additions. The Board and Faculty of Westminster Theological Seminary in California granted a study leave in 1988 enabling me to make significant progress in preparing the manuscript for publication. Bryce Craig and Thom Notaro of Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company have provided encouragement, equipment and needed advice. Catherine Drown has given her time in order to help with proofreading.

But a very special lady has aided in ways which can never be fully estimated. Grace Mullen, Archivist and Acting Director of the Montgomery Library of Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, has provided answers, searched through reference collections, sent books and microfilm and done numerous other chores cheerfully and accurately. I have appropriately dubbed her America's equivalent to Sherlock Holmes. Thanks so much, Gracie!

Many others have given their time and energy to this project. I shall attempt to acknowledge them more fully in the index volume to this set (projected to be volume 3).

SOLI DEO GLORIA!

TURRETIN'S DEDICATION

Most magnificent, noble and honored men of the consul and all the Senate of the celebrated Republic of Geneva, health and all happiness is desired for you from Francis Turretin.

As often as I think of the state of this republic, at whose helm God has stationed you, most distinguished nobles, so many great miracles occur to me by which it has become famous that what the divine poet formerly sung concerning Jerusalem, no one will deny can be predicated not undeservedly concerning it: "Glorious things are spoken of thee, O city of God." Small indeed, I confess, and scarcely another less among the thousands of Judah, if the advantages of nature are regarded; great, however, and scarcely another greater if the gifts of God are attended to. But although the blessings are innumerable which God, with a liberal hand, has thus far poured out and this day pours out upon it; yet there are two illustrious above the others which commend its dignity: religion, than which nothing is more holy, and liberty, than which nothing is sweeter. This is, as it were, another Goshen, which the rays of the sun of righteousness illumine, while the Egypt of the world is covered with the more than Cimmerian darkness of errors; another Tsohar, small, but secure, in which the pious find a pleasing asylum, while the destructive fire of the divine judgment burns and feeds upon many other regions of the world; a true Bethshemesh and Heliopolis, house and city of the sun, where that visible sun is no longer worshipped (which is reported to have been done here in Gentilism by a tradition no less constant than concordant).

But the divine dayspring from on high is adored, Christ the Lord, who is our sun and shield; the sun of every blessing, asserting the glory of religion; the shield of the most safe protection, affording an invincible and inexpugnable guard to liberty. Both of these (the greatest glories of Geneva) supply the most just argument for celebrating the admirable providence of God towards us. For who is not amazed that in those most serious convulsions of almost the whole of Europe in which scarcely any region has been free from war (none of which has not felt its most dreadful effects), yet we thus far almost alone in this corner of the earth enjoying a halcyon peace have remained untouched and unrestrained. Meanwhile others are compelled with deepest grief to behold devastated fields, cities taken and sacked, villages burned, provinces cut off and other lamentable, direful and dreadful concomitants of war. Torn away from their paternal habitations they miserably wander as exiles and stragglers. Under our own vine and fig tree, we tranquilly eat our bread and enjoy the profoundest peace.

Truly we would be the most ungrateful of mortals did we not consider this liberty and peace to be the pure blessing of God, who watches for our salvation. He alone has produced and produces this ease for us. He who was first the author of so great a gift, willed afterwards to be the supporter and conservator of the same. For who else could have unveiled the artifices of so many conspirators and traitors beyond all expectation of men? Who else could have expelled and frustrated so many incursions and nefarious attempts? The lovers of hiero-

glyphics, when about to represent providence sustaining all things, were accustomed ingenuously to paint a city supported by no prop, pendulous in mid air, sustained by a large arm stretched out of heaven. Our Geneva, not shadowy and emblematically but truly, is that city sustained by the hand of God alone; not by human means or assistance: "Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord" (Zech. 4:6).

But far greater and more illustrious ought that other benefit to be regarded which is the principal foundation of the divine protection under whose shade we thus far safely repose (viz., heavenly truth and the deposit of a purer religion with which inestimable gift God willed to bless us). Through it—the tyranny of the Roman Antichrist having been cast down, error triumphed over, superstition put to flight, idols overthrown, darkness scattered—that saving light which even long ago was hoped for after the darkness, has happily arisen upon those who were lying in the darkness of the shadow of death. Happy hills which God has loved so much as to place the golden candlestick of truth—from these the rays of divine truth diffused in every direction have lit up a great part of the world; favored state and church which Christ has thought worthy of so great honor as to consecrate it for the resting place of the ark, the seat of the gospel and the sanctuary of his name. However hated by the world, she may perceive the fury and rage of the devil and of Antichrist more and more excited against her. Yet beloved by God and dear to him as the pupil of his eye, she sweetly takes refuge under the shadow of his wings, joyfully rejoicing not only in her own good things, but imparting these favors to many others also so that she deserved the appellation of either the mother or the nurse of these who professed that they owed to this our state after God their own origin or increase. But in this respect she is most especially happy—that by the special favor of God she always enjoys the wonderful privilege of the Reformation and has preserved thus far unimpaired the most precious of religion (*keimēlion*) committed to her. This is our glory, this our crown, by which we are well distinguished above many other people of the earth to whom he has denied similar grace: we are marked by the glorious name of the property of God and the Holy Lion.

Since, in truth, nothing should be more important to us than the constant and faithful custody of so great a benefit (with a grateful commemoration of it towards God the bestower), it was, most distinguished nobles, the unwearied desire of your pious ancestors, who, as the best nurses of the church, always held it among their first cares to support strenuously the cause of religion no less than that of liberty, that it might be preserved pure and free from all contagion of errors: most wisely judging it to be not so much the palladium in which Troy nor the heaven descended (*ouranopetes*) shield in which Rome formerly gloried, as the ark of the covenant, the indubitable pledge of God's presence (upon the retention and conservation of which the security and happiness of the republic as well as of the church depend).

It would be a long story to recount with what monstrous errors that most base enemy of the human race, in a former age, strove to obscure and at the same time to extinguish the light of the renascent gospel—not only by sworn foes of the Reformation, who endeavored to draw it back under the pristine yoke of Anti-Christian bondage, but also by perfidious Sinons, who, living in its bosom under the plausible but false pretext of cherishing and illustrating religion, at-

tempted to introduce into doctrine the faith of deadly opinions. With wonderful felicity by the vigilance of your ancestors, the Lord liberated it. Your annals testify by what numerous and great stratagems the divine work of the Reformation was attacked almost from its cradle; with what rage of profane and factious persons the holy discipline of morals was besieged and how often the purity of evangelical truth was assailed.

At one time, this was attempted by the fanatical rabble of the Anabaptists, who in the year 1536, immediately after the commencement of the Reformation, made a disturbance here. Afterwards it was the deceitful arts (more changeable than Proteus) and most iniquitous calamities of Peter Caroli, the impudent Sophist. Then again the destructive corruptions of the word of God and orthodox doctrine by Sebastian Castellio, the leader of modern semi-Pelagians; by the most base contrivances of Gruet, a turbulent man, throwing together into the same hodgepodge of errors Samosatenianism with Manichaeism. After that, in the year 1551, by the impiety of Jerome Bolsec who labored to corrupt the sacred doctrine of predestination and saving grace with Pelagian poison. At length, it was attempted by the horrible blasphemies of Michael Servetus, not a man, but a monster of all wickedness, in reference to the adorable mystery of the holy Trinity. This most abandoned man, although often warned, did not cease disgorging the most pestiferous poison among the common people, which he had already scattered for many years in the celebrated places of Europe. At length being thrown into prison and persevering in his diabolical obstinacy, he suffered the most just punishment of execrable impiety in the year 1553. Still Satan (so often vanquished) did not cease to renew the strife and to excite new masters of impiety afterwards: such as Valentine Gentilis, Paul Alciatus and other disciples of the same fraternity with the most impure Servetus. In the year 1558, these joined together the error of the Tritheists with Samosatenianism and Arianism (i.e., monsters with monsters). These the authority of your predecessors firmly restrained and happily put to flight, so that always with great praise, they approved themselves to be "strenuous and hearty defenders of the cause of piety," the honorable utterance which that most distinguished man of God, Calvin, formerly used concerning them.

That this is also your principal care, most watchful fathers of your country, your zeal and piety do not suffer us to doubt. For indeed you have remembered that dominion is strengthened by piety and righteousness according to the oracle of the wisest of kings; and that your rule never could be happy and well ordered unless you took care that by the word of God, his authority should always avail with you and that Christ himself should reign through you. You have remembered that here might be not so much an aristocracy as a theocracy, having God always for its president and ruler; and that the safety of the republic, which should always be the supreme law, could not be better consulted than by defending those two impregnable ramparts—the culture of pure religion and the pious care of nurturing the church, which God has committed to the protection of your wings. This has been so accomplished thus far by you that not only has religion remained here uncontaminated by any corruption of error and superstition through the special favor of God, but nothing besides has been changed in the purer doctrine once received here, which you have bound yourselves always religiously to be retained. Go on, Lords, constantly in this sacred purpose and cause, by your pious and unwearied vigilance, these good things to be perpetual

to us; so that under your auspices this republic may always be happy and flourishing in piety even to the latest posterity. This undoubtedly you can hope from God, who has promised to be a guard of those cities which would be the seats of truth and the refuge of the pious as long as you will always be solicitous about religiously worshipping and retaining him and promoting his glory above all things; as long as you will take care that among your citizens piety and justice, the love of religion and of country, love and the holy concord of souls shall flourish, and vices (too many in this most corrupt age even in the growing church) be severely repressed; as long as by our zeal this city shall truly correspond to her name "Reformed," as much with respect to integrity of morals as to purity of doctrine (and, that I may speak the word, the "city of God" and true *chptsybhh*, in which shall be the good pleasure of God).

However because this care belongs not only to the rulers of the republic and the chief men, but more closely touches those who minister in sacred things (whom the supreme arbiter of things employs for his work), we cannot sufficiently admire his provident care over us in choosing here for himself a seat of truth. So he never forsook his own work, sending faithful and energetic laborers into his harvest who, furnished with eminent gifts, should begin courageously the divine work of purging religion and when begun should carry it forward unto perfection. Everyone knows how much Geneva owes to the labors of those remarkable servants of God, William Farel and Peter Viret, whom God willed to use in laying the foundations of the Reformation; but especially to the most fervent zeal and indefatigable diligence of that greatest and never-to-be-sufficiently-praised theologian, John Calvin. He was well known (*tou pany*) by his most ardent zeal and unwearied diligence. Furnished wonderfully with a heroic spirit, a most acute judgment and profound erudition, God unexpectedly called him to his work at Geneva in the most difficult times. God willed his labor to be happily expended in establishing a purer doctrine and discipline of morals (yet not without great contests).

Their followers, who held the lamp after them, always proposed this to themselves before other things, that "impure babblings" (*bebēlois kainophōniais*) and "erroneous teaching" (*heterodidaskaliais*) being rejected (which the apostle denounces) that most sacred trust (*parakatathēkēn*), which they have received unimpaired from their ancestors, they also might religiously preserve unimpaired and transmit to their successors. Since we, by the grace of God, even now enjoy this singular benefit, we could not escape the guilt of the heaviest crime if we should suffer this glory and crown to be snatched from us and if those who succeed to the labors of such men should not be solicitous to press faithfully in their footsteps. Indeed let me say something about myself.

From the time that God wished me by your remarkable favor to be elevated to the honorable position which I have occupied for about thirty years (although I always felt myself far unequal to such a burden, and the consciousness of my own feebleness easily persuaded me how inferior I was to those great men who preceded us here), yet I can solemnly testify before God that no other object was ever proposed to me than that I might always follow my predecessors, not with the same steps, but in the same way and according to my ability tread in their footsteps, though not with equal paces. Nor did I believe that I could better adorn the place which I have found and satisfy the conscience of the oath by which I was

bound in the office entrusted to me than if I should strive solely for this—that the youth committed to me might be imbued with a purer theology and with the sober and solid doctrine here.

To this course (although of my own accord disposed), the domestic example of the two faithful servants of Christ connected with me by blood also impelled me. I mean the great theologian John Diodati, my maternal uncle, whose name (most celebrated through the whole world) and work on the sacred Scriptures (most praised and most worthy of the cedar, to mention no other) demonstrate the illustrious man. Also Benedict Turretin, my most dear parent, of blessed and most beloved memory who, snatched away by a premature and most regretted death, obtained the praise of an accurate and solid theologian, as both fame (I being silent) proclaims and his writings testify. Excited by these more and more to duty, I have always considered that this one thing should be done by me—that vain and useless questions being dismissed (which feed curiosity, but do not minister to faith), I should compose all my works after the sacred cynosure of the word and set before the youth consecrated to God the "pure rational milk" (*logikon adolon gala*) by which they might advance every day in the truth which is according to piety and prepare themselves for the work of the ministry. Such is the object of this production, the first part of which comes into light. At first, it was intended for the use of our scholars and rudely sketched. I am not so much voluntarily moved as in certain measure compelled to give it to the public in order to satisfy the frequent and reiterated demands of those who supposed that some advantage would thus be given to the guardians of sacred things in the easier development of the controversies waged with our adversaries. Whether their expectation will be confirmed, the event in its own time (with the favor of God) will teach us.

In the meantime, I have determined with all suitable submission to present and to dedicate to you, most illustrious men, this work (such as it is). For although I hesitated not a little whether I ought to approach you with this slight gift (nor were there wanting various reasons to deter me from my purpose), yet the persuasions of your kindness and the consideration of my duty effected that (all fear being shaken off) I should not doubt to write your splendid names before this work of mine; that under your auspices it might come before the public more happily and safely, being persuaded that the argument would not be ungrateful to you, which contains the claims of saving doctrine (than which nothing ought to be dearer to us). Nor that you would deny your patronage to this little work which aims at nothing else than the promotion of the cause of God and heavenly truth, of which he has willed you to be the defenders against the vain inventions of men. Besides nothing was more just than to make these fruits (although poor) of my studies, yours. They were already yours by right, since they sprang up and were cultivated on your soil. Thus I might prove to you even from this specimen, my, if not erudition, at least fidelity in the discharge of the office entrusted to me. Nor without the crime of ingratitude (*acharistias*) could that singular benevolence have suffered me to act otherwise, by which that most pious and most virtuous man, Francis Turretin, my grandfather, came here from the city of Lucca about a hundred years ago. All the blessings of a most sweet country being left, impelled by the sacred zeal of professing a purer religion, under the protection of the most renowned senate, he fixed his seat here with his family delighting in the enjoyment of the most desired light of the gospel with

many neighbors and relatives of the Italian nation and other pious men whom the love of the truth and the sweet savor (*euōdia*) of Christ had attracted here. From the year 1552, an Italian church was founded by the efforts of John Calvin under the protection and authority of a Christian magistrate, which even now at this day by the singular grace of God is preserved under your protection. The memory of this kindness, as it will remain fixed in our minds for ever, so it demands that in testification of a grateful mind it should be declared unto all.

And on this account you have not ceased to give not obscure proofs of the same favor towards me chiefly, whom you have honored with many distinctions; not only by committing to me above all my merit the sacred office which I perform both in the church and in the academy, but also by always cherishing me in a kind manner and approving thus far all my attempts. Thus often being invited elsewhere, although thinking nothing less than about the change of my position (and especially some years before being honorably called by the most noble and mighty senators both of confederated Belgium and of Holland to the theological profession in the most flourishing Athanaeum in Batavian Lugdunum [Leiden]) with a benevolent affection towards me you wish to retain me here. This being done you have so more and more bound my faith and service to you (already devoted) that I would deservedly acquire a bad name if, while I could not discharge the debt, I would not at least ingenuously acknowledge it; nor take care that some constant monument of my regard for you and of a grateful mind should always exist. Accept therefore with serene countenance, most distinguished nobles, this little pledge, not of a little but of my most devout respect and most ardent zeal towards this your seat of gospel light. And proceed to favor him as he willingly acknowledges that he is now under the highest obligations to you; so he professes and promises to be wholly yours by service and reverence. As to what remains, as a suppliant, I entreat the most good and most great God, by whom kings reign that he may always be propitious to you, eminent rulers. May he preserve safe the republic as long as possible and enrich you with all manner of blessings, so governing you by his leading (*hēgemonikō*) spirit of wisdom and strength, of piety and justice, that all your counsels may contribute to the glory of his most holy name, the advantage of the republic and the happiness of the church. Amen.

Geneva, February 10th, A.D. 1679.

TURRETIN'S PREFACE TO THE READER

Kind reader, I cannot avoid briefly stating to you here at the threshold, my reasons and design in publishing this work, lest you should think erroneously of it or ascribe to me in relation to it something from which I have always been free. For since so many highly approved writings of this sort have been published by theologians (the abundance of which often confuses the studious, uncertain to whom they ought most especially to devote themselves), I hardly seem to have been able to avoid the mark of foolhardiness and imprudence. Meanwhile I (who ought to be compared with them in neither talent nor teaching) recognize that I am unprepared from all these things which require of such a work that it ought to be executed with excellence (*cum laude*). Yet I would dare to put forth my efforts for the public in this kind of writing, as if I could brighten the light of the sun or as if I desire to write an Iliad after Homer. It was not from private choice, but from deference to what was judged a public call. But besides the fact that the obligation arising from the office imposed upon me could alone sufficiently and more than sufficiently defend me here, it prescribes the duty of assisting the studies of the youth consecrated to God by teaching or by writing. As in erecting the tabernacle of the Lord, their diligence was also praiseworthy who, not being able to contribute gold, silver, scarlet and other more precious things, at least did not hesitate to offer brass and iron and the cheaper things in their possession; yea, even skins and the hairs of goats, God not estimating the gifts according to their price, but according to the affection of their mind. The very occasion of the undertaken work, not sought but offered (yea thrust upon me) will abundantly testify what has been done by me and my intention. For while I was endeavoring according to my strength to inform the youth from the requisitions of the entrusted office (not only publicly but also privately), among other things I proposed for their investigation the *Decades* of the most celebrated Maresius. And that this might be to them a more useful exercise, I thought that the state and foundation of the controversies treated there should be explained in a few words (some distinctions and observations also being added) by which the *prōton pseudos* ("principal falsehoods") of opponents might be revealed and the principal objections solved. Nor content with the living word, I wished these to be committed also to writing that they might be fixed more deeply in the memory.

Thus the work gradually grew; nor was it consulted without some fruit by the studious. I proposed to myself only this scope of my labor and never would have thought of publishing the hurried work, had not both the prayers of the studious and the wishes of friends and the well-founded rumors reached my ears concerning the design entertained by others of publishing it without my knowledge (not so much obtained as extorted from me). Therefore, that a rude and unformed production (defiled by many blemishes and errors) might not be sent forth, I at length determined ("willing yet with an unwilling mind," *hekōn aekonti ge thymō*) to yield to the wishes of those demanding this of me and to publish this little work whatever it may be, reviewed and increased with a little more diligent care and

digested into a more accurate method (as though not able to prove my erudition, I might at least prove to all regard for friends and my desire to defend the truth). Hence if anyone desires more in these pages and calls this a crude and immature foetus, he will have me confessing the same (who professed it first). I add this also—that it ought rather to be kept back, than to be published.

Thus also as to the name, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*. Let no one think that a full and accurate system of theology is delivered here. For this was not indeed the design proposed to me, but only to explain the importance of the principal controversies which lie between us and our adversaries (ancient and modern) and supply to the young the thread of Ariadne, by the help of which they may more easily extricate themselves from their labyrinth. For since in this fond-of-wrangling age it becomes the man of God not only to be imbued with a deeper knowledge of truth for rightly dividing the word of God (*pros to orthotomein ton logon tou theou*), but also to be equipped with the powerful armor of righteousness and especially with the shield of faith, to convict antagonists (*pros to tous antilegontas elenchein*), to quench the fiery darts of Satan and destroy the fortification and reasonings opposed to the knowledge of God, so that every thought may be brought captive in obedience to Christ—the progress of the studious cannot be better provided for than by teaching them to handle the sword with the trowel (which sacred history tells us the Jerusalem builders formerly did); that is, with instruction (*paideia*) in the truth, upon which faith may be built, to join the conviction (*elenchon*) of the false by which the errors (either directly or indirectly impugning it) may be solidly refuted, so that they can be successful in setting right the many and weighty controversies which at this day and to our grief prevail extensively among Christians and miserably lacerate the church of the Lord.

But because it is evident dangerous errors are concerned and occur chiefly and most frequently about the state of the controversy, which being unknown, it happens that the contest (*astochōs*) is unhappily carried on with masks and at random like blinded gladiation. I have given attention to this above all things, that discarding everything irrelevant I might diligently bring out (*exagōnia*) and explain as far as possible the state and main hinge of the questions according to the opinion of the parties. Thus this being once rightly posited and explored, the way might be rendered easy to the rest, whether the truth was to be constructively (*kataskeuastikōs*) erected or error to be destroyed (*anaskeuēn*) by refutation. These two additional things I proposed to accomplish, not that I might laboriously bring together all the reasons usually adduced for the confirmation of the truth (because here we must contend not so much by number as by weight), but that I might select with judgment the better and more solid by which it can be supported, strength also being added to them where there was need and the principal objections (*exceptionibus*) of adversaries (*tōn ex enantias*) answered. To these I thought sources of solution (*fontes solutionum*) should be subjoined so that the prolix series of arguments being dismissed, distinctions might be present briefly and as it were at one glance by which the weapons of the adversaries might be blunted and the nerves of the principal objections be easily cut.

All this I have endeavored to execute with brevity and perspicuity so that neither too great conciseness should produce obscurity, nor too great prolixity tedium. Hence content with a bare and simple exposition of things, a wearisome citation of testimonies which might have been heaped together being omitted

and all parade of emotion avoided, I have thought it sufficient to indicate by brief references what I might otherwise have drawn out in a just handling of the argument. But no one ought to be surprised either at my touching upon various common questions because I here desire to profit not the erudite and the intractable (*epoptais*) who have no need of these writings, but catechumens (*tois katēchoumenois*) and initiates who wish to be instructed. For their education, we ought to accommodate the word in speaking as also the style in writing. I leave others untouched which in common places (*loci communibus*) mention is often wont to be made. For our theology already labors with too great a mass of controversies, and our theology is overwhelmed (of which not a few are less necessary, many also rashly agitated by unwise man). These persons, either by an unhappy curiosity, disdaining the open things in the Scriptures, search into the sealed and closed heaven and strive to break into the secret recesses of God (*embateuontes eis ha mē heōrakasi,* cf. Col. 2:18). By a liberal gathering of straws (*karphologia*), they follow up the inane apices of words, and seek to know a bulrush (i.e., find difficulties where there are none). For the most part I have thought it always to be important for the progress of learners and the increase of piety, to diminish rather than to increase the questions, as much as the truth would admit. Therefore I wished to select those which seemed either of greater moment or more necessary at this time, others being dismissed which are either too difficult and curious or inane and jejune, which the apostle calls *zētēseis mōras kai aperantous* (cf. 2 Tim. 2:23—"but foolish and unlearned questions avoid") which neither hurt those ignorant of them nor profit those who know them. As the golden rule of the apostle always maintains: "to know in order to be wise" (*phronein eis to sōphronein*). And so I judged that the profane caprice of crafty men for the new and curious interests of the prurient ought to be carefully avoided, and I did nothing more zealously than that I should not turn away from the form of sensible speech as well as from the simplicity and purity (*eilikrineia*) of the pristine faith which our pious predecessors after Christ and the apostles passed down to us and which was constantly maintained here as much as ever could be preserved by me undefiled.

Of course, I am aware that this will by no means suit the taste of many people who think that this age is so fertile; to whom old truths appear worthless and who esteem nothing but mysterious and modern thinking; who are "wise in their own conceit" (*idiognōmones*) and "cherish their own opinion" (*dokēsisophoi*) as if this were the standard of truth. Under the front of greater light and of a deeper dragnet for truth displayed before the ignorant, the traditions are cast down, the good constitutions are destroyed, "their own interpretations and their own decisions are esteemed" (*idias epilyseis* and *kurias doxas,* cf. 2 Pet. 1:20). They take care to take on the resemblance of prophecies and just as if they were in good mind they do not blush to proclaim that those who differ with them are empty-headed, ignorant and slavishly addicted to old forms.

But whatever they ascribe or judge to be foolish because of this vice, I consider it with true, heartfelt praise and judge this fact to be special evidence of commendation. For since each of the oldest things is most true, no description of better stamp can be given especially in sacred argument than that something has less novelty. Old is best here and that which goes back to earliest antiquity. It was discovered through much sad experience that they always dangerously go

astray who spurn the well-known and well-worn paths in order to cut new ones which lead off as much as possible into the pathless heights and precipices.

I admit that we ought not to despise the diligence of those who recently have done justice to their brilliant gifts from God powerfully displaying a special genius for acumen honorably taken up with examination of the Scriptures and in bringing the truth to light. And it would be sheer ingratitude against God, the author of such great gifts, to willfully defraud them of their due praise or to refuse to profit from them. But they are indeed rejected under that old, pernicious pretense, and novel doctrines are introduced into the church as if those who preceded us lived in a fog and in shadows until now, and they were unable to purge religion from their own errors. This certainly is injurious to the reputation of such great men and harmful to religion—it ought not to be tolerated by pious ears!

Let other books, then, be commended by their novelty. I do not want this statement to justify mine. I avoided it most diligently lest it should contain anything new, a stranger from the word of God and from the public forms received in our churches, and nothing is built up there that is not confirmed by the vote of our most proven theologians of highest reputation.

I do not expect or ask for any praise in the future from my little work, but I will consider my labor to be well satisfying if you soberly and favorably regard that this work of mine, such as it is, renders service to the church of God. If any fruit is returned from hence, it will come through divine blessing for illumination of the truth and edification of the saints. But if this main portion of my labor be neither unhelpful for you nor clearly useless—which I alone have reluctantly brought into the light—were I to perceive this to be the case, I would proceed to another part more eagerly and act with the aid of a good God if he would see fit to bestow to me strength and life that I might more swiftly deliver the faith once given.

Meanwhile, since I am a man (and I do not suppose that I am free from any human limitations), if anything would be said by me here that would correspond little with Scripture united with the rule of our faith, not only do I want it to be unsaid, but even to be stricken out.

You then, dear reader, when you kindly express appreciation and are lenient toward my errors: "If you know something better than these precepts, pass it on, my good fellow. If not, join me in following these" (Horace, *Epistles* 1.6.67-68 [Loeb, 290-91]).

May the God of truth and of peace cause us to walk always in truth and charity; may we grow every day in him who is the head, until we all arrive at the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, perfected in power and to the measure of the maturity of Christ. Amen.

FIRST TOPIC

THEOLOGY

FIRST QUESTION
Should the word "theology" be used in the Christian schools, and in how many ways can it be understood?

The word "theology" is rightly used.

I. Since, according to the laws of accurate method, the use and true sense of terms (*prōton exetazein ta onomata*) are first to be explained (as the Philosopher [Aristotle] has it), for words are the types (*typoi*) of things, some things must be premised concerning the word "theology" before we come to the thing itself. But although the proposed question may seem hardly necessary (in the common sense and in that received by almost all who think it should be retained as a technical [*technikon*] word properly and emphatically declaring its subject), yet we must meet the opinion of those who dislike it because it does not occur in Scripture and is used to denote the false system of the heathen and who judge that it would be more suitable to use other words drawn from Scripture.

II. Although the word "theology" is not in so many words in-written (*engraphos autolexei*), yet it is not altogether un-written (*agraphos*). The simple words of which it is composed often occur there: as *logos tou theou* ("word of God") and *logia tou theou* ("words of God"; cf. Rom. 3:2; 1 Pet. 4:11*; Heb. 5:12). Therefore it is one thing to be in Scripture as to sound and syllables (or formally and in the abstract); another to be in it as to sense and the thing signified (or materially in the concrete). Theology does not occur in Scripture in the former manner, but in the latter.

III. Although it is not lawful to form any doctrines not in Scripture, yet it is lawful sometimes to use words which are not found there if they are such as will enable us either to explain divine things or to avoid errors. For this purpose, the words "triad," *homoousiou*, "original sin" and the like have been used by theologians.

IV. Although the heathen often abused this word to designate their false system, yet this does not prevent applying to our true and saving science what was wrongly given by them (falsely and falsely so-called [*pseudōnymō*]) the name of theology. Just as the word "God" (which among the Gentiles denoted a false and fictitious god), and the word "church" (which was applied to a secular assembly) are used in the Scriptures in a sounder sense for the true God and the assembly of the saints. The word "theology" (of Greek origin) was transferred from the schools of the Gentiles to sacred uses, just as the vessels of the Egyptians were appropriated to sacred purposes by the Israelites.

V. We do not deny that there are various synonyms in the Scriptures by which the heavenly science might be designated; as when it is called "wisdom in a mystery" (1 Cor. 2:7), the "form of sound words" (2 Tim. 1:13), the "acknowledging of the truth which is after godliness" (Tit. 1:1), "doctrine" (Tit. 1:9) and is expressed by other like words. But nevertheless this name can and ought to be retained because it has been used so long and is the most appropriate for expressing this saving science.

VI. It is evident that the word "theology" was used by the Gentiles. For they who discoursed sublimely of God, or settled the worship of the gods, or set forth their birthdays, marriages, offspring, dominion and achievements were called "theologians" and their science "theology" (see Lactantius, *The Wrath of God* 2 [FC 54:85-88]; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 3.3 [ANF 2:384; PG 8.1119-20]; Isidore, *Etymologarium* 8*.6.18 [PL 82.307]; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 3.4.9 [Loeb, 1:126-27]).

Use of the word.

VII. Among Christians, the word "theology" is used either inadequately (with reference to the efficient to mean a discourse of God [*Theou Logon*], and with reference to the object, a discourse about God [*logon peri tou Theou*]) or adequately inasmuch as it denotes both a discourse of God and a discourse about God. These two must be joined together because we cannot speak concerning God without God; so that it may be termed the science which is originally from God, objectively treats concerning and terminatively flows into and leads to him, which Thomas Aquinas aptly expresses, *Theologia a Deo docetur, Deum docet, et ad Deum ducit* ("Theology is taught by God, teaches God and leads to him," ST, I, Q. 1, Art. 7+—not in Thomas, but a medieval scholastic adage). So this nomenclature embraces the twofold principle of theology: one of being, which is God; the other of knowing, which is his word.

VIII. Again it is used by authors in three ways: (1) broadly; (2) strictly; (3) according to the true extent of its signification. In the first way, it is accommodated to metaphysics, and in this sense Aristotle calls the first philosophy "theology" (*Metaphysics* 6.1.10-11 [Loeb, 1:296-97] and 11*.7.8-9 [Loeb, 2:86-89]). He divides theoretical philosophy into three parts: physical (*physikēn*), mathematical (*mathēmatikēn*) and theological (*theologikēn*). In the second way, the fathers designate particularly that part of the Christian science which treats of the divinity of Christ by the word "theology." In this sense, John is with emphasis styled "Theologian" because he boldly asserted the deity of the Word (*tēn tou logou theotēta*, cf. Rev. 1:2). The other fathers applied to Gregory Nazianzus the name of "Theologian" because he demonstrated the divinity of Christ in various orations. Hence a distinction was made by them between theology (*theologias*) and economy (*oikonomias*). By the former, they meant the doctrine of the divinity of Christ; by the latter, the doctrine of his incarnation. *Theologein Iēsoun* is with them to discourse of the divinity of Christ (Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* 5.28 [FC 19:343; PG 20.512]; Basil the Great, *Adversus Eunomium* 2 [PG 29.601]; Gregory Nazianzus, Oration 31*.26, "On the Holy Spirit" [NPNF2, 7:326; PG 36.161] and Oration 38*.8, "On the Theophany" [NPNF2, 7:347; PG 36.320]). In the third and most proper sense, it denotes "a system or body of doctrine concerning God and divine things revealed by him for his own glory and the salvation of men." In this sense, we use it here.

IX. The use of the word "theology" is either equivocal and abusive (when it is applied to the false theology of the heathen and heretics); or, less properly, when it is referred to the original and infinite wisdom which we conceive to be in God knowing himself in an unspeakable and most perfect manner (for the word cannot reach the dignity of the thing itself); or to the theology of Christ and to angelic theology; or, more properly, when it is applied to the theology of men on earth which (as we shall see hereafter) is divided into natural and supernatural.

SECOND QUESTION
Whether there is a theology and its divisions.

Theology is proved to be.

I. Many things prove that there is a theology. (1) The nature and goodness of God who, since he is the best, is most communicative of himself. He cannot communicate himself more suitably to a rational creature and in a manner more fitting to human nature than by the knowledge and love of himself. (2) The consent of people and the universal, innate desire to know God which must be for some purpose. For although they have shamefully wandered from true theology, yet the very fact of their seeking it proves the existence of such a theology. Hence no nation has ever been found so barbarous as not to have its hierophants engaged in gaining the knowledge of and in teaching divine things. (3) The design of creation; for God made rational creatures with this intention—that he might be recognized and worshipped by them, which cannot be done without theology. (4) The nature of the thing because the two things requisite for the making up of a system (the *to gnōston* or knowable object, and the *to gnōstikon* or knowing subject) are found here (viz., God, the most capable of being known of knowable things [*tōn epistētōn epistētotaton*], and rational creatures endowed with intellects capable of gaining the knowledge of him). (5) The necessity of salvation; for as man is appointed for a supernatural end, he must necessarily have presented to him supernatural means for reaching that end. Now this is no other than faith which absolutely requires the knowledge of God.

II. All entities discussed in philosophical systems are not discussed with reference to all that can possibly be known of them, but only with reference to that which can naturally be perceived of them. Hence from the extent of the object of philosophy no prejudice can justly be occasioned to supernatural theology which treats certain entities not as they are known by nature, but by revelation. (2) Although all natural entities form the subjects of the inferior sciences, this does not take away the necessity of theology, where different supernatural mysteries are taught and to which no human science has ever extended.

III. The senses do not stand in need of any supernatural knowledge in order to their perfection. It would be wrong to infer from this that the intellect does not need it because the intellect is ordained to a supernatural end, surpassing the comprehension of the reason. This is not by any means the case with the senses. But although this need of the intellect is a mark of imperfection with regard to an end not as yet attained and as denoting the absence of the end, yet it indicates perfection with regard to its capacity for reaching that end.

IV. Metaphysics is the highest of all sciences in the natural order, but acknowledges the superiority of theology in the supernatural order. The expression of philosophers—that sciences are distinguished by their greater or lesser abstraction and therefore the science which has least to do with matter as metaphysics is superior to all—must be understood of sciences merely theoretical, occupied with universal things only and belonging to the natural order. For these form their own objects by an abstraction of the mind, and their superiority is regulated by the degree of abstraction. However, this cannot apply to theology, being partly theoretical and partly practical and therefore superior to all in the natural order and not forming its own object by any abstraction, but receiving it from revelation already formed and distinct.

Different kinds of theology.

V. Theology is wont to be distinguished in diverse ways into true and false. The false and equivocally so-called (applied to an erroneous system concerning God and his worship) is of various kinds. First, that of the Gentiles which evidently has been manifold. Thus Plato (*The Republic* 2+) makes it twofold: symbolical (*symbolikēn*) or mythical (*mythikēn*) (consisting of things wrapped up in a covering of signs under which the Gentiles and especially the Egyptians were accustomed to teach divine mysteries); and philosophical (*philosophikēn*) or demonstrative (*apodeiktikēn*) (occupying itself in the contemplation of divine things). Marcus Varro makes it threefold: mythical (*mythikēn*) or fabulous (of the poets, which was intended for the stage and theaters); political (*politikēn*) or civil (of the priests and people, which was publicly used in the temples according to the rites of each city and nation); and physical (*physikēn*) or natural (of the philosophers, which was taught in the schools; cf. Augustine, CG 6.5 and 8.1 [FC 8:314-17 and 14:21-22]). Thus both the poets (on account of their fabulous discussions on the nature of god and divine things [*theologoumenous mythous*]) and the philosophers and priests are called "theologians" by Justin Martyr (*Hortatory to the Greeks* 3 [ANF 1:274; PG 6.247-48]) and Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* 5.8 [ANF 2:454-57]). However the principal part of their theology was a setting forth of the generation of the gods (*theogonias*) because they believed that the gods were generated. Second, that of infidels and heretics who either openly rejected Christ (as the Jews, Mohammedans, etc.), or who, while they retain the name of Christ, are in fundamentals at variance with the word of God (as the theology of papists, Socinians and other like heretics). For although their theology may contain some truth, yet because the greater part is false and the errors fundamental, it is properly called "false" (the denomination being taken from the larger part).

VI. True theology is divided into: (1) infinite and uncreated, which is God's essential knowledge of himself (Mt. 11:27) in which he alone is at the same time the object known (*epistēton*), the knowledge (*epistēmōn*), and the knower (*epistēmē*), and that which he decreed to reveal to us concerning himself which is commonly called archetypal; and (2) finite and created, which is the image and ectype (*ektypon*) of the infinite and archetypal (*prōtotypou*) (viz., the ideas which creatures possess concerning God and divine things, taking form from that supreme knowledge and communicated to intelligent creatures, either by hypostatical union with the soul of Christ [whence arises "the theology of union"]; or by beatific vision to the angels and saints who walk by sight, not by faith, which is called "the theology of vision"; or by revelation, which is made to travellers

[viz., to those who have not yet reached the goal and is called "the theology of revelation"] or the stadium).

VII. Second, the theology of revelation is again divided into natural and supernatural. The natural, occupied with that which may be known of God (*to gnōston tou Theou*), is both innate (from the common notions implanted in each one) and acquired (which creatures gain discursively). This was exquisite in Adam before his fall, but is highly disordered in corrupted man. The supernatural (which transcends our reason and is communicated to us by God by the new light of grace so that we may obtain the enjoyment of the highest good, which was revealed to the patriarchs before as well as after the flood, and through Moses delivered by God to the people of Israel, and is called the Old Testament or the New Testament, which is called by way of eminence "Christian" because it has Christ for its author and object) is from Christ (Jn. 1:18) and speaks of him (Acts 1:1; 1 Cor. 2:2). It is strictly called "revealed" because its first principle is divine revelation strictly taken and made through the word, not through creatures.

VIII. Supernatural theology may be considered either systematically, as denoting the system of saving doctrine concerning God and divine things drawn from the Scriptures (the doctrines with their subdivisions being arranged in a certain order which is called both abstractive and objective); or habitually and after the manner of a habit residing in the intellect, and is called "concretive" and "subjective." Again, habitual theology is either the habit of principles (by which each believer perceives things foreign to and remote from reason) or the habit of conclusions (by which from principles known by the light of faith we unfold and confirm the saving doctrine).

IX. As there is a threefold school of God (that of nature, grace and glory), and a threefold book (of the creature, of Scripture and of life), so theology has usually been divided into three parts: the first of which is natural, the second supernatural and the third beatific; the first from the light of reason, the second from the light of faith, the third from the light of glory. The first belongs to men in the world, the second to believers in the church and the last to the saints in heaven.

The unity of theology.

X. Although theology treats diverse things and those pertaining to different sciences, it does not cease to be one because it considers them under the same formal aspect, inasmuch as they are divine things revealed to us by the word of God. Now unity of doctrine depends upon the unity of the object considered not materially, but formally. Hence if other sciences discuss various things contained in theology, they do not handle them in the same manner or under the same formal aspect. For theology discusses them as they are revealed to us by the word of God. Again, it considers them in relation to remote causes (viz., the first efficient from which they flow and the ultimate end to which they are referred) and not however in relation to the proximate causes; and according to supernatural, not natural accidents.

XI. It is one thing for theology to be one as to substance and kind of doctrine; quite another to be one as to manner of treatment. In the latter sense, it can be called "multiple" according to the various modes of teaching (*paideias tropon*). Thus it is divided into didactic, problematic, elenctic, casuistic, etc. But in the former sense it neither is nor can be multiplex because it always contains one and the same kind of doctrine.

XII. Hence it is evident that it can differ as to more and less in relation to the different degrees of revelation (as it was more obscure under the Old Testament or clearer under the New); either more perfect or imperfect with regard to the subjects. But it does not follow that it differs as to kind because the same substance of doctrine is retained in both, Christ being the same yesterday, today and forever (Heb. 13:8).

XIII. Theology does not lose its unity although it may be called partly theoretical, partly practical. Any science is called one not by a simple and absolute unity (that is, a numerical and individual as if it were one and a simple quality like whiteness in a wall), but by an aggregative unity which is termed the unity of collection (inasmuch as many special habits are brought together and arranged so as to make up one total habit of science). Thus the image of God is one although it embraces newness of mind and of the affections; and free will is one, although it resides in the intellect and will.

THIRD QUESTION

Whether natural theology may be granted.

Statement of the question.

I. The question does not concern theology in general, but natural theology in particular. Nor does it concern this as it was in Adam before the fall (for that it was in him is sufficiently evident from the image of God after which he was made); rather it concerns this as it remained after the fall.

II. The question is not whether natural theology (which is such by act as soon as a man is born, as the act of life in one living or of sense in one perceiving as soon as he breathes) may be granted. For it is certain that no actual knowledge is born with us and that, in this respect, man is like a smooth tablet (*tabulae rasae*). Rather the question is whether such can be granted at least with regard to principle and potency; or whether such a natural faculty implanted in man may be granted as will put forth its strength of its own accord, and spontaneously in all adults endowed with reason, which embraces not only the capability of understanding, but also the natural first principles of knowledge from which conclusions both theoretical and practical are deduced (which we maintain).

III. The question is not whether this knowledge is perfect and saving (for we confess that after the entrance of sin it was so much obscured as to be rendered altogether insufficient for salvation), but only whether any knowledge of God remains in man sufficient to lead him to believe that God exists and must be religiously worshipped.

IV. Our controversy here is with the Socinians who deny the existence of any such natural theology or knowledge of God and hold that what may appear to be such has flowed partly from tradition handed down from Adam, and partly from revelations made at different times (Faustus Socinus, *Praelectiones theologicae* 2 [1627], pp. 3-7; Christopher Ostorodt, *Unterrichtung . . . hauptpuncten der Christlichen Religion* 3 [1612], pp. 23-28). The orthodox, on the contrary, uniformly teach that there is a natural theology, partly innate (derived from the book of conscience by means of common notions [*koinas ennoias*]) and partly acquired (drawn from the book of creatures discursively). And they prove it by the following arguments.

Natural theology is proved by Rom. 2:14.

V. We find in man a natural law written upon each one's conscience excusing and accusing them in good and bad actions, which therefore necessarily implies the knowledge of God, the legislator, by whose authority it binds men to obedience and proposes rewards or punishments. "The Gentiles, which have not the law" (i.e., the law of Moses) "do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another" (Rom. 2:14, 15). This could not be said if conscience did not dictate to each one that there is a deity who approves of good actions and disapproves and punishes evil deeds. Nor are these objections of force: (1) the work of the law and not the law itself is said to be inscribed because with the apostle these are synonymous—"to be a law unto themselves" (v. 14) and "to have the work of the law written in their hearts" (v. 15). Also the nature of the thing proves it because such a work of the law is meant by whose instinct man not only distinguishes between good and evil, but is prompted to perform the one and avoid the other. (2) The law is not said to be innate but inscribed (i.e., known), as the law of Moses was made known to the Jews by revelation. For the inscription implies a natural revelation of that law to the conscience opposed to the external revelation made to the Jews by the writing upon stony tables. Hence it is expressed by the conscience which exerts itself both in observation (*syntērēsei*) and in consciousness (*syneidēsei*) (v. 15).

VI. God has given to man both an innate and acquired knowledge of himself as the following passages prove: Ps. 19:1; Acts 14:15-17; 17:23; Rom. 1:19, 20. Nor can the bold corruption of Socinus be tolerated who refers the words of Paul to the second creation made by Christ, as if the apostle meant to say that the things which had been invisible and unknown to men even from the creation were now clearly seen and understood by the works of God and divine men (viz., of Christ and his apostles). For the words of Paul and the entire context loudly declare that he speaks of the first creation (as he wishes to prove that the wicked against whom the wrath of God is revealed from heaven [v. 18] hold the truth in unrighteousness, viz., the true notions of God contained in the natural revelation, which is shown by v. 19 where he says "that which may be known of God is manifest in them [*en autois*], for God hath shewed it unto them"—partly in their hearts and partly in the works of creation). (2) The design of Paul teaches the same things. He wants to demonstrate that neither the Gentiles by nature (chap. 1) nor the Jews by the law (chap. 2) could be justified (because all are sinners), but only by the gospel revealed by Christ. (3) *Poiēmata* here cannot be applied to the miracles performed by the apostles because they are never so called in Scripture, nor were they known to the Gentiles of whom he speaks. *Poiēmata* refers to the works of the creation of the world because the invisible things of God are said to be made manifest in them from the creation of the world (*apo ktiseōs kosmou*).

From universal experience.

VII. Universal experience confirms it. For what is commonly and immutably in all men without exception must be in them naturally because natural things agree in all and are immutable. But the knowledge of the deity is immutably in all because there is no nation so barbarous upon whom this persuasion of deity does not rest (Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* 1.23 [Loeb, 19:61]). So

that rather than have no god, they have worshipped almost anything, even the filthy Devil himself. And none have been able to shake off this impression, the fear of God still returning (especially in adversity), although for a time they may seem to have divested themselves of it.

By the institution of religions.

VIII. The institution of religions in the world most clearly proves natural theology. For whence that hidden propensity of men towards religion which induced Plato to call man the most religious animal (*zōon theosebestaton, Timaeus* 41 [Loeb, 9:90-91]), unless from the sense of a deity whom they ought to worship. Nor would the people have been disposed to embrace idolatry even in its most shocking forms and to receive so readily false and counterfeit religions which impostors by political contrivance devised to keep men under subjection, unless they had been impelled by some natural instinct to religion and the worship of some deity. Nor can it be said that the Gentiles did this not so much by instinct as by imitation. If there had been no natural instinct, man (a creature of glory) would never have bowed down to the most debased creatures, that he might not be thought to be destitute of any sense of deity; nor could what arises only from imitation be so common and universal.

Sources of solution.

IX. Although there may be some nations so savage as to appear to have no sense of deity, yet they are not destitute of all knowledge of him. There can indeed be barren seeds of religion lying dormant in them (on account of their gross blindness and lust) by which they seem to resemble beasts and brutes, but yet they do remain in them (as in the Americans and Brazilians adduced here by Socinus). Although Jean de Lery (of Burgundy) observes that no gods are acknowledged among them, yet he not obscurely intimates that there are traces of the deity in them, when he informs us that they have their caribs or priests whom they believe to be able to impart warlike bravery and to produce all fruits from the earth; by their supposed intercourse with spirits; and by their holding that the souls of the virtuous (after flying over lofty mountains) would lead a joyful life with perpetual delights in the most pleasant gardens, while, on the contrary, those of the wicked would be snatched way to Stigna [Aygnan] (their name for the Devil) and live with him in eternal torments (*History of a Voyage to the Land of Brazil* 16 [ed. J. Whately, 1990], p. 136). The same author in *Historia Navigationis in Brasiliam* 6+ (1594) narrates that the supreme being of the Mexicans is Hoizili Pochtli. Joseph Acosta (*Natural and Moral History of the Indies* 5.3* [ed. C. R. Markham, 1880], 2:301) says that the Peruvians have their gods, and among them their Piracocha whom they call Pachacamak, creator of heaven and earth. Similar accounts occur in Girolamo Benzoni (*History of the New World* [trans. W.H. Smyth, 1857]) and Bartolo de las Casas and others.

X. It is not repugnant that one and the same thing in a different relation should both be known by the light of nature and believed by the light of faith; as what is gathered from the one only obscurely, may be held more certainly from the other. Thus we know that God is, both from nature and from faith (Heb. 11*:6); from the former obscurely, but from the latter more surely. The special knowledge of true faith (by which believers please God and have access to him, of which Paul speaks) does not exclude, but supposes the general knowledge from nature.

XI. The mind of man is a *tabula rasa* not absolutely, but relatively as to discursion and dianoetical knowledge (which is acquired necessarily by inferring one thing from another); but not as to apprehensive and intuitive knowledge. For even according to Paul, the work of the law is in such a manner written in the hearts of the Gentiles that they do by nature the things contained in the law. Hence is a twofold inscription upon the heart of man: the one of God in the remains of his image and the natural law; the other of the Devil by sin.

XII. What is natural, subjectively and constitutively, always exists in the same manner, but not what is such qualitatively and consecutively (for qualities admit of increase and diminution). Natural theology is so called not in the first, but in the second sense. Hence it is not surprising that it should vary as to degree in relation to its subjects, who differ in intellectual acumen.

XIII. Although we do not deny that natural theology depends also upon the institution of men, yet certainly that mode would have been insufficient, if the natural knowledge of God (both innate and acquired) had not been supplied.

XIV. Although the knowledge of God is natural, it does not follow that no mortal can deny his existence. For if any have denied him, they have done so not so much through ignorance as through perverseness, their own consciences convicting them (as David testifies of the atheists who poured contempt upon the people of God [Ps. 14:4, 5], and Paul asserts of philosophers [Rom. 1:18, 19], teaching that they held the truth [viz., the true notions of God] in unrighteousness). Therefore the reason for the denial was not so much an absolute ignorance of God as their corruption and wickedness choking the implanted knowledge and all but destroying it in order that they might sin more freely.

Fourth Question

Is natural theology sufficient for salvation; or is there a common religion by which all promiscuously may be saved? We deny against the Socinians and Remonstrants.

Occasion of the question.

I. The impious doctrine of the Pelagians that everyone well grounded in whatsoever religion will be saved gave occasion to this question. Not only the Libertines, David-Jorists and the like (who, content with an honest and civil life, hold religion to be a matter of indifference) retain it, but also the Socinians of the present day approve it. They do this in part directly, teaching that those who worship God according to the light of nature as a kind of more hidden word, appease and are pleasing to him and find him their rewarder (Socinus, *Praelectiones theologica* 2 [1627], pp. 3-7); in part indirectly and obliquely, reducing the doctrines of religion absolutely necessary to salvation to the very lowest number and making these common to all in their mode and degree (of which hereafter). The Remonstrants evidently agree with them: some more openly as Curcellaeus and Adolphus Venator (Adolf de Jager) who, in his defense against the ministers of Dort (cf. *Een besonder Tractaet . . . der Predicanten der Stadt Dordrecht* [1612]), expressly denies the proposition "no one can be saved who is not placed in Christ by true faith"; others more cautiously, as Arminius, Corvinus, Episcopius (who, not immediately indeed, but mediately), admit the Gentiles and others to salvation, holding that by a right use of the light of nature, the light of grace can

be obtained and by grace admission to glory (Arminius, "The Apology or Defence of James Arminius Against Certain Theological Articles," 15, 16, 17 in *The Writings of James Arminius* [1956], 1:322-29; and Arnoldus [Johannes Arnoldus Corvinus], *Defensio sententiae . . . I. Arminii* [1613] against Tilenus). Many of the papists hold the same error, scrupling not to defend the salvation of the heathen without the knowledge of Christ; as Abulensis, Durandus, Capreolus, Andradius, Vega, Soto, Erasmus and others.

II. On the other hand, the orthodox constantly maintain that the theology or true religion by which salvation can come to man after the fall is only one (i.e., that revealed in the word of the law and gospel), and that all other religions except this one are either impious and idolatrous or false and erroneous. Although retaining some obscure and imperfect notions of the law and that which may be known of God (*tou gnōstou Theou*), yet these false and erroneous religions are of no further use than to render men inexcusable (*anapologēton*).

III. The question is not Are the certain first principles of religion common to all men? For we grant that in natural theology by the light of nature some such do exist upon which supernatural theology is built (for example, that there is a God, that he must be worshipped, etc.). Rather the question is Are first principles (adequate and proper to true religion) held among all? This we deny.

Statement of the question.

IV. The question is not whether natural theology is useful to men, for we acknowledge its various ends and uses: (1) as a witness of the goodness of God towards sinners unworthy even of these remains of light (Acts 14:16, 17; Jn. 1:5); (2) as a bond of external discipline among men to prevent the world from becoming utterly corrupt (Rom. 2:14, 15); (3) as a subjective condition in man for the admission of the light of grace because God does not appeal to brutes and stocks, but to rational creatures; (4) as an incitement to the search for this more illustrious revelation (Acts 14:27); (5) to render men inexcusable (Rom. 1:20) both in this life, in the judgment of an accusing conscience (Rom. 2:15) and, in the future life, in the judgment which God shall judge concerning the secrets of men (Rom. 2:16). Rather the question is Is it by itself sufficient for salvation, and was the design of God in that revelation the salvation of those to whom it is made? This we deny.

Proof that natural theology is insufficient to salvation.

V. The reasons are various. (1) There can be no saving religion without Christ and faith in him (Jn. 3:16; 17:3; Acts 4:11, 12; 1 Cor. 3:11; Heb. 11:6). But Christ is revealed nowhere except in the gospel; nor is faith given without the word, since it comes by hearing (Rom. 10:17). Nor is it a valid objection that it merely follows from this that the Christian religion is the only ordinary way of salvation, and not that God could not extraordinarily grant salvation to those who might live in a holy manner according to the law of nature, although they had never heard of Christ. For since the Scriptures testify that Christ is the only way of salvation (without whom no one can come to the Father), it is criminal to suppose an extraordinary way without him. (2) The state of the Gentiles and all those destitute of the word of Christ is called the "time of ignorance" (Acts 17:30), when God as it were winked at them, suffering them to walk in their own ways (Acts 14:16), and when they worshipped the unknown God (Acts 17:23) and were without God

(Eph. 2:12) in the world (which could not be said if the natural revelation was sufficient for salvation). (3) If salvation could have been obtained by a common religion, there would have been no need of the gospel and the preaching of the word. However Paul testifies, "After that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching [i.e., by the word of the gospel which is foolishness to the wicked] to save them that believe" (1 Cor. 1:21).

Sources of solution.

VI. It is one thing to allow some knowledge of God as Creator and preserver however imperfect, corrupt and obscure; another to have a full, entire and clear knowledge of God as Redeemer and of the lawful worship due to him. Natural theology has the former in that which may be known of God (*gnōstō tou Theou*). Revelation alone has the latter in the faith (*tō pistō*) which is gained only from the word. Nor (if God has not left himself without witness [*amartyron*] in nature by doing good to men as to temporal things [*ta biotika*, Acts 14:17] which he often bestows upon those whom he hates and has devoted to destruction) does it follow that the external calling is objectively sufficient for salvation because it is said "he suffered the nations to walk in their own ways" (v. 16) and it is called that "time of ignorance" (Acts 17:30, referring plainly to a defect in the external calling because he opposes it to the time of the New Testament in which he calls men to repentance by the word).

VII. It is one thing to seek the favor and grace of God revealed through his word in virtue of his promises in Christ; another to seek an unknown god in the works of nature and providence, if haply by feeling after they may find him. The latter is properly applied to the Gentiles (Acts 17:26, 27), but not the former. Nor (if elsewhere in the Scriptures the phrase "to seek God" signifies to fly to his faith and to seek the guardianship of his grace, and "to find him" denotes to obtain the protection sought and to experience the propitious presence of his most holy deity) does it follow that it must be understood in the same sense here; both because the objects are different and the manner of seeking manifestly so. The other passages adduced refer to the covenanted people of God, but this only to those who were strangers from the covenants of promise. The former to those who knew God by the word and detested idols; the latter to idolators ignorant of God. The former to seeking and finding God known favorably through Christ; the latter to seeking an unknown God through the works of nature and providence so that he might be known and be distinguished from idols. Finally, in the former it is simply and absolutely said that believers ought to seek God that they may find him for salvation, but in this that God had given in the creation and government of the world such proofs of his power and divinity as that by them they might be induced to seek the Creator of all things in that manner (viz., if by "feeling after" they might find him). No one will say this applies to those saints mentioned in the Old Testament who were accustomed to approach him relying on his most sure promises in Christ.

VIII. Rom. 1:19, 20 (concerning that which may be known of God, *gnōstō tou Theou*) does not favor a common religion by which all may be saved and which is sufficient for salvation. (1) Only that which may be known (*gnōstō*) is there spoken of and not that which is to be believed (*pistō*), which alone is saving. (2) Paul says the knowledge (*to gnōston*) of God is manifest in the Gentiles, but not

all knowledge (*pan gnōston*) (viz., what may be learned from the book of nature, but not all that may be known of him from his word and which must be known in order to salvation, such as the mystery of the Trinity, and of Christ the Redeemer, etc.). (3) This knowledge (*gnōston*) which is restricted by the apostle to his "power and godhead" (i.e., to the knowledge of his existence and of those attributes which strike our senses in the works of creation and providence) is usually referred to natural theology; but is not extended to the knowledge of his will and mercy in Christ which can be derived only from his word, and not at all from his works and without which there can be no salvation. (4) This knowledge (*gnōston*) is only such as to render men inexcusable (Rom. 1:20). Nor should the words *eis to* here be understood only eventually to denote that the thing turns out so accidentally, but also intentionally as to the purpose of God because this event must have been intended by him since it refers to a work which he performed by his decree, not to that which he commands only by the law.

IX. That which is sufficient to render inexcusable does not therefore suffice for salvation if used properly; for more things are requisite for the obtainment of salvation than for incurring damnation justly and without excuse (*anapologētōs*). For evil arises from some defect, but the good requires a whole cause. For example, he who offends in one point is guilty of all (Jam. 2:10); but not, therefore, he who does well in one point is just in all. The commission of one sin can render a man inexcusable, but the performance of one good work is not sufficient to save him. Thus the Gentiles were inexcusable because they substituted gods without number in place of that one God whom they could know from the light of nature; but we cannot infer from this that the knowledge of the one God is sufficient absolutely for salvation. Thus this inexcusableness must be restricted to the subject matter of which the apostle treats (viz., to idolatry), which was sufficient for their condemnation, although the avoidance of it would not suffice for their salvation.

X. It is one thing for a man to be excusable or excused; another to be savable or saved, if he is excusable only from a part and not from the whole (which would be the case with the heathen if they would use aright the light of nature, which is impossible). Although they might properly regulate their external actions by abstaining from subsequent sins, still they could not obtain the pardon of previous and especially of original sin, and change their corrupt state and nature. For the actions which they would perform would be only external and good as to substance, not also as to the manner and source (being destitute of the Holy Spirit); and, if profitable, would be so only as to the present or future, but not as to the past in removing former guilt (without which, however, no one can be saved).

XI. It is falsely asserted that in that which may be known of God (*gnōstō tou Theou*) there is given objectively a revelation of grace, and a Redeemer sufficient for salvation, if not clear and explicit, at least obscure and implied, inasmuch as in it God is known as merciful and therefore, in a certain although confused manner, as a Redeemer who will accept a satisfaction, may call to repentance and promise remission of sin. For in the first place, to be able to know God as merciful by a general mercy tending to some temporal good and the delay of punishment is far different from being able to know him as merciful by a mercy special and saving in Christ after a satisfaction has been made. To be able to know him as placable and benign is different from being able to know him as actually

appeased or certainly to be appeased. We grant that the heathen could have the former from the light of nature, but not the latter which nevertheless is necessarily required to tranquilize the conscience. For what advantage would there be in knowing that God could be appeased unless it was evident that he was willing to be appeased and the means of such a propitiation were well ascertained? For when the conscience is weighed down by the guilt of sin and a sense of the divine justice, it could never be tranquilized unless both the goodwill of God, and the manner of satisfying his justice became known. Now who will say that this could be derived from the book of nature where God manifests himself only as the Creator and preserver? On the contrary, who does not confess that it can be sought for only in the word of the gospel, which reveals to us the mercy of God in Christ? Otherwise why should Paul call this a mystery which was kept secret since the world began (Rom. 16:25)? Why should he say that the Gentiles were strangers from the covenants and without Christ (Eph. 2:12), if they had always been in some manner under the covenant of grace and professed a certain (although a confused and implied) knowledge of saving mercy in Christ?

XII. No better do they disentangle themselves who seek another incrustation and distinguish between a mediate and an immediate sufficiency. As if the Gentiles who could not have a revelation immediately sufficient might yet have one mediately sufficient, inasmuch as they suppose that if anyone had made a good use of the light of nature, God would have superadded the light of grace (since this is agreeable to his mercy and can be gathered from the saying of Christ, "Whosoever hath, to him shall be given," Mt. 13:12*). For besides the absurdity of calling a revelation sufficient which requires another additional revelation (in which sense we strongly ridicule the opinion of the papists who maintain that the Scriptures may be called mediately sufficient because, although they do not contain all things, they refer us to tradition from which they can be gained), the very thing to be proved is here taken for granted— that God would superadd the light of grace to one making a good use of the light of nature as if he had bound himself to anyone or owed something to man, or as if this connection could be proved from some passage of Scripture. Indeed this seems to have been drawn from the fountains of Pelagians who held that "God would not withhold grace from one who did what he could." Mt. 13:12* cannot be adduced here because it refers to the gifts of grace which God is accustomed to crown with new gifts, not to the gifts of nature.

XIII. Rom. 2:4 (*to chrēston tou Theou eis metanoian agein*, "the goodness of God leadeth to repentance") does not apply here because Paul is not speaking of the Gentiles, but of the Jews, whom in this chapter he wishes to convict of sin, as in chapter 1 he had proved the Gentiles to be guilty. This appears: (1) from the things which he attributes to the person addressed which properly belong to none but a Jew, as that he judges others in those things which he does himself, etc.; (2) from v. 17, where he mentions the Jew by name as the very man with whom he speaks, "behold, thou art called a Jew." These words are not the beginning of a new discourse to a person different from the preceding, but the continuation of the former discourse with a clearer designation of the person. Therefore the goodness (*chrēstotēs*) here spoken of denotes the revelation made to the Jews and the benefits bestowed upon them, and has no reference to the works of general providence.

XIV. Although the conscience of the Gentiles may be said to excuse them sometimes (Rom. 2:14, 15), it does not follow that they can, in that state, enjoy true and solid peace, and the perfect salvation which follows it. It is one thing to excuse in some things or from a part, which it does; another, to excuse in everything and from the whole, which it cannot possibly do. It is also one thing to excuse from the more serious crimes (comparatively to others more iniquitous), and quite another to bestow upon us that sure and lasting peace flowing from a sense of the love of God and of our reconciliation with him, which the Gentiles do not have.

XV. A difference exists between a furnished and destitute state. The one is of the law considered in itself and its own nature; the other, in relation to us. The law was given to man in the beginning (before the fall) for life and by itself also led to life according to the sanction "do this and thou shalt live" (cf. Rom. 2:13). But after the fall, being destitute of strength through the flesh, it is not given for life, but for a mirror of sin and misery to render the sinner inexcusable (Rom. 3:19, 20).

XVI. The work of the law is used in two senses: either formally for that which the law itself does; or imperatively for that which it enjoins upon man. The former is the work or duty of the law with regard to men in teaching, promising, forbidding and threatening. The latter is the work of man in reference to the law. The former is the proposition and revelation of the law; the latter its observance and fulfillment. The Gentiles are said to do the things "contained in the law" (Rom. 2:14) not in the latter, but in the former sense; not by complying with the law's demands, but by doing what the law itself does—prescribing the good and forbidding the bad. This is evident: (1) from the general scope of Paul which is to prove that the Gentiles are exposed to death by the natural law even without the written law; (2) from the exegetical (*exēgētika*) words which follow because these, "having not the law" are "a law unto themselves." Therefore to do the things contained in the law is equivalent to being a law unto themselves.

XVII. Although some of the heathen (comparatively considered and in relation to each other) may have been better than others; although their works civilly and morally speaking may be called virtues, and so followed by the double reward of a well-regulated life, both positive (as productive of some temporal good and peace of conscience in this world) and negative (as making their punishment more tolerable), nevertheless (theologically speaking and relatively to God) their works best in form were nothing else than more splendid sins and in the sight of God worthy of no reward.

XVIII. The examples of Melchizedek, Job, the centurion and the like adduced here are not to the point because they all did the things for which they are praised in the Scriptures by the aid of special grace and revelation, not by the mere light of nature.

XIX. Although a Gentile by birth, Cornelius, was yet a proselyte by religion. Although he could not believe that the Messiah had come and was that Jesus whom Peter preached, yet he could believe with the Jews from the oracles of the prophets that he would come. Thus he is not to be reckoned among the Gentiles, but among the patriarchs who looked for salvation from a Redeemer not yet manifested. Hence by the advent of Peter, he did not receive a beginning, but an increase of faith.

XX. The two articles mentioned in Heb. 11:6 must not be understood physically, as if they could be perceived by the light of reason, but hyperphysically and theologically, to denote their manifestation to us by a saving knowledge, assuring us not only that God is, and is the omnipotent Creator of all things, but who he is (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), and after the fall a Redeemer and a rewarder not only of those seeking him legally by merit, but of those seeking him by grace evangelically through faith in the Mediator. The following arguments prove that this is the meaning of the apostle: (1) the adjunct of saving faith, which he sets forth throughout the whole chapter; (2) the examples of the saints mentioned there, so that the faith in God of which the apostle speaks is not the general knowledge of God diffusing his goodness in any way, but the knowledge of the true God bestowing heavenly blessings on account of Christ. By "approaching to God" the apostle means nothing else than to obtain communion with him in Christ (as everywhere else in the same epistle, Heb. 4:16; 7:25; 10:22). Hence Curcellaeus makes a false distinction between faith in God and faith in Christ, making the former absolutely necessary to salvation, the latter so only after a divine revelation. For no faith in God can be true and saving which is not connected with faith in Christ (Jn. 14:1), since we cannot believe in God except through Christ.

XXI. We do not deny that some of the fathers cherished a hope of the salvation of those Gentiles and philosophers who regulated their lives in accordance with reason (as Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 6.5, 17 [ANF 2:490, 517-18; PG 9.264, 392]; Justin Martyr, *First* Apology* 46 [FC 6:83-84; PG 6.397]; John Chrysostom, "Sermon 36 [37]," *Homilies on the Gospel of Matthew* [NPNF1, 10:241; PG 57.416] and others cited by Isaac Casaubon, *De rebus sacris et . . . exercitationes . . . Baronii* I* [1614], pp. 2-4). But the error of those who could speak more safely before the rise of Pelagianism is less to be wondered at than that of many of the Scholastics who struck upon the same rock, after the strong defense of the necessity of grace in Christ made by Augustine and his followers.

XXII. Zwingli assigned a place in heaven to Hercules, Theseus, Numa, Aristides, Socrates and similar distinguished men ("A Short and Clear Exposition of the Christian Faith," 12 in *On Providence and Other Essays: Ulrich Zwingli* [1922/1983], p. 272). In this work (after mentioning the saints of the Old and New Testament in his description of the heavenly hosts), he adds, "Here you will see Hercules, Theseus, Socrates, Aristides, Numa, etc. Here you will see your predecessors and as many of your ancestors as have departed this life in faith." Besides not being approved by us, it is certain that he erred rather in fact than in right, not as if he thought the gate of salvation stood open without Christ and faith, but because he hoped that divine mercy had (in a manner hidden from us, but known to himself) wrought faith in some of those whom he had so illustriously endowed with heroic virtues. This is evident from his speaking expressly of those who departed in faith, which ought not to be restricted to the ancestors of the king, but extended to all those of whom he had just spoken. That this was his opinion, we gather from his declaration concerning original sin to Urbanus Rhegius where, after saying that they erred who adjudged to condemnation all whom we call Gentiles, he adds, "Who knows how much faith the hand of God had written

upon each of their hearts?" (*De peccato originali declaratio, ad Urbanum Rhegium [1526]*, CR 92.379).

XXIII. The various sacrifices of the Gentiles do not prove that they had a knowledge of God's mercy in Christ. For they were not offered so much to obtain his saving grace (which cannot become known to man without a revelation since its exercise is altogether free) as to appease his justice (which is known by nature and its exercise necessary).

Fifth Question: The Object of Theology

Are God and divine things the objects of theology? We affirm.

The object of theology.

I. The object of any science is everything specially treated of in it, and to which all its conclusions relate; but it may be viewed either materially (as to the thing considered) or formally (as to the mode of considering).

God and divine things.

II. Although theologians differ as to the object of theology, the more common and true opinion is that of those who refer it to God and divine things (God as the primary and divine things the secondary, whether done by God or to be believed and done by men), i.e., God directly and indirectly (viz., God and the things of him [as his works] and subject to him [as creatures] and tending to him [as the duties of man]). Thus that all things are discussed in theology either because they deal with God himself or have a relation (*schesin*) to him as the first principle and ultimate end.

III. That God is the object of theology is evident both from the very name (*theologias* and *theosebeias*), and from Scripture which recognizes no other principal object. It is also evident from the conditions of an object which are found in him. (1) It must be something uncompounded. (2) Certain things may be predicated of it denominatively, such as affections and properties. (3) Everything belonging to the system should have a relation to it for God is an uncompounded and most simple being. Certain things are predicated of him denominatively such as his attributes. To him all things are referred and have the relation of origin, preservation and dependence.

God as revealed and covenanted.

IV. But when God is set forth as the object of theology, he is not to be regarded simply as God in himself (for thus he is incomprehensible [*akatalēptos*] to us), but as revealed and as he has been pleased to manifest himself to us in his word, so that divine revelation is the formal relation which comes to be considered in this object. Nor is he to be considered exclusively under the relation of deity (according to the opinion of Thomas Aquinas and many Scholastics after him, for in this manner the knowledge of him could not be saving but deadly to sinners), but as he is our God (i.e., covenanted in Christ as he has revealed himself to us in his word not only as the object of knowledge, but also of worship). True religion (which theology teaches) consists of these two things.

Sources of solution.

V. The unity of a science and its distinction from any other is not always taken from the unity of the material object (or thing considered), but from the unity of the formal object (or mode of considering). Although physics, ethics and medicine treat of the same subject, they do not cease to be distinct sciences because they consider man in different relations: physics as a species of natural body; ethics as capacious of virtue and happiness; medicine as curable from diseases and restorable to health. Thus although theology treats of the same things with metaphysics, physics and ethics, yet the mode of considering is far different. It treats of God not like metaphysics as a being or as he can be known from the light of nature, but as the Creator and Redeemer made known by revelation. It treats of creatures not as things of nature, but of God (i.e., as holding a relation and order to God as their Creator, preserver and Redeemer) and that too according to the revelation made by him. This mode of considering, the other sciences either do not know or do not assume.

VI. Theology labors to prove the existence of God not from a primary and proper intention, but, as it were, incidentally from an adventitious necessity (viz., for the purpose of confuting the profane and atheists who without shame and with seared consciences deny it). (2) The axiom—"science does not prove its subject, but takes it for granted"—is true in human and inferior sciences, but not in theology. Theology is of a higher order for it extends itself to the proof of all things which can be proved by the means peculiar to itself (viz., by divine revelation). It does this, not instrumentally, but authoritatively.

VII. It is not necessary for the habit of a science so to comprehend its object as to have a perfect knowledge of whatever belongs to it. It is sufficient if it knows many things concerning it and can draw deductions from its principles. Therefore, a science need not necessarily be equal to its subject by an exact and arithmetical equality. It suffices if it is equal according to some proportion of equality which is found in theology. For theology treats of God and his infinite perfections, not as knowing them in an infinite but in a finite manner; nor absolutely as much as they can be known in themselves, but as much as he has been pleased to reveal them. So theology may be properly said to equal its object according to the formal relation of revelation, not by equalling God himself, but only the revelation given by him.

VIII. The common saying—"science is not of particulars, but of universals"—must be received with limitation. For metaphysics, physics, etc. are sciences and yet they treat not the less on that account of singulars, of God and the world. Therefore the axiom must be understood as singulars composed of matter and constituted under the lowest species. For if theology treats of such (as of Adam, Noah and others), it does this not principally, but only to unfold the origin of things or for an example of life and a testimony to divine providence (and therefore on account of general causes). But if any singular, immaterial and in the pure act is presented, science can undoubtedly appropriate it because being is an object of intellect. Therefore the more perfect a being is, the more can he be known and apprehended; and he is the more perfect, the more he is in act and the less in potency. God can with great propriety be reckoned among universals for he is universal in causation, since he is the universal cause of all things also in predication; not indeed directly, but indirectly for though all things are not God,

they are nevertheless of God, or to or from him. Accordingly every relation of universality is not wanting in this part in the subject of theology.

IX. In the lower sciences, the principles differ from the subject as demonstrating the qualities and properties of the subject by proper principles because as the subject of every human science is of a finite essence and power, there must necessarily be certain principles from which it may flow or be constituted. But in theology (which is of a higher order), the subject is truly divine and infinite in nature and potency, and accordingly before everything, so that it can have no relation of dependence. Hence, by reason of this infinity, it contains at the same time these two relations: it is both the subject concerning which theology treats and also at the same time its principle.

X. Theology treats of sin not as belonging to God, but as holding a certain relation (*schesin*) to him (either that of opposite and contrary or as coming under his providence and justice); just as medicine treats of diseases and their remedies although its principal subject is man as curable.

SIXTH QUESTION: THE GENUS OF THEOLOGY

What is the genus of theology?

The genus of systematic theology.

I. Theology may be considered either systematically and objectively (with regard to that which is taught) or habitually and subjectively (with reference to a habit residing in the intellect). In the first sense, no other genus than doctrine can be more accurately assigned to it because it is taught by God and learned in the church. But doctrine (literally such) is far superior to every human doctrine, both in origin and matter and form and end. So it is described in Scripture by *didachēn* (Jn. 7:17; 1 Tim. 4:6; 6:3); by form of doctrine (*typon didachēs,* Rom. 6:17), as in the Old Testament *thvrh* denotes the whole doctrine of salvation. In the latter sense, it is properly described by a certain habit of mind.

What habit should be assigned to it?

II. In order to understand better what habit of mind should be assigned to it, we remark that every habit of mind is either a habit of knowing or believing or supposing. These answer the three assents of the mind: the act of knowing, believing and supposing. For every assent of the mind is founded either upon testimony or reasoning. If upon testimony, it is faith; if upon reason sure and solid, it is knowledge; if upon reason only probable, it is opinion.

Whence arose the fivefold distinction of habits?

III. The habit of knowing, in contradistinction to that of believing and supposing, embraces the five intellectual habits enumerated by Aristotle—intelligence, knowledge, wisdom, prudence, art (*Nichomachaen Ethics* 6 [Loeb, 325-73]). It is then taken in a general sense for every kind of certain and evident habitual knowledge, whether of things necessary and speculative or contingent and practical. Now this fivefold distinction arises from the fivefold variety of objects about which the mind may be occupied. For it may be occupied with things necessary which

are either principles to which we at once give assent without demonstration (the knowledge of these is called "intelligence"); or conclusions to which we assent when demonstrated (which constitute knowledge); or conclusions connected with principles (which signify wisdom); or about contingent things which, again, are either things to be done (*prakta*, whose sole end is good conduct), *eupragian* (about which prudence is occupied), or things to be made (*poiēta*, which have for their end the production with which art is concerned).

It cannot be referred to any of the habits properly.

IV. None of the intellectual habits (treated in ethics and mutually contradistinguished) can constitute the true and proper genus of theology because they are all habits of knowing and theology is not a habit of knowing, but of believing. (2) They are natural habits, invented and improved by the ingenuity of men, while theology (whose principle is not human reason, but divine revelation) is supernatural and God-given (*theosdotos*). (3) They are all either theoretical or practical simply, while theology is of a mixed genus partly theoretical and partly practical.

V. As to the species, theology cannot be intelligence because this is only the knowledge of principles and not of conclusions. Theology is the knowledge of both. Again, the former is concerned with principles known by nature and clear by its own light, but theology is concerned with principles revealed in the word of God. It is not knowledge because it is not founded upon the evidence of reason, but only upon testimony. It does not rest in mere knowledge, but directs and ordains it to operation. It is not wisdom because all the parts of wisdom are denied it (viz., the intelligence of principles known per se and the knowledge of conclusions). It is not prudence because it relates not only to things to be done, but also to things to be believed and is a power directive of spiritual not civil actions. Finally, it is not art because it is not an effective habit belonging to those which are terminated out of the efficient on some work.

Still it embraces them all eminently.

VI. Although theology can properly and strictly receive its denomination from no one of these habits, yet it may well be said eminently to include them all. For inasmuch as it treats of God as the first cause, it is like wisdom. Inasmuch as it contains first principles, it is like intelligence. Inasmuch as it demonstrates conclusions, it is like knowledge. Inasmuch as it directs actions, it is like prudence. Inasmuch as it is edifying to the church, it is like art. Hence in Scripture these terms are promiscuously applied to it: "intelligence" (Ps. 119:34, ?73*), "knowledge" (Ps. 119:66; Is. 5:13), "wisdom" (1 Cor. 2:6, 7), "prudence" (Ps. 119:98*). And frequently in the book of Proverbs (chaps. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), it is called "art" since the doctrine of faith is called a work and building upon which we ought to labor (1 Cor. 3:11; 2 Cor. 6:1).

Of all these, wisdom comes nearest to it.

VII. If any genus of these habits must be attributed to theology, wisdom is most analogous to it and approaches its nature the nearest. Not exactly in the Aristotelian sense because it does not differ much from intelligence and knowledge, but rather in the Stoical sense, as a collection of all habits, intellectual as well as moral (Stobae, Sermon 1, "De Virtute," *Ioannis Stobaei Sententiae* [1609], pp. 1-29). Hence Suidas says that wisdom is "the learning and the skillful use of contemplation, knowledge and recog-

nition" (*hapantōn mathēsin kai tēn technēn kai phronēsin, kai epistēmēn kai noun, Suidae Lexicon: Graece et Latine* [repr. 1986], 4:835). Thus the doctrine of faith is often designated in Scripture by the name of "wisdom" (as in the book of Proverbs and 1 Cor. 2:6, 7). Reason also confirms this because: (1) Wisdom is the knowledge of things most excellent. Now theology treats of God and his works, and our eternal happiness (things important above all others). These it treats of in the most excellent manner, not according to reason but from divine revelation. (2) Wisdom is an architectonic system commanding and directing all others. Now this is most peculiar to theology, which is so far the arbiter and mistress of all sciences that it judges of them and cannot itself be judged by another. For all other systems must be referred to it as a standard, and whatever does not agree with theology must be rejected from them. So although it does not prescribe to other systems principles and objects, yet it so far rules over them (because it establishes their limits) that they neither dare to hold any object opposed to theology, nor to use their principles against it. And also with respect to the ultimate end (viz., the glory of God) which although they do not immediately attain, yet they are bound to have such a direction.

VIII. If theology takes some things from other systems, it is not as an inferior from superiors, but as an superior from inferiors (as a mistress freely using her handmaids). Theology does not so much take from others, as presupposes certain previously known things upon which it builds revelation.

Seventh Question
Is theology theoretical or practical?

Origin of the question.

I. The Scholastics first broached this question, among whom it was formerly agitated a great deal and for a long time. Some maintained that theology is simply speculative (as Henry of Ghent, *Summae Quaestionum Ordinarium*, Art. 8, Q. 3 [1520/1953], 1:fol. lxv; Durandus, "Prologi Sententiarum Quaestio Sexta," in *Sententias Theologicas Petri Lombardi Commentariorum libri quatuor* [1556], pp. 9-10; Joannes Rada, *Controversariarum theologicarum* 3 [1620], pp. 62-93). Others maintained that it is simply practical, as Scotus and his followers. Others maintained that it is neither theoretical nor practical, but rather affective or dilective (viz., higher than theoretical and practical systems) since its end is love, which does not come under practice (as Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, Aegidius Romanus). Finally, others maintained that it is mixed (viz., speculative and practical at the same time), but more speculative (as the Thomists) or more practical (as Thomas de Argentina).

II. The question is necessary not only for the understanding of the true nature of theology, but also on account of the controversies of this time; especially with the Socinians and Remonstrants who say that theology is so strictly practical that nothing in it is positively necessary to salvation, unless it is that which pertains to moral precepts and promises. Hence (resting in obedience to the precepts and confidence in the promises) they let go the whole of religion as to fundamentals, the knowledge of mysteries being excluded. Evidently their object is this: to take away the necessity of the knowledge of the doctrines of the Trinity, incarna-

tion, etc. and thus more easily to pave the way to a common religion (i.e., to atheism) by which all promiscuously may be saved. Among the orthodox, some hold it to be merely practical, more hold that it is of a mixed nature; but some hold that it is more speculative, others that it is more practical. We consider theology to be neither simply theoretical nor simply practical, but partly theoretical, partly practical, as that which at the same time connects the theory of the true with the practice of the good. Yet it is more practical than theoretical.

Definition of a theoretical and a practical system.

III. A theoretical system is that which is occupied in contemplation alone and has no other object than knowledge. A practical system is that which does not consist in the knowledge of a thing alone, but in its very nature and by itself goes forth into practice and has operation for its object. Again, knowledge can be directed to operation as an object in two ways: either absolutely and by itself or relatively and accidentally. That knowledge is by itself directed to practice which is referred to operation according to the nature of that system to which it belongs. The knowledge of ethics is practical because the nature of ethics demands that whatever things are treated of in it should be referred to operation and use. That knowledge is accidentally referred to operation which is not practical according to the nature of the system to which it belongs, but only with regard to the end which he who is possessed of this knowledge proposes to himself. Thus physics is practical accidentally, when he who is furnished with this knowledge directs it to operation and use. Theology is called practical in the former and not in the latter sense.

IV. A science practical per se is not only that which is concerned with an operable thing and is regulative and directive of some operation. Otherwise that part of medicine which considers the parts of the human body and their diseases (and the signs and causes of diseases) would be speculative and not practical, which is absurd. For the ultimate and principal object of that branch of medicine is not the knowledge but the cure of diseases. Also that which is either impulsive to operation (as the knowledge of the good or evil consequences which follow virtue or vice), impels to right actions or is prerequisite to a better operation and action, as pathology (*pathologikē*) in medicine. Theology is called practical not only in the first sense, but also in the second and third. There is no mystery proposed to our contemplation as an object of faith which does not excite us to the worship of God or which is not prerequisite for its proper performance.

V. The arguments which prove that theology is either theoretical or practical (if they are understood exclusively of one or the other) fail and restrict it too much, but if they are understood inclusively are equally true. Theology is not of a simple kind (i.e., either only theoretical or only practical) as physics and ethics in philosophy, but of a mixed kind including both relations (*schesin*).

Theology is theoretico-practical.

VI. That theology is mixed (i.e., partly theoretical and partly practical) the following proofs may be given. (1) The object to be known and worshipped as the first truth and the highest good is God. (2) Man is the subject to be made perfect in the knowledge of the truth (by which his understanding may be enlightened), and in the love of good (by which the will may be adorned); in faith (which is extended to the credible [*pista*]); and in love (to practical [*prakta*] things). (3) The principle is both external (the word of God

which embraces the law and the gospel—the former setting forth the things to be done, the latter those to be known and believed, hence called the "mystery of godliness" and "the word of life")—and internal (the Spirit who is a Spirit of truth and sanctification, of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord, Is. 11:2). (4) The form embraces the essence of true religion, and demands the knowledge and worship of God which are connected together inseparably (as in the sun, light and heat can never be separated from each other). So neither can that knowledge of God be true unless attended by practice (Jn. 13:17; 1 Jn. 2:5). Nor can that practice be right and saving which is not directed by knowledge (Jn. 17:3). Hence Lactantius says, "Religion should not be received without wisdom, nor is wisdom without religion to be approved" (Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* 1.1 [FC 49:20; PL 6.119]; and "all the wisdom of man is in this one thing, that he may know and worship God" (ibid., 3.30* [FC 49:243; PL 6.444]); and "religion cannot be separated from wisdom nor wisdom from religion because it is the same God who ought both to be known (which is wisdom) and to be worshipped (which is religion); but wisdom precedes and religion follows because we must first know God in order to worship him. So in the two words there is the same force, although they may seem to be different; for the one is placed in the sense, the other in acts, yet they are like two streams flowing from one fountain" (ibid., 4.4 [FC 49:251-52; PL 6.456-57]). (5) The end is the happiness of man which consists partly in the vision and partly in the fruition of God, from each of which arises assimilation to him (Jn. 13:17).

Sources of explanation.

VII. That any science may be merely practical, it is requisite for its object to be practicable (*prakton*) and operable. That it may be theoretical-practical, it is sufficient not that the object should lead to practice, but that the practice should operate about it. So God is not indeed practicable (*praktos*), but practice should be occupied about the love and worship of him. Again, although a material object is not practicable (*prakton*), yet a formal object (viz., God as supernaturally revealed in his word) may be called partly theoretical (*theōrētos*) and partly practical (*praktos*) because he is revealed as an object both to be known and to be worshipped.

VIII. The speculative and practical can be specific differences of the lower sciences to which the natural faculty of the understanding can pertain. Thus the object cannot be determinative both to contemplation and to practice at the same time. But since theology is of a higher and more excellent order, it is not confined within these narrow limits of nature, but can easily embrace the speculative and practical (as the common sense perfectly contains the specific differences of the external sense, and the rational life the vegetative and sensitive life in man).

IX. When life eternal is said to consist in the knowledge of God (Jn. 17:3) and happiness in his vision, this indeed shows that theology is also speculative, as having many theoretical (*theōrēta*) objects. But we cannot from this infer that it is merely speculative because this knowledge itself is not only theoretical but practical (1 Jn. 2:5). Vision denotes not only knowledge but also enjoyment (according to Scripture usage).

X. A system may be called practical either with respect to its ultimate end (because it is directed to some operation as its end) or also with respect to its object (because it is occupied with a practical [*prakton*] object falling within the will

and action of man). In the former sense, theology may be called practical, not in the latter. For besides matters merely practical, it has also many theoretical matters which constitute the doctrines of faith.

XI. Although the knowledge of God and his attributes is not strictly practical (when we understand by practical that which is regulative of some operation so that the thing known may be done—as the knowledge of the law is the rule of obedience and of acts morally good); yet it is practical so far as practical means that which both excites and impels to action, so that if the thing known is not done, yet it incites to moral action. For this very reason, God has made himself known to us that we may worship him. Therefore he has manifested to us his power (that we may stand in awe of it) and his goodness (that we may love it).

XII. Theology may be considered either abstractly in the object or concretely in the subject. Although an impious theologian does not carry his system into practice, it does not cease to be practical in itself because the abuse of the subject does not overthrow the legitimate use of the object.

XIII. The theology of the saints in heaven cannot be termed merely theoretical because their happiness embraces not only an apprehension of the highest good by vision (which is in the intellect), but also an enjoyment of it by love (which is an act of the will).

XIV. Theology is so far theoretical-practical that it cannot be called merely practical, but also theoretical, as the knowledge of mysteries is an essential part of it. (1) For God commands and enjoins upon us the knowledge of the truth no less than obedience to the precepts (Jer. 31:34). Even life eternal is placed in the knowledge of God (Jn. 17:3). Nor can it be said with Schlichtingius that this has reference to a knowledge of his will manifested by Christ in the gospel and not to a knowledge of his nature. John 17:3 teaches us that it refers not only to his will, but especially to his nature: "that they may know thee" (viz., to be the true God, which denotes the nature, not the will). (2) From knowledge arises faith on which religion depends (Rom. 10:17). (3) The Apostles' Creed which, according to the Socinians, contains a compendium on religion and its articles, treats only of things to be believed, not of those to be done. (4) The knowledge of God is put for his whole worship in Jer. 31:34; Is. 53:11; 1 Jn. 2:3.

XV. Nevertheless, that theology is more practical than speculative is evident from the ultimate end, which is practice. For although all mysteries are not regulative of operation, they are impulsive to operation. For there is none so theoretical (*theōrēton*) and removed from practice that it does not incite to the love and worship of God. Nor is any theory saving which does not lead to practice (Jn. 13:17; 1 Cor. 13:2; Tit. 1:1; 1 Jn. 2:3, 4; Tit. 2:12).

EIGHTH QUESTION

Is human reason the principle and rule by which the doctrines of the Christian religion and theology (which are the objects of faith) ought to be measured? We deny against the Socinians.

Statement of the question.

I. That the state of the question may be perceived more clearly, before all things, the terms must be explained, and some previous principles laid down. (1) Human reason is taken either subjectively for that faculty of the rational soul by which man understands and judges between intelligible things presented to him (natural and supernatural, divine and human); or objectively

for the natural light both externally presented and internally impressed upon the mind by which reason is disposed to the forming of certain conceptions and the eliciting of conclusions concerning God and divine things. Again, reason can be viewed in two aspects: either as sound and whole before the fall or as corrupt and blind after it. The principle which here comes into question should be the first and self-evident (*autopiston*) from which all the truths and articles of faith are primarily drawn, and into which they are at last resolved. As in all the arts, those are the principles by which they are erected and demonstrated, and upon which it is not lawful for them to rise. The object of faith (meant here) is formal, not presupposed (i.e., the articles of saving faith, peculiar [*oikeioi*], properly and strictly so called); not the presupposed which are common to natural theology and sound reason such as these: that God exists; that he is just, wise, good; that the soul is immortal; etc.

II. In this controversy, there is an error on both extremes. They err in excess who attribute to reason in matters of faith more than its due (as the Socinians). They err in defect who underrate it (as the Anabaptists, Lutherans and papists). Here we dispute against the first; afterwards we will engage the others.

III. The question is not whether reason has any use in theology. For we confess that its use is manifold both for illustration (by making clear divine mysteries from human and earthly things); for comparison (by comparing old things with new, versions with their sources, opinions of doctors and decrees of councils with the rule of the divine word); for inference (by drawing conclusions); and for argumentation (by drawing forth reasons to support orthodoxy [*orthodoxian*] and overthrow heterodoxy [*heterodoxian*]). But the question is simply whether it bears the relation of a principle and rule in whose scale the greatest mysteries of religion should be weighed, so that nothing should be held which is not agreeable to it, which is not founded upon and cannot be elicited from reason. This we deny against the Socinians who, the more easily to reject the mysteries of the Trinity, incarnation and the satisfaction of Christ (and others of the same kind clearly revealed in Scripture), contend that reason is the rule of religion of things to be believed, and that those things are not to be believed which seem to the mind to be impossible (Ostorodt, *Unterrichtung . . . hauptpuncten der Christlichen Religion* 6 [1612], p. 42, "Man is not bound to believe what reason dictates to be false"; and Smaltzius: "If religion should be opposed to reason, by that very thing it would not be religion, for religion is the highest reason; yea, even reason itself," *Refutatio Thesium D. Wolfgangi Frantzii*, Disp. IV [1614], p. 137).

IV. The question is not whether reason is the instrument by which or the medium through which we can be drawn to faith. For we acknowledge that reason can be both: the former indeed always and everywhere; the latter with regard to presupposed articles. Rather the question is whether it is the first principle from which the doctrines of faith are proved; or the foundation upon which they are built, so that we must hold to be false in things of faith what the natural light or human reason cannot comprehend. This we deny.

Reason is not the principle of faith.

V. The reasons are: (1) The reason of an unregenerate man is blinded with respect to the law (Eph. 4:17, 18; Rom. 1:27, 28; 8:7). With respect to the gospel, it is evidently blind and mere darkness (Eph. 5:8; 1 Cor. 2:14). Therefore, it must be taken captive that it may be subjected to faith, not exalted that it may rule it (2 Cor. 10:3-5*). (2) The mysteries of faith are beyond the

sphere of reason to which the unregenerate man cannot rise; and, as the senses do not attempt to judge of those things which are out of their sphere, so neither does reason in those things which are above it and supernatural. (3) Faith is not referred ultimately to reason, so that I ought to believe because I so understand and comprehend; but to the word because God so speaks in the Scriptures. (4) The Holy Spirit directs us to the word alone (Dt. 4:1; Is. 8:20; Jn. 5:39; 2 Tim. 3:15, 16; 2 Pet. 1:19). (5) If reason is the principle of faith, then first it would follow that all religion is natural and demonstrable by natural reason and natural light. Thus nature and grace, natural and supernatural revelation would be confounded. Second, it would follow that reason is nowhere to be made captive and to be denied, against the express passages of Scripture; and that those possessed of a more ready mind and a more cultivated genius can better perceive and judge the mysteries of faith against universal experience (1 Cor. 1:19, 20; Mt. 11:25). (6) Reason cannot be the rule of religion; neither as corrupted because it is not only below faith, but also opposed to it (Rom. 8:7; 1 Cor. 2:14; Mt. 16:17); nor as sound because this is not found in corrupt man, nor in an uncontaminated man could it be the rule of supernatural mysteries. Nor now when it is corrected by the Spirit must it be judged according to itself, but according to the first principle which illuminated reason now admits (viz., the Scriptures).

Sources of explanation.

VI. A ministerial and organic relation is quite different from a principal and despotic. Reason holds the former relation to theology, not the latter. It is the Hagar (the bondmaid which should be in subjection to Scripture); not the Sarah (the mistress which presides over Scripture). It ought to compare the things proposed to be believed with the sacred Scriptures, the inflexible rule of truth. As when we refer the things we wish to measure to the public standard with the hand and eye. But reason itself neither can nor ought to be constituted the rule of belief.

VII. We must observe the distinction between an instrument of faith and the foundation of faith. It is one thing to introduce something to be believed and another to educe what may be understood and explained from the words; not by forcing a sense on a passage, but by unfolding that which seems involved. Reason is the instrument which the believer uses, but it is not the foundation and principle upon which faith rests. If in various passages of Scripture the use of reason is mentioned, this is not to make it the foundation of faith (as if I ought to act according to reason as a rule), but its office only is designated that believers may work conformably with and by it, as an instrument.

VIII. Rational worship is used in two senses: either originally, from reason as its origin and principle; or subjectively and organically, in reason as its subject and working by reason as an instrument. In Rom. 12:1, Paul does not use the reasonable service which he prescribes to believers in the first sense, for this would be to approve of will worship (*ethelothrēskeias*, which he elsewhere condemns); but in the second, for that which is founded on reason and is exercised by reason. That is, Paul uses that which is spiritual and inward, not carnal and outward, by antithesis to the Levitical and Old Testament ceremonial service which was carnal in the offering up of beasts; whereas God now no more requires brutes, but rational and spiritual sacrifices, as Peter calls them (1 Pet. 2:5).

IX. Christ's teaching may be called rational either as to the kind of doctrine or as to the mode of teaching. If we take it in the first sense (which is the question here), it is false; yea, he introduced a doctrine opposed and unknown to blind reason (Mt. 16:17). But the second sense has no pertinence here, since we confess that reason stands in the relation of an instrument.

X. There is a difference between deriving a doctrine from nature, and illustrating in a certain manner a doctrine already known; or to seize from nature the opportunity of teaching. The latter we recognize in the parables of our Lord, but not the former. For he did not expressly prove his mysteries by parables, but only illustrated them that under these representations they might be more easily understood.

XI. There is a difference between the "truth of propositions" and the "truth of conclusions," as Augustine remarks (CI 2.32 [FC 2:104-5; PL 34.59]). The former answers to the axiomatic judgment, the latter to the discursive (dianoetic). Divine revelation dictates axioms or sentences of faith to us in the Scriptures. Therefore, when these are beyond our comprehension, we ought simply to believe them on the authority of that infallible master of sentences whose *ipse dixit* (*autos epha*) is in all things sufficient. But right reason apprehends the truth of conclusions, and of itself determines what may be inferred from some other thing.

XII. To ascertain the reason of a consequence is different from ascertaining the consequent itself. Often the reason of a consequence is perceived when neither the antecedent is discerned nor the consequent comprehended. It is only understood that this thing follows from that. Faith perceives the consequent, but reason the consequence. To reason belongs the perception of the reason of a consequence, whether it be right and necessary or otherwise. Nor does it follow from this that faith which perceives the consequent is founded upon reason because reason is not an argument here, but an instrument. As when faith is said to be by hearing, hearing is not an argument of faith, but an instrument because reason does not put upon the text a sense which was not there, but brings forth by legitimate consequence something which was concealed in it and thus was taught implicitly by it.

XIII. In matters of faith reason stands not only in the relation of an instrument by which, but also sometimes from a means and argument from which the theologian argues (viz., when from his own treasury he draws arguments for the faith; or contends for principles by showing their credibility to those who do not acknowledge it; or treats from principles by drawing arguments from nature either to prove or confirm theological conclusion). Hence the same conclusion may be of faith (inasmuch as it is proved from Scripture) and of knowledge (inasmuch as it is demonstrated by reason). Yet we must not from this infer that reason is the principle and rule by which doctrines of faith should be measured.

Mixed syllogisms are of faith.

XIV. In mixed syllogisms (where one proposition is of faith, another of reason) reason is not the foundation and rule upon which the conclusion rests, but only the means and instrument by whose aid the truth virtually concealed in the other premise is elicited. Therefore in syllogisms of this kind the middle term is not taken from reason, but from Scripture. The connection however of the middle with the major extreme when it is denied by the adversary is shown by the principles of reason not to strengthen the truth of the mean,

but of the connection. For example, I deny that the glorified body of Christ is everywhere, having taken from Scripture this mean, that it is a real body. But the major (that no body is everywhere) is drawn from reason. Hence in such arguments the theological conclusion follows from the mean inferring, and the logical from reason which connects the consequence. One of the premises which is of faith communicating its force to the conclusion rests (as to the matter of consequent) upon revelation alone; although (as to the form and mode of consequence) it depends upon reason.

XV. It should not be replied here that the conclusion always follows the weaker part (i.e., reason which is weaker than divine revelation). For (1) that axiom must not be pressed beyond quantity and quality, so that if one of the premises is universal, the other particular, one affirmative, the other negative, the conclusion should always be particular and negative. (2) According to many, the conclusion ought to follow the weaker part, while it follows revelation which is inevident (at least philosophically speaking), where a proposition founded upon authority is considered weaker and more evident than one founded upon reason because it is farther removed from a scientific demonstration.

XVI. Hence we may safely infer that in mixed syllogisms of this kind the conclusion is theological and of faith because every proposition takes its denomination from the subject, not from the predicate. Therefore, since the subject is theological, the proposition is theological, although it may have a predicate philosophical or from the light of nature. Hence the assent given to conclusions of this kind is the assent of faith rather than of knowledge because the assent follows the nature of the proposition to which it is given. Therefore if the proposition is philosophical, it has an evident assent to which the mind is moved by the light of reason and knowledge. But if it is theological, it has the assent of faith to which it is moved by the light of revelation. Therefore although the assent to the conclusion may come from each proposition, yet because the weight of the proposition derived from theology is greater than that from philosophy, the assent itself may be said to belong simply to theology and not to philosophy.

XVII. Reason is taken either materially for the kind of doctrine derived from the light of reason, or formally for the manner of delivering it which is commonly called the mode of instruction (*tropos paideias*). But in neither sense can it be called the principle of theology; not in the former sense because theology is neither built upon reason nor resolvable into it; not in the latter sense because although it is in this sense an instrument (as has been said), yet it cannot be considered as the principle.

XVIII. For a thing to be contrary to reason is different from its being above and beyond it; to be overthrown by reason and to be unknown to it. The mysteries of faith are indeed contrary to corrupt reason and are assailed by it, but they are only above and beyond right reason and are not taught by it. So in neither of these senses can it be called their principle.

XIX. Although things of faith agree with reason and doctrine can be at variance with sound enlightened reason, it does not follow that they agree with corrupted and blind reason, or that even sound reason is its principle. For not only agreement, but also dependence constitutes a principle, such as exists between cause and effect.

XX. The proper rule of things to be believed and disbelieved is not the apprehension of their possibility or impossibility, but the word of God. Nor are those things only possible to God which seem so to men, for he can do above all that we can think (Eph. 3:20; Mt. 19:26), and it would be impious for a finite mind to circumscribe within narrow limits the infinite power of God.

XXI. Although light is not contrary to light, and natural and revealed truths are not at variance with each other, yet natural truth itself is often not what human reason dictates, which is often mistaken by an abuse of natural and revealed light. Therefore revealed truth can be opposed to ratiocination and human conceptions, although it may agree with natural truth which reason often does not see or apprehend. Thus here the first principles of nature (known of themselves) must be distinguished from the conclusions and conceptions of reason which are deduced from those principles. The former are true and sure; the latter obscure, often erroneous and fallible.

XXII. A small and a great light may differ in degree and species: in degree, as to a natural object; in species, as to a supernatural. Reason may be a small light; but in things civil and natural, not in things supernatural.

XXIII. Although reason is not the principle of faith, it does not follow that atheists cannot be converted. The manner of dealing with them can be either theological (by arguments founded on Scripture) or philosophical, so that by the principles of reason the prejudices against the Christian religion drawn from corrupt reason may be removed.

XXIV. The Lutherans falsely object to us that we hold reason to be the principle and rule of demonstration in controversies because we sometimes draw arguments from reason, and argue from reason against the ubiquity of Christ's body. For we assign to reason only a ministerial and instrumental, not a principal office. And if, in compound questions, we use reason for the purpose of proof, it bears the relation not of a principle but of a means from which the theologian argues; and they are not with us primary arguments, but only secondary and auxiliary forces. Besides, while the theologian uses arguments drawn from reason, he does it rather as a philosopher than as a theologian. As to the ubiquity of the body of Christ, we reject this doctrine, both philosophically and theologically, because it is absurd and contradicts the first principles of theology and philosophy.

Ninth Question

Does any judgment belong to reason in matters of faith? Or is there no use at all for it?

Statement of the question.

I. We must avoid two extremes here: the one of those who sin in excess attributing too much to reason, and regarding it as the rule of religion and faith (which the Socinians do against whom we argued in the preceding question); the other of those who err in defect, who (lest they might appear to consider reason as the rule of faith) attribute little or nothing to it. Of this way of thinking are not only the Anabaptists and Weigelians, but also the Lutherans and papists. These hold that the testimony of reason is not to be heard when it judges of certain mysteries of faith. For example, when it refuses to admit the doctrine of transubstantiation or ubiquity because it is repugnant to the light of

right reason. And because we do not repudiate entirely the use of reason, they write about us as if we made ourselves the judges and final arbiters in matters of faith, and thus deceive the world by a fair pretence, while we glory in acknowledging Scripture as the only judge.

II. The question does not concern the judgment of decision by which controversies are publicly determined. No one of us attributes this to reason, but either to God alone speaking in the Scriptures (if we speak of the supreme) or to pastors appointed in the church (if we treat of the subordinate judgment). Rather the question concerns the judgment of private discretion by which truth is distinguished from falsehood and this we think should be attributed to reason rightly instructed. (2) In a judgment we must distinguish between the subject (or intellectual power) and the rule (or law and foundation upon which the intellect rests) in order to judge from its prescriptions. (3) The rule with regard to the object to be judged, respects the truth either of sentences or of conclusions. Again, sentences are of things known either by nature or known only by supernatural revelation.

III. Having established this point, I say that to reason belongs the judgment of discretion in matters of faith, both subjectively (because it belongs to the intellect alone to know and distinguish these matters of faith) and normally; and indeed with respect to the truth of conclusions in all propositions (whether known by nature or by revelation), but with respect to the truth of propositions only in those known by nature and even then with this threefold caution. (1) That the judgment of reason not be considered as necessary, as if theology could not do without it. (2) That the word of God (where also these truths are revealed) be considered always as the primary rule and reason as the secondary. (3) That when the word adds something unknown to nature to a thing known by nature, then we should not judge of it by nature or reason, but by the word (not that the word and reason are at variance, but because reason is perfected by the word). But in things known only by revelation (as the mystery of the Trinity, of the incarnation, etc.), the only rule is the word of God, beyond or above which we must not be wise.

IV. The question is not whether the mysteries of faith are above reason or whether reason can reach them. For we readily grant that there are things which far surpass the comprehension not only of men, but even of angels the disclosure of which was a work of supernatural revelation. We also grant that reason is not only incapable of discovering them without a revelation; not only weak in comprehending them after being revealed; but also slippery and fallible (readily pursuing falsehood for truth and truth for falsehood), and never believing the word of God and its mysteries unless enlightened by the grace of the Spirit. Rather the question is—Is there no use at all for it, and should we entirely reject the testimony of reason, as often as the truth or falsity of any doctrine is to be judged? This our opponents hold and we deny.

V. Although the human understanding is very dark, yet there still remains in it some rays of natural light and certain first principles, the truth of which is unquestionable: such as, the whole is greater than its part, an effect supposes a cause, to be and not to be at the same time are incompatible (*asystatous*), etc. If this were not the case, there could be no science, nor art, nor certainty in the nature of things. (2) These first principles are true not only in nature, but also in

grace and the mysteries of faith. Faith, so far from destroying, on the contrary borrows them from reason and uses them to strengthen its own doctrines. (3) Although reason and faith are of different classes (the one natural, the other supernatural), they are not however opposed, but hold a certain relation and are subordinate to each other. Reason is perfected by faith and faith supposes reason, upon which to found the mysteries of grace.

VI. Reason cannot and should not draw mysteries from its own treasury. The word of God alone has this right. Unless derived from this source, they are on that very account to be discarded (Gal. 1:8). (2) Reason must not be listened to when it complains of not being able to comprehend the mysteries of faith. For how can the infinite be comprehended by the finite? Therefore the wish to reject mysteries because they cannot be comprehended by reason is a sin not only against faith but also against reason which acknowledges itself to be finite and far inferior to those sublime mysteries. (3) It must not be heard when it wishes, by overturning the questionable truth of the first principles of natural religion, to establish its own errors under the pretext of their being mysteries of faith (either as to things merely natural or supernatural or mixed) which grace borrows from nature for its own use. Hence right reason ought to reject these fictions as incompatible (*asystata*) with the indubitable first principles of natural religion.

The use of reason proved.

VII. That the use of reason is manifold was seen before (viz., for illustration, comparison, inference and proof). It may be further proved: (1) by 1 Cor. 10:15 where the apostle appeals to the judgment of the Corinthians, both of the common people and wise men; (2) from the examples of Christ, the apostles and prophets who always employed reason in teaching the mysteries of faith. Nor should it be considered unfair to argue from those inspired (*theopneustoi*) persons to ourselves who are fallible because the force of reasoning does not depend upon the infallibility of the person using it, but upon the evidence of the thing. (3) From 1 Jn. 4:1 where we are commanded "to try the spirits," which could not be done without the help of reason. (4) The testimony of the senses is not to be entirely rejected in matters of faith (as we shall hereafter prove); therefore neither is reason because the senses are far inferior to reason.

Sources of explanation.

VIII. There is a difference between knowing the meaning of a proposition and knowing its truth. In the former manner, the gospel is regarded simply as the word, but in the latter, as the divine and infallible word. Reason is occupied with the former, but faith alone with the latter.

IX. An incomprehensible thing (which cannot be grasped) is different from an incompossible (which cannot be conceived). The mysteries of the Trinity, incarnation and predestination are incomprehensible, as we have only an obscure and imperfect knowledge of them. But the fiction of transubstantiation or of ubiquity cannot be conceived, on account of the natural repugnance of our intellect to the conception of a thing altogether impossible.

X. Reason as corrupt and in the concrete may be at variance with theology, but not reason as sound and in the abstract (which possibly may be ignorant of mysteries and may not teach them, but must not therefore be considered as denying them). As you would improperly gather that the physician is at variance with the lawyer because he does not quote laws, so neither does the philosopher con-

tradict the theologian, although he does not treat of his mysteries, and acknowledges them to be out of his sphere.

XI. Those are called human things which either spring from carnal corruption (in which sense Christ opposes human to divine things, Mt. 16:17) or are the remains of the image of God, and so are not repugnant but subordinated. Nor does light oppose light, nor truth oppose truth because God is the author of both.

XII. Although we allow the judgment of discretion to reason enlightened by the Holy Spirit, we do not by this constitute ourselves the ultimate arbiters and judges in controversies of faith or take away from Scripture the supreme and decisive judgment (for these are subordinate, not contrary). Reason in this sense always judges according to Scripture as the first and infallible standard.

XIII. Because the mysteries of faith surpass the comprehension of reason, it follows that it should not be used as the first principle and foundation for exhibiting the truth of axioms of faith. But it does not follow that it cannot be used to exhibit the truth or falsity of conclusions in controversies of faith. For the truth of conclusions is perpetual in the nature of things and can be learned in those schools also which are out of the church, as Augustine frequently tells us (CI 2.31.49 [FC 2:104]).

XIV. When we allow a certain judgment to reason in things of faith, we do not mean reason as blind and corrupted by sin (in which sense we confess the natural man cannot receive the things of God [1 Cor. 2:14] and that "the carnal mind [*phronēma*] is enmity against God," Rom. 8:7), but we speak of reason as sound and healed by grace (in which sense "the spiritual man is said to judge all things" [1 Cor. 2:15], and Paul often appeals to the judgment of believers, 1 Cor. 10:15; 11:13; Heb. 5:13, 14).

XV. The "captivity of thought" which the apostle recommends (2 Cor. 10:5) does not exclude all liberty of judgment, but only the desire of contradiction when it exalts itself against Christ and his gospel. Not that reason cannot discern, but that it ought not to oppose (although the mysteries proposed do surpass its comprehension and cannot be reached by it). He does not therefore mean to take away reason entirely because grace does not destroy, but perfects nature. He only wishes it to serve and be a handmaid to faith and as such to obey, not to govern it as a mistress; that it may be in subjection and not entirely discarded, that it may be not the foundation, but the defender of faith and embrace, contend for and adorn the faith already established.

XVI. To deny or oppose an article of faith because it does not seem to agree with reason is different from opposing erroneous opinions respecting it and false expositions of Scripture. Not because philosophical rules do not admit of them, but because they are contrary to the word of God to which the natural truth of conclusions conforms.

XVII. Although we use reason and its principles in theological controversies, it does not follow that we make a mixture of philosophy with theology and of human with divine things. They are not used as the foundation and principle of faith (from which we prove these mysteries), but only as instruments of knowledge (as when with the eye of the body and the light of the sun we see any visible object, there is no mixture of the eye with the sun because they do not concur in the same, but in a different manner).

XVIII. The transition from a genus to a genus then occurs when that which belongs to one system is taken to demonstrate the conclusion of another. But this is by no means our method in this subject because the middle term is not drawn from philosophy to prove a conclusion of faith, but from Scripture. (2) The principles or axioms drawn from reason or philosophy in order to prove some article of faith are not so peculiar to philosophy as that they cannot be supposed to belong also to natural theology (which ought to come before supernatural and revealed). Thus they can be said to have a reference to articles of faith, if not formal at least presupposed.

TENTH QUESTION

May the judgment of contradiction be allowed to human reason in matters of faith? We affirm.

Origin of the question.

I. This controversy is conducted by our party against the Lutherans (especially the Ubiquitarians) who (when we say that their opinion about Christ's body being in many places [*polytopia*] or everywhere [*pantachousia*] is contradictory) usually reply that the judgment of contradiction in matters of faith does not belong to reason, but to the sacred Scriptures (Lucas Osiander [the elder], *Enchiridion controversiarum . . . Calvinianus* 1.3 [1608], pp. 25-45; Balthasar Mentzer, *Elencheus errorum Antonii Sadeelis*, Arg. 6 [1609], pp. 75-76; Josua Stegmann, *Photinianismus hoc est succincta refutatio errorum Photiniarum* [1643], disp. 2, q. 3, pp. 17-19). Hence Balthasar Meisner says that this axiom ("contradictory things are therefore impossible because for the same thing to be and not to be is impossible [*adynaton*]") is extremely dangerous in divine things (*quaest. metaph. 3. contra Calvin.*+). For a proper knowledge of the state of the question, three things must here be distinguished: the reason judging, the principle from which the judgment is formed, and the rule of consequence by which it is formed. (1) Reason here does not mean that which is blind and corrupted by sin, but that which is restored and enlightened by the Holy Spirit. (2) The principles are axioms not known by nature or founded upon human authority, but given in the Scriptures. (3) The rule by which reason directed and strengthened in tracing and applying the truths of Scripture is the rule of just consequence impressed upon the rational creature by God. This rule is not the rule of the truth itself (which is the word of God alone and the first normal truth), but only the rule of consequence by the assistance of which we may know and discern with greater certainty what follows from a truth and what does not.

Statement of the question.

II. The question is not whether reason can of itself reach into the mysteries of faith (for no one doubts that many of them far surpass the comprehension of reason), but whether it can judge of the contradiction of propositions (which can be discerned only by the laws of nature and reason). (2) The question does not concern the absolute and unlimited judgment of decision, but concerns the judgment of discretion which is bound and limited by the word and must always be proved by it (1 Thess. 5:21; 1 Jn. 4:1). This, if not always producing conviction in others, nevertheless suffices for our own.

III. Thus we decide that the judgment of contradiction belongs to reason; but (1) a revelation always being supposed, and its truth worthy of faith per se; (2) organically and ministerially, not despotically and authoritatively; (3) with conformity to Scripture itself which clearly interprets itself and requires no other interpreter to establish its sense. Thus reason enlightened by the Holy Spirit through the word is able to consider and to judge from the word (according to the rules of good and necessary consequence) how the parts of a doctrine cohere, and what may or may not follow from them.

Proof that the judgment of contradiction belongs to reason.

IV. The reasons are: (1) the Scriptures frequently enjoin this judgment (Mt. 7:15; 16:6; Col. 2:8; 1 Thess. 5:21; Heb. 5:14); (2) the examples of the saints confirm it, as the Bereans (Acts 17:11) and the Corinthians (1 Cor. 10:15); (3) the design of Scripture teaches it (which is the perfection of the man of God in the knowledge of the truth and the conviction of gainsayers [2* Tim. 3:16; Tit. 1:9], which cannot be accomplished without it); (4) the use of reason is a strong proof because as the knowledge of the affirmation and negation of propositions and the doctrine of contradiction belong to it, so also must such a judgment. And unless we allow this, the widest door will be thrown open to all kinds of heretics and fanatics for introducing their fictions and monstrous opinions and we can never use any true contradiction.

Sources of explanation.

V. Although this judgment is made subjectively by man, it must not be considered as human (formed in the manner of men originally from human reason and affections), but divine (proceeding from the light and influence of the Holy Spirit). In this sense, Paul says "he that is spiritual judgeth all things" (viz., spiritually) by the light of grace and not of natural reason (1 Cor. 2:15*).

VI. Reason cannot judge of the power of God from natural principles, but this is not to say that it cannot judge of it from the word (Mt. 19:26; 2 Tim. 1:12; Ps. 115:3). Thus the judgment of contradiction as to a perfectly blind reason is dangerous when the judgment is formed from corrupt principles. But we speak of enlightened reason giving its decisions from the word.

VII. Reason is to be brought into captivity (2 Cor. 10:5) when it exalts itself against Christ and his gospel, but it can be heard when it is obedient and judges from it.

VIII. The darkness of the human intellect does not hinder sound reason from judging of the truth of connections and so contradictions. We allow indeed that it cannot judge of the truth of propositions (as ignorant of it per se and which it must seek from the law and testimony). But it does not follow from this that it cannot judge of the contradiction of the expositions, opinions and interpretations which men give of these mysteries.

IX. Reason can judge not only of a direct and formal contradiction (containing in the same terms both an express affirmation and negation), but also of an indirect and implied (deduced by necessary consequence). Such are these: the blood of Christ cleanses us from all sin, therefore there is no purgatory; Christ ascended into heaven, therefore he is not everywhere.

X. It is not necessary in order to ascertain a contradiction to know distinctly the things themselves and their essence. It is sufficient if the truth of conclusions is known from which we can readily form a judgment of the contradiction of a proposition.

XI. Although many things may seem contradictory to a number of persons which are not really so, it does not follow that something of the kind ought to appear so which is not, to men rightly using reason and thought.

XII. It is one thing to speak of sound and renewed reason in the abstract; quite a different thing to speak of the same in the concrete and as it is in this or that corrupt subject. We allow a judgment to reason not in the latter, but only in the former sense.

XIII. To take away from reason every judgment and to maintain that we must not confide in it absolutely is different from maintaining not only that those things must be believed which reason knows, but that in a more perfect school those things are to be learned which reason cannot attain unto or teach. We do not hold the former, but the latter.

XIV. Although the judgment of contradiction is allowed to reason in matters of faith, it does not follow that the human intellect becomes the rule of divine power (as if God could not do more things than human reason can conceive). God's being able to do something above nature and human conception (which is said with truth in Eph. 3:20) is different from his being able to do something contrary to nature and the principles of natural religion (which is most false). Nor is the power of God in this manner limited by the rule of our intellect, but our mind judges from the word what (according to the nature of a thing established by God) may be called possible or impossible.

XV. Reason cannot judge of the power of God so as to comprehend it most perfectly, or to think those things impossible which are above nature, or to introduce something into theology under the pretext of divine power unless it has gathered it beforehand from the word; much less that when the word of God certainly and clearly establishes anything can it have recourse to the omnipotence of God to overthrow it. But so far it judges well of the power of God when it estimates it according to the nature of things and his word, so as to call that impossible and contradictory to this or that person, but which is really such because it opposes the nature of the thing and the truth revealed in the word.

XVI. It is one thing for reason to be able to be a judge of what is false, contradictory and repugnant both to the universal principles of reason and thus revelation (for instance in the subjects of transubstantiation, ubiquity, the adoration of creatures and the like); another thing that reason ought to be the judge and the standard too of a revealed and mysterious (*mystēriōdous*) truth which is infinitely exalted above its sphere and delivered by God whose thoughts (how immense!) are far above human thoughts and who wishes reason to be brought into captivity to the obedience of faith (2 Cor. 10:5). This we deny, but that we affirm.

Eleventh Question

Is there any use of the testimony of the senses in mysteries of faith; or ought it to be entirely rejected? We affirm the former and deny the latter.

Statement of the question.

I. This question is put forth against us by papists who (to weaken the argument which we draw from the testimony of the senses to overthrow the fiction of transubstantiation and of the bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist and establish the reality of the substance of the bread and wine because the senses see, touch and taste nothing but bread and wine) have gone so far as to say

that the testimony of the senses is not to be regarded in mysteries of faith because mysteries are above the senses, and faith must consist in believing what we do not see.

II. Although the orthodox are unwilling that the testimony of the senses should be heard in all mysteries, they nevertheless maintain that a proper regard should be paid to their testimony when the discussion concerns sensible and corporeal things which come within the sphere of their activity.

III. As to the state of the question, it must be noted that as there are three kinds of things which may be known (viz., those known by faith [*pistai*], by the senses [*noētai*] and by the intellect [*aisthētai*]), so there are three faculties answering to them (viz., the senses, reason and faith); and that the senses perceive sensible things, reason intelligible things, and faith spiritual and supernatural things. But as the senses do not claim for themselves the judgment of things which are the objects of reason, so much less can reason and the senses judge of things of faith; but each faculty is occupied with its own objects, and as they ought not to be confounded, so they ought not to be mutually opposed.

IV. The question is not therefore whether the testimony of the senses is in every case to be regarded, so that we should grant nothing except what the senses can seize. For we grant there are many mysteries to which reason and much less the senses cannot rise, such as the mysteries of the Trinity, of the incarnation, etc. Rather the question is when the senses judge of an object belonging to them and do not go beyond their proper sphere, must their testimony be rejected or admitted? The question is whether faith may be opposed to a well-directed judgment of the senses and overthrow it. This we deny.

V. Some mysteries are entirely spiritual and placed far beyond our comprehension; such as the mysteries of the Trinity, of the incarnation, etc. But others are placed in sensible and corporeal things (i.e., whether God uses them as instruments and means for carrying out his purposes, or wishes to lead us along by them to a clearer knowledge of more sublime mysteries, such as the miracles of Christ, the types and figures of the Old Testament and the sacraments of the New). The former are properly the objects of our faith and in no way strike the senses. But as to the latter (in which a spiritual is joined with a corporeal thing) the spiritual thing always remains an object of faith, but the corporeal an object of sense. Therefore the question is whether faith may use the testimony of the senses in corporeal things. For instance, when it judges of the substance of the bread and wine in the Eucharist, and the absence of the body of Christ, must we reject it?

The testimony of the senses proved.

VI. That the testimony of the sense should not be rejected is proved: (1) by the example of Christ who, to prove the reality of his body after the resurrection, appeals to the senses—"handle me and see" (Lk. 24:39). This he would never have done if their testimony was false and uncertain. Thus the angel uses this argument: "He is not here; for he is risen, as he said. Come, see the place where the Lord lay" (Mt. 28:6*). In Acts 1:11, the apostles used the same proof when they promised that Christ should come in like manner as they had seen him go; so in 1 Jn. 1:1, 2 and 2 Pet. 1:17, they found the principal proof of the truth and divinity of the gospel upon the testimony of the senses. (2) God makes use of the preaching of the word and the con-

templation of his works to lead us to faith. Now these means unquestionably presuppose not only the use of the senses (without which both the word and works of God would be unknown), but also the fidelity and truth of their testimony. For if the senses can be deceived, what certainty could be produced in us either by the word or works of God? (3) The Holy Spirit employs the exercises of the senses in describing intellectual actions (as seeing, hearing, tasting, etc.) which could not be done unless their testimony were certain and not slippery. (4) The faithfulness of God will not suffer us to believe that he wished to trifle with men by referring them to a testimony which could deceive and be false.

Sources of explanation.

VII. Although the senses are not absolutely infallible, it does not follow that their testimony is worth nothing. For there are certain conditions in which (being answered) they are not deceived: (1) that the object be at a proper distance; (2) that the medium be pure and free from everything which could distort the image; (3) that the organ be rightly disposed; (4) that all the senses (at least those which can take cognizance of the particular object) be consulted and make the same judgment; (5) that the senses act carefully and not hastily, otherwise they might be deceived; (6) that the fancy be free and without fevers or delirium, otherwise we would often think we saw and heard things which we did not see or hear. If we pay attention to all these conditions, it will be evident that they all so concur in testimony about the reality of the bread and wine in the Eucharist that it can by no possibility be fallacious or doubtful.

VIII. The senses were not deceived in the case of Mary Magdalene who supposed Christ to be the gardener (Jn. 20:15) because she was deceived by a precipitancy of judgment which she immediately corrected when (her ears assisting the eyes) she recognized the Savior by his voice; or in the case of the disciples at Emmaus who did not know Christ (Lk. 24:31). This passage testifies that their knowledge was imperfect and obscure, but not false, since they believed him to be a real man who walked with them, but did not think he was Christ. Or in the case of the angels' appearing in human form; for although they were not true men, yet they were true bodies and not phantasms in which they appeared, and something supernatural was always connected with them. Hence persons could tell that they were not mere men; rather there was something supernatural, such as the light which surrounded the angel announcing the birth of Christ, and the shining garments in which the angels who witnessed the resurrection of Christ appeared. Hence it was not difficult for the senses and reason to form a correct judgment of them. If some were deceived (as possibly sometimes happened) the error was not on the part of the object which clearly showed itself, but on the part of the subject and the principle of judgment of the senses.

IX. For a person to be struck with blindness by God so as to be unable to see any object properly and clearly is different from the senses (well ordered) being deceived in the testimony which they (rightly disposed) give concerning an object in their own sphere. The former is said of the Sodomites who could not find the door of Lot's house (Gen. 19:11) and of the Syrian soldiers who could not see the city of Samaria (2 K. 6:18), but not the latter.

X. If Christ passed through the midst of the crowd which wished to cast him headlong from the hill (Lk. 4:30), we are not therefore to believe that he made his body invisible and imperceptible to the senses; rather he hid himself in the

crowd that he might escape their fury, or struck them with blindness, or suddenly quieted or repressed their excitement, as Ambrose (*Expositio Evangeli . . . Lucam* 4.56 [PL 15.1713] on Lk. 4:30) and Bede (*In Lucae Evangelium Expositio* [PL 92.378] on Lk. 4:30) think.

Twelfth Question: The Use of Consequences

Are the doctrines of faith and practice to be proved only by the express word of God? May they not also be legitimately proved by consequences drawn from Scripture? We affirm the latter.

Statement of the question.

I. This question owes its rise to the new method of disputing peculiar to the jugglers and mountebanks among the papists who, in order to evade with greater ease the arguments by which we invincibly established from Scripture our opinion and confuted their errors, supposed that they had no better way of getting out of the difficulty than by compelling us to prove that all our doctrines are contained in so many words in Scripture, all use of consequences being rejected. Cardinal Perronius appears to have devised this method first (*Reply of the . . . Cardinall of Perron to the Answeare of the . . . King of Great Britaine* [1630/1975]). Many others of the same worthless class followed him—Gontery, Cotton, Arnoldus (Arnoux) and especially Veron who caused a peculiar method of disputing to be called "Veronian" from him. To these the Wallenburgian Brethren in Germany joined themselves and other light-shunning missionaries. But other heretics darkened the world before these, for the Arians often used this argument to overthrow the *homoousion*. The Macedonians also denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit just because it is nowhere in Scripture expressly said that the Holy Spirit is God (see Gregory Nazianzus, Oration 31 [5], "On the Holy Spirit," 1.1 [NPNF2, 7:318]). Maximus, the monk, testifies that the Apollinarians and Monophysites used the same weapons (in his twenty orations+ which are commonly, but falsely, ascribed to Athanasius).

II. The fifth article of the French Confession (whence they wish it to appear that they have drawn the sentence which they fix upon us) asserts indeed the perfection of Scripture when it says that "it is the rule of all truth and comprehends whatever is required for the glory of God and our salvation, so that it is lawful neither for men nor even for angels to add anything to, or take away from it" (Cochrane, 145). But it does not maintain that nothing is to be received which we do not find in so many words in Scripture; yea, by mentioning near the end that three creeds are received by us (the Apostles', the Nicene and Athanasian) it sufficiently intimates that we do not seek for the very letters, but the truth of doctrines and worship (ibid., 146). It therefore means that the word of God alone should be adhered to exclusive of all traditions, but does not restrict us to the express word exclusive of consequences.

III. In order to understand the question, we must recollect that a thing may be said to be in Scripture in two ways: either *kata lexin* (expressly and in so many words); or *kata dianoian* (implicitly and as to the sense). We say that all things are contained in Scripture not in the first way, but in the second.

IV. Consequences may be considered either materially (to denote the doctrines themselves drawn out by consequence), or formally (for the connection itself of

the terms). Augustine distinguishes between "the truth of propositions and the truth of conclusions" (CI 2.32 [50] [FC 2:105; PL 34.59]). Again some are innate and educed from Scripture, being virtually contained in it; others implied and carried into it. Some are proximate, necessary and plain; others are remote, probable and obscure. We speak here of the former, not of the latter.

V. The solid proof of a thing is such either in itself or in relation to this or that man. The one consists in the evidence of the thing; the other in the conviction of man. The former is always present in a sound reasoning by consequences, not so the latter.

VI. The articles of faith which should be proved from Scripture are either positive and affirmative (containing some doctrine to be believed), or negative and exclusive (rejecting errors introduced by heretics). The former ought to be proved clearly and certainly from Scripture because they are the proper objects of faith; but as to the latter it is not requisite that any mention should be made of them, but only of general principles by which their falsity can be shown. Hence our opponents trifle when they ask us to prove by so many words in Scripture that there is no purgatory, that the pope is not the head of the church, that the Mass is not a sacrifice, etc. (1) The affirmative is bound to prove, not the negative. (2) These doctrines are not positive, but negative with us. Therefore it is sufficient for us to teach that they are not contained in Scripture and that other things (which plainly refute them) are.

VII. The sufficiency and perfection of the Scriptures does not consist in their condemning all errors and heresies by name, but only in their announcing all positive doctrines clearly. For as the right is the touchstone of itself and of obligation (all necessary truth being clearly established), the errors opposed to it are rejected.

VIII. The question therefore is brought within these limits: whether, besides the express word of God, evident and necessary consequences are admissible in theology; or whether the doctrines of faith and practice may be lawfully proved by them. We affirm; our opponents deny. Not all however, for Bellarmine agrees with us here. "Nothing," says he, "is of faith, except what God has revealed by the apostles and prophets, or what may be plainly deduced from them" (VD 4.9, pp. 131-32; cf. "De Justificatione," 3.8 in *Opera* [1858], 4:542-44). Cano ("De Locis Theologicis," 12.6 in *Opera* [1605], pp. 586-97), Salmeron (*Commentarii in evangelicam historiam* [1612], vol. 1, Prolegomenon 9, Canon 7, p. 95), Torquemada, (*Summa de Ecclesia* 4, Pt. II.8 [1561], pp. 380-81) and many others agree with him. These maintain that to be of faith which by necessary and legitimate consequence can be derived from Scripture.

The use of consequences proved from the design of Scripture.

IX. Many things establish the use of consequences in things of faith. (1) The design of Scripture, which is to serve for doctrine (*didaskalia*), for reproof (*elenchos*), for correction (*panorthōsis*), for instruction (*paideia*) and comfort (*paraklēsis*) (2 Tim. 3:16; Rom. 15:4) which could not be answered without them because no thesis could be transferred to its hypothesis, nor could any application of Scripture to theological or practical uses ever be made. (2) The nature of man to whom the mysteries of religion are committed, who is not a trunk or a brute, but a rational creature and (being capable of reasoning) bound to search the Scriptures (Jn. 5:39) and not to be satisfied with the shell of the words but to

penetrate to the very kernel and sense that he may gather from what he has read something which he has not read (as Augustine well remarks, *Contra Maximinum Hereticum Arianorum Episcopum* 2*.3 [PL 42.760]). (3) The wisdom of God; for as when a wise man speaks, he wishes everything which can lawfully be gathered from his words to be understood as being said by him; thus being infinitely wise and foreseeing all that could be deduced from the word, God so spoke that whatever could be lawfully gathered from what he said should be considered as his word. (4) The practice of heretics, who the better to defend their errors against the orthodox, have entirely repudiated the use of consequences. The Arians denied the *homoousion* just because it was not contained in Scripture in so many words (*autolexei*). Hence they are called "syllable-catchers" by Basil. Gregory Nazianzus calls the contender against the divinity of the Holy Spirit who uses this artifice, an A.B.C. Sophist and a pettifogger of words (*sykophantēn tōn onomatōn*, Oration 31*.24, "On the Holy Spirit" [NPNF2, 7:325; PG 36.160]). (5) The usage of papists who prove by consequences many of their doctrines concerning the primacy and infallibility of the pope, transubstantiation, purgatory and the like. (6) The example of Christ and the apostles who often used consequences; as when Christ proved against the Sadducees the resurrection of the dead from the formula of the covenant (Mt. 22:32) which says nothing expressly about the resurrection; and when the apostles proved that Jesus of Nazareth was the true Messiah promised in the Old Testament, although nothing is there said of him in so many words (*autolexei*). Nor should it be replied that the authority of Christ and the apostles is infallible and therefore that their consequences also are of undoubted truth, while ours are not. For although the consequences of Christ are infallible in themselves from the authority of the speaker, yet they had not their force with the Sadducees from the authority of the speaker (which they did not acknowledge), but from the nature of what was said. Otherwise, how could Christ by this proof have stopped the mouths of his enemies who did not acknowledge his authority?

X. Although the inferences of Christ as to us may pass into the word of God for the simple reason that they come from Christ and may be made lawfully objects of faith, yet it is false that these were esteemed actually by the Sadducees, the enemies of Christ. Nay for this sole reason, they were admitted because they had a foundation in the words of Moses quoted by Christ. They were therefore recognized as such by them, regard being paid to the words and not the speaker.

XI. The *Logismoi*, against which the weapons of our warfare are directed (2 Cor. 10:4, 5*), are not all kinds of reasoning, but as we read there *logismoi epairomenoi kata tēs gnōseōs tou Theou* (viz., exalting themselves against, not acting as handmaids; opposing the gospel, not lending their assistance to it). The former are deservedly to be destroyed because they are incompatible (*asystatoi*) with faith; but not so legitimate reasonings, being in subjection to revelation and properly used both for its explication and application.

XII. The foundation upon which a thing rests is different from the instrument which we use for the knowledge of the thing itself. That which has a fallible foundation cannot be infallible because the effect cannot be greater in every respect than its cause. Reason here however is not the foundation, but the instrument.

XIII. Although the intellect which educes consequences is fallible, it does not follow that the consequences themselves are false and uncertain. (1) The possi-

bility of being deceived is different from being actually deceived; the being at fault sometimes from being so always. A power which is of itself and always fallible in every exercise cannot give foundation to infallible certainty. But such is not the intellect because it is fallible not in itself but accidentally; nor in all, but only in some things. Otherwise if the argument held good universally and if (because reason is sometimes deceived) no reliance must ever be placed upon it, it would follow that all true knowledge and certainty had been removed from the world, and Pyrrhonism and incomprehensibleness (*akatalēpsian*) introduced. In like manner all certainty of the senses would be taken away because they are sometimes deceived, which everyone sees to be in the highest degree absurd. For the power of fallibility is not necessarily connected with each act. Nay it can by the use of legitimate means be hindered from flowing into the act. Therefore as the senses must be freed from all obstacles inhibiting their certainty (existing either in the object, the medium or the organ), so the intellect must be freed from the prejudices which stand in the way of right reason, and then it will not go wrong. Now we speak here of a sound and rightly constituted intellect.

XIV. To apprehend the reason of a consequence is different from apprehending the consequent itself. Faith apprehends the consequent; reason the consequence. And it does not follow from this that faith (by which the consequent is believed) is founded upon reason because reason is not an argument here on account of which I believe, but the instrument through which I believe. Now the instrument does not introduce into the text what was not there before, but educes by legitimate consequences what was concealed in it. Hence the theological conclusion results from the inferred mean, but the logical from reason or the instrument eliciting consequences. The consequence, as to its materiality, is founded upon the word; as to its formality, upon reason.

XV. Although reason concurs in educing consequences, it does not follow that faith is established by reason; as, although faith cometh by hearing, yet the senses are not the foundation of faith; faith uses reason, is not built upon it. It uses it as an instrument of application and mode of knowledge, but is not built upon it as a foundation and rule of things to be believed.

XVI. Mixed syllogisms (in which one of the premises belongs to natural, the other to revealed religion) do not cease to be of faith. (1) Every proposition receives its denomination from the subject and not from the predicate. (2) A proposition of revealed religion virtually contains that which is drawn from the light of nature to prove it and thus communicates its own force to it. (3) To prove a conclusion of faith, the middle term must be taken not from nature, but from the Scriptures; but where the connection of the mean with the major extreme is denied by the adversary, it must be assisted by the principles of reason, not in order to prove the truth of the mean, but of the connection. For example, I deny that the bread becomes the body of Christ in the Supper (this mean term having been assumed that it has the accidents of bread). But if the connection of the mean with the major extreme is denied (viz., that is true bread which has the properties of bread), it must then be proved from reason because it is not contained in Scripture formally, but only virtually.

XVII. The agency of reason is so far from making faith doubtful that it rather greatly assists and establishes the knowledge and certainty of it. Only distinguish between reason in the abstract and in the concrete: reason illuminates in the be-

liever or is darkness in the unregenerate. It is true that the blind and false reason does make a doubtful faith, but we deny it concerning sound and enlightened reason.

XVIII. Although the divine may have a more perfect knowledge of consequences, yet this is no reason why an ignorant person may not have the same according to his capacity, although he may be unacquainted with logic and metaphysics because the light of reason and natural logic suffice to enable him to perceive natural consequences.

XIX. In this kind of reasoning where something is adduced by consequence, it is requisite: (1) that one of the premises, or both, immediately or mediately, be contained in proper or figurative words in the Scriptures; (2) that the consequence or inference be necessary and evident (necessary not only by a formal, but also by a material and consequential necessity, as when a consequent is deduced from an antecedent, a species from a genus, an effect from a cause); (3) that it be evident on account of assent so that on account of the evidence of inference we may assent no less to the conclusion than to the premises.

XX. It is one thing to speak of reasonings drawn from Scripture and according to it and subordinated to and resolvable into it; another to speak of those which are opposed to it. Because heretics use the latter to prove their errors, it does not follow that the former are inadmissible. For the legitimate use of a thing ought not to be taken away on account of its abuse.

XXI. The use of consequences is not at variance with the simplicity of the disciples of Christ for although it becomes the sheep of Christ to be simple, they ought not to be brutes, but rational creatures. Nor if we are bound to listen to Christ's voice alone, ought the use of consequences therefore to be rejected provided we employ them with lawful moderation. Yea it is because the voice of Christ is to be heard that we must search the Scriptures so as to distinguish his voice from others, which cannot be done without the use of reason. So far from departing from Scripture or adding to it by reasonings drawn by consequences from Scripture, we are thus able rather to trace out and reduce to practice only those things which the Scriptures contain.

XXII. Although Scripture is said to be perfect (as a foundation of things to be believed and done inasmuch as it contains all the doctrines and precepts of life necessary to salvation) this is not to deny the necessity of explication and application. For a rule is perfect, and yet we have to apply it. Nor does that application detract from the perfection of the rule, but rather proves and declares it.

XXIII. The *mataiologia* or "vain jangling" which the apostle condemns (1 Tim. 1:6) is not sound reasoning by consequences from Scripture, but a curious and troublesome discussion of unimportant things which he calls fables and endless genealogies (*mythous kai genealogias aperantous*, v. 4) such as the fables of the Gentiles concerning the gods and their generation (*theogonia*) and also the dreams of the Jews concerning Lilith, Behemoth, Leviathan and other silly trifles of the Talmud.

XXIV. The abuse of reasonings is not to be confounded with their use, nor is a thing considered in the abstract to be condemned on account of its perverse application in the concrete. Thus many are deceived in their perception of objects of sound and sight. Still, on that account, we are not to say that all things are uncertain which are apprehended by the senses. So if they err, who use consequences

to establish the false doctrines of transubstantiation or of consubstantiation because they are forced and illegitimate, those who use them lawfully ought not to be condemned. Otherwise it would follow that the use of the Scriptures themselves must be condemned because many heretics have made an improper use of them.

XXV. To listen to a person as a framer of doctrines (in which character Moses, the prophets and Christ alone are to be heard both as to the things taught and as to the manner of teaching) is different from listening to a maker of instruments suitable for explaining and applying these doctrines (in which character men using consequences are to be heard).

XXVI. There is a difference between the principles of doctrines and of the truth of propositions and the principles of the truth of inferences. The former are drawn from Scripture; the latter from reason. And because the truth of propositions is more important, it is principally regarded in arguments, and from it the judgment ought to be made concerning the conclusion. Hence the conclusion of the argument will be theological because the principle of the doctrines is such. But reason is not the principle of the thing, but of the knowledge of the thing; nor so much the principle as the instrument by which the thing to be proved is known.

XXVII. The consequence is a work of reason (considered formally and organically) because it is elicited by reason, but not as considered originally and materially for the doctrine elicited by consequence. Thus consequences are not of faith on the part of the organ by which they are deduced (for I do not believe because I so reason, but because the word of God declares it); yet they are of faith on the part of the principle from which they are deduced (for as the premises, so must the conclusions thence be deduced).

XXVIII. We may consider a thing as coming from the Holy Spirit, either mediately and in branches (viz., that which is deduced from Scripture by the help of reason) or immediately and in the root (which is contained in it in so many words). In the former sense, consequences are from the Holy Spirit, not in the latter.

XXIX. Although we must not regard as the doctrine of the Reformed those which can by any method be deduced from their confessions and be imputed to them; nor as the opinion of the Lutherans that which may be inferred from their doctrine—it does not follow that we must not consider as the word of God that which may be lawfully and plainly deduced from it. The cases are entirely different. For the Holy Spirit (who searches the deep things of God [*ta bathē tou Theou,* 1 Cor. 2:10] as he is omniscient) could foresee and intend whatever it was possible to gather rightly from his words. But men (who are neither omniscient nor infallible) were unable to know what might in after times be deduced from their words.

XXX. When Peter denies that Scripture is of private interpretation (2 Pet. 1:20), he does not use the word "private" subjectively—that which can be legitimately derived by any private person from a comparison of Scriptures. Otherwise the Holy Spirit would not command us to read and to search the Scriptures and compare spiritual things with spiritual (1 Cor. 2:13); to prophesy according to the proportion of faith (Rom. 12:6); and to apply them to conviction and correction (2 Tim. 3:16*). Rather he means interpretation as private originally and (as the

text reads *idia epilysis*, i.e., one's own and individual) arising from the brain and pleasure of each man, and which the words of Scripture and the comparing of them do not furnish (such as the right which the pope claims for himself of interpreting Scripture at his pleasure according to that infallible spirit which he makes peculiar and private to himself).

XXXI. That Scripture may be explained by Scripture, it suffices that Scripture in the antecedents and consequents, in the parallels, scope, etc., supply to the interpreter the foundations and reasons by which he may deduce the genuine sense and demonstrate it to the consciences of others. But it is not necessary for the Scriptures to say in any place that this passage must be explained by another, nor that there should be read expressly in Scripture the consequences and interpretation which I propose; as when a lawyer comparing law with law and explaining one by another says that the emperor and legislator interpret each other. There is no need for the emperor to say anywhere expressly that this law must be explained by that and these words by those.

XXXII. Although Scripture judges not of the propriety of a consequence as to the truth of connection (because this depends upon the aid of reason), it does not cease to be the sole judge of controversies of faith as to the truth of propositions. As the law does not cease to be the judge of suits which arise in the state, although it does not declare that the consequences (which are deduced from it for acquitting one and condemning another) are good and well formed. Nor was it ever heard that the principles of the real sciences judged of the appropriateness of the consequences derived from them, although controversies may be decided by them, physical by physical, ethical by ethical.

XXXIII. As hearing does not make the sound and sight does not make the light (which it perceives by looking), so neither does the intellect make its own object (nor the truth and the word of God which it understands by reasoning); but in like manner it must have these things presented to it. But as the intellect by reasoning makes the truth and the word of God conclusive, so sight and hearing (by their exercise) give us the knowledge of light and sound.

XXXIV. Although that is plain and evident which is denied by no one and is immediately comprehended by all, it does not follow that a thing is not perspicuous which is not immediately comprehended by all. For often many things are obscure to many persons (which could and would be very plain to them) either because they did not give the proper attention or because they were blinded by prejudice. When we say that our consequences are evident, we do not mean in the former sense, as if they were denied by no one and could be readily comprehended by anyone without attention and examination; but that they are evident to those diligently attending and considering them in a proper manner, or such that he who does not see them cannot have a good conscience.

XXXV. If by formally revealed is meant that which is contained expressly in the word of God, we certainly cannot say that consequences are formally revealed. But if by it be meant that which is contained in so many or in equivalent words, or that which by evident and necessary consequence may be deduced from it, we cannot deny that they are formally revealed and therefore may with propriety be called the formal object of faith.

THIRTEENTH QUESTION
Is there any use of philosophy in theology? We affirm.

The false apostles sinned in excess. I. On this subject men run into two extremes. Those who confound philosophy with theology err on the side of excess. This the false apostles formerly did who incorporated various unsound philosophical opinions with the Christian doctrine and are on this account rebuked by the apostle (Col. 2:8). Some of the fathers, coming out from among the philosophers, still retained some of their erroneous opinions and endeavored to bring the Gentiles over to Christianity by a mixture of philosophical and theological doctrines: as Justin Martyr, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and the Scholastics, whose system is philosophical rather than theological since it depends more upon the reasonings of Aristotle and other philosophers than upon the testimonies of the prophets and apostles. The Socinians of this day strike against the same rock, placing philosophy in the citadel as the foundation of faith and interpreter of Scripture. *Paradoxus exercitator* strenuously contends for this in an impious treatise lately published concerning philosophy, the interpreter of Scripture (now known to be Ludwig Meyer, *Philosophia Sacrae Scripturae Interpres. Exercitatio paradoxa* [1666]). They sin in defect who hold that philosophy is opposed to theology and should therefore be altogether separated from it, not only as useless, but also as positively hurtful. The fanatics and enthusiasts of former ages held this view and the Anabaptists and Weigelians of the present day (who seem professedly to have proclaimed war against philosophy and the liberal arts) retain it.

II. The orthodox occupy a middle ground. They do not confound theology with sound philosophy as the parts of a whole; nor do they set them against each other as contraries, but subordinate and compound them as subordinates which are not at variance with, but mutually assist each other. Philo Judaeus and, after him, the fathers appropriately illustrated this by the allegory of Sarah and Hagar—the mistress and servant. Theology rules over philosophy, and this latter acts as a handmaid to and subserves the former. They acknowledge that it has many and various uses in theology which must be accurately distinguished from its many abuses.

III. Although every truth cannot be demonstrated by reason (the boundaries of truth being much more widely extended than those of reason), yet no lie against the truth can be sheltered under the protection of true reason, nor can one truth be destroyed by another (although one may transcend and surpass the other) because whatever the one may be—whether below, according to or above reason, and apprehended by the senses, the intellect or faith—it has come from no other source than God, the parent of truth. So grace does not destroy nature, but makes it perfect. Nor does the supernatural revelation abrogate the natural, but makes it sure.

IV. Philosophy is used either properly and in the abstract for the knowledge of things human and divine (as far as they can be known by the light of nature), or improperly and in the concrete for a collection of various opinions at variance with each other (which the philosophers of different sects held). In this latter sense, we acknowledge that it contains many errors and that it is of no use but of

the greatest harm. Thus Paul condemns it (Col. 2:8). But in the former sense, its uses are many. In passing, we give only the more general.

V. First, it serves as a means of convincing the Gentiles and preparing them for the Christian faith. Hence Clement of Alexandria says that "it prepares the way for the most royal doctrine" (*prokataskeuazein tēn hodon tē basilikōtatē didaskalia, Stromata* 1.16 [ANF 2:318; PG 8.796]), as is plain from the sermons of Paul (Acts 14 and 17) and from the writings of the fathers against the Gentiles. Hence the expression of Julian the Apostate (when he saw that the errors of the Gentiles were scattered by the Christians who were assisted by philosophy and literature): "We are caught by our own wings" (*tois hautōn pterois haliskometha,* cf. Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History* 3.4 [NPNF2, 3:97]). So God wishes us to apply all the truths of the lower sciences to theology and after rescuing them from the Gentiles (as holders of a bad faith) to take and appropriate them to Christ who is the truth, for the building of the mystic temple; as formerly Moses enriched and adorned the tabernacle with Egyptian gold, and Solomon procured the assistance of the Sidonians and Syrians in building the temple. Second, it may be a testimony of consent in things known by nature, by which (as from a twofold revelation) the truth and certainty of the things themselves may be better confirmed. Third, it may be an instrument of perceiving things clearly, and rightly distinguishing between them—judging concerning that which is true and false, consequent and inconsequent, according to the rules of good and necessary consequence impressed upon our rational nature by God after it has been illuminated by the light of the divine word (see above, Question X). For although reason receives the principles of religion from the light of faith, yet (this light preceding) it ought to judge from these principles how the parts of the heavenly doctrine cohere and mutually establish each other; what is consistent with and what is contrary to them. Fourth, the mind may be furnished and prepared by these inferior systems for the reception and management of a higher science. This must however be done so carefully that a too great love of philosophy may not captivate us and that we may not regard it as a mistress, but as a handmaid. Thus Clement of Alexandria: "Let philosophy submit to theology, as Hagar to Sarah, and suffer itself to be admonished and corrected; but if it will not be obedient, cast out the handmaid."

VI. Many abuses can also be reckoned up: (1) when those things which philosophy reports truly concerning things subject to it and of an inferior order are transferred to the mysteries of theology. For example, that from nothing nothing comes; from privation to a habit there is no return; a virgin cannot be a mother, etc. Here is a change to a different genus (*metabasis eis allo genos*), and what philosophy teaches must be understood of its own kingdom and of natural causes, not of the kingdom of grace and in a supernatural order. Therefore, they are at fault who use such arguments against the creation of the world, the incarnation and the resurrection of the dead because Scripture teaches us that these things were the results not of natural causes, but of the omnipotence of God. (2) When under the pretext of philosophy, false dogmas of philosophers are assumed, and from them errors are introduced into theology or defended, such as the opinion of Aristotle about the eternity of the world, of Plato about purgatorial fire, of the Stoics about fatal necessity, etc. But the errors of philosophers are not the dictates of philosophy, any more than the mistakes of artificers are to be imputed to the art itself. "Philosophy," says Clement of Alexandria, "is not to be called

Stoic, nor Platonic, nor Epicurean, nor Aristotelian, but whatever has been properly spoken by these sects—this, gathered into one whole, is to be called philosophy" (*Stromata* 1.7 [ANF 2:308; PG 8.731]). (3) When philosophy assumes to itself the office of a master in articles of faith, not content with that of a servant (as was done by the Scholastics who placed Aristotle upon the throne; and by the Socinians who would not admit the doctrines of the Trinity, of the incarnation, etc. because they did not seem to be in accordance with the principles of philosophy). (4) When more new distinctions and phrases than necessary are introduced from philosophy into theology under which (oftentimes) new and dangerous errors lie concealed.

VII. For a thing to be denied by philosophy is different from not being taught by it. We do not deny that various theological mysteries are not taught in philosophy, but it does not follow that they are denied by it because the limits of the two sciences must be kept distinct. The physician does not meddle with geometry, nor the lawyer with natural science. So philosophy should be kept within its proper bounds and not be allowed to thrust its pruning hook into a different field. Therefore, because it says nothing about the Trinity and the incarnation, we must not suppose that it denies these doctrines.

VIII. Paul does not condemn true philosophy considered in itself (Col. 2:8), but the vain and false philosophy held by the philosophers of that age by whom the doctrines of the gospel were corrupted. Such is always found in the concrete, when it is carried beyond its true bounds and takes upon itself the judgment of supernatural and divine things. The words of Prudentius are applicable here: "If the lesser nature seeks to strain its gaze too keenly and to penetrate the mysteries of God, who would question that its vision is beaten, its frail power flags, the working of the tired intellect is thrown out in little mind and is dulled and fails under its feeble efforts" (*A Reply to the Address of Symmachus*, II, 99-104 [Loeb, 2:14-15]). That Paul meant such a philosophy is evident: (1) from the description subjoined because he calls it vain deceit (*kenēn apatēn*); (2) from the example of the "worship of angels" (v. 18), which is not a doctrine of true philosophy, but a cancerous tumor; (3) from the similar case because Paul condemns enticing words (*pithanalogian*, v. 4); not all (since he himself often used them) but those which deceive (*paralogizousan*). So he does not condemn all philosophy, but only that which is unsound and deceptive; such as the false apostles endeavored to introduce that they might thus lead believers away from the truth and simplicity of the gospel while, under the pretext of some hidden wisdom, they occupied themselves in pressing upon the Colossians new and erroneous doctrines concerning the worship of angels (probably fished up from the Platonic pools). Or by deceitful words (*paralogismois*) and sophisms, they labored to recommend the use and necessity of legal ceremonies and human traditions, and so by degrees to bring them from Christ back again to Moses.

IX. In Rom. 1:21, 22, the apostle does not condemn true philosophy, but only its abuse; nor does he speak of philosophy, but of philosophers who, puffed up with an empty opinion of their wisdom, became vain in their imaginations. So when he disputes at Athens (Acts 17:18) against the Stoics and Epicureans, he does not reject philosophy in itself, but only the doctrines of those philosophers who opposed the belief in the one true God, Jesus Christ and in the resurrection of the dead.

X. That because God is the author of philosophy and of natural reason, these should be the interpreters of Scripture is an absurd inference. For God is the author of the former by a natural enlightenment (*phanerōsin*) in the corrupt state of man so far as concerns truth known still by nature, but of the latter by a gracious revelation (*apokalypsin*) in a state restored by grace so far as concerns mysteries inaccessible to reason. Nor because God is the author of philosophy is he therefore the author of the interpretations which any philosopher may put upon it.

XI. The fathers sometimes spoke rather severely of philosophy: as Tertullian, where he says that "philosophers are the patriarchs of heretics" (*Treatise Against Hermogenes* 8 [ACW 24:37; PL 2.204]), and "What similarity exists between Athens and Jerusalem, what between the academy and the church, between heretics and Christians? Our doctrine is from the porch of Solomon, not of Zeus, they may see who have introduced a Stoic and Platonic and dialectic Christian. We have no need of curiosity after Jesus Christ, nor of searching after the gospel" (*Prescription Against Heretics* 7 [ANF 3:246; PL 2.20-21]). Cyprian (*Letter* 55, 16.1 [ACW 46:42]), Lactantius (*Divine Institutes* 3.13 [FC 49:194-97]) and others do not condemn true philosophy keeping within its bounds, but a false and rash philosophy (which dares to meddle with things above its comprehension), and the philosophers of that time who were most bitter enemies of the Christian faith.

XII. Although the apostles taught theology without the help of philosophy, it does not follow that we also can do it because the consequence from that extraordinary and immediate instruction of God (which was necessary in those first beginnings of the rising church) to the ordinary and mediate (which is given by the study and help of inferior sciences) does not hold good.

XIII. Although theology teaches many things which philosophy knows not, it does not follow that a thing may be false in philosophy which is true in theology because truth is not at variance with truth, nor is light opposed to light. But care must be taken that philosophical truths be not extended beyond their own sphere and the ordinary powers of nature to those things which are of supernatural revelation or power; that the physical be not confounded with the hyperphysical or human with divine things. For example, it is true in philosophy that a virgin cannot bring forth, that a heavy body is carried downwards, that fire burns matter placed in contact with it, that from nothing, nothing can come—the contraries of which theology maintains. But they are not on this account opposed to each other because these things are spoken of in different relations (*kat' allo kai allo*). In philosophy, they are denied with reference to the laws of nature, but in theology they are affirmed with reference to divine omnipotence and supernaturally.

XIV. Although the philosopher may be allowed to begin with a doubt in order to a safer investigation of natural things, yet this cannot be introduced into subjects of theology and faith. They are founded upon certain and indubitable principles and truths known per se, to doubt concerning which is impious (as concerning the existence of God) unless we wish to strip ourselves of conscience and the moral dependence on the Creator (which cannot be shaken off or for a moment rejected without crime) and thus to introduce philosophical doubt (*epochēn*) into religion and render the whole of theology sceptical.

Fourteenth Question: Fundamental Articles and Errors
Are some theological topics fundamental, others not; and how can they be mutually distinguished?

The Socinians err in defect.

I. The question concerning fundamental articles is difficult and important. It has been discussed by many who have erred both in defect and in excess. The Socinians err in defect who admit very few fundamentals (and those only practical, the theoretical being almost entirely set aside) so that they may teach that the settling of the differences in religion is easy since they relate more to theological conclusions and to the dogmas of the schools than to fundamental articles of faith (which are both few in number and held substantially by both sides). Under this pretext they take away from fundamentals the principal doctrines of faith: as the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, the person of Christ, the satisfaction, etc. To this class the Arminians evidently belong who reduce fundamentals to those heads which are placed beyond dispute among almost all Christians and are contained in these three: faith in the divine promises, obedience to the divine precepts and a due reverence for the Scriptures.

II. Those who err in excess are both the papists who are impudent enough often to declare as fundamental their own hay and stubble and whatever the Romish church teaches; and the more strict Lutherans who (to render a union with us more difficult) extend fundamentals more widely than is just, turn almost every error into a heresy and make necessary those things which are indifferent so as more easily to prove that we differ on fundamentals.

III. The orthodox hold the mean between both. As they necessarily build upon some fundamentals, so they neither restrict them too closely, nor extend them too far.

IV. As in a house that is the foundation which has such a position that the house can neither be erected nor stand without it, so in religion that is the foundation upon which the whole of religion depends and it standing, religion stands; removed, religion falls. It is used in two senses: either simply and personally (applied to Christ the foundation of all salvation upon which the church and religion are built as upon a firm and immovable rock, Mt. 16:18; 1 Pet. 2:6, 7; 1 Cor. 3:11—"for other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ"); or comprehensively and naturally for the fundamental truth which all are required to believe and which is therefore called the foundation of faith. But this may be either widely extended to the first rudiments of the Christian religion (which were taught the catechumens for initiation and are called by the apostle the foundation [*themeliou*], or the principles [*archēs*]): such as repentance from dead works, faith toward God, the doctrine of baptisms, the laying on of hands, the resurrection of the dead and eternal judgment (Heb. 6:1, 2). These principles however have not an equal degree of necessity, some being necessary primarily and by themselves and others secondarily only and by reason of some other thing. In this sense, fundamental articles of religion belong to the decalogue, the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the sacraments and the power of the keys because they contain the doctrine of salvation as necessary and fundamental without which we cannot receive the rest. Or strictly, it denotes the

essential doctrines of Christianity of which the theory (*theōria*) and practice is necessary simply as to the thing itself; or which are simply and absolutely necessary to be believed by all Christians and cannot be unknown or denied without peril to salvation. In this sense, we now speak of fundamental articles.

All articles are not fundamental.

V. Although all the truths revealed in Scripture are necessary to be believed as divine and infallible, yet they are not all equally necessary and the amplitude and extension of faith must be accurately distinguished here from its necessity. Not everything which belongs to the amplitude of faith must therefore belong to its necessity. All truths are not of the same weight. Some have a greater, others a lesser degree of necessity. For example, some are necessary by the necessity of means; others only by the necessity of precept. Some relate to doctrines strictly so called, others only to rites and ceremonies. One relates to some article or doctrine as to substance (for instance that Christ suffered and died); another to the same considered only with reference to circumstances (for instance, that Christ suffered under Pontius Pilate and was crucified between two thieves). For we might be ignorant of the latter without peril to our salvation.

Proof of this from Scripture.

VI. Scripture plainly intimates such a difference between articles (1 Cor. 3:11-13). Here Paul distinguishes the foundation from the things built upon it. In Phil. 3:15, he teaches that there are some doctrines about which Christians may differ without destroying peace and love. If anyone touches the fundamentals, he is subjected to this anathema: "But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed" (Gal. 1:8). In others there is room for Christian forbearance: "Him that is weak in the faith receive ye" (Rom. 14:1); and "Let us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded; and if in anything ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheless, whereunto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing" (Phil. 3:15, 16). But as in faith there is a difference with respect to doctrines, so also in the law with respect to precepts there is a moral and a ceremonial necessity—the former is absolute and indispensable, the latter hypothetical and changeable.

VII. Hence some doctrines are necessary to be known simply for the existence of faith, others only relatively (*kata ti*) and for its well-being; some to the production of faith, others to its perfection (Heb. 6:1); some per se and absolutely to all whether babes (*nēpiois*) or perfect (*teleiois*) others accidentally only to these of full age (*teleiois*) and advanced (Heb. 5:13, 14). Some doctrines are relatively necessary to the instruction of others. This necessity again is to be taken in a certain degree of latitude according to the gifts, instruction, calling, sex and age, inasmuch as some belong to the flock, while others are pastors to whom are committed the oracles of God, whose duty it is to give instruction (*didaskein*) and to convince the gainsayers (*tous antilegontas elenchein*, Tit. 1:9).

VIII. Again as one object of faith is general and proportionate (viz., the whole word of God) and another special and peculiar (viz., the doctrine concerning Christ with the dependant articles and the promises of God), so some doctrines of faith are primary and immediate; as the articles concerning the Trinity, Christ the Mediator, justification, etc. Others are secondary and mediate (or conse-

quent) hypotheses and conclusions springing from and deduced from the primary. Some are positive, affirming some true doctrine; as that Christ is the Son of God, that his death is a ransom (*lytron*) for our sins. Others are negative, rejecting what is false; as that the Mass should not be celebrated, that there is no purgatory, etc. With regard to these doctrines, some are necessary to be believed publicly and formally, as the special and proper objects of faith (primary and immediate doctrines and positive articles concerning the principal head of faith); others only implicitly and virtually.

A threefold error, against the foundation, about it and beside it.

IX. What we have said about articles of faith may be said of the errors to which they are opposed. As all truths are not of the same necessity, so all the wounds which are inflicted upon the truth are not therefore deadly, nor is every error capital. Hence we distinguish errors into three kinds: (1) against the foundation; (2) about it; and (3) beside it. An error against the foundation is that which directly overturns one or more articles of faith (i.e., one which denies the divinity of Christ and the Trinity of persons). An error about the foundation is that which does not indeed directly deny a fundamental article, but yet maintains an opposition, which standing, the article indirectly and by necessary consequence is overthrown; as that which teaches the existence of God, but does not recognize his providence (because providence being removed, God is taken away). An error beside the foundation is one which either does not touch the foundation at all or has reference to it only by a remote and obscure consequence and is occupied about problematical and curious questions, neither revealed in the word nor necessary to be known. Such are the doctrines which Paul calls "hay and stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12*), which can stand with the true foundation. These will not hinder the one professing them from being saved, although he will suffer loss.

X. One error directly, at first and immediately overthrows the foundation; another, indirectly, secondarily and by consequence. The former is undoubtedly the greater of the two. Again, an error can overturn the foundation indirectly and by a proximate, evident, necessary consequence; or by a remote, evident and wrested consequence. The former is certainly a deadly error, not so the latter. Thus the papists do not directly attack the sufficiency of the satisfaction of Christ and justification by faith and other like doctrines; but indirectly and by consequence (though evident and necessary) oppose it by their errors concerning the merit of works, their own satisfactions, the sacrifice of the Mass, purgatory, etc. They who quietly rest in the terms of an implied contradiction where there is opposition in apposition and a contradiction in the addition are to be regarded as overthrowing the foundation no less than those who directly attack it.

XI. An error which by inevident and violent consequence is deduced from any doctrine (or which they who hold the doctrine seriously and piously detest) cannot with justice be imputed to them. For instance, those with which the Reformers were charged (i.e., that they made God the author of sin, that they denied his omnipotence because they would not hold to the ubiquity of Christ's body, that they converted the sacraments into mere signs because they denied the bodily presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper), cannot be lawfully ascribed to them. These errors neither follow—but are only supposed to follow—nor are evident and innate consequences which may be deduced from the true doctrine

of the Reformers, but are wrested against their intention and instead of being received are condemned and rejected by them.

XII. There is a verbal error (about phrases only) and a real error (about the doctrines themselves). The former cannot be fundamental because "it is heresy concerning the understanding, not concerning Scripture" (Hilary, *The Trinity* 2*.3 [FC 25:36; PL 10.51]). The sense, not the words, gives character to a fault. As Jerome says, "The gospel is not in words of the Scriptures, but in the sense, not on the surface, but in the marrow, not in the leaves of words, but in the root of reason" (*Commentariorum . . . ad Galatas* 1 [PL 26.347] on Gal. 1:11, 12).

XIII. It is one thing to speak of doctrines and principles of theology; another to speak of their conclusions and consequences. The knowledge and assent to the latter is necessary indeed to theologians that they may have a richer knowledge of divine things for the confirmation (*kataskeuēn*) of the truth and the overthrow (*anaskeuēn*) of error. But they are not always necessary to Christians in general and can be unknown by them without endangering their salvation. But when we speak here of fundamental articles, we do not mean those which are explicitly necessary to be known by the perfect man (the man of God) so as to fill up the measure of his duty and name; but exactly those which every believer and Christian must believe in order to salvation.

XIV. Some have only the necessity of means, others only that of precept. The former compose the foundation of themselves and primarily; the latter are secondarily built upon the foundation which strengthens and confirms them. The former are absolutely and always necessary; the latter relatively. Without those salvation cannot be obtained; but without these it can. Nor does a simple privation of these ensure condemnation, but only the contempt, such as the sacraments.

XV. We must distinguish between the body of substance of an article or doctrine and its mode and circumstances. The substance of a fundamental article neither can nor ought to be unknown and always remains the same, but it is otherwise in relation to the circumstance or mode, the ignorance of which is not, as a matter of course, damning. Hence an error is either about the substance of a thing or about the mode, circumstance or degree; either about the fact (*to hoti*) or about the how (*to pōs*) and the wherefore (*to dioti*). It is true that sometimes when the mode is altered the thing itself is taken away because the mode enters into the essence of the thing and forms a part of it; as in practice, he who takes away the mode of divine worship enjoined by God overthrows the worship itself (Mt. 15:9). He who takes away the mode of redemption by the ransom (*lytron*) of Christ (the mode of justification by faith) overthrows redemption itself and justification. But it is also true that an error as to the mode and circumstances may not be hurtful to the thing itself. For example, the Greeks were convicted of an error about the mode of the procession of the Holy Spirit; nevertheless they held to the doctrine of the Trinity and the divinity of the Spirit.

XVI. Faith may be considered either according to the plenitude and degree of light or according to the multitude of things to be believed. In the former respect, faith could increase in proportion to the measure of revelation and be fuller under the New than under the Old Testament economy, but not in the latter because in this sense faith is unchangeable (Eph. 4:5) and "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, and today and forever" (Heb. 13:8).

XVII. The doctrine concerning Jesus, the son of Mary, the true Messiah, is not a new article of faith as to substance and *in thesi*, since they of old believed that the Messiah would come. But it is only a special determination and application of the prophetic oracles *in hypothesi*.

XVIII. Some subjects are fundamental in themselves; others become so only accidentally when they run into some fundamental topic. For example, circumcision is not in itself fundamental, but it becomes so when it is made necessary for salvation and runs into the doctrine of justification. In this sense, the apostle inveighs against the false apostles (who wished to retain the use of circumcision) as holding a deadly error (Gal. 5:2, 3). So also the article concerning the Lord's Supper is not of itself fundamental, yet it is rendered such by the papists when they make it a propitiatory sacrifice for sins.

XIX. The following things must belong to fundamental articles: (1) that they be catholic, for the things necessary for the salvation of everyone are required for a universal faith (according to the Athanasian Creed "whoever wishes to be saved must above all things hold the catholic faith; for unless it is held entire and inviolate he will perish forever" [cf. Schaff, 2:66]); (2) that the belief of the catholic truths necessarily draws salvation after it; and the ignorance of them, the entire doubt of danger, the impious and heretical denial, is damnable; (3) that believers cherish a true consent to them, nor do some think differently from others because if anyone thinks or speaks otherwise he is subjected to the curse (Gal. 1:8). Hence where a difference in fundamentals exists, there cannot be union. (4) That all theological doctrines be reduced to them as to a rule which the apostle calls the analogy of faith (*analogian pisteōs*); (5) that they be primary and principal truths upon which all others are built as upon a foundation—and being removed, faith itself is overthrown; not secondary and less principal, by the removal of which faith is only shaken.

The criteria of fundamental articles are drawn from the nature of the doctrines.

XX. The criteria for distinguishing fundamental and non-fundamental articles can be derived from the nature and condition of the doctrines themselves (viz., those which contain the necessary causes and conditions of salvation, both the end and the means necessary to that end, since, if the causes are denied, the effect is also taken away and the means being denied, the end cannot be obtained). Hence as the grace of God by which we are elected, the merit of Christ by which we are redeemed, and the Spirit by whom we are sanctified are the principal causes of salvation and faith the instrumental (Jn. 3:16, 17), repentance and conversion to God the necessary conditions (Heb. 6:1*; Mt. 3:2), we say that all these doctrines are fundamental.

XXI. Second, fundamental articles can be derived from the declaration of Scripture. For those would certainly be considered fundamental the knowledge of which is called necessary and saving, and the ignorance or denial deadly. Such are the articles concerning the one and triune God, both positively (Jn. 17:3) and negatively (1 Jn. 2:23); concerning sin (1 Jn. 1:10; Eph. 2:1); concerning the person, nature and offices of Christ (1 Cor. 3:11; Acts 4:12; 1 Jn. 4:3; Eph. 2:11, 12); concerning the gospel (Rom. 1:16, 17; Gal. 1:8, 9); concerning faith (Heb. 11:6; Mk. 16:16); concerning justification without works (Rom. 3:27; Gal. 2, 3); concerning sanctification and the worship of God (Eph. 2:10; Heb. 12:14); and concerning the resurrection and eternal life (1 Cor. 15:14; 2 Tim. 2:8; Rom. 10:9).

XXII. The third mark of fundamental articles can be drawn from the Apostles' Creed in which the ancients gathered together from the apostolic writings the substance of fundamental doctrines. Hence the name "Symbol" was given to it because it is as the mark or sign as it were of Christianity. We must however carefully note: (a) that it cannot be an exact mark of fundamental articles because it treats only of theoretical articles relating to faith, not of practical articles relating to worship; (b) that the things to be believed are not found here in so many words (*autolexei*) and explicitly, but implicitly by consequence and analogy: for example, although nothing is said about the grace of God and the satisfaction of Christ, nothing about providence, conservation and the like, yet they may easily be deduced from what is said; (c) that the Symbol is not to be considered only with regard to the words, but as to the sense (because, as Hilary says, "The Scriptures do not consist in the reading but in the understanding," *Ad Constantium Augustum*, II,9 [PL 10.570]; and "fundamentals are not found in the words but in the sense," as Jerome says). Therefore although heretics may say that they receive the Symbol, yet they do not because they reject its true and genuine sense. So Sabellius, Arius, Macedonius and other anti-Trinitarians formerly professed (to no purpose) in the words of the Symbol their faith in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, while they endeavored to overthrow this very doctrine not by secret attacks, but by open warfare. The Socinians of our day and their disciples are doing this. In vain do the papists profess their belief in it, who corrupt the meaning of the various articles concerning the sufferings and death of Christ, his descent to hell, the catholic church, the remission of sins and the like.

XXIII. Although theology is both theoretical and practical, yet the Socinians are wrong in saying that fundamental articles can be distinguished from non-fundamental by this one criterion alone—the obedience due to God and Christ or the seal for piety and good works (because not only are the commands of duty necessary to salvation, but also the doctrines of faith, as we learn from Jn. 20:31 and 2 Tim. 3:16). Hence, as there are practical fundamental articles, so there should also be theoretical.

XXIV. Although some of the orthodox hold to more, others to fewer articles of faith, they do not differ in reality, but only in the words and manner of proposing them. Some bring them into more general and summary classes; others classify them more particularly and as to parts (*kata merē*). Hence some limit the foundation of salvation to the sole truth concerning Jesus Christ as our crucified Redeemer from 1 Cor. 2:2; this however, embraces many others. Others limit it to the two concerning the knowledge of God and of Christ from Jn. 17:3. Others again extend them to four heads, theoretical as well as practical; others to six. But they all agree in these fundamental articles: the doctrines concerning the sacred Scriptures as inspired (*theopneustō*), being the only and perfect rule of faith; concerning the unity of God and the Trinity; concerning Christ, the Redeemer, and his most perfect satisfaction; concerning sin and its penalty—death; concerning the law and its inability to save; concerning justification by faith; concerning the necessity of grace and of good works, sanctification and the worship of God, the church, the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment and eternal life and such as are connected with these. All these are so strictly joined together that they mutually depend upon each other. One cannot be withdrawn without overthrowing all the rest.

The question concerning the number of fundamental articles is rash and useless.

XXV. The question concerning the number of fundamental articles which our adversaries have proposed, besides being rash (since Scripture says nothing definitely about it) is also useless and unnecessary because there is no need of our knowing particularly the number of such articles, if we can prove that they err fundamentally in one or more. And this can be done easily with regard to the papists, Socinians, Anabaptists and similar heretics.

XXVI. Nor does it follow from this that the perfection of Scripture in necessary things is detracted from, nor that the rule of ecclesiastical communion is wanting among us. For the Scriptures do not cease to contain most fully all things necessary to salvation, although their number is not accurately set forth. The truth of the fundamental articles (which should be to us in place of a rule) may be clearly deduced from the criteria mentioned above.

XXVII. When the orthodox sometimes maintain that the fundamental articles are few, this must not be understood absolutely and simply, but both as to the principal heads. Taken collectively (*syllēbdēn*), these are few in comparison with the papists (who largely increase them) making the canons of the church, the publicly received dicta of the schools and the traditions of the fathers into articles of faith, any departure from which involves one in the guilt of heresy.

SECOND TOPIC

THE HOLY SCRIPTURES

FIRST QUESTION: THE WORD OF GOD
Was a verbal revelation necessary? We affirm.

I. As the word of God is the sole principle of theology, so the question concerning its necessity deservedly comes before all things. Was it necessary for God to reveal himself to us by the word; or was the word of God necessary? For there were formerly (and are even at this day) various persons who believe that there is sufficient assistance in human reason to enable us to live well and happily. Hence they think that any revelation coming from heaven is not only needless, but also ridiculous because it is altogether very likely that nature had a prospective reference to man, no less than to other animals. Therefore they give as their opinion that reason (or the light of nature) is abundantly sufficient for the direction of life and the obtainment of happiness.

II. But the orthodox church has always believed far otherwise, maintaining the revelation of the word of God to man to be absolutely and simply necessary for salvation. It is the "seed" of which we are born again (1 Pet. 1:23), the "light" by which we are directed (Ps. 119:105), the "food" upon which we feed (Heb. 5:13, 14) and the "foundation" upon which we are built (Eph. 2:20).

The necessity of the word is proved by the goodness of God.

III. (1) The perfect goodness of God (communicative of itself) proves it. For when he had made man for himself (i.e., for a supernatural end and a condition far more happy than this earthly), he was without doubt unwilling that he should be ignorant on this subject and has declared to him by the word, happiness itself and the way to reach it (of which reason was ignorant). (2) The most wretched blindness and corruption of man proves it. Although after sin, man may still have some remaining light to direct him in earthly and worldly things, yet in divine and heavenly things which have a relation to happiness, he is so blind and depraved that he can neither become acquainted with any truth, nor perform any good thing unless God leads the way (1 Cor. 2:14; Eph. 5:8). (3) It is proven by right reason which teaches that God can be savingly known and worshipped only by his light, just as the sun makes itself known to us only by its own light (Ps. 36:9*). Neither would impostors (in order to introduce new sacred rites) have feigned conferences with deities or angels (as Numa Pompilius with the nymph Egeria and Muhammad with Gabriel) unless all men were persuaded that the right method of worshipping the deity depended upon a revelation from himself. Hence all nations (even barbarous) agree that it is well for man to seek for some heavenly wisdom in addition to that reason which they call the guide of life.

This has given rise to those different religious rites and ceremonies which prevail all over the world. Nor are they to be heard here who maintain that this is only an ingenious contrivance of men to keep the people in duty. For although it is true that cunning men have contrived many things in religion to inspire the common people with reverence and by this to hold their minds more obedient, yet they never could have gained their purpose unless there had already been in the human mind an inborn sense of its own ignorance and helplessness. By reason of this, men suffer themselves to be easily led about by such jugglers and deceivers.

By the twofold appetite of man.

IV. The twofold appetite naturally implanted in man proves this: one for truth, the other for immortality; one for knowing the truth, the other for enjoying the highest good that the intellect may be completed by the contemplation of truth and the will by the fruition of good in which a happy life consists. But since these appetites cannot be in vain, a revelation was necessary to show the first truth and the highest good and the way to each (which nature could not do). Finally the glory of God and the salvation of men demanded it because the school of nature was not able either to lead us to a knowledge of the true God and to his lawful worship or to discover the plan of salvation by which men might escape from the misery of sin to a state of perfect happiness growing out of union with God. Therefore the higher school of grace was necessary in which God might teach us by word the true religion, by instructing us in his knowledge and worship and by raising us in communion with himself to the enjoyment of eternal salvation—where neither philosophy, nor reason, could ever rise.

V. Although in the works of creation and providence God had already clearly manifested himself so that the *to gnōston tou Theou* "is manifest in them, and the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen" (Rom. 1:19, 20), yet after the fall, this real revelation could not be sufficient for salvation, not only as to the subject (because the power of the Spirit did not accompany it by which the blindness and wickedness of man might be corrected), but also with regard to the object (because the mysteries of salvation and the mercy of God in Christ, without which there is no salvation [Acts 4:12], have no place there). God (as an object of knowledge, *to gnōston tou Theou*) indeed presents himself, but not as an object of faith (*to piston*); God the Creator, but not the Redeemer; the power and the Godhead (i.e., the existence of the deity and his infinite power may be derived from the work of creation), but not his saving grace and mercy. Therefore it was necessary that the defect of the former revelation (made useless and insufficient by sin) should be supplied by another more clear (not only as to degree, but also as to species), not only that God should use mute teachers, but that his sacred voice should also not only declare the excellence of his attributes, but open to us also the mystery of his will in order to our salvation.

VI. Although natural revelation may hand over different things concerning God and his attributes, will and works, yet it cannot teach us things sufficient for the saving knowledge of God without a supernatural verbal revelation. Indeed, it shows that God exists (*quod sit Deus*), and of what nature (*qualis*), both in unity of essence and as possessed of different attributes, but does not tell us who he is individually and with regard to the persons. This will (as contained in the law), it imperfectly and obscurely manifests (Rom. 2:14, 15), but the mystery of the

gospel is entirely concealed. It displays the works of creation and providence (Ps. 19:1-3; Acts 14:15-17; 17:23-28; Rom. 1:19, 20), but does not rise up to the works of redemption and grace which can become known to us by the word alone (Rom. 10:17; 16:25, 26).

Second Question: The Necessity of Scripture

Was it necessary for the word of God to be committed to writing? We affirm.

I. As in the preceding question we have proved the necessity of the word, so in this we treat of the necessity of the Scriptures (or the written word) against papists. For as they endeavor studiously to weaken the authority of Scripture in order the more easily to establish their unwritten (*agraphous*) traditions and the supreme tribunal of the pope himself; so, for the same reason, they are accustomed in many ways to impair its necessity in order to prove it useful indeed to the church, but not necessary (as Bellarmine shows, VD 4.4, pp. 119-22). Yea Cardinal Hosius does not hesitate blasphemously to say, "Better would it be for the interests of the church had no Scripture ever existed"; and Valentia, "It would be better had it not been written."

Statement of the question.

II. As to the state of the question, keep in mind that the word "Scripture" is used in two senses: either materially, with regard to the doctrine delivered; or formally with regard to the writing and mode of delivery. In the former sense (as we said before), we hold it to be necessary simply and absolutely, so that the church can never spare it. But in the latter sense (which we are now discussing), we hold that it is not absolutely necessary with respect to God. For two thousand years before the time of Moses, he instructed his church by the spoken word alone; so he could (if he wished) have taught in the same manner afterwards, but only hypothetically (on account of the divine will) since God has seen fit for weighty reasons to commit his word to writing. Hence the divine ordination being established, it is made necessary to the church, so that it pertains not only to the well-being (*bene esse*) of the church, but also to its very existence (*esse*). Without it the church could not now stand. So God indeed was not bound to the Scriptures, but he has bound us to them.

III. Therefore the question is not whether the writing of the word was absolutely and simply necessary, but relatively and hypothetically; not for every age, but now in this state of things; nor relatively to the power and liberty of God, but to his wisdom and economy as dealing with man. For as in the natural economy parents vary the mode of instruction according to the age of their children (that while infants may be taught at first by spoken word, then by the voice of a master and the reading of books and finally may derive instruction by themselves from books), so the heavenly Father who chasteneth his people as a man chasteneth his son (Dt. 8:5), instructs the church yet in infancy and lisping by the spoken word, the simplest mode of revelation. The church presently growing up and in the beginning of its youth constituted under the law, he teaches it both by spoken word (on account of the remains of its infancy) and by writing (on account of the beginnings of a more robust age in the time of the apostles). At length, as of full age under the gospel, he wishes it to be content with the most

perfect mode of revelation (viz., with the light of the written word). So the Scriptures are made necessary not only by the necessity of command, but by the hypothesis of the divine economy which God wished to be various and manifold (*polypoikilon*) according to the different ages of the church (Eph. 3:10).

IV. Hence arose the distinction of the word into unwritten (*agraphon*) and written (*engraphon*), a division not of the genus into species (as the papists maintain, as if the unwritten word were different from the written), but a distinction of the subject into its accidents, because that it was formerly not written and now is written are accidents of the same word. It is therefore called "unwritten" (*agraphon*), not with respect to the present time, but to the past when God saw fit to instruct his church by spoken word alone and not by writing.

V. Although God "at sundry times and in divers manner" (*polymerōs kai polytropōs*) spoke in time past unto the fathers—(Heb. 1:1), now with a clear voice and a discourse delivered (*prophorikō*) in words, then with an internal afflatus (as if by a mental discourse [*endiathetō*], sometimes by sending dreams, at others by exhibiting visions; sometimes by an assumption of the human form, often by the ministry of angels and other symbols of the divine presence)—yet the doctrine was always the same; nor has it been changed by the mode of revelation or delivery, nor by the mutations of time.

The necessity of the Scripture proved.

VI. Three things particularly prove the necessity of the Scripture: (1) the preservation of the word; (2) its vindication; (3) its propagation. It was necessary for a written word to be given to the church that the canon of true religious faith might be constant and unmoved; that it might easily be preserved pure and entire against the weakness of memory, the depravity of men and the shortness of life; that it might be more certainly defended from the frauds and corruptions of Satan; that it might more conveniently not only be sent to the absent and widely separated, but also be transmitted to posterity. For by "letters," as Vives well observes, "all the arts are preserved as in a treasury, so that they can never perish, while on the contrary, tradition by the hand is unhappy" (*De disciplinis . . . de Corruptis Artibus* 1 [1636], p. 5). This is a divine and wonderful advantage of letters, as Quintilian says, "that they guard words and deliver them to readers as a sacred trust" (*Institutio Oratoria* 1.7.31 [Loeb, 1:144-45]). Nor for any other reason are the public laws, statutes and edicts of kings and the decrees of the commonality inscribed upon brass or committed to public tablets, except that this is the most sure method of preserving them uncorrupted and of propagating through many ages the remembrance of those things which it is important for the people to know.

Sources of explanation.

VII. Although the church before Moses did not have a written word, it does not follow that it can also do without it now. Then the church was still in its infancy and had not as yet been formed into a body politic, but now it is increased and more populous. Its position in former times was different from what it is now. In those times, the unwritten (*agraphon*) word could be more easily preserved on account of the longevity of the patriarchs, the fewness of the covenanted and the frequency of revelations (although it suffered not a few corruptions). But in other times when the life of man was shortened, and the church was no longer comprehended within one or another family, but increased

to a most numerous people and the divine oracles were more sparingly declared, another method of instruction became necessary so that this sacred republic might be governed not only by spoken word, but by written laws.

VIII. Although some particular churches might for a time be without the written word of God (especially when they were first built), yet they could not have been without that which was written (which undoubtedly sounded in their ears by the ministry of man), nor was the church in common then without the Scripture.

IX. The Holy Spirit (the supplier [*epichorēgia*] by whom believers should be God-taught [*theodidaktoi*], Jer. 31:34; Jn. 6:45*; 1 Jn. 2:27) does not render the Scripture less necessary. He is not given to us in order to introduce new revelations, but to impress the written word on our hearts; so that here the word must never be separated from the Spirit (Is. 59:21). The former works objectively, the latter efficiently; the former strikes the ears from without, the latter opens the heart within. The Spirit is the teacher; Scripture is the doctrine which he teaches us. (2) The words of Jer. 31:33, 34 and 1 Jn. 2:27 are not to be understood absolutely and simply (as if it was no longer necessary for believers under the New Testament dispensation to use the Scriptures, otherwise there would have been no use in John's writing to them), but relatively because on account of the more copious effusion of the Holy Spirit under the New Testament dispensation they are not to be so laboriously taught as under the Old by rude and imperfect elements. (3) The promise of Jeremiah will be fulfilled completely only in heaven where, on account of the clear vision of God, there will be no more need of the ministry of the Scriptures or of pastors, but each one will see God as he is face to face.

X. It is not true that the church was preserved during the Babylonian captivity without the Scripture. Daniel is said at the end of the seventy years to have understood by the books the number of years (Dan. 9:2), and it is said that Ezra brought the book of the law (Neh. 8:2). The passage in 2(4) Esdras 4:23, being apocryphal, proves nothing. But although Ezra collected the sacred books into one body and even corrected some mistakes made through the negligence of the scribes, it does not follow that the church was entirely destitute of the Scriptures.

XI. Bellarmine falsely affirms that after the time of Moses those of foreign countries who were brought over to the new religion used tradition alone and were without the Scriptures. For proselytes were diligently instructed in the doctrine of Moses and the prophets, as we learn even from the single example of the eunuch of Queen Candace (Acts 8:27-39). Nor were the Scriptures entirely unknown to the Gentiles, especially after they had been translated into Greek in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus.

XII. Christ is our only teacher (Mt. 23:8) in such a sense as that the ministry of the word is not thereby excluded, but necessarily included because now in it only he addresses us and by it instructs us. Christ is not set in opposition to the Scriptures; rather he is set in opposition to the false teachers of the Pharisees who ambitiously assumed the authority due to Christ alone.

XIII. Although the Scriptures formally are of no personal use to those who cannot read (*analphabētous*), yet materially they serve for their instruction and edification much as the doctrines preached in the church are drawn from this source.

THIRD QUESTION

Were the sacred Scriptures written only occasionally and without the divine command? We deny against the papists.

Statement of the question.

I. This question is agitated between us and the papists. In order to lessen the authority and perfection of the Scripture, they teach not only that it is not so very necessary and that the church could do without it, but also that it was not delivered to the church by the express command of God, but only in peculiar circumstances; that Christ neither commanded the apostles to write nor did the apostles think of writing the gospel with a primary intention, but only with a secondary and occasional intention (Bellarmine, VD 4.3,4, pp. 116-22).

II. The question is not whether the sacred writers were impelled by certain occasions to write. For we do not deny that they often made use of the opportunities offered to commit to writing the mysteries of God. Rather the question is whether they wrote so according to opportunities that they could not also write according to an express divine command. For we think these things should not be opposed to each other, but brought together. They could write both on the presentation of an opportunity and yet by a divine command and by divine inspiration. Yea, they must have written by the divine will because God alone could present such an occasion, for it was neither presented to them without design nor employed of their own accord.

III. A command may be implicit and general or explicit and special. Although all the sacred writers might not have had a special command to write (as many did have, Ex. 17:14; Dt. 31:19; Is. 8:1; Jer. 36:2; Hab. 2:2; Rev. 1:11*), yet they all had a general command. For the command to teach (Mt. 28:19) also includes the command to write, since persons at a distance and posterity can be taught only by writing. Hence preaching is sometimes said to be "in writing," at others "in deed" and again "in word." Further, immediate inspiration and the internal impulse of the Holy Spirit by which the writers were influenced was to them in the place of command. Hence Paul calls the Scriptures God-inspired (*theopneuston*, 2 Tim. 3:16) and Peter says that "prophecy came not in old time by the will of man: but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost" (*hypo pneumatos hagiou pheromenous*, 2 Pet. 1:21). Now it would be absurd (*asystaton*) to say that the apostles wrote as God inspired and moved them and yet that he did not command them. A command is not more efficacious than the inspiration of the things to be written; nor does a faithful ambassador ever depart from his instructions.

IV. Although the apostles do not always make mention of a special command of Christ (which nevertheless they do, as John, Jude and others), they plainly give us to understand this when they: (1) profess to be the universal teachers of all nations; (2) call themselves faithful servants of Christ (and therefore particularly anxious to fulfill his commands); (3) say that they are influenced by the Spirit (2 Pet. 1:21). Hence Gregory the Great well remarks, "He himself wrote who dictated these things to be written; he himself wrote who was also the inspirer of the work" ("Preface" to the First Part, *Morals on the Book of Job* [1844], 1:15 [Praef. 1.2, PL 75.517]).

Sources of explanation.

V. Each apostle was not bound to write, although he was bound to preach. For as they committed themselves to divine inspiration in the exercise of preaching, so they were bound to wait for and to follow the same in writing. For the office was equal in those things which were essential to the apostleship that they all might be equally teachers inspired of God (*theopneustoi*), but it was not equal in the exercise of all the particular acts belonging to it. Hence it is not strange that (according to the pleasure of the Holy Spirit) some were employed both in writing and preaching, others only in preaching.

VI. A common book was not composed by all the apostles conjointly, both that they might not seem to have entered into a compact and that it might not appear of greater authority than that which would be written separately by each individual. This seems to have been the reason why Christ abstained from writing—that we might say that here is one who writes his epistle not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in the heart (2 Cor. 3:2). It was sufficient, therefore, for these things to be written by some and approved by the rest. Yea, it adds great weight and authority to the apostolic writings that they wrote in different places, for various reasons and on different occasions, in a different style and method to different persons and yet so consistent with each other.

VII. It was not necessary for the apostles to write a catechism so as to deliver their doctrines professedly. It was enough for them to hand down to us those doctrines in accordance with which all symbolical books and catechisms might be constructed. If they did not formally write a catechism, they did materially leave us either in the gospels or in the epistles those things by which we can be clearly taught the principles of religion (*katēcheisthai*).

VIII. As we ought not to impose a law upon the Holy Spirit and prescribe to him the method of revealing his will, so we ought not to doubt that the method of writing which they followed was the most suitable; not only because the custom of writing by epistles was at that time generally adopted (because this kind of writing was best adapted to disseminate the gospel speedily, which was the principal object of the apostles), but also because this method of writing (simple and popular) suited all (the unlearned as well as the learned) and transmitted a theology not ideal and merely theoretical, but practical and real.

IX. The Apostles' Creed is so called, not efficiently (as delivered by the apostles), but materially (as it was drawn from the doctrines of the apostles and is the marrow and substance of them).

X. They who wrote when an opportunity was offered and by the necessity of it, could nevertheless write by command. Things subordinate are not opposed to each other. The command of Christ was the principal impelling cause and the occasion offered the secondary impelling cause (as it were less principal) which they knew how to use for the glory of God and the edification of men, just as the apostles preached both by command and by occasion.

XI. Although the apostles were bound to write because they were bound to teach, it does not follow that pastors of the present day are equally bound always to write as to teach because they stand in a different relation. Since the apostles were bound to teach all nations, they were ecumenical teachers; not so ordinary pastors who have a particular flock entrusted to them.

FOURTH QUESTION: THE AUTHORITY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES
Are the holy Scriptures truly authentic and divine? We affirm.

I. The authority of the Scriptures (which we have just discussed) depends on their origin. Just because they are from God, they must be authentic and divine. Hence arises the question concerning their authority which can be twofold: (1) with atheists and the heathen, who attribute no higher authority to the Scriptures than to any other books; (2) with those Christians who, while acknowledging its authority, nevertheless wish to make it depend (at least as far as we are concerned) upon the testimony of the church. As to the former class, the question is whether the Bible is truly credible of itself (*autopistos*) and divine. But as to the latter, the question is How do we know that it is such; or upon what testimony does the belief in the authenticity (*authentias*) of the Bible mainly rest? Here we take up the first question, not the second.

The authority of the Scriptures.

II. The first question may seem hardly necessary among Christians who should consider as an incontrovertible truth the fact that the Scriptures are inspired of God (*theopneuston*) as the primary foundation of faith. Yet even among Christians of this age, there are too many atheists and libertines who endeavor in every way to weaken this most sacred truth. Therefore it is of the greatest importance to our salvation that our faith should be in good time fortified against the diabolical cavils of these impious persons.

III. The authority of Scripture (concerning which we here inquire) is nothing else than the right and dignity of the sacred books, on account of which they are most worthy of faith with regard to those things which they propose to be believed and of our obedience in those things which they command us to omit or to do. The divine and infallible truth of these books (which have God for their author) is the foundation because he has the highest right to bind men to faith and duty. But this truth may be either intrinsic or extrinsic. The former is the credibility (*axiopistia*) in itself of the word which is always equal and consistent with itself, whether it has the testimony of men or not. The latter is the estimation or judgment of men in relation to the Scriptures, which is different as the subjects are different.

Of history and of rule.

IV. Again authenticity is either of history or of narrative; or in addition to this of truth and of rule. According to the former, whatever is narrated in Scripture is most true as it narrates either what is good or what is bad, whether it be true or false. But those things are said to have the latter which are so true in themselves that they are given as a rule of faith and practice. All things in Scripture do not have the authenticity of rule (as those things which the wicked and the Devil are reported to have said), but all do have historical authenticity.

Statement of the question.

V. The question is not whether the sacred writers (as men simply and in a divided sense) could err (for we readily grant this); or whether as holy men influenced by the Holy Spirit and in a compound sense, they did in fact err (for I think no one of the adversaries, except a downright atheist, would dare to say this). Rather the question is whether in writing they were so acted upon and inspired by the Holy Spirit (both as to the things themselves and as to

the words) as to be kept free from all error and that their writings are truly authentic and divine. Our adversaries deny this; we affirm it.

Scripture proves itself.

VI. The Bible proves itself divine, not only authoritatively and in the manner of an artless argument or testimony, when it proclaims itself God-inspired (*theopneuston*). Although this may be well used against those Christians who profess to believe it, yet it cannot be employed against others who reject it. The Bible also proves itself divine ratiocinatively by an argument artfully made (*artificiali*) from the marks which God has impressed upon the Scriptures and which furnish indubitable proof of divinity. For as the works of God exhibit visibly to our eyes by certain marks the incomparable excellence of the artificer himself and as the sun makes himself known by his own light, so he wished in the Bible (which is the emanation [*aporroē*] from the Father of lights and the Sun of righteousness) to send forth different rays of divinity by which he might make himself known.

By marks which are either:

VII. But these marks are either external or internal. The former, though not sufficient for a full demonstration of the thing, are of great importance in its confirmation and in the conviction of unbelievers. However, in the latter, the main strength of the argument consists.

External;

VIII. The external are: (1) with regard to the origin (the highest antiquity above all pagan monuments), for "that which is most ancient is most true," as Tertullian says. (2) With regard to the duration; the wonderful preservation (even to this day) of the divine word by his providential care against powerful and hostile enemies who have endeavored by fire and by sword to destroy it, while so many other books, against which nothing of this kind had ever been attempted, have wholly perished. (3) With regard to the instruments and amanuenses; the highest candor and sincerity in the writers, who do not conceal even their own faults (*hēttēmata*), but ingenuously confess them. (4) With regard to the adjuncts; the number, constancy and condition of the martyrs who sealed it with their blood. For since nothing is dearer to man than life, so many thousands of persons of both sexes, of every age and condition, would not (in defense of the Scriptures) so willingly have sought death (even the most cruel), unless thoroughly persuaded of its divinity. Nor would God have employed his omnipotence in working so many and such great miracles both under the law and the gospel, for the purpose of inducing a belief in the divinity of the Bible, if it had been a mere figment of the human brain. The testimony of the adversaries favors our side, as of the heathen concerning Moses, of Josephus and the Talmudists concerning Christ, and of Muhammad himself concerning both testaments (which may be seen in Vives, Plesseus, Grotius and others). Finally, the consent of all people who, although differing in customs (also in opinions about sacred things, worship, language and interest), have nevertheless received this word as a valuable treasury of divine truth and have regarded it as the foundation of religion and the worship of God. It is impossible to believe that God would have suffered so great a multitude of men, earnestly seeking him, to be so long deceived by lying books.

Or internal.

IX. The internal and the most powerful marks are also numerous. (1) With regard to the matter: the wonderful sublimity of the mysteries (which could have been discovered by no sharp-sightedness of reason) such as the Trinity, incarnation, the

satisfaction of Christ, the resurrection of the dead and the like; the holiness and purity of the precepts regulating even the thoughts and the internal affections of the heart and adapted to render man perfect in every kind of virtue and worthy of his maker; the certainty of the prophecies concerning things even the most remote and hidden. For the foreseeing and foretelling of future things (dependent on the will of God alone) is a prerogative of deity alone (Is. 41:23). (2) With regard to the style: the divine majesty, shining forth no less from the simplicity than the weight of expression and that consummate boldness in commanding all without distinction (*parrēsia*), both the highest and the lowest. (3) With regard to the form: the divine agreement and entire harmony (*panarmonia*) of doctrine, not only between both testaments in the fulfillment of predictions and types, but also between particular books of each testament; so much the more to be wondered at, as their writers both were many in number and wrote at different times and places so that they could not have an understanding among themselves as to what things should be written. (4) With regard to the end: the direction of all things to the glory of God alone and the holiness and salvation of men. (5) With regard to the effects: the light and efficacy of the divine doctrine which is so great that, sharper than any two-edged sword, it pierces to the soul itself, generates faith and piety in the minds of its hearers, as well as invincible firmness in its professors, and always victoriously triumphs over the kingdom of Satan and false religion. These criteria are such as cannot be found in any human writing (which always display proof of human weakness) and prove the Scriptures truly divine especially when, not each by itself, but all collectively (*athroōs*) are considered.

X. We must not suppose these marks shine equally and in the same degree in all the books of the Bible. For as one star differs from another star in light, so in this heaven of Scripture, some books send out brighter and richer rays of light; others far more feeble and fewer in proportion to their being more or less necessary to the church and as containing doctrines of greater or lesser importance. Thus the gospels and Paul's epistles shine with far greater splendor than the book of Ruth or Esther; but yet it is certain that in all are these arguments of truth and majesty, which by themselves prove a book divine and authentic (or at least that nothing can be found in them to make their authenticity [*authentian*] doubtful).

XI. Neither is it necessary that all these marks should occur in every chapter or verse of a canonical book to distinguish it from an apocryphal or in each part of Scripture detached from the whole. It is sufficient for them to be given in the divine writings considered collectively and as a totality.

XII. Although false religions usually claim for their doctrines these criteria, the true religion may appropriate these criteria to herself because the vain and false opinions of men do not weaken the truth of the thing itself. The Turk may most falsely claim divinity for his Koran and the Jew for his Kabbalah (the contrary of which is evident from the fables and lies with which each of these books is filled). However, this is no reason why the believer should not truly predicate divinity of the sacred Scriptures because everywhere in them he sees the brightest rays of divine truth.

XIII. Although faith may be founded upon the authority of testimony and not upon scientific demonstration, it does not follow that it cannot be assisted by artificial arguments, especially in erecting the principles of faith. For before faith can believe, it must have the divinity of the witness to whom faith is to be given

clearly established and certain true marks which are apprehended in it, otherwise it cannot believe. For where suitable reasons of believing anyone are lacking, the testimony of such a witness cannot be worthy of credence (*axiopiston*).

Authenticity of the testimony of the prophets and apostles who were not deceived.

XIV. The testimony of the prophets and apostles is unexceptionable and cannot reasonably be called in question by anyone. For if it were uncertain and fallacious, it would be questionable either because they themselves were deceived or because they deceived others; but neither can be said with truth. They were not deceived and could not be. For if they were deceived, they were deceived either by others or by themselves. The former cannot be said because they were deceived neither by God (who as he can be deceived by no one, so neither does he deceive any man); nor by the angels (who do not deceive); nor by wicked spirits because the whole of this system tends to the overthrow of Satan's kingdom. No more can the latter be said. For if a person is deceived in anything, it arises principally from this: either because he does not see it himself (but receives it upon the testimony of others); or because he has seen it only in passing and cursorily; or because the thing itself is obscure and too difficult to be comprehended by the mind of man; or because the subject is improperly disposed and prevented by some disease from making a proper judgment. But here there was no such thing. For (1) they profess to have received the things which they relate not from an uncertain rumor and from others who had a partial acquaintance with them, but they had the most certain and definite knowledge, perceiving them with their eyes and ears and employing the greatest attention and study to investigate them. (2) Nor do they speak of things remote and distant, but of those which were done in the very places and time in which they wrote. Hence John says, "That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, of the Word of life, declare we unto you" (1 Jn. 1:1). (3) They do not discourse of things obscure and merely speculative (in which the ignorant and illiterate could easily have been deceived, not being able to rise to their sublimity), but of facts cognizable by the senses and before their eyes. For instance, of the resurrection of Christ (with whom they had been familiar before his death) who manifested himself to them after his resurrection, not momentarily, but for a long time; not only once, but often; not before one and then another, but before many of both sexes and all conditions. (4) Finally, it cannot be said that their faculties were impaired or in a diseased state. For besides the fact that they do not show any marks of corrupt imagination and mind (yea, their words and lives manifest wisdom and a well regulated mind), there is this to be said in addition—that not one or another, but many thought and gave utterance to the same thing. Hence it follows that there is no reason for saying that they were deceived.

Nor did they seek to impose on others.

XV. As they could not be imposed upon themselves, so neither did they seek to impose on others. For they who deceive and lie have in view some emolument, either that they may obtain glory, or conciliate the favor of men, or procure wealth and advantages. But as we hear their testimony, what desirable thing in life or after death was sought by the men of God? In life, indeed, are all those things by which men are usually deterred from lying—poverty, exile, tortures, the direst punishments—and after death,

infamy and eternal suffering. And yet disregarding all these things, they did not hesitate in order to confirm their testimony, to expose themselves willingly to innumerable trials, to endure the vilest reproaches and to suffer the most cruel deaths. Therefore, who can for a moment suppose that they would suffer such things for that which they considered uncertain and false, when even for the most certain and indubitable things scarcely any man can be found who would risk so much as his reputation or property, much less seek death? Indeed, no one can charge them with the guilt of so great a lie who does not at the same time prove them to have been most foolish and wicked. Most foolish because they would then have been willing to lie without any prospect of advantage, with the most certain calamity in view, against the very doctrines of the religion about which they wrote and which so strongly forbids lying. Most wicked because they would have wished to deceive the whole world by lies and to involve it in every evil for no earthly good.

Nor could they.

XVI. Finally, neither could they have imposed on others even if they wished. For they wrote not of things remote and distant (or done in ancient times, or secretly and in some corner as impostors generally do that they may not be convicted of falsehood), but they relate those things which happened in their own day publicly and in the face of the sun (in the very place in which they wrote and indeed in the presence of those to whom they wrote and who might easily have detected fraud and imposture if there had been any). Therefore, if they were not deceived themselves, nor deceived others, their testimony is undoubtedly divine and so all the doctrines depending on and formed upon it are authentic.

XVII. We cannot call in question the fact of the existence of the prophets and apostles and of their having written the books attributed to them without overthrowing the faith of all antiquity and introducing Pyrrhonism. The same doubt might with equal reason be shown over all the writings we possess; but since these books were undoubtedly written by credible authors, what man in his senses would not rather believe that they were written by those whose names they bear (as all Christian churches everywhere have firmly believed, about which no one either of the Jews or of the pagans had the least doubt and which was believed in the most ancient times when they had every opportunity of investigating the truth) than by some other persons?

The authenticity of the books of Moses is shown.

XVIII. Whatever is brought forward to weaken faith in the Mosaic history can easily be refuted by a thorough examination. For he who denies that Moses ever lived or that he was the author of the books attributed to him can be convinced without difficulty. For not only Jews and Christians make mention of him, but also many profane writers. Also this was firmly believed by a most numerous nation, nor is there any ground for doubt, unless we wish to destroy entirely belief in all histories and to deny that Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and others ever existed and wrote the books which bear their names (which no one but a fool would say). But this can be said with much less truth of Moses than of the others because no book could have been cast aside by the Jews with greater show of reason. For thus they would have freed themselves from the yoke of a most rigorous law. Yet none was received and preserved by them with greater zeal and eagerness; none ever obtained so suddenly such great authority as to be regarded as a divine law and rule of religion, for no other reason than from a persuasion of the truth contained in it.

XIX. Second, if (finding this position untenable) he flies to another and confesses indeed that Moses existed and wrote these books, but asserts that he was an imposter and a consummate fabler, who imposed upon the Israelites by empty lies and false prodigies in order to bring them into subjection to the law which he proposed (and so to himself), it can with as little difficulty be disproved. For besides the fact that the heathen themselves and the most bitter enemies of Christianity (as Porphyry, lib. 4+) give Moses the credit of being a truthful writer, it cannot easily be conceived how the great wisdom and remarkable virtue which shone in the whole life of Moses can be reconciled with so barefaced an imposture; or how he could devise and recommend by fraud and imposture so admirable a law from which all that is good in others has been borrowed and which had for its object the glory of God and the holiness of the people. Again, if he was an impostor, it is wonderful that he adopted a plan directly contrary to his object and by which his deception could easily be discovered. For if the account which he gives of the creation of the world is false, it would have been very easy to convict him of falsehood by the small number of generations which came between Adam and the flood and between the flood and the departure of the people from Egypt; since, in the time of Moses, many persons were still living who had seen Joseph, whose father saw them, who for one hundred years of his life could have been with Methuselah, who saw Adam. Hence without trouble the truth or falsity of the thing could have been ascertained. (3) If Moses was an impostor and wished to deceive the Israelites, he undoubtedly hoped to make them believe his falsehoods and deceptions. But how could he for a moment suppose that he could make them believe so many and so great miracles reported to have been wrought either in Egypt or in the wilderness, if no such things had taken place—especially as he was writing to those who would have been ear-witnesses or eye-witnesses of them? The things of which he wrote are reported to have been done not many ages before, but in their very day; not secretly and in a corner, but openly and publicly before six hundred thousand men (and even before his most bitter enemies) who could have convicted him of falsehood. Could he hope that no one would be found among the people to doubt these things or to inquire of the Egyptians concerning their truth? Is it credible that of so great a number of men whom he constantly and severely upbraids as a rebellious and stubborn nation (yea, whom he several times afflicted with the severest punishments, visiting with sudden death not only hundreds, but also thousands and acting in such a manner as would with reason exasperate them against him), there was no one to bring the charge of fraud and imposture while they so often murmured and rebelled against him? Finally, if he acted as an impostor, he must undoubtedly have proposed to himself some advantage or glory or wealth, either that he might obtain the supreme authority for himself and his posterity, or to secure from men the praise of wisdom and heroic virtue; but how far removed from the desire of gain or of glory Moses was, both the thing itself clearly shows and the sincerity with which he so ingenuously confesses his own sins (and especially his incredulity) abundantly testifies.

XX. But perhaps the Israelites, aware of the falsity of the things which Moses relates, consented to the deception and imposture in order to glorify their nation. But who would believe that the Israelites were so utterly devoid of sense as willingly to consent to so great an imposture by which they were forced to come

under the almost unendurable (*abastaktō*) yoke of the strictest law, if they had been altogether certain that this law was a mere fiction of Moses? Or can it be said with any shadow of truth, that of these six hundred thousand all to a man consented to this deception, so that not one was found to oppose it? (2) So far from their gaining glory and praise from other nations, on the contrary, they would thus deservedly bring upon themselves the odium and contempt of all. For who would say that it was a nation's glory to have her murmurings and most heinous sins exposed to the view of men, to be rebuked as stiff-necked (*sklērotrachēloi*) and the most ungrateful of mortals, to have published to the world the severest punishments by which God avenges himself of their stubbornness and rebellion; yea who does not see that these would bring such a nation into everlasting disgrace? In one word, we cannot explain why a people so stiff-necked and devoted to pleasure (*philēdonos*) would so readily and voluntarily submit to the yoke of such a troublesome law and one severely punishing the smallest transgression, unless we believe that they were firmly persuaded of the divine calling of Moses and of the truth of his doctrines.

The conversion of the world proves the divinity of the Scripture.

XXI. The conversion of the world and the success of the gospel is a very clear proof of its divinity. For unless the apostles were men of God and delivered heavenly truth, it cannot be conceived how it happened that their doctrines (destitute of all those helps by which any doctrine of human origin can be recommended and propagated and most obstinately resisted by all those things by which doctrine could be resisted, viz., the authority of magistrates, the customs of the people, the favor of princes, the eloquence of orators, the subtlety of philosophers, accommodation to the morals and dispositions of men promulgated by a few illiterate and weak men, far removed not only from deception, but even from suspicion; endowed with no gifts of eloquence, schooled in no arts of flattery, rejected and despised) by persuasion alone (without any assistance of public authority and favor, without the help of arms, through innumerable trials and deaths often), in the shortest time, in almost every place, were so propagated as to break through all opposition and come forth victorious over the religions which were furnished with all these helps, so that whole nations and even kings themselves, leaving the religion of the country in which they had been born and brought up, without the hope of any advantage (yea, in sure expectation of trials) embraced this which was absurd to reason and disagreeable to the flesh and which seemed to repel rather than allure.

XXII. Certainty can be threefold: (1) mathematical; (2) moral; (3) theological. Mathematical (or metaphysical) is that which belongs to first principles known by nature of themselves and to conclusions demonstrated by principles of this kind (as when the whole is said to be greater than any of its parts and that the same thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time). (2) Moral certainty accompanies those truths which cannot indeed be demonstrated, but yet persuade by such marks and probable arguments that a sensible man cannot doubt them (as that the *Aeneid* was written by Virgil and the *History* of Livy by Livy). For although the thing does not carry its own evidence with it, yet it has been attended with such a constant testimony that no one, having a knowledge of things and of letters, can doubt it. (3) Theological certainty attends those

things, which although they cannot be demonstrated or known of themselves and by nature, are nevertheless founded not only upon probable grounds and moral arguments, but upon truly theological and divine (viz., upon divine revelation). Therefore, this gives them not merely a moral and conjectural certainty, but a truly divine faith. The Scriptures do not possess metaphysical certainty; otherwise the assent which we give to them would bespeak knowledge, not faith. Neither do they possess simply a moral and probable certainty; otherwise our faith would not be more certain than any historical assent given to human writings. But they have a theological and infallible certainty, which cannot possibly deceive the true believer illuminated by the Spirit of God.

Sources of explanation.

XXIII. The prophets did not fall into mistakes in those things which they wrote as inspired men (*theopneustōs*) and as prophets, not even in the smallest particulars; otherwise faith in the whole of Scripture would be rendered doubtful. But they could err in other things as men (just as David erred in his letter concerning the killing of Uriah [which has historical authenticity but not normal]; and Nathan in the directions which he gave to David about building the temple without having consulted God, 2 S. 7:3) because the influence of the Holy Spirit was neither universal nor uninterrupted, so that it might not be considered an ordinary excitation or merely an effect of nature (2 K. 2:17).

XXIV. The apostles were infallible in faith, not in practice; and the Spirit was to lead them into all truth so that they might not err, but not into all holiness that they might not sin because they were like us in all things. The dissimulation and hypocrisy of Peter (Gal. 2:12) was a sin of life, not an error of faith; a lapse in his morality from weakness and the fear of incurring the hatred of the Jews, but not an error of mind from an ignorance of Christian liberty, which he testified sufficiently to have known in his familiar intercourse with the Gentiles before the arrival of the Jews.

XXV. When Paul says, "I speak, not the Lord" (1 Cor. 7:12*), he does not deny the inspiration of the Lord (which he claims, 1 Cor. 7:40), but only that this precept or this law was expressly mentioned by the Lord before himself. Thus the meaning is, this controversy concerning willful desertion was not agitated in the time of Christ and there was no occasion for deciding it. Paul (now illuminated by the Spirit) does.

XXVI. Things in the law which seem to be trifling and useless are found (by the pious and devoted) to be of the greatest importance, i.e., to call forth their obedience, to overthrow idolatry, to the formation of their morals and (if they are rightly used) making known the Messiah. The genealogies and other things which seem to be superfluous are the testimonies of the rise, propagation and preservation of the church, and of the fulfillment of the promise concerning the Messiah's being born of the seed of Abraham and David.

XXVII. Hosea is not commanded to take a wife of whoredom, for then the children of such a connection could not be called children of whoredom as they are called in 1:2. But this must be taken allegorically to represent the foul idolatries of Israel.

Fifth Question

Do real contradictions occur in Scripture? Or are there any inexplicable (alyta) *passages which cannot be explained and made to harmonize? We deny.*

I. Although when the divinity of the Scriptures is proved (as in the preceding question), its infallibility necessarily follows, yet the enemies of true religion and of Scripture in every age flatter themselves that they have found not a few contradictions (*enantiophanē*) in it and boast of their discoveries in order to overthrow its authenticity (*authentian*); as Porphyry, Lucian (of Samosata), Julian the Apostate and others formerly of the Gentiles, and many atheists of the present day who declare that they have met with many contradictions and difficulties (*apora*) in it which cannot in any way be reconciled. Thus there is the necessity of taking up this subject particularly in order that the integrity of the Scriptures may be preserved safe and entire against their wicked darts.

II. We have to deal here not only with declared atheists and Gentiles who do not receive the sacred Scriptures, but also with those who, seeming to receive them, indirectly oppose them. For instance, the Enthusiasts who allege the imperfection of the written word as a pretext for leading men away from it to their hidden word or private revelations; the papists, who while maintaining the divinity of the Scriptures against atheists, do not scruple with arms fitted to themselves to oppose as much as they can its own and so the entire cause of Christianity, and to deliver it up to the enemy by insisting upon the corruption of the original so as to bring authority to their Vulgate version. Lastly, many Libertines who, living in the bosom of the church, are constantly bringing forward these various difficulties (*apora*) and apparent contradictions (*enantiophanē*) in order to weaken the authority of the Scriptures.

III. The learned pursue different methods in answering them. Some think that they can get rid of all difficulties by saying that the sacred writers could slip in memory or err in smaller things; so Socinus, "De sacrae Scripturae auctoritate," *Opera omnia* (1656), 1:265-80; Castellio, *Dialogorum sacrorum* (1651) and others. But instead of being a defense against the atheists, this is a base abandonment of the cause. Others confess that the Hebrew and Greek originals are corrupted in some places by the wickedness of the Jews or of heretics, but that a remedy can easily be found in the Vulgate version and the infallible authority of the church. This opinion is held by many of the papists against whom we will argue when we speak of the purity of the sources. Others again think that a few very slight errors have crept into the Scriptures and even now exist which cannot be corrected by any collation of manuscripts. These are not to be imputed however to the sacred writers themselves, but partly to the injuries of time, partly to the fault of copyists and librarians. Yet on this account, the authenticity (*authentia*) of the Scriptures cannot be weakened because they occur only in things less necessary and important (thus Scaliger, Capellus, Amamus, Vossius and others think). Finally others defend the integrity of the Scriptures and say that these various contradictions are only apparent, not real and true; that certain passages are hard to be understood (*dysnoēta*), but not altogether inexplicable (*alyta*). This is the more common opinion of the orthodox, which we follow as safer and truer.

Statement of the question.

IV. The question does not concern the irregular writing of words or the punctuation or the various readings (which all acknowledge do often occur); or whether the copies which we have so agree with the originals as to vary from them not even in a little point or letter. Rather the question is whether they so differ as to make the genuine corrupt and to hinder us from receiving the original text as a rule of faith and practice.

V. The question is not as to the particular corruption of some manuscripts or as to the errors which have crept into the books of particular editions through the negligence of copyists or printers. All acknowledge the existence of many such small corruptions. The question is whether there are universal corruptions and errors so diffused through all the copies (both manuscript and edited) as that they cannot be restored and corrected by any collation of various copies, or of Scripture itself and of parallel passages. Are there real and true, and not merely apparent, contradictions? We deny the former.

That Scripture is not corrupted is proved.

VI. The reasons are: (1) The Scriptures are inspired of God (*theopneustos*, 2 Tim. 3:16). The word of God cannot lie (Ps. 19:8, 9; Heb. 6:18); cannot pass away and be destroyed (Mt. 5:18); shall endure forever (1 Pet. 1:25); and is truth itself (Jn. 17:17). For how could such things be predicated of it, if it contained dangerous contradictions, and if God suffered either the sacred writers to err and to slip in memory, or incurable blemishes to creep into it?

VII. (2) Unless unimpaired integrity characterize the Scriptures, they could not be regarded as the sole rule of faith and practice, and the door would be thrown wide open to atheists, libertines, enthusiasts and other profane persons like them for destroying its authenticity (*authentian*) and overthrowing the foundation of salvation. For since nothing false can be an object of faith, how could the Scriptures be held as authentic and reckoned divine if liable to contradictions and corruptions? Nor can it be said that these corruptions are only in smaller things which do not affect the foundation of faith. For if once the authenticity (*authentia*) of the Scriptures is taken away (which would result even from the incurable corruption of one passage), how could our faith rest on what remains? And if corruption is admitted in those of lesser importance, why not in others of greater? Who could assure me that no error or blemish had crept into fundamental passages? Or what reply could be given to a subtle atheist or heretic who should pertinaciously assert that this or that passage less in his favor had been corrupted? It will not do to say that divine providence wished to keep it free from serious corruptions, but not from minor. For besides the fact that this is gratuitous, it cannot be held without injury, as if lacking in the necessary things which are required for the full credibility (*autopistian*) of Scripture itself. Nor can we readily believe that God, who dictated and inspired each and every word to these inspired (*theopneustois*) men, would not take care of their entire preservation. If men use the utmost care diligently to preserve their words (especially if they are of any importance, as for example a testament or contract) in order that it may not be corrupted, how much more, must we suppose, would God take care of his word which he intended as a testament and seal of his covenant with us, so that it might not be corrupted; especially when he could easily foresee and prevent such corruptions in order to establish the faith of his church?

VIII. The principal arguments for the integrity of the Scriptures and the purity of the sources are four. (1) The chief of these is the providence of God (who as he wished to provide for our faith by inspiring the sacred writers as to what they should write, and by preserving the Scriptures against the attempts of enemies who have left nothing untried that they might destroy them), so he should keep them pure and uncorrupted in order that our faith might always have a firm foundation. (2) The religion of the Jews who have always been careful even to the point of superstition concerning the faithful keeping of the sacred manuscripts. (3) The diligence of the Masoretes who placed their marks as a hedge around the law that it might not in any way be changed or corrupted. (4) The number and multitude of copies, so that even if some manuscripts could be corrupted, yet all could not.

Sources of explanation.

IX. The contradictions (*antilogia*) found in Scripture are apparent, not real; they are to be understood only with respect to us who cannot comprehend and perceive the agreement everywhere, but not in the thing itself. And if the laws of legitimate contradiction are attended to (that opposites should agree with the same thing [*tō autō*], in the same respect [*kata to auto*], with reference to the same thing [*pros to auto*] and in the same time [*tō autō chronō*]), these various apparent contradictions (*enantiophanē*) in Scripture might be easily reconciled. For the discourse does not concern the same thing, as when James ascribes justification to works, which Paul denies to them. For the former speaks of declarative justification of the effect *a posteriori*, but the latter of justification of the cause, *a priori*. Thus Luke enjoins mercy, "Be ye merciful" (Lk. 6:36) which Deuteronomy forbids, "Thou shalt not pity" (Dt. 19:13). The former refers to private persons, the latter to magistrates. Or they are not said in the same respect, as when Matthew denies the presence of Christ in the world, "Me ye have not always" (Mt. 26:11*); and yet it is promised, "I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world" (Mt. 28:20). The former is said with regard to his human nature and bodily presence, but the latter with regard to his divine nature and spiritual presence. Or the statements are not made with reference to the same thing, as when something is said absolutely and another comparatively. "Honor thy father" (Ex. 20:12); "if any man hate not his father" (Lk. 14:26). The former must be understood absolutely, the latter comparatively for loving less and esteeming less than Christ. Or not in the same time, hence the expression "distinguish times and you will reconcile Scripture." Thus at one time circumcision is extolled as a great privilege of the Jews (Rom. 3:1*); at another it is spoken of as a worthless thing (Gal. 5:3). But the former refers to the Old Testament dispensation when it was an ordinary sacrament and a seal of the righteousness of faith, but the latter concerns the time of the gospel after the abrogation of the ceremonial law. At one time the apostles are sent to the Jews alone by a special mission before the passion of Christ and prohibited from going to the Gentiles ("Go not into the way of the Gentiles," Mt. 10:5); at another they are sent to all nations by a general mission after the resurrection (Mk. 16:15).

X. Although we give to the Scriptures absolute integrity, we do not therefore think that the copyists and printers were inspired (*theopneustous*), but only that the providence of God watched over the copying of the sacred books, so that although many errors might have crept in, it has not so happened (or they have

not so crept into the manuscripts) but that they can be easily corrected by a collation of others (or with the Scriptures themselves). Therefore the foundation of the purity and integrity of the sources is not to be placed in the freedom from fault (*anamartēsia*) of men, but in the providence of God which (however men employed in transcribing the sacred books might possibly mingle various errors) always diligently took care to correct them, or that they might be corrected easily either from a comparison with Scripture itself or from more approved manuscripts. It was not necessary therefore to render all the scribes infallible, but only so to direct them that the true reading may always be found out. This book far surpasses all others in purity.

XI. Although we cannot find out immediately a plain reconciliation and one free from all difficulties between passages of Scripture (which treat either of names or of numerical and chronological subjects), they must not at once be placed among inexplicable things (*alyta*). Or if they are called inexplicable (*alyta*), they will be such only by the inability of the one endeavoring to explain (*tē adynamia tou lyontos*), not in themselves, so that here it will be wiser to acknowledge our own ignorance than to suppose any contradiction. For these histories are not written so in detail as to contain every circumstance. Many things were undoubtedly brought into a narrow compass; other things which did not appear to be so important were omitted. It could also happen that these places had various relations (*scheseis*) well known to the writers, although now unknown to us. Hence Peter Martyr well remarks on 2 K. 8:17: "Although there occur obscure places in chronology, we must not, to get over them, say that the sacred text is false. For God, who of his own mercy wished the divine letters to be preserved for us, has given them to us entire and uncorrupted. Wherefore if it ever happens that we cannot explain the number of years, we must confess our ignorance and recollect that the sacred letters speak so concisely that the place where the calculation must be commenced does not readily appear. Therefore the Scriptures remain uncorrupted, which if weakened in one or another place, will also be suspected in others" (*Melachim id est, Regum Libri Duo* [1566], p. 259). And: "It often happens that in this history the number of years assigned to the kings appear to be at variance with each other. But doubts of this kind can be solved in many ways; for sometimes one and the same year is attributed to two persons because it had been completed and perfected by neither. Sometimes sons reigned some years with their parents, and these are assigned now to the reign of the parents and then to that of the children. There occurred also sometimes interregna, and the unoccupied time is attributed now to a former and then to a later king. There were also some years in which rulers were tyrannical and wicked, and therefore these are passed by and not reckoned with the other years of their reigns" (ibid., p. 127 on 1 K. 15:1).

Of Cainan.

XII. The passage in Lk. 3:36 concerning the younger Cainan (who is inserted between Arphaxad and Sala contrary to the truth of the Mosaic history, Gen. 11:13) is truly hard to be understood (*dysnoētos*) and has greatly exercised the ingenuity of the learned; yet it should not be considered entirely inexplicable (*alytos*) since various methods of solution can be given. Passing by other opinions, we think that to be the best which makes Cainan surreptitious (*hypobolimaion*) and spurious, having crept in from the version of the Septuagint in which the chronology of

Demetrius (according to Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 9.17.419d [ed. Gifford, 1903], p. 451) testifies that it existed even before the time of Christ, either from the carelessness of copyists or from a certain pious zeal, that Luke might be consistent with the Septuagint which was then of great authority. This is plainly proved: (1) by the authority of Moses and of the books of Chronicles which, in the genealogical records formed in three places (Gen. 10:24; 11:13; 1 Ch. 1:18), make no mention of him; (2) the Chaldee paraphrases which uniformly omit Cainan in the book of Genesis and Chronicles; (3) Josephus does not mention him, nor Berosus guided by him, nor Africanus whose words Eusebius quotes in his *Chronicorum* (cf. 1.16.13 [PG 19.153-54]); (4) the sacred chronology would thus be disturbed and brought into doubt in the history of Moses, if the years of Cainan are inserted between Arphaxad and Sala. Abraham would not be the tenth from Noah as Moses asserts, but the eleventh. (5) It does not exist in any of the Codices. Our Beza testifies that it is not found in his most ancient manuscript (*Annotationes maiores in Novum . . . testamentum, Pars prior* [1594], p. 262 on Lk. 3:36). Ussher ("De Cainano Arphaxadi filio" in *Chronologia Sacra* 6; cf. *Whole Works* [1847-64], 11:558) asserts that he saw the book of Luke written in Greek-Latin on the most ancient vellum, in characters somewhat large without breathings and accents (which having been brought from Greece to France was laid up in the monastery of St. Irenaeus in the suburbs of Lyons; and being discovered in the year 1562 was afterward carried to England and presented to the University of Cambridge), and in it he could not find Cainan. Scaliger in his prologue to the chronicle of Eusebius ("Prolegomena," *Thesaurus temporum Eusebii . . . chronicorum canonum* [1606/1968], 1:ii) affirms that Cainan is lacking in the most ancient copies of Luke. Whatever the case may be, even if this passage proves to be a mistake, the authenticity (*authentia*) of Luke's gospel cannot be called in question on that account: (a) because the corruption is not universal; (b) this error is of little consequence and a ready means of correcting it is furnished by Moses, so that there was no necessity for that learned man Vossius to throw doubts upon the purity of the Hebrew manuscript in order to establish the authenticity (*authentian*) of the Septuagint.

XIII. If a great variety occurs in the genealogy of Christ (which Matthew and Luke give both as to the persons and their number), it should not seem wonderful. For they are not the same, but different. Matthew gives the genealogy of Joseph, whose family he traces from David through Solomon; but Luke traces the pedigree of Mary upwards through Nathan (another son of David) to the same David. Matthew leaves the pedigree of the spouse to be sought for in the family of the husband according to the Hebrew custom. Luke wished to supply the omission by describing the origin of Mary, so that the genealogy of Christ from both parents might be preserved full and entire, that there might be no ground for the scruples of the weak or the cavils of the enemies of the gospel (and that the former might be made certain and the latter convinced that Christ according to the ancient prophecies was the true and natural son of David, whether a regard should be had to the husband Joseph, into whose family he had passed by the marriage with Mary, or to Mary herself). Especially when we know that virgins (only daughters) who inherited (*epiklērous*) the entire fortunes of their parents (such as was the blessed virgin) were not permitted to marry out of their own tribe and family. But the genealogy is referred by Luke to Joseph and not to

Mary because it was not the custom to trace genealogies through the female side (for they were reckoned either in the parents or in the brothers if unmarried or in their husbands if married). Hence the common saying of the Jews: "the family of a mother is no family" (*mshpchth 'm l' mshpchth*).

XIV. Although Jacob is called the father of Joseph by Matthew (but Heli by Luke), there is nevertheless no contradiction because this is to be understood in different respects (*kat' allo kai allo*). First, there is nothing absurd in one son having two fathers considered differently: one natural (who begot the son from himself), the other legal (who adopted the same born from another according to law). Manasseh and Ephraim were the natural sons of Joseph alone, but the legal sons of Jacob by adoption. Obed, the grandfather of David, had one natural father (Boaz), but also a legal father, Mahlon, the former husband of his mother Ruth, to whom Boaz, the second husband, raised up a seed according to law. Thus Jacob was the natural father of Joseph, but Heli (who was the natural father of Mary) can be called the father of Joseph, either the legal (as Africanus thinks) because Heli having died without sons, Jacob married his wife according to the law (Dt. 25:5) and begat from her Joseph, the husband of Mary; or the civil, in relation to the marriage entered into with Mary his daughter by which he became his son-in-law, as Naomi calls her daughters-in-law "her daughters" (Ruth 1:11, 12, the common mode of speaking). Or it can be said that not Joseph but Christ is called the son of Heli, as these words *hōs enomizeto hyios Iōsēph* may be included in a parenthesis, the parenthesis not stopping as is commonly supposed, after the word *enomizeto*, in this sense, *ōn* (*hōs enomizeto hyios Iōsēph*) *tou Hēli* (viz., Jesus being [as was supposed the son of Joseph], the son of Heli [i.e., the grandson by his daughter, the virgin Mary]). This transition from grandfathers to grandsons is not unusual especially when the fathers are dead; and on this account the more here because Christ was without father (*apatōr*) as to his human nature.

XV. If it is asked why Mt. 1:8 says that Joram begat Uzziah when it is evident from 2 K. 8:24 (cf. 1 Ch. 3:11, 12) that Joram begat Ahaziah, Ahaziah Joash, Joash Amaziah, and so three kings are omitted, and a leap is made from Joram, the great-grandfather, to Uzziah, the great-grandchild's son: we can answer by saying that it is not unusual in Scripture for the descendants of ancestors from the highest antiquity to be called their sons and daughters—as the Jews call themselves the sons of Abraham (Jn. 8:39); Elizabeth is said to be of the daughters of Aaron (Lk. 1:5); Christ is called the son of David (Mt. 22:40-46). So it is said that Joram begat Uzziah by a mediate generation, on account of which the grandsons and great-grandsons descending from ancestors are called sons. But why these three kings are omitted and no others is not quite so clear, nor can the reasons given by various persons obtain our assent. It seems more likely that this was done for the sake of the round numbers because Matthew wished to reduce all these generations to fourteen, an abridgment to aid the memory. To obtain this he considered it of little importance to leap over some persons less remarkable, as other historians also have frequently done in giving a summary. But for a peculiar reason these three kings were omitted that the posterity of Ahab even to the third or fourth generation might be distinguished by this mark of the curse (1 K. 21:22), by erasing the kings who were of the posterity of Ahab, so that they might be regarded as never having lived or reigned. But Joram is not excluded because he did not spring from the cursed blood of Ahab nor his great-grandson Uzziah,

although he was descended from Ahab because the divine curse did not usually extend beyond the third or fourth generation.

XVI. If it is asked how Josiah is said to have "begotten Jeconiah" (Mt. 1:11) when (from the books of Kings, 2 K. 24:6; 1 Ch. 3:15, 16) it is evident that Josiah had four sons of different names (*heterōnymous*)—Johanan or Jehoahaz; Jehoiakim or Eliakim; Zedekiah or Mattaniah; and Shallum—but that Jeconiah was the son of Jehoiakim, it can be answered in different ways: either that the text was corrupted by librarians and that *Iacheim* should be supplied between Josiah and Jeconiah, Jehoiachim being the son of Josiah and the father of Jeconiah (which is proved by the authority of the ancient manuscript which R. Stephanus and Henry his son used, with whom Stapulensis and Bucer agree); and so the restoration would stand more truly *Iōsias de egennēse ton Iacheim—Iacheim egennēse ton Iechonian*. Or that Josiah is called the father of Jeconiah mediately because he was his grandfather, and that Jehoiakim was omitted because, as he was not worthy of sorrow and of a burial with the kings of Judah (Jer. 22:18, 19), so he was not worthy of mention in the genealogy of Christ. Or that there were two Jeconiahs and that they are mentioned in Matthew 1:11, 12, the first Jehoiakim, the son of Josiah (who is also called Eliakim) and Jeconiah. This should not be wondered at since many of the Jewish kings had two names and even three; as Zedekiah is called also Mattaniah, Uzziah is called Azariah. The other Jeconiah properly (1 Ch. 3:16), or Jehoiakim, the grandson of Josiah mentioned in Matthew 1:12, is plainly distinguished from the former both by the mention of his brothers (whom the latter had not, Jer. 22:18, 19) and by the mention of Salathiel born of Jeconiah after the captivity (*meta metoikesian*, Mt. 1:12).

XVII. Although Salathiel is said to have begotten Zerubbabel (Mt. 1:12) and yet is called "the son of Pedaiah" (1 Ch. 3:17-19), there is no contradiction because Salathiel having died without children, Pedaiah his brother could raise up seed for him, and by law as a husband's brother had from his wife Zerubbabel. Hence he is called the son of Pedaiah (1 Ch. 3:19) because he was truly begotten by him; and of Salathiel (Mt. 1:12; Hag. 1:1) because he was raised up to him by his brother; or because Zerubbabel was the successor of Salathiel, Pedaiah having died before Salathiel the father, as he might have been the immediate son of Pedaiah and only the mediate of Salathiel his grandfather.

XVIII. There is no contradiction between 1 Ch. 3:19, Mt. 1:13 and Lk. 3:27 when the sons of Zerubbabel are said in Chronicles to be "Meshullam and Hananiah," but in Matthew "Abiud" and in Luke "Rhesa." This can be easily explained by saying that three different lines of Zerubbabel are meant: one in Chronicles of his oldest son Meshullam and of others whose progeny was distinguished, and from whom the rulers and chiefs were chosen to lead the Jewish nation back from Babylon; the second in Matthew, Abiud, from whom Joseph was descended; the third in Luke, Rhesa, from whom Mary was descended. These two were private men who led an obscure life and therefore seem to have been omitted in the Chronicles. Or we might say with others that there were different Zerubbabels and Salathiels, and so we should not wonder at their posterity being different.

XIX. When it is said Josiah begat Jeconiah *epi tēs metoikesias*, these words are not to be translated literally (i.e., "in the carrying away") since it is evident from the particular divine promise that they did not live to see that evil and died some years before the captivity (2 Ch. 34:28; 35:24). But they are to be translated "at"

or "about it" (viz., when the captivity threatened). Thus *epi* coincides with *heōs* (until the carrying away) as *meta* coincides with *apo* (Mt. 1:17). Then *epi* will denote the time in which the thing was done; taken however not strictly, but with some latitude (as Mk. 2:26; Lk. 3:2) being the same as *b* in Hebrew which often signifies "about" or "near" (Gen. 2:2; Ex. 12:15) and must be translated by "at" or "about" (viz., the carrying away being at hand). Or *epi* is not to be referred to the more remote word "begat," but to the nearer "his brethren" (*epi metoikesias* for *ek metoikesias*, by an enallage of the preposition which is very frequent, for *tous ek metoikesias* who were of the carrying away, i.e., "among those who were carried away to Babylon").

XX. Although it is said that Jeconiah begat Salathiel (Mt. 1:12) and that Salathiel was the "son of Neri" (Lk. 3:27), there is no contradiction. There were different Salathiels, one the son of Jeconiah (of whom Matthew speaks), the other the son of Neri (of whom Luke speaks); the former of the line of Solomon, the latter of that of Nathan. And since the ancestors of Salathiel even to David with Luke were entirely different from those of Salathiel with Matthew, it is probable that they speak of different persons. Nor is it any objection that both the Salathiel in Matthew and in Luke are said to be the father of Zerubbabel because there might be also two Zerubbabels, as there is a similar repetition of two or more succeeding each other in the same order (Lk. 3:24), Matthat and Levi (Lk. 3:29; 1 Ch. 6:7, 8), and the same thing is repeated concerning their four grandsons (1 Ch. 6:12).

XXI. Concerning *k'ry* (Ps. 22:17), the passage is not inextricable (*alytos*). For even if the common reading is retained, we must not therefore suppose there is a corruption, but only an anomaly of writing, where the aleph is added by epenthesis, as often elsewhere (*r'mh* for *rmh*, "it shall be lifted up"—Zech. 14:10) and waw is changed into yodh (letters which might very easily be mistaken for each other); "they had taken," *ns'v* for *ns'y* (Ezr. 10:44). Marinus calls that letter not yodh, but waw diminutive, and thinks it is put to indicate clearly the marks of the nails of Christ (*Arca Noe* [1593], Pars I, p. 332 on *khrh*). Hence in the royal manuscripts it is written with the yodh pointed, as if it was yodh shurek (*k'ry*) instead of waw shurek as in Jer. 50:11. (2) It is confirmed by this—that the Masoretes tell us the word *k'ry* with kamets under the kaph occurs only twice in the Bible and then with a different signification. But Is. 38:13 (where it occurs once) cannot be rendered otherwise than "as a lion." Therefore it must be explained here with a different sense; and this since the connection (*allēlouchia*) of the words can be no other than that which is commonly given to it (viz., "they have pierced"). (3) In the great Masora a list is given of words in pairs, written alike, but differing in signification, among which is found that which occurs in Is. 38 and this. Hence the signification with the psalmist should be different from that with Isaiah. (4) The most ancient versions so render it. The Septuagint has *ōryxan*; so also the Arabic, Syriac and Ethiopic. (5) The scope of the psalm is to treat about the design of Christ's enemies in his crucifixion which is evident from the parting of garments and casting lots upon his vesture. But who can believe that the principal thing (and the most important of all) should be passed over in silence? (6) The connection of the words demands it; for if we read "as a lion," there would be a hiatus and no sense—"my hands and feet as a lion." There must be some word to complete the sentence and that word can be

no other than *krv* ("they pierced") to which the prophecy of Zech. 12:10 has reference: "they shall look upon him whom they have pierced." (7) Even if we should grant that this passage has been tampered with by the Jews, it would not follow that the corruption is universal because the Masoretes testify that they found the word *k'rv* written in the more approved manuscripts (the marginal Masora to Num. 24:9). And Jacob Ben-Haiim, the collector of the work of the Venetian Masoretes, found written in some corrected copies (i.e., occurring in the text *k'rv,* but read [i.e., placed in the margin] *k'ry*). John Isaac, a converted Jew, testifies that in the Psaltery of his grandfather he found the same thing. This is confirmed by Capito (?*Institutionum Hebraicarum* 1.7* [1525], p. 22). We will believe the papists (who say that the Complutensian Bible has it) and Genebrardus (proved by the testimony of many Jews) that it was so read.

XXII. David is said to have bought from Araunah the threshing floor and the oxen for fifty shekels of silver (2 S. 24:24). But in 1 Ch. 21:25 mention is made of six hundred shekels of gold. The reconciliation is easy from the subject of the purchase. He gave fifty shekels for that part of the threshing floor on which at first he built an altar. After he knew from the fire which fell down from heaven that this was the place God had selected for building a house, not content now with that small threshing floor, he bought the whole field and mountain for six hundred shekels.

XXIII. In 2 S. 24:13, seven years of famine are mentioned by God to David as a divine punishment. But in 1 Ch. 21:12, there is mention of only three. But they may very easily be reconciled by saying either that God at first mentioned seven years which afterwards (David manifesting so much feeling) were reduced to three in answer to the prayer of God or of David (as in Gen. 18:24-32, the number of fifty just persons is reduced to ten). Or that in the number seven (mentioned in the book of Samuel) are included the three years of famine which had already passed by, having been sent to avenge the Gibeonites (which is treated of in 2 S. 21:1 together with the closing year). But in the book of Chronicles, mention is made only of the three years which were to come (so think Kimchi, Peter Martyr and Junius).

XXIV. Jehoiachin is said to have commenced his reign when he was eighteen years old (2 K. 24:8). But in 2 Ch. 36:9, it is said that he was only eight. That is, in this eighth year he began to reign with his father since it was the custom of the kings at that time (i.e., the fathers to associate their sons with them in office, so that the lawful heir to the throne might as early as possible be designated and acknowledged). But in the eighteenth year (at his father's death) his reign commenced. So Wolphius (cf. Peter Martyr, *Melachim . . . Regum Libri duo* [1599], p. 409), Sanctius and others (following Kimchi) reconcile these passages. Abrabanel wishes the ten days which are added in the book of Chronicles to be taken for ten years (as often elsewhere). He thinks this is very probable for the following reason: otherwise the day in which kings reigned were not usually mentioned, but only the years or months.

XXV. Many think there is an insoluble contradiction between 2 Ch. 22:2 and 2 K. 8:26 where Jehoram, the father of Ahaziah is said to have begun his reign in the thirty-second year of his age (2 Ch. 21:5) and to have reigned eight years, so that he died in the fortieth year of his age (v. 20). But Ahaziah is said to have begun to reign in his forty-second year (2 Ch. 22:2), and thus the son is made

older than the father by two years. Again he is said to have begun to reign in his twenty-second and not in his forty-second year (2 K. 8:26). Yet this is not the opinion of all; nor are there wanting various methods of reconciling them. Some (as Junius and Tremellius, following Rabbi Levi ben Gerson) maintain that in the book of Kings the true year of Ahaziah's age (in which he began to reign, and the length of his life) is told. But in Chronicles not the duration of his own life, but of his mother Omri's family (from the time he began to reign even to his death which happened in this very year by a remarkable judgment of God, on account of the memory of this singular miracle or calculation) is given to Ahaziah who in the same year, with the rest of the family of Ahab and Omri, was slain by the sword of Jehu. For Omri reigned six years in Israel (1 K. 16:23), Ahab his son twenty-two years (1 K. 16:29); Ahaziah the son of Ahab two years, Joram his son twelve years—added together these amount to forty-two. But in the twelfth year of Joram, king of Israel, Ahaziah, king of Judah, began to reign (2 K. 8:25). Some of this same opinion think there is a transposition in 2 Ch. 22:1 and that they should stand thus: "his mother's name also was Athaliah, the daughter of Omri" (i.e., the granddaughter, being the daughter of Ahab, the son of Omri) "who was in her forty-second year when Ahaziah began to reign." But because this transposition appears rather forced and obscure, others think it would be better to refer the forty-two years not to Omri but to Athaliah herself and thus read: "his mother's name was Athaliah (the daughter of Omri) who was forty-two years old." For there was nothing which more closely concerned either Ahaziah or the state of the Jewish kingdom than the rise of the woman Athaliah, born for the destruction not only of her husband and children, but also for the whole kingdom and especially of the royal progeny. Others, to whom this reconciliation also appears rather forced, add another: Joram, the father of Ahaziah, in addition to the years of his reign and life mentioned in Scripture, lived and reigned twenty years more, but he may be said to have reigned only eight years *bhchzqthv* ("in his strength," i.e., well and happily). However from the time that he fell into the hands of the Arabians and was seized with a terrible disease (2 Ch. 21:16, 17, 19), he lived for some years which are not reckoned in his reign, but in that of his son Ahaziah in the book of Kings because he lived ingloriously. Hence it is said that he departed without being desired and was not buried in the sepulchers of the kings (2 Ch. 21:20). But Ahaziah (who began to reign with his father in the twenty-second year of his age) after the death of his father in his forty-second year, reigned alone and only one year (2 Ch. 22:2). So Kimchi, Martyr, Vatablus, Lyranus and others explain it, and this is the opinion of Jerome (*Paralipomenon*, PL 28.1451-52). Others maintain that there is a mistake in the book of Chronicles, attributable not to the sacred writers but to copyists, which easily crept in by their carelessness in the abbreviated writing (*brachygraphia*) which often occurs in the recension of numbers, so that *mb* (which means forty-two) is put for *kb* (which denotes twenty-two). But they deny that on this account the passage is inexplicable (*alyton*) because the knot can be easily untied, and the true reading restored from a comparison of the book of Kings, which gives the number answering to the truth of history and of the years of Joram and Ahaziah. And it is evident that the different versions of the book of Chronicles retain the number twenty-two; as the Syriac, Arabic and many Greek manuscripts—the Oxford, Cambridge and Roman.

XXVI. In Ex. 12:40, it is said the sojourning of the children of Israel in Egypt was four hundred and thirty years. Yet in Gen. 15:13, it is foretold that the posterity of Abraham should be afflicted by strangers four hundred years (which is confirmed in Acts 7:6). The answer is easy. Gen. 15 gives the round number instead of the odd, as is often done both by the sacred and by profane writers. Therefore although from the time at which this prophecy was given to Abraham (from which this number was to begin) 430 years ought in fact to roll around; yet only four hundred are mentioned, as a round number and the odd thirty are left out. Because if the Israelites are said to have dwelt in Egypt 430 years (Ex. 12:40), it does not follow that they remained for as many years in Egypt. It is evident that their stay was only 210 years, but the affliction of the Israelites is referred to Egypt because the beginning of it was from Gen. 12:10 and the end; or because it was of longer continuance, more severe, posterior and rendered remarkable by the reign of Joseph, the multiplication of the Hebrews, and their most weighty oppression and stupendous liberation.

XXVII. The servants of Solomon are said to have fetched from Ophir four hundred and twenty talents of gold (1 K. 9:28). But in 2 Ch. 8:18, four hundred and fifty are mentioned. They can readily be reconciled if we say that he speaks not of the same but different removals because Solomon sent ships there every three years (1 K. 10:22); or because the thirty talents were not brought to the king, but appropriated to the fleet.

XXVIII. The prophecy concerning the thirty pieces of silver and the field bought with them is cited from Jeremiah (Mt. 27:9), which is certainly found in Zech. 11:12. From this some attribute universal falsehood and slips of the memory (*sphalma mnēmonikon*) to Matthew. But the difficulty can be cleared up in various ways. Some are of the opinion that the name Jeremiah (*Ieremiou*) has crept into the text from the ignorance of transcribers (since *zou* may have been written as an abbreviation of *Zachariou*), but that the error is one of small importance (viz., occurring in a proper name the correction of which is easily made from a comparison of the Old and New Testaments). Others (with better reason) maintain that there is here a blending (*synchysin*) of two prophetical passages from which this testimony is drawn, viz., from Jer. 32 and Zech. 11. Cases similar to this occur in: Mt. 21:5* from Is. 62:11 and Zech. 9:9; Mt. 21:13* from Is. 56:7 and Jer. 7:11; Acts 1:20 from Pss. 69:25* and 109:8; 1 Pet. 2:7, 8 from Ps. 118:22 and Is. 8:14. Nor is it an unusual thing (when the words or testimonies belong to two persons) to omit one and give only the name of the other (as Mk. 1:2, 3 where the first part is taken from Malachi, the latter from Isaiah, and yet Malachi is omitted and Isaiah alone mentioned). And this can be done with greater propriety when the one who is cited is either more ancient than the other, and the later has drawn many things from him (as is the case here). For Jeremiah was before Zechariah, and Zechariah borrowed many things from him and imitated (as it were) his addresses (as might easily be shown from Zech. 1:14 which is taken from Jer. 18:11 and 35:15; and Zech. 3:8 from Jer. 23:5). Hence the Jews were in the habit of saying, "the spirit of Jeremiah is in Zechariah." To this it can be added that from the tradition of the Rabbi's in the Babylonion Talmud (Baba Bathra, 14, cf. BT 1:70) which Rabbi David Kimchi quotes in his preface to the prophet Jeremiah, Jeremiah stands at the head of the prophets and is therefore named first (Mt. 16:14). Therefore Matthew (citing these words contained in the book of

the prophets) could quote them only under his name because he held the first place there. So in Lk. 24:44, the book of holy writings (*Hagiographorum*) is mentioned under the name of the Psalms because this is the first of them. Finally, Jeremiah alone might be mentioned here by Matthew because he wished to give an account, not so much of the thirty pieces of silver or of the price for which Christ was bought (about which Zechariah treats), as of the price of the bought field (about which Jeremiah treats). Therefore what is said here of the price is drawn from Zechariah, and what is said of the field from Jeremiah.

XXIX. A difficult and indeed an intricate knot arises from the collation of Gen. 11:26 with Acts 7:4. In untying this, Joseph Scaliger himself gives up in despair (*epechei*) and does not endeavor to explain it ("Animadversiones in Chronologica Eusebi," in *Thesaurus temporum* [1606/1968], 2:17). Jerome (*Liber Hebraicarum quaestionum in Genesim*, PL 23.1006) and Augustine (CG 16.15 [FC 14:516-19]) confess the difficulty to be insoluble. But there are not wanting fit methods of solution to satisfy humbly inquiring minds. The difficulty consists in this: that Moses says that Abram was born in the seventieth year of Terah (Gen. 11:26), and Stephen expressly asserts that Abraham removed from Haran to Canaan after the death of Terah (Acts 7:4). Now it is plain from Gen. 12:4 that Abraham departed from Haran in his seventy-fifth year, and his father Terah lived to the age of two hundred and five years (Gen. 11:32). Now if it is evident that Abraham was born in the seventieth year of Terah's age and went to Haran in the seventy-fifth year of his own age, he would not have departed after the death of his father (as Stephen said) but sixty years before (i.e., in the one hundred and forty-fifth year of Terah's age). Some suppose that there is here a slip of Stephen's memory in the computation of time, but that it does not impair the credibility (*autopiston*) of Luke's history because he was bound to relate faithfully the words of Stephen and was not anxious about correcting his error. But as it is certain that Stephen, being full of the Spirit, was also inspired (*theopneuston*), he cannot be convicted of error without impairing the credibility (*autopistia*) of the word. Others maintain that the birth of Abram must not be assigned exactly to the seventieth year of Terah's age, but to the hundred and thirtieth year; and that the contrary cannot be gathered from what is said in Gen. 11:26 ("Terah lived seventy years, and begat Abraham, Nahor, and Haran") because although he is placed first, this was not done on account of his age but on account of his importance (as in Gen. 5:32 it is said, "Noah in his five hundredth year begat Shem, Ham and Japheth," i.e., began to beget his three sons, the most illustrious of whom was Shem, although born one or two years after Japheth, the elder). So Terah in his seventieth year began to beget his three sons, the most illustrious of whom was Abram. Therefore he is placed first, though not the firstborn. According to this opinion, Abram (born in the hundred and thirtieth year of Terah's age) lived with him partly in Chaldea, partly in Haran for seventy-five years, even until his death; after which (according to the command of God received in Chaldea) he departed with his family from Haran to Canaan. But others (to whom the postponing of the birth of Abraham to Terah's 130th year appears forced because the Bible says nothing about it and the whole genealogy of Abram would thus be rendered uncertain), in the face of Moses' particular care to have it right, solve the difficulty otherwise. They maintain that there were two calls of Abram: the first from Ur of the Chaldees to Haran, his father being alive and in

his 145th year, and Abraham in his seventy-fifth (of which Moses speaks, Gen. 11:31*; 12:1). But the other (after the death of his father) from Haran to Canaan which appears to be intimated in Gen. 12:4, 5. Stephen indeed plainly refers to this when he says, "Abraham called of God came out of the land of the Chaldeans, and dwelt in Haran; and afterwards and from thence, when his father was dead, he removed him into Canaan" (Acts 7:4). Here God is said to have called him twice: first from Ur of the Chaldees to Haran; afterwards from Haran to Canaan. This seems to be a fit and easy solution of the difficulty. Finally, some think there is an error in the enumeration of the years of Terah's age, which did not reach to 205 years but only to 145, as the Samaritan Pentateuch reads. Eusebius (*Chronicorum* 1.16 [PG 19.157-58]) mentions this: *kata to Samarikon Hebraikon Tharra genomenos etōn o genna ton Abraam kai epezēsen etē oe mechris oe etous Abraam*, "When Terah was seventy years old he begat Abraham and lived afterwards seventy-five years, even to the seventy-fifth year of Abraham." They conjecture that the error arose from mistaking the letter mem, which denotes forty, for kaph, which means one hundred, giving rise to a difference of sixty years. But since it is the common opinion of both Jews and Christians that only the Hebrew Pentateuch and not the Samaritan is authentic, no one would be willing to say that the former should be corrected by the latter.

XXX. If it is asked how the passage where seventy Israelites are said to have gone down to Egypt (Gen. 46:27) can be reconciled with Acts 7:14 (where seventy-five are enumerated), different answers can be given. Some think there is no discrepancy because the places are not parallel, viz., that Moses gives the genealogy of Jacob; or only a catalogue of the posterity coming from his own loins and descending into Egypt with him, the wives of his sons being left out. Thus they are said to have been sixty-six (Gen. 46:26). From this number are to be excluded Joseph and his two sons (who did not go with him into Egypt because they were already there), and Er and Onan (who had died in Canaan) and Dinah, his daughter. Added for the whole number of the sons and grandsons of Jacob, these amounted to seventy-one, from which number if you take five, sixty-six will remain. But in v. 27, Moses gives the catalogue of the whole family, both of those who went down with him into Egypt and of those who were already there (i.e., Joseph and his sons) to whom if you add Jacob, the head of the family, you will have the number seventy. Now Stephen wished to show how many Joseph had called down to Egypt and therefore excluded Joseph with his two sons and the two grandsons of Judah, Hezron and Hamul (Gen. 46:12) who were born in Egypt. But he reckons Jacob by himself, distinguishing him from his relatives (*syngeneia*). So there remain eleven brothers (the sons of Jacob) with Dinah, their sister; fifty-two grandsons, to which are added the eleven wives of his sons (who belonged to his kindred, *tēn syngeneian*); thus we will have the number of seventy-five souls. Others maintain that the passage is corrupted, that Stephen did not say, nor Luke write, *pente*, but *pantes*, which word Moses also expresses in Gen. 46:27, "all the souls." Thus the passage should be translated "who all" (i.e., taken together, there were "seventy" souls) or *pantōs* ("altogether"). But from the carelessness of transcribers *pantes* might easily have been written instead of *pantōs* or *pantōs pente*, both by the Septuagint and by Luke and yet the authenticity of Scripture be preserved. From the comparison with other passages and from the analogy of faith, it could easily be emended and the faith of the doctrine and of

the history remain no less safe on that account. Again, others suppose that Stephen did not follow the Hebrew text here, but the Septuagint as the more common and everywhere received—this has the number seventy-five—and that he did not think an attention to the number belonged to what he was speaking about and that the Septuagint collected this number from the five sons of Joseph added from 1 Ch. 7:14-27, whom Moses does not mention and who were born after going down into Egypt (viz., Machir, Gilead, Shuthelah, Toben and Eden). But whether Stephen followed the Septuagint here or the error in the Septuagint and in Acts crept in through the carelessness of transcribers, it is nevertheless certain that the error is not incurable, since it is easily corrected from the Hebrew text. For Scripture ought to be explained by Scripture.

XXXI. Stephen speaks thus of the patriarchs: "And were carried over into Sychem, and laid in the sepulcher that Abraham bought for a sum of money of the sons of Emmor (*tou Sychem*)" (Acts 7:16). But from Gen. 23:9-10, it is plain that Abraham bought the sepulcher from Ephron near the city of Hebron. From Gen. 33:19 (cf. Jos. 24:32), it appears that not Abraham, but Jacob bought the field of the sons of Hamor, not for a sum of money but for an hundred lambs. Hence an inextricable difficulty seems to arise. Yet it can be cleared up easily, if we say that Stephen did not refer to the purchase of Abraham recorded in Gen. 23:9, but to that of Jacob: "And Jacob came safe to the city of Shechem and bought a parcel of a field at the hand of the children of Hamor, Shechem's father, for an hundred lambs" (Gen. 33:19). This is where Joseph is said to have been buried (Jos. 24:32). Nor can it be objected to this that Stephen says Abraham bought the field and not Jacob. Either Abraham may here be the genitive so as to read *ho tou Abraam* (understand *ekgonos*); or Abraham is used patronymically for a descendant of Abraham (i.e., for Jacob, his grandson). Oftentimes the names of the fathers are put to designate their posterity even when there is a reference to individuals; as David is put for Rehoboam, his grandson ("What portion have we in David?" 1 K. 12:16); and Rehoboam for Abijah (1 K. 14:6*); and David for Christ (Jer. 30:9; Ezk. 34:23) (cf. Virgil, *Aeneid* 4.660-662 [Loeb, 1:440-41], where Aeneas is called "Dardanus" for a descendant of Dardanus). Or with Beza, we must suppose the name Abraham to be a gloss, which having been written by a sciolist in the margin, afterwards crept into the text (*Annotationes maiores in novum . . . Testamentum, Pars prior* [1594], p. 482 on Acts 7:16). Thus not Abraham, but Jacob is said to have bought this field. Nor can it be objected that the fathers are said to have been carried over into Sychem when only Joseph is said to have been buried there. For Moses mentions Joseph alone because he only was a prophet and foresaw the deliverance and sought by faith that his bones might be carried away to Canaan (Heb. 11:22), for which he also provided by an oath (Gen. 50:25). Hence it became him to record this because in this way the Israelites freed themselves from this sacred charge (Ex. 13:19). Yet Stephen could speak in the plural by an enallage of number or by a synecdoche of the whole (as often occurs in Scripture). In Mt. 26:8, the disciples are said to have "indignation" which must be understood of Judas Iscariot alone (who alone was indignant at the pouring out of the ointment, as Jn. 12:4-6* explains it). In Mt. 27:44, the thieves are said to have cast the same in the teeth of Christ on the cross (which relates to only one of them, according to Luke 23:39). Again, although Moses does not expressly say so, yet it can easily be inferred that the other brothers of

Joseph were buried in the same place because the Jews held all the patriarchs in equal regard and reverence. The same cause which moved Joseph to desire this, they all had (viz., faith in the promise of God, possessions in the land and the hope of resurrection). It is proper to bring in here what Jerome relates (*The Pilgrimage of the Holy Paula* [1887], p. 13; CCSL 55.322) that having turned aside to Shechem, she saw there the sepulchers of the twelve patriarchs. This testimony (being that of an eyewitness) is preferable to that of Josephus (AJ 2.199 [Loeb, 4:251]) who says that the patriarchs were buried at Hebron. Nor is it any objection that the father of Sychem is not in the text (as in Genesis 33:19*), but simply *tou Sychem*. For with propriety, the word "father" can be supplied, as is often the case elsewhere: Luke 24*:10, "Mary of James" (i.e., the mother of James); Herodotus, *Kyros ho Kambyseō*, "Cyrus the father of Cambyses" (Herodotus, 1.73 [Loeb, 1:88-89]); *Olympias hē Alexandrou*, "Olympia the mother of Alexander" (cf. Herodotus, 5*.22 [Loeb, 3:22-23]). Finally, it is no objection that Jacob is said to have bought the field for an hundred lambs according to Moses, but with Luke the field is said to have been bought for a sum of money. For the word *ksyth* denotes money as well as a lamb because coins were then stamped with the figure of a lamb; as in ancient times all money bore the figure of animals because before the use of coins merchandise was exchanged for cattle (see Rabbi David Kimchi on the word *ksyth*; Johannes Buxtorf [the elder], *Lexicon Chaldaicum, Talmudicum, et Rabbinicum* [1640], pp. 2159-60; Bochart, *Hierozoicon* [1663], p. 437).

XXXII. There is no contradiction between 2 Cor. 11:4 and Gal. 1:8 because in the latter it is not said that there is "another gospel" really and as to truth than that preached by the apostles; but in the former only by an impossible supposition, not that it is really granted or can be granted, but to take away all excuse from the Corinthians for their readiness to receive false apostles. As if Paul had said, "If it could happen that coming to you, he could bring another Jesus and another gospel more perfectly, you would rightly receive and accept such a teacher and despise us. But since this is altogether impossible (as you yourselves acknowledge and the false apostles do not dare to deny), you have no excuse to offer."

XXXIII. It is said, "There was nothing in the ark save the two tables of stone" (1 K. 8:9), and in Heb. 9:4 the apostle says there were other things in the same place when he writes "in it" (that is in the ark of which he had just spoken) "was the golden pot that had manna, and Aaron's rod that budded, and the tables of the covenant." There occurs no contradiction and the difficulty will be at once removed, if we say that *en hē* refers not to the nearest word *kibōton* ("the ark"), but to the more remote, *skēnēn*, (v. 3). We know that the relative is sometimes referred not to the nearest antecedent, but to the more remote; or that the preposition *en* does not here mean "in" (as if the manna and the rod of Aaron were in the ark itself), but "with" or "near" and "at"; and so answers to the Hebrew preposition *b*, which does not always imply that one thing is inside of another, but also that which is added to another and adheres to it. The latter sometimes means "with," as "thou shalt talk with (*bm*) them" (Dt. 6:7); "with bullocks" (*bprym*, 1 S. 1:24); "in," that is, "with the beasts" (Hos. 4:3); so "with the glory" (*en doxa*, Mt. 16:27); "in the voice, in the trump," for "with" (1 Thess. 4:16*); at others it means "at" or "near"; at Gibeon (Jos. 10:10); "in Kirjath-jearim" (Jdg. 18:12), i.e., near that place; "those that bought and sold" are said to have been "in the temple," i.e., in its porches (Mt. 21:12); as also Christ is said to have

"walked in the temple," i.e., in Solomon's porch (Jn. 10:23); and elsewhere to have suffered "in Jerusalem" (i.e., near it). So it can well be translated "in" or "near" which ark were the urn and the rod to denote not the placing of them in, but near it; or "with which," i.e., to which ark the pot and rod and the tables of the covenant were joined, but in different ways: the tables indeed within, but the pot and rod without or by the side of the ark.

XXXIV. When Christ forbids us to swear *holōs* ("altogether," Mt. 5:34*), he does not intend absolutely and simply to condemn oaths which elsewhere are permitted and approved and even commanded by God (Ex. 22:8, 10, 11; Lev. 5:4; Num. 5:19, 20; Prov. 18:18[?]; Heb. 6:16). But only particular kinds of oaths are condemned by Christ as rash and unlawful (i.e., those which the Jews were in the habit of using, of which he speaks in the same place, viz., by "heaven, earth, Jerusalem," the head and other such created things). Universal terms are often restricted to a particular class "all that ever came before me are thieves" (Jn. 10:8), viz., all those not called or sent, or those saying that they, or some other person, were the door of the sheep. And "all things are lawful for me" (1 Cor. 10:23*); "I am made all things to all men" (1 Cor. 9:22), viz., in things lawful and indifferent —for evil and wicked things are not lawful to any person or at any time.

XXXV. Saul is said to have reigned forty years (Acts 13:21), but in 1 S. 13:1, only two years. The answer is that it is not said in 1 S. 13:1 that Saul reigned only two years, but that he had reigned only two years when he chose the three thousand men mentioned in the following verse. When he had reigned two years, he collected together these military men (his two years then being at an end as the Syrian and Arabian versions show).

XXXVI. From what has been said, it is evident that those different apparently contradictory (*enantiophanē*) passages adduced to destroy the authenticity (*authentian*) of the Scriptures and introduced by us as specimens (although difficult and hard to be understood [*dysnoēta*]) are not altogether inexplicable (*alyta*). There are also some others brought forward by papists to prove the corruption of the sources by Jews or heretics, but they will be satisfactorily disposed of when we speak of the authentic edition.

Sixth Question

From what source does the divine authority of the Scriptures become known to us? Does it depend upon the testimony of the church either as to itself or as to us? We deny against the papists.

Occasion of the question.

I. The object of the papists in this and other controversies set forth by them concerning the Scriptures, is obvious, viz., to avoid the tribunal of Scripture (in which they do not find sufficient help for the defense of their errors) and to appeal to the church (i.e., to the pope himself) and thus become judges in their own cause. Hence, as we treated before of the doctrine of Scripture (whether it agreed with itself or not), we must now inquire concerning the Scriptures themselves whether it is proper that religious controversies should be decided by their authority and testimony. For this purpose a sharp discussion has been kept up concerning its origin and necessity, its perfection and perspicuity,

the integrity and purity of the canon and especially concerning its authority; if not entirely to destroy it, nevertheless to weaken it greatly. Thus what Irenaeus says concerning the heretics of his day is appropriate to them: "When they are convicted from Scripture, they turn round and accuse the Scripture, as being corrupt, and having no authority" (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies* 3.2 [ANF 1:415; PG 7.846]).

Some papists speak harshly; others more calmly.

II. But we must here observe that some speak roughly, others more calmly on this subject. For some (*gymnē tē kephalē*, without wish of concealment) altogether deny the authenticity (*authentian*) of Scripture in itself without the testimony of the church and think it worthy of no more belief (I shudder to relate) than the Koran, Titus Livy or the fables of Aesop. In a former age those who undertook to dispute with our men concerning the authority of Scripture belched forth these blasphemies. Such are the impious words of Hosius against Brentius ("Confutatio Prolegomenon Brentii," in *Opera* [1583], 1:530). He asserts that it can be said in a pious sense that "the Scriptures have only as much force as the fables of Aesop, if destitute of the authority of the church." Eck says that "the Scriptures are not authentic, except by authority of the church" (*Enchirdion of Commonplaces* 1 [trans. F.L. Battles, 1979], p. 13, "On the Church and her Authority"). Baile says that "without the authority of the church we should no more believe Matthew than Titus Livy" (cf. Andre Rivet, *Sommaire de toutes les controverses touchant la religion* [1615], p. 217). Andradius says, "There is nothing of divinity in the books in which the sacred mysteries are written and that there cannot be found in them anything to bind us to religion and to believe what they contain; but that the power and dignity of the church are so great as that no one without the greatest impiety can resist it" (*Defensio tridentinae fidei catholicae* 3+ [1580]). Stapleton says, "The church must be considered in such a light, as that we ought not to believe the testimony in any other way than the apostles believed the testimony of Christ, and that God is not be believed except on account of the church" (*adversus Whittak.*, lib. i, c. 7+ [1620]). But because others saw that this was deservedly censured by our men as impious and blasphemous, they have spoken more cautiously in thus declaring their opinion. They confess the Scriptures absolutely and in themselves to be authentic and divine, as coming from God (the source of all truth), but yet they say that (relatively and as to us) they have not that authority except on account of the testimony of the church, through whose kindness they become known and are received by us as divine. Hence arose the distinction of authority ("as to itself" [absolute] and "as to us" [relative]) which Bellarmine ("De conciliis Auctoritate," 2.12 in *Opera* [1857], 2:61), Stapleton ("De Principiis fidei doctrinalibus controversia," Cont. 5*.1 in *Opera* [1620], 1:311-12 and "Authoritatis ecclesiasticae," 2.11 in *Opera* [1620], 1:1019-24) and others have advanced.

III. But in whatever manner they explain their opinion (if we properly consider the thing itself), we will find that this distinction has been framed to deceive and to remove the odium attaching to their impious doctrine rather than to unfold the truth of the thing itself. As authority belongs to the genus of things related *ek tōn pros ti*, it should not be considered absolutely but relatively. Therefore Scripture cannot be authentic in itself without being so as to us. For the

same arguments which prove it authoritative in itself ought to induce us to assent to its authenticity as to us; but if its authority as to us is suspended upon the church as the formal reason for which I believe the Scriptures to be divine, it follows that its authority as to itself must also be suspended upon the same. Indeed others have more plainly confessed this. That this is really their opinion may be satisfactorily gathered from the other controversies in which they here engage. For how could they deny either its perfection or perspicuity or purity, if they believed it to be authentic in itself.

Statement of the question.

IV. To exhibit the state of the question, the question is not whether the Bible is authentic and divine, for this our opponents do not deny or at least wish to appear to believe. Rather the question is Whence is it made known to us as such, or by what argument can this inspiration be proved to us? The papists suspend this authority upon the testimony of the church and maintain that the principal motive by which we are induced to believe the authenticity (*authentian*) of the Scriptures is the voice of the church. But although we do not deny that the testimony of the church has its own weight (as will afterwards be seen), yet we maintain that primarily and principally the Bible is believed by us to be divine on account of itself (or the marks impressed upon it), not on account of the church.

V. Second, it is not asked concerning the foundation or efficient cause of the faith by which we believe the divinity of the Scriptures (i.e., whether the Holy Spirit applies it to us or not). For this belongs to another question concerning free will, and our opponents acknowledge it with us (Stapleton, "Triplicatio inchoata adversus . . . Whitakerum," 9 in *Opera* [1620], 1:1166-71; Canus, "De Locis Theologicis," 2.8 in *Opera* [1605], pp. 41-53). Rather the question concerns the argument or principal motive which the Spirit uses in persuading us of its truth; whether it is the direct argument of the testimony of the church (as the papists say) or the rational, derived from the marks of the Scripture itself (which we hold).

VI. As a threefold cause can be granted for the manifestation of anything (an objective, efficient and instrumental or organic), so a threefold question can arise about the divinity of the Bible: the first, concerning the argument on account of which I believe; the second, concerning the principle or efficient cause from which I am led to believe; the third, concerning the means and instrument through which I believe. And to this triple question a triple reply can be given. For the Bible with its own marks is the argument on account of which I believe. The Holy Spirit is the efficient cause and principle from which I am induced to believe. But the church is the instrument and means through which I believe. Hence if the question is why, or on account of what, do I believe the Bible to be divine, I will answer that I do so on account of the Scripture itself which by its marks proves itself to be such. If it is asked whence or from what I believe, I will answer from the Holy Spirit who produces that belief in me. Finally, if I am asked by what means or instrument I believe it, I will answer through the church which God uses in delivering the Scriptures to me.

VII. Third, the question does not concern the motive or the introductory (*eisagōgikō*) and ministerial (*leitourgikō*) means, whose assistance the Holy Spirit uses in persuading us of the authority of the Scriptures. This we readily concede

to the church. Rather the question concerns the principal argument and motive by which we are brought to faith (not human, but divine) which they place in the church. We believe it is not to be found out of Scripture itself.

VIII. Fourth, the question is not whether divine revelation is the formal reason (simply and absolutely) of our faith, for this our opponents acknowledge with us. Rather the question is What is that first and clearest revelation with respect to us which ought to be received through and on account of itself, and not on account of some other better known to us and therefore the most common and the first principle of faith by which all things ought to be proved, but itself by none prior to it whether that revelation is to be looked for in the Scriptures or in the church? We think that revelation to be contained in the Bible itself which is the first and infallible truth and rule of faith. But papists maintain that it must be sought in the voice and testimony of the church. Stapleton says, "Now therefore the voice of the church is the supreme external testimony on earth" ("Auctoritatis ecclesiasticae," 1.8 in *Opera* [1620], 1:893); and "God speaking by the church speaks not otherwise than if he spoke immediately by visions and dreams, or some other supernatural manner of revelation" (ibid., 1.9, p. 902); and "the whole formal reason of our faith is God revealing by the church" (ibid., 1.14.12, p. 926). Gretser says, "the testimony of the church alone is a fit answer to the question, whence do you know that the Scripture is divinely revealed?" (?"Tractatus de Quaestione, Unde scis scripturam cum generatim . . . ," 7+ in *Opera Omnia* [1734-41], 8:961-1003). Bellarmine says, "It is true that we do not certainly know what God has revealed except from the testimony of the church" (VD 3.10, response to argument 13, p. 114); and "Catholics believe what they do because God has revealed it, and they believe that God revealed it because they hear the church so speaking and declaring" ("De gratia et libero arbitrio," 6.3 in *Opera* [1858], 4:435-36).

IX. The question then amounts to this—why, or on account of what, do we believe that the Bible is the word of God; or what argument does the Holy Spirit principally use to convince us of the inspiration of the Scriptures? The testimony and voice of the church, or the marks impressed upon Scripture itself? Our opponents assert the former; we the latter.

The authority of the Scriptures does not depend upon the testimony of the church.

X. That the authority of the Scriptures either as to itself or as to us does not depend upon the testimony of the church is proved: (1) because the church is built upon the Scripture (Eph. 2:20) and borrows all authority from it. Our opponents cannot deny this since, when we ask them about the church, they quickly fly to the Scriptures to prove it. Therefore the church cannot recommend the authority of Scripture either as to itself or as to us, unless we wish to make the cause depend upon the effect, the principle upon that which derived from it and the foundation upon the edifice. Nor ought the objection to be brought up here (that both may be true) that the church borrows its authority from the Scriptures, and the Scriptures in turn from the church (just as John bore testimony to Christ who also himself gave testimony to John). For it is one thing to give testimony to someone as a minister, as John testified concerning Christ, that through him (*di' autou*), not on account of him (*di' auton*), the Jews might believe (Jn. 1:7). It is quite a different thing to give authority to him as a lord which

Christ did to John. (2) The authority of the church would be prior to that of the Scriptures and so would be the first thing to be believed (upon which our faith at first would depend and into which it would finally be resolved), which our opponents, who make the authority of the church depend upon Scripture, would not admit. (3) A manifest circle would be made since the authority of the church is proved from Scripture, and in turn the authority of the Scripture from the church. (4) Our opponents are not yet agreed as to what is meant by the church —whether the modern or the ancient, the collective or the representative, a particular or the universal; or what is the act testifying concerning the authority of Scripture (whether enacted by some judicial sentence or exercised by a continuous and successive tradition). (5) A fallible and human testimony (as that of the church) cannot form the foundation of divine faith. And if God now speaks through the church, does it therefore follow that she is infallible because there is one kind of inspiration which is special and extraordinary (such as made the apostles and prophets infallible [*anamartētous*], and of which Christ speaks properly when he says that the Holy Spirit would lead the apostles into all truth, Jn. 16:13*); another common and ordinary which does not make pastors inspired (*theopneustous*).

But is proved by itself.

XI. That the Scripture makes itself known to us is proved: (1) by the nature of the Scripture itself. For as a law does not derive its authority from the subordinate judges who interpret it or from the heralds who promulgate it, but from its author alone—as a will obtains its weight not from the notary to whom it is entrusted, but from the purpose of the testator; as a rule has the power of ruling from its own innate perfection, not from the artificer who uses it—so the Scripture which is the law of the supreme lawgiver, the will of our heavenly Father and the inflexible (*aklinēs*) rule of faith, cannot have authority even as to us from the church, but only from itself. (2) By the nature of the highest genera and of first principles; for those things are known by themselves and are not susceptible (*anapodeikta*) of proof which cannot be demonstrated by any other, otherwise the thing would go on to infinity. Hence Basil says "it is necessary that the first principles of every science should be self-evident" (*anankē hekastēs mathēseōs anexetastous einai tas archas, In Psalmum cxv homilia,* PG 30.104-5). Thus Scripture, which is the first principle in the supernatural order, is known by itself and has no need of arguments derived from without to prove and make itself known to us. If God has stamped such marks upon all first principles that they can be known at once by all men, we cannot doubt that he has placed them upon this sacred first principle (in the highest degree necessary to our salvation). (3) By comparison, as objects of the sense presented to faculties well disposed are immediately distinguished and known without any other external argument, on account of a secret adaptation and propensity of the faculty to the object. Light is immediately most certainly known to us by its own brightness; food by its peculiar sweetness; an odor by its peculiar fragrance without any additional testimony. Thus the Scripture, which is set forth to us in respect to the new man and spiritual senses, now under the symbol of a clear light (Ps. 119:105), then of the most sweetest food (Ps. 19:10; Is. 55:1, 2; Heb. 5:14) and again of the sweetest smelling savor (Cant. 1:3), may easily be distinguished of itself by the senses of the new man as soon as it is presented to them and makes itself known by its own light, sweetness and fragrance (*euōdia*); so that there is no need to seek elsewhere for proof that this is light,

food or a sweet smelling savor. (4) By the testimony of our opponents who prove the inspiration of the Scriptures by its own marks; Bellarmine says, "Nothing is better known, nothing more certain than the sacred Scriptures contained in the writings of the prophets and apostles, so that he must be in the highest degree foolish who refuses to believe in them" (VD 1.2, p. 24); see Cano, "De Locis Theologicis," 2.8 in *Opera* (1605), pp. 41-53; Gregory de Valentia, *Analysis fidei catholicae* 1.15 (1585), pp. 51-53; (Peter) Soto, *Defensio Catholicae Confessionis* 47 (1557), pp. 56-58.

Sources of explanation.

XII. We do not deny that the church has many functions in relation to the Scriptures. She is: (1) the keeper of the oracles of God to whom they are committed and who preserves the authentic tables of the covenant of grace with the greatest fidelity, like a notary (Rom. 3:2); (2) the guide, to point out the Scriptures and lead us to them (Is. 30:21); (3) the defender, to vindicate and defend them by separating the genuine books from the spurious, in which sense she may be called the ground (*hedraiōma*) of the truth (1 Tim. 3:15*); (4) the herald who sets forth and promulgates them (2 Cor. 5:19; Rom. 10:16); (5) the interpreter inquiring into the unfolding of the true sense. But all these imply a ministerial only and not a magisterial power. Through her indeed, we believe, but not on account of her; as through John the Baptist the faithful believed in Christ, not on account of him (Jn. 1:7); and through the Samaritan woman Christ was known by the Samaritans, not on account of her (Jn. 4:39).

XIII. The resolution of faith objectively considered (as to the things to be believed) is different from its subjective or formal consideration (as to the act of believing). The former is in Scripture and the external testimony of the Holy Spirit expressed in Scripture; the latter in its internal testimony impressed upon the conscience and speaking in the heart. For as two things are necessary to the generating of faith (the presentation of truth in the word and the application of it in the heart), the Holy Spirit operates in both (i.e., in the word and in the heart). Therefore he is said properly to testify in the word objectively after the manner of an argument on account of which we believe. In the heart, he is also said (but with less propriety) to testify efficiently and after the manner of a first principle, by the power of which we believe. In this sense, the Spirit (who is reckoned among the witnesses of the divinity of Christ and of the truth of the gospel) is said to "bear witness that the Spirit is truth" (1 Jn. 5:6), i.e., the Spirit working in the hearts of believers bears witness that the doctrine of the gospel delivered by the Spirit is true and divine.

XIV. Article 4 of the French Confession says, "We know that the books of Scripture are canonical, not so much from the common consent of the church, as from the internal testimony and persuasion of the Holy Spirit" (Cochrane, 145). Hence, we must understand by the Holy Spirit, the Spirit's speaking both in the word and in the heart. For the same Spirit who acts objectively in the word by presenting the truth, operates efficiently in the heart also by impressing that truth upon our minds. Thus he is very different from a Spirit of enthusiasm.

XV. The private judgment of the Spirit (which is such subjectively with regard to the subject in which it inheres) is different from that which is such originally because it depends upon man's own will. The former we allow here, but not the latter. For the Spirit that testifies in us concerning the inspiration of the Scrip-

tures is not peculiar to individuals with regard to the principle and origin. Rather he is common to the whole church and so to all believers in whom he works the same faith, although he is such subjectively with regard to each individual because he is given separately to each believer.

XVI. Although the church is more ancient than the Scriptures formally considered (and as to the mode of writing), yet it cannot be called such with respect to the Scriptures materially considered (and as to the substance of doctrine) because the word of God is more ancient than the church itself, being its foundation and seed. The question does not concern the testimony of the ancient church of the patriarchs (which existed before the Scriptures), but of the Christian church, long after them.

XVII. Although believers are persuaded by the testimony of the Holy Spirit of the inspiration of the Scriptures, it does not therefore follow that all who possess the Spirit should agree in receiving equally every book. Since he is not given to all in an equal measure, so neither does he furnish all with an equal knowledge both as to the principle of religion and as to its doctrines, nor move them to assent by an equal power. Hence some Protestants might doubt concerning one or another canonical book because they were not yet sufficiently enlightened by the Holy Spirit.

XVIII. It is not always necessary that a thing should be proved by something else. For there are some things which are self-evident according to the philosophers (as the highest categories of things, and ultimate differences and first principles) which are not susceptible of demonstration, but are evident by their own light and are taken for granted as certain and indubitable. If perchance anyone denies them, he is not to be met with arguments, but should be committed to the custody of his kinsmen (as a madman); or to be visited with punishment, as one (according to Aristotle) either lacking sense or needing punishment. Aristotle says there are certain axioms which do not have an external reason for their truth "which must necessarily be and appear to be such per se" (*ho anankē einai di' auto kai dokein anankē, Posterior Analytics* 1.10 [Loeb, 70-71]); i.e., they are not only credible (*autopiston*) of themselves, but cannot be seriously denied by anyone of a sound mind. Therefore since the Bible is the first principle and the primary and infallible truth, is it strange to say that it can be proved by itself? The Bible can prove itself either one part or another when all parts are not equally called into doubt (as when we convince the Jews from the Old Testament); or the whole proving the whole, not by a direct argument of testimony (because it declares itself divine), but by that made artfully (*artificiali*) and ratiocinative (because in it are discovered divine marks which are not found in the writings of men). Nor is this a begging of the question because these criteria are something distinct from the Scriptures; if not materially, yet formally as adjuncts and properties which are demonstrated with regard to the subject. Nor is one thing proved by another equally unknown because they are better known by us; as we properly prove a cause from its effects, a subject by its properties. The argument of the papists that Scripture cannot be proved by itself (because then it would be more known and more unknown than itself) can with much greater force be turned against the church.

XIX. If any deny the inspiration of the Scriptures, it is not because the object in itself is not known or understandable, but because they are destitute of a well-

disposed faculty. To them the gospel is hid because Satan has blinded their eyes (2 Cor. 4:4); as some deny God (who is most capable of being known) because they are fools, or do not see the sun because they are blind; as the blind woman in Seneca complained that the sun did not rise. Yet notwithstanding this the sun always sends forth his rays, which are perceived per se by those who have eyes.

XX. It is one thing to discern and to declare the canon of Scripture; quite another to establish the canon itself and to make it authentic. The church cannot do the latter (as this belongs to God alone, the author of Scripture), but it does only the former, which belongs to it ministerially, not magisterially. As the goldsmith who separates the dross from the gold (or who proves it by a touchstone) distinguishes indeed the pure from the adulterated, but does not make it pure (either as to us or as to itself), so the church by its test distinguishes indeed canonical books from those which are not and from apocryphal, but does not make them such. Nor can the judgment of the church give authority to the books which they do not possess of themselves; rather she declares the already existing authority by arguments drawn from the books themselves.

XXI. The knowledge of a thing may be confused or distinct. The church can be known before the Scriptures by a confused knowledge, but a distinct knowledge of the Scriptures ought to precede because the truth of the church can be ascertained only from the Scriptures. The church can be apprehended by us before the Scriptures by a human faith, as an assembly of men using the same sacred things; yet it can be known and believed as an assembly of believers and the communion of saints by a divine faith, only after the marks of the church which Scripture supplies have become known.

XXII. When the apostle says that "faith is by hearing" (Rom. 10:17), he does indeed give us to understand that the ministry of the church ought to come in as the ordinary means of producing faith in adults. He does not teach, however, that the church is clearer and better known than the Scriptures.

XXIII. To inquire concerning the number, the authors, parts and single words of the sacred books is different from inquiring concerning the fundamental doctrines contained in them. The latter knowledge pertains to every believer, but not the former. Nor will his salvation be in jeopardy who cannot tell who wrote the gospel of Matthew, provided he believes the book to be authentic and divine. The knowledge of the primary author of any book is one thing; that of the amanuensis is another. The latter belongs only to an historical faith, but the former to a divine.

XXIV. Since the circle (according to philosophers) is a sophistical argument (by which the same thing is proved by itself) and is occupied about the same kind of cause in a circuit coming back without end into itself, the circle cannot be charged upon us when we prove the Scriptures by the Spirit, and in turn the Spirit from the Scriptures. For here the question is diverse and the means or kind of cause is different. We prove the Scriptures by the Spirit as the efficient cause by which we believe. But we prove the Spirit from the Scriptures as the object and argument on account of which we believe. In the first, the answer is to the question Whence or by what power do you believe the Scriptures to be inspired? (viz., by the Spirit). But in the second, the answer is to the question Why or on account of what do you believe that the Spirit in you is the Holy Spirit? (viz., on account of the marks of the Holy Spirit which are in the Scriptures). But the

papists (who charge the circle upon us) evidently run into it themselves in this question, when they prove the Scriptures by the church and the church by the Scriptures; for this is done by the same means and by the same kind of cause. If we ask why or on account of what they believe the Scriptures to be divine, they answer because the church says so. If we ask again, why they believe the church, they reply because the Scriptures ascribe infallibility to her when they call her the pillar and ground of the truth. If we press upon them whence they know this testimony of Scripture to be credible (*autopiston*), they add because the church assures us of it. Thus they are rolled back again to the commencement of the dispute and go on to infinity, never stopping in any first credible thing. Nor is the question here diverse. In both instances, the question concerns the reason and argument on account of which I believe; not the faculty or principle by which I believe.

XXV. The church is called "the pillar and ground of the truth" (*stylos kai hedraiōma tēs alētheias*, 1 Tim. 3:15) not because she supports and gives authority to the truth (since the truth is rather the foundation upon which the church is built, Eph. 2:20), but because it stands before the church as a pillar and makes itself conspicuous to all. Therefore it is called a pillar, not in an architectural sense (as pillars are used for the support of buildings), but in a forensic and political sense (as the edicts of the emperor and the decrees and laws of the magistrates were usually posted against pillars before the court houses and praetoria and before the gates of the basilica so that all might be informed of them, as noted by Pliny, *Natural History*, lib. 6, c. 28+ and Josephus, ?AJ 1.70-71 [Loeb, 4:32-33]). So the church is the pillar of the truth both by reason of promulgating and making it known (because she is bound to promulgate the law of God, and heavenly truth is attached to it so that it may become known to all) and by reason of guarding it. For she ought not only to set it forth, but also to vindicate and defend it. Therefore she is called not only a pillar (*stulos*), but also a stay (*hedraiōma*) by which the truth when known may be vindicated and preserved pure and entire against all corruptions. But she is not called a foundation (*themelion*), in the sense of giving to the truth itself its own substructure (*hypostasin*) and firmness. (2) Whatever is called the pillar and stay of the truth is not therefore infallible; for so the ancients called those who, either in the splendor of their doctrine or in the holiness of their lives or in unshaken constancy, excelled others and confirmed the doctrines of the gospel and the Christian faith by precept and example; as Eusebius says the believers in Lyons call Attalus the Martyr (*Ecclesiastical History* 5.1 [FC 19:276]); Basil distinguishes the orthodox bishops who opposed the Arian heresy by this name (*hoi styloi kai to hedraiōma tēs alētheias, Letter* 243 [70] [FC 28:188; PG 32.908]); and Gregory Nazianzus so calls Athanasius. In the same sense, judges in a pure and uncorrupted republic are called the pillars and stays of the laws. (3) This passage teaches the duty of the church, but not its infallible prerogative (i.e., what she is bound to do in the promulgation and defending of the truth against the corruptions of its enemies, but not what she can always do). In Mal. 2:7, the "priest's lips" are said to "keep knowledge" because he is bound to do it (although he does not always do it as v. 8 shows). (4) Whatever is here ascribed to the church belongs to the particular church at Ephesus to

which, however, the papists are not willing to give the prerogative of infallibility. Again, it treats of the collective church of believers in which Timothy was to labor and exercise his ministry, not as the church representative of the pastors, much less of the pope (in whom alone they think infallibility [*anamartēsian*] resides). (5) Paul alludes here both to the use of pillars in the temples of the Gentiles (to which were attached either images of the gods or the laws and moral precepts; yea, even oracles, as Pausanius and Athenaeus testify) that he may oppose these pillars of falsehood and error (on which nothing but fictions and the images of false gods were exhibited) to that mystical pillar of truth on which the true image of the invisible God is set forth (Col. 1:15) and the heavenly oracles of God made to appear; and to that remarkable pillar which Solomon caused to be erected in the temple (2 Ch. 6:13; 2 K. 11:14; 23:3) which kings ascended like a scaffold as often as they either addressed the people or performed any solemn service, and was therefore called by the Jews the "royal pillar." Thus truth sits like a queen upon the church; not that she may derive her authority from it (as Solomon did not get his from that pillar), but that on her, truth may be set forth and preserved.

The passage of Augustine.

XXVI. The passage of Augustine, "I would not believe the gospel if the authority of the church did not move me" (*Against the Epistle of Manichaeus Called Fundamental* 5 [NPNF1, 4:131; PL 42.176]) does not favor the papists. First, Augustine speaks of himself as still a Manichean and not yet a Christian. What he places in the imperfect is equivalent to the preterite pluperfect: "I would believe and it would move" for "I would have believed and it would have moved"—a very common usage with the Africans (as the learned observe); cf. Augustine, "If I would then love that fruit" for "I would have loved" (*Confessions* 2.8 [FC 21:46; PL 32.682]). Second, the authority of which he speaks is not that of right and power (which our opponents here pretend), as if he would have believed because the church so ordered; but that of worth, derived from the great and remarkable proofs of the providence of God (visible in the church) such as miracles, the agreement of people, the succession, etc. (Augustine, *Against the Epistle of Manichaeus Called Fundamental* 4 [NPNF1, 4:130]) which can lead to faith, although unable to produce it primarily. Third, the external motive to faith is here alluded to and not the infallible principle of believing which chap. 4 teaches us is to be sought in the truth alone. For he acknowledges that truth is to be preferred before everything else, if it is so perfectly exhibited as that it cannot be called into question. "Let us follow those who invite us to believe; first, when we are not as yet able to understand, so that being made more able by the faith itself we may deserve to understand what we believe, having not now men, but God himself as the informer and illuminator of our minds within us" (ibid., 14 [NPNF1, 4:136; PL 42.183]). Thus, Peter d'Ailly (*Questiones super libros senteniarum* [1490/1968], Q. 1, in Sec. 1, Art. 3, [pp. 4-10]) understands it; Canus, "De Locis Theologicis," 2.8 in *Opera* [1605], pp. 41-53; Gerson, Driedo and Durandus refer it to the primitive and apostolic church, not to the present for whose authority it is here contended. See our "Disputatio Theologica de Scripturae Sacrae Authoritate" in *Francisci Turrettini Opera* (1848), 4:253-68.

SEVENTH QUESTION: THE CANON
Has any canonical book perished? We deny.

The word "canon" is used widely or strictly.

I. The distinctions of the word "canon" must be premised so that the various questions concerning the canon of Scripture may be more satisfactorily answered. It is used either widely or strictly. In the former sense, it was used by the fathers for the ecclesiastical decrees and constitutions by which the councils and rulers of the churches usually defined the things pertaining to faith, practice and good order (*eutaxian*). Such are the various canons both of the universal church and of the African church; and the collection of canons of Burchard, Ivo, Gratian and the canonical law itself contained in the Code of the Canons, as distinguished from the divine law included in the code of the sacred Scriptures. In the latter sense, it is applied by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*) to the Scriptures alone because God has given it to us as a rule of faith and practice. In this sense, it is called by Irenaeus "the invariable rule of truth" (*Kanōn tēs alētheias aklinēs, Against Heresies* 1.9*.4 [ANF 1:330; PG 7.545]); and by Chrysostom, "the exact scale, standard and rule of all things" (*hapantōn akribēs zygos kai gnōmōn kai kanōn,* Homily 13, *On Second Corinthians* [NPNF1, 12:346; PG 61.496-97]).

The canon of doctrines and of books.

II. But as the word of God can be considered in a twofold aspect (either for the doctrine divinely revealed or for the sacred books in which it is contained), so there can be a twofold canon: one of the doctrines, embracing all the fundamental doctrines; and the other of the books, containing all the inspired (*theopneustous*) books. The Scriptures are called canonical for a double reason, both with regard to the doctrines (because they are the canon and standard of faith and practice, derived from the Hebrew *qnh,* which signifies a "reed" or surveyor's pen and is so used in Gal. 6:16 and Phil. 3:16) and with respect to the books (because it contains all the canonical books). In this sense, Athanasius (near the beginning of *Synopsis Scripturae Sacrae* [PG 28.283]), tells us that the books of the Christians are not infinite but finite and comprehended in a "certain canon."

Statement of the question.

III. The first question concerns the integrity of the canon, whether any canonical book has perished or whether the collection of Scripture is now destitute of any book which God introduced into the canon. About this both the orthodox and papists are divided into various parties. Most papists contend that many canonical books have been lost in order that thus they may prove the imperfection of Scripture and the necessity of tradition to supply its defects. Some of our men (as Musculus and Whitaker, following Chrysostom) assert the same, but with a twofold difference. First they affirm this only of some books of the Old Testament and not of the New, as the papists. Second they think nothing is taken from the perfection of Scripture by this circumstance (as the papists do) because they do not infer the integrity of the canon from the number of the sacred books (or their quantitative perfection), but from the fullness of the doctrines and the essential perfection of all things necessary to salvation

which abundantly exists in those books which still remain. Yet the more common and sounder opinion is that of those who hold that no books truly canonical have perished, and if any have perished, they were not worthy of this character.

That no canonical book has perished is proved by the testimony of Christ.

IV. Proof is derived: (1) from the testimony of Christ—"it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail" (Lk. 16:17; cf. Mt. 5:18). But if not even one tittle (or the smallest letter) could fail, how could several canonical books perish? Although Christ speaks directly of the doctrine of the law and not of its books, yet it can be applied analogically to them, so as to imply their preservation and so much the more. Mention is made not only of the letters and points of which the Scripture is made up, but also that God wished this doctrine to be preserved in the written books. (2) From the declaration of Luke and Paul: neither could Luke have made mention of all the prophets and of all the Scriptures (Lk. 24:27), if any portions of them had perished; nor could Paul have asserted that "whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning" (Rom. 15:4), unless they supposed that all the writings of the Old Testament existed.

From the providence of God.

V. (3) From the providence of God perpetually keeping watch for the safety of the church (which cannot be conceived to have allowed her to suffer so great a loss). Otherwise what would become of the wisdom and goodness and power of God if he had willed that such a precious treasure should be shown to his church and then taken away; and that the body of Scripture should exist at this day mutilated and defective? (4) From the duty of the church which is religiously to preserve the oracles of God committed to her and to search them diligently. That she has not been careless to her charge is evident even from this—that neither Christ nor his apostles ever charged the Jews with this crime. This sacrilege they (who did not omit lesser things) would not have passed over in silence, if they had been really guilty. Yea, Paul commends this privilege of the Jews because unto them were committed the oracles of God (*logia tou Theou*, Rom. 3:2; 9:4). (5) From the purpose of the Scripture which was committed to writing as a canon of faith and practice even to the consummation of ages which could not be obtained, if (by the loss of some canonical books) a mutilated and defective canon (or rather no canon at all) has been left to the church. (6) From the practice of the Jews; because no more canonical books of the Old Testament were acknowledged by them than by us, nor copied in their Targums, nor translated by the Septuagint.

Sources of explanation.

VI. All things which men of God have written are not therefore divine and inspired (*theopneusta*). For they could study and write some things as men with historical care (according to the richness of their knowledge), some things as prophets by divine inspiration (according to the authority of religion). The former can be judged with freedom; the latter ought to be believed necessarily (as Augustine, CG 18.38 [FC 24:145-46] well remarks). As not everything they said was canonical, so neither everything they wrote. If therefore Solomon did write many books of parables and songs (as concerning plants and animals, 1 K. 4:32, 33), it does not follow that they were canonical. They could

have been prepared by human diligence to exhibit the extensive knowledge of things with which he was furnished, but not as a proof of divine and supernatural inspiration.

VII. The books which are supposed to be lost were either not sacred and canonical (such as the book of the wars of the Lord [Num. 21:14]; the book of Jasher [Jos. 10:13*; 2 S. 1:18*]; chronicles of the kings of Judah and Israel [1 K. 14:19, 20; 15:7]), containing no religious doctrines, but either political annals in which the achievements of the Israelites were recorded or tables of public acts and political statutes, as is evident from 1 K. 11:41. Or the books, supposed to be lost, still remain under different appellations; as the books of Nathan and Gad (1 Ch. 29:29); and of Iddo (2 Ch. 9:29); of Shemaiah and Iddo (2 Ch. 12:15). As the Jews teach, and some of the fathers testify, and many papists of reputation confess (as Sixtus Senensis, Paul Burgensis, Ludovicus de Tena, Sanctius and others), these form part of the books of Samuel and of Kings.

VIII. The book of the Lord (which Isaiah 34:16 mentions) is no other than the prophecy he wrote in the name of the Lord. Therefore he calls it the book of Jehovah. The book of the Lamentations of Jeremiah at the death of King Josiah (mentioned in 2 Ch. 35:25) still remains in the Lamentations.

IX. It is not said in Col. 4:16 that there was any epistle of Paul to the Laodiceans because it speaks of an epistle "from" (*ek Laodikeias*) not "to" (*pros Laodikeian*) Laodicea (which may have been an epistle written from the Laodiceans to Paul). Since there were some things in it profitable for the Colossians to know, Paul wished it to be read by them with his own. Hence it is evident with how little reason Faber Stapulensis wished to force an epistle to the Laodiceans upon the Christian world (which the wiser papists have acknowledged).

X. Jude 14 does not mention the book of Enoch, but only his prophecy. He is said to have prophesied, not to have written. But this book (if it ever existed) was never contained in the canon. This is evident from the silence both of Josephus and of Jerome and from this—that Moses is reckoned as the first canonical writer in Lk 24:27. Indeed it appears from Augustine (CG 15.23 [FC 14:474]) that there existed in his time an apocryphal book falsely ascribed to Enoch as its author, a fragment of which we owe to Joseph Scaliger ("Animadversiones in Chronologica Eusebi," in *Thesaurus temporum* [1606/1968], 2:244-45).

XI. If some passages are quoted from the Old Testament by the apostles, not now to be found expressly in any canonical book, it does not therefore follow that any canonical book in which they were contained has been lost. Either they may be found implicitly as to the sense (*kata dianoian*), as when Matthew says concerning Christ, "He shall be called a Nazarene" (2:23), which is taken either from Is. 11:1* (according to Jerome) where Christ is called a "root"; or by intention (from Jdg. 13:5, where it treats of Samson the type of Christ who it is said shall be a "Nazarite unto God" from the womb). Or in that which is said in 1 Cor. 5:9 concerning the epistle which Paul had written to them, there is no objection to our considering it as referring to the one he is writing. A little before, he had ordered them to excommunicate the incestuous person, as when this epistle is read (Col. 4:16), viz., the one he was then writing (*hē epistolē*). Or they are merely historical, as what Jd. 9 says of the altercation between Satan and Michael about the dead body of Moses, which he could have learned either from tradition (as some hold) or from some ecclesiastical book (not canonical) that is lost.

XII. Although the autographs of the law and of the prophets (kept in the ark) may have been burnt up with it when the city was overthrown and the temple burned in the time of the Babylonian captivity, it does not therefore follow that all the sacred books perished then (which were again restored within forty days by Ezra as by a second Moses) because many copies could have been in the possession of the faithful from which afterwards the worship of God might have been restored (Ezr. 6:18; Neh. 8:2). Nor is it very likely that Ezekiel and the pious priests (as also Jeremiah, Gedaliah and Baruch who received permission to remain in Judea) would have been without them, especially when the preservation and reading of the sacred books belonged to them; in Daniel's case this is plain (Dan. 9:2). The passage 2(4) Esdras 4:23 (cf. 14:21), whence its universal destruction is argued, proves nothing (as it is apocryphal to papists themselves) and is refuted by another apocryphal book which is esteemed canonical by papists, which says that the ark in which was deposited the book of the law (Dt. 31:26) was preserved by Jeremiah in a cave of Mt. Nebo (2* Mac. 2:5*). The deep silence of Scripture especially refutes this fiction (which would not have passed by so great a loss without mention of public mourning) seeing that it so bitterly weeps over the pollution of the sanctuary, the destruction of Jerusalem, the taking away of the sacred vessels, the overthrow of the temple and other things. Ezra could therefore have labored to collect, yea and even to correct and restore the copies which had been corrupted in the captivity (which he could best do being inspired of God [*theopneustos*]), but there was no necessity for his giving it to the church entirely new.

EIGHTH QUESTION

Are the books of the Old Testament still a part of the canon of faith and rule of practice in the church of the New Testament? We affirm against the Anabaptists.

Statement of the question.

I. This question brings us into collision with the Anabaptists who reject the books of the Old Testament from the canon of faith, as if they had not the least reference to Christians and as if they should not draw from them doctrines of faith and rules of life. The Mennonites in their Confession (Article 11) teach that "all Christians, in matters of faith, ought to have recourse necessarily only to the gospel of Christ" ("Belydenisse naer Godts heylig woort," Art. 11 [?1600] in *The Bloody Theater or Martyrs' Mirror* [comp. T.J. van Braght, 1837/1987], p. 382). This is confirmed in the Colloquy of Frankenthal (*Protocol . . . de Gansche Handelinge des Gesprecks te Franckenthal . . . Gaspar van der Heyden*, Art. 1:57 [1571], p. 73). On the contrary, the orthodox maintain that the Old Testament no less than the New pertains to Christians and that from both, the doctrines of faith and rules of life must be drawn (French Confession, Articles 4, 5; First Helvetic Confession, Art. 1—cf. Cochrane, 145, 100).

II. The question does not concern the Old Testament in relation to the Mosaic economy, for we grant that this was so abrogated by Christ that there is no place for it any longer in the economy of grace. Rather the question concerns the Old Testament as to doctrine, whether there is no further use for it in the New Testament as a rule of faith and practice.

III. The question is not whether Christ reformed the law given in the Old Testament by correcting and perfecting it under the New (for we will treat of this hereafter with the Socinians). The question is whether the Old Testament Scripture pertains to Christians, so that from it no less than from the New Testament the rule of faith and practice ought to be drawn; and that the religion of Christ is contained in Moses and the prophets as well as in the New Testament and can be demonstrated from them. This our adversaries deny; we assert.

IV. Nor is the question about the distinction between the Old and New Testament and the difference in the doctrine which occurs in both. For we do not deny that this is far clearer in the New than in the Old Testament, both on account of the types in which they are enveloped and on account of the predictions and prophecies which are given in it. Rather the question concerns the principle of the Christian religion; whether it is only the books of the New Testament or also those of the Old. We maintain the latter.

Proof that the Old Testament is canonical to Christians.

V. The reasons are: (1) because Christ recommends the Old Testament and enjoins upon believers the hearing of Moses and the prophets (Lk. 16:29). This was not said to the Jews exclusively because a general precept is here given embracing all who desire to escape eternal punishment. What is here proposed as a precept, Peter recommends to the practice of Christians: "We have also a more sure word of prophecy; whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day star arise in your hearts" (2 Pet. 1:19). It cannot be objected that a limitation is added by Peter, that this applies only until the time of the New Testament when the day should dawn. If it is understood of the New Testament, the use of the word of prophecy is not therefore restricted by this expression until the time of the New Testament because the *to eōs hou* ("even until") is not always so positive of the past as to be exclusive of the future (this is evidenced by many passages: Gen. 28:15; Mt. 28:20*; 1 Cor. 15:25). But if it is referred to the day of eternal life (and so the rising of the day star in the firmament of glory, which is truly the day by way of eminence [*kat' exochēn*], which is clearly evident, because he writes to believers who had obtained like precious faith [*isotimon*] and so in their hearts the day of grace, and the day star of the gospel had already risen) then the argument becomes more powerful, viz., take heed unto this word of prophecy until the end of the world, until that happy day arises (which is the true day), since it will be perpetual and never followed by any night.

VI. (2) The New Testament church is built upon the foundation of the prophets and apostles (Eph. 2:20), i.e., upon their doctrines. Nor can the New Testament prophets be meant here as in Eph. 3:5 and 1 Cor. 12:28 because he speaks of the perpetual foundation of the universal church. Now the gift of prophecy under the New Testament was temporary, and the order of collation does not of itself imply a priority or posteriority of time or duration; as in Eph. 4:11*, the prophets of the New Testament are placed before the evangelists, and yet they were not in fact prior to them.

VII. (3) "Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope" (Rom. 15:4). Now although all things in the Scriptures are not equally important as to matter and use, yet all are equally so as to their source and authenticity

(*authentias*) and therefore given equally for the good and edification of the church.

VIII. (4) The canon of the Old Testament suffices for faith and practice, and those sacred writings in which Timothy was instructed from his childhood (when the New Testament canon was not complete) could make him wise (*sophisai*) unto salvation (2 Tim. 3:15, 16). And if "the man of God" (i.e., the minister of the gospel) may be thoroughly furnished by them unto every good work, much more are they useful and necessary to the faith of a private man and the direction of his life. And Paul does not refer here only to the time preceding the writing of the New Testament because he speaks in general of all Scripture given by inspiration (*theopneustō*) of God (v. 16).

IX. (5) Christ directs the Jews to search the Scriptures (Jn. 5:39) that from them they might have eternal life. This was not said to the Jews indicatively only, but also imperatively. The design of Christ was to lead the Jews to the reading of the Scriptures, as the means of bringing them to a knowledge of himself and as an unexceptionable witness of himself. Even if Christ had spoken indicatively, it would have amounted to the same thing because he approved that practice.

X. (6) The Old Testament contains the same doctrine in substance with the New, both in matters of faith and practice; nor is any other gospel now set forth to us than that which was promised before in the prophetic writings (Rom. 1:2*; 16:25, 26). Hence Paul, who declared the whole counsel of God concerning salvation to Christians (Acts 20:27*), professes to have said no other things than those which the prophets and Moses said (Acts 26:22). And no other law is prescribed for us than that which was formerly introduced by Moses, commanding us to love God and our neighbor (Mt. 22:37, 39*).

XI. (7) If the Old Testament is not important for Christians, it could not be unexceptionably proved against the Jews that Jesus Christ of Nazareth is the true Messiah. This can be done only by a collation of Scriptures and a comparison (*synkrisin*) of marks predicted in the Old Testament concerning the Messiah and of their fulfillment in our Jesus under the New. This was often done by Christ and his apostles (Lk. 24:27, 44; Acts 10:43; 17:11; 26:22; Rom. 3:21). Without it, the Jews could not be convinced of their error and brought to faith because they acknowledge no other standard.

XII. By the law and the prophets (who should continue until John, Mt. 11:13*) are not meant the books of the Old Testament and their continuance, but the economy of the Old Testament compared with that of the New (of which the former was prophetical, the latter evangelical; the one shadowy and typical, promising a Messiah to come, the other clear and open, announcing the Messiah as already come). Christ in comparing these two modes of revelation together said the former by prophecy (*prophēteian*) continued only until John because as the Messiah had come, he should no longer be predicted as about to come, but the other by the gospel (*euangelismon*, which announced the advent of Christ) began from John.

XIII. When the apostles are called "ministers of the spirit and not of the letter" (2 Cor. 3:5, 6), by letter we must not understand the books of the Old Testament, as if there would be no further necessity for them (since they elsewhere often make use of them), but the legal economy in contradistinction to the evangelical (which is in many respects better than the former, not only in clearness and extent, but principally in efficacy because it not only orders and

commands duty as the law, but also works by the Spirit in writing the law upon the heart).

XIV. It is one thing for an old covenant to become antiquated as to the mode of administration and the accidents or the external observation of appendages to it (which Paul asserts, Heb. 8:13). It is a very different thing for it to become so as to the thing administered and the substance or internal form of the covenant itself (which we deny).

XV. It is one thing to speak of the life of the Old Testament ceremonies or of the law as related to them. It is quite another to speak of the duration, knowledge and contemplation of the books of the law and the prophets. That which has only a shadow of good things to come does not pertain to Christians, who have the express image of the things, as to practice and observation; yet it can pertain to them as to doctrine and knowledge and relation to the image (*tēn eikona*). Yea, from a comparison of the shadow with the real form, the body itself will stand out more distinctly.

XVI. Christ does not dispute against Moses and the real precepts of the law (Mt. 5), but acts rather as the interpreter and vindicator of the law, rejecting the corruptions and glosses which had been foisted onto it by the Jewish teachers and restoring it to its purity and genuine sense. This we will show particularly when we come to the law.

XVII. Although the New Testament is perfect intensively as to the substance of saving doctrine, yet it is not such extensively as to the whole extent of divine revelation. For it speaks only of Christ already come and not of him about to come, which kind of testimony would be most useful to the confirmation of faith. So then the perfection of the books of the New Testament does not exclude the use of those of the Old, both because they testify to their dependence upon the Old Testament and because the reiterated testimony of many witnesses concerning the same thing is stronger with respect to us and greatly confirms (*asphaleian*) our faith.

XVIII. That which was in no way given by Christ, either mediately or immediately, does not pertain to Christians. But the law which was given by Moses was given also by Christ; by Moses as a servant, by Christ as the Lord. Hence this same angel which appeared to Moses in the wilderness (Acts 7:30, 38) and was Jehovah himself (Ex. 3:2), is said to have "spoken to Moses in Mount Sinai" because the Son of God (who is called the angel of the covenant of his presence) was the primary author and promulgator of that law (of which Moses was only the minister). Nor is the difference between the promulgation of the law and the gospel thus taken away because the Son of God operated in the law mediately only and as without a body (*asarkos*), but he is called the primary author of the gospel, immediately as incarnate (*ensarkos*, Heb. 2:3).

XIX. Christ is called the "end of the law" (Rom. 10:4) both because he was the mark at which the whole law aimed and because he was its perfection (*teleiōsis*) and fulfillment, not by abrogating every use of it, but by fulfilling its predictions and obeying it both in himself (by acting and suffering) and in his people (by writing it on their hearts). Hence he says, "I am not come to destroy the law, but to fulfil it" (Mt. 5:17).

XX. Servants must not be listened to when their master is present, if they testify either without his permission or against him. But they can and ought to be

heard, if with his consent they testify of him. This Moses and the prophets have done (Jn. 5:46; Acts 10:43) no less than the apostles. Christ (Lk. 16:29) expressly commands us to hear Moses and the prophets. This is not going back from Christ to Moses but proceeding from Moses (who is a schoolmaster to lead us to Christ, Gal. 3:24) to Christ.

XXI. The beginning of John's preaching is well called the "beginning of the gospel" (Mk. 1:1) as to the fulfillment and in relation to Christ as already set forth; not as to the promise and in relation to Christ about to be set forth, which properly had place under the Old Testament (Rom. 1:2; Gal. 3:8; Is. 52:7; 61:1).

NINTH QUESTION: THE APOCRYPHAL BOOKS

Ought Tobit, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, the first two books of the Maccabees, Baruch, the additions to Esther and Daniel to be numbered among the canonical books? We deny against the papists.

Why called Apocryphal.

I. The Apocryphal books are so called not because the authors are unknown (for there are some canonical books whose authors are unknown and some apocryphal books whose authors are known); not because they could be read only in private and not in public (for some of them may be read even in public), but either because they were removed from the crypt (*apo tēs kryptēs*) (that sacred place in which the holy writings were laid up) as Epiphanius and Augustine think; or because their authority was hidden and suspected, and consequently their use also was secret since the church did not apply to them to confirm the authority of ecclesiastical doctrines (as Jerome says, 'Praefatio in libros Salomonis' from "Hieronymi Prologus Galeatus" in *Biblia Sacra Vulgata Editionis Sixti V . . . et Celementis VIII* [1865], p. lii); or, what is more probable, because they are of an uncertain and obscure origin (as Augustine says, CG 15.23* [FC 14:474]).

Statement of the question.

II. The question is not about the books of the Old and New Testament which we hold as canonical, for the papists agree with us as to these; nor about all the apocryphal books, for there are some rejected by the papists as well as by us (as the 3rd and 4th of Esdras, 3rd and 4th of Maccabees, the Prayer of Manasses, etc.). The question is only about Tobit, Judith, Baruch, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, 1 and 2 Maccabees, the additions to Esther and Daniel, which the papists consider canonical and we exclude from the canon—not because they do not contain many true and good things, but because they do not bear the marks of canonical books.

Why the Apocryphal books are excluded from the canon.

III. The reasons are various. (1) The Jewish church, to which the oracles of God were committed (Rom. 3:2), never considered them as canonical, but held the same canon with us (as is admitted by Josephus, *Against Apion* 1.39-41 [Loeb, 1:178-79], Becanus, *Manuale controversiarum* 1.1 [1750], pp. 11-12) and Stapelton, "De Principiis fidei doctrinalibus controversia," Cont. 5.7* in *Opera* [1620], 1:322-23). This they could not have done without the most grievous sin (and it was never charged upon them either by Christ or his apostles) if these

books no less than the others had been committed to them. Nor should the canon of the Jews be distinguished here from that of Christians because Christians neither can nor ought to receive other books of the Old Testament as canonical than those which they received from the Jews, their book-servants "who carry the books of us students" (as Augustine calls them, "On Psalm 40 [41]" [NPNF1, 8:132; PL 36.463]). (2) They are never quoted as canonical by Christ and the apostles like the others. And Christ, by dividing all the books of the Old Testament into three classes (the law, the Psalms and the prophets, Lk. 24:44), clearly approves of the canon of the Jews and excludes from it those books which are not embraced in these classes. (3) The Christian church for four hundred years recognized with us the same and no other canonical books. This appears from the *Canons of the Synod of Laodicea* 59 (NPNF2, 14:158); Melito, bishop of Sardis, who lived 116 years A.D. (according to Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* 4.26* [FC 19:262-63]); from Epiphanius ("De Epicureis," *Panarion* [PG 41.206-23]); Jerome ("Hieronymi Prologus Galeatus," in *Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editionis Sixti V . . . et Clementis VIII* [1865], pp. xliii-lv); Athanasius (*Synopsis Scripturae Sacrae* [PG 28.283-94]). (4) The authors were neither prophets and inspired men, since they wrote after Malachi (the last of the prophets); nor were their books written in the Hebrew language (as those of the Old Testament), but in Greek. Hence Josephus (in the passage referred to above) acknowledges that those things which were written by his people after the time of Artaxerxes were not equally credible and authoritative with those which preceded "on account of there not being an indisputable succession of prophets" (*dia to mē genesthai tēn tōn prophētōn akribē diadochēn, Against Apion* 1.41 [Loeb, 1:178-79]).

IV. The style and matter of the books proclaim them to be human, not divine. It requires little acuteness to discover that they are the product of human labor, although some are more excellent than others. For besides the fact that the style does not savor of the majesty and simplicity of the divine style and is redolent with the faults and weaknesses of human genius (in the vanity, flattery, curiosity, mistaken zeal and ill-timed affectation of learning and eloquence, which are often met with), there are so many things in them not only foolish and absurd, but even false, superstitious and contradictory, as to show clearly that they are not divine but human writings. We will give a few specimens of the many errors. Tobias makes the angel tell a falsehood. He says that he is Azariah, the son of Ananias (Tob. 5:12*) and that he is Raphael, the angel of the Lord (12:15). The angel gives a magical direction for driving away the devil by the smoke of a fish's liver (Tob. 6:6), against that of Christ (Mt. 17:21). He arrogates to himself the oblation of prayers (Tob. 12:12), which belongs to the work of Christ alone. The book of Judith celebrates the deed of Simeon (Jud. 9:2), which Jacob cursed (Gen. 49:5-7); praises the deceits and lies of Judith (Jud. 11), which are not very consistent with piety. Worse still, she even seeks the blessing of God upon them (Jud. 9:13). No mention is made of the city Bethulia in the Scriptures; nor does any trace of the deliverance mentioned there occur in Josephus or Philo, who wrote on Jewish subjects. The author of Wisdom falsely asserts that he was king in Israel (Wis. Sol. 9:7, 8) that he might be taken for Solomon. Yet he alludes to the athletic contests which in the time of Solomon had not been established among the Greeks (Wis. Sol. 4:2). Further, he introduces the Pythagorean metempsychosis (*metempsychōsin*, Wis. Sol. 8:19, 20) and gives a false account of

the origin of idolatry (14:15, 16). The Son of Sirach (Sir. 46:20) attributes to Samuel what was done by the evil spirit raised by wicked devices (1 S. 28:11), falsely speaks of Elijah's bodily return (Sir. 48:10), and excuses his oversights in the prologue.

V. There are so many contradictions and absurdities in the additions to Esther and Daniel that Sixtus Senensis unhesitatingly rejects them. Baruch says that in the fifth year after the destruction of Jerusalem, he read his book to Jeconiah and to all the people of Babylon; but Jeconiah was in prison and Baruch had been taken away to Egypt after the death of Gedaliah (Jer. 43:7*). He mentions an altar of the Lord (Bar. 1:10) when there was none, the temple being destroyed. The books of the Maccabees often contradict each other (compare 1 Mac. 1:16 with 9:5, 28 and chapter 10). The suicide (*autocheiria*) of Razis is praised (2 Mac. 14:42). Will-worship (*ethelothrēskeia*) is commended (2 Mac. 12:42) in Judas's offering a sacrifice for the dead contrary to the law. The author apologizes for his youth and infirmity and complains of the painful labor of abridging the five books of Jason, the Cyrenian (2 Mac. 2:23*, 24; 15:39). If you wish any more specimens from these books, consult Rainold, Chamier, Molinaeus, Spanheim and others who have pursued this line of argument with fullness and strength.

Sources of explanation.

VI. The canon of faith differs from the canon of ecclesiastical reading. We do not speak here of the canon in the latter sense, for it is true that these apocryphal books were sometimes read even publicly in the church. But they were read "for the edification of the people" only, not "for establishing the authority of the doctrines" as Jerome says, *Praefatio . . . in Libros Salomonis* (NPNF2, 6:492; PL 28.1308). Likewise the legends containing the sufferings of the martyrs (which were so called from being read) were publicly read in the church, although they were not considered canonical. But we speak here of the canon of faith.

VII. The word "canon" is used by the fathers in two senses; either widely or strictly. In the first sense, it embraces not only the canon of faith, but also the canon of ecclesiastical reading. In this way, we must understand the Third Council of Carthage, Canon 47 (Lauchert, p. 173) when it calls these canonical books (if indeed this canon has not been foisted in [*pareisaktos*] because it mentions Pope Boniface who was not at that time pope; hence Surius, the Monk [*Concilia omnia* (1567), 1:508*] attributes this canon to the Seventh Council of Carthage, not the Third) not strictly and properly of the canon of faith, but widely, of the canon of reading. The synod expressly says that the sufferings of the martyrs should also be read and so we must understand Augustine when he terms them "canonical." For he makes two orders of canonicals: the first of those which are received by all the churches and were never called in question; the second of those which are admitted only by some and were usually read from the pulpit. He holds that the latter are not to be valued as rightly as the former and have far less authority (Augustine, *Reply to Faustus the Manichaean* 11.5* [NPNF1, 4:180]). But the Apocrypha are spurious, false and worthless writings—the fables of the Scriptures (Augustine, CG 15.23 [FC 14:474]). However the word "canon" is taken strictly for that which has a divine and infallible authority in proving the doctrines of faith. Jerome takes the word in this sense when he excludes those books from the canon. Thus Augustine attached a wider signification to the word "canon" than Jerome, who again takes

the word "apocryphal" in a wider sense than Augustine, not only for books evidently false and fabulous, but also for those which (although they might be read in the church) should not be used to prove the doctrines of faith. Thus the seemingly contradictory expressions of these fathers may easily be reconciled. Thus Cajetan near the end explains them: "The words of councils as well as of teachers being brought to the test of Jerome, it will appear that these books are not canonical (i.e., regulars to establish matters of faith), although they may be called canonical (i.e., regulars for the edification of believers), since they were received into the Biblical canon for this purpose" ("In librum Hester commentarii," in *Quotquot in Sacra Scripturae* [1639], 2:400). Dionysius Carthusianus agrees with him (Prooemium in "Tobiam," in *Opera Omnia* [1898], 5:83-84).

VIII. The papists make a useless distinction between the canon of the Jews and that of Christians. For although our canon taken generally for all the books of the Old and New Testament (in which it adequately consists) is not equally admitted by the Jews, who reject the New Testament; yet if it is taken partially with reference to the Old Testament (in which sense we speak of it here), it is true that our canon does not differ from that of the Jews because they receive into the canon no other books than we do.

IX. When the fathers sometimes mention Deuterocanonical books, they do not mean such as are truly and in the same sense canonical as to faith, but only those which may be placed in the canon of reading on account of their usefulness for piety and edification.

X. The citation of any passage does not of itself prove a book to be canonical, for then Aratus, Menander and Epimenides (quoted by Paul in Acts 17:28; 1 Cor. 15:33; Tit. 1:12) would be canonical. (2) The same passages which our adversaries bring forward as quotations from the Apocrypha are found in the canonical books, and the apostles would rather quote from these than from the former.

XI. If they are connected with canonical books, it does not follow that they are of equal authority, but only that they are useful in the formation of manners and a knowledge of history, not for establishing faith.

XII. Although some of the Apocryphal books are better and more correct than the others and contain various useful moral directions (as the book of Wisdom and the Son of Sirach), yet because they contain many other false and absurd things, they are deservedly excluded from the canon of faith.

XIII. Although some have questioned the authenticity of a few books of the New Testament (i.e., the epistle of James, 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John and Revelation, which afterwards were received by the church as canonical), it does not follow that the same can be done with the Apocryphal books because the relation of the books of the Old and New Testaments to this subject are not the same. For the books of the Old Testament were given to the Christian church, not at intervals of time and by parts, but she received at one and the same time from the Jews all the books belonging to her written in one codex after they had been stamped with an indubitable authority, confirmed by Christ and his apostles. But the books of the New Testament were published separately, in different times and places and gradually collected into one corpus. Hence it happened that some of the later books (which came to some of the churches more slowly, especially in

remote places) were held in doubt by some until gradually their authenticity was made known to them. (2) Although in certain churches some of the epistles and Revelation were rejected, yet those who received them were always far more numerous than those who rejected them. Yet there was no dispute about the Apocryphal books because they were always rejected by the Jewish church.

TENTH QUESTION: THE PURITY OF THE SOURCES

Have the original texts of the Old and New Testaments come down to us pure and uncorrupted? We affirm against the papists.

I. This question lies between us and the papists who speak against the purity of the sources for the purpose of establishing more easily the authority of their Vulgate version and leading us away to the tribunal of the church.

II. By the original texts, we do not mean the autographs written by the hand of Moses, of the prophets and of the apostles, which certainly do not now exist. We mean their apographs which are so called because they set forth to us the word of God in the very words of those who wrote under the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

III. The question is not Are the sources so pure that no fault has crept into the many sacred manuscripts, either through the waste of time, the carelessness of copyists or the malice of the Jews or of heretics? For this is acknowledged on both sides and the various readings which Beza and Robert Stephanus have carefully observed in the Greek (and the Jews in the Hebrew) clearly prove it. Rather the question is have the original texts (or the Hebrew and Greek manuscripts) been so corrupted either by copyists through carelessness (or by the Jews and heretics through malice) that they can no longer be regarded as the judge of controversies and the rule to which all the versions must be applied? The papists affirm, we deny it.

IV. However all the papists do not agree. There are some whom they call "Hebraizers" who have recognized the purity of the sources and openly defended it (as Sixtus Senensis, *Bibliotheca sancta* 8 [1575], 2:314-19; Bannes, *Scholastica commentaria in . . . Summae Theologicae* [1585], I, Q. 1, Art. 8, 1:69, 70, 72; Andradius, *Defensio Tridentinae fidei catholicae* 4 [1580], pp. 574-709; Driedo, "De ecclesiasticis scripturis et dogmatibus," 2 in *Opera* [1572], 1:23-62; Arias Montanus, "Praefatio," *Biblia sacra Hebraice, Chaldaice, Graece et Latine* [1572], vol. 1; Joannes Isaacus, *Defensio veritatis Hebraicae sacrarum . . . adversus . . . Lindani* [1559]; Bonfrerius, *Pentateuchus Moysis Commentario . . . totius Scripturae* 12.5 [1625], p. 43; Simeon de Muis, "Epistola," *Assertio veritatis Hebraicae adversus exercitationes . . . Ioannis Morini* [1631] and many more). Others, on the contrary, vehemently urge the corruption of the sources: as Stapleton, Lindanus, Cano, Cotton, Morinus, Perronius, Gordon, etc. Others, unwilling to assert that the sources are corrupt, take a middle ground and hold that it is not a consequence of that purity and integrity that all things in the versions ought to be tested and amended by them. This is the opinion of Bellarmine (VD 2.2, pp. 62-65) who on this subject as on others is not at all consistent with himself.

The providence of God proves that the sources have not been corrupted.

V. The following arguments prove that the sources have not been corrupted. (1) The providence of God which could not permit books which it willed to be written by inspiration (*theopneustois*) for the salvation of men (and to continue unto the end of the world that they might draw from them waters of salvation) to become so corrupted as to render them unfit for this purpose. And since new revelations are not to be expected (after God has recorded in the Scriptures his entire will concerning the doctrine of salvation), what can be more derogatory to God (who has promised his constant presence with the church) than to assert that he has permitted the books containing this doctrine to become so corrupt that they cannot serve as a canon of faith? (2) The fidelity of the Christian church and unceasing labor in preserving the manuscripts; for since Christians have always labored with great zeal to keep this sacred deposit uncorrupted, it is not credible that they would either corrupt it themselves or suffer it to be corrupted by others. (3) The religion of the Jews who have bestowed upon the sacred manuscripts great care and labor amounting even to superstition. Hence Josephus says that after the lapse of ages no one has dared either to add to or take away from or alter the peculiar books of the Jews in any respect and that they think it an honor to die for the Scriptures (*Against Apion* 1*.42 [Loeb, 1:180-81]). Philo, in his book on the departure of the Israelites from Egypt (cited by Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 8.6.357c [ed. Gifford, 1903], 1:387) goes further, asserting that "even up to his time, through a space of more than two thousand years, not so much as a word had been changed in the law of the Hebrews and that any Jew would rather die a hundred times, than suffer the law to be altered in the least." They carry their ridiculous superstition concerning the sacred manuscript to such a length that if a corrected book of the law fell on the ground, they proclaimed a fast and expressed their fears that the whole universe would return to its original chaos, so far were they from corrupting the manuscripts. (4) The carefulness of the Masoretes not only about verses and words, but also about single letters (which, together with all the variations of punctuation and writing, they not only counted, but also wrote down, so that no ground or even suspicion of corruption could arise). Arias Montanus employs this argument in the "Praefatio" to his *Biblia sacra Hebraice, Chaldaice, Graece et Latine* (1572), vol. 1. (5) The multitude of copies; for as the manuscripts were scattered far and wide, how could they all be corrupted either by the carelessness of librarians or the wickedness of enemies? Augustine says, "No prudent man can believe that the Jews however perverse and wicked could do it, in copies so numerous and so far and widely diffused" (CG 15.13* [FC 14:440; PL 41.452]). Vives said this ought to be the reply to those "who argue that the Hebrew manuscripts of the Old Testament and the Greek of the New have been so falsified and corrupted as to make it impossible to draw the truth from these sources" (*Saint Augustine, of the Citie of God with . . . comments of . . . Vives* [1620], p. 519).

VI. (6) If the sources had been corrupted, it must have been done before Christ or after, neither of which is true. Not before because Christ would not have passed it over in silence (for he does censure the various departures in doctrine), nor could he bear to use corrupted books. Did he disregard the salvation of his people so far that he would neither himself, nor through his apostles,

admonish us even by a word that the books of Moses and the prophets had been tampered with; while in the meantime he convicts the Jews from these very books (but to what purpose, if they had been corrupted and falsified?) and invites and urges his disciples to their perusal and search? Not afterward, both because the copies circulated among Christians would have rendered such attempts futile, and because no trace of any such corruption appears. For if this had been the case, why do we find the passages which Christ and the apostles quoted from Moses and the prophets just the same now as then and in no way corrupted? Why do Origen and Jerome, eminent scholars, so explicitly absolve the Jews from this crime? Therefore if no corruption took place either before or after the time of Christ, it never did (which argument Bellarmine follows, VD 2.2, pp. 62-65).

VII. (7) The Jews neither would nor could corrupt the sources. An examination of passages of Scripture proves that they were unwilling (besides their religion of which we have spoken). If they had wished to corrupt anything, they would by all means have tampered with the prophecies which speak of Christ and confirm the faith of Christians. For who can believe that they (if, as is supposed, actuated by hatred towards the Christians) would have falsified those passages from which they could derive no advantage against Christians and left untouched those upon which (as immovable) Christians build the foundation of evangelical truth? The matter stands thus: whatever passages are said to have been corrupted by the Jews, oppose Christians little or not at all; and the most important prophecies concerning Christ remain complete and are much more clear and emphatic (*emphatikōtera*) in the Hebrew than in the versions (as Jerome, *Letter 32* [74], "Ad Marcellam" [NPNF2, 6:45-46], Johannes Isaacus, *Defensio Veritatis Hebraicae sacrarum . . . adversus . . . Lindani* 2 [1559], pp. 61-122 and Andradius, *Defensio tridentinae fidei catholicae* 2 [1580], pp. 167-460 observe). That they could not do it, even if they had strongly desired, not only the multitude of copies proves, but also the watchfulness of the Christians whose copies not all the Jews together could corrupt. The provident wisdom of God (which will not suffer one jot or tittle to pass from the law till all be fulfilled, Mt. 5:18) has much less permitted the body of heavenly doctrine to be weakened by the Jews and so great a treasure to be taken away. He rather wished, as Bellarmine well remarks, "for this very purpose to scatter the Jews over the whole world and the books of the law and the prophets to be carried about that our enemies might afford a testimony to the truth of Christianity" (VD 2.2, arg. 5, p. 63). Hence Augustine calls the Jews "a book-case nation, carrying as porters the law and the prophets as slaves usually carry manuscripts, that they by carrying may be deficient and these by reading may be proficient; for the Jews serve us as book-slaves and amanuenses, carrying the books for us the students" (cf. *Reply to Faustus the Manichaean* 12*.23 [NPNF1, 4:191; PL 42.266]; *Psalm 57* [56].7 [9] [NPNF1, 8:227; PL 36.666]; *Psalm 41* [40].13 [14] [NPNF1, 8:132; PL 36.463]); "in heart enemies, in books witnesses" as he elsewhere expresses it (*On Faith in Things Unseen* 6.9 [FC 4:467; PL 40.179]).

Sources of explanation.

VIII. Although various corruptions might have crept into the Hebrew manuscripts through the carelessness of transcribers and the waste of time, they do not cease to be a canon of faith and practice. For besides being in things of small importance and not pertaining to faith and practice (as Bellarmine himself confesses and which, moreover, he holds do not affect the integrity of

the Scriptures, VD 2.2, pp. 62-65), they are not universal in all the manuscripts; or they are not such as cannot easily be corrected from a collation of the Scriptures and the various manuscripts.

IX. The hatred of the Jews towards the Christians could indeed be the remote cause of the corruption of the sources, but this could be hindered by another superior cause (viz., by the providence of God which had the same prospective reference to the Christians concerning the sure rule of faith as to the Jews, that the gospel might be built up on an unmistakable basis). This could not have been, if he had suffered the sources to be corrupted.

X. The variance of the Septuagint from the original text does not imply that the text is corrupt, but rather the version is at fault. Jerome even in his time acknowledged this: 'Praefatio . . . in Pentateuchum Moysi*,' from "Hieronymi Prologus Galeatus" in *Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editionis Sixit V . . . et Clementis VIII* (1865), p. xlviii; 'Praefatio . . . in librum Paralipomenon Praefatio,' from "Hieronymi Prologus Galeatus" in *Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editionis Sixti V . . . et Clementis VIII* (1865), p. xlix; and *Letter 106*, "Ad Suniam et Fretellam" (PL 22.838). Bellarmine says that the Septuagint was so corrupted and falsified as to seem an entirely different thing, so that now it is not safe to correct the Hebrew or the Latin texts from the Greek manuscripts (VD 2.6, pp. 68-71).

XI. So far are the *keri* and *kethib* (which amount to 848 in number) from corrupting the text that they rather show the various readings of copies by which all corruptions of later hands are excluded. The same may be said of the *chasir* and *jother*, which mark grammatical defects or redundancies. From this is manifest the superstitious desire of the Masoretes to preserve the text, not to corrupt it even in the smallest degree.

XII. The *tikkun sopherim* (or corrections of the scribes) which are only eighteen, do not imply that there were corruptions in the text. Otherwise Christ (if they had been made before his time) or the orthodox fathers (if after his time) would not have passed them by without censure. Nor are they necessary corrections (as the reader can see), but rather choice readings. They are not so much changes of the sense as of words, made either by men of the great synagogue (of whom Ezra, inspired of God [*theopneustos*] was the chief, who after the return from the Babylonian captivity entirely restored the copies of the sacred books which had been scattered or corrupted and arranged them in their present order); or by the authors themselves (who after the manner of rhetoricians made corrections in the text). But that they are not all necessary, the thing itself proves because the sense is complete, the words in the text being retained; see Glassius, *Philologia sacra* (1713), 1, "Tractatus 1: De integritate and puritate Hebraei V. Test.," pp. 1-174.

XIII. The similarity of certain letters might indeed have been the occasion of the introduction of errors into the various manuscripts through the negligence of transcribers, but they could not have been so universal as not to be detected by others; especially after the work of the Masoretes, who numbered not only the words, but even the letters as often as they occur in the text.

XIV. So far is the work of the Masoretes from being a proof of the corruption of the sources that, on the contrary, it was intended to guard against errors, so that not even one small point could afterwards be altered or destroyed.

XV. Although the apostle renders by *phthongon* (Rom. 10:18) what is expressed by *qvm* (Ps. 19:4 [5]), it does not follow that the Hebrew text is incorrect and that *qvm* ("their line") is put instead of *qvlm* ("their voice" or "sound"). For *qv* signifies not only an extended or perpendicular line, but also a written line or letter by which boys are taught their elements. In Is. 28:10, this word is used to designate the untaught infancy of the people of Israel where the prophet says this people must be taught "precept upon precept, and line upon line" like children. So the psalmist says, "day teaches day and night unto night showeth knowledge" (Ps. 19:2). Now *phthongos* not unfitly answers to this word, as it is not only taken for the sound but also for the writing of a letter, just as we speak of a written diphthong and vowel. Further, Paul does not quote this passage as a proof, but only allusively and by anagoge accommodates it to the preaching of the gospel by the apostles, having regard to the sense rather than to the words.

XVI. The corrupting of words is different from misinterpretation. The Jews have misinterpreted Is. 9:6 (5), so as to make the words *vykr' shmv* ("and he shall call his name") refer to the father who calls, not to Christ who is called. But they have not altered the words, for whether taken passively or actively it comes to the same thing. According to the Hebrew idiom, the future active without a subject often has a passive signification; as Ribera, *In librum duodecim prophetarum Commentarii* (1611), p. 303 (on Mic. 2, par. 17). Thus verbs of the third person taken impersonally can be translated now actively and then passively. Therefore the Hebrew lection ("and he shall call his name") must not be altered, but must be explained by supplying the subject; not God the Father (according to the Jews), but everyone (viz., of believers) shall call his (i.e., Christ's) name; and for the sake of clearness it must be taken passively, "his name shall be called." Thus also in Jer. 23:6, there is a difference in the interpretation. Not in the words which are properly given, either in the singular ("he shall call him"), the nominative preceding Israel and Judah (as the Septuagint has it); or in the plural ("they shall call") as Pagninus, Vatablus and Arias Montanus translate it following the Chaldee, Syriac, Arabic and Vulgate versions. Jerome retains both readings ("he" and "they shall call") (*Commentariorum in Jeremiam* [PL 24.820] on Jer. 23:6). Nor would any of the ancients say that this was corrupted.

XVII. In Gen. 49:10, the three targums of Onkelos, of Jerusalem, and of Jonathan and Kimchi understand *shylh* of the Messiah. It is evident that the Jews have not corrupted this passage to prove that the Messiah had not yet come. Besides, the name *shylh* which is attributed to the Messiah in the Talmud (BT [1935], "Sanhedrin," 2:667) is no less opposed to the Jews and indicative of Christ than the word *shylh* ("sent"), which they maintain as the true reading, whether it is derived from *shyl*, which means "a son"; or from *shlh* which means "peaceful"; or as the Septuagint has it (and more appropriately for *'shr lv, hō apokeitai*, "to whom the kingdom belongs") as we find a similar phrase in Ezk. 21:27*.

XVIII. Zech. 9:9 has not been tampered with, when it is predicted of the Messiah that he shall be a king, just and *nvsh'*. This word may be taken either passively (to denote that he was to be saved from death, as the apostle says in Heb. 5:7); or that he was to save himself (as in Is. 63:5*); or as a deponent, it may be used actively, many instances of which are met with in Hebrew; as *nshb'* ("he swore"), *nsl* ("he despoiled"). Thus it will be a participle signifying the same as *mvshy'* ("liberator," "savior").

XIX. Although the sojourning of the children of Israel in Egypt (Ex. 12:40) is said to have been 430 years (which cannot be understood of the time spent in Egypt alone, which was only 215 years; but concerning the time spent both in the land of Canaan and in Egypt, as the Samaritan and Greek parallel texts explain it), the Hebrew manuscripts ought not to be pronounced corrupt for the following reason. It is introduced by way of synecdoche (mentioning only Egypt) because it was the most remarkable exile of the Israelites, the denomination being made from the letter.

XX. There are no verses omitted in Ps. 14(15), for those quoted in Rom. 3:11-18 are not taken from this by the apostle, but collected from many Psalms (as from Ps. 5:9, 10[11]:7, 36:1, 140:3 and Is. 59:7, 8, which Jerome mentions "Preface" in Book 16, *Commentariorum in Isaiam* [PL 24.547]).

XXI. There is no corruption in the Greek text of 1 Cor. 15:47, but only in the Vulgate. The latter omits the word *Kyrios* (which here refers to Christ to make it evident that the Lord is Jehovah, not a mere man). Thus the antithesis of the first and second Adam becomes much stronger: "the first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven."

XXII. Although the doxology (*doxologia*) which appears at the end of the Lord's Prayer (Mt. 6:13), is not found in Lk. 11, nor in the various copies, it does not follow that the passage is corrupt because our Lord may have twice proposed the same form of prayer: first in the private instruction of his disciples without it and then to a promiscuous crowd where he added it. Nor is it unusual for one evangelist to omit what another has mentioned, since they did not think it necessary to record absolutely everything; as for instance Mt. 6:33 has "seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness," but Lk. 12*:31 simply "seek the kingdom of God." We must not therefore erase, but supply from Matthew what Luke has omitted, since both were inspired (*theopneustos*), especially as the full form exists in all the Greek copies of Matthew, according to Erasmus and Beza.

XXIII. Although in some manuscripts, we read *kairō douleuontes* ("serving time," Rom. 12:11), it does not appear in all. Indeed Franciscus Lucas says that he saw six manuscripts in which the word *Kyriō* occurs. Beza asserts that it is so in all the most approved manuscripts (*Annotationes maiores in Novum . . . Testament: Pars Altera* [1594], p. 133 on Rom. 12:11) and Dominic de Soto observes that this is the universal reading both in the Greek and Latin.

XXIV. It is true that all the Greek copies differ from the Latin on 1 Jn. 4:3, for where the Greek have "every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh," the Latin read "every spirit that denies Jesus." Yet it does not follow that the sources are corrupt because the Greek reading is both more majestic and far stronger against the Nestorians and Eutychians.

XXV. A corruption differs from a variant reading. We acknowledge that many variant readings occur both in the Old and New Testaments arising from a comparison of different manuscripts, but we deny corruption (at least corruption that is universal).

XXVI. It is one thing to speak of the attempts of heretics to corrupt some manuscripts (which we readily allow). They gave rise to the complaints of the fathers; as concerning Marcion (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies* 1.27 [ANF 1:352]); and Origen on Rom. 16:13 (*Commentariorum . . . ad Romanos* [PG 14.1271]); and Theodoret of Cyrrhus concerning Tatian (*Haereticarum fabularum compendium*

[PG 83.370-71]). It is quite a different thing to speak of their success or of entire universal corruption. This we deny, both on account of the providence of God, who would not permit them to carry out their intention, and on account of the diligence of the orthodox fathers, who having in their possession various manuscripts preserved them free from corruptions.

Eleventh Question: The Authentic Version

Are the Hebrew version of the Old Testament and the Greek of the New the only authentic versions? We affirm against the papists.

I. Of the versions of the Scriptures; some are *prōtotypoi* or *archetypoi* ("original" and "primary") which the authors themselves used. Others are *ektypoi* (or "secondary"), namely versions flowing from them into other languages. All admit that the Hebrew of the Old and the Greek of the New Testament are the original and primitive. But we and the papists dispute whether each is authentic, of itself deserving faith and authority and the standard to which all the versions are to be applied.

The opinion of the papists.

II. Some of the papists may be more favorable to the sources, asserting their purity (as we have already seen), ascribing authenticity to them as a consequence of purity and maintaining that all the versions and even the Vulgate ought to be referred to and can be corrected by them: as Sixtus Senensis (*Bibliotheca sancta* 8, haer. 2 [1575], 2:314-19); Driedo ("De ecclesiasticis scripturis et dogmatibus," 2 in *Opera* [1572], 1:23-62); Andradius (*Defensio tridentinae fidei catholicae* 2 [1580], pp. 167-460) and others. Yet many are more hostile to them, holding that there is no certainty in the Hebrew text, that we should not refer to the sources in controversies of faith, nor correct the Vulgate version by them: as Stapleton ("De Principiis fidei doctrinalibus controversia," Cont. 5, Q. 3, Art. 1 in *Opera* [1620], 1:771-74); Cano ("De Locis Theologicis," 2.11 and 2.13 in *Opera* [1605], pp. 65-85, 90-100); Lindanus and others who argue for the corruption of the sources. This opinion arose from a decree of the Council of Trent Session 4, which says that "the Latin Vulgate should be held as authentic in the public reading, disputations, preaching, and expositions, so that no one should dare to reject it under any pretext" (Schroeder, pp. 18, 297). A number of the papists (ashamed of this decree) endeavor to attach a different meaning to it, as if the Council had decreed nothing against the authenticity of the originals, nor preferred the Vulgate to the sources, but only chose one of the Latin versions then circulating as better than the rest (Bellarmine, VD 2.10, pp. 75-77). This is also the opinion of Andradius, Salmeron, Serarius and others. But Bannes properly exclaims against this as a distortion of the synodical decree and the very words of the decree plainly show it. For if it ought to be considered authentic, so that no one should dare to reject it under any pretext, is it not put on an equality with the sources themselves; yea, even exalted above them? And even if it varies from the sources, it is not to be corrected by them, but they rather corrected by it. Hence Mariana complains that after this promulgation of the Council of Trent, "the Greek and Hebrew fell at one blow" (*de V.V.*, p. 99+). Our opinion is that the Hebrew of the Old and the

Greek of the New Testament have always been and still are the only authentic versions by which all controversies of faith and religion (and all versions) ought to be approved and tested.

What is an authentic writing?

III. An authentic writing is one in which all things are abundantly sufficient to inspire confidence; one to which the fullest credit is due in its own kind; one of which we can be entirely sure that it has proceeded from the author whose name it bears; one in which everything is written just as he himself wished. However, a writing can be authentic in two ways: either primarily and originally or secondarily and derivatively. That writing is primarily authentic which is *autopiston* ("of self-inspiring confidence") and to which credit is and ought to be given on its own account. In this manner, the originals of royal edicts, magistrates' decrees, wills, contracts and the autographs of authors are authentic. The secondarily authentic writings are all the copies accurately and faithfully taken from the originals by suitable men; such as the scriveners appointed for that purpose by public authority (for the edicts of kings and other public documents) and any honest and careful scribes and copiers (for books and other writings). The autographs of Moses, the prophets and apostles are alone authentic in the first sense. In the latter sense, the faithful and accurate copies of them are also authentic.

IV. Again, the authority of an authentic writing is twofold: the one is founded upon the things themselves of which it treats and has relation to the men to whom the writing is directed; the other is occupied with the treatise itself and the writing and refers to the copies and translations made from it. Over all these this law obtains—that they ought to be referred to the authentic writing and if they vary from it, to be corrected and emended. The former authority may be either greater or lesser according to the authority of him from whom the writing comes and in proportion to the power which he has over the persons to whom he directs his writing. But in the sacred Scriptures this authority is the very highest, such as can be in no other writing, since we are bound straightway to believe God for that supreme power which he has over men as over all other things, and for that highest truth and wisdom distinguishing him, and to obey in all things which his most sacred word (contained in the authentic Scripture) enjoins for belief or practice. But the latter consists in this, that the autographs and also the accurate and faithful copies may be the standard of all other copies of the same writing and of its translations. If anything is found in them different from the authentic writings, either autographs or apographs, it is unworthy of the name authentic and should be discarded as spurious and adulterated, the discordance itself being a sufficient reason for its rejection. Of the former authority we spoke in Question Four, "On the Divinity of the Scriptures." We will now treat of the other which occurs in the authentic version.

V. Finally, authenticity may be regarded in two ways: either materially as to the things announced or formally as to the words and mode of annunciation. We do not speak here of authenticity in the former sense for we do not deny this to versions when they agree with the sources, but only in the latter which belongs to the sources alone.

The Hebrew of the Old and the Greek of the New Testament are the only authentic editions.

VI. The reasons are: (1) because the sources alone are inspired of God both as to the things and words (2* Tim. 3:16); hence they alone can be authentic. For whatever the men of God wrote, they wrote under the influence of the Holy Spirit (2 Pet. 1:21), who, to keep them from error, dictated not only the matter but also the words, which cannot be said of any version. (2) They are the standard and rule to which all the versions should be applied, just as the copy (*ektypon*) should answer to the pattern (*archetypon*) and the stream be distinguished from its source. Here pertains the canon of Gratian, "As the faith of the old books must be tested by the Hebrew volumes, so the truth of the new needs the Greek writing for its rule" ("Decreti, Pt. I," Dist. 9*.6 in *Corpus Iuris Canonici* [ed. A. Friedberg, 1955], 1:17). Jerome is full on this subject that he may defend the authority of the Hebrew text as the fountain to which all the streams of the versions ought to be traced and by it corrected (*Letter 26 [102]*, "Ad Marcellam" [PL 22.430-31]; *Letter 72*, "Ad Vitalem" [PL 22.673-76]; *Letter 106*, "Ad Suniam et Fretellam" [PL 22.837-67]). (3) These editions were authentic from the very first and were always considered to be so by the Jewish and Christian church many centuries after Christ. Nor can any reason be given why they should now cease to be authentic. As to the argument from corruption (besides taking for granted the thing to be proved), it has been already answered by us.

VII. (4) If the Hebrew edition of the Old Testament and the Greek edition of the New Testament are not authentic (*authentias*), there would be no authentic version, since none besides this has a divine testimony of its own authenticity. Thus there would be no authentic word of God in the church, no end of contentions because there would be no sure rule of faith and practice in which we might have full confidence. And the Scriptures, like a wax nose or the Lesbian rule, could be turned at pleasure any way. (5) Our opponents acknowledge that in certain cases it is right to have recourse to the sources. Bellarmine asserts: (a) "when in the Latin manuscripts there appears an error of the copyists; (b) when they have various readings and there is an uncertainty as to the true one; (c) when there is any ambiguity in the words or things; (d) when the force (*energeia*) and meaning of the words are not fully expressed" (VD 2.11, p. 78). Now this could not be done if the sources were not authentic. Arias Montanus shows by various considerations that the errors of the versions could not be corrected except upon the truth of the primitive language ("Praefatio," *Biblia sacra Hebraice, Chaldaice, Graece et Latine* [1572], vol. 1). Vives thinks that the sources ought surely and unquestionably to be appealed to (*Saint Augustine, of the Citie of God . . . with . . . comments of Lodovicus Vives* 14.8 [1620], p. 480). Salmeron, Bonfrerius, Masius, Muis, Jansen, with their disciples and others, are of the same opinion.

Sources of explanation.

VIII. The various readings which occur do not destroy the authenticity of the Scriptures because they may be easily distinguished and determined, partly by the connection of the passage and partly by a collation with better manuscripts. Some are of such a kind that although diverse, they may nevertheless belong to the same text.

IX. Although various contentions may spring from the Hebrew and Greek sources, yet it does not follow that they cannot be authentic. If that were the

case there would be no authentic edition at all for us to consult, since every language will supply sufficient material of controversy to the contentious. Then again this is not the fault of the sources, but of those who abuse them, either by not understanding or by twisting the words to suit their own purposes and pertinaciously adhering to them.

X. There is no truth in the assertion that the Hebrew edition of the Old Testament and the Greek edition of the New Testament are said to be mutilated; nor can the arguments used by our opponents prove it. Not the history of the adulteress (Jn. 8:1-11), for although it is lacking in the Syriac version, it is found in all the Greek manuscripts. Not 1 Jn. 5:7, for although some formerly called it into question and heretics now do, yet all the Greek copies have it, as Sixtus Senensis acknowledges: "they have been the words of never-doubted truth, and contained in all the Greek copies from the very times of the apostles" (*Bibliotheca sancta* [1575], 2:298). Not Mk. 16 which may have been wanting in several copies in the time of Jerome (as he asserts); but now it occurs in all, even in the Syriac version, and is clearly necessary to complete the history of the resurrection of Christ.

XI. In order to weaken the authenticity (*authentian*) of the Hebrew edition, our opponents have recourse to the "newness of the points" (in vain, as if the punctuation was only a human invention devised by the Masoretes and therefore founded upon human authority, not upon divine and infallible authority; and that it can be changed at pleasure without risk and so always leave the meaning of a passage uncertain and doubtful). Several answers may be given to this. (1) Bellarmine agrees with us here "the errors arising from the points do not interfere with truth because they have come from without and do not change the text" (VD 2.2, p. 65). (2) On this hypothesis, not only does the certainty of the original text fall, but also that of the Vulgate which was taken from that source (unless it can be proved that the first author of that version—whether he was Jerome or some other one—received a revelation of necessary words directly from the Spirit which, were this not the case, it would be certain he had received from the tradition of the Jews; if this were uncertain, the whole authority of the sacred text would totter).

XII. (3) Even if the points were lately added (as they maintain who trace their origin to the Masoretes of Tiberias), it would not follow that the punctuation was a merely human invention, depending solely upon human will (which, if established, would greatly weaken the authenticity of the Hebrew manuscript; because the points, at least according to those who hold this opinion, are not supposed to have been made at the pleasure of the Rabbis, but according to the analogy of Scripture, the genius of the sacred language and the sense established by usage among the Jews). For although (according to this latter hypothesis) the points may not have been from the beginning as to form, still it cannot be denied that they were always as to sound and value or power. Otherwise since vowels are the souls of consonants, a doubtful sense (and in fact no sense at all) would constantly arise from the words, unless they were coeval with the consonants. Prideaux well observes, "No one will deny that the points and accents have been from the first as to sound and value, but only as to the marks and characters" (Lectio 12, "De Punctorum Hebraicorum origine," in *Viginti-duae Lectiones* [1648], pp. 195, 197). And a little afterwards, "the vowels were coeval with the

consonants as to sound and subjective power, although the marks and signs might not then have been known" (ibid., p. 197). Indeed it can scarcely be doubted that the vowels were represented, if not by their present form, yet by some marks in place of points (viz., by the letters *'vy*, as some think) which moreover are called *matres lectionis*, so that the certain and constant sense of the Holy Spirit might be gathered (otherwise it would depend upon mere tradition, and the regulations and memory of men might easily be forgotten and corrupted). This is the opinion of the very learned Walton: "By the use, and according to tradition, by the aid of the three letters *'vy*, called *matres lectionis*, and standing in the place of vowels before the invention of points, the true reading and pronunciation has been preserved" ("De Textuum originariorum integritate et auctoritate," [Prolegomena, 7] in *Biblia Sacra Polyglotta* [1657], 1:44).

XIII. (4) The adversaries take for granted the very thing to be proved—that the points are a human and recent invention, the contrary of which the Jews with great unanimity thus far (except one Eli, a Levite, who lived a hundred years ago) have asserted. In their footsteps follow many celebrated men, grammarians as well as theologians, Protestants and papists: Junius, Illyricus, Reuchlin, Munster, Cevalerius, Pagninus, M. Marinus, Polanus, Diodati, Broughton, Muis, Taylor, Bootius, Lightfoot, the great majority of modern theologians, and the Buxtorfs, who here say everything before them—the father in his *Tiberias, sive commentarius Masorethicus triplex* (1665), and the son in that very weighty work (*Anticritica: seu vindiciae veritatis Hebraicae* [1653]) in which he opposed the *Arcanii punctationis L. Cappelli vindiciae adversus Joh. Buxtorfii* (in Louis Cappel's, *Commentarii et notae criticae in Vetus Testamentum* [1689], pp. 795-979). Nor would it be difficult to establish this opinion by various arguments, if appropriate here. But as this question seems rather to be grammatical than theological, we are unwilling to bring it into our field. Suffer us briefly to say that we have always thought the truer and safer way to keep the authenticity (*authentian*) of the original text safe and sound against the cavils of all profane persons and heretics whatever and to put the principle of faith upon a sure and immovable basis, is that which holds the points to be of divine origin, whether they are referred to Moses or to Ezra (the head of the great Synagogue). Therefore, the adversaries err who wish to impugn the authority of the Hebrew manuscript from the newness of the points.

Twelfth Question

Is the present Hebrew text in things as well as words so authentic and inspired (theopneustos) *in such a sense that all the extant versions are to be referred to it as a rule and, wherever they vary, to be corrected by it? Or may we desert the reading it supplies, if judged less appropriate, and correct it either by comparison of ancient translators, or by suitable* (stochastikē) *judgment and conjecture, and follow another more suitable reading? We affirm the former and deny the latter.*

I. As the authority (*authentia*) of the sacred text is the primary foundation of faith, nothing ought to be held as more important than to preserve it unimpaired against the attacks of those who endeavor either to take it entirely away or in any manner to weaken it. For this purpose, the preceding controversy against the

papists was taken up. The present question has the same object. In it we will examine the opinion of the celebrated Louis Cappel who, as in his *Arcanum punctationis*, undertook most strenuously to defend the newness of the points as a recent invention of the Masoretes and therefore originating in human diligence and labor. Thus in his *Critica sacra* he strives earnestly to prove that we are not so bound to the present Hebrew text but that we may often lawfully depart from it whenever we can get another better and more suitable reading, either from a comparison of ancient interpreters or by the exercise of right reason or by proper judgment and conjecture (which he fully discusses in *Critica sacra* 6.4-5 [1650], pp. 391-408). In taking up this subject, we do not wish to detract from the reputation of a man deserving well otherwise of the church of God, but only to confirm the opinion thus far constantly held in the church concerning the unimpaired authority (*authentia*) of the sacred text, against those who do not hesitate at this time to adopt these peculiar opinions (*kyrias doxas*) and new hypotheses, or speak of them as trivial and of very little or of no importance to faith.

II. His opinion comes to this: (1) Because the points are a human invention, they can (when necessity calls for it) be altered, and others substituted in their place when the sense which they give is either false or absurd. (2) Not only are we at liberty to change the reading as to the points, but as to the writing itself; still the freedom is greater concerning the former than concerning the latter because the Masoretes (to whom we ought to be bound) often made the former at their pleasure and by the exercise of private judgment. (3) If it can be shown from a collation of ancient interpreters (whether Greek, Chaldee or Latin) that the sense of the versions is either equally good and appropriate or truer and more suitable than that of our Hebrew copy, it will be lawful to change the present reading and to substitute another in its place. (4) This can be done not only from a comparison of interpreters, but also, if we can discover an error in the present reading and a worthless or an absurd and false sense, and can (either by right reason and by the natural faculty of reason or by conjecture) find a plainer and more suitable sense (though a different reading), then in such cases it will be lawful to discard the present reading and to prefer the other. That such is his opinion appears from many passages and particularly from this: "From these it follows that if any reading differing from the present Hebrew text, as to the consonants or letters, and so also as to the words and whole periods, gives a better sense, it is more genuine, true and suitable, wherever it may be found, whether with the LXX, or the Chaldee paraphrases, with Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion or Jerome (the author of the Vulgate version) and therefore should be followed and embraced rather than that of the Masoretes" (*Critica sacra* 6.5.9 [1650], p. 402). This he often confirms elsewhere.

III. In order to strengthen this opinion, he brings forward another hypothesis; viz., that the Hebrew manuscripts (which the Septuagint and other interpreters used) differed from that now in use (which he calls contemptuously the Masoretic and Jewish manuscript), and that the discrepancies of the ancient versions from the present Hebrew copy are so many various readings of the Hebrew text (with the exception perhaps of those which have arisen from the blunders of interpreters who either did not get the signification of the Hebrew words or did not pay sufficient attention to them). Hence he denies that our Hebrew Bible constitutes the sole source, asserting that it should be regarded as only one copy and that the

true and genuine original authoritative text must be gathered and formed from a collation of all the ancient versions. Thus he distinguishes between the "Hebrew Codex in itself and the present Masoretic Codex." The former exists in all the copies which we now have, whether among the Jews or among Christians. The former is to be collected from a comparison of the present text with the ancient versions, which in certain cases he not only puts on an equality with, but also plainly prefers to the present Codex, since he holds that the sense which they give should be followed as truer and more proper than another which the present Codex gives (as we have seen above). "As much regard should be paid to the Septuagint as to the present Codex, not only when the former gives a better sense but also when it gives a sense just as good and appropriate because the Septuagint is more ancient, and in an equality of reading and sense, the authority of the more ancient prevails" (*De Critica . . . epistola apologetica in qua Arnoldi Bootii* [1651]+). And a little afterwards: "The authority of the Septuagint is above that of the present standard, not only in those places where its reading gives a better sense, but also where it gives one as good and appropriate, and that because it is the more ancient. The same can and ought to be said of all the codices of the ancient interpreters."

IV. Far different however is the opinion held in common by our churches; viz., that no other codex should be held as authentic than the present Hebrew one, to which as to a touchstone, all the ancient and modern versions should be referred and if they differ from it be corrected by it, and not it to be amended by them. But although they think the various codices can and ought to be compared with each other that the various readings, arising from the carelessness of transcribers may be discerned; and the errors in whatever codex they occur may be corrected; and do not hesitate to say that no little help in acquiring the true sense comes from a collation of the ancient versions; yet they do deny that they can ever be made equal to, much less be preferred to the original text, so as to make it lawful to adhere to the sense which they give and which may seem to us more appropriate and to reject another which flows from a reading of the present text.

V. That this has ever been the opinion of all Protestants is perfectly clear. The controversy carried on previously with the papists about the authentic edition sufficiently confirms it. The illustrious author in question cannot deny it, for in the beginning of his *Critica sacra*, he says, "The first and most ancient Protestants have said that all things should be examined and corrected by the Hebrew text, which they call the purest source" (1.1 [1650], pp. 3-4). Sixtinus Amama in his celebrated work *Anti-Barbarus Biblicus* (1656) confirms this after proposing his own opinion on the subject. "We conclude," says he, "that all the versions without exception, ancient as well as modern, should be tested by it" (viz., the Hebrew text); "that it is even now the standard, canon and rule of all versions" (1.3, p. 33); and "that therefore no version whatever can be put on an equality with the Hebrew text much less be preferred to it. Thus all Protestants think concerning all versions, whether ancient or modern" (1.4, p. 35).

Statement of the question.

VI. From this the state of the question may easily be inferred. The question is not whether it is lawful to compare the versions with each other and with the original in ascertaining the true sense. Rather the question is whether it is lawful to make equal or prefer to it a reading which arises from them (and seems more appropriate) by substituting it in place of a present read-

ing (in our judgment giving no sense or an absurd and false one). The question is not whether there are not various discrepancies between the present text and the ancient versions; but whether these discrepancies are to be considered as so many various readings of the Hebrew Codex, so that the authentic readings can be no other than that which arises from the collation of the present text and the ancient versions. Lastly, the question is not whether in the examination and collation of codices (both manuscript and printed) we can use our own judgment and the reasoning faculty to distinguish the more approved and to decide which reading is better and more suitable; but whether it is lawful to make critical conjectures about the sacred text (just as in profane authority) by changing letters and points and even whole words, when the sense arising from the present reading does not seem to us appropriate. This the learned man maintains; we deny.

VII. The reasons are: (1) On this hypothesis it follows that there is no authentic text in which we can repose with entire confidence. It would either be the present Hebrew Codex (but according to this opinion this holds the place only of one copy and that reading therefore can be considered as the authentic Hebrew source where there is no dissent among interpreters from the present codex, as the learned man says, *Apol. cont. Boot*, p. 17+) or it would be other codices which the ancient interpreters used. But besides taking for granted that they were different from the present codex (which is his capital error [*prōton pseudos*] as will be proved afterwards), although this is conceded to him, yet they cannot now inspire confidence because they are lacking and no longer exist anywhere except in this version itself (which, since it is human and fallible, cannot become an authentic codex). Finally, who can assure us that the seventy faithfully followed their Hebrew text and that the Greek text (which we now read) is the very same with that which the seventy wrote?

VIII. (2) If all the discrepancies of the ancient versions from the present text were so many various readings of the Hebrew manuscripts different from ours and which the interpreters used, why is there no mention made of such manuscripts by the ancients and no trace of them among the Hebrews (who for many ages have been so careful in observing and collecting even the smallest variations, as the discrepant readings of Ben Ascher and Ben Naphtali, of the orientals and occidentals show)? For who can suppose that these variations of less importance should have remained and that those which were noticed by the ancient interpreters should so utterly perish as to leave no trace behind? For as there were many copies, it is surprising that not one has come down to our time. (a) It is assumed that there are no causes of these discrepancies besides the diversity of manuscripts while there are many others more certain; just as in the present versions, it would be wrong to infer that the interpreters used different manuscripts because innumerable differences of translation occur, when no other except the present copy remains from which they were made. Who does not know that they might more often have attended to the sense rather than to the words, as Jerome frequently says of the seventy? Again, sometimes a discrepancy may have been caused by their ignorance or negligence because they did not notice particularly the words, so that they could often make mistakes in similar letters and words even without a different manuscript. Jerome more than once charges them with this. (b) They might also have used too much liberty in boldly translating in the face of their copy because they did not clearly perceive the

sense and connection of the Hebrew text and preferred to follow with a slight change the sense which they thought flowed from it more naturally. (c) The various ancient versions are evidently not such as they are when first issued, but have been greatly corrupted and altered. This is especially true of the Septuagint and Vulgate. (d) Many corruptions may have crept in through the carelessness or ignorance of transcribers. Therefore they have not arisen from a variety of manuscripts.

IX. (3) Thus the ancient versions would be put on an equality with the original text. For if in all the discrepancies, the ancient interpreters are to be tested by the text no more than this by them, but both to be subjected to the common canon of a more suitable sense, so that a better sense shall decide the true reading (whether it occurs in the Hebrew text or in any of the interpreters), the Hebrew text would have no higher authority than the ancient interpreters except that which would arise from a fitter sense. Indeed it would often be thrown below the translations when its reading would be rejected for others.

X. (4) If we are not bound to the present reading of the Hebrew text and the true reading is to be derived partly from a collation of ancient versions, partly from our own judgment and conjectural (*stochastikē*) faculty (so that there shall be no other canon of authoritative reading than that which seems to us to be the fitter sense), the establishment of the authoritative reading will be the work of the human will and reason, not of the Holy Spirit. Human reason will be placed in the citadel and be held as the rule and principle of faith with the Socinians.

XI. (5) If it is lawful to make conjectures on the sacred text, even when the Hebrew codices agree with the versions (as the learned man [Cappel] says, *Critica sacra* 6.8.17 [1650], p. 424), there could no longer be any certainty of the authenticity (*authentias*) of it, but all would be rendered doubtful and unsettled and the sacred text would be subjected to the will of each conjecturer. Whether this is not to divest it of all authority anyone can readily tell. Nor can it be replied that conjectures are not to be admitted unless they are founded upon and demonstrated by sure reasons and arguments, when the received reading gives a sense either false and absurd or doubtful and disconnected. For everyone will think that he can give reasons for his conjectures and will tax with falsity and absurdity the reading which he endeavors to overthrow. Now who could be the judge whether these conjectures are made rightly and truly? And without a judge, perpetual controversies and disputes would arise between interpreters, each one fighting for his own interpretation and not allowing others to be preferred to his. Nor (if conjectures can have place in the examination of various manuscripts in order to determine the better and more suitable reading) are others therefore to be allowed, founded upon private judgment and not upon the authority of any approved manuscript, not only entirely worthless in themselves, but highly dangerous and destructive to the Scriptures from the great and bold presumption of the human intellect. Neither ought the example of profane authors to be cited here who can freely and without danger be criticized. As if sacred and profane criticism hold an equal rank, and as if there is not the greatest difference between human writings (liable to error) and the divine (God-inspired, *theopneuston*) whose majesty should be sacred, which were received with so great reverence, have been preserved with so much care and approved by so general a consent as to deserve the title of authoritative truth. But what will become of this sacred book, if everyone is allowed to wield a censorious pen and play the critic over it, just as over any profane book?

XII. (6) If no preference is given to the present Hebrew copy over the ancient interpreters, no greater regard paid to it than to them and even the reading of these often preferred when they seem to give a better sense, then Protestants have thus far been contending with the papists on false grounds. For they have asserted the authority of the present Hebrew text above the versions whether ancient or modern. Nor can we any longer press against them that all the versions (and especially the Vulgate) should be examined and corrected by it, if so many versions are not only made equal to it, but also preferred to it.

Sources of explanations.

XIII. A different reading is one thing; a different interpretation another. Interpreters may have given various interpretations, but it does not follow that these have arisen from the different readings of various manuscripts, but from the other causes mentioned.

XIV. It is not necessary that the scribes should have been unerring (*anamartētoi*), if we do not suppose there were many Hebrew codices. It is enough that providence has so watched over the integrity of the authoritative codex that although they might have brought into the sacred text many errors either through carelessness or ignorance, yet they have not done so (or not in all the copies), nor in such a way as that they cannot be corrected and restored by a collation of the various manuscripts and of Scripture itself.

XV. Although we may rightly say that the Scripture would be rendered uncertain by the different various readings of various interpreters elicited only from conjecture, it does not follow from this that they are made uncertain by the different interpretations because they have given different translations of one and the same text. For thus indeed the sense is rendered doubtful and uncertain, but not the reading of the words and phrases. It is most difficult with so many various and uncertain readings and conjectures to maintain the certainty of the Scriptures because here is introduced the twofold uncertainty of the reading and the sense. In one case, a sure standard is established to which the discordant interpreters may be referred, but in the other there is no sure foundation and all things are made to depend upon the will and decision of the human mind.

XVI. Although we are bound to the present codex, it is not necessary for it to represent to us the autograph (*autographon*) of Moses and the prophets without even the smallest difference. For in order to preserve a copy exactly conformed to the original, it is sufficient for the same words to occur in each, without which the sense could not exist; and with the words the letters also, without which the words could not exist or be written (although some discrepancies might occur in other minutiae).

XVII. Although this learned man often declares that all the versions ought to be judged and corrected by the Hebrew text and that this is to be preferred to any version whatever, he cannot therefore be freed from the charge (which rests upon him) of putting the ancient versions on an equality with the original text and even of preferring them. For by the Hebrew text he does not mean the present original text which is used by all (both Jews and Christians), but the Hebrew text in general, which he wishes to derive both from the present codex and from the ancient codices which he supposes the ancient interpreters used and (as we said before) rests upon no solid foundation. And all the theologians who thus far have in any way argued concerning the Hebrew text and its authenticity have meant no other than the common and now received text.

XVIII. From what has been said, it appears how dangerous the hypotheses of this learned man are and with how much reason our friends have resisted the publication of this work, lest the cause of God might suffer injury and encouragement be given (although undoubtedly against his will) to the adversaries of the authenticity (*authentian*) of the sacred text.

XIX. Whoever desires to learn more on this subject should consult the *Anticritica: seu vindiciae veritatis Hebraicae* (1653) of the celebrated Buxtorf (which he opposes to the *Critica sacra*) in which he has accurately and most satisfactorily set forth this whole argument. The testimonies of other great men might also be adduced to show how highly displeased they are with his opinion and work. For instance James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh, who says it contains "a most dangerous error" to be met at once before it has time to spread (Letter 288, "To Dr. Arnold Boate," in his *Whole Works* [1847-64], 16:187). And of the same Arnold Bootius in his epistle (cf. Letters 286, 291, 299, "Boate to the Archbishop of Armagh," *Whole Works* [1847-64], 16:182, 193-97, 234-36) to that venerable bishop and in his *Vindiciis*, in which he styles this work a "most pernicious writing in which there is nothing (*ouden*) sound (*hygies*)" (*Vindiciae seu apodixis apologetica pro Hebraica veritate* 6 [1653], p. 51). He calls it "an unhappy critique, setting forth an opinion entirely false and highly injurious to the sacred word of God" (ibid., p. 57). "Its author is the most hostile enemy to the Hebrew verity, depriving it of all certainty and authority" (ibid., p. 1). Thus many others who loudly complained of it. But as sufficient for the present, we give the testimony of Andrew Rivet, a great man and highly distinguished throughout France and Belgium, who after reading the *Arcanii punctationis* of this learned author, seemed to be drawn over to his opinion, but having read the answer of the celebrated Buxtorf speaks far otherwise in a letter to Buxtorf dated 1645 (which the latter gives in his *Anticritica: seu vindiciae veritatis Hebraicae: adversus Ludovici Cappelli Criticam* [1653]): "As to Capellus, our distinguished friend will send to you his diatribe against you, which I have not yet seen, but know is exposed for sale at Amsterdam where it was published. It will give you an opportunity of examining more closely into other things which he mediates against the sacred text, resting upon dangerous reasoning under the appearance of candor and truth. In these I see that he has imposed upon learned and strong men, but not sufficiently informed on such subjects, some of whom extol his critique not only as an elaborate but also as a highly necessary work. Our colleagues here, thoroughly versed in these subjects, have thought differently and were opposed to our setting it up with their type" (pp. 345-46*). In another letter by the same from Breda (dated 1648): "I am firmly convinced that you, influenced by a true zeal for the authenticity (*authentia*) of the divine word, have entirely overthrown the foundation of that pestiferous and profane critique which this man produced and gave as a help to our enemies, when rejected by the orthodox. If he had gained his end, the whole of the Old Testament would resemble the shoe of Theramenis fitting either foot" (ibid., p. 346). And again: "God will prevent this audacity from going further. I congratulate you heartily that he has raised you up as the pious defender not only of the private cause of your blessed (*tou makaritou*) father, but also of the public possession of the whole true church. May God bless you for your exertions and long spare your life for future labors benefitting us" (ibid.). This judgment many followed, who although at first disposed to favor the new hypotheses, yet when they

had more closely examined them and read the writings of Buxtorf and others against them, were not ashamed to alter their former opinion and yield to a better.

THIRTEENTH QUESTION: VERSIONS

Are versions necessary, and what ought to be their use and authority in the church?

I. This question has two parts. The first relates to the necessity of versions; the second to their authority. As to the former, although the wiser papists recognize their utility and necessity and have themselves made many in various languages, still not a few (taking the opposite ground) condemn them as hurtful and dangerous as Arboreus who says, "the translation of the Scriptures into the vernacular tongue is one source of heresies" (*Primus Tomus Theosophiae* 8.11* [1540], p. 247). Asoto, Harding, Baile and many of the Society of Loyola (*Jesuits*) agree with him and censure the pious and holy desire of translating the Scriptures as "a curious invention (*heurēma*) of heretics banished from orthodox religion, and therefore useless to the church, and impiously and iniquitously devised for the purpose of spreading heresy." Against these the orthodox maintain not only the utility, but also the necessity of versions and prove it by many arguments.

Vernacular versions are necessary.

II. (1) The reading and contemplation of the Scriptures is enjoined upon men of all languages, therefore the translation of it into the native tongues is necessary. Since men speak different languages and are not all familiar with those two in which it was first written, it cannot be understood by them unless translated; it comes as the same thing to say nothing at all and to say what nobody can understand. But here it happens by the wonderful grace of God that the division of tongues (which formerly was the sign of a curse) becomes now the proof of a heavenly blessing. What was introduced to destroy Babel is now used to build up the mystical Zion.

III. (2) The gospel is preached in all languages; therefore it can and ought to be translated into them. The consequence holds good from the preached to the written word because there is the same reason for both and the same arguments (which induced the apostles to preach in the native tongue) prove the necessity of versions. Now although the apostles wrote in only one language, it does not follow that the Scriptures should not be translated into others because there is a different rule as to the sources and versions. The sources ought to be written in only one language and moreover the apostles (as the universal teachers of the church) were bound to write in no other than the universal and most common tongue (which Greek was at that time) just as the Old Testament (intended for the Jews) was written in the Hebrew tongue, their vernacular. But, where the Greek language is not used, there is a need of versions for the spread of the gospel.

IV. (3) Vernacular versions are necessary on account of the constant practice of the church, according to which it is certain that both the oriental and western churches had their versions and performed their worship in the vernacular tongue, as their liturgies evince. Why should the same not be done now when there is the same necessity and reason for instructing the people? Thus since there were two remarkable dispersions of Israel (one among the Chaldeans, the other among the Greeks), and the people of God by using their peculiar idioms

almost entirely forgot the Hebrew language, the Targums or Chaldean paraphrases and Greek versions were made for the benefit of the more ignorant classes. There were many Targums. First comes the Chaldean paraphrase of Jonathan ben Uzziel, the disciple of Hillel, the fellow-disciple of Simeon who was born forty years before Christ. When he saw the pure Hebrew language falling into disuse by degrees and employed only by the learned, he made the Chaldean version from this great treasure; we have a version of the earlier and later prophets by him. Onkelos, who flourished after Christ and was contemporary (*synchronos*) with Gamaliel, added to this a translation of the Pentateuch. A paraphrase of the Hagiographa is also extant by an unknown author. There are also extant Syriac, Arabic, Persian and Ethiopic versions, but little used and known. There is a Syriac translation of the New Testament (which is the most ancient) and is attributed by some to the church of Antioch.

V. The numerous Greek versions of the Old Testament follow these. The most celebrated is the Septuagint made about three hundred years before Christ under Ptolemy Philadelphus. The second is that of Aquila of Pontus, under the emperor Hadrian about A.D. 137. Being first a Greek in religion, afterwards a Christian, then being excommunicated from the church for his attachment to the study of astrology, he went over to the Jews and (actuated by hatred of the Christians) translated the Old Testament in order to corrupt the prophecies concerning Christ. Third, that of Theodotion, who lived under Commodus (A.D. 184), born in Pontus, a Marcionite in religion, and afterwards turning Jew made a new version in which he followed the Septuagint for the most part. Fourth, that of Symmachus, under Antoninus and Aurelius (about A.D. 197), who from a Samaritan turned Jew and translated the Old Testament in order to confute the Samaritans. There were also two others of uncertain authors: from Jericho, found in a cask in that city, under Caracalla (A.D. 220); the other, the Nicopolitan, found near Nicopolis in the reign of Alexander Severus (A.D. 230). Out of all these versions Origen made up his Tetrapla, his Hexapla and his Octapla. The Tetrapla contained in distinct columns the four Greek versions of the Septuagint, Aquila, Symmachus and Theodotion. In the Hexapla, he added two Hebrew editions: one in Hebrew, the other in Greek letters. In the Octapla were inserted the two other anonymous Greek versions, those of Jericho and Nicopolis which some call the seventh edition. The eighth was that of Lucian the Martyr who emended the preceding ones and was favored highly by the Constantinopolitans. The ninth was that of Hesychius which the Egyptians and Alexandrians embraced. The tenth was one which the ancients said was translated from the Latin of Jerome into Greek.

VI. Various ancient Latin versions were also made principally from the Greek versions. The most common was the Italian according to Augustine (CI 2.15 [FC 2:79; PL 34.46]). Two others were made by Jerome: one from the Septuagint; the other (which he carefully corrected from the Hebrew and Greek text) is supposed to be the present Vulgate, but in process of time became greatly corrupted. Many learned men—Lorenzo Valla, Faber Stapulensis, Cajetan, Arias Montanus and others—have pointed out the corrections. Other more modern versions (some in Latin, some in other languages), we need not notice here because they are well known. Hence it is evident that it has been the perpetual practice of the church to use versions.

Sources of solution.

VII. The title on the cross was written in only three languages, not that these three might be set apart for a sacred use, but because they were then the most known and so the best adapted to spread the fame of Christ throughout the whole world (the design of God in that title).

VIII. The unity of the church (Eph. 4:3) does not depend upon the unity of language, but upon the unity of doctrine. The first councils were brought together lawfully and advantageously held, notwithstanding the diversity of tongues.

IX. The dignity of Scripture arises rather from the sense than from the words and if these three languages appear to increase the dignity, it is accidentally from the superstition of the unlettered multitude, not per se.

X. We do not deny that these three languages (after they have ceased to be vernacular) should be retained more often in the assemblies of the learned, that by them and according to them ecclesiastical business may be transacted and controversies settled. But where the faith and devotion of each one is concerned and in order that he may understand what he is doing, they do not have an equal propriety among the people and in public worship.

XI. Although we do not deny that the Hebrew language was in different ways corrupted among the common people by their intercourse with foreigners in the captivity and that many Chaldean and Syriac words crept into it, yet it does not follow from this either that the text was in any way changed or that it was not understood by the people upon whom it was inculcated. For Zechariah, Haggai and Malachi wrote in the pure Hebrew, which they would not have done if the people could not have understood it. Again, we gather from Neh. 8:8 that Ezra read the book of the law before the whole multitude (to which they listened attentively, which they could not have done if they had not understood it). And if Ezra with the Levites is said to have caused them to understand what was read, this must be referred to an explanation of the sense and of the things themselves rather than as a translation of the words.

XII. Although the versions are not authentic formally and as to the mode of enunciation, yet they ought nevertheless to be used in the church because if they are accurate and agree with the sources, they are always authentic materially and as to the things expressed.

The authority of versions.

XIII. Hence we gather what the authority of the versions is. Although their utility is great for the instruction of believers, yet no version either can or ought to be put on an equality with the original, much less be preferred to it. (1) For no version has anything important which the Hebrew or Greek source does not have more fully, since in the sources not only the matter and sentences, but even the very words were directly dictated by the Holy Spirit. (2) It is one thing to be an interpreter, quite another to be a prophet, as Jerome says (*Praefatio in Pentateuchum* [PL 28.182]). The prophet as God-inspired (*theopneustos*) cannot err, but the interpreter as a man lacks no human quality since he is always liable to err. (3) All versions are the streams; the original text is the fountain whence they flow. The latter is the rule, the former the thing ruled, having only human authority.

XIV. Nevertheless all authority must not be denied to versions. Here we must carefully distinguish a twofold divine authority: one of things, the other of

words. The former relates to the substance of doctrine which constitutes the internal form of the Scriptures. The latter relates to the accident of writing, the external and accidental form. The source has both, being God-inspired (*theopneustos*) both as to the words and things; but versions have only the first, being expressed in human and not in divine words.

XV. Hence it follows that the versions as such are not authentic and canonical in themselves (because made by human labor and talent). Therefore, under this relation (*schesei*), they may be exposed to errors and admit of corrections, but nevertheless are authentic as to the doctrine they contain (which is divine and infallible). Thus they do not, as such, formally support divine faith as to the words, but materially as to the substance of doctrine expressed in them.

XVI. There is one perfection of thing and truth to which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be taken away; another perfection of the version itself. The former is a strictly divine work and is absolutely and in every way self-credible (*autopiston*). Such perfection is in the word carried over into the versions. The latter is a human work and therefore liable to error and correction—to which indeed authority can belong, but only human (according to the fidelity and conformity with the original text), not divine.

XVII. The certainty of the conformity of the versions with the original is twofold: the one merely grammatical and of human knowledge apprehending the conformity of the words in the versions with the original (this belongs to the learned, who know the languages); the other spiritual and of divine faith, relating to the agreement of things and doctrines (belonging to each believer according to the measure of the gift of Christ, as he himself says, "My sheep hear my voice," Jn. 10:27; and Paul, "he that is spiritual discerneth all things," 1 Cor. 2:15). Although a private person may be ignorant of the languages, he does not cease to gather the fidelity of a version as to the things themselves from the analogy of faith and the connection of the doctrines: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself" (Jn. 7:17).

XVIII. Conformity to the original is different from equality. Any version (provided it is faithful) is indeed conformable to the original because the same doctrine as to substance is set forth there. But it is not on that account equal to it because it is only a human and not a divine method of setting it forth.

XIX. Although any version made by fallible men cannot be considered divine and infallible with respect to the terms, yet it can well be considered such with respect to the things, since it faithfully expresses the divine truth of the sources even as the word which the minister of the gospel preaches does not cease to be divine and infallible and to establish our faith, although it may be expressed by him in human words. Thus faith depends not on the authority of the interpreter or minister, but is built upon the truth and authenticity (*authentia*) of the things contained in the versions.

XX. If a version could contain the pure word of God in divine words, no correction could take place. For the sources neither can nor ought to be corrected because they are God-inspired (*theopneustoi*) in things as well as in words. But because it sets forth to us in human words the word of God, it follows that it can admit of correction, not with regard to the doctrine itself (which still remains the same), but with regard to the terms which especially in difficult and obscure

passages can be differently rendered by different persons according to the measure of the gift of Christ.

Fourteenth Question: The Septuagint

Is the Septuagint version of the Old Testament authentic? We deny.

I. Among the Greek versions of the Old Testament, that of the seventy interpreters deservedly holds the first place with us. It was so highly valued by the Jews and Christians in the east and west that by the former it was used publicly in the synagogues and by the latter it alone (or versions made from it) was used in their churches. From this version all the translations into other languages (which were anciently approved by the Christian church) were executed (with the exception of the Syriac): as the Arabic, Armenian, Ethiopic, Illyric, Gothic and the Latin version in use before the time of Jerome. To this day the Greek and most other oriental churches recognize it alone.

Statement of the question.

II. The question does not concern the time or the manner in which this version was executed, whether it was made under the auspices and at the expense of Ptolemy Philadelphus; or by the Jews for their own convenience (as Scaliger, *Epistolae* 11 [14] [1627], pp. 100-101); or the seventy interpreters who being shut up in separate cells accomplished the whole work in seventy-two days and indeed with the most exact agreement (although each of them understood and performed the whole work separately from the rest); and other things of the same kind which are related of these interpreters both by Aristeas (who has given a prolix account of the circumstances) and by Josephus and the Christians (who, because they used this version, gave a ready ear to these narratives, eagerly taking hold of whatever would establish its authority). These matters are purely historical and therefore do not belong to our design. However, if we were called upon to express an opinion, we would give our cordial assent to that of those learned men who consider all these things as worthy of little credit. Even in his time, Jerome began to exhibit and attack the genuineness of the narratives, and this has been done more clearly and strongly by more modern writers (Vives, *Saint Augustine, of the Citie of God . . . with . . . comments of Lodovicus Vives* 18.42 [1620], pp. 687-88; Scaliger in *Thesaurus temporum Eusebii* [1606]; Drusius, Casaubon, Wouverus, Ussher, Rivet, Heinsius and others). But we speak here only of its authority (i.e., whether such an authority is to be given to it as to make it to be reckoned God-inspired [*theopneustos*] and authentic).

III. Although the papists do not all speak alike, yet most of them agree that this version was divinely inspired and therefore properly obtains divine authority; and that the translators are to be considered not as interpreters but as prophets, who, that they might not err, had the help of the Holy Spirit in a special way, as Bellarmine says (VD 2.6, pp. 68-71). Baile, Stapleton, P. Carthusia (*de Translat. Bibli.* c. iv.5+) and Johannes D'Espeires ("Tractatus 2: De Versione Septuaginta Interpretum," Disp. I, Dubium 10, *Auctoritas Scripturae Sacrae Hebraice, Graeca et Latine* [1651], pp. 183-86) all agree with him, and so especially does John Morinus, who tries hard to establish the authenticity (*authentian*) of this version (*Exercitationis ecclesiasticae et Biblicae* 7.4+ [1669]). Among our scholars, that most learned man

Isaac Vossius tries to uphold the same idea by a number of arguments in a special treatise (cf. *De Septuaginta Interpretibus* [1661-63]).

IV. Although we do not deny that it is of great authority in the church, yet we regard this authority as human, not divine, since what was done by the translators was by human effort only, not by prophets and men who were God-breathed (*theopneustois*) by the direct inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

V. Therefore it is not to be asked whether it should have any authority in the church. We concede that it is of great weight and rightly to be preferred to other translations. (1) It is the oldest of all, made two thousand years ago and so to be honored for its hoary hair. (2) It was read both in public and in private by the Jews wherever they were dispersed. (3) The apostles and evangelists used it in quoting many Old Testament passages and consecrated it, so to speak, by their writings. (4) The apostles gave it to the church when through it they conquered the world for Christ. Thus the Gentile church was born, raised and nourished by it. (5) The Greek and Latin churches held it as the authorized version for six hundred years. (6) The fathers and ancient ecclesiastical writers explained it by commentaries, set it forth to the people in homilies and by it strangled rising heresies. In their councils, they drew canons from it for the regulation of faith and practice. Rather the question is whether it has such an authority as that it ought to be regarded as authentic and equal to the sources. Our adversaries maintain this; we deny it.

The version of the LXX is not authentic.

VI. The reasons are: (1) It was executed by human study and labor not divinely inspired (*theopneustois*) men. Its authors were interpreters, not prophets (who ceased after Malachi, called by the Jews the seal of the prophets). It is evident also from this as Aristeas says, "the interpreters conferred with each other, disputing and comparing notes on everything, until at length they could all agree" (*Letter of Aristeas* 302 [trans. H. St. J. Thackeray, 1904], p. 52). Now if they consulted together, they did not prophesy. For the sacred writers never consulted with each other discussing everything which they might write. But as taught by the Holy Spirit, they committed all things to writing without any disputation or delay. (2) If they wrote under the influence of the Holy Spirit, such a number would have been superfluous (one being sufficient). There would have been no need for men of great learning, skilled in the Hebrew and Greek, if it had been executed without human study and aid. (3) In many instances, it varies from the sources in words and things and has various false interpretations (*parermēneias*) and discrepancies, as has been shown by the handlers of this argument. Hence Morinus was forced at least to confess, "No more authority is to be ascribed to this version than to those made by human industry" (*Exercitationis ecclesiasticae et Biblicae* 7.4+ [1669]). (4) It is not considered pure now, but greatly corrupted and interpolated. We have only its ruins and wreck (*leipsana*), so that it can hardly be called *the* version of the Septuagint (like the ship Argo which was so often repaired as to be neither the same nor yet another). Jerome frequently alludes to this (*Letter 112* [89], "Ad Augustinum" [PL 22.928-29]; 'Praefatio . . . in librum Paralipomenon Praefatio,' from "Hieronymi Prologus Galeatus" in *Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editionis Sixti V . . . et Clementis VIII* [1865], p. xlix and '. . . in Esdram et Nehemiam Praefatio,' from ibid., p. l). Thus it is usually maintained by the learned that it is from the *koinē* version which may be called *loukianis*, as Jerome testifies (*Letter 106* [135], "Ad Suniam et Fretallam" [PL 22.838]).

Sources of solution.

VII. The apostles used this version not because they believed it to be authentic and divine, but because it was then the most used and most universally received and because (where a regard for the sense and truth was preserved) they were unwilling either rashly to dispute or to create a doubt in the minds of the more weak, but by a holy prudence left unchanged what when changed would give offense, especially when it would answer their purpose. However, they did this in such a manner that sometimes when it seemed necessary, when the version of the Septuagint seemed to be not only unsuitable but untrue, they preferred the source (as Jerome says, *Jerome's Apology . . . Against the Books of Rufinus* 2.34 [NPNF2, 3:517]). This can easily be gathered from a comparison of Mt. 2:15 with Hos. 11:1; Jn. 19:37 with Zech. 12:10; Jer. 31:15 with Mt. 2:18; Is. 25:8 with 1 Cor. 15:54.

VIII. The quotations in the New Testament from the Septuagint are not authentic *per se* (or because they were translated by the seventy from Hebrew into Greek), but *per accidens* inasmuch as they were drawn into the sacred context by the evangelists under the influence of the Holy Spirit.

IX. If some of the fathers extol this version and assert its authenticity (as we cannot deny was done by Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Augustine and others), they did so more from feeling than knowledge, being almost entirely unacquainted with the Hebrew language. Nor are we bound to adopt their opinion since they, as well as the seventy, were liable to human errors and passions. But Origen and Jerome, the most learned of them, held an entirely different opinion, teaching that they were interpreters, not inspired.

X. Although the church used this version for many years, we must not infer that she held it to be authentic and divine, but only that she held it in great estimation. Ordinary use could not have interfered with the liberty of access to the source as often as might be necessary.

XI. The great discrepancies in chronology between the Hebrew text and the version of the Septuagint (the Hebrew manuscripts making only 1656 years from the creation to the deluge, while the Septuagint makes 2242) does not prove that the version is authentic, but rather that it is corrupt. The consent of the Hebrew codices favors the Hebrew calculation (there being no variation in them on this subject); (2) so too the agreement (*symphōnia*) of all the ancient versions: the Chaldean, the Syriac, the Samaritan, the Arabian and the Latin, which vary from the Septuagint here and follow the Hebrew; (3) also the manifest error of the Greek version in extending the life of Methuselah at least fourteen years beyond the flood (if not twenty) and yet does not say that he was in the ark. For if Methuselah begat Lamech in the 165th year of his age (as the admirable notes in Walton's edition of the Greek version say, *Biblia sacra polyglotta* [1657], 1:20 on Gen. 5:25), Methuselah ought to have lived so many years after the flood. And if some Greek copies have in this instance followed the Hebrew (as Vossius says of the African and Alexandrine Codices), these few (which were no doubt corrected from the Hebrew) ought not to be opposed to the numberless copies which the church and the fathers followed in which this computation does exist.

XII. The arguments for the Greek computation are easily answered. First, as to the years of puberty—these were referred by the Greeks to the two hundredth

year (a greater proportion to the whole life), by the Hebrews to the one hundredth year. Since Walton himself (although holding Vossius' opinion) acknowledges the weakness of this argument and says "they are foolish conjectures, unworthy of a man of sound mind" ("De Versionibus Graecis," [Prolegomena 9] in *Biblia sacra polyglotta* [1657], 1:68); and it is also assumed that the years of puberty (or the power of generation [*paidogonian*]) necessarily follow the quadruple or quintuple proportion of the whole life (since they ought to answer to the vigor of the body), it is absurd that in those first ages in which their bodies were very vigorous, puberty should be put off to the two hundredth year. It is clearly evident that in the cases mentioned by Moses, the proportion of puberty to life was not observed: Noah begat in his five hundredth year; Mahalalel in his sixty-fifth; Lamech in his 102nd; Cainan in his seventieth; Enoch in his sixty-fifth. The powers of generation of the postdiluvian patriarchs (although their lives were much shorter) are made almost equal to those of the former by the Greeks and are referred for the most part to the 130th year.

XIII. Second, what they adduce to prove the authenticity (*authentian*) of the Greek text (because no such corruption could happen by chance, which nevertheless has happened, nor by design because no good reason can be given for doing so) are still stronger proofs of the integrity of the Hebrew Codex—to which (other things being equal) the prerogative is not usually denied. Now although this corruption did not exist in the original version, could it not arise from the carelessness or oversight of transcribers (*ablepsia*)? Again, a sufficient and plausible pretext is that in the matter of time they wished to gratify the Egyptians (because the Hebrew text is much more opposed to the antiquity of Egypt than the Greek). For although Walton rejects this reason, yet Vossius considers it of great importance and on this very account prefers the Greek to the Hebrew because that agrees more with the antiquity of the Egyptians than this. By the addition of these 1600 years, the dynasties of the Egyptians might easily be included within the limits of the creation. Scaliger and G. Vossius propose a plan in which this can be done, if we admit the additions of the Greek with the Hebrew.

XIV. No importance can be given to the Greek computation from the fact of the Greek church and most of her writers following that computation instead of the Hebrew because this might have arisen from error or from an ignorance of the Hebrew language, inducing them to follow the most universally received version.

XV. The anachronism (*anachronismos*) in the Septuagint in the calculation of the life of the postdiluvian patriarchs (where they extend the number of years above 1700 to the birth of Abraham—the Hebrew making only 292 years—because they add at least one hundred years to the life of each of the patriarchs who lived between the flood and the time of Abraham) cannot favor the authenticity of that version. It demonstrates a glaring error from whatever source it may have arisen. The attempts which Vossius and Walton make to confirm this are not strong enough to weaken the authenticity (*authentian*) of the sacred text (as Robert Baillie, *Operis historici et chronologici* 1.4 [1668], pp. 20-41 powerfully demonstrates at length).

Fifteenth Question: The Vulgate
Is the Vulgate authentic? We deny against the papists.

I. The question does not refer to the utility of the Vulgate and its frequent correspondence with the truth (which no one denies); nor to its antiquity and long use in the church (which also is granted by all). The question is whether its authenticity is of such a nature that it can be made equal to the original and be preferred to all other versions. This we deny and the papists assert, in accordance with the Council of Trent, Session 4, Decree 1: "Whoever will not receive as sacred and canonical these entire books with all their parts, as they have been usually read in the Catholic church, and are contained in the Old Vulgate edition, let him be accursed" (Schroeder, p. 18). And again: "In addition the same Synod considering that it would be of no little benefit to the church, if it should point out which of all the Latin Editions is to be considered as authentic, determines and declares, that this old and Vulgate edition itself, which has been used for so long a time in the church, should be esteemed authentic in the public reading of the Scriptures, in disputations, in preaching, and in expounding, and that no one should dare to reject it under any pretext whatever" (ibid.).

II. True, there are varying opinions among the papists as to the sense of this decree. Some maintain that no comparison is made between that version and the source, but only with other Latin versions then in use; as Bellarmine, Serarius, Salmeron, Mariana and many others who think that it can even be corrected and emended from the sources. Others maintain that it is absolutely declared to be authentic (so that there is no better) and is to be preferred to all editions in whatever language and, even by it the original codices (as corrupt) must be emended; as Cano, Valentia, Gordon, Gretser, Suarez and others. But whoever attentively considers the words of the decree will easily perceive that it leans to the latter opinion. For if it can be rejected "under no pretext whatever" then not "under the pretext of the Hebrew codex" (which Hart openly maintained in his colloquy with Rainolds; cf. *Summe of the Conference Between John Rainolds and John Hart* [1584]). Hence Cardinal Ximenes, in the preface to the Complutensian Bible, declares that "he placed the Latin between the Hebrew and the Greek as the two thieves on this side and on that, but Jesus in the middle—that is the Roman or the Latin Church" ("Prologus ad lectorem," *Biblia Polyglotta* [1514-17], vol. 1, leaf 2v). Nor does Mariana receive the support of his companions when (in his book on the Vulgate) he says that it is of no less authority than the sources when it agrees with them and must be pardoned when it differs. Therefore the *Index Expurg.*+ erased these words "*ubi cum fontibus convenit.*" Ludovicus de Tena, confronting Mariana, says, "If the Vulgate is authentic only when it agrees with the sources and faulty when it differs from them, then it is not absolutely authentic and the Tridentine decree gives it no greater certainty as to us than it had before. Even before the decree it was considered authentic under that condition (viz., of agreement with the sources). Therefore if the Council of Trent did so decree, the question still remains unsettled" (*Isagoge in Totam Sacram Scripturam* 1, diff. 6.3 [1620], p. 31).

The Vulgate is not authentic.

III. Although we respect the Vulgate as an ancient version, we deny its authenticity. (1) It was elaborated by human skill and has no God-inspired (*theopnueston*) author which the authentic edition demands. For whether its author was Jerome (as the papists hold) or some other one before his time (who combined the Italian version and the Vulgate so-called) or Sixtus V and Clement VIII (who in many particulars corrected the old one which was used in the church) no one of them was inspired (*theopneustos*).

IV. (2) It was not authentic either before the decree of the Council or after. Not before because it contained many errors, which were freely pointed out by the papists (Nicholas of Lyra, Paul Burgensis, Driedo, Jerome of Oleastro, Cajetan and others—especially by Isidorus Clarius, who says that he observed eighty thousand errors in the Latin Vulgate). Sixtus of Siena says, "We are free to acknowledge that we have corrected many errors from Jerome in the old translation, and so in this our new edition have discovered some blemishes, solecisms, barbarisms, and many improper and ungrammatical translations; obscure and ambiguous interpretations, some things added others omitted; some transposed and corrupted by the fault of the writers, which Pagninus, Oleastrius, Vatablus, Cajetanus have noticed in their interpretations and expositions" (*Bibliotheca sancta* 8 [1575], 2:365). Surely if Pope Leo X had esteemed it authentic before, he would not have authorized Pagninus of Lucca to make a new version because he saw that the celebrated version of Jerome had been grossly corrupted and injured by the carelessness of men and the waste of time (as Sixtus of Siena relates, ibid., 4, p. 265). Nor could it be called authentic after the Council (of Trent) because a council could not make that authentic which was not so before. For as it cannot make our uncanonical book canonical, but only declare it such, so neither can it make a version authentic (since this belongs to God alone who can confer divine authority on whatever writing he pleases). But a council can only declare that the version is faithful and consistent with its source; or, if faults have crept in, to correct them; also to make its use obligatory upon the church.

V. (3) It varies from the sources in many places. Clement VIII grants this concerning the Sixtine edition, emending it although it had been pronounced authentic by the Council and corrected by Sixtus. Two years afterwards, he reviewed it, restored some things which had been expunged by Sixtus and changed and corrected many things. This is evident from a comparison of the examples in the *Bellum Papale* (1678) of Thomas James where (besides innumerable varieties) he brings forward two thousand readings which (confirmed by the apostolic authority of Sixtus against the truth of the Hebrew and Greek) Clement corrected by the same authority and called back to the sources ("Praefatio ad Lectorem," *Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editionis Sixti V Pontificis . . . et Clementis VIII* [1865], p. xli). These cannot be considered errors of the press, for who can believe that thousands of errors could have crept from the press into that edition upon which Sixtus bestowed so much labor? The preface to the Clementine edition (which Clement pronounced authentic after the Sixtine) shows that it also contains many errors. "Therefore receive, Christian reader, with the approval of the same pontiff, a Vulgate edition of the Holy Scriptures corrected with whatever care could be given; although it is difficult to call it final in every part, on account of human weakness, yet it cannot be doubted to be more corrected and

purer than all the others which have been published up to now" ("Praefatio ad Lectorem," *Biblia sacra . . . Vulgatam Clementiam* [1965], p. xi). For if it is difficult to say that it is entirely free from all faults and only purer than those which have preceded it, therefore it does not deny that afterwards more correct ones could be produced, nor can it be what the Council called "fully corrected" (*emendatissima*) (Schroeder, p. 19). But in what follows this very thing will be more evident when it is expressly said, "in the ancient Vulgate version of the Bible a certain force seems to have altered that which was relinquished by deliberate exchange." Bellarmine, who was among the correctors, does not conceal this: "You see, the Vulgate Bible was not completely corrected by us; for good reason we left much undone which seemed to call for correction" (cf. "In Christo Patri Iacobo Blasaeo . . . Franciscus Lucas," in *Biblia sacra Vulgata* [1624], vol. 2, near the end of the volume).

VI. (4) Formerly many papists (Erasmus, Valla, Pagninus, Cajetan, Oleaster, Forerius, Sixtus of Siena) acknowledge that the Vulgate was filled with mistakes, and many celebrated interpreters of the present day (Salmero, Bonfrerius, Serarius, Masius, Muis and others) agree with them and therefore leave it for the sources.

VII. (5) There are many passages which, being falsely rendered, give occasion or support to the most dangerous errors. *Ipsa* ("she") shall bruise (Gen. 3:15) is referred to the virgin; whereas in Hebrew we read *hv'* (*ipsum*, i.e., "the seed"). *Erat enim Sacerdos* ("he was a priest," Gen. 14:18) for *et erat* ("and he was"). *Invocatur nomen meum super eos* ("let my name be invoked over them," Gen. 48:16) for *vocetur in iis nomen meum* ("let my name be named among them"). *Adorate scabellum pedum ejus* ("worship his footstool," Ps. 99:5) instead of *ad scabellum* ("at his footstool"), if the ark is meant; or *in scabello* (i.e., in the temple) which is his footstool. *Omnia in futurum servantur incerta* ("All things in the future are kept uncertain," Ecc. 9:2) instead of *omnia sunt ante eos* ("all things are alike to all"). *Suggeret vobis omnia, quaecunque dixero vobis* ("suggest to you all that I shall say to you," Jn. 14:26) to favor unwritten (*agraphous*) apostolic traditions; but the Greek is very different, *panta ha eipon hymin* (*omnia quae dixi vobis*, "all that I said to you"). *Adoravit fastigium virgae* ("he worshipped the top of his staff," Heb. 11:21) contrary to the intention of Paul (*prosekynēse epi to akron*, *adoravit super summitatem baculi*, "he worshipped upon the top of his staff"), i.e., as Beza translates it for *baculo innixus* ("leaning on his staff," *Annotationes maiores in Novum . . . Testament: Pars Altera* [1594], p. 537 on Heb. 11:21). *Talibus hostiis promeretur Deus* ("with such sacrifices God's favor is merited," Heb. 13:16) instead of *delectatur* ("God is delighted"). *Non ego, sed gratia Dei mecum* ("Not I, but the grace of God with me," 1 Cor. 15:10) for *quae mecum est* ("which is with me"). Other passages may be adduced in which there are errors of omission and of addition; as *Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus, alioquin gratia iam non est gratia* ("And if by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace," Rom. 11:6), a whole clause is lacking after this which is contained in the Greek, "but if it be of works, then it is no more grace; otherwise work is no more work." The words *In propatulo* ("in the open") are omitted three times in Mt. 6:4, 6, 18. These words are lacking in Mt. 15:8: "This people draweth nigh to me with their mouth." In Mt. 20:22, these are missing: "and to be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with?" In 1 Cor. 6:20, after *in corpore vestro* these are missing: *et in spiritu quae sunt Dei* ("and in your Spirit, which are God's"). The following are errors of addition: Lk. 10:1 makes

"seventy-two others" which in Greek is *heterous hebdomēkonta* ("seventy others"); Acts 9:29, *loquebatur quoque gentibus, et disputabat cum Graecis* ("he was speaking also with the Gentiles, and disputing with the Greeks"), instead of *loquebatur et disceptabat adversus Graecos* ("he was speaking and disputing against the Greeks"); Rom. 4:2, *ex operibus Legis* ("by the works of the Law"), the Greek warants only *operibus* ("by works"). Many similar examples will occur to the reader. See further Whitaker, Chamier, Amamus, James and others of our men who have pointed out the errors of this version.

VIII. (6) Whatever that version may be, which they maintain is partly composed from the ancient version called the Italic (Augustine, CI 2.15* [FC 2:79; PL 34.46]) and the Vulgate (Jerome, *Commentariorum in Isaiam prophetam* 13.49 [PL 24.463-74]), partly from the new one of Jerome, it cannot be authentic. For neither was the Vulgate divinely inspired (*theopneustos*) (otherwise it would not have been lawful for Jerome to correct and interpolate it), nor can the new be considered such according to Jerome's own confession.

IX. (7) The decree of the Council of Trent canonized an edition which at the time had no existence and appeared forty-six years afterwards. The decree was made in 1546. In 1590, the work was finished and published by Sixtus V; two years after that it was published by Clement VIII. Now how could a council approve and declare authentic an edition which it had not examined and in fact had not yet been made?

Sources of explanation.

X. Although the Hebrews and Greeks may have their own authentic texts, it does not follow that the Latins ought also to have one because the cases are not parallel. For it is evident that the Hebrew text of the Old and the Greek of the New Testament proceeded from prophets and apostles really inspired by the Holy Spirit, yet no one will venture to affirm that the authors and promoters of the Vulgate version were equally inspired (*theopneustous*).

XI. The long use of a version connected with reason can give authority to it, but not authenticity (so that it would be improper under any pretext to depart from it). For such authenticity depends not upon long use, but upon divine inspiration. Again, the use of this version has prevailed in the Latin church alone, not in the Greek and Eastern church.

XII. The true and proper cause of an authentic edition is not the testimony of the fathers, the practice of the church or confirmation by a council. For even according to Bellarmine the church does not make books authentic, but only declares them to be such (VD 1.10, pp. 40-42). Therefore the church cannot declare a version to be authentic which is not so in itself.

XIII. There is no necessity for the common people (who are ignorant of the Hebrew and Greek) to hold the Vulgate as authentic in order to know whether they are reading the Scriptures or not. They can apprehend the truth of Scripture no less from the vernacular versions, which they read and understand, than from the Vulgate, which they do not understand.

SIXTEENTH QUESTION: THE PERFECTION OF THE SCRIPTURES

Do the Scriptures so perfectly contain all things necessary to salvation that there is no need of unwritten (agraphois) *traditions after it? We affirm against the papists.*

I. In order to shun more easily the tribunal of the Scriptures which they know to be opposed to them, the papists endeavor not only to overthrow their authenticity (*authentian*) and integrity, but also to impeach their perfection and perspicuity. Hence arises this question concerning the perfection of the Scriptures between us.

Statement of the question.

II. On the state of the question consider: (1) that the question is not whether the Scriptures contain all those things which were said or done by Christ and the saints or have any connection whatever with religion. We acknowledge that many things were done by Christ which are not recorded (Jn. 20:30); also that many things occurred as appendices and supports of religion which are not particularly mentioned in the Scriptures and were left to the prudence of the rulers of the church who (according to the direction of Paul, 1 Cor. 14:40) should see that all things be done decently in the church. The question relates only to things necessary to salvation—whether they belong to faith or to practice; whether all these things are so contained in the Scriptures that they can be a total and adequate rule of faith and practice (which we maintain and our opponents deny).

III. The question is not whether all those things are taught in Scripture word for word (*autolexei*), or immediately and expressly. We acknowledge that many things are to be deduced by legitimate inference and to be considered as the word of God. But the question is whether they are so contained in Scripture, be they expressly in it or derivable from it by legitimate inference, that there is no need of another and an unwritten (*agraphō*) rule of faith from which to derive matters of religion and salvation.

IV. The question does not concern the intensive or qualitative perfection relating to the accurate truth of doctrines and precepts and the most perfect method of delivering them. Rather the question concerns the extensive and quantitative perfection relating to all things necessary to faith and practice. The former occurs in every part of Scripture; the latter in the whole body.

V. The question is not whether the perfection of Scripture has always been the same as to degree (for we acknowledge that revelation increased according to the different ages of the church, not as to the substance of the things to be believed, which has always been the same, but as to the clearer manifestation and application of them). The question is whether it is now so complete as to be an adequate rule of faith and practice without the help of any traditions.

VI. The question is not whether there was never an occasion in the church for unwritten (*agraphois*) traditions (for we acknowledge that God sometimes taught the church by unwritten [*agraphō*] words before the time of Moses). Rather the question is whether when the canon of Scripture has been once closed, there is any place for unwritten (*agraphoi*) traditions worthy of as much reverence as the Scriptures (which the papists hold and we deny).

VII. The question is not whether all traditions are to be entirely rejected (for we grant that there may be some use for historical traditions, concerning facts and ritual traditions, concerning rites and ceremonies of free observation). But we here speak only of doctrinal and moral traditions relating to faith and practice, the use of which beside the Scriptures we disapprove.

VIII. The question is not whether the divine and apostolic traditions (i.e., all the doctrines taught by Christ or his apostles) are to be received (for all readily

grant this). The question is whether there are any such traditions beside the Scriptures. Therefore until our adversaries prove conclusively that their unwritten (*agraphous*) traditions have indeed flowed from Christ and his apostles (which they never can do), we discard them as human.

IX. The question then amounts to this—whether the Scripture perfectly contains all things (not absolutely), but necessary to salvation; not expressly and in so many words, but equivalently and by legitimate inference, as to leave no place for any unwritten (*agraphon*) word containing doctrinal or moral traditions. Is the Scripture a complete and adequate rule of faith and practice or only a partial and inadequate rule? We maintain the former; the papists the latter, holding that "unwritten traditions pertaining to faith and practice are to be received with the same regard and reverence as the Scriptures," Session 4 (Schroeder, pp. 17-20; Bellarmine, VD 4.2,3, pp. 115-19).

X. The Jews preceded the papists in the reception of traditions, dividing the law into the written and oral. Moses, having received the law on Mt. Sinai, delivered it to Joshua, he to the seventy elders, they to the prophets, they again to the great synagogue and so on until at last it was committed to writing in the Talmud. Hence various *deuterōseis* ("traditions") prevailed among them as calling forth rebukes from Christ—an artifice of Satan to draw the Jews more easily from the written law by this law. By the same device, he has caused the papists to contrive a twofold word of God: one written, the other not written, as if Christ and his apostles taught many things by the spoken word which they did not commit to writing. Hence arose unwritten traditions (so-called *agraphoi*), not because they never have been written, but because (according to Bellarmine) they were not written by the original author or because they are not found written in any apostolic book.

XI. In order to clear themselves of the charge of attributing insufficiency to the Scriptures in this way, some of them distinguish between an explicit and an implicit sufficiency (as Stapleton and Serarius) or mediate and an immediate (as Perronius). And they confess that the Scripture is not indeed sufficient immediately and explicitly, but yet that it can be called so mediately and implicitly because it refers to the church and to tradition what is not contained in itself.

XII. On the other hand, we give to the Scriptures such a sufficiency and perfection as is immediate and explicit. There is no need to have recourse to any tradition independent of them.

The perfection of the Scripture is proved by 2 Tim. 3:15, 16.

XIII. (1) Paul says *pasan graphēn* is *theopneuston* "and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works" (2 Tim. 3:15-17). Here many arguments for the perfection of the Scripture are latent. First, the Holy Scriptures "are able to make us wise [*sophisai*] unto salvation" (2 Tim. 3:15). For what do we desire more than to be made partakers of salvation? Second, it is useful for all theoretical and practical purposes, for teaching the faith and forming the manners. Third, it can make the man or minister of God perfect in every good work, and what is sufficient for the shepherd must also be so for the sheep.

XIV. To no purpose do the papists object, first, that it is called useful. Everything useful is not sufficient. Water is useful to life, air to health, yet they are not

sufficient. For what is useful not to some things only, but universally to all (by a complete and adequate, not a partial and incomplete utility) must necessarily be sufficient. Now Scripture is here pronounced such when it is said to be able to make a man wise (*sophisai*) unto salvation, and to be useful for the indoctrination (*didaskalian*) of the true and refutation (*elenchon*) of the false, for the correction (*epanorthōsin*) of evil and the instruction (*paideian*) of good, since nothing more is required for perfection. Nor do those comparisons apply here because it is one thing to speak of utility, referred only to a remote and accidental end, such as exists in the air to health and in water to nutrition, for the utility would mean only a help, not a sufficiency; quite another thing to speak of utility as referred to a proper, immediate and natural end; for then it necessarily draws sufficiency along with it, as when fire is said to be useful for the production of warmth. Now it is plain that the Scriptures are said to be useful in this latter sense. Second, it refers only to the Scriptures of the Old Testament. Therefore, if they alone are said to be sufficient for all things, the New Testament would be proved superfluous; or if the New could be added to the Old Testament, there would be no objection to our adding now another to the New. For Paul speaks of all Scripture existing at that time, and we know that not only the Old Testament, but also many parts of the New had then been written. (2) If the Old Testament was sufficient, then so much the more the Old and New together. (3) The sufficiency of the Old Testament for its time does not prove the superfluousness of the New, for as the age of the church varies, the grade of revelation also varies; not that it becomes more perfect as to the substance of doctrines, but only as to the circumstances and their clearer manifestation. (4) If the New Testament was added to the Old, it does not follow that another can be added to the New because now the canon of Scripture is perfect in every way, not only as to the substance of matters of faith, but also as to the mode and degree of revelation which we can have in this life. Third, he does not say *holēn* ("the whole"), but *pasan graphēn* ("all Scripture"). For if the syncetegorema is pressed, that perfection must belong to each part of the Scriptures (which is absurd). For the word *pasa* here is not distributive for particular parts or verses of Scripture, but collective for the whole (as it often means, Mt. 2:3; 27:45; Acts 2:36; Lk. 21:32; Acts 20:27*). Thus it is understood by Cornelius a Lapide, Estius and the Catechism of the Council of Trent.

XV. (2) God expressly forbids us to add anything unto or to diminish from his word: "Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish aught from it" (Dt. 4:2); "but though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that ye have received, let him be accursed" (Gal. 1:8); "If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book: and if any man shall take away anything, God shall take away his part out of the book of life" (Rev. 22:18, 19). It cannot be said that he means only the law delivered by spoken voice by Moses (which was fuller than the written) because the written (*engraphon*) and unwritten (*agraphon*) word of Moses differed not in reality, but only in mode. Nor did he teach by spoken voice anything else than what he wrote. Hence he was ordered to write the whole (not a mutilated) law for the perpetual use of the church; and as a faithful servant he did so (Ex. 24:4; Dt. 31:9, 11, 19). So everywhere by "the law" is meant the book of the law (Dt. 28:58; Jos. 1:7); or that it means only the integrity of obedience because integrity of obedience relates to the integrity of the law,

which is such that it is wrong to add anything to it; or that it means corrupting and not perfecting additions because no tradition can make that perfect which is already so; nor is corruption and opposition so much condemned as simple addition and opposition. Hence, Paul does not so much say against, but above (*supra*) or beyond (*praeter*); *par' ho* (*evangelizatum est*) as the Vulgate has it (Gal. 1:8). Theophylact properly observes: "He did not say, if they preach anything contrary to, but even if they preach the smallest thing beyond what we have preached" (*ouk eipen hoti ean enantia katangellousi, alla kan mikron ti euangelizontai par' ho euangelisametha, Epistolae . . . ad Galatas Expositio* [PG 124.960] on Gal. 1:8). Every addition in matters of faith is a corruption (because added to the foundation which must be the only one) and anything added overthrows it, just as a circle is destroyed if you make the slightest addition, and a weight to be just must not be tampered with. Nor were the prophets and apostles therefore wrong in adding so much to the Mosaic canon. For the ages of the church must be considered in accordance with which revelation ought to increase, not as to the substance of doctrines, but as to the mode and circumstances. On the contrary, Paul (who says that he declared unto believers all the counsel of God, Acts 20:20, 27) nevertheless protests that he had spoken no other things than those which the prophets and Moses spoke (Acts 26:22). Finally, many of the popish additions are not only beyond, but even contrary to it. As to John, he did not mean only to forbid the interpolation of his own prophecy, but as the last of the sacred writers, he closes the whole canon of the Scriptures with his apocalypse and seals it with those last terrible words. Besides the argument in equals always holds good and what is said of this book must apply to the others also.

XVI. (3) The law of God is said to be "perfect, converting the soul and making wise the simple" (Ps. 19:7*). Now the conversion and restoration of the soul cannot take place unless all things necessary to salvation are known. Nor can it be said that this refers only to the intensive perfection (as to quality) because the law is immaculate and free from fault as to single parts, and not to the extensive perfection as to quantity and amplitude. For both the primary signification of the word *thmym* denotes such a perfection as needs nothing more; and the very nature of the thing demands it because it speaks of a perfection which can convert the soul and give wisdom to the simple (which would be impossible without a full sufficiency).

From the end of the Scriptures.

XVII. (4) The design of the Scriptures demand such a perfection for they were given that we might have salvation and life from them (Jn. 20:31; 1 Jn. 5:13; Rom 15:4), but how could that end be answered unless they were perfect and contained all things necessary to salvation? They were designed to be the canon and rule of faith. Now a rule which is not entire and adequate is for that very reason no rule at all because a rule is such a measure as cannot be added to, nor diminished—an inviolable law (*nomos aparabatos*) (as Phavorinus says, "an infallible measure, admitting of no addition or diminution," *kai metron adiapseuston, pasan prosthesin kai aphairesin mēdamōs epidechomenon—Dictionarium Varini Phavorini* [1538], pp. 986 [*kanon*] and 1313 [*nomos*]). They are designed to be the testament of Christ. Now if no one would dare to add anything (*epidiatassesthai*) to a man's testament (Gal. 3:15), how much less to the divine, in which the lawful heir may no less safely than firmly believe the whole will of the testator to be

contained? Finally, they were intended to be the contract of the covenant between God and us. Now who would say that either more or different things than those which we now find written were either promised by God or required from us?

XVIII. (5) All doctrinal traditions besides the Scriptures are rejected (Is. 29:13). "In vain they do worship me, teaching the doctrines and commandments of men" (Mt. 15:4, 9). Nor can it be replied that the Pharisaical traditions are rejected, not the apostolic. All doctrines taught by men and not contained in the Scriptures are rejected and the assumption is gratuitous that there are any apostolic traditions out of the Scriptures. Believers are called to the law and the testimony (Is. 8:20) and destruction is denounced against those who do not speak according to it. Nor can traditions be meant by the testimony because God everywhere rejects them. Either the law itself (often called "the testimony") is meant as a testimony of God exegetically or the writings of the prophets which were added to the law. Paul forbids us "to be wise above that which is written" (*par' ho gegraptai*, 1 Cor. 4:6), not only as to morals (to be wise in his own eyes, as Solomon has it, Prov. 3:7), but also as to doctrine—to be puffed up with a vain presumption of knowledge inducing him to propose in the church strange doctrines beyond the Scriptures, as the false apostles among the Corinthians did.

Because no satisfactory reasons can be given for traditions.

XIX. (6) No fit reason can be given why God should wish one part of his word to be written and the other to be delivered by spoken voice. And he would have strangely consulted the interests of his church, if he had entrusted a necessary part of doctrine to the uncertain tradition of men, since every tradition must necessarily be corrupted by the lapse of time. Besides there is no rule for the distinguishing of traditions which does not bring us back to the testimony and authority of the church, and this very authority is most strongly controverted. Therefore, since their origin is doubtful, their authority uncertain, the sense often perplexed and ambiguous and the test of them impossible, everyone must see that they are deservedly rejected by us that we may adhere to the Scriptures alone as the most perfect rule of faith and practice.

From the fathers.

XX. (7) The fathers most decidedly agree with us here. Tertullian: "I adore the fullness of the Scriptures" (*Treatise Against Hermogenes* 22*.3 [ACW 24:57; PL 2.218]). And again: "Hermogenes may teach that it is written, or if it is not written let him fear that woe to those who add anything" (ibid.). And elsewhere: "We have no need of curiosity after Christ, nor of inquisition, after the gospel. When we believe, we first believe this, that there is nothing beyond which we ought to believe" (*Prescription Against Heretics* 7 [ANF 3:246; PL 2.20-21]). Jerome says, "That which does not have authority from the Scriptures, we can as easily despise as approve" (*Commentariorum in Evangelium Matthaei* [PL 26.180] on Mt. 23:35, 36). Augustine says, "In the things openly declared in the Scriptures, we can find whatever is necessary for faith and practice" (CI 2.9* [FC 2:72; PL 34.42]). Basil says, "It is a proof of unbelief and a sign of pride either to weaken any of those things which are written or to introduce what is not written" (cf. *Concerning Faith* [FC 9:58-59; PG 31.678-79]). Irenaeus says, "We knew not the provision for our salvation through others than those through whom the gospel came to us, which indeed they preached, but afterwards through the will of God

delivered to us in the Scriptures, to be the pillar and foundation of our faith" (*Against Heresies* 3.1 [ANF 1:414; PG 7.844]).

Sources of explanation.

XXI. Although all things are not written severally (*kata meros*) as to words and deeds (since there is neither a number nor science of singulars, of which Jn. 20:30 treats), yet they are written as to form (*kat' eidos*), as to the substance of necessary doctrine. Hence we grant that many sayings and doings of Christ and his apostles are not contained in the Scriptures, but deny that any such were different as to substance from those which are recorded there.

XXII. What the papists maintain should be received besides the Scriptures either exist in them really—as the Trinity (as to the thing itself), infant baptism (which Bellarmine proves from Scripture ["De Sacramento Baptismi," 8 in *Opera* (1858), 3:171-74]), baptism not necessary to be repeated, the number of the sacraments (at least those enumerated in Scripture), the admission of females to the Eucharist (Acts 2:42; 1 Cor. 11:5, cf. v. 28), the change of the Sabbath to the Lord's day (Rev. 1:10; 1 Cor. 16:2; Col. 2:16, 17); or they are not doctrines necessary to salvation—as the perpetual virginity of Mary even post partum and the obligation to keep the Passover on the Lord's day; or they are false and counterfeit—as the local descent of Christ to hell, purgatory, the Mass, the return of Enoch and Elijah, etc.

XXIII. The trust committed to Timothy (1 Tim. 6:20) refers not to some doctrine delivered by the spoken voice and not written, but either to the form of sounder words (mentioned in 2 Tim. 1:13), instead of the profane novelties and oppositions of science falsely so called (*pseudōnymou gnōseōs*), or to the talents committed to his charge. These have nothing in common with the farrago of unwritten traditions.

XXIV. The many things which the disciples of Christ could not bear (Jn. 16:12) do not imply the insufficiency of the Scriptures or the necessity of traditions. For they were not new doctrines differing in substance from the former (Jn. 14:26), but the same as about to be more fully declared and more strongly impressed by the Spirit. And afterwards, being instructed fully by the effusion of the Spirit, they committed them to writing.

XXV. Second Thess. 2:15 does not sanction unwritten (*agraphous*) traditions, but designates the twofold method of delivering the same doctrine by the voice and by writing. The disjunctive particle *eite*, which can also be considered copulative (as in Rom. 12*:8; 1 Cor. 15:11; Col. 1:20), marks a diversity not of the thing, but of the mode, which might be one or the other, especially in those primitive days when the canon of the New Testament Scriptures was not yet completed. Again, although all things were not contained in the epistle to the Thessalonians, it does not follow that they were not to be found elsewhere in the Scriptures.

XXVI. Tradition is sometimes taken to mean any doctrine handed down to us whether in writing or by the voice; and again for a doctrine handed down by the voice alone and not written. The question does not concern tradition in the former sense (for then all the doctrines contained in the Scriptures might be called traditions, as Paul calls the institution of the Lord's Supper, 1 Cor. 11:23), but concerning an unwritten doctrine.

XXVII. A false distinction is made by Perronius between mediate and immediate sufficiency, so that the Scriptures may be called sufficient not in the second

but in the first sense because they refer us to the church to supply their defects. This would imply a true insufficiency in the Scriptures, for by appealing to the church as having that sufficiency, it would declare its own insufficiency. (2) Then the law might be called perfect for salvation because it refers us to Christ in whom is salvation. (3) The Scriptures do not refer us to the church that she may propose new doctrines, but explain and apply the truths already contained in them. Nor ought the reply to be made here that we hold mediate sufficiency when we maintain that the Scriptures (if not expressly, at least by consequence) contain all things necessary to salvation. When the Scriptures teach anything by consequence, they do not refer us to another for instruction, but give forth from themselves what was virtually latent. Nor can the simile adduced by Perronius of credential letters (*literarum credentiae*, which are called sufficient although they do not contain all the instructions given to the ambassador) apply here. The Scriptures are not only a credential letter, but also the edict of a king, containing so fully all the things to be believed and done that nothing can be added to or taken from them.

XXVIII. The perfection of Scripture asserted by us does not exclude either the ecclesiastical ministry (established by God for the setting forth and application of the word) or the internal power of the Holy Spirit necessary for conversion. It only excludes the necessity of another rule for external direction added to the Scriptures to make them perfect. A rule is not therefore imperfect because it requires the hand of the architect for its application.

XXIX. Some doctrines are positive and affirmative, stating positively what we must believe; others are negative, teaching what we must reject. The question here does not concern the sufficiency of Scripture as to negative articles, as if it ought to contain a rejection of all the errors and heresies which either have arisen or will hereafter arise. For as the right is an index of itself and of the wrong, errors are at once refuted by the laying down of the truth. The question concerns affirmative articles particularly, the very food of the soul.

XXX. Tradition is used either formally for the act of handing down or materially for the thing handed down. Here we do not speak of tradition in the first sense (admitting it, since we possess the Scriptures by it), but in the second, which we deny.

XXXI. The Old Testament Scripture was perfect essentially and absolutely for it contains sufficiently as to that time the substance of doctrine necessary to salvation; although accidentally and comparatively, with respect to the New Testament Scripture, imperfect as to the mode of manifestation, although with respect to the Jewish church it was the age of manhood (Gal. 4:1-4).

XXXII. Jesus, the son of Mary, is the true Messiah; or the Son of God come in the flesh. This is not a new article of faith, but an unfolding and application of what preceded—teaching *in hypothesi* what had already been delivered concerning the Messiah *in thesi* in the Old Testament. Thus when Christ added a facsimile to the original handwriting, a fulfillment to the prediction and a body to the shadow, he did not propose a new doctrine, but only exposed and illustrated an old one.

XXXIII. The tradition of the Scriptures does not sanction other traditions besides. The question properly is not of principles (*principiis*), but of things principiated (*principiatis*): whether, granting the Scriptures, there is need of any oral

traditions to supply their defects in things necessary to salvation. Finally, we acknowledge that tradition is formal and active because the oracles of God were committed to the church as their keeper and proclaimer. But the tradition is not material and passive, implying some doctrine delivered in addition to the Scriptures (which we deny). So we have the Scriptures through tradition not as the source of belief, but only as the means and instrument through which they have come down to us.

XXXIV. The Scriptures are said to be perfect not always adequately to the object, as if it fully explained all the mysteries it records. For there are many things in themselves adequately inexplicable (as God, the Trinity, etc.), but adequately to the end because it so states them that they may be apprehended by us sufficiently for salvation.

XXXV. When we say that the Scriptures are perfect inasmuch as being a rule, we understand this as to the whole of Scripture collectively and not distributively (viz., as to its particular parts, as in a material rule, not everything belonging to it is a rule).

XXXVI. Although the fathers often appealed to the traditions, it does not therefore follow that they recognized the oral (*agraphous*) traditions of the papists, for they speak diversely of them. Sometimes tradition is used by them for the "act of tradition" by which the sacred books were preserved by the church in an uninterrupted series of time (also a perpetual succession) and delivered to posterity. This is formal tradition and in this sense Origen says "they learned by tradition that the four gospels were unquestioned in the church universal." Second, it is often taken for the written doctrine which, being at first oral, was afterward committed to writing. Thus Cyprian says, "Sacred tradition will preserve whatever is taught in the gospels or is found in the epistles of the apostles or in the Acts" (*Epistle 74 [73]*, "To Pompey" [ANF 5:387; PL 3.1175-76]). Third, it is taken for a doctrine which does not exist in the Scriptures in so many words, but may be deduced thence by just and necessary consequence; in opposition to those who bound themselves to the express word of the Scriptures and would not admit the word *homoousion* because it did not occur verbatim there. Thus Basil denies that the profession of faith which we make in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit can be found in the Scriptures (meaning the Apostles' Creed, whose articles nevertheless are contained in the Scriptures as to sense) (*On the Spirit* [NPNF2, 8:41, 43]). Fourth, it is taken for the doctrine of rites and ceremonies called "ritual tradition." Fifth, it is taken for the harmony of the old teachers of the church in the exposition of any passage of Scripture which, received from their ancestors, they retained out of a modest regard for antiquity because it agreed with the Scriptures. This may be called "tradition of sense" or exegetical tradition (of which Irenaeus speaks, *Against Heresies* 3.3, ANF 1:415-16, and Tertullian often as well, *Prescription Against Heretics* [ANF 3:243-65]). Sixth, they used the word tradition *ad hominem* in disputing with heretics who appealed to them not because all they approved of could not be found equally as well in the Scriptures, but because the heretics with whom they disputed did not admit the Scriptures; as Irenaeus says, "When they perceived that they were confused by the Scriptures, they turned around to accuse them" (*Against Heresies,* 3.2 [ANF 1:415; PG 8.846]). They dispute therefore at an advantage (*ek periontos*) from the consent of tradition with the Scriptures, just as we now do from the fathers against the

papists, but not because they acknowledged any doctrinal tradition besides the Scriptures. As Jerome testifies, "The sword of God smites whatever they draw and forges from a pretended apostolic tradition, without the authority and testimony of the Scriptures" (*Commentarii in prophetas: Aggaeum 1:11* [CCL 76A.725]).

Seventeenth Question: The Perspicuity of the Scriptures

Are the Scriptures so perspicuous in things necessary to salvation that they can be understood by believers without the external help of oral (agraphou) *tradition or ecclesiastical authority? We affirm against the papists.*

I. The papists, not satisfied with their endeavors to prove the Scriptures insufficient in order to bring in the necessity of tradition, began to question their perspicuity (as if the sense could by no one be ascertained with certainty without the judgment of the church) in order to have a pretext for keeping the people from their perusal. Having concealed the candle under a bushel, they reign in darkness more easily.

Statement of the question.

II. As to the state of the question, observe: (1) The question does not concern the perspicuity or the obscurity of the subject or of persons. For we do not deny that the Scriptures are obscure to unbelievers and the unrenewed, to whom Paul says his gospel is hid (2 Cor. 4:3). Also we hold that the Spirit of illumination is necessary to make them intelligible to believers. Rather the question concerns the obscurity or perspicuity of the object or of the Scriptures (i.e., whether they are so obscure that the believer cannot apprehend them for salvation without the authority and judgment of the church—which we deny).

III. The question does not concern the obscurity of the things or mysteries recorded in the Scriptures. We agree that there are many mysteries contained there, so sublime as to transcend the highest flight of our minds and can thus far be called obscure in themselves. Rather the question concerns the obscurity of the mode in which these most abstruse things are delivered and which we maintain are so wonderfully accommodated (*synkatabasei*) by the Lord that the believer (who has the eyes of his mind opened) by attentively reading may understand these mysteries sufficiently for salvation.

IV. The question is not whether the Holy Scriptures are perspicuous in all their parts so as to need no interpreter nor exposition of doubtful passages (which Bellarmine falsely and slanderously charges upon us, stating the question thus: "Are the Scriptures of themselves as perfectly plain and intelligible as to need no interpretation?"—VD 3.1, p. 96). For we unhesitatingly confess that the Scriptures have their *adyta* ("heights") and *bathē* ("depths") which we cannot enter or sound and which God so ordered on purpose to excite the study of believers and increase their diligence; to humble the pride of man and to remove from them the contempt which might arise from too great plainness. Rather the question concerns only things necessary for salvation, and indeed as to them, only so far as they are necessary to be known and cannot be unknown without criminality. For instance, the mystery of the Trinity is plainly delivered as to the fact (*to hoti*) which is necessary, but not as to the how (*to pōs*), which we are not permitted to know (nor is that essential to salvation). For as in nature so also in the Scrip-

tures, it pleased God to present everywhere and make easy of comprehension all necessary things; but those less necessary are so closely concealed as to require great exertion to extricate them. Thus besides bread and sustenance, she has her luxuries, gems and gold deep under the surface and obtainable only by indefatigable labor; and as heaven is sprinkled with greater and lesser stars, so the Scriptures are not everywhere equally resplendent, but are distinguished by clearer and obscurer places, as by stars of a greater or lesser magnitude.

V. The question is not whether things essential to salvation are everywhere in the Scriptures perspicuously revealed. We acknowledge that there are some things hard to be understood (*dysnoēta*) and intended by God to exercise our attention and mental powers. The question is whether things essential to salvation are anywhere revealed, at least so that the believer can by close meditation ascertain their truth (because nothing can be drawn out of the more obscure passages which may not be found elsewhere in the plainest terms). As Augustine remarks: "Admirable and healthily the Spirit has so arranged the Scriptures that by the plainer passages he might meet our desires and by the obscurer remove our contempt" (CI 2.6 [FC 2:66; PL 34.39]); and, "We feed in the open places, we are exercised by the obscure; there hunger is driven away, here contempt" (*Sermon 71*, "De Verbis Domini," 7.11 [PL 38.450]).

VI. The question does not concern the perspicuity which does not exclude the means necessary for interpretation (i.e., the internal light of the Spirit, attention of mind, the voice and ministry of the church, sermons and commentaries, prayer and watchfulness). For we hold these means not only to be useful, but also necessary ordinarily. We only wish to proscribe the darkness which would prevent the people from reading the Scriptures as hurtful and perilous and compel them to have recourse to tradition when they might rest in the Scriptures alone.

VII. The question then comes to this—whether the Scriptures are so plain in things essential to salvation (not as to the things delivered, but as to the mode of delivery; not as to the subject, but the object) that without the external aid of tradition or the infallible judgment of the church, they may be read and understood profitably by believers. The papists deny this; we affirm it.

The perspicuity of the Scriptures is proved from Pss. 19:8; 119:105; 2 Pet. 1:19.

VIII. The perspicuity of the Scriptures may be urged: (1) from those parts of them which proclaim this clearness—"the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes" (Ps. 19:8); "thy word is a lamp unto my feet" (Ps. 119:105); "a light shining in a dark place" (2 Pet. 1:19); "the law is light" (Prov. 6:23). Nor is Bellarmine's first objection of any force, that only the precepts of the law are meant and not the whole of Scripture. For the word "law" frequently means the whole word of God, and the effects (consolation and renewal) teach that it ought so to be understood. The interlinear gloss of Lyranus and Arias Montanus agree with us. Peter unquestionably calls the whole word of God a light. Bellarmine's other objection is as untenable—that although it may refer to the whole of Scripture, it must be understood in no other sense than that it illuminates the intellect. The Scriptures are said to be luminous not only because they illuminate the intellect, but because they are in themselves luminous and naturally adapted to illuminate those who look upon them with the eyes of faith. Thus they are

luminous formally and effectively because like the sun they emit rays and impress themselves upon the eyes of the beholder. Finally, nothing could be more silly. For it is the same as saying that the Scriptures do not illuminate unless they illuminate, for as they illuminate so are they understood.

IX. Dt. 30:11 (where the word is said to be not hidden nor far off from us) refers to the easiness not only of fulfilling, but also of understanding its mandates without which they could not be fulfilled. Nor must this be understood only of the law of Moses, but of the word of God in general. Hence Paul applies it to the word of faith (Rom. 10:8*), which cannot be fulfilled by works, but must be believed by faith.

X. The gospel is said to be hidden to unbelievers alone (2 Cor. 4:3) and therefore is plain to believers, not only as preached but also as written. This follows because the apostles wrote the same things they had preached and because the clearness of the gospel is here opposed to the obscurity of the Old Testament (in the reading of which the Jews were occupied and of which Paul treats in 2 Cor. 3:14).

XI. The perspicuity of the Scriptures is further proved: (1) by their efficient cause (viz., God, the Father of men, who cannot be said either to be unwilling or unable to speak plainly without impugning his perfect goodness and wisdom); (2) their design (to be a canon and rule of faith and practice, which they could not be unless they were perspicuous); (3) the matter (viz., the law and the gospel, which anyone can easily apprehend); (4) the form (because they are to us in place of a testament, contract of a covenant or edict of a king, which ought to be perspicuous and not obscure).

XII. The fathers frequently acknowledge it, although they do not deny that the Scriptures have their depths (*bathē*), which ought to excite the study of believers. Chrysostom says, "The Scriptures are so proportioned that even the most ignorant can understand them if they only read them studiously" (*Concionis VII de Lazaro* 3 [PG 48.994]); and "All necessary things are plain and straight and clear" (*In secundam ad Thessalonicenses* [PG 62.485]). Augustine says, "In the clear declarations of Scripture are to be found all things pertaining to faith and practice" (CI 2.9* [FC 2:72; PL 34.42]). Irenaeus says, "The prophetic and evangelic Scriptures are plain and unambiguous" (*Against Heresies* 2.27* [ANF 1:398; PG 7.803]). Gregory says, "The Scriptures have, in public, nourishment for children, as they serve in secret to strike the loftiest minds with wonder; indeed they are like a full and deep river in which the lamb may walk and the elephant swim" ("Preface," *Morals on the Book of Job* [1844], 1:9; PL 75.515).

Sources of explanation.

XIII. The ignorance and blindness of man are not to be compounded with the obscurity of the Scriptures. The former is often pressed upon the Scriptures, but it is not so, nor can the latter be legitimately inferred from the former no more than that the sun is obscure because it cannot be seen by a blind man. Hence if David and other believers desire their eyes to be opened that they may see wonderful things out of the law, it does not therefore prove the obscurity of the Scriptures, but only the ignorance of men. The question here is not Do men need the light of the Holy Spirit in order to understand the Scriptures? (which we willingly grant); but Are the Scriptures obscure to a believing and illuminated man? Again, illumination may be either theoretical or practical, in its first stage or in its increase. David does not properly seek the former, but the latter.

XIV. When Christ is said to have opened the minds of his disciples that they might understand the Scriptures (Lk. 24:45), this does indeed mean that man cannot himself without the aid of grace understand the Scriptures. But this does not thence prove their obscurity, nor can the darkness in the minds of the disciples be imputed to the Scriptures.

XV. It is one thing for *dysnoēta* ("things hard to be understood") to be in the Scriptures, another for *anoēta* ("unintelligible"), which cannot be understood however diligently one studies. Peter says the former (2 Pet. 3:16*), not the latter. It is one thing to say that there are "some things hard to be understood" (*dysnoēta tina*), which we concede; another that all are so (*dysnoēta panta*), which we deny. It is one thing for them to be hard to be understood (*dysnoēta*) in Paul's manner of delivering the epistles, which we deny; another in the things delivered, which Peter intimates. The relative (*hois*) cannot be referred to the word *epistolai*, as Gagnae (cf. *Biblia magna commentariorum literalum* [1643], 5:1067 on 2 Pet. 3:15) and Lorinus confess, but to the things of which he treats. It is one thing to be hard to be understood (*dysnoēta*) by the unlearned and unstable, who by their unbelief and wickedness wrest them to their own destruction (which we hold with Peter); another that they are hard to be understood (*dysnoēta*) by believers who humbly seek the aid of the Holy Spirit in searching them.

XVI. From the obscurity of some parts of the Scriptures (viz., of the ancient prophecies and oracles), the consequence does not hold good as to the obscurity of the whole. Either those prophecies are not of things essential to salvation or whatever is obscure in them is elsewhere made clear. Thus, the "book shut and sealed" (mentioned in Dan. 12:4 and Rev. 5:1), teaches indeed that prophecies are obscure before their fulfillment, but does not prove the whole of Scripture to be so obscure that they cannot be understood by believers in things necessary to salvation.

XVII. Although our knowledge through the Scriptures may be obscure when compared with the knowledge in glory (where we will no longer know through a glass and darkly, but shall see God face to face, 1 Cor. 13:12*), it does not follow that it is absolutely and in itself obscure with respect to our present life. It is sufficiently clear for us here, since through it with open face we behold as in a glass the glory of the Lord (2 Cor. 3:18). (2) Paul speaks of the enigmatical knowledge common to all travellers here, himself not excepted. "Now," says he, "we see in a mirror." But were the Scriptures obscure to Paul? The passage, then denotes only the imperfection of our knowledge in this life and the difference between the revelation of grace and glory, but not the obscurity of the Scriptures.

XVIII. Although the Scriptures must be searched (Jn. 5:39), it does not follow that they are everywhere obscure even in things essential to salvation. First because we do not say that they are perspicuous to everyone, but only to the attentive mind and diligent seeker. Moreover there is need of scrutiny because they are perspicuous to the one who searches, for the most evident things will be obscure to the cursory and careless reader. Second we do not deny that the Scriptures have their *adyta* ("heights") and depths (*bathē*) of mysteries to be fathomed only by the most laborious study and persevering efforts. But then there are many other things (and these essential) which readily strike the eyes of believers.

XIX. Although the apostles could not fully understand the resurrection and ascension of Christ (Jn. 16:18), it does not follow that the Scriptures were to

them obscure. For each one had a knowledge sufficient for his state and the doctrines then revealed. A full revelation of these was to be expected after the resurrection.

XX. The knowledge of the Scriptures may be either literal and theoretical (by which the words are understood as to the letter and grammatically) or spiritual and practical (by which they are apprehended as true by faith). There are many things in the Scriptures theoretically perspicuous even to the natural man. The wicked may dispute most ingeniously of the principal articles of faith, but the practical knowledge is peculiar to believers alone (1 Cor. 2:14, 15; 2 Cor. 4:3).

XXI. The reasons for the obscurity of the Scriptures from the mode of delivery adduced by the papists cannot prove them to be so obscure in the essentials of salvation that they cannot be a perfect rule of faith and practice and the necessity of having recourse to the infallible authority of the church and its pretended tribunal for their explanation. For besides the fact that we are never commanded to do so, they are not such as cannot be ascertained by proper study; or the things contained in those passages are either not essential to salvation or they are elsewhere clearly explained.

XXII. It is one thing to speak of the absolute obscurity of the Scriptures in relation to all the ages and states of the church; another to speak of their comparative obscurity in relation to a particular state. We confess that the Old Testament Scriptures are obscure compared with the New Testament, and the state and age of the Christian church; but this does not destroy their perspicuity in themselves and sufficiently in relation to the state of the Old Testament church to which they were given.

Eighteenth Question: The Reading of the Scriptures

Can the Scriptures be profitably read by any believer, and ought he to read them without permission? We affirm against the papists.

Opinion of the papists on the reading of the Scriptures.

I. The opinion of the papists can be best collected from Rule IV, "Rules Concerning Prohibited Books" published under the sanction of the Council of Trent, which reads thus: "Since experience has proved that on account of the rashness of men more hurt than profit has arisen from permitting the Bible in the vulgar tongue, they interdict the Bible with all its parts, whether printed or in manuscript, in whatever vulgar tongue it exists" (cf. Schroeder, pp. 274-75). But as this appeared rather too harsh, Pius IV appeared willing to modify it when he left the concession of the reading of the Bible to the "judgment of the ordinary pastor" or "bishop" ("to those who, they knew, would not receive hurt but an increase of faith and piety from such a perusal"). But the following observation of Clement VIII on Rule IV shows that this hope was evidently illusory, since he denies that any such power of granting permission "can be afforded *de novo* to bishops or others which had up to this time been denied by the command of the inquisition" (which practice was to be adhered to). Thus by taking away with one hand what they seemed to give with the other, they show their real object to be to hide this light under a bushel and to snatch the Scriptures from the hands of the people lest their errors should be discovered. Yet it must be confessed that to some of the papists who

thought the reading of them should be allowed to believers, this seemed a cruel tyranny. But these are few in comparison with those who advocate its prohibition. Their opinion is received as common to the whole church because founded on a law sanctioned by the authority of a council and a pope. The Council itself proclaimed "his authority to be supreme in the church universal" (Session XIV, Schroeder, p. 96) expressly commissioned to "ascertain and to publish those things which pertained to the censure of books" (continuation of Session XXV, Schroeder, p. 255). Therefore, this can be considered in no other light than a universal law of the Roman Church until it shall be expressly repealed, no matter what they may say to the contrary. But we, on the other hand, maintain not only that every believer may freely read the Scriptures, but also ought to without waiting for permission from a bishop or priest.

Statement of the question.

II. The question is not whether the reading of the Scriptures is absolutely and simply necessary to all. For both infants are saved without it and many unlettered (*analphabētoi*) persons among adults, who never read it. The question is whether it is so lawful for everyone that no one (although ignorant and unlearned) should be prohibited from reading them.

III. The question is not whether some discretion may and ought not to be used in reading the books of Scripture according to capacity (as formerly the young were not allowed to read some of the scriptural books because deficient in judgment on account of age). This is not so much an interdiction as a method of instruction and can fitly conduce to their greater improvement and edification. The question is whether the reading should be forbidden to anyone (which we deny).

The reading of the Scriptures proved.

IV. The reasons are: (1) the command of God which applies to all and each one (Dt. 6:6-8; 31:11,12; Ps. 1:2; Col. 3:16; Jn. 5:39; Jos. 1:8; 2 Pet. 1:19; Rev. 1:3). (2) The design of the Scriptures, for they were given for the profit and salvation of all and to supply all with arms against our spiritual enemies (2 Tim 3:16; Rom. 15:4; Eph. 6:17). (3) The Scriptures are the Testament of our heavenly father, and should a child be forbidden to read the will of his father? (4) The uniform practice of the church, Jewish and Christian (Dt. 17:18, 19; Acts 8:27; 17:11; 2 Pet. 1:19; 2 Tim. 3:15, 16). Nor are the ancient fathers ever so unanimously zealous as in recommending and inculcating upon all the reading of the Scriptures (cf. Chrysostom frequently in Sermon 6, *Sermones IX in Genesim* [PL 54.608]; "Homily 1," *In Matthaeum* [NPNF1, 10:1-8] and *Concionis VII de Lazaro* 3 [PG 48.995], where he often repeats that ignorance of the Scriptures is the cause of all evils; Augustine, *Confessions* 6.5 [FC 21:135-37]; Sermon 35, *De Tempore* [PL 38.213-14]; Basil, "Homily 10," *On Psalm 1* 1 [FC 46:151-52]; Cyprian, actually Novatian, "The Spectacles" [FC 67:124-25]; Origen, Sermon 9, *In Leviticum* [PG 12.508-25] and Sermon 12, *On Exodus* [FC 71:367-74]; Jerome, Letter 107, "To Laeta" [NPNF2, 6:189-95, esp. 193]).

Sources of explanations.

V. That which of itself and properly brings more injury and loss than advantage should not be permitted. But this does not hold good of that which is such only accidentally (i.e., from the fault of men). If men abuse the Scriptures, this does not happen per se, but accidentally from the perversity of those who wrongfully wrest them to their own destruction. Otherwise (if on account of the

abuse the use should be prohibited), the Scriptures ought to be taken away not only from the laity, but also from the teachers who abuse them far more. For heresies usually arise not from the common people and the unlearned, but from ecclesiastics.

VI. If errors can arise from the Scriptures improperly understood, so far from keeping them from their perusal, this ought the rather to excite them to searching. Thus, properly understanding them, they may be able to confute such errors.

VII. The liberty of reading the Scriptures does not take away either oral instruction or pastoral direction or other helps necessary to understanding. It only opposes the tyranny of those who do not wish the darkness of their errors to be dissipated by the light of the divine word.

VIII. When Christ forbids giving what is holy to dogs and casting pearls before swine (Mt. 7:6), he does not mean to deny believers the right of reading and using the Scriptures (nor could the sons of God be denominated dogs and swine). He only means that the symbols of divine grace should not be communicated to the impure and every sinner; or that the loftiest mysteries of faith should be rashly obtruded upon unbelievers or upon those who by a desperate obstinacy resist the manifested truth. Rather the symbols of divine grace should be used for the instruction of those who come with a humble and docile spirit.

IX. Is it not sufficient that the reading of the Scriptures is allowed by the papists to some? For that ought not to be granted to some as a privilege which is enjoined upon all as a duty.

NINETEETH QUESTION: THE SENSE OF THE SCRIPTURES

Whether the Scriptures have a fourfold sense: literal, allegorical, anagogical and tropological. We deny against the papists.

The opinion of papists on the sense of the Scriptures.

I. The papists, in order to force upon us another visible judge of controversies (viz., the church and the pope) besides the Scriptures and the Holy Spirit speaking in them, attribute a manifold sense to them and hence infer that they are doubtful and ambiguous. Therefore they distinguish between the literal and the mystical sense and divide this last into three parts: allegorical, tropological, anagogical. Allegorical, when the sacred history is transferred to things of faith, as what is said of the two covenants or of Sarah and Hagar (Gal. 4:24*); anagogical, when the words of Scripture are applied to the things of a future age, as what is said of the rest (Heb. 4:3); tropological, when transferred to morals. All are expressed in the familiar distich:

> *Litera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria,*
> *Moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia.*
>
> ("The letter teaches facts; what you believe is allegory; The moral is what you do; where you're bound is anagogy"—Nicholas of Lyra, "Prologus in Additiones" in *Postilla Super Totam Bibliam* [1492/1971], vol. 1, B vii [3]).

And of the orthodox.

II. We thus think that only one true and genuine sense belongs to the Scriptures. That sense may be twofold: either simple or compound. Simple and historical is that which contains the declaration of one thing without any other signification; as the precepts, the doctrines and the histories. And this again is twofold, either proper and grammatical or figurative and tropical; proper, arising from the proper words; tropical, from figurative words. The composite or mixed sense is in prophecies as types, part of which is in the type, part in the antitype. This does not establish two senses, but two parts of one and the same sense intended by the Holy Spirit, who with the letter considers the mystery, as in that prophecy, "ye shall not break a bone thereof" (Ex. 12:46). The full sense is not obtained unless the truth of the type or paschal lamb is joined with the truth of the antitype or Christ (cf. Jn. 19:36).

Statement of the question.

III. The literal sense is not so much that which is derived from proper words and not figurative, as it may be distinguished from the figurative (and is sometimes so used by the fathers); but that which is intended by the Holy Spirit and is expressed in words either proper or figurative. Thus Thomas defines the literal sense as "that which the Holy Spirit or the author intends" (ST, I, Q. 1, Art. 10, p. 7); Salmeron says, "that which the Holy Spirit, the author of the Scriptures, wished primarily to signify through words, whether according to the proper inherent grammatical signification, or by tropes and translations" (*Commentarii in evangelicam historiam* [1602-04], vol. 1, Prolegomenon 7, p. 73). The thing said (*to rhēton*) is not therefore always to be sought in proper words, but also in figurative (as we truly retain the thing said [*to rhēton*] in the sacraments because we retain the sense intended by the Holy Spirit). Such also is the sense of the parables employed by our Lord in which we must always keep in mind his intention. Nor is that only to be considered the literal sense, which signifies the thing brought into comparison, but also denotes the application. Hence there is always only one sense and that literal by which (through such a comparison) any truth is set forth.

IV. That the Scriptures have only one sense is evident: (1) from the unity of truth—because truth is only one and simple and therefore cannot admit many senses without becoming uncertain and ambiguous; (2) from the unity of form—because there is only one essential form of any one thing (now the sense is the form of the Scriptures); (3) from the perspicuity of the Scriptures, which cannot allow various foreign and diverse senses.

V. The question is not whether there is only one conception in the sense of the Scriptures, for we grant that often there are many conceptions of one and the same sense (but subordinate and answering to each other especially in the composite sense which embraces type and antitype). The question is whether there may be many diverse and non-subordinated senses of the same passage (which is the opinion of Azorius, *Institutiones morales* [1613], Pt. I, 8.2, pp. 507-509; Thomas, ST, I, Q. 1, Art. 1, p. 7; Lyranus, Gretser, Becanus, Salmeron, Driedo, Bellarmine and others).

Sources of explanation.

VI. Distinguish the sense of the Scriptures from their application—the sense is only one, whether simple (in the histories, precepts and prophecies openly proposed) or composite (in the typical); whether proper (enunciated

in proper words) or figurative (in figurative words). But the application can be diverse, both for instruction (*didaskalian*), reproof (*elenchon*), correction (*epanorthōsin*), etc., which are the theoretical and practical uses of the Scriptures. Thus allegory, anagogy and tropology are not so much diverse senses as applications of one literal sense. Allegory and anagogy refer to instruction (*didaskalian*), but tropology to correction (*epanorthōsin*).

VII. Allegory is either innate (or inferred, or intended by the Holy Spirit) or invented by men. In the latter sense, it does not enter into the sense of the Scriptures, but is a consequence drawn from the study of man by manner of application. But the former is contained in the compound sense as a part of it because it cannot be doubted that it was intended by the Spirit and thus from his mind. Hence what is said of the two wives of Abraham is applied to the two covenants (Gal. 4:21-29); what is said of the rest is applied to the heavenly rest (Heb. 4:3-11). So when we proceed from the sign to the thing signified, we do not introduce a new sense, but educe what was implied in the sign so as to have the full and complete sense intended by the Spirit.

VIII. Although the intellect of God is infinite, able to embrace many infirmities at the same time, it does not follow that the sense of the Scriptures is manifold. From the intellect to the words of God, the consequence does not hold good, nor is the signification of expressions to be measured by the copiousness of the speaker (who is infinite here), but by his certain and determinate intention accommodated to the capacities of men to whom he speaks. When God understands, he understands himself as he is infinite and so he understands himself infinitely. But when he speaks, he speaks not to himself, but to us (i.e., in accommodation to our capacity which is finite and cannot take in many senses).

IX. The book written within and on the back side, within and without (Ezk. 2:10; Rev. 5:1), does not mean a twofold sense of one and the same Scripture, but the multitude of things written everywhere—there of the plagues to be inflicted on the Jews, but here of the decrees of God.

X. The difficulty of passages does not imply a manifold intention of God, but some ambiguity in the words or weakness of our intellect. Although words can have various significations *in thesi* ("in the abstract"), yet on the hypothesis of this or that passage, they are referred to only one of these significations by the Holy Spirit. These significations are to be ascertained by a consideration of the context and analogy of faith.

XI. The literal sense is sometimes taken more widely for the whole compass of the sense intended by the Holy Spirit (whether in the type or antitype) and so also contains within it the mystical sense. The literal sense is sometimes taken more strictly for that which the words immediately and proximately afford and so is distinguished from the mystical (which is signified not so much by the words as by the things which the words signify), which arises only mediately from the intention of the speaker.

XII. Although we hold to a composite sense, yet we do not take away the unity of truth and the certainty of the Scriptures which we charge upon the papists. For the truth set forth in these prophecies embraces many relations (*scheseis*), all intended by the Spirit.

XIII. As the Scriptures are most copious containing more things than words, so it is not absurd to say that the Holy Spirit wished to connote to us by one and

the same word many things at the same time. Yet these things are mutually subordinate so that the one may be the sign and figure of the other, or have some mutual connection and dependence. Thus the promise of seed given to Abraham referred both to Isaac as the type and to Christ as the antitype (Gal. 3:16). The prophecy about the bones of the lamb not to be broken (Ex. 12:46) belonged both to the Paschal lamb in a figure and to Christ in a mystery (Jn. 19:36). The promise given to David, "I will be his father" (2 S. 7:14) applied both to Solomon and to Christ (Heb. 1:5). The prediction concerning the Holy One not seeing corruption (Ps. 16:10) is applied both to David imperfectly and to Christ perfectly (Acts 2:29, 30). Such are the numberless scriptural passages which contain various relations (*scheseis*), all of which ought to be taken together in order to gather the full sense. Nor was their fulfillment once and at the same time, but successively and by degrees. Hence the ancient predictions generally had three relations (*scheseis*): to the state of the law in the Jewish church; to the state of grace in the Christian church; and to the state of glory in heaven. Thus the prophecy about the people walking in darkness and beholding a great light (Is. 9:1,2*) has three degrees of fulfillment: (1) in the Babylonian restoration; (2) in the preaching of the gospel (Mt. 4:14-16); and (3) in the last resurrection in which those who sit in the valley of the shadow of death shall see the great light of God's glory. The same remark applies to the prophecy about the dry bones (Ezk. 37:1-14), which was fulfilled when the people went forth from the most mournful Babylonian captivity as from a sepulcher (Ezk. 37:12); it is fulfilled every day in the spiritual resurrection (Eph. 5:14); and will be perfectly fulfilled in the final resurrection (Jn. 5:25).

XIV. The various passages adduced by the papists to prove a multiple sense (Hos. 11:1 with Mt. 2:15; Ps. 2:7 with Acts 13:33; 2 S. 7:14 with Heb. 1:5 and 5:5) show indeed that there may be a sense composed from the type and antitype and fulfilled in various degrees—first in the type and second in the antitype. But this does not prove a manifold sense generically diverse.

XV. The mystical sense is either sacred, proposed through the writers by the Holy Spirit and therefore grounded in the Scriptures themselves (as the passages of Jn. 3:14* about the brazen serpent; of Paul about the baptism of the cloud and sea, and the spiritual food and drink of the Israelites, 1 Cor. 10:1-4, and about the allegory of the two wives of Abraham, Gal. 4:22; about the ark and baptism, 1 Pet. 3:21); or it is ecclesiastical—used by ecclesiastical writers either for the sake of illustration or for pleasure. Philo first tried this in two books of allegories, and some of the fathers followed—especially Origen who employed this kind of interpretation more than the others and often ran into extravagance. Hence he was not undeservedly rebuked by Jerome, "Origen thinks the acuteness of his genius is a sacrament of the church" (*ep. ad Avitum et Amabilem+, cf. Commentariorum in Isaiam*, PL 24.154). This latter sense, although suitable for illustration, has no power to prove because it is a human, not a divine interpretation. It probably may recommend, but cannot persuade. But the former has the power of proving doctrines of faith, as it has the Holy Spirit for its author and so is according to his intention. Therefore the common expression—symbolical theology is not demonstrative (*argumentativum*)—has force only in human allegories and parables, not in divine.

XVI. The mystical sense is not found in every part of Scripture, but can be lawfully admitted only where the Holy Spirit gives opportunity and foundation

for it. Here we must carefully guard against carrying it beyond the intention of the Spirit and thus failing to preserve its true design.

XVII. As in every passage of Scripture, there is some literal sense (whether proper or figurative), so there is only one sense of the letter of each passage (whether simple as in the histories or compound as in the types). However the application may be different according to the various theoretical or practical uses.

XVIII. To ascertain the true sense of the Scriptures, interpretation is needed. This is true not only of the words which are contained in the versions, but also of the things (called "prophecy" by Paul [Rom. 12:6] and *epilysis* by Peter [2 Pet. 1:20]). It is not to be sought by each man's private judgment (which is the *idia epilysis* condemned by Peter), but is to be gathered from the Scriptures themselves as their own best and surest interpreter (Neh. 8:8; Acts 17:11). But for this, after fervent prayer to God, there is need of an inspection of the sources, the knowledge of languages, the distinction between proper and figurative words, attention to the scope and circumstances, collation of passages, connection of what precedes and follows, removal of prejudices and conformity of the interpretation to the analogy of faith. All of this can be referred to these three means: analysis (*analysin*), comparison (*synkrisin*) and analogy (*analogian*). Analysis is threefold: grammatical, which inquires into proper expressions; rhetorical, which inquires into the figurative; and logical, which observes the scope and circumstances and attends to the connection (*allēlouchian*) of words. Comparison (*synkrisis*) compares passages of Scripture with each other (Acts 9:22)—the more obscure with the plainer, similar and parallel with similar, dissimilar with dissimilar. The analogy of faith (Rom. 12:6) signifies not only the measure of faith granted to each believer, but also the constant harmony and agreement of all heads of faith exhibited in the clearer expressions of Scripture (to which all expositions ought to be conformed) that nothing may be determined at variance with the articles of faith or the precepts of the Decalogue.

XIX. We must not rashly and unnecessarily depart from the proper literal sense, unless it really clashes with the articles of faith and the precepts of love and the passage (on this account or from other parallel passages) is clearly seen to be figurative. Now this is the surest criterion (*kritērion*) of a figurative locution: (1) if the words taken strictly give either no sense or an absurd and impossible sense (as when Christ is called the gate of the sheep [Jn. 10:7] and the true vine [Jn. 15:1]); (2) if they are repugnant to the analogy of faith and at variance with any received doctrine, either theoretical or practical. For as the Spirit is always undoubtedly self-consistent, we cannot consider that to be his sense which is opposed to other truths delivered by him. Hence we infer that the words of the Eucharist are to be understood tropically (figuratively) because the strict sense contradicts the various articles of faith concerning the truth of the body of Christ, his ascension to heaven and return to judgment. The words of Hos. 1:2* are not to be explained strictly, but symbolically and allegorically because it commands a crime forbidden by the law. The golden rule also belongs here. "If it is a preceptive locution either forbidding a crime or an evil deed, or commanding a useful or benevolent deed, it is not figurative; but if it seems to command the former or forbid the latter, it is figurative" (Augustine, CI 3.16 [FC 2:136; PL 34.74]). The reason is it is proper for God to command what is good because he is good and to prohibit most severely what is evil because he is holy, however often he may permit it to be done.

XX. In addition to this rule of faith, the other means which the papists bring in (as the practice of the church, the consent of the fathers, the decrees of councils), besides being all referable to the will of one pope, are uncertain and (resting upon no solid foundation) are impossible and contradictory. They impede the mind with innumerable difficulties rather than assist it, as we will show hereafter.

Twentieth Question: The Supreme Judge of Controversies and Interpreter of the Scriptures

Whether the Scriptures (or God speaking in them) are the supreme and infallible judge of controversies and the interpreter of the Scriptures. Or whether the church or the Roman pontiff is. We affirm the former and deny the latter against the papists.

I. This is a primary question and almost the only one on account of which all the other controversies about the Scriptures were started. From no other cause is either the authority of the Scriptures called in question by the papists or their integrity and purity attacked or their perspicuity and perfection argued against, than to prove that the Scriptures cannot be the judge of controversies and the necessity of having recourse to the tribunal of the church.

Statement of the question.

II. On the state of the question keep in mind: (1) that the question does not concern any kind of judgment (i.e., whether any judgment belongs to the church and its officers in controversies of faith). The orthodox refute the charge made against them by their practice. Rather the question concerns only the supreme and infallible judgment by which everything must necessarily stand or fall—whether this belongs to the Scriptures themselves (as we hold) or to some man or assembly composed of men (as the papists maintain).

III. The threefold judge must be accurately distinguished here. First is the supreme and autocratic (*autokratorikos*), which judges by legislative and absolute authority after the manner of the highest prince, which enacts laws and from which there is no appeal. Second is the subordinate (*hypēretikos*) or ministerial, which interprets the laws after the manner of a public minister. Third is an idiomatic (*idiōtikos*) or private, which both from the laws and from their interpretation judges in the way of private discretion. The first gives a judgment of final and absolute decision. The second gives a judgment of public determination, but subordinate and in accordance with the laws. The third gives a judgment of private discretion without any public authority. Here we dispute not about the ministerial and private judgment, but the supreme and infallible.

IV. The question is not whether the Scriptures are the rule and standard of controversies. This the papists do not object to, at least they appear to be willing to hold it, although what they give with one hand they take away with the other, arguing their obscurity and imperfection. But the question is whether the Scriptures are a total and full rule, not a partial and imperfect rule. For they want it to be only a partial rule, and indeed so it is explained according to the mind of the Roman Catholic church.

V. The opinion of the papists comes to this. (1) They distinguish between the rule and the judge (who ought to bring judgment from the Scriptures). They acknowledge the Scriptures indeed to be a rule, but partial and inadequate to

which unwritten (*agraphos*) tradition must be added. The Scripture is not sufficient for settling controversies unless there comes in the sentence of some visible and infallible judge clearly to pronounce which party has the better cause. For otherwise there would be no end of contentions. Now such a judge can be found nowhere else than in the church where they erect four tribunals from which there is no appeal: (1) the church; (2) the councils; (3) the fathers; (4) the pope. But when the votes are properly counted, the pope remains *solus* (alone), to whom they are accustomed to ascribing that supreme and infallible judgment.

VI. That such is their opinion this passage from Andradius (who was in the Council of Trent) proves: "This high authority of interpreting the Scriptures we grant not to individual bishops, but to the Roman pontiff alone, who is the head of the church, or to all the chief officers collected together by his command" (*Defen. triden. fidei*, lib. 2+). "That judge cannot be the Scriptures, but the ecclesiastical prince; either alone or with the counsel and consent of the fellow bishops" (Bellarmine, VD 3.9*, p. 110). "The Roman pontiff is the one in whom this authority, which the church has of judging concerning all controversies of faith, resides" (Gregory of Valentia, *Analysis fidei catholicae* 7 [1585], p. 216). Still this is not the opinion of all. For although they who exalt the pope above the council ascribe this authority of a judge to him, yet they think differently who hold the council to be above the pope finally. Others, to reconcile these two opinions, think the pope (in the council) or the council (approved by the pope) is that infallible judge.

VII. Now although we do not deny that the church is a ministerial and secondary judge, able to decide controversies of faith according to the word of God (although as to internal conviction [*plērophorian*] we hold that the Holy Spirit, as the principle, must persuade us of the true interpretation of the Scriptures), yet we deny that as to the external demonstration of the object any infallible and supreme judge is to be sought besides the Scriptures. Much less is the pope to be admitted to perform this office. For we think that the Scriptures alone (or God speaking by them) are sufficient for that.

The Scriptures alone are the supreme judge of controversy.

VIII. The reasons are: (1) God in the Old and New Testaments absolutely and unconditionally sends us to this judge—"and thou shalt do according to the law which they shall teach thee" (Dt. 17:10); "to the law and the testimony, etc." (Is. 8:20); "They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them" (Lk. 16:29). Christ does not say they have the priests and scribes (who cannot err), but they have Moses and the prophets (viz., in their writings), implying that they are abundantly sufficient for full instruction and that their authority must be acquiesced in. Nor is the meaning of Christ different in Mt. 19:28 where he promises that after his departure the apostles "should sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." This must be referred to the judicial power they would obtain in the church through the word. Thus, "ye do err," said Christ to the Sadducees, "not knowing the Scriptures" (Mt. 22:29). And elsewhere he enjoins upon the Jews the searching of the Scriptures (Jn. 5:39).

From the practice of Christ and the apostles.

IX. (2) The practice of Christ and his apostles confirms this for in controversies of faith they appeal to the Scriptures (Mt. 4:4, 6, 7; 22:29; Jn. 5:39; 10:34, 35; Acts 17:2, 11; 18:28; 26:22) and profess to know nothing besides Moses and the prophets (Lk. 24:44; Acts 26:22). Peter compares the word to a heavenly vision, as a more sure word (*logon bebaioteron*), whereunto we do well to take heed (2 Pet. 1:19), nothing at all being said about his own privilege or of papal infallibility. The Bereans are commended (Acts 17:11) for comparing what they heard with the rule of the Scriptures, not consulting any oracle of infallibility. On the contrary, the Pharisees and Sadducees are condemned because they departed from them (Mt. 15:3; 22:29).

From the nature of an infallible judge.

X. (3) A supreme and infallible judge is one who never errs in judgment, nor is he able to err; is uninfluenced by prejudice and from whom is no appeal. Now these requisites can be found in neither the church, nor councils, nor pope, for they can both err and often have erred most egregiously, and they are the guilty party. They are accused of being falsifiers and corruptors of the Scriptures and from them appeals are often made to the Scriptures (1 Jn. 4:1; Is. 8:20; Jn. 5:39; Acts 17:11). But God speaking in the Scriptures claims these as his own prerogatives alone, as incapable of error in judgment, being truth itself, uninfluenced by partiality, being no respecter of persons (*aprosōpolēptēs*); nor can any appeal be made from him because he has no superior.

Because every man is liable to error and God alone is infallible.

XI. (4) Man cannot be the infallible interpreter of the Scriptures and judge of controversies because he is liable to error. Our faith cannot be placed in him, but upon God alone from whom depends the sense and meaning of the Scriptures and who is the best interpreter of his own words. As the only teacher, he can best explain the meaning of the law (Mt. 23:8, 10); our lawgiver who is able to save and to destroy (Jam. 4:12). If the rulers of the church are influenced by the Holy Spirit, they do not cease to be men and therefore fallible. For their inspiration is only ordinary and common, not extraordinary and special (conferring the gift of infallibility which the apostles and prophets had).

Because the Scriptures recognize none except God.

XII. (5) If there were such a judge as the papists maintain: (a) it is a wonder that the Lord never mentions this interpreter who is so essential; (b) that Paul in his epistles (and especially in that to the Romans) does not inform them even by a single word of so great a privilege; (c) that Peter in his catholic epistles did not arrogate this as about to be transmitted to his successors, much less exercise it; (d) that the popes were neither able nor willing by that infallible authority to settle the various most important controversies which the Romish church cherished in her own bosom (i.e., between the Thomists and Scotists, the Dominicans and Jesuits, the Jesuits and Jansenists, etc). For why did they not at once repress those contentions by their infallibility and untie the tangled knots? If they could not, what becomes of their infallibility? If they could, why did they not save the church from such scandals?

Because the church cannot be a judge in her own cause.

XIII. (6) The church cannot be regarded as the judge of controversies because she would be a judge in her own cause and the rule of herself. For the chief controversy is about the power and infallibility of the church, when the very question is whether the church is the judge, or whether the church can err. Shall the same church sit as judge, and must we believe her just because she says so? Must she be supported in denying the Holy Scriptures to be the judge (which all acknowledge to be the infallible word of God); in wishing the church or the pope to sit as judge in her own cause and to be the infallible judge of her own infallibility (concerning which there is the greatest doubt) and which is most evidently not only liable to err, but has often erred? For the papists themselves are forced to confess that not a few popes were heretics or wicked men and devoted to magical arts (Adrian VI, *in 4 Sent.*+).

From the fathers.

XIV. (7) The ancients here agree with us. Constantine (after stating what he thought was clearly taught concerning God in the gospels, the apostolical and prophetical books) adds, "therefore laying aside warring strife, we may obtain a solution of difficulties from the words of inspiration" (*tēn polemopoion oun apelasantes erin, ek tōn theopneustōn logōn labōmen tōn zētoumenōn tēn lysin*, to the Nicene fathers according to Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History* 1.6* [NPNF2, 3:44; PG 82.920]). Optatus writes, "You say it is lawful, we say it is not lawful; between your permission and our prohibition the minds of the people fluctuate and waver. No one believes you, no one believes us, a judge must be sought from heaven, on earth we can get no decision; but why should we knock at the door of heaven when we have the Testament here in the gospel?" (*De Schismate Donatistarum: Adversus Parmenianum* 5.3 [PL 11.1048-49]). Augustine says, "We are brethren, why should we contend? Our father did not die intestate; he made a will . . . open it, let us read, why should we wrangle?" (*Psalm 21** [ACW 29:224; PL 36.180]). And: "This controversy requires a judge. Christ shall judge; the apostle with him shall judge" (*On Marriage and Concupiscence* 2.33 [NPNF1, 5:306; PL 44.470]). Lactantius says, "God speaks in the divine writings as the supreme judge of all things, to whom it belongs not to argue, but to pronounce" [*Divine Institutes* 3.1 [FC 49:166; PL 6.350]). Gregory of Nyssa writes, "The inspired writing is a safe criterion of every doctrine" (*kritērion asphales epi pantos dogmatos hē theopneustos graphē, Against Eunomius* 1.22 [NPNF2, 5:62; PG 45.341]); cf. Cyprian, *Letter 63*, "To Caecilius," (ACW 46:98); Chrysostom, "Homily 23 on the Acts of the Apostles" (NPNF1, 11:148-55); Augustine, *On Baptism, Against the Donatists* 2.6 (NPNF1, 4:428).

XV. As a prince must interpret his own law, so also God must be the interpreter of his own Scriptures—the law of faith and practice. And the privilege allowed to other authors of interpreting their own words ought not to be refused to God speaking in the Scriptures.

Sources of explanation.

XVI. When we say that the Scriptures are the judge of controversies, we mean it in no other sense than that they are the source of divine right, and the most absolute rule of faith by which all controversies of faith can and should be certainly and perspicuously settled—even as in a republic, the foundations of decisions and of judgments are drawn from the law. So a judge may be

taken widely and by metonomy of the adjunct for a normal and not a personal judge. Hence he must not be confounded with the subordinate judge who decides controversies according to the rule of the law and applies the authority of the law to things taken singly (*ta kath' hekasta*). This accords with the Philosopher's rule, "The law must govern all, but the magistrates and the state must decide as to individuals" (*dei ton nomon archein pantōn, tōn de kath' hekasta tas archas kai tēn politeian krinein*, Aristotle, *Politics* 4.4.33-34 [Loeb, 21:304-5]).

XVII. It is not always necessary to make a distinction between the judge and the law. The Philosopher confesses that in prescribing universal rights the law has the relation of a judge; but in the particular application (in things taken singly, *en tois kath' hekasta*) the interpreter of the law performs the office of judge, but a ministerial and subordinate one (Aristotle, *Politics* 3.6 [Loeb, 21:219-31]). In this sense, we do not deny that the church is the judge, but still always bound by the Scriptures. As in a republic, the decision of a magistrate is so far valid as it is grounded on the law and agrees with it. Otherwise, if at variance with it, it is invalid and appeal may be made from it. Thus in the church the judgment of pastors can be admitted only so far as it agrees with the Scriptures.

XVIII. Although the Scriptures cannot hear the arguments of the contending parties (nor always so give its decision as to acquit by name this one and condemn that one), it does not follow that they are not the supreme judge and perfect rule. For these are not necessary to the supreme but to the ministerial judge, who is bound to give his decision according to the law and must examine witnesses and arguments and inspect the laws because he acts *de facto* not *de jure*. But the supreme judge is he who (aside from every controversy) ordains as to universal rectitude what must be done and avoided and whose prescriptions subaltern judges are bound to observe. Nor do we ever read in the laws the express condemnation of this or that person, Titus or Maevius. Thus it is here, as the cause is of faith *de jure* and not *de facto*, since the question is what must be believed or disbelieved (which the law and the judge can decide without hearing the parties).

XIX. It is not necessary for the supreme judge speaking in the Scriptures to declare a new word to us every day on account of new heresies springing up. For he (who knew all that would happen) so pronounced his truth in the word that faithful ministers may recognize universal truth by it and so refute all errors. Hence from the Scriptures, the fathers most triumphantly refuted the heresies of Pelagius, Arius, Macedonius and others, although nothing is said expressly about them.

XX. It is not necessary that there should be another visible, infallible judge than the Scriptures for settling all controversies. (1) An end of controversies is not to be expected in this life—"for there must be also heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you" (1 Cor. 11:19). Even in the time of the apostles, various heresies crept in which were not entirely removed. (2) It is one thing to convince an adversary *de facto* and to stop his mouth so that he cannot answer anything; another to convince him *de jure* so that he may have what will be sufficient to convince him, if he is not obstinate. Although the Scripture does not always do the former on account of the perversity of men, yet it always does the latter, which is sufficient. (3) As in a well-administered republic it is sufficient if there are good laws by which things taken singly (*ta kath' hekasta*) can be decided by subordinate judges, so in the church it is enough if there is an infallible written word whence individual pastors may

draw a rule of judgment in particular controversies. (4) A visible judge among the papists has not hindered the rise of innumerable controversies, which he has not yet settled by his infallible authority.

XXI. The Scriptures may have various and ambiguous senses, not from the nature of the thing affirmed or the intention of the affirmer, but from the unskillfulness or obstinacy of the distorter. Therefore this ambiguity and obscurity (if such there is) does not take away their authority, but shows the necessity of the Spirit of illumination and of the minister to explain them.

XXII. Although there may be a dispute about the true interpretation of a passage of Scripture, it is not necessary that there should be any visible, infallible judge besides the Scriptures. They interpret themselves. Man must not be regarded as the author of the interpretation he gives in accordance with them because nothing of his own is mixed with it. He adds nothing to them, but only elicits and educes from the Scriptures what already was contained there, even as one who legitimately deduces a conclusion from premises does not form it at pleasure, but elicits it from the established premises and as latent in them.

XXIII. In the dispute concerning the judge of controversies, we do not properly treat of the principles (i.e., of the questions which relate to the Scriptures), which are here taken for granted to be the principles, not proved to be so. Rather we treat of things principiated (i.e., of the doctrines contained in the Scriptures), which (granting the authority of the Scriptures) we think can be sufficiently ascertained from the Scriptures themselves. We do not deny that the Scriptures prove themselves (as was before demonstrated) not only authoritatively and by way of testimony, but also logically and by way of argument.

XXIV. The Scriptures can be called mute and speechless in reference to judgment, no more than the church in her councils and the fathers in their writings, who nevertheless, the papists maintain, can both speak and judge. If a father speaks in his will and a king in his edicts and letters, why may we not say that our heavenly Father speaks with the clearest voice to us in each Testament and the King of Kings in his divine oracles? Nor can there be a doubt on this point, since the Scriptures (or the Holy Spirit in them) are so often said to speak to, accuse and judge men. The law is said to speak to those who are under the law (Rom. 3:19). "They have Moses and the prophets," said Abraham to the man who fared sumptuously (Lk. 16:29), not indeed alive and seeing, but neither mute nor speechless; yea even speaking and hearing. So Isaiah is said to "cry out" (Rom. 9:27). Moses accuses the Jews (Jn. 5:45). The law judges (Jn. 7:51). "He that receiveth not my words, hath one that judgeth him (*echei ton krinonta*): the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day" (Jn. 12:48). In the same sense, the word of God is said to be *kritikos*—"a judge of the thoughts" (Heb. 4:12).

XXV. An earthly judge in the external court ought to be furnished with compulsory power, but the spiritual judge in the court of conscience holds a different relation. The kingdom of God is not to be advanced by bodily compulsion, but by the spiritual demonstration of the truth (1 Cor. 2:4). Again, although physical compulsion has no place here, even a spiritual and internal compulsion is not desirable, both with respect to believers (whom God, speaking in the Scriptures, gently and sweetly draws and moves to obedience, Jn. 6:44; 2 Cor. 10:4) and with respect to the wicked and unbelieving whose consciences he vexes and torments.

XXVI. The example of Moses and Aaron cannot be applied to establish a supreme and infallible judge besides the Scriptures. For each was a ministerial not autocratic (*autokratorikos*) judge; one extraordinary, the other ordinary. They decided controversies not by their own authority, but according to the law and commands of God: Moses, as a mediator, by appealing to God (Ex. 18:19), but Aaron by answering from the law and according to it—"according to the sentence of the law which they shall teach thee, thou shalt do" (Dt. 17:11). Otherwise, if they spoke contrary to the law, they were not to be heard. (2) The matter here treated of is not as to controversies of faith, but of rites—the judging between blood and blood, leprosy and leprosy. (3) It treats not only of the high priest, but of the whole Levitical priesthood whose decision is binding when done in accordance with the prescriptions of the law. Otherwise, if absolutely binding, Jeremiah (26:12, 13), Christ (Jn. 9) and the apostles (Acts 3; 13), who departed from it, committed a capital crime. (4) From the high priest the consequence does not hold good to the pope because in the New Testament there is no high priest except Christ, of whom Aaron was a type.

XXVII. The "one shepherd" (Ecc. 12:11) does not mean the typical priest of the Old Testament, but Jesus Christ, the true priest of the New, who is that good shepherd of his people (Ezk. 34:23; Jn. 10:11). From him all the words of wisdom came because men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost (2 Pet. 1:21), as the papists themselves (Tirinus, Menochius, Cornelius a Lapide) explain it.

XXVIII. In Hag. 2:11 and Mal. 2:7, not any one priest, but indefinitely priests are commanded to be interrogated and, being interrogated, to answer according to the law. Nor does this prove their infallibility, but their duty. Mal. 2:8 nevertheless intimates they did not always do this since it adds, "but ye are departed out of the way."

XXIX. The "seat of Moses" (Mt. 23:2) is not the succession in the place and office of Moses or the external court of a supreme judge to whom the authority in question belongs (for the seat of Moses was not in existence nor was any such privilege attached to it); rather it is the promulgation of the true doctrine delivered by Moses (as the ordinary gloss on Dt. 17 has it, "The seat of Moses is wherever his doctrine is"), and the chair of Peter is wherever his doctrine is heard. So those who have been teachers of the law delivered by Moses are considered to have taught in Moses' seat, as Hilary observes (*Commentarius in Matthaeum* 24.1 [PL 9.1048]). Therefore the Pharisees teaching in Moses' seat were to be heard as far as they faithfully proposed to the people his doctrine, without any admixture of their own.

XXX. Although Christ sends us to the voice of the church (which if anyone will not hear, he is to be regarded as a heathen man and a publican, Mt. 18:17), yet he does not constitute it the infallible judge in matters of faith. (1) For he does not speak of controversies of faith, but of private offenses and fraternal admonition which (if unsuccessful in private) must be referred to the public censure of the church. Not one infallible prelate is to denounce this to all churches, but individual pastors to their own flock. (2) He alludes here to a custom of the Jewish system which excommunicated the contumacious. This applies no more to the Romish church than to every particular church within proper limits. (3) If the argument is drawn from similarity, the church is commanded to be heard as long as she hears Christ and speaks his words; otherwise, if she recedes from Christ and speaks in opposition to him, she is to be anathematized (Gal. 1:8).

XXXI. The councils sometimes asked from absent popes, not confirmative authority, but fraternal assent. Otherwise they could not claim for themselves the right of deposing them, of examining and abrogating their acts (which they did). The fathers and particular churches could in more difficult ecclesiastical affairs consult them, not as infallible judges (to whose decrees they were bound to submit their consciences), but as honorary and prudent arbiters who (before they were poisoned by the breath of pride, superstition and tyranny) were held in great esteem among the churches on account of the dignity (*prōteia*) of the city.

XXXII. Although in the external court of the church every private person is bound to submit to synodical decisions (unless he wants to be excommunicated), and such judgment ought to flourish for the preservation of order, peace and orthodoxy, and the suppression of heretical attempts; it does not follow that the judgment is supreme and infallible. For an appeal may always be made from it to the internal forum of conscience, nor does it bind anyone in this court further than he is persuaded of its agreement with the Scriptures.

XXXIII. Although we allow to individual believers the judgment of private discretion (because "he that is spiritual judgeth all things" [1 Cor. 2:15], and the apostle commands us to "prove all things" [1 Thess. 5:21]), we do not therefore assert in opposition to Peter (2 Pet. 1:20*) that the Scriptures are of private interpretation (*idia epilysis*). For *epilysis* here does not mean the interpretation of the Scriptures so much as the origin of the prophetic oracles. They may be said to have been written, not by each one's own private impulse and instinct (which is said of those who run although not sent by God, Jer. 23:21), but by the dictation of the Holy Spirit who moved them. Thus *epilysis* here does not pertain to the office of an interpreter, hearer or reader of the Scriptures, but to the power or impulse of prophesying; or to that notion by which the prophet was impelled to speak and to write. This is favored by a comparison with the preceding and following verses in which the question is not Who has the right of interpreting the prophecies? but By whose impulse and influence did the prophets write, and in what regard ought we to hold the prophecies; what reverence is due to them, and why is faith to be placed in them as the unquestionable oracles of God (viz., because they did not flow from man's own impulse and will as if they were a human invention or man's device, but from the impulse and influence of the Holy Spirit by whom holy men of God were moved)? In this sense, *epilysis* will signify the mission of the men of God to prophesy, by which God opened for them as it were the barriers to running (in allusion to the ancient racers who, as soon as the bars at the starting point were removed, rushed forward). But if the word is here taken to mean interpretation (as is done by many from the force of the word *epilysis*, which signifies to expound and explain, Mk. 4:34; Acts 19:39), prophecy will be denied to be of private interpretation (*idias epilyseōs*) (which is such as to principle and origin, i.e., from one's own mind, but not as to subject). So that private interpretation here is not opposed to the common or public, but to the adventitious gift of the Holy Spirit.

XXXIV. From this judgment of private discretion attributed to each believer, they are wrong who infer that human reason is the judge of controversies and interpreter of the Scriptures (which the Socinians maintain and has already been refuted by us, Topic I, Question 8). Here the believer is not only moved by the light of reason, but more specially by the influence of the Spirit. And although

the interpreter may examine the conceived sense of the Scriptures by natural reason, yet he cannot oppose a dictate of reason to the Holy Scriptures or withhold from it faith on account of some preconceived opinion of reason in opposition to it. Human reason (which is deceptive and slippery) is surely more likely to deviate from the truth of a thing than the Scriptures (which are the word of truth and even truth itself). Thus reason here must be brought under subjection to faith (2 Cor. 10:5) not exalted above it.

XXXV. The uncertainty of human judgment does not prove that God speaking in the Scriptures cannot be a fit judge in our cause, since it cannot be known either who has the Holy Spirit or whether he may actually be obtained. In this matter there is no need of knowing immediately and *a priori* who has the Spirit, but only who speaks according to the Scriptures. When this becomes known by a reference to the Scriptures, we can readily judge *a posteriori* who utters the words of the Spirit and speaks from him. Thus the Bereans did not inquire *a priori* whether Paul who preached to them was moved by the Holy Spirit (for this was known to God alone, the searcher of hearts, *kardiognōstē*), but whether Paul spoke according to the Scriptures. Hence from his agreement with them, they inferred that he spoke not from himself, but by the Spirit. We conclude with the golden words of Basil: "Let the divinely inspired Scriptures then judge for us and let the vote of truth be given to those among whom doctrines are found harmonizing with the Scriptures" (*ouk oun hē theopneustos hēmin diaitēsatō graphē, kai par' hois an heurethē ta dogmata synōda tois theiois logois, epi toutois hēxei pantōs hē theia tēs alētheias psēphos, Letter 189*, "To Eustathius the physician" [NPNF2, 8:229; PG 32.688]).

TWENTY-FIRST QUESTION: THE AUTHORITY OF THE FATHERS

Are the writings of the fathers the rule of truth in doctrines of faith and in the interpretation of the Scriptures? We deny against the papists.

I. Although from the preceding question we are already satisfied that the fathers cannot sit as judges in controversies of faith, yet because the papists frequently recur to them and are accustomed to obtrude upon us the consent of the fathers as a rule of truth, we must devote a separate question to this argument which is of the greatest importance in the controversies of the present day.

Who are meant by the fathers.

II. By "the fathers" we do not mean with Augustine the apostles as the first founders and patriarchs of the Christian church (*Psalm 45*, NPNF1, 8:153), but (in accordance with the present usage which is sanctioned by the ancients) the teachers of the primitive church who (after the death of the apostles) taught and illustrated the doctrine of salvation, orally and in writing. On account of age, they lived many years before our times; on account of doctrine (for by inculcating it upon their disciples), they begat sons to God in the church.

III. Although some extend their age down to the tenth century, we do not think it ought to be carried down further than the sixth. For it is certain that purity of doctrine and worship became greatly corrupted after the six hundredth year (in which Antichrist raised his head)—error and superstitions increasing by the just judgment of God. In the first century after the death of the apostles, the

principal fathers were Ignatius and Polycarp, fragments of whose writings are extant. In the second, Justin Martyr and Irenaeus. In the third, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius. In the fourth, Athanasius, Eusebius of Caesarea, Hilary of Poitiers, Basil, Gregory Nazianzus, Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius, John Chrysostom. In the fifth, Augustine, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, Hilary of Arles, Prosper of Aquitania, Leo I. In the sixth, Fulgentius the African, Gelasius (Cyzicus), Gregory the Great and others.

IV. There are three opinions among the papists as to the authority of the fathers. First, those who put them on an equality with the Scriptures: to which belong those decrees of the Glossator asserting, "the writings of the fathers to be authentic, individually as well as collectively" (Dist. 9+). Second (just the opposite), those who hold their writings to be merely human and therefore incapable of being a rule of faith. This was the opinion of Cajetan ("Praefatio," *Commentarii . . . in quinque Mosaicos libros in Sacrae Scripturae* [1639], vol. 1) and of the wiser papists. Third, those who, holding a middle ground, concede that the authority of individual fathers is human and fallible, but think that the common and universal consent of the fathers in controversies is infallible and divine. This was the opinion of the Council of Trent, affirming that "the traditions of the fathers pertaining both to faith and practice must be received with an equal affection of piety with the Old and New Testaments" (Session 4, Schroeder, p. 17). And, in the same place, "It prohibits anyone from daring to interpret the Scriptures contrary to that sense which the holy mother church has held, or now holds . . . or even against the unanimous consent of the fathers" (Session 4, Schroeder, p. 19). Most of the papists—Stapleton, Bellarmine, Canus, Valentia and others—agree with this.

V. The orthodox (although they hold the fathers in great estimation and think them very useful to a knowledge of the history of the ancient church, and our opinion on cardinal doctrines may agree with them) yet deny that their authority, whether as individuals or taken together, can be called authoritative in matters of faith and the interpretation of the Scriptures, so that by their judgment we must stand or fall. Their authority is only ecclesiastical and subordinate to the Scriptures and of no weight except so far as they agree with them.

Statement of the question.

VI. The question is not Are the fathers to be considered witnesses, giving testimony of the consent of the ancient church and the opinion of the church in their own age? Rather the question is Are the fathers to be considered as judges, capable of deciding controversies of faith by their infallible authority? The papists maintain the latter; we hold the former. When we dispute at any time from the fathers against our adversaries, we use them only as witnesses, to approve by their vote the truth believed by us and to declare the belief of the church in their time. We do not use them as judges whose opinion is to be acquiesced in absolutely and without examination and as the standard of truth in doctrines of faith or in the interpretation of the Scriptures.

The fathers cannot be judges.

VII. The reasons are: (1) the fathers, regarded either separately as individuals or collectively, were not prophets or apostles who, acting through an immediate call and endowed with extraordinary gifts, had the privilege of infallibility; rather they were men fallible and exposed to error, of imperfect

knowledge and capable of being influenced by hearty zeal and swayed by their feelings. Nor did that mediate calling with which they were furnished place them beyond the danger of error. Not only could they err, but they often undoubtedly did err on many vital points, whether as individuals or taken together. This might readily be proved, if the papists themselves did not agree with us here; as Bellarmine who confesses that even the most learned fathers seriously erred in many things (VD 3.3,10, pp. 101-3, 111-14), contradict each other ("De Christo," 2.2 in *Opera Omnia* [1856], 1:201-2) and that they all sometimes are blind (ibid.). Sixtus Senensis confirms this ("Praefatio" to Book 5, *Bibliotheca Sancta* [1575], vol. 2; cf. Salmeron, *Commentarii in evangelicam historiam* [1602-04], vol. 13, Part 3, Disputatio 6, pp. 206-9).

VIII. (2) The writings of the fathers have been in various ways corrupted and tampered with: partly through the various spurious writings circulated under the name of the fathers (which yet in the judgment of the learned are an adulterous offspring iniquitously laid at the door of the fathers) or through the artifice of sycophants, or the frauds and impostures of heretics, or the base love-of-gain (*aischrokerdeian*) of printers or booksellers; partly through corruption and falsification creeping into their genuine writings. These have evidently been corrupted in various ways, either by the injury of copyists, or the audacity of the monks, or above all through the villainy of the Jesuits in correcting, expurgating and castrating them. The learned in previous times have complained of this and our own have proved it by innumerable examples (as may be seen in Rivet, "Critici Sacri," in *Opera* [1651], 2:1041-1152 and Daille, *A Treatise on the Right Use of the Fathers* [1856] and others who handle this argument).

IX. (3) The fathers themselves acknowledge that their writings ought not to be authoritative, nor their bare assertion in matters of religion to be absolutely decisive. Augustine says: "I confess to thy love that I have learned to give this reverence and honor to those books of Scripture alone which are now called canonical, as firmly to believe that no one of their authors erred in writing anything . . . but I so read the others, that however excellent in purity of doctrine, I do not therefore take a thing to be true because they thought so; but because they can persuade me, either through those canonical authors, or probable reason, that it does not differ from the truth. Nor do I think that you, my brother, are of a different opinion. I say further, I do not suppose that you wish your books to be read as if they were the writings of the prophets or apostles, which beyond a doubt are free from any error" (*Letter* 82, "To Jerome" [NPNF1, 1:350; PL 33.277]). "We ought not to consider the disputations of any men, though they be catholic and praiseworthy men, as canonical Scriptures, so that we may not, saving the reverence due to those men, disallow or refuse anything in their writings, if perhaps we find that they thought otherwise than the truth is. Such am I in other men's writings, such will I that other men be understanders of my writings" (Augustine, *Letter* 148, "To Fortunatianus" [NPNF1, 1:502; PL 33.628-29]). "We do no injury to Cyprian when we distinguish any writings of his whatsoever from the canonical authority of the holy Scriptures. For not without cause with such healthful diligence the ecclesiastical canon is appointed, to which certain books of the prophets and apostles do pertain, which we dare not judge at all and according to which we may freely judge of other writings either of faithful men or infidels" (Augustine, *Contra Cresconium* 2.31 [PL 43.489-90]). "I am not

bound by the authority of this epistle because I do not account the writings of Cyprian as canonical Scriptures, but I consider of them out of the canonical Scriptures and whatsoever in them agreeth with the authority of the Holy Scripture, I receive with his praise; but whatsoever agreeth not, I refuse it with his leave" [ibid., 2.32 (PL 43.490)]. Even more fully and strongly does he confirm the same thing: "There [i.e., in the canonical Scriptures] if anything strikes me as absurd, it is not lawful to say the author of this book held not the truth; but either the Codex is faulty or the interpreter has erred or you do not understand. But in the productions of those who lived afterwards, which are contained in numberless books, but in no way equal to the most sacred excellence of the canonical Scriptures, even in whatever one of these equal truth is found, yet their authority is far unequal" (*Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 11.5 [NPNF1, 4:180; PL 42.249]). In the same strain, Jerome says, "I know that I esteem the apostles differently from certain tractators [handlers]; the former as always speaking the truth, the latter as men sometimes making mistakes" (*Letter 82*, "To Theophilus Bishop of Alexandria" [NPNF2, 6:173; PL 22.740]). "Origen should be read occasionally, as Tertullian, Novatus and Arnobius, and some ecclesiastical writers, so that we may extract what is good from them and shun the opposite, according to the apostle's direction, prove all things, hold fast that which is good" (Jerome, *Letter 62* [76], "Ad Tranquillanum" [NPNF2, 6:133; PL 22.606]). Jerome frequently inculcates this and with great freedom repeatedly censors the sentiments and expositions of his predecessors. Indeed he speaks of their writings thus: "If any one will speak better or even more truly, let us acquiesce freely in the better" (*commenta. in Haba. et Zach.*, t. 5+). Likewise Ambrose testifies, "I am unwilling that you should believe me. Let the Scriptures be recited. I do not speak from myself because in the beginning was the word, but I hear. I do not attach, but I read" (*The Sacrament of the Incarnation of Our Lord* 3 [FC 44:224; PL 16.857]). Also Cyril, "Do not attend to my fluent comments for possibly you may be deceived; but unless you receive the testimony of the prophets to each particular, you must not believe my words" (*Catechetical Lectures* [NPNF2, 7:73; PG 33.730]).

X. (4) Papists themselves reject the authority of the fathers (when opposed to them) and freely recede from them—so much is their recognition of them as judges in matters of faith worth. More passages to prove this could be adduced than those already referred to in Bellarmine, Sixtus Senensis and Salmeron. Speaking of his commentaries on the Scriptures, Cajetan says, "If at any time a new sense agreeing with the text occurs, and not contrary either to the Scriptures or to the doctrine of the church, although perhaps it differs from that which is given by the whole current of the holy doctors, I wish the readers not too hastily to reject it, but rather to censure charitably. Let them remember to give every man his due. There are none but the authors of the holy Scriptures alone to whom we attribute such authority, as that we ought to believe whatsoever they have written." "But as for others," says Augustine, "of however great sanctity and learning they may have been, I so read them that I do not believe what they have written merely because they have written it" (*Letter 82*, "To Jerome" [FC 12:392; PL 33.277]). Melchior Cano after having said from Augustine that only the holy Scriptures are exempt from all error, further adds, "But there is no man, however holy or learned, who is not sometimes deceived, who does not sometimes dote or sometimes slip" ("De Locis theolgicis," 7.3, num. 3 in *Opera*

[1605], p. 353). And afterwards, "We should therefore read the ancient fathers with all due reverence; yet, as they were but men, with discrimination and judgment" (ibid.). "To follow the ancients in all things, and to tread everywhere in their steps as little children do in play, is nothing else but to disparage our own parts and to confess ourselves to have neither judgment nor skill enough for searching into the truth. No, let us follow them as guides, but not as masters" (ibid., num. 10, p. 359). In his comments on the gospels, Maldonatus often says, "So almost all the fathers explain it, with whom indeed I cannot agree" (*Commentary on the Holy Gospels: Matthew* [1888], 2:34, 136, 179-80 on Mt. 16:18, 19:11, 20:22). Petavius says, "The fathers were men. They had their failings and we ought not maliciously to search after their errors that we may lay them open to the world; but that we may take the liberty to note them whenever they come in our way, to the end that none be deceived by them; and that we ought no more to maintain or defend their errors than we ought to imitate their vices, if at least they had any" ("Animadversiones in Epiphanium cum Appendice Gemina," in *Opera* [1682], 2:205, 244, 285). Baronius frequently blames and refutes the fathers most freely whenever they happen to hold a different opinion from his own. If then our adversaries are discovered to so recklessly despise and trample under foot even the approved fathers whenever they do not agree with them, with what face can they insist upon their being heard as judges in our controversies?

Sources of explanation.

XI. What all the doctors deliver by unanimous consent according to the word of God, the universal church can and ought to believe. But if they do not speak out of the word, but rather against it, so far is the church from being bound to receive it that she is rather bound to anathematize them (Gal. 1:8).

XII. Although the fathers who were nearest to the age of the apostles were necessarily the purest, it does not follow that their writings can be considered as a rule of truth with the apostolic writings. The gift of infallibility was the peculiar distinction (*axiōma*) of the apostleship and cannot belong to their successors who were not furnished with the same gifts.

XIII. The unity of the church may be properly preserved by the unity of faith delivered in the Scriptures, not by the consent of the fathers (which is difficult and almost impossible to ascertain).

XIV. The obedience due to rulers (Heb. 13:17) is not blind and brute, so that we should yield ourselves to everything they say or write. Rather it should be rational, listening to them speaking and delivering the oracles of God which they have received from Christ (Mt. 28:20; 1 Cor. 11:23).

XV. Although we are unwilling to acknowledge the fathers as judges in matters of faith, we do not therefore mean that their authority is null. For they can be of great use (if not to the formation of faith, at least to its illustration and confirmation) to obtain testimony concerning the faith of the ancient church and to convince us that the papists rather boast of the consent of the fathers than follow it. Further that the doctrines which the papists obtrude upon us from tradition contrary to the Scriptures were unheard of in the first centuries.

XVI. In vain do the papists allege the consent of the fathers for the judgment of controversies and the interpretation of Scripture. (1) Even if it could be ascertained, it would make only a human and probable argument (such as might be obtained from the responses of prudent men), but not a necessary and absolute

one (*anypeuthynon*), for even the fathers themselves submitted to the judgment of the Scriptures. (2) If not impossible, it is at least most difficult to get such a consent. Nor is that way (so lengthy and intricate and involved in such a labyrinth of volumes) fitted for terminating controversies especially since it is almost impossible to know what the ancients thought about our controversies. This follows: (a) because we have very few writings of the ancient fathers (especially of the first, second and third centuries, which nevertheless are those we are most especially to regard as nearest to the age of the apostles). For those writings of the first three centuries which are extant for the most part treat of subjects widely remote from our controversies and refer to them only in passing and in relation to some other thing. And this follows (b) because the fathers often differ one from another and are not always consistent with themselves in the same matters of faith. They often change their opinions, advancing in the knowledge of the truth with age and, when old, retracting the opinions they held in their youth.

XVII. We do not despise and treat the fathers injuriously when we deny to them that supreme power of judging. Indeed we must take care not to rob them of their just praise, but much more not to defer to them too much (there is more danger of the latter than of the former). Yea, if they could come forth from their graves, they could not endure the attribution of such authority to them and would sharply rebuke us in the words of the apostles to the Lycaonians (who would needs render them divine honor)—"we also are men of like passions [*homoiopatheis*] with you" (Acts 14:14, 15). They frequently declare that they wrote not to give authoritative rules, but to be useful. Thus they should be read not with a necessity of believing, but with the liberty of judging. They also openly acknowledge that their works are in no way to be placed on an equality with the authority of the most holy Scriptures (as Augustine says, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 11.5 [NPNF1, 4:180] and *Contra Cresconium* 2.31 [PL 43.489-90]).

XVIII. Therefore we gather that the fathers neither can nor ought to be regarded as judges in our controversies, but as witnesses who (by their wonderful consent) give testimony to the truth of Christianity and prove (by their silence or even by weighty reasons) the falsity of the doctrines introduced by the papists beyond and contrary to the Scriptures. Their writings must be respectfully received and may be read with profit. Yet at the same time they cannot have any other than our ecclesiastical and human authority (i.e., subordinate and dependent on the Scriptures).

THE ONE AND TRIUNE GOD

FIRST QUESTION
Can the existence of God be irrefutably demonstrated against atheists? We affirm.

I. Although the "Deity is unbounded and incomprehensible" (*apeiron kai akatalēpton . . . to theion*) as Damascene well remarks (*Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 1.4 [NPNF2, 9:4; PG 94.797]); and to speak the truth concerning God is even dangerous on account of his exalted "preeminence (*hyperochēn*)," as Cyprian says; yet because God has condescended to reveal himself to us both in nature and in the Scriptures (and it is incumbent upon the one who approaches God to believe that he is and is a rewarder of those who seek him, Heb. 11:6), the discussion concerning God holds the first place in theology and embraces the sum of all saving knowledge. We are to learn so that with fear and trembling (searching into what the Lord has revealed) we may not rashly pry into the secrets which he has reserved to himself alone—"lest being unlawfully curious in the latter, we may be found worthy of just condemnation in the former," as Prosper says (*Call of the Nations* 1.21* [ACW 14:68; PL 51.674]).

II. The subject admits of a threefold division. First, that we may know that he is (with respect to existence) against the atheist. Second, that we may know what he is (with respect to his nature and attributes) against the heathen. Third, that we may know who he is (with respect to the persons) against the Jews and heretics. The former two relate to God considered essentially (*ousiōdōs*); the latter relate to him regarded hypostatically (*hypostatikōs*) and personally.

III. Although that there is a God is an indubitable first principle of religion (rather to be taken for granted than proved, so that they who doubt it are to be punished and not disputed with, as Aristotle says), yet the execrable madness of modern atheists (of whom this most corrupt age is far too fruitful, who do not blush impiously to deny this clearest truth) renders this question necessary.

IV. The question is not whether the true and saving knowledge of God obtains everywhere among men. For no one can deny that the true God was and is even now unknown by many nations, who are therefore called atheists (*atheoi*) by the apostle (Eph. 2:12). Rather the question is whether such a knowledge of the deity is implanted in men by nature, that no one can be wholly ignorant of him; or whether the existence of God can be demonstrated by unanswerable arguments, not only from the Scriptures, but also from nature herself. Profane men and atheists unscrupulously deny this; we assert it.

The being of God is proved.

V. The demonstration of deity rests upon four foundations principally: (1) the voice of universal nature; (2) the contemplation of man himself; (3) the testimony of conscience; (4) the consent of all mankind. For God, the

wonderful artificer of the universe, has so deeply stamped upon all its parts the impression of his majesty that what was commonly said of the shield of Minerva (into which Phidias had so skillfully introduced his likeness that it could not be taken out without loosening the whole work) has a far juster application here. God cannot be wrested from nature without totally confusing and destroying it.

From the subordination of causes.

VI. Nature proves the being of God since she proclaims that she not only is, but is from another and could not be without another. For if it is certain and indubitable that out of nothing, nothing is made and that nothing can be the cause of itself (for then it would be before and after itself), it is also certain that we must grant some first and unproduced being from whom all things are, but who is himself from no one. For if every being is produced, it is produced either by itself or by some other; not by itself because (as was just said) nothing can be the cause of itself; not by another because then it would follow that there could be an infinite series in producing causes or that a circle would be made, both of which are untenable. For as to the circle, it evidently cannot be granted since in those things which are made there is always a last thing which has not made anything else. Besides such a circle is impossible; for suppose it were true, it would follow that the same thing was made by itself and was the cause (mediately at least) of itself. Nothing would be more absurd. Neither can an infinite series of producing causes be allowed because in causes there must necessarily be some order as to prior and posterior. But an infinite series of producing causes rejects all order, for then no cause would be first; rather all would be middle, having some preceding cause. Indeed there would be no cause which ought not to have infinite superior causes before itself (which is impossible [*asystaton*]). If there were infinite causes before each and every cause, before the whole multitude and collection of causes there would be infinite causes and thus that collection would not be total. Again, if the first cause can never be reached by ascending from the effects to the cause, so the ultimate effect can never be arrived at by descending from the causes to the effects. For the infinite can be gone through no more by ascending than by descending. Therefore we must necessarily stop in some cause which is so the first as to recognize no superior. Thus that series of causes ought not to be *in infinitum*, but *ad infinitum* in which it will be terminated.

From the newness of the world.

VII. (2) The newness of the world with the commencement of motion and of time proves the necessary existence of God. For if the world began, it must necessarily have received its beginning from someone. Inasmuch as it could not be from itself, it could be from no other than God. Now there are many proofs that the world had a beginning and is not eternal. Time could not be from eternity. If so, then from eternity there must have been the vicissitude of day and night which is impossible (*asystaton*). It is inconsistent that day and night have been from eternity since they would either have been at the same time (which implies a contradiction) or successively (which destroys the eternity). Again, if time is eternal, there could not have been a first day, for if there were, time had a beginning. If there were no first day, a day preceded every day (i.e., there was a day before there was a day). Third, if time is eternal, there were infinite years, infinite months, days and hours. But the num-

ber of months, years and days will either be equal or not. If equal, it would follow that a part is equal to the whole, and the whole is not greater than its part. If unequal, there will be made a greater and lesser in an infinity. Fourth, either no day was from eternity, or every day, or only some one. If the former, time is not eternal; experience teaches the falsity of the second; the third cannot be said because if some one day was from eternity, its duration ought to be infinite and without a beginning (which implies a contradiction) since its duration would be terminated in twenty-four hours. Fifth, all motion is with succession (including priority and posteriority) which is repugnant to eternity. Sixth, if the sun revolved and illuminated the world from eternity that was done either with respect to our hemisphere, or exactly the opposite, or with respect to both at the same time. The former cannot be said because what is successive cannot be called eternal; not the latter because it is impossible for the sun to illuminate both hemispheres at the same time. For it would have to be in many places at the same time and everywhere would be day and there would be no such thing as night.

VIII. If men were from eternity, there would be granted infinite generations succeeding each other, and the number of men who have lived thus far would be infinite. But there can be no such thing as an infinite series in generations (as we said before), nor can the number of men who have thus far lived be infinite, since it is increased every day. Nothing can be added to that which is infinite! Again either some one man was from eternity or no one. If no man, then men are not from eternity and were not created by God. If some man was, he could not have been created by another, since what is produced by another is after it and what is eternal recognizes nothing before itself.

IX. To no purpose do atheists (in order to prove the possibility of an infinite series) bring forward the consideration of posterior eternity. For by descending into the eternity without end, there is granted a first, though not a last, and the last can never be arrived at; so by ascending into anterior eternity, there is granted a last, though not a first. Two things entirely dissimilar are here brought together: that which was and has really passed and that which never will be nor come to pass. For the duration of past time, and the succession of men who have lived thus far, was and no more is; but the duration of futurity and of the men who will live in it is such that it can never be said to have passed by. Finally, there may be the beginning of a thing without end (as in the duration of angels and of souls), but there cannot be an end without a beginning because an end necessarily supposes some beginning from which the thing had its origin. Hence the consequence does not follow. If in posterior eternity there can be granted a duration which had a beginning and will not have an end, then in anterior eternity there can be granted a duration which may have an end and yet never had a beginning.

From the beauty of the universe.

X. (3) The wonderful beauty and order of the universe is another proof. For if order requires wisdom and intelligence, the most perfect supposes the most perfectly necessary and infinite wisdom which we call God. Now he is blind who does not see the most beautiful order everywhere and most wicked who does not acknowledge it. There is so suitable a disposition of parts, so constant a concord of things so discordant, so harmonious an agreement and consent of creatures the most diverse, so swift and at the same time equable motion of the heavenly bodies and so immutable a stability and constancy of the order once

established. So not only do the heavens declare the glory of God, but every blade of grass and flower in the field, every pebble on the shore and every shell in the ocean proclaim not only his power and goodness, but also his manifold (*poly-poikilon*) wisdom, so near each one that even by feeling, God can be found. Augustine says, "The prophetic voices excepted, the world itself by its own most regular mutability and mobility and the exquisitely beautiful appearance of all visible things, silently as it were proclaims both that it was made and could be made only by a God unspeakably and invisibly great, and unspeakably and invisibly beautiful" (CG 11.4 [FC 14:191; PL 41.319]).

XI. You may say perhaps that these things were so arranged by chance and by a fortuitous concourse of atoms. But I know not whether such an impious and absurd opinion is worthy of refutation, since these things denote not chance (*tychēn*), but the highest art (*technēn*). For things which come by chance are uncertain and ill-arranged and have nothing constant and similar; but nothing can be conceived more regular and composed than this universal frame. To say, then, that this most beautiful and highly decorated universe was produced by a fortuitous concourse of atoms is the same as to say that "if innumerable forms of the one and twenty letters were thrown together, the annals of Ennius could be produced from them when shaken upon the earth and could afterwards be read" (as Cicero remarks, *De Natura Deorum* 2.37.93 [Loeb, 19:212-13]). In the same place, he quotes from Aristotle: "If there were persons who had always lived under the earth in good and splendid habitation and yet had never come out upon its surface, but had heard that there was a deity and a power of the gods; then upon some occasion the jaws of the earth being opened they could come out and walk abroad in these places where we now live; when suddenly they would see the earth, and sea and the heavens, and behold the sun, and know both its admirable magnitude and virtue, and contemplate the whole sky bespangled with stars, their rising and setting, their regulated and immutable eternal motion; when they saw these things they would assuredly think both that there were gods, and that these so magnificent works were theirs" (ibid., 2.37.95, pp. 214-15).

From the tendency of all things to an end.

XII. (4) The tendency of all things toward an end confirms this. For since all natural beings act for the sake of some end (which they always certainly and infallibly pursue), they must necessarily be directed by the design of some ruler. Inasmuch as nature does nothing vain, if it acts for the sake of some end, it must either itself know and seek that end or if it does not know or seek it, be directed to it by another. Now since among natural things there are many incapable of forming plans (because they are either inanimate or devoid of reason [*alogoi*]), they need some external counsel to direct them. Now that external counsel can be attributed to no other than the author and ruler of nature. Nor can it be said that nature herself is in single things by whose counsel they are directed to their ends, for nature will be the natural property and particular single nature of each thing. But how can that be capable of counsel if the things themselves are brutes (or certain common nature collected from the nature of single things)? But a common nature is not beyond the single natures or some intelligent and subsisting substance by whose counsel all things are directed. But this is to make a god of nature and with the denial of God, to recognize him under the name of nature, according to the Philosopher who says a "work of nature is the work of an unerring intelligence."

XIII. (5) Man himself has in his own breast a familiar teacher of this very truth. If he would withdraw his attention from all things and reflect upon himself, he would recognize no less wisdom in the little world than in the great, and admire in his body a visible (and in his mind a scintillating) divinity. For whence is the body constructed with such wonderful and truly stupendous skill? Whence so many different members created together by a mutual interweaving and so fitly disposed to their peculiar offices, unless from an immense spirit? Whence the mind, a particle of the divine breath, possessed of so many faculties, furnished with so many gifts, unless from a supreme intelligence? This image clearly bespeaks its prototype, and everyone who pays attention will not only hear and see God present in himself, but also in a manner touch and feel him.

From conscience.

XIV. (6) This is especially taught by this power and stimulus of conscience (the inseparable attendant of crime either begun or finished) whose sense can neither be blunted, nor accusation escaped, nor testimony corrupted; nor can it fail to appear on the appointed day, nor its tribunal be shunned. For how comes it that the conscience is tormented after a crime committed (even in secret and with remote judges), where no danger threatened from men (even in those who held supreme power) unless because it is affected by a most intimate sense of deity (as appears from the case of Nero, Caligula and others)?

> But why should you suppose that a man escapes punishment whose mind is ever kept in terror by the consciousness of an evil deed which lashes him with unheard blows, his own soul ever shaking over him the unseen whip of torture?
>
> —Juvenal, *The Satires of Juvenal* 13.192-95 (Loeb, 260-61)

> As each man's conscience is, so doth it, for his deeds, conceive within his breast or hope or fear.
>
> —Ovid, *Fasti* 1.485-86 (Loeb, 5:36-37)

Whence those terrors of conscience, trembling at more atrocious wickedness, unless from the sense of some avenger and judge whom, not seeing, it everywhere feels? For these terrors cannot arise from any fear of civil laws or any temporal punishment or disgrace—both because these are only feared in the case of open crimes (which alone the civil laws and in accordance with them the judges can punish), and because they affect those also who recognize no superior on earth and who therefore can be judged by no one. Otherwise how does it come about that when an unforeseen danger assails or a sudden fear arises, they who appeared to have wholly divested their minds of the sense of deity, tremble at an angry God and implore his aid with ejaculatory prayers and groans? But what makes them so terribly afraid, who are either profane in secret and in their mind only deny that there is a God? You may say perhaps it is a vain fear; but if vain, whence is it? Why is it so tenacious and inexpugnable even when there is no cause for fear? Who or what is feared by him who alone is conscious of his own thoughts, who is confident that there is no arbiter or witness or judge of them? Himself? But he is his own best friend. Others? But they do not know his thoughts or intentions. Then if they wish to be safe, they prove by their mouth what they deny in their heart. Why then are they not secure? Therefore, willing

or unwilling, they must believe that there is a God whom right reason itself teaches them to fear and orders them to recognize as the Lord and Judge of all.

XV. Nor can it be objected that Paul says that men sometimes arrive at such a height of wickedness as to render themselves without feeling (*apēlgēkotes*, Eph. 4:19), i.e., free from all the pain which conscience otherwise usually produces; yea to such a pitch as to have their consciences cauterized (*kekautēriasmenēn*) and therefore destitute of all sense and remorse (as the same apostle says, 1 Tim. 4:2). For this indeed indicates the attempt and desire of such wicked men (and the effect of that attempt which may appear externally) when they show to others a bold confidence and a mind confirmed in wickedness, as if they were pressed by no sense of guilt or torture of conscience; but it does not show what their minds are internally. For this does not appear, this they can dissimulate in public. If they are regarded externally, they are without sense, without pain, indeed they openly declare the absence of it. But if we could look within, we would find their minds restless and pierced with the sharpest thorns. Yet I do not mean to deny that by a habit of sinning their consciences may be made so callous that occasionally and for a time they may seem to have lost all sense of sin and may not feel or care for the goads of conscience (especially in prosperity, when their powers are unimpaired, health is strong and public approbation is present). But it cannot be said that they have lost all sense entirely. Conscience slumbers, but is not dead; it is intoxicated from the flesh, but not extinct. Otherwise, how could Paul say, "Men having not the law, are a law unto themselves, and show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile [thereupon and at intervals] accusing, or else excusing one another" (Rom. 2:14, 15) in good or bad action.

From the consent of mankind.

XVI. (7) Another argument is the constant and perpetual sense and consent of all men. For although they may have entertained different notions concerning the nature and number of the deity and the reason and method of worshipping him, they erred for the most part most wickedly. Still in so great a variety there was this uniform agreement in the belief that there is some deity who ought to be religiously worshipped. "There is no nation," says Cicero, "so intractable and fierce, although it may be ignorant what a God it should have, yet is not ignorant that one should be had" (*Laws* 1.8.24 [Loeb, 16:324-25]). Indeed so deeply has this notion struck its roots in the minds of men that men would rather believe there is a god than that there is none and preferred to have a false god than no god. Hence it happened that they would rather worship stones and stocks and even the vilest things than be without some deity (which never could have been done by man naturally proud unless he possessed the strongest impression of a divinity). If some monsters have existed, who by gigantic efforts have proclaimed war against their own nature in denying a God (as the psalmist testifies, "the fool says in his heart there is no god," 14:1), besides the fact that this is to be understood rather of practical than theoretical atheists (as will be hereafter proved), they ought not to be opposed to the common and general consent of all. Nor should the furious attempts of those who strive to stifle this knowledge and even die in their obstinacy prejudice the universal judgment of all the rest which (diffused everywhere throughout all parts of the world) has most constantly continued through so many ages. No more than the monsters and prodigies which are

sometimes seen contrary to nature can overturn the regular laws established by God; or the instances of insanity overturn the definition of man as a rational animal.

XVII. Since then this constant and universal agreement of all men concerning this primary truth can either have arisen not from a simple desire (which in many would tend to a removal of a deity to be feared on account of their crimes than to an acknowledgment of one), nor be founded on state policy or ancestral tradition (which could never be so efficacious as to produce a general consent in the minds of all), it follows necessarily that it took its rise from the evidence of the thing itself. It is so great that no one possessed of a sound mind can be ignorant of it. It is evident from the most intimate sense of deity, impressed by God upon each one, so as to deprive them of the pretext of ignorance. Since all to a man may understand that there is a God and that he is his maker, they are condemned by their own testimony for not worshipping him. Here pertain those words of Iamblicus, "Before all use of reason a notion of the gods is naturally implanted in men, yea a certain tact of divinity better than knowledge" (*De Mysteriis Aegyptiorum* [1972], p. 1). This is the knowledge of God (*to gnōston tou Theou*) which he wished to manifest in the Gentiles (Rom. 1:19). Damascene explains this: "The knowledge of the existence of God is naturally impressed upon all men by himself" (*pasi hē gnōsis tou einai theon hyp' autou physikōs enkatsepartai, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 1.1 [NPNF2, 9:1; PG 94.789]).

XVIII. It makes little difference whether we explain this sense by a natural knowledge of God implanted, or a common notion, or a conception of the mind, or (as more recently) by the idea of God as the most perfect being impressed upon our minds. These all come to the same thing, viz., that there is implanted in each one from his birth a sense of deity which does not allow itself to be concealed and which spontaneously exerts itself in all adults of sound mind. Only let us observe that the idea of God can with less propriety be said to be impressed upon us, if by it is meant a certain intelligible species and image of God in our minds representing to us clearly and distinctly the whatness (*quidditatem*) and essence of God (which both his infinite majesty rejects and our finite and weak intelligence cannot take in). For how could either an (in any way) adequate or a clear and distinct image of an infinite being exist in a finite mind? Nor (if it may be held as certain from the common notion and instinct of conscience that there is a God) does it follow that by a clear and distinct conception (such as the idea of which we speak is supposed to be) we can ascertain immediately who and what he is. Besides it is certain that a clear and distinct idea of God (if there is any such in us) comes not from nature (darkened and blinded as it is by sin), but from the supernatural revelation of the word, in which he has clearly manifested himself to us (although this very knowledge in relation to that of glory is only specular and enigmatical, i.e., as yet imperfect and very obscure).

XIX. Many other arguments might be adduced to confirm this truth: from the prophecies of contingent future events (which could not be foretold long before their accomplishment unless by an omniscient mind); from the heroic actions of illustrious men (which could not be thought to be done without a divine influence); from the changes and overthrow of empires (which the thing itself declares happened by the finger of God); from the public judgments and punishment of crimes inflicted by an avenging nemesis; and from the miracles surpassing the power of all nature. For as it can do nothing beyond its power (and not only the

Scriptures record, but both Jews and Gentiles confess that many miracles have often been wrought in the world), we must necessarily suppose a most perfect being, greater and more excellent than all nature, to whose power they must be ascribed (who can be no other than God).

XX. Now these and the like arguments (drawn from the contemplation of the divine works and the inmost recesses of nature), which are sufficient to cover with confusion these impious fighters against God (*theomachoi*), are more clearly confirmed by the testimony of the irrefragable word which (since it bears on its front the conspicuous marks of its own divinity, as we have seen before, and everywhere declares its author to be God) has inscribed this persuasion upon the minds of believers in indelible character.

XXI. To these arguments *ad hominem* might also be added those of sufficient force to move even the atheist to believe in deity, if not for the sake of vindicating God himself and religion, at least for his own sake and profit. For if there were no God, no republic, no society in the world would be safe. Without virtue, without religion, nothing can be safe. If there were no God, there would be neither virtue nor religion. What would the world be but a mere den of robbers in which license would be each one's law, no such thing as right or wrong, no right of government, no necessity of obedience—the most abandoned, the superior and the most powerful, the master? No check would be placed upon the oppression of rulers and the rebellion of subjects. Each one would follow the bent of his own inclination. Again, if there were no God, no mortals would even for a moment be safe or secure from violence, fraud, perjury, slaughter of blood. Every hour everything would have to be feared. Take away the barriers of divinity and what would become of confidence and innocence? What license or violence would not be witnessed? As to human edicts (besides the fact that they cannot change the mind for the better, but on the contrary make it artful and intent upon all the arts of deception), what place would there be for human laws, if (the sense of deity being removed) the conscience would shake off all relations of justice and injustice?

Sources of explanation.

XXII. Although God is not manifest to the senses comprehensively as he is in himself, yet he can be perceived apprehensively as shining in his works, appearing in signs, heard in the word and manifested in the fabric of the whole universe. (2) It is a false assumption that there is nothing in the intellect which was not before in some sense. For universals are in the intellect and never were in any sense. A mind is known as also an angel, yet they are never perceived or seen except from their effects. Why therefore may not God be most certainly known in the mind from his works and *a posteriori*, although we cannot perceive him with our eyes or any of the other bodily senses?

XXIII. It is one thing to acknowledge that there is an apparent confusion and disorder (*ataxian*) in the universe as to us (which we do); another, that there is a true and real confusion and disorder on the part of God (which we deny). For what to us may appear disordered, with God may be perfectly arranged.

XXIV. Although various things in the world seem to be useless, many indeed hurtful and dangerous, tending to its own destruction and the extreme misery of the human race (such as dreadful and volcanic mountains overwhelming by a perpetual eruption of flames and ashes fields, villages, cities and entire regions with men and other animals indiscriminately; whirlpools, ship-wrecking rocks,

poisonous herbs, noxious animals and other things of the kind), it does not follow that the world was not created and is not now directed by some perfectly good and wise being. Besides the fact that the glory of the Creator is most strikingly exhibited by all these, yet there is nothing so useless and apparently hurtful as not to be conducive in various ways both to man and other creatures. Nor (if we cannot ascertain the various uses of these things) does it follow that they have none.

XXV. The prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the pious exhibit a most wise dispensation which converts all these to its own glory and the salvation of the pious. But this ought not to weaken our faith in deity. Indeed they confirm the truth of a final judgment after this life where each one will receive a reward according to his faith and works.

XXVI. Infinite goodness does not immediately take away all evils if it is a perfectly free and not a necessary agent. It judges that the permission of evil for the purpose of extracting good from it pertains more to its wisdom and omnipotence than the not permitting the existence of evil.

XXVII. When God is said to be from himself, this must be understood negatively (because he is from no one, since he is self-living [*autozōē*] and self-existent [*autoōn*]), rather than positively, as if he were the cause of himself (implying a contradiction) because he would then be before and after himself.

XXVIII. It is one thing to use religion and the sense of deity to coerce people to obedience and preserve them in duty; another to impose upon them such a persuasion of deity, although false. I confess indeed that legislators have done the former and cunning men have contrived many things in religion for the purpose of inspiring the common people with reverence and striking them with terror, so that they might keep their minds under greater subjection. But they never could have succeeded in that unless the minds of men had been imbued before with such a constant persuasion of deity that the propensity to religion burst forth from it as from a seed. Finally, who can believe that by the power or cunning of a few that constant opinion could be diffused through all parts of the world and through all ages, bringing so much terror to conscience even in the most secret crimes? Who does not see that if the persuasion of a divinity is due to the authority of laws and the fear of punishment, it would last no longer than the continuance of the yoke of slavery? On the contrary, we know in fact that it has pervaded all men, even the most free and those not bound by the chains of the law.

Second Question

Are there any atheists properly so called? We deny.

Statement of the question.

I. As there is so large a number of atheists now in the world, it might at first sight seem amazing that anyone should either question or deny that there could be any. After laying down certain distinctions, it will be apparent in what sense it may be true that there can be many atheists, and yet that there are none.

Speculative or practical atheism.

II. First, an atheist may be either speculative or practical: the former as to faith, not acknowledging a God; the latter as to manners and life, recognizing but not worshipping him (who live just as if there were no God or wish in their hearts there was none). For although there is no practice which does not imply some knowledge (nor any knowledge at least concerning the worship of God which does not tend in some way to practice); so there is no practical atheism which does not arise from a depraved knowledge and corrupt judgment of mind and no speculative atheism which does not also draw after corrupt practice. Yet this does not hinder the denomination being made from the prevailing quality, so that the atheism which consists rather in ostentatious words and blasphemies should be called speculative, but that which is rather occupied with impious deeds should be termed practical. Now while we admit there are many practical atheists, we deny that there are any speculative.

Speculative atheism.

III. Second, a speculative atheist is either direct and express or indirect and interpretative. The direct is one who shakes off all knowledge, sense and belief of deity. The indirect is one who attributes to or denies to God such things that by necessary consequence God is denied. For example, he who denies the providence and justice of God (although he may profess to acknowledge a God) by that very thing denies him because God cannot be without providence. We do not here treat of the latter, but of the former.

IV. Third, the direct atheist is either one externally disputing (yea even maliciously denying against his sense); or internally doubting (for a time vexed with doubts of the existence of God and appearing to yield to them for a moment in paroxysms of temptation); or studiously affecting a total want of perception of deity (*anaisthēsian*); or plainly and certainly persuaded in his heart that there is no God. Concerning the former we do not treat (who, moreover, we do not deny can be found), but concerning the latter (whom we do). The question then is whether atheists are supposable not practically, but speculatively; not indirectly and interpretatively, but directly; not those who externally dispute, or deny, or internally doubt and endeavor to persuade themselves that there is no God; but who expressly believe it in their hearts and profess with their mouth. This we deny.

Proof that atheism cannot be granted.

V. The reasons are: (1) There is implanted in man a knowledge of God and sense of divinity, of which man can no more be destitute than of a rational intellect. Hence he cannot divest himself of it without putting off himself (as was proved before, Topic 1, Question 3). If in Scripture the saving and practical knowledge by which they may be converted is denied to sinners (1 Jn. 2:4), it is not as if a theoretical and inefficacious knowledge is therefore denied. And if the ignorance of a depraved disposition is attributed to them (1 Thess. 4:5; Eph. 4:17, 18), the ignorance of pure negation cannot be attributed to them equally.

VI. (2) The atheist has the work of the law written in him (Rom. 2:14), and a natural observation and conscience in which God has erected his throne to be extinguished only with the light of reason. For although men of desperate impiety often endeavor to shake it off, yet they cannot. And as for a time they may seem to have rendered themselves insensible and conscience may slumber, at length it

starts up and pierces their hearts with severer pangs, so that involuntarily they are held captive and then feel deeply him whom they desire to be ignorant of (as was the case with Caligula, Nero and many others). Nor can it be properly objected that this conscience is not always joined with any knowledge or fear of God. The scourge of conscience might be occasioned by the fear of men; for although this might be the case in known crimes, in those secret sins which men are ignorant of and perpetrated by those recognizing no superior on earth, whence could such terror arise except from a sense of God's justice, smiting their consciences the more as they endeavored to escape it? Hence here truly there must be present something divine (*theion ti*).

VII. (3) God has so clearly manifested himself in his works that men even by feeling may find him (Acts 17: 26, 27), and cannot open their eyes without being immediately struck with the majesty and splendor of so great a deity. Nor does the particle (*ei ara*) used by the apostle throw doubt upon the evidence and certainty of the divine revelation, but refers to the senselessness and negligence of the seekers (as in Acts 8:22). Thus what is added concerning the presence of God ("he is not far from every one of us") does not denote the special promise of grace to his faithful worshippers, but indicates the blessing of providence common to all men.

VIII. The acquired knowledge of God is usually obtained in the threefold way of causality, eminence and negation. By way of causality, when from the effects we infer the cause and from second causes we ascend to the first: "He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see?" (Ps. 94:9). By way of eminence, we eminently ascribe (*kat' exochēn*) to God whatever of perfection there is in creatures. By way of negation, we remove from him whatever is imperfect in creatures, as when he is said to be invisible, immortal, immutable. By way of negation we arrive at the knowledge of negative attributes. By way of eminence, we know the positive attributes. And by way of causality we ascend to the knowledge of relative attributes.

Sources of explanation.

IX. When it is said, "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 14:1), the certain and firm persuasion of an atheist denying God is not so much described, as the doubt and endeavor of the impious man striving to extinguish this knowledge. Therefore he does not say he believes and maintains, but he "says" (i.e., silently says to himself and endeavors to persuade himself of it). (2) A direct speculative atheism cannot be meant here because it treats of the wicked and sinners in general, as is evident from a comparison with Rom. 3. Now it is certain that all sinners cannot in this sense be called atheists. (3) Here is denoted not so much a denial of the existence of the providence of God (as is evident from Ps. 10:4 where what is said of the wicked man "who through the pride of his countenance, will not seek: God is not in all his thoughts"). Verse 11 refers to the denial of providence: "He hath said in his heart, God hath forgotten: he hideth his face; he will never see it." Hence Owen rightly says:

> The fool says in his heart, there is no God,
> He spoke, and no one believed this fool;
> The fool denies God to be if no one, who therefore
> Is an atheist? No one who wants God to be.
>
> —"De Atheo," *Epigrammatum* 3.16 (1622)

X. An external negation of God (or only an erratic thought and doubt concerning him) differs from a fixed and constant denial in the heart. We allow that the former may exist in man, but not the latter.

XI. Whatever authors say of the stifling and obliteration of the light of nature for a time in a paroxysm of fury and of the cauterization of conscience (its lethargy and senselessness [*anaisthēsia*]), ought not to be referred to the total extinction of that natural knowledge, nor to the certainty of a contrary assent and persuasion. Rather it ought to be referred to a certain suppression and darkening of that light and knowledge by which impious men cast off (as much as they can) the actual thought of God and endeavor to persuade themselves that there is no God; nor believe nor fear the vengeance of God as Judge.

XII. The Gentiles are called atheists (*atheoi*, Eph. 2:12) not because they recognize no deity at all, but because they are destitute of the knowledge of the true deity. He who holds not the true God, must necessarily have no God. In fact the polytheist (*polytheotēs*) is an atheist (*atheotēs*).

XIII. Those who were branded with the infamous name of atheists among the ancients were not so much enemies of every deity, as despisers of idols and false gods (which Apuleius and Agellius testify concerning Socrates, who was declared by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest man in all Greece).

XIV. It is one thing for the actual thought of God to be absent for a time from the mind of an atheist, and that through negligence and criminality. It is another for the knowledge of God (which is primarily impressed after the manner of a permanent disposition or habit, and thence by ratiocination receives its form from the book both of nature and of the Scriptures) to be absent. The former can sometimes occur, but not the latter.

XV. To the examples of atheists who seem to have abjured all sense of deity (as is said of Julius Caesar, Vaninus and others who persisted in their obstinacy even to the last gasp of life), we may reply that they indeed externally denied and internally zealously strove to extirpate this sense. However we cannot tell what their real persuasion was. Further, if their morals are considered, we can gather not obscurely that they were not free from internal tortures of conscience (whatever they might externally simulate for the purpose of obtaining glory by a profession of unyielding atheism). Nor does it hinder that they continued even to death in that madness because as the heart of man is deep and desperate, they could profess it (against the interior sense and the dictation of conscience) to merit the praise of unconquerable constancy and bravery among their surviving associates.

XVI. Although no one knows what is in man, save the spirit of man which is in him (1 Cor. 2:11), it does not hinder us from certainly maintaining that no one can utterly cast out of his heart all sense of deity, even as he can never divest himself of conscience. These are self-evident principles, depending upon the very consitution of man. So although an individual may profess that he neither knows, nor understands anything, does not perceive the truth of this principle ("nothing can be and not be at the same time"), has no law of nature or movement of conscience accusing or excusing; to such an insufferably vain sceptic, protesting falsely and contrary to the internal sense of his mind, universal experience, reason and the Scriptures can rightly be opposed, so that whatever he may say, we may charge him with doing violence to his own conscience.

THIRD QUESTION: THE UNITY OF GOD
Is God one? We affirm against the heathen and Tritheists.

I. The opinions concerning God can be reduced to three principal ones, according to Gregory Nazianzus: (1) to anarchy (*anarchian*), which atheists maintain; (2) to polyarchy (*polyarchian*), which the heathen hold; (3) to monarchy (*monarchian*), which Christians teach (*Oration 29** [NPNF2, 7:301; PG 36.76]).

Statement of the question.

II. One numerically is used in two senses: either affirmatively only or also exclusively. In the former sense, that is one which is undivided in itself and divisible by any other, but besides which others of the same order and nature can be granted (as every human individual is one numerically). In the latter sense, that is one which is the only one and single (*monadikon*), besides which there is nothing else like it (as the sun is said to be one because the only one). The question here does not concern the unity of God in the former sense, but in the latter. God is so one affirmatively as to indivision that he is also one as to the exclusion of others.

III. The question does not concern the personal numerical unity. As will be proved hereafter, there are more persons than one in the Godhead. Rather the question concerns the essential numerical unity: whether God is one numerically as to essence. We defend this against the polytheism (*polytheotēta*) of the heathen and the error of the Tritheists.

IV. The question is not whether there are many Gods so called (*legomenōs*) (according to the absurd and false opinion of men which prevails among the heathen). Rather the question is whether there are more than one in reality and as to essence. The question is not whether there are more participatively and improperly (for we confess that in this sense even angels and magistrates are often called "gods" in the Scriptures on account of a certain participation in dominion and authority, Ps. 82:6; Heb. 2; Jn. 10:34). Rather the question is whether there are more properly and originally (which we deny).

The unity of God proved from the Scriptures.

V. That there is but one God both the Scriptures frequently assert and reason proves: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord" (Dt. 6:4); "But to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things" (1 Cor. 8:6*); "God is one" (Gal. 3:20); "There is one God, and one mediator" (1 Tim. 2:5). Moses denies that there are or can be found more besides this one: "See now that I, even I, am he, and there is no god with me" (Dt. 32:39); and "I, even I, am the Lord; and beside me there is no savior" (Is. 43:11*; cf. also Is. 37:16; 44:8).

From reason.

VI. Reason also confirms the same thing. It is a contradiction to suppose more infinite, eternal, omnipotent and most perfect beings (such as God should be) and also more rulers of the world: "the government of the many is not good; let one be the ruler" (*ouk agathon polykoiranin heis koiranos estō*—Homer, *Iliad* 2.204 [Loeb, 1:64-65]). "If God is not one, he is not at all" (Tertullian, *Against Marcion* 1.3* [ANF 3:273; PL 2.249])—for if there are more, they would either be equal (and so neither would be the first and most perfect); or unequal (and so the inferior would

not be God); or one would be the cause of all the rest (and so he alone would be the true God); or not (and so no one of them would be God because he would not be the cause of all).

VII. Nor was this altogether unknown by the heathen themselves when they assigned to one supreme God (called "the Father of men and of the gods") the government of the universe. When they subordinated others to him and traced their origin from him, they divested of divinity those whom they called gods. Hence Hermes Trismegistus, the father of philosophers, in "Poimandres," 4*.10.2 (in *Corpus Hermeticum* [ed. A.D. Nock, 1983], 1:53) and elsewhere, maintains that one God, one unity is the root of all which is (*hē monas*); says he, *pantōn archē kai rhiza*. Pythagoras, according to Cicero and Plutarch, says, "God is one, not as many think apart from the administration of the world, but whole in the whole." Orpheus, who, if we credit (Pseudo) Justin Martyr, was the author of polytheism (*polytheotētos*) because he first introduced the names and genealogy of the gods, yet recognizes only one God (*Hortatory Address to the Greeks* [ANF 1:279; PG 6.269]). Clement of Alexandria says, "There is one only unmade God and all other gods and things are the offspring of this one" (*Eis d' hos autogenēs henos ekgona panta tetyktai, The Exhortation to the Greeks* 7.64 [Loeb, 166-67]). The same opinion was held by wiser heathen—Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Cicero, Seneca and others (whose testimony see in Plesseus, *A Worke Concerning the truenesse of Christian Religion* 3 [1617], pp. 26-43); also Justin, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Lactantius, Arnobius, Augustine and other fathers, who abundantly prove the unity of God against the heathen.

Sources of explanation.

VIII. The variety of divine names and attributes does not argue a plurality of gods. They are used to connote the perfection of the one God in order that by many inadequate conceptions we might comprehend in some measure what we could not by a single adequate one.

IX. Although there are more persons than one in God, yet there are not more natures. All persons partake of one and the same infinite nature, not by division, but by communication. If three persons in human things indicate three men, we ought [not] to infer that in divine things three persons are three Gods; or that the unity of the divine essence implies also a unity of person (as Socinus wishes). Of three human persons, there are three singular, numerically distinct essences, since even one subsistence exhausts and bounds their finite singular essence. But of the three divine persons, there is only one undivided and singular essence which, being infinite, is communicable to more than one.

X. Polytheism (*polytheotēs*) and atheism (*atheotēs*) are properly reckoned as springing from the same foolish origin. The apostle calls the Gentiles "atheists" (*atheous*, Eph. 2:12) because they were polytheists (*polytheoi*). He who holds not to only one God, holds to no God because he is destitute of the true.

XI. What of this inquiry—since reason and nature lead us to but one God, whence could the polytheism (*polytheismos*) of the Gentiles take its rise, who instead of the one God worshipped a tribe of gods (*dēmon theōn*) (as Nazianzus observes, *Oration* 38, "On the Theophany," 8 [NPNF2, 7:347; PG 36.320])? Prudentius thus sings of them, "Every marvel that earth and ocean produces they held a god. Hill, seas, rivers, fire" (*A Reply to the Address of Symmachus* 1:297-98 [Loeb, 1:372-73]). Hesiod makes the number of the gods thirty thousand: "for there are

thirty thousand immortals upon the all-nourishing earth" (*Tris gar myrioi eisin epi chthoni poulyboteirē, Athanatoi, Works and Days* 252-53 [Loeb, 20-21]). Various answers can be given. The principal is the forgetfulness of the true God and the necessity of man. Pressed by his necessity, man looks around on every side for helpers and therefore makes many gods for himself. Pliny elegantly unfolds this: "Frail, toiling mortality, remembering its own weakness, has divided such deities into groups, so as to worship in sections, each the deity he is most in need of" (*Natural History* 2.5 [Loeb, 1:178-79]). Since there they were pressed by a manifold necessity, they sought manifold gods to relieve them, just as if one supreme God could not do all things.

XII. Second, the veneration and worship of those who bestowed remarkable blessings upon the human race introduced a multitude of gods. For they who either were illustrious in crimes, or rendered themselves worthy of praise by distinguished benefits, or because by some grand discovery were serviceable to the human race, or because they were successful in war, or were founders of nations or cities, were enrolled among the number of the gods. Hence Cicero: "Human experience moreover and general custom have made it a practice to confer the deification of renown and gratitude upon distinguished benefactors. This is the origin of Hercules, of Castor and Pollux, of Aesculapius, and also of Liber" (*De Natura Deorum* 2.24.62 [Loeb, 19:182-83]). Pliny also observes: "To enroll such men among the deities is the most ancient method of paying them gratitude for their benefactions. In fact the names of the other gods and also of the stars that I have mentioned above, originated from the services of men" (*Natural History* 2.5* [Loeb, 1:180-83]). Tertullian (*Ad Nationes* 10-11 [ANF 3:118-21]), Minucius (Felix) (*Octavius* 21 [ANF 4:185-86]), Lactantius and Arnobius show this at large (viz., that the gods held in the greater estimation among the heathen were nothing else than men). And if we examine the subject closely, we may easily discover that the philosophers and poets borrowed (most of them) from the Hebrews; but these are so interpolated by the cunning of Satan and involved in fable that a large mass of filth would have to be stirred up in order to find a few grains of gold. For example, take Saturn with his three sons dividing among themselves the empire of the world. Learned men have observed that Noah and his three sons were latent here (as Bochart and Vossius have satisfactorily proved).

XIII. Third, an occasion of polytheism, among others, was not only the multitude of divine names, but principally the variety and abundance of the attributes and works of God. By this men influenced imperceptibly to the belief in many gods, sought so many and so great perfections divided among more, rather than combined in one.

FOURTH QUESTION: THE NAME "JEHOVAH"

Is his name so peculiar to God alone as to be incommunicable to creatures? We affirm against the Socinians.

I. God is both a being singular in the highest sense, and in his own nature distinct from every thing whatsoever. He does not need a discretive name; nor does a name properly belong to him, either appellative (which is of the distinct species of the same genus) or proper (distinctive of the individuals of the same

species). Therefore Trismegistus, according to Lactantius, says, "God has no name" (*anōnymon*, *Divine Institutes* 1.6 [FC 49:32; PL 6.139]). Yet because all our knowledge begins from a name, he assumes various names in Scripture to accommodate himself to us. Some are taken from might—as El, Elohim; some from omnipotence and all-sufficiency—as Shaddai; some from loftiness (*exelsitate*)—as Elion; others from dominion—as Adonai. But the first and principal name is Jehovah, which is derived from his essence or existence.

Statement of the question.

II. There are two principal questions concerning this name. One is grammatical, concerning its pronunciation, i.e., whether it can be pronounced, and what is the true and genuine method of pronouncing it—Jehovah or Adonai. The other is theological, concerning its use, i.e., whether it is peculiar to God alone or common also to creatures. Dismissing the former question to the consideration of critics, we treat here only of the latter.

III. This question comes between us and the Socinians who (to elude the argument we are accustomed to draw from this name to prove the divinity of Christ) maintain that this name can be communicated to various creatures and is usually attributed in the Scriptures to angels and to Christ as ambassadors of God. They take for granted (as a rule of indubitable truth) "that an ambassador can bear the name and person of the sovereign." Still they do acknowledge a distinction, viz., if the word Jehovah has the word Sabaoth joined with it, it is peculiar to God alone, but if it is without it, it is also common to creatures. But we say that this name is so peculiar to God as to be altogether incommunicable to creatures. It is true that even among the orthodox themselves there exists a discrepancy about the use of this name, but it is rather verbal than real. While some confess that it belongs to no created person, but yet is used with reference to the ark of the covenant (by metonymy of the adjunct), others hold that it is attributed to and agrees with no creature at all. However all agree that this name taken absolutely and without a trope is peculiar to God alone. Nevertheless the latter opinion seems to be the truer and better adopted to strangling the error of the Socinians.

IV. The reasons are: (1) God claims this name as his own and peculiar to himself—"I am Jehovah; that is my name; and my glory will I not give to another" (Is. 42:8; 48:11*; Am. 5:8; 9:6). Hence Israel sings, "Jehovah is his name" (Ex. 15:3). The Jews call it absolutely *hshm* ("the name"); *shm h'tsm* ("the name of substance"); *shm hmpvrsh hmyrchdh* ("the peculiar and separate name").

V. The etymology and signification of the word is such as agrees with God alone. From Scripture, it is evident that it implies most especially three things which are seen to be connected (Is. 44:24-26): (a) the eternity and independence of God, inasmuch as he is a necessary being, and existing of himself, independent of any other, self-existent (*autoōn*)—"I am that I am" (Ex. 3:14). Hence he is called simply the being (*ho ōn*, as the ancient philosophers and Plato especially acknowledged). John describes him by the three distinctions of time: "which is, and which was, and which is to come" (*ho ōn kai ho ēn kai ho erchomenos*, Rev. 1:4). In reference to this we have that expression of the ancient heathen: "Zeus was, Zeus is, Zeus will be, O great Zeus" (*Zeus hēn, Zeus esti, Zeus essetai ō megale Zeu*, Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 10.12.10 [Loeb, 4:436-37]). (b) It implies causality and efficiency because what is the first and most perfect in each genus is the

cause of the rest (for God is by himself so that he is the cause of being to all others, Is. 44:24). (c) It implies immutability and constancy in promises because he really performs and does what he has promised by giving to his promises being (*to einai*), not only self-existent (*autoōn*), but also essentially existent (*ousiōn*) and essence-making (*ousiopoios*). In this sense, he says that he had not been known to the patriarchs by his name Jehovah (Ex. 6:3), not as to the signifying word (for the contrary is evident from the book of Genesis), but as to the thing signified (because he had not as yet given being to his promises concerning the multiplication of seed, the bringing of the people out of Egypt, their introduction to Canaan, etc.). He had made himself known to the patriarchs by his power in the creation of the world, in its government and in the bestowal of many blessings and their wonderful defense; but he had not as yet really declared himself to be Jehovah, by fulfilling the promises given to the patriarchs. But since eternal existence, omnipotent power and immutable truth belong to God alone, the name Jehovah (which embraces these three) ought to be peculiar to him alone.

VI. The name Jehovah by its nature or grammatical construction cannot be common to more than one because it is per se individual and is never found with *h* emphatic or demonstrative. (2) It is always used in the singular, but never in the plural. (3) It nowhere occurs with an affix or in the construct state. Since then it is attributed to God, it must be peculiar to him.

Sources of explanation.

VII. If this name is anywhere applied to an angel (as Gen. 16:13; 18:17; 48:15, 16; Ex. 3:2), the "uncreated angel" is meant. He is not a created angel, but the Son of God, the angel of his presence, who in the prelude to his incarnation often so appeared (as is evident from the circumstances of the places where the properties, works and honor of God are ascribed to that angel). He ascribes to himself a divine effect, "to multiply seed" (Gen. 16:10). He is called, "The God of vision" (Gen. 16:13). He is designated an uncreated angel (Gen. 18): (1) by the name because only one of the three angels who appeared is called Jehovah; (2) from the divine attributes, since he claims for himself omnipotence and omniscience, predicts future things (Gen. 18:10, 14) and is called the Judge of the whole earth (Gen. 18:25); (3) from honor because Abraham adores him, which yet the angel does not refuse (as he would undoubtedly have done if he had been a created angel as in Rev. 19:10). The angel is said to have redeemed Jacob from all evil (the prerogative of God alone) and he sought a blessing from him which no one but God can give (Gen. 48:16). The angel who appeared to Moses (Ex. 3) is immediately afterwards called Elohim and Adonai; is said to have sent Moses (Ex. 4:5) and to be the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who heard the cries of the people.

VIII. The angel of Jehovah is not always distinguished essentially from Jehovah (the one sent from the sender), but only personally. Thus he who is the angel of Jehovah is also the angel Jehovah.

IX. To do something by the authority of God (which applies to a created angel) differs from having the authority of God and to claim his name (which belongs to no one but the true and eternal God). A public servant (*apparitor*) or ambassador of a prince acts by his authority and in his name, but yet does not assume the titles of the prince or suffer himself to be called king or prince. So a created angel never assumes the person of God as to apply the name to himself or suffer to be applied by another any name of his whatsoever.

X. When the apostle commends hospitality because thereby angels have been sometimes entertained unawares (Heb. 13:2), he has no reference to the appearance made to Abraham (Gen. 18:1-15), but to that which happened to Lot (Gen. 19:1-11) where there were only two created angels. The third, who was uncreated, remained with Abraham to converse with him and afterwards met Lot as he was coming out of Sodom; so he addresses him as Jehovah (19:24).

XI. The supreme God cannot be sent imperatively, but by consent. Nor is it contradictory (*asystaton*) to be "the angel of Jehovah" and to be "Jehovah." As to the former, Jehovah is taken hypostatically, but as to the latter, essentially. The Son, who is the very same God with the Father, can be sent by God the Father.

XII. The angel spoken of by Moses (Ex. 23:20) cannot be a creature because God orders him to obey him, not to provoke him. Hence he would not pardon the transgressions of men, and his name was in him, which is far different from being clothed with the authority of God. Otherwise it might be said equally of Moses and any of the prophets that the name of God was in him (which nowhere is said).

XIII. It is one thing to be and be called Jehovah; another for Jehovah to be and to dwell somewhere. The latter (not the former) is said of the church (Ezk. 48:35), when it is said she shall be called by that name "Jehovah is there" (*yhvh shmh*).

XIV. It is one thing to inscribe a symbol on an altar, but another to ascribe some name to an altar. The former (but not the latter) is said in Ex. 17:15, which denotes the title and inscription of the altar—"Jehovah [supply 'is'] my banner," just as certain inscriptions were usually placed on palaces and temples.

XV. It is one thing for the ark of the covenant to be called Jehovah, but another for God (of whose presence the ark was the symbol and pledge) to be so called. The latter is said in Ps. 24:7 and 47:6, not the former. Thus the customary expression when the ark was taken up or rested, "Rise up, Jehovah, and let thine enemies be scattered" (Ps. 68:1), was not directed to the ark itself (which was not capable of receiving such worship), but to God (to whom alone it belonged to scatter his enemies) adumbrated in the ark.

XVI. It is not said in Jer. 33:16 that Jerusalem shall be called "Jehovah, our righteousness." The prophet teaches that he who would call Jerusalem to salvation would be Jehovah, our righteousness, in order to denote the foundation of its faith and hope. Nor ought it to be objected that Jerusalem may be called Jehovah with the same propriety that the church is called "Christ" (1 Cor. 12:27). For the name Christ is common to many, from which believers are called Christians on account of the similarity of unction (1 Jn. 2:20), but there is not the same reason for the name Jehovah, which is singular and peculiar to God alone.

XVII. Although the word *Kyriou* ("Lord") when taken appellatively, is common to more than one, yet when taken absolutely it can be ascribed to no one but God alone (as answering to Jehovah, not otherwise than if it was a proper name, as the Septuagint, and after them the apostles render *Yhvh* by *Kyrion*, for want of a more suitable word to express fully its emphasis).

XVIII. Although God hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son as incarnate (*ensarkon*, Heb. 1:2), this does not hinder his having already spoken to the fathers by himself as without flesh (*asarkon*). Otherwise it would be false that he is called the same yesterday and today (Heb. 13:8); that he was tempted by the Israelites in the desert (1 Cor. 10:9); that the law was given in "the hand of a

mediator" (Gal. 3:19); and that he spoke to Moses and gave to him the "lively oracles" (*logia zōnta*, Acts 7:38). Therefore in the promulgation of the law, we must distinguish between the primary legislator (who was Christ the angel of the covenant mentioned in Acts 7:30*, who appeared to Moses in the bush and to whom, moreover, divine works and honors are ascribed) and the apparitors (attendants) who ministered as servants. In this sense, the law is said to have been "given by angels" (Gal. 3:19; Heb. 2:2) because Christ used their ministry, whether in establishing a magnificent splendor in the mountain with thunderings and fire and the sound of a trumpet, or in words themselves being formed. Hence they are called angels, in the plural, while the angel (who is also called Jehovah) is everywhere mentioned in the singular. The comparison drawn between the law and gospel (Heb. 2:2) (in that the law was given by angels, but the gospel by the Son) was not made simply with reference to the primary author who in both cases was Christ. It was made with respect to the mode of acting and the servants. In the former, God willed to use the ministry of angels, but in the latter Christ himself incarnate willed to speak directly. As therefore there is a difference between what the prince does by himself and immediately and what he performs by his servants, so the gospel is said to be more excellent in this sense—Christ incarnate (*ensarkos*) promulgated it immediately and by himself speaks to us, while he willed to give us the law by Moses and angels.

XIX. It cannot be said that the name Jehovah is given either to the golden calf (Ex. 32:5) or to Micah's image (Jdg. 17:3) because in both places that name is given to the true God. In the former, Aaron proclaimed a feast to be celebrated to Jehovah by the calf, which would be the symbol of the true god after the manner of the Egyptians (among whom Apis was worshipped under the form of an ox; hence they are called the gods which brought the people up out of Egypt, Ex. 32:4). In the latter, the silver of which the image was made is said to have been dedicated to Jehovah (Jdg. 17:3) in reference to the end (i.e., to his worship).

Fifth Question

Can the divine attributes be really distinguished from the divine essence? We deny against the Socinians.

What are the divine attributes?

I. To understand the question certain things must be premised concerning the divine attributes. The divine attributes are the essential properties by which he makes himself known to us who are weak and those by which he is distinguished from creatures; or they are those which are attributed to him according to the measure of our conception in order to explain his nature.

II. Attributes are not ascribed to God properly as something superadded (*epousiōdes*) to his essence (something accidental to the subject), making it perfect and really distinct from himself; but improperly and transumptively inasmuch as they indicate perfections essential to the divine nature conceived by us as properties.

III. Although the several attributes represent the most fertile and simple nature of God, yet they can represent it only inadequately (i.e., not according to its total relation, but now under this perfection, then under another). For what

we cannot take in by one adequate conception as being finite, we divide into various inadequate conceptions so as to obtain some knowledge of him (which is not a proof of error in the intellect, but only of imperfection). Thus omnipotence is the divine essence itself apprehended as free from every obstacle in acting; eternity is the essence of God as without limit in duration; and so of the rest.

IV. These inadequate conceptions of the essence of God are presented to us by a precisive abstraction (*abstractionem praecisivam*) or by a simple and negative precision (as I may think of goodness by not thinking of power); but not by an exclusive or privative precision (as, for example, I may assert him to be omnipotent who is neither merciful nor just).

Statement of the question.

V. The question concerning the divine attributes as distinct from the divine essence is agitated with us by the Socinians (who, the more easily to prove that the Holy Spirit is not God or a divine person—although he may be called a virtue of God—maintain that the attributes of God are really distinct from his essence). The orthodox teach that they are really the same with his essence, but are to be distinguished from it virtually and eminently.

VI. Those things are said to differ really which are distinguished as things diverse according to essence, whether they agree with the subject or not. But to be distinguished virtually is nothing else than either by virtue to contain distinct effects, or to have unitedly in themselves what are distinct in others, or to have an eminent virtue which can be the principal of diverse actions. Its foundation cannot be intrinsic, but extrinsic; not on the part of the principal or subject, but in relation to the end and object; on account of the diversity of operations and effects arising out of the properties and according to which diverse formal conceptions of them are formed.

VII. The attributes of God cannot really differ from his essence or from one another (as one thing from another) because God is most simple and perfect. Now a real distinction presupposes things diverse in essence which the highest simplicity rejects. Things really diverse can become one only by aggregation (which is opposed to absolute perfection). Again, if they differed really, the essence would be made perfect by something really distinct from itself and so could not be in itself most perfect. Third, it would follow that God is not therefore immutable because he would have in himself passive potency (the root of mutability) by which the attributes might either be elicited from the essence or added to it. But since God is the first and independent being (which is whatever can be) nothing can be added to or taken away from him.

VIII. Yet that the attributes of God differ both from his essence and mutually from one another is evident from the diversity of conceptions. For where there is ground for founding distinct formal conceptions of anything (although one and simple in itself considered), there we must necessarily grant virtual and eminent distinction. Since therefore in the most simple divine essence there is ground for forming diverse formal conceptions concerning the divine perfections (which is evident from their distinct definition and explanation), it is best to say that these attributes giving rise to such conceptions are virtually to be distinguished both from the essence and from each other.

IX. Although the attributes are essentially and intrinsically one in God, yet they may properly be said to be distinguished both intellectually (*noēmatikōs*) as

to the diverse formal conception and objectively and effectively as to the various external objects and effects. Hence it is evident that this distinction is neither simply real between things and things, nor formal (which is only in our manner of conception), but eminent (which although it does not hold itself on the part of the thing as between thing and thing, yet has a foundation in the thing on account of the diversity of objects and effects).

Sources of explanation.

X. Although our formal conceptions of the essence and properties of God may be diverse, yet they cannot be called false. For there answer to them as many objective conceptions, actually indivisible indeed in God on account of his most perfect simplicity, but yet virtually and eminently distinct.

XI. Attributes may be mutually predicated of each other in an identical sense inasmuch as they may be considered as having unity and identity with each other (as when I say the divine intellect is the same thing with his will, or his justice is the same thing with his mercy). However this is not the case in the formal sense because they are formally distinguished in our conceptions and by their objects (so I cannot say justice is mercy because the formal conception of justice differs from the formal conception of mercy).

XII. He who conceives what is actually and really one and simple in God as actually and really diverse, conceives what is false. But he who conceives that which is actually one in itself as more than one virtually and extrinsically or objectively, does not conceive what is false. Rather he conceives the thing imperfectly and inadequately on account of the weakness of the human intellect and the eminence and perfection of the divine nature.

XIII. The divine attributes may be regarded either absolutely and subjectively in themselves (and on the part of God) or relatively as to their effects towards creatures (or on the part of the object). I confess that in the latter way punitive justice and sparing mercy are opposed, but not in the former (concerning which we treat).

XIV. The properties are many on the part of the object and end (or of the operations and effects), but not on the part of the subject or principle, which is one and perfectly simple.

XV. Where there is priority and posteriority as to absolute and real being, there is a real difference; but not where there is only priority and posteriority as to known and intelligible being (which is the case in God and his attributes).

XVI. The definition of a thing in itself differs from our conceptions of that thing. The former, not the latter, argues a real distinction. Now the definitions of the divine properties are rather of our conceptions (conceiving God under this or that relation) than of the thing itself (which is one and most simple).

SIXTH QUESTION

Is the distinction of attributes into communicable and incommunicable a good one? We affirm.

I. Among the various distinctions of the divine attributes, none occurs more frequently than that by which they are distributed into communicable and incommunicable. Concerning this a few things must be spoken because it is not equally received by all.

Communicable and incommunicable attributes.

II. In order to understand the distinction, note that communication is twofold: one essential and formal (through the intrinsic being of a thing); the other by resemblance and analogy (with respect to the effects and works). As to the former, we say all the properties of God are equally incommunicable, no more capable of being communicated than the divine essence. Otherwise they would cease to be properties. But the latter we confess can be granted since God produces in creatures (especially in rational creatures) effects analogous to his own properties, such as goodness, justice, wisdom, etc.

III. In this sense, those attributes can properly be called incommunicable strictly and in every way, which are so proper to God that nothing similar or analogous, or any image and trace can be found in creatures. Such are the negative attributes which remove from him whatever is imperfect in creatures (such as infinity, immensity, eternity, which are such that every creature is either without them or has their contraries). But others are not badly termed communicable (of which there is some appearance or certain faint vestiges in creatures) and by simple analogy of name and effects. Such are the affirmative attributes which are attributed to God by way of eminence or causality.

IV. The communicable attributes are not predicated of God and creatures univocally because there is not the same relation as in things simply univocal agreeing in name and definition. Nor are they predicated equivocally because there is not a totally diverse relation, as in things merely equivocal agreeing only in name. They are predicated analogically, by analogy both of similitude and of attribution. The former is when things are called by the same name on account of a certain similarity existing between them; the latter when one name is so attributed to more than one thing that it may be said of one primarily and principally or by priority, but of the others secondarily and by posteriority on account of dependence on that first. So these attributes may be predicated of God essentially and in a manner plainly singular (i.e., infinitely and most perfectly) and so also in the abstract. In this sense, God alone is said to be good (Mt. 19:17), i.e., originally, independently, essentially; but concerning creatures only secondarily, accidentally and participatively.

V. Believers are said to be partakers of the divine nature (2 Pet. 1:4) not univocally (by a formal participation of the divine essence), but only analogically (by the benefit of regeneration which impresses upon them the marks of holiness and righteousness most properly belonging to God, since they are renewed after the image of their Creator, Col. 3:10). Thus we must understand what often occurs in the fathers when they speak of the renewed man (*theousthai*) and the one made conformable to God (*theoeidē*); not essentially (which applies to the Son alone), but analogically.

VI. The distinction of attributes into communicable and incommunicable argues no inequality of the divine properties (as if some were more proper to God than others) because all are equally essential to him. But this commends the goodness and glory of God because he willed to express in his creatures some resemblance and shadow (*aposkiasmation*) of his own perfections.

VII. This distinction cannot favor the error of those who maintain that the divine properties were communicated to the human nature of Christ. As will be

seen in the proper place, communication in the concrete, as to the person (which we acknowledge in Christ), differs from communication in the abstract, as to nature (which we deny). Communication may be formal and intransitive by a transfusion of the same properties which are in God into the human nature of Christ (which we reject); or it may be transitive and effective by analogy (which we hold can be granted in rational creatures in respect to the affirmative attributes).

SEVENTH QUESTION: THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD

Is God most simple and free from all composition? We affirm against Socinus and Vorstius.

I. The Socinians agitate this controversy with us since they deny that simplicity can be attributed to God according to the Scriptures and think it should be expunged from the number of the divine attributes for no other purpose than to weaken more easily the mystery of the Trinity by establishing the composition of the divine essence (*The Racovian Catechism* 3.1 [1818], p. 33). Vorstius retained this error (with various others also) and introduced it into his *Tractatus theologicus de Deo* (1610) and in the notes to "Disputatione III: De Natura Dei" (cf. *Tractatus theologicus de Deo* [1610], pp. 19-28). With these the Remonstrants also agree. In their *Apology*, they deny that the simplicity of God is necessary to be believed or that anything occurs in Scripture relative to it, but that the whole doctrine is metaphysical whether you consider the word or the thing ("Apologia pro confessione sive declaratione . . . Remonstrantes," 2 in Episcopius, *Operum theologicorum* [1665], Pt. II, p. 129). But the orthodox have constantly taught that the essence of God is perfectly simple and free from all composition.

II. Simple is used in two senses: either absolutely and simply; or relatively and comparatively. Absolutely is such as in every kind of being excludes composition; comparatively is such as excludes it only with respect to some. Heaven and the elements are called simple bodies with respect to mixed, but do not exclude composition from their matter and form and quantitative parts. Angels and souls are simple with respect to bodies, but not absolutely such because they always involve a composition. Here we speak of absolute and not of comparative simplicity.

III. The simplicity of God considered not morally, but physically, is his incommunicable attribute by which the divine nature is conceived by us not only as free from all composition and division, but also as incapable of composition and divisibility.

Proof that God is perfectly simple.

IV. This is proved to be a property of God: (1) from his independence, because composition is of the formal reason of a being originated and dependent (since nothing can be composed by itself, but whatever is composed must necessarily be composed by another; now God is the first and independent being, recognizing no other prior to himself); (2) from his unity, because he who is absolutely one, is also absolutely simple and therefore can neither be divided nor composed; (3) from his perfection, because composition implies imperfection inasmuch as it supposes passive power, dependency and mutability; (4) from his activity, because God is a most pure act having no passive admixture and therefore rejecting all composition (because in God there is nothing which needs to be made perfect or can receive perfection from any other, but he is

whatever can be and cannot be other than what he is). Whence he is usually described not only by concrete but also by abstract names—life, light, truth, etc.

V. From the removal of all species of composition (such as physical—of matter and form, since he is incorporeal); or of quantitative parts (which do not apply to God); or of subject and accident (because no accident can make the most perfect still more perfect); logical (of kind and difference because God is above every genus, nor is his a common nature capable of being restricted by difference); metaphysical act and power (since he is a pure act and incapable of change properly so called, to whom nothing new can happen or be received by him); of essence and existence (as in created things in which the nature of existence differs from that of essence, since their essence can be conceived without existence; nor does existence enter into their definition because they can be and not be, and existence with respect to them is something contingent, not necessary. For in God essence cannot be conceived without existence, and it is repugnant to conceive of God as not existing; hence philosophers call him a being by essence (i.e., which exists in virtue of its own essence) and of the nature of whose essence it is that he always exists. For this reason, God calls himself Jehovah (viz., he who is, "I am that I am" [*'hyh 'shr 'hyh*]) to signify that being belongs to him in a far different manner than to all created things, not participatively and contingently, but necessarily, properly and independently. Finally, his simplicity is proved from nature and subsistence; for persons and essence are not related as real component extremes from which a *tertium quid* may arise (as in human things from the nature of man and the subsistence of Peter arises that person whom we call Peter); otherwise not a Trinity but a certain quaternity would be conceived of in God; nor do modes (such as subsistences) compose, they only modify.

VI. But as God rejects all composition in himself, so his simplicity hinders him also from being compounded with any created things so as to hold the relation of some part either of matter or form (against the opinion of the Platonists who supposed God to be the soul of the world; and of the Manicheans who held that all creatures were propagated from the essence of God). This is so both because he is altogether diverse from creatures, and because he is immutable and incorruptible (he cannot coalesce in one with any mutable and corruptible created thing). For all composition infers mutation by which a thing becomes part of a whole, which it was not before.

Sources of explanation.

VII. If all things are said to be of God (Rom. 11:36), this must be understood not *hylikōs* ("belonging to matter") and materially, but *dēmiourgikōs* ("formatively") and efficiently. We are called the race and offspring of God (Acts 17:28), not by a participation of the same essence, but by similarity of likeness; efficiently not essentially, as also he is called the "Father of spirits" (Heb. 12:9) with reference to creation, not to composition. The Son of God is God-man (*theanthrōpos*) not by composition properly so-called, but by hypostatical union (by which the Word [*logos*] indeed assumed human nature in one hypostasis, but was not compounded with it as part with part; but stood to it in the relation of perfecter and sustainer to make perfect and sustain an essential adjunct, so that the human nature indeed did thence receive perfection, but nothing was added by it to the divine nature).

VIII. Composition is in that in which there is more than one real entity, but not where there is only more than one mode because modes only modify and

characterize, but do not compose the essence. But in divine things there are one essence and three hypostases (which are modes distinguishing indeed the persons from each other, but not composing because they are not real entities concurring to the composition of some fourth thing, since they have one common essence; but they are only modifications according to which the essence is conceived to subsist in three persons).

IX. Simplicity and triplicity are so mutually opposed that they cannot subsist at the same time (but not simplicity and Trinity because they are said in different respects): simplicity in respect to essence, but Trinity in respect to persons. In this sense, nothing hinders God (who is one in essence) from being three persons.

X. The decrees of God can be regarded in two ways: either subjectively (if it is right so to speak, i.e., on the part of the internal act in itself and absolutely); or objectively, extrinsically and relatively with respect to creatures (respectively). In the former manner, they do not differ from God himself and are no other than God himself decreeing. But in the latter, they do differ because they may be conceived as many and various (not as to the thing, since God has decreed all things by one single and most simple act, but as to the objects), even as the knowledge of God is conversant with innumerable objects without detriment to his unity.

XI. The decrees of God are free, not absolutely and as to the principle, but relatively and objectively and as to the end. For there could be no external object necessarily terminating to the divine will, for God stands in need of nothing out of himself. Therefore they could be and not be. But this does not hinder them from being called necessary as to the principle and internal act because the act of intelligence and will could not be absent from God at all. He could not be God without intelligence and will. They are necessary, therefore, as to internal existence, but free as to external relation (*schesin*) and habit. Nor can the will of God be said to cease absolutely, but with respect to the external object on which it is terminated.

XII. The decrees of God are immanent acts of the divine will, but not properly its effect. God ought not to be called so much the cause as the principle of them. Hence there is no need that they should be posterior to God except in our order and in the manner of conceiving them.

XIII. Although the essence of God (considered simply in itself) is absolute and implies no relation to creatures, yet this does not hinder it (when considered with relative opposition to creatures and as determining itself in the manner of vital principle to the production of this or that thing out of itself) from having a certain reference (*schesin*) and relation to creatures. Nor can that manifold relation make composition in God, more than the relation which his omniscience and omnipotence bear to things *ad extra*, constituted a real difference between God and his omnipotence and omniscience.

XIV. Whatever in God is essential and absolute is God himself. Thus the absolute attributes may be identified really with the divine essence and are in it essentially, not accidentally. If they are predicated of God in the concrete, their subject is only of denomination, not of inhesion (*inhaesionis*). But whatever is personal and modal in God is indeed God himself in the concrete, though not in the abstract.

XV. The relative attributes do not argue composition, but distinction. The formal nature of relations is not to be in, but to be to. Nor do they superadd a

new perfection to the essence, but only imply a habitude of the essence to other things. Paternity and dominion do not render him another being, but in a different manner dispose the possessor without superinducing a change in him.

XVI. The personal property of the Son does not make his essence different from that of the Father, nor of a simple essence make a composed, for nothing real is added to the essence, rather it only makes the Son distinct from the Father. Distinction is not composition.

XVII. The fathers often insist on this simplicity of God. "The nature of God is simple and immutable and undisturbed, nor is he himself one thing and what he is and has another thing" (Augustine, l. 5, *de Trinit.* c. 1+). And after teaching that no creature is truly and perfectly simple, he adds: "Now although God may be called manifold, yet he is truly perfectly simple, for he is called great, wise, happy, and true, and whatever with propriety may be said of him. But his greatness is the same as his wisdom, for he is not great in mass, but in virtue, and his goodness is the same as his wisdom and greatness and truth" (*The Trinity* 6.6,7* [FC 45:208-9; PL 42.929]). So too Athanasius: "God is not composed who composed all things that they might be; nor is he such as those things are which were made by his word; since he is a simple substance in whom there is no quality nor any shadow of change, as James testifies" (*To the Bishops of Africa* 8 [NPNF2, 4:493; PG 26.1043]).

EIGHTH QUESTION: THE INFINITY OF GOD

Is God infinite in essence? We affirm against Socinus and Vorstius.

I. The infinity of God follows his simplicity and is equally diffused through the other attributes of God, and by it the divine nature is conceived as free from all limit in imperfection: as to essence (by incomprehensibility) and as to duration (by eternity) and as to circumscription, in reference to place (by immensity). We here treat of the first, leaving the others for future consideration.

Statement of the question.

II. We do not treat here of infinity (improperly so called and as to us) as the number of the stars and of the sands upon the seashore is said to be infinite. For we cannot count them (although in itself it is necessarily finite) since there is nothing actually and absolutely infinite but God. We treat of infinity proper and in itself.

III. We do not treat of syncategorematic and relative infinity, concerning which it is said there are not so many but there may be more (as quantity is said to be infinitely divisible). But we treat of categorematic and absolute; not of potential infinity (in which sense the longing of matter with respect to forms is said to be infinite), but of infinity actually such (according to which the essence is not only indefinite [*aoristos*], but truly infinite [*apeiros*]); not only actually infinite in the oblique case, but also an infinite act in the proper case.

IV. The Socinians and Vorstius, who ploughs with their oxen, interfere with this infinity. As they do not acknowledge the immensity of God as to essence, so they deny that God is actually infinite simply, although with respect to us he may often be called such. And the Remonstrants agree with them (although indirectly) ascribing indeed infinity of power and operation to God, but either taking away or calling in question the infinity of his essence.

Proof that God is infinite in essence: from Ps. 145:3; Job 11:7.

V. The orthodox attribute absolute infinity to God with respect to essence. In the first place, Scripture clearly teaches it: "Great is the Lord, and greatly to praised, and of his greatness there is no end" (Ps. 145:3). Here the psalmist speaks not of the greatness of mass (which can in no way apply to the most simple God), but of the greatness, or better the infinity, of essence and virtue. Thus Zophar: "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? Deeper than hell; what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea" (Job 11:7-9). Nor ought it to be said that these words properly refer to perfection of wisdom, as Crellius wishes ("De Deo et Ejus Attributis," 1.27 in *Opera* [1656], 4:91). For besides the passage itself testifying that it treats of the incomprehensibility of God, if it had reference only to wisdom, the argument would not lose a particle of its force because the property of an infinite perfection cannot agree with a finite nature. To the same purpose are the following: "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span?" (Is. 40:12); "Behold, the nations before him are as a drop of a bucket, and as nothing" (Is. 40:15, 17).

From the perfection of God.

VI. Second, from the pure perfection of God. For since he has every perfection which can be and be possessed, it is evident that nothing can be or be conceived better and more perfect. Thus he must necessarily be infinite because an infinite good is better than a finite. Besides, the perfections in created things are included within certain limits beyond which they are not extended and all their activity has a certain sphere beyond which it cannot go. However in God it is different. Besides containing every perfection of every being, he has it in the most eminent manner (i.e., he embraces every degree of every perfection without any limitation).

And his power.

VII. This is further confirmed by the consideration of his power. Since power (as the other attributes) may be identified with the essence, the essence must be the same with it in nature and therefore infinite no less than it. That his power is infinite is evident from this—that with God nothing is impossible (for this cannot be said of finite and limited power). Finally, if the essence of God is finite, he must be limited by some cause (which cannot be said of him who has no cause superior to himself, but is the cause of all). Therefore we can join with the ancients in saying that "God is infinite and incomprehensible and that infinity and incomprehensibility are the one thing which can be comprehended concerning him" (*apeiron akatalēpton to theion kai touto monon autou katalēpton hē hapeiria, kai hē akatalēpsia*).

VIII. God is said to be infinite in essence in three ways: (1) originally, because he is absolutely independent, who neither has nor can have anything prior or superior to himself; (2) formally, because he has an absolutely infinite (*apeiron*) essence; (3) virtually, because his activity has no finite sphere, nor does he need the concourse of any cause in acting, but does all things whatsoever he wills.

Sources of explanation.

IX. Although God cannot produce an infinite effect (because it is not producible), yet he does not cease to be of infinite virtue because he acts in an infinite mode. The infinity, which cannot be found in the end on account of repugnancy, is found in that mode of acting.

X. Comprehension either denotes the full obtaining and fruition of the thing desired in reference (*schesin*) to those who reach the goal in a race (in which sense the saints in heaven are called "attainers" [Phil. 3:12; 1 Cor. 9:24] to distinguish them from believers who are still on the road); or it denotes the accurate and perfectly absolute knowledge of God, which is perfectly adequate to the object. In this sense, none can be said to have attained—neither men nor angels—because the finite is not capable of the infinite.

XI. Although God perfectly and adequately knows himself, it does not follow that his essence is finite because both the knowledge and apprehension which God has of himself are infinite. Thus the essence is said to be finite to God less properly. Not that God judges his essence to be finite, but that his knowledge is adequate to it.

XII. It implies a contradiction for something to be indefinite and to be actually infinite without any limits of essence, and actually this something (i.e., most singular) undivided in itself and divided from every other.

XIII. Although all creatures are at an infinite distance from the uncreated perfection, and between them and God there is no proportion of equality and commensuration, it does not follow that all creatures are equally perfect because the measure of the creatures' perfection is not taken from their distance from the perfection of God, but from the greater or lesser degrees of perfection which each thing partakes from God.

XIV. All perfections belong to God, either formally (as perfections simply such, i.e., which absolutely speaking it is better to have than not to have, and than which no greater perfection can be conceived); or eminently (as perfections relatively, which indeed in their kind indicate some perfection, but necessarily conjoined with some imperfection; and because it cannot have them properly and formally, yet is said to possess them virtually and eminently because it can produce that perfection or because it can perform without it whatever that can perform, all imperfection being excluded).

XV. That which is so that it is not anything else (neither formally nor eminently) is finite with respect to substance. Of God however this cannot be said, who is so something that nevertheless he is all things eminently, containing in himself eminently the perfections of all things.

XVI. Although local infinity requires that formal existence of a thing in all places, yet infinity of essence does not require the thing to be formally all substance, but only to contain the perfections of every substance, if not formally, at least eminently.

Ninth Question: The Immensity of God

Is God immense and omnipresent as to essence? We affirm against Socinus and Vorstius.

I. After the infinity of God with respect to essence, the same is to be considered with respect to place and time by which he is conceived as uncircumscribed

by any limits (*aperigraptos*) of place or time. The former is called immensity, the latter eternity. We must speak of these separately—first of immensity.

Statement of the question.

II. The question does not concern the presence of power and operation which is called energetic (*energētikē*) (as the sun is said to be present with us by the power of his rays although, very far distance in his body); for the adversaries do not deny this. Rather the question concerns the presence of nature (*ousiōdēs*), called essential, which they do not admit.

III. The question does not concern the various modes of the special divine presence, according to which it is said to be in Christ by hypostatical union and fulness of deity (Col. 2:9), in heaven by glory (1 K. 8:27), in the church by grace (Ezk. 48:35). The divine presence is either: a symbolical presence, when under some visible symbol he manifests himself to believers (as to Moses in the bush, to the people in the cloudy pillar, to the patriarchs under the form of angels and men); or a sacramental and mystical presence, when under external signs and elements he exhibits and confirms his grace to us; or a spiritual and vivifying presence and when by his Spirit he dwells in the hearts of believers. No one denies that these various species of the presence of God are particular and proper to certain places. However the question relates to the general presence of God by essence, abstracted from all these singular modes.

IV. God may be said to be present with all things in three modes: (1) by power and operation; (2) by knowledge; (3) by essence. This is usually expressed by the Scholastics in the line: *Inter, praesenter Deus est, et ubique potenter* ("Meanwhile, God is present, and everywhere powerfully"). He is said to be everywhere by his power because he produces and governs all things and works all things in all (in which sense Paul says, "In him we live and move and have our being," Acts 17:28). He is present with all by his knowledge because he sees and beholds all things which are and become in every place as intimately present to and placed before him. Hence "all things" are said "to be naked and open unto the eyes of him" and "there is no creature that is not manifest in his sight" (Heb. 4:13). Finally, he is everywhere by his essence because his essence penetrates all things and is wholly by itself intimately present with each and everything. Now it is of this last presence we properly treat here, for our adversaries themselves do not deny that God is everywhere present by his power and knowledge (as has been said already).

V. Three modes of being in a place are commonly held: (1) circumscriptively—attributed to bodies because they are in place and space so as to be commensurate with parts of space; (2) definitively—applicable to created spirits and incorporeal substances (which are defined by certain places, and are so here as not to be anywhere else); (3) repletively—which is ascribed to God because his immense essence is present with all and, as it were, completely fills all places. But although this distinction (when cut to the quick) may be inaccurate and repletion may seem to belong properly to a body occupying place by its extension, yet since it has been by long use received among philosophers and theologians (and can take appropriate sense according to the mind of the Holy Spirit himself, who testifies that "God fills heaven and earth," Jer. 23:24), it ought not to be rashly rejected (if skillfully explained and understood in a sound sense, especially since we have no proper and accurate terms for explaining the ubiquity of God and are compelled here to use phrases borrowed from finite and corporeal things).

VI. Therefore God is so said to be repletively everywhere on account of the immensity of his essence, that this should be understood in a most different manner from the mode of being in place of bodies (i.e., beyond the occupation of space, and the multiplication, extension, division of itself, or its mingling with other things, but independently and indivisibly). For wherever he is, he is wholly; wholly in all things, yet wholly beyond all; included in no place and excluded from none; and not so much in a place (because finite cannot comprehend infinite) as in himself. Hence the rabbis call him place (*mqvm*) to intimate that he is not contained in place, but contains all things in himself. Theophilus (of Antioch) says, "God is the place of all things, and is place to himself" (*ho Theos topos esti tōn holōn, kai heautō topos esti, To Autolycus* 2.3 [ANF 2:95; PG 6.1049]).

VII. The Socinians with Vorstius argue with us concerning this immensity and omnipresence of God, admitting his presence as to virture and operation, but denying it as to essence. They maintain that God is contained in heaven (as Socinus, "De Jesu Christi Invocatione Disputatio . . . cum Francisco Davidis," in *Opera Omnia* [1656], 2:709-66 and Crellius, "De Deo et Ejus Attributis," 1.27* in *Opera* [1656], 4:90-93 often assert) and endeavor to sustain this by various arguments. Vorstius, although seeming to hold back (*epechein*) on this question, yet sufficiently opens up his opinion in his *Tractatus theologicus de Deo* (1610), p. 230 and his *Apologetica Exegesis* (1611), placing substantial omnipresence among absurdities (*asystata*) and impossibilities (*adynata*). He expressly teaches that God (according to his essence) is in heaven, but according to his virtue and efficacy is on the earth and present with all creatures.

VIII. But the orthodox believe and confess the immensity and omnipresence of God, not only as to virtue and operation, but principally as to essence. Still they think the mode of it should neither be curiously inquired into, nor be rashly defined. This only is to be held as certain—that it does not consist either in the multiplication of the divine essence (which is one numerically and individually); or in the extension and diffusion of any corporeal mass (since he is an uncreated spirit); or in physical contact (which belongs only to bodies); but in the simple and to us incomprehensible infinity of the divine essence, which is so intimately present with all things that it is both everywhere in the world and yet is not included in the world.

Proof of God's immensity from Scripture.

IX. The reasons are: (1) Scripture ascribes this omnipresence to God—"Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence. If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: If I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me" (Ps. 139:7-10*). "Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool; where is the house that ye build unto me?" (Is. 66:1). In the latter, he proves that he cannot be included in temples made with hands, not by a reason drawn from the distance of the place in which his proper seat is (as Vorstius feigns), but from the magnitude of his substance, which completely fills the universe. Yea, he elsewhere protests that he fills heaven and earth: "Do not I fill heaven and earth?" (Jer. 23:24). That no one might imagine he is contained within heaven or the world, elsewhere the Holy Spirit testifies: "the heaven of heavens cannot contain him" (1 K. 8:27).

X. To no purpose is it objected by Crellius that these passages treat of omnipresence of power and efficacy, not of essence. For (a) the words themselves teach the contrary (which refer not only to operation, but to the very essence itself; for what else can these words mean: "Thou art there; I fill heaven and earth; the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee"); (b) from parity, he ought to be in the sepulcher or in hell in the same way in which he is said to be in heaven because the presence of God is equally asserted of both places. Either he is everywhere as to essence or he is nowhere as to essence. (c) The design of the psalmist is to show that no one can be concealed from God so as not to be seen by him because he can be nowhere where God is not and can hide himself in no place where God cannot easily detect him (since the darkness and the light are both alike to him). (d) Things which ought to be composed are opposed. The presence of power does not exclude, but necessarily supposes the presence of essence. For where God is not, there he cannot operate because he operates immediately by his essence. Therefore, if he operates everywhere, he must be everywhere.

XI. (2) The same thing is proved by those passages which teach that God works all things in all and sustains them by the word of his power (Heb. 1:3), and that he is not far from everyone of us because in him we live and move and have our being (Acts 17:27, 28). The presence of a spirit cannot be known more certainly than by its operations, nor is it less impossible for anyone to effect something where he is not, than when he is not. Nor ought it to be said that God works all things in all, but by second (or physical or hyperphysical) causes, and therefore the presence of the essence is not to be directly inferred from the operation. For besides the fact that God does not always act by second causes (but often immediately by himself as in the creation of the world, its sustentation, the miracles and works of grace in the heart), when he uses second causes, he is most intimately present with them in order to work by them.

XII. (3) If God is not immense in essence, but finite, it will favor the contradiction that the creature is greater than God. For as nothing can be added to infinity, so it is of the nature of the finite that something can always be added to it. Indeed if the essence of God is not elsewhere than in heaven, the universe will be greater than God. Again if he is finite in essence, he must also be finite in power because infinite power cannot be in a finite subject. Third, if God is not immediately present with creatures by his essence, but only by operation, the belief of the incarnation of the Son of God could not rest upon a sure foundation. For what kind of an hypostatical union could have taken place with the human nature, if the divine essence remained concluded in heaven and was not present on the earth?

Sources of explanation.

XIII. God is said "to be in heaven," not exclusively of the earth, as if he is included in heaven as to essence; but because in heaven as a royal palace, he displays his glory in an eminent manner. Nor if worshippers raise their eyes to heaven, either by natural instinct or by command of the word, is this done because God is included in heaven (which the apostle proves, Acts 17:24), but (1) in order that when we are about to approach unto God, we may elevate all our thoughts above these terrestrial and fleeting things and think nothing concerning God but what is great and lofty; (2) that we may know heaven to be the seat and throne of God, where there is a more illustrious display

and a richer communication of glory and grace, whence all blessings are to be looked for and sought (as under the old dispensation the worshippers turned their faces towards the ark and temple and not because God was included in the ark or temple, but on account of the remarkable manifestation of grace usually made there); (3) that we may also remember that heaven is the habitation prepared for us by God, towards which we ought continually to press (as the Israelites driven into exile looked back to the temple, panting as it were in wishes for their country and liberty; so we should be kept in mind of our exile and pilgrimage, so as to breathe after liberty and seek our country with unwearied exertion); (4) to show that our prayers should no longer be directed to a certain fixed place on earth, but should be elevated to heaven, to be placed upon our altar (Christ in heaven) to be sanctified by him.

XIV. It is not unworthy of the divine majesty to be everywhere on earth, even in the most filthy places, because he is not there by physical contact or by any mingling or composition, but as the efficient and conserving cause of things. (2) If it was not unworthy of God to create all things even the most mean, why should it be unworthy of him to be perpetually present with them? The sun by his rays permeates sordid places without being polluted by them, and how much less God?

XV. God is far off from the wicked (as to the special presence of his favor and grace), but is always present with them by his general presence of essence. Where God is, there indeed is his grace originally and subjectively, but not always effectively because its exercise is perfectly free.

XVI. It is absurd to suppose God to be in the devils and the wicked as he is in believers (as a gracious God), but not to be in them as a Judge and the avenger of crimes; not as an approver of wickedness, but as the Creator and sustainer of nature. Although he is differently in heaven and in hell (here by grace, there by justice; here as blessing, there as punishing), yet he can be in both places as to the immensity of his essence.

XVII. Although the essence of God is abstracted from all created entities, it does not follow that he cannot be omnipresent as to essence. For it is said to be abstracted inasmuch as it is divided from them and is not a part of them; but it is said to be omnipresent, not that it comes into composition with them as a part or is contained by them, but inasmuch as it is terminated by the essence of none, nor excluded from it.

XVIII. When God is said to be immense (as so everywhere in the world that nevertheless he is not included in the world, which is finite, but may be conceived to be also beyond the world), this ought not to be understood positively (as if certain spaces are to be conceived of beyond the world which God completely fills by his presence), but negatively (inasmuch as the universal spaces of the world do not exhaust the immensity of God so as to be contained in and circumscribed by them). He is said, therefore, to be beyond the world because included in it, not as being in certain imaginary places, but in himself by the infinity of his own essence, as he was before the creation of the world in himself. "He was to himself both place, and world and all things," as Tertullian says (*Against Praxeas* 5 [ANF 3:600; PL 2.160]).

XIX. He who conceives God as everywhere present by his essence, does not therefore conceive him as extended like bodies through the whole world, but as

containing the whole world in the most simple infinity of his own essence (or as coexisting indivisibly with all created things), just as eternity holds in its embrace all time as a point and coexists with it indivisibly.

XX. So far is the doctrine of the essential omnipresence of God from favoring atheism (as the Remonstrants in their "Apologia pro confessione sive declaratione . . . Remonstrantes," in Episcopius, *Operum theologicum*, Pt. II [1656], p. 130 maintain) that on the contrary the denial of it encourages it not a little because it takes away the reverence and fear of him, feigning that he is absent and therefore either does not see or cannot punish the sins of men. But the pious, who fear God, are said to walk before him because they are incited by his presence to his worship and service.

XXI. It is one thing to declare and demonstrate *a posteriori* the presence of God through the external operation; another thing to define *a priori* the presence of God by that operation or to maintain that God is not present except by power and operation. The former we acknowledge can rightly be done, but the latter we deny because the operation of God supposes his presence, and he must first be conceived to be and to exist before he can be conceived of as acting. Certain more modern thinkers (who limit the omnipresence of God by his operation), may be allowed their opinion if they understand it in the former sense for its manifestation *a posteriori;* but if they refer it to its constitution *a priori*, it is deservedly rejected as contrary to Scripture and approaching too near the error of the Socininans.

XXII. Although the immensity and omnipresence of God are always connected together, yet they admit of distinction. The former indicates an absolute property belonging to him from eternity; the latter, based upon it, denotes a habitude to place existing in time. They are related to each other as a first and second act or a principle (*principii*) and a principiate (*principiati*). For out of immensity arises omnipresence, which supposes immensity as its foundation. God is therefore omnipresent because he is immense.

XXIII. When God is said to ascend or descend, to go away or to come, this does not take away his omnipresence because it is not said with respect to his essence, but only to the absence or presence of his diverse operations. God therefore comes when in a peculiar manner he works anywhere, either in grace or in justice; but he departs when he removes the symbols of his grace and denies to men the testimonies of his saving presence. Otherwise "in him we live, and move and have our being," as Paul says in Acts 17:28.

XXIV. The heathen themselves were not ignorant of this attribute of God. Trismegistus says, "God is a circle whose center is everywhere, but his circumference nowhere" (?cf. "Asclepius," 3.27b in *Hermetica* [ed. W. Scott, 1985], 1:324). Aratus says, "All things are full of Jove" (*Phaenomena* 1-4 [Loeb, 206-7]). Virgil says, "God they say, pervades all things, earth and sea's expanse and heaven's depth" (*Georgics* 4.221 [Loeb, 1:210-11]). To the same purpose are the following: *quo fugis Encelade, quascunque accesseris oras sub Jove semper eris+*. Seneca says, "Wherever you turn yourself, there you will meet him; no place is without him; he fills his own work" ("De Beneficiis," 4.8.2 in *Seneca: Moral Essays* III [Loeb, 3:218-19]).

Tenth Question: The Eternity of God

Does the eternity of God exclude succession according to priority and posteriority? We affirm against the Socinians.

Statement of the question.

I. The infinity of God in reference to duration is called eternity to which these three things are ascribed: (1) that it is without beginning; (2) without end; (3) without succession (i.e., the duration of a thing as to priority and posteriority, as to present, past and future). The question here properly is not whether God is eternal with reference to the two former (i.e., whether he is without beginning and end). Socinus and Vorstius cannot deny this against so many perfectly clear testimonies of Scripture. The question concerns the third—whether his eternity is without succession or whether it is subject to the differences of time as they pretend (see Crellius, "De Deo et Ejus Attributis," 1.18 in *Opera* [1656], 4:41-45). We maintain that God is free from every difference of time, and no less from succession than from beginning and end.

II. The question does not concern eternity improperly and relatively so called (as it is taken sometimes for the long duration of a thing, as circumcision is called "an eternal covenant" [Gen 17:7], i.e., constant, which ought to continue until the restitution of all things [*diorthōsin*]; and the hills are said to be "eternal" by Moses [Dt. 33:15] because on account of their long continuance and constant duration they seem to approach eternity; or it may be used for that which has no end, although it might have had a beginning, as the angels and souls are eternal). Rather the question concerns eternity absolutely and properly so called, both anterior as well as posterior.

The eternity of God proved.

III. Scripture teaches that such eternity belongs to God, not only when it calls God "eternal" (Gen. 21:33; "who inhabits eternity," Is. 57:15; "the king eternal, immortal, invisible," 1 Tim. 1:17; "who was before the world was formed . . . from everlasting and to everlasting," Ps. 90:1, 2), but also when it ascribes all the properties of eternity to him (Ps. 102:26-28): both dividedly that he is without beginning because he was before the foundation of the earth (Ps. 102:25*), without end—"who is ever the same, and whose years shall have no end" (Ps. 102:27*); without succession because he is said "to remain" without any change and "always to be the same" (Ps. 102:27*)—for he is not always the same from whom almost every moment something anteriorly is removed and by whom posteriorly something is added. Conjointly when to the mutability of the most constant things (which have a beginning, end and succession) is opposed the perpetual continuance of God in the same state; "the heavens shall perish, but thou shalt endure; yea all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed; but thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end" (Ps. 102:25-27*). The passage in Jam. 1:17 is similar: "with God is no variableness, neither shadow of turning" (*parallagēn, ē tropēs aposkiasma*). The succession and flow of the parts of duration (which exist successively) necessarily involve a certain species of motion (which cannot be applied to God).

IV. Again, he is said to be "the first and the last" (Is. 41:4) and "the Alpha and Omega" (Rev. 1:8). He is the beginning without beginning because while he is

the beginning of all things, he himself has no beginning. He is the end without end because (since he is the end to which all things are referred) he can have no end. Now that which is without beginning is also without succession because succession depends upon a beginning and implies order according to former and latter. The name Jehovah necessarily includes this eternity because (as has been said) it designates God to be the first and independent being, liable to no change. Hence the French Version appropriately translates it everywhere by *l'Eternel* because eternity eminently (*kat' exochēn*) belongs to him alone.

V. The eternity of God cannot have succession because his essence, with which it is really identified, admits none. This is so both because it is perfectly simple and immutable (and therefore rejects the change of former into latter, of past into present, of present into future, which succession involves), and because it is unmeasurable, as being the first and independent. However that which continues by succession can in some way be measured.

VI. True eternity has been defined by the Scholastics to be "the interminable possession of life—complete, perfect and at once." Thus it excludes succession no less than end and ought to be conceived as a standing, but not a flowing, now. The reason is because nothing flows away with time from the life of God as from ours. God has every moment at once whatever we have dividedly by succession of time. Hence philosophers have well said that neither the future nor the past (he will be or was), but only the present (he is) can properly be applied to him. For the eternal duration of God embraces indeed all time—the past, present and future; but nothing in him can be past or future because his life remains always the same and immutable.

Sources of explanation.

VII. The three differences of time are applied to God when he is called "the one who is, and was and is to come" (*ho ōn, kai ho ēn, kai ho erchomenos*, Rev. 1:4). This is not done formally, but eminently and after the manner of men (*anthrōpopathōs*), to describe (if possible) in this manner the eternity of God. This is not done dividedly as if they might be predicated of him successively, but undividedly because the eternity of God embraces all time at once. Hence the past is affirmed without the negation of the present and the future, and the present is asserted, but without the negation of the past and the future. "Although," says Augustine, "that immutable and ineffable nature does not admit of he was or will be, but only of he is, yet on account of the mutability of time, with which our mortality and mutability is concerned, we may say without error, he is, was, and will be. He was in the past ages, he is in the present, he will be in the future. He was because he never was not; he will be because he will never cease to be; he is because he always is" (Tractate 99, *On the Gospel of John* [NPNF1, 7:383; PL 35.1888]).

VIII. Although eternity may coexist with all the differences of time, it does not follow that they equally coexist among themselves. It does not coexist with them taken together and existing at once, but coexists with them existing dividedly and mutually succeeding each other. Thus the past while it was, coexisted with eternity, the present now coexists with it, and the future will coexist with it.

IX. Things which agree with one third thing, agree together themselves, but only with respect to the same third thing. Thus all the differences of time agree

together in this—that each when it exists, coexists with the whole of eternity. However they ought not therefore to agree among themselves so as to coexist at once because the whole eternity does not coexist with them taken at once, but dividedly as they mutually succeed each other (as the sun and its motion coexist with all the days of the ages; nevertheless it does not thence follow that they all coexist among themselves because every day coexists in its own order with the sun, which is always the same).

X. Although time coexists with the whole of eternity, it is not therefore eternal because that coexistence is not adequate (as if they were of the same duration and nature), but inadequate (of a thing evidently heterogeneous both as to nature and as to duration).

XI. The indivisible eternity of God embraces all divisible times, not coextensively or formally, but eminently and indivisibly. Thus the immense God embraces in his immensity all the extended and divisible parts of the world (although indivisible in his nature) because wherever he is, he is wholly.

XII. A point is either mathematical (the beginning of a line or of time); or physical and political (viz., the shortest extension either of mass or of time); or metaphysical (which denotes the negation of extension and divisibility). In this third sense, it is not absurd that the world and time should be contained in a point of eternity.

XIII. When a thousand years are said to be in the sight of God as one day (Ps. 90:4), it refers not only to estimation (that God considers a thousand years as no more than one day), but also to the comparison of our duration (which is ephemeral [*ephēmeros*]) with the divine (which is eternal). It intimates that God is not to be measured by our rule, as if his promise could be retarded, even if in our judgment fulfilled too late. For God is not subject to any differences of time, but a thousand years in his sight are as one day.

XIV. God is called "the ancient of days," not as stricken with old age and sated with years (as the Saturn of the heathen), but as before and more ancient than days themselves and the birth of time. Therefore days and years are not ascribed to him properly, but after the manner of men. For we who live in time can conceive nothing unless by a relation (*schesin*) to time, in which we are.

XV. When the actions of God are considered either as past or present or future, this is said not with respect to the efficient reason, but in reference to the effects and objects (which are produced in diverse times and on which his acts are terminated).

XVI. Time and eternity are not related to each other as part and whole, but as species of duration mutually opposed. Eternity always was and will be. However, time neither always was nor always will be, but will cease with the world.

Eleventh Question: The Immutability of God

Is God immutable both in essence and will? We affirm.

I. Immutability is an incommunicable attribute of God by which is denied of him not only all change, but also all possibility of change, as much with respect to existence as to will.

II. The adversaries oppose this immutability of God, especially that which relates to the acts of his will. Hence God can now will what he before nilled and

nill now what he before willed (Crellius, "De Deo et Ejus Attributis," 1.21 in *Opera* [1656], 4:47-49; Vorstius, *Tractus theologicus de Deo* [1610]). With the orthodox, we maintain that every kind of immutability is to be ascribed to him both as to nature and as to will.

The immutability of God proved.

III. (1) Scripture expressly attributes it to him: "I am the Lord, I change not" (Mal. 3:6); "the heavens shall perish, but thou shalt endure" (Ps. 102:26); "with God is no variableness, neither shadow of turning" (Jam. 1:17). In the latter not only change is denied of him, but even the shadow of change, that he may be contrasted with the sun, the fountain of material light, liable to various changes and eclipses by which its light is intercepted. But God, the father of lights, acknowledges no tropics and can be obscured by no clouds since there is nothing to intercept his influence. The immutability of the divine will and counsel in particular is often asserted: "God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent; hath he said, and shall he not do it? Or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?" (Num. 23:19). "My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure" (Is. 46:10; cf. Pss. 33:11; 110:4; 1 S. 15:29; Heb. 6:17).

IV. Reason confirms it for he is Jehovah, and so a necessary and independent being that can be changed by no one. "All created things are mutable" (*pan ktiston trepton*), says John of Damascus (*Dialogus contra Manichaeos* 68 [PG 94.1568]) because they take their being from some other than themselves. God is immutable because he is from himself and recognizes no cause above himself. (2) He can neither be changed for the better (because he is the best) nor for the worse (because he would cease to be the most perfect). Augustine says, "Whatsoever is changed from the better for the worse, and from the worse for the better, is not God, because perfect virtue can neither change for the better, nor true eternity for the worse" (Tractate 23*, *On the Gospel of John* [NPNF1, 7:154; PL 35.1588]). (3) All causes of change are removed from him: dependence *a priori;* passive power; error of mind; inconstancy of will.

Sources of explanation.

V. Creation did not produce a change in God, but in creatures; not a physical change and properly so called (which supposes its material), but hyperphysical by which the creature passes from nonexistence to existence. An agent said to be changed (which in itself becomes different from what it was before), but which becomes different (not in itself but only relatively and in order to another thing) cannot be said to be changed. Now when God became the Creator, he was not changed in himself (for nothing new happened to him, for from eternity he had the efficacious will of creating the world in time), but only in order to the creature (because a new relation took place with it). And as to the act of creation being transient not immanent, it is not so much in God as from him.

VI. God was not changed by the incarnation; the Word (*logos*) was made flesh, not by a conversion of the Word (*tou logou*) into flesh, but by an assumption of the flesh to the hypostasis of the Word (*logou*).

VII. It is one thing to change the will; another to will the change of anything. God can will the change of various things (as the institution and abrogation of the Levitical worship) without prejudice to the immutability of his will because even from eternity he had decreed such a change. So from eternity he decreed to

create the world and preserve it until a certain time, but afterwards to destroy it with a flood. In the same manner, we must reason concerning his knowledge. The knowledge of God does not change with the thing known because God who knew it not only knew that this change would take place, but even decreed it.

VIII. It is one thing to be indifferent to various objects; another to be mutable. The cause of indifference is not mutability, but liberty. The will of God could be indifferent before the decree, but after the decree it cannot be mutable.

IX. The power of varying his own acts is not the principle of mutability in itself, but only in its objects (unless it is understood of the variation of his own acts which a perfect will does not vary, but only an imperfect; for no one can vary his purpose unless some disadvantage is discovered attending it, which cannot be the case in God).

X. It is one thing to inquire whether God might have determined himself to other objects than those he has decreed before he had resolved anything concerning them; another whether the decree having been formed he could rescind it. The latter we deny, but the former we assert. And yet no mutability is thus charged upon God because he is therefore said to be changed (who begins to will what he nilled or to nill what he willed) which can have no place in God.

XI. Repentance is attributed to God after the manner of men (*anthrōpopathōs*) but must be understood after the manner of God (*theoprepōs*): not with respect to his counsel, but to the event; not in reference to his will, but to the thing willed; not to affection and internal grief, but to the effect and external work because he does what a penitent man usually does. If repentance concerning the creation of man (which he could not undo) is ascribed to God (Gen. 6:6, 7*), it must be understood not pathetically (*pathētikōs*), but energetically (*energētikōs*). Although he could not by a non-creation undo what he had done, yet by a destruction he could produce change.

XII. Unfulfilled promises and threatenings do not argue a change of will because they were conditional, not absolute. This is evident from Jer. 18:7-8*. Although the condition may not often be expressed, it must be understood as tacit and implied.

XIII. When the death of Hezekiah was predicted, there was not a declaration of what would happen according to the will of God, but of what (according to the nature of second causes) would happen unless God interposed.

XIV. The necessity of the immutability we ascribe to God does not infer Stoic fate. It is only an extrinsic necessity and from the hypothesis of the divine will, without interference with the liberty and contingency of things, as will be proved hereafter when we come to the decrees.

Twelfth Question: The Knowledge of God

Do all things fall under the knowledge of God, both singulars and future contingencies? We affirm against Socinus.

I. Among the communicable and positive attributes (which affirm some perfection of God), there are three principal ones by which his immortal and perfectly happy life is active: intellect, will and power. The first belongs to the principle as directing, the second as enjoining, the third as executing.

II. Concerning the intellect of God and the disquisition of his knowledge, two things above all others must be attended to: the mode and object. The mode consists in his knowing all things perfectly, undividedly, distinctly and immutably. It is thus distinguished from human and angelic knowledge: perfectly because he knows all things by himself or by his essence (not by forms abstracted from things—as is the case with creatures—both because these are only in time with the things themselves, but the knowledge of God is eternal, and because he can have no cause out of himself). (2) Undividedly, because he knows all things intuitively and noetically, not discursively and dianoetically (by ratiocination and by inferring one thing from another). If God is sometimes set forth as inquiring or reasoning, this is not said properly, but humanly (the Scriptures lisping with us to the perfect and certain knowledge of God). (3) Distinctly, not that by a diverse conception he collects diverse predicates of things, but because he most distinctively sees through all things at one glance so that nothing, even the most minute, can escape him. (4) Immutably, because with him there is no shadow of change, and as he himself remaining immovable gives motion to all, so he sees the various turns and changes of things by an immutable cognition.

III. The object of the knowledge of God is both himself (who most perfectly knows himself in himself) and all things extrinsic to him whether possible or future (i.e., as to their various orders and states; as to quantity—great and small; as to quality—good and bad; as to predication—universals and singulars; as to time—past, present and future; as to state— necessary and free or contingent).

Whether God knows singulars.

IV. The principal question agitated here is that about singulars and future contingent things which some wish to withdraw from the knowledge of God; singulars indeed, as Averroes, who denies that they can be exactly known by God. This is also charged upon Jerome since he thinks it to be absurd and "unworthy of the divine majesty to let it down to this, that it should know how many gnats are born or die every moment, number of cinches and fleas on earth" (*Commentariorum in Abucuc* 1.1 [PL 25.1286] on Hab. 1:13*, 14*). This opinion is highly injurious towards God, if precisely urged. But these rather harsh words can be softened and understood comparatively; they mean nothing else than to withdraw these things from the special care exercised towards men, to teach their advantage over them. Jerome seems to intimate this by adding: "Nor are we such foolish flatterers of God as, while drawing down his power to the lowest things, to be injurious to ourselves, teaching that the same providence extends to irrational as to rational creatures" (ibid.).

V. Indeed Scripture is so clear on this subject as to leave no room for doubt. For why should Christ say that the hairs of our head are all numbered and not one sparrow can fall on the ground without the will of the Father (Mt. 10:29, 30)? How could Paul assert that all things are naked and open (*tetrachēlismena*) unto him, and there is no creature that is not manifest in his sight (Heb. 4:13)? How could the psalmist intimate that God tells the number of the stars and calls them all by their names (Ps. 147:4) unless God beheld individual things? And if God created and governs them, why should he not also know them?

VI. The divine understanding is no more debased by the knowledge of a mean thing than the sun is polluted by a filthy thing. And if the power of God was not lowered when he created them, why should his knowledge be debased by the

contemplation of them? Yea, since all things (even the greatest) are the smallest before him in comparison with his infinity (as Is. 40:15 magnificently says) and, as it were, nothing, the knowledge of all things should be denied of him if the smallest are removed from his notice.

Statement of the question: the knowledge of future contingent things.

VII. Another question of greater importance refers to future contingent things, the knowledge of which the Socinians endeavor to wrest from God in order to establish more easily the indifference of free will (its freedom from all necessity, even from that which is usually placed upon it by the foreknowledge of God). They may sometimes seem to attribute to him a full knowledge of all things, even of those which are future. "Under the name of the wisdom of God in this place we embrace the knowledge of all things." And a little after: "As to future things, there are the most palpable proofs in Scripture that God knows them also" (Crellius, "De Deo et Ejus Attributis," 1.24, *Opera* [1656], 4:65). Yet elsewhere they openly withdraw from him the knowledge of future contingencies as not being in the class of knowable things, saying either that he does not know them absolutely or only indeterminately and probably. Socinus says, "Since, then, there is no reason, no passage of Scripture, from which it can be clearly gathered that God knew all things which happened before they happened, we must conclude that we are by no means to assert such a foreknowledge of God, especially when both many reasons and sound testimony are not wanting, utterly opposed to it" (*Praelectionis theologicae* 11 [1627], p. 38). So too Crellius: "They act inconsiderately who say that God knows determinately future contingencies because otherwise he would not be omniscient, since the rasher, therefore, he cannot conceive future things determinately because he is omniscient and never errs in this that can be known" ("De Deo et Ejus Attributis," 1.24, *Opera* [1656], 4:66, 68). And Smalcius in opposition to Frantzius, still more clearly: "But how can that be true which destroys itself and is repugnant to the Scriptures or does great violence to them? To say that God knows those things which are in no manner, such as future contingencies are, is to contradict himself; for what is knowable is not properly contingent, and what is properly contingent cannot be known" (*Refutatio Thesium D. Wolfgangi Frantzii*, Disp. XXII* [1614], pp. 436-37). On the other hand, the orthodox maintain that future contingent things fall under the infallible knowledge of God.

VIII. On the state of the question observe: (1) that a thing may be contingent in two ways—either with respect to the first cause (inasmuch as it can be produced or not produced by God, and so all creatures are contingent with respect to God because he might not have created any if he had so willed); or with respect to second causes (which can produce or not produce their effect and are thus distinguished from necessary causes). We here speak of future contingents in the latter and not in the former sense.

IX. (2) A thing can be considered either as to the certainty of event or as to the mode of production. A future contingent thing implies both; for as future it signifies the certainty of event, but as contingent the mode of production. It has the former from the decree of the first cause; the latter from the constitution of the second cause.

X. Thus the question is whether things, not any whatsoever and having a necessary cause (for there is no doubt as to these), but contingent (which have a free

cause) and indifferent (*adiaphoron*); not logically as to the first cause, in which sense even the most necessary things are contingent (since they can be and not be), but physically (as to the contingent second cause) fall under the infallible knowledge of God, not as knowing them only indeterminately and probably, but determinately and most certainly. This the Socinians deny; we affirm.

XI. The reasons are: (1) Scripture frequently claims such a knowledge of God—"Lord, thou knowest all things" (Jn. 21:17) and "God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things" (1 Jn. 3:20). The objection is fruitless that "all things" refers to all knowable things and that future contingents are not such. This is the *prōton pseudos* (a thing to be proved, not taken for granted). However we say they are knowable not in themselves determinately, but in the decree of God.

XII. "Known unto God," said James, "are all his works from the beginning of the world" (Acts 15:18). If all works, therefore also the free and contingent; if known from eternity, therefore also the future. Nor ought it to be said: (a) that the reference here is not to every work of God or of men, but to that of which James was speaking—the calling of the Gentiles. For the universal mark admits of no restriction, but shows that James proceeded from the genus to the species, from the thesis to the hypothesis in this sense—whatever God does in time, he decreed and foreknew from eternity; therefore he decreed and foreknew that the Gentiles would be introduced into the communion of the church without an observance of the Mosaic Law; (b) that it refers to works which are and not to those which neither have been, nor are, nor will certainly be, such as future contingents are. For although they are not as to real being, yet they are as to known being; although they will not certainly be as to second causes, yet they will certainly be as to the first by which they are defined. (c) The calling of the Gentiles was so a work of God that it ought also to be the work of the nations because they ought to respond to his call through grace. Therefore if God certainly knew that call, he ought to know future contingent things.

XIII. "All things are naked and open unto his eyes" (Heb. 4:13). If all things, therefore the thoughts and voluntary actions of men; and existing not only in act but also future, which God sees not only in their causes, but also in his decree. Hence he is said "to understand our thoughts afar off, and to know our downsittings and uprisings; for there is not a word in my tongue, but thou knowest it altogether" (Ps. 139:1-4*)—therefore not only actually existing, but also future: "Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee" (Jer. 1:5); "I knew that thou wouldst deal very treacherously" (Is. 48:8); "I know the things that come into your mind, every one of them" (Ezk. 11:5).

XIV. (2) Because God predicts future contingent things, therefore he knows them. For unless he infallibly knows, he could not certainly predict them, as he frequently does. "The foreknowledge of God has as many witnesses, as he has made prophets" (Tertullian, *Against Marcion* 2.5 [ANF 3:301; PL 2.290]). "He declares the end from the beginning and from ancient times the things that are not yet done" (Is. 46:10). "Show the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods" (Is. 41:23). God thus distinguishes himself from false gods and creatures. The examples of prediction occur everywhere in the Scriptures. What do our adversaries reply here? That these predictions are of probabilities only, as they impiously speak. But who can stand the blasphemous expression: that the infallible knowledge of God is merely conjectural, and his word (which

is stronger than heaven and earth, and of which not even an iota can pass away until all be fulfilled) is founded upon mere fallible probabilities; that these predictions are of things which God had decreed to bring about? But there is no future thing which God has not decreed, either to do if good or to permit if bad; nor can he foreknow unless he has decreed them. That they are rather admonitions than predictions? But the passages themselves prove the contrary, for a prediction is simply the narration of a future thing, but an admonition is a persuasion to a work of virtue or a dissuasion from the contrary. For if some predictions can lead to the persuasion of men, it does not follow that they are not predictions; that this is said only of certain future things, not of all. But why should it be said of some and not of all? No reason can be assigned for the diversity.

XV. (3) Because the most perfect nature of God demands it; for if the knowledge of future things is a perfection in creatures, much more will it be so in God. Again, because he is omniscient (which he would not be unless his knowledge extended to all things not only past and present, but also future—contingent as well as necessary). (a) Because he is the searcher of hearts (*kardiognōstēs*), which would not be true if he did not most intimately know not only the thoughts, purposes and affections of the heart, but also the propensities and dispositions before their actual execution (Jer. 17:9, 10; Job 34:21; Jn. 2:24, 25; Acts 1:24; Rev. 2:23). (b) Because he is omnipresent—everywhere and intimately present with all his creatures and moving and directing them before they move or direct themselves.

XVI. (4) The decree of providence draws this necessarily after it because as whatever takes place in time, God immutably decreed either to effect or to permit, so he ought infallibly to foreknow it all. The reason is that the foreknowledge of God follows his decree, and as the decree cannot be changed, so neither can his knowledge be deceived: "Our God is in the heavens: he hath done whatsoever he pleased" (Ps. 115:3); "For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things" (Rom. 11:36); "He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will" (Eph. 1:11). Nor can these passages be referred only to the things which God himself does and not to those which ought to be done by men (as placed in their will, as Socinus maintains). For all things alike are subject to divine providence; nor does the liberty of human actions hinder them from falling under his knowledge and decree, as will be proved hereafter.

XVII. Although it is difficult to comprehend the mode in which God certainly knows future contingent things, yet the thing itself (confirmed by so many passages of Scripture and reasons) is not therefore to be denied.

Sources of explanation.

XVIII. The principal foundation of the divine knowledge about future contingent things is not either the nature of second causes (which is supposed to be indifferent [*adiaphoros*]) or simply the divine essence, as immutable by creatures and as capable of producing them because it is the foundation of the possibility of things; the decree alone by which things pass from a state of possibility to a state of futurition (in which he sees them as it were determined and certainly future); and because the decree of God is not occupied about the thing, but also about the mode of the thing (i.e., that the thing may take place according to the nature of its cause, necessarily if necessary, freely if free, God sees them in the decree not only as certainly future, but also as certainly future contingently).

XIX. Of whatever things there is not a determinate truth, of them there cannot be a certain and infallible knowledge if they are absolutely and in every

respect indeterminate. But future contingent things are not such. For if they are indeterminate with respect to the second cause and in themselves, they are not so as to the first cause which decreed their futurition. If their truth is indeterminate with respect to us (who cannot see in which direction the free second cause is about to incline itself), it is not so with respect to God to whom all future things appear as present.

XX. It is not inconsistent (*asystaton*) for the same thing to be said to be possible and impossible at the same time (but as to different things [*kat' allo kai allo*]): possible with respect to potency or the second cause (considered in itself and in a divided sense) and impossible relatively (on the hypothesis of the divine decree and foreknowledge). So it was possible for Christ not to be crucified, if God had so willed, and impossible on account of the decree. What therefore in the compound sense and on the supposition of the decree of God concerning the futurition of the thing was impossible not to take place; yet in the divided sense (and the decree being laid aside) was possible not to take place.

XXI. It is one thing for a thing to be able to be done or not to be done (i.e., for a thing to be possible or not to be future hypothetically); another for a thing to be able to be at the same time future and not future. The former denotes only the temporal identity of power as much as the thing could be done or not; the latter implies the power of temporal identity because it is supposed that something could at the same time be and not be. Contingency applies to the former method, not to the second which is absurd (*asystatos*).

XXII. We acknowledge a contradiction in these two propositions—the man is about to walk and he is not about to walk; but not in these—the man is about to walk, and he is able not to walk. The first speaks of the truth of futurition; the latter of the truth of possibility. There is no repugnancy between these two propositions, and they can be true at the same time. Adam is certainly about to fall, and Adam is able not to fall (the former speaks of futurition of a thing from the decree; the latter of the possibility of a thing from the disposition of the second cause).

XXIII. The infallibility and certainty of the event does not take away the nature of the contingency of things because things can happen necessarily as to the event and yet contingently as to the mode of production. If there is granted a prescience of future contingent things, all things would take place necessarily by necessity of consequence, by the necessity of infallibility; not by necessity of the consequent and absolute. Therefore, there remains always this distinction between necessary and contingent things. The former have an intrinsic necessity because they arise from necessary proximate causes and are such in themselves; while the contingent, although having an extrinsic necessity by reason of the event, yet in their nature take place by contingent causes.

XXIV. The freedom of the will is indeed overthrown by a physical and coactive necessity which is at variance with the formal reason of liberty, but not by a hypothetical necessity and of the infallibility of the event, for the same thing in this respect can be both free and necessary. Hence although men's actions may be free (because done spontaneously and by a previous judgment of reason), they do not cease to be necessary with respect to the divine decree and foreknowledge. Now the foreknowledge of God implies indeed the infallibility of futurition and of the event and the necessity of consequence, and yet does not imply coaction or violence, nor take away from the will its intrinsic liberty.

XXV. The infallible foreknowledge of God does not imply that God is the cause of sins because God foreknows sins as certainly about to be (for example,

the selling of Joseph and the betrayal of Christ); not as if they were to be effected by him as sins, but to be permitted and yet regulated by him. This mode makes him no more guilty in his foreknowledge and decree than in the execution because neither the decree nor the foreknowledge subject the man to an intrinsic necessity, but only to an extrinsic as to the event.

XXVI. God does not make trial of men from ignorance (in this way to gain knowledge which he was not possessed of before), but from his most wise providence in order to declare to others what was before unknown to them. Thus he tried Abraham (not in order that he might know his faith and obedience by this experiment, which he was previously ignorant of, since even before he professed that he knew his piety [Gen. 18:19], but in order to make known to the world and the church his remarkable faith). If it is said that God then knew that he feared him ("Now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thine only son from me," Gen. 22:12), this is not to be understood absolutely of the knowledge which God obtained, but transitively of the knowledge which he gave to others (as similar words are often used in the Scriptures).

XXVII. Although God testifies that he willed to go down and see whether the cry of Sodom which came to him was true (Gen. 18:21), it does not follow that he was ignorant of the nature and degree of the impiety of that city before. He had already said, "The cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great." But this is said after the manner of men (*anthrōpopathōs*) to intimate that he performs the part of a good and exact Judge, and neither pronounces nor executes anything rashly (as an accurate judge inquires on the spot into the thing itself to avoid precipitate action).

XXVIII. God is said to expect grapes from the vineyard (Is. 5:4) not because he was ignorant of what would happen, but this is spoken after the manner of men because he seriously charged the people to be studious of good works; and such was the nature of the gifts bestowed that he was as much bound to expect fruit from them (unless they had fallen upon an ungrateful soil) as the industrious husbandman is accustomed to look for fruit from a vineyard properly cultivated.

XXIX. When God conceives future contingent things as certainly future, he does not conceive of them otherwise than they are; but he knows them relatively to the decree as necessarily about to take place and determinate which, relative to their cause, he knows as indeterminate and contingently future. Therefore, God foreknows them both in himself and in his decree (as the first cause), and so they are necessary on account of the immutability of the decree and the infallibility of foreknowledge; and God foreknows them in the second causes on which they proximately and immediately depend, which are per se indefinite, and so they are contingent things.

Thirteenth Question: Middle Knowledge

Is there a middle knowledge in God between the natural and the free? We deny against the Jesuits, Socinians and Remonstrants.

The twofold middle knowledge.

I. Although the knowledge of God is one and simple intrinsically no less than his essence, yet it can be considered in different ways extrinsically as to the objects. But it is commonly distinguished by theologians into the knowledge of simple intelligence (or natural and indefinite) and the knowledge of vision (or free and definite). The former is the knowledge of things

merely possible and is therefore called indefinite because nothing on either hand is determined concerning them by God. The latter is the knowledge of future things and is called definite because future things are determined by the sure will of God. Hence they mutually differ: (1) in object because the natural knowledge is occupied with possible things, but the free about future things; (2) in foundation because the natural is founded on the omnipotence of God, but the free depends upon his will and decree by which things pass from a state of possibility to a state of futurition; (3) in order because the natural precedes the decree, but the free follows it because it beholds things future; now they are not future except by the decree.

The origin of the middle knowledge.

II. Besides these two species of divine knowledge, a third was devised by the Jesuits, Fonseca, Lessius, Molina. It is not agreed among themselves who is the true parent of this fetus (*foetus*) (each claiming it for himself) which they called "middle" because it is between the natural and the free and differs from both. It differs from the indefinite and natural because it is occupied about future, but not about possible things. It differs from the free because it relates not to things certainly future, but only hypothetically so. The authors explain this middle knowledge to mean the foreknowledge of God about future conditional events whose truth depends not upon the free decree of God (being anterior to this), but upon the liberty of the creature (which God certainly foresees), whether in itself or in the thing (how it will determine itself if placed in certain given circumstances).

III. The design of the Jesuits was to defend the semi-Pelagian heresy of foreseen faith and good works in election, and to support the figment of free will in order the more easily to free themselves from the arguments of the Dominicans who rejected such a foresight (principally for this reason—that since there is no knowledge in God [unless either natural—of things possible—or free—of things future] all foreknowledge of faith and of the good use of free will ought to depend upon, not to precede the decree). This argument they supposed could be escaped in no other way than by inventing this middle knowledge. There is no need to take account of the disturbances this question executed among the Jesuits and Dominicans. The pope, in the meantime, to whose tribunal the whole matter was frequently referred for his infallible judgment, in an affair of so great moment, slept and did not dare to determine anything. It suffices to make this observation—that what the Jesuits contended for as their Helen was fiercely assailed as most false by the Dominicans (among whom were the eminent Cumel, Ripa, Alvarez, Nugno and others with whom the Jansenists of this day agree).

IV. This invention was afterwards adopted by the Socinians and Remonstrants who courageously defend it so as to preserve free will in the citadel; see Arminus 'Certain Articles to be Diligently Examined and Weighed,' "On God Considered According to His Nature," *The Writings of James Arminius* (1956), 2:480-81; Vorstius, *Tractatus theologicus de Deo* (1610); Grevinchovius, *Dissertatio theologica de duabus quaestionibus . . . controversis . . . inter G. Amesium* (1615).

Statement of the question.

V. The question is not whether God knows future contingencies (for all agree that God knows from eternity by a certain knowledge not only things themselves, but all their combinations and connections, whether present, past and future, or necessary and contingent). Rather the question is whether they belong to a kind of middle knowledge distinct from the natural and free. The latter we deny.

VI. The question does not concern necessary conditional future things, which on this or that given condition cannot but take place (as—if the sun rises, it will be day; if Peter heartily repents, he will be saved), for as these are necessarily connected together either from the nature of the thing or on the hypothesis of the divine decree, they fall under either the natural knowledge of God (if the condition is only possible) or the free (if it is future and decreed by him). Rather the inquiry relates to contingent conditional future things, which (the condition being posited) can be and not be; for example, if John would be of Lutetia, he would speak or would sin and the like. The inquiry relates to whether they can be certainly and determinately known antecedently to the decree of God; this we deny.

VII. The question is not whether the knowledge of conditional future things is in God antecedently to every decree (for our adversaries do not deny that a certain general decree precedes by which he has decreed to produce the second causes and is ready to afford at least a general and indifferent cooperation to the creature, as often as he willed that they should determine themselves to act). Rather the question is whether a special decree concerning the certain futurition of this or that thing precedes so that God may see that thing antecedently to such a decree (either in itself or in its causes). This they maintain; we deny.

VIII. Therefore the question is whether besides the natural knowledge (which is only of things possible) and the knowledge of vision (which is only of things future), there may be granted in God a certain third or middle knowledge concerning conditional future things by which God knows what men or angels will freely do without a special decree preceding (if placed with these or those circumstances in such an order of things). The Jesuits, Socinians and Remonstrants affirm this; the orthodox deny it.

Proof that no such middle knowledge can be granted.

IX. The reasons are: (1) Natural and free knowledge embrace all knowable things and entities and are not to be multiplied unnecessarily. There is nothing in the nature of things which is not possible or future; nor can future conditional things constitute a third order. For they are such either from a condition only possible or powerful, yet never to take place, or from a condition certainly future and decreed. In the former manner, they do not recede from the nature of possible things and belong to natural knowledge; in the latter, they are future and decreed by God and come under the free knowledge.

X. (2) Things not true cannot be foreknown as true. Now conditional future things are not true apart from the determination of the divine will; for example, the Sidonians would have repented if the powers had been supplied to them, for they would have been indifferently disposed in their nature to repent or not to repent, those powers being given; therefore from some other source ought to come the truth that they would repent, those powers being posited, if it is at all true. But no cause of this thing can be imagined except the will of God. There was nothing from eternity which could be the cause of the determination of a thing indifferent to either part except the will of God; not his essence or knowledge, for neither can operate *ad extra* separated from the will. Therefore, as no effect can be understood as future (whether absolutely or hypothetically) without the divine decree (because no creature can be in the world without the divine causality), so no future conditional thing can be knowable before the decree.

XI. (3) If all the acts of the created will fall under the divine providence so that none are independent and indeterminate, no middle knowledge can be granted (which is supposed to have for its object the free determination of the will, depending upon no superior cause). Now that there is such a subjection of the created will is evident from the dependence between the first cause and second causes, between the Creator and creatures. Nor can it suffice to save that dependence that the will may be said to be created and its liberty given by God for it would not cease to be the principle of its own determination, if its acts did not depend upon some decree. It would not be indeed the first being, but yet it would be the first operator (nor any more the second, but the first cause because if it depended in being upon God, it would not depend upon him in operation).

XII. (4) No uncertain knowledge should be ascribed to God. The middle knowledge can have no certainty because it is occupied about an uncertain and contingent object (viz., the indifference [*adiaphorian*] of the will). I ask, therefore, whence can God certainly know what will or will not take place? For either this can be done from the nature of the things themselves when he regards them (either in their causes or in themselves) as free acts in a created will (which pleases Bellarmine)—but how can an uncertain thing afford foundation to certain knowledge—or this can be done from the infinity of divine knowledge, which certainly foreknows in what direction moral persuasion will incline the will (otherwise free) to the opposite (which Vasquez and Suarez hold); but how could infirmity of knowledge change the nature of things and see a thing as certainly to take place which is contingent? Again knowledge either makes the event certain or foresees it as certain. If it makes it so, how can it foreknow it as such; where then is the indifference of the will? If it foresees it as certain, how could the foresight of an uncertain and indifferent thing be itself certain? Or from the eternal existence of things by which they are said to be present to God (as others prefer); but since they could have no real being from eternity (but only an intentional), they cannot be said to have existed from eternity otherwise than by reason of the decree in which they obtain their futurition. Since, therefore, the certain necessity of the event cannot be founded on the contingent connection of the ends or on the knowledge which recognizes but does not make the thing, it follows that it is only from the efficacious decree of the connector. Thomas Aquinas says most satisfactorily, "He who knows an effect contingent in its own cause only and not in some superior cause certainly determining it, has only a conjectural knowledge concerning it; since from an indifferent cause as far as it is indifferent, a determinate act cannot flow; and for the same reason from a contingent antecedent, as far as it is contingent, a necessary conclusion cannot flow before the decree of the divine will" (ST, I, Q. 14, Art. 13, p. 83).

XIII. (5) This middle knowledge takes away the dominion of God over free acts because according to it the acts of the will are supposed to be antecedent to the decree and therefore have their futurition not from God, but from itself. Indeed God would seem rather to depend upon the creature while he could decree or dispose nothing, unless a determination of the human will were posited which God would see in such a connection of things. Nor ought the reply to be made that the dominion of God is not therefore taken away because he can remove that connection or some circumstance of it; for example, in the foreknowledge by which God knew that Peter would deny Christ if placed in a certain condition,

God could hinder him from denying Christ by taking away some foreseen circumstance (for instance, the fear of death) or by adding greater light in the intellect and a greater inclination in the will to confession, and the like. For it is not sufficient for the support of the dominion of God that he could hinder Peter from denying Christ, for he might have deprived Peter of life before the apprehension of Christ (but this would be to have dominion over the life of Peter, not over his free will); but it is requisite that the free acts of Peter, of denying or not denying Christ, should depend upon him (which is denied on the supposition of this knowledge). In fine, if God can take away one foreseen circumstance, he can therefore change the event of the thing: if he can by a decree change the event of a thing, therefore it also pertains to the decree to procure it; for he who hinders the event by a removal of some circumstance ought to cause it by supplying the circumstances.

XIV. (6) On the supposition of such a knowledge, a reason for predestination can be assigned out of God besides his purpose and good pleasure (*eudokian*) because the foreseen consent of the will of Jacob placed in such circumstances would be at least the condition without which God could not predestine to salvation Jacob rather than Esau. But no reason for that election can be derived from Paul except the purpose (*eudokian*) of God: "For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil" not on account of a foreseen good use of free will through middle knowledge, but "that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth; it was said, the elder shall serve the younger" (Rom. 9:11, 12*). Nor should it be said that this condition is assigned on the part of God who has the knowledge, not of men; for although it is God who foreknows, yet the object which he foreknows is maintained to be the good use of free will foreseen before the decree, so that the reason of the decree is put not in God, but in man. Thus grace might with greater propriety be called the servant of the human inclination than the mistress, and the companion than the cause, making God depend upon man rather than man upon God.

Sources of explanation.

XV. 1 S. 23:11, 12 cannot favor this middle knowledge because it is not so much a prediction of future things which were still in futurition (as a revelation of things which then existed although secret, viz., of the plans discussed among the men of Keilah about the delivery of David if he stayed there). For when David was doubtful concerning the design of Saul and the intention of the men of Keilah towards himself, and therefore inquired of the Lord whether Saul was about to descend against the men of Keilah, and they would deliver him up into the hands of Saul (if he stayed among them), God answered that David should withdraw himself and fly from their fury, and that Saul would descend and the men of Keilah would deliver him up (if he remained there), because in truth both Saul girded himself for the journey, and the men of Keilah were even then secretly plotting to deliver David up to him. "For they will deliver thee up," i.e., they have the will to do so, as the interlinear gloss has it. So the words "to descend" and "to deliver up" do not refer to the act itself as hypothetically future, but (as often elsewhere) they are put for the purpose and intention, i.e., to have in the mind to do this (as Acts 12:6 and 16:27).

XVI. The words of Christ ("If the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth

and ashes," Mt. 11:21*) are not to be strained to the letter, as if they referred to something which on a certain condition would be determinately future. For it is a hyperbolical and proverbial kind of speech where Christ (by a comparison odious to the Jews) wishes to exaggerate the contumacy and rebellion of their cities (rendered illustrious by his miracles), which, as the searcher of hearts (*kardiognōstēs*), he knew to be greater and more obstinate than the wickedness of the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon. So Christ does not speak of the foreknowledge of any future conditional things, but wishes by using a hyperbole to upbraid the Jews for ingratitude and impenitence greater than that of the Tyrians and Sidonians; as if a teacher (addressing a slow and dull scholar) should say, if I had taught an ass as long, he would have known it; or of an inexorable judge, if I had beaten rocks and stones as long, I could have broken them; we do not mean either that rocks could be softened or an ass taught, but only that the slowness of the scholar and the hardness of the judge are extreme. In the same manner, Christ says, "If these should hold their peace, the stones would cry out" (Lk. 19:40); not as if the stones could cry out, but to show that his person, doctrine and works were so clear and indubitable that they could no longer be concealed. There is a similar passage in Ezk. 3:6: "Had I sent thee to a people of a strange speech, they would have hearkened unto thee."

XVII. In 2 S. 12:8, the prophet enumerates the blessings of God towards ungrateful David, to which he would have added greater if David had continued in obedience (not from any conditional decree or from middle knowledge, but according to the promise made to piety). So in Ps. 81:14, 15, we have a conditional promise with a reproof of ingratitude, but we read nothing concerning the foreknowledge of a future conditional thing before the decree. In the same manner are to be understood the words of Elisha to Joash: "Thou shouldest have smitten five or six times; then hadst thou smitten Syria till thou hadst consumed it" (2 K. 13:19); not that he knew this by middle knowledge, but because the prophet would from his own wish infer that from a divine revelation made indefinitely.

XVIII. It is one thing for God to foresee or know the connection of one thing with another (for example, of sin with death and of righteousness with life); another to know connection as future in such a subject placed in this or that state. This requires some decree to determine what ought to be done concerning that subject; but the former can be founded on possibility alone and the mutual habitude of things.

XIX. It is one thing for God to know all the connections of all things as necessary and the causes of things about to happen through them antecedently to the decree; another to know the contingent connections of events and of all possibly future things. If the former were granted, it would favor the middle knowledge, but it is false that God knows all the connections of all things as necessary and about to produce infallibly the event of things (especially in free acts) antecedently to the decree upon which all the futurition of things depends. But the latter, which we allow, does not countenance the middle knowledge because contingent connections of this kind belong only to natural knowledge, when considered antecedently to the decree, determining the certain futurition of their connections or means.

XX. What is conceived to be determinately from God can also be pronounced to be determinately; but what is conceived only to be possibly can be pronounced

to be only possibly. Now it is denied that the coexistence of a free act on hypothesis can be conceived to be determinately antecedently to the decree; it is granted that it may be possibly. So it is true that Peter would possibly sin if placed in a given order of things antecedently to the decree; but not determinately so as to make it true that Peter would actually and in fact sin if placed in such an order of things. This could not be certain unless from a permissive decree of God.

XXI. Necessity and contingency have a different relation in simple terms from what they have in complex. In the first manner, being is divided into necessary and contingent, nor can they belong to the same; but in the second (inasmuch as they arise from the diverse habitude of causes to their effects) so far coincide that what in respect to the first cause is necessary with respect to the second can be contingent, the first cause so disposing it. This not only insures the existence of the thing, but in its own manner that it is a necessary thing necessarily, a contingent contingently. Yet that necessity as to the first cause does not take away the liberty of free will because it is not a necessity of coaction, but of consequence or infallibility which best conspires with liberty.

XXII. Although God antecedently to his decree can know of the various means which can be used to move the will (that this or that can have a greater influence than others if employed), yet he cannot know that they will actually persuade antecedently to the will of giving those means and of moving the will efficaciously to produce the effect. Nor has the illustration drawn from fire any force, which God knows to be possessed of the property of making warm antecedently to the will of creating fire which will actually warm. For the reason of natural agents determined in their nature to one thing is different from that of free agents, which can be inclined to one or the other of opposite things.

XXIII. The cause of the existence of things differs from the cause of their futurition. Second causes can concur with God to cause the existence of a certain thing because they exist and are active at the same time with God. But no second cause can concur with him to cause the futurition of things because futurition was made from eternity, while all second causes are only in time. Hence it is evident that the futurition of things depends upon nothing but the decree of God, and therefore can be foreknown only from the decree.

Fourteenth Question: The Will of God

Does God will some things necessarily and others freely? We affirm.

I. The will of God (whose object is only the good, as that of the intellect is the true) necessarily follows his understanding. But because good is either uncreated and infinite or finite and created, a twofold object can be assigned to the will: a primary (viz., God) as the infinite good; but the secondary (all created things out of God, holding the relation of finite good which also out of himself God wills, but not in the same manner); himself, indeed, necessarily by complacency, but all other things freely by decree—hence the proposed question arises.

Statement of the question.

II. On the state of the question observe: (1) that necessity is twofold; one absolute, which simply and by itself and its own nature cannot be otherwise, as that God is good, just, etc. The other hypothetical, which is not so of itself and simply such but that it could be otherwise, but yet on the positing of something it necessarily follows and could not be otherwise; as for example, if

you posit that God predestinated Jacob to salvation, it is necessary that Jacob should be saved, namely on the hypothesis of the decree. Otherwise he could have been not predestinated and not saved. When, therefore, the question is asked whether God wills some things necessarily, but others freely I refer not only to the hypothetical necessity (for thus those things which God wills freely, the decree being posited, he no more not wills), but concerning the absolute necessity.

III. Free is said either with reference to spontaneity or indifference: the former what is done spontaneously and without compulsion, but the latter what is so disposed that it can be done and not be done. When it is asked whether God wills some things freely, not only the will of spontaneity is meant (for so the things which God wills most necessarily, he wills also freely, i.e., without coaction), but properly the liberty of indifference (i.e., whether he so wills that he could have nilled them).

IV. Third, there are two kinds of things willed: one principal, which holds relation of the ultimate end; another secondary, which has the relation of the means. In the former, the will is carried necessarily so that it cannot but be carried to it; in the latter, it is carried freely and by election having a necessary and inseparable connection with the ultimate end (so that without it the end cannot be). For then by the same necessity by which we will the ultimate end, we will also that means (as he who wills the preservation of life, wills also the taking of food, without which life cannot be preserved).

V. This being established, I say that God wills himself necessarily, not only by a hypothetical necessity but also by an absolute necessity. He is the ultimate end and the highest good which he cannot but will and love, not only as to specification (that he can will and love nothing contrary), but also as to exercise (that he never ceases from willing and loving himself), for he cannot nill his own glory or deny himself. But other things he wills freely because, since no created thing is necessary with respect to God but contingent (as he could do without them), so he wills all things as that he could not will them (i.e., by the liberty not only of spontaneity, but also of indifference).

VI. This liberty of the divine will about created things must be understood absolutely and *a priori* and with respect to the things considered in themselves. For in this sense God wills created things necessarily from hypothesis because (supposing he has once willed) he can no more will them on account of the immutability of his will; but speaking absolutely he wills them freely because he is influenced to will them at first by no necessity, but by mere liberty and could abstain from their production.

VII. But this indifference of the divine will, so far from lowering the majesty of God, is the greatest proof of his perfection who, as an independent being, needs nothing out of himself (which is the greatest testimony to the imperfection of creatures).

VIII. God wills all created things not to make himself perfect (as if he stood in need of them), but to communicate himself and to manifest his goodness and glory in them. Hence because he could be without them without any detriment to his happiness, he is said to will them freely. For since God wills all things out of himself inasmuch as they are ordained for his goodness as the end (and the goodness of God is perfect without others so that no perfection can accrue to him from others), it follows that God wills other things from himself, not to be

absolutely necessary, but only from supposition (*ex hypothesi*) (as Thomas Aquinas properly remarks, ST, I-I, Q. 19, Art. 3, pp. 104-5).

IX. Although God wills all things on account of his goodness and wills his goodness necessarily, yet it does not follow that he wills by the same necessity all other things which he wills out of himself. For he wills these things not to increase, but to diffuse his goodness and so that he might be without them.

X. There is not the same reason of the understanding in knowing and of the will in willing because the understanding has the things in itself and beholds them as they are in itself. However the will is carried towards them when in understanding they are understood after the manner of a recipient; but in willing, otherwise; the understanding beholds things as existing (at least in itself) and therefore cannot but understand them; whereas the will makes them, and besides is freely occupied about them. As therefore all things as they are in God have a certain necessity, but in themselves contingency; therefore whatever God knows, he knows from necessity; but not equally whatever he wills does he will from necessity.

XI. Although every volition in God is eternal, yet they ought not immediately to be called absolutely necessary. For what is necessary originally on the part of the principle can be free terminatively and on the part of the object.

XII. Here belongs the question concerning the will of God about sin (i.e., how God can be said to will sin), but this will come up more fitly under the head of providence.

FIFTEENTH QUESTION

May the will be properly distinguished into the will of decree and of precept, good purpose (eudokias) *and good pleasure* (euarestias), *signified, secret and revealed? We affirm.*

I. Although the will in God is only one and most simple, by which he comprehends all things by a single and most simple act so that he sees and understands all things at one glance, yet because it is occupied differently about various objects, it thus happens that in our manner of conception, it may be apprehended as manifold (not in itself and intrinsically on the part of the act of willing, but extrinsically and objectively on the part of the things willed).

II. Hence have arisen various distinctions of the will of God. The first and principal distinction is that of the decretive and preceptive will. The former means that which God wills to do or permit himself; the latter what he wills that we should do. The former relates to the futurition and the event of things and is the rule of God's external acts; the latter is concerned with precepts and promises and is the rule of our action. The former cannot be resisted and is always fulfilled: "Who hath resisted his will?" (Rom. 9:19). The latter is often violated by men: "How often would I have gathered you together, and ye would not" (Mt. 23:37).

III. As there are various passages of Scripture in which the will of God is taken either for the decree (Rom. 9:19; Eph. 1:11) or for the precept (Ps. 143:10; Rom. 12:2), so there are also some in which both wills of God are signified at the same time (i.e., Jn. 6:38, where Christ says, "I came down to do the will of him that sent me" [i.e., to fulfil the things decreed by God and to obey the command of the Father]). And when we say in the Lord's Prayer, "Thy will be done," we ask that our lives may correspond to his precepts and his decrees be fulfilled.

IV. Although the precept falls also under the decree as to proposition, still it does not fall as to execution. Thus they may be properly distinguished from each other, so as the will of decree may be that which determines the event of things, but the will of precept that which prescribes to man his duty. Therefore God can (without a contradiction) will as to precept what he does not will as to decree inasmuch as he wills to prescribe something to man, but does not will to effect it (as he willed Pharaoh to release the people, but yet nilled their actual release).

V. Hence it happens that although these wills may be conceived by us as diverse (owing to the diversity of the objects), yet they are not contrary. For as was just said, they are not occupied about the same thing. Undoubtedly if God by the power of his decree would impel men to do what he has by his law prohibited, or if when attempting to obey the law he would by an opposite impediment recall them from obedience, he would will repugnancies and be himself opposed to his own will. But the decree of God does not contend with his command when he prescribes to man his bounden duty (for the performance of which, however, he does not will to give the strength because he wills indeed the thing as to the proposition of duty, but yet not as to the execution of the event).

VI. The preceptive will has a twofold object: sometimes affirmative (with respect to which it can also be called affirmative when the effecting of the thing is prescribed); sometimes negative (with respect to which it can itself also be called negative consisting in the prohibition of a thing). So the decretive will may have affirmative objects with respect to which it is called effectual and affirmative as well with respect to the end as to the principle; but others negative with respect to which the will ceasing can be called also negative (if not as to the principle at least as to the end) and then may be called permissive by which he determines not to hinder the creature from sinning. For although that volition may be positive as to the principle (inasmuch as he wills not to hinder), yet it is properly called negative as to the end (which is a non-hindering).

VII. The effective will cannot stand together with the negative preceptive. For God can never by himself will to effect what his law forbids as evil. Rather it best agrees with the affirmative preceptive will; for the same one who prescribes faith decrees to give it to the elect. The affirmative preceptive will can stand together with the negative decretive will, so that God may prescribe to the creature what nevertheless he does not will to effect in the creature. So he enjoins upon all the keeping of the law which, however, he does not effect in them. He enjoins faith in Christ upon the called which nevertheless he has decreed to withhold from many.

VIII. Besides this distinction of will, there is another by which it is distributed into the will of *eudokias* and *euarestias* (often used by theologians). The will *eudokias* answers to the decretive; *euarestias* to the preceptive. This distinction has the warrant of Scripture, which often calls the former *eudokian* and the latter *euarestian*. Thus Christ (speaking of the decretive will) says with respect to those things by which he either conceals or reveals his mysteries: "even so, Father, for so it seemed good (*eudokia*) in thy sight" (Mt. 11:26); and Paul says "God predestinated us according to the good pleasure (*eudokian*) of his will" (Eph. 1:5). In Eph. 1:9, mention is made of good pleasure (*eudokias*) in this sense. The *euarestian* is frequently referred to the preceptive will, which is called both that of approbation and that of complacency (as in Rom. 12:2 where the will of God to which we

ought to conform is called good and acceptable [*euarestos*]; cf. "proving what is acceptable [*euareston*] unto the Lord," Eph. 5:10); "for this is acceptable [*euareston*] unto the Lord," Col. 3:20). In this sense, *euarestia* indicates the preceptive and approving will by which God declares what is pleasing to himself and what he wills to be done by men; but *eudokia* indicates the decretive will by which God testifies his good pleasure about the things which he has determined to perform.

IX. Therefore it is not so to be understood as if that which depends upon the *eudokia* of God may not also be acceptable (*euareston*) to him. For whatever God has decreed to be done is truly grateful to him in that respect, nor can he be said to will to perform what it would not please him to perform. But it can be received only in this way by which it is made to consist in the will of decree and precept—that by the will *eudokias* may be designated precisely that will by which God decrees to do or permit something and concerning which you can for the most part render no other reason than because it so pleased God; but by the will *euarestias* may be designated that by which he wills to propose to the creature his duty as a thing pleasing to him and in which he takes complacency.

X. We may sometimes interchange the *eudokian* for the *euarestia*, when it is spoken of those things with which God is pleased because there is in them some quality or condition which agrees with the nature of God and therefore conciliates his favor; as the Father says of Christ, "In whom I am well pleased" (*en hō eudokēsa*, Mt. 3:17), i.e., most ardently love. Yet even this may with propriety be referred to the will of good pleasure which Christ fulfilled most perfectly by satisfying his justice. Still here it is taken strictly for the decree, no reason for which is to be sought except the good pleasure of God.

XI. *Euarestia* contradistinguished from *eudokian* in this connection means nothing else than the mere complacency by which God approves anything as just and holy and delights in it (and besides wills to prescribe it to the creature as his most just duty). Hence it does not properly include any decree or volition in God, but implies only the agreement of the thing with the nature of God (according to which he cannot but love what is agreeable to his holiness). For the approbation of anything is not forthwith his volition, nor if I approve a thing, should I therefore immediately will it. So that it is less properly called the will of God.

XII. Although to the will *euarestias* belong also the promises of giving salvation to believers (which are proposed with the gospel precept), it does not follow that it ought to connote any condition, decree or volition (properly so called) concerning the giving of salvation to all. For such a decree cannot consist with the decree of reprobation, or with the wisdom of God, to which it is repugnant to will anything under an impossible condition (and which God, who alone can give it, has himself decreed to withhold from the creature). But from this we can only gather that there is an inseparable connection between faith and salvation, constituted by God himself so that no one can obtain salvation who does not possess faith, and no one can have faith without most certainly obtaining salvation. Thus the promises added to the precepts signify only what God will grant to believers and penitents, not what he wills to grant to all those to whom the precept is proposed.

Will of sign and pleasure.

XIII. The third distinction is into the will as *signi* and *beneplaciti*, introduced at first by Hugo St. Victor, taken from him by Lombard (*Sententiarum* 1, Dist. 45 [PL 192/2.641-44]), frequently used by all the Scholastics, and especially by Thomas Aquinas (ST, I, Q. 19, Art. 11, 12, pp. 111-13) and, when properly explained, retained by our theologians.

XIV. The Scholastics call that the beneplacit will which remains concealed previously in God and is left to his most free power and becomes at length known by some oracle or by the event. But the will of sign is that which by some sign (for instance by a precept or promise) is made known to us and which indicates some effect out of God as the sign of his will. Hence the Scholastics usually reckoned five signs by which the will of God is manifested: precept, prohibition, counsel, permission, operation. These were comprehended in this versicle: *Praecipit et prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet*. But this is false: (1) because there are more such signs, for instance promises and threatenings, prophecies and narrations; (2) operation is not a sign of will, but its effect belonging to the beneplacit will; (3) permission does not fall under the signified, but under the beneplacit will; (4) counsel may be either referred to the beneplacit or included in the precept.

XV. With more propriety, therefore, the beneplacit will is made by us to answer to the decretive (which is nothing else than the decree of the good purpose of God about future external things); the will of sign is made by us to answer to the preceptive and approving (which prescribes to man his duty and indicates what is acceptable to God).

XVI. It is called the signified will, not because it signifies what God wills to do about man or concerning man (for in this sense it would not differ from the beneplacit will), but because it signifies what God wills to enjoin upon man as pleasing to himself and his bounden duty. Hence that will may well be said to fall under the decree and good pleasure as to the precept of the thing, not as to the thing of the precept because God prescribes nothing in time which he has not decreed from eternity to prescribe.

XVII. When the will of pleasure is contradistinguished from the signified will, the word "beneplacit" is not taken widely to denote the simple complacency and approbation of the thing or the decree of its injunction. In this sense, the will of sign can also be called the will of beneplacit because it is occupied about things approved by God and things which he decrees to enjoin upon the creature. But it is taken strictly to denote the *placitum* or decree of God concerning the effecting or permitting of a certain thing, just as the decrees of courts are called *Placita* ("decisions").

XVIII. There cannot be contrariety between these two wills because they do not will and nill the same thing in the same manner and respect. The will of purpose is the will of event and execution. The signified will is the will of duty and of the obligation to it. Thus God willed the immolation of Isaac by a will of sign as to the preception (i.e., he prescribed it to Abraham as a test of his obedience), but he nilled it by a beneplacit will as to the event itself because he had decreed to prohibit that slaughter. Now although these two acts of the divine will are diverse ("I will to command Abraham to slay his son" and "I do not will that immolation"), yet they are not contrary, for both were true—that God both decreed to enjoin this upon Abraham and equally decreed to hinder the effecting of it.

Hence God without contrariety willed Isaac to be offered up and not to be offered up. He willed it as to the precept, but nilled it as to the effect. The whole will of God about this affair was not either only to command Abraham to make that sacrifice or to hinder it, but ought to embrace those two diverse acts (the former of which is affirmative, occupied with the injunction of the thing; and the latter negative, respecting the hindrance of it). Nor does it follow from this that man is ordered to believe what is false. For we are ordered to believe what is revealed just because it is revealed. However the event is not already revealed by a command of this kind, but only the duty and the obligation to it.

XIX. Although God may be said to will the salvation of all by the will of sign and to nill it by the beneplacit will, yet there is no contradiction here. Besides the fact that the universal proposition is to be understood not so much of the singulars of the genera as of the genera of the singulars, the former will relates to the mere approbation of God and the command of duty, while the latter is concerned with its futurition and fulfillment. The former denotes what is pleasing to God and what he has determined to enjoin upon man for the obtainment of salvation, but the latter what God himself has decreed to do. But these two are not at variance: to will to call to faith and salvation, and yet to nill to give that faith and salvation; to will (i.e., to command man to believe) and to nill (i.e., to decree not to give him faith in order that he may believe).

XX. The will of sign which is set forth as extrinsic ought to correspond with some internal will in God that it may not be false and deceptive; but that internal will is not the decree concerning the gift of salvation to this or that one, but the decree concerning the command of faith and promise of salvation if the man does believe (which is founded both upon the connection established by God between faith and salvation and the internal disposition of God by which, as he loves himself, he cannot but love his image wherever he sees it shining and is so much pleased with the faith and repentance of the creature as to grant it salvation).

XXI. The promised salvation set forth by the will of sign does not indeed properly and directly fall under the precept because in their formal nature promise and precept differ. The former indicates a blessing, the latter a duty. However reductively and secondarily it can belong to it inasmuch as it is added to the precept by way of stimulus as means and motive to excite the performance of that for which the precept is given. And although it is necessary that the promise should have some foundation as to the certainty of the event (in order to influence man), that must not be sought from the decree of God about particular persons (of bestowing salvation upon all which cannot consist with the decree of reprobation), but from his decree about the things themselves (i.e., from the ordination and inseparable connection established by God between faith and salvation as between the means and the end). Thus it happens that salvation is most surely in the gospel promised to all believers because so close is the connection between faith and salvation from the good pleasure of God that no one can have the former without being also possessed of the latter.

XXII. To that external word which is a sign (for example, every believer in Christ shall be saved) some internal word or thing signified ought to answer (viz., the will of God to connect inseparably faith in Christ with salvation and to propose to man such an order and way of salvation). But it cannot be the conditional will to save each and every individual under that condition because God would testify

that he wills what in reality he does not will towards those passed by (from whom he withholds the condition).

XXIII. Although the will of sign signifies that God is merciful, it does not follow that he ought to be merciful with respect to each and every individual, but only with respect to those who are about to have the condition expressed by that will (viz., to believers), to whom alone (since they are no other than the elect) the mercy expressed by that will properly belongs. Besides, since that will of sign has never been universal with respect to each and every one (although universal and common with respect to all people and conditions), the mercy signified by it cannot be universal.

XXIV. If God by this will had signified that he willed the salvation of all without exception, he would have signified that he willed what he least willed (since by passing over the greater part, he has not willed to give them salvation). But when it signifies that he wills the salvation of all believers and penitents, it signifies that he wills that which he really wills and nothing is more true, nothing more sincere than such a declaration.

The secret and revealed will.

XXV. The fourth distinction of the will is into secret and revealed. The former is commonly applied to the decretive will, which for the most part lies concealed in God; but the latter to the preceptive will, which is revealed and manifested in the law and gospel. Its foundation springs from Dt. 29:29: "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are revealed belong unto us, and to our children, that we may do all the words of this law." The former is called a profound and unfathomable abyss (Ps. 36:6; Rom. 11:33, 34); the latter is discovered to all, nor is it far from us (Dt. 30:14; Rom. 10:8). The former has for its object all those things which God wills either to effect or permit (and which he wills to do in particular concerning individuals and are therefore absolute and determined to one thing). The latter relates to those things which belong to our duty and are proposed conditionally. The former always takes place; the latter is often violated.

XXVI. It is called a secret will, not because always concealed from us and never revealed (for frequently God in his word manifests to men certain secrets of his counsel and lays them bare by the event), but because they remain hidden in God (until he reveals them by some sign, as by a prophecy or by the event).

XXVII. Although the secret will concerning our election remains concealed in God, it does not follow that we can have no certainty of salvation because although we cannot gain it *a priori*, yet we can *a posteriori*.

XXVIII. Whatever Christ willed to be done in time by men (from duty according to the law and gospel), that he has also revealed in time; but not forthwith whatever he has decreed to be done by himself from good pleasure (which God for the most part keeps to himself and manifests to us only by the event, Acts 1:7; Mk. 13:32).

XXIX. Although God is the best, it is not necessary that he should exercise a good will to all for salvation by an antecedent will because the exercise of his goodness depends upon his most wise will (which pities whom it wills and whom it wills hardens). Nor if he wills to pour out his goodness on the creature by the blessing of creation and of providence, ought he to exercise good will to it unto salvation.

Sixteenth Question

May the will be properly distinguished into antecedent and consequent, efficacious and inefficacious, conditional and absolute? We deny.

I. Besides the previous distinctions of the divine will received by the orthodox, there are also others proposed by our adversaries. These are deservedly rejected because less proper and seeming to have in them something ulcerous (*hypoulon ti*).

Whether the will may be properly distinguished into antecedent and consequent.

II. Such is the distinction of the will into antecedent and consequent frequently met with among the Scholastics. John of Damascus appears to have introduced it first, saying that one will is leading (*proēgoumenēn*), but the other is following (*hepomenēn*) (*Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 2.29 [NPNF2, 9:42; PG 94.968-69]). It was afterwards eagerly seized by the Scholastics and employed by the Novatorians, Arminians, Socinians and other patrons of universal grace to help their cause.

In what sense it is admitted by some.

III. There are some even of our theologians who think it may be retained after the fathers, but yet in a most different sense from the Neopelagian (namely both with respect to the commands and with respect to the decrees). Indeed, as to the commands they wish the antecedent will to have place in precepts, but the consequent in promises and threats added to the precepts by way of sanction (and in the blessings or punishments following man's obedience or rebellion). As to the decrees, they wish the antecedent will to have place with regard to order and our manner of conception, so that it is termed that which is conceived to go before (for example, the will to create man, which precedes the will to redeem him); but the consequent is that which is conceived to follow another act of the will.

In what sense to be rejected.

IV. But our men constantly reject it in the sense of the Scholastics and Neopelagians who understand by antecedent will the purpose of God concerning the saving of all men universally, but by consequent will the decree concerning the salvation of believers and the damnation of unbelievers. The former is so called because it precedes the act (whether good or bad) of the human will; the latter is so called because it is posterior to the human will and depends upon its good or bad acts.

V. Thus the Arminians wish that to be the antecedent will by which God wills something to the rational creature before every or any act of that creature, but the consequent that by which he wills something to the rational creature after some act (or after many acts of the creature). So by the antecedent will God willed to establish the kingdom of Saul and by the consequent will he willed to hurl him from his kingdom; by the former he willed to gather the Jews together as a hen gathers her brood, but by the latter he willed to disperse them through all nations. The former can be resisted, but the latter can be resisted by no means (so Arminius, "Examination of a Treatise Concerning . . . Predestination . . . by William Perkins," *The Writings of James Arminius* [1956], 3:281; Corvinus, *Petri Molinaei novi anatomici* [1622]).

VI. This distinction is in many ways injurious to God: (1) because it attributes to him contrary wills (viz., that God wills the salvation of all and wills the salvation only of some); that from eternity he seriously willed the salvation of Judas and yet, at the same time and in the same moment, knew that Judas never would believe; and that he did not will to give faith to Judas by which he might infallibly have been converted; yea, would permit him to remain in his unbelief and to perish. Who would dare to attribute such wills to a man of sound mind, as to say that he willed seriously and ardently what he knew never would happen, and indeed would not happen because he nilled to effect it, on whom alone the effect depends? Nor can the examples adduced here by Arminius effect this. For example, the father who desires and seriously wills his son to obey him, but does not violently draw him to obedience; and the merchant who wills his merchandise to be saved, but driven by necessity throws it into the sea. Thus God (says he), forced by the wickedness of men, condemns those whom he had willed to save if obedient. Things altogether dissimilar are compared here. It is one thing to speak of men, who although very seriously wishing something, yet cannot obtain their desire (unless through the appropriate means, which are not in their hands, and they are therefore frequently disappointed in their hope and frustrated in their intention); but another thing to speak of God, who is never without the just and appropriate means for accomplishing what he intends. In order to make the example pertinent, it ought to be stated thus—can the father, who knows that his son will not be obedient (unless he furnishes him with such a mind and disposition and yet does not will it) be said to seriously will his son to obey him? Or can the merchant, who knows that his goods cannot be preserved (unless the storm is appeased by himself and yet does not will it) be said seriously to desire the safety of his goods? If such examples were brought forward, evidencing that a rational creature can seriously and ardently will that which he knows he never will do (although having the power to do it and when upon it alone the event certainly depends), the fraud would easily be detected, and that would be attributed to God by the adversaries which cannot be ascribed to creatures using right reason.

VII. Second, this distinction cannot have place in God without ascribing to him not only folly and impotence (by making him intend seriously and desire with natural affection that which is not performed and cannot be performed through man because he himself does not will it); but also mutability because there can be no place for the consequent will until the antecedent is first rescinded. For how could God at the same time, by the same act of will, will to save all men and to damn the greater part of them?

VIII. Third, the antecedent will is not so much a will as a velleity, an empty and void desire incapable of accomplishment which cannot apply to God (the most wise and powerful). For how can he be called the most perfect and happy who cannot carry out the design and object truly intended, on account of the intervention and obstacle of the creature determining itself otherwise independently.

IX. Fourth, God in this way would be subjected to man since the consequent will is said to depend upon the determination of the human will so that no one is elected by God who does not first choose God by his faith and repentance.

X. Fifth, it is repugnant to the gospel which constantly teaches that God wills to save not all simply, but only the elect and believers in Christ and that the

means of salvation are not offered or conferred upon all, but only upon some. In fine, it overthrows the eternal election of God because it leaves it uncertain, founded not upon the good pleasure (*eudokia*) of God, but upon the human will (than which nothing is more uncertain and changeable). It makes it such as that no execution can answer to it (i.e., makes it void and inefficacious).

Sources of explanation.

XI. In 1 S. 13:13, the antecedent will is not set forth by which he willed to establish the kingdom of Saul forever. For how could he have willed this which he knew never would happen and the contrary of which he had already decreed? But when it is said "now would the Lord have established thy kingdom forever," it implies only that the sin and rebellion of Saul would be the cause of the speedy discontinuance and of the transference of his kingdom to another (which would not happen if he had remained in duty according to the promises made to piety).

XII. This twofold will cannot be proved from Mt. 23:37: (1) because it is not said that God willed to scatter those whom he willed to gather together, but only that Christ willed to gather together those whom Jerusalem (i.e., the chiefs of the people) nilled to be gathered together, but notwithstanding their opposition Christ did not fail in gathering together those whom he willed. Hence Augustine says, "She indeed was unwilling that her sons should be gathered together by him, but notwithstanding her unwillingness he gathered together his sons whom he willed" (*Enchiridion* 24 [97] [FC 2:450; PL 40.277]). Therefore, Jerusalem is here to be distinguished from her sons as the words themselves prove (and the design of the chapter, in which from v. 13 to v. 37, he addresses the scribes and Pharisees and rebukes them because "they neither went into the kingdom of heaven themselves, nor suffered those that were entering, to go in"); (2) the will here alluded to is not the decretive, which is one only and simple, but the preceptive, which is referred to calling and is often repeated by the preaching of the word—"How often would I?" (and so Christ here speaks as the minister of circumcision).

XIII. If God in the first world granted the space of 120 years to invite them to repentance, an antecedent will cannot be thence inferred (as if he had decreed to spare it) because it would be opposed to the eternal decree of sending a deluge upon it. But the preceptive will only is indicated which prescribed to it the duty of repentance so as to render it inexcusable on the supposition of its contumacy.

XIV. In vain is it said that the distinction into antecedent and consequent will was invented to reconcile the various passages of Scripture which would otherwise seem contradictory (*asystata*) (as that he had promised to introduce the people into Canaan and yet he willed to destroy them in the desert [Ex. 32 and Num. 14]; that he wills to save all and yet to damn the many; to call many to the marriage whom nevertheless he determined to exclude from it). For there is a far more certain and truer method of reconciliation. The promise of introducing the people is not repugnant to the will of punishing them because it was made under a condition (Ex. 32:34) and was literally fulfilled, if not with respect to the individuals themselves who fell in the desert on account of their unbelief (Dt. 1:35; Heb. 4:6), yet with respect to the nation itself in general, which at length reached it. The will of saving all men does not overthrow the decree of reprobation of passing by many because it is neither the decretive will, but only the preceptive

and approving will; nor the universal, which respects all and individuals, but only general, which is indiscriminately extended to any. So they can be called to the marriage by the preceptive will who nevertheless were excluded from it from eternity by the will of good pleasure.

Effectual and ineffectual will.

XV. The second distinction usually brought forward by the adversaries is that of effectual and ineffectual will, which is understood to mean that the effectual will corresponds with the decretive (and is so called because it is always fulfilled and cannot be resisted); but that the ineffectual will coincides with the preceptive (and is so termed because it often remains void on account of man's rebellion). Both can be tolerated (although the locution is less fit and capable of being abused [*eudiablētos*]). If it is referred to the decretive will alone (as understood by the adversaries who maintain that there are in God velleities and fruitless desires in which he fails of this purpose and does not accomplish his intentions as the conditional decrees attributed to him), it cannot be admitted. Scripture testifies that the counsel of God is immutable and that his will cannot be resisted (Is. 46:10; Rom. 9:19). If it cannot be resisted, it must also accomplish what he intended. Second, the ineffectual will cannot be attributed to God without convicting him either of ignorance (as not knowing that the event will not take place) or of impotence (as not able to give effect to what he intended). Nor ought it to be said that this happens not from want of power, but from his good pleasure because he willed to use such a force as would infallibly carry the thing into effect; for that very circumstance would prove that God had not seriously willed it, for he who seriously intends anything uses all the means in his power to accomplish it. In fine, the same reasons which teach that there is no antecedent will prove there is no ineffectual will.

XVI. Although every will of God is effectual because the event intended is always brought about, it ought not immediately to be efficient for efficiency is only in good things, but efficacy also in evil.

XVII. The passages which attribute a desire or wish to God do not immediately prove any ineffectual will in him, but things spoken after the manner of men must be understood in a manner becoming to God (*theoprepōs*), unless we wish to adopt the deliriums of the Anthropomorphites. If referred to the past, these passages mean nothing else than a serious disapprobation of committed sins with a strong rebuke to the ingratitude of men and a declaration of the benefits lost and the evils incurred by their sins. Thus the following passages are to be understood: "O that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways" (Ps. 81:13*); "O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandments! then had thy peace been as a river" (Is. 48:18). But if they relate to the future as "O that they were wise, that they would fear me and keep my commands, that it might be well with them" (Dt. 32:29), they imply only a serious command supported by promises and threatenings (by which he declares what he approves as honest and holy and the great delight he takes in those who obey him).

XVIII. When God testifies that "he has no pleasure at all in the death of the sinner, but that he should return from his ways, and live" (Ezk. 18:23), this does not favor the inefficacious will or the feeble velleity of God because the word *chpts* (which occurs there) does not denote desire so much as delight and complacency. Thus God may be said not to delight in the punishment of the wicked

inasmuch as it is the destruction of the creature, although he wills it as an exercise of his justice. So he is said to will the repentance of sinners approvingly and preceptively as a thing most pleasing to himself and expressed in his commands, although with respect to all of them he nills it decretively and effectively.

The absolute and conditional will.

XIX. The third distinction is in the absolute and conditional will. The former is that which depends upon nothing out of himself, especially an external condition; the latter is that which is suspended upon a condition out of God (for example, when God is conceived to will to save Judas if he believes). Although this is admitted by some less properly with respect to the preceptive will because promises and threatenings are proposed conditionally, yet if understood of the will of decree and good pleasure (as by the adversaries), it is deservedly rejected because it is unworthy of God as repugnant to his independence and wisdom and power (because it would remain doubtful and uncertain, viz., suspended on the mutable will of man and so ineffectual and frustrated, making God often to fail in his purpose).

XX. Again the condition upon which God is conceived to will anything, will either be certainly future from the decree of God or certainly not future, nor even possible. If the former, it will no longer be conditional, but absolute (since God is supposed to will the condition not as conditional, because then there might be an infinite series, but absolutely). If the latter, God would be made to seriously intend something under a condition never to take place (and even impossible), which God himself (who alone can) does not will to grant. If this cannot be said of a wise man, it cannot be attributed to God without the greatest detriment to his most wise and powerful divine majesty.

XXI. To avoid error in the meantime, the conditional will ought to be regarded in two ways: either *a priori* and antecedently, suspended upon a condition; or *a posteriori* and consequently, viz., whose execution depends upon the intervention of some condition in the creature. In the latter sense, the will less accurately can be called conditional because the decrees of God ordain with the end the means also for carrying it into execution. He who decrees us to salvation, decrees also faith and repentance as the means of obtaining it. But in the former sense (of which we here speak), it cannot be admitted because thus every good pleasure of God is absolute.

XXII. It is one thing for the condition to be such on the part of the internal act or of the volition itself; another to be such on the part of the external object or of the thing willed. In the latter sense, we grant the things willed to be conditional, but not in the former (i.e., that the volition itself depends on a condition). For example, the salvation decreed to us by God can be called conditional because not granted without the intervention of faith. However the decree of salvation itself is absolute, as much with respect to the end (i.e., salvation) as to the means (which God has absolutely and unconditionally determined to bestow upon all his elect).

XXIII. Thus this proposition that God wills the salvation of men, provided they believe, may have a twofold sense. It may signify either that God wills or determines salvation to come to us under the condition of faith (i.e., provided we believe), which is certainly true. But here our salvation only is conditional and not the will of God; yea, the will of God has determined the condition as

much as the salvation. Or it may signify that from the condition of faith posited (or at least foreseen), there arises in God the will of conferring salvation upon men. In this sense, the proposition is false because nothing temporal can be the cause of that which is eternal. The will in God is not to be conceived of as suspended upon a condition antecedently, but as imposing the condition itself consequently as the means. He does not will to save men if they believe, but he wills them to believe in order to salvation (or he wills to save them through the faith which he has determined to give them). But we will treat of these things more at large when we come to the decrees.

Seventeenth Question
Can any cause be assigned for the will of God? We deny.

I. This question depends upon those preceding and is rendered necessary by the Pelagians who, in the matter of predestination, seek in the foresight of faith or of the good use of free will the causes of the divine will out of God. But with the orthodox, we think that no cause (properly so called) of the divine will is to be sought out of God.

Statement of the question.

II. On the state of the question, observe that it is one thing to seek for the reason of the will of God; another for the cause. The question here is not whether any reason of the will of God can be given; for the will of God (who made all things most wisely) cannot be without reason (*alogos*) (although for the most part that reason is concealed from us). Augustine says, "The cause of the will of God can be secret, it cannot be unjust" (*Letter 149 [59]*, "To Paulinus" [FC 20:256; PL 33.639]). Here he takes cause for reason because elsewhere he maintains that it is absurd to seek for a cause of the will of God: "They uselessly seek the causes of the will of God, since his will is itself the cause of all things which are" (*De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.2 [PL 34.175]). Rather the question concerns a cause properly so called, moving the will of God to will this or that (which the adversaries maintain can be granted; we deny).

III. As the will of God is the cause of all things, so it can have no cause of itself. It is as certain that there can be no cause of the will of God out of himself, as it is that nothing can be prior to him. For if his will has a cause, there is something which preceded it. Thus it would be the second cause, not the first; the thing ruled, not the rule. Hence Lombard says, "He that seeks a cause of the divine will, seeks something greater than it, while there is nothing greater" (*Sententiarum* 1, Dist. 45.4 [PL 192/2.642]). Besides, since the will of God is eternal, it can have no cause out of itself not eternal.

IV. It is one thing to grant a cause on the part of the act of willing, another on the part of the thing willed. In the former sense, no cause of the will of God can be granted, but in the latter sense there can because among the things willed by him, some may be the causes of others. Thus Christ can be said to be the cause of the salvation decreed because it is given to us on account of Christ; but not of the decree of salvation because this flows from the sole good pleasure of God. The Scholastics mean this when they say that God wills this on account of that, but not on account of that, wills this; for example, that he wills salvation on account

of Christ, but not on account of Christ wills salvation. Thus Christ, the meritorious cause of salvation, holds himself on the part of the salvation he acquired for us, but not on the part of the decree itself by which it is assigned to us. So there is an order and causality among the things willed by God (so that one may be for another), but not in the divine volition which recognizes no cause out of itself.

V. Some of the properties of God are absolute, founded upon his absolute right and supreme dominion (such as his autocratic [*autokratorikē*] potency and power); others are relative, founded upon right modified by virtues and requiring for their exercise some condition or quality in the object about which they ought to exert themselves (such as justice, which supposes sin, and mercy, which supposes misery). Thus we must reason concerning the acts of the will operating according to them. For when he operates from the absolute properties as supreme Lord and arbiter of all things (for example, when he wills to create or elect one in preference to another, not only is there no cause of his will besides his good pleasure, but neither any condition or quality in the object to move it; for potency indeed does not suppose its object but constitutes it; and since election is among equals, it sees nothing in one preferable to another, as mutually distinguishing them, and therefore acts from mere good pleasure). But when it acts from the relative properties (as from justice to punishing or from mercy to saving) although some quality is always supposed in the object (viz., either sin or misery), it cannot have the place of a cause properly so called (because then either all would be damned because they are sinners, or all would be saved because they are miserable), but only the place of a quality in the object required for the exercise of these properties. If some cause or motive must be sought, it is not to be sought out of God, but only in his justice and mercy by which the will is incited to action.

VI. Although among the effects of the divine will some have the relation of causes with respect to others (as God has willed that there should be an order both in nature and in grace by which they should be mutually connected), yet their power is not such that they can move the divine will to elicit its own act, since they are the effects of it as the first cause. No other cause can be assigned why the Lord has done this or that than this—because he so willed. If you ask further, why he so willed, you seek something greater and more sublime than the will of God (which cannot be found). Therefore human temerity ought to restrain itself and not to seek what is not, lest perchance it fail to find that which is.

Eighteenth Question

Is the will of God the primary rule of justice? We distinguish.

I. This question not only was agitated among the Scholastics (who differed about it), but is also mooted among the orthodox themselves. Some hold the affirmative—that all moral good and evil depend upon the free will of God and nothing is good and just unless God wills it. Others contend for the negative and recognize some essential goodness and justice in moral acts antecedently to the will of God, so that the things are not good and just because God wills them, but God wills them because they are good and just.

Statement of the question.

II. We follow the latter opinion with these distinctions. (1) The will can be called the primary rule of justice either intrinsically or extrinsically (i.e., either with respect to God or with respect to all things out of him). In the former sense, his will is regulated by his justice; in the latter sense, the justice in us is regulated by nothing else than his will. (2) As the law of God is either natural and indispensable (founded on his nature and holiness) or free and positive (depending only upon his will), so the goodness or the badness of things can be referred either to the natural or to the positive law.

III. This being posited, I say that the will can be called and in reality is the first rule of justice extrinsically and in reference to us, but not intrinsically and in reference to God. This is so with respect to us because the fount of justice ought to be sought nowhere else than in the will of God which, as it is most perfectly just in itself, so it is the rule of all recititude and justice; for the first in every genus is the rule of all the rest. In this sense, theologians say that the will of God is the supreme rule of justice, and consequently whatever God wills is therefore just and good because he wills it. But with respect to God, the will cannot always be called the first rule of justice. It is a rule in those things which have only a free and positive goodness, but not in those which have essential goodness (i.e., in ceremonial, not in moral). For in the latter, God's will is regulated, not indeed extrinsically but intrinsically (viz., by his most holy nature). Hence it has been well said that certain things are good because God wills them (such as the observance of ceremonies and all positive commands), but that God wills others because they are just and good per se and in their own nature (such as the love of God and our neighbor). If (which is impossible) God had not commanded them, they would not cease to be just and therefore to be attended by us.

IV. The reasons are: (1) As there is granted in God natural justice and holiness antecedently to his free will, so the moral goodness and justice founded upon the justice and holiness of God and bearing his image, must be natural. And as God cannot deny himself or hate his own holiness, so he cannot but love his image and prescribe it to the creature as the most perfect rule of justice and holiness.

V. (2) There is in God an eternal and indispensable right (antecedent to every free act of will) by which as Creator he has dominion over the creature. Thus the creature ought to depend upon God not only in relation to being as to conservation, but in relation to morals as to worship and obedience; and that obligation is such and so close that its contrary is absurd (*asystaton*) and cannot be maintained without repugnance. God can no more be conceived to absolve the creature from this duty than to deny himself. Therefore since there is such a right in God antecedently to his will, there must be some rule of justice independent of his will.

VI. (3) If the will of God was the first rule of justice even intrinsically so that nothing would be good and just unless God wills it, it would follow that there would be no atheism, magic, Epicureanism, hatred and blasphemy of God and other crimes of like kind which he cannot command (and by it render them morally good as commands). Whatever can fall under the precept of God can also be made honest and just. Thus God could dispense with all the precepts of the decalogue and command the creature to believe that he is not good and holy, ought not to be adored, but rather ought to be regarded with hatred; yea, that he even does not exist—at which the mind revolts. Thus God, if he willed, might be

the author and approver of man's disobedience for he might command him not to obey his precepts or prohibitions; for there is supposed to be no obligation in man or right of obligation in God antecedently to the will of God. Thus there would be no essential vindicative justice in God or any necessity of satisfaction to be pressed against Socinus (which nevertheless they do who embrace this opinion).

Sources of explanation.

VII. God is not under any moral duty outwardly because he is a debtor to no one, and there is no cause out of him which can place him under obligation. Yet he can be under obligation inwardly because he is a debtor to himself and cannot deny himself. As the Son, in divine things, is obliged to work by the Father, and the Father is obliged to love the Son, so in external acts (supposing the creature to be produced), God cannot but command him and give just and holy precepts.

VIII. The law is called the rule of all good and bad actions as to us and our knowledge because the relation of good and evil becomes known to us from no other source than the law. But with respect to God and his right of obliging or commanding, it exists antecedently to the will of God because founded on this very majesty and holiness.

IX. It is absurd to say that God depends upon something out of himself, but not that he depends upon himself (provided this is understood in a manner becoming to God [*theoprepōs*], i.e., that he wills nothing unless according to his own holiness and justice).

X. God is not bound to the law which he imposes on man (viz., formally, by taking the law as a law), but he is not free and absolved from all the matter of the law, so that he can either command or himself do the opposite of it (for example, believe that he is not God and command others to believe so—which sounds horrible to pious ears).

XI. Although the divine will is simply free outwardly, yet from the supposition of one free act it can be necessitated to another (as if he wills to promise absolutely, he must fulfill the promise; if he wills to speak or reveal himself, he must necessarily make a true revelation; if he wills to govern, he is bound to govern justly). So the divine will cannot be determined from itself to willing that something should be or not be, but can well be determined with respect to complexities to the rectitude of those things which are or which he wills to be.

XII. Man sins immediately against the revealed law of God, but also mediately and consequently against God, the author of the law, and the supreme Lord who imposed it. Thus sin remains always as transgression (*anomia*) as much with respect to the revealed external law as to the eternal (which is based on the holiness of God).

NINTEENTH QUESTION: THE JUSTICE OF GOD

Is vindictive justice natural to God? We affirm against the Socinians.

I. To the will of God belong the virtues which are usually ascribed to him not under the relation of habit after the manner of human virtues, but inasmuch as they denote that perfection which resides in habit and the promptness of acting (although otherwise they do not differ from the essence). However these can be

referred to two principal ones, which embrace the others under them: justice and goodness. The former is that by which God is in himself holy and just and has the constant will of giving to each his due. The latter is that by which he is conceived as the supreme good and the giver of all good.

Justice is either universal or particular.

II. The word "justice" (to speak of it first) is generally used in two senses: either for the universal comprehension of all virtues (as injustice is taken for every kind of sin) and is called universal justice (*justitia universalis*) by which, as God is in himself perfectly holy and just, so in all his works he preserves an incorruptible rectitude and justice. To this belongs in a higher sense what the poet says of human justice: "In justice is all virtue found in sum" (*Ev de dikaiosynē syllēbdēn pas' aret' esti*, Theognis, *Elegy and Iambus* 146 [Loeb, 244-45]). To this pertain, in particular, benignity and beneficence, constancy and fidelity in fulfilling promises (which very frequently in Scripture come under the name of justice). Or justice is taken for particular justice, which gives to each his due, is occupied with the distribution of rewards or punishments and is called distributive (*distributiva*), although in reference to the rewards of the pious (as will be shown hereafter) it does not crown their merits, but its own gifts and "gives what is its own, rather than restores what is ours" (as the Concil. Araus. cap. xxii.+ expresses it). Hence it is ascribed to God not so much properly as analogically. As to commutative justice, which preserves an arithmetical proportion (being based upon an equality of what is given and received and through which authority may be transferred, neither of which can be said of God—for "who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him again?" Rom. 11:35), we (with the sounder Scholastics) think this should be removed from God.

III. Again, divine justice can be considered either absolutely in itself (as nothing else than the rectitude and perfection of the divine nature; called by us universal justice and by others the justice of God; belonging to him as God) or relatively (with respect to its egress and exercise through the divine will according to the rule of his supreme right and eternal wisdom). It may be regarded as twofold: either in the rule and government of creatures (called Lordly justice, belonging to him as Lord and supreme arbiter of things who does with his own what he wills and directs all his actions in governing and administering created things according to the rule of his own rectitude and wisdom; for that which in the administration of affairs is to us a law, is in God his own right, conjoined with his perfectly wise and just will); or in judgments, and these either "premiative" (*praemiantibus*) (granting rewards) or vindictive (and this latter either for chastisement or for punishment) which is called *justitia vindicatrix* or punitive justice concerning which the proposed question treats. To understand this, certain things must be premised.

Statement of the question.

IV. The rational creature and his moral dependence upon God being supposed, the first egress of this justice is in the constitution of the penal law; not simply as a law (for this properly depends upon the justice of rule), but as penal. The second egress is in the infliction of punishment; but this again can be regarded either as to the thing and substance of punishment in general or as to the mode and circumstances attending it; either in time or degree or persons. Again, the right of God with regard to punishment is either supreme and

rigorous (called accurate right, *akribodikaion*) or it is a right tempered by a certain moderation (*epieikeia*). As to the former, punishment is imposed not only on sin but also on the very person of the sinner. As to the latter, there is granted a manifold moderation in the exercise of justice either in time (by delay) or in persons (by transfer) or in degree (by mitigation). Hence arises a twofold right with regard to the infliction of punishment: one necessary and indispensable with respect to sin iteslf; the other free and positive with respect to the sinner. Justice demands necessarily that all sin should be punished, but does not equally demand that it should be punished in the very person sinning or at such a time and in such a degree. The Scholastics expressed this properly when they said that impersonally punishment is necessarily inflicted upon every sin, but not personally upon every sinner.

V. Now although we hold the egress of justice to be necessary, yet we do not deny that God exercises it freely. This necessity is not exclusive of concomitant liberty, but only of antecedent indifference according to which we say that on the hypothesis of the sinful creature God is inclined to inflict punishment freely indeed (i.e., spontaneously and without coaction), but not indifferently (as if he might or might not punish at pleasure).

VI. Hence it is evident in what sense this justice may be called natural; not as if it drew with it a physical necessity, but because it is founded in the very nature of God and even identified with it (although it cannot exert itself outwardly, unless by means of an act of the intellect and will, in the same way in which the other attributes, as goodness, wisdom, etc., although natural, are not exercised except by means of the free will).

VII. This justice can be regarded in three ways: as a *dynameōs* or potentiality, in which sense it is the will of God itself turning away from and willing to punish sinners; or as an actuality (*energeia*) itself and the act of judgment or punishment by which it carries out its judgments towards sinners; or for its effect or the punishment inflicted by justice. Here we treat not the third signification, but the first and second, which are seen joined together in Ps. 119:137: "Righteous art thou, O Lord, and upright are thy judgments."

VIII. A question is agitated here with us by the Socinians concerning vindictive justice. The more easily to destroy the satisfaction of Christ, they deny that vindictive justice is natural to God, but is only the effect of his most free will (which can be and not be in the same way, as it was free to God to create the world and not to create). Socinus indeed confesses that such a justice belongs to God, which if he willed to use perpetually, it would be right to destroy all sinners without waiting for their repentance and thus to leave no sin unpunished (*De Iesu Christo Servatore*, Pt. I.1 [1594], pp. 1-11). He concedes also that God willed to pardon sin save only upon repentance. He does not deny that God constituted the punishment of sin according to the rule of his right and wisdom, but denies that there is any attribute in God necessarily demanding a satisfaction for sin. If he punishes sin, this is the perfectly free effect of his will from which he might abstain. Thus Socinus: "Nor is there any justice in God obliging him to punish sin altogether, from which he cannot abstain. There is indeed in God perpetual justice, but this is nothing else than equity and rectitude" (*Praelectionis theologicae* 16 [1627], p. 87). And a little after: "That which is commonly called justice as opposed to mercy is not a quality of God, but only the effect of his will" (ibid., p.

88). Confirmations of this occur in Socinus, *De Iesu Christo Servatore*, Pt. I.1 (1594), pp. 1-11 and Pt. III.1, pp. 221-28; Ostorodt, *Unterrichtung . . . hauptpuncten der Christlichen Religion* 31 (1612), pp. 229-45; Crellius, "De Deo et Ejus Attributis," 1.23 in *Opera* (1656), 4:45-64.

IX. On the other hand, the orthodox maintain that this justice is an essential property of God and not merely the effect of his free will. Nevertheless it must be confessed that there is among them some diversity of opinion about the exercise of this justice—some holding it to be necessary, others that it is free and indifferent (viz., such that God can abstain from it if he will). Hence they think diversely concerning the necessity of the satisfaction. Some maintain that it is only hypothetical (viz., from the hypothesis of the divine will and decree) so that God could not remit sins without a satisfaction; not that his justice would demand this absolutely and necessarily, but because he so decreed (which opinion Twisse follows walking in the footsteps of some of our teachers who spoke with more freedom before Socinus arose). But others make it absolute, not only depending on the decree, but also taking its rise from the divine justice. But although both agree as to the hinge of the question against the Socinians (who deny the necessity of a satisfaction), still it is certain that the latter opinion (now the most commonly held) is far more efficacious to the strangling of that most pestilent heresy and more in accordance with the nature of God and the words of Scripture.

Statement of the question.

X. Therefore the question comes to this—whether the vindictive justice of God is so natural to him that he cannot but exercise it (the sinning creature being granted); and to leave sin unpunished would be repugnant to it; or whether it is so free in God that its exercise depends upon his will and good pleasure alone. They with whom we treat maintain the latter; we defend the former.

Vindictive justice is proved from Scripture.

XI. That vindictive justice is essential to God, these four arguments especially prove: (1) the voice of Scripture; (2) the dictates of conscience and the consent of nations; (3) the sanction of the law with the whole Levitical priesthood; (4) our redemption through the death of Christ. Scripture frequently ascribes this justice to God. First, in those places in which the praise of perfect holiness and justice is given to God by which he is said to utterly detest and turn away from sin: "Thou art a God that will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children" (Ex. 34:7); "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil" (Hab. 1:13); "Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness: neither shall evil dwell with thee" (Ps. 5:4*); and frequently elsewhere. Hence we conclude, if the hatred of sin is necessary in God, justice is equally necessary because the hatred of sin is the constant will of punishing it, which cannot fail in him who is not destitute of power. In us indeed there can often be an abhorrence without punishment either from want of power or because vengeance does not belong to private persons, but to the rulers and magistrates. In God the case is different as he is furnished with both the highest power and authority. Therefore if he hates sin necessarily, he must necessarily punish it. Now that he does necessarily hate sin is manifest from his love of justice opposed to it. As he necessarily loves justice so that he cannot but love it, so he must necessarily from the nature of contraries abhor sin and abhorring, punish. For as he who loves a person or thing wishes well and, if he can, does

well to it, so true hatred and abhorrence cannot exist without drawing after them the removal and destruction of the contrary. Otherwise if he cannot punish, he cannot hate; if he cannot hate, he can love it, which is absurd (*asystaton*). Nor, if he does not punish the sins of the elect, does it follow that he leaves them unavenged because he has punished them in Christ.

XII. Second, in those places which speak of God as a just Judge: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" (Gen. 18:25); "Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? God forbid: for then how shall God judge the world?" (Rom 3:5*, 6); "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men . . . who know the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death" (Rom. 1:18, 32); "It is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you" (2 Thess. 1:6). For since the office of judge and ruler belongs naturally to God, the rectifying right (*epanorthōtikon*) concerning punishment which depends upon it must be essential; and so also avenging justice founded on that.

From the sense of conscience and the consent of people.

XIII. Second, the dictates of conscience and the consent of nations confirm the testimony of Scripture: the former when it places man before the tribunal of God and either accuses or excuses him in good or evil deeds (Rom 2:14, 15); the latter by which among all people (even the most savage) this persuasion has prevailed that God is the just Judge of crimes, and if he did not exercise this justice, he would not be God. Hence they feigned *Dikēn* to be the daughter of Jupiter and held that she was set over human affairs to avenge injuries and inflict punishment upon those who transgressed against the gods. But whence that public voice of conscience convicting and striking terror into men? Whence those secret lashes by which they are tormented after a crime committed (even unknown to anyone) unless from the most firm persuasion of avenging justice (by which, as it is known to them that God has a vindictive eye [*theon echein ekdikon omma*], so they tremble and are terrified at his vengeance)? They prove this public consent, testified in various ways, especially by sacrifices (concerning which Pliny affirms that the whole world agreed in them), although discordant and unknown to itself. For since sacrifices were instituted for this end most especially, that by them the wrath of the deity might be averted, it is evident that this notion (*prōlēpsin*) was implanted in them—that the just God could not but be the avenger of crimes. And such deep roots has this notion struck in their minds that they were driven to the horrible wickedness of human sacrifices (*anthrōpothysias*) that (namely by a more excellent sacrifice) they might the more happily appease an angry deity.

From the law.

XIV. Third, the moral and ceremonial law itself establishes the same thing. Since the precepts of the former (as to a great part) are indispensable and founded upon the eternal and natural right of God, it is necessary that the penal sanction added to them should be of the same nature; also because (as has been shown before) there is a natural and necessary connection between sin and punishment, moral and physical evil, just as moral and physical good are mutually connected by an indissoluble bond. The same is true of the tendency of the ceremonial law since the whole apparatus of legal sacrifices were designed for no other purpose than to

show the necessity of the expiation of sins in order to satisfy divine justice. Paul would not so often have insisted that these sacrifices could not take away the guilt of sin if it could be taken away without the necessity of justice by the mere will of God. For that which depends on the free will of God could be accomplished by the intervention of legal victims as well as by the blood of another. Therefore since it was impossible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins (Heb. 10:3, 4), not only from the will of God, but also from the nature of the thing itself (because sin is so foul a thing that it cannot be wiped away by the blood of goats), it follows so to speak that the necessity of such sacrifices depended not on the mere will, but on the very essential justice of God.

From the death of Christ.

XV. Fourth, the death of Christ no less plainly demonstrates this. For if it was free and indifferent to God to punish or not to punish sin without compromising his justice so that no reason besides the mere will impelled God to send his Son into the world to die for us, what lawful reason can be devised to account for God's willing to subject his most beloved and holy Son to an accursed and most cruel death? Will the supreme goodness and wisdom of God suffer us to believe that this was done gratuitously and without the highest necessity? Was God, who delights not in the death of the sinner, delighted in the death of his most innocent Son (if this depended absolutely on his mere pleasure and he was moved by no other reason to devote him to destruction)? Thus his offering himself for us was not a work of bare will, but of justice, which demanded this sacrifice for its own satisfaction. Hence he is said "to have been set forth by God to be a propitiation to declare his righteousness" (Rom. 3:25*) and "to have reconciled us to God through his blood" (Col. 1:20).

Sources of explanation.

XVI. It is not always lawful to dispense with one's right. It is lawful indeed as to positive and free right, but not as to natural. It is lawful as to the private right of a creditor (which regards his own interest), not as to the public right of a ruler and judge (which regards the majesty of the laws and rectitude and the performance of duty). Thus a magistrate would err, if by a too great indulgence he would dispense with the right of punishment as this would give impunity to crimes. Now the penal right of which we speak is not a positive but a natural right, founded on the very holiness and justice of God. It springs from the essential dependence of the creature (subjecting it to its Creator) both as to obedience by reason of precepts and as to punishment by reason of their sanction. It is not the private right of a creditor; for although sins are sometimes compared to debts, yet they are also crimes which cannot remain unpunished without prejudice to the laws. Rather it is the public right of a ruler because God does not punish as the offended part, but as Judge and the supreme ruler of the world.

XVII. Now although by not punishing sin God would do injury to no one out of himself, he would do it to his own justice, which ought not to be offended with impunity. He would do injury to the laws enacted by him, whose majesty ought to be unimpaired. He would do injury to the public good whose guard and administrator he is. He cannot deny himself or divest himself of the natural dominion which he exercises over creatures (which however if he would do, he would injure no one).

XVIII. Although the effects of justice depend upon the free will of God, it does not follow that justice itself (as it is conceived in the first act) is equally a free act of will. Rather it is an essential property requiring in its exercise and egress the intervention of free will, to determine the mode, the time, the degree and the persons upon whom it wills to inflict punishment.

XIX. It is one thing to punish sins from a physical necessity (such as exists in fire to burn); another to do so from moral and rational necessity. If God would punish sin according to the first, it is true that he would always act in the same manner, would punish equally and as much as he could. But this does not hold good of the moral necessity because the exercise of this attribute depends on the most wise will of God (which in the infliction of punishment can, according to moderation [*epieikeian*], use various modifications without detriment). This is true of justice which indeed necessarily demands that every sin should be punished, but not that every sinner should be punished immediately (or in this or that degree).

XX. Although the effects of justice and mercy may be contrary on account of the diversity of their objects, still it does not follow that these attributes are contrary in themselves any more than the sun is contrary to itself when it melts wax and hardens clay.

XXI. The justice and mercy of God differ in their exercise. Mercy indeed is perfectly free, able to exert or not exert itself without injury to anyone because it consists in a merely gratuitous act which it is not bound to exercise towards anyone. For whether he had pitied us or not, he would have done injury to no one because he owed this to no one. But the act of justice, although most free, is nevertheless necessary because due. It consists in rendering to each one his own. Although nothing is properly due to the creature (and properly speaking there is here no right of the creature in him), yet this is due to himself and to the preservation of the laws enacted by him. Thus if he would not do this, he would not be just.

XXII. If there were no sinful or miserable creature, there would be no justice or mercy as to relative being and in the exercised act. Still there would always be justice as to absolute being and in the signified act (just as omnipotence was in God from eternity, although he had created nothing).

XXIII. Although God can exercise some forbearance (*epieikeian*) as to the degree of punishment, it does not follow that he can equally take away all degrees of punishment because justice has a certain latitude of degrees beyond which, if it should go, it would not be justice; but although such a degree cannot be defined by us, yet God has it in the best manner defined and perfect.

XXIV. The question here is not simply whether God can through his potency not punish sin; but whether he can through his justice, which is properly exercised about punishment (which, because repugnant to it, it is therefore well said that God cannot do). But although it is not a formal contradiction in terms to say that sin is not punished, yet it is in reality because this would imply that God does not hate sin and is able to love it.

XXV. Although from his absolute right God is able to annihilate creatures, he cannot equally inflict upon an innocent person infernal and everlasting torment. For the former is an effect of supreme dominion, but the latter necessarily involves a relation (*schesin*) to justice (which does not allow the infliction of such torment upon the undeserving, as it cannot bear that the whole punishment

should be taken away notwithstanding whatever demerit). See the "Disputation on the Necessity of Christ's Satisfaction," Parts I and II (Turretin, *Opera* 4:385-435).

Twentieth Question: The Goodness, Love, Grace and Mercy of God
How do they differ from each other?

I. As vindictive justice (treated of in the preceding question) and hatred, wrath and severity (pertaining to it) are concerned with the infliction of physical evil or of punishment, so goodness and the qualities contained under it (viz., love, grace and mercy) are occupied with the communication of good, but diversely.

II. The goodness of God is that by which he is conceived not only absolutely and in himself as supremely good and perfect (as it were) and the only good (*autoagathon*, Mk. 10:18) because he is such originally, perfectly and immutably; but also relatively and extrinsically as beneficent towards creatures (which is called benignity) because it is of the reason of good to be communicative of itself.

What is the goodness of God?

III. Although the goodness of God extends itself to all creatures, yet not equally, but exhibits the greatest diversity in the communication of good. Hence one is general (by which he follows all creatures, Ps. 36:6, 7); another special (which has respect to men, Acts 14:17) and another most special (relating to the elect and referred to in Ps. 73:1: "God is good to Israel"). If you seek the causes of this diversity, various ones can be assigned besides his will. (1) It was in accordance with his supreme dominion to show the most free power in diffusing his gifts (which in this inequality is exhibited in the highest manner). (2) The wisdom of God demanded that a certain order should exist in things (which is beheld in the connection of superiors and inferiors). (3) It conduced to the beauty of the universe (which creatures differing in form, actions and qualities render perfect). (4) It afforded a better demonstration of the inexhaustible fountain of divine goodness, since one creature could not receive the full communication of good (thus it should be imparted to more).

What is the love of God?

IV. From goodness flows love by which he communicates himself to the creature and (as it were) wills to unite himself with and do good to it, but in diverse ways and degrees according to the diversity of the objects. Hence is usually made a threefold distinction in the divine love: the first, that by which he follows creatures, called "love of the creature" (*philoktisia*); the second, that by which he embraces men, called "love of man" (*philoanthrōpia*); the third, which is specially exercised towards the elect and is called "the love of the elect" (*eklektophilia*). For in proportion as the creature is more perfect and more excellent, so also does it share in a greater effluence and outpouring (*aporroēn*) of divine love. Hence although love considered affectively and on the part of the internal act is equal in God (because it does not admit of increase and diminution), yet regarded effectively (or on the part of the good which he wills to anyone) it is unequal because some effects of love are greater than others.

It is threefold: benevolence, beneficence, complacency.

V. A threefold love of God is commonly held; or rather there are three degrees of one and the same love. First, there is the love of benevolence by which God willed good to the creature from eternity; second, the love of beneficence by which he does good to the creature in time according to his good will; third, the love of complacency by which he delights himself in the creature on account of the rays of his image seen in them. The two former precede every act of the creature; the latter follows (not as an effect its cause, but as a consequent its antecedent). By the love of benevolence, he loved us before we were; by the love of beneficence, he loves us as we are; and by the love of complacency, he loves us when we are (viz., renewed after his image). By the first, he elects us; by the second, he redeems and sanctifies us; but by the third, he gratuitously rewards us as holy and just. Jn. 3:16 refers to the first; Eph. 5:25 and Rev. 1:5 to the second; Is. 62:3 and Heb. 11:6 to the third.

VI. These four things in the highest manner commend the love of God towards us: (1) the majesty of the lover; (2) the poverty and unworthiness of the loved; (3) the worth of him in whom we are loved; (4) the multitude and excellence of the gifts which flow out from that love to us. (a) God loves us (who, constituted in the highest preeminence [*hyperochē*] and happiness, needs us not and is not bound to love us; indeed can most justly hate and destroy us if he so willed). (b) Men are beloved, not only as empty and weak creatures, but as sinners and guilty, rebellious servants, who so far from deserving it, are on the other hand most worthy of hatred and punishment (viz., enemies and covenant breakers). (c) He in whom they are beloved is Christ (Eph. 1:5, 6*), the delight of his heavenly Father and the "express image of his person" (Heb. 1:3*), than whom he could have given nothing more excellent, nothing dearer, even if he had given the whole universe. (d) The effects of his love are both many in number and great in value (viz., all the benefits by which salvation is begun in this life and perfected in the other and, what is the crown and sum of all blessings, the gift of God himself, who imparts himself to us as an object of fruition both in grace and in glory).

Grace may be taken either affectively or effectively.

VII. Grace succeeds love from which it is called *chnvn* ("gracious," Ex. 34:6) by which God is conceived as willing to communicate himself to the creature from gratuitous love without any merit in the creature and notwithstanding its demerit. Now it is usual to understand it principally in two ways: either affectively (as they say), i.e., with respect to the "internal act" in God; or effectively, with regard to the effects which it produces outwardly in creatures. The former is towards us, and we stand objectively related to it; the latter is in us, and we stand subjectively related to it. In the former sense, it denotes the favor and benevolence of God (or his benignant and disposed will) bestowing all things liberally and gratuitously, not from our merit or desert. Again, this implies either the favor by which he loved and elected us to life from eternity (in which sense election is called "the election of grace" [Rom. 11:5], and we are said to be "predestinated to the praise of the glory of his grace" [Eph. 1:6], i.e., of his glorious grace) or that by which he regards us as graceful and accepted in the Son of his love (in which

sense, most especially, the apostle often invokes "grace and peace" upon the believers to whom he writes, i.e., both the favor and benevolence of God and its effects of every kind, which are signified by the word "peace," according to the Hebrew idiom). In the same sense, mention is made of the grace of God in Rom. 3:24, Lk. 1:30 and Tit. 3:7.

VIII. In the latter sense, grace (taken effectively) indicates all the gifts (*charismata*) of the Holy Spirit gratuitously given to us by God: whether ordinary—of faith, hope and love—for each one's salvation bestowed upon us in calling, conversion and sanctification (in which sense the word "grace" is used in 1 Cor. 15:10 and Eph. 2:7, 8); or extraordinary and miraculous—for the common edification of the whole church (which are designated by the name of grace in 1 Cor. 12:4, 7, 8 and Eph. 4:7). The Scholastics were accustomed to calling the latter gifts by the name of grace gratuitously given (*gratiae gratis datae*), but the others by the name of grace making acceptable (*gratiae gratum facientis*). But this is false both because the ordinary gifts no less than the others are gratuitously given and because they cannot make us acceptable to God (since this is the effect of the sole grace and righteousness of Christ imputed to us). Therefore grace making acceptable with more propriety implies the benevolence of God towards us by which (not from our merit, but by his gratuitous love) he makes us acceptable in Christ. By grace gratuitously given are indicated all the gifts gratuitously conferred on us through the Holy Spirit. And this grace in reference to the variety of its acts is distinguished into operating or preventing (which moves the will to will) and cooperating and subsequent (which effects the performance of the volition). We will treat the latter in the proper place.

IX. Again, grace is distributed into decretive and executive. The former denotes the eternal purpose of God concerning the electing of us before the foundations of the world were laid. The latter embraces the universal dispensation of that wonderful mystery (according to the variety of degrees and times) which exercised itself towards the elect in redemption and in calling, justification, sanctification and other salutary effects (which Paul alludes to in Eph. 1 and 2 Tim. 1:9, 10).

How mercy is to be ascribed to God.

X. Mercy attends upon the grace of God. For as the latter exercises itself about man as a sinner (granting the pardon of his sin) so the former is exercised about man as miserable (relieving his misery). This is properly ascribed to God not as signifying grief arising from the misery of another (as it is in men), but as indicating a prompt and disposed will to succor the miserable without any anguish or perturbation of mind.

XI. It does not spring from any external cause which usually excites this effect in men (as the tie of blood, of friendship, the company of misery, imbecility of age, sex, etc.). Rather it springs from his goodness alone (as he loves to communicate himself to the creature and as he does not refrain from succoring the miserable). Indeed it requires misery in the object, but only as holding the relation of condition and quality and not of a cause. So freely is it occupied about it, that it can exert or not exert itself without injury to anyone. Hence it is said "he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy" (Rom. 9:18).

General and special.

XII. Mercy is commonly considered as twofold: the one general by which God succors all creatures subjected to any misery (Ps. 104:27); the other special by which he has compassion on his own, electing out of the mass of fallen men certain ones to be saved through Christ (who are, therefore, called "vessels of mercy"). The former is temporal, occupied only with secular things (*ta biōtika*) and the good of this life; but the latter is saving and eternal, blessing us with the possession of salvation and of eternal life.

XIII. The magnitude of his mercy may be collected from various sources: (1) with regard to the principle of pitying, (viz., God who, perfectly happy in himself and in want of nothing, yet moved by his good pleasure [*eudokia*] alone, condescended to have mercy upon us); (2) with regard to the objects (i.e., men upon whom he takes pity who not only deserved nothing, but are totally unworthy of this favor as sinners and enemies of God); (3) with regard to the mode and effects because he pardons our innumerable sins, removes eternal misery from us and bestows an infinite and eternal good (to wit, life and salvation); (4) with regard to duration because it is eternal (*chmd 'vlm*, Is. 54:8; Hos. 2:19; Lam. 3:22; Lk. 1:55*). Hence it is to be opposed: (a) to the severity of the divine justice, in which sense it is said "to rejoice against judgment" (Jam. 2:13); (b) to the number and heinousness of sins (Mic. 7:18); "For where sin abounded, grace did much more abound" (Rom. 5:20), and "God hath concluded all in sin, that he might have mercy upon all" (Rom. 11:32*); (c) to the multitude of miseries and temptations because there is not one so great from which the supreme mercy of God, according to his inexpressible riches, does not free us (Ps. 103:8; Eph. 2:4, 5); (d) to the terror of death and the divine judgment because in that decisive day all the pious will obtain mercy (2 Tim. 1:18).

XIV. Although the mercy of God is most ample and manifold with regard to the effects which are innumerable (in which sense he is called "abundantly merciful" [*polyeleos*, Ps. 51:1; 1 Pet. 1:3], *oiktirmoi* [i.e., commiseration and bowels of compassion are ascribed to God, Rom. 12:1]), yet it has its own objects and vessels into which it is poured out (viz., the elect and believers upon whom he determined to have mercy from eternity, who are distinguished from others whom he decreed to pass by and are therefore called "vessels of wrath fitted to destruction," Rom. 9:22). It is an asylum for the penitent and pious, but not a refuge for the impenitent and impious.

TWENTY-FIRST QUESTION: THE POWER OF GOD

What is the omnipotence of God, and does it extend to those things which imply a contradiction? We deny.

I. The power of God (the executing principle of the divine operations) is nothing other than the divine essence itself productive outwardly (through which he is conceived as able to do whatsoever he wills or can will). Here (before all things) this comes to be distinguished from such a power or *exousia* as implies the right and authority to do anything, while the power of which we speak indicates in its conception only the force and faculty of acting.

Statement of the question.

II. It is not queried whether passive power (which is the principle of suffering from another) may be granted in God. Since this cannot be supposed without imperfection and change, it is evident that it should be removed far from him. Nor if the generation of the Son or the spiration of the Spirit is expressed in passive terms, does it immediately follow that there is in God passive power (since this denotes a mere relation [*schesin*] to the persons generating and spirating). But we treat only of the active power, the principle of acting on another.

III. The question does not concern the actual and ordinate power according to which God actually and irresistibly does whatsoever he wills to do, yet in the time and manner which seems best to him: "Our God is in the heavens; he hath done whatsoever he pleased" (Ps. 115:3). With regard to this, it is well said that from the actual power to the work or effect the consequence holds good, but concerning the absolute (through which he is conceived as able to do more than he really does, viz., those things which are not repugnant to his most perfect nature or imply no contradiction, through which God could have raised up from stones children to Abraham [Mt. 3:9] and sent twelve legions of angels to Christ [Mt. 26:53]). With regard to the latter, we must remark that from the absolute power to the work, the consequence does not hold good because God can do many more things than he actually does.

IV. Although power and will do not really differ, it does not follow that the power is not more extended than the actual volition itself. As the actual volition answers to the actual power (through which he does whatsoever he wills), so the faculty or possibility of willing ought to answer to the absolute power (through which God is conceived to be able to do whatsoever he can will).

V. Some of our theologians appear to reject the absolute power as a profane and detestable invention (as Calvin, ICR 3.23.2, p. 950). They understand this not absolutely, but relatively, with regard to the abuse of the Scholastics who deduced from it many monstrous doctrines. The latter suggested the nature of absolute power consisted in this—that God can do whatever can be imagined by us whether good or evil, contradictory or not: for instance, that he could lie and sin; that he could do what would be repugnant to the nature of things. Calvin rightly denies this absolute power because it would not belong to power and virtue, but to impotency and imperfection. But he was unwilling to deny that God (by absolute power) can do more things than he really does by his actual power.

In how many senses "possible" and "impossible" are used.

VI. The object of God's power is nothing other than the possible, i.e., whatever is not repugnant to be done (as the object of his omniscience is the knowable). But the impossible falls not under the omnipotence of God, not from a defect in his power, but from a defect in the possibility of the thing because it involves in its conception contradictory predicates (as vision, although it might be infinite, could be extended only to visibles, not to audibles).

VII. Impossible and possible are used in three ways: (1) supernaturally; (2) naturally; (3) morally. The impossible supernaturally is what cannot be made even by the divine power (as a sensitive stone, an irrational man). The possible supernaturally is what can take place at least divinely (as the resurrection of the dead). The naturally impossible is what cannot be done by the powers of nature

and second causes, but yet can be done by supernatural power (as the creation of a world, the conception of a virgin, etc.). But the naturally possible is that which does not exceed the powers of finite nature. The morally impossible is what cannot be done according to the laws of holiness; but the morally possible is what is agreeable to the laws of virtue. God can indeed do the naturally impossible, but not what is said to be such either morally or supernaturally.

VIII. The impossible to nature with respect to second causes, i.e., which surpasses the usual and customary course of nature (as for the sun to stand still, for fire not to burn) differs from the impossible by nature, i.e., which is repugnant to the nature of a thing with respect to all causes. When it is said that the impossible does not fall under the power of God, it is understood in the second sense not in the first; for otherwise what is impossible with men is possible with God.

IX. The impossible is so either on the part of the thing (repugnant to its nature) or on the part of God (because he cannot do it). Not that it is absolutely impossible in itself because it can be done by others (and often is done), but because it cannot fall on God (for example, to lie, to sin, to die—things not impossible absolutely in themselves, but with respect to God). Whatever implies any defect or imperfection (whether moral—such as a lie, sin, the denial of himself [Heb. 6:18; 2 Tim. 2:13; Jam. 1:13, 14]; or physical—such as death or corruption) cannot fall on him because he is omnipotent. As Augustine excellently notes: "God is omnipotent and since he is omnipotent he cannot die, nor be deceived, nor deny himself. He cannot do many things, and yet he is omnipotent; and he is therefore omnipotent because he cannot do these things, for if he could die he would not be omnipotent" (*The Creed [De symbolo: sermo ad catechumenos]* 1 [FC 27:290; PL 40.627]). "The power of God is not diminished when it is said that he cannot die and be deceived; for so he cannot do it that if he could, he would have rather the less power. Rightly, indeed, is he called omnipotent who yet cannot die and be deceived for he is called omnipotent by doing what he wills, not by suffering what he does not will" (CG 5.10 [FC 8:263; PL 41.152]).

X. Hence is evident what must be determined concerning the object of God's power (viz., that it is not all which can in any way be conceived or imagined; since many false things and evil things and things which cannot be are conceived of; nor even only that which God wills, for that God can do many more things than he wills, the thing itself exclaims and Scripture expressly teaches [Mt. 26:53; Mt. 3:9]). Rather it is all that which is not repugnant, both on the part of the thing and on the part of God (i.e., what can be done and what God can do).

XI. Hence we gather what must be judged concerning contradictories; for that is said to be contradictory which is logically impossible, i.e., which has a repugnancy and includes contradictory predicates (for example, a corporeal God, an irrational man). Now a repugnance may be immediate and explicit when the terms are explicitly contradictory (for example, a deed undone, a man not man). Or it may be mediate and implicit when the repugnant terms only virtually and implicitly include a contradiction (for example, when inseparable properties are denied or contrary predicates are affirmed of the subject—as God corporeal and mortal, man not risible, the body not extended, accident not inherent). For such things involve contradictory predicates which strike against this first principle of indubitable truth (i.e., "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time").

Contradictories do not fall under the power of God.

XII. That such things do not fall under God's power is evident: (1) because impossibilities cannot be done by him and contradictories are impossible because they are incompossible; for a contradiction is of eternal disjunction and to affirm and to deny, to be and not to be are eternally opposed; (2) the power of God is concerned with being (i.e., what can be); but a contradiction is a non-entity; (3) if he could perform contradictories, he could make the same thing to be and not be at the same time so that two contradictory propositions might be true at the same time; (4) then evidently nothing would be impossible any more because there would be nothing greater than that which contradicts.

Sources of explanation.

XIII. Now although his power is not extended to contradictories, its infinity must not therefore be considered as limited. The power of every agent must be estimated from its proper object. Now the proper object of divine power is that which is not repugnant. Therefore when he is said to be omnipotent or able to do all things, the word "all things" distributes only entities, under which impossible and contradictory things are not contained.

XIV. God can indeed do things which are above man's reason because he is able to do above all that we ask or think (Eph. 3:20), but not things contrary to reason. If he can do things which are impossible to men (i.e., surpassing human strength), it does not immediately follow that he can do things impossible with the reason (i.e., repugnant to reason). Indeed it is true that the divine surpasses our logical and ratiocinative intellect, but it cannot be thence inferred that God can do those things which in our logic imply a contradiction. For although our right reason may fail in an equalizing (*adaequatione*) of divine truth (so as not to take in the whole), yet it contains nothing contrary to that truth.

XV. It is one thing to say that God can do more than we can understand and our mind conceive. It is another to say that he can do things which imply a contradiction. The former our theologians have taught in accordance with Scripture, but not the latter (which they have constantly denied without any fear of limiting the divine power).

XVI. With God no word or thing (which can have the relation of true being) is impossible (Lk. 1:37). But that which is contradictory is not such; rather it is a nothing and a non-entity.

XVII. To do contraries is one thing; to do contradictories another. God can do the former, but not the latter. If God had constituted the nature of things differently and had implanted in us other ideas of things, he might indeed do things diverse and contrary, but not contradictory. Nor would that first principle be false, for it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time (which is the true foundation of contradiction).

XVIII. God could have made the past not to be the past in the divided sense and before it was past; but in the compound sense, he cannot make what is past to be not past because it is no less impossible for a thing to have been and not to have been at the same time than for it to be and not to be.

XIX. Although we assert that God cannot do certain things, we ought not therefore to be considered as denying his omnipotence (as we are charged by the papists and Lutherans). For we understand this only of those things implying a

contradiction and arguing some fault or imperfection in the first cause; to do such things would be a proof of impotence, not of power. Nor can the power of God be convicted of impotence for not being able to do things impossible anymore than the vision because it cannot see sounds or the hearing because it cannot hear colors. Now we reckon those things to be contradictory which we deny that God can do (as that accidents can subsist without subjects, that any body can be illocal or everywhere [*polytopon*]).

XX. What John says (that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham, Mt. 3:9) does not prove that God can do contradictories. It only rebukes the vainglory of the Jews and the hope of impunity on account of the holiness of their ancestors and the supposed dignity of the nation by declaring that if they were destroyed God could miraculously father another people to himself from stones to be the sons of Abraham (not by generation but by imitation). Now this locution can be understood either figuratively of stones, not physically but ethically (i.e., of the foreign nations which worshipped stones and are compared with them in Scripture); or literally in this sense—if you should all miserably perish, yet God will not be false to his promises, nor will a posterity be wanting to Abraham. As he formed Adam from the earth, so from these stones he is able to raise up unto Abraham children, not carnal, but spiritual; or proverbially and hyperbolically—as it is said that the stones would cry out (Lk. 19:40) to intimate that God could, by extraordinary means and beyond the course of nature, collect a people for himself. Thus absolute power is here intimated (to wit, a power surpassing the constituted order in nature), but not actual power which observes and follows that order.

XXI. Although all the works of God are finite (nor can anything infinite in act and properly so called be done by him), the omnipotence of God is not therefore limited because it does not cease to be infinite (both with respect to essence, with which it is interchangable, and with respect to the mode of operation, which ought to be infinite in finite works—whether on account of the infinite distance between being and nothing or because an infinite agent ought necessarily to be concluded, to which nothing upon which it may act is presupposed; and with respect to the objects which can be called infinite, not in act, but in power).

XXII. God exercises this infinite power either mediately (by the intervention of second causes, which he uses as instruments of operation) or immediately (when he operates through himself without other causes). In the former sense, he exerts his power in a finite degree because he cannot communicate his virtue to a creature unless in a finite degree of which the creature is capable (for example, when God exerts his power in the nourishment of man by food). In the latter sense, he exerts it in an infinite manner because he alone operates (as when he exerts his power in the conversion of man).

XXIII. Although the impossibility of a thing arises more on the part of the thing (on account of the repugnancy of terms) than on the part of God (in which not any impotence, but rather the highest power and perfection is indicated), yet nothing is impossible on the part of the thing which is not also so on the part of God (as whatever is said to be possible is not so called simply on the part of the thing, as if it had an intrinsic entity in itself from eternity [according to the erroneous opinion of some], but on the part of God and with respect to the power of the agent, inasmuch as that is said to be possible which the first agent can produce).

XXIV. If God could make an infinite in actual extension and number, it would be such as to have an infinite actual extension or a really infinite number. Thus would be granted more infinites in act and reality; yea, something of so great extension or of such a number, as that God could not add to it either a unit or one cubit, since nothing can be added to that which is actually infinite (which strikes everyone as most absurd). Indeed, to suppose any creature to be infinite in act or extension or number is as great a contradiction as for a creature to be eternal and not made.

XXV. This proposition that God can deceive if he will (although he neither will nor can will it), by whatever interpretation softened, is deservedly rejected as too crude and dangerous. Yea it is openly repugnant also to the truth delivered in Scripture concerning God. For if God can deceive, he can also lie and sin if he so willed (which is opposed to his most perfect truth and holiness). For a long time, this concept was condemned therefore as blasphemous among the Scholastics. To deceive another by words, what else is it than to lie or to speak falsely? Therefore if God can deceive by words, he can also lie (which is expressly repugnant to Scripture [Tit. 1:2; Heb. 6:18] and to the nature of God, in which there can be neither ignorance nor error of judgment nor malice nor any such thing from which a lie could take its origin). Yea, if we could say this, I shudder to relate, we could also say that God could be made not God; if God can deceive, he can sin; if he can sin, he can become not God because he who sins (or can sin) is not God. (2) God through his own goodness, holiness and justice cannot be said to be able to do what is evil, unjust and impure, even if he willed. Therefore by the same consequence, he cannot be said to be able to deceive (on account of his immutable truth, which must be ascribed to God even before every conception of the will). (3) God cannot do that which he cannot will; for he cannot do anything without his will, since the will deduces power into act and whatever God can do, that he can also will to be done (unless we maintain that a thing may be said to be possible and impossible at the same time, to the same most simple and most true God—which is absurd [*asystaton*]). Now no one but an atheist will deny that God cannot will to deceive. (4) If God can deceive if he will, he could oblige us, if he willed, to believe a lie and that too with divine faith on account of his authority. (5) God cannot perform contradictions. Therefore he cannot deceive if he will. For that God can deceive is that he can be untrue and so not God. (6) If he can deceive, our faith in the Scriptures would always be wavering. If the Scriptures were given by a God who can deceive, how could we persuade an atheist that he had not deceived? To no purpose would you say that he did not will to deceive, for how could he be assured of this? Not from Scripture (which expressly says this) because he could immediately reply, this was said by that God who can deceive, and how do we know that he has not here given the effect which he is said to be able to give? Not from the nature of God because it is not repugnant to God's nature to give that effect which he has the power to give. In vain also would you say that it is repugnant to his nature to will to effect it because if it is not repugnant to his nature to be able to perform it, neither will it be repugnant to his nature to be able to will to perform it.

XXVI. Although the power of God extends itself to more things than his will in the exercised act (because he can do many more things than those which he actually wills are future); yet it is not more widely extended than the will in the

signified act (i.e., God cannot do more than he can will since both his power and will form the law to himself from his nature).

XXVII. It is one thing for God to decree the commission of an error by a creature and to permit a creature to be deceived, but another for him to be able immediately by himself to deceive anyone. The former can justly be done and is in fact done by God, but not the latter, which involves the relation of sin.

XXVIII. Although it may with propriety be said that God can do anything if he wills (with respect to those things which he cannot will from the hypothesis of his immutable decree because such an operation does not involve any repugnancy to the nature of God), this cannot be said with the same truth in relation to those things which he cannot will through his goodness and justice because such things are not only impossible from hypothesis with respect to the decree, but absolutely and in themselves on account of the repugnance which they bespeak to the nature of God.

Twenty-Second Question: The Dominion and Sovereignty of God

What is the dominion of God, and of how many kinds? May an absolute and ordinate right be granted?

The foundation of God's dominion.

I. With the power of God (treated of in the preceding question) ought always to be connected his sovereignty from which the right and authority of doing what he does belongs to him. But sovereignty arises from his dominion, concerning which this question is now taken up.

II. That God is Lord of heaven and of earth (if the Scriptures themselves did not so often testify), the very nature of God (which is independent, most perfect and the cause of all things) would evince. Its foundation is considered to be twofold: (1) preeminence (*hyperochē*) and eminence of nature; (2) amplitude and excellence of beneficence. As among men, there are two foundations of lawful dominion. First, eminence of power above others, for it is in accordance with the nature of things that the superior and more excellent should have dominion over the inferior and more ignoble (whence Aristotle expressly asserts if anyone could be found far surpassing other mortals in all virtues, he should be constituted king over all the rest). Second is beneficence by which one man acquires a right over another. He is therefore lord because he is kind. Since, then, God is established in the highest preeminence (*hyperochē*) and has bestowed (and every day bestows) upon his creatures as his work innumerable blessings, he is most justly called the Lord of all, as the artificer is lord of his own work.

How the natural and economical dominion differ.

III. That dominion is called natural and essential to distinguish it from the economical which belongs to Christ (Phil. 2:9) and differs from it in many respects: (1) with regard to principle and origin the former is called natural, *kata physin* (because given by no one), but the latter is called economical and *kata thesin* (because given by another, viz., by the Father—"All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth," Mt. 28:18*); (2) with regard to the foundation. The former is founded upon the decree of providence by which he predetermined all things and events; but the latter upon the decree of predes-

tination according to which he predestinated us to adoption through Jesus Christ (Eph. 1:5). (3) With regard to the objects—the kingdom of nature is universal, embracing all creatures; the kingdom of grace is especially terminated on the church, whence by a peculiar reason he may be called the King and Lord of the church (for although he exercises his power and justice also over the wicked themselves who are in subjection to him and whom he rules and breaks with a rod of iron [Ps. 2:9], yet he especially reigns in the elect and believers through grace). (4) With regard to their effects; for the effects of divine providence in the natural kingdom are common and diffused over all creatures although in different ways; but the effects of the kingdom of grace are saving benefits peculiar to the elect alone—calling, adoption, justification, sanctification, etc. (5) With regard to administration; that is, exercised by Christ as God together with the Father and the Holy Spirit—whence it is called essential because common to the whole divine essence; but this is exercised by him as Mediator and God-man (*theanthrōpō*)—whence it is called personal because it pertains to the person of the Son and is appointed to his economy. (6) With regard to duration; that is eternal and immutable (Ps. 145:13). But this will have an end, at least as to mode, because he will deliver up the kingdom to God the Father (1 Cor. 15:24).

IV. The principal property of God's dominion is that it is not only universal, but also absolute and unlimited. For as God is an independent and truly self-powerful (*autexousios*) being, so he is evidently irresponsible (*anypeuthynos*), liable to no censure or judgment (Job 9:12; Dan. 4:25) who can do with his own what he will (Mt. 20:15) and with whom no one can contend or say to him, why hast thou done this? although the reason of his works and judgments may be hidden from us (Job 33:13): "Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?" (Rom. 9:20, 21).

Absolute and ordinate right.

V. Hence arose the distinction of God's right into absolute and ordinate; that is, the dominion and sovereignty which God holds over all his creatures of determining concerning them at pleasure without injustice. Its foundation is double. The first is the excellence of his nature above all creatures, for that supreme preeminence (*hyperchē*) which he possesses over all things conciliates for him the highest sovereignty. The other is the dependence of all creatures upon him, both in being and in operation (Act 17:24), through which, as he is the first from whom all things proceed, so he must also be the last to whom they should be referred (Rom. 11:36).

VI. The ordinate right is the order or reason of justice which God has declared to us by the word of the law and gospel, both as to the duty of man in both covenants (viz., works and faith), and as to the promise and threat annexed to it in life and death, in salvation and condemnation. Its foundation is the covenant entered into with the creature or the will of God manifested to us by the external word of the law and gospel. Hence it has place in the ordinary dispensation of God towards men; but the other in the extraordinary (which God can indeed exercise without impairing his justice, but which nevertheless he very rarely does exercise).

VII. The proof of both occurs in predestination. For in election it belongs to the absolute right that God, according to his most free good pleasure, destines sinful and guilty men to salvation; and although all are equal, yet he elects this

one instead of another, as in the case with Esau and Jacob, concerning which the apostle says: "the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth; it was said the elder shall serve the younger" (Rom. 9:11, 12*). Hence it is immediately added, "He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth" (Rom. 9:18). But it favors the ordinate, both that he is gracious to sinners and saves them not without the satisfaction of Christ (Rom. 3:25), and that he rewards faith and works graciously according to his promise (2 Thess. 1:5-7). In reprobation, the absolute right is beheld in this—that although all men are equal, yet he passes by this one instead of another, acting from his good pleasure (*eudokia*) alone; not as Judge, but as an autocrat (*autokratōr*) and Lord who has the power to make a vessel unto honor and unto dishonor (Rom. 9:21; Mt. 11:26). But the ordinate is found in this—that he reprobates and condemns no one except on account of sin (Rom. 1:32).

VIII. Although the absolute right is not revealed by the law, it must not therefore be held as contrary to the law. It is above and beyond the law, but not against it; nor moreover can it be called unjust, inasmuch as it is not conformed to the law because (as was proved before) the adequate rule of justice is not the law alone, but partly the nature of God and partly his will. Thus it is one thing to act from the rule of ordinary justice, but another from a superior order (viz., from an autocratic right, to which justice is not repugnant but subordinated). So a prince in pardoning crimes, acts not from justice as a judge, but from clemency as lord and prince (who can dispense with the law instituted by himself). So God in the exercise of this absolute right, although he can do nothing opposed to his justice, yet does not act from it, but from the most free good pleasure belonging to him as supreme Lord.

IX. The extent of the absolute right of God must not be curiously searched into, much less rashly defined; nor is it in our power or place to put any limits either to the power or the sovereignty of God. If no one could endure a little worm disputing the authority of men and setting bounds to it, how much less is this to be suffered in a man who, compared with God, is far more insignificant than a worm? Therefore, it becomes us to dismiss the curious and useless questions of the Scholastics, who by a rash presumption undertake to define the incomprehensible secrets of God's majesty. Only two things are important for us to remember here: on the one hand, that the right of God is supreme and absolute, and above what we can either think or speak, and that he can do with his own what he pleases; and on the other, that it is always holy and agreeable to the most perfect nature of God, so that in its use he does nothing in opposition to his wisdom, goodness and holiness.

X. When the Scriptures speak of the absolute right (as Rom. 9 and Job 33, 42*), they do not so much mean what God actually does as what he can do in order that thus the mouth of the obstinate and impudent (who jeer at the liberty of God) may be stopped.

Natural and free right.

XI. Here belongs the distinction of the right of God into natural and free. The former is founded on the very nature of God, but this depends upon his pleasure and will; that is eternal and indispensable (whose contrary he cannot will without a contradiction), but this is positive and dispensable (whose opposite he could will without repugnancy). Thus it belongs to the natural

right that God cannot deny himself and give his glory to another; that the rational creature should obey and be under the law of God or pay its penalty; that God cannot but govern the world as long as it is a world and prescribe to the creature holy and just commands. For all these things are such that God cannot will their contraries without repugnancy. But to the free right belongs the permissions of sin, the bestowal of distinguishing grace, the institution of the symbolical and ceremonial law; for these are of such a nature that God could have willed or nilled them without detriment to his justice.

Twenty-Third Question: The Holy Trinity

What are the meanings of the words "essence," "substance," "subsistence," "person," "Trinity," homoousion *in this mystery; and may the church properly use them?*

I. The absolute consideration of God (as to his nature and attributes) begets the relative (as to the persons). Here we are occupied with the adorable mystery of the Trinity, which neither reason can comprehend nor example prove, but the authority of divine revelation alone proposes to be received by faith and adored with love.

II. As it can be prudently explained as to the fact (*to hoti*) from Scripture (because clearly delivered in it), not as to the wherefore (*to dioti*) or the how (*to pōs*) (incomprehensible [*akatalēpton*] to the angels themselves), the genuine sense and use of the words (usually employed to make it more easily understood) must be unfolded.

Essence.

III. First, here occurs the word *ousias* or "essence" and "nature" which denotes the whatness (*quidditatem*) of a thing and is often met with in Scripture, not only in the concrete when God is called *ho ōn* (Ex. 3:14; Rev. 1:4), but also in the abstract when deity (*theotēs*, Col. 2:9), nature (*physis*, Gal. 4:8), divine nature (*theia physis*, 2 Pet. 1:4) is attributed to God. The Hebrew word *twshyh* applies here; it designates the real essence (*tēn ontōs ousian*, ?Job 12:16).

Substance.

IV. (2) Substance is attributed to God by the fathers not as it is called from standing under the accidents (which do not fall on God), but from subsisting (because he subsists through and from himself). But we must notice here that the ancients sometimes stand opposed to each other and do not use the word substance in the same manner. Some take substance from subsistence such as Hilary (of Poitiers) who acknowledges "three substances in the deity" (*On the Councils* 32 [NPNF2, 9:13; PL 10.504]). Others evidently taking substance for nature and essence acknowledge only one and deny that there are three (such as Augustine, *The Trinity* 5.9 [FC 45:187-88; PL 42.917-18]; Tertullian, *Against Praxeas* [ANF 3:597-627] and others).

Subsistence.

V. (3) Hence the word "subsistence" (called by the Greeks *hyparxis*) marks a mode of subsisting (*tropos hyparxeōs*) or personality. Now to subsist differs from to exist. To exist means that a thing actually is without its causes in the nature of things, which applies to accidents no less than to substances; but to subsist means a mode of existing proper to substances. Now subsistence is commonly held to be twofold: the

one by which it is consituted a substance in the being of a substance; the other which is constituted in the being of a suppositum. The former is usually explained by independence from the subject; it belongs to all substances, incomplete as well as complete; the latter is usually explained by incommunication or incommunicability, inasmuch as the singular substance is neither a part nor an adjunct of another; if it is intellectual, it is called a person. The former is the very existence of the substance, but the latter is said to superadd some mode to the existence of the singular substance (which mode is called entitative, ultimately terminating and completing the substantial nature and giving to it incommunicability, so that to subsist in this sense belongs to a singular nature ultimately completed and incommunicable). Thus the humanity of Christ has the former subsistence by which it is constituted in the being of a substance because it is a true substance independent of the subject, but not the latter (which constitutes a suppositum) because it is not a human suppositum, since it is united with and adjoined to the word to constitute the God-man (*theanthrōpou*). But here the word "subsistence" is used in the latter, not in the former sense.

Hypostasis.

VI. (4) To designate this subsistence the Greeks employed the word *hypostaseōs*, which formerly gave occasion to great disturbances in the church on account of the equivocal sense of the word. For among the fathers, it is taken either generically and wisely for the very substance of a thing. Thus the ancient Romans and Africans made no distinction between essence and hypostasis. Hence the Synod of Sardica (cf. "Synodica Concilii Sardicensis," in Mansi, 6:1215-16) declares it to be heretical to assert three hypostases, but orthodox to assert only one. Athanasius writes, "Hypostasis is substance and means nothing else than that which exists" (*hypostasis ousia estin, kai ouden allo sēmainei, ē auto to on, Letter to the Bishops of Africa* 4 [NPNF2, 4:490; PG 26.1035]). This was also the opinion of Jerome who would not suffer the mention of three hypostases, lest three divine essences, and so three Gods might be implied (*Letter 15*, "To Pope Damasus" [NPNF2, 6:19]). Or it is taken strictly for the subsistence of a thing and a *suppositum* (as the Council of Alexandria [A.D. 362*] against the Sabellians determined that one essence [*ousian*] could be held, yet three hypostases [*hypostaseis*]—see Basil, *Letter 38*, "To his Brother Gregory" [NPNF2, 8:137-41]). Hence the reconciliation is easily made between the apparently contradictory passages of the fathers, as Athanasius showed in the Council of Alexandria (cf. "Epistola Synodica Concilii Alexandrini," in Mansi, 3:350) of which he was president. He prudently and happily put a stop to the sharp controversy arising from this cause between Eastern and Western parties, the Greeks and Latins (which Gregory Nazianzus notices in his *Oration 21*, "On the Great Athanasius" [NPNF2, 7:269-80]). According to the testimony of Augustine, they were accustomed to say *mian ousian, treis hypostaseis*, viz., "one essence, three subsistences" (*The Trinity* 5.8 [FC 45:187; PL 42.917]). But afterwards, lest the ambiguity of the word might give occasion to error (as Aquinas remarks, ST, I, Q. 29, Art. 2, p. 157), the opinion of the Greeks (who use *hypostasin* for subsistence) obtained, and this is now the common opinion received by all. Further, Scripture appears to precede us here, for in comparing the person of the Son with the person of the Father (whose image he bears), it calls him "the express image" of the subsistence of the Father (Heb. 1:3).

Person.

VII. (5) Hence it is evident what must be understood by the word "person." That which among the Greeks is called "hypostasis" is with the Latins called *persona*. It is not as the word is drawn from the stage denoting the mask of players (according to Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 5.7 [Loeb, 1:398-99]), where actors, masked, are called *personati;* or when it is taken from some quality or external appearance which adds nothing to the importance of a cause—in which sense a judge ought not in a trial to regard the person of the rich above that of the poor and respect of persons [*prosōpolēpsia*] is denied of God; or for some office and function, as when one is said to put off the person of judge and to put on that of an accuser. But rather properly and strictly, it denotes an intellectual *suppositum*, as it is used in 2 Cor. 1:11 (and constantly among lawyers, when an action is divided into the thing or person).

VIII. The word "person" is properly concrete and not abstract. Besides the form (which is personality), it also marks the subject with the form from which it is denominated. However, sometimes it is taken abstractly. Hence it happens that the divine persons come to be considered in two ways: either in the concrete, as when the Son is said to be *hyparchein* ("to be in the form of God," Phil. 2:6); or in the abstract when he is called "the express image of the person of the Father," Heb. 1:3). In the latter sense, it is contradistinguished from the essence as the mode of a thing. In the former sense, it includes the essence with the mode. Hence arose a twofold definition of a divine person: one abstractive, employed by our Calvin (ICR 1.13.6, p. 128) defining a person to be a "subsistence in the essence of God by which (related to others) he is distinguished by an incommunicable property"—having followed here Justin and John of Damascus who called it *tropon hyparxeōs* ("a mode of subsisting") (cf. [Pseudo-] Justin Martyr, *Quaestiones et Responsiones ad orthodoxos*, Q. 139 [488C] in *Corpus apologetarum Christianorm* [ed. J. Otto], 5:224, 225; John of Damascus, *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 1.8 [NPNF2, 9:8; PG 94.816, 818], cf. also his *Contra Jacobitas* 52 [PG 94.1461]); the other concretive, given by Melancthon and Ursinus, who define a person as "the individual that subsists, is living, intelligent, is not sustained by another, nor is a part of another." The former expresses more fully the perfection of the divine persons; the latter more clearly sets forth the truth of their subsistence.

Trinity.

IX. (6) The word "Trinity" (proper to this mystery) follows. Although not existing in Scripture in the abstract, it is nevertheless found in the concrete (1 Jn. 5:7), so that there was no necessity for the papists to derive it from tradition to betray the cause of faith to heretics, since Bellarmine himself ("De Christo," 2.5 in *Opera* [1856], 1:205-6) confessed that the Trinity can evidently be deduced from Scripture. And although the Greek word *Trias* may seem from the first imposition of the name to denote only the number three, yet this word (like many others) was consecrated by ecclesiastical custom and applied to this mystery alone by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*). "Trinity" however is the appropriate word, not "triplicity," which implies a multiplication of essence. God, therefore, is said to be triune (*trinus*), not triple because there are three persons, but only one numerical essence.

Homoousion.

X. (7) After the word "Trinity," we must explain *to homoousion*, the subject of so many controversies in the ancient church. The origin of the word is to be traced to the Arian heresy. Arius always endeavored to escape in various ways by confessing that Christ was God (but created before the world; yea, begotten, possessed

of the divine essence, yet participated and dependent). At length the orthodox, to cut off every way of escape for him, declared in the Council of Nicea that the Son was *homoousion* (i.e., of the same nature and essence with the Father). No one but a stranger to ecclesiastical history is ignorant of the great controversies springing from this word. For example, the Arians accused the orthodox of introducing a recent invention of the Nicene fathers, altogether unknown to the ancients (whom, moreover, they called Homoousians). Nevertheless, Athanasius (who often used this word before the rise of the Arian heresy) demonstrated this to be false from Dionysius of Rome and Dionysius of Alexandria (cf. NPNF2, 4:167, 181, 473). But when the Arians saw that they were caught by this word (having recourse to fraud), they endeavored by the addition of a letter to destroy the entire force of it, acknowledging the Son to be *homoiousion*, i.e., of a similar substance with the Father, but not *homoousion* (as Theodoret says, *Ecclesiastical History* 2.16*-18 [NPNF2, 3:82-84; PG 82.1049-58] and 5.21+). Hence it happened that in the Council of Ariminum/Rimini (A.D. 359) (cf. Sozomen, *Ecclesiastical History* 4.17 [NPNF2, 2:312]), the more simple ones (deceived by the Arians) agreed to put the word *homoiousion* in the place of *homoousion*. Hence the Arians boasted that the Catholics had passed over to their side, but the others constantly resisted. Athanasius detected the subterfuge and taught that there was not a similar, but the same essence in the Father and Son.

XI. Curcellaeus, who vigorously attacks the word *homoousion*, falsely maintains that it refers to a "specific" and not "numerical unity" so that the essence in the Father and Son may be said to be one in species indeed, but not one and the same in number (as Peter and John may properly be said to be *homoousioi* because they are *homoeideis*, partakers of the same specific essence). If the fathers only meant a specific unity, they would have introduced Tritheism, holding not only to three persons, but to three diverse numerical essences in the three persons (as three human persons mean three men). Again, there would be nothing strange and incomprehensible (*akatalēpton*) in this mystery (which all men confess) because every day we see that very thing among men. Third, since human nature is divisible, it can indeed remain the same in species when propagated by generation, although it is not the same in number because it detaches a certain part of its substance, which passes over to the begotten. This is not so with the divine, which is indivisible. For either it cannot be communicated or the same numerically can be communicated. Therefore either Christ is not the Son of God or he ought to have the same numerical essence communicated to him. But this will be more fully proved hereafter.

XII. The word *homoousion* is used rather than *monoousion* or *tautoousion;* not that the former demonstrates a specific and the latter a numerical unity, but because the last two can be used consistently with the only one hypostasis of Sabellius; for *monoousios* rather denotes him who has one singular essence, than him who is of the same essence with another or designates him whose nature and essence is so the only one, i.e., that there is nothing like him (as the sun is *monoousios* because it is the only one of its species, but the other heavenly bodies are called *homoousia* because they mutually possess the same nature, or one not very different). So God is *monoousios* (because the only one and having no partaker of his nature), numerically separated from his essence. Now the persons of the Trinity cannot be called *monoousioi* because they are three persons, not one

only. *Tautoousios* also is not free from ambiguity for it can designate him who has his essence from himself, not by communication from another (in which sense the Father alone would be *tautoousios* with respect to person); but *homoousion* denotes here more than one person (partakers of the same numerical essence).

Emperichōrēsis.

XIII. Here belongs the word *emperichōrēseōs* which the fathers frequently used and Curcellaeus rails at (as unwritten [*agraphon*], ambiguious and employed to signify a thing nowhere taught in Scripture). But that it was not used without reason to describe the intimate mutual union of the persons can be inferred not obscurely from Scripture itself when "the Son is said to be in the Father, and the Father in the Son" (Jn. 10:38; 14:11). They thought this mystery could not be better expressed than by the phrase *enallēlon emperichōrēsin* (i.e., a mutual intertwining or inexistence and immanence), so as to designate thus that union by which the divine persons embrace each other and permeate (if it is right to say so) each other. So that although always remaining distinct, yet they are never separated from each other, but always coexist; wherever one is, there the other also really is. And if believers are said to dwell in God and he in them (1 Jn. 3:24; Jn. 14:23) on account of the intimate presence of the Spirit (who is the strictest bond of their communion with God), does it not follow that such an *emperichōrēsis* can be attributed to them? There is the widest difference between the mystical union of believers with God and the divine union of the persons of the Trinity in nature, or of the human and divine natures in the person of Christ.

XIV. The words "property," "relation" and "notion" (used by the Scholastics) can have their use when understood in a sound sense. "Property" denotes the peculiar mode of subsisting and diacritical (*diakritikon*) character by which this or that person is constituted in his personal being and is distinguished from the others. "Relation," again, intimates the same property inasmuch as it indicates the relation (*schesin*) of one person to another. And "notion" designates the same character inasmuch as it signifies that one person is distinct from another (so as to be the index and mark of distinction between the persons). However some difference can be observed between them because notion has a wider extension than relation, and relation has a wider extension than property. For there are only three properties—paternity, filiation, procession; four relations—paternity, filiation, spiration (active and passive); and five notions—unbegottenness (*agennēsia*), paternity, filiation, spiration (active as well as passive).

XV. From a notion arise notional acts (frequently mentioned by theologians) properly to be distinguished from essential acts which flow from the essential properties and are terminated upon something external (which is essentially other than and diverse from God); hence they are common to the three persons. But the notional proceed from the personal properties, which belong to the persons singularly and are terminated upon an internal work such as generation and spiration.

Concerning the use of the words "Trinity," "person," etc.

XVI. The meaning of the words commonly used on this subject being explained, we must now say a few things concerning their use (i.e., whether it is lawful to use them in explaining this mystery). The occasion of the question arose from the importunity of heretics who, the more easily to get rid of the thing itself, endeavored to eliminate the words themselves from Scripture as new, foreign and having no authority. The Arians, Sabellians and other anti-Trinitarians pressed this against

the orthodox in their day—that the names *ousias*, *homoousios*, *hypostaseōs*, etc. did not occur in the Scriptures and so ought not to be admitted in the church. Arius asks, "Why is the word, of which neither the prophets nor the apostles make mention, added to the apostolic faith?" (*Vigilii Tapsensis Contra Arianos* 1.10 [PL 62.161]). Treading in their footsteps, the Socinians and the Arminians (who agree with them) in their turn oppose this, especially Curcellaeus who, in a special dissertation, labors to prove that the use of these words is neither useful, nor necessary. Therefore it is better "to return to the simplicity of the sacred writings, and reject from them all words invented by men, or at least compel no one hereafter to swear by them" ("Prima Dissertatio Theologica: De Vocibis Trinitatis," Section 11, *Opera Theologica* [1675], p. 816).

XVII. Verily if there was an agreement about the thing itself, we think there should be no anxiety about the words because it is not becoming for the theologian *nosein peri logomachias* ("to contend about words"). And in this sense must the words of our Calvin be understood (which have been so shamefully perverted by the papists and Lutherans): "O that the names of the Trinity, of the homoousia, etc. were buried, should only this faith be established among all, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God, yet that the Son is not the Father, nor the Spirit the Son, but that they are distinct from each other by some peculiarity" (ICR 1.13.5, p. 126). But it is often found that they who litigate more pertinaciously than others against the words, cherish a secret virus. It is sufficiently evident that those new corruptors of religion condemn the words adopted by the ancients for no other reason than that they are unwilling to receive the things designed by them. Knowing that with the words they might abolish the doctrine also, we therefore did right in retaining them and insist on their use being not only lawful, but also beneficial and necessary for repressing the pertinacity of heretics and for bringing them out of their lurking places.

Statement of the question.

XVIII. The question is not whether it is lawful to introduce into the church rashly and unnecessarily foreign and new words unauthorized by the Scriptures. All agree on this point, lest occasion of calumny be given to the adversaries, the seeds of dissension be sown in the church and the suspicion of singularity arise. Indeed often new things and recent doctrines are veiled under new words—applicable to which are the various dicta of the fathers which command the avoidance of the newness of words and freedom of expressions (cf. Augustine, CG 10.23 [FC 14:157-58] and Jerome, Letter 15, "To Pope Damasus" [NPNF2, 6:18-20, esp. p. 19]). But the question is whether it is lawful (under the exigency of some weighty reason) to enunciate inwritten (*engrapha*) doctrines by unwritten (*agraphois*) words for the plainer explication of the truth and the more complete refutation of errors.

XIX. The question is not whether the word of man is to be preferred to God's word, but whether it can be admitted for the elucidation of the latter in which the adversaries are accustomed to seek for hiding places. Indeed the question is whether we are bound to stick so tenaciously to the words of Scripture that in the explication of doctrines no others but them can be devised and used. This the adversaries maintain; we deny.

XX. The reasons are drawn: (1) from their utility which is manifold, whether for the richer explication of that mystery or for the stronger refutation of the

heresies opposed to it; (2) from necessity, because unless it were lawful to use words not to be found exactly (*autolexei*) in Scripture, we could not interpret it and apply it to uses both theoretical and practical. Thus it would be useless for instruction and correction, for the conviction and reproof of heretics because there never was anyone who did not attempt to confirm his errors by the Scriptures and did not think that they had some support in them. Hence whatever was sanctioned by the words of Scripture alone could be received by them and their error be all the while retained. Thus Sabellius did not deny that they were three—the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit—because Scripture says this; but he made one person of those three, calling them by various names by reason of diverse operation. Arius did not deny that Christ was God, but he understood him to be a factitious and dependent God. Socinus confesses Christ to be the Son of God, but with respect to office and power, not with respect to nature. He does not deny that he redeemed us by his blood, but improperly and metaphorically, not truly and meritoriously. So invariably heretics are accustomed to laud the Scriptures "speaking the same things, but thinking differently" (*homoia men lalountes, anomoia de phronountes*, as Irenaeus says in "Preface," *Against Heresies* 1 [ANF 1:315; PG 7.441]). Therefore it was a matter of Christian prudence to employ such words as would more clearly confirm the orthodox faith and so bind heretical perverseness as to allow no chance of escape anymore by an ambiguous and deceitful equivocation. (3) From parity, because in other articles, ecclesiastical terms are fitly employed (as "original sin" and "sacrament"). Why then can they not be lawfully used in this mystery?

XXI. (4) This was the mind of the ancients in using these words. Athanasius says, "It is always the custom of ecclesiastical discipline, if at any time new heretical doctrines arise, against the insolent changes of questions, to change the terminology, the things remaining immutably" (*Disputatio cum Ario coram Probo Judice*, libri 1; cf. Vigilii Tapsensis, *Contra Arianos* [PL 62.162]). Gregory Nazianzus says, "We must not contend spitefully about terms as long as the syllables lead to the same opinion" (*Oration* 39, "On the Holy Lights" [NPNF2, 7:355; PG 36.346]). "We confess that these terms were produced by the necessity of speaking, since there would be need of a copious disputation against the snares and errors of heretics" (Augustine, *The Trinity* 7.4 [FC 45:233; PL 42.941]). And Augustine again: "Against the impiety of the Arian heretics they introduced the new name homoousios, but did not signify a new thing by that name" ("Tractate 97," *On the Gospel of St. John* [NPNF1, 7:376; PL 35.1879]). Hence Thomas Aquinas says, "The necessity of disputing with heretics compelled them to invent new terms expressing the ancient faith" (ST, I, Q. 29, Art. 3, p. 158).

Sources of explanation.

XXII. "The form of sound words" spoken of by Paul (*hypotypōsis hygiainontōn logōn*, 2 Tim. 1:13) is not an external form of locution, so bound down to the words of Scripture that it would be unlawful to use even a syllable or word not found in Scripture. Otherwise sermons and comments on Scripture would be all wrong. Rather it denotes that method of teaching which does not depart from the intention of Scripture and the analogy of faith, and which rejoices not in the swelling arrogance of empty eloquence, but in the religious simplicity of true wisdom.

XXIII. It is one thing to speak of the mode of enunciating things; another to speak of the things themselves. When Paul forbids to teach otherwise (*heterodidaskalein*, 1 Tim. 6:3), he refers to the things themselves—that no one should teach other (*hetera*) things (i.e., doctrines alien from the truth and simplity of the gospel). But he does not speak of the mode of delivering, as if he thought it unlawful to use other words besides those inwritten (*engraphois*). For God did not give the church the gift of prophecy in vain; for its purpose is the interpretation of Scripture which would evidently have been useless if it were wrong to express in other words the things delivered in Scripture.

XXIV. A newness of words only differs from that which (with the words) introduces a newness of things. The one is useful and necessary for the elucidation of truth and the confutation of error; but the other is deceitful and deadly, smuggling in foreign doctrines under new and foreign words. Paul condemns the latter not the former when he orders us to avoid "profane and vain babblings" (*tas bebēlous kainophōnias*, 1 Tim. 6:20). Hence Augustine says, "The apostle does not say the newness of words must be avoided, but [he adds] profane; for there are doctrines of religion agreeing with the newness of words . . . the things themselves called by new names were before their names" ("Tractate 97," *On the Gospel of John* [NPNF1, 7:375-76; PL 35.1879]).

XXV. It is one thing under the penalty of anathema to obtrude words upon the church for her reception, but another to obtrude the things signified by the words. The latter can rightly be done, but not the former.

XXVI. Not to be in Scripture expressly and according to the letter (*kata to gramma*) differs from not being there equivalently and as to the thing signified (*kata to pragma*). The words "Trinity," "consubstantiality" (*homoousiou*), "inhabitation" (*perichōrēseōs*), "person" are not in Scripture in the former manner, but in the latter.

XXVII. Those words ought to be avoided which afford matter for strife per se in the church, but not those which only accidentally do so on account of the pertinacity of heretics (who attack the words in order to get rid of the things signified by them).

XXVIII. Although the Council of Alexandria (according to Socrates, *Ecclesiastical History* 3.7* [NPNF2, 2:81]) decreed that such terms should not be used in addresses to the people, yet it acknowledged that they might lawfully be employed in controversies when we have to do with skin-changing (*versipellibus*) heretics, who force us to it.

XXIX. The foundations of faith differ from its defenses: the former are built upon Scripture alone and are derived from it; the latter are drawn even from beyond Scripture to ward off the attacks of besiegers. The latter kind are the various words devised by theologians to guard against the fraud and unscrupulousness (*panourgian*) of heretics.

XXX. Concerning God, we must not speak except with God (i.e., nothing must be asserted except what he himself has asserted in his word as to the things themselves, but not therefore as to the words). Otherwise we could not speak of them in any other than the Hebrew language (in which God spoke).

TWENTY-FOURTH QUESTION

Is the mystery of the Trinity a fundamental article of faith? We affirm against the Socinians and Remonstrants.

I. Before discussing the truth of the mystery of the Trinity, we must premise some things concerning its necessity, not only against the Socinians (who directly deny it to be an article of faith), but also on account of the Remonstrants (who, although seeming to profess their belief of it, still deny it a place among the fundamental articles, so that the ignorance of it does not bring salvation into peril; as they not obscurely testify to this in "Apologia pro confessione sive declaratione . . . Remonstrantes," 3 in Episcopius, *Operum theologicorum* [1665], Pt. II, pp. 132-36; "Responsio Remonstratium . . . per quatuor Professores Leydenses," ibid., Pt. II p. 294); and Episcopius, "Institutiones theologicae," 4.34 in *Opera theologica* [1678], pp. 338-40). Thus they who would secretly subvert the truth of Christian doctrines oftentimes begin by agitating the question concerning their importance and necessity so that men, lulled into the sleep of security, may the more easily suffer themselves to be robbed of the truth and refuse to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints.

Statement of the question.

II. On the state of the question observe: (1) that the discussion concerns not only the negation, but the simple ignorance of this article. For certain things revealed in the word are of such a nature that without peril of salvation they can be unknown (although they cannot be denied without that peril). However not only the denial, but also the simple ignorance of the Trinity is damnable.

III. The question is not whether there ought to be an equal degree of this knowledge in all. For we confess it can be various and manifold: in some greater and fuller; in others less and more obscure (for example, in the Old Testament believers in comparison with those of the New; in ignorant and simple persons compared with the teachers). Rather the question is whether some knowledge of it at least is necessary to all in regard to state, persons and time in which they live.

IV. The question does not concern the full and perfect comprehension of this mystery; nor does it concern an intuitive knowlege of it. The former belongs to the glorified saints alone; the latter belongs to the Trinity alone; in which sense Cyprian says, "The Trinity is known to itself alone" (cf. "De Baptismo Christi" [attributed to Cyprian] in "Arnold Carnotensis, Opera," p. 32 in Cyprian, *Opera* [ed. John Oxoniensem, 1682]). Rather the question is only whether the knowledge and confession of the three divine persons is required for the catholic faith and necessary to all who would be saved.

V. The question is not whether the knowledge of the Trinity is necessary absolutely as to the constructive (*kataskeuēn*) and destructive (*anaskeuēn*) reasoning bearing upon it (either as to all the proofs by which theologians confirm it or as to the refutation of the sophisms by which heretics attack it). Rather the question concerns the positive and simple knowlege and confession of the doctrine.

VI. Thus the question comes to this: whether the mystery of the Trinity is a fundamental article, necessary to the faith of all believers, so that not only the denial, but even the ignorance of it cannot consist with salvation. This the adversaries deny; we affirm (influenced principally by the following arguments).

The doctrine of the Trinity is a fundamental article.

VII. First, eternal life is placed in the knowledge of it. "This is life eternal," says Christ, "that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou has sent" (Jn. 17:3). And in answer to the objection that Christ is here spoken of not as God, but as the Mediator sent by God, parallel passages can be adduced where Scripture speaks of him as of the true God, the primary object of faith: "This is the true God and eternal life" (1 Jn. 5:20); "Ye believe in God, believe also in me" (Jn. 14:1). Furthermore Christ could not be a Mediator without being truly God; now he is distinguished here not from God, but from the Father by whom he was sent.

VIII. Second, it contains the primary object of faith and worship, the confession of which our baptism necessarily includes (Mt. 28:19). For it is not sufficient to know that God is (*quod sit*) as to existence or what he is (*quid sit*) as to his attributes; but we must know also who he is (*quis sit*) (as to the persons as he presents himself to be known by us in his word). Hence "whosoever denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father" (1 Jn. 2:23); and "he that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father which hath sent him" (Jn. 5:23). Therefore, God has revealed himself as one in essence, three in persons (viz., the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit). Thus he who does not acknowledge and believe the Trinity has not the true God, but has erected for himself an idol in place of God.

IX. Third, various fundamental doctrines depend upon this article: such as the doctrines concerning the sending of the Son, his advent in the flesh, his satisfaction, the mission of the Holy Spirit and his divine works and the like. Without it, the principal causes of salvation would be unknown (i.e., the grace of the Father, the merit of the Son and the sanctification of the Holy Spirit). These cannot be ascribed to a created being without blasphemy. Therefore since it is necessary to salvation that we should distinctly know God (from whom all saving benefits flow to us), so the doctrine of the Trinity deserves to be reckoned among the principal articles of faith.

X. Fourth, it is the stay of the whole Christian religion and of our salvation. By it, we are distinguished from the Jews of this day, Mohammedans and the heathen. Fifth, it was the uniform faith of the ancients, as may readily be gathered from the symbols, councils, fathers, imperial rescripts and confessions of the churches. Hence that of the Athanasian Symbol: "He who wishes to be saved, must before all things hold to the catholic faith, which if anyone does not preserve entire and inviolate, he will undoubtedly perish forever; now the catholic faith is this, that we reverence one God in Trinity, and Trinity in unity" (Schaff, 2:66).

Sources of explanation.

XI. Although the mystery of the Trinity was more obscure under the Old than under the New Testament, it does not follow that it was then altogether unknown. For otherwise, they could neither have known the true God nor have been able to believe in the Messiah. Therefore we must distinguish knowledge from its degrees. The same knowledge was given as to substance (as will hereafter be proved), but it varied in degree. Now the degree does not change the species.

XII. The Trinity is contained in the Symbol (Apostles' Creed) if not in the signified act, at least in the exercised inasmuch as we seal our faith in the three persons.

Nor is the faith by which I believe in God the Father different from that by which I believe in the Son and the Holy Spirit.

XIII. It is one thing to believe the fact (*to hoti*) of the Trinity; another to know the wherefore (*to dioti*) and the how (*to pōs*). We do not say it is a fundamental article in the latter sense because not even the angels themselves comprehend this, much less the most sagacious men; but we say this only in the former sense. In this latter manner, the ignorant and the simple are bound both to believe and to profess the doctrine of the Trinity.

XIV. A belief in the Trinity cannot but be required from the baptized when they are sprinkled in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. Yea, the confession of faith required from them and contained in the Apostles' Creed did not (from the beginning) extend beyond the doctrine of the Trinity. Hence the most ancient expositions of the Creed (extant in Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, Justin) extends no further; yea, Socrates, Sozomen and Nicephorus teach that the Nicene Creed also was contained within these heads. Baptism administered in the name of Christ does not exclude, but includes a belief in the Trinity because Christ cannot be acknowledged without the Father and the Spirit.

XV. For any article to be fundamental, it is not necessary that it should always exist literally in Scripture, as to all the words by which it is usually set forth. It suffices if it is contained there as to the thing (and equivalently) and may be thence deduced by evident and necessary consequence. Thus although the word "Trinity" does not occur in Scripture in the abstract, it suffices that the thing itself is found there in the concrete and as to sense.

XVI. The dissent of scholars (which occurs in the exposition of this mystery) ought not to detract in the least from the truth of the thing (especially when the dissent is not in reality, but in the manner of conceiving or the mode of explaining or the method of defending it—which is allowable among theologians, even the Protestant ones). As to the Scholastics, we do not hesitate to say that they have miserably darkened the whole doctrine by their curious and presumptuous questions. But their contentions, we do not make ours; yea, we wish the man of God to be far removed from their fooleries and logic-choppings (*leptologēmasi*).

XVII. The fundamental topics are called catholic not so much with respect to persons as to doctrine. Not that all Christians (whether true or only nominal) thus far agree concerning them, but because they are retained by all true Christians who profess the catholic faith.

XVIII. The article of the Trinity is not only theoretical, but also practical because it contributes to the gratitude and worship of God. Thus we devote our faith and service to the Triune God who has revealed himself to us. It also contributes to consolation so that we may know that Christ has truly redeemed us and that our salvation is securely positioned.

XIX. Episcopius falsely pretends that the Ante-Nicene Fathers held a different belief. Yet it can easily be shown from Justin, Athenagoras, Ignatius and others that this doctrine was constantly both believed and confessed. Also that very confession of faith which Episcopius mentions sufficiently attests this; for how could they believe in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit unless they believed in the Trinity? Nor can it be conceived how when so suddenly and unexpectedly Arius opposed it, 318 fathers should so unanimously have condemned him, unless this opinion had been certain among the ancients. Socinus very candidly confesses that on this subject he differs from the fathers and councils.

XX. Indeed the truth of the matter can be clearly gathered from the surviving monuments of the first centuries. We give only a few out of the many. Pliny, the younger, in his letter to Trajan speaking of the Christians, teaches that they worshipped Christ as God. "They affirmed," says he, "that the whole of their fault, or error, lay in this, that they were wont to meet together on a stated day before it was light and sing among themselves alternately a hymn to Christ, as God, and bind themselves by an oath, not to the commission of any wickedness, but not to be guilty of theft, or robbery, or adultery, never to falsify their word, nor to deny a pledge committed to them, when called upon to return it" (Pliny, 10.96* [Loeb, 2:288-89]). By these words Pliny testifies that the Christians esteemed the Lord Jesus Christ as God and adored him with divine worship and religious hymns of praise. Such testimony, drawn from the enemies themselves, does not suffer us to doubt the faith of the primitive Christians. Tertullian (referring to it) says that Pliny (the second, i.e., the younger) writing to Trajan concerning the Christians discovered nothing concerning their sacraments besides their meeting together before it was light to "sing to Christ as God"—for so we must read; not as it is commonly read "to Christ and God" (*Apology* 2 [FC 10:11; PL 1.321]). The words of Pliny clearly show this (and from him Eusebius, "Chronicorum liber Posterior," in *Thesaurus Temporum* [ed. J.J. Scaliger, 1606/1968], p. 165).

XXI. Clement of Rome in his letter to the Corinthians (a genuine work of venerable antiquity) speaks of Christ not only as a man, but as one whom he does not fear to join with God together with the Holy Spirit. "Have we not one God and one Christ, and one Spirit poured out upon us?" (*ouchi hena theon echomen, kai hena christon, kai hen pneuma charitos to ekchythen eph' hēmas*, "First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians," 46 [ANF 1:17; PG 1.303-4]). In the same place, he calls him "the sceptre of divine majesty" (ibid., p. 9; PG 1:239) to remove him from the humble position of men. Aristides, who lived a little after Clement of Rome in the time of Aelius Hadrianus, confirms the same thing in his *Apology* presented to the Emperor Hadrian (cf. *Apology of Aristides* [ANF 11:263]). Eusebius mentions this (in his *Chronicorum* 2 [PG 19.557-58]), and Jerome (in his list of ecclesiastical authors, Letter 70, "To Magnus" [NPNF2, 4:50; PL 22.667]), and especially the most ancient of the Roman Martyrologies, the words of which are these: "[Aristides] presented to the emperor Hadrian a treatise on the Christian religion containing the reasons of our doctrine. He also, in the presence of the emperor, delivered a discourse in which he clearly demonstrated that Jesus Christ was the only God" (*Roman Martyrology* [1869], p. 290). With a similar reason, Ignatius confirms the same mystery. "We have," says he, "one physician, Jesus Christ the Lord our God, from eternity the only begotten son, but afterwards also man from the Virgin Mary" (*echomen iatron ton Kyriou hēmōn theon Iēsoun Christon, ton pro aiōnōn hyion monogenē kai logon, hysteron de kai anthrōpon ek Marias tēs parthenou*, Pseudo-Ignatius, "Ad Ephesios," 7.2 in *Patres Apostolici* [ed. F.X. Funk, 1913], 2:188-91). Nothing could be more explicit than this. Theodoret alludes to this passage (cf. *Dialogues* 1 [NPNF2, 3:176; PG 83.82]). Elsewhere Ignatius calls "Christ his God" (Pseudo-Igantius, "Ad Romanos," 6.3 in *Patres Apostolici* [ed. F.X. Funk, 1881], 2:211); in Pseudo-Ignatius, "Ad Magnesianos," 8.2 (in *Patres Apostolici* [ed. F.X. Funk, 1881], 2:87), he says that "Christ is the Word of the Father, not projected but essential." Athenagoras, the Athenian philosopher, in his apology for the Christians (cf. *Embassy for the*

Christians [ACW 23:29-78]) which he presented to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus and Lucius Verus (a work mentioned by Epiphanius, *Adversus haereses [Panarion]* 64.20, 21 [PL 41.1102-3] and in Fronto Du Duc, *Bibliotheca veterum Patrum* [1624]) in many places perspicuously and solidly lays down the faith of the holy Trinity. "So that we assert that God and the Son, his Word, and the Holy Spirit are one according to power, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit" (*Embassy for the Christians* 24 [ACW 23:61; PG 6:946]). In various passages (which we do not have space to quote), Justin Martyr states the same doctrine. Consult his *Dialogue with Trypho* [FC 6:147-366]), where he triumphantly proves against him that Christ is God from the prophecies of the Old Testament which refer to him; and his *Apology* (FC 6:119-35) which is commonly considered the second. Irenaeus, following in the footsteps of Justin Martyr, says, "Christ himself with the Father is the God of the living, who spake with Moses, who also was manifested to the fathers" (*Against Heresies* 4.5* [ANF 1:467; PG 7.985]; ibid., 3.6, pp. 418-20 and 2.5,6, pp. 364-66). Clement of Alexandria frequently inculcates the divinity and the worship of the Word (*Stromata* 7 [ANF 2:523-56]); *Christ the Educator* 1.11 [FC 23:84-86] and 3.12 [ibid., p. 275]).

Twenty-Fifth Question

In the one divine essence are there three distinct persons: the Father, Son and Holy Spirit? We affirm against the Socinians.

Statement of the question.

I. To understand this primary question which we agitate with the ancient as well as the more modern anti-Trinitarians, take notice that the orthodox faith is this: in the one only and most simple essence of God there are three distinct persons so distinguished from each other by incommunicable properties or modes of subsisting that one cannot be the other—although by an inexpressible circum-insession (*emperichōrēsin*) they always remain and exist in each other mutually. Thus the singular numerical essence is communciated to the three persons not as a species to individuals or a second substance to the first (because it is singular and undivided), nor as a whole to its parts (since it is infinite and impartible); but as a singular nature to its own act of being (*suppositis*) in which it takes on various modes of subsisting. Hence it is evident: (1) that the divine essence is principally distinguished from the persons in having communicability, while the persons are distinguished by an incommunicable property; (2) that it differs from other singular natures in this—that while they can be communicated to only one self-existent being (*supposito*) and are terminated on only one subsistence (because they are finite), the former (because infinite) can admit of more than one.

II. Hence it is that the three divine persons are not three gods (as among men) because the divine persons partake of the same numerical essence, and that infinite. But three men partake of the same specific essence only, not numerical. Thus the three persons of the Trinity are not to be called *synousioi* or *homoiousioi*, but *homoousioi* because they have between themselves not only a similar, but the same numerical essence (nothing like which exists in creatures). Nor do the properties by which they are mutually distinguished constitute unequal degrees

(although they may designate their order as diverse modes of subsisting). By this neither is the essence divided in the persons nor are the persons separated from the essence, but they are only so distinguished that the one cannot be the other.

III. The question is not whether God is one numerically; or whether these three names (the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit) may be spoken of God. This the Sabellians and Socinians readily grant. Rather the question is whether these three names designate three distinct persons subsisting in but one, undivided essence, which the orthodox maintain and the anti-Trinitarians deny. The latter consist of both they who, with Sabellius, recognize only one person, who in different respects puts on now the name of Father, then of Son and again of Holy Spirit (which most pestiferous error in a former age that monster of a man Michael Servetus recalled from the pit); and they who, with the Tritheists, from three persons make up three essences (*essentia*)—one essentiating (*essentiantem*), two essentiated (*essentiatas*) (which the impious Valentine Gentilis asserted); and they who, with the wretched Socinus, blasphemously dare to traduce this most sacred mystery as a figment of the human brain. Against these, the orthodox faith must be established.

The Trinity can be satisfactorily proved, not from the light of nature, but from revelation alone.

IV. But as this mystery far transcends the reach of the human reason, so it can be solidly demonstrated from the revealed word alone. Whatever proofs of it some are wont to adduce from nature and reason, or from the perfection and power of God, or from his understanding, or from the communication of good (although on the supposition of a revelation, they may with respect to believers serve in some measure to illustrate it), yet they cannot convince and obtain the force of solid proof. The same is the case with the various similitudes usually employed here: from the human soul, the rainbow, a tree, a fountain, the sun and light. These seem to afford some resemblance to the Trinity, though very obscure as they always labor under a great dissimilitude. Thus they ought to be proposed soberly and cautiously, not for the purpose of convincing adversaries, but for confirming believers and showing them the credibility at least of this great mystery.

V. The things pertaining to this mystery occurring in the monuments of the heathen are either adulterated or suppositititious (as the things drawn from Trismegistus and the Sibylline Books, which have been for a long time condemned as spurious by the more acute). If there were no other proof, this would suffice—that this mystery is there more clearly unfolded than was done by any of the prophets. Or the things pertaining to this mystery are of no importance, as the allusions in Plato and the Platonists to three principles—"Mind," Word" and "Spirit" (which if they prove anything, favor three essences or separate gods). All the truth they contain appears to have been drawn from the ancient doctrine of the Hebrews and the reading of Moses and the prophets. It must be ascribed to tradition grounded on revelation rather than to reason grounded on the light of nature.

VI. Therefore whatever it is permitted to know concerning this mystery must be learned from the word of God alone. The only certain and invincible proof is to be drawn neither from the obscure and corrupt light of reason, nor from the rivulets of the fathers, nor from the stagnant pools of the Scholastics ("air-walkers" [*aerobatountōn*] and rashly rushing into that deep of deeps) who, while laboriously

striving to leave nothing undiscussed by their subtle acuteness, at length feel that the searchers into majesty are oppressed by it; rather it is to be drawn from the perfectly limpid fountains of Scripture in which the Holy Spirit has condescended to reveal to us the whole of this mystery as far as it is necessary to be known for salvation; in the Old Testament, indeed rather obscurely, but in the New more clearly. Hence we start with our proofs.

1. The Trinity is proved from the baptism of Christ.

VII. The first is drawn from the baptism of Christ (Mt. 3:16, 17*) in which three persons manifested themselves in distinct personality: the Father who spoke from heaven; the Son who ascended from the Jordan; and the Spirit who descended from heaven in the form of a dove and rested upon the Son. One is heard, but is neither seen nor descends. Another is not heard, but descends in a visible form. Another descends to and ascends from the river, baptized in the sight of all. Hence the saying of the ancients, "Arian, go to Jordan, and there you will see the Trinity." The Son here meant is not a common, but the singular and proper, and "beloved in whom the Father was well pleased," who must baptize with the Holy Spirit (Lk. 3:16). This cannot be said of a created person, but only of a divine person. The Spirit mentioned cannot only designate some will or property of God because the properties of God are never in Scripture said to descend from heaven upon anyone (which is a personal act) much less to assume any corporeal and visible form. Nor ought the particle *hōsei* (which is attached) to be referred to the mode of descent (as the Socinians wish, as if it meant descending gradually and lightly in the manner of a dove, not impetuously as a hawk eager after its prey); but to the mode of appearing (which was made under that visible and bodily form to designate better the character of the Spirit of Christ). Hence both the descent itself, and the remaining upon Christ sufficiently prove a descending person, not a simple quality. Nor is it an objection that we are said "to be baptized with him." We can as properly be said "to be baptized with the Spirit" (viz., figuratively and mystically) as to "be clothed with and be nourished by Christ" (although he is a person).

2. From our baptism.

VIII. Second, the same thing is proved by our baptism instituted by Christ: "Teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (Mt. 28:19). Here also three distinct persons are mentioned of the same nature, authority and power to whom we equally give our names and promise obedience. We are baptized into the name common to them, not into the names (which denotes unity of essence). To be "baptized into the name of God" signifies particularly three things: (1) the authority of God who instituted it and confirmed by this sacrament (as a seal) the covenant he made with us; (2) the promise of grace and protection of those whom he receives by baptism into his fellowship; (3) the stipulation of worship and obedience to which the baptized are bound by the covenant. It is also necessary that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit should be that only one and true God who, as the author of the covenant of grace, has the authority to institute sacraments, to seal it, who can promise and bestow covenanted grace, and to the worship of obedience of whom the covenanted are introduced and obligated (which Paul clearly testifies can be said of no mortal [1 Cor. 1:13] when he denies that the Corinthians were baptized in the name of Paul). Nor can it weaken the force of

this argument that the Israelites are said to have been baptized into Moses (1 Cor. 10:2) since it is one thing to be baptized into the name of God, another to be baptized into Moses, i.e., by the ministry of Moses, "by the hand of Moses" (*bydh msch*, as the Syrian and Arabian versions have it); or, what is better, "into the doctrine of Moses," to the confirmation of the doctrine delivered by Moses (just as Moses is often used for the law or the doctrine delivered by him; cf. Jn. 5:45, 46—"Moses" [i.e., the doctrine of Moses] "in whom ye trust and whom ye believe accuses you"). "They have Moses and the prophets" (Lk. 16:29) not in their persons, but doctrines. So "to be baptized unto the baptism of John" is to be baptized unto the confirmation of the doctrine which John sealed by his baptism (Acts 19:3).

3. From 1 Jn. 5:7. IX. Third, it may be proved from 1 Jn. 5:7 where three are expressly mentioned who are said to be one: "for there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one." Three witnesses are brought forward not as qualities, but persons. For as the Father is a person, so also is the Word and the Spirit who are placed in the same order and degree. Witnesses, not human or angelic, who utter a divine testimony (v. 10) are opposed thereby to a human and created witness. Still they so distinctly testify that they are one not only in consent and will but in essence, that they are called "one" (Jn. 10:30). To no purpose do the adversaries (in order to avoid this dart) endeavor to weaken confidence in this passage, as if it were interpolated because it is wanting in various Greek manuscripts, is not found in the Syriac and Arabic versions and is omitted by various fathers. For the most ancient and approved manuscripts, which retain this text, support our opinion. Jerome in his prologue to the Canonical Epistles (*Prologus Septem Epistolarum Canonicarum* [PL 29.870-74]) remarks that it existed in the Greek manuscripts, and Erasmus confesses that it was extant in the Codex Britannicus. The most approved editions (that of Complutensis, Antwerp, Arias Montanus, Robert Stephen's and Walton), which are founded upon the best manuscripts, have it. Hence, if in some it is wanting, this must be attributed either to the fraud and treachery of the Arians (as Jerome acknowledges) or of the more ancient heretics whose sacrilegious hands evidently tampered with the Scriptures. In addition, the connection of the text itself and the series of the apostle's discourse demand it. For there would be no sense to the following words ("and there are three that bear witness in earth") unless there were supposed to be three preceeding witnesses testifying in heaven with whom a comparison could be made of the witnesses in earth.

X. Falsely also they maintain that it treats only of the unity of consent or *homoboulia:* (1) because perfect unity of consent (*homoboulia*) supposes also sameness of essence (*homoousian*); hence they of our party who refer it to consent do not exclude, but suppose an identity of nature; for whatever is not God (since what is mutable and fallible can fail), its testimony cannot be called divine and one with God; (2) not only are they said to agree in one thing (*eis to hen*, as is said of the earthly witnesses, which is properly referred to consent), but that they are one (*to hen*, which properly implies identity of nature). Nor if believers are said "to be one" (Jn. 17:21) as "the Father is one with the Son," does it follow that the unity is the same in both cases. Nor does the word *kathōs* always denote equality, but some analogy and similitude (as 1 Pet. 1:19; Mt. 5:48). It is not said of believers that they are one with God, but that "they are one spirit" (1 Cor.

6:17); not referring to an essential, but to a mystical and spiritual union, so that to be one spirit (*einai hen pneuma*) is the same as to be "one in spirit" (*einai hen tō pneumati*) because the same spirit operates both in the head and in the members.

4. From 2 Cor. 13:14.

XI. Fourth, the apostolic benediction not obscurely evinces the same thing. "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all" (2 Cor. 13:14). For these three blessings, embracing the whole plan of salvation, are sought by believers from three distinct persons and distinguished by three names. Therefore if the Lord who confers grace, and God who bestows love are persons, why should not also the Holy Spirit (who is classified with them) be of the same order and dignity? Nor can it be objected here that the communion of the Spirit must be understood passively, not actively (as if this were a wish that the grace of Christ and the love of the Father would communicate the Holy Spirit to believers). It is one thing to seek the Spirit from the love of God and the grace of Christ; but another to seek that the communion of the Spirit may be with believers, no less than the grace of Christ and the love of the Father (which is done here). For in this manner the three blessings flowing from the three persons in the work of redemption are designated according to the mode of operation proper to each one; the love of God in the destination; the grace of Christ in the acquisition; and the communion of the Spirit in the application (as the Spirit is elsewhere set forth as the author of gifts and as the object of prayer, not as its matter, when grace and peace are sought from him, Rev. 1:4, 5).

5. From Jn. 15:26.

XII. Fifth, here belong the passages in which express mention is made of three, mutually distinct from each other, to whom divine works are equally ascribed; as "when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me" (Jn. 15:26); and "I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever" (Jn. 14:16). Here we see that mention is made of the Comforter sent, of the Son sending, and of the Father from whom he proceeds, and in whose name he is sent (who as the one from the other in turn—the Son from the Father and the Spirit from the Son—yet are placed in an equal grade of authority and power for the accomplishment of the work of redemption, which belongs to God alone without the intervention of creatures). Thus the mission and execution show only an order among the persons and a distinction of personal relation, not a diversity of essence or of causality. Nor is it an objection that Christ says that he prays to the Father and that the Father is greater than he (Jn. 14:16, 28) because he says this with respect to office and economy, not in relation to essence; or that the Spirit is said to be given to many (which belongs not to a person). For the Son also may well be said to be given to many, not by destroying or dividing the person, but by communicating blessings; or that the Spirit is said to speak not of himself (Jn. 16:13). For this must not be understood absolutely as if he did not speak anything, but because he did not teach anything different from what Christ had taught (to intimate that he is the end-accomplishing [*telesiourgikon*] principle, consummating the work begun by the Father and carried on by the Son).

XIII. "Now there are diversities of gifts," says Paul, "but the same Spirit. And there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all" (1 Cor. 12:4-6). Now since it is evident that no one but God alone can be the author of gifts, operations and administrations, it is necessary that the Spirit, the Lord and God the Father (from whom they proceed) must be that one God. Nor can it be said that those are subordinate not principal causes because they are placed in the same order, and the Spirit is said to distribute to every man severally gifts as he will (just as much as the Father is said to be the author of operations). The apostle wishes to reduce to unity the Corinthians (quarrelling among themselves about gifts) by this argument: whatever you possess—whether gifts, or administrations, or miraculous operations—proceed from the one God. Yet these are bestowed partly by the Holy Spirit, partly by the Lord Jesus, partly by God the Father (who is called God by way of eminence, *kat' exochēn*). Therefore the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are that one God in whom you ought to cherish unity.

Sources of explanation.

XIV. It is impossible to be and not to be the same in the same respect. But in the Trinity they who are distinguished personally can be the same essentially. Therefore, although the Son is of the same essence with the Father, he is rightly said not to be the Father; for the former is said only with respect to essence and the latter with respect to person.

XV. Three numerical Gods are not one numerical God. Although the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are three numerical persons, still they are not three numerical Gods because they partake of the same divine essence. The Father is one, the Son is another (but not another God). He is another personally, but not essentially.

XVI. The principles which are true concerning finite natures must not be transferred to the infinite; otherwise they become false (for example, three cannot be one; the begetter and the begotten are not one in essence; the singular and individual cannot be communicated to more than one). Thus the inference is faulty—three human persons are three men, therefore three divine persons are three gods. The reason is that these three human persons partake only of the same specific and not numerical essence and a similar rather than the same essence (for they have each one his own essence and singular existence); but the divine persons partake of the same infinite, numerical essence.

XVII. Although there are three divine persons, it does not follow that there are three infinites. For as the Trinity of persons does not imply a Trinity of gods (on account of the identity of essence), so it does not imply a Trinity of infinites because the three persons have the same numerical infinity (which is an essential property). Thus they are the one infinite God.

XVIII. Where there are one and three really distinct, there are four. But here, the three persons are not really distinguished from the essence, but only the mode of subsisting (so that another may be found among the persons, but not another thing between them and the divinity because these three persons are nothing else than the one God who subsists diversely in three persons).

XIX. Although the true God is the Trinity, yet not whatever is true God is the Trinity. Rather it is either the Trinity or some one of the persons.

XX. He who conceives God as one has a complete conception as to the complement of essence, but not immediately as to the complement of personality. Nor if our conception of God is incomplete, does it therefore follow that the divine essence itself is incomplete because the essence is inseparable from the persons.

XXI. One in number substantively as to essential unity cannot be three in the same respect; but it can be three adjectively and personally as to the personal Trinity.

XXII. Things which are the same with a third are the same with each other (viz., with respect to that third in which they agree). Thus because the persons agree in essence, they are also the same among themselves as to essence. Thus they may properly be said to be *idem*, but not *iidem*, the same God, but not the same persons. (2) Things which are the same with a singular and incommunicable third are the same with each other, but when they are the same with a universal (or at least a communicable third), they are not mutually the same (for example, Paul and Peter are one in human nature specifically, but they are not mutually the same numerically because human nature is universal). The Father and the Son are one in the divine nature and yet are not mutually the same because the divine nature in which they agree (although singular and individual) is nevertheless communicable to more than one person.

XXIII. Hence appears what must be answered to the sophism of heretics who bring forward as an expository syllogism: "The divine essence is the Father; the divine essence is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father" (viz., that it is of mere particulars and is composed of four terms because the middle term [to wit the divine essence] is not incommunicable as it ought to be in such syllogisms and is taken diversely in the major and minor). For in the major, either it is taken universally and completely in this sense—the divine essence is the Father (i.e., whatever is the divine essence) and thus it is false; or it is taken particularly and incompletely—the someone who is the divine essence is the Father; and so it is true, but concludes nothing because they are mere particulars.

XXIV. Although the divine nature taken precisely may be conceived to have singularity and existence, yet it cannot be called a person because it does not have incommunicability. Although it extends more widely than the single persons taken separately, yet with respect to the persons taken together it is adequate to and identified with them. So each person partakes indeed of the whole divinity, but not totally and adequately (if it is proper so to speak) because it is so in the Father as it is also in the Son.

XXV. In what essence the Father is the only God opposed to the Son and Holy Spirit and not only to creatures and the false deities of the heathen, in that there are not three distinct persons; but thus we deny the Father to be the only one in the divine essence. Nor is this proved by Jn. 17:3 because the exclusive particle *monon* ("only") does not limit the subject "thee," but the predicate "true God." It is opposed not to the Son or the Holy Spirit, but to creatures and false gods in this sense, that "they might know thee, who art the only true God" (which the structure evidently teaches). For if it referred to the subject "thee," it would have been written without the article (*monon ton alēthinon theon*, "thou alone art the true God"); not as it is written here (*se ton monon*, "thee, who art the only true God") where the article placed before the word *monon* intimates that it belongs to the following predicate and not to the antecedent subject.

XXVI. Besides the essence and relation taken separately, there is the person consisting of both; not as of composing parts, but as of a thing and its mode. The person begets, or is begotten, or proceeds. Essence is communicated by generation or spiration. The relation begetting is distinguished from the begotten and the proceeding.

XXVII. The thought concerning three to be worshipped with equal reverence does not distract the mind of the worshipper lest perchance he might divide the worship due to the one God among more than one, since he ought to be convinced that, on the ground of the unity and consubstantiality (*homoousia*) of the persons, the Son and the Holy Spirit are invoked by the same act of invocation which is addressed to the Father. He ought always to recollect that expression of Gregory Nazianzus, "I cannot think of one without being instantly surrounded with the splendor of three; nor can I discern the three without being suddenly attracted to one" (*ou phthanō to hen noēsai kai tois trisi terilampomai, ou phthanō ta tria dielein, kai eis to hen anapheromai, On Holy Baptism* 41 [NPNF2, 7:375; PG 36.417]).

TWENTY-SIXTH QUESTION

Can the mystery of the Trinity be proved from the Old Testament, and was it known under it? We affirm against the Socinians.

I. From the arguments adduced by us before to prove the necessity of this doctrine as a fundamental article, it might be satisfactorily inferred that it was revealed and known under the Old Testament (since fundamentals are the same among all believers admitting neither of increase nor of diminution). Yet the Socinians (in order by any means to destroy the belief of this mystery) are wont to urge peculiarly that it is a new doctrine invented after the time of Christ and his apostles (whom the Arminians also carry on their shoulders here). It therefore becomes necessary to establish against both the truth of this mystery not only from the New, but also from the Old Testament.

The Trinity was not unknown under the Old Testament.

II. Indeed, we confess that it was not revealed under the Old Testament with the same clearness as it is now taught in the New. It was delivered far more obscurely because the reason of that economy and the (as yet) infantile condition of the ancient church required it. Yet this is no objection to its having been made known even to the patriarchs sufficiently for salvation. The orthodox thus far have constantly asserted this against the Socinians, and it can be proved by various arguments.

III. For the proof we must make a choice of the passages of Scripture that we may contend not so much by number as by weight. For it is not becoming in us to be so anxious about the number as about the solidity, lest the Christian religion be exposed to derision and an opportunity of cavilling be afforded to the adversaries. When our Calvin labored to do this, he was undeservedly and most unjustly traduced by them as a Judaizer or an Arianizer. On the contrary, scarcely has anyone more strongly and triumphantly confirmed the Christian faith against the impiety of the Arians and the Jews.

A plurality of persons is proved from Gen. 1:26, etc.

IV. But as God has condescended to reveal himself here "at sundry times and in diverse manners" (*polymerōs kai polytropōs*), there is a double kind of proof. First, we may adduce those passages from which a plurality of persons may be gathered; second, those in which the Trinity is expressly mentioned. Among the former are a large number which introduce God speaking of himself in the plural number. The principle ones are these three: at the creation of man, "Let us make man in our image" (Gen. 1:26); at the transgression of Adam, "Behold, the man is become as one of us" (Gen 3:22); and at the confusion of tongues, "Let us go down and there confound their language" (Gen 11:7). No reason can be assigned why God (who elsewhere so frequently speaks of himself in the singular) should use the plural verb, unless to intimate a certain (at least) plurality of persons in the unity of essence. Hence he does not say "let me make," but "let us make," so that more than one is intimated. As in creating, there is a common operation to them, so there ought to be a common nature. He does not say in "images," but in "our image," so that the identity of image designates the identity of essence common to these more than one. Nor ought it to be objected here: (1) that God for the sake of honor speaks of himself in the plural by enallage (like kings and princes) because the idiom of the language forbids it. For although the second or third person can be so addressed for the sake of honor, yet it is altogether unusual for the first person to speak thus of himself (as Aben Ezra himself on Genesis 29:27 remarks+). Nor can any example to the contrary be adduced. Those which are sought from various passages of Scripture are synecdochical, where one speaks in the name of more: Laban of himself and friends who were present (Gen. 29:27); Bildad of himself and companions (Job 18:2, 3); Daniel of himself and companions (Dan. 2:36); Christ of himself, John the Baptist and his disciples (Jn. 3:11); the church of herself and daughters (i.e., believers, Cant. 1:4). The present custom of kings does not imply that this practice existed among the Hebrews, since Pharoah, Nebuchadnezzar, Belshazzar and the most ambitious kings are introduced speaking of themselves in the singular. When kings do thus speak, it is done not so much for the purpose of exalting as of depressing themselves, that they may seem to speak not only of themselves, but also the opinion of the nobles. (2) If God spoke thus of himself for the sake of honor, he ought always to have spoken so (which he certainly did not do). Third, this enallage would be not only useless but also dangerous because the believer would thus be easily induced to believe a plurality of persons (which however would be false on that hypothesis).

V. Of no force either is the objection that angels are here addressed because in no one of the three passages can they be understood. Not in the first, because the angels neither assisted in the least in the creation of man nor is he anywhere said to have been formed in their image. Although men are in various respects similar to the angels, yet they cannot be said to have been made in their image because for this would be required no kind of similitude, but also a dependence of the type upon the prototype and examplar (which does not occur here). Not in the second (Gen. 3:22), because those whom God addresses are equal to him and their likeness (man) aimed at according to the promise of the serpent (which cannot be said of the angels). Not in the third (Gen. 11:7), because they are addressed whose work is the confusion of tongues (which does not pertain to the

angels, but to God alone). Besides the deep silence here concerning the angels, Jehovah alone is said to descend, to see, to confound (which ought not to have been said if he had employed angels as his ministers in this work).

2. From Gen. 1:2.

VI. Second, a plurality may be proved from those passages where the discourse concerns God as about different persons. "The Spirit of God" (Gen. 1:2) is said to move upon the face of the waters. By the Spirit cannot be understood the "air" or "wind" because neither had as yet been created. And no distinction of things had been made, nor any angel because it is not known whether angels had as yet been created (nor is God said to have used their help in creation). Nor can it be understood of any virtue and efficacy of God as the cause of the fecundity of things because that is described by incubation and is distinguished from the Spirit (as the effect from the cause and actions belong to self-existent things [*suppositorum*]). Therefore by the Spirit must necessarily be meant some *suppositum* or person concurring to this work; to wit, the same Spirit who is elsewhere termed the author of creation (Ps. 33:6; 104:30; Is. 40:13, 14, expressions applying to no created thing). Nor is it an objection that he is called the Spirit of God for he is so the Spirit of God considered hypostatically as to be also God the Spirit essentially (*ousiōdōs*) as the Son of Man is also man. Nor if that incubation (as an external work) is common to the whole Trinity originally does it follow that it cannot belong appropriatively to the Holy Spirit because he performs it immediately and by himself (although from the Father and the Son); just as redemption (which is ascribed to the whole Trinity) yet singularly and terminatively is attributed to the Son.

From Hos. 1:7

VII. The same thing may be proved from those passages in which God is distinguished from himself, not essentially but personally. Jehovah says, "I will save them by Jehovah their God" (Hos. 1:7). Where two are spoken of—one who saves, another by whom he saves (viz., the Messiah)—and both Jehovah. "Jehovah rained fire and brimstone from Jehovah" (Gen. 19:24), i.e., the Son from the Father. For if he had wished only to denote that this had been done immediately by God, it would have sufficed to say Jehovah rained without adding "from Jehovah." Therefore undoubtedly a mystery lies concealed in this locution, although an apodictical argument cannot be drawn from this passage taken by itself. So "Jehovah said to my Lord" (Ps. 110:1) and "God, thy God, hath annointed thee with the oil of gladness" (Ps. 45:7*), where mention is made of God anointing and anointed (viz., hypostatically not essentially). Here belong the passages in which divine names and attributes are ascribed to the Messiah: when he is called "Jehovah our righteousness," "the mighty God," "the angel of his presence." These manifestly prove a divine person distinct from God the Father. Nor can the heretics bring forward anything here to weaken the force of this argument, as will be shown in the proper place when we come to treat of the diety of the Son.

The Trinity may be proved from Gen. 1.

VIII. As the passages which connote a plurality of persons are various, so those in which that plurality is restricted to a Trinity are not a few. First, it is collected with some clearness from the history of the creation where Moses distinctly mentions Elohim creating, the Spirit of God moving upon the waters, and the Word producing all things. That Elohim is God, the adversaries do not deny; that the Spirit of God is a person

distinct from him has been already proved; and that the Word is not a simple command and mandate of God, but a personal Word is evinced by a comparison of Moses with John who, alluding to Moses, describes the Word spoken of by Moses as a person subsisting with God the Father, by whom all things were created (Jn. 1:1-3). Nor can it be understood either of "an external word" by which God commanded the angels as his ministers because they were not yet created—they themselves ought to be produced by that Word who made all things without exception; or of an internal word by which he enjoined this upon himself—because God is introduced speaking in the third person, as if commanding another person not himself (and that too repeatedly). This cannot be explained as being done either undesignedly or in accommodation to an internal word. It remains therefore that we must understand a "personal Word" (i.e., the Son of God, who is often set forth in the Chaldee paraphrase by *mymr* or "the Word"). Nor is it an objection that the verb "said" connotes an efficacious command of God. For although objectively and terminated on the creatures about to be produced, it implies the efficacious command of God (to whom they would owe their origin), yet it supposes within and originally the personal Word of God as the principle which that mandate ought to obey (as by him he works all things and made the worlds, Heb. 1:2). In reference to this David says, "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth" (Ps. 33:6). Here distinct mention is made of three concurring in creation: "Jehovah," "the Word" and "the Spirit." For the Word can be no other than that by whom John says all things were made (1:3). Nor can any other Spirit be meant than him who moved upon the waters in the first creation. And if the Spirit of the mouth of God is elsewhere usually applied to his efficacious word (cf. 2 Thess. 2:8), it ought here also to be taken in the same sense, since such express mention had been made of him in the first part of the verse.

2. From the liberation of the people from Egyptian bondage.

IX. Second, the same may be proved from the deliverance of the people out of Egyptian bondage, the guidance of them through the wilderness, and introduction into Canaan. He is that true God whom the Israelites acknowledged and worshipped, who brought them out of Egypt, lead them through the wilderness and introduced them into the land of promise. For no other besides God could have performed so great a work, as he himself testifies in the preface to the law: "I am the Lord thy God who brought thee out of the land of Egypt." Also he often claims this as his prerogative (Ex. 3:8; Dt. 33:29). Now this work is ascribed to the three persons of the Trinity—the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Concerning the Father, the adversaries do not doubt; concerning the Son, the following passages prove (Ex. 3:2; 23:20; 32:34), in which this work is ascribed to the "angel of Jehovah." That this angel is not a created angel, but the uncreated Son of God himself, sent by God for this work and often manifesting himself under this form to the patriarchs, is evident from the description of him and the various attributes given to him (which are such as cannot apply to a creature, but belong to God alone). (1) He says he is the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob (Ex. 3:6); calls the Israelites his people (Ex. 3:7); sends Moses to Pharaoh (Ex. 3:10); promises himself divine worship after their deliverance from Egypt (Ex. 3:12). (2) He is said to have gone before the Israelites in a pillar

of cloud and fire (Ex. 14:19), which is expressly attributed to Jehovah (Ex. 13:21; Num. 11:25; 14:14). (3) It is said that "the name of God" will be in him so that they will not escape unpunished who rebel against him (Ex. 23:20, 21*). (4) He is called "the very presence of God" ("My presence shall go with thee," Ex. 33:14) because he is the image of the invisible God, the express image of the person of the Father. That the Holy Spirit also here concurred as a person with the others is evident from the noted passage: "I will mention the lovingkindnesses of the Lord" (Is. 63:7-14). He said "surely they are my people, so he was their Savior." "The angel of his presence saved them in his love, but they rebelled and vexed his Holy Spirit." Here three distinct persons are enumerated: "Jehovah," "the angel of his presence," and "the Holy Spirit." Distinct operations are ascribed to each: to Jehovah, lovingkindness towards the people; to the angel of his presence, redemption; and to the Holy Spirit, vexation and contention with the people, while he was turned to be their enemy. Since, then, a truly divine work is ascribed to these three, it is necessary that they should be the one true God essentially (although mutually distinguished in mode of subsisting and personally).

3. From the descriptions of the Messiah.

X. Third, the same thing is evidenced by the descriptions of the Messiah. Since he is everywhere proposed not only as the seed of the woman and the fruit of the womb (i.e., a true man), but also as the true and eternal God, to whom divine names and attributes and works are ascribed (as will be demonstrated hereafter), who was to be sent from the Father and the Holy Spirit, it is evident that the mystery of the Trinity was thus revealed with sufficient clearness. Here belongs the passage, "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek" (Is. 61:1, 2). Christ himself authorizes us to refer these words to the Messiah (Lk. 4:21); nor can the Jews, although obstinate, deny it. Such things are predicated of him as can apply neither to Isaiah nor to any other mortal. As therefore the work ascribed to the Messiah proves him to be God, so when mention is made of Jehovah and his Spirit sending and anointing him, two persons distinct from him are connoted. The passage in Haggai 2:4, 5* is pertinent here, which mentions these three: "I am with you, saith the Lord of hosts: according to the word that I covenanted with you, so my spirit remaineth among you."

4. From the threefold repetition of the name Jehovah, Num. 6:24-26.

XI. Fourth, from the threefold repetition of the name Jehovah, as in the blessing of the priest: "The Lord bless thee, and keep thee: the Lord make his face shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee: the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace" (Num. 6:24-26). For this threefold repetition can be employed for no other purpose than to designate those three persons from whom, as from one true Jehovah, that blessing is sought. Thus Jacob mentions three times the God from whom he seeks a blessing for his sons: "God, before whom my fathers did walk; the God which fed me all my life long unto this day, the Angel which redeemed me from all evil, bless the lads" (Gen. 48:15, 16). Now the angel who redeemed him from all evil and from whom he sought the blessing could not be a creature. Here also must be referred the seraphic trisagion: "Holy, holy, holy is Jehovah God of Hosts" (Is. 6:3). For although this threefold repetition can denote the unwearied assiduity of the heavenly inhabitants in

praising God and the excellency of the divine holiness, still this does not hinder it from being considered as also designating a sacred Triad. The latter may be gathered from this—that these are ascriptions to Jehovah, the plurality of whose persons is implied even from this—not only that he says, "Who will go for us" (Is. 6:8), but also that the mandate issued there is to be attributed not only to the Father, but also to the Son and Holy Spirit (from a comparison of Jn. 12:41 and Acts 28:25, where the things spoken here of Jehovah are attributed to the Son and the Holy Spirit, who consequently are understood to be designated in this trisagion). To no purpose does Volkelius endeavor to destroy the argument from those passages where a threefold repetition is found (as Jer. 27:4; 22:9; Ezk. 21:32) because it is not founded simply upon the repetition, but upon that in connection with other circumstances of the text.

XII. Fifth, to these must be added those passages from which the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is proved (of which we will treat hereafter when we take up their divinity). These would have no force, unless a Trinity of persons in unity of essence had been connotated.

XIII. Sixth, there is not one Old Testament and another New Testament God (as the Marcionites and Manicheans formerly pretended), but one and the same revealed in both as the sole object of faith and worship. Under the New Testament, he has revealed himself as one in essence and three in persons. Therefore he must necessarily have been revealed to the Jews as such and known and worshipped by them. Otherwise they would not have worshipped the true God who is no other than the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit (because he who has not the Son has not the Father either, 1 Jn. 2:23).

XIV. Finally, if the Trinity was not revealed in the Old Testament, the orthodox thus far (the ancient as well as the more modern) have labored falsely to prove it from the Old Testament (which cannot without grievous injustice be charged upon so many great men and faithful servants of God). Nor ought it to be said that we can now indeed gather this from the Old Testament assisted by the light of the gospel; but that it could not be done equally by the fathers. For although we confess that the light of the New Testament serves in a great measure to illuminate for us the obscurity of the ancient oracles, yet it cannot be denied that God, who condescended to reveal them to the fathers for their instruction and consolation, adapted them to their comprehension so that they might from them be instructed in this mystery (as far as was necessary for their salvation). Otherwise to no purpose were these things revealed to them.

XV. Although the Jews of our day refuse to acknowledge this mystery, it does not follow that it was unknown under the Old Testament (no more than the various other mysteries which are denied by them now, although it is certain that they were formerly revealed). For the knowledge of a thing ought not to be measured by the ignorance of this or that subject, but by the revelation made in the word. In addition, the modern Jews, bearing a veil of unbelief over their hearts and bewitched by the nefarious hatred with which they persecute our Messiah, voluntarily shut their eyes to that light which the ancient believers, not blinded by prejudice, contemplated with great consolation, assisted by the Holy Spirit.

TWENTY-SEVENTH QUESTION

Can the divine persons be distinguished from the essence, and from each other, and how?

The persons may be distinguished from the essence.

I. A Trinity of divine persons having been established, we must now treat of their distinction both from the essence itself and from each other. The persons are manifestly distinct from the essence because the essence is one only, while the persons are three. The former is absolute, the latter are relative; the former is communicable (not indeed as to multiplication, but as to identity), the latter are incommunicable; the former is a something broader and the latter are narrower. For although the essence is adequate to the three persons taken together, yet it is broader than each one of them because each person has indeed the whole divinity, but not adequately and totally (if it is right so to speak), i.e., not to the exclusion of the others because it is still communicable to more. The former is the common principle of external operations, which are undivided and common to the three persons; the latter are the principle of internal operations, which belong to the single persons mutually related to each other.

II. About the nature of this distinction theologians are not agreed. Some maintain that it is real; others formal; others virtual and eminent (of reasoned ratiocination, which although it may not be on the part of the thing, still may have its foundation in the thing); others personal; others, finally, modal. We think these various notions ought not to be troubled and cut to the quick since, being drawn from human and finite things, they can but very imperfectly adumbrate this mystery. It is better to be satisfied with this general notion that there is a distinction, although what and how great it is cannot be comprehended and expressed by us.

Not essentially, but modally.

III. Now although all these species of distinction come far short of the sublimity of this great mystery, still no one seems to us to approach nearer to it than the modal distinction (*distinctione modali*) by which the mode is said to be distinguished from some thing. For the personal properties by which the persons are distinguished from the essence are certain modes by which it may be characterized; not indeed formally and properly (as modes are said to be in created things, which as finite can be differently affected and admit modes really distinct and posterior to the thing modified, which cannot fall on the infinite and most perfect essence of God); but eminently and analogically, all imperfection being removed. Thus the person may be said to differ from the essence not really (*realiter*), i.e., essentially (*essentialiter*) as thing and thing, but modally (*modaliter*)—as a mode from the thing (*modus a re*).

IV. Hence it follows that there is no composition in God because composition arises only from diverse things. Here we do not have a thing and a thing, but a thing and the modes of the thing by which it is not compounded but distinguished. Again, composition belongs to those things which are related to each other as power and act (which cannot be granted here). Nor can the term composition be applied to God without implying imperfection.

V. Whatever is in God essential and absolute is God himself (such are the divine attributes, power, wisdom, justice, etc.). But whatever is in God personal,

relative and modal may not immediately in every way be identified with the divine essence. It is indeed God in the concrete, but not in the abstract. It is God the Father or God the Son or God the Holy Spirit, but cannot be called formally the divinity itself.

VI. While infinity is an essential property belonging to the divinity, it is not necessary that it should be properly ascribed to the personalities. It suffices that they be called modes of the infinite essence.

VII. The wisdom and power of God taken precisely and essentially are attributes which are identified with the divinity. Yet they are spoken of the Son and the Holy Spirit personally, and relatively as they are affected by the personalities of the Son and the Holy Spirit.

VIII. The distinction of the persons from each other seems to be greater than from the essence. For the essence can be predicated of the person, nor is there granted an opposition between the person and the essence in the exercised act or in the concrete. Thus it may be said, this person is not God, for the Father is God, the Son is God, etc., although in the signified act and in the abstract, a person is not the essence. But the persons cannot be mutually predicated of each other, for the Father cannot be called the Son or the Son the Father.

In explaining the distinction between the persons Sabellianism must be avoided.

IX. In explaining this distinction two extremes must be avoided—the sources of the most grevious heresies. On the one hand, there is Sabellianism, introduced about the year 260 by Sabellius, the Pentapolitan of the city of Ptolemais in Egypt. He was followed afterwards by Praxeas, an Asiatic, and Hermogenes, an African. In a latter age, Michael Servetus restored this error, maintaining a distinction only of reason between the persons, so as to make only one person (who on account of various effects may be called now the Father, now the Son, and then the Holy Spirit). On the other hand, there is the Tritheism of Philoponus and Valentine Gentilis (who from the three persons make three eternal, unequal spirits, essentially distinct from each other).

X. The orthodox hold a middle ground. Against Sabellius, they deny that the distinction of reason alone has place here because the Father is another than the Son and the Son than the Father (on the part of the thing beyond the operation of our conception). Against the Tritheists, they reject the real (*realem*) or essential distinction because although there are more persons than one mutually distinct, yet there is only one essence. But they hold to a modal (*modalem*) distinction because as the persons are constituted by personal properties as incommunicable modes of subsisting, so they may properly be said to be distinguished by them.

XI. Although theologians may seem in some measure to differ from each other here (some urging a real, others only a modal distinction), yet they are easily reconciled. Those who say that they differ really are nevertheless unwilling to express it as a real major distinction (*distinctionem realem majorem*) which exists between things and things (as if there was in the Trinity a difference of things or one and another essence, which would be opposed to the unity and simplicity of the divine essence). But they say it is only a real minor distinction (*distinctionem realem minorem*, as the Scholastics have it) which exists between a thing and the mode of the thing or between the modes themselves, which coincides with the modal distinction held by others. Although in God there is not one and another

thing (i.e., different essences), still there is one and another subject (a difference of persons).

XII. To authorize this distinction in the deity, it is not necessary that there should be any adequate or equal example among creatures. It is sufficient if there is anything similar or analogous as a foundation; yea, it would even be sufficient to attend to the persons themselves which would be distinct only in name (as Sabellius held) if there were no real modal distinction.

XIII. Things incommunicable to each other (*allēlois*) can be said to differ really (i.e., not only by reason); but it does not immediately follow that they differ essentially and specifically. The persons differ from each other in the first manner, not in the second.

XIV. These modes of subsisting (*tropoi hyparxeōs*) by which the persons are distinguished from each other may well be called real (*reales*) because they are not a work of reason, but imply something positive on the part of the thing (by which the persons are constituted and distinguished from each other). Yet they cannot well be called either substantial (*substantiales*) or accidental (*accidentales*) since this division applies only to a finite being and indeed to things, not to modes. If at any time, they are said to be substantial, this is done improperly with respect to the subject modified (*subjecti modificati*) (if we may so speak) and not with respect to the form or quiddity of the modes themselves.

XV. But although these modes are wont to be explained mostly negatively by incommunicability, it does not follow that nothing positive is meant, but indicates only a bare negation of the conjunction of the divine essence with any other thing in order to constitute one self-existent thing (*suppositum*). That negative term implies positively the ultimate complement by which the thing is so complete in itself, as that it cannot be further united with or communicated to any other. Hence that communicability is founded upon something positive, which is formally constitutive of the person, and not upon something negative. Otherwise the conception of the Trinity would be purely negative, and the three persons of the Trinity in their personal being would be constituted and be mutually distinguished from each other by negation alone, and the personal internal works would have only a negative principle. Since these cannot stand, we are necessitated to say that the mode of subsisting in the divinity superadds something positive to the unity of the divine essence. Now although we cannot easily conceive what that something positive is, it ought not, therefore, to be said to consist in a mere negation.

The distinction of persons is found: (1) in the persons themselves as to order.

XVI. This distinction of the persons may be principally observed in two things: (1) within (*intus*), in the persons themselves; (2) without (*foris*) in their operations. First, as to the persons, with respect to order, because the Father is proposed in Scripture as the first person, who is from no one; the Son as the second, who is from the Father; and the Holy Spirit as the third who is from the Father and the Son. With respect to that order a certain preeminence (*hyperochē*) is attributed by theologians to the Father, not indeed as to essence and deity (because the persons being consubstantial [*homoousioi*] the highest equality exists among them), but as to mode (both in subsisting and in working): in subsisting, because both as to order and as to origin, he precedes the

Son and the Holy Spirit (as having no principle either of order or of origin, but existing from himself—not positively, but negatively). In this sense, he is called by the fathers "the fountain of diety" (*pēgaia theotōtos*), not absolutely as to existence, but respectively as to the communication of it. In working (*operando*), because the order of operating follows the mode of subsisting. Hence the Father operates from himself, but the Son from the Father.

And personal properties.

XVII. Second, as to personal properties—which are not common to the single persons, but singular to each person (and so incommunicable because they agree with the persons as persons and constitute the very incommunicability of the persons). Thus to the Father is ascribed *agennēsia;* to the Son *gennēsis;* to the Holy Spirit *ekporeusis*. The Father is said to be self-begotten (*autogennētos*)—not affirmatively (otherwise he would be the principle of himself and prior and posterior to himself), but negatively (because he is unbegotten, *agennētos*). As Athanasius explains this in the Athanasian Creed (*ap' oudevos esti poiētos, oude men ktistos oude gennētos*), "He is made of none, neither created nor begotten," in contradistinction to the Son (who although not created or made, still is begotten from the Father) (*Symbolum Quicunque*, PG 28.1587). So the Son is said to be from the Father by generation; not with respect to essence and absolutely as God, but with respect to person and reduplicatively (*reduplicative*) as Son. The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son by spiration; for generation and spiration are communicative of the essence to the term of personality.

XVIII. Because these personal and characteristic properties are usually expressed by the relative names of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, it happens that they may well be said also to be distinguished from each other by relations (not indeed predicamental, which are accidental, but transcendental). For as to each person there is a peculiar subsistence and a peculiar property, so also to them singly there is a peculiar relation. Now although these relations can be called real (*reales*) on the part of the foundation (which is constituted in the internal operations because there is a real difference between the persons, and the Father is really distinct from the Son); still they cannot be called real beings (*realia*, as the Scholastics term them) because they are not absolute entities, but only modifications and characters of the essence.

XIX. Yet the persons are so distinguished by these relations as to be not so much principles constitutive of the persons, as declarative of them *a posteriori;* to wit, inasmuch as they are regarded in their external and respective being. So paternity (which is the relation of the Father to the Son) notifies to us the first person, filiation the second, spiration the third. And although there may be granted in the Father two relations—paternity and spiration—yet the Father is not distinguished into two persons. Besides what is common to the Father and the Son cannot be a distinguishing property (*diakritikē*) of the Father, only the opposed relations here make the distinction (which does not occur in paternity and spiration).

2. In the external works.

XX. Second, the distinction is collected from the works of the persons. For although the external works are undivided and equally common to the single persons (both on the part of the principle and on the part of the accomplishment), yet they are distinguished by order and by terms. For the order of operating follows the order of subsisting. As therefore the Father is from himself,

so he works from himself; as the Son is from the Father, so he works from the Father (here belong the words of Christ, "the Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do," Jn. 5:19). As the Holy Spirit is from both, so he works from both. They also differ in terms as often as any divine operation is terminated on any person. So the voice heard from heaven is terminated on the Father, incarnation on the Son and the appearance in the form of a dove on the Holy Spirit.

Twenty-Eighth Question: The Deity of the Son

Is the Son true and eternal God, coessential and coeternal with the Father? We affirm against Socinus.

I. That the divine majesty and glory of the Son of God, our Redeemer, may be established against those most pestilent heretics (who with execrable impiety oppose it), the state of the question must be properly laid down so that the things irrelevant (*exagōnia*) and uncontroverted may be separated from the controverted. Thus also the genuine opinion of those who are wont often to conceal it under ambiguous words (in order to impose upon the more simple) may be ascertained.

Statement of the question.

II. The question is not whether the Son is a divine person and whether he may be called God (for the adversaries profess to believe this). Hence Smalcius wrote a treatise *De Divinitate Jesu Christi* (1608) and *De Christo vero et Naturali Dei Filio* (1616). He also says, "We do not deny that the son is a person and divine" (*Refutatio Thesium D. Wolfgangi Frantzii*, Disp. I [1614], p. 5). And Socinus: "We say that we acknowledge Christ to be the natural son of God" ("Responsio ad libellum Jacobi Wuieki Jesuitae," chap. 5 in *Opera Omnia* [1656], 2:569). Thus they often ascribe to Christ such things as seem to prove his true divinity. Still if we search more deeply into their sense, it will readily appear that they are only words and expressions devised to raise a smoke, so that they may seem to agree with us in this primary head of the Christian religion (although in reality they differ from us most widely). For whatever they predicate of Christ, it is certain that they do not rise beyond his human nature. They ascribe to him only a precarious and dependent divinity (with respect to his miraculous conception and divinity or with respect to the office imposed upon him). But they have no reference to his consubstantiality (*homoousian*) with the Father which is the real hinge of the question.

III. In order then to clear away all this smoke, the question ought not to be conceived—whether the Son is God; but—whether he is true and eternal God, coessential with the Father. The question is not whether he can be called the natural son of God in such a sense as to leave his divinity precarious and dependent upon him by reason of preeminence, authority, dominion and office. Rather the question is whether he is the proper Son who received from the Father by ineffable generation the same numerical essence with the Father, not in time, but from eternity. The Socinians (with the ancient Arians) deny this (Ostorodt, *Unterrichtung . . . hauptpuncten der Christlichen Religion* 6, 7 [1612], pp. 38-56; Volkelius, *De vera Religione* 5.10 [1630], pp. 420-56); but we affirm it.

IV. The Remonstrants evidently lean towards the Socinians. For although they may wish to appear to differ from them by asserting the generation of the Son, yet in explaining it they sufficiently betray their agreement denying the consubstantiality (*homoousian*) of the Son with the Father and maintaining that the Son (not only in order, but also in dignity and power) differs from the Father and is not coordinate and consubstantial with him, but only subordinate (as Episcopius has it, "Institutiones theologica," 4.32 and 4.35 in *Opera Theologica* [1678], pp. 332-34, 340-44).

The deity of the Son may be proved: (1) from the names of God.

V. That the Son is true God, both consubstantial (*homoousion*) and eternal with the Father, these four things ascribed to him (and belonging to God alone) invincibly prove: (1) the names of God; (2) the attributes of God; (3) the works of God; (4) the worship due to God. First, the names; frequently, both in the Old and in the New Testament, he is called God ("God, thy God, hath anointed thee," Ps. 45:7*) which is proved to be applicable to Christ from Heb. 1:8, 9 where God the Father is distinguished from God the Son, not essentially (*ousiōdōs*), but hypostatically (*hypostatikōs*). He is called "his God," not by reason of nature, but by reason of office and economy. In Is. 9:6, the child and the Son given to us is called "the mighty God." The thing itself exclaims that this title (with the others accompanying it) is not a description of God calling and imposing the name (as the Rabbis contend), but of the Messiah called in order to designate his majesty and glory. In Jer. 23:5, 6, the Branch of David is said to be called "Jehovah our Righteousness." That this must be understood of the Messiah is proved by the connection, the appellation of "Branch" and "King," and the enumeration of his benefits. A similar passage occurs in Jer. 33:16. The passage in Is. 7:14 belongs here; the son whom the virgin shall conceive and bear shall be called "Immanuel"; not only because through and in him the supreme God is truly with us, i.e., favors and assists us (as Socinus holds, for thus it would not be a name of the Messiah and yet that it is may be gathered from Is. 8:8; but rather an undetermined enunciation [which is foreign to the mind of the Holy Spirit]). He is the God who is with us (as Mt. 1:23* interprets it, "God with us" [*meth' hēmōn ho Theos*]). In Mal. 3:1, he is called "the Lord" who shall come to his temple (which the evangelists indicate is to be spoken of the Messiah, Mk. 1:2; Lk. 1:76). Now who is the Lord to whom the temple belongs by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*), but God? Hence the day of his coming is called the great and dreadful day of Jehovah (Mal. 4:5).

VI. This may be still further confirmed by a comparison of the various passages of the Old and New Testaments in which what is said in the Old of Jehovah, the God of Israel, the Creator of heaven and earth, is applied in the New to Christ, the Son of God (cf. Num. 14:22; 21:5, 6 and Ps. 95:9 with 1 Cor. 10:9; Ps. 102:26 with Heb. 1:10, 11; Is. 6:9, 10 with Jn. 12:40, 41; Is. 45:23 with Rom. 14:11; Joel 2:32 with Rom. 10:13; Ps. 68:18 with Eph. 4:8, 9).

VII. In the New Testament, he is still more clearly called God. "The Word was God" (Jn. 1:1), which cannot be understood of a secondary and factitious God by reason of office (as the adversaries wish), but of the true God by reason of nature. He does not say *egeneto* (as in v. 14 when speaking of the incarnation, which he had before noticed); but *ēn* ("he was") to designate his eternal existence. Again,

he must be God in the same manner as he must be in the beginning before the creation of all things (v. 1), as its author (v. 3). This applies to no one but the supreme God. Third, it is not credible that John in the very first words of his history would have been willing to use the name of God improperly and ambiguously without adding any explanation and thus be the means of drawing believers readily into a most dangerous error—to believe this Word to be true God, while yet he is not. Now although his Word may be said to have been with God (personally considered, i.e., the Father, in which sense he could not be the same person with whom he is said to be), this does not militate against his being God, essentially the same with the Father.

VIII. He is called "the true God, and eternal life" (1 Jn. 5:20), which words must not be referred to the Father, but to Christ (as is evident both from the pronoun *houtos*, which refers to Christ the antecedent immediately preceding, and from the scope of the apostle, which is to teach that Christ is come to lead us to the knowledge of and communion with the true God). We therefore are in that true God because we are in his Son Jesus Christ, since Jesus Christ himself is also "the true God and eternal life." A confirmation arises from the fact that the expression "eternal life" is never applied by John to the Father, but repeatedly to the Son (Jn. 1:4; 11:25; 1 Jn. 1:2; 5:11, 12).

IX. He is called "God blessed for ever" (Rom 9:5). This cannot be referred by a doxological (*doxologikēn*) apostrophe to the Father because neither the thing demands, nor will the series of words admit it. The article with the participle (*ho ōn*) is relative; not beginning a new sentence, but continuing one already begun. Nor can it be referred to the Father, but to Christ, the immediately preceding antecedent. Then, the limitation *kata sarka* (which is opposed to the blessed God) shows that the two natures in Christ are designated: the human (according to which he descended from the fathers) and the divine (according to which he is God, blessed for ever). He is called "the great God" (Tit. 2:13)—certainly not the Father, but the Son because only one article is prefixed to the words God and Savior (which would not be the case if they were two persons). *Epiphaneia* is never attributed to the Father, but always to Christ. He, whose advent we look for, is said to have given himself for us (Tit. 2:14), which applies to Christ alone.

X. The exclamation of Thomas to which he gives utterance after seeing and touching Christ ("My Lord and my God" [*ho Kyrios mou, kai ho Theos mou*, Jn. 20:28]) necessarily refers to Christ; nor can it without violence be wrested from this application because it is preceded by the words "he said unto him" (*eipen autō*, viz., to Christ) to approve his faith by this notable confession as if he would say, "Thou art truly he, my Lord and my God." Hence we find the prepositive article (*ho*) and not the mark of admiration (ō). So he is said to be "God manifested in the flesh" (1 Tim. 3:16) and "God, who purchased the church with his own blood" (Acts 20:28) which can be said of no other than the Son, who assumed our flesh and by his blood acquired eternal redemption for us.

XI. Nor must we omit the celebrated passage Phil. 2:6 where "the form of God" is ascribed to Christ—"who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God." Hence various arguments are drawn: (1) because Christ is said to be in "the form of God" (which could not apply to him if he were not God by nature). For as the form of a servant opposed to it necessarily denotes the human nature in a servile condition, so the form of God fitly designates the

divine essence shining (*coruscantem*) with glory and majesty. (2) Because he is said to be "equal with God" both as to nature (because the same with the Father) and as to person (because he is his most perfect image) and as to state (because he enjoyed the same glory from eternity). (3) Because he was in the form of God before he was in the form of a servant, i.e., before he was born and was made a man, which the word *hyparchein* indicates. In vain does Socinus wish "the form of God" to be referred to the glory and "the power of miracles" which Christ laid aside in his passion. For then others possessed of the gift of miracles might be said to be in the form of God (which not only is not said, but cannot be said). The antithesis of the form of a servant does not prove that the form of God is only some external appearance and quality. Indeed it evinces the contrary; for as a similar condition could not be except in the human nature, so the form of God can be only in the essence of God. Nor does this emptying, ascribed to Christ, consist in the absolute deposition of the divine form, but only in the concealing (*occultatione*) of it under the veil of the flesh in this state of humility. Although *isos* sometimes means only similar, not equal, it cannot be taken in that sense here. For such an *isotēs* is meant as arises from the possession of the form of God (which imports not only a certain similitude, but a true equality and identity).

XII. Although the name of God can improperly, restrictedly and in the plural be attributed to creatures (as to angels and magistrates who are sometimes called "gods"), yet never is it properly, absolutely and in the singular given to anyone but the true God. Hence the Son of God, to whom it is thus given, must be true and eternal God.

2. From the attributes: eternity.

XIII. The same deity is proved by the divine attributes, which being proper to God alone to the exclusion of creatures, he cannot but be God of whom they are predicated. Such is eternity, which is often attributed to him; as when it is said, "The Lord possessed me [Wisdom] in the beginning of his way . . . I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was" (Prov. 8:22, 23*). We will prove hereafter that this Wisdom is a person. It is also said in Mic. 5:2 that "his goings forth have been from the days of eternity." Here a twofold going forth is mentioned: the one future in time at Bethlehem, from the fathers as to his human nature—"out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be ruler"; the other past (or better, eternal) by generation from the Father according to the divine nature—"whose goings forth have been from of old, from the days of eternity." Thus no one might suppose he began to exist just when he was born. He is called "the first, and the last, who is, who was, and who is to come" (Rev. 1:11* and 4*); "the Father of eternity" (Is. 9:6); having neither beginning of days, nor end of life (Heb. 7:3). For these are such things as cannot fall on a finite and temporal duration.

XIV. Here pertains the passage where the Word is said to have been "in the beginning" (Jn. 1:1); not, certainly, in the beginning of the gospel or of the new creation (as the adversaries maintain), but in the beginning of time. For no other beginning can be meant here than that of which Moses speaks (Gen. 1:1)—to which John manifestly alludes (as the scope demonstrates, which is to describe the person of Christ partly from this, that he was before his incarnation—thence from the beginning—partly from this, that he was made through the incarnation, where he uses the word *egeneto* and not *ēn*). Then again the thing itself evinces this. For

who can think it probable that John meant only this, that the Word (i.e., Christ the orator of the Father) was just in the beginning of the gospel (i.e., when he began to preach the gospel)? So absurd a sense is unbecoming the Holy Spirit.

XV. "Before Abraham was, I am" (Jn. 8:58), which the adversaries falsely apply to predestination, so that he may be said to have been before Abraham by reason of predestination. But he was not treating of the predestination of Christ, but of his real existence, since indeed the question was whether Christ could say that Abraham had seen his day (which the Jews of that time denied concerning Christ and Christ affirmed, drawing his argument from the fact that he already existed before Abraham was). Much less can that other unblushing corruption of Socinus be admitted, who interprets these words thus: "Before Abraham has become" (to wit, the father of many nations) "I exist." But it does not treat here of the time in which the nations were to be called, but of that in which Abraham lived (which they thought Christ, who was less than fifty years old, could not have preceded; not concerning the future, but the past). In the same sense Christ is said to have had glory with the Father before the world was (Jn. 17:5); not only because it was predestinated to him by the Father, but also because he actually possessed it from eternity (which he could not have done unless he had then existed). Grace, indeed, can be said to have been given to us by God through predestination before we were (2 Tim. 1:9), but no one can be said actually to have glory, save he who actually exists.

Immensity.

XVI. His deity is proved by immensity and omnipresence since he is said to be in the midst of his people wherever they may be gathered together (Mt. 18:20): "Lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world" (Mt. 28:20). Also "No man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man which is in heaven" (Jn. 3:13)—where Christ speaking on the earth says that he is in heaven. Now no one can be both in heaven and on earth at the same time, but he who fills heaven and earth. Nor can Socinus be listened to who changes the present into the past so as to make it mean the Son of man descended from heaven and was in heaven. This contradicts the words of Christ, *ho ōn en tō ouranō* ("the one which is in heaven"), which the thing itself declares to refer to his present existence in heaven even after he had descended from it and not to the past. Therefore he is said to have descended from heaven by incarnation, who always was in heaven by immensity.

Omnipotence.

XVII. Omnipotence is ascribed to him in Rev. 1:8 and 11:17 where he is called the Almighty (*pantokratōr*). In Jn. 5:17 he is said to do all things which the Father does; and in Heb. 1:3, to uphold all things by the word of his power. Nor, if the Son can do nothing of himself by reason of order and origin, does it immediately follow that his power is limited and dependent. For a diversity of order does not make a diversity of essence and virtue. In Mt. 28:18, all power is said to be given him, which necessarily supposes omnipotence; for he could not have all power in heaven and earth as Mediator, unless he has omnipotence as God.

Omniscience.

XVIII. Omniscience is predicated of him: "Lord, thou knowest all things" (Jn. 21:17); "Now are we sure that thou knowest all things" (Jn. 16:30). He is called the searcher of hearts (*kardiognōstēs*, Rev. 2:23); knows the very thoughts of the heart (Lk.

6:8; Jn. 2:24, 25). Nor can it be said that Christ has this by revelation because God keeps this to himself alone (1 K. 8:39). Christ is said to be ignorant of the day of judgment (Mk. 13:32), not as the Son of God, but as the Son of man (such as he seemed to his interrogators). And if the Father alone is said to know this, it does not exclude the knowledge of the Son and of the Spirit (who searches the deep things of God) no more than the Father can be said to be ignorant of himself, when it is said, "No one can know the Father, save the Son" (Mt. 11:27). The word "only" therefore does not absolutely exclude all, but those in a particular genus for whom it was better that they should not know it (viz., men) so that they might always be prepared and watchful; lest that day should surprise them sleeping and unprepared.

Immutability. XIX. Immutability: "the heavens shall perish; but thou remainest; thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail" (Heb. 1:11, 12). These words apply to the true God alone, as is evident from Ps. 102:26, 27 (from which the apostle quotes). So in Heb. 13:8, he is said to be "the same yesterday, today, and forever," with regard not only to doctrine and operations, but also to essence and person (because effects suppose their cause).

XX. Finally, the "fulness of the Godhead" is said to dwell in him (i.e., the essence with the attributes, Col. 2:9), and the life of God is attributed to him (Jn. 5:26). Nor if it is said to have been given him by the Father is his dignity therefore lessened, because this marks only order, not inferiority (since he received the same numerically with the Father, not from grace, but from nature; not in time, but from eternity).

3. From the divine works. XXI. Third, the same thing may be proved from the divine works ascribed to him: as creation, which God ascribed to himself alone (Is. 40:12; 44:24) and which demands infinite virtue. "When he prepared the heavens, I was there" (Prov. 8:27ff.)—where eternal Wisdom is speaking. "All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made" (Jn. 1:3). "He made the worlds" (Heb. 1:2). "Thou, Lord, hast laid the foundation of the earth" (Heb. 1:10). "By him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, thrones" (Col. 1:16, 17). (2) The creation, conservation and government of the universe; because "he upholds all things by the word of his power" (Heb. 1:3); "By him all things consist" (Col. 1:17); "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work" (Jn. 5:17). (3) The working of miracles which he performed either himself per se or by the instrumentality of the apostles (as appears everywhere in the gospels); and especially the resurrection of the dead (Jn. 5:21; 6:40) which prove Christ's absolute dominion over creatures. Hence he appeals to these works as unanswerable proofs of his divinity (Jn. 5:36 and elsewhere).

XXII. The second creation cannot be meant in Jn. 1:3, as Socinus cavils. (1) John speaks absolutely and without any restriction which he is wont to use whenever he treats of the new creation. (2) He treats of the universal creation in which all things were made by him and without whom nothing was made. (3) He mentions the creation of the world which knew not Christ (Jn. 1:10); thus not so much of the church. (4) Paul extends that creation absolutely to all creatures, visible and invisible, and even to angels, and distinguishes the first creation from the second (concerning which he treats only in Col. 1:16-18*). And if all things

are said to have been created by the Son, this does not imply an instrumental cause (which cannot be in creation), but the principal efficient cause (just as all things are said to be by God [Rom. 11:36]; and the particle *dia* is often so taken [Gal. 1:1]). And not only "by him" (*di' autou*), as the principle, were all things created, but "for him" (*eis auton*), as the end (Col. 1:16), which does not belong to an instrument. Indeed all things are said to have been made "in him" (*en autō*), just as we are said to live, move, and have our being in him (*en autō*) (viz., God—Acts 17:28). And if creation is ascribed to the Father appropriatively, is it therefore denied to the Son (as the Father is not excluded from the work of redemption, although it is ascribed peculiarly to the Son)?

XXIII. The power of working miracles was not adventitious and ministerial to him (like that of the apostles and prophets), but proper and innate because it is said to have flowed from him (Lk. 6:19; 8:46). (2) The apostles deny that they wrought miracles by their own power, but in the name of Christ (Acts 4:7, 10, i.e., by his power and authority). They sought that power from Christ (Acts 9:34). If Christ sometimes used prayers in the working of miracles (as Jn. 11:41), it does not follow that he had no power of his own to perform them. For he did this not from a defect of potency, but partly according to the voluntary economy by which he submitted himself to the Father in his mediatoral office and referred all things to him; and partly to accommodate himself to those in whose presence he wrought the miracles—to teach them that all things are to be obtained by prayer.

XXIV. The works of grace and of redemption are also ascribed to Christ: such as election (Jn. 13:18); redemption (Acts 20:28); calling (Jn. 10:16; Mt. 9:13); sanctification (Eph. 5:26); the mission of the Holy Spirit (Jn. 16:7, 14; 15:26); defense against all attacks of enemies and the bestowal of eternal life (Jn. 10:10, 28); the vivification and resurrection of the dead (Jn. 5:21); and the raising of himself, which is adduced as an invincible proof of his divinity (Jn. 2:19; 10:18; Rom. 1:4); the universal judgment (Jn. 5:22; Acts 17:31). For all these belong to the true God alone. Nor ought it to be said that these things are ascribed to Christ as the instrumental cause by which the Father works. Most of these works require that they be done immediately by God without the intervention of any instrument. Although Christ may act here as Mediator (who by reason of economy is inferior to the Father), he does not cease to be equal to him as to power and essence and performs these things as Lord. Speaking of the constitution of the church (Heb. 3:3, 4), the apostle says that Christ built that house and so proves beyond contradiction that he was counted worthy of far more honor than Moses, who was only a faithful servant in it. He immediately adds: "for every house is builded by someone; but he that built all things is God" (to wit, intimating most clearly that Christ, who built the church, is God). Thus he is called by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*) the Lord and Husband of the church (Eph. 4:5; 5:25), which Is. 54:5 teaches pertains to God alone, the Holy One of Israel.

4. From worship.

XXV. Fourth, the religious worship due to God alone (on account of his infinite power, glory and majesty) is given to him. Faith—"Ye believe in God, believe also in me" (Jn. 14:1); hope—"Blessed are all they that put their trust in him" (Ps. 2:12); and "cursed be the man that trusteth in man" (Jer. 17:5); adoration—"Let all the angels worship him" (Heb. 1:6); "Kiss the Son" (Ps. 2:12); "The Father hath committed all judgment unto the Son; that all men should honor the Son, even as

they honor the Father" (Jn. 5:22, 23*); "There is given him a name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, and every tongue confess that Jesus is Lord, to the glory of the Father" (Phil. 2:9-11*). His deity is proved from invocation, because grace and peace and other spiritual blessings (which can be expected from God alone) are sought from Christ no less than from the Father in the epistles of Paul. Believers are described as "callers upon the name of Jesus Christ our Lord" (Acts 7:59; 9:14; 1 Cor. 1:2). Glory and honor—every creature is induced to ascribe glory to the Lamb no less than to the Father: "Blessing, and honor, and glory and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever" (Rev. 5:13).

XXVI. In vain is it objected here: (1) that faith can be terminated on a creature also because the Israelites are said to have "believed God and Moses" (Ex. 14:31); this does not refer to the person of Moses, but to his doctrine; (2) that Christ is the secondary and not the primary object of faith for a subordination is not admissible in the object of faith, nor can faith and religious worship be divided between the Creator and creatures anymore than divinity—"That is my name: and my glory will I not give to another, neither my praise to graven images" (Is. 42:8). Nor ought it to be said that the honor of God is not alienated when we worship anyone according to his command, for this would be done for the sake of God alone and the honor would be terminated on God himself. For the supposition is always false that such honor can be lawfully exhibited to a creature, since faith and adoration demand an object infinite, omniscient, omnipotent and possessed of eternal glory (which can fall on no creature, even the most perfect).

XXVII. But although Christ must be adored as Mediator, it does not follow that his divinity cannot be satisfactorily inferred from his adoration. For the Mediator in his very conception indicates a divine person which the economical minority does not destroy. He is not to be adored directly as man reduplicatively, i.e., with respect to the human nature (which is not an adorable object of itself, but specifically he who is man may be adored), but with respect to the divine nature. Thus three things are with propriety to be distinguished here: the object of adoration, which is the person of Christ; the foundation, which is the divine nature; and the adjunct, without which the adoration is not made (viz., the human nature).

XXVIII. To these four classes of arguments we can add others also. (1) From the equality of the Son with the Father (Jn. 5:17, 18), since Christ says that he continually worked with the Father. The Jews interpreted equality of essence and power and therefore endeavored to kill him as a blasphemer because he said that God was his Father, making himself equal with God. This inference Christ was so far from reproving and denying that, on the contrary, he confirmed it still further by various arguments both from the equality of life and of living essence—"as the Father hath life in himself; so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself" (Jn. 5:26). From equality of operation—"for what things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son in like manner (*homoiōs*)" (Jn. 5:19); and from the equality of honor and worship due to God alone—"that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father" (Jn. 5:23). These imply absolute equality, and not only limited with respect to operation (as the adversaries maintain), but on this account the more—that equality of operation with

God presupposes necessarily equality of essential power and therefore of essence itself. Nor is it an objection that it is said "he can do nothing of himself" (Jn. 5:19), for this denotes, it is true, the order of operating (which follows the order of subsisting), but does not prove the inequality of essence or power. Otherwise it would not be said that he operates in like manner (*homoiōs*).

XXIX. (2) From his unity with the Father—"I and my Father are one" (Jn. 10:30). To refer this only to unity of consent and not of essence is to do violence to the words of Christ: (a) because Christ reasons from the unity of power to the unity of essence (Jn. 10:28, 29), which two do not differ in God; (b) because the Jews wished to stone Christ, not on account of the unity of will, but on account of the unity of essence with God (which in their opinion he blasphemously ascribed to himself)—"For a good work we stone thee not; but for blasphemy; and because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God" (Jn. 10:33). (c) Christ does not recall and correct what he had said, but defends and confirms it in the following verses by an argument drawn from magistrates, who are called gods in Scripture. Hence he deduces not only from comparison, but even from the lesser to the greater (*a minori ad majus*); if political magistrates are called gods on account of some temporal office entrusted to them, how much more can I (whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world clothed with the office of Mediator, demanding divine virtue, and who do the works of the Father, so that the Father is in me and I in the Father, which can be said of no creature) lawfully call myself God and the Son of God? His sanctification and mission into the world is brought forward by Christ, not as the antecedent cause of filiation and *a priori* (as if on that account only he was to be called Son), but as an argument and sign *a posteriori* whence it might be inferred.

XXX. (3) From the mediatorial office of Christ. A mediator ought to be a Prophet to illuminate the mind (not only externally, but also internally) and incline the heart; a King to defend the church against the assaults of Satan and the world, and by his Spirit to govern it powerfully; a Priest to satisfy the infinite divine justice by the infinite merit of his death and obedience and to purchase eternal redemption for us. All these could not be done by a mere man, but demanded one possessed of infinite essence and power (as will be proved in its place). This very thing also can be invincibly deduced from the filiation of Christ, as will be demonstrated in the following question.

Sources of explanation.

XXXI. Christ was made Lord after the resurrection (Acts 2:36), not in essential dominion (which he had even from the foundation of the world as the maker of all things [Heb. 1:2] and inasmuch as he is the Word [*Logos*]), but in personal and economical dominion. This belongs to him because he is the God-man (*theanthrōpos*) (and indeed not simply, for long before, David had called him "Lord" [Ps. 110:1]; nor as to its authority and foundation, which he had from the beginning, but relatively and by reason of the full manifestation and inauguration).

XXXII. He who is constituted heir by a gift of grace (not by propriety of nature) is not true God. But the Son is not so called heir because he is the proper Son of God; not the Son because heir, but heir because the Son. Again he is called heir by reason of the dominion he obtains over all things.

XXXIII. He who is distiniguished from God considered essentially (*ousiōdōs*), is not God; but Christ is distinguished from God considered only hypostatically

(*hypostatikōs*) inasmuch as the name of God is by appropriation given to the Father, not to the exclusion of the Son and the Holy Spirit, but economically. For Christ holds the office of Mediator and the Holy Spirit that of Comforter, while the Father as the first person sustains the majesty of the deity.

XXXIV. He who is set forth as a mere man, cannot be God; but not he who is set forth as a true man because he can be both—man and God. The passages which predicate humanity of Christ assert its truth, but do not deny his divinity. When Christ is denominated from the humanity, divinity is not therefore excluded (as when the divinity is asserted, the humanity is not excluded because the denominations attributed to the person can be drawn from either nature).

XXXV. A thing can be received either in time, or from eternity, or from grace, or from nature. The former method of receiving truly argues inferiority and inequality of nature and cannot fall on the true God; but the latter can belong to the divine persons without any inequality because the order of subsisting of the persons does not take away the equality of essence. So the Son can be said to have received all things from the Father either as the Word (*Logos*) (by a communication of the same essence from eternity) or as God-man (*theanthrōpos*) and Mediator in time by the imposition of office (in respect to which he confesses that he is less than the Father).

XXXVI. A principle may be either of communication or of inchoation (*inchoationis*); the Son as a principle of communication (viz., the Father), but not of inchoation because the essence was communicated to him from eternity.

XXXVII. Christ is called *pōtotokos*, not *prōtoktistos*—"the firstborn of every creature" (Col. 1:15) by reason of dominion (because as all things were made by him, so he had authority over all); but not by reason of creation (as if he was the first produced among creatures). Otherwise it would not be said he was even in the beginning and made all things. In this sense, he is called "the beginning of the creation of God" (Rev. 3:14); not passive (as if he was the first creature), but active because from him all creatures take their origin as Paul explains in the place cited.

XXXVIII. The Father is said to be "one God" (1 Cor. 8:5, 6), not in relation to the Son or the Holy Spirit, but to idols. This appears from the antithesis "an idol is nothing in the world, and there is none other God but one" (1 Cor. 8:4), and 1 Cor. 8:5, 6 which treat of those who are called gods in heaven and in earth. (2) As one Lord does not exclude the Father from lordship, since he is called the "Lord of Lords" (1 Tim. 6:15); therefore neither does one God (the Father) exclude from deity the Son who is also said to be true God. The one God (the Father) and one Lord Jesus Christ are indeed distinguished from each other, but personally and not essentially.

XXXIX. When Christ denies that he is good contrasted with God, who alone is good (Mt. 19:17), this must not be understood absolutely, but relatively to the mind of the young man who looked upon him as a bare man (*psilon anthrōpon*). It is as if he would say, why do you call me good, since you do not esteem me as God, and no one is truly and perfectly good except God?

The Son is properly called Autotheos.

XL. Although the Son is from the Father, nevertheless he may be called God-of-himself (*autotheos*), not with respect to his person, but essence; not relatively as Son (for thus he is from the Father), but absolutely as God inasmuch as he has the divine essence existing from itself and not divided or produced from another essence (but not as having that

essence from himself). So the Son is God from himself although not the Son from himself. Hence it is evident how unjustly Genebrardus and other papists charged Calvin with heresy here. For in order to confute the heresy of Valentinus Gentilis (who attributed divine essence to the Father alone [whom therefore he called the primary God and *autotheon*] and said the Son and the Holy Spirit received their essence from the Father), he said that the Son no less than the Father is *autotheon*, but with respect to essence alone (which is no less self-essence [*autousia*] in the Son than in the Father), but not with respect to the person (which Bellarmine approves, "De Christo," 2.19 in *Opera* [1856], 1:217-19).

XLI. That Christ is said to have been born of a virgin, suffered and died, not to be everywhere present and to be less than the Father, shows indeed that he was a true man like to us in all things, but does not deny him to be God. Yea, he is so set forth as born from a virgin in time as to be begotten from God from eternity (Prov. 8:22). He is so less than the Father by reason of voluntary depression (*exinanitionis*) and assumed flesh as nevertheless to be equal to him with respect to eternal deity communicated to him from eternity (Jn. 5:18). He was so mortified in the flesh as to be quickened by the Spirit (1 Pet. 3:18).

Twenty-Ninth Question: The Eternal Generation of the Son

Was the Son of God begotten of the Father from eternity? We affirm.

I. The preceding question established the consubstantiality (*homoousian*) and essential identity of the Son with the Father. This question will demonstrate his personal distinction from him, his ineffable and eternal generation against the blasphemies of anti-Trinitarians.

Statement of the question.

II. The question is not whether Christ can be said to be begotten of God by the miraculous conception of the Holy Spirit; or whether he can be called the Son of God by a gracious communication of existence, power and divine glory (for this the adversaries readily grant and acknowledge no other cause of his filiation). But the question is whether he was begotten of God from eternity, and whether he may be called Son on account of the secret and ineffable generation from the Father. The Socinians blasphemously deny this; we affirm it.

III. But in order that the truth of this eternal generation may be built up better, something must be premised concerning its nature. Not that it can be conceived or explained by us. "For here the voice is silent, the mind fails; not only mine, but even that of angels," as Ambrose says (*Of the Christian Faith* 1.10*.64 [NPNF2, 10:212; PL 16.566]). Gregory Nazianzus puts a stop to our curiosity when he wishes it to be reverenced in silence: "The begetting of God is to be honored by silence; the great thing is for you to learn he was begotten" (*Theou gennēsis siōpē timasthō, mega soi to mathein hoti gegennētai*, *On the Son* 8 [NPNF2, 7:303; PG 36.84]). The words of Is. 53:8, although having another bearing, may be rightly used here—"Who shall declare his generation?" But only that it may be distinguished from human generation and be explained negatively rather than positively.

IV. As all generation indicates a communication of essence on the part of the begetter to the begotten (by which the begotten becomes like the begetter and

partakes of the same nature with him), so this wonderful generation is rightly expressed as a communication of essence from the Father (by which the Son possesses indivisibly the same essence with him and is made perfectly like him). Whatever may be the analogy between natural and human generations, and the supernatural and divine, still the latter is not to be measured by the former or to be tried by them because they greatly differ (whether we consider the principle, the mode or the end). For in physical generation, the principle is not only active, but also passive and material; but in the divine it is only active. In the former, a communication is made not of the whole essence, but only of a part which falls and is alienated from the begetter. In the latter, the same numerical essence is communicated without decision and alienation. In the one, the produced is not only distinct but also separate from the begetter because the begetter generates out of himself terminatively. In the other, the begetter generates in himself and not out of himself. Thus the begotten Son (although distinct) still is never divided from him. He is not only of a like (*homoiousios*), but also of the same essence (*homoousios*).

V. This generation was made without time (*achronōs*); not in time, but from eternity. Therefore not priority or posteriority of duration can be observed here, although there may be priority of order according to which the Son is from the Father, although not after the Father. (2) Without place (*achōristōs*) because the Father did not beget out of himself, but in the same essence. Hence the Word (*Logos*) is said to have been with God, and the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Father. (3) Without any passion (*apathōs*) or change, either in the Father or in the Son, since that he begat denotes no imperfection, but is rather the reception of all perfection. Although, therefore, with respect to the Father generation may well be called active, still it cannot well be called passive with respect to the Son because otherwise the Son could be said to be in the power of the begetter. Nor is there a difficulty in his being said to be begotten; for this, which is spoken after the manner of men (*anthrōpopathōs*), must be understood worthily of God (*theoprepōs*) by removing all imperfection. Hence what has place in transient and physical and material generation ought not to be transferred to the hyperphysical, immanent and divine.

VI. A person is properly said to generate a person because actions belong to self-existence (*suppositorum*); but not an essence to generate an essence because what begets and is begotten is necessarily multiplied (and thus the way would be paved to Tritheism). Essence indeed is communicated by generating; yet the generation, as it is originally made from the person, so it terminates on the person.

VII. That the Father begets the Son, and the Son is begotten, can both be said in a sound sense: the former with respect to generation considered in itself because the works of the Trinity inwards (such as to beget and to be begotten) are eternal and unceasing. Otherwise, if personal acts had an end, they would also have a beginning, and all mutation in God could not be denied. As therefore in work they are perfect, so in operation they are perpetual. Nor, moreover, can any imperfection of generation be inferred because even in nature there are things which are while in the act of becoming (as the rays of sun). The latter however is said better with respect to us to whom that which is in a state of becoming is imperfect, but that which is in actual being is perfect. Hence Scripture (in accordance with which we must speak) uses the past tense rather than the present (Ps. 2:7;

Prov. 8:22-31). The generation therefore may well be said to be terminated by a termination of perfection, not by a termination of duration, as the Scholastics express it. When the Son is said to be always begotten, the perfection of termination is not denied, but only the end of communication.

The generation of the Son may be proved from Ps. 2:7.

VIII. This generation may be proved: (1) from the remarkable oracle, "Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee" (Ps. 2:7)—which not only the apostles acknowledge to be spoken of the Messiah (Acts 4:25; 13:33; Heb. 1:5), but the Jews themselves (pressed by the force of truth) are compelled to confess. Now he is called the Son of God, not generally, but he who is such by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*) and to the exclusion even of the angels themselves. "For unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son" (as the apostle argues, Heb. 1:5). Consequently he is true and eternal God with the Father. For who but God could extend the bounds of his kingdom even to the ends of the earth (Ps. 2:8); break and dash in pieces like a potter's vessel kings and people (v. 9); whom the kings of the earth ought to kiss (i.e., religiously worship, vv. 11, 12); who has absolute power of life and death? Who, even when his wrath is kindled but a little, can destroy nations and princes; in whom trust is to be placed; and from whom happiness is to be expected, except the true and eternal God? To this Son is ascribed a generation, not temporal and physical, but hyperphysical and eternal—such as can belong to him who is the eternal Son of an eternal Father and so true God with him, by which he is exalted not only above men, but even above the angels themselves. Now, if he could be so called on account of a gracious communication of existence or of glory, this could be attributed not to him alone, but also to others (although in a different degree). Nor is the passage in Acts 13:33 an obstacle, where Paul seems to refer this oracle to the resurrection of Christ. For Ps. 2:7 is adduced by the apostle not so much to prove the resurrection of Christ (which he does, Acts 13:35 from Ps. 16:10), as to prove the fulfillment of the promise given to the fathers concerning the raising up of Christ and the sending of him into the world. These things are not to be opposed, but composed; not that this generation consists in his resurrection, since even from the beginning he was with God (Jn. 1:1), yea even from everlasting (Prov. 8:22), and God speaking from heaven at his baptism testified that he was his Son; but by reason of manifestation (*phanerōseōs*) and declaration *a posteriori* because he is made known by it (as Paul interprets when he says that "Christ was declared [*horisthenta*] to be the Son of God by the resurrection from the dead," Rom. 1:4) according to Scripture usage by which things are said to become or to be born when they are manifested (Prov. 17:17). Because, therefore, the resurrection was an irrefragable proof of his divinity and eternal filiation, the Holy Spirit, with the psalmist, could join both together and refer as much to the eternal generation as to its manifestation (which ought to be made in the resurrection). And Paul properly says that the oracle was fulfilled when its truth was exhibited, since by the resurrection the Father has most fully declared that he is really (*ontōs*) and peculiarly (*idiōs*) his own Son; even as James says that the oracle concerning the justification of Abraham by faith ("Abraham believed God and it was imputed to him for righteousness," 2:23) was fulfilled when he offered up his son; not because the justification just then took place through that obligation, but because

it was then declared. And so with regard to the word "today" (*hodie*), which is added not to point out a certain time in which that generation began; but that we may understand that all things are present with God, and that that generation is not successive, but permanent in eternity (viz., in it there is nothing past or future, nor any succession of time, but an indivisible "now" [*to nyn*] embracing however all the circumstances of time). As, therefore, with God there is no yesterday or tomorrow, but always today, so this filiation being eternal can properly be designated by the today of eternity.

IX. Equally vain is the objection that it is such a generation as is the part of a decree (or its effect) and so a merely arbitrary work. "I will declare," says he, "the decree: the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance" (Ps. 2:7, 8). This generation is not set forth as a part of this decree, but only as its foundation upon which the universal kingdom (granted to him) is built. For unless Christ had been the true and eternal Son of God, begotten by him from eternity, he never could have been appointed Mediator and obtain a universal kingdom. Finally, the difficulty is not increased by the fact that these things pertain to David who nevertheless cannot be said to have been begotten by God from eternity. For although this oracle can in some measure pertain to David as the type (by reason of the dignity to which he was exalted), yet for a far different reason would it apply to Christ in whom alone it could receive its perfect fulfillment and to whom especially David in the spirit of prophecy had regard. Thus the same thing is said of Melchizedek and of Christ (Heb. 7:3): that he is without father (*apatōr*), without mother (*amētōr*), having neither beginning of days nor end of life. Still no one denies that it is said in a far different sense concerning Christ and Melchizedek. Indeed if the words are carefully weighed, it will plainly appear that although many things in this psalm apply to David, as the type, yet this oracle peculiarly and by way of eminence (*exochōs*) is proper to Christ. For such things are predicated of him as cannot fall on mortal man. This is often the case in composite oracles. Some things agree both with the type and the antitype and some either with the type alone or with the antitype alone. That this is the case here is apparent from the circumstances of the text.

From Prov. 8:22ff.

X. Second, the same thing is gathered from the passage in which Wisdom is introduced speaking thus: "Jehovah possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works; before any time, I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth . . . When he prepared the heavens, I was there . . . when he appointed the foundations of the earth, I was with him as his delight" (Prov. 8:22-30). No words could more clearly confirm the mystery of which we treat. The eternal Wisdom of the Father says Jehovah possessed him! How? Only by a true generation by which he is said to have been begotten and held as a most cherished delight by the Father; and this not in time, but from eternity ("in the beginning of his way, before his works," Prov. 8:22). And that no scruple may remain, he adds in Prov. 8:24, 25 that this was before the beginning and foundations of the earth, before there were any depths and mountains (which denotes absolute eternity). Now this wisdom cannot be only some quality or virtue, but must necessarily be a subsisting person because whatever things are attributed to him are personal

(as that "he teaches, cries out, calls and constitutes kings," Prov. 8); "builds her house, kills beasts, prepares a feast, and sends forth her maidens" to call men, and the like (Prov. 9:1-3)—which can belong only to a person. Nor can there be a personification (*prosopopoeia*) here by which wisdom in general and in the abstract is introduced as speaking; for although prosopopoeia is admissible in amplifications and exaggerations (especially in fables), yet not in short and collected precepts, where the same thing is so often repeated and no intimation of a figurative locution is anywhere given. Otherwise there would be no certainty in Scripture if it were lawful to recur to prosopopoeia everywhere. Nor can a similar example be shown, for that which is adduced from Prov. 9:13 (concerning foolishness introduced as speaking under the image of a simple woman) is far from the point as mere inspection proves, and can best be referred to an adulterous woman and her enticements. That which is drawn from 1 Cor. 13:7 concerning charity (which is said to bear and to believe all things) makes no more for the adversaries because the abstract is put for the concrete—charity for the man possessed of charity (to whom such things belong). So here Wisdom is put in the abstract, not qualitatively, but personally (for him who is endowed with wisdom; who, because he possesses it most perfectly, is called not only Wisdom in the singular, but Wisdoms [*chkhmvth*], in the plural, according to the Hebrew idiom).

XI. Now that this is none other than the Son of God, Christ our Lord, is collected not only from the name itself, Wisdom (by which he is often distinguished in the New Testament, Lk. 7:35; 1 Cor. 1:24), but also from the attributes ascribed to this Wisdom (which most aptly square with him and can belong to no other). For who else can deserve the name of Wisdom and indeed of Wisdoms? Who else calls men to him, teaches the true way of salvation, wishes the law and his precepts to obtain in the church, convicts sinners of foolishness, promises life to those who regard him and denounces final destruction upon the unbelieving? Who else was with God before the world was and was perpetually with him while creating the world? If Jehovah is said to have possessed Wisdom from the beginning, is not the "Word" said "to have been in the beginning" and "to have been with God" (Jn. 1:1)? If it is said to have been a delight to the Father, is not Christ "the beloved Son" (*huios agapētos*, Mt. 3:17)? If ordained and anointed by the Father, was not Christ foreordained before the foundation of the world and anointed for the mediatorial office (1 Pet. 1:20)? If Wisdom is said to have been brought forth before the hills, was not Christ before all things (Col. 1:17)? If by her kings reign, is not Christ the King of Kings and Lord of Lords (Rev. 19:16)? If Wisdom teaches and cries out, calls and exhorts men to repentance in high and low places, both immediately by herself and immediately by her maidens, do we not read the same of Christ both immediately by himself preaching the gospel and mediately by his servants the apostles whom he sent through the whole world to call men to a participation of his grace?

XII. The word *chvllthy* ought not to be translated "I was created," as Vatablus (cf. "Annotata ad libros Hagiographos," in *Critici Sacri* [1660], 3:4091 on Prov. 8:25) and Pagninus hold, but "I was begotten" (as the Chaldee and the Greeks render it). For the Piel of the word *chvll* (from the root *chvl*) denotes not only "to bring forth" (in reference to women), but also "to beget" (with respect to men, according to Buxtorf, *Lexicon Hebraicum et Chaldaicum* [1646], pp. 198-200). And if elsewhere this verb can be referred to a formation (as Ps. 90:2; Dt. 32:18), it

does not follow that it must always be used in the same sense when the thing spoken of cannot suffer it (as here where mention is made of Wisdom begotten before the ages). When the Septuagint translates it "created me" (*ektise me*), it is either an error for *ektēse* or *ektēsato*; or it was so given because among the Greeks the words "to create" (*to ktizein*) and "to beget" were sometimes used reciprocally for each other (Ps. 90:2; 104:31; Dt. 32:18); or because they did not sufficiently attend to the mind of the Holy Spirit. For the word *khnh* (used here) is a general term denoting acquisition or possession. In particular, this can be obtained either by creation (as Gen. 14:19) or by generation (Gen. 4:1). The latter signification must be retained here, as is evident: (1) from the other phrases here accumulated "in the beginning of his way," "before his works," "before the ages," "before the foundations of the earth," which are simply the description of an absolute age; (2) from the word *chvll*, which is added to explain that possession and which means generation when the Septuagint translates it *genna me*.

3. *From Mic. 5:2.*

XIII. Third, it may be proved from Mic. 5:2 where "his goings forth" are said "to have been from of old, from the days of eternity" (viz., in opposition to his temporal egress from the city of Bethlehem by his birth of a virgin in order to distinguish his temporal egress and generation from the eternal). For he cannot but have been begotten from the essence of the Father whose goings forth are said to have been from the beginning, from the days of eternity. And that this prophecy refers to the Messiah, Jonathan (ben Uzziel) acknowledges (Chaldee Paraphrase) and substitutes in place of *mvshl*, the word *mshych'* ("Messiah") (cf. Walton, *Biblia sacra polyglotta*, [1657], 3:74 on Mic. 5:2). The things predicated prove it because he is called ruler in Israel by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*); to him is ascribed the calling of the nations, a pastoral kingdom, the strength of Jehovah, the extension of glory and peace unto all the ends of earth (Mic. 5:4, 5). The various objections brought forward are easily answered. Although the going forth has a broader extension than generation, still it cannot be denied that generation is a going forth. Just as all the sons and posterity are said to go forth from the thigh of the fathers, and often the Son is said to have proceeded and gone forth from the Father (Jn. 13:3; 16:27, 28), so he could not have proceeded from the Father unless by a substantial generation, whose going forth preceded all creation and the production from nothing. If *mqdm* elsewhere does not signify eternity, it does not follow that it nowhere does because God is said to be *mqdm* (Hab. 1:12) "from the beginning" (*ap' archēs*), "from everlasting"; and God is called *qdm*, i.e., the eternal God (Dt. 33:27). So here the going forth is said to be from the beginning, i.e., from eternity; and the rather because another phrase is added pertaining to the same thing for emphasis (*epitasin*)—*mymy 'vlm* ("from the days of eternity"). For although *'vlm* and *qdm* (taken separately) refer to some time, yet when joined (as here) they signify eternity. That is indeed an audacious perversion to refer this to the antiquity of Christ's family because he sprang from David of Bethlehem, who lived long before. It does not treat of the antiquity of the family of the Ruler, but of the Ruler himself (as not so much in the remote potency for being born, but as having actually existed). Nor is it better to say that he was from the beginning by reason of predestination because it had been decreed from eternity by God that he should some time go forth from the family of David. For the prophet does not speak of the decree concerning the Messiah to be mani-

fested at some time, but of his actual going forth. Otherwise the goings forth of all things might be called eternal, because decreed.

4. From the filiation of Christ.

XIV. Fourth, it may be proved from the filiation of Christ, which (as most peculiar and perfectly singular) ought necessarily to imply a communication of essence from the Father in the most perfect manner (viz., by generation). Therefore he is not only called "the Son" (*ho hyios*) by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*) (Heb. 1:5) and "thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (Mt. 16:16), but also his own Son—"he that spared not his own Son" (Rom. 8:32); who has his own Father (Jn. 5:18); who begot the Son even from his essence—"the only begotten Son"; and "we beheld the glory of the only begotten" (Jn. 1:14); and "the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father" (Jn. 1:18); and "highly beloved" (Mt. 3:17). Now if he were called Son only on account of a gracious communication of existence and glory (with respect to the human nature, whether in this miraculous conception or in this resurrection and exaltation or in this vocation), he could not be styled either the one or the only begotten Son of God (because such a filiation can belong to others also, if not in the same degree, yet in the same kind). For the angels also are called sons on account of excellency of nature; and magistrates on account of dignity of office; and Adam on account of adoption and regeneration, as well as resurrection. Therefore there must be some other mode of filiation proper and singular to him (which can be no other than by generation), so that by nature he may obtain that which is conferred by grace upon others. This the apostle contends for when he teaches that Christ is so the Son that with respect to him not even the angels are or can be called sons (Heb. 1:5).

XV. When Christ is said to have been seen "as the only begotten (*hōs monogenēs*) of the Father" (Jn. 1:14), the *to hōs* is not assimilative as if he were only like unto the only begotten. Rather it is expressive of truth (as often elsewhere, 2 Cor. 3:18; Lk. 22:44; 1 Cor. 4:1) because he was truly such. This is inferred even from this, that he is said to have been in the beginning with God; yea, also to be God by whom all things were created. And if Christ has many brethren (Rom. 8:29), he does not cease to be the only begotten by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*) because the generation is evidently dissimilar and totally different in kind: not mystical, but natural; not by an expression of qualities, but by a communication of the essence itself. Isaac is called the only begotten (Heb. 11:17) not simply, but relatively (because alone begotten from free Sarah in lawful wedlock with Abraham and therefore made sole heir). Now although *monogenēs* and *agapētos* may be enunciated of the same subject (Gen. 22:2; Mt. 3:17), it does not follow that they are absolutely equivalent. Otherwise whoever are the "well-beloved of God" (*agapētoi Theou*) might also be called "the only begotten from the Father" (*monogeneis para patros*) (which is false).

XVI. Christ is said to be "the own Son of the Father" not only inasmuch as it is opposed to one of another family, for thus he would not be distinguished from believers who also (in this sense) can be called the own sons of God (since they are not another's); but inasmuch as it is opposed to an adopted and metaphorical son. Thus he may be called the natural son who is such by the privilege of his nature and not by the grace and benefit of adoption only (in opposition to believers who are adopted sons, Eph. 1:5). Just as the Father is called his own Father

(Jn. 5:17), not in a loose way, but in a most proper way (because the Jews, when they heard it, wished to stone him as if he had blaphemed—which they would not have done if he had merely spoken of an adoptive paternity).

From Col. 1:5; Heb. 1:3.

XVII. Fifth, he is the "image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15) and "the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person" (*apaugasma tēs doxēs, kai charaktēr tēs hypostaseōs autou*, Heb. 1:3). For that ought to be a true generation whose end he is, who is the image of the begetter and the character of his person (such as Christ is said to be). Not without reason does Paul here join together *apaugasma* and *charaktēra* to denote the truth and perpetuity of the image. It is not only a brightness quickly vanishing, but a mark (*character*) which once impressed always remains. Nor is the objection of force here, that man is the image of God and yet not begotten from his essence. For an image may be accidental and analogical, consisting in a similarity of virtues (as in man with respect to God, who in this sense is said to be a partaker of the divine nature, 2 Pet. 1:4); or essential and natural (as existing in fathers and their sons, who are of the same nature with them). Such is Christ who is therefore said to be not only like to, but also equal with the Father. Now although Christ is the image of God considered hypostatically (i.e., of the Father and of the same essence with him), it does not follow that he is the image of himself because he can be the image of another (as to the mode of subsisting, who is of the same essence with him). He cannot be the same person with him of whom he is the image, but this does not hinder him from being the same in essence. Although he may even be called the image of God (as God-man [*theanthrōpos*] and in relation to his mediatorial office) because he perfectly represents to us the Father, so that he who sees him sees also the Father (Jn. 14:9); still the idea of the essential image is not excluded, but supposed. Because inasmuch as he is the *Logos*, that substantial image glitters in Christ incarnate, and from him (as a mirror) is reflected the most clear image of the divine virtue—hence he is called "God manifested in the flesh" (*Theos phanerōtheis en sarki*, 1 Tim. 3:16).

XVIII. Christ cannot be called the Son of the living God with respect to unction and office (as if the name of Christ and the Son of God were coincident because they are expressly distinguished by the Lord). Nor is Christ said to be the Son of God because he was the Messiah. On the contrary, he is recognized as the Messiah just because he is the Son of God (who alone could be equal to this office). Hence it follows that because these two things are mutually joined together by an indivisible bond, no one can confess Jesus to be the Messiah without at the same time acknowledging him to be the Son of God, and vice versa. For Christ and the Son of God designate the same person, but not the same thing in the same person; for Son expresses the person, Christ the office. Nor ought it to be added that believers are often called the sons of the living God, who nevertheless, no one would say, are coessential with God (Hos. 1:10; Gal. 3:26; Rom. 8:14). For who does not know that the filiation of believers, no one of whom can be called the only begotten (*monogenēs*) and proper Son of God (to wit, by gratuitous adoption in Christ) differs far from that by which Christ is by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*) called the Son of the living God (by antithesis to the son of dying man as something far more excellent). Even as Peter would intimate that he (with the other disciples) regarded him not only as the Son of

man (as others considered him, supposing him to be either Elijah or one of the prophets or John the Baptist), but also the Son of that eternal God who always lives and never fails. Therefore as he was of the same nature with his mother as the Son of man, so he necessarily must be also of the same nature with the Father as the Son of the living God.

XIX. Although Christ might be called "the brightness of the Father's glory" (*apaugasma tēs doxēs*) and the "express image of his person" (*charaktēr tēs hypostaseōs*) by reason of his mediatorial office and as he is God-man (*theanthrōpos*) because the Father has most perfectly expressed in him his own image and stamped it, as it were, with his own seal (Jn. 6:27), yet this does not hinder it from being attributed to him as he is the *Logos* and by reason of the eternal filiation. According to this, he is the "light of light, and God of God" (as the Nicene Council declares) and bears the most express image of the person of the Father in himself (by which he so differs from him according to subsistence as to agree with him according to essence). Indeed that relation (*schesis*) cannot have place unless these things are supposed because he could not have exhibited to us by incarnation the glory of God and the mark of his person unless he had been such before by an eternal generation.

Sources of explanation.

XX. Christ is called the "firstborn" in diverse ways: (1) by reason of his temporal nativity when he is called "the firstborn of Mary" (because no one was born of her before him and no one after him); (2) by reason of his resurrection as "the firstborn from the dead" (Col. 1:18), both because he first arose, not so much by priority of time as of causality (because he arose by his own power [Jn. 2:19], while all others rose by the power of Christ) and because he arose to immortal life, never again to die; (3) by reason of authority and dominion, in which sense he is called the "firstborn of every creature" (Col. 1:15) and "among many brethren" (Rom. 8:29) because all the prerogatives of primogenitureship—a kingdom, priesthood, a double portion—most properly belong to him; (4) by reason of his eternal generation when he is called the "first begotten of God" (Heb. 1:6) because begotten by the Father from eternity (*pro pasēs ktiseōs monogenōs genētheis*, as the Greek Scholia have it). Nor ought the first begotten always to belong to the number of those of whom he is said to be the first begotten, since it often denotes the only begotten, before whom no one was and after whom no one will come. Thus Christ is called the firstborn of every creature, not because he is the first of creatures, but because he was begotten before creatures. Thus we must not understand here a ranking (*connumeratio*) with creatures, but a going before and a preexistence. For if he is before every creature, he ought not to be reckoned among creatures and so must be eternal.

XXI. The Father begat the Son as neither now existing because he would be supposed to have been already before, nor as not yet existing (for so he would not be eternal), but coexisting (because he was with the Father from eternity). Therefore division applies only to physical generation where the begotten passes over from not-being to being. But it cannot be accommodated to this hyperphysical generation, which is an eternal act of the eternal Father (from whom the Son emanates and in whom he remains without any abscission [*praecisione*] by coexisting). Hence the Son was not properly before generation, nor did he begin to be through generation, but always emanated from the Father by an eternal

and internal act (like the rays emanating simultaneously with the sun, only in a more eminent, inexplicable manner). (2) In fine, by generation the divine essence is communicated to the begotten, not that it may exist, but subsist. Thus it is not terminated on the absolute existence, but on the mode of subsisting; nor by it is he constituted God absolutely, but the Son relatively.

XXII. Necessary and voluntary may in a measure be distinguished in God as to our manner of conception, yet they are not really opposed. Hence the Father is said to have begotten the Son necessarily and voluntarily; necessarily because he begat by nature, as he is God by nature, but voluntarily, because he begat not by coaction (*coacte*), but freely; not by an antecedent will, which denotes an act of willing (free outwardly), but by a concomitant, which denotes the natural faculty of willing in God; not by the liberty of indifference, but of spontaneity.

XXIII. Although the Son may be said to be begotten by the Father, it does not follow that the Son is the Son of himself because the essence does not generate an essence, but a person (the Father, the Son, who is another one, although not another thing).

XXIV. That which is most perfect does not generate a thing differing from itself essentially, but a person differing from itself personally. For the essence of the Father is the essence of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, although to be the Father is not to be the Son, nor to be the Holy Spirit. Hence one thing remains always the most perfect (viz., God), although he is not one person because it is communicable to three self-existences (*suppositis*), not diverse in essence, but distinguished by characteristic relation.

XXV. When the Son is said to be one God with the Father and yet to be a distinct person from him, there is no contradiction. Although he has the same essence (according to which he is said to be one with the Father), yet he has not the same mode of subsisting. If in finite and created things a diverse essence is required for a diverse person, does it not thence follow that this holds good in divine things where the same numerical and singular essence can nevertheless be communicable to more than one (because infinite)?

XXVI. Although believers may be said "to be begotten" or "to be born of God" on account of a similarity of virtues (and not by a communication of essence), it does not follow that it can be understood in the same sense of Christ (because the discussion concerns a proper generation by which he is the proper and only begotten Son of God).

XXVII. The miraculous conception of Christ can be an argument *a posteriori* by which his eternal filiation is known, but is not immediately its cause *a priori*. Thus we must understand the words of the angel to the blessed virgin: "Therefore that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the son of God" (Lk. 1:35). Here the particle *dio* is a mark of consequence, not of a consequent; of sign why he should be called the Son of God, not of cause. For before his conception, he is said to have existed (Jn. 1:1; Phil. 2:6). Hence he does not say simply "he shall be," but "he shall be called" (*klēthēsetai*, i.e., "manifested").

XXVIII. The Son of God is not called Christ because he was sanctified by the Father (Jn. 10:36). He adds other reasons for filiation, both from unity of essence (Jn. 10:30) and from identity of works (Jn. 10:38). He was sanctified (i.e., consecrated to the mediatorial office) because he was the Son (which otherwise he could not have undertaken). Nor is he the Son because beloved (Mt. 3:17), but beloved because he is the Son (as the order of the words teaches).

XXIX. While this hyperphysical generation is altogether different from physical and finite generation, the adversaries falsely argue from the latter to the former (as if any change, or imperfection, or priority of nature, or of time could fall on God). Every substantial generation is a change from not-being to being because everyone begotten is posterior to the begetter; he who begets communicates a part of his substance to another, and the begetter is essentially different from the begotten. These and similar things drawn from human generation are improperly transferred to the divine by a change to another kind (*metabasin eis allo genos*). And if these generations are mutually compared, they are to be considered as coequal. Indeed while whatever of perfection occurs in finite generation is attributed to it (as that the begetter begets a thing similar to himself by communication of essence), whatever denotes any imperfection must be carefully removed from it.

XXX. To no purpose do the Scholastics weary themselves in investigating and explaining the mode of this generation, since it is not only ineffable, but also incomprehensible (*akatalēptos*) to the angels themselves. "It is undecorous to seek," says Athanasius against Arius, "how the Word is from God, or how he is the brightness of God, or how God begets and what is the mode of his generation. For he is crazy who would attempt such things, since he would essay to interpret in words a thing ineffable and proper to the divine nature and known only to himself and his Son" (*Four Discourses Against the Arians* 2.36 [NPNF2, 4:367; PG 26.223]). And Hilary: "As the Father is inexpressible in that he is unbegotten; so the Son in that he is the only begotten cannot be expressed because he who is begotten is the image of the unbegotten" (*The Trinity* 3.18 [FC 25:80; PL 10.86]).

XXXI. The similitudes usually employed to explain this mystery (drawn either from the mind, which by understanding itself, excites the idea and image of itself in itself, which always remains in the mind whence it may emanate; or from the sun from which rays simultaneously emanate as it was neither before nor without them) can in some measure serve to illustrate this mystery, and the more because Scripture sometimes alludes to them when it calls the Son of God *Logon*, "Wisdom," "the image of God" and "the brightness of the Father's glory" (*apaugasma doxēs*). But they cannot set forth a full and accurate determination of the mode of this generation. Hence here (if anywhere) we must be wise with sobriety so that content with the fact (*tō hoti*) (which is clear in the Scriptures), we should not anxiously busy our thoughts with defining or even searching into the mode (which is altogether incomprehensible), but leave it to God who alone most perfectly knows himself.

THIRTIETH QUESTION: THE DEITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

Is the Holy Spirit a divine person, distinct from the Father and the Son? We affirm.

I. As the anti-Trinitarians do not deny the personality, but the eternity of the Son; so they do not detract from the eternity, but the personality of the Holy Spirit. Therefore as we have just proved the eternity of the Son, the personality of the Spirit must now be demonstrated against the same.

Statement of the question.

II. The question does not concern the Spirit considered essentially (*ousiōdōs*), in which sense God is called a "Spirit" (Jn. 4:24), and the divine nature of Christ often comes under this name (1 Tim. 3:16; 1 Pet. 3:18, 19), for this equally belongs to the three persons. Rather the question concerns the Spirit regarded hypostatically (*hypostatikōs*) and designating one of them singularly.

III. The question is not whether the Spirit, called Holy by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*), not only subjectively (because he is most holy), but also efficiently (because he sanctifies us), is a thing or a creature or some virtue of God (as the other attributes), for this the adversaries do not dispute. Rather the question is whether he is a divine person, not divided, but distinct from the Father and the Son. The fighters against the Spirit (*pneumatomachi*), the ancient as well as the more modern, deny it. We affirm it.

The Holy Spirit is a divine person.

IV. The reasons are: (1) Various personal actions are attributed to the Holy Spirit (as to teach [Jn. 14:26]; to testify [Jn. 15:26; Rom. 8:16]; to reveal future things [1 Tim. 4:1]; to search the deep things of God [1 Cor. 2:10]; to separate some and send them to minister by an express command [Is. 61:1; Acts 13:2; 20:28]; to create [Gen. 1:2]; to make pregnant a barren virgin [Lk. 1:35]; to exercise operations of every kind and confer upon men ordinary as well as extraordinary gifts—"all these worketh that one and the self-same spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will" [1 Cor. 12:11], where what he had said of God, that "he worketh all things" [*ho de autos esti Theos ho energōn ta panta*, 1 Cor. 12:6], is here applied to the Holy Spirit [*panta de tauta energei to hen kai to auto pneuma*]. This could not be said if the Holy Spirit was not a divine person of the same order and virtue with the Father). Nor is the objection valid that personal properties are often ascribed to things, and yet the things themselves are not to be considered persons: as to sin, that it deceives and kills (Rom. 7:11); to the law, that it speaks (Rom. 3:19); to charity, that it believes and hopes all things (1 Cor. 13:7); to the blood of Abel, that it cried out (Gen. 4:10). For it is plain that the passages adduced do not denote the principal causes of acting, but the means to which the action of the principal agent is by a usual interchange ascribed. For sin properly can neither deceive (rather the devil through sin) nor actively kill (but meritoriously). The law properly does not speak, but the legislator speaks in or through the law. Charity (i.e., the man imbued with it) believes. Blood cries out, not effectively but objectively. Those things however which are ascribed to the Holy Spirit, so belong to persons and living beings that in Scripture they cannot be transferred to inanimate things.

V. No better do they succeed, who refer this to personification (*prosopopoeia*) because the subject of a prosopopoeia is ordinarily some corporeal thing lacking life and sense (as when the heavens are commanded to hear, and the rivers to clap their hands—which do not apply to the Holy Spirit). (2) If Scripture had spoken of the Holy Spirit figuratively in one or another place, it would have explained this elsewhere in proper words (which it does not do; indeed it uniformly speaks of him so). (3) If the opinion of the adversaries is correct, the whole gospel history can easily be transformed into jejune allegories, and the expressions concerning Christ be transferred with the same propriety to the virtue of wisdom. (4) Although some figures of speech occur in Scripture with respect to

other things, it does not follow that whatever we read concerning the Holy Spirit should be understood figuratively and by a prosopopoeia. A collation of the passages will readily prove the disparity.

VI. Second, because he is set forth not only as distinct from the Father and the Son, but also as another one and sent from both (Jn. 15:26; 16:7); cf. Jn. 14:16—"I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete." Now no one will say that one called another than the Father and the Son and sent by them is not a person equally with them. And the name "Paraclete" ascribed to him (which as it implies a personal office in Christ inasmuch as he acts as our intercessor and patron by pleading our cause with the Father, 1 Jn. 2:1) ought to denote the same in the Holy Spirit—that he is personally the Paraclete of the Father and the Son for us (i.e., their interpreter) by performing towards us the duty of counsellor and consoler. Third, the exchange of gender teaches this, joining to *pneumati* (which is of the neuter gender) the masculine pronoun better adapted to denote a person: *hotan elthē ekeinos to pneuma tēs alētheias* (Jn. 16:13). In Eph. 1:13, 14, we are said to be sealed with "the Holy Spirit of promise" (*tō pneumati hagiō hos estin arrabōn*). For no reason can be given why such a change should be made in Scripture except that thus the person of the Holy Spirit may be more clearly designated.

VII. Third, because he concurs with the Father and the Son (who are undoubtedly distinct persons) with equal power, authority and virtue in sealing believers and conferring benefits upon the church. This is evident from the prescribed formula of baptism (Mt. 28:19), the apostolic benediction (2 Cor. 13:14) and the testimony concerning Christ (1 Jn. 5:7) (which could not be the case unless he were a person distinct from them and of the same condition and authority with them). The objections of the adversaries have been discussed before (in the Question concerning the Trinity).

VIII. Fourth, because he appeared in a visible form (as in the baptism of Christ, in the form of a dove [Mt. 3:16] and on the day of Pentecost, in the form of tongues which seemed to the apostles cloven like fire sitting upon them [Acts 2:3]). It belongs to persons (not to attributes or accidents) to assume visible forms and to appear in or with or under such forms. Nor without absurdity can anyone say that the justice or mercy of God or any other virtue manifested itself by a visible form. Nor should it be objected that not everything which appears is per se subsistent since accidents appear and yet do not subsist per se. For although it is true that accidents immediately strike the eye, yet they always suppose a substratum or person. Hence under that visible form there must have been some subsistence (which the text asserts was the Holy Spirit and expressly distinguishes from the persons of the Father and the Son in the baptism of the Savior). Nor can it be said that the fiery tongues should be restricted to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The text draws a plain distinction between the Spirit and his gifts: "They began to speak with other tongues, as the Holy Spirit" with whom they were filled "gave them utterance" (Acts 2:4).

IX. Fifth, because there is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Hence mention is made of Israelites who grieved the Spirit of holiness (Is. 63:10); and of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit as an unpardonable sin (Mt. 12:31, 32); and of Ananias and Sapphira who are said to have lied to the Holy Ghost (Acts 5:3)—whence they immediately paid the penalty of their crime. Now he against whom we sin must be a divine person. For as God alone is the object of worship and adoration,

so he alone is properly and ultimately the object of sin. And as the blasphemy directed against the Father and the Son supposes them to be persons, so also the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. Indeed this is the more certainly evinced from the fact that the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is reckoned a far more grievous crime, since it is unpardonable—capable of being remitted neither in this world nor in that which is to come, i.e., never (according to Mark's interpretation). This could not be said if he was not a person. Now although in Scripture some things are said to be blasphemed which are not persons (as "our good," Rom. 14:16; "doctrine," 1 Tim. 6:1; "the word of God," Tit. 2:5; "the way of truth," 2 Pet. 2:2); it does not follow that the same may be said of the Spirit because things are always said to be blasphemed relatively to God himself. Thus the blasphemy of our good is an offense against God himself from whom we receive that good; the blasphemy of doctrine and the word extends to God the author of them. But it is different with the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit because it is expressly distinguished from that against the Father and the Son.

X. It is falsely said that Ananias lied to the Holy Spirit as a gift of God (possessed by Peter) and not as a divine person. For no one can lie to anyone but to an intelligent and living person. Hence Peter says, "Thou hast not lied unto men, but unto God" (Acts 5:4), to wit, by lying to the Holy Spirit. This is explained in Acts 5:9 by tempting (*to peirazesthai*) the Holy Spirit (which can be said only of a person). And although *to pseudesthai* with the accusative means rather "to falsify and deceive" than "to lie" (which cannot be said absolutely, since this verb is joined not only with the dative but also with the accusative in the same signification, Prov. 14:5; Is. 57:11), still it comes to the same thing (since he ought to be a person whom others desire to deceive equally with him to whom they endeavor to lie).

XI. Sixth, the distinction between the Holy Spirit and his gifts (so often drawn) proves this. For why should Scripture so carefully make such a distinction if the Spirit was nothing else than a gift of God? It is true indeed that the Spirit is sometimes put for his gifts, but it is evident also that he is elsewhere expressly distinguished from them as their author and efficient cause: "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit" (1 Cor. 12:4); "To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another, the word of knowledge" (1 Cor. 12:8); "All these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will" (1 Cor. 12:11). And that no one may imagine it is some virtue or power of God belonging to him as an attribute, the Scripture distingushes power (*dynamin*) from the Spirit: "Jesus returned from the desert in the power of the Spirit" (Lk. 4:14); "ye shall receive," said Christ, "the power of the Holy Spirit coming upon you" (Acts 1:8). In the latter, power (*dynamis*) denotes the effect, but the Spirit is cause and source (viz., a person endowed with this power, which he pours out upon others).

The divinity of the Holy Spirit may be proved: (1) from the names.

XII. Now that the Holy Spirit is not only a person but a divine person can be most incontestably evinced from the four arguments by which we have proved the names, the attributes, works and worship of God are ascribed to him. The names, indeed, because what is said of Jehovah of Hosts (Is. 6:9) is applied to the Holy Spirit: "Well spake the Holy Ghost by Esaias the prophet, saying, go unto this people" (Acts 28:25, 26*). He who is called the Spirit of God is imme-

diately afterwards said to be God and the Rock of Israel: "The Spirit of Jehovah spake by me, and his word was in my tongue. The God of Israel said, the Rock of Israel spake to me" (2 S. 23:2, 3*). Here pertains that Ananias is said to have lied to God because he lied to the Holy Spirit (as we have seen before); also that believers are said to be temples of the living God because they are the temples of the Holy Spirit who dwells in them: "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" (1 Cor 3:16; 6:19). And since the temple and the divinity are related, he cannot but be God whose temple we are said to be. Nor ought this to be understood only of his presence or indwelling; for not all things said to be dwelt in are on that account temples, and we are never called temple of the divine word, which however ought to dwell in us largely. But a temple necessarily involves a relation to the religious worship of him to whom it is erected. Hence Augustine: "If we commit sacrilege by building a temple to any creature, how is not he the true God to whom we do not build a temple, but whose temple we ourselves are?" (*Collatio cum Maximino**, PL 42.722).

2. From the attributes.

XIII. Second, divine attributes belong to him. Eternity, because he was even in the beginning of creation for "he moved upon the face of the waters" (Gen 1:2). Now he who preceded the creation of all things is not himself created and is therefore eternal. Omnipresence and immensity: "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit?" (Ps. 139:7, 8). That this is to be referred to the presence of his essence and not only of his virtue has been proved before in the question concerning the immensity of God. "The Holy Spirit dwells in you" (1 Cor. 3:16), not assuredly by his efficacy only, but also by his essence because he is there as God in his temple. Omniscience, because he searches the deep things of God, not effectively because he makes us search. It does not belong to us to search the deep things of God (*ta bathē tou Theou*, 1 Cor. 3:16) lest we should be overwhelmed by his glory (Prov. 25:27); but subjectively and formally because he is said to bear the same relation to the things of God as the spirit of man to the things of man (properly and formally searching into the interior things of each by reflex operations). The design of the apostle leads us to this, which is to prove that God's Spirit (omniscient and searching all things) can alone certainly reveal to us those things which God has prepared for them that love him (which otherwise neither eye hath seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, 1 Cor. 2:9). Now he is said to search, not by inquiring (which would imply some doubt), but by penetrating (just as God is said to search the heart and reins). Here pertains that he is said "to announce future things" (Jn. 16:13), which belongs to God alone; and that the prophets, who predicted future things, spoke by him (2 Pet. 1:21). Omnipotence, because he is called the "power of the Highest" (Lk. 1:35), not simply essential, but personal. Life, because he is a vivifying Spirit (1 Cor. 15:45) who quickens our mortal bodies (Rom. 8:11).

3. From works.

XIV. Third, the works both of nature and of creation (Gen. 1:2; Ps. 33:6); conservation and government (Ps. 104:30); the working of miracles (Mt. 12:28; 1 Cor. 12:4) and of grace; the conception of Christ (Lk. 1:35); unction and mission (Is. 61:1); remission of sins and regeneration (1 Cor. 6:11; Jn. 3:5); government of the church (Acts 13:2; 15:28; 20:28); prediction of future events (Jn. 16:13; Acts 11:28); bestowal of gifts (1 Cor. 12:7); illumination (Eph. 1:17, 18); sanctification (2 Thess. 2:13; 1 Pet. 1:2); the resurrection of the dead (Rom. 8:11).

4. From worship.

XV. Fourth, divine worship is given to him because we are baptized in his name as well as in that of the Father and the Son. In the Apostles' Creed, we are commanded to believe in him as well as in the Father and the Son. We seek grace and peace and other benefits from him no less than from the Father and the Son (2 Cor. 13:14*). In Rev. 1:4, grace and peace are sought "from the seven spirits which are before the throne." The Holy Spirit is thus represented not with respect to personality (which is one only), but with respect to the sevenfold (i.e., the multiple) variety of gifts which he bestows upon believers. The number seven is used, not only on account of his perfection, but in allusion to the seven churches written to (in order to intimate that he will pour upon them copious showers of his gifts, as if a single spirit were given to each church). Nor can it be said that by these seven spirits is not meant a person, but is expressed the medium through which the apostle wishes grace and peace to come from the Father. For he seeks grace from the spirits in the same way as from the Father (from the spirits [*apo pneumatōn*] as the principle and cause). Thus because we are the temple of the Holy Spirit, Paul concludes that we must glorify God both in our body and in our soul, which are God's (1 Cor. 6:20). What God? (to wit, that God whose temple we are, not to the exclusion of the Father and the Son, but economically designating the Holy Spirit, whom to invoke is to glorify). Hence the Spirit who speaks by the prophets is invoked by the church: "Lord, thou art God, which hast made heaven and earth, who, by the mouth of thy servant David hast said" (Acts 4:24, 25). By this example also the ancient church always invoked him in the hymn of the Holy Spirit—"Come, Creator Spirit;" and "Glory to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit."

XVI. If Scripture less frequently makes mention of the adoration and worship of the Holy Spirit, it is not because he is not to be adored equally with the Father and the Son (for there are not wanting precepts and examples of this adoration); but because in the economy of salvation (which answers to the order of the persons) as the Father works through the Son and the Son through the Holy Spirit, so the glory of the deity arising from adoration is carried from the Holy Spirit who excites prayers in the hearts of believers through the Son as Mediator to the Father. For this reason he is more often set forth as the author and principle of prayers than as the object towards which they may be directed (as the one who rather invokes [i.e., causes us to invoke] than the one who may be invoked).

Sources of explanation.

XVII. A gift of God considered essentially (*ousiōdōs*) cannot be God; but this does not hinder the gift of God taken personally from being a divine person (just as Christ, who is a divine person, is nevertheless called the gift of God, Jn. 3:16; 4:10; Is. 9:6). Thus the Holy Spirit can be called the gift of God. Nor does it always imply a contradiction for one to be both a gift and the giver of himself, since Christ gave himself for us and to us for the support of our eternal life: "The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world" (Jn. 6:51).

XVIII. If some things are at times attributed to the Holy Spirit which seem to be less proper to a person (as that we are anointed, baptized and filled with him; that he is poured out by God and given to us), these must be understood of his gifts in us. However the truth of his person still remains (just as Christ is said to

be put on, received and eaten by us, and to be given to us by God without prejudice to his personality).

XIX. The gifts (*merismoi*) of the Holy Spirit (Heb. 2:4) do not so much mean (passively) partitions of the Spirit, as (actively) distributions of the gifts mentioned—made by the Spirit who distributes his own gifts to whom he will (1 Cor. 12:11). Therefore although we acknowledge a distribution of the gifts of the Spirit, yet we deny a division or partition of the person of the Spirit (which is undivided in itself and divided from any other).

XX. As the Holy Spirit is often by metonymy put for his gifts, so he is said to be increased or diminished not with regard to the principle but with regard to the gifts which he scatters among men. Thus God is said to have taken of the same Spirit which he had bestowed upon Moses (i.e., of the same gifts and grace which were necessary for the government of the republic) that he might give to the seventy elders in order that they might bear a part of the burden (Num. 11:17). Elisha seeks for himself a double spirit (2 K. 2:9, i.e., graces twofold more than those commonly seen in other prophets or a double portion of the gifts of the Spirit [viz., a great abundance] to enable him to perform the great and difficult duty required of him). If this is called "the power and spirit of Elijah" (Lk. 1:17), it must not be understood originally, but subjectively because it resided in Elijah.

XXI. The true God cannot be sent by command because he acknowledges no superior; but he can be sent by consent (which denotes diversity of office indeed, but not of essence). The Son and the Spirit are sent in the latter way, not in the former.

XXII. The Holy Spirit was not before the glorification of Christ (Jn. 7:39)—not simply and absolutely, as if he just then began to be according to his personality (*kath' hypostasin*) (the contrary which his effects demonstrate), but relatively, by reason of the more copious outpouring about to take place afterwards, upon the apostles and others.

Thirty-First Question: The Procession of the Holy Spirit

Did the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son? We affirm.

I. As generation (*gennēsis*) is ascribed to the Son, so procession (*ekporeusis*) is ascribed to the Holy Spirit—taking the word not only widely (as denoting "to have origin from some one"; for thus it can also be applied to the Son, to whom *exodos* and *exeleusis* is attributed, since he is said to have come forth from the Father [Jn. 16:28] and to have eternal goings-forth [Mic. 5:2]), but strictly (inasmuch as it denotes an emanation from the Father and the Son, distinct from the generation of the Son).

Statement of the question.

II. The question does not concern the temporal and external procession (which is terminated on creatures by which the Holy Spirit is sent to sanctify us and make perfect the work of salvation); but the question concerns the eternal and internal procession (which is terminated inwardly and is nothing else than the mode of communication of the divine essence, i.e., that by which the third person of the Trinity has from the Father and the Son the same numerical essence which the Father and the Son have).

How procession differs from generation.

III. That this procession differs from the generation of the Son cannot be denied because they are different persons who stand related to each other in origin. But the nature of this distinction cannot be explained and may more safely be unknown than inquired into. Hence John of Damascus says "that there is a difference between generation and procession, we have learned, but what the nature of the distinction is we by no means understand" (*Hoti men esti diaphora geneseōs kai ekporeuseōs memathēkamen, tis de tropos diaphoras mēdamōs, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 1.8* [NPNF2, 9:9; PG 94.824]). And Augustine: "There is a difference between generation and procession, but I know not how to distinguish them because both are inexpressible" (*Contra Maximinum* 2*.14, PL 42.770). I know that the Scholastics wish to derive this difference from the operation of the intellect (*modum intellectus*)—hence he is called the Wisdom of God; but procession by way of the will (*modum voluntatis*)—hence he is called Love and Charity. But as this is unsupported by Scripture, so it entangles rather than explains the thing. They speak more wisely who, stammering in a matter so difficult, place the distinction in three things: (1) in the principle, because the Son emanates from the Father alone, but the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son together. (2) In the mode, because the Son emanates by way of generation, which terminates not only on the personality, but also on the similarity (on account of which the Son is called the image of the Father and according to which the Son receives the property of communicating to another person the same essence; but the Spirit by way of spiration, which terminates only on the personality and by which the proceeding person does not receive the property of communicating that essence to another person). (3) In the order, because as the Son is the second person and the Spirit the third, generation in our mode of conceiving precedes spiration (although they are really coeternal).

The Greeks and Latins dispute concerning the principle of procession.

IV. As to the principle of procession, there is a celebrated controversy between the Greeks and Latins who, however, are agreed about the unity of the Godhead and the Trinity of persons. The question is whether he proceeds from the Father only or from the Father and the Son. The Greeks held the former; the Latins the latter. The Greeks accuse the Latins of adding to the Nicene Creed (explained at Constantinople) the words *filioque;* the Latins, on their part, charge the Greeks with inserting the word *monou* in Article 7 of the Athanasian Creed (*apo tou monou patros*, cf. PG 28.1581, 1585, 1587, 1589). The Eastern and Western churches frequently disputed violently about this thing. At length, at the Council of Florence (A.D. 1439), concord was brought about by determining that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. But the orientals who subscribed to this receded from the transaction and still vehemently persist in their former opinion.

V. Although the Greeks ought not to have been charged with heresy on account of their opinion, nor ought it to have been the occasion of a schism arising or continuing, still the opinion of the Latins may be properly retained as more agreeable to the words of Scripture and the truer. (1) The Holy Spirit is sent from the Son as well as from the Father (Jn. 16:7). He therefore ought to proceed from him because he cannot be sent by the Son unless he proceeds from him. (2) He is

called the Spirit of the Son as well as the Father (Gal. 4:6). (3) Whatever the Spirit has, he has from the Son no less than from the Father (Jn. 16:13-15), and as the Son is said to be from the Father because he does not speak of himself, but of the Father (from whom he receives all things), so the Spirit ought to be said to be and to proceed from the Son because he hears and speaks from him. (4) He breathed the Holy Spirit on his disciples in time (Jn. 20:22). Therefore he breathed him from eternity; for temporal procession presupposes an eternal.

VI. The Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit not as two diverse principles (since the breathing power is the same in both), but as two self-existent (*supposita*) concur in that procession by the same power.

VII. Although the Spirit may be said to proceed from the Father (Jn. 15:26), it is not denied of the Son. Indeed it is implied because the mission of the Spirit is ascribed to him and whatever the Father has, the Son is said to have equally (Jn. 16:15).

VIII. Since breathing virtue is numerically one in the Father and the Son, it is not good to say that in this respect the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son (as if he was principally from the Father, but secondarily and less principally from the Son). If the mode of subsisting is considered (according to which the Father is the fountain of deity from whom the Son emanates), not improperly in this sense is he said to proceed from the Father through the Son (as to the order and mode of procession).

IX. If in certain primitive creeds the expression *filioque* was omitted (proving the procession from the Son), this was because at that time there had been no controversy agitated concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit. Yet it was prudently added afterwards on account of rising errors.

FOURTH TOPIC

THE DECREES OF GOD IN GENERAL AND PREDESTINATION IN PARTICULAR

FIRST QUESTION
Are decrees in God, and how?

I. After consideration of the absolute essence of God, his attributes and the relation of the persons comes the discussion of the essential internal acts of God commonly called the decrees. With respect to these the inquiry here is: whether they are in God and how they are in him.

Decrees are in God.

II. That there are decrees in God both Scripture testifies (which repeatedly attributes to him to *prognōsin*, *prothesin*, *hōrismenēn*, *boulēn*, *eudokian*) and manifold reason evinces. This is true both from the highest perfection of God (to which it pertains that nothing shall take place without his will) and from his omniscience (by which he knows from eternity all his works, not only possible but also future—which he could not behold otherwise than in his decree) and from the dependence of second causes upon the first (and of all things and events upon the supreme being and agent).

III. The decree is ascribed to God not inasmuch as it is the effect of previous deliberation and consultation with reasoning passing from one thing to another (of which he has no need "to whose eyes all things are naked and most open," Heb. 4:13), but by reason of the certain determination concerning the futurition of things (according to which he does nothing rashly, but designedly, i.e., knowingly and willingly).

IV. The divine acts admit of a threefold distinction. (1) There are immanent and intrinsic acts having no respect to anything outside of God (such are the personal acts—to beget, to spirate—of which there is an absolute necessity without power to the opposite). (2) Others are extrinsic and transient acts which are not in God, but from him effectively and in creatures subjectively (as to create, to govern)—these are temporal acts and God is denominated extrinsic only from them. (3) There are acts immanent and intrinsic in God, but connoting a respect and relation (*schesin*) to something outside of God (such are the decrees, which are nothing else than the counsels of God concerning future things out of himself).

V. Concerning these decrees the question is How are they in God—essentially or only inherently (*inhaesive*) and accidentally? The former the orthodox maintain; the latter is maintained by Socinus and Vorstius who, to overthrow the simplicity of God and to prove that there is a real composition in him, maintain that they are accidents properly so called. Against these, we thus argue.

They are not in God as accidents;

VI. No accident can be granted in God; therefore decrees cannot be in him inherently and accidentally. This is evident: (1) from his simplicity because he on whom accidents fall is not absolutely simple, being composed of subject and accident; (2) from his infinity and perfection because whatever is added to a thing tends to make it perfect. Now God is most perfect in every respect and not merely perfectible, as all creatures. (3) From his immutability, because accident is the root of all change. Now God is immutable in will as well as in essence.

But as immanent acts of will.

VII. Since then they cannot belong to God accidentally, we must necessarily say that they are in him essentially, as immanent acts of his will with a relation (*schesei*) and termination outside of him. Thus they do not differ really from his essence, since the will of God (with which they are identified) is nothing else than the essence itself willing (apprehended by an inadequate conception by us). In this sense, the decrees are rightly said to be identified with the essence, conceived after the manner of a vital act determining itself to the production of this or that thing out of itself. Hence they take on the notion of a double cause, efficient and exemplar. Efficient because all future things are for this reason future—that God has decreed them (nor can any prior cause of his works be assigned). Exemplar because the decree of God is (as it were) the idea of all things out of himself, after which as the archetype (*archetypon*) they, as the ectypes (*ektypa*), are expressed in time.

And are properly called ideas.

VIII. As every agent freely and from counsel acts after an idea, the ideas of all things may not improperly be said to be in the mind of God—not as meaning some intelligible species or some form of things elicited from the things themselves, coming from an external source and impressed upon God (as is the case with human ideas); but as implying a notion or exemplar cause, preexisting the things themselves in the mind of God and impressed upon them at their production, and is nothing else than the very divine essence itself (as it is understood by God himself, either as imitable by creatures [if it is a thing merely possible belonging to natural knowledge] or to be imitated [if it is future and has respect to free knowledge]).

IX. Hence it appears that idea is ascribed to God and to man in different ways. In man, the idea is first impressed and afterwards expressed in things. In God, it is only expressed properly, not impressed because it does not come from without. In man, the things themselves are the exemplar and our knowledge is the image; but in God the divine knowledge is the exemplar and the things themselves the image or its expressed likeness.

X. Although the ideas of things possible and future are maintained to be in the mind of God, it does not follow that God equally can be conceived of either as possible or as future. It suffices that we gather that the possibility and futurition of all things depend on God and that God in this sense is all things not formally, but eminently.

XI. Although an idea suggests (a reason of) similitude and agreement, still there is the greatest distance between God and the creature. Thus no similitude seems to be possible. Nevertheless the idea must not cease to be granted because

we must distinguish first the similitude of univocation, when two things agree in one univocal and common conception (as Peter and Paul are said to be similar because they agree in humanity which is common to them). Thus there is not granted a similitude between God and creatures because those things which are said concerning God and concerning creatures are not said univocally, but analogically. Second we must distinguish the similitude of expression or of representation (as one thing distinctly represents and expresses another, whether they agree in another common thing or not; for the idea which is in God represents most perfectly the creature itself and so the idea is properly called the similitude of the thing known).

XII. It is one thing to act in accordance with an adventitious and accidental idea; another to act after an essential idea. It argues imperfection to act after an adventitious idea—one borrowed from without; but not after an essential idea (as God does, having regard to no example out of himself, but to his own essence).

Sources of explanation.

XIII. The liberty of the divine decree does not hinder it from being God himself because it is free only terminatively and on the part of the thing, but not subjectively and on the part of God. It is free in the exercised act inasmuch as it resides in the liberty of God to decree this or that thing. It is not free in the signified act because to decree anything depends upon the internal constitution of God by which he understands and wills. It is free as to the respect and relation (*schesin*) outside himself, but not as to the absolute existence within. Therefore three things come to be carefully distinguished in the decree: (1) the essence of God willing and decreeing after the manner of a principle; (2) its tendency outside himself, without however any internal addition or change because it indicates nothing but an external respect and habitude towards the creature, after the manner of a relation; (3) the object itself or the things decreed, which have a reason of the end. In the first mode, the decree is necessary, but in the latter free (see above Topic III, Question VII, "On the Simplicity of God," Section 11).

XIV. What is dependent on another as on a cause properly so called is not God; but not what depends on another as on a principle (such as the decree does) which is posterior in the sign of reason (*in signo rationis*) and on the part of our conception (not by reason of the thing and time).

XV. A transient act differs from the agent and is not so much in God as from him; but an immanent act (such as the decree) is identified with the agent because in God there is no difference between "to be," "to be able" and "to operate." God does not act like creatures through something superadded to his nature, but through his own essence determining itself to this or that thing as a vital principle. Thus it is well said that no action proceeding from a free will can be God absolutely and in itself, but still can well be called God considered relatively (*schetikōs*), as a vital act determining itself spontaneously. In this sense, the decree is nothing other than God himself decreeing.

XVI. As God is a being absolutely necessary, so the decree is necessary intrinsically on the part of the principle (*a parte principii*). Notwithstanding this, it is free extrinsically and terminatively. Nor does this imply any real distinction in God because it is a mere relation (*schesis*) and respect outside himself which modifies but does not compound.

XVII. The decrees of God are not many intrinsically and differently (*allōs kai allōs*) in God (although relating to different things [*pros allo kai allo*] extrinsically). Hence the things which in finite beings are formally diverse are eminently identified in the infinite being.

Second Question
Are the decrees of God eternal? We affirm against Socinus.

The Socinians deny the eternity of the decrees.

I. In order to prove that the decrees differ really from God, the Socinians teach that they are not eternal, but temporal (or at least relatively temporal or at least relatively eternal). Hence they maintain that some were made before the creation of the world (as the decree concerning creating, preserving and governing it and the like), while others were temporal, made at different times after the creation as the exigency demanded (as Crellius says according to Volkelius, *De vera Religione* 1.32 [1630], pp. 420-56). Vorstius and the Remonstrants do not think differently. We believe that all the decrees are absolutely eternal.

The orthodox assert it.

II. The reasons are: (1) Scripture ascribes eternity to them (as when a kingdom is said to have been prepared for the pious "from the foundation of the world" [Mt. 25:34]; when we are said to have been chosen "before the foundation of the world" [Eph. 1:4]; and grace is said to have been given in Christ "before the world began" [*pro chronōn aiōniōn*, 2 Tim. 1:9]; and Christ to have been foreordained by God "before the foundation of the world" [*pro katabolēs kosmou*, 1 Pet. 1:20]—i.e., from eternity, for that which preceded the beginning of time must be eternal). Nor does the adverb of time "before" (used here) imply a temporal act because it is taken not so much positively (to indicate a difference of time) as negatively (to denote its removal). Nor ought it to be said that this is asserted only of certain decrees and not of all (to show the singular excellence of the persons or things or their preeminent certainty) because the same ought to be the case with all the decrees. Hence the fixing of some does not exclude, but includes and supposes the others analogically. Indeed Scripture extends it not to some decrees only, but to all.

III. A second proof is the passage where James asserts that "known unto God are all his works from eternity" (Acts 15:18). If the foreknowledge of God is eternal, it is necessary that the decree upon which it is founded should also be eternal (since he does not know things as future except in the decree, through which they pass from a state of possibility to a state of futurition).

IV. Third, if the decrees were made only in time, he would take counsel as needed (*pro re nata*) just like men. This agrees neither with his infinite wisdom nor with his most absolute perfection and immutability, since for him to be susceptible of any new decree is just as absurd as if something could happen to him unexpectedly.

V. Fourth, Vorstius (after Socinus) makes a false distinction between (so-called) eternity absolute and restricted, simple and relative. But Scripture always speaks in the same way of eternity and never hints at such a distinction. Nor

does the nature of the thing itself admit of it because eternity is not successive, but indivisible and simultaneous.

Sources of explanation.

VI. Although some decrees may be said to be prior or posterior to others, it does not follow that they are not eternal in themselves because this is not said on the part of God (for so they are one only and a most simple act in God), but with respect to our own manner of conception (who, on account of the distinct objects, cannot conceive of the decrees except distinctly by priority and posteriority). So this priority and posteriority is to be considered not so much in reference to the decrees as to things decreed (which in the execution have their order—some are before or after others).

VII. That is not eternal to which something is prior in the order of time and duration; but that can be called eternal to which something is prior by a priority of order and of nature. God is prior to his decrees in the latter way (as their principle), not, however, in the former.

VIII. A cause is not always prior to its effect in the order of time, not even in creatures. Indeed it often happens that effects are simultaneous with their causes: for instance when they proceed from them by emanation—as the light of the sun, thought of the mind, the act of knowledge and love in the angelic intellect (and the human just created) are synchronous (*synchronoi*). So nothing hinders the decree from being coeternal with God by whom it is made, although he ought to be called not so much the cause of the decree as the principle of it.

IX. Although God changes his dispensation towards men in time, either for good or for evil, it does not follow that the decree itself is changed or is made only in time because this very change was decreed even from eternity. Rather these things, said in accommodation to men (*anthrōpopathōs*), ought to be understood in a manner becoming God (*theoprepōs*); not with respect to a change in God, but with respect to a change in his works. Thus the following passages are understood: Jer. 18:10; 31:28; Dt. 28:63.

X. Although the decrees of God are maintained to be eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal. It follows only that God decreed from eternity what would take place concerning them in time. Therefore they are said to have been only as to being as known and intentional (on account of their decreed futurition, in the same sense that all his works are said to have been known to God from eternity [Acts 15:18]), not as to real being.

XI. If the decrees are deemed by some to be eternal *a posteriori* because they cease with the execution itself, this must be understood only with respect to the objects which are produced outside of God, not with respect to the divine act (which undergoes no change). So after the execution, the thing decreed ceases indeed to be in a state of becoming because it has already taken place; but still the decree itself does not cease because it is most true that God from eternity decreed some such thing.

XII. Although the decrees can be diverse with respect to the things decreed, yet there are none opposed to each other with respect to the same objects (as he wills to destroy by one decree, him whom, by another, he wills to save). If God decreed that good and evil should happen to the same man successively, it does not follow that there are contrary decrees. Yea, as they are from one God, so they ought to be considered as the effects of one and the same decree always consistent

with itself. For this reason, God willed foresight to man (just as diverse and often contrary remedies are successively used by the decree of the same physician for the cure of a sick man).

XIII. The eternity of God's decrees does not take away his liberty in decreeing. Although no moment can be assigned in which God was actually indifferent to decreeing this or that thing, still it is certain that the nature of God was in itself indifferent to decreeing this or that thing. For there was no necessary connection between God and creatures as exists between the Father and the Son (whom he could not but beget). On the other hand, he might (if he had willed) have abstained from any production of things.

Third Question

Are there conditional decrees? We deny against the Socinians, Remonstrants and Jesuits.

I. No distinction of God's decrees is more frequently urged by the Socinians, Remonstrants and others who contend for the idol of free will, than that of the absolute and conditional. Yet none is attended with greater absurdities or has fewer claims to acceptance. The design of the Socinians and their followers on this subject is to confirm the figment of middle knowledge (*scientia media*), to establish election from foreseen faith and to extol the strength of the human will.

Statement of the question.

II. The question does not concern the absolute or conditional decree *a posteriori* and consequently; or with respect to the things decreed and the objects willed outside of God (whether such decrees may be granted as either have no condition and means in execution, or include something). For in this sense, we do not deny that various decrees can be called conditional because they have conditions subordinate to them (although it must be confessed that it is a less proper way of speaking because the condition ought not to be confounded with the means; and it is one thing for a thing to be decreed under a condition, but another for it to be decreed as to be brought about through such means). Rather the question concerns the decree absolute or conditional *a priori* and antecedently on the part of the decree itself (whether the decrees are such as are suspended upon a condition containing power and of uncertain event outside of God; or whether they are absolute, depending upon his good pleasure alone). The Socinians and others assert the former; we the latter.

There are no conditional decrees.

III. The reasons are: (1) every decree of God is eternal; therefore it cannot depend upon a condition which takes place only in time. (2) God's decrees depend on his good pleasure (*eudokia*) (Mt. 11:26; Eph. 1:5; Rom. 9:11). Therefore they are not suspended upon any condition outside of God. (3) Every decree of God is immutable (Is. 46:10; Rom. 9:11). Now a conditional decree is mutable because every condition is mutable (especially if not decreed by God, but placed in the free will of man—such as is meant here). Hence, the conditional decree ceasing, God would fail in his purpose and would be obliged to enter upon new counsels by a second thought (*deuteras phrontidas*). (4) It is repugnant to the wisdom and power of God to make such decrees as depend upon an impossible condition (which neither will nor can be because he

upon whom alone it depends does not will to grant it). If this can take place in men weak and ignorant of the future, does it not follow that it can take place in God—the most wise, omniscient and omnipotent (to whom all things are not only foreseen but also provided for)?

IV. (5) It is absurd for the Creator to depend upon the creature, God upon man and the will of God (the first cause of all things) upon the things themselves. But this must be the case if the decrees of God are suspended on any condition in man.

V. (6) There is no middle knowledge (*scientia media*) having for its object future conditional things (as was proved before, Topic III, Question 13). Therefore there is no conditional decree, usually placed under it as a foundation.

VI. (7) Conditional decrees cannot be granted without supposing that he who decreed either was ignorant of the event or that the event was not in the power of the one decreeing or that he determined nothing certainly or absolutely concerning the event. All this, being highly derogatory to God, cannot and ought not to be ascribed to him.

VII. Hence with great wisdom the French Synods repeatedly proscribed the conditional decrees as inefficacious acts of willing (*velleitates*) and deceitful and vain desires (being contrary to the wisdom, power and constancy of God).

Sources of explanation.

VIII. It is one thing to maintain that God has not decreed to save anyone except through legitimate means; another that the decree to save these or those persons through legitimate means is conditional and of uncertain event (which the adversaries feign). Although faith and perseverance are related as the condition prerequisite to the decreed salvation (so that without them it ought not to be expected), yet they hold not the relation of powerful conditions to God's eternal decree of bestowing salvation upon this or that one in Christ. Indeed so far from God having decreed salvation to them under such a condition, on the contrary (by the very same decree by which he decreed salvation to them) he also decreed faith and perseverance to them and all the other means necessary for salvation.

IX. It is one thing for the thing decreed to be conditional; another for the decree itself. The former we grant, but not the latter. There can be granted an antecedent cause or condition of the thing willed, but not immediately of the volition itself. Thus God wills salvation to have the annexed condition of faith and repentance in the execution, but faith and repentance are not the condition or cause of the act of willing in God, nor of the decree to save in the intention.

X. Conditional promises and threatenings do not favor conditional decrees because they do not pertain to the decreeing will, but to the preceptive will and are appendages to the divine commands, added to stimulate and excite men. So he who promises and threatens under an uncertain condition does not predict or decree what will actually happen, but only what may happen by the performance or neglect of the condition. Hence such promises and threats show only the necessary connection of the condition with the thing conditioned, but involve no futurition of the thing. Now the decrees have a categorical verity concerning the thing about to be or not about to be.

XI. Although every hypothetical promise or threat ought to be referred mediately to some decree upon which it depends, it ought not to be a conditional, but an

absolute decree; not indeed concerning the execution of the thing itself or its certain futurition, but only concerning its infallible connection with another. For example, the gospel proposition—to save sinners if they believe—is founded upon some decree. Not indeed of the futurition of the thing (as if it decreed to give salvation to all under the condition of faith), but of the connection by which God willed indissolubly to join faith with salvation. So when Paul threatens "death to those who live after the flesh" (Rom. 8:13), it would be improper to infer that God had made a conditional decree concerning the death of all if they live according to the flesh; but only that God has joined together sin and death by the most strict connection. Thus it is true that brutes would have a sense of humor (*risibilia*), if they were rational. Yet no one would say from this that God conditionally decreed that brutes should have a sense of humor, if they were rational. It is sufficient for such a proposition to be founded upon a general decree by which he willed a sense of humor to be a property of reason and that reason should always be attended by a sense of humor. In the same sense, I properly infer that all sinners would be saved if they would believe—not from any conditional decree, but from this most certain general truth which God has sanctioned by his absolute decree (viz., that faith is the infallible means of salvation). For as he has appointed faith as the only way of bringing men to salvation, hence arises the truth of this hypothetical proposition—if a sinner believes he will be saved (which denotes only the certainty of consequence, but does not involve the positing of the consequent).

XII. The counsel which the Pharisees are said to have rejected against themselves (Lk. 7:30) does not denote any conditional decree concerning saving the Pharisees under the condition of faith and repentance, but the will of command (viz., the testimony of John concerning Christ by which God gave counsel to them about the mode of obtaining eternal salvation, as the word "counsel" is used in Ps. 107:11; Prov. 1:25, 30; Rev. 3:18 and elsewhere).

XIII. In 1 S. 2:30 ("I said indeed that thy house and the house of thy father, should walk before me forever; but now the Lord saith, Be it far from me") and 1 S. 13:13 ("If thou hadst kept the commandment of the Lord thy God, he would have established thy kingdom forever"), the promise was made to Saul on the supposition of his obedience (which was not founded upon any conditional decree concerning a thing which neither ever was, nor would be, but only upon the connection established by God between piety and life).

XIV. The various passages of Scripture which speak of future things, this or that condition being fulfilled (such as Gen. 20:7; 2 S. 17:1-3 with v. 14; 24:13; Jer. 16:3, 4; 17:24-26; 38:17, 18; 42:9, 10), do not favor any conditional decrees, but only denote various promises and threats. Indeed they show the certainty of the connection of one with the other: for example, of obedience and preservation and salvation, of rebellion and destruction. But they do not show the futurition of the event either absolute or conditional or what God has particularly decreed concerning these or those things. Therefore this is the more true, that since God (who has all things in his own power) knows that such a condition will never take place (since he himself has not decreed it), he cannot be said to have decreed anything under that condition. For nothing can be conceived more absurd than to maintain that God decrees something under a condition which at the very moment of decreeing he knows never will take place.

XV. Although the decrees (on the part of the objects) often include some condition, they do not cease to be absolute formally and in themselves because the condition and the thing conditioned depend immutably upon God, either as to permission (as in evil) or as to effecting (as in good things).

XVI. So far is God from changing his decrees to suit the changes of men, that on the contrary every change of human acts proceeds from the eternal and irrevocable decree of God (who in this way brings to pass what he had decreed should take place through promises and threats). Nor does he change his former opinion by the prayers of the pious, but by those very prayers accomplishes what he had determined should come to pass. Thus when God changes what he has made, when he takes away from man the life he has given, when he destroyed the world he had created, the change is in the things, not in God. For from eternity, he decreed to make the change and unless he did so, the decree to make the change would be changed.

XVII. The passage in Num. 14:30, where God protests by Moses that the Israelites should not enter the land (which he had promised them by a solemn oath) teaches indeed that the solemn promise was made to that people by God of introducing them into the land of Canaan, but under the condition of their obedience (which ceasing, the promise and the contract also ceased). But it does not argue that there was a conditional decree concerning their introduction. Indeed as he had decreed to make such a promise, so for his own reasons he determined to permit their contumacy and not to introduce an individual of that generation into the Promised Land. Again, as the promise had been made to the nation in general, it was not necessary that it should refer to each individual in it and be fulfilled in them. It was sufficient for it to apply to those who belonged to the following generation in whom it should be fulfilled.

XVIII. Although the relative properties of God (such as mercy and justice) suppose for their exercise in the objects about which they are occupied, some quality (as for instance misery and sin), it does not follow thence that the decree made concerning the salvation or condemnation of men is conditional. For although it is supposed in order to its formation, still it is not suspended on it, but will be most certainly and infallibly fulfilled according to the good pleasure of God.

XIX. Whatever is said against conditional decrees applies equally to the hypothetical will because there can be no act of will concerning future things out of itself which does not involve the notion of a decree. Hence they cannot escape who, while omitting the expression conditional decree, still retain the hypothetical will; for they mean the same thing, the name only being changed. See further Topic III, Question 13 concerning middle knowledge (*scientia media*) and Question 26, Section 19ff. concerning conditional will.

Fourth Question

Does the decree necessitate future things? We affirm.

I. The question is agitated between us and the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians (old and new) who, to establish the more easily the idol of free will, deny the necessity of things from the decree and foreknowledge (which the orthodox constantly maintain).

Statement of the question.

II. On the state of the question observe: (1) that a thing is said to be necessary which cannot be otherwise (*to mē endechomenon allōs echein*), the word meaning not to cease (*a non cessando*). Now this can be viewed in two ways: either in God or in the things themselves. In God, a twofold necessity is commonly remarked: the one absolute, the opposite of which is simply impossible to God (as when God is said to be incorruptible and incapable of denying himself); another hypothetical, arising from the hypothesis of the divine decree which, being made the effect itself willed, must necessarily follow. The former is founded on the immutable nature of God; the latter on his immutable will. This last is again twofold: one of immutability from the immutable decree; another of infallibility from his infallible foreknowledge. In things themselves, there also occur various kinds of necessity: (1) physical and internal on the part of second causes which are so determined to one thing that they cannot act otherwise (as in fire the necessity of burning); (2) of coaction, arising from an external principle acting violently; (3) hypothetical of the event or dependence through which a thing, although naturally mutable and contingent, cannot but be (on account of its dependence upon the ordination of God whose will cannot be changed nor his foreknowledge be deceived).

III. The question does not concern absolute and physical necessity with respect to second causes in themselves (because we confess that some are necessary, others contingent), but with respect to God and in order to him. The question does not concern the necessity of coaction because the decree brings no violence to second causes, but decrees the futurition of things to take place agreeably to their nature. Rather the question concerns hypothetical and consequential necessity with respect to the certainty of the event and the futurition from the decree. We assert the latter.

The decree implies the necessity of the event.

IV. The reasons are: (1) All things were decreed of God by an eternal and unchangeable counsel; hence they cannot but take place in the appointed time; otherwise the counsel of God would be changed, which the Scriptures declare to be impossible (Is. 46:10; Eph. 1:9); (2) Scripture predicts that necessity—"It must needs be that offenses come" (Mt. 18:7); "But how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be [viz., from the decree]" (Mt. 26:54); "The Son of man goeth, as it was determined" (*kata to hōrismenon*, Lk. 22:22). Thus "Herod and Pontius Pilate were gathered together for to do whatsoever thy hand and counsel" [i.e., the most efficacious counsel] "determined before to be done" (Acts 2:23; 4:28). "For there must be also heresies" (1 Cor. 11:19). (3) The most fortuitous and casual things are said to happen necessarily; as shown by the example of an accidental death (Ex. 21:12, 13), of lots (Prov. 16:33), of the sparrows and the hairs of our heads (Mt. 10:29, 30), of the preservation of the bones of Christ (Jn. 19:36) and his death (Acts 4:28).

V. (4) As all things are foreseen by an infallible foreknowledge (Acts 15:18; Heb. 4:13), so they must necessarily happen infallibly. (5) They are certainly predicted as future so that the word of God cannot fail, nor can Scripture be broken. Therefore they must happen necessarily, if not as to the mode of production (which is often contingent), still as to the certainty of the event (which cannot be otherwise).

Sources of explanation.

VI. That which maintains a determination to one thing by a physical necessity or a necessity of coaction, takes away liberty and contingency; but not that which maintains it only by a hypothetical necessity. For the certainty does not arise from the nature of second causes, which are free and contingent, but extrinsically from the immutability of the decree (which so determines the futurition of the event as not to change the nature of things, but permits necessary things to act necessarily, free things freely). Hence it is evident that the necessity and immutability of the decree indeed takes away contingency with respect to the first cause. For since all things happen necessarily, nothing can take place contingently. But this does not take it away with respect to second causes because the same decree which predetermined also determined the mode of futurition, so that the things having necessary causes should happen necessarily and those having contingent causes, contingently. Therefore the effect may properly be called both necessary and contingent at the same time, but in different respects (*kat' allo kai allo*): the former on the part of God and relative to the decree; the latter on the part of the thing and relative to second and proximate causes which might be disposed differently.

VII. Although in relation to the first cause, all things are said to be necessary, yet taken according to themselves certain things can be free, contingent and fortuitous because each thing is and may be judged according to proximate and particular causes. "Every effect in necessity and contingency follows the proximate cause and not the first," as Thomas Aquinas says ("De Praescientia et Praedestinatione," in *Opera Omnia: Opuscula Varia* [1889], 32:92).

VIII. The necessity of the decree indeed takes away the liberty of independence and the irresponsibility (*to anypeuthynon*) and uncontrol (*adespoton*) of the creature because it so depends upon the first cause that it can neither be nor move without it. But this does not take away the liberty of spontaneity and indifference because the necessity is only hypothetical (ensuring the certainty of the event, but not taking away the nature and properties of second causes). Hence we may rightly say, "Adam sinned necessarily and freely": the former with respect to the decree and the futurition of the thing; the latter with respect to his will and as to the mode. For no matter what the necessity of the decree, still Adam sinned voluntarily and consequently most freely.

IX. Although there is a necessity of the event from the decree, nothing is detracted by it from the wisdom and justice of God (as if the former could not successfully exhort men to duty, nor the latter apportion rewards or punishments to virtue and vice). This necessity (as was just now said) being extrinsic and hypothetical in the highest manner is consistent with the liberty of creatures (who do not cease to act most freely on their part, although the effect is necessary on the part of God). So far therefore from these being mutually opposed to each other, they amicably conspire together because through these means (although free), the events determined by the decree of God are promised and produced.

X. Although all things are said to be necessary from the decree, God cannot on this account be reckoned the author of sin. The decree which is the cause of the futurition of sin is nevertheless neither its physical cause (by the infusion of evil) nor its ethical cause (by the approbation of it). So although sin necessarily follows the decree, it cannot be said to flow from the decree. The decree does not flow into the thing, nor is it effective of evil, but only permissive and directive.

XI. But as God (on account of the necessity which his decree gives to things) cannot be charged with sin, so neither can sinners on that account be excused. Such a necessity does not take away their liberty and choice (*proairesin*) in acting, nor hinder them from exercising their acts most freely. Nor, if they follow out in this way the decree of God, are they to be considered as obeying it because the decree is not the rule of our actions, but the law of God. Therefore although they fulfil the decretive will, they are not to be esteemed the less guilty because they sin against the preceptive will by violating most iniquitously the law laid down for them. Thus Herod and Pontius Pilate (with the Jews) did not escape incurring the guilt of a most terrible crime by their crucifixion of Christ, although they did nothing but what the hand and counsel of God had already decreed before should be done (Acts 4:28). But we will treat of these things more fully when we take up the actual providence of God concerning sin and his concurrence. There the slander usually hurled at us (concerning God as the author of sin and concerning Stoical fate) will be refuted.

FIFTH QUESTION: THE END OF LIFE

Is the fixed and immovable end of the life of each man with all its circumstances so determined by the decree of God, that he cannot die in another moment of time or by another kind of death than that in which he does die? We affirm against the Socinians and Remonstrants.

I. This question is pressed upon us by the Socinians and Remonstrants who, to establish the mutability of decrees, deny even that the term of life is so fixed and determined by the providence of God that it cannot be either protracted or shortened. It was lengthily discussed some years ago in Belgium by that distinguished man John van Beverwyck (Beverovicius), a physician of Dort, who investigated the opinions of learned doctors concerning it and published them in his *Epistolica Questio de Vitae Termino* (1636).

Statement of the question.

II. On the state of the question observe: (1) that the term of life may be common and general (such as is assigned to the human race) or special (such as is given to the duration of this or that individual). We do not speak here of the first, but of the second. The question is not whether it is appointed unto men by the decree of God once to die; nor whether there may be granted a certain term of human life either longer or shorter (whether absolutely and in itself or compared with the life of other animals—for this the adversaries do not deny). Rather the question concerns the special term (*termino speciale*): whether a unique and immovable moment of birth and death is fixed by God for each one.

III. (2) The term of life can be said to be movable or immovable in different senses, either with respect to the first cause or with respect to second causes. The question is not whether the physical germ of life (arising from proximate natural causes) is immovable. We confess that it can be contracted or protracted on account of good or bad regimen (as he who might have lived longer by the order of nature may shorten the ordinary course of life by intemperance in eating or drinking or other vices; or may perish by the sword, famine or other violent

causes). Rather the question is whether the hyperphysical term (established by the first cause and by divine ordination) is immovable. The distinction of Thomas Aquinas applies here, "Fate as in second causes is movable, but as from divine foreknowledge is immovable, not by an absolute but by a conditional necessity" (ST, I, Q. 116, Art. 3, p. 568).

IV. Fixing the term of life is either absolute antecedently or consequently so as to exclude all use of second causes and means. The question does not concern the latter: whether each one's life and death is decreed absolutely without any respect to the necessary means (which are certainly subordinated to their ends and included in the same decree) so that whatever men may or may not do, what God has decreed will certainly come to pass. No one of our party asserts this because we hold that the term is so fixed as not to exclude the necessity of means. But the question concerns the absolute fixing antecedently, i.e., depending upon no foreseen condition. Thus the question comes to this: whether the term of life (not the general and common, but the special and peculiar) is so fixed and immovable (not with respect to second causes, but the first—God's eternal decree) that it can in no way either be prolonged or shortened; or whether it is so indefinite and movable that it can either be cut short by the vices of men or lengthened by the art and skill of physicians. The latter is affirmed by the Remonstrants and Lutherans following the Socinians; but the orthodox hold the former.

That the term of life is fixed may be proved: (1) from Job 14:5.

V. The reasons are: (1) from Job 14:5 where he thus addresses God—"Seeing his days are determined, the number of his months are with thee, thou hast appointed his bounds that he cannot pass"; and "Is there not a warfare" (Job 7:1) or an appointed time (for Pagninus and Mercer intimate that *tsb'* means this here), and "are not his days also like the days of an hireling?" Hence it is inferred that there is granted a certain and determined number of days to the life of each man, and that this has been unchangeably fixed by God so that no one can pass beyond it. Nor ought it to be objected: (a) that the expression is conditional on account of the particle *'m* (because the series of the discourse teaches that it is not to be taken conditionally, but argumentatively; for "since" in this sense—since the days of man are determined, and thou hast appointed short bounds to him which he cannot pass or turn from, i.e., this ought to satisfy thee, that his misery is such through sin that it ought to be finished in a short time, so that there is no need to load him with more weighty burdens); (b) that Job speaks of the common term prefixed to human life which all ordinarily attain who do not shorten their days by their own fault (because the words show that he speaks of the particular term prefixed to each one, for he treats of the number of his months, of his days and his term); (c) although Job speaks of the determining of days, yet he does not intimate how that is done by God. Nothing hinders us from saying that the manner in which each of us will act (or at least on the hypothesis of a good or bad use of our will) has been circumscribed by a certain divine foresight because it is taken for granted that there is a reference to obedience or disobedience, to a good or bad use of free will while there is no allusion to it. In addition, God can foresee nothing as future unless consequent to his decree (either effective or permissive, concerning its futurition).

(2) From Ps. 39:4, 5.

VI. Second, "Lord, make me to know mine end, and the measure of my days, what it is; that I may know what time I have here. Behold spans" [i.e., as handbreadths] "hast thou made my days, and mine age is as nothing before thee" (Ps. 39:4, 5). Hence we make two inferences: (a) that God knew the end of man; therefore he predetermined it because he could neither know nor foretell unless he had predetermined it; (b) that God has given a certain measure to the days of man, which would be untrue if he had not fixed beforehand the term of his life. Nor is the brevity of life in general only intimated here, but the brevity of the days of David in particular are determined and limited by God (not conditionally, but absolutely).

(3) From Acts 17:26.

VII. Third, "God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation" (Acts 17:26). Now where there are *kairoi protetagmenoi*, there ought to be a determined term of life. This cannot be referred only to the duration of the human race, but also to the duration of each individual. For afterwards there is added, "In him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts 17:28); and "He giveth to all life, and breath, and all things" (Acts 17:25). Acts 1:7 affords a confirmation, where God is said to have put the times in his own power; therefore also the time of each mortal. And if he has assigned to everything its time to be born and to die (Ecc. 3:1, 2), no reason can be given why a decreed day established by him on which each one must die may not equally be believed as well as a predetermined birthday on which each one should come into the world.

(4) From Mt. 10:28.

VIII. Fourth, Mt. 10:28-30 from which we thus conclude: if the hairs of our head are all numbered, much more our days, months and years. If not even a sparrow can fall to the ground without the Father's will, how much less is man to be considered as entering upon and leaving the station of this life without the special nod of the supreme ruler (to whom the right of life and death properly belongs)? These things were spoken to the apostles so as to pertain also to others. As the command is general, the promise against the perils of persecution and death ought also to be common. Thus an argument of consolation is drawn from the providence of God, not that which is peculiar to the apostles, but common to all.

(5) From the prediction of death.

IX. Fifth, the term of life is infallibly predicted. Therefore it is immutably predetermined because no other cause of the certainty of the prediction can be given. It is evident from the example of the deluge of the first world predicted 120 years before (Gen. 6:3); of Moses (Dt. 31:14); of the infant belonging to David (2 S. 12:14); of the son of Jeroboam (1 K. 14:12); of Ahaziah, king of Israel (2 K. 1:4); of Peter (Jn. 21:18); of Christ, the Savior, whose death was predicted not only as to the kind (Lk. 18:32, 33*; Jn. 12:33), but also as to the hour and time (Jn. 7:30; 13:1; 17:1); of the sons of Eli (1 S. 2:34); of the Israelites smitten with the pestilence (2 S. 24:15), where it is explicitly said that the pestilence prevailed even "to the time appointed" (*'th mv'dh*); of Belshazzar (Dan. 5:25, 26); of Ahab and Jezebel (1 K. 21:22, 23). Since

then whatever is foreknown by God has its definite and infallible futurition from the definite counsel and foreknowledge of God (Acts 2:23), it is as necessary that the manner and day of the death of individuals should be determined by God as that both should be infallibly and certainly foreknown by him. For to pretend that anything is indefinitely and conditionally foreknown by God (as the adversaries wish) is absurd (*asystata*).

X. Sixth, the kind of death which may seem to be most casual and accidental is predetermined by the immutable decree of God; therefore much more other kinds of death. It is evident in casual homicide, concerning which it is said, "God delivers him into his hand" (Ex. 21:13, 14), and "He is delivered from the face of God" (as Onkelos has it in *Targum Onqelos to Exodus* [ed. B. Grossfeld, 1988], p. 60 on Ex. 21:13); in Ahab whose imminent destruction is foretold (1 K. 22:28), and yet he is said to have perished "by chance" (1 K. 22:34) (viz., as regards the second cause who was not thinking of Ahab); in the idolatrous Jews whom God is said to have numbered to the sword (Is. 65:12); in Herod who was eaten up with worms (Acts 12:23); in the first world deluged with water; in the 185,000 men of the army of Sennacherib who perished in one night. Now who would say that the decree of God concerning such an inevitable kind of death was suspended upon the obedience or disobedience of each one, or the good or bad use of free will (as a necessary condition without which God cannot absolutely prefix the term of life to anyone)?

XI. Seventh, God by a sure and predetermined order regulates the whole life, movements and ages of man from the beginning to the end. Therefore he also ought to designate the last end of life. For he who governs the whole and providently cares for each preceding act, why should he neglect the end? If the matter of lesser importance is governed by God, shall the very greatest, that critical day on which eternity hangs, be left to man? The conception and birth of a man and all that pertains to his life with the varied circumstances are written in God's book (as frequently noted in Ps. 139:16; 106; 107; 144; 121). Are not those written in his book also which relate to the extreme period of life (the most memorable of all)? Does God not have "the issues from death" in his power (Ps. 68:20)? Is not the Lord of death and of life also the Lord of the end and of the beginning?

XII. Eighth, if God did not predetermine each one's term of life, it would follow that the providence of God is concerned only with the whole (*ta kath' holou*) and not with the particulars (*ta kath' hekasta*); that man is the controller not only of his own fortune, but also of his life and death; that God and his will and knowledge are inferior to second causes and ordains and disposes all things as contingencies arise, changes his counsel, fixes and refixes terms, forms and bends his decrees to suit the movements of men. And thus God is not God (i.e., an independent and absolute Lord who does what he wills), but a hypothetical Lord, circumscribed by conditions. All this, being impious and blasphemous, necessarily makes that from which they are deduced such also.

Sources of explanation.

XIII. The days of Hezekiah were not prolonged beyond the term fixed by God, but only beyond that time in which (according to the order of secondary and natural causes and the very nature of the disease) he seemed but a step from death and as about to die actually, unless God would graciously interpose. Therefore the denunciation of death made by the prophet is one of threatening,

not one of predestination; not absolute, but conditional (although the condition was not expressed, but only declared by the event). Therefore he had decreed not that Hezekiah should die, but only to denounce the sentence of death against him (so that broken by a salutary sorrow he might the more earnestly have recourse to him). And that it was so understood by the king is evident from the fact that immediately turning to the wall he prayed most ardently to Jehovah for the prolongation of his life. Now although the threatening was not to be fulfilled, still it did not cease to be most serious because through it he had determined to carry into effect the decree of preserving the king. The death denounced through the threatening did indeed contend with the event decreed (which was the prolongation of life); but not the threatening itself of death (which was the means appointed by God for its execution).

XIV. "The wicked shall not live out half their days" (Ps. 55:23)—not properly or absolutely, but comparatively and relatively; not indeed to the decree of God, but either to their nature and habit of body (because if left to themselves without divine interference, they might live longer by the possibility of the second cause, but not by the possibility of the effect depending upon the concurrence of the first and second cause); or relatively to the opinion, hope and intention, both of themselves and of others because they had already conceived the hope of a great sum of days. Thus often in Scripture a thing is said to be such as it is regarded in the opinion and fallacious judgment of men: "What he has" [i.e., what he seemeth to have] "shall be taken from him" (Lk. 8:18). And if some of the pious are snatched away by a premature death, and some of the wicked attain to a lengthened age by the fixed decree of God, it does not immediately follow that this threatening of the psalmist is of no account, and that the latter are not therefore to be considered as more unhappy than the former. Although they die equally at the appointed time (with respect to divine providence unknown to them), yet the death of each is far different. The latter, in a premature time and always unprepared, dread and flee death and vainly strive to put it off. In death, they see nothing but death. Without repentance, hope or consolation, they pass from death to death and render it most bitter to themselves (not so much departing willingly from the world as felled violently—torn up by the roots). But the pious, satisfied with days (although in the very flower of age), readily follow the voice of their Lord, desire to be dissolved that they may be with Christ and prepared to depart with lamps kindled and loins girded, wishfully wait for the coming of the bridegroom. The wicked, no matter when they die (even if in decrepit old age), always depart prematurely and unprepared. So that the pious, howsoever and whenever they may die, always die maturely and opportunely. Hence they are said to sleep and to rest in their beds and to return to the Lord.

XV. The wicked dies, not in his time (Ecc. 7:17), both with respect to second causes and natural constitution, because his life might be prolonged further, which God by a just judgment wills to break off, and with respect to his wish and hope, because he always dies out of season, i.e., unwilling and unprepared, who has never learned how to live or to die, although more than sufficiently mature on account of sins. Hence an unprovided for and unexpected death is said to snatch him in an evil time (i.e., not his own, Ecc. 7:17). The fit time of repentance and piety is the accepted time and truly our possession (*ktēma*) which we ought to use for our benefit because upon it all felicity (*eutychia*) depends. But

when it has passed, there remains only an unseasonable time (*kairoe akairos*); thus Gregory the Great speaks (*Morals on the Book of Job* 17*.6 [1845], 2:283).

XVI. When Scripture speaks of "the lengthening out" or "the cutting short" of days (made by God with respect to the pious or the wicked, Ex. 20:12; Dt. 4:40; 30:19, 20; Ps. 91:16; 1 K. 3:14; Prov. 10:27), it does not mean so much properly a lengthening or cutting short of the term fixed by God, as it means absolute longevity or untimely death (by metonomy of the antecedent for the consequent, as Paul explains the words of the law—that "thou mayest live long on the earth," Eph. 6:3*). Again the days of anyone are said to be shortened or prolonged not absolutely and simply beyond the term fixed by God to each one, but only comparatively (both to others and to the laws and ordinary course of nature and to their own wishes and expectations). For as to some, it is granted to live longer than either they themselves believed or others hoped, so many are deceived in their calculations. While in the flush of age and fortune, they perceive the thread of life snapping much quicker than they had persuaded themselves.

XVII. Although length of days is promised to the pious and brevity of days is denounced upon the wicked, still the term of life is not suspended upon the uncertain condition of man. For God who decreed to bring them to piety, also decreed to grant them longevity by crowning his own gifts and not their merits. If he shortens the life of the wicked on account of their crimes by the same counsel by which he decreed to permit them, he also decreed to punish them in this way. Therefore the promises and threatenings do not declare what God has decreed with himself about individuals, but what kind of men he wills either to fit out with longevity or to visit with shortness of life; what rewards he has established for piety and what punishments for impiety, which, however, are to be understood according to the nature of temporal things—always with the condition of his will who can, as he judges to be fit, either contract the life of the pious for their salvation or lengthen that of the wicked for their greater punishment.

XVIII. Although it might have been possible for this or that man to live longer (in the divided sense and apart from the decree of God), yet in the composite sense (and on the supposition of the decree), it was necessary for him to die in that particular place, time and manner. Although Lazarus would not have died if Christ had visited him while sick, yet it was divinely appointed that Christ should be absent that he might die.

XIX. So far is the certainty of the end of the event from taking away the necessity and the use of means that it rather supposes them. For by God's decree, such means were instituted to bring about the futurition of the thing. Although the life of Hezekiah was prolonged so that he could have no doubt about it, he ought not therefore to neglect food, but on the contrary to act in subserviency to the counsel of God in this respect. Thus God gave to Paul the life of all them in the ship (Acts 27:24), yet when the sailors wished to flee out of the ship, the apostle said to the centurion, "Except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved" (v. 31). Hence it appears that the aid of physicians, appointed by God to relieve diseases, cannot be neglected without temerity (although entire dependence is not to be placed in them). Nor ought they to cease from their work because they do not know (nor is it necessary that they should) what God has determined concerning the life or the death of the sick man. We must do our duty and leave the result with God. If the term of life has not yet arrived, let him bless the remedies

and use them to obtain his purpose. But if he has determined otherwise concerning him, the art of the physician will be in vain (but still he will have done this duty).

XX. Although the term of life is fixed, yet prayers for a long life are not improper both because that term is known to no one, and because prayers ought always to go upon the supposition of the divine will (to which believers ought always to submit themselves and their all).

XXI. Suicides cannot on this account be excused because they do not commit this crime in order to fulfil the decree of God (of which they are ignorant), but to carry out the diabolical fury with which they are smitten. Nor are they excused by God on account of the term thus fixed to their life any more than robbers are excused in killing a traveller who has fallen into their hands by the providence of God.

XXII. The doctrine concerning the fixed term of life ought to make us brave and undisturbed in all the perils which surround us, while we follow our calling. Yet it should not produce in us rashness in tempting God and courting every danger unnecessarily. Under the pretext that their days are numbered, the Turks fly from no danger and have no fear of pestilence and its contagion (whom moreover this opinion makes "secure but not safe from the pestilence," as Busbequius cleverly remarks, "Epistle 4," *The four epistles of A.G. Busbequius* [1694], p. 288).

XXIII. Whether anyone dies once or twice (as was the case with Lazarus and the daughter of Jairus) or does not die at all (as Enoch) or is only changed (as the surviving believers on the last day, 1 Cor. 15:51), yet the decree of God remains immovable (by which he has predetermined to individuals either life or death—one or double [*geminam*] or change [*transmutationem*]).

XXIV. The inhabitants of the first world (the Sodomites and the like sinners) might have prolonged their lives if they had repented; not beyond the bound fixed by God because as he had not decreed to give them repentance, so he did not will to prolong their lives but with respect to natural causes and the ordinary course of life.

XXV. Destruction was denounced against the Ninevites under a condition—except they would repent. But tacit and understood (and to bring it about), God employed the terrible threatenings of the prophet.

XXVI. When Moses says, "The days of our years are seventy and eighty years" (Ps. 90:10), he does not speak of the special term of life assigned to each individual, but both of the general term (to which the life of the Israelites of his time had been reduced whose bodies fell in the wilderness, and indeed as to a great part within that term of seventy or eighty years) and of the common term posited for the life of men (which for the most part [*hōs epi to poly*] falls within that term, those surviving it being few and far between).

XXVII. Here it is proper to notice that frequently in the profane philosophers and poets we read of the certainty and unavoidableness of death, as that of Pindar—"the fatal decree cannot be shunned" (*to ge morsimon ou parphykton, Pythian Odes*, 12.30 [Loeb, 310-11]). Hence the word *mortis* seems to be derived from the word *moros*, which means "death" with the poets. For *moros* comes from the verb *meirō*, as if *memerismenos tois pasin, ek de tou moros ginetai morismon* (as the *Etymologicon Magnum* [of Thomas Gaisford (1848/1962), 591.7] has it) and by metathesis of *s*, *morsimon, to peprōmenon kai to eimarmenon*. Here also belongs this: "There is an end fixed for the life of mortals, and death cannot be avoided,

but die we must" (Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* 3.1078-79 [Loeb, 244-45]); and this of Silius Italicus—"both peace and war stand all together at the end of the slave, and the last day brings annihilation+." From these the words of Cicero do not differ: "But whatever the time given us in which to live, we should therewith be content" (*De Senectute* 19.69 [Loeb, 20:80-81]). Also: "No man dies too soon, because he lives only as long as he was destined to live. For each the boundary-line is marked; where it has been placed, it will always remain, and no endeavor or favor will move it farther on" (Seneca, "De Consolatione ad Marciam," *Moral Essays* 21*.4-5 [Loeb, 2:74-75]).

Sixth Question: Predestination
Ought predestination to be publicly taught and preached? We affirm.

Occasion of the question.

I. Some of the brethren of France in the time of Augustine started this question. Since, in his books against the Pelagians, he had inserted and inculcated many things concerning predestination, so as in this way to defend the truth against their impious doctrines, many were disturbed by it (as appears from the two letters of Prosper, a disciple of Augustine, and of Hilary, the presbyter*; cf. "Letters 225 and 226 to Augustine" [FC 32:119-29 and 129-39]). The reason was not that they judged it to be at all false, but because they thought the preaching of it was dangerous and invidious, better to be suppressed than brought into prominence.

II. There are some of the same opinion at the present day. Wearied with the contentions arising from this doctrine in almost every age, they think that it is best for the peace of the church and the tranquility of conscience to let these questions alone (since by them scruples are suggested and doubts generated which are calculated to weaken the faith of the weak and to drive men to desperation or into carnal security). But this opinion is more honest than true and cannot be readily received by those who have known the richest fruits of consolation and sanctification to redound to believers from this doctrine properly understood.

III. Hence we think that this doctrine should be neither wholly suppressed from a preposterous modesty nor curiously pried into by a rash presumption. Rather it should be taught soberly and prudently from the word of God so that two dangerous rocks may be avoided: on the one hand, that of "affected ignorance" which wishes to see nothing and blinds itself purposely in things revealed; on the other, that of "unwarrantable curiosity" which busies itself to see and understand everything even in mysteries. They strike upon the first who (sinning in defect) think that we should abstain from the proposition of this doctrine; and upon the latter who (sinning in excess) wish to make everything in this mystery scrupulously accurate (*exonychizein*) and hold that nothing should be left undiscovered (*anexereunēton*) in it. Against both, we maintain (with the orthodox) that predestination can be taught with profit, provided this is done soberly from the word of God.

Predestination should be taught.

IV. The reasons are: (1) Christ and the apostles frequently taught it (as appears from the gospel, Mt. 11:20, 25; 13:11; 25:34; Lk. 10:20; 12:32; Jn. 8:47; 15:16 and in other places; and from the epistles of Paul (the whole of Rom. 9 and Rom. 8:29, 30; Eph. 1:4, 5; 2 Tim. 1:9; 1 Thess. 5:9; 2 Thess. 2:13). Nor otherwise do Peter, James and John express themselves who speak repeatedly of this mystery whenever occasion offered. Now if it was proper for them to teach it, why is it not proper for us to learn it? Why should God teach what would have been better (*arrēton*) unspoken (*ameinon*)? Why did he wish to proclaim those things which it would be better not to know? Do we wish to be more prudent than God or to prescribe rules to him?

V. (2) It is one of the primary gospel doctrines and foundations of faith. It cannot be ignored without great injury to the church and to believers. For it is the fountain of our gratitude to God, the root of humility, the foundation and most firm anchor of confidence in all temptations, the fulcrum of the sweetest consolation and the most powerful spur (*incitamentum*) to piety and holiness.

VI. (3) The importunity of the adversaries (who have corrupted this primary head of faith by deadly errors and infamous calumnies which they are accustomed to heap upon our doctrine) imposes upon us the necessity of handling it so that the truth may be fairly exhibited and freed from the most false and iniquitous criminations of evilly disposed men. As if we introduced a fatal and Stoical necessity; as if we would extinguish all religion in the minds of men by it, to soothe them on the bed of security and profanity or hurl them into the abyss of despair; as if we made God cruel, hypocritical and the author of sin—I shudder to relate it. Now as all these things are perfectly false, they ought unquestionably to be refuted by a sober and healthy exhibition of this doctrine from the word of God.

Sources of explanation.

VII. Although wicked men often abuse this doctrine (improperly understood), its lawful use towards the pious ought not therefore to be denied (unless we wish to have more regard for wicked men than believers). (2) If, on account of the abuse of some persons, we should abstain from the proposition of this mystery, we must equally abstain from most of the mysteries of the Christian religion which the wicked abuse or laugh at and satirize (such as the mystery of the Trinity, the incarnation, the resurrection and the like). (3) The calumnies launched against the doctrine of Paul by the false apostles could not cause him to suppress it; yea, he thoroughly discussed it in his inspired way so that he might shut the mouths of adversaries. Why then should we refrain from its presentation? Let us only follow in the footsteps of Paul and, with him, speak and be silent.

VIII. If some abuse this doctrine either to licentiousness or to desperation, this happens not per se from the doctrine itself, but accidentally, from the vice of men who most wickedly wrest it to their own destruction. Indeed, there is no doctrine from which more powerful incitements to piety can be drawn and richer streams of confidence and consolation flow (as will be seen in the proper place).

IX. The mystery of predestination is too sublime to be comprehended by us as to the why (*to dioti*) (as he is rash who would attempt to find out or to assign the reasons and the causes of it). But this does not hinder it from being taught in Scripture as to the fact (*to hoti*) and from being firmly held by us. Two things therefore must be distinguished here: the one, what God has revealed in his

word; the other, what he has concealed. The former we cannot despise (unless wickedly); the latter we cannot investigate (unless rashly). "The secret things," says Scripture, "belong unto God: but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children" (Dt. 29:29). To neglect things revealed argues ingratitude, but to search into things concealed argues pride. "We must not therefore deny what is plain because we cannot comprehend what is hidden," as Augustine expresses it (*On the Gift of Perseverance* 37 [NPNF1, 5:540; PL 45.1016]).

X. The fathers before Augustine spoke more sparingly concerning this mystery not because they judged it best to ignore it, but because there was no occasion presented for discussing it more largely (the Pelagian heresy not having as yet sprung up). Indeed it is true that they sometimes expressed themselves without sufficient caution. Nevertheless Augustine (*On the Gift of Perseverance* 48-49* [NPNF1, 5:545-46]) proves that they did not pass over this truth in utter silence (for who could be ignorant of that which is so clearly set forth in sacred Scriptures?)—the testimony of Ambrose, Cyprian and Gregory Nazianzus being adduced for this purpose.

How predestination should be taught.

XI. While we think that predestination should be taught, we do not further suppose that human curiosity should be enlarged, but believe there is need here of great sobriety and prudence; both that we may remain within the bounds prescribed by Scripture, not endeavoring to be wise beyond what is written (*par' ho gegraptai*), and that we may prudently have a regard for the persons, places and times to regulate the proposition of it. For it ought not to be delivered immediately and in the first instance, but gradually and slowly. Nor ought it to be delivered equally as to all its parts, for some ought to be more frequently inculcated as more useful and better suited to the consolation of the pious (as the doctrine of election), but others ought to be handled more sparingly (as reprobation). Nor ought it to be set forth so much to the people in the church as to the initiated (*tois mystais*) in the school. Again, predestination must be considered not so much *a priori* as *a posteriori*. Not that we may descend from causes to effects, but ascend from effects to causes. Not that we should curiously unroll "the book of life" in order to see if our names are written therein (which is forbidden to us), but that we should diligently consult "the book of conscience" which we are not only permitted, but also commanded to do, that we may know whether the seal of God is stamped upon our hearts and whether the fruits of election (viz., faith and repentance) may be found in us (which is the safest way of proceeding to the saving knowledge of that doctrine). In one word, all curious and fruitless questions must be avoided here, and what Paul calls "foolish and unlearned questions" (*apaideutous zētēseis kai aperantous*, 2 Tim. 2:23)—which usually engender strifes and contentions. Our only object should be to increase our faith, not to feed curiosity; to labor for edification, not to strive for our glory.

SEVENTH QUESTION

In what sense are the words "predestination," prognōseōs, eklogēs *and* protheseōs *used in this mystery?*

I. Since the Scriptures (whose genuine signification throws great light upon the knowledge of the thing itself) use various words in explaining this mystery, we must premise certain things concerning them.

Predestination.

II. First the word "predestination" occurs here, and it must not be passed over lightly. For although the word *proorismou* does not exist in the Scriptures, yet the verb from which it comes is often read (Acts 4:28; Rom. 8:29, 30; Eph. 1:5). Moreover to predestinate (or *proorizein* from the force of the verb) signifies to determine something concerning things before they take place and to direct them to a certain end.

III. However it is understood by authors in three ways. (1) More widely for every decree of God about creatures and most especially about intelligent creatures in order to their ultimate end. Thus it is frequently employed by the fathers for providence itself. (2) More specially for the counsel of God concerning men as fallen either to be saved by grace or to be damned by justice (which is commonly called "election" and "reprobation"). (3) Most specially for the decree of election, which is called "the predestination of the saints." Again according to the latter, it can be taken in two senses (*schesin*): not only for the destination to the end, but particularly for the "destination to the means" (in which sense it is used by Paul when he says that God predestinated those whom he foreknew to be "conformed to the image of his Son," Rom. 8:29, 30). Here it is plain that predestination is distinguished from foreknowledge and refers most especially to the means, not to the end. Thus after saying that God hath chosen us in Christ, the apostle adds "having predestinated us unto the adoption of children" (*proorisas hēmas eis hyiothesian*, Eph. 1:5) to mark the destination of means ordained for obtaining the salvation destined by election.

IV. About this word, moreover, it is asked whether it is to be referred only to election or whether it embraces reprobation also. This controversy was formerly vehemently urged in the matter of Gottschalk in the ninth century, John Erigena Scotus maintaining that it suited election alone (*De Divina Praedestinatione liber** [PL 122.355-440]). On the other hand, Gottschalk, the Lyonians and Remigius, the bishop (in their name), extended it to reprobation. The same question now lies between us and the papists. For the papists (to whom the term reprobation is hateful) contend that it must be used in the first sense. Hence they are accustomed to call reprobates not predestinated, but "foreknown"; and do not subordinate but oppose reprobation to predestination (as Bellarmine, Gregory de Valentia and Pighius, *De libero hominis arbitrio* 8.2 [1642], p. 137). With them even some of the orthodox appear to agree, though not with the same object in view. But we (although willing to confess that the term predestination is according to Scripture usage often restricted to election; yet not only from the proper signification of the word, but also from Scripture usage and received custom) think that it is rightly extended to reprobation so as to embrace both parts of the divine counsel (election and reprobation), in which sense it is taken here by us.

Predestination embraces election and reprobation.

V. The reasons are: (1) the Scripture extends the word *proorizein* to the wicked acts of those reprobates who procured the crucifixion of Christ—"the son of man goeth *kata to hōrismenon*" (Lk. 22:22; Acts 4:28). Herod and Pontius Pilate did nothing but what "the hand and counsel of God *proōrise* to be done." Nor ought the objection to be made that it does not treat of their reprobation, but of the ordination of the crucifixion to a good end. These things are not to be opposed, but composed. The crucifixion of

Christ (which is to us the means of salvation) was to the crucifiers the means of damnation (which depended on the most just decree of God).

VI. Second, the Scripture uses equivalent phrases when it says that certain persons are appointed to wrath (1 Thess. 5:9; 1 Pet. 2:8), fitted to destruction (Rom. 9:22), ordained to condemnation (Jd. 4), made unto dishonor (Rom. 9:21) and for the day of evil (Prov. 16:4). If reprobation is described in these phrases, why can it not be expressed by the word "predestination"? Third, because the definition of predestination (viz., the ordination of a thing to its end by means before it comes to pass) is no less suitable to reprobation than to election. Fourth, the fathers frequently thus speak: "We confess the elect to life and the predestination of the wicked to death" (Council of Valence, Mansi, 15:4). "He fulfills what he wills, properly using even evil things as if the very best to the damnation of those whom he has justly predestinated to punishment" (Augustine, *Enchiridion* 26 [100] [FC 3:454; PL 40.279]; cf. also his "Treatise on the Merits and the Forgiveness of Sins," 2.26 [17] [NPNF1, 5:55]; CG 21.24 [FC 24:387-94]; Fulgentius, *Ad Monimum* 1 [PL 65.153-78]). "Predestination is twofold: either of the elect to rest or of the reprobate to death" (Isidore of Seville, *Sententiarum Libri tres* 2.6 [PL 83.606]).

VII. Although in truth predestination is sometimes taken strictly in the Scriptures for the predestination of saints or the election to life, it does not follow that it cannot be used more broadly. Nor if the objects of reprobation and election are opposite are the acts themselves, therefore (on the part of God), mutually opposed to one another. Indeed, they can proceed from the same course acting most freely.

Prognōsis *is not taken theoretically, but practically.*

VIII. The second word which occurs more frequently is *prognōsis*. Paul speaks of it more than once: "whom he did foreknow" (*hous proegnō*, Rom. 8:29); "he hath not cast away his people which *proegnō*" (Rom. 11:2); and they are called elect "according to foreknowledge" (*kata prognōsin*, 1 Pet. 1:2). Because the ancient and more modern Pelagians falsely abuse this word to establish the foresight of faith and works, we must observe that *prognōsin* can be taken in two ways: either theoretically or practically. In the former way, it is taken for God's simple knowledge of future things, which is called prescience and belongs to the intellect. In the latter, it is taken for the practical love and decree which God formed concerning the salvation of particular persons and pertains to the will. In this sense, knowledge is often put for delight and approbation (Ps. 1:6; Jn. 10:14; 2 Tim. 2:19). Thus *ginōskein* signifies not only to know but also to know and to judge concerning a thing (as the *Plebiscitum* is not the knowledge of the people, but the sentence—from the verb *scisco*, which means "to decree and determine"). Therefore when the Scripture uses the word *prognōseōs* in the doctrine of predestination, it is not in the former sense for the bare foreknowledge of God by which he foresaw the faith or works of men. (1) Because by that, he foreknew those also whom he reprobated, while here it treats of the foreknowledge proper to the effect. (2) Bare foreknowledge is not the cause of things, nor does it impose method or order upon them, but finds it out (as happens here in the chain of salvation). (3) Because nothing could be foreseen by God but what he himself had granted and which would so follow predestination as the effect, not indeed precede it as a

cause, as will be proved hereafter. But it is taken in the latter sense for "practical foreknowledge" (i.e., the love and election of God) that we may not suppose it to be without reason (*alogon*), although the reasons of his wisdom may escape us (in which manner Christ is said to have been foreknown [*proegnōsmenos*], i.e., foreordained by God "before the foundation of the world," 1 Pet. 1:20).

IX. Again, in that benevolence and practical foreknowledge of God we distinguish: (1) the love and benevolence with which he pursues us; (2) the decree itself by which he determined to unfold his love to us by the communication of salvation. Hence it happens that *prognōsis* is at one time taken broader for both (viz., love and election, as in Rom. 8:29 and Rom. 11:2); at another, more strictly for love and favor which is the fountain and foundation of election. Thus Peter speaks of it when he says that believers are elect "according to the foreknowledge" (*kata prognōsin*), i.e., the love of God (1 Pet. 1:2).

Eklogē.

X. Third, we must explain the word *eklogēs* ("election"), which now and then occurs, but not always with the same signification. Sometimes it denotes a call to some political or sacred office (as Saul is called "elected" [1 S. 10:24]; Judas "elected," viz., to the apostleship, Jn. 6:70). Sometimes it designates an external election and separation of a certain people to the covenant of God (in which sense the people of Israel are said to be elected of God, Dt. 4:37). But here it is taken properly for the election to eternal salvation (viz., for the counsel of God by which he decreed to pity some from grace and to save them, being freed from sin by his Son). Again, in this respect, it is either taken objectively for the elect themselves (as *eklogē epetychen*—"the election" [i.e., the elect] "hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded," Rom. 11:7); or formally for the act of God electing (which is called *eklogē charitos*, Rom. 9:11). Again, the latter may be considered either in the antecedent decree (as it was made from eternity) or in the subsequent execution (as it takes place only in time by calling). Christ refers to this in Jn. 15:16: "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you"; and "Ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world" (v. 19). Augustine joins both forms (*schesin*): "We are elected before the foundation of the world by that predestination in which God foresaw his future things would take place; we are chosen out of the world however by that calling by which God fulfills what he has predestinated" (*On the Predestination of the Saints* 34 [17] [NPNF1, 5:515; PL 44.986]).

XI. Election then by the force of the word is stricter than predestination. For all can be predestinated, but all cannot be elected because he who elects does not take all, but chooses some out of many. The election of some necessarily implies the passing by and rejection of others: "Many are called," said Christ, "but few chosen" (Mt. 20:16); and Paul, "The election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded" (Rom. 11:7). Hence Paul uses the verb *heileto* to designate election, which implies the separation of some from others: "God from the beginning *heileto*, i.e., hath taken out and separated you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth" (2 Thess. 2:13).

Prothesis.

XII. Fourth, *prothesis* is often used by Paul in the matter of election to denote that this counsel of God is not an empty and inefficacious act of willing, but the constant, determined and immutable purpose of God (Rom. 8:28; 9:11; Eph. 1:11). For the word is of the highest efficacy (as the old grammarians tell us) and is

called distinctly by Paul *prothesis tou ta panta energountos*—"the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will" (Eph. 1:11). Sometimes it is applied to election, as *prothesis kat' eklogēn*—"the purpose of God, according to election" (Rom. 9:11); and we are said "to be predestinated" (*kata prothesin*, Eph. 1:11). Sometimes it is joined with calling—"who are the called according to his purpose" (*tois kata prosthesin klētois*, Rom. 8:28). For both election and calling depend and are built upon this purpose of God.

XIII. Now although these words are often employed promiscuously, yet they are frequently distinguished; not without reason are they used by the Holy Spirit to denote the various conditions (*scheseis*) of that decree which could not so fitly be explained by a single word. For the decree can be conceived in relation to the principle from which it arises, or to the object about which it is concerned, or to the means by which it is fulfilled. With regard to the former, *protheseōs* or *eudokias* (which denotes the counsel and good pleasure of God) is mentioned as the first cause of that work. With regard to the next, it is called *prognōsis* or *eklogē* (which is occupied with the separation of certain persons from others unto salvation). With regard to the last, the word *proorismou* is used according to which God prepared the means necessary to the obtainment of salvation. *Prothesis* refers to the end; *prognōsis* refers to the objects; *proorismos* to the means; *prothesis* to the certainty of the event; *prognōsis* and *eklogē* to the singleness and distinction of persons; *proorismos* to the order of means. Thus election is certain and immutable by *prothesin;* determinate and definite by *prognōsin;* and ordinate by *proorismon.*

XIV. These three degrees (if we may so speak of the eternal decree) answer to three acts in the temporal execution: calling, justification and glorification. For as we will be glorified with the Father, redeemed by the Son and called through the Holy Spirit, so the Father determined from eternity to glorify us with himself. This is *prothesis.* He elected us in his Son. This is *prognōsis.* He predestinated us to grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (who seals the image of the Son in us through his holiness and the suffering on the cross). This is *proorismos.* For as the Father sends the Son, the Son with the Father sends the Holy Spirit. And vice versa, the Holy Spirit leads us to the Son, and the Son at length conducts us to the Father.

XV. The words by which the predestination of the members is described are employed also to express the predestination of the head. For concerning him equally *prothesis* is predicated when Paul says *hon proetheto hilastērion* (Rom. 3:25); *prognōsis* where we have *proegnōsmenos* (1 Pet. 1:20); and *proorismos*, not only when he is said to be *horistheis* to be the Son of God (Rom. 1:4), but also when his death is said to have happened by the determinate counsel of God and by his predestination, who *proōrise* to be done whatever was done by Herod and Pontius Pilate (Acts 2:23).

EIGHTH QUESTION: THE PREDESTINATION OF ANGELS

Was there a predestination of angels, and was it of the same kind and order with the predestination of men? The former we affirm; the latter we deny.

I. Although the Scripture speaks far more sparingly of the predestination of angels than of men (which it most concerns us to know), yet because it judged it

to pertain to our edification to reveal something about it, we should follow it as a guide and learn that which it has willed to teach us concerning this question.

A predestination of angels may be granted.

II. The Scripture expressly testifies to a predestination of the angels when it mentions elect angels: "I charge thee before God, and the elect angels" (1 Tim. 5:21). This is said not only adjectively because they are excellent and preeminent, but also participially because they are elected by God in order to be distinguished from the reprobated. Their reprobation also is described more than once when they are said to be delivered into chains of darkness to be reserved unto judgment (2 Pet. 2:4; Jd. 6), and an eternal fire is declared to be prepared for them from eternity (not material and sensible, which could not affect a spirit, but spiritual and intellectual by which souls may be tormented, Mt. 25:41). Hence their condition is set forth in Lk. 10:18; Rev. 12:10; 20:10.

Its object.

III. As to its object, the question is What angels were considered by God predestinating? Some hold that they were equal, not unequal (i.e., still pure and standing, but liable to fall). Some he decreed to keep from falling and to confirm in good; others he decreed to permit to fall and to condemn them on account of sin (which indeed can truly be said if reprobation is taken in a wider signification as including the decree of not preserving from the fall and of permitting it). Thus the object of reprobation must be the pure but liable angel. However if it is understood more strictly and properly (to denote the decree of deserting in the fall and of condemning them on account of it), the angels cannot here be considered only as pure but liable to fall (as in the case of the elect), but as fallen. First, because the creature's liability to fall does not make him reprobable; rather the fall itself does. Nor is anyone rightly adjudged to punishment (or decreed to be adjudged) because he might sin against the law, but because he is supposed to have actually sinned. Again, all reprobation absolutely considered is an act of justice and wrath, since by it they are made vessels of wrath and fitted for destruction (Rom. 9:22). Hence it cannot be simply an act of good pleasure (as the permission of sin which depends upon his good pleasure alone), since (while all were of equal condition and equally liable to fall) it proceeded from his good pleasure (*eudokia*) alone to decree to permit the fall of these rather than of others. Third, because the predestination of men supposes sin (as will be proved hereafter). Therefore the angelic reprobation also presupposes sin. Otherwise no satisfactory reason for the diversity can be given.

IV. The Scripture seems to lead us to this—making reprobation the consequent of sin—when it says that "God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them when cast down, into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment" (2 Pet. 2:4). And Jd. 6 says that he "has reserved unto the judgment of the great day the angels which kept not their first estate." Therefore they are conceived to have sinned and left their first estate before they could be conceived as reprobated (since the first degree of reprobation is placed in dereliction in the fall and in rejection from the face of God). Therefore he did not reprobate and devote to eternal punishment those whom he would permit to fall; but those whom he had permitted to fall by their own fault, he reprobated and relinquished forever.

V. Although the permission of the fall of angels is indeed supposed by their reprobation, it will not on that account be considered as decreed without an end

by God. For the end of this decree could be the manifestation of God's glory in the weakness of the creature, so that the difference might appear more clearly between the mutable and liable creature and the immutable and eternal Creator. Hence the fall in time was not the means of executing reprobation, but it was the condition required in the object (on which reprobation followed, both as to desertion in the fall and as to damnation).

VI. And hence is gathered the first difference between the predestination of angels and men. In the latter, men were considered by God as equal, in the same corrupt mass and as sinners and fallen. In the former, angels were considered by God as unequal. For those of them who were elected were regarded as standing by the grace of God. On the contrary, the reprobate were regarded as having fallen by their own fault. Liability to fall was indeed common to all, but they could not be reprobated on account of it. Otherwise all would have been reprobated because this was a state of pure nature; but they were reprobated on account of the fall (which was a state of corrupt nature) and so justly reprobable.

Election of angels.

VII. Let us say something of both parts of the predestination of angels. First there is the election of the good angels, consisting of two acts: preservation from falling or confirmation in good; and destination to supernatural life and happiness (both of which appear from the event). Since some of them kept their first estate and were confirmed in good (so that they always do behold the face of the Father, Mt. 18:10), it cannot be doubted that this depended upon election, since it could not arise from that nature which was common to all from the creation (for common things afford no room for a difference). In the meantime, the grace or virtue by which the good angels stood until their confirmation and the fall of the others, must be distinguished from the confirming grace which was the first benefit of election. For as long as they stood (before they were confirmed), they stood by that strength which they had received at their creation and which was concreated with them (by which the evil angels also stood until their fall). But when they were confirmed, not only that they should not fall, but that they should be no more capable of falling, this flowed from election, which separated them from the others. Before, they had the help *sine quo non*, which sufficed for them to stand if they willed. Through election, they had the help by which they could actually and immutably stand (in virtue of which they were transferred from a state of liability to an immutable state of happiness and glory incapable of being lost).

VIII. Although this election cannot in truth be called gratuitous in the same way as the election of men (which depends upon God's mercy alone), yet it does not cease to be gratuitous because God was not bound to it. For although from the hypothesis of the decree about the creation of angels, he was bound to create them good and holy, not sinners; he was not bound to create them immutably just. For he did no injury to those whom he permitted to fall by their own fault; without any injury he could have left the others in that state of liableness to fall. Therefore that he willed to bestow upon them the grace of confirmation was of his good pleasure, not from their merit.

Whether the angels were elected in Christ.

IX. Moreover, how they obtained the grace of that confirmation and whether they may properly be called elected in Christ is investigated among theologians (who do not all mutually agree). All indeed agree that they cannot be said to have been elected in Christ the Redeemer because where there is no sin, there is no place for redemption. But they differ in this—whether in any way he can at least be called their Mediator (not indeed of redemption, but of preservation, confirmation and gathering together [*anakephalaiōseōs*], so that they, who by nature were liable to fall, might be confirmed in grace beyond the possibility of falling; and they, who were not to be redeemed from a past, might at least be kept from a future fall). This was the opinion of Bernard who maintains that Christ was the Redeemer of angels: "For in what manner do you say that the Lord Jesus Christ was the Redeemer of the good angels? He, who raised up fallen man, gave to the standing angel the power of not falling, thus rescuing him from captivity, thus defending him from it, and in this way redemption was equal to both: paying for that man, preserving this angel" ("Sermon 22 [6]," *Song of Solomon* [Trans. S.J. Eales, 1984 repr., p. 126; PL 183.880]).

X. Indeed although that opinion may not be at all repugnant to the analogy of faith, yet we think the opinion of those who deny the election of angels to have been made in Christ the Mediator is truer and more in accordance with the words of Scripture. Indeed we confess that the grace of confirmation came to them through the Word (*Logon*), so that they might receive their confirmation from the same one from whom they had obtained their being. For the Father works only through the Son (who is the fountain of all life and grace) in the works of nature as well as in those of grace (Jn. 5:17). But we do not think this can be said equally of Christ, the God-man (*theanthrōpō*) and Mediator.

Whether the angels were elected in Christ.

XI. The reasons are: (1) because the Scripture (which calls Christ the Mediator between God and men, but never of angels, 1 Tim. 2:5) never says so; further, it expressly denies that Christ took on him the nature of angels, but the seed of Abraham (Heb. 2:16); (2) because every mediator supposes discordant parties (for he is of two, Gal. 3:20), but there was no disagreement between God and the angels; (3) because it behooves a mediator to be connected with both parties (which cannot be said of Christ in relation to angels); (4) because Christ is the Mediator of those whose propitiation (*hilasmos*) and advocate he is (because these are the formal acts of mediation, 1 Tim. 2:5, 6; 1 Jn. 2:1, 2). But since these acts are concerned only with sinners, they cannot have place with respect to angels.

Sources of solution.

XII. Christ can rightly be called "the head of the angels" in respect to dominion and government because even the angels are under him as Mediator (as their Lord and King) to whom they minister in preserving and defending the church (Heb. 1:14). In this sense, the angels and powers are said to be subject to him (1 Pet. 3:22). But he is not properly called "the head of influence and sustentation" (as with respect to believers whom he unites to himself and vivifies as members of his mystical body). Hence Paul who asserts that Christ was exalted far above all principality (Eph. 1:21) testifies that "he was given to be the head of the church alone, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all"

(Eph. 1:22, 23). This is not true in all creatures, but in all believers who belong to his body (which he calls his complement, both actively because he fills it with his graces, and passively because that mystical body is increased and completed by these members).

XIII. The mediator is no more required for confirming the creature in the grace of the Creator than he was required for creating and uniting it in the first instance with him (because there is the same reason for both). If then he cannot be said to have been a Mediator at their creation, neither can he be said to have been their Mediator at their confirmation.

XIV. The angels are said to be "unclean" and "foolish" before God (Job 4:18; 15:15), not absolutely (as if there was some culpable defect in them, for then they could not be called holy), but relatively in comparison with God's infinite perfection (because he is holy essentially, unchangeably and independently). Nor if they stood in need of the Son of God as a conserver and confirmer (that they might stand in him and through him by whom they were created, Col. 1:16-18), did they therefore have need of Christ, the Redeemer. Otherwise man also would have needed him in his state of innocence (which, however, no one would say).

XV. The passages where "all things" are said "to be gathered together in one in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth" (Eph. 1:10), and where "all things" are said "to be reconciled unto God by him, having made peace through his blood" (Col. 1:20) do not prove that an election of good angels was made in Christ. (1) They can be referred to men (those who have attained as well as the sojourners) to signify that in Christ is gathered together and reconciled unto God the whole church (both of the Old as well as the New Testament—that triumphant in heaven, this still militant on earth). This appears to be confirmed from the fact that the reference is to the gathering together and reconciliation of those who were dismembered and separated from God through sin (which cannot be said of the angels). (2) Although the words might be extended to the angels, it would not follow that they were elected and confirmed through Christ because they can be said to be gathered together in Christ either insofar as by men having been put in the place of the fallen angels through Christ, their loss is (as it were) repaired and made up, as Augustine maintained (*Enchiridion* 16 [62] [FC 3:421]) and after him Lombard. Or they are gathered together insofar as Christ (peace having been made) reconciled the angels to men (as sedition being quelled, good citizens and rebels, who were before at variance, are reconciled and having laid aside their hatred live under the same prince as tranquil as if they formed but one body—which is the opinion of Chrysostom on this passage, cf. "Homily IV," *On Colossians* [NPNF1, 13:275]).

XVI. And hence arises a second difference between the predestination of angels and of men. These were elected in Christ (Eph. 1:4, viz., to be saved and redeemed), but the angels (although they were confirmed by the Son of God) cannot be said to be elected in Christ. Indeed Christ could use them as ministers, but yet ought not to come for them as the objects of his mediation.

XVII. The election of some being supposed, the preterition of others follows. By this he not only was unwilling to confirm them in good, but decreed to permit their sin. The fall taking place, he decreed to leave them in and condemn them on account of their sin. Their reprobation to this is referred. It is also contained in two acts: one negative (dereliction in the fall); the other affirmative (damnation

to eternal punishment). For they are not merely passed by (while confirmation in good and raising up from evil is denied them), but they are also positively condemned to eternal punishment (Mt. 25:41; Jd. 6).

XVIII. Again, in preterition we can mark two acts: (1) the permission of the fall which, we said, precedes reprobation in the sign of reason (*signo rationis*); (2) desertion in the fall. The former is an act of mere good pleasure. If the reason is sought why he willed to preserve some from falling, but to permit others to fall, no other can be found than his good pleasure alone (because it so pleased him). The latter is an act of justice. He willed to leave them in sin just because they deserved it. Moreover, he so deserted all in sin that he willed to give the hope of grace to no one; or he would have spared some one of them, but adjudged them to an eternal and irrevocable punishment, dealing more severely with them than with men (some of whom he willed by his mercy in Christ to raise from the fall). Yet here in a similar case, he denied similar grace. Sparing men, he spared not the devils, but willed their wound to be incurable and their ruin irreparable. If the reason is asked, let Augustine answer: "It can be hidden, but cannot be unjust" (*On Forgiveness of Sins and Baptism* 29 [21] [NPNF1, 5:26; PL 44.125]). Various probabilities are commonly urged: (1) that man sinned from weakness, but the devil from wickedness; moreover the higher his knowledge was, on that account also the more grievous was his sin; (2) that man was seduced by another, but the devil sinned no one tempting him, but by his own will—by an apostasy evidently voluntary and absolutely spontaneous; (3) because in the fall of the angels, the whole angelic nature did not fall, while in man sinning the whole human race fell; therefore divine mercy provided a remedy that the whole race might not perish. But whatever reasons are brought forward, it is better to acquiesce in the most free good pleasure of God and with grateful hearts acknowledge and celebrate the philanthropy (*philanthrōpian*) of God towards us. Having abandoned the angels (in no way inferior to us, indeed far more excellent than we) who sinned (upon whom in an equal fault he has not bestowed equal grace) nevertheless he determined in wonderful mercy to raise up and lead us to salvation (who equally lie in sin and are guilty from the fall).

XIX. Therefore as God decreed the creation of angels for the manifestation of his goodness, and the permission of their fall for the demonstration of his liberty and absolute dominion (and the greater illustration of his grace towards others whom he willed to preserve from falling); so he constituted the dereliction in the fall (and damnation on account of their sins) for the display of his justice.

XX. Moreover, the damnation of angels (which is a positive act of reprobation) is resolved into two parts: the casting down from heaven and the hurling into hell. The Scripture mentions both: the first, indeed, when he is said to fall from heaven: "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven" (Lk. 10:18), and "the accuser of the brethren, called the Devil, with his angels" is said to "have been cast out into the earth" (Rev. 12:9, 10). The punishment is appropriate to the sin, for as they left their habitation and estate voluntarily withdrawing from God, so it was most just that he should be driven from those happy seats far from the sight of God (as a king ejects from his hall him by whom he is grievously offended). It not infrequently mentions the second also: as when Peter says "that the evil angels were cast down to hell (*seirais zophou tartarousthai*), and delivered into chains of darkness" (2 Pet. 2:4); and Jude says they are reserved in everlasting

chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day; and they are said to be cast into the lake of fire and brimstone (Rev. 20:10) prepared for them from eternity (Mt. 25:41).

XXI. Although in truth, this most just sentence of God against the Devil was immediately passed, yet it was not immediately executed as to all its parts. Although he has been cast down from heaven, he was not straightway hurled into hell, but is still permitted some delay in the world—God loosening the reins somewhat in his wisdom, both for the exercise of the pious and the punishment of the wicked. Hence he is called "the prince of the air" and "[the prince] of the world," "the god of this age" who, "as a roaring lion, walketh about [us] seeking whom he may devour" (1 Pet. 5:8). Here is to be referred that passage concerning "the loosening and binding of Satan until the last day, when he shall be thrown into the lake of fire and brimstone, where he shall be tormented forever" (Rev. 20:10, 14).

XXII. From these things it is evident that the fallen angels are now so constituted in the penal state, that their reprobation is known by them and they know (to increase their desperation) that no spark of hope is left for them. Here also they differ from reprobate men whose reprobation (although sure from eternity and immutable) is however infallibly known by no one while on earth. Yet the devils so bear the punishment of damnation as to know that they have no hope of pardon. Thus to wish to condole their misery (as preposterous as to hope with Origen for their restitution after many revolutions of the ages) is a ridiculous hope.

Ninth Question: The Object of Predestination

Whether the object of predestination was man creatable, or capable of falling; or whether as created and fallen. The former we deny; the latter we affirm.

Statement of the question.

I. After having spoken of the predestination of angels, we come to that of men. The first question has respect to its object, about which we must treat a little more distinctly because the opinions even of orthodox themselves vary.

II. The question is not simply "what" the object of predestination was (as to nature). For it is evident that here we speak of the human race, not the angelic (of which we spoke before). Rather the question is "of what kind" it was (with regard to quality, i.e., how man was considered in the mind of God predestinating and with what qualities he was clothed; whether those before the creation and fall or after).

III. The opinions of theologians can be reduced to three classes. Some ascend beyond the fall (*supra lapsum*) and are hence called supralapsarians. They think that the object of predestination was man either not as yet created or at least not yet fallen. Others descend below the fall (*infra lapsum*) and hold that man not only as fallen, but also as redeemed through Christ (and either believing or unbelieving) was the object of predestination. Others, holding a middle ground, stop in the fall (*in lapsu*) and maintain that man as fallen was considered by God predestinating. We will treat the second opinion later; now we will examine the first and third.

IV. At the outset, we must take notice that whatever the disagreement of theologians may be on this subject, yet the foundation of faith remains secure on both sides and that they are equally opposed to the deadly error of Pelagians and semi-Pelagians. Both they who ascend higher in this matter and include the creation or the fall of man in the decree of predestination, and they who suppose both all agree in this: that men were considered by God as equal (not unequal) and such that their choice depended upon God alone (from which foundation all heretics depart).

V. Not without warrant, a reconciliation of this double opinion is attempted by some from the broader or stricter use of the word "predestination." By the former, it is taken generally for every decree of God about man in order to his ultimate end (in which sense it undoubtedly embraces the decree concerning the creation of man and the permission of his fall). By the latter, it is taken specially for God's counsel concerning the salvation of men from his mercy and their damnation from his justice (in which manner it is resolved into election and reprobation and has for its object man as fallen). Yet because that former signification is not of Scripture use (and confounds the works of nature and grace, the order of creation and redemption), we more willingly acquiesce in the latter opinion (which the Synod of Dort wisely sanctioned from the word of God) as the more true and better suited to tranquilize the conscience and repress the cavils of adversaries. And if anyone doubts that this was the opinion of the Synod, the words of Article 6 will prove it: "the decree of election and reprobation revealed in the word of God" is said to be "the profound, equally merciful and equally just choice of men lost" ("Primum Caput: De Divina Praedestinationes," 6 in *Acta Synodi Nationalis . . . Dordrechti* [1619-20], 1:279). And in Article 7, election is defined as "the immutable purpose of God, by which, before the foundations of the world were laid, he chose, out of the whole human race, fallen by their own fault from their primeval integrity into sin and destruction, according to the most free good pleasure of his own will, and of mere grace, a certain number of men, neither better nor worthier than others, but lying in the same misery with the rest, to salvation in Christ" (ibid., p. 280).

VI. That the state of the question may be perceived better, observe: (1) that it is not inquired whether the creation of man and the permission of the fall come under the decree of God (for it is acknowledged on both sides that this as well as that was determined by God). But the question is whether they stand in the relation (*in signo rationis*) of the mean with respect to the decree of salvation and damnation, and whether God in the sign of reason is to be considered as having thought about the salvation and destruction of men before he thought of their creation and fall.

VII. (2) Again the question is not whether in predestination the reason of sin comes into consideration. They who ascend above the fall (*supra lapsum*), do not deny that it is here regarded consequently, so that no one will be condemned except for sin, and no one saved who has not been miserable and lost. Rather the question is whether sin holds itself antecedently to predestination as to its being foreseen, so that man was considered by God predestinating only as fallen (which we maintain).

VIII. (3) The question is not whether sin holds the relation of the impulsive cause with respect to predestination. For they who stop in the fall acknowledge

that it cannot be called the cause, not even with respect to reprobation (because then all would be reprobated), much less with respect to election. Rather the question is only whether it has the relation of quality or preceding condition requisite in the object. For these two differ widely: What kind of a person was predestinated; and Why or on account of what? The former marks the quality and condition of the object, while the latter indicates the cause. So the question returns to this—whether to God predestinating, man was presented not only as creatable or created (but not fallen), but also as fallen; not as to real being, but as to known and intentional being, so that although the fall was not the cause, yet it might have been the condition and quality prerequisite in the object? The learned men with whom we now treat deny this; we affirm it.

Man creatable was not the object of predestination.

IX. The reasons are: (1) a non-entity cannot be the object of predestination. Now man creatable (or capable of falling) is simply a nonentity because by creation he was brought from non-being to being. The reason of the major appears from this: that the salvation and destruction which are intended by predestination are the ends which are introduced into the subject (which moreover is supposed already to exist). Nor ought it to be objected here that the object of the creation (or of the decree of creation) was a nonentity; for such also might equally have been the object of predestination. For the nature of creation is widely different. It speaks of the production of the thing. It does not suppose its object from that of predestination (which is concerned with an object already made) and does not make it simply to be, but to be in this or that manner. Therefore as the decree concerning the creation of man ought to have for its object man creatable (to which it was destined), so the decree concerning the salvation or damnation of man ought to regard man as fallen (because redemption or destruction was destined for him). Moreover, every subject is conceived to be before its adjuncts.

X. (2) Either all creatable men were the object of predestination or only some of them. Yet neither can be said: not the former because there were innumerable possible men who never were to be created and, consequently, neither to be saved, nor damned; not the latter because if only some from all those creatable, they were not indefinitely foreknown, but definitely as about to be (for no other reason can be given why the other creatables were not predestinated than because they were not about to be). To no purpose is the retort that all creatable men were not absolutely the object of predestination because all would not be creatable in time. For besides the absurdity of saying they were creatable (if they could not be created), no reason can be brought why as many as were creatable did not fall under the object of predestination (if man creatable as such was its object). Therefore that a discrimination may be found between those who could be presented to God predestinating or not, we must descend to the decree of creation and suppose them as really to be created and not only as creatable.

XI. (3) The object of the divine predestination ought to be either one eligible through mercy or reprobatable through justice. This cannot be said of man creatable and liable to fall, but only man as created and fallen. Nor is there any force here in the distinction between "elicit and imperate acts:" as if man was not eligible or reprobatable as to imperate acts (i.e., as to actual mercy), but properly as to elicit acts (i.e., as to the intention of pitying and of punishing). For it

assumes that the elicit acts extend more widely than the imperate (since the latter are the effects of the former), and that the effects of the mercy or justice of God can be destined to creatures, neither miserable nor guilty (which is repugnant to the nature of these respective attributes which suppose an object clothed with certain qualities).

XII. (4) If predestination regards man as creatable or apt to fall, the creation and fall were the means of predestination; but this cannot be said with propriety. (a) The Scripture never speaks of them as such, but as the antecedent conditions while it passes from predestination to calling. (b) The mean has a necessary connection with the end, so that the mean being posited, the end ought necessarily to follow in its time. But neither the creation nor the fall has any such connection, either with election or with reprobation, for men might be created and fall and yet not be elected. (c) The means ought to be of the same order and dispensation; but the creation and fall belong to the natural order and dispensation of providence while salvation and damnation belong to the supernatural order of predestination. (d) If they were means, God entered into the counsel of saving and destroying man before he had decreed anything about his futurition and fall (which is absurd).

XIII. To no purpose would you say that God could not arrive at the manifestation of his glory in the way of justice and mercy, unless on the position of the creation and fall (and therefore both can have the relation of means). For although sin and creation are required antecedently to the illustration of mercy and justice, it does not follow that they were means, but only the requisite conditions. All those things (without which we cannot accomplish something) are not necessarily means. Thus existence and ductility are supposed in clay as the condition for making vessels for honor or for dishonor, but it is not the mean. Disease in the sick is the previous condition without which he is not cured, but it is not the mean by which he is cured.

XIV. (5) This opinion is easily misrepresented (*eudiablētos*), as if God reprobated men before they were reprobatable through sin, and destined the innocent to punishment before any criminality was foreseen in them. It would mean not that he willed to damn them because they were sinners, but that he permitted them to become sinners in order that they might be punished. And it would imply he determined to create that he might destroy them.

But it is man as fallen.

XV. Hence it appears that they speak far more safely and truly who, in assigning the object of predestination, do not ascend beyond the fall. The Scripture certainly leads us to this. It says that we are chosen out of the world; therefore not as creatable or capable of falling only, but as fallen and in the corrupt mass: "Because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you" (Jn. 15:19). Nor does he escape who says that eternal predestination is not meant here, but calling (which is made in time). These are not to be opposed, but brought together. For from what mass in time God calls a man, the same he elected him from eternity. The kind of man that was considered by him in the execution of the decree, such he ought to be considered by him in the decree itself. For that cause, it was not necessary that there should be the same order of intention and execution, but only that there should be the same object of calling and election. From this, it may be gathered that man as a sinner was elected because he is called as such.

XVI. Next, the election of men is made in Christ (Eph. 1:4). Therefore it regards man as fallen because they cannot be elected in Christ except as to be redeemed and sanctified by him. Therefore they are chosen as sinners and miserable. Nor ought it to be replied that to be "chosen in Christ" is nothing else than to be chosen "by Christ" (not as Redeemer, but as God) to denote not the means, but the principal cause of election. For although it is not to be denied that Christ, as God, is the author of our election, yet it is plain that it cannot be so understood in this place. (1) We are said to be chosen in Christ in the same way as we are said to be blessed and redeemed in him (Eph. 1:3, 7). But this ought to be understood of Christ not as God simply, but as Redeemer. (2) It is confirmed by the parallel passage where grace is said to have been given us in Christ before the world began (2 Tim. 1:9)—surely not as God simply, but as Mediator. (3) The whole order of things in the chapter (in which are recounted the saving benefits of God bestowed upon us through Christ) proves that it treats of Christ under that aspect (*schesei*). Nor does Beza himself disavow this (although wedded to the first opinion). He holds that "in him" means "to be adopted in him" (*Annotationum Maiorum in Novum Testamentum* [1594], Pars Altera, p. 349 on Eph. 1:4). Since then no one can be elected to the salvation to be obtained by Christ except as lost and miserable, the object of this election must necessarily be man as fallen.

XVII. Third, the mass of which Paul speaks (Rom. 9:21) is the object of predestination. However it is no other than a "corrupt mass." (1) That mass is meant from which are made the vessels of mercy and the vessels of wrath; the former to honor, the latter to dishonor (Rom. 9:21-23)—for wrath and mercy necessarily suppose sin and misery. (2) That mass is meant from which were taken Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau who are proposed as examples either of gratuitous election or of just and free rejection. But such is the corrupt mass because it speaks of twins conceived in the womb (Rom. 9:11) and consequently sinners. (3) That mass is meant lying in which men can be hated of God, as Esau. But such ought to be the corrupt mass because God could not hate a pure and innocent creature. (4) That mass is meant from which Pharaoh was raised by God to manifest his power in his destruction, but no one would say that Pharaoh was raised from a pure mass. Such is the opinion of Augustine who calls it "the mass of perdition" (*Enchiridion* 25 [99*] and 28 [107] [FC 3:450-53, 460; PL 40.278, 282]). "Because that whole mass was condemned, justice renders the due contumely, grace gives the undue honor"; and afterwards, "they were made of that mass, which, on account of the sin of one, God deservedly and justly condemned" (Augustine, *Letter 194*, "To Sixtus" [FC 30:304, 315; PL 33.876, 882]). He asserts the same thing in *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians* 2 (NPNF1, 5:391-401) and *Against Julian* 5.7 (FC 35:269-75).

XVIII. It is vainly alleged: (1) that the pure mass is here meant because the children had done nothing good or evil (Rom. 9:11). The answer is that they are not said absolutely to have done nothing good or evil (since it treats of them as conceived in the womb, therefore already sinners), but in comparison with each other (i.e., having done nothing good or evil by which they might be distinguished from each other). Jacob did nothing good on account of which he should be elected in preference to Esau. Esau did nothing evil before Jacob on account of which he should be reprobated, for they were equal as to all things. So that the distinction of one from the other could arise from nothing else than the good pleasure (*eudokia*) of God: "that the purpose of God according to election might

stand, not of works, but of him that calleth" (Rom. 9:11). (2) It is vainly alleged that the mass from which vessels are made to dishonor is meant; thus not corrupt, but pure because man would be already a vessel of dishonor. The answer is that *atimia* here does not denote sin, but the punishment of sin (as honor indicates the crown of glory for which man is prepared). So to be "made a vessel unto dishonor" is not to be created for destruction, but to be reprobated and prepared for destruction (which agrees with no one but the sinner). Paul does not say of the vessels of wrath that God prepared (*katērtisen*) them (as he says of the vessels of grace), but that they were prepared (*katērtismena*) for destruction because God finds some as vessels fitted for destruction by their own fault; others he makes vessels of grace by his mercy. (3) It is vainly alleged that the mass, not of sin, but of clay from which Adam was formed, is intended. The answer is that whatever reference Paul had in the comparison of the potter (whether to Jer. 18:6 or Is. 45:9), no other than the corrupt mass can be meant because from no other clay could vessels of mercy and of wrath be made by God. Nor does the comparison have any other object than to show the highest liberty of God in the election to reprobation of men. (4) It is vainly alleged that the corrupt mass cannot be meant because then all the objections proposed by Paul (Rom. 9:14, 19) would easily be removed. The answer is we deny it. For the objections always remain in election and reprobation when made, since no reason can be given why he should elect or reprobate this rather than that one. No answer can be given other than that of the apostle, "O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?" (Rom. 9:20). (5) It is vainly alleged that thus Adam and Eve would be excluded from predestination because they were not formed from the corrupt mass. The answer is that we deny it. That formation is not to be understood physically by creation, but ethically by predestination. In this manner, our first parents themselves could also be formed from the corrupt mass because as miserable and sinners they were elected to salvation, not indeed in the mass of original sin originated (which exists only in their posterity), but of original sin originating (with which they were infected).

XIX. Fourth, the manifestation of God's glory by the demonstration of his mercy in the elect and of his justice in the reprobate was the end of predestination according to the apostle (Rom. 9:22, 23). But this requires the condition of sin in the object, for neither mercy can be exercised without previous misery, nor justice without previous sin. If God had predestinated man to glory before the fall, it would have been a work of immense goodness indeed, but could not be properly called mercy (which regards not only the not-worthy, but the unworthy and the one meriting the contrary). So if God had reprobated man free from all sin, it would have been a work of absolute and autocratic (*autokratorikon*) power, but not a work of justice. For he mercifully frees and justly condemns man, as Augustine says. Therefore he ought to consider the fall both in election and in reprobation. To no purpose does the very subtle Twisse take exception saying that the exercise of mercy and justice (effectively considered) supposes men to be miserable and guilty, but not equally the intention of pitying. Otherwise it would follow from the equality that since the object of salvation is the believer, he is also the object of eternal destination (which no one but an Arminian would say). For whether mercy and justice are considered effectively (by reason of their

exercise and the external act in man) or affectively (by reason of the internal act of God), they demand the same object. Although predestination places nothing (as they say) in the predestinated (and so the purpose of pitying is not mercy itself effectively considered communicated to the creature), it does not follow that it is not an act of mercy (which accordingly ought to suppose misery and the fall); just as a prince, who decrees to pardon the criminal, by that very thing exercises an act of mercy towards him, although he has not as yet in fact made known to him the absolving sentence. Nor does the learned man's reason from equality avail concerning the decree of salvation because the previous condition is confounded with the subsequent mean. The former (as is the fall) ought indeed to precede as much in intention as in execution; but the latter (as is faith with respect to salvation) ought indeed to precede the execution—not equally in intention, but rather as the means, it ought to follow the intention of the end. So the sick man is the object of the physician's deliberation about his cure, but in that he cannot be considered as already purged because purgation is the means for obtaining the cure.

XX. Thus the end of predestination with respect to man (to wit, salvation and damnation) supposes necessarily creation and fall in the object. The means also prove that very thing: in election in Christ, calling, justification, sanctification (which demand the previous condition of the fall and sin, for Christ is the Savior from sin, Mt. 1:21). Calling is of sinners, justification of the guilty, sanctification of the unholy. And in reprobation the means are the abandonment in sin, separation from Christ, retention of sin, blinding and hardening (which apply only to the sinner).

Sources of solution.

XXI. The creation and fall are not ordered as means by themselves subordinate to the end of predestination, but are presupposed as the condition prerequisite in the object (as existence and ductility in clay are not the means which the potter strews under his purpose of preparing vessels for honor and dishonor, but only the condition or quality prerequisite in the object and the cause *sine qua non*). For unless man were created and fallen, it could not come into execution.

XXII. Although predestination did not precede the decree to create man and permit his fall, it does not follow that God made man with an uncertain end. For if God did not have the manifestation of mercy and justice in salvation and damnation as an end, it must not straightway be said that he had no end at all. Why may God not have willed to manifest his glory in both by the exercise of other attributes (i.e., of power, wisdom and goodness) although he might not have looked to his mercy and justice because their object had not as yet been constituted? Therefore the end on account of which God decreed to create man and to permit his fall was not the manifestation of his justice and mercy in their salvation and damnation from the decree of predestination (which in the order of nature and in the sign of reason [*in signo rationis*] is posterior to it [unless we wish God to have first thought about refitting his work before he thought about constructing it; and about the cure of the sick before he determined anything about the disease]). Rather it was the communication and (as it were) the spreading out (*ektasis*) of the power, wisdom and goodness of the Creator which shone forth both in the creation of man (Ps. 8:5, 6) and in his fall in different ways (which was the last within the bounds of nature and in such an order of things). But

after sin had corrupted and disturbed this order entirely, God (who elicits light from darkness and good from evil) instituted the work of redemption for no other end than to display more magnificently and (as it were) in the highest degree in another order of things, the same attributes and together with them his mercy and justice. To this end the means serve, not creation (which belongs to another kind and order), not the fall (which was only the occasion and end from which God began the counsel of salvation), but the covenant of grace, the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit, redemption, calling, etc. (which belong not to the order of nature, but to the higher supernatural order of grace).

XXIII. The common axiom which supralapsarians like to use here (and with which Twisse makes himself hoarse and on which alone he seems to build up the artfully constructed fabric of his disputation on this argument) is: "That which is last in execution, ought to be first in intention." Now the illustration of God's glory through mercy in the salvation of the elect and through justice in the damnation of the reprobate (as the last in execution, therefore it ought to be the first in intention) admits of various limitations. First, it holds good, indeed, as to the ultimate end, but not as to the subalternate ends. Otherwise it would follow as well that what is next to the last in execution is the second in intention, and what is next to that is the third and so on. In the execution, he (1) creates, (2) permits the fall, (3) redeems, (4) calls, sanctifies and glorifies. Thus it behooved God first to intend the glorification and redemption of man before he thought about his production or the permission of his fall (which everyone sees to be absurd). Now the illustration of mercy and justice in the salvation and damnation of men is not the ultimate end simply and absolutely (as to the government of man in general), but in a certain respect and relatively (as to the government of the fallen). For the ultimate end (as I have said already) was the manifestation of God's glory in common by the creation and fall of man. Hence the decree of election is called the first in intention, not absolutely (as if it was the first of all the decrees in order, even before the creation and fall), but both in the class of decrees concerning the salvation of sinful man and with respect to the means subordinate to it. Second, it holds good only in the same order of things and where a necessary and essential subordination of things occurs. They, with whom we treat, do not disavow this but maintain that it only holds good in things subordinated by nature. But no necessary connection and subordination can exist between the creation and fall and redemption. Rather all must see between them rather a gap and great abyss (*mega chasma*) (on account of sin) which has broken up the order of creation and given place to the economy of redemption. Sin is against nature. It is not the means either with respect to salvation (unless accidentally, i.e., the occasion) or with respect to damnation (for damnation is on account of sin, not sin on account of damnation). Therefore God's ways in nature and grace, and his economies of providence and predestination must not be confounded here. Since the end is different, the means must also necessarily be so. Therefore the axiom can have place in the same order—as what is last in execution in the order of nature or of grace, is also first in intention. However it does not hold good concerning disparates where a leap is made from one dispensation to another, from the natural order of providence to the supernatural order of predestination (as is the case here).

XXIV. Moreover that subordination is so to be conceived as not to be understood subjectively and on the part of God. Since all things are decreed by one and a most simple act (which embraces the end and means together), not so much subordination has place here as coordination. By coordination, these various objects are presented together and at once to the divine mind and constitute only one decree. Rather that subordination is to be conceived only objectively and on our part, inasmuch as for more easily understanding, we conceive of them subordinately according to the varied relations (*schesin*) and dependence which the things decreed mutually have to each other (which, however, are united in God).

Prov. 16:4.

XXV. God did not make the wicked as wicked by a physical production, instilling a bad quality into him. Rather whom he apprehended as wicked by his own fault "he made" (i.e., "ordained" by a moral and judicial destination) for "the day of evil" (i.e., for the day of calamity and destruction). To this condemnation Jude says the wicked are ordained. The word *poiein* is often used in the Scriptures for ordination.

XXVI. Although the object of predestination is determined to be man as fallen, it does not follow that predestination is made only in time. Fallen man is understood as to his known and foreseen being, not as to his real being. Also the prescience of the fall and its permissive decree is no less eternal than the predestination itself.

XXVII. Although God is said to have raised Pharaoh up for this same purpose that he might show his power in him (Rom. 9:17), it does not follow in his reprobation that he was considered before his creation and fall. He does not speak of the first creation, but of his production from an unclean seed or his elevation to the kingdom which God brought about by his providence, that in him (whom he foresaw would be rebellious, and hardened by his miracles and plagued by his just judgment) he might have the material upon which to exercise power in his destruction.

XXVIII. Although the apostle speaks of the absolute power and right of God in the predestination of men by the comparison of the potter (Rom. 9:21, 22), it does not follow that it preceded the creation and fall of man. For that most free power and absolute right of God sufficiently appears in the executed reprobation of fallen men, since that separation of men from each other can have no other cause than his good pleasure alone.

XXIX. Although the creation and fall come under the decree of God and so can be said to be predestinated, the word "predestination" being taken broadly for every decree of God concerning the creature; yet no less properly does predestination taken strictly begin from the fall because in this sense the decree of creation and the fall belong to providence, not to predestination.

XXX. That Calvin followed the opinion received in our churches about the object of predestination can be most clearly gathered from many passages, but most especially from his book *Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God* (trans. J.K.S. Reid, 1961). "When the subject of predestination comes up," he says, "I have always taught and still teach that we should constantly begin with this, that all the reprobate who died and were condemned in Adam are rightly left in death" (ibid., p. 121). And afterwards, "It is fit to treat sparingly of this question not only because it is abstruse and hidden in the more secret recesses of God's sanctuary; but because an idle curiosity is not to be encouraged; of which that

too lofty speculation is at the same time the pupil and nurse. The other part, that from the condemned posterity of Adam, God chooses whom he pleases, and reprobates whom he will, as it is far better fitted for the exercise of faith, so it can be handled with the greater fruit. On this doctrine which contains in itself the corruption and guilt of human nature I more willingly insist, as it not only conduces more to piety, but is also more theological" (ibid., p. 125; cf. ICR 3.22.1 and 7, pp. 932-34, 940-41). "If all have been taken from a corrupt mass, it is no wonder that they are subject to condemnation" (ICR 3.23.3, pp. 950-51). So too he thinks that Paul speaks of a corrupt mass where, among other things, he says, "it is true that the proximate cause of reprobation is because all are cursed in Adam" (*New Testament Commentary on Romans and Thessalonians* [trans. R. Mackenzie, 1961], p. 200 on Rom. 9:11). In this judgment of the celebrated theologian (answering to Article 12 of the French Confession [Cochrane, pp. 148-49] as also to the decree of the Synod of Dort), we entirely acquiesce and think it should be acquiesced in by all who are pleased with prudent knowledge.

XXXI. Besides these two opinions about the object of predestination, there is a third held by those who maintain that not only man as fallen and corrupted by sin, but men also as redeemed by Christ (and either believing or disbelieving in him) was considered by God predestinating. This was the opinion of the semi-Pelagians and is now held by the Arminians and all those who maintain that Christ is the foundation of election, and foreseen faith its cause (or, at least, the preceding condition). But because this question is involved in that which will come up hereafter (concerning the foundation and impulsive cause of election), we add nothing about it now. For if it can once be proved that neither Christ nor faith precede election, but are included in it as a means and effects, by that very thing it will be demonstrated that man as redeemed and, as believing or unbelieving, cannot be the object of predestination.

Tenth Question: The Cause of Election

Is Christ the cause and foundation of election? We deny against the Arminians and Lutherans.

I. The first controversy concerning election (upon which all the others depend) refers to its cause: whether besides the mere good pleasure of God another impulsive cause out of himself can be granted, by which he was influenced to form the decree of election. The orthodox maintain that the good pleasure (*eudokian*) alone has place and think that no other cause can either be given or rightly sought. But the adversaries (who cherish Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism) suppose that others also can come in order: for instance, either Christ and his merit, or the foresight of faith and works. Hence a tripartite question arises concerning Christ, faith and works. Was election made on account of Christ and in consideration of his merit; or from the foresight of faith; or from foreseen works? The first we treat now.

Statement of the question.

II. On the state of the question observe: it is not asked Did Christ enter into the decree of election? or Was there no consideration of Christ's merit in the destination of salvation? For we do not deny that he entered into it consequently as the primary means of its execution; nor do we hold that salvation was destined to us without any regard to his merit. For we acknowledge

that God, who decreed salvation to us, by the same act destined Christ, the Mediator, to acquire it for us. Rather the question is did Christ enter into the decree antecedently as the impulsive and meritorious cause, on account of which it was destined to us? This the adversaries desire; we deny.

III. The question is not whether Christ was the meritorious cause and foundation of the salvation decreed on the part of the thing, but of the decree of salvation on the part of God. Not, Was he the cause on the part of the effect willed terminatively? but Was he the cause on the part of the act of willing formally? Not, Was he the foundation of election to be executed *a posteriori*, but Was he the foundation of election to be decreed *a priori?* Not, Was the decree of election independent of the consequent means (which we acknowledge as necessary) and among them Christ? but Was it independent of an impulsive cause and antecedent conditions? So that the question is reduced to these terms: Was Christ the foundation and meritorious cause, not of salvation *a posteriori*, but of election *a priori;* not on the part of the effect in man, but of the act of willing in God? Was the decree absolute, not as to the means, but as to the antecedent cause? This we deny; the adversaries affirm.

IV. The Arminians here and there build upon this as the primary foundation of their opinion (as appears from the *Collatio . . . Hagae* [1615], the Acts of the Synod of Dort, the writings of Arminius, Corvinus, Grevinchovius and others). They could have drawn this from the papists who urge the foreseen merits of Christ to be the cause of predestination (as Didacus Alvarez, *De Auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani* 5.39 [1610], pp. 288-94; Vasquez, *Commentariorum ac Disputationum in Tertiam Partem . . . Thomae* 1, Disp. 91.1 [1631], pp. 619-20; cf. also 90.2, 3, pp. 616-18; Suarez, "Commentaria . . . in tertiam partem D. Thomae," Q. 19, Art. 4, Disp. 41*, Sect. 4.17 in *Opera Omnia* [1856-78], 18:[374]), although neither a few nor obscure Scholastics exclaim against it (Thomas Aquinas, ST, III, Q. 24, Art. 4, p. 2153; Bonaventure, "Liber III. Sententiarum," Dist. 11 in *Opera Theologica Selecta* [1941], 3:233-53; Durandus, *Sententias theologicas Petri Lombardi Commentariorum*, Bk. 3, Dist. 10 [1556], pp. 199-200 and others). The Lutherans agree with the Arminians here in asserting that Christ is the meritorious cause of election (as Eckhardus, *Fasciculus controversiarum Theologicarum* [1631], Gherardus, Brockmannus and others). Under the pretext of extolling the glory of Christ, their object is to establish universal grace and destroy God's absolute election according to good pleasure (*kat' eudokian*). With them some of our divines who defend universal grace also agree (who, the more easily to build up universal redemption, hold that the decree to send Christ for the salvation of the human race preceded the decree of election which they say was occupied about giving faith and flowed from God's general love to men [*philanthrōpia*] and therefore was broader than that).

Christ is not the foundation of election.

V. The reasons of the orthodox are: (1) because election was made from God's mere good pleasure; therefore, not on account of Christ because good pleasure excludes every cause out of God upon which election may depend. Hence by Moses, he says, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy." So "I thank thee, O Father, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father: for so it seemed good in thy sight" (Mt. 11:25, 26*); "That the purpose of

God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth" (Rom. 9:11); "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy" (Rom. 9:16); "Fear not, little flock, for it is your Father's good pleasure (*eudokēse*) to give you the kingdom" (Lk. 12:32). If, then, all things in the mass are ascribed to God's sole good pleasure, another cause beside cannot and ought not to be sought. Nor is the exception available that this good pleasure is founded on Christ in order that it may be exercised towards us. It is one thing that it ought to be founded on Christ, as the antecedent cause upon which it depends (which we deny), since from it Christ himself was ordained as the Mediator. It is quite another thing to be founded in him as the foundation of redemption preordained by that very good pleasure (*eudokia*) of God (which we grant).

VI. (2) The effect of election cannot be called its cause. Rather Christ is an effect of election since he was himself elected and preordained to be a Mediator (Is. 42:1; 1 Pet. 1:20; Jn. 3:16, where the love of God towards the world precedes in order the mission of the Son as its cause). "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son for us" (1 Jn. 4:10). In vain do Corvinus and others object that a certain love or affection in God of pitying unto salvation is to be supposed unto the mission of Christ and that it is common and universal with respect to all, not special with respect to the elect. This is taking for granted what ought to be proved. For we acknowledge no such universal saving love from the Scriptures, but only a special love towards the elect, to whom Christ was destined as Savior and head (as will be proved in its place).

VII. Third, it is confirmed by this, that the object ought to be prior to the act about which it is occupied. But the object of Christ's merit is the elect. Therefore election ought to precede both redemption and its decree. Moreover that the object of Christ's death is the elect is proved from those passages which state that Christ gave himself for his people (Mt. 1:21), for his sheep (Jn. 10:11, 15), for his friends (Jn. 15:13, 14), for his church (Eph. 5:25). Nor if the Scriptures seem elsewhere to extend the death of Christ more widely to all, must universality be forthwith understood absolutely. Rather it must be understood in a limited manner, either with respect to the universe of believers or with respect to classes of individuals (not to the individuals of classes, as will be proved hereafter).

VIII. Fourth, the intention of the end ought to precede the destination of the means. Now salvation is the end, Christ the means. Therefore the destination of salvation to the elect ought to be conceived before the destination of Christ to obtain that end. Just as the intention of healing the sick man ought to precede the physician's examination and the application of remedies, so it is necessary that we should conceive the thought concerning the election of those to whom he destined salvation was in the mind of God before the thought concerning election of the Savior to procure salvation for them. Otherwise Christ would have come with an uncertain end and would have been appointed Mediator before anything was determined by God concerning those who were actually to be redeemed.

Sources of solution.

IX. Although Christ is the foundation of salvation, he cannot forthwith be called the foundation of election because many more causes are required for salvation than for election. For the means of election are made the causes of salvation; nor can election be called salvation since it places nothing as yet in the elect, but is only the principle and cause of salvation.

X. We are said to be "elected in Christ" (Eph. 1:4), not already "existing" in him (as if the participle *ontas* were to be supplied). For no one can be in Christ without first being given to him by the Father (Jn. 17:6, 7) and planted in him by faith and love to which we are elected. Rather we are said to be elected as "about to be" in Christ and to be redeemed by him (so that the infinitive *einai* is to be supplied to denote that Christ is the primary means of election to be executed and the cause of salvation destined to us through him, not the cause of the decree by which it is decreed). Many things prove that this is the meaning of Paul. (1) He says that we "are elected in Christ," not "on account of him"; that denotes the consideration of Christ in election as a subordinate mean (which we grant); but this denotes its causality (which cannot be said unless we wish the means to be intended before the end itself). (2) He says that we are elected in Christ that "we should be holy." Therefore we cannot be regarded as existing in Christ antecedently for then we would be holy already. Rather the meaning is that we are about to be consequently. (3) Paul elsewhere interprets himself when he says, "God hath appointed us to obtain salvation by Christ" (1 Thess. 5:9). Thus to be elected in Christ is nothing else than to be destined to salvation to be obtained in Christ or by him. Therefore Christ is the cause of salvation, not of election. We are said "to be chosen to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth" (2 Thess. 2:13). Not that sanctification is the cause of election (since it is its end in this place), but because salvation is a consequence of holiness and faith.

XI. We are evidently not elected in Christ in the same manner as we are blessed in him. Nor is there an equal reason of the blessings given us in time of the decree or internal act (immanent in God) which was made from eternity. Those are founded in Christ as the meritorious and efficient cause because without him nothing can be communicated to the creature. On account of him and from him (as head) flows whatever grace is bestowed upon us. Rather the decree recognizes no cause but his good pleasure (*eudokian*). Nor can election be represented as a blessing because it is indeed the fount and principle of all blessings. That cannot properly be called a blessing which really passes over to us and to which we hold ourselves subjectively. This cannot be said of election, which remains in God. Therefore the particle *kathōs* used by Paul (Eph. 1:4) does not denote the parity of election and blessing (as having the same cause), but the foundation and origin of blessings flowing from election (to teach that nothing takes place in time which was not determined from eternity and that believers are not blessed by God in Christ except as God determined from eternity in the decree of election that they should be blessed in him).

XII. Grace is said to "have been given us in Christ before the world began" (*pro chronōn aiōniōn*, 2 Tim. 1:9). It was given by destination (on account of the certainty of the event), not by actual collation. It was given "in Christ" (as the foundation of redemption and salvation) because salvation was destined to be conferred by Christ. But it was not given on account of him as the cause of election itself.

XIII. On account of what, God saves us in time (also from eternity he decreed to save us on account of that) is true if "on account of" is referred to the thing decreed, not to the decree itself; to the thing willed, not to the volition. God decreed to save us on account of Christ since he does actually save us on account

of him in time. But it is false if "on account of" be referred to the very act of God decreeing and the decree itself. The mission of Christ is the effect, not the cause of the decree.

XIV. Although we are not elected on account of Christ, yet we are not elected without and apart from him. By the very decree which destined salvation to us, Christ also was destined to acquire it for us; nor was it otherwise destined than as to be acquired by Christ. Therefore election does not exclude but includes Christ; not as already given, but as to be given. Nor should these two ever be separated from each other (which nevertheless the sophisms of our adversaries effect).

XV. Although the love of beneficence and complacency cannot be exerted towards us except on account of Christ antecedently (because the actual pacification of God made by Christ ought necessarily to be supposed to the real communication of the divine love to us), this is not equally necessary with respect to the love of benevolence (which remains in God). God could be favorably disposed to us antecedently to Christ, although he could not bless us except on account of him. Nor does this carry any prejudice to his justice because that love does not exclude, but includes and draws after it a satisfaction necessarily. Just because he is favorably disposed to us, he appointed Christ as a Mediator, that he might actually bless us through him. If he loves us, he ought not to be considered as already appeased, but only as about to be. Beneficence indeed requires a reconciliation already made, but it is sufficient for benevolence that it shall be made in its own time.

XVI. It is one thing for Christ as *Logon* to be the efficient cause of election; another for him as God-man (*theanthrōpon*) and Mediator to be its objective and meritorious cause. The former is asserted by Christ, "I know whom I have chosen" (Jn. 13:18) and "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you" (Jn. 15:16), but not the latter.

XVII. If "we are predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren" (Rom. 8:29), it follows indeed that Christ is the primary means of execution upon which all the rest depend, but not that he is the cause of the election itself. Yea, since foreknowledge (which here signifies an election of persons, as we said before) is put before predestination (inasmuch as it signifies a destination to means), it is clearly intimated that they were first elected by God who were to be saved before they were given to Christ and predestinated to be conformed to his image. Nor if Christ is called the firstborn among many brethren is it necessary that he was first elected in every respect. It suffices that he obtains the first place in the execution by reason of causality and dignity.

XVIII. What is founded upon the mercy of God effectively considered ought also to be founded upon the merit of Christ because Christ is the channel through which God's mercy passes to us (the fountain of all blessing and grace). However what is founded upon God's mercy affectively considered (inasmuch as it remains in God, as is election) ought not forthwith to be founded upon the merit of Christ; it is sufficient for it to involve that consequently.

XIX. Although by some orthodox theologians, the election of Christ is maintained to be prior to the election of men, they are not therefore to be considered as favoring the innovators. First, because this is so understood by them as to be a priority only of order, not of causality (as the Arminians hold). Again, the election of Christ as Mediator should not be extended more widely than the election

of men who are to be saved, so that he was not destined and sent for more than the elect (the contrary of which the patrons of universal grace hold). In the meantime, it must be observed that all this difference of order is not to be understood with respect to God (to whom all things are present at once and by whom—by one simple act—all things are decreed, as much those which look to the end as to the means). Rather this difference is to be understood only with respect to us, who on account of our finite intellect, inadequately conceive them by dividing those things which are nevertheless united in themselves.

ELEVENTH QUESTION

Is election made from the foresight of faith, or works; or from the grace of God alone? The former we deny; the latter we affirm.

I. This is the principal hinge of the Pelagian controversy. On this, as a common rock, all in our day who have renewed Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism have struck.

Statement of the question.

II. On the state of the question observe: (1) The question is not whether the decree of election is absolute consequently and from the means (for we confess the merit of Christ, faith and works to be means necessary to its execution). Rather the question is whether it is such antecedently from the motives and preceding condition (by which God may have been influenced to choose this one rather than that one). The latter we deny.

III. (2) The question is not whether there are any causes of that decree with God; for as he is most wise he does nothing without reason (*alogōs*), and he has reasons of his dispensation which are undoubtedly most weighty (although concealed from us). Rather the question is whether these reasons are in man outside of God. The latter we deny.

IV. (3) The question is not whether faith is the condition or (at least organic) cause of the salvation decreed outside of God (for this no one of us denies). Rather the question is whether it is the condition or cause of the decree itself in God. Hence the question returns to this—Is the mere grace and good pleasure (*eudokia*) of God so the cause of election that it is in no way suspended upon the foresight either of faith or of works, whether that is maintained to be its cause or only the prerequisite condition? The adversaries deny this; we affirm it.

V. The papists differ from each other on this point. Without mentioning the opinions of the more ancient Scholastics (who are found to be very discordant and many of whom, openly turning to Pelagianism, suspend predestination upon the foresight of merit and the good use of free will), it is certain that the popish theologians in the Council of Trent were divided. Some asserted with Augustine the gratuitous election of God; others, on the contrary, with Pelagians and semi-Pelagians, suspended it upon the foreseen merit of men and the good use of free will. This contention continued and was afterwards fiercely agitated among the Dominicans and Franciscans. Now it still glows between the Jansenists and Jesuits. The former contend for the gratuitous predestination of God; the latter, on the other hand, for the foresight of works. Still it must be confessed that the Jesuits themselves are not evidently agreed. Some hold that men were elected

gratuitously to the first grace indeed; but to glory, not gratuitously but on account of foreseen and future merit (as Stapleton, "Antidota Apostolica in Epistolam ad Romanos Cap. IX," *Opera* [1620], 3:650; Becanus, *Summa Theologicae Scholasticae* 4.4.8 [1651], p. 88; Dionysius Carthusianus/Petavius, *Opus de Theologicis Dogmatibus* 10.2 [1700], 1:394-96 and many more of that society). Others, however, maintain that men were elected together gratuitously, not only to grace, but also to glory. Bellarmine above all others follows out this whole argument fully and more nearly to our mind ("De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio," 2.6, 7, 10, 11 in *Opera* [1858], 4:304-8, 312-15) where he asserts that "no reason on our part of the divine predestination can be assigned" (ibid., 2.9, p. 311). "We say," says he "no reason can be assigned, in order to exclude, not only merit properly so called, but also if it is not said to be merit except of congruity, and even if it is not called the true cause, but only the condition without which they would not be predestinated who are predestinated" (ibid.). He maintains "that this ought not to be called the opinion only of some doctors, but the belief of the Catholic church" (ibid., 2.11, p. 315), which he sustains by various arguments (ibid., 2.10-12, pp. 312-19). Thus he seems to be wholly on our side here (although elsewhere he may advocate opinions concerning free will, sufficient grace, the uncertainty of salvation and the merit of works incompatible [*asystata*] with this doctrine). However, whatever his opinion (and that of others who here follow Augustine and stand on the side of truth), the more common opinion among both the Jesuits and many papists is undoubtedly that of those who suspend predestination to life or election upon the foresight of works and the good use of free will. Against these, we here dispute.

VI. The Lutherans here also are split into factions. From the beginning, no controversy arose about this head, that great man of God, Luther, retaining Augustine's doctrine of gratuitous predestination (as he solidly defended it in his book *On the Bondage of the Will* [LCC 17:101-334]). Yet afterwards while dispute succeeded dispute, some (turning away by degrees from his mind) spoke more improperly and suspended election upon foreseen faith. Thus foreseen faith might have the relation either of impulsive or (at least) instrumental cause, as it holds itself with respect to justification (on this point, Jacobus Andreae, Hunnius, Gherardus and others do not sufficiently agree with each other). This is now the more common opinion among them (although there are not wanting others who here both think and speak more wisely; among others, the celebrated Calixtus).

VII. The Arminians (who bring popery and Pelagianism in by the back door) have struck against the same rock. For although they endeavor with great labor to prove that they do not make faith the cause of election (in order to shun the odium of semi-Pelagianism deservedly charged upon them), still they do not deny that it is the cause *sine qua non* or the prerequisite condition necessary in those to be elected. Yea, not obscurely can we gather that they proceed further and attribute a certain causality to faith, so that God is moved by its foresight to choose this rather than that one. Otherwise why would they say so often that election is founded on the foresight of faith unless they meant that the consideration of faith influenced the election of one before another? Hence the Hague subscribers say, "It is absurd to place the absolute will of God in the decree of election as the first cause, going before the remaining causes, to wit, Christ, faith, and all the other" (*Collatio scriptio habita Hagae Comitis* [1615], p. 127). Corvinus

leaves it doubtful "whether faith ought to be called the cause, or condition" (*Petri Molinaei novi anatomici* [1632], p. 351). Moreover, they make a twofold decree of election: the first general, of saving believers; the second special, of saving individuals by name whom God foresaw would believe. They hold that no other cause of the first can be given than the pure will of God, but as to the second (although it also is founded upon the divine will), they hold it supposes the consideration and regard of faith, so that God is moved by it to elect one rather than another. But here we do not treat of the first decree (whose futility will be demonstrated elsewhere), but of the second.

VIII. By the unanimous consent of the church, the Reformed maintain election to be purely gratuitous and that no foresight can be granted of faith or of works and merit—neither of congruity (*meritum de congruo*), nor condignity (*meritum de condigno*). Nor is it an objection that some appear to think differently. While holding that election to salvation (according to our manner of conceiving) is posterior to election to faith, they think God first decreed to give faith to man before destinating him to life. Thus they hold that predestination to glory and life is of faith as the condition foreseen by God in him who is elected (as Testard expresses it, "No one would have denied election to justification and glorification, if they had distinctly considered it to be from foreseen faith, and its object to be man believing, inasmuch as believing"—*Erinekon*, Th. 289* [1631], p. 248). Capellus says, "Destination to eternal life and glory, or the will of God concerning the glorification of man, is founded upon the condition of faith and repentance, but this condition God himself works in us" (Thesis 13, "Thesis theologicae de electione et reprobatione," in *Syntagma thesim* [1664], p. 113). For although this opinion on the subject of faith differs from those of the Arminians, yet because on others they approach nearer it and depart from the opinion thus far received in our churches (which have constantly contended for a purely gratuitous election without any foresight of faith or works), it is deservedly rejected as too crude and dangerous.

IX. This, therefore, is the opinion of our churches—that election to glory as well as to grace is entirely gratuitous. Therefore no cause, or condition, or reason existed in man, upon the consideration of which God chose this rather than another one. Rather election depended upon his sole good pleasure (*eudokia*) by which, as he selected from the corrupt mass a certain number of men neither more worthy nor better than others to whom he would destine salvation, so in like manner he decreed to give them faith as the means necessary to obtain salvation (see Synod of Dort, "Primum Caput: De Divina Praedestinationes," 7, 9, 10 in *Acta Synodi Nationalis . . . Dordrechti* [1619-20], 1:280).

Election is not from foreseen faith.

X. The arguments by which they establish this are principally these: (1) Faith and obedience are the fruit and effect of election. Therefore they cannot be the cause or previous condition. The same thing cannot be at once the cause and effect; to be elected from faith and to be elected to faith. Moreover, that faith and obedience are the fruit of election is proved in various places: "Whom he predestinated, them he also called" (Rom. 8:30*). Now calling is to faith and faith is its end, so that calling is the effect of predestination. "He hath chosen us, that we should be holy" (Eph. 1:4); therefore not because we were. "Having predestinated us unto adoption" (*eis hyiothesian*,

Eph. 1:5); therefore unto faith by which that adoption is secured to us (Jn. 1:12). "As many as were ordained to eternal life, believed" (Acts 13:48). Therefore precisely they believe who are elected and because they were elected. However they were not elected because they believe—hence it is called "the faith of the elect" (Tit. 1:1) because it is given to the elect alone. Hence Augustine: "We understand calling by which they become the elect, not who are elected because they believed, but are elected that they might believe. For if on that account they were elected, since they believe, they assuredly had elected him first by believing in him, so that they deserved to be elected" (*On the Predestination of the Saints* 34 [17] [NPNF1, 5:514-15; PL 44.985]).

XI. In vain is it objected here: (a) as to Romans 8:30* that it does not mean calling to faith, but to suffering (in which it becomes us to be conformed to the Son of God that we may be conformed to him in glory); hence no other than a conditional predestination is meant (viz., if men wish to follow God electing). The answer is, no other calling can be meant than to faith and obedience (although it has the condition of the cross annexed) because it treats of the calling according to purpose (i.e., the efficacious which is proper only to the elect) in opposition to the inefficacious calling (which belongs also to others). (b) It is put before justification and inseparably coheres with it. (c) It is the immediate effect of election, which cannot be said of the cross. Nor if it is calling to faith does it follow that God was favorably disposed to sinners before they believed with the love of complacency, although it pleased God to pursue them with the love of benevolence that he might bless them. (d) No other predestination can be meant than that which is strictly connected with justification and glorification, and according to which all things work together for good to those who love God. This can be said only of the absolute, not of the conditional (which the adversaries feign), which nonetheless does not hinder many from failing and condemnation.

XII. (2) It is falsely retorted on Eph. 1:4 that believers can be elected also to holiness. The answer is that for the very reason that they are believers, they are supposed to be already holy, since faith purifies the heart. And since the apostle teaches that all spiritual blessings are given to us in Christ from election, it thence necessarily follows that faith (the primary of these blessing) flows from election. Nor, if the apostle speaks of the complete election of individuals, does it follow that all the Ephesians to whom he wrote were elected because these expressions are synecdochical (in which the denomination is made from the better). Besides, Paul could so speak because in the judgment of charity he hoped well for them. Since the sure marks of election are placed here, it is evident that the description of election could truly apply only to those who possessed the marks. However, although faith is antecedent to adoption, it does not follow that it is equally so to election because it is not the cause of adoption, except insofar as it is the means ordained of God by election to confer it.

XIII. The adversaries falsely suppose that Acts 13:48 does not refer to eternal election, both because they are not said to be foreordained (*protetagmenoi*) of God, but simply ordained (*tetagmenoi*); and because it would thence follow that it had been revealed to Paul and Luke that all those who received the word of life were elected from eternity (which is absurd). The answer is that the simple word *tetagmenoi* is put for the compound. Thus in Rom. 9:22 (most especially with respect to God to whom all things are present), it is not so much foreordination

as ordination. Again, although they are not said to be ordained by God, yet there can be no other sense (unless we hold that they were ordained by themselves, which is Pelagian). (3) There was no necessity that the election of individuals should be extraordinarily revealed to Paul. It was sufficient that Paul could gather election from faith, as the cause from its effect. No better is their other gloss (with which, after Socinus, they endeavor to corrupt this passage by referring this ordination to a disposition or aptitude to faith) by which each one is made fit for believing that the sense may be "as many as were disposed to eternal life, believed." Nowhere in Scripture is the phrase so taken. It is also at variance with the text where ordination has a relation not to faith or disposition in the subject, but to life. It is not said, who were "disposed to faith," but "to life." Nor are the indisposed (*ataktoi*) opposed to the destined (*tois tetagmenois*), but to the well-disposed (*eutaktois*) who rightly keep the posited order. First Corinthians 16:15 does not belong here because it refers not to an internal disposition, but to an ordination to office (by which they of whom it speaks addicted themselves to the ministry of the saints). In fine, it is gratuitously assumed that the unregenerate man (such as they were of whom Luke speaks) could be disposed to eternal life before believing in Christ (which is repugnant to the whole of Scripture and opposed to the nature of the thing). For this good disposition should be either from the man (and so he would choose himself) or from God (and so it would arise from the most free election of God).

XIV. In Titus 1:1, it is called "the faith of the elect" because it is not of all (2 Thess. 3:2), but only of those who are ordained to eternal life (to whom God gives it)—not to others (Mt. 13:11). Not that it is in the elect antecedently (so that no one would be elected without the foresight of it), but because it is in them consequently (so that no one can have faith except from election and dependent on it).

XV. Although the apostle may have meant only election in time (2 Thess. 2:13) or calling which is made through the gospel to the participation of grace (not, however, eternal to salvation), our argument would not be of less force on account of the mutual connection and analogy of both. The contrary is readily gathered from the words themselves because they speak of an election which was made "from the beginning" (*ap' archēs*) (i.e., from eternity, according to the style of the Scriptures) and which is perfected by calling (2 Thess. 2:14). So that the apostle here recounts the causes not of election, but of salvation; and the words "through sanctification" are to be joined not with the verb "hath chosen," but with the word "salvation" (as if he would say he hath chosen to the obtaining of salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and through belief of the truth—as he elsewhere expresses it, 1 Thess. 5:9).

XVI. Second, election was made from good pleasure alone and not from any works. The passages are explicit: "that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth" (Rom. 9:11). Hence it is added, "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy" (Rom. 9:16). Thus it is called the election of grace (Rom. 11:5, 6). Thus Christ, speaking of the revelation of the mysteries of salvation (depending upon election), attributes it to good pleasure alone: "even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight" (Mt. 11:26*). Nor does Paul speak otherwise: "God hath saved us, and called us, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ before the world began" (2 Tim. 1:8*, 9).

XVII. Falsely do the Remonstrants contend that the good pleasure of God (concerning which the Scripture speaks in the matter of election) is that by which he decreed to select faith from many possible conditions and to receive it as a condition of the salvation to be communicated. For although we do not deny that this was determined by God, yet we deny that it is the decree of election of which Paul speaks. For that decree is practical, ordaining to salvation particular persons, not disposing things or the connection of things in order to salvation. It terminates on creatures themselves, not on their qualities. "He hath chosen us" (to wit, men), Paul says (Eph. 1:4), "whom" (viz., men) "he predestinated" (Rom. 8:30). That quality of faith is not said in this sense to be chosen, but prescribed to the elect, i.e., given to and prepared for them from eternity.

XVIII. Faith can consist with the good pleasure and grace of God when subordinated to it (as the effect or means depending upon that same good pleasure) because he prepared the means no less than determined the end itself. Thus Paul asserts "that it is of faith, that it might be by grace" (Rom. 4:16) because faith alone can consist with grace in the matter of justification, but is incompatible (*asystatos*) with it when considered as the antecedent cause. For he who speaks of grace alone, excludes all other causes outside of God.

XIX. Rom. 9:11, 12 cannot be reconciled with the foresight of faith or works. (1) It treats of twins who had done nothing good or bad by which they might be distinguished from each other. (2) Election is said expressly to be of him that calleth, not of works. (3) In verses 15 and 16, it is wholly ascribed to the mercy of God alone: "He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." But if God has mercy upon men from foreseen faith, salvation can be said to be of him that willeth and runneth, not only of God that pitieth. (4) If foresight were granted, there would be no place for the objections and scruples proposed by Paul (Rom. 9:14)—as if God were unjust in electing this rather than that one. There is no species of injustice in him who elects those who believe and reprobates unbelievers.

XX. To no purpose is it here objected that he does not treat in this chapter of the election or reprobation of certain persons, but of the decree of justification (by which God determined to give righteousness and salvation to believers in Christ—those being rejected who sought righteousness by the law). Besides the fact that Paul had most fully discussed this argument in the preceding chapters so that there was no need to return to it, the scope of the apostle sufficiently evinces the contrary (which is to show that the promises of God and the covenant made with Abraham were not destroyed even if a great part of the Jews would resist the gospel). These promises were ratified always in the sons of promise. Yet who should or should not be such (i.e., sons of promise) depends upon the divine predestination. Also the very series of the discourse sufficiently teaches this; especially verses 11, 15 and 16 which cannot be explained of justification by faith, but manifestly refer to election and calling. Here works are not opposed to faith, but to the election and calling of God. Paul does not say, not by works but by faith (as he ought to have said), but "of him that calleth" (Rom. 9:11*). "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth" (Rom. 9:16). He does not add, but of him that believeth (as he ought to have done), "but of God that showeth mercy" (Rom. 9:16). And truly since it treats of the cause (why of two equally

conceived in sin and equal in every respect, he preferred this to that one), the mere mercy of God and gratuitous election must be considered; not faith which follows election and does not precede it. What occurs in Rom. 9:30ff. concerning the righteousness of faith which the Gentiles attained, does not prove that Paul treats in this chapter of justification. Rather it is a conclusion drawn from the preceding (viz., that from this election and gratuitous calling the Gentiles were made partakers of the righteousness of faith, while the Jews, following for a great part the works of the law, were cut off from salvation by the just judgment of God). Hence it is brought out that faith is the only mean (*medium*) of salvation and not its cause.

XXI. Although the rejection and election set forth in the person of Esau and Jacob can in some way refer to their posterity secondarily, yet it primarily regards them in order to show the cause of the discrimination between the sons of the flesh and the sons of the promise. What is proposed in Rom. 9:6, 7 is not to be sought in preceding and foreseen good or evil works, but in the eternal purpose of God electing Jacob from grace and reprobating Esau; so that these are not proposed only typically (*typice*), but also paradigmatically (*paradigmatice*), just as the previous examples of Israel and Jacob refer to individual persons.

XXII. Third, if election is from foreseen faith, God must have foreseen it in us: either as an act of nature proceeding from us, or as an act of grace depending on God, or as a common act, arising conjointly from both (partly from God, partly from man). If as an act of God, he foresaw it therefore as his own gift (i.e., decreed by him from election). Thus it would follow, not precede election. If as an act of nature we therefore elected ourselves (contrary to Paul, 1 Cor. 4:7), Pelagius gains the victory. If as a common act, either the act of God takes its form from the act of man (and so man would be the architect of his own salvation and could sacrifice to his own net, since he would bring to his own salvation the principal part) or the act of man takes its form from the act of God (and so election will be the cause of faith, not the contrary). We must either ascend with the Scriptures to God discriminating among men by his own gift or descend with Pelagius to man discriminating himself by his own free will (for there can be no middle way).

XXIII. Fourth, if election is from foreseen faith, God would not have elected man, but rather man would have elected God, and so predestination should rather be called postdestination; the first cause would be made the second, and God would depend on man (the falsity of which, both the thing itself exclaims and Christ expressly testifies: "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you," Jn. 15:16). This oracle is often repeated by Augustine, especially in his book *On the Predestination of the Saints:* "which election the Lord signifies saying, ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, nor does faith itself precede: for he did not elect us because we believed, but that we might believe, that we might not be said to have first chosen him" (38 [19] [NPNF1, 5:517; PL 44.988]).

XXIV. Fifth, if election is from foreseen faith, no place will be given for the objections usually urged against it, and nothing would be more easy than to answer the question, why this rather than that one was chosen. Thus to no purpose would Paul exclaim, "O the depth" (*ō bathos*, Rom. 11:33). In vain would he (as by the interposition of a jagged-tooth bit) repress the curiosity of man by the rebuke "who art thou" (*su tis ei*), and the comparison of him to the potter's clay.

Although the economy by which believers would be saved and unbelievers damned would be admirable, yet so clearly has it been revealed to us in the gospel that nothing else is lacking. Therefore in predestination something full of admiration must be put. This can be nothing else than the election of some in preference to others (who are no worse) and the reprobation of some in preference to others (who are no better). Since there is and can be conceived no cause of this discrimination in man, the minds of men are forced to stop and adore (as it were under a veil a mystery full of awe-inspiring reverence). Nor would the apostle have had recourse to the bare good pleasure of God "who has mercy on whom he wills," if the cause of that discrimination were in man himself. Nothing would have been more easy than to answer that God did no injustice to any because if he condemns, he condemns the unbelieving; if he elects, he elects believers. Since, therefore, he does nothing of the kind, but makes mention of good pleasure alone, by that very thing he most clearly testifies that he recognized no cause of that difference than his good pleasure (*eudokian*) alone. And thus election is not of foreseen faith.

Sources of solution.

XXV. There is one reason of the love of benevolence and beneficence; another of the love of complacence and friendship. The latter indeed goes before faith necessarily because it gives it, while the former supposes it. The former depends on the esteem of the one loving and his sole good pleasure (*eudokia*); the latter flows from the worthiness of the thing loved (or his fitting disposition). When Paul says to the Hebrews "without faith it is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11:6), he does not mean the first love, but the second. There he speaks of the actual faith of the elders by which they obtained the testimony of righteousness. Hence it is rightly inferred what kind of persons please God in time; not why he elected them from eternity that they might please him.

XXVI. It is one thing for man to please God; another, however, for it to please God to elect man. The former supposes faith existing in the subject (and of this Paul speaks, Heb. 11:6), but not the latter. Nor, if it pleases God to give grace to a man, does it immediately follow that the man pleases God. Otherwise it would follow that because it pleased him to reconcile the world unto himself, the world also pleased God before he was reconciled (which is most absurd [*asystaton*]). The former denotes the complacence which is terminated on man and supposes his act; the latter denotes only that which is terminated on the decree itself and indicates the act of God. Although, in truth, it pleased God to elect us from eternity without faith, it does not follow that without faith we can equally please God in time. It can please God to wish well to the creature antecedently to faith, but God cannot have complacency in the creature except consequently to it.

XXVII. *Prognōsis* in Rom. 8:29 must not be understood speculatively for bare prescience because God can foresee nothing in man except what he himself will give. Rather it must be understood practically for his gratuitous election, as was seen before. Nor, if Paul says that whom God "foreknew, he also did predestinate to be conformed (*symmorphous*) to the image of his Son," does he mean that they were such antecedently. For they could not obtain this except by calling (which follows), but that they might be such consequently, so that the words *pros to einai* are to be supplied to indicate the effects and means of predestination, not the causes and motives. Hence it is evident, not why he predestinated this one in

preference to another, but to what he predestinated and with what means (viz., to glory and to a conformity with Christ—both by holiness and by suffering). Therefore *prognōsis* denotes the decree of the end or destination to salvation; *proorismos* denotes the decree of the means necessary to the attainment of that end (cf. Eph. 1:5).

XXVIII. What James says—"God hath chosen the poor of this world rich in faith" (Jam. 2:5)—intimates, indeed, to what God elected (viz., to faith), but not by what and on account of what. Thus the words "rich in faith" are not to be taken causally but finally (by the ellipsis of the infinitive *einai*, cf. Eph. 1:4). This is evident from the equality because he elected the rich in faith in the same way as "the heirs of the kingdom." Yet they are elected heirs of the kingdom that they may be made such, not that they were already such actually before his election.

XXIX. It is one thing to be unwilling to suspend election upon faith and works (which we hold); another to maintain that salvation is decreed to us without any regard to obedience and faith (which is calumniously charged upon us). The decree of salvation is not founded on such regard, but yet the decreed salvation itself depends upon the obedience of faith which God works in us.

XXX. It is one thing that they are elected as about to believe; another that they are elected reduplicatively and causally—because as believers and about to believe. The former is granted because he decreed to save no one without also decreeing to give him faith. Hence these propositions are convertible: every believer is elected, and every elect one is a believer. But the latter (of which we speak here) is denied. Hence the passages which teach that no one but the believer is saved prove indeed the necessity of faith to obtain salvation in time, but not the foresight of faith (which by election is prior from eternity). It is one thing that God willed to save believers; another that he decreed to save them because he foresaw that they would believe.

XXXI. If God saves believers as such, it indeed follows that he decreed to save them as such; but not as such elected them to salvation because faith, which is the cause of salvation, is only an effect and means of election. So it is true that God saves in time in the same way in which he decreed to save. As he saves in time by faith, so he decreed from eternity to save by faith (i.e., that faith is the condition and means of obtaining salvation). But this does not hold good equally, if understood of the cause of the decree. For faith (the antecedent cause of the salvation decreed for us) cannot be the cause of the decree, but only the means by which the salvation decreed for us can be obtained. Moreover, although nothing takes place in time which was not decreed from eternity, yet there ought not therefore to be the same reason of the decree as of the execution. For the decree begins from the end and stops in the means; but the execution begins from the means and stops in the end. God in electing is conceived first to have decreed to save, then to intend to give the means of salvation (viz., faith and obedience). But in the execution, he gives the means before leading to the end. Hence what is the cause of salvation ought not forthwith to be reckoned the cause of election (but rather the effect). The physician intends the healing of the sick man before he thinks of the remedies, but in the execution he applies the remedies before he heals. Although God in executing gives faith before salvation, yet it cannot thence be inferred that God in electing considered faith before salvation.

XXXII. Although God predestinates men to faith as a means by which they may attain salvation, it is not necessary that God equally predestinates the reprobate to unbelief and impenitence. For there are some means which God finds in us, others which he makes. Unbelief and impenitence are not placed by God, but are found in us. On the other hand, faith springs from God alone, not from us.

XXXIII. Although reprobation is made from the consideration of sin, it does not equally follow that election is made from the consideration of faith and good works. Reprobation is an act of justice, necessarily supposing sin. Election is an act of mercy, supposing nothing but misery. Thus men might in predestination be regarded in a state of misery (into which they fell by their own fault), but not in a state of grace (to which they were only to be led by the decree of election).

XXXIV. The will to give salvation as a crown and reward to believers presupposes faith and perseverance in the man to be saved (who without them could not be saved); but not in God who saves (as if his will depended upon the foresight of such faith, when this very faith arises from that decree). Therefore justice demands that the reward should not be given until after obedience, but does not demand that it should be destined on account of foreseen obedience, especially when that reward is merely gratuitous (not only promised by God as a reward to excite us to duty, but also destined as a gift and inheritance). God has prepared a kingdom in the heavens for them that love him (1 Cor. 2:9), so that love is the condition preceding possession. God has not prepared a kingdom on account of love as the impulsive cause of the preparation. Nor would you be right in drawing here a distinction between the method (*schesin*) of a father (which obtains in predestination) and the method (*schesin*) of a judge (which will have place on the day of judgment), so that the collation of salvation is not so much an act of grace (depending on election) as an act of justice (rewarding each one according to his works). For although the justice of faithfulness ought to exercise itself in the gratuitous remuneration of believers, it cannot therefore be denied that the mercy of God the Father, flowing from gratuitous election, will have place here. For eternal life is given to us as the inheritance of sons from the good pleasure of the Father: "Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom" (Lk. 12:32); "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world" (Mt. 25:34). Election in the Scriptures is not only referred to the means (viz., faith and holiness, as that hypothesis determines), but also to the end (viz., salvation itself and eternal life, cf. 2 Thess. 2:13; 2 Tim. 1:9; Rom. 6:23 and often elsewhere).

XXXV. The election which is made among unequals and according to inherent qualities, ought to be made of that which is better. But there is not the same reason of that which takes place among equals (those constituted in the same misery). For then (which is the condition of our election) the better are not elected, but the equally bad that they may be made better.

XXXVI. Although sanctification is a mark of election *a posteriori* by which it both becomes known to us and is made manifest to others (in which sense Paul says, "that he who purges himself, shall be a vessel unto honor" [2 Tim. 2:21], i.e., will be declared to be such, cf. Mt. 5:44; Jn. 8:31), it cannot, however, for this reason be considered the cause or condition of election.

TWELFTH QUESTION: THE CERTAINTY OF ELECTION

Is the election of certain men to salvation constant and immutable? We affirm against the Remonstrants.

I. This question grows out of the preceding and is debated by us with the same adversaries. Nor is it strange that they who suspend election upon an inconstant and mutable condition should maintain its uncertainty and mutability.

II. The Arminians (in order to defend the apostasy of saints) uphold the mutability of election. Thus they make it twofold: one incomplete and not decisive (*peremptoriam*) (of those who will believe), which can be revoked and made void by the inconstancy of men who can fall from faith; the other, however, complete and decisive (of those persevering and dying in faith), which is immutable.

III. In truth, although the orthodox confess that various acts can be assigned in election by reason of the various objects (viz., of end and means), yet they deny that the Scripture makes mention either of different degrees or of different kinds of election. Rather they acknowledge one only complete and decisive (*peremptoriam*); not indefinite (of men believing and persevering), but definite of a certain number of men destinated from the same corrupt mass to obtain salvation by and on account of Christ. This number is so certain and immutable that it can never be revoked, but infallibly obtains its end at length.

Statement of the question.

IV. On the state of the question observe: (1) that it does not concern the subjective certainty of election (on our part) and as to the sense which we may have of it (which will be discussed hereafter), but it concerns the objective certainty (on the part of the thing). The question is not whether the elect can fall on his part (which experience teaches us is too true, if he were left to himself); but whether he can fall on the part of the decree by which he was elected to salvation.

V. The question is not—Is election so certain as to render means no more necessary and that no matter what man may do he will be saved necessarily? We do not wish to separate the end from the means (which God has joined to each other). Rather the question is—Is it certain, the means ordained by God being complied with? The question then returns to this—Is the decree of election so sure and immutable that the elect must necessarily and infallibly be brought to salvation at last? The adversaries deny; we affirm.

The immutability of election is proved from Heb. 6:17, Rom. 9:11 and Rom. 11:29.

VI. The reasons are: (1) there is the same reason of the decree of election as of the other decrees of God, which are immutable (as was seen above from Ps. 33:11; Num. 23:19; Mal. 3:6; Jam. 1:17). "My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure" (Is. 46:10)—where with the immutability of the decree is noted the infallibility of the event. Hence the Scripture attributes to election "immutability of counsel" (*ametatheton tēs boulēs*, Heb. 6:17) and "the purpose which stands" (Rom. 9:11). And it testifies elsewhere that "the gifts and calling of God are without repentance" (*ametamelēta*, Rom. 11:29). If, in truth, the gifts and calling flowing from election are without repentance, why should not election itself (their cause) also be without repentance (*ametamelētos*)?

Nor must it be said here that God does not indeed repent of his gifts, but man can repent of the gift received or preserved. Although man on his part in the divided sense can fail, yet he cannot in the compound sense (as elected and called), since indeed this very unrepentable (*ametamelētos*) election and calling (by working in him irresistibly) gives him the power to will and perfect. It keeps him from ever repenting of the gift received by producing repentance not to be repented of (*ametamelēton*, 2 Cor. 7:10).

VII. Here belongs the remarkable passage of Paul: "The foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his" (2 Tim. 2:19). There are as many reasons here as words. For because the church is the house of the living God, and the work of salvation the edifice which is built up in it, that no doubt may arise as to its firmness, the apostle assigns to it a foundation (viz., eternal election) on which our salvation is entirely founded; an excellent foundation, not of man, but of God—both originally (because it was laid by his hand alone, Heb. 11:10; 1 Pet. 2:6) and subjectively (because it is built upon him as the Rock of Ages, Mt. 16:18). Thus it is not perishable and movable like the foundations of earth and men (which at length are destroyed by various accidents), but sure and immovable, that cannot be overturned. Indeed it is *hestēke* (i.e., stands sure and unshaken by a perpetual stability recognizing no differences of time). That too is sealed by the knowledge of God not of simple inspection, but practical, discerning them that are his from them that are not. As men are wont to confirm by a seal writings which they wish to be ratified and sure, so God wished to fortify the decree of election by a seal that there might be no room for doubt: "having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his. And, Let everyone that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity" (2 Tim. 2:19). This passage exhibits as it were a twofold emblem for full confirmation: one with respect to God; the other with respect to us. The former belongs to the love and care of God; the latter to the desire of sanctification which God produces in them that are his. By both of these, the certainty of election is evidenced. If it could be frustrated, it would arise either on the part of God or on our part; but neither can be said. Not the former because God knoweth them that are his (i.e., loves and protects so that they can never fall); not the latter because the same takes care that whoever has professed the name of Christ and is of the number of his people, should depart from iniquity.

VIII. What stronger expressions could there be to establish the immutability of election? For what objection can be made? That it does not treat of election, but only of the doctrine of the resurrection alluded to in the preceding verse? The answer is that the doctrine of the resurrection involves the whole reason of salvation which is founded upon election. But the scope of the apostle here evinces the contrary (which is to confirm the faith of true believers against the defection of Hymeneus and Philetus and other similar apostates, lest they should on that account be disturbed). It concerned their own salvation because the reason of the temporary (*proskairōn*) faith of those differed most widely from that of the faith of the elect. The former could be shaken and overturned because it was not on a firm basis, but the latter by no means because it was founded upon the immovable Rock of Ages. Therefore, although Hymeneus and Philetus and others may have wandered from the faith, "nevertheless the foundation of God standeth sure" (*ho mentoi stereos hestēke Theou themelios*) with respect to true believers

whom God recognizes and loves as his own. Or would they add that it treats of the foundation which is built upon the foreknowledge of faith because it is said to have this seal, "The Lord knoweth them that are his"? But not even so will they gain anything both because that knowledge is not speculative, but practical (not supposing but making the object); and because it is here set forth, not antecedently to the foundation, but as the consequent seal (which therefore follows and does not precede election). Finally would they say that a departure from iniquity is indeed set forth as the duty of man (who ought to do this), but not immediately as his act (who really can fulfil it)? But here the act of man may not be separated from his duty because the same God who commands us to depart from iniquity works that very thing in us by his Spirit. To keep us from ever wandering from God, the Spirit makes us depart by a holy apostasy from the world and sin, mortifying the deeds of the body (Rom. 8:13) and crucifying the flesh with its lusts (Gal. 5:24).

IX. Second, the elect cannot be seduced. In Mt. 24:24, Christ, speaking of false prophets, says they shall show such and such great signs and wonders, "insomuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect" (*kai tous eklektous*) (i.e., if any power could avail against election). This could not be said unless it were really impossible for the elect to be seduced (not with respect to any lighter error into which we may without repugnance fall, but to a deadly and final error). Nor to elude the force of this place will it do to object, first, that "the elect" here means only the excellent. Nowhere in the New Testament does this word imply excellence without respect to the decree (as the passages adduced by the adversaries themselves prove, Lk. 23:35; 1 Pet. 2:4; Acts 9:15). That it is not to be understood differently here appears from Mk. 13:20, where they are described as "the elect, whom God hath chosen." Second, it is objected that *ei dynaton* indicates not an absolute impossibility, but only a great difficulty. It is to be referred not to the event of the seduction itself, but to the purpose and desire of the seducers; so that the sense is, as much as is in them, they will leave nothing untried by which they may be able to seduce the elect. Moreover if their machinations cannot effect it, yet nothing hinders the elect from giving themselves up and perishing by an innate capability of falling. Otherwise what need was there of the warning against seduction, if it was impossible for them to be seduced? The answer is: the scope of Christ evinces the contrary, which is to heighten the extreme danger of the last times. Believers would be threatened from false Christs and false prophets who would show forth such signs that not only the temporary (*proskairoi*), but even the elect themselves (if it were possible) would be subverted. This could not be true if only a difficulty were meant—a moral impossibility on the part of the seducers. It is as if the sense were, the false prophets will leave nothing untried to injure (as far as they can) the elect. But what necessity was there to foretell this (of which no one would doubt when such would be the ability and such the arts of the seducers)? Again, that difficulty would either be capable of being overcome by the false prophets attempting it or not. If it could be overcome, nothing new or great was here foretold by Christ. If it could not, the obstacle would not be from their impotency or ignorance, but from a superior cause which they would suppose in vain (viz., election). Hence he does not say "if it were possible for them" (*ei dynaton autois*), but "if it were possible" (*ei dynaton*), which denotes not a simple difficulty, but the impossibility

of the event (cf. Gal. 4:15). If the seduction is impossible on account of the immutability of election, it does not follow that the exhortations of Christ to watchfulness are useless, because they are the means by which God has determined to carry out his purpose. Otherwise it was useless for Christ to forewarn Peter of his fall, because he was to be raised up again; and for Paul to forewarn the centurion about the shipwreck, since all were to be saved (Acts 27:31).

X. Third, there is an inseparable connection between election and glory, so that as many as have been elected will also be glorified. It is evident from the golden chain of salvation (wrought by the apostle, Rom. 8:29, 30), where the beginning is made from the eternal election of God, flowing thence through individual graces, proceeds to the last complement of salvation: from eternity to eternity—from eternity with respect to predestination, to eternity with respect to glorification. "For whom God did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son. Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified." Here Paul speaks of glorification in the past tense both with respect to its foundation (*inchoationis*) in grace and holiness (which is glory begun, 2 Cor. 3:18) and with respect to its certainty (because it is just as certain and infallible as if they were already actually introduced into heaven). If, therefore, these graces mutually connected most closely so wait upon each other that no one is predestinated who is not called, no one called who is not justified, no one justified who is not glorified—from this it invincibly appears that election is immutable, infallibly reaching its event.

XI. Some of the papists (as Becanus and Tirinus), to escape this passage, have recourse to a transposition of words (*hyperbaton*) (as if it should be read—"God predestinated those whom he knew would be conformed to Christ"). But Bellarmine himself acknowledges that this is a distortion of the text (which means the contrary). Others hold that it treats of the foreknowledge of those whom God foreknew would finally believe. But that gloss corrupts the text itself. Paul says God first foreknew those whom he predestinated that they might be conformed to his Son; therefore, they could not be foreknown as already conformed much less as believing and persevering even unto faith. Therefore, foreknowledge itself is practical of persons, not theoretical of qualities; hence he does not say "whose faith" he foreknew, but "whom" he foreknew. No better do they escape who maintain that all these are conditional, provided we do not cease to love God (to wit, that the apostle shows what God will do on his part—i.e., that he will glorify believers and the persevering). Paul does not say that if they once believe and love God, they will perpetually continue in his service. Otherwise, he would excite believers to patience in suffering to no purpose. For they gratuitously suppose that these are to be taken conditionally, since the condition itself (viz., faith) falls under the promise as being the fruit of calling. Otherwise the boasting of the apostle and the triumph of faith would be vain, for what would it avail to be safe from eternal enemies if danger would always threaten us from our own inconstancy?

XII. Moreover, Paul elsewhere confirms that very thing most clearly when he sets forth the connection between the destination to glory and the obtainment of salvation: "The election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded" (*hē eklogē epetychen*, Rom. 11:7). He does not simply say "the elect" have obtained (to wit, righteousness or salvation, which the other Jews fruitlessly sought by the law),

but "the election" to denote not only the subject (i.e., those who are saved), but the cause (why they rather than the others obtained salvation, to wit, the eternal election of God). Therefore the apostle had said, "God hath not cast away his people which he foreknew" (Rom. 11:2), on account of the certainty of election.

XIII. Fourth, the names of the elect are written in heaven, in the book of life, which admits of no erasure (Phil. 4:3; Rev. 13:8; Heb. 12:23). Hence Christ orders his disciples to rejoice not that the spirits were subject to them, but rather because "their names were written in heaven" (Lk. 10:20), for which joy there could be no reason if that inscription could be easily effaced and depended only upon the tenuous thread of the mutable will of man. For that alone is true joy which is solid and cannot be taken away (*anaphaireton*). This appears more strikingly whether the inscription is attended to in general—by which the Scripture usually designates the strength and infallible execution of God's decrees both in wrath ("Behold, it is written before me" [viz., the sin of the Israelites] "I will not keep silence, but will recompense, even into their bosom," Is. 65:6) and in grace ("A book of remembrance was written before him for them that feared the Lord," Mal. 3:16); or in particular—by which the author and the subject of the inscription is considered. Although the Holy Spirit might have alluded to a manifold custom by this phrase (either to the register of friends, or to military conscription, or to the roll of citizens enjoying the rights of citizenship), it is certain that by this book the eternal election of God is designated. In his mind, he inscribed the names of those whom he receives into the number of his faithful and whom he determined to admit into the heavenly Jerusalem, whose invincible power and unmoved constancy renders that inscription indelible: "for if a man said, what I have written, I have written, shall God inscribe anyone in the book of life and erase it" (as Augustine says, *Psalm 69 [68]* 29 [13] [NPNF1, 8:310; PL 36.862). If the decrees of the Persian kings were irrevocable, how much more those of the King of kings, to whom neither ignorance in decreeing nor impotence in executing can be attached. Even the title of the book favors us. Why should it be called "the book of life" in which they who are written "are written unto life" (Is. 4:3), if they could perish eternally? Finally, the condition of the passage itself evinces this. As the earth is the seat of inconstancy and frailty, so the wicked (whose portion is on earth and who will perish with it) are said "to be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13). But the faithful are said to be "written in heaven," not only because their citizenship (*politeuma*) is in heaven (Phil. 3:20) and they have a right to the heavenly country, but also because an incorruptible inheritance (which they cannot fail to obtain) is reserved there for them (1 Pet. 1:4). Hence elsewhere Christ promises to the victor that "he will not blot out his name out of the book of life" (Rev. 3:5). John declares that no one who works abomination shall enter into the holy city, "but they which are written in the book of life" (*ei mē hoi gegrammenoi en tē biblio tēs zōēs*, Rev. 21:27). Since therefore none but such can expect this, so as many as are of this number can by this right promise it for themselves.

XIV. Falsely is "the book of the Lamb" distinguished here from "the book of life." As if in the former are inscribed the names of those persevering in faith and therefore of those who are saved; in the latter, however, are inscribed all believers under the condition of perseverance. It is evident from Rev. 13:8 that the book of life and of the Lamb are the same, where the book of the Lamb is at the same

time called "the book of life of the Lamb." In vain also is a twofold inscription feigned, the one made according to eternal predestination from the foresight of perseverance (which is indelible); the other, however, temporal, which is said to be made according to the present state of faith and righteousness (which is delible). This is unworthy of the majesty and wisdom of God and makes him changeable (*allo pros allon*), his decrees being suspended on the variable notions of the human will and, entering upon new counsels as often as that, changing either for the better or for the worse.

XV. But the most perfect nature of God compels us to reason far otherwise. If the decree of election could change, it would do so either because he knew not what was about to happen from ignorance or because he could not follow it out from weakness; or because he willed not to perfect it from inconstancy. But since no such thing can occur with God (the most wise, most powerful, best and most faithful), it is a consequence that what he has once determined will remain ratified and sure, and will infallibly obtain its event, all impediments being removed.

Sources of explanation.

XVI. Our election can be made sure *a posteriori* with respect to the sense of it in our hearts. In this sense, the words of Peter are to be understood when he orders believers to make their calling and election sure (*bebaioun*, 2 Pet. 1:10). For by the practice of good works and the desire of sanctification, the truth of election becomes more and more known to us and is confirmed in our hearts. But it does not therefore follow that it ought to be confirmed *a priori* and with respect to God's counsel itself (which as it is unchangeable [*ametatheton*], always remains the same and cannot be made void).

XVII. The word *adokimos* is not necessarily taken participially (for him who is reprobated by God and predestined to eternal death), but is often used nominally (for the inept, unfit). In turn, *dokimos* signifies him who has the approved stamp and is adapted to and fitted for the work to which he is called. Therefore, when Paul says that "he kept under his body, lest that when he had preached to others, he himself should be *adokimos*" (1 Cor. 9:27), he does not mean that he could from an elect person become a reprobate. He only intimates that he brought his body into subjection, lest on account of a more licentious life he might be rendered *adokimos* and unfit to preach the gospel (to wit, he alludes to the pugilists of whom those who were lazy and sluggish from too much bleeding were rejected as inept and less fit). Add to this the fact that the solicitude of Paul could not infringe upon the certainty of the decree which does not exclude but includes the use of means.

XVIII. The elect can fail in the divided sense (considered as man in himself), but not in the compound sense as elected (considered relatively to the immutability of the divine decree and the invincible protection of God).

XIX. The book from which Moses wishes to be blotted out (Ex. 32:32) is not the book of eternal life or predestination, but the book of providence or of the present life. The passage teaches that he is actuated by so great a zeal for God's glory and love for the people, as to be prepared by his own death to redeem the whole people from destruction. He also wishes to die rather than to see that whole nation (joined in covenant with God, distinguished by so many and so great miracles) perish in the desert with the ignominy of the divine name. It is not difficult to gather this from the mention of the book of God ("blot me out of

thy book"), not of the book of life; also because the wish of Moses ought to answer to the punishment with which God threatened the people (which was destruction and bodily death: "Now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them: and that I may consume them; and I will make of thee a great nation," Ex. 32:10). Therefore he ought to speak of the same kinds of death which, in a similar case, he understands: "And if thou deal thus with me, kill me, I pray thee" (Num. 11:15). (2) Although this should be understood of the book of life, the mutability of election could not therefore be inferred because it is a wish which has a tacit condition (if the thing could be done and would redound to God's glory); so that the possibility of the fact is not denoted, but the ardor of the one praying and the intense zeal and love by which he is impelled to wish for his own destruction (if indeed this could happen) in order to secure the salvation of his brethren. Christ prays to the Father that the cup of suffering might pass from him, not that this could happen by the decree of God, but to express the intimate sense of the divine wrath and of the most terrible death impending upon him. Here is to be applied the wish of Paul who "wishes that himself were accursed from Christ for his brethren" (Rom. 9:3). Not that he wished to be separated from Christ as to grace and holiness (which would be not only ungrateful to God, but impious in the one seeking it), but as to glory and happiness (since indeed this, by the nature of the thing and the will of God, might take place).

XX. It is one thing to be really and positively blotted out of the book of life, when they are expunged who were before inscribed in it; another to be blotted out only according to expectation (*kata doxan*) and negatively, when it is declared that anyone is not written in it. In the former sense, no one can be really blotted out of the book of life; but in the latter sense, hypocrites and temporary professors (*proskairoi*) are said to be blotted out when the mask is torn off from them, and the event declares they never were written in it. Thus Augustine sets it forth, "How, then, can they be blotted out of that in which they were never written? This is said according to their hope because they thought they were written in it. What does 'they were blotted out of the book of life' mean? That it is evident to them that they were never in it, for the following verse explains it, 'and let them not be written with the righteous' " (*Psalm* 69 [NPNF1, 8:310; PL 36.863]). God says, "If any man shall take away from the words of this prophecy, I will take away his part out of the book of life" (Rev. 22:19). God does not positively blot him out who was never written in it, but shows that he never was written in it. Also it is said, "His part shall be taken away out of the holy city;" not which he had or would have, but that which he did not have at all.

XXI. Since the certainty of the end does not exclude the necessity of means (but supposes it), the doctrine of the immutability of election is falsely said to take away the utility of warnings and threatenings (the means instituted by God for the execution of his decree) and to foster carnal security. Hence the same saints who most certainly assure themselves of constancy in life and the enjoyment of heaven do not cease to be solicitous concerning their salvation because they know that this cannot be attained without the intermediate duties of holiness and the avoidance of the opposite course: "every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself" (1 Jn. 3:3; cf. 1 Cor. 9:26; Phil. 3:14).

XXII. Whence appears the impiety of the reasoning of the wicked who, from the certainty of election, think their salvation to be secure no matter how they

may live. Here things are divided which ought to be joined together: the end from the means (viz., salvation from faith and holiness); and things are joined together which ought to be divided (viz., vice with happiness, moral evil with physical good). By the decree of election, the faithful are so predestinated to the end that they can be brought to it in no other way than by the means which God has established. Therefore, although it is true that every elect person will necessarily be saved, yet it is most false that he will be safe in whatever way or on the supposition of moral failure whatever. God, indeed, decrees the salvation of the elect as certain and sure, but the same God decrees it is certain only in the way of faith and holiness: "because without holiness no man shall see the Lord" (Heb. 12:14). And as necessary as it is that the elect shall be saved, so necessary is it that he will be saved in this way and order. It is a contradiction in the thing added to say that the elect will be saved even though impenitent because he is elected not only to salvation, but also to holiness.

XXIII. It is one thing to be deprived of the right to a kingdom demeritoriously (*demeritorie*, i.e., with respect to privilege); another, however, effectively (or actually). When they sin, believers lose their right to the kingdom as to demerit, but not equally in fact. That is, they deserve to be condemned, but yet they will be acquitted by the firm purpose of God. Hence these two propositions can stand together at the same time: it is impossible that elect David can perish; it is impossible that David, the adulterer (and continuing so) can be saved. However, the divine mercy and providence unties this knot by taking care that he shall not die in that state in which he would be excluded from eternal life. Before the end of life, he will be recalled to repentance, the way of salvation. Therefore, although in atrocious sins believers contract damnable guilt and lose their present fitness for the kingdom of heaven, yet because the act of man cannot rescind the divine acts, on that account the state of adoption cannot be broken up, nor the right to the kingdom of heaven taken away (which depends upon the gratuitous election of God and was obtained by the merit of Christ himself). Nor does the special love with which God follows them permit them to fall into hostile hatred (which is joined with the purpose of damnation), although it does not hinder God's paternal indignation against his rebellious children (that he may call them away from their sins).

XXIV. The election to salvation differs from that to the apostleship: the former is irrevocable, but not the latter. Judas, the betrayer of Christ, is said to be elected to the apostleship (Jn. 6:70). Nor is the particle *ei mē* (Jn. 17:12, where it is said that no one of those who were given to Christ has perished, but "the son of perdition") exceptive, but adversative (as often elsewhere). Not that Judas is excepted from those who were given to Christ and have not perished, but that he is opposed to them. Thus it may be evident that he was not given to Christ because he perished as the son of perdition, i.e., already devoted to destruction beforehand.

XXV. One "grafting into the olive tree" is of external calling by profession, another of internal communion by saving faith. From the former, the Jews, who were considered the people of God, could be cut off (Rom. 11:23), but not from the latter (which is peculiar to the elect and is immutable). The other arguments which are adduced for the apostasy of the saints will be noticed in the topic on perseverance.

THIRTEENTH QUESTION

Can the believer be certain of his own election with a certainty not only conjectural and moral, but infallible and of faith? We affirm against the papists and Remonstrants.

I. The objective certainty of election being proved, we must speak of the subjective, which the papists and Arminians equally impugn. Truly, the full discussion of it belongs to the topics of justification and perseverance. Yet because this question is also agitated by the adversaries about the doctrine of election, we must say something concerning it here.

The opinion of papists.

II. The opinion of papists cannot be more certainly gathered than from the decree of the Council of Trent which denies "that anyone can know with the certainty of faith, not admitting anything false, that he has obtained the grace of God" (Session 6, chap. 9, and canons 13, 14, 15; Schroeder, pp. 35, 44). It denies that it is proper for those who have truly and without any shadow of doubt been justified, to determine with themselves that they have been justified. And it pronounces a curse "upon him who shall say, that the man renewed and justified is bound by faith to believe that he certainly belongs to the number of those predestinated." However the adversaries are not sufficiently agreed among themselves concerning the meaning of the Synodical decree, some drawing it to the confirmation of certainty (which they hold); others to the condemnation of it (individuals accommodating each sense of the Council to their own changes). Yet it is certain that most (and especially the Jesuits) so interpret it that the believer can indeed (from conjectures and probable signs) hope well concerning his future happiness, yet can conclude nothing certainly, nor know with the certainty of faith.

And of the Arminians.

III. The Arminians deny that there is given any sense of election in this life (except a conditional one) and consider it praiseworthy and useful to doubt whether they will always be what they now are (as the Hague subscribers express themselves). They fear that such a certainty may be to sinners a bed of ease on which they may luxuriously pamper themselves and hug the sweet delusion to their breast. Hence they think that such a certainty is sufficient by which believers may know that they (if they persevere in faith) will remain in the grace of God and obtain eternal life (i.e., a conditional not an absolute certainty and that too, only of the present, not of the future). The source of this error is the false opinion of election which they say will be completed only in the moment of death. Before it is complete, as long as anyone lives, he can fail each moment. Therefore he ought to doubt his election because he cannot be certain whether he will persevere even unto the end.

Statement of the question.

IV. Hence the state of the question is gathered. (1) The question is not, is election perceptible to us *a priori:* "For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counselor?" (Rom. 11:34). Rather election is perceptible only *a posteriori;* not by ascending into heaven that we may inquire into the causes of election and unroll the book of life (which is prohibited); but by descending into ourselves that we may consult the book of conscience and, observing the

fruits of election in ourselves, ascend from the effects to the cause. Moreover, this is not done more certainly than by a practical syllogism, of which the major is read in the word, the minor into the heart. "Whoever truly believes and repents is elected; now I believe, therefore I am elected."

V. (2) The question does not concern an extraordinary revelation—Can anyone be certain extraordinarily of his election and salvation? This the adversaries do not deny with regard to some to whom they hold God has granted this peculiar grace. Rather the question concerns the ordinary and common manner, which is made by the energy (*energeian*) and full conviction (*plērophorian*) of faith. The question does not concern a probable and conjectural certainty, which may be deceptive (such as they acknowledge); but concerns the certainty of faith. It does not concern the certainty of another's election and salvation (which can be gathered only from the judgment of charity), but concerns the certainty of one's own election.

VI. (3) The question does not concern the certainty of every kind (which excludes all fear of the contrary and always remains in the same degree—such as will be that of the saints in heaven who will be exposed to no more temptations). For we acknowledge that this certainty (with respect to our innate weakness) is often shaken and fluctuates. This is especially true in the first beginnings of calling or in suffering and trials; yea, is even suppressed for a time (as in the paroxysms of temptation when the consolation of the believer is sometimes so intercepted, and the light of the divine countenance so hidden that in the agony of his mind the believer may complain with David that he is cut off from before God's eyes, Ps. 31:22). Rather the question concerns such a certainty as goes forth sometimes into act, so that there is no believer who sometime before his death is not impressed with this persuasion for his consolation.

VII. (4) The question is not Can that certainty go forth into act in every state of man, even without the desire of holiness and the use of means? As if a man persevering in sin, can and ought to persuade himself that he is elected to eternal life and will certainly be saved (which we contend is most absurd [*asystata*]). He would deceive himself with a vain and most false hope who would think so. Rather the question is Can the believer, while he is in the way of holiness and uses the means appointed by God, have this persuasion? For God has given the promises only to those who walk in that way. There (i.e., in that way) are to be found the true tokens (*gnōrismata*) and indubitable criteria (*kritēria*) of election and justification.

VIII. Therefore the question is reduced to this: Can the adult believer be certain (not as to a continuous and uninterrupted act, but as to the foundation and habit that can never be lost) not only of his present, but also of his future state? Or should he (not from a consideration of his own worthiness, but of the divine esteem and powerful custody) elicit an act of certainty, not only probable and conjectural (which allows of deception), but of true faith concerning his election and salvation. The adversaries deny this; we affirm it.

The elect can be certain of their salvation.

IX. The reasons are: (1) believers can know that they are sons of God and believe; therefore, they can know that they are elected because adoption and faith are the infallible effects and fruits of election. They can know that they are sons of God not only from the filial love by which they are prompted to invoke him as Father, but also from the testimony of the Spirit who witnesses that they are sons of God (Rom. 8:15, 16). They can

know that they believe from the nature of faith (which not only by a direct act is carried into the thing promised, but also by a reflex act into a proper apprehension). Otherwise if believers could not know that they believed, the apostles could not say, "We believe and are sure" (Jn. 6:69). And the father of the lunatic: "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief" (Mk. 9:24); "We do know that we know him" (1 Jn. 2:3). Nor could Paul say, "I know whom I have believed" (2 Tim. 1:12) and exhort others "to examine themselves, whether they were in the faith" (2 Cor. 13:5), unless this could be known. Hence Augustine says, "Whoever has it, may see his own faith in his heart, and hold it with the most certain knowledge and the conviction of conscience" (*The Trinity* 13.1 [FC 45:371; PL 42.1014]). Nor does it hinder that various persons can deceive themselves with a vain hope and by a rash presumption glory in the faith which nevertheless they do not possess. The vain boasting of hypocrites does not take away the true confidence of believers. If they who are destitute of that Spirit do not know him, it is not properly inferred that they who do possess it are ignorant of it and cannot discern it by its criteria (*kritēriois*). I confess that those marks do not always have an equal degree of clearness or certainty, but on that account they are not to be reckoned fallacious and merely conjectural. For as certainly as he who lives knows that he lives from the vital actions which he clearly perceives in himself, so he who lives by the spiritual life of the sons of God can know that he lives by the Spirit which works in him.

X. Second, the same thing is gathered from the inscription of God himself. As from eternity, he inscribed the names of the elect in "the book of life"; as, in "the book of the Scriptures," he records the promises of perseverance to confirm our faith: so in "the book of conscience" and in the tables (not stony, but fleshy) of the heart—not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God (2 Cor. 3:3), he copies the transcript (*apographum*) of our election, inscribing grace and the law upon our minds in order to make us certain of the eternity of his love and his perpetual care and protection (Jer. 31:33). And very pertinent here is the "white stone" (*psēphos leukē*) which Christ promises to give to him that overcomes (Rev. 2:17). "In it a new name shall be written, which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it." For whether allusion is made to ancient trials in which acquittal was usually made by a white stone and condemnation by a black (whence the former was called *psēphos sōzousa* [the saving stone], the latter *psēphos anairousa* [the condemning stone]), in order to denote the full justification of the believer; or to the public assemblies in which magistrates were created by voters, the names of the chosen being written in square bits of stone or white stones (whence the voting was called *psēphophoria*) in which sense is indicated the high dignity of the sons of God who are made kings and priests unto God (Rev. 1:6); or to the contests and gymnastic games in which a white stone was the symbol of victory, and thus the triumph of faith, and the happiness of believers would be designated—it is certain that "the new name" (which it is said will be written in that stone) is no other than the name of "the sons of God" (which although unknown to others, God willed to be known to the one receiving it). But this could not be said at all if neither election nor adoption could be known to any believer. I confess, indeed that this promise will be perfectly fulfilled only in heaven when our race is finished and happiness consummated; but this hinders not its commencement here for the consolation of believers, when over-

coming they perceive already the first fruits (*hypernikōntes*) of the heavenly reward (*brabeiou*).

XI. Third, it is confirmed by the testimony and "sealing of the Holy Spirit," which not only testifies that we are the sons of God (Rom. 8:16), but also "seals us unto the day of redemption" (Eph. 4:30). But how could he either testify truly that we are the sons of God and heirs of the kingdom of heaven or seal us unto the day of redemption, if we had no evidence of it and if his testimony might be false and his sealing deceptive? But the contrary proves itself by the word "seal," which designates an immovable, certain thing, even as those are called inviolable which are sealed with the foremost seal. Hence the fathers call that seal indissoluble (*akatalyton*). If the Devil sometimes transforms himself into an angel of light, it does not follow that the testimony or the seal of the Spirit is fallacious and uncertain; or that the believer (who seriously attends to it) can always be deceived so as never to be persuaded of its truth. For such is the sweetness and power of that operation, so wonderful the splendor of that divine light and so invincible the efficacy of faith to captivate the heart unto obedience, so inexpressible the joy and consolation, diffused over the conscience that believers must know it and by indubitable argument can distinguish themselves from the rash boastings of the wicked. "Hereby we know," says John, "that we dwell in him, and he in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us" (1 Jn. 3:24).

XII. Nor does that have another bearing which Paul says: "We have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God" (1 Cor. 2:12). That is, it is not sufficient for God (on account of his own glory and our salvation) to bestow blessings upon us, unless he impresses upon our minds a sense and knowledge of them so that we can return thanks for and enjoy them with pleasure and rejoicing. Nor can we say with Becanus that the apostle speaks of the gifts of glory which he prepared for us from eternity, not of the gifts of grace (of which we treat). Paul speaks of both and we dispute concerning both. If certainty is given by the Spirit of the gifts of glory (which are future), how much more will he give it of the gifts of grace, which are present? If the latter are said not to have entered into the heart of man with respect to natural knowledge, it does not immediately follow that they cannot be perceived by the believer's heart by supernatural revelation.

XIII. Fourth, the practice and example of the saints (who were certain of their own election and salvation) teaches that certainty is not only possible, but necessary. It is evident: in Abraham, the father of the faithful—"who against hope believed in hope . . . being not weak in faith . . . [but] being fully persuaded (*plērophorētheis*), that what he had promised, he was able also to perform" (Rom. 4:18, 19, 21*); in David, who was perfectly certain that he would not be moved (Ps. 16:8), but that goodness and mercy would follow him all the days of his life (Ps. 23:6) and that he never would be ashamed (Ps. 31:1); in Paul, who expressly testifies that he was persuaded nothing could separate him from the love of God—*pepeismai* ("I am persuaded"), says he, "that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities shall be able to separate me from the love of God which is in Christ" (Rom. 8:38, 39*). Now what could be the foundation of such exultation except the certainty of the election and adoption of believers? On account of this, it happens that they overcome (*hypernikōsi*) in all things and can securely triumph over all their enemies (Rom. 8:31-33). Nor is any extraordinary revelation

to be maintained here as if by a peculiar privilege this was granted of God to some and not to others. For the faith of Abraham is set forth as an example to others (Rom. 4:23, 24*). Paul seeks his own assurance, not from a special revelation, but from general foundations and motives (viz., God's eternal election, Christ's death and intercession, the immutable love of God). Since these are common to all believers, it is evident that they, no less than Paul, can and ought to elicit that fiducial act of certainty.

XIV. Fifth, the effects of faith demand this certainty: effects such as confidence (*pepoithēsis*, Eph. 3:12); full assurance (*plērophoria*, Heb. 10:22); boasting (*kauchēsis*, Rom. 5:2); unspeakable joy (*chara aneklalētos*, 1 Pet. 1:8) which cannot be taken from us (Jn. 16:22). For how could we either have assurance and a full persuasion (by which we could approach with confidence to the throne of grace) or have peace with God and a hope which maketh not ashamed or boast and exult with unspeakable and glorious joy, if our consciences could be agitated by perpetual fear and doubts and we could gain only a conjectural and uncertain opinion concerning the love of God and our salvation?

Sources of solution.

XV. The certainty of God's grace cannot be gathered from the external state (whether prosperous or adverse—in which sense the wise man says, "No man knoweth either love or hatred" [Ecc. 9:1], i.e., cannot know from external events which happen equally to the good and bad whether he is in the favor or under the displeasure of God) because *hkhl lphnyhm* is immediately added, i.e., not as the Vulgate wrongly translates it, "all future things are kept uncertain," but "all things are before their face" (as Arias Montanus, *Biblia sacra Hebraice, Chaldaice, Graece et Latine* [1572], 3:647 on Ecc. 9:1) or "all things at their faces," i.e., evil and good happen alike to all. It does not follow that faith cannot have certainty undoubtedly from the word of God and the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Nor can a total and absolute uncertainty be pressed here as much with respect to the pious as the wicked. For the wicked can and ought to know that they deserve hatred while they continue in their sins: and believers can know from faith and piety that they are the sons of God and consequently in his favor and love.

XVI. A thing may be uncertain with regard to our indisposition and unworthiness which, however, may be certain with regard to the faith of a renewed heart (which depends not upon its own virtue, but upon the immutability of election and the infallibility of God promising). We are uncertain on our part, but certain on the part of God. Our assurance does not consist in the affection of our disposition, but in the infallible effect of divine grace.

XVII. The "fear and trembling" recommended in the Scripture (Prov. 28:14; Phil. 2:12; 1 Pet. 1:17) strike a blow only at carnal security, but do not overthrow the certainty of election and justification. They mark anxiety about the means by which they arrive at the end, not hesitancy about the end and event (which is founded upon God's decree). The fear is not slavish (of distrust and of despair), which casts out love (1 Jn. 4:18) and is opposed to confidence; but filial (of humility, reverence and pious solicitude), which perfectly consists with confidence (Ps. 2:11; Phil. 2:12), but destroys rash and carnal presumption.

XVIII. Although the sense of the divine love may for a time slumber and be suppressed in the sons of God (as to the second act, whether in evils of fault or of

punishment, so that they may be disturbed with various doubts), yet it is never shaken off as to the first act. At length they certainly struggle out from those trials by the grace of an electing and supporting God, by which it comes to pass that God restores unto them the joy of his salvation and makes the broken bones rejoice (Ps. 51:8, 12). For as God is faithful, he wishes indeed to try believers, but does not wish them to be overcome. He suffers them to slip, but does not permit them to be overthrown. If he judges it expedient for them to be sometimes pressed, still he never wishes them to be oppressed, but sustains and lifts up those that slip (2 Cor. 4:8, 9).

XIX. Although the certainty of salvation (which arises from the reflex act of faith and experimental knowledge) is not founded immediately upon the word of God (saying that I believe and repent), yet it does not cease to be built upon it immediately (inasmuch as it describes the nature, properties and effects of true faith and repentance from which we can easily gather the verity of our own faith and repentance). Hence no less is it to be held the certainty of divine faith which does not depend on the uncertain and doubtful principle of human reason, but on the divine and infallible testimony of the word and Spirit (whose works, faith and repentance, as they are produced in us, so they may be seen and known by his operation).

XX. That the believer may know what God has from eternity decreed concerning him or what he may expect from him in eternity, he ought not rashly to rush into the secret things of God. But from the knowledge of his present state, he can easily gather both the past and the future. For since grace is the connecting link between election and glorification (as the necessary fruit of the former and the infallible means to the latter), let each one know that he is in the grace of God. But everyone knows it who believes and has repented. He can also certainly determine that he is elected by God and will infallibly at last be glorified by him. Thus the certainty of salvation, including three things—the certainty of past election, of present grace and of future glory—can be derived from no other source than the sense of present grace.

XXI. Although in truth the certainty of present grace supposes on our part a fulfillment of the conditions prescribed to us by God (viz., of faith and repentance), it must not on that account be considered impossible. Although the compliance with such conditions is, on our part, uncertain, yet it is not so on the part of God who has promised to give to us these very conditions. Although we cannot be certain of a perfect and absolute fulfillment, yet we can (with the help of the Holy Spirit) be persuaded of a fulfillment true, sincere and without hypocrisy. Otherwise the apostles could not profess that they believed (Jn. 6:69); nor could the eunuch answer Philip, "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God" (Acts 8:37).

XXII. So far is the doctrine of the certainty of grace from being the mother of security and the midwife of licentiousness, that there is no greater incentive to true piety than a vivid sense of the love of God and of his benefits. This so powerfully lays hold of and inflames the mind that it is all on fire with a reciprocal love of him from whom it receives so great favors and has been so highly preferred over others left in the common mass of perdition.

XXIII. The state of the believer is twofold: one of wrestling or victory; either while he fights and contends hand to hand with the enemy or while he triumphs over the prostrate foe. Thus faith, and the certainty arising from it, differs in

each. In the former it is weak; in the latter it is strong. In the first, it fears and hesitates; in the second, it confides and rejoices. In the first, it utters groans and sighs from a sense of God's anger and the burden of sins; in the other, it experiences inexpressible joy from the sweetness of redeeming grace. Therefore although the believer in the struggle cannot elicit an act of certainty, this does not hinder him (when the temptation has been overcome and his strength renewed by grace) from coming out stronger and more confirmed.

XXIV. The examples of the saints who have doubted the love of God towards them prove indeed that the act of certainty is not perpetual in them, but is in different ways interrupted. But this does not prove that it is always absent from them and that they cannot in any state elicit it. Yea, the very ones who in terror doubt (while pressed by heavy temptation), elsewhere exult and rejoice in security. The same David who in an aberration of mind complains that he is forsaken of God (Ps. 22:1) and cut off from before his eyes (Ps. 31:22), elsewhere full of faith and joy persuades himself that he will not be confounded and that nothing will hurt him though he should walk through the valley of the shadow of death because God is always with him (Ps. 23:4; Ps. 118:5). The same Paul who complains that he is carnal and sold under sin and deplores his misery ("O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Rom. 7:24), a little after gives thanks to God as if for a victory achieved (Rom. 7:25) and securely scoffs at all his enemies ("who shall separate us from the love of Christ?" Rom 8:35).

XXV. Since the actual certainty of believers cannot go out into act without the use of means, in vain would it be sought with the continued purpose of sinning and in the grievous lapses of the saints. For so far from being certain in that state that they are in the favor of God, they ought on the contrary to feel assured that they are under the heaviest guilt and in a state of damnation (in which most certain destruction hangs over them unless by repentance they return to themselves).

XXVI. Therefore this saving doctrine must be proposed with great caution: for the relief of afflicted consciences, not to foster the security of the wicked; to be a remedy against despair, not a bed of carnal license. Thus this certainty should never be urged without immediately adjoining the desire after sanctification as the necessary condition of obtaining it.

XXVII. Although this certainty is necessary to the consolation of the believer, still for the verity of faith itself there is no need of its explicit act every moment; nor must he be said to be without faith who is not as yet confirmed in this certainty. If he sometimes is without that sense of it, he is not immediately to reckon himself among the reprobate and to doubt concerning the divine mercy. Rather he should seek and implore it most earnestly from God and (on his part) is bound to use all efforts in order to excite and root it deeper and deeper in himself by the practice of faith and good works. Therefore a man ought not to wait until the very last breath of life in order to pronounce that he is certainly elected (as the adversaries wish). For then he is not considered anymore as to be elected, but as to be introduced into life eternal; nor could the consideration of election be of any use to the believer, if only in the end of life he could be assured of it. Rather he must labor with all his strength to obtain for his solace a more vivid sense of it every day in the advance of sanctification. But we will speak more fully of these things when we treat the certainty of salvation.

Fourteenth Question: Reprobation
Is the decree of reprobation absolute, depending upon the good pleasure (eudokia) *of God alone; or is sin its proper cause? We distinguish.*

I. The doctrine of election having been set forth, we must come to reprobation. Reprobation is taken here not in its whole extent for any purpose of removing either some persons or things either from certain offices and benefits or from certain uses; in this sense the Scripture speaks of "reprobate silver" (Jer. 6:30) and of Christ, the chosen stone, impiously set at nought by the Pharisees and priests and other builders (Acts 4:11; 1 Pet. 2:7). It is not taken for the execution of reprobation or the very act of reprobating (which is made in time), but for the decree itself, sanctioned from eternity and described as the eternal, unchangeable and most free purpose of God by which he decreed not to pity some certain men lying in exactly equal corruption and guilt with others, but to damn eternally those left in sin (on account of it) in order to demonstrate his glorious justice, liberty and power.

II. It is hardly worthwhile to inquire whether reprobation may be granted. There have been those who, under the pretext of extolling the mercy of God, have taken upon themselves to deny it (as Samuel Huberus who, in a former age, did not hesitate to assert the universal election to salvation in Christ of all men irrespective of their belief). Nevertheless not only does election (opposed to it) necessarily prove reprobation (because the election of some cannot be said without the preterition of others) and the damnation of the wicked (which takes place in time) supposes it (unless we wish God to take counsel in time after the deed is done), but the Scripture so clearly establishes it that no one (but of blind audacity), I do not say can deny it, but cannot even doubt it.

III. What is said of God's love towards Jacob and hatred towards Esau applies here: "Was not Esau Jacob's brother? saith the Lord: yet I loved Jacob, and I hated Esau" (Mal. 1:2, 3). This is applied by Paul to election and reprobation (Rom. 9:11-13*). Compare also the passages concerning God having mercy and hardening —"He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth" (Rom. 9:18); concerning "the vessels of mercy" which God had prepared unto glory and "the vessels of wrath" which were fitted to destruction (Rom. 9:21, 22); concerning those who were appointed to salvation and others who were appointed unto wrath and disobedience (*apeitheian*, 1 Thess. 5:9; 1 Pet. 2:8); who are inscribed in the Lamb's book of life (Rev. 13:8); and others "who were ordained to condemnation" (Jd. 4); concerning the blessed, called by God to the possession of their kingdom, and the cursed whom (as he never knew) he thrusts far away from his face (Mt. 7:23; 25:41). Nor, moreover, is thus endangered either the goodness or the infinite mercy of God, who is so good and merciful that he is also perfectly just. As he demonstrates the former towards the elect, so he justly exercises the latter towards guilty and sinful reprobates.

The double act of reprobation, positive and negative.

IV. In order to better understand the nature of reprobation and the state of the proposed question, certain distinctions must be premised. First, before all things, the twofold act of reprobation must be distinguished. Although on the part of God, it is performed by one most simple act, yet according to our inadequate mode of conception (for the readier understanding of the matter), it is usually divided by theologians into

two. The former is called negative; the latter, affirmative or positive. The former refers to preterition; the latter to predamnation. Although each in its own sense is positive on the part of God (as denoting an act of the divine will by which he not only does not will to free them, but wills to leave them in their guilt and misery), yet the former is rightly called negative (with respect to the terms which are not to pity and not to give grace) because it consists in the denying of grace. However the other is positive because it affirms something positive (viz., judgment and punishment) concerning them.

V. Nevertheless this distinction is not a division either of the genus into its species or of the whole into its parts or of the subject into its accidents, but a distinction of one formal act with respect to the various terms and objects which stand in affirmation and negation (*arsei kai thesei*). This distinction is founded upon the Scripture itself inasmuch as it sometimes speaks of reprobation negatively, making it to consist in the preterition of some, in the destination both of grace (Mt. 11:25; 13:11) and of glory (Mt. 7:23; Rev. 20:15); at other times positively, in the destination to greater hardening (Jn. 12:39, 40; Rom. 9:18) and to damnation (Rom. 9:11, 12; Jd. 4).

The negative act includes preterition and desertion.

VI. The negative act includes two: both preterition, by which in the election of some to glory as well as to grace, he neglected and slighted others (which is evident from the event of election); and negative desertion, by which he left them in the corrupt mass and in their misery. However this is so to be understood: (1) that they are not excepted from the laws of common providence, but remain subject to them; nor are they immediately deprived of all God's favor, but only of the saving and vivifying (which is the fruit of election); (2) that actual sins of all kinds follow that preterition and desertion; not indeed from the nature of preterition and desertion itself and the force of the denied grace itself, but from the nature of the corrupt free will and the force of corruption in it (as he who does not cure the disease of a sick man is not the cause per se of the disease, nor of the results flowing from it; so sins are the consequents, rather than the effects of reprobation; necessarily bringing about the futurition of the event, but yet not infusing or producing the wickedness; not by removing what is present, but by not supplying what would sustain). If the sun does not illuminate the earth, it is not the accidental cause of darkness. Can God abandoning man and not removing his corruption, be straightway called the accidental cause of his sin? For darkness follows by necessity of nature the non-illumination of the sun, but sins voluntarily follow the denial of grace.

VII. Although God by that desertion denies to man that without which sin cannot be avoided, the causality of sin cannot on that account be attributed to him. (1) God denies it justly and is not bound to give that grace to anyone. (2) From that negation does not follow the capability of sinning (which man has from himself), but only the non-curing of that incapability. (3) God denies the grace which they are unwilling to accept (or to retain) and which they of their own accord despise, since they desire nothing less than being governed by the Holy Spirit. (4) He does not deny that grace that they may sin, but that they may be punished on account of sin.

The positive act bespeaks a destination to damnation and to hardening.

VIII. The positive act is that by which he determined to visit with deserved punishment the men passed by and left in their state of corruption, who had voluntarily abused the light either of nature or of the gospel (which was supplied to them by common providence). This was called predamnation (or precondemnation). It includes two things: destination to damnation, by which they are "vessels of wrath fitted to destruction" (*orgēs katērtismena eis apōleian*); and destination to intermediate judgments, the principal of which are blinding and hardening, which happens to the utterly lost (*apollymenois*) alone. Hence it is evident that reprobation is more extensive than damnation (although sometimes confounded with it by a synecdoche of the whole) because it is not only a decree of damning, but also a decree of not having mercy, of not giving Christ as Mediator, of not calling effectually, etc.

The twofold relation of God as Lord and as Judge.

IX. Second, we must also accurately distinguish here the twofold relation (*schesis*) of God in this matter, answering to the twofold act of reprobation noticed before. The one is an autocrat (*autokratoros*) and supreme Lord who does with his own what he wills; the other of a Judge who justly determines to inflict the due punishment upon the sinner. The former exerts itself in a negative act (or preterition) in which, as the most free dispenser of his own goods, he denies to one the grace not owed which he bestows upon another. Christ speaks of this (Mt. 11:25, 26; 20:15); and Paul (Rom. 9:11, 18). However the latter exerts itself in a positive act (or predamnation) by which, as a just Judge, he sentences the guilty to punishments due from the order of justice. Mention is made of this in Prov. 16:4; Mt. 25:41; Rom. 9:21, 22; 1 Thess. 5:9. Both demonstrate the majesty and glory of God reprobating and restrain the audacity of the reprobate, since they can neither justly expostulate with God (because he is free and because he is just, or because he uses both these attributes in reference to this or that individual).

Reprobation is considered either absolutely or comparatively.

X. Third, reprobation no less than election is considered either absolutely with respect to one, or comparatively and relatively with respect to many. In the former sense, it can be asked why he reprobated or elected this one; in the latter, why he elected this rather than that one and reprobated this rather than that one. The answers vary according to the diverse act of reprobation and the relation (*schesin*) of the reprobator (as we will see immediately).

XI. When we speak of the absolute decree of reprobation, the question is not whether it is absolute, either from the final cause (for no one can doubt that God in all his decrees and in this most especially proposed to himself the best and most wise end) or from the leading (*proēgoumenē*) and internal cause (by which God is moved from within to acting). For it is certain that the latter also was not wanting in God (the most wise) or from the preceding condition and quality in the object. Since we have proved before the object of predestination to be man considered as fallen, sin ought necessarily to be supposed as the condition in him who is reprobated no less than in him who is elected. Rather the question is whether the decree of reprobation is absolute from a cause properly so called (immediate and external) by which God was influenced out of himself to reprobate man.

XII. The question is not whether reprobation as a positive act or predamnation depends upon the mere good pleasure (*eudokia*) of God. For as it is the act of God, the Judge, decreeing the punishment due to the sinner, the consideration of sin assuredly comes in here. For the will of punishing cannot be granted in God (except of punishing the sinner), nor can the infliction of or destination to punishment be just without criminality. But there is not an equal reason for the negative act or preterition which springs from him as the supreme Lord in virtue of his absolute right. No cause can properly be given of that except his good pleasure (*eudokian*).

XIII. In the meantime, as it is considered absolutely or comparatively, we must answer in different ways regarding it. If considered absolutely, it is rightly ascribed to the natural corruption of man, which makes him justly reprobable. If considered comparatively however, it must be referred solely to the good pleasure of God, electing whom he wills and passing by others according to his most free power. Therefore when it is asked why this or that one was reprobated, the proper answer is that this was done just because, on account of sin, he was worthy of being reprobated. Not that sin is properly the cause of reprobation, otherwise all would have been reprobated who are equally sinners. But because sin is the preceding condition and quality in the object from which the capability of being reprobated arises in man (or the cause *sine qua non*), for if man were not a sinner he would not be reprobated by God (although every sinner is not forthwith reprobated). But when it is asked why he reprobated this rather than that one (while both were equally sinners and therefore deserving reprobation), here sin cannot be alleged because it is common to both, and common things do not make a difference. No cause can be given but the mere good pleasure of God, i.e., because it so pleased him. Paul has this in mind in the examples of Esau and Jacob (Rom. 9:11), who, although equal mutually, still were distinguished from each other by the love and hatred of God. For there was nothing good in Jacob above Esau, on account of which he should be elected in preference to him; nothing in Esau, on account of which he should be reprobated rather than Jacob. Hence this must be ascribed solely to God's good pleasure. Further, here the act of God (as autocrat [*autokratoros*] and supreme Lord) discovers itself. As he is the most free dispenser of his own goods, he can do with his own what he wills—electing this one, passing by that; giving to one grace, denying it to another, without any injustice to either.

XIV. The question, therefore, comes back to this—Is God's eternal decree of reprobation not so much the affirmative as the negative; not so much the absolute as the comparative? Is it independent, not of the consequent means or of the final cause or of the preceding condition or quality, but of the external, immediate cause; and does it depend solely upon the good pleasure (*eudokia*) of God? Or does it always suppose foreseen sin and unbelief as the meritorious cause of the reprobation of one rather than another? The adversaries affirm the latter; we support the former.

XV. As the Arminians suspend the decree of election upon foreseen faith, so they maintain that the decree of reprobation supposes foreseen unbelief. Thus no one is passed over by the mere will of God, but each reprobation of individuals is made according to the consideration of antecedent unbelief and final perseverance in the same. Therefore they hold the object of reprobation to be man

not only as a sinner, but as finally unbelieving and impenitent (as they express themselves in the Synodical Acts; cf. *Acta Synodi Nationalis . . . Dordrechti* [1620], Pt. I, pp. 112-22).

XVI. Although holding the object of reprobation no less than of election to be man as a sinner (as was seen above) so that it was not made without the beholding of sin, yet we deny that foreseen sin or unbelief can be accounted the cause why one rather than another is reprobated. We say that no other quality or condition is presupposed in the passed-by than that which is found in the elect and is common to the whole corrupt mass. So that the sole good pleasure (*eudokia*) of God makes the difference between the elect and reprobate and not any quality, either good or bad, foreseen in them. In this sense, we think the decree of reprobation can properly be called absolute.

The absolute decree of reprobation is proved.

XVII. The reasons are: (1) Reprobation no less than election is made from good pleasure; therefore not from foreseen unbelief, as appears from Rom. 9:18 ("whom he will he hardeneth"). If the will is the cause of the hardening, it is also the cause of the reprobation because the cause of a cause is also the cause of the thing caused. Now hardening is the cause of damnation; therefore that which is the cause of the former is also the cause of the latter. Moreover, Paul proves this: (a) by the example of the twins, one of whom was elected, the other reprobated, before they had done anything good or bad (Rom. 9:11); therefore the cause arises from the sole good pleasure of God (either calling or rejecting) and not from works; (b) by the similitude of the potter; for if the potter has this power over the clay that he can from the same mass form a vessel unto honor or dishonor, why cannot God have so great a power over his creatures as to be able to reprobate one and elect another? The reason for the difference is added; for the power of the potter over the clay although great, is yet finite and limited, while the power of God over men is infinite. Finally, man is the creature of God, but the mass is not the creature of the potter. Hence a stronger argument arises—if the potter has so great a power over the clay (which is not his work), why should God not have a greater power over man, his creature?

XVIII. Nor does it avail to make this exception, that the decree does really precede all conditions performed, but not foreknown; all works, but not the foresight of works. For the very words of Paul preclude this retreat (*krēsphygeton*) of Pelagians (as Augustine teaches at large, Letter 194, "To Sixtus" [FC 30:301-32), which adduces no other reason of the difference made between these two equal brothers than the purpose according to election (*prothesin kat' eklogēn*) (which thence is asserted to be only from him that calls and not from works—either performed or foreseen—because infants can be reprobated, whose works [as never having been performed] cannot be foreseen). And this is further confirmed by those words which, in the person of the Jews, the apostle immediately objects to himself; to wit, if only the purpose of God makes the difference between equals, there might seem to be injustice with God (Rom. 9:14). What then does Paul say? Does he here have recourse to faith or unbelief to render the cause of that discrimination (which would at once stop the mouth of the Jews)? Rather he rises to the good pleasure of God alone. "Let it not be," he says. God shall answer for himself and assert his own most free power (Ex. 33:19). "I will have mercy on

whom I will have mercy" (Rom. 9:15). Hence he infers, "It is not, then, of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy" (v. 16). And lest someone should say this makes election absolute (but not reprobation), he immediately adds, "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth" (v. 18).

XIX. To no purpose is it also added that "the oracle concerning loving Jacob and hating Esau cannot be referred to any absolute election or rejection from salvation, but to the bestowal or negation of the external prerogative of primogeniture and the promise of the land of Canaan annexed to it; that it must be understood not so much concerning the persons themselves as of their posterity" (as it is set forth in Mal. 1:2). "Otherwise all the posterity of Jacob would be elected and all the posterity of Esau reprobated." The answer is although that announcement may be extended to the posterity also (Gen. 25:23; Mal. 1:3) and, in the historical sense, may be referred to the blessing or external appointment to dominion or servitude, still this does not hinder it from being referred (in the mystical sense) properly to election and reprobation with respect to the fathers themselves (who are not excluded here but included and meant primarily by the Holy Spirit). Paul, inspired of God (*theopneustos*), clearly understanding this, applies it appropriately to his design (viz., to teach that the promise made to Abraham was not cut off although the greater part of the Jews would be rejected; for they were not all his genuine sons, but some "sons of the flesh" [to whom the promise had no reference], others "sons of the promise" [in whom it was ratified], which he declares by the twin example of Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau; also because in this there was the highest parity between the brothers from one father and mother [and the result of one conception], he sets forth the cause of the difference between them, not in the foreseen good or evil works of each, but in God's purpose alone, loving and electing the one, but displeased with and rejecting the other). Hence it does not follow that the same is true of all their posterity, as if either all Jacob's posterity ought to be elected or all Esau's reprobated. For there is not an equal reason of those things which are enunciated in the Scripture historically and those which are enunciated mystically. Thus Esau neither went under nor shook off the yoke of slavery historically, but he did mystically go under it and never shook it off, that the purpose of God might stand firm.

XX. Second, temporal reprobation (a transient act beyond God) is from his sole good pleasure (therefore all the more eternal)—an immanent act in God. This is evident from Mt. 11:26* where Christ refers the cause of the revelation and concealment of mysteries to good pleasure (*eudokian*) alone: "even so, Father, for as it seemed good in thy sight." Nor can it be said that this pertains to the event only, not to the counsel of God. For the words themselves are too clear to be eluded by such sophistry. Nor can it be said that they are revealed unto "babes" (i.e., to those who are docile, well disposed and humble) and hid from the "wise" (i.e., who with a puffed up opinion of their own wisdom by their obstinacy have become unteachable and incurable). It is gratuitously supposed that "babes" here mean the humble and well disposed: (a) because grace makes men humble, does not find them so; (b) the beginning and not the increase of faith is here treated of; (c) it would not be strange for God to reveal himself to the docile rather than to the proud (the reason of which is evident); nor would there have been any necessity for recurrence to the good pleasure (*eudokian*) of

God. Meanwhile, as temporal reprobation is placed either in preterition and the negation of grace granted to others (or in the withdrawal of the grace offered, but rejected and despised), so it can properly be said to be made on account of sin because it is an act of justice with him punishing, but that (of which we here treat) is the act of a Lord doing with his own what he wills.

XXI. Third, since unbelief is a consequence of reprobation, it cannot precede it. "Ye therefore hear not, because ye are not of God," said Christ to the Pharisees (Jn. 8:47). "Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep" (Jn. 10:26), i.e., ye are not of the number of the elect. "Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said, he hath blinded their eyes" (Jn. 12:39, 40). Hence Peter says, "the reprobate were appointed unto disobedience" (1 Pet. 2:8). Nor is the exception of any weight that in Jn. 8:47 and 10:26 nothing is said concerning reprobation, but it is only taught that they who are not docile and desirous of learning (but actuated by contrary affections and vices, against all right reason) cannot hear the word of Christ or believe him (which is the cause why they are not of God, but of the Devil). For besides the fact that it is falsely supposed that there can be granted in man any disposition to faith before he believes, the declaration of Christ would thus be inverted. He does not say they are not of God and sheep of Christ because they do not believe, but they do not believe because they are not Christ's sheep and of God (to wit, because they were passed over by God in the election of those given to Christ that they might be his sheep). They also falsely maintain that in Jn. 12:39 nothing else is indicated than that the people deserved to be left in their blindness and deadness and that this act was penal (on account of preceding sins, not from the sole good pleasure). The answer is that whatever the condition of the people, it always remains true that their contumacy followed their blinding and so was not antecedent to their reprobation. Finally, as to 1 Pet. 2:8, they falsely maintain that they are said to be appointed unto the punishment of disobedience (*apeitheian*) and not unto disobedience itself because otherwise it would cease to be disobedience as that could not be an act of divine destination. For the words themselves prove the contrary: "who stumble at the word, being disobedient: whereunto also they were appointed" (*apeithountes, eis ho kai etethēsan*) undoubtedly by God and by his judgment (as the Scripture elsewhere testifies, 1 Thess. 5:9; Jd. 4). Not that he infused unbelief into them, but because he had determined not to give them faith and to make them more blind and rebellious against the gospel and at length to damn them forever. Hence the disobedience (*apeitheia*) does not cease to be such because the appointing unto it (made by the decree of God) is not made for the effecting of it, but for the desertion of man in it and for the aggravation of it by a just judgment.

XXII. Fourth, if reprobation were made from foreseen unbelief, it would not be an inscrutable mystery, nor would the apostle have been bound to ascend to the secret, unsearchable (*anexereunēton*) judgment of God in order to stop the mouth of man in the objections (which the flesh usually urges here) if so easy an answer were at hand (drawn from men themselves and their unbelief). Since he does not even once (Rom. 9:14; 11:33, 34; Dt. 29:29), by that very fact he testifies that no other cause of that discrimination was recognized by him than the sole good pleasure of God.

Sources of solution.

XXIII. Although this sacred doctrine is usually impiously traduced as harsh and cruel and consequently hostile to all consolation, piety and religion by the adversaries (who, having taken up the cause of the reprobate against God, are accustomed with dreadful blasphemy to accuse him of injustice, simulation, cruelty and respect of persons), yet it is easy to free God from these most false criminations of men and to bridle restless and insane human reason.

XXIV. The absolute decree of reprobation being laid down, the justice of God does not labor either in destining man to death (because he condemns no one but the sinner) or in giving unequal things to equals—electing some and passing by others. For then he acts not as Judge, but as Lord (who can without injury to anyone give unequal things to equals, when it is concerned with a thing not due, such as grace). Thus the elect indeed have that for which they may give thanks to God (i.e., the bestowal of grace, which they have not merited), but the reprobate cannot complain because God was not bound to bless anyone, nor had he pledged himself by any promise to bestow upon the reprobate the same grace which is given to the elect; and because, if they examine themselves, they will discover in their own sin the most just foundation both of their preterition and punishment.

XXV. His truthfulness does not suffer, while he calls to salvation those whom he has nevertheless excluded from salvation by an absolute decree. For that external calling does not declare any volition or intention on God's part by which he wills to save them, but only the proposition of duty and the declaration of the mode or means through which salvation is attainable (with the promise of it to those who may have the prescribed condition). Therefore as the offer of salvation made to them is not absolute but conditional, God cannot be said to deal insincerely with them when he calls them (although he had decreed from eternity to pass by and condemn them). Truly if he would point out to them in the gospel any other way of salvation than that which leads to salvation or if he would exclude from salvation on account of the decree of reprobation those who believe and repent from the heart, it might be said that he treated them with insincerity. But here there can be no hypocrisy either with respect to God (because he sincerely shows the only and infallible way to salvation, seriously exhorts them to follow it and promises most truly salvation to all those who will walk in it—viz., to believers and penitents) or as to men (because the offer is not made to them absolutely, but under a condition which they voluntarily and by their own fault despise).

XXVI. This philanthropy (*philanthrōpia*) and mercy does not suffer because he decreed to leave the greater part of men in their sin and to condemn them on account of it. Although it is the highest, it ought not on that account to be universal to the salvation of all. Yea, as it is free and undeserved, God can exercise at pleasure or not exercise it towards the sinful creature. Nor is he bound to pour it out upon all. As he willed to manifest it in the election of some, so he determined to declare his justice in the reprobation of others.

XXVII. His holiness does not suffer, as if the causality of sin might be ascribed to him because the necessity of sinning is connected with the denial of grace, and the decree of hardening seems to predestinate men to sin. For besides the fact that God does not make sin in the reprobate man (but finds or foresees it as

about to be from his permission), the necessity of sinning (which follows reprobation) cannot fix the causality of sin upon God: both because it is voluntary in the sinner and drawn upon (*epispastos*) himself and because it follows upon reprobation (as the consequence only and not as the effect). An effect presupposes a cause, but a consequence only an antecedent. Moreover between the antecedent and the consequence causality does not intervene. As the sun cannot be called the cause of darkness because darkness follows upon its absence, so sin succeeds reprobation, but is not caused by reprobation. "Nor is it a consequence" (as Augustine formerly well remarked in his book *de artic. falso impositis*, ad artic. 15+) "that God takes away repentance from those to whom he does not give it and destroys those whom he does not help." From this you can properly infer only that man necessarily goes to destruction, unless God supports him; but not (by any means) that God sins because he does not give to man what he is not bound to give. Although God can be said to have predestinated men to hardening as a punishment (in which sense the disobedient are said to be appointed unto disobedience [*eis apeitheian*, 1 Pet. 2:8] and the wicked ordained to condemnation, Jd. 4), it does not follow that he predestinated them to it as it is sin (*anomia*); and if anyone should affirm it, we would not hesitate to anathematize such a person with the Council of Orange (cf. Hefele, 4:165). Nor is it necessary that he should destine to the means in the same manner as to the end. For according to the nature of means, he is differently occupied about them in their destination—either that he may effect some things or only permit and direct others. In this sense, he can be said to predestinate to sin and hardening not effectively, but permissively and directively (inasmuch as he decreed to permit and rightly order it).

XXVIII. He who punishes or decrees to punish anyone for not doing that which he could not in any way do (either by an unjust abstraction of power or by the obstacle of external actions, the inclination to it nevertheless remaining) can be said to act unjustly. But far be it from us to maintain any such thing in God. We say that God punishes in time (and determined from eternity to punish sinners) because they did not that which they ought to have done and also could in the beginning have done, but afterwards (by their own fault) they neither could anymore nor did wish to do. If God deserts man in the guilt which he contracted by his own vice and denies the grace necessary to his restoration, he cannot be accused of unrighteousness. For since he is Lord (of most free power), he is not bound by law to restore the power to do what he ought to him who lost that power by his own will. Thus he can most justly always demand from man what he ought to do and, on account of its omission, punish him (although he has lost the power to perform it), since it is just as much a debt after the loss of power as a debt of money after the destruction of property.

XXIX. Since respect-of-persons (*prosōpolēpsia*) properly belongs to a judge who, neglecting the legitimate foundation of right, regards in judgment the external qualities or conditions which have nothing to do with the cause; falsely is God in predestination accused of partiality (*prosōpolēptēs*), in electing one above another. For he does not act then as a Judge, but as a Lord and prince, who can give to this one and deny to that one unmerited grace without injury to either (because he can do with his own what he pleases and has no respect to the condition in destining salvation). Augustine explains this well: "That supposes they believe God to be an accepter of persons; if they believe that without any preceding

merit, he has mercy on whom he will and calls those whom he makes worthy, they too little consider that due punishment is rendered to the condemned, undeserved grace to the freed, so that neither the former can complain of his unworthiness, nor the latter glory in his worthiness; and the rather no respect of persons is made there, where one and the same mass of damnation and offence involves them, so that the one freed may learn of the not freed, that punishment would have visited him also, unless grace had intervened. However if grace, then assuredly it is due to no merit, but bestowed by gratuitous goodness. But it is unjust, say they, to free this and to punish that one in one and the same evil cause; certainly, therefore, it is just that both should be punished. Who will deny this? Let us, therefore, give thanks to the Savior, while we do not see rendered to us that which in the damnation of those like us we recognize as due to us also" (Letter 194, "To Sixtus" [FC 30:303; PL 33.875]). And afterwards: "Why he should free or not free this rather than that one? Let him who can search so great a depth to his judgments; nevertheless let him take care of the precipice; for is there unrighteousness with God? Let it not be!" (ibid., pp. 316-17; PL 33.882).

XXX. Although God is said to will the salvation of all (1 Tim. 2:4) and not to delight in the death of the sinner (Ezk. 18:23), it does not on that account follow that he has reprobated no one because the same Scripture elsewhere testifies that God does not have mercy upon some and ordains them to condemnation. It is one thing, therefore, to will the salvation of men by the will *euarestias* (i.e., to be pleased with it); another to will it by the will *eudokias* (i.e., to intend it). One thing to will the salvation of all indiscriminately; another to will the salvation of all and everyone universally. The latter is incompatible (*asystaton*) with reprobation, but not the former.

XXXI. Since God wills no one in this life to be assured of his reprobation (but can call to himself at the last hour even the most abandoned sinners), the doctrine of reprobation properly understood cannot drive men to desperation. It ought rather to excite them to watchfulness and solicitude that (knowing the severity of God) they may not be exalted with pride (but fear), and departing from the road of sin (which would lead them to this precipice) may walk constantly in the path of holiness. As the fruit of election, the latter will conduct them infallibly to life.

XXXII. Although no one will be damned except for sin, it does not follow equally that no one will be reprobated except on that account because reprobation has a wider extension than damnation. Nor is it only an act of justice in predamnation which is really made from a beholding of sin, but also an act of lordship in preterition (considered comparatively) which proceeds from the most free power of God and cannot have a habit (*schesin*) of sin (which is common to the elect as well as to the reprobate).

XXXIII. Although the destruction of man follows necessarily upon the decree of reprobation, yet the cause of it cannot be ascribed to God, but to man alone (according to Hos. 13:9, "O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself"). For God reprobates no one but the sinner who is consequently deservedly reprobable. Hence the reason of the destruction is most just, both from original sin (which is supposed in the man to be reprobated) and from actual sin (which, although it cannot but follow the denial of faith and so is necessary, is nevertheless spontaneous and voluntary and not forced).

XXXIV. If the flesh proceeds to make further disturbance and to cry out against this inscrutable mystery, let us remember that the doctrine of the apostle was opposed by the same weapons (Rom. 9:14, 19). And this is an invincible proof of the conformity of our doctrine with that of Paul. Therefore let us with him use the same arms to extinguish those darts set on fire of the devil: "O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" And with him, bearing in mind the severity and goodness of God, let us exclaim, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor? Or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen" (Rom. 11:33-36*).

Fifteenth Question

Is infidelity, or unbelief of the gospel, presupposed as a cause of reprobation? We deny against the Remonstrants.

I. This question depends upon the preceding and although it can readily be solved from what was said there, still something must be added for the purpose of clearer illustration.

Unbelief twofold: natural and acquired.

II. Unbelief or incredulity is either natural or acquired. The former is the natural blindness and corruption of the sinner, which does not and cannot receive the things which are of God (1 Cor. 2:14; 2 Cor. 3:5); the latter is the voluntary contumacy towards the gospel, which does not and cannot receive, or when perceived rejects it. Again, the former can be regarded either as to origin and habit, inasmuch as it is common to all men who are by nature children of wrath (Eph. 2:3). Thus it precedes predestination because it is supposed as the condition in the one to be predestined. Or it may be regarded as to act and exercise which is in the "not called" reprobates who are deserted in that corruption. Thus it is a consequence of reprobation.

Negative and positive.

The latter is proper to the "called" reprobates who are not only negatively unbelieving (on account of inborn corruption, they neither have nor can have faith of themselves), but also positively (inasmuch as they reject Christ by a positive unbelief or come short of faith in him).

Statement of the question.

III. We do not inquire about natural unbelief (negative as to origin)—whether it can be presupposed to reprobation; for this we mutually grant. Rather we inquire about acquired and positive unbelief which is made through actual incredulity against the gospel. The Arminians maintain this always precedes here, so that no one will be reprobated except the one who is foreseen by God as an unbeliever (and indeed perseveringly and finally such). Thus the Remonstrants speak in the declaration of their opinion: "Reprobation from eternal life is made according to the consideration of antecedent unbelief and perseverance in the same" (*Acta Synodi Nationalis . . . Dordrechti*, Art. 1, Th. 8 [1620], Pt. I, p. 113).

IV. The question is not whether from all eternity God foreknew that the passed-by would die in their unbelief (for this could not escape the omniscient God). Rather the question is whether that foreseen unbelief was the cause of non-election (or of preterition). We deny the latter because no one is foreseen as certainly about to die in unbelief except the one whom God (in the destination of efficacious grace by an antecedent decree) passed by. The question, therefore, is whether the foresight of unbelief (not natural and original, but actual and acquired; not negative, but positive) precedes reprobation and is its cause; or whether it follows it. The Remonstrants hold that it precedes; we hold that it follows.

Unbelief is not the cause of reprobation.

V. The reasons are: (1) because unbelief follows reprobation and therefore cannot precede it, as evident from the passages before adduced and defended (Jn. 8:47; 12:39; Mt. 11:25; 13:11; 1 Pet. 2:8). For if the hardness of men and their contumacy against the gospel follows from God's preterition, it falsely is called its cause.

VI. (2) Because reprobation treats equal men, equally corrupt with the elect. From the same mass of sin, some are made vessels unto honor others unto dishonor; some are destinated either to life or to death (which could not be said if it were made from foreseen unbelief which is peculiar to the passed-by).

VII. (3) Because thus it would follow that none could be reprobated except unbelievers and rebels against the gospel, i.e., that none could be damned except those called through the gospel. And so neither the heathen, Turks nor others (who neither were called through the gospel nor have heard anything concerning Christ) could be reprobated. So no sins would be damnable except those committed against the gospel; neither would the guilt of original sin be sufficient for damnation, on account of which, nevertheless, we are born children of wrath (Eph. 2:3) and are said to have died in Adam (1 Cor. 15:22). Nor would actual sins against the law of nature and of Moses be true causes of damnation (contrary to the express declarations of Scripture which subjects to damnation the Gentiles who without the law of Moses have sinned against the light of nature alone [Acts 14:16; Rom. 2:12; 3:19; 5:12]—as well as the Jews who sinned with the law). To no purpose is the exception that they to whom the gospel has not been preached will, notwithstanding, be damned for their contempt of it because they have not qualified themselves by the law of nature to hear the gospel. The very thing to be proved is taken for granted (viz., that they have despised the gospel to whom it was never made known). But if, according to the apostle, they will perish without law who sinned without law, why can it not also be said that they will perish without the gospel who have not heard the gospel? In what is added (that they are guilty of despising the gospel because they have not disposed themselves by the law of nature to hear it), they serve up stale Pelagianism concerning natural dispositions to good (so often rejected by Paul) and falsely maintain that man is bound to dispose himself to the reception of that of which he has never heard anything and never will. Not more happily do they escape this difficulty who seek calling to grace in natural revelation. This is to confound knowledge (*to gnōston*) and faith (*to piston*); nature and grace. Paul would badly say that God left the Gentiles to walk in their own ways (Acts 14:16), and that they were strangers from the covenants and without God in the world (Eph.

2:12), if the preaching of the gospel could in any way be made known to them through creatures.

Sources of solution. VIII. When Paul says, "God shall judge men according to his gospel" (Rom. 2:16), he does not propose the gospel which he preached as the rule of the universal judgment to be made of each and every man. For he had expressly said, "As many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law: and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law" (Rom. 2:12). Rather he calls up the certain futurition of the judgment and of its author from his infallible declaration made in the gospel of which he was the minister. Thus is intimated not according "to what," but "by whom" God will judge (to wit, by the Mediator as Judge of the living and the dead, which is taught not in the law but in the gospel, Jn. 5:22, 27; Acts 17:31).

IX. Although the gospel sentences no one to damnation on account of original sin alone, neither does it follow that God cannot reprobate anyone on account of it. This is not as if no one will be condemned on account of original sin, but because the purpose of the gospel (Jn. 3:36), differs from that of the law (Rom. 3:19, 20*; 2:12).

X. Although all the called who resist calling and reject the grace offered through the gospel will be condemned on account of unbelief (in which sense the words of Christ in Jn. 3:18, 36 must be understood), this does not imply that no one will be reprobated except as unbelieving. The relation of reprobation differs from that of damnation. The one is of the called through the gospel; the other of the not-called who cannot be damned on account of the rejection of Christ of whom they have never heard. If it is said that unbelievers will be condemned, it is not immediately laid down that they alone and not others will be condemned. For the gospel nowhere holds or posits an exclusion.

XI. Although the doctrine of election must be sought from the gospel alone because it is wholly gratuitous (Rom. 11:5), there is not the same relation with reprobation which is gathered as much from the law as from the gospel. Nor if faith alone is the means of salvation, ought unbelief alone to be the meritorious cause of damnation. For salvation can only be obtained in virtue of the covenant of grace, which exacts no condition except faith, in opposition to the law, which demands works. Yet damnation arises not only from the violation of the covenant of grace, but also from the violation of the covenant of works and sins committed against the law (original as well as actual). To say that God entered into a new covenant in Adam with the whole human race and renewed it with Noah (so that no one will be condemned for sins against the old covenant) is to take for granted what needs to be proved. It not only has no foundation in Scripture, but is openly opposed to it, while it asserts that covenant to be particular and not universal (as will be shown in the proper place).

SIXTEENTH QUESTION

Is the will of God to save persevering believers and condemn the unbelieving, the whole decree of predestination? We deny against the Remonstrants.

I. Of the various errors with which the Remonstrants have corrupted the doctrine of predestination, the principal is that by which they maintain that God's

will to save believers and the persevering and to damn the finally unbelieving is the entire decree of predestination. Thus they speak in the Synodical Acts: "The peremptory will of God made known in the gospel concerning the salvation and destruction of men, is the total and entire decree of predestination. The will to save those persevering or dying in faith, and to leave under wrath the impenitent and unbelievers, is God's will concerning the salvation and destruction of men exhibited in the gospel" (*Acta Synodi Nationalis . . . Dordrechti* [1619-20], 2:17-18). Since therefore they are accustomed to hide the poison of their unsound doctrine under unsound words, it is expedient to lay open their mind in a few words so that it may appear how far they wander from the truth delivered in the word of God, even on this subject.

Statement of the question.

II. This, however, is not difficult to understand if we consider for what purpose they hold that general and indefinite decree (viz., in order to teach not what God decreed concerning individuals, but what he determined about the qualities of those to be saved and to be damned, selecting from all possible conditions faith as the condition of salvation). Although we do not deny that this order was established by God, that faith should be the means of salvation, yet we do deny that predestination is placed in it (much less that its total and entire decree is included in this constitution).

III. The reasons are: (1) Predestination, according to Scripture usage, always respects individuals, separating them in the common mass of sin and destining these to life, those to death: "Many are called, but few are chosen" (Mt. 20:16); "Whom he foreknew them he also predestinated" (Rom. 8:29, 30; 9:16, 18); "As many as were ordained to eternal life, believed" (Acts 13:48). Nowhere is it referred only to qualities. But their will is occupied with qualities about persons only contingently and eventually and that too on account of qualities without distinction or separation of individuals. It denotes indeed what kind of persons God has determined to save, but not whom in particular he has decreed to save or to damn; since in fact this indefinite decree predestinates and selects no one in particular, inscribes no one in the book of life, and (it standing) it might happen that either no one would be damned or no one saved. Thus there would be a Savior without any to be saved and a head without members.

IV. (2) Predestination, as it is presented to us in the Scripture, is the efficacious will of God, efficaciously producing the means of election in the elect and also infallibly bringing about the end (i.e., salvation). And by means of reprobation, it permits some things, effects others by a just judgment and unfailingly inflicts damnation upon the reprobate (Rom. 8:29, 30; 9:11, 18, 22, 23;11:7; Eph. 1:4, 5). But their will is inoperative (*aergos*) and unoccupied (being suspended upon the mutable human free will—of most uncertain issue).

V. (3) As proven before, predestination precedes faith and perseverance (as the cause its effect) and unbelief (as the antecedent its consequent). But the believers and unbelievers (who will be saved or damned by their will) are understood to be such antecedently not consequently by the adversaries. This is nothing else than to pervert the series of the causes of salvation and to make postdestination of predestination.

Sources of salvation.

VI. Christ and his apostles announced the whole will of God concerning the salvation of men (as much as it concerns us to know, Acts 20:27), while they revealed most fully to us the method of obtaining salvation through Christ and its conditions. But those whom he willed from eternity to elect and to whom he wills to give faith (as it belongs to the secret counsel of God, not to his revealed will, which is the object of evangelical preaching), is it not wonderful that it remains concealed with God and is manifested to us only from the event? Indeed although they who are to be saved are not mentioned by name in the gospel, still God willed that it should be sufficiently foreseen for the consolation of believers (by giving in his word the characteristics and marks of true election from which they can have assurance of their own election).

VII. The absolute decree concerning the salvation of individuals does not prevent the conditions of obtaining it from being wisely prescribed to men. Indeed God decreed salvation absolutely and antecedently without regard to any preceding cause, but not consequently and without means (but to be obtained through means). Nor is it more absurd (the peremptory will of saving anyone being laid down) to enjoin something upon him in order to the obtaining of it (even under a threat of the contrary evil) than it was absurd to prescribe the use of food to Hezekiah (even though the prolongation of his life had been decreed by God) and for Paul to forbid those who were in the ship to go out under the peril of shipwreck (Acts 27:31), even though by divine revelation the conservation of all was rendered certain. For the certainty of the end does not exclude the necessity and the use of means.

VIII. There is no contradiction between the absolute decree of election (which relates to a few) and the revealed will (which offers salvation indiscriminately to all through faith in Christ). The offer of salvation (made through the gospel) is not made absolutely, but conditionally (under the condition of faith and repentance). Although these two things are diverse from each other (to offer salvation indiscriminately to all under the condition of faith and absolutely to decree salvation and faith to a few), yet they cannot be reckoned contradictory because they do not refer to the same thing and are not to be understood in the same respect. The one pertains to the revealed will of approbation, the other to the secret decretive will.

IX. Although the hypothetical promise concerning the giving of salvation to all believers is indiscriminately proposed to all the called, it does not follow that it flows from the general decree concerning the salvation of all believers and the choosing of faith from all possible conditions to be the condition of the salvation to be communicated (which precedes the special decree concerning the salvation of individuals as our adversaries maintain). Since it is a decree concerning the means of salvation, it ought necessarily to be subordinated to the decree concerning salvation (which has the relation of end). Thus God should not be conceived as having thought about appointing faith to be the means of salvation before thinking of those to whom he willed to give salvation (in order to confer the same upon them, he selected the means necessary to it and among others, faith). For that connection between faith and salvation is of immutable verity. Hence it is indiscriminately proposed to all the called (although according to the counsel of God it is fulfilled as to the event only in the elect to whom he determined to give faith).

SEVENTEENTH QUESTION

Can there be attributed to God any conditional will, or universal purpose of pitying the whole human race fallen in sin, of destinating Christ as Mediator to each and all, and of calling them all to a saving participation of his benefits? We deny.

I. This question grows out of the ones preceding and is agitated between us and various persons who, although not entirely agreeing with each other, all depart from the doctrine thus far received in our churches.

II. The more common opinion of the Lutherans is this: predestination is God's eternal will (or purpose and good pleasure) to save men through Christ apprehended by faith. This will is distinguished into antecedent and consequent. The former they hold to be God's eternal purpose and decree to save all men in general (lost in sin) through Christ apprehended by faith. It rests upon three foundations: the universal mercy of God; the universal merit of Christ; and the universal ministry of the word or calling. The latter they hold to be God's eternal purpose to save believers and damn unbelievers. The cause of this particularity arises not from God (who seriously, constantly and ardently wishes that all men should believe and be saved through faith in Christ), but from men themselves (who do not conform to the merciful and universal good pleasure of God, nor believe). These are the words of Haffenreffer (*Loci Theologici* 3, Sta. 3 [1606], p. 287). Eckardus (*Fasciculus Controversarium Theologicarum* 15.2 [1631], pp. 304-14), Hutter, Hunnius, Gherardus ("De electione et reprobatione," in *Loci Theologici* [1864], 2:58ff.) and others agree with him here.

III. The Arminians agree here with the Lutherans and even go farther making four decrees subordinate to each other: (1) concerning the giving of Christ as Mediator for the whole human race; (2) concerning the bestowal of salvation upon believers in Christ and the damnation of unbelievers; (3) concerning the supplying with means sufficient to salvation all and everyone; (4) concerning the saving of particular persons who would believe and the damning those who would not believe. Under the three former decrees as a foundation, they lay universal grace or the affection of mercy of God towards the whole human race (impelled by which he destined Christ as Mediator to all and determined to bestow upon all the means sufficient to salvation, as they express themselves in *Collatio Hagae*, *Acts of the Synod of Dort* and other writings prepared by Arminius, Corvinus, Grevinchovius, Episcopius and others).

IV. Further, it must not be concealed that the Reformed theologians themselves do not here think alike in all things. There are some who (although agreeing with us in the center of the Pelagian controversy concerning election wholly gratuitous and the particular decree about giving faith to these and not to those [as also concerning efficacious and irresistible calling] and who differ on this subject from the Arminians) by a certain pious design (as it seems) of promoting ecclesiastical peace and from a desire of disputing more strongly with the Remonstrants (although with less happy success) have adopted certain hypotheses of theirs, extending more widely the periphery of grace and defending the universality of mercy, redemption and calling, while they maintain that God (impelled by his philanthropy [*philanthrōpia*] and mercy to the human race) decreed from eternity to send his Son into the world, who having made satisfaction

for sin, might acquire by that method remission of sins and eternal salvation for all, if they would embrace him through faith and not refuse to become partakers of so great salvation). Thus they hold that God in a certain manner willed that all men equally might be saved, provided they would believe. But they add that God influenced no more by his common philanthropy (*philanthrōpia*) than by a certain special kind of love and mercy, elected some from the totality of men (upon whom he would bestow faith with this intention—that he might lead them most certainly to salvation; so that no more did he will to save them provided they would believe, but determined to bring them to faith in order that they might be saved). And for this reason they maintain that two decrees are here to be principally considered: the one general (concerning the saving of believers through Christ by which God determined to have mercy upon all and everyone and to give Christ as Mediator to all and to call all to salvation); the other special (by which he decreed to call effectually some certain persons and bestow upon them faith in preference to others). As to the former, they agree with the Remonstrants; as to the latter they differ from them (cf. Amyrald, "Doctrinae de gratia universali . . . defensio," in *Dissertationes Theologicae Quatuor* [1645] and Testard, *Erenikon* [1633]).

V. But the opinion received among the Reformed determines something far different: viz., that God willed to have mercy not upon all, but only upon some certain persons of the human race (fallen into sin and death); moreover he decided to raise them from the fall and bring them to salvation (others being left in their original corruption); and because he could not exercise his mercy towards them, unless satisfaction were first made to his justice, therefore he destined Christ for them as Mediator to satisfy and obtain salvation for them as surety and as head; and that through the efficacy of the Spirit working faith, he might apply the salvation acquired to them. So that God is conceived to have thought first of the end (i.e., of giving salvation to certain ones), afterwards of the means; first of the means of acquisition and then of the means of application. But one decree is not broader than the other, nor is it maintained that he destined salvation (or Christ) to any others than those to whom he destined the Spirit and faith. For as the three principal parts of saving grace are referred by appropriation to the three persons of the Trinity—election to the Father, redemption to the Son and sanctification to the Holy Spirit—so they ought to obtain an equal periphery and amplitude. Thus no one was elected by the Father who will not be redeemed by the Son and sanctified by the Spirit; and no one in turn will be redeemed by Christ who was not elected by the Father from eternity and will not be sanctified by the Spirit in his own time.

Statement of the question.

VI. Hence the true state of the question can easily be gathered. (1) The question is not whether each and every human (whether he believes or not) was predestinated to salvation. This invention of Samuel Huberus, a disturber of the Swiss churches, was exploded some time ago and condemned.

VII. (2) The question is not whether God is borne by a general love and philanthropy (*philanthrōpia*) towards men as his creatures, and also bestows upon them various temporal benefits pertaining to the things of this life (*ta biōtika*). We do not deny that God has never left himself without witness (*amartyron*) with regard to this (Acts 14:17). And we readily grant that there is no one who

does not owe some gratitude to God and who, whatever he is or can do, is not bound to give thanks to his Creator. But the question concerns the special and saving love which tends to spiritual benefits, and by which God willed to have mercy upon them to salvation. We think this is particular to the elect alone, not universal and common to all.

VIII. (3) The question is not whether there is in God a will commanding and approving faith and the salvation of men; nor whether God in the gospel commands men to believe and repent if they wish to be saved; nor whether it pleases him for me to believe and be saved. For no one denies that God is pleased with the conversion and life of the sinner rather than with his death. We willingly subscribe to the Synod of Dort, which determines that "God sincerely and most truly shows in his word, what is pleasing to him; namely, that they who are called should come to him" (*Acta Synodi Nationalis . . . Dordrechti* [1620], Pt. I, p. 266). But the question is whether from such a will approving and commanding what men must do in order to obtain salvation, can be gathered any will or purpose of God by which he intended the salvation of all and everyone under the condition of faith and decreed to send Christ into the world for them. Hence it appears that they wander from the true order of the question who maintain that we treat here only of the will of approbation (*euarestias*), but not of the will of good pleasure (*eudokias*). It is evident that we treat not of that which God wishes to be done by us, but what he wills to do for the salvation of men and of the decree of sending Christ for them (which everyone sees belongs to the will of good pleasure [*eudokias*] and not to that of approbation [*euarestias*]).

IX. (4) The question is not whether by a certain absolute decree, he intended the salvation of each and every individual. They with whom we now treat confess with us the absurdity of this because if this were so, all would infallibly be saved; while on the contrary "many are called and few chosen." But the question is whether by a certain conditional decree (and most serious will), God determined to give salvation to each and every one under the condition of faith. Although sometimes the brethren may deny that they hold any conditional decree (but only a conditional will, in order to avoid the sentence passed in the French Synod against those who might wish so to speak), yet they cannot deny that the chief among them were not shocked at the phrase "conditional decree" and that it repeatedly occurs in the writings of very celebrated men: Amyrald, Testard, Placaeus, Cappel and others. The thing itself which they maintain demands this. For since no act of proper and intrinsic will in God concerning the event of anything can be granted (which does not imply a decree), whoever recognizes a conditional will in God must necessarily admit a conditional decree in him.

X. (5) The question does not concern the unversality of redemption or of calling. Concerning this (with the favor of God), we will speak hereafter. Rather the question concerns the universality of mercy and of grace as to the intention of salvation. Thus the question may be reduced to these boundaries—whether there is in God a general decree; whether it is called a counsel or purpose or a conditional will by which God truly and earnestly intended to have mercy unto salvation upon each and every one (not by giving faith, but by sending Christ for each and every one and calling all to salvation under the condition of faith and repentance). The patrons of universal grace maintain this; we deny it.

XI. Moreover because this question appears to some as unnecessary and inopportune (because it only involves a certain diverse method about which no controversy should be agitated and not any difference in the head of doctrine), we must observe in advance that if the method alone were concerned (not drawing after it a difference of the thing itself), we might easily spare this controversy. For we do not think that we ought to quarrel (*tropō paideias*) with anyone about the manner of instruction alone provided the sound doctrine be preserved. Yet if the thing itself is examined a little more attentively, it will readily appear not only that the method is concerned, but that under the pretext of a new method, a new doctrine is brought in. For who would say that the dogmas here set forth concerning mercy, redemption and universal calling pertain to simple method? Is it only a method to teach that God willed something in earnest and ardently which he knew never would or could take place and to which he, who alone could, did not will to bestow upon man the necessary means? Is it a method to teach that a Mediator was destined to those to whom he was never made known; and that men are called sufficiently to salvation, if not immediately at least mediately from the contemplation of the heavens and the earth; that the impetration of salvation extends more widely than its application, and that Christ did not properly merit faith for us? Truly he who will accurately weigh these and the like things will readily discover that the discussion not only concerns a method, but concerns a most weighty doctrine (as they with whom we treat cannot deny).

XII. Meanwhile, whatever discrepancy of opinion may here be perceived among our men, the foundation of faith thus far remains safe on both sides through the grace of God, while each asserts: (1) the universal corruption of each and every man, and the universal and invincible inability to emerge from it (of whatever kind it may be) without the efficacious grace of God; (2) the particular election from that misery unto salvation, and the immovable preterition of many whom God (who might have left all) willed to leave in their misery by a most free, but yet by a most just judgment; (3) efficacious grace, which alone can produce that faith and without which it cannot be held as a particular gift destined from eternity by God to the elect alone, granted also to them alone in time and without which no one can obtain salvation; (4) the gospel alone as the ministry of the Spirit and the sole instrument of ingenerating (*ingenerandae*) faith in Christ (all other revelations being wholly insufficient for salvation, if not objectively, at least subjectively, on account of the innate corruption of man). These are the capital doctrines of faith which we all constantly defend against the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians.

XIII. We all indeed agree in opposing the deadly errors of Pelagians and of those who follow their camp. Nevertheless that new method excogitated by great men (although seemingly better fitted for the popular ear and the pleasure of men, and usually cried up as better suited to defend the justice of God against the reprobate, and to transfer the whole cause of the destruction of men to themselves) does not cease to be encumbered with various absurdities and inextricable difficulties. Therefore, it is less becoming to God, is inconsistent with itself, departs from the form (*hypotypōsei*) of sound words and is dangerous on account of multiple consequences which it draws after itself (and was condemned before by our churches and rejected). That this was not done without weighty reason

(the peace of those dissenting being secured) must now be proved in a few words. We now treat of the first head (viz., the will or universal purpose of having mercy upon all unto salvation).

Proof that no universal mercy can be granted.

XIV. That there is no such will or purpose in God we prove: (1) from the decree of election and reprobation. Because the Scripture makes the purpose of having mercy particular, not universal (since it testifies that God had mercy upon some certain persons only, loves them and inscribes them in the book of life, but hates, hardens, appoints to wrath and ordains to condemnation others, Rom. 9:11, 12, 13, 18, 22; 1 Thess. 5:9; 1 Pet. 2:8). Who would say that God willed to pity unto salvation those whom he reprobated from eternity; and most seriously intended for them the end under a condition, whom by the same act of will he excluded from the means of ever arriving at that end? And who does not see that the conditional purpose to give salvation to innumerable persons is destroyed by the absolute purpose concerning the not giving of faith to them?

XV. To no purpose is the exception here: (1) that the particular decree of having mercy upon some certain ones does not overthrow the universal because they are spoken in different respects (*kat' allo kai allo*) concerning God; the particular decree being according to election (*kat' eklogēn*), but not so the universal; and that there is no opposition between these two acts—that God first willed the salvation of each and every individual (if they would believe), and secondly willed to give faith to some certain ones that they might certainly be saved. We answer that it is gratuitously supposed that there is that twofold purpose of having mercy, while the Scripture draws every purpose of God's mercy from his eternal election; yea, it makes election itself to consist in it (Rom. 8:28, 29; 9:11; Eph. 1:11; 2 Tim. 1:9). And the thing itself teaches that it cannot be conceived without absurdity—that God (in whom there cannot be priority and posteriority, and who decrees all things by a sole and most simple act of will) by the same act willed most seriously to intend salvation for some under a certain condition; and at the same time, he (who alone can give) determined to deny to them the very condition without which salvation cannot be obtained. What else is this than to will to have mercy and not to will at the same time? I confess that the sole act of the divine will can be divided into various acts (which may be conceived as prior and posterior), but this is to be understood only of those which do not butt against each other and destroy themselves. Now to say that God intended salvation for all and at the same time decreed to elect and love some, but to hate and reprobate others, is most absurd (*asystata*). Nor can they at the same time stand with God (or even successively) unless his will is supposed to be liable to change (which is blasphemous).

XVI. Second, not more happily is the love of God here distinguished into comparative and absolute. Is it maintained that Paul, when he speaks of the love of Jacob and the hatred of Esau, wishes only to intimate that God loved the former more and preferred him to the latter (just as the word meaning "to hate" is often put in the Scripture for "to love less," Gen. 29:31). Although God may be said to have embraced some with a peculiar love (so as to give faith to them), it does not follow that he was unwilling to save others. For various degrees in the love of God towards men can be conceived no less than towards other creatures.

We answer as follows: although we readily grant that sometimes hatred is put for a diminished love among men, yet we deny that with Paul God's hatred towards Esau can be thus understood. It is opposed to his love of Jacob, which is said to be according to election (*kat' eklogēn*). Therefore this love necessarily includes the purpose of having mercy upon and saving Jacob; the hatred denies it and marks the purpose of reprobation by which he was freely passed over and excluded from salvation (so that thus far the Reformed theologians have uniformly held it). Nor if, in the effects of God's general love and the common providence by which he is borne to all his creatures (according to the variety of subjects distinguished by a greater or less excellence of nature), there are degrees, does it forthwith follow that there are degrees affectively in God's special and saving love. Since his love cannot be vain and inefficacious, those whom he loves unto salvation he ought to love fully and even unto the end (Jn. 13:1).

XVII. (2) He who in earnest wills an end to anyone also wills and bestows (as far as he can) the means necessary to obtain it; especially if he has them all in his power, and they depend upon him alone. Therefore if God wills by a general will the salvation of each and every man, he ought to will also the means conducive to salvation: such as the preaching of the word, faith, repentance—without which salvation cannot be obtained. But he neither wills nor bestows (as far as he can) these upon innumerable persons (to whom he grants neither the preaching of the word nor the gift of faith). Therefore, neither ought it to be said here that this holds good of him who wills the end by an absolute and full will, but not by a diminished and conditional will. It must be proved (not taken for granted) that any such diminished and conditional will can be allowed in God, the contrary of which we have before established. Indeed we do not deny that it can have place in creatures who are impotent and do not have all things under their own will. But such a will cannot be attributed without the greatest absurdity to the omnipotent God, who holds all things in his hand (see above Topic III, Question 16).

XVIII. To no purpose also is it added that God can be said to will the means (not indeed to effect that all should actually use the means necessary to obtain salvation, but to offer them to all) so that they to whom they are offered might use them if they wished. Neither a prince nor a parent would on that account be denied to have willed the one his subjects and the other his children to live well and happily because they had not effected that they should use (in their own case) those means offered to them for obtaining that end. We answer that he who in earnest wills an end to anyone is bound (as far as he is able) not only to offer to but to confer and bestow (if this is in his power alone) upon him, not some certain, but all the means necessary to attain the end. And from this, it appears how foreign to the purpose are the similes of the prince and father here adduced. Although the prince and father may wish their subjects and children to live well, and may further it by all the means in their possession, yet they cannot actually effect this. For if they could and yet would not, it would be the surest proof that they did not seriously will it. But to God nothing is impossible and impassable. So that if he does not bestow upon all, all the means necessary to salvation (which depends upon him alone), it is a proof that he in fact willed it.

XIX. Third, if God has a universal will to save all, it is either absolute or conditional. If absolute, all will actually be saved; if conditional, he wills either to

effect the condition necessary to salvation in men or only to exact it. If only to exact it, he does not will and intend the salvation of such by exacting from them an act which he knew to be impossible to man. Again, that condition will certainly be about to come to pass or certainly not about to come to pass. If the former, each and every man will certainly be saved; if the latter, God would be made to will vehemently that which he nevertheless well knew would never take place (as depending upon a condition such that it never would come to pass in this respect because he himself, who alone can, does not will to effect it). Now if it does not belong to a wise man to will anything under a condition which he knows to be impossible, how much less can this be attributed to the most wise God?

XX. Nor is the knot untied if we say that God often in the Scripture testifies that he wills the salvation of those in whom, nevertheless, he does not will to effect the condition of faith, but only to demand it. Although this may be granted concerning the will of approbation (which is referred to the preceptive will), it cannot be said equally of the decretive will. Otherwise God would fail of his design and could intend that which he certainly knows he never could accomplish. Nor does he help the matter any more who adds that God is not bound to give faith to man; therefore no one can have occasion to complain of him if he only demands it from the reprobate, but does not effect it. Although nothing on the part of man can oblige God to give faith to anyone, yet (it being supposed that he earnestly wills the salvation of men) it seems thence to be gathered that he is bound to give faith to them that they may obtain the salvation which he intends for them. Truly if the powers requisite for believing were supplied to man or if sufficient objective grace were furnished, God could not be said to will this under an impossible condition. On this point, the opinions of the Arminians cohere better and are more consistent with each other—affirming sufficient grace and the indifference (*adiaphorian*) of free will. But as long as an invincible and insuperable inability of whatever kind (either moral or natural, with which we have nothing to do now, as the brethren with whom we treat assert) is maintained from this to be in man, it may well be concluded against them that God on that hypothesis most seriously wills something under an impossible condition (one which he knows never will take place because he does not will to fulfil it).

XXI. Fourth, if God wills that each and everyone shall be saved, either all will actually be saved (which is false) or a certain will of God remains defeated and inefficacious (which is absurd). Nor is it satisfactory to say that whatever God wills is not always done, since some things pleasing and agreeable to him are not done, and many things which do not please him and which he does not will, are done. Nor is it satisfactory to hold that what he wills to do will undoubtedly take place, but not immediately; what he himself does not will to effect, will be performed by others. We answer that it is one thing to speak of the approving and preceptive will (in which sense it is certain that many things are done which he does not will, and many things are not done which he wills, i.e., approves and commands: as he wills that men fulfil the law and obey him, which nevertheless is not done), but another of the decretive will (which implies the purpose and intention of God, in which sense he cannot will and intend anything which is not actually done). The very things which he does not will by the preceptive will and yet are done, are not done unless he wills them by his decretive will. Thus

what is done "against his will" is not done "beyond his will," as Augustine formerly expressed it. But here (as we said before), we do not treat only of the approving will (by which he holds the salvation of men dear), but of the decretive (by which he intended to send Christ into the world to acquire salvation for all if they would believe). According to this hypothesis, the decretive will is necessarily made void and frustrated.

XXII. You may say that one can be said to will something in vain in two ways: either to signify that he wills it rashly and with no reason; or to mean that which he by no means wills to be done. It is absurd for God to will anything in vain in the former sense (nor has it place here) since indeed that he willed those who perish to be saved, he did not will rashly to be done, but from the reason of his goodness. But in the second sense, it is not absurd that God willed anything in vain which is not actually done. We answer that this does not untie the knot. That is said to be in vain which does not bring about the end intended (which no one can deny to be the case here); for that will either had salvation for its end or not. If not, God cannot be said to have willed them to be saved. If it had and did not obtain it, it follows that God failed of his end. You may retort that this will can be called efficacious and inefficacious in various ways: efficacious with regard to the many acts which it exercises (such as the decree concerning the sending and delivering up to death his own Son for the satisfaction of justice; the decree concerning the preservation of the world and the light of saving knowledge, by which, dispensed in different ways and according to the various times, men are called); but inefficacious if it is referred to the minds and the acts of men (which by no means effects that which he wishes them to do, i.e., to believe and repent). We answer that not even in this way is the difficulty removed. For in whatever way it may be called efficacious, it will always remain inefficacious with respect to the end intended by God (viz., the salvation of men). Finally, it cannot be conceived how God should have willed efficaciously with respect to individuals that which is far greater (viz., the giving of his Son), yet should not have willed efficaciously that which is far less (viz., that men should believe and repent). For otherwise he might clearly have understood that without this the other things would be in vain and would benefit no one.

XXIII. Fifth, God does not will those to be saved whom he does not will to call to faith and salvation even by his word. For the means are denied to those to whom the end is supposed to be denied. But to innumerable persons, he has denied the preaching of the word (the only means to faith and salvation)—as under the old dispensation to all the Gentiles and, under the new, to many nations upon whom as yet the light of the gospel has never shone and who still lie in the darkest shadows of paganism. Now is it credible, if God had that most propense will of having mercy upon each and every one unto salvation and decreed to send Christ as Mediator for them that he, for about four thousand years, should have permitted all the nations (with the exception of the Israelites) to walk in their own ways and said nothing to them about the Mediator who was to come into the world for them and excluded them from the preaching of his word, the only means of faith and salvation (Rom. 10:17)? Where then has that good will exercised itself which God is said to have had in favor of them? And for what good was Christ destined to those to whom he was never revealed? Truly even this dispensation of God towards the Gentiles (aliens from the covenants) would

alone (if no other argument could be obtained) sufficiently, and more than sufficiently, prove that the hypothesis concerning the universal will and mercy of God unto salvation is absurd and built upon no solid foundation.

XXIV. I know that passages are brought to confirm this: where God says that "he left not himself without witness (*amartyon*), in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons filling our hearts with food and gladness" (Acts 14:17*) and 17:26, 27 where Paul testifies that "God is not far from every one of us, and hath determined the times before appointed, that men should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him." We answer that neither passage favors that opinion. Not the former, for although God is said not to have left himself without witness (*amartyron*) through various temporal benefits bestowed upon the Gentiles, yet in the same place it is testified that "he suffered all nations to walk in their own ways" (as to the revelation of salvation, which is not referred to an internal dereliction or privation of the Spirit alone, but also to an external dereliction or defect of external calling because he did not give them his statues and laws as he did to Jacob, Ps. 147:19, 20). Not the latter, for Paul immediately adds, "The times of this ignorance God winked at; but now, under the gospel, commandeth all men everywhere to repent" (Acts 17:30). This institutes an express antithesis between the time of the Old Testament and the New, relative to the external call to repentance. If he formerly winked at the times of ignorance and now at length commands men to repent, it is a proof that God did not formerly enjoin this upon men and so the external call to salvation was wanting to them. Whatever therefore was revealed to them pertained to the revelation of God, the Creator and Preserver of the world, but not to God the Redeemer; and to the wisdom which shines forth in the works of general providence, and not to that which is hidden in a mystery and revealed in the works of grace and the gospel alone (1 Cor. 2:5). Here belongs "that which may be known of God" of Paul (*to gnōston tou Theou*, Rom. 1:19), as was proved before, Topic I, Question 4.

XXV. Sixth, that very thing is confirmed by the first gospel promise (Gen. 3:15), which pertained not to all and everyone, but to believers alone. The latter are designated "the seed of the woman" under Christ the head, in contradistinction to the reprobate who are denoted by "the seed of the serpent." Although the devils also can be contained under the seed of the serpent, it does not exclude the reprobate themselves also (who are called "a generation of vipers" [Mt. 3:7], "children of the wicked one" [*hyioi ponērou*, Mt. 13:38; Jn. 8:44]) from coming under that name on this account even the more, that whatever things are said to the seed of the serpent most exactly applies to them. For as the poison of the serpent is in them (viz., his wickedness and nature through their imitation of him, in whom the serpent as head exercises himself and lives, and through whom he acts), so there comes in a perpetual enmity between them and the seed of the woman. They observe his heel and bruise it; nor in them or by them is the head of Satan ever bruised or to be bruised; yea, their head is bruised by the seed of the woman. Whence it appears that this promise is by no means universal to the whole human race, but particular to Christ and believers (who are set forth under the name of the seed of the woman). Christ indeed primarily and eminently (*exochōs*); but believers secondarily and in dependence on Christ (for whom and in whom alone Christ bruises the head of Satan, i.e., destroys his kingdom and

power [Rom. 16:20], and between whom and the Devil and the world a perpetual enmity exists).

XXVI. Nor can it be an objection that the reprobate can also be called "the seed of the woman" by reason of origin, inasmuch as they are descended from the woman. For "the seed of the woman" is here understood not only in a physical sense (otherwise Christ would have here no prerogative above the wicked who are designated by "the seed of the serpent"), but principally in a moral sense. This is true both with respect to Christ (who was to be the extraordinary seed conceived from the Holy Spirit) and with respect to believers (who under their head ought, in the state of grace, to be the seed of that woman to whom God had made the promise of grace and whom he willed to raise up from the fall, not so much physically through generation, as morally through imitation by the power of the Spirit) by which they would become the children not of the flesh, but of the promise. Thus although the seed of the woman put absolutely does not designate men as believers, yet when put comparatively and in contradistinction to the seed of the serpent, it is rightly predicated of them. Although this seed individually and antonomastically (*antonomastikōs*) is referred to Christ (who by his own power was to execute this great work), yet secondarily (and taken collectively) it is well extended to believers alone "who are Christ's" and the members of his mystical body (in whom Christ ought also to bruise the head of the serpent, not only by his merit through satisfaction, but also by his efficacy through sanctification—without which the former bruising would be vain and frustrated).

XXVII. Of this particularity, however, God wished to give not obscure proofs in the fulfillment of the promise. He afterwards exhibited these in the covenant of grace, in the families of Adam (by the distinction made between Cain and Abel), of Noah (between Shem and Ham), of Abraham (between Ishmael and Isaac) and of Isaac (between Esau and Jacob). Why did God so carefully wish to make a distinction in the families of the patriarchs (by taking some and leaving others) unless it was to testify that his saving grace was not universal, but particular to those whom, by a peculiar privilege, he willed to separate from others?

XXVIII. Finally, we may now omit many other things since by this hypothesis wants, and vehement desires (yet fruitless and frustrated) are attributed to God by which he is made to intend and in earnest will that, which willing, he yet knew never would be or could be. Is it easy for anyone to gather whether they are becoming to the majesty of the supreme deity or repugnant to his wisdom and power; whether under the pretext of extolling the divine goodness and grace, they are not too much obscured and lessened while they are made to be vain and inefficacious, and accomplish nothing else than increasing the guilt of man and rendering him inexcusable (*anapologēton*). Nor can this absurdity be taken away by saying that the Scripture seems to impute to God desires and wants of this kind (Ps. 81:13; Is. 48:18). It is evident that these are anthropopathical locutions, to be understood in a manner becoming to God (*theoprepōs*), and to be referred to the preceptive will in order to teach what is pleasing to God and what is the duty of man. They are not to be referred to the decretive will to intimate what he intended and what he willed to be done about man (as was shown before, Topic III, Question 16).

Sources of solution.

XXIX. The love treated in Jn. 3:16 when it is said that "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son," cannot be universal towards each and every one, but special towards a few. (1) It treats of the supreme and intense love of God (a greater than which is not and cannot be conceived) towards those for whom he gave his only begotten. This is evident both from the intensive (*epitatikē*) particle *houtōs* (which has great weight here) and from the thing itself. For as no one can have a greater love than to lay down his life for his friends (Jn. 15:13), so no greater love can be found than that by which God (when men were yet enemies) delivered his own Son to death for them. And as Abraham could not more evidently prove his piety to God than by offering up his son as a sacrifice, so God could not more illustriously demonstrate his love to men than by giving up his Son to them as a propitiatory victim (*hilastikēn*). (2) The love by which God gave his Son draws after itself all other things necessary to salvation: "For he that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?" (Rom. 8:32). But not upon each and every one, rather upon the elect alone, he bestows all things with Christ. (3) Therefore the end of that love which God intends is the salvation of those whom he pursues with such love; hence he adds, "For God sent not his son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved" (Jn. 3:17). If therefore God sent Christ for that end (that through him the world might be saved), he must either have failed of his end or the world must necessarily be saved in fact. However it is certain that not the whole world, but only those chosen out of the world are saved; therefore to them properly this love has reference. Nor can it be conceived if a universal love is here understood, how such and so great love (which is by far the cause of the greatest and most excellent good, viz., the mission of Christ) can consist with the hatred of innumerable persons whom he willed to pass by and ordain to damnation (to whom he never has revealed either his Son or willed to bestow faith, without which it is set forth in vain). Nor can it be conceived how this love of God can be so greatly commended here which yet remains void and inefficacious on account of the defect of subjective grace, which God has determined to deny.

XXX. The word "world" does not prove this love to be universal. Although it may be taken in common and indefinitely for the human race (as our Calvin, the Belgic commentators and others interpret it), it does not follow that this love is to be referred to each and every one, but only that a peculiar privilege was bestowed upon the human race with respect to some particular part so that the entire species should not wholly perish. Indeed this is in opposition: (1) to the family of angels to whom, in like sin, he did not grant like grace. Hence he is called indeed philanthropist (*philanthrōpos*), but not philangelist (*philangelos*). If a prince of two rebellious states would utterly destroy the one sparing nobody, but so far spare the other as to rescue some certain ones from the common punishment destined to the others, he would be said to have entirely loved the one above the other, although he might not have loved all the members of the latter equally because the good of the part redounds to the whole, and the denomination is made from the better. (2) It is in opposition to the economy of the Old Testament where salvation was set forth not to the world but to the Jewish nation alone to intimate that it was not sent for the Jews only, but also for the Gentiles indis-

criminately. This would beautifully fall in with the design of Christ to take away from Nicodemus the empty boastings in which the Jews were accustomed to indulge (and with which he also undoubtedly was fascinated), as if the Messiah had been promised and sent to his nation alone, and the other nations were either to be brought into subjection to them or to be cut off. In order, therefore, to meet the opinion of that nation (itself implanted and ready now to unfold the mystery of the calling of the Gentiles), he said that God loved the world, not only one nation or people. In this sense, he is called by the Samaritans "the Savior of the world" (Jn. 4:42), i.e., not only of the Jews (as under the Old Testament when salvation was only of the Jews, as Christ testifies, Jn. 4:22), but also of the Gentiles. Thus the worship of God would no longer be restricted as before to the temple of Jerusalem, but the true worshippers might everywhere worship in Spirit and in truth. Nor otherwise is Christ called by John the Baptist "the lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world" (Jn. 1:29), and by the evangelist "the propitiation not for our sins only" (i.e., the Jews) "but also for the sins of the whole world" (1 Jn. 2:2), i.e., of the other nations. Thus he would accomplish a common good to the whole church and designate those who at the same time were about to believe and who were scattered over various regions of the world (as Calvin explains it). Nor is it a new and unusual thing for "the world" to be taken not always in its whole latitude, but to be restricted to some certain ones out of the world: as when it is put for the Gentiles in opposition to the Jews, "if the fall of them be the riches of the world" (Rom. 11:12); for the world of the wicked, of which Christ says, "I pray not for the world" (Jn. 17:9) and "the whole world lieth in wickedness" (1 Jn. 5:19); for the world of believers when Christ says, "I will give my flesh for the life of the world" (Jn. 6:51), not indeed of the world of the reprobate (who remain always in death), but of the elect (who are made alive through Christ); and "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them" (2 Cor. 5:19). It is true of the elect alone that they are actually reconciled to God and that their sins will not be imputed unto them. Why then should "the world" not be taken universally for individuals, but indefinitely for anyone (Jews as well as Gentiles, without distinction of nation, language and condition) that he may be said to have loved the human race inasmuch as he was unwilling to destroy it entirely, but decreed to save some certain person out of it; not only from one people as before, but from all indiscriminately although the effects of that love should not be extended to each individual, but only to some certain ones (viz., those chosen out of the world)? And nothing is more frequent in common conversation than to attribute to a community something with respect to some certain individual, not to all.

XXXI. The words which follow ("that whosoever believeth in him") are not exceptive or restrictive of the object (as if from that world beloved by God believers alone are declared to be those actually to be saved). Rather they are exegetical or designative of the means and condition by the intervention of which salvation is promised and will be conferred (to intimate that no one can be a partaker of so great a benefit except through faith). Thus it pertains to all believers and them alone, not eventually but definitely (to wit, as many as would believe from the decree of God). Thus Christ in one verse embraces the whole structure of salvation: the leading (*proēgoumenēn*) cause—the love of God; the object—the world; the means acquiring—Christ; applying—faith; and the end—salvation

and eternal life. Nor can the world which God is said to have loved and which Christ came to save be distributed into believers and unbelievers (Jn. 3:18). Rather only the necessity of faith is confirmed (as the only means by which we can enjoy Christ). For after he said, "He came into the world not to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved" (because the end of Christ's advent is not the destruction of men, but their salvation—for there was no necessity for Christ to come into the world to destroy men, who will perish sufficiently by their own fault) that no one might think his advent pertained to each and every man whether they would believe or not, he confirmed what he had said before concerning the necessity of faith to signify that it was destined only for believers, all others being excluded: "He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already" (Jn. 3:18).

XXXII. The universal particles which often occur here are not always employed in their whole extent, but sometimes more broadly, sometimes more strictly, according to the subject matter. Sometimes they denote the whole of the nations in distinction to the Old Testament economy where salvation was only of the Jews. Thus the passage of Paul must be explained when he says that "God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all" (Rom. 11:32). This ought not to be referred to each and every one, but only to the peoples of whom he treats—to teach that the Jews as well as Gentiles were concluded in unbelief that the mercy of God might be exercised towards both distributively, Jews as well as Gentiles. This is evident from the very connection of the words (Rom. 11:30, 31). Thus we understand his words, "Whosoever believeth shall not be ashamed, for there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek; for the same Lord over all, is rich unto all that call upon him" (Rom. 10:11, 12). Here also belongs the passage: "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: but in every nation he that feareth him, is accepted with him" (Acts 10:34, 35). (2) Sometimes the universality of conditions and states is designated in opposition to worldly polities. Thus distinctions are made between slaves and the free, the poor and the rich, men and women, the noble and the ignoble. But in the dispensation of grace, God attends to no such thing, nor accepts the person, but calls to communion with him indiscriminately all of whatever state and condition and sex. Thus we understand the place where "the grace that bringeth salvation" is said to "have appeared to all men" (Tit. 2:11, 12), i.e., to everyone of whatever condition they may be, whether masters or servants. For of these he was speaking in the preceding verse, and after having exhorted masters to treat their servants kindly, he immediately adds—"For the grace that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all," i.e., to them as well as to you. Also "in Christ there is neither circumcision nor uncircumcision, bond nor free, Barbarian nor Scythian; but Christ is all, and in all" (Col. 3:11)—not in each and every individual, but in all indiscriminately of whatever order, sex, nation and condition. (3) Sometimes the whole of believers and the world of the elect (as opposed to the world of the reprobate and unbelievers) is understood. Thus all are said "to live in Christ just as in Adam all die" (1 Cor. 15:22). Not that there is the same latitude of those living as those dying, for many more die in Adam than are saved in Christ. With regard to the whole of believers, as many as perish and die, die in Adam; so as many as are made alive, are made alive in Christ. For these two heads are compared with each other, not as to amplitude of object, but

as to analogy of the mode of communication. As Adam communicates sin to all his posterity and death through sin, so Christ bestows righteousness upon all his members and life through righteousness. So Rom. 5:18, 19 is to be explained where a comparison is made between Adam and Christ, not as to extent, but as to similarity of operation. Thus the world is taken for the whole of the elect and believers (2 Cor. 5:19). In this sense, Augustine places two worlds in the world. "The whole world," says he, "is the church, and the whole world hates the church: the world therefore hates the world, the enemy the reconciled, the damned the saved" ("Tractate 87," *On the Gospel of John* [NPNF1, 7:355; PL 35.1853]; cf. also Prosper, *The Call of the Nations* 1.3 [ACW 14:28]).

XXXIII. Although God protests that "he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but in his conversion and life" (Ezk. 33:11), it does not follow that from eternity he willed and intended under any condition the conversion and life of each and every man. For besides the fact that conversion cannot be intended under any condition (because it is itself a condition), it is certain that here is treated the will of *euarestias* and of complacency, not the will of good pleasure (*eudokias*) (which the verb *chpts* proves, meaning everywhere to be pleased and to hold as grateful, to imply that God is pleased with the conversion and life of the sinner as a thing grateful to him and agreeing with his perfectly merciful nature, rather than with his destruction, and therefore exacts it from man as a bounden duty to be converted if he desires to live). But although he wills not (i.e., is not pleased with the death of the sinner, as it denotes the destruction of a creature), yet he does not cease to will and intend it as an exercise of his justice and as the occasion of manifesting his glory (Prov. 1:26; 1 S. 2:34). Take, for example, a pious magistrate who is not pleased with the death of the guilty, yet does not cease justly to decree their punishment in accordance with the laws. Nor is it the case that if God does not properly intend their repentance and salvation, does he to no purpose say to the reprobate who are invited to repentance, "Why will ye die?" For he rightly shows them by these words what they must do to avoid death and that by their voluntary impenitence, they alone are the cause of their own destruction, not God. For although by the decree of reprobation, he had passed them by and determined not to give them faith, yet no less voluntarily do they sin and so obstinately bring down their own destruction upon themselves.

XXXIV. When Paul says, "God will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. 2:4), he does not favor the universality of grace. This is true whether with some we refer the verb "to will" to the will *euarestias* to teach that God is pleased with the salvation and conversion of men and invites them to it by the preaching of the word. Furthermore, they wish this to belong—that it is said God wills them "to be saved" (*sōthēnai*), but not "to save" (*sōzein*) them because from the revealed will of approbation to the secret will of good pleasure the consequence does not hold good. Or we may understand the will of good pleasure and of decree with Calvin and others. This seems more appropriate because the particle "all" is taken here not distributively (for the individuals of classes), but collectively (for classes of individuals), i.e., as Beza renders it "for all sorts" (*Annotationum maiorum in Novum Testamentum* [1594], Pars Altera, p. 444 on 1 Tim. 2:4) from every nation, condition, age and sex. In this sense, God wills not that all men individually, but some from every

class or order of men should be saved. As Augustine explains it, "All the human race distributed through whatever differences, kings, primates, noble, ignoble, lofty, humble, learned, unlearned . . . in all languages, in all manners, in all ages, in all professions, established in an innumerable variety of wills and consciences, and whatever other differences there may be among men" (*Enchiridion* 27 [103] [FC 3:457; PL 40.280]). This exposition is confirmed first by the fact that such a syncategoreme is most frequently used in Scripture in this sense: as when "all animals" are said to have been "in the ark," the Pharisees to have tithed "all herbs," Christ to have healed "all diseases" in the people, "all Jerusalem and Judea" to have gone out to John, that "all flesh" shall see the salvation of God, "all beasts" were in the great sheet of Peter, that God will pour out his Spirit upon "all flesh" and the like. Everyone sees these pertain not to individuals of classes, but to classes of individuals. (2) From equality because the Holy Spirit elsewhere supplies us with this sense where believers give thanks to Christ because he redeemed "them out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation" (Rev. 5:9), i.e., not each and every man, but indiscriminately out of all conditions and people. (3) The design of Paul demands this, which is to show that even heathen magistrates are contained under the object of prayers, and that God must be supplicated for them although they then were enemies of the church. This might raise scruples in the minds of many. Paul removes these when he says, "God will have all men to be saved" (i.e., from all ranks of men and so can take some even of kings and emperors). And since we do not know who they are, it is our duty to pray for all. (4) The circumstances of the passage confirm this. The apostle exhorts us to pray "in every place" (1 Tim. 2:8); not in each and every place (in which we cannot be), but indiscriminately in any place, as distinguished from the old dispensation where worship was restricted to the temple of Jerusalem. He wishes us to pray for "all men"; not that we ought to pray for each and every one in particular, since we are not to pray for those who sin unto death (1 Jn. 5:16), but indiscriminately for everyone, so as to exclude no order and state of men from our prayers, since from every state he can gather his own elect. (5) He wills all to be saved in the same manner as that in which he "wills them to come unto the knowledge of truth" which it is evident has not been done with respect to many, nor is done at this day. If God wills this, how does it happen that it is not done, since his will properly so called is always efficacious and accomplishes what he wills and which nothing can resist? Again, God wills them all to come to the knowledge of the truth either absolutely (and so all would come to it, which is false) or under a condition. But what can that be? If they hear it? But he does not have it preached to many. If they believe? But to believe is to have arrived already at the knowledge of the truth. (6) God wills all those to be saved for whom Christ gave himself as a ransom (*antilytron*) (as their Mediator by substituting himself in their place and suffering in their stead the punishment due to them) so that this is immediately added by the apostle (1 Jn. 5:6). Now this cannot be said of each and every man in particular without by that very thing each and every man being actually saved (which no one would say).

XXXV. Although we say that the word "all" is to be referred to classes of individuals, not to the individuals of classes, it does not follow that prayers ought to be conceived for classes only, or for ideas, but not for individuals. Singulars must be distinguished from individuals. The will of God is not indeed terminated on the

classes, but on the singulars collected from them, and ought not therefore to be carried further to individuals. Thus when we say that we must pray for any people, we do not wish to pray for states and conditions of men, but for the undivided singulars in each class; not definitely for individuals, but indefinitely for any people; not so much positively (as if we should include all and particular persons in our prayers) as negatively (because we exclude no one precisely from our prayers). Neither is this to be understood precisely and in the philosophical sense (as if there were absolutely no race of men or nation from which in any time some would not be saved). Rather it is to be understood in the popular sense because there is no nation, no condition of men, excluded from salvation and from which God cannot (when he pleases) call some to a participation of salvation (although this may not usually be done either at all times or in all places). Still man is the most particular species in the genus of being, yet not in the genus of character (since men can be distributed into various classes either with regard to origin or with regard to conditions or kind of life).

XXXVI. Although the apostle commands us "to pray for all men," he does not immediately will that prayers should be conceived for each and everyone, since there are some for whom we must not pray. Rather he only commands that we should pray for men without distinction, for whatever order and religion they may be, even for emperors (although heathen and enemies of Christ). Nor if it was our duty to pray for each and every one in particular, would it follow that God wills each and every man to be saved. For our prayers are not founded upon the decree of God concerning the salvation of men (which is hidden from us), but only upon the command of God (who here commands us as the duty of love by which we are bound to our neighbor) and upon the economy of grace (in which we know that God indiscriminately wills to call men from every nation and order). For since it is one part to hope well for all, nor can it be known what God has purposed with himself concerning the salvation or destruction of individuals, we can exclude no one by name as if already infallibly lost (unless we know that he has sinned unto death). Rightly therefore we may pray for all that those who are of the election of God may be brought unto salvation. Thus the argument of the apostle proceeds rightly that we should pray for Nero, not because God wills those who are preserved to be saved, but because even from the ranks of emperors and kings he may have elected some to salvation; and because he may have among them those whom he wills to save (to whom on that account we ought not to deny the benefit of our prayers, so that if perchance some of those whom we commend to God in our prayers may be of that number, their salvation can be promoted by our desires).

XXXVII. Because the authors of this new method are accustomed frequently to appeal to Calvin (as if they taught nothing but what was already formerly delivered by him), it pleases us to refer here to the words of that illustrious man on this passage, in which (as a masterpiece) they place the principal defense of their cause (which sufficiently prove how far he differed from their opinion). For so far from agreeing with them, he expressly denies that the apostle treats here of individual men and teaches that we must simply understand "that neither any people nor order of the world is excluded from salvation, since God wills the gospel to be proposed to all without exception" (*Second Epistle . . . to the Corinthians . . . Timothy, Titus and Philemon* [trans. T.A. Smail, 1964], pp. 208-9). And after-

wards: "But the discourse concerns classes of men, not particular persons; for he means nothing else than to include princes and foreign nations in this world" (ibid., p. 209). This is confirmed in his sermon on the passage where he proves at large that it does not treat of the individuals of classes, but of classes of individuals; he goes so far as to consider those who think differently to be disturbers and obstinate. "How can the dictum of these disturbers hold good—God wills all men (i.e., each individual) to be saved? If he wills this now he also willed it always; if he willed it always, what becomes of that which the apostle adds, that he wills all to come to the knowledge of the truth?" ("Sermon 13," *Sermons . . . on . . . Timothie and Titus* [1579], p. 152). Thus it is in the work *Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God* (trans., J.K.S. Reid, 1961) which carries before it the expression "The Agreement of the . . . Church of Geneva" (p. 45): "He wills them to be saved in the same manner as he wills them to come to the knowledge of the truth, for Paul connects these two things together. Now I ask whether the same will was established by God from the beginning or not. For if he willed his truth to be known by all, why did he not publish his law to the Gentiles also? Why did he keep the light of life shut up in the narrow confines of Judea" (p. 108; CR 36.302). Calvin often confirms this very thing in the same treatise: "Now Pighius confidently says that God wills all men to be saved when not even the external preaching of the doctrine, which yet is far inferior to the illumination of the Spirit, is common to all" (ibid., p. 109). And a little after: "This is extorted from Pighius, that no one, unless deprived of sense and judgment, can believe that salvation is appointed unto all by the secret counsel of God" (ibid.). "How humble will he be, who can neither bear to hear of the pristine misery from which he was delivered and extenuates, as much as he can, the beneficence of God extending promiscuously to all? Surely they are far from illustrating the grace of God according to merit who preach that it is common to all" (ibid., p. 57). And when Georgius repeatedly opposes the passage (1 Tim. 2:4): "But Paul teaches that God wills all men to be saved," he immediately replies, "Therefore he either confesses that God is not a performer of his will or all without exception will be saved" (ibid., p. 149). And in the same place: "If they answer that God will have all men to be saved as far as he can . . . why then did he not will the gospel to be preached indifferently to all from the beginning of the world? Why for so many ages did he suffer so many nations to wander in the shadows of death?" "If he willed the salvation of all, he would give them all into the custody of his Son and unite them all to his body by the sacred bond of faith. Now faith is evidently the peculiar pledge of his paternal love, reserved for his adopted children" (ICR 3.22.10, p. 946). "How is it then, if God will have all men to be saved, that he opens not the gate of repentance to those miserable men who would be more ready to receive the favor" (ICR 3.24.15, p. 982). "How God will have all men to be saved must not be anxiously doubted about because these two things have a close connection with each other: salvation and the knowledge of the truth. Now answer—if God willed to make known his truth to all, why has not his truth ever reached so many nations from the time that the gospel began to be promulgated? Finally, why has he not opened the eyes of all equally when the interior illumination of the Spirit, with which he has blessed only a few, is necessary to faith? This knot also must be untied by you; since no one can approach to God, unless drawn by the secret influence of the Spirit, why does he not draw all men promiscuously, as

he will have all men to be saved?" (*Calumniae Nebulonis . . . de Occulta Dei Providentia* CR 37.293).

XXXVIII. Although God can be said to will men to be saved who yet are not saved (when it treats of the will of complacency [*euarestias*] which commands man's duty and declares what is pleasing to God), yet this cannot be said equally of the will of decree. As many as God wills to be saved, he also wills to save and actually saves at the appointed time, that his will may not be rendered vain and frustrated. But in this question (as was just said), it is not treated simply of that which he holds dear and wills to be done by men, but of that which he himself wills to do towards men by destining to them salvation under the condition of faith, and determining to send Christ for this end that he might acquire it for them. Therefore they are mistaken who discover a hiding place in this distinction, as if in this affair the question were only whether God wills all men to be saved and not whether he wills to save them. These two propositions come to the same thing when understood of the will of good pleasure (*eudokias*) (concerning which we have proved before at the start of our question, and that God wills no one to be saved in this sense whom he does not also will to save).

XXXIX. When Peter testifies that "God is longsuffering to usward, and not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance" (2 Pet. 3:9), he does not favor in the least the cause of universalism. Either this relates to the will of precept and complacency (*euarestias*) by which men are invited to repentance by the preaching of the gospel and by repentance to life (which you would wrongly draw to the decree and intention of God); or (if you refer it to the decree—which pleases others and seems broader), it should not be extended further than to the elect and believers (for whose sake God puts off the consummation of ages until their number shall be completed and by whom, collected from the four corners of the world, the gospel ought to be preached in the whole world). Now to this it is evident the apostle looked: (1) from the pronoun "us" (which precedes with sufficient clearness destinating the elect and believers, as elsewhere more than once) and to explain which he adds "not willing that any" (i.e., of us) "should perish"; so that the pronoun should be repeated *apo koinou* as is often the case; and (2) from the fact that Peter wishes to give the reason of that longsuffering through which God puts off the consummation of the ages (which cannot be drawn from his command, but from his wise counsel for the sake of the elect, by which, as on account of the elect alone, he preserves the world, so he puts off the promise of his coming, even until each and every one of them is brought unto salvation, Rev. 6:11). Nor is it astonishing that, on account of the elect (no one of whom God wills to perish), the end of the world should be put off. For in like manner Christ observes "except those days would be shortened" (which were about to come to the whole of Judea) "there should no flesh be saved: but for the elect's sake those days shall be shortened" (Mt. 24:22). As therefore here the days of evil should be shortened on account of the elect Jews (that they might not be overwhelmed with the burden of calamities), so the last day is put off on account of the elect (who are to be brought to Christ, until their whole number be made up). Finally, he speaks of them whom God wills to come to repentance, not only by inviting to it by the precepts and promises of his word, but by working it by the efficacy of the Spirit (since he speaks of those in whom the promise of God should be fulfilled [Mt. 24:9, 13], who are no other than the

elect). Nor if God can be called "longsuffering" (*makrothymos*) towards the wicked by a delay of their punishment, does it immediately follow that it is the same longsuffering (*makrothymian*) of which Peter speaks (i.e., that by which he delays his judgments upon the world on account of the elect and waits for the time in which their number shall be completed). Nor was it useless to admonish Christians of this (although a mystery of undoubted verity) because it would have the best effect in the consolation of believers and in strengthening their minds against the temptations which would arise from the delay in the fulfillment of God's promises.

XL. While God may be called philanthropic (*philanthrōpos*), it is not necessary that he should love unto salvation each and every one. It is sufficient that he love some only in that sense (as he is called a lover of the Greeks [*philellēn*] who loves the Greek nation, although not forthwith all the individuals of it). So God is with propriety called "the lover of men" (*philanthrōpos*), not "of angels" (*philangelos*) because while he loved no one of the fallen angels, he has loved some men. Otherwise the passage cannot be explained in Titus 3:4. There mention is once made of "love toward man" (*philanthrōpias*); yet it is certain that he there speaks of those who were really and actually saved by justification and regeneration (which pertains to the elect alone).

XLI. God wills those to be saved (whom he wills to repent and believe) in the same manner in which he wills them to believe. If he wills them to believe decretively and effectively (as with respect to the elect), he also wills them to be saved in this respect and so they are really saved. If he wills only preceptively and approvingly (as with respect to the reprobate upon whom he enjoins faith and repentance), in the same manner also he wills them to be saved (i.e., that he approves of and is pleased with their salvation), but not immediately that he destines it to them or intends it either absolutely or conditionally (because the method of the decretive will differs from that of the preceptive and approving). God indeed ought necessarily to will what he commands, but in the manner in which he commands (i.e., as he wills its being enjoined, but not always as to the execution and issue). Nor immediately does he intend what is commanded, since many things are commanded which are by no means intended. Thus God commanded Pharaoh to let the people go and yet he cannot be said to have actually intended (either absolutely or conditionally) their dismission since he intended on the contrary the hardening of Pharaoh and the retention of the people. He ordered Abraham to offer up his son and yet did not intend his immolation. He commands all to obey the law which yet he does not intend. As therefore from the command to fulfil the law you would erroneously gather that God intends the perfect sanctification of men and their justification and life from it, so from the command to believe and repent, you would notwithstanding falsely infer that God by that very thing intended the faith and repentance and so the salvation of all those to whom such an external command is promulgated. But although the end of the command in the signified act and on the part of the thing may be said to be that they should believe and repent, yet it cannot be determined that this is the end intended on the part of God and in the exercised act (for if he had intended this, he would have procured and effected the necessary means by which it would be brought about). Therefore the precept signifies that God really wills to enjoin that upon us, but not that he really wills or intends that what is com-

manded should take place. Nor does the example of legislators (who will and intend, as much as they can, those things which they enjoin upon their citizens) pertain to this because in them cannot be distinguished (as in God) the will of decree and of precept (nor if they should have the strongest will to accomplish a thing, could they immediately give effect to it as God can).

XLII. Faith and repentance can be considered either as performed and fulfilled in man (i.e., in its formal and absolute being and as God produces them by his Spirit in him) or only as prescribed and commanded in material and intentional being (i.e., inasmuch as they are commanded under the promise of eternal life). In the former sense, they are well called "means to salvation" because by them salvation is most certainly to be obtained. In the latter sense, this is not so. Yea, salvation then properly does not have the relation of the end (which he who commands intends), but rather of the means and motive to excite obedience (which is the proper end of the precept, as it is a precept). Thus God wills preceptively with respect to the reprobate the means to salvation in its material, but does not will them effectively in its formal. He wills to teach the reprobate what means for salvation are furnished, but does not will to effect them (so that they should be performed by them as undoubted means of salvation to be obtained).

XLIII. The salvation set forth in the gospel promise can be considered in two lights: either as the end directly intended by the agent and as a good actually to be conferred; or as a good only to be offered and as a motive added to a precept in order to excite obedience. In the former sense, it truly falls under the effective decree of God because it cannot be possessed unless given by God. But in the latter sense, this is by no means true. It suffices that it falls under the decree of proposing, not of effecting. Again, salvation can pertain to the will of precept in two ways: either properly and directly or indirectly and reductively. In the first sense, it cannot fall under the precept because the precept and promise differ—the former belongs to duty, the latter to blessing. In the second, nothing hinders us from saying that it is reduced to the precept inasmuch as it is added to it as a spur to excite obedience in him to whom it is proposed.

XLIV. From a promise to a decree, the consequence does not hold good. If God promises a thing conditionally, he has not therefore decreed conditionally to give it. It suffices that the thing willed is conditional; it is not required that the volition itself should be conditional (i.e., he wills indeed that salvation should be given under a condition, but does not will under a condition that salvation shall be given). He intends absolutely to promise salvation under the condition of faith (not that the decree should be designated as conditional, but that the connection between faith and salvation may be indicated). The foundation, therefore, of the truth of the gospel promise is not to be drawn from the decree of God concerning persons, but from his wise ordination of things (and the inseparable connection between the means and the end—of faith and repentance with salvation); not to teach properly what God has actually decreed to confer upon this or that one, but what is the way and what are the means and condition necessary in order to obtain salvation (and what is in store for those having that condition). Therefore as the promise is made only to the one having the condition (and nothing is promised to the one not having it), so he has decreed to give nothing except to him who may have the prescribed condition. Not only does he will to give nothing to others, but he has even decreed to inflict punishment

upon them. Hence with the promise, a threat is always joined (Jn. 3:36). As God seriously wills that every believer and penitent should be saved, so he wills also every unbeliever and impenitent to be damned. You may say, if the reprobate would believe, he would be saved in virtue of the gospel promise; but he cannot be saved unless that promise is supposed to be extended to all. We answer: Who does not see that the argument is falsely drawn away from the thing conditioned to the absolute? For if the promise ought to pertain to him (if he would believe), it does not follow that it already pertains to him antecedent to his faith. Since it was destined by God to believers alone, no one can claim it for himself unless he actually believes (which no one does who is not elected). And to no purpose is such a hypothesis feigned which makes an opposition in the apposition; for if the reprobate would believe, by that very thing he would be no more a reprobate but an elect one (and consequently a true object of the gospel promise).

XLV. Although God does not will (i.e., intend to effect the salvation of the reprobate who are called), that external calling cannot on that account be termed fallacious and illusory and one in which God does not act in good faith (while he promises seriously what nevertheless he does not will to give). (1) The promise, as was just said, is not absolute, but conditional, promising nothing except upon a condition (which is fulfilled in the elect alone). (2) That calling is not such as to lay open the secret counsel of God concerning the salvation of this or that person, but only to prescribe in general to man his duty and set forth the infallible way of salvation (and they who follow this will necessarily be saved). In both God acts in the best faith, for he both prescribes most truly to man his duty and teaches the sole way of salvation, and most sincerely promises a blessing to the one doing his duty. Therefore he promises nothing which he does not will to give. For as he promises only to the one having the condition, so he also wills and intends to give salvation only to the believer and denounces punishment against the unbeliever. (3) He does not call in earnest who does not will (i.e., does not command and take pleasure that the one called should come whither he calls), but he does not cease to call in earnest who does not will (i.e., intend and decree effectively that the one called should respond to the call). To a serious call, it is not required that there should be a constant intention of actually bringing to oneself those who are called, but only that there should be the constant will of commanding duty and of promising a blessing to those who do it. So God seriously wills (i.e., commands man to obey the law that he may live, according to the brief clause of the covenant of works: "Do this and thou shalt live"). Yet he cannot for this reason be said to will (i.e., to intend) that man should fulfil the law and fulfilling live by it. (4) The opinion which we oppose is far more strongly pressed with the same difficulty. For on this hypothesis, God is made most seriously to desire and intend the salvation of men (provided they have faith) which yet he knows they have not (and cannot have of themselves), and which he himself decreed from eternity by an irrevocable decree not to give (who alone can). It is easy to decide whether this can be consistent with the sincerity of God. By this very thing, God is represented as testifying that he wills and does not will (at the same time) their salvation because he does not will that without which it cannot be obtained (as if anyone would say that he wills man to live, but yet willed that he should breathe).

XLVI. Although the external call is presented as much to the reprobate as to the elect, yet it is not presented in the same manner. To the latter, it has reference primarily, directly and principally. For by it he intends their faith and salvation; on account of them, he has instituted the ministry and provides for the preaching of the gospel, so that the scattered sons of God may be gathered (Jn. 11:52), and the church collected and edified (Eph. 4:11, 12), which would not have been done if there had been no elect in the world. Hence he does not call them only imperatively, but also operatively (by working in them by his Spirit the condition itself). But it has reference to the former only secondarily and indirectly because they are mixed with the elect (whom God intends by the word to bring out of the world unto salvation). Not that salvation may be said to be destined for them by God conditionally, but only that their duty is prescribed to them and the way of salvation exhibited. There does not cease therefore to be a multiple end of that calling with regard to them (although God has not decreed, nor intends, that they should respond to it and be saved). As legislator, he wills to prescribe to them their duty; as Lord, he wills kindly to show them the way of salvation; as Judge, he wills to convict them of contumacy and rebellion and to render them inexcusable (*anapologētous*).

XLVII. Although the intention of pastors in that calling agrees with the intention of God both in this—that they do nothing except by God's appointment whether in commanding faith or promising salvation; in which sense they are said to be the mouth of God and to beseech us in the name of Christ (2 Cor. 5:19, 20); and in this—that both properly intend the salvation of the elect alone and not of the reprobate; yet they do not agree in all respects. For ministers are unable to distinguish between the elect and reprobate, and do not know by name those who will or will not believe. They address all promiscuously, and only indistinctly are able to promote the salvation of the elect because they are unknown to them. They may undoubtedly desire from the promptings of love that all should be saved. Nor ought they to despair absolutely of the salvation of anyone (unless they consider him to have sinned unto death and to be really a reprobate), since God can call men in the very last hour. Therefore they are bound diligently to perform their duty towards all sinners. They would involve themselves in great guilt before God, if in the perdition of any they could be accused of a neglect of duty as long as any hope of emendation remained. To this pertains what Paul says, "that he exhorted every man, that he might present every man perfect in Christ" (Col. 1:28). To teach that, he did what was incumbent upon him that he might promote the salvation of everyone (whether Jew or Gentile) committing the event to God. At another time, he (the hardening [*pōrōsei*] and rejection of the Jews being known), after shaking his raiment, left them and turned himself to the Gentiles (Acts 18:6; 13:46). But God knows his own, and those for whose salvation and conversion alone he has destined calling. He also distinctly and formally intends their salvation by it, but not that of others whom he knows were reprobated by him from eternity (and either do not truly follow, or never will follow, and whose salvation, therefore, he cannot intend, but rather the detection of the wickedness of their hearts [Lk. 2:35], and their inexcusability on the supposition of their contumacy [Rom. 1:20; Jn. 15:22], as the event itself clearly shows). Nor must it be said here that the question concerns the mind and will of the caller, it does not concern the event of the call. For the event

itself (which depends upon the most free and wise dispensation of God) sufficiently indicates what was the mind and will of the caller, since nothing can happen beyond his intention.

XLVIII. Although Christ was no more destined for the salvation of the reprobate than of the devils (and in this respect they are alike, that the damnation of both is irrevocable), on that account there is not an equal relation of both in all respects. First, because Christ did not take on him the nature of angels, but the seed of Abraham (Heb. 2:16); he was sent not for devils, but for men. So it is rightly proposed to men alone and not to devils (from whom all hope of salvation is taken away). Second, because the devils (with the damned being constituted out of the way) are now in a penal state where they suffer the punishment of their crimes. Nor can they be called any more even imperatively. But as the reprobate are still in the way (as long as they live upon the earth where they are tolerated with great patience by God, while their punishment is as yet put off) and their reprobation is not known as yet to themselves, nothing hinders them from being called. Thus they may understand their duty and may not plead ignorance as a pretext for their impenitence.

Eighteenth Question: The Order of the Divine Decrees in Predestination

Is any order to be admitted in the divine decrees, and what is it?

I. Although Christian piety might readily spare this question, if men, content with the things revealed, would be content with knowing sensibly and would never strive to break into the secrets of God, for the purpose of rashly searching into his inscrutable (*anexereunēta*) counsels and minutely dividing his decrees (as if God was to be measured by the human rule); still the pertinacity of our adversaries has rendered it necessary in some degree. Under a new and preposterous order of God's decrees, they have introduced a new and dangerous doctrine against the grace of God and in favor of the free will of man. To meet them, a few things must be said concerning the order of the decrees so that it may be evident whether any order is to be admitted in them, what is the true and genuine order from the word of God, and what is the false order.

Whether an order is to be admitted in the decrees of God.

II. Although in the decrees (considered formally on the part of God), order cannot properly be attended to (because they are not many and divided acts, but one only and a most simple act by which he from eternity decreed all things), yet there is no objection to ascribing a certain order to them. As they are considered objectively and on our part (with regard to our mode of conception, since the things decreed are manifold and most diverse and have a mutual dependency and subordination, mutually), some order must necessarily be conceived in them (according to which, some may be said, and may be distinctly perceived by us, to be prior or posterior to others).

III. Now since there are two principal works of God which ought to proceed from his decree—the one of creation and nature; the other of redemption and grace—two decrees must here be conceived before the others. The first concerns the work of creation; the other concerns the work of redemption (between

which, as the means, comes in the decree concerning the permission of the fall of the human race). Again, as the work of redemption has various parts (some of which bear the relation of end and others of means; some pertain to the mission of Christ, others to calling and others to glorification), so diverse decrees can be conceived according to their diversity. But in what order they are to be placed, when so compared, is not agreed upon.

The first opinion of the supralapsarians concerning the order of the decrees.

IV. They who ascend above the fall (*supra Lapsum*) or creation to determine the object of predestination think the various decrees which are conceived by us about the state of man should be so arranged that the decree of predestination should be made to precede the decree of creation and the permission of the fall. God should be conceived to have contemplated the manifestation of his glory in the exercise of mercy and justice as to the salvation and damnation of men before he contemplated the creation of man or the permission of his fall. So that the creation and the permission of the fall have the relation of means to the manifestation of his mercy and justice as the end. The first decree, according to them, concerns the manifestation of God's glory in the exercise of mercy and justice through the salvation and damnation of men; the second concerns the creation; the third concerns the permission of the fall; the fourth concerns the sending of Christ for the salvation of those whom he had decreed to save.

V. Although this order contains nothing absolutely repugnant to the foundation of salvation and the analogy of faith (and has pleased great men and those deserving well of the church), yet various objections hinder its reception (as was fully proved before, Question 9). We add these considerations also—that this order seems harsher and less suitable. (1) On this hypothesis, the first act of God's will towards some of his creatures is made to be an act of hatred, inasmuch as he willed to demonstrate his justice in their damnation (indeed before they were considered in sin, and consequently before they were worthy of hatred; yea, while they were considered as innocent and so the object rather of love, which does not appear to agree sufficiently with his unspeakable goodness). (2) It is also harsh because, according to this order, God is considered to have imparted to them by far the greatest effects of love from a principle of hatred, while he is made to create them in a state of integrity for the purpose of illustrating his justice in their damnation (which seems to indicate that he is neither perfectly good nor perfectly wise and just). (3) It is falsely supposed that God exercises an act of mercy and justice towards his creatures in the destination of salvation and destruction who are neither miserable nor guilty; yea, who are not even conceived of as yet existing. Now since these virtues are respective, they presuppose and do not make their object. (4) It is also gratuitously asserted that the creation and the fall are the means of election and reprobation, since they are antecedent to them. Otherwise sin would be on account of damnation, while on the contrary, damnation is on account of sin and God might be said to have created men whom he would destroy.

The second opinion—that of the Arminians.

VI. The Arminians, having fallen into the other but far more dangerous extreme, thrust in Pelagian doctrines under the pretext of a new order and so dispose the order of the decrees as to establish in the matter of salvation four decrees in subordination to each other. The first is that by which he decreed to constitute his Son, Jesus Christ, as Mediator and Savior of the fallen human race; to abolish sin by his death; recover by his obedience the lost salvation; and communicate it by his power. The second is that by which he decreed to receive into favor penitents and believers and to save through and on account of Christ those persevering even unto the end. On the other hand, he decreed to leave in sin and damn eternally the impenitent and unbelieving. The third is that by which he decreed the means sufficiently necessary for repentance and faith, and efficaciously to supply them to all. The fourth is that by which he decreed to save or damn by name some certain and particular persons whom he foresaw from eternity would or would not believe. These four decrees they think are thus subordinated to each other: (1) the destination of Christ as Mediator who should acquire for sinners the right to salvation; (2) the ordination of faith and perseverance as the condition of the salvation to be communicated; (3) the ordination of the means to the end by the help of which sinners may believe and persevere; (4) the ordination of salvation itself, made for particular persons as believing and persevering (to which the ordination of damnation against the finally impenitent and unbelieving corresponds). The three former decrees are general, regarding the whole human race indefinitely without respect to particular individuals and under which as a foundation universal grace is laid (or the benevolent affection of God towards the whole human race by which he ordained indiscriminately to each and every sinner in particular, Christ as Mediator, faith as the condition of salvation, the means also to faith). The last is particular by which he determined the salvation or destruction of individuals as he foresaw they would or would not believe. Thus the connection of this with the three others is not necessary, but contingent and eventual, inasmuch as it could happen that Christ, being given as Mediator, and the law of faith being laid down and the means supplied for it, no one would believe and be saved, but the whole be damned. For the grace bestowed upon them is always supposed to be resistible, i.e., which man can at pleasure either receive or reject. Thus the Remonstrants set forth their opinion concerning the order of the decrees in the Synodical Acts (cf. *Acta Synodi Nationalis . . . Dordrechti* [1620], Pt. II, pp. 14ff.).

VII. This order impinges upon the truth and the form of sound doctrines in many ways, and draws after itself the most weighty errors. (1) In general, it is a capital error because in it the doctrine of gratuitous predestination is corrupted and delivered over to the mind of the Pelagians (while it is suspended upon man and the powers of free will, inasmuch as election is supposed to be made from foreseen faith and from a good use of free will). (2) According to this hypothesis, election and reprobation are acts of justice, depending upon God as Judge, who is said to elect believers and reprobate unbelievers. Accordingly, no more place would be given to the objections (urged by Paul in Rom. 9), why he should have elected or reprobated this and not that one. On the contrary, the Scripture constantly asserts that these depend on the sole good pleasure (*eudokia*) of God and are acts of his mere good pleasure as the supreme God, who can do with his own

what he pleases. (3) According to this opinion, God only foresees but does not produce faith. For the sufficient grace which is said to be conferred (being common to all) cannot distinguish certain men from others. Thus that discrimination will be a work of nature and of free will, and not of grace and of the Holy Spirit. This is contrary to the express words of Scripture which calls forth the gift of God, and usually attributes the cause of the difference between men, not to men, but to grace alone (1 Cor. 4:7; Eph. 2:8). (4) According to this hypothesis, there would be no election to faith, but only to salvation. Yet God cannot elect to salvation (as the end) without also electing to faith (as the means) (cf. Ps. 65:4; Acts 13:48; Rom. 8:30). (5) There is not so much a distinction laid down of those to be saved and to be damned, as the mere prescribing of the condition under which men are to be saved or damned. (6) If the end of this whole doctrine is more closely attended to, it will be discovered to be nothing else than to introduce Pelagianism and papism (newly white-washed) to replace (in the citadel) the idol of free will and to weaken the grace of Christ by a more subtle method indeed (but so much more dangerous than before). This can be easily gathered from an examination of particulars.

VIII. For all these decrees labor under this defect, that not even in word do they touch upon the true nature of election. For the Scripture teaches that the decree of election is eternal, immutable, absolute and thus practical and efficacious or energetic (*energētikon*) (Mt. 11:25; 13:11; Acts 13:48; Rom. 8:28, 29). Whence almost as often as it speaks of the good pleasure (*peri tēs eudokias*) in this mystery, it immediately mentions the energy (*tēs energeias*) with which God works all in all (Eph. 1:11; Phil. 2:13), to teach that it is not the contemplation of God unconcernedly looking on, but the highest and most efficacious love of God infallibly operating. But here all things are various, revocable, conditional and suspended on the faith of men. Nothing save a merely speculative and as it were, doubtful event is attributed to God. No mention is made of efficacious and irrevocable election. For these two decrees which with them come principally under the name of predestination (to wit, the second and fourth) cannot pertain to election, nor are they properly acts of God, nor does the second work anything. For in truth, by the second (by which he determined to save believers and condemn unbelievers) faith is only chosen as the condition of salvation, but not of any individual mortals. The fourth (by which he decreed by name to save those whom he foresaw would believe) decrees nothing new, but only foreknows those who (according to the rule of the second decree) will arrive at salvation or not. (2) Predestination is delivered in the word as always referred to particular individuals. Among them, it is determined according as they are either made vessels of grace or vessels of wrath; are destined to life or to destruction (Rom. 8:29, 30; Rom. 9:11, 16; Eph. 1:4, 5; Jn. 10:26; 13:18; 17:6, 12). Far different however are the decrees of the Arminians. The first and third decrees are occupied indefinitely about the human race; the second is concerned only with the qualities of those to be saved or damned (without any distinction of persons). The fourth is indeed occupied about particular persons, but contingently and eventually (i.e., on account of those qualities which can be present in or about the subject in which they are). Nor does it so much respect persons, as faith in the persons (according as it is foreseen as about to be in man from a good use of grace and free will). (3) The grace of predestination according to the Scripture is

particular to some certain persons, not common to all (Mt. 11:25, 26; Rom. 8:29; 9:11, 16, 18; Eph. 1:4, 5); but the grace built upon the first three decrees is common to each and every one, since it is placed in universal mercy, universal redemption and universal calling.

IX. (4) Predestination to life necessarily includes the decree of God's giving faith and perseverance (Acts 13:48; Rom. 8:29, 30). And the promise concerning the giving of faith to the elect no less pertains to the circuit of the gospel covenant (Heb. 8:10; Eph. 2:8; Phil. 1:29), than the promise concerning the giving of salvation to believers. But there is nothing concerning the gift of faith in those four decrees: neither in the first, which is about the mission of Christ; nor in the second, which establishes faith as the condition of salvation, but determines nothing concerning its donation with respect to certain persons; nor in the third, which is about calling to faith and the administration of the means for it (because since that sufficient grace is not irresistible, it depends upon the will of man to use it or not); nor in the fourth, which is founded upon the foresight of faith and which presupposes it from common grace only as to God. Rather the gift of faith is from the special determination of the believer and perseverer himself as the proper and proximate cause of both.

X. (5) The Scripture mentions only one election, which is definite and complete, particular and absolute, eternal and irrevocable. But the school of Arminius feigns a twofold: one general, indefinite, incomplete, conditional and revocable; the other complete, peremptory, definite and irrevocable (which can obtain in the very end of life and after death because it is suspended on final perseverance). Finally, according to this hypothesis, the object of predestination is believers alone or unbelievers called (to whom grace is presented in time). Thus all infants and most of the Gentiles (who never were the partakers of calling) are falsely excluded from it (cf. Question 15 above).

XI. If, however, we descend deeper into the examination of these decrees, it will not be difficult to discover the manifold repugnance of them to the genuine doctrine of predestination delivered in the Scripture. I speak of the first (regarding the mission of Christ). (1) The Scripture testifies that Christ was ordained and given to death for those given to him from the Father by name (Jn. 17:2, 6, 9); for his sheep (Jn. 10:11, 26, 29); for his people (Mt. 1:21); and for the church (Eph. 5:25). However by this first decree, he is destined for the human race universally, and that ordination is supposed to have been made in uncertainty before God had determined anything with himself concerning the salvation of anyone by name. (2) From the decree of the Father, Christ could not die in vain, but should efficaciously redeem and save those for whom he died (Tit. 2:14; Gal. 2:21; Eph. 5:25). But this first decree being laid down, Christ might have died and yet no one have been saved if, namely, none would have complied with the condition of the covenant. Thus he would be a Savior without any saved, the head without members, and a king without subjects. (3) From the Father's counsel, Christ was sent to acquire salvation for us and actually to obtain for his own remission of sins, the gift of the Holy Spirit and eternal life. Otherwise he could be called neither our Savior or Surety (on the part of God, as of men) nor the author and prince of salvation, the leader and consummator of our faith. But according to this first decree, he did not acquire these things for us, but for his Father (the possibility or the right of again acting with sinful man and of prescribing to him new

conditions of salvation, the promise of grace and of the remission of sins being added). Thus he is considered to have acquired not so much salvation as the possibility of salvation by removing the obstacle of justice, which hindered God from making a new covenant with us. What else is this than to enervate the cross of Christ and to make of none effect his most perfect merit?

XII. In the second, there is no less repugnancy (while that is maintained to be the whole and entire decree of predestination which does not even pertain to it). (1) By predestination, God decreed what he himself wills to do concerning us and not what he may order us to do. But this decree (by which he determined to save believers and to damn unbelievers) has reference only to external calling (which prescribes to men their duty) and tends only to this: that the conditions and qualities of those to be saved (and not their persons) are chosen; what kind of persons are to be saved, not who. (2) Election is a certain and definite act of good pleasure by which he willed to have mercy unto salvation upon some certain persons in preference to others and decreed to give Christ and faith to them. But this decree is indefinite and vague (referring to no one by name) and does not give but supposes faith. In the third (which is concerned with the dispensation of means beyond what have been mentioned), we mark also these contrarieties to what is written (*antigrapha*), both with respect to the object and to the mode. (a) The means to faith and salvation are maintained to be supplied sufficiently and efficaciously to each and every one, so that no one will be damned except those who reject these means by their own free will. On the contrary, the Scripture in many places testifies that they are furnished not to each and every one, but to some certain persons only by the good pleasure (*eudokia*) of God (Ps. 147:19; Mt. 11:25; 13:11; Rom. 8:28, 29). This is true in the Old as well as in the New Testament. (b) These means are supposed to be dispensed in an irresistible and common manner so that (whatever operation of this grace is laid down) there always remains to the will its own indifference (*adiaphoria*) and liberty—either of admitting or of rejecting it. The Scripture everywhere teaches that grace to be irresistible and invincible, bestowing not only strength to believe, but the very act of faith itself (which no will of man can resist). Finally, as to the fourth, concerning the saving of those who will believe; besides the fact that it is already embraced in the second and coincides with it (nor is it properly a decree which established something new, but the application of the preceding decree), the Pelagian prevision is here brought back. This makes God to depend upon man and grace on free will. It holds such an election as has for its object man considered only in the end of life and of which no sense or fruit except a conditional can be realized by anyone in this life. Since all these things are dangerous (also contrary to what is written [*antigrapha*] and untheological [*atheologa*], wholly destroying the gratuitous election of God and erecting again the idol of free will), they have thus far constantly and deservedly been rejected by the orthodox.

The third opinion, of those who hold universal grace.

XIII. The third opinion about the order of the decrees belongs to those among the Reformed who hold to universal grace and who, moreover, so divide the divine decrees, that in various particulars they approach to the hypotheses of the Remonstrants, while in others they depart from them. For they also make four decrees: two general and two particular. The first, general—concerns Christ being given as

Mediator to the human race to remove, by his satisfaction, the obstacle of divine justice and to open the way of salvation to each and every one. Another concerns universal calling by which God determined (the satisfaction being made by Christ) to call each and every one to salvation and to offer the grace in Christ obtained by means sufficient in themselves. Both of these are founded on the universal philanthropy (*philanthrōpia*) and mercy of God by which, having pitied the human race, he willed to give Christ as the universal remedy, that whosoever believes in him should not perish, but might have eternal life, and provides that the same should be offered to each and every one under the condition of faith and repentance. However because he foresaw that no one would believe on account of the innate depravity of man and that the gospel of Christ would be rejected by all, they maintain that God then by a special decree elected some to whom he would give Christ and would furnish with faith (whom afterwards he determined to save, others being left in their voluntary unbelief and impenitency). Therefore a twofold special decree must be attended to here: the one concerning the giving of faith to some; the other concerning the giving of salvation to them (which arises from the special love wherewith God pursues his chosen ones). The general decree respects the human race promiscuously and determines nothing concerning persons individually. The special, however, respects them by name by selecting some from others. The general is occupied with objective grace which is given to each and every one. The special is occupied about the subjective and either the giving or the denial of it. The general tends to the taking away of the external impediment to salvation, placed in the impossibility (*adynamia*) of satisfying the justice of God for sin. The special, however, is occupied in removing the internal, placed in the impossibility (*adynamia*) of believing. The general is founded upon a desire of giving salvation or upon a will seriously desiring the salvation of men (and moreover destining Christ to acquire it, but not unfolding the omnipotence for bestowing it); but the special depends on a will potentially efficacious or effective. In the general, Christ is given to all, but not faith; and salvation is promised, but under a condition. In the special, the condition itself is promised and faith is given. The general is said to be of God as legislator who prescribes to men faith in Christ as the necessary condition and duty, if they desire to be saved (according to the formula of the evangelical covenant "believe and thou shalt be saved"). The special, however, depends upon the same one as the manager and dispenser of events, under which habitude (*schesei*) he determines not only what man ought to do, but what in fact he will or will not do, and what God himself has decreed to work in him.

XIV. Although this order truly differs in the principal head from the above stated order of the Arminians (viz., in the special decree, which these are unwilling to acknowledge, in order the more easily to defend the indifference [*adiaphorian*] of free will and the resistibility of grace), they who are part of this opinion agree as to this part with those who urge the particularity of grace. But in the other decrees (which are general), it cannot be denied that they accede to the order of the Remonstrants and are confirmed by almost the same arguments. Now the reasons can be sufficiently collected why that new method (although brought forward with much parade [*meta pollēs phantasias*], brought forward as the most fit for explaining places of Scripture and blunting the weapons of adversaries) could not be received by our churches. This will be further evidenced also from the

inconveniences which follow the establishment of this order in the divine decrees. For (not to repeat what we before objected against the general decrees of the Arminians, which are nonetheless opposed to these) who does not see in these two decrees (to wit, the general and the special) those things are connected which cannot easily be reconciled, much less that they could be performed by one single and most simple act of will by which all things are decreed by God, since they necessarily demand a succession of prior and posterior? By the general decree, he wills the salvation of all and by the special of only a few; by that, he loves exceedingly those whom by this he hates and turns away from; by the former he determined to give Christ and to call to faith and repentance before reprobating; by the latter, however, he reprobates those whom he foresees will be rebellious to the call and so consequently only to the decree of calling. On this account the more, because on this hypothesis it is maintained that there would be no sincerity in the calling unless the decree of calling precedes the decree of reprobation. Yea, from this very fact that the general decree is said to be necessarily prior to the special, it is plainly deduced that these not only cannot be conceived by us together and at once, but cannot be even in God unless successively. In vain, however, is it said that we also make a prior and a posterior in God when we put the decree concerning the end before the decree concerning the means; the decree of election to salvation before the decree of sending Christ and of giving faith. For widely different things are brought together; for although on account of the weakness of our minds, we cannot conceive at the same time of the decree of the end and of the means (but are compelled to divide it into two inadequate conceptions), yet it is certain that nothing hinders them from being included in one, single and most simple act in God because they are subordinated to and most strictly connected with each other. But who will say that there is the same reason of that general decree of the special love (which lay down the most diverse things with respect to the same) and hatred, the will of saving and of damning, the decree of calling and the decree of reprobating, the man called and rebellious?

XV. Second, on this hypothesis God is made to have thought of the means before the end (viz., of Christ who was the most principal means of the execution of election before the salvation of the elect). Everyone sees that this is repugnant to right reason. For in every decree, a wise person intends the end before thinking of the means. Now the destination of the Mediator is not the end of the salvation of men, but on the contrary the salvation of men is the end of the destination of the Mediator. Nor did God intend salvation for men that he might send a Mediator, but he intended the Mediator that he might procure salvation for them. Hence it has thus far been constantly believed among us that Christ is the primary means of election and the decree to send him is subordinated to the decree of election (or rather is coordinated as one single decree because by that very same decree by which he determined to save men, he determined to save them through Christ; and thus at the same time he willed to them both this end and by this means). (2) It is confirmed by this, that the end of the mission of Christ was to save his people from their sins (Mt. 1:21) and to gather a church to himself out of the world which he would unite to himself as his mystical body. Hence in the decree to send Christ, his people ought to be considered as already such (which it could not be except from the election of God). (3) The Mediator (and

they whose Mediator Christ ought to be) and the Redeemer (and those to be redeemed) are of things as to their relation (*ek tōn pros ti*) and thus (at the same time) are of things in their nature. He cannot be considered as Mediator, unless they are considered at the same time whose Mediator he ought to be. This is most especially true when that office implies necessarily that he should be the surety and head of those for whom he was sent, so that by substituting himself in their place he might receive upon himself the punishment due to them and might acquire for and communicate to them all good things. But how could the decree to send Christ be conceived without antecedently (or at least at the same time) conceiving of the election of those for whom he ought to offer himself and whose surety and head he was about to be? For since these things are relative (*schetika*), they ought to be at the same time. By that very decree by which it was determined to send Christ into the world to obtain salvation for sinners, the number of those to be saved ought also to be decreed by God. Those whom he should ransom ought to be designated, so that it might be given to those alone who were given to him of the Father by election (Jn. 17:2, 6, 9).

XVI. You may say that Christ is indeed to be regarded as the means not of election (of which he is rather the foundation), but of God's general philanthropy (*philanthrōpias*) and mercy (by which he pursues the whole human race to remove the obstacle of divine justice through a satisfaction, so that there might be no further hindrance to the salvation of men except their own unbelief). We answer that besides the fact that we have already proved that it cannot be called the foundation of election, this also can be said: that it is gratuitously supposed he was sent from the general philanthropy (*philanthrōpia*) (which regards all indefinitely but no one by name), which is repugnant to the Scripture and the mission of Christ (which is necessarily occupied about particular individuals for whom he ought to come). (2) If Christ was sent only for this end that he might remove the obstacle of divine justice, it would follow that he acquired for us only the possibility of salvation, not salvation itself; and that he properly acquired something for God, not for us (viz., the power of giving salvation to us under this or that condition). Everyone sees that this is wholly foreign to the merit of the death of Christ and the doctrine of the Scripture, which describes the power and efficacy of the death of Christ to us, not only that the Father might give something to us, but that he might actually give salvation (not that he might be simply reconcilable, but that he might be actually reconciled). Hence he is called the prince of salvation who gives "eternal life to his sheep" (Jn. 10:28); who hath purchased for us not the possibility of salvation, but "eternal redemption" (Heb. 9:12); who has actually reconciled us unto God "having made peace through the blood of his cross" (Col. 1:20); and so in innumerable places. You may add, perhaps, that Christ did not only propose this general end to himself, but that he had also another special end of dying for the elect and those who would believe by name. But thus there is gratuitously supposed to be both in God (sending Christ) and in Christ (dying), a twofold intention: the one general—of offering himself for all under a condition; the other special—of giving himself efficaciously for some certain ones. It is as if in one surety, two were to be sought: one who pledges in part for all, but the other who pledges in all for some; the one impetrating salvation for all (but under a condition of such a nature as to render that impetration vain and useless); the other, however, who absolutely obtains and at the same time

applies it to some; one who dies for the good of all; another who dies in the place of only a few. Yet the Scripture, when it speaks of the death of Christ for men, nowhere sets forth this twofold intention, but one only of substituting himself in the place of sinners and of acquiring for these the expiation of sins and all the blessings of salvation. Next, if Christ had a special regard for some (as given to him of the Father) their election must necessarily be conceived antecedently to the decree of the mission of Christ. Since the primary scope of his mission was altogether the salvation of them, they for whom he came must be supposed to have been elected (before his mission was considered). For Christ was not sent that they might be chosen, but (on the contrary) he came that he might present himself for them. Otherwise the elect ought to be for the world because Christ would be sent as Redeemer for them, not the world for the elect. Nevertheless, all the benefits which all other men obtain ought to be ascribed to the elect (for whose sake the heavens and earth continue, and which will perish at once when their number shall be made up; for whose sake equally Christ appeared and the gospel is preached). Hence it is evident that the mission of Christ could not be decreed without those at the same time being designated for whom alone he would come and for whose sake he was elected and foreordained as Mediator and head from eternity.

XVII. Third, this order supposes that Christ has not merited faith for his own because the satisfaction for all is conceived to precede the decree to give faith to some. Thus there are those who are consequently excluded from obtaining faith in Christ, who nevertheless were not excluded from his redemption and merit. Nor do they (with whom we treat) deny it who derive it from the free decree of God. They moreover maintain that it should rather be called the "gift of the Father" than the "gift of the Son." Yet the Scripture everywhere attributes this to Christ no less than all other spiritual benefits (Eph. 1:3; Phil. 1:29; Heb. 12:2). Even the consideration of the covenant of grace alone (of which Christ was made the Mediator and Surety) necessarily implies this. For in the covenant of grace the conditions and all the means of salvation are promised to us on account of him with salvation itself: among which the primary is most undoubtedly the Holy Spirit and the gift of faith (Jer. 31:33; 32:40; Lk. 24:49). And if this grace flows from him as the head into all the members by his own efficacy, why should it not be said to depend upon him as surety, inasmuch as he obtained it for us by his merit?

XVIII. Fourth, less properly (in the aforementioned order) is calling placed before election. It is certain that calling is destinated for the execution of election; nor ought this to have place only with respect to the internal call made by the Spirit, but also to the external made by the word. The Scripture frequently testifies and the thing itself proclaims that for no other superior cause has God instituted the ministry and provided for the preaching of the gospel in the world, than to collect his church and to lead the elect into communion with Christ and through Christ to salvation. Hence it is necessary that they to whom the gospel was properly destinated should at first be presented to God as objects. But although this call extends more widely than election and many more are called by this method than are chosen (Mt. 20:16), it is extended secondarily even to the reprobate (who are mixed up with the elect) in order to show them their duty and to point out the way of salvation (as was said before). Yet it does not cease to

be the means (properly so called) to the salvation of the elect in whom it is received by faith and operates effectually. In this respect, it is not extended beyond the end itself (viz., the salvation of the elect). If Christ places it before election when he says, "Many are called and few chosen" (Mt. 20:16), it does not immediately follow that it ought to be before in the decree. For there is one method in the order of execution (of which Christ speaks), but another in the order of intention. For although it is certain that God carries out his counsels in that order in which he decreed to carry them out, still it cannot thence be inferred that the order of intention is the same with that of execution. In the former, the end precedes as intended and the means follow. In the latter, the means precede, the end follows as obtained. Just as a wise man first intends the end and afterwards the means (yet first uses the means before arriving at the end), so God in the execution begins from calling in order to bring to the salvation destinated by election. But in the intention, on the contrary, he first thinks of the end or of salvation to be destinated by election; next he thinks of calling as the necessary means for obtaining that end.

XIX. Fifth, the distinction between "God as legislator" and "Father" or "manager" and "disposer of events" (upon which is founded the whole series of these decrees) cannot apply here. It may have its place and be rightly used by theologians when treating of the comparison between the legal and evangelical covenants. In the former, he holds himself after the manner of a lawgiver only by the promulgation of the law and the exaction of duty; but in the latter he acts as the Father who not only commands, but also operates; not only enjoins duty, but gives strength to perform it. Thus he is rightly called the lawgiver of all, but the Father of a few. However it cannot have its place (unless falsely) and be referred to the evangelical covenant, as if God in it would act now only as a lawgiver, then as a Father. For it is plain that this covenant (diverse from the legal in its whole genus) belongs to a Father, not only to a lawgiver (whose essence does not consist only in the prescription of duty for the obtaining of salvation), but especially in the absolute promise of salvation in Christ and of all the means necessary to obtain it. Therefore it is usually expressed by the name of "promise" by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*) and of "testament" to designate that the whole depends on the grace of God the Father in Christ. Otherwise it might have been said either that the evangelical covenant is no less without strength (*asthenes*) than the law itself (Rom. 8:3) and can be abrogated (which the apostle constantly denies, Heb. 8:7, 13); or is twofold—the one universal with all in which salvation is promised under the condition of faith, which is prescribed, but is not given (that it therefore may remain void and inefficacious); the other, however, particular with the elect alone, in which not only is salvation promised under the condition of faith, but also faith itself and that which is really energetic (*energētikon*) and obtains its effect infallibly in all the covenanted. The latter is a thing unheard of in Scripture and in sound theology. Again, since, in the destination and mission of Christ, God has exhibited to us the highest love (than which a greater cannot be supposed as the Scripture everywhere testifies, Jn. 3:16; 15:13; Rom. 5:8; 1 Jn. 4:9) and has bestowed upon us a great and most excellent gift (than which nothing greater can be conceived, drawing all other things after itself, Rom. 8:32), who will say that this proceeds from God the lawgiver and not from God the Father? It is the office of the lawgiver to prescribe to the creature; but to give a Savior to

execute the work of redemption and substitute himself in our place for the expiation of our sins and the procuring of salvation, is not the part of a lawgiver, but of a Father. The Scripture leads us to this when it asserts that Christ was given to us by God as the sponsor and Mediator of the new covenant so that peace being made by his blood, he might reconcile God to men and men to God and so might be the foundation and the cause of all kinds of blessings, to be bestowed upon us either in grace or in glory (Eph. 1:3, 4; Col. 1:20; Heb. 9:15). This surely could not be said if the mission of Christ was not the proper blessing of the Father to procure wholly the salvation of his own, but the work only of a lawgiver (who willed in this way to remove the obstacle of his justice in order to establish the evangelical law of faith in Christ and to open the way to himself for prescribing this duty to the creature). If, in the gospel dispensation, the external call directed to the reprobate has the relation only of a legal command (because it does not reach farther than preception of duty), it does not follow that the gift of the Son (or the decree of his mission) is from God as lawgiver since it is evident that the proper design of God in it is no other than to procure the salvation of the elect (who were given to him by the Father to be redeemed).

XX. Since, therefore, from these things it is clear that this order of decrees departs not a little from the example of sound words and draws various absurdities after itself, it ought not to seem astonishing that it could not be received by our churches. Nor ought it to be alleged that it seems better suited: (1) to exalt the goodness of God (for it is not exalted, but rather obscured and diminished, when it is maintained to be vain and inefficacious); (2) to save the verity of the invitation of all men to salvation (for from what has been said before it is evident that its sincerity is self-consistent without universal grace; nor is it founded upon the universality of grace, but upon the economy of the new covenant by which, all external distinction of people being taken away, the Son acquired all nations for himself as an inheritance, i.e., he opens and grants commonly at pleasure the grace of preaching to whatsoever nations and people so that he may gather a church from them); (3) to vindicate the justice of God against the reprobate (for he is always seen to be blameless whether he condemns men on account of sins committed against the law or fully prosecutes them as guilty of unbelief against the gospel; since in both cases [voluntarily sinning], they are the cause of their own destruction, not God); (4) to reconcile the places of Scripture which (now more broadly, then more strictly) speak of the grace of God and the mission of Christ (for that reconciliation is easily accomplished from another source, from the different dispensation of this covenant and the various relations [*schesei*] of the covenanted).

The fourth opinion, which is the common one of the Reformed.

XXI. The third opinion, therefore, being dismissed, we embrace the fourth, which is the common one among the Reformed. It holds a twofold decree according to a twofold order of the works of God: the one of providence, the other of predestination. In the former, God is conceived to have thought first about the manifestation of his glory in the creation of man, then in the permission of the fall. In the latter, he is conceived to have thought first about the manifestation of his glory in the exercise of mercy and justice by the election of some and the reprobation of others (afterward about the means necessary to obtain that end). However as salvation

can be considered under a threefold relation (*schesei*) (with regard either to the destination or the acquisition or the application), so a threefold decree concerning it is conceived: the first (by which it is destinated by election); the second (by which its acquisition is procured by redemption); and the third (by which its application is ordained by calling). So God (moved by his philanthropy [*philanthrōpia*] and goodness) is conceived to pity the fallen human race, so that although he might most justly destroy the whole on account of sin, yet was unwilling that they should utterly perish; but selected a certain and definite number of men (lying with others in the common mass of corruption) unto salvation in preference to the others. Yet because he could not have mercy on them with the saving of his justice (unless a satisfaction had first been made to him for sin), he therefore destined Christ as their Mediator, surety and head (who, the fullest satisfaction having been made, might acquire for them salvation, viz., the Spirit, faith and sanctification). Finally, because salvation had been acquired for the elect in vain unless it would be applied to them, he therefore determined to call them effectually to Christ by the preaching of the gospel and the grace of the Holy Spirit (who by powerfully working faith in them by his own efficacy infallibly applies and bestows the salvation acquired by the merit of Christ).

XXII. According to this order, the first decree with us concerns the creation of man. The second concerns the permission of his fall by which he drew with him into ruin and destruction all his posterity. The third concerns the election to salvation of some certain ones from the fallen human race and the leaving of others in their native corruption and misery. The fourth concerns the sending of Christ into the world as the Mediator and surety of the elect. Having appeased God's justice by his own most perfect obedience, Christ obtained for them alone full salvation. The fifth concerns effectually calling them by the preaching of the gospel and the grace of the Holy Spirit, giving them faith, justifying, sanctifying and at last glorifying them.

XXIII. Three things principally prove that this order is indeed the most suitable. (1) The Scripture subordinates the mission of Christ and redemption to election (Eph. 1:3, 4, 7; Rom. 8:29, 30; Jn. 3:16; 17:2, 6; 1 Thess. 5:9; 1 Pet. 1:2) and derives from the merit of Christ all the saving gifts of the Spirit (to wit, faith and repentance, Jn. 16:7; Rom. 8:32; Eph. 1:3-5; Phil. 1:29; Heb. 9:14, 15). (2) The nature of the thing—in the legitimate order of things the intention of the end ought to precede the intention of the means, so that in the execution the means should first be used before the end is arrived at. Now here the end intended by God in the covenant of grace is the salvation of the elect, but the means to procure it are Christ and the call to the individual by the word and the Spirit. Christ would never have been sent into the world unless the elect were to be redeemed. Nor would the gospel have been preached unless the same were to be collected into the mystical body of Christ. When Paul says "it pleased God" (*eudokian*) by the preaching of the gospel "to save them that believe by the foolishness of preaching" (1 Cor. 1:21), he teaches that the end of the ministry and of the gifts bestowed by Christ is no other than the "perfecting of the saints and the edifying of the body of Christ" (Eph. 4:12). For that reason, it is necessary that the elect (who alone are to be saved and edified in the body of Christ) should be considered antecedently to the mission of Christ and the preaching of the gospel (which was instituted for their sake). Thus the object of calling is the elect, not

of election the called. (3) The economical operation of the persons of the holy Trinity in the work of salvation: for as each of them concurs in it according to the mode of working peculiar and proper to himself (the Father by electing, the Son by redeeming and the Holy Spirit by regenerating), so they ought to agree in the object about which they are occupied. Thus there is the same periphery (*peripheria*) of the election of the Father, of the redemption of the Son and of the regeneration of the Holy Spirit; so that as many as are elected by the Father should be redeemed by the Son and regenerated by the Spirit. And no one is given to the Son to be redeemed who was not elected by the Father and who is not to be sanctified by the Spirit.

XXIV. Although in truth we think the decrees of God should thus be arranged, yet we must always bear in mind that this is said only with respect to our manner of conception. For we are compelled to divide into various inadequate conceptions what we cannot compass in one single conception. However this is not said on the part of God himself who decreed with himself all these things by a single and most simple act (as much those things which look to the end, as those which look to the means). In this sense, it is rightly said that there is in God only one single decree (embracing at once the end and the means) by which he determined to have mercy unto salvation upon some above others and to save them by and on account of Christ. In this we think we ought to acquiesce with simplicity and soberness (so that we may be solicitous concerning the reduction of this saving doctrine to practice by the desire of piety and sanctification, and concerning the confirmation of our election and call by good works) rather than be concerned with the investigation of vain and interminable (*aperantois*) questions, which the profane temerity of men is accustomed to agitate here (feeding an idle curiosity, but not building up faith).

XXV. Here is the profitable and saving use of the doctrine of predestination: that it may not afford any occasion either to the desperation of men or to their profane license—the two terrible rocks upon which the wicked (falsely abusing it) are accustomed to strike. Some, from the immutability of reprobation, elicit the certainty of their own damnation and the impossibility (*adynamian*) of salvation whatever they may do. Others gather from the certainty of election, the infallibility of their own salvation no matter how they may live. But it is evident that they basely deceive themselves, since there is no doctrine which affords greater consolation to believers and more powerful incentives to piety and holiness (if anyone properly understands it and does not rashly separate what God has joined together or falsely join together what he has separated—the principal source of the error of the wicked). Being profane, they separate the means from the end while they promise themselves salvation without the desire of holiness. Others separate the end from the means; they despair of salvation, although they might labor for holiness. He, however, who will always join together these things (strictly and mutually connected with each other by God) will never abuse this saving doctrine either to desperation or licentiousness.

FIFTH TOPIC

CREATION

FIRST QUESTION
What is creation?

The works of God are of nature and grace.

I. Thus far we have treated the immanent acts of God *ad extra*, commonly called the decrees. We intend now to speak of the transient and external acts (called the works of God) by which he executes his decrees outside of himself. However, because some are carried out by a general and common operation in nature, others by a particular and proper action in the church, they are usually distinguished into works of nature and grace. The former are so called not because God works them by nature (since indeed he acts externally, not by necessity of nature, but by the liberty of his own will, Ps. 115:3; Eph. 1:11), but because they pertain to all creatures and their natural ends. The works of grace refer only to men and their supernatural ends.

The works of nature are creation and conservation.

II. Again, the works of nature are twofold: of creation, which God produced by the first creation; and of conservation and providence, by which created things are conserved in their being and governed and directed in their operation.

III. The first work of nature is creation, by which he formed out of nothing as to its whole being this entire universe and all that is in it. Hence it is called "the beginning of the ways of God" (Prov. 8:22) because having come forth from the secret sanctuary of his eternal majesty, he willed to communicate himself *ad extra* by it and manifest himself unto men.

Creation is used either broadly or strictly and means "a production out of nothing."

IV. However creation here is not taken broadly and improperly. In this sense, it is used in the Scriptures for any production of things whatsoever, even by generation: "Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created; and thou renewest the face of the earth" (Ps. 104:30); "I make peace, and create evil" (Is. 45:7); or for the ordination of certain extraordinary events—"The Lord hath created a new thing in the earth, A woman shall compass a man" (Jer. 31:22); or for regeneration which is (as it were) a second creation, both in grace—"Create in me a clean heart" (Ps. 51:10) and in glory—"for, behold, I create new heavens and a new earth" (Is. 65:17; Rev. 21:1). Rather creation is taken here strictly for the production of things out of nothing, which is the proper and primary signification of the Hebrew word *br'*, the Greek *ktizein* and the Latin *creandi* (which is maintained in the theological schools).

V. It means "the production of all things out of nothing" (*ex nihilo*). Since all things were created, they must necessarily have been brought forth from nothing because whatever might be supposed to have preexisted ought to have been contained in the universality of all things. Therefore God is said "to call those things which be not as though they were" (*ta mē onta hōs onta*, Rom. 4:17) because by calling he gives being. Elsewhere he is said "to have commanded the light to shine out of darkness" (2 Cor. 4:6), not as if out of matter, but as if out of the bounds (*ex termino*). Therefore, when all things are said to be "out of nothing" (*ex nihilo*), the preposition *ex* ("out of") does not indicate a relation (*schesin*) to matter or to the efficient. Rather it indicates a relation to a terminus, so that no subject existing before the creation is denoted, but only the *terminus a quo* from which all things were produced or the order of creation (which was made not so much out of nothing [*ex nihilo*], as after nothing [*post nihilum*]).

VI. Creation may be either first and immediate (which is simply *ex nihilo*) or secondary and mediate (which is made indeed from some matter). The former is unfit and out of order, not set in order by any force of second causes (if we may so speak) to the production of the terminus and in which there resides only an obediential or non-repugnant potency (with respect to the first cause acting by an infinite power). So "nothing" is used either absolutely and simply (with respect to itself as well as to the subject; materially as well as formally) from which the first creation was made; or relatively and formally such with respect to itself (if not with respect to the subject from which it is said to be second).

VII. Nothing can come from nothing: (1) not naturally through a finite and created power; (2) not from a subject as the principle and intrinsically constitutive material; (3) not by way of generations. On the contrary, all things are properly said to be from nothing supernaturally through infinite power (as from the *terminus a quo* and by the way of creation).

VIII. It is one thing for visible things to be made from things not appearing positively (i.e., from certain invisible things); another, however, to be made from things not appearing negatively (i.e., from no preexisting things). The apostle does not speak of the former, but only of the latter (Heb. 11:3). Therefore he does not say *eis to ek mē phainomenōn ta blepomena gegonenai* (as if those nonappearances were some preexistent subject), but *eis to mē ek phainomenōn ta blepomena gegonenai* ("were seen to be made not out of the things which do appear"), thus denying that anything existed before the production of matter. Thus it is the same as when God is said to have made all things *ouk ex ontōn* ("not from things which exist," 2 Mac. 7:28).

IX. A thing is said to be the same in origin as in its destruction, not with respect to the terminus of creation, but with respect to the beginnings of generation. Hence the inference would be improper: no thing is resolved into nothing, therefore no thing was produced from nothing.

X. Although creation is sometimes called a "generation" (as in Gen. 2:4 and thence the book of Genesis took its name), this must be understood not physically, but metaphysically for the origin of things. Creation differs most widely from generation. The latter demands and always supposes a subject and *terminus a quo* (viz., the negation of form in a fit subject, a corporeal thing [as the *terminus ad quem*]—motion, time and place, and is made successively by a particular cause). But creation (at least the first) makes (does not suppose) its own object, is

extended to immaterial things and is made by a universal cause (and it alone in an instant). Hence, properly speaking, no subject is supplied to creation (although the terminus of creation can, in a certain sense, be called also its subject because the action is terminated upon it and in a measure finds in it its subject).

Active and passive creation, which is the foundation of the relation between God and creatures. It is properly called "real."

XI. Creation can be considered in two ways: either actively (inasmuch as it belongs to God and so it is not indeed a practical volition of God formally because arising from it as its immediate principle; but is a transient act of God by which he confers being upon created things); or passively (inasmuch as it belongs to the creature passing from a state of nonexistence to existence, not by a change properly so called, the transit of a preexisting subject from one term to another, but a common and general change, implying any inception whatever of a thing). Thus arises the relation existing between God and his creatures, which although adding nothing new to God (and indicating only an extrinsic habitude to the creature) is yet properly called real, both because it stands between real extremes and because the reason of founding it on both sides occurs on the part of the thing (even no one thinking). The creature being made, God always holds the relation (*schesin*) of Creator to it, and it in turn depends upon and is related to him as the creature (even if no one would think of him).

And yet it implies no change in God.

XII. Now although creation is not formally a divine volition, still on that account there is no change made in God by it. Nor is any new perfection added to him because it is an external and transient act which is from God, but not in him. It is made without any motion and new determination. No new will enters into him, but only a new external work proceeds from his eternal efficacious and omnipotent will. Nor ought any perfection to be added to him on that account because the internal acts (which perfect the operator) must be distinguished from the external (which perfect the work, to which class creation belongs). Hence whatever change was made by the creation was made in the creatures passing from nonexistence to being and not in God himself creating. By the same practical volition which he had from eternity, he created the world in time—produced it actually in the beginning of time.

SECOND QUESTION

Is the ability to create communicable to any creature either principally or instrumentally? We deny.

Occasion of the question. Some of the Scholastics advocate the communicability of the creative power.

I. This question was broached by the Scholastics and sharply contested among them, some defending the affirmative, others the negative. Durand maintained that a creature having a negative power to create could be produced by God (*Sententias theologicas Petri Lombardi Commentariorum*, Bk. 2, Dist. 1, Q. 4 [1556], pp. 109-11). The Master (Peter Lombard) thinks a creature can be an instrument of creation, employed voluntarily by God, able to work not by its own, but by a borrowed power (*Sententiarum* 4, Dist. 5.3 [PL 192/2.852]). Suarez and many of the Romanists,

according to Vasquez (*Commentariorum ac Disputationum in Primam Partem . . . Thomae* 2, Disp. 176.1 [1631], pp. 280-82) defend this, having specially in view the establishment of the monstrous doctrine of transubstantiation (according to which insignificant sacrificers are impiously called "creators of their own Creator," as Biel says [*Canonis Misse Expositio*+]). Nevertheless the majority of the Scholastics earnestly maintain the opposite (viz., that creative power can belong to no other than God). Thomas Aquinas proves this at large (*Summa Contra Gentiles* 2.21 [trans. J.F. Anderson, 1956], pp. 60-64 and ST, I, Q. 45, Art. 5, p. 236). Occam, Bonaventure, Cajetan, Bannes and many others agree with him.

As also the Remonstrants and Socinians. The orthodox deny it.

II. The Remonstrants with the Socinians have also adopted this fiction, having drained it either from the inventions of the Jews (who hold that God employed angels as co-workers [*synergous*] in creation) or from the ditches of the philosophers (who taught that the supreme being made this lower world by the aid of demons or *genii*). Their object is to tear away and weaken the crowning argument for the divinity of Christ (which we draw from the works of creation). But we reject this dogma as rash and blasphemous. We also hold that the power to create is peculiar to God alone and incommunicable to any other.

III. (1) God claims creation for himself alone: "I am the Lord that maketh all things; that stretcheth forth the heavens alone" (Is. 44:24*) to the exclusion of all creatures; "that spreadeth abroad the earth by myself" and consequently by no other instruments; "I have made the earth, and created man upon it: I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens, and all their host have I commanded" (Is. 45:12); "For thus saith the Lord that created the heavens; God himself that formed the earth and made it; I am the Lord and there is none else" (Is. 45:18)—proving that no one but he himself is Jehovah because he alone is Creator; "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance?" (Is. 40:12*); "Hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not?" (Is. 40:28); "which alone spreadeth out the heavens, and treadeth upon the waves of the sea" (Job 9:8); and in many other passages. Hence the name "Creator" is usually applied to him singularly (as proper and incommunicable), which could not be said if the creative power could be communicated to others).

IV. (2) By this mark, God is distinguished from idols and the false gods of the heathen: "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, even they shall perish from the earth," but the Lord is the true God "who hath made the earth by his power, and established the world by his wisdom" (Jer. 10:11, 12); "for all the gods of the nations are idols: but the Lord made the heavens" (Ps. 96:5). Thus Hezekiah distinguishes the true God from all false gods by this mark: "Thou hast made heaven and earth" (Is. 37:16). Nor is this denied only to false gods but also to all creatures, while it is attributed to God alone.

V. (3) Creation is a work of infinite power. Hence it cannot be performed by a finite being, not even as a physical instrument (which should be of efficacy proportionate to the production of its effect). Rather it demands an omnipotent cause. However that it must be of infinite power is evident both from this—that it is performed by a nod and word alone; and—that by it the infinite distance

between being and nothing ought to be taken away. For since being and nothing are immediately and contradictorily opposed (and by that distance are separated from each other, a greater than which can neither be nor be conceived), they must stand infinitely apart: not indeed by a distance of perfection (as God stands infinitely distant from his creatures, and the infinite being stands far more distant from nothing than the finite, which has fewer perfections); but by a negative distance and one of contradiction (according to which the finite being stands equally distant from nothing with the infinite because the finite equally with the infinite being is not nothing or something). That God is truly not from nothing and cannot be resolved into nothing (as the creature) does not depend upon the distance of negation between being and nothing, but upon the infinite distance of perfection between God and his creatures. Indeed although every creature is finite, it does not follow that a finite power can be sufficient to produce it because we must distinguish between the thing itself and the mode of production. The produced substance must be finite because nothing infinite can be produced. Yet the mode of production does not cease to belong to infinite power because omnipotence is required to bring a creature forth from nothing.

VI. (4) Every creature acts in dependence upon a subject and requires a subject on which to operate. Here, however, there is no preexisting subject since creation makes and posits its subject, but does not suppose it. (5) Every cause (principal as well as instrumental) ought to reach the work itself and to have a proper and peculiar power to act at least dispositively to the production of the effect. And yet no creature can be so elevated as to be capable of a work of infinite power (whether principally or instrumentally and with such an efficiency as to take hold of the work itself). This is so both because it is an instantaneous act (and thus standing in need of no preparation) and because it has no subject upon which its labor can be exercised.

VII. Although creatures may concur in the working of miracles, it does not follow that they can concur equally in creating. (1) In miracles, a subject is always supplied with which the instrument can be occupied, but not in creation. (2) In the working of miracles, men hold only a moral relation (as moral instruments at whose presence God works), but not a physical (so as to take hold of the miraculous work by any real action). Hence the apostles say that they do not work miracles by their own power, but only by the power of Christ (Acts 3:12). Although there cannot be only a moral cause of a physical effect, still there can be a moral instrumental cause together with the physical. But as creation takes place in a moment and no subject is supplied, no instrumental cause (either physical or moral) can be granted in it.

VIII. God created all things by a word, not after the manner of an instrument and ministerial cause, but efficiently and principally by the personal Word, the eternal Son of God, the same in essence with the Father; who, therefore, with the Father and the Holy Spirit constituted the one sole total cause of creation. As the same nature belongs to him, so the same causality and energetic (*energētikē*) force—the order of acting which belongs to them however being preserved. When all things are said to have been made "by the Word" (*dia logou*, Jn. 1:3), this does not denote the instrumental cause anymore than when all things are said to be "through him" (*di' autou* [viz., God], Rom. 11:36).

IX. Although God is not able to communicate creative power to the creature, it does not follow that this argues impotency in God because it does not proceed from a defect of power, but from its perfection (which cannot be extended to contradictories). Such a communication is absurd, both on the part of God (who cannot give his glory to another) and on the part of the creature (because he would thus be an infinite and omnipotent being, i.e., not a creature).

X. It requires the same power to create and recreate. If infinite power is required for creation, no less is demanded for recreation. Hence conversion is so often expressed under the name of creation and the exceeding great power of God is celebrated in it (Eph. 1:19, 20; 3:16, 20). And if God effects it by the ministry of men and the preaching of the word, this is not done by them as the physical cause, but only as the moral (since the Holy Spirit by his efficacy alone can perform the work).

THIRD QUESTION

Was the world from eternity, or at least could it have been? We deny.

1. Question concerning the actual eternity of the world against the philosophers.

I. The question has two parts. One concerns the actual eternity of the world—whether it was really from eternity; the other concerns the possibility—whether at least it could be. The first lies between us and the ancient philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world; either materially only (as Plato) as to its matter which they held to be coeternal with God. This was the fiction of the Stoics who advocated two principles of things *noun kai hylēn* ("mind and matter"). Or formally also, as Aristotle, who asserted that the world was formally eternal also and maintained that from eternity there were the same successive changes of generation and corruption as are observed now (*Physics* 8.1 [Loeb, 2:269-79]). Thomas Aquinas (with a too great love of his teacher) endeavors to excuse him, as if he did not believe the world to be absolutely eternal, but only denied that either the first matter or the heavens were produced by generation (ST, I, Q. 46, Art. 1, p. 241). Yet it can be easily shown that the reasons he adduces were intended to prove (against Plato) that the world never had a beginning (cf. *Physics* 8.1 [Loeb, 2:277]). The pseudo-Christians and atheists of our day (who advocate the eternity of the world or at least of matter) agree with these.

2. Question concerning the possible eternity of the world against the Scholastics.

II. The other question is agitated among the Scholastics, most of whom contend for the possible eternity of the world; cf. Thomas Aquinas (ST, I, Q. 46, Art. 1, pp. 240-42), Cajetan, Durandus, Occam, Biel, Capreolus, Pererius and others. Some of these again refer this to incorruptible beings alone; others, however, extend it to all creatures whatsoever. Still many are for the negative (as Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, Toletus, Henry of Ghent and others) who assert the newness of the world to be in accordance with the law of creation and so deny that it could have been produced from eternity. The orthodox on this point follow the latter, denying both the actual and possible eternity of the world and holding that the world was created by God in the beginning of time only.

Proof that the world is not eternal.

III. The arguments against the actual eternity of the world are: (1) the voice of the Scriptures which state that "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" (Gen. 1:1). What is said to have been made in the beginning cannot be said to have existed from eternity. Nor ought the Jerusalem Targum to be quoted here in opposition, which renders *br'shyth* by *bchvkhm'* ("in wisdom") because God is said to have "founded the earth by wisdom" (Prov. 3:19) (*Das Fragmententhargum: Thargum jeruschalmi zum Pentateuch* [ed. M. Ginsburger, 1899], p. 1); or that reference is here made to the Son, the Wisdom of the Father, as the author of creation (which pleases many according to Jerome, *Hebraicae Questiones in Libro Geneseos* [CCSL 72.3]). The latter is true, but is not the meaning here. The word *r'shyth* cannot bear such an interpretation, since it can be referred to nothing more fitly than to the beginning of time and created things. Thus John explains it, "In the beginning was the Word" (*En archē ēn ho Logos*, Jn. 1:1); and Paul, "Thou, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth" (*kat' archas*, Heb. 1:10); and "from the beginning of the creation" (*ap' archēs ktiseōs*, 2 Pet. 3:4). Hence Onkelos renders *bhqdhmyn* "in the beginnings" (*Targum Onkelos to Genesis* [ed. M. Aberbach and B. Grossfeld, 1982], p. 43); Rabbi David Kimchi translates *br'shyth* by *btchlh* ("in the beginning"); the masters of the Jews interpret with Solomon Jarchi (Rashi) *br'shyth hkhl* "in the beginning of the universe" (*Pentateuch . . . with Rashi's Commentary* [1965], p. 2). Now creation is said to have taken place in a "beginning" not "preexisting" (as if there had been a beginning of time even before), but "coexisting" (because with the first creature, its duration or time was created). Augustine rightly sets this forth: "although we believe that God made heaven and earth in the beginning of time, we ought by all means to understand that before the beginning of time, time was not; for God made time also . . . And if time began to be with heaven and earth, time cannot be found before he had made the heavens and the earth" (*De Genesi Contra Manichaeos libro duo* 1.2* [PL 34.174-75]).

IV. The various passages of Scripture which assert the production of the world belong here: Ps. 33:6; Jn. 1:3; Heb. 1:10; Jer. 10:11, 12. They also predicate the eternal existence of God (as also of his decree) from this—that they are said to have been before the foundation of heaven and earth (Ps. 90:2; Prov. 8:22, 23; Eph. 1:4; Mt. 25:34; 2 Tim. 1:9). For since every production of things externally implies newness of being (because whatever is produced could not have been before it was produced and what is eternal can have nothing before itself), it is necessarily proved that the world is not eternal, but was certainly made in time. But as they who contend for the eternity of the world do not acknowledge the Scriptures, we must consult nature herself and sound reason which demonstrate the newness of the world by many arguments.

V. First, from the subordination of causes in which a progress into infinity cannot be granted without necessarily arriving at a first cause which gave beginning to the others (as has been already proved, Topic III, Question 1, Section 6). (2) From the newness of motion and time; for since neither motion nor time could have been from eternity (but must necessarily have had some beginning), it is evident that the world (which is in perpetual motion and whose duration is measured by time) could not have been from eternity and must have had a beginning. Now time and motion cannot be eternal as has already been proved by

various reasons in the cited place (Topic III). From this also is gathered most certainly that both demand a succession of priority and posteriority (which is incompatible with eternity). Again, if the motion of the sun were from eternity, the sun must have been from eternity either in some one sign of the Zodiac or in all at the same time. But neither can be said: not the former because it would follow that by an infinite duration it had passed through a whole eternity over only one or another sign (i.e., the finite space which it passes over in one month)—which is absurd (*asystaton*); not the latter because it would be necessary for the sun to be in all the signs of the Zodiac at the same time. Otherwise it would have been in one before the other (which is repugnant to eternity). But there is a contradiction in saying that the sun moved through the Zodiac (i.e., passed from one sign to another) and yet was in all the signs. The same may be said of the various changes seen on the earth and all sublunary things (and thus in men themselves) which cannot be called eternal and necessarily demand a beginning.

VI. Third, from the newness of histories and the sciences and arts. For the most ancient profane histories do not reach back farther than the Trojan War (i.e., about three thousand years) because from the destruction of Troy to the foundation of Rome 730 years elapsed; from the foundation of Rome to the time of Christ 750 years; and from Christ to us 1678 years. Nor does the sacred history written by Moses cover any more than six thousand years. And yet if men were from eternity, it is not very likely that there would have been no histories except for five or six thousand years. For why that deep silence of previous times? Or why did history begin then rather than before? This moved Lucretius, although an Epicurean and despiser of God, to acknowledge the newness of the world:

> Yet grant this heaven, this earth the heaven surrounds,
> Time ne'er produced, eternal of themselves—
> Whence ere the Theban war, and fate of Troy,
> Have earlier bards no earlier actions sung?
> Whence fell each chief unhonored? and his deeds
> Shut from the tablet of immortal fame?
> But, I think the world's vast scope exists
> New from its nature, and of recent birth:
> For many a liberal art now first unfolds,
> And much is still progressive; genius much,
> E'en at this hour, so navigation adds;
> Nor minstrels long (*De Rerum Natura* 5.324-33 [Loeb, 362-63]).

After an attentive consideration of these things, Macrobius says, "Who can doubt that the world is recent and new, since Greek history scarcely contains the history of two thousand years+." If, however, any people extend their annals farther back, they are either mere fables and the sport of lying fame or monthly years (or years of four months) and not solar years are meant. Diodorus Siculus observes this concerning the Chaldeans (*Diodorus Siculus* 2*.31 [Loeb, 1:453-57]) who according to Cicero boasted that they preserved the births of children forty-three thousand years before Alexander the Great, understanding by it lunar years (i.e., months) (?*De Divinatione* 2.43 [Loeb, 20:472-73]). Porphyry himself (an unexceptionable witness here) who saw these observations of the Chaldeans (which Calisthenes had sent from Babylon to Greece in the time of Alexander)

writes that there were only nineteen hundred years. The same can be said of the arts and sciences. For it is evident that their first beginnings do not extend back beyond some thousands of years at the farthest. This appears from their inventors whose series Pliny (although an assertor of the eternity of the world, inconsistently) relates (*Natural History* 7.56 [Loeb, 2:634-41] and 8 [Loeb, 3:3-161]). Now who can believe that men existed from eternity and devised no such inventions; or if so, did not transmit them to their posterity; or if they desired to transmit them, yet they have so perished that no trace at all of them can be found by us?

VII. Fourth, from the consent of nations and of the wise men of the world, many of whom at least have not been ignorant of the production of the world; although they could not rise to the knowledge of the creation *ex nihilo* by the Word (which Paul testifies can be perceived only by faith—"Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear," Heb. 11:3). If similar expressions occur in Plato, Hermes Trismegistus and other wiser heathen, they were not derived simply from the light of nature, but from the testimonies of the Chaldeans and Egyptians (who received their knowledge from Moses and the Israelites). Still it is evident that among them it was believed as a certain thing that the world had a beginning. The testimonies of Hermes Trismegistus, Orpheus, Pythagoras, Plato, Proclus, Homer, Hesiod and others (which we omit for the sake of brevity) can be seen in Plessaeus (*A Worke Concerning the trunesse of Christian Religion* [1617], 9:122-43) and Zanchius ("De Tribus Elohim," in *Opera Theologicorum* [1613], 1:14-16).

Proof that the world could not have been eternal.

VIII. As the world is not eternal so neither could it have been (whatever the Scholastics may babble). The impossibility arises both on the part of God, on the part of creation and on the part of the creature. First, on the part of God because he cannot produce anything coeternal with himself (otherwise there would be two eternals). Thus eternity (according to the Scriptures an incommunicable attribute of God) would be communicated to the creature. (2) A cause should be prior to its own effect; nor can an effect be coeval with its cause. To no purpose are the following objections brought up here. (a) The eternal generation of the Son (which does not hinder his being coeternal with the Father) because creation differs most widely from that generation. The latter is an internal act of God which makes the Son consubstantial (*homoousion*) with the Father by a communication of the same numerical essence. The former is an action passing out of God into the creature, producing in it an entirely different nature. (b) The objection from the emanation of the sun's rays which are coeval with the sun. For the relation of things acting by emanation differs from that of those acting by transmutation (natural from free agents). In the former, the effects can be coeval with the cause, but not in the latter. The rays emanate naturally from and are of the same nature with the sun, but creatures are produced freely by and are altogether different from God.

IX. Second, it is repugnant on the part of creation. Since creation is out of nothing (in which a thing passes from nonexistence to being), it necessarily carries with it newness of being because a thing must be conceived not to have been before it could be produced (and so could not have been eternal). Nor does it

help the matter to say that by the words *ex nihilo* is meant only the negation of material or independence of a subject. For it also denotes a nothing of terminus, so that the creating at one time was not and afterwards began to be.

X. Third, that impossibility exists on the part of the creature: (1) because eternity is repugnant to what has a successive and finite duration and being. And yet every creature as such has a successive and finite being and duration (and cannot be conceived otherwise). Therefore (2) if the creature is eternal, it ought to have existed either in the eternity of God or in its own. If the latter, there would be two eternals, two infinites, and the duration of God and of the creature would be equal (and there would be an eternity out of God with which he would coexist). If the former, the existence of creatures will be the existence of God (since the eternity of God does not differ from his existence). Moreover, the eternity and infinity of God will thus be common to the creature (which is absurd [*asystaton*]). Yea, a created eternity indicates a contradiction in the thing added (*adjecto*) (as a finite infinitude). Finally, it is of the formal relation of the creature to depend essentially upon God and to have a beginning of existence. Now what depends upon another must be after it and so cannot be eternal. "When you maintain that a thing has a beginning of its being, you deny it by that very fact to be eternal," as Lactantius says (*Divine Institutes* 7.1 [FC 49:471; PL 6.736]).

Sources of solution.

XI. An eternal agent, which acts out of itself upon another thing, requires a coeternal object. But God is not an eternal agent in this sense because he began to act out of himself only in time. And if he is called a pure act (*purus actus*) because always active in himself and devoid of all passive power (the root of change), does it follow that he always acted out of himself?

XII. It is one thing to be a sufficient cause actually (*actu*), but another in action (*in actu*). God was from eternity a sufficient cause actually because he always existed and always willed to create the world. But he was not from eternity in action (*in actu*) because he did not will to create from eternity, but only in time.

XIII. Although God did not create from eternity, he did not on that account change from potency to act and from leisure to work. For agents who act by volition alone differ from those in whom laborious efforts are required besides the volition. The latter (in the production of their work) pass from potency to act, from volition to the effecting. This is not so with the former who act by a mere volition (as God who, as he willed the existence of the world in time, so he willed it from eternity). And thus a certain change was made in the world, which passed from nonexistence to existence, but not in God who (remaining in himself the same) produced by his practical volition a thing from nothing out of himself.

XIV. As God never was without his omnipotence, so he never was without the power to create the world. He could not from eternity have exercised the act of that power, but only in time. Not from a defect of power in himself, but from the incompatibility of the creature with eternity. Thus God could not any time have created the world, but only in that time in which it could have been created and not before.

XV. There is one possibility on the part of passive power which resides in the things to be produced, but another on the part of the active power of the agent. The world was possible from eternity, not according to the passive power of the subject, but according to the active power of God. For this possibility is not

founded in any power on the part of the thing to be produced, but on the part of God. It is founded in the power of the producer because God could have produced it at a certain time.

XVI. An action (according to its totality) being posited, the effect immediately follows. But creation was not posited from eternity according to its totality. Although it was as to its principle, still it was not as to its terminus. Although it was an internal and immanent act in God, it was not an external act passing over into the creature.

XVII. Since before the beginning of time in which the world was created, there was nothing else than eternity, it cannot properly be said that God could have created the world sooner than he did. Sooner and later are marks of time which have no place in eternity. Meanwhile if sooner or later are referred to the duration itself of the world, it could have been created sooner or later in the point of eternity (which embraces all, even possible differences of times). Thus the duration of the world might have been of many more ages than it actually is; so that from the beginning of the world to the present time, there might have flowed by not only five or six million years, but seven or nine. And yet you could not rightly infer from this that therefore the world might have been created from eternity because the consequence does not hold good from a longer, finite and bounded duration (in which we conceive God to have been able to create the world) to an eternal and infinite duration (which is absurd [*asystatos*] with respect to the world).

XVIII. What is unbegotten never began to be by generation, but could begin to be by creation. Matter is such: not begotten, but created.

XIX. When we say the world was made in time, we do not understand this accurately (*akribōs*) (as if time properly so called was before the world in which it was created). Rather this phrase is to be understood popularly as opposed to eternity and means nothing else than that the world is not eternal, but received a beginning of duration. Thus before that moment, nothing else than eternity can be conceived to have been.

XX. Although it is better for the world now to exist than not, yet it was not better for it to have existed from eternity. For we are not to determine what is better or worse by the light of our reason, but by the will of God revealed to us in his word. According to Scripture, it is evident not only that it is not better (i.e., more fitting) for the world to have been from eternity (because the creature would thus be made equal to the Creator), but that it was not even possible on account of the manifold repugnancy of the thing.

FOURTH QUESTION

In what season of the year was the world created? In the spring, or in autumn?

I. Although this question is rather chronological than theological (and so may rightly be referred to problematic questions), yet because it has its own use in sacred things also, it must not be omitted here.

II. All agree that the sun was created by God in some fixed and definite part of the Zodiac (i.e., either in one of the equinoxes, whether vernal or autumnal) or in one of the solstices (whether the summer or the winter). For although in a circle

(and in the circular motions of the planets), there is properly no beginning, or end, or middle, or anything definite and fixed, yet in relation to certain parts and the inhabitants of the earth, the aforesaid Zodiacal parts may be properly called determined and fixed for various uses in human life.

III. Hence there have been diverse opinions among the learned concerning the time of the year in which the world was created. Some refer the creation of the world to the summer solstice; others, however, to the equinoxes. Gerhard Mercator and a few others contend for the summer solstice; but the whole body of chronologists stands in favor of the equinoxes, if not for the points, at least for the times. Many contend for the spring, but more (and the better) for the autumn (as Scaliger, Calvisius, Ussher, Torniellus, Petavius and others, whom we follow, relying principally on these arguments).

Proof that the world was created in autumn.

IV. (1) The world undoubtedly seems to have been created at that time of the year in which the Israelites began their civil year while in Egypt. They certainly followed that method of time which they had received from their fathers and in which they had been instructed by their ancestors—Shem, Noah and the other patriarchs back to Adam. That they began not from the spring but from the autumn is gathered both from Ex. 23:16 (where the feast of the gathering of all the fruits out of the field is said to have been celebrated "in the end of the year" [*bts'th hshnh*]) and Ex. 34:22 (where the Feast of Tabernacles is called a solemnity which ought to be celebrated in the seventh month, in the revolution of the year [*bchqvphth hshnh*] or "the year turning"). For that month Tishri (answering to our September or October) may be said to shut and to open the year. And its being called "the seventh month" is not an objection because the reference is evidently to the sacred and not the civil year. We know there was a double computation of the year among the Jews: one for civil, the other for sacred things. Tishri, the first month of the civil year, became afterwards the seventh of the sacred year from the time that God (in memory of their deliverance from Egypt) willed the month Nisan (also in Hebrew "Abib" answering to our March and April) to be the beginning of the sacred year (as we gather from "this month shall be unto you the beginning of months: it shall be the first month of the year to you" [Ex. 12:2] which must be understood only of the sacred year and divine things). For as to things civil and political, the month Tishri always remained the first and from it the beginning of the year was reckoned. Josephus explains it thus: "Moses reckoned Nisan, which is Xanthicus, the first month, because in it he had led the Hebrews out of Egypt; he also made it the beginning of all things pertaining to divine matters: otherwise he made no innovations in the remaining dispensation of the year" (AJ 1.81 [Loeb, 4:36-39]).

V. (2) It is confirmed by the time of the deluge, which is said to have commenced in the second month (Gen. 7:11). For since it is altogether very likely that it was sent in the time suitable for inundations (rather than in that fit for drying the earth and keeping off storms), it ought to be referred to the beginning of winter rather than to the spring. Thus the second month must be computed from the autumnal equinox and be referred to November, not from the vernal (according to which the flood would have begun about the spring, prevailed in the summer and ended in the middle of winter).

VI. (3) It ought to have been created in that season of the year in which the Jewish sabbatical year and their year of Jubilee began (which was the autumnal). For both the sabbatical year (which was in each seventh year) and the year of Jubilee (in the fiftieth after seven times seven) began in the autumn after the harvest. Hence Lev. 25:9 says the trumpet of Jubilee was to sound on the tenth day of the month Tishri. Here we must add (with many others) that the Feast of Trumpets was celebrated in this month. It seems to have been done for no other reason than because they were then reminded of the creation which had happened at that time.

VII. (4) There are still vestiges of this opinion in the Jewish synagogues (of most ancient origin). For on the last Sabbath of the month Tishri, the Jewish lectionary begins, whose first chapter (called *phrshh*) is the beginning of the book of Genesis, both because with them the year begins from that time and because they believe the world was then created. Hence the Chaldee paraphrase on 1 K. 8:2 (while treating of the dedication festivals of the temple built by Solomon, celebrated in the Feast of Tabernacles in the month of Ethanim) speaks thus: "In the month Ethanim, which before the time of Moses was called the first, now however the seventh" (cf. Walton, *Biblia sacra polyglotta* [1657], 2:440). Here belongs the fact that the Egyptians, Persians and other eastern nations begin their year even now from the autumn.

VIII. (5) It was fitting that the world should be created at that time of the year most useful to man (for whose sake it was created), in order that he and other animals might be supplied with what was necessary for food and sustenance. None truly was more suitable for this than autumn, when the trees are laden with fruit and plants heavy with their seed for the production of others. Hence although the spring is superior to the other seasons of the year in pleasantness, the autumn surpasses it in utility. Again, as God willed to create man and other animals in a perfect state, we must think that he did the same also with respect to plants and trees (for which the autumn was undoubtedly more suitable than the spring).

Sources of explanation.

IX. When we say the world was created in autumn, this must not be understood of every part of the globe. It could not happen that everywhere (at one and the same time) it could be spring or autumn, summer or winter (because the seasons differ by reason of hemispheres and climates). When it is summer in the Antarctic regions, it is winter in the Arctic; when the sun begins to withdraw from the Antarctic and approach the Arctic, in the former it is autumn and in the latter spring. But it must be understood of that part of the world in which Adam was formed and (in our hemisphere) in which Moses wrote the history of the creation (since the sun ought to have begun his course from some one of the twelve Zodiacal signs, either from the Ram [*Ariete*] in spring or from the Scales [*Libra*] in autumn).

X. Although spring images a nascent world and sets forth its infancy, it is not thence well inferred that the world was created in the spring. For as the works of God are perfect, it ought to have been created in a perfect state; thus not only as nascent, but as perfect in all its parts. It can therefore be called the image of the nascent world in the constituted nature (*in natura constituta*) and in the ordinary way of generation, but not in the extraordinary way of creation and in nature to be constituted (*in natura constituenda*).

XI. That God commands the earth to bring forth herbs and grass does not necessarily prove this to have been done in the spring. For fruitbearing trees also were commanded to bring forth fruit according to their own kind (which could be done at no fitter time than the autumn). If it is absurd that the earth should germinate in autumn (which nevertheless often happens), it is more absurd for every kind of tree to bear fruit (which they ought to produce only in autumn).

XII. We cannot deny that many of the ancient writers referred the origin of the world to the time of spring.

> Yes! lovely Spring! when rose the world to birth,
> Thy genial radiance dawn'd upon the earth,
> Beneath thy balmy air creation grew,
> And no bleak gale on infant nature blew;
> —Virgil, *Georgics* 2.336-39 (Loeb, 1:138-39)

So astrologers have commonly referred the beginnings of the heavenly motions to the first point of Aries. Scaliger himself confesses that the ancients held the twenty-fifth day of April in great esteem because they supposed the world was created then, and Christ born and put to death on that day ("Prolegomena," *Thesaurus Temporum: Eusebii Pamphili* [1606/1968], p. ii). Thus they called it the *protoktiston hēmeran* because they believed the first of the equinoxes began from it. But if we examine the foundations upon which they built, it will be evident that this opinion commends itself rather by the multitude of authors than by the weight of their reasons.

Fifth Question

Was the world created in a moment, or in six days? And, were the particular works of each of the six days created without motion and succession of time, or did God employ a whole day in the production of each thing?

The world was not created in a single moment.

I. Augustine thought that creation took place not during an interval of six days, but in a single moment (*The Literal Meaning of Genesis* 1.15 [ACW 41:36-37 and CG 11.9 [FC 14:199-201]). With him, many of the old writers agree (whom Cajetan follows) so that what Moses relates concerning the six days must be understood allegorically of angelic cognitions. It is as if all things are said to have been created in six days because they were represented by so many notions to the intellect of angels. Thus each angelic cognition may be called a day and may be said to have a morning and evening (and from this the distinction of angelic cognition into *matutinam* ["morning"] and *vespertinam* ["evening"] seems to have arisen).

But in six days.

II. But there are the following objections to this opinion: (1) the simple and historical Mosaic narration, which mentions six days and ascribes a particular work to each day; (2) the earth is said to have been without form and void and darkness rested upon the face of the deep (which could not have been said if all things had been created in one moment); (3) in the fourth commandment (recommending the sanctification of the seventh day), God is said to have been engaged in creation

six days and to have rested on the seventh (so that by this example the people might be induced to rest on the seventh day). This reason would have had no weight, if God had created all things in a single moment. (4) No reason can be given for the order followed by Moses in his narration, if all things were not made successively.

III. When the Son of Sirach says that God created all things *koinē* (18:1), he does not speak of a simultaneity of time (as if he created all things "at the same time"—the false rendering of the Vulgate). Rather it must be understood of the gathering together of all creatures which were formed equally and in common by God (so that there is nothing which was not created by him).

IV. Now although God was able to create all things in a moment, yet he willed to interpose some space in finishing his works: (1) to testify his own liberty; (2) to set forth his wisdom, power and goodness more distinctly by parts in this magnificent work (and more clearly indicate the mutual connection, dependency and order of things); (3) to excite us to the distinct contemplation of the divine works; (4) to teach man by his own example that he must labor six days and rest on the seventh and be occupied with divine worship in memory of the creation.

The work of each day accomplished in a moment.

V. However, although he willed to spend many days in the work of creation, it cannot be inferred from this (as some wish) that God employed a whole day in the works of the particular days and so produced them successively. The Scriptures testify that things straightaway stood forth at the nod and command of God and that no delay of time intervened between the mandate and the execution because nothing could resist him, and God no more needed time for the production of things than for commanding them into existence: "He spake and it was done" (Ps. 33:9). Hence Ambrose (on the words "let there be light"): "He did not speak so that the operation should follow, but the matter was finished with the word; whence that beautiful expression of David, he spake and it was done because the word fulfilled the effect" (*Hexameron* 1.9 [33]* [FC 42:39; PL 14.153]).

VI. (2) If resurrection takes place "in a moment" (*en atomō*), "in the twinkling of an eye" (*en rhipē ophthalmou*, 1 Cor. 15:52), why not also creation? If Satan could show to Christ all the kingdoms of the world "in a moment of time" (*en stigmē chronou*, Lk. 4:5), why could God not create them in a moment? If the various miracles were wrought in a moment, why not creation also? And God could as easily create in a moment the light, the sun, the stars and the planets, as the angels and the soul of Adam (viz., by his sole command and word). Nor could it have been done otherwise because in the very moment that nothing ceased, something began to be; and when light started forth, the darkness vanished.

Sources of explanation.

VII. It is one thing to say that the time in which things were produced was successive: another that the production itself was successive. The mode of production could be momentary, but not the mode of existence in time.

VIII. Although its distinct work is assigned to each day, it does not follow that a whole day was employed in finishing each work; or that God needed that interval of time to perform it. Rather God, on each of those distinct days, produced nothing besides. Otherwise, if he had occupied the whole of the first day in the creation of light, he would have finished it only at the beginning of the following night (which is absurd).

IX. Since God is said to have rested from absolute creation on the seventh day (because he ceased creating any new species), he could not be said to have rested in this sense on any day of the six, since upon each of them he operated and created something pertaining to the complement of the universe.

X. Although various works are referred to the sixth day (which could not have been performed at the same time), this is not an objection against each having been finished in a moment. Thus God created the body of Adam from the dust of the earth in a moment, in another he breathed life into it, in another he sent a sleep upon him and took out one of his ribs, from which in another moment he formed Eve. The beasts also in a moment received the impulse of coming to Adam (although from that impulse they went to him successively).

XI. There was no need of a great interval of time to separate the waters. As God in a moment caused the earth or dry land to stand out of the waters (by which it was on all sides surrounded), so in the same moment he gave motion to the waters (by which they began to flow together and to run into the caverns and subterranean passages prepared to receive them). Although this was done successively, yet in a moment it was impressed upon them by the word and command of God.

XII. When things are said to have been created in a moment, we are to understand not so much a mathematical as a physical moment (i.e., the very shortest time conceivable).

XIII. If the immediate creation of the works of the first day was momentaneous (*momentanea*), such ought to have been the mediate production of the works of each day. The relative nothing and indisposed matter cannot be conceived to have been less ductile in the hand of God than the absolute nothing. Thus matter could have been created from the latter in a moment and without delay, while from the former nothing could have been made except with delay and succession of time.

Sixth Question

In what order were the works of creation produced by God in the six days?

The works of creation may be regarded either collectively or distributively.

I. The works of creation may be considered: either in general (collectively and aggregatively) and wont to be expressed by "the world" or "the universe" (*to pan*); or in particular (distributively) with regard to the production of its various parts in the six days of creation. In the latter, their creation is first set forth, then their distinction and lastly their adornment.

II. In all these, God demonstrates his power splendidly in the production of all things (great as well as small) *ex nihilo* by his word alone; his wisdom, in their variety, order and use; his goodness, in the communication of himself (by which he made all things very good). Thus he exercised an ordering and command which powerfully gave existence to things; approbation, which blessed the produced thing with goodness; ordination, which wisely directed all things and assigned to each its own use; and sanctions, which subjected them constantly to the laws once impressed upon them.

III. The works of the first day are reckoned as three (the heaven, the earth and light) according to those first words of Genesis: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." For although some think this is said in anticipation (by way of a general proposition placing before us a compendium and summary of the whole creation which is afterwards unfolded distinctly and impressively by single days, an opinion favored by Chrysostom and many after him), still it seems more satisfactory and more suitable to the Mosaic narration that this first verse described the beginning of creation by the production of the two general parts of the world (to wit, the heavens and the earth). Afterwards it is followed by a description of the particulars contained in the heaven and the earth, and which God produced distinctly in the following days. This is plainly gathered from v. 2 where it is added, "And the earth was without form and void" (which could not be said, unless the earth is supposed to have been already created, v. 1). Otherwise we must maintain that these were created by God before the six days or we must imagine that they were uncreated and coeternal with God. To this the Socinians seem plainly to incline, while they persist in saying that no mention is made of the creation of matter itself in the six days of Moses. Their object is thus the more easily to weaken the argument we derive from this—to establish the divinity of Christ from his existence before the creation of the world. Hence Volkelius expressly says, "Moses has said nothing concerning the creation of the land and water, nor the sacred writings elsewhere; nor are they to be censured, who either suspend their opinion about this matter, not daring to explain what the Scriptures have not explained, or so follow that which seems most in accordance with reason, as to leave to others the liberty of doubting or of dissenting" (*De vera Religione* 3*.4 [1630], p. 7). Anyone can readily judge that they desire to weaken the argument for the creation of the world *ex nihilo*.

What is meant by the heaven? Both ethereal and highest.

IV. More rightly then, by "the heavens and earth" is meant the universal machine of this world, destitute, however, as yet of ornament, splendor and perfection (which is afterwards received in the separate creation of the particular works in the space of six days). And by "the heavens" is indicated not only the ethereal heaven (as yet devoid of stars), but especially "the highest heaven," called the Empyrean or "the heaven of heavens" (1 K. 8:27), "the third heaven" (2 Cor. 12:2) and metaphorically "Paradise" (Lk. 23:43), whose builder and maker (*technitēs kai dēmiourgos*) is God (Heb. 11:10). As to substance it is most subtle; as to quality most lucid; as to duration, intrinsically incapable of failing; as to situation, constituted far above all the visible heavens (1 Tim. 6:16; Rev. 21:10; Jn. 14:3; Eph. 4:10). Hence God dwelling in heaven is said to dwell on high, in the highest (Dt. 4:39; Ps. 102:19; Lk. 2:14; 24:49; Jam. 1:17); and Christ ascending into heaven is said to have ascended on high and far above all the heavens (Ps. 68:18; Eph. 4:8, 10; Heb. 7:26). This must be opposed to the Lutherans who hold that heaven to be uncreated and feign that it is illocal (*illocale*) and incorporeal and everywhere (in order to weaken the argument drawn from the ascension of Christ to heaven against the ubiquity of his body).

Under it the angels are included.

V. Under this highest heaven, we think the angels (its inhabitants) are contained. And although Moses (adhering rather to the description of sensible and visible things) does not expressly mention their creation, still he sufficiently intimates it by "the host of the heavens" (Gen. 2:1) and by that heaven which was to be their habitation (Jd. 6; Lk. 2:13; Mt. 24:36). Hence they are said to have applauded God (as already created) when he founded the earth (Job 38:6, 7), which was made on the first day. They are also reckoned in the first place among creatures before the sun, moon and stars (Ps. 148:2).

2. The earth.

VI. Another work of the first day was the earth (under which name the waters also are wont to be comprehended), which Moses describes by emptiness and vacuity (*thhv vbhv*); not only because the earth was destitute of inhabitants and indwellers, but also because it was bare of herbs, flowers, trees, all light, ornament and beauty (which afterwards were added to it). This is expressed in the same place also by the abyss covered with darkness. Thus that unformed mass (composed of earth and water together) is denoted. From this, the poets have taken their Chaos which Ovid not inelegantly expresses in these words: "Formerly the sea and the land and the heaven that covers all things, was one appearance of nature throughout the whole world, which they called Chaos, a rude and undigested mass; nor anything but a lumpish weight and the jarring seeds of things not well joined, heaped together in the same place" (*Metamorphoses* 1.5-9 [Loeb, 3:2-3]). Matter, however, is called unformed, not absolutely and simply (devoid of all form), since indeed whatever exists, exists through its own form, but relatively and comparatively (because still lacking the elegant and exact form which it afterwards obtained). It was as to substance partly earthly, partly watery; as to quantity, huge and as it were a mass without bottom, then called the abyss; as to quality, deformed and shrouded in darkness; as to effect empty and inefficacious, the material whence all sublunary bodies were taken. Here belongs what is immediately added concerning "the Spirit moving upon the face of the waters" (v. 2). This can apply to neither the air nor wind (not as yet created and which does not cherish but rather dissipates); not to a created angel (to whom this work does not belong); nor to the power and efficacy of God in general. The latter is set forth better by the word "incubate" from which the Holy Spirit (who is its principle) is distinguished; but it belongs to the Spirit of God alone who himself (also God) nourished and fecundated that unformed mass by his virtue and vital warmth and warmed it to generation (*pros zōogonian synethalpe*). The latter is a metaphor taken from the eggs of birds or incubating fowls; as is said of the eagle (Dt. 32:11), which by the motion and spreading of her wings either cherishes and warms the eggs to the production of her young or sustains them already produced (which is the force of the word *rchq*, Jer. 23:9).

3. Light.

VII. The third work of first day was the primeval light, from which (after the creation of the heaven and earth) God most fittingly began the production of particular creatures; not only because the creature was most simple and excellent, but also because it was necessary for the adornment of the heaven and the fecundation of the earth (which was also to cause the day, manifest the works of God and be as

it were the common obstetrician of natural things, to serve by its own innate heat to bring forth and cherish seeds). In this God also wished to present a type of the second creation, which begins from the light of the knowledge of the word: "For God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ" (2 Cor. 4:6).

VIII. Now this light was neither an accident without a subject (as the Romanists twaddle) nor the elements of fire (as others maintain). Fire is never called day, nor does it cause the day; nor lucid little clouds (which by their circular motion from the east to the west) made day and night (as others think). For on the first day, no cloud had been created, but a shining body lighted up in one hemisphere of the ethereal heavens (which by its circumrotation distinguished the day and night of the first three days, until that light was afterwards, on the fourth day, collected and distributed into the body of the sun and stars).

The works of the second day: (1) the expanse.

IX. The works of the second day were: (1) the expanse or that immense distance and most vast space reaching from the surface of the terrestrial globe even to the extreme boundary of the visible heaven (called "heaven" in v. 8). Not indeed the ethereal heaven (which was created on the first day distinct from the earth and on the fourth day at length adorned with stars), but the aerial (which being before confused and mixed together lay concealed in that unformed concretion of water and land). This is more frequently denominated "heaven" in the Scriptures. Hence "the fowls of heaven" are mentioned afterwards in v. 20. In the Hebrew, it is called *rqy'* from expansion or extension (as in a covering or curtain—alluded to in Ps. 104:2 where God is said to have "stretched out the heavens like a curtain"). Nor is it an objection that in vv. 14, 15, 17 "the expanse" is attributed also to the ethereal heavens, the seat of the stars. The Scriptures speak of it in different respects, either in its whole breadth (as embracing what comes under the name of the visible heavens [i.e., the ethereal heavens] and the aerial) or with respect to its upper part (as in the passage cited) or with respect to its lower part (v. 20). In this sense, it divides the upper from the lower waters (vv. 6, 7). In this sense, the ordination of the expanse took place on this second day and its adaptation to the separation of the waters from the waters, the higher from the lower. "And God said, let there be an expanse in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters" (Gen. 1:6).

(2) The division of the waters. The waters above are clouds.

X. Another work of this day was the division of the waters above from those below (i.e., of the clouds standing out above the lowest part of the expanse from those below and as it were poured around the expanse, which were unseparated until the third day). For "the water above" can be properly referred only to "the clouds" in the middle region of the air. The Scriptures clearly intimate this by various passages which interpret the waters as the clouds: "Who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters: who maketh the clouds his chariot" (Ps. 104:3); "He bindeth up the waters in his thick clouds and the cloud is not rent under them" (Job 26:8); "When he uttereth his voice, there is a multitude of waters in the heavens, and he causeth the vapors to ascend from the ends of the earth" (Jer.

10:13). It is confirmed by the very nature of the clouds which are nothing else than water evaporated by the power of the daily heat and again congealed by the cold air (which Pliny calls "waters standing in the heavens," *Natural History* 31*.2 [Loeb, 8:378-79]). Finally, Moses makes the waters only twofold: above and below. However, the clouds (which are waters) cannot be those below; therefore they must be referred to those above. For although they may be called inferior originally and terminatively (because brought out of a lower place), yet they are not such subjectively and with respect to situation when they have been carried up on high.

Not supercelestial waters.

XI. The Lutherans (following many of the Scholastics) have therefore falsely invented "supercelestial waters" to render more difficult the ascension of Christ and of believers into heaven. Such waters could be of no use (neither for cooling the heat of the heavens and stars [they having none] nor for compressing the heavens that they may not be agitated and vacillate by the violence of the winds; for the heavenly orbs were so firmly established by God that they can be disturbed by no power of the winds—nay, nothing can reach up to them). And if certain waters are said to be "above the heavens" (Ps. 148:4), they are not therefore above the ethereal heaven, but above the aerial (which is also repeatedly called heaven). Nor if the clouds cannot be in heaven except by the attraction of the sun in constituted nature (*natura constituta*), does it follow that God could not raise them up extraordinarily without the sun in nature to be constituted (*natura constituenda*). Now although they are not said to be above the expanse, they ought not immediately to have been above the whole breadth of the expanse, but above a part of it. They are not said so much to have been above the expanse (*'l rqy'*) as from under it (*m'l lrqy'*), to intimate that the waters were not carried out above the whole expanse (so that the whole of it would be lower than the waters), but that they were carried upwards and made one with the expanse above and below, rather with respect to us than to the whole expanse. Finally, "the windows of heaven" (Gen. 7:11) (which, being opened, poured forth that immense amount of water in the flood by which the former world was overwhelmed and perished) denote nothing else than most copious showers metaphorically, which burst forth from dense clouds.

The works of the third day: (1) the collection of the waters.

XII. The works of the third day are: (1) the collection of the lower waters into certain beds and the separation of them from the land so that the land (freed from them) might become a fit and convenient residence for animals (and especially for men about to be created). From its characteristic property, he called it "dry," while partly concealed and subterranean holes were left and disposed as tubes through which the perennially gushing fountains and great rivers might break forth from that immense receptacle of the collected waters (the sea) for the irrigation of the earth. Nor can the opinion of some be readily admitted, that this work belongs to the second day (being put here by hysterosis) and that *vy'mr* ought to be translated, not (as always elsewhere) "and he said," but "now he had said." There is no reason why *vy'mr* should be translated in v. 9 in the pluperfect tense, while in all the other places of this chapter where the same verb occurs (vv. 3, 6, 11, 14, 20, 24, 26), it should be constantly rendered "and he said." Nor should Moses after

the separation of the waters above from those below have added (as at the close of each day) "and the evening and the morning were the second day" if what follows in vv. 9 and 10 still belonged to the second day. Nor does there seem to be any necessity for such a hysterosis. For what is drawn from this (that the second day would be without the accustomed benediction) cannot establish it. A sufficient reason can be given that on this day the lifting up of the land from that great mass of waters surrounding it was begun and brought near its end; but it was finished at length on the following day when the lower waters were collected together and the dry land appeared.

(2) Germination of the earth.

XIII. Another work of this day was the germination of the earth and the production of plants—fruit-bearing and seed-bearing trees (vv. 9-11)—that when the individuals became extinct, the species of the thing might be preserved. Although a certain force and fecundity was then given to the earth (by which it could afterwards produce the same from the seed of all kinds of herbs and cherish and nourish them from its own bosom), yet at that first germination of plants instantaneously effected, it held itself only passively and materially, not actively.

The work of the fourth day: the creation of luminaries.

XIV. The work of the fourth day was creation of luminaries in the expanse (v. 14), i.e., in that part of the expanse which we call ether or the ethereal heavens. With these, he wished to adorn the heaven as he had before adorned the earth with herbs and trees. A threefold use is denoted: first in dividing between the light and the darkness (i.e., the night of the artificial day)—"Let there be luminaries in the expanse of the heavens to divide the day from the night" (v. 14); second, in marking and setting bounds to the changes and seasons of the year; third, in the communication of their powers (by which these lower things imbued may be variously affected), while by their light, heat and motion they flow into sublunary things. Thus "the heavens may hear the earth; and the earth may hear the corn, and the wine, and the oil" for the use of men (Hos. 2:21, 22*). However, the minds of men are to be excepted from this (they not being at all influenced by the luminaries).

The work of the fifth day: the production of water and flying animals from the earth.

XV. The work of the fifth day was the production of water animals or fish from the water (vv. 20, 21), of flying animals and birds from the earth (as expressly taught in 2:19) and consequently the adornment of the sublunary world with creatures possessing sense and motion. A convenient gradation being observed (and a process instituted from the building of the house to the production of its inhabitants), some of them were at first imperfect, but afterwards, however, more perfect.

The work of the sixth day: the production of animals and of man.

XVI. On the sixth day, he gave the finishing stroke to his works by the creation of both land animals (of which three kinds are enumerated—cattle, creeping things and beasts—to which all others must be referred, whether perfect or imperfect) whose species are innumerable; and man who was to be the inhabitant of the constructed world, a production after the image of God. Thus to the remaining creatures (which have only a degree of being or a degree of life or a

degree of feeling and motion), there might be added one having the most perfect degree of life (viz., reason) and whom, therefore, as the most excellent work and the epitome of the whole, God not only reserved for the last place, but made in a peculiar method above the others and (as it were) after a consultation: "Let us make man." This does not indicate deliberation in the worker, nor difficulty in the work, but the dignity of the work itself; in order to show "by the labored expression that he was engaged in a most important work," as Chrysostom says on this passage (*dia tēs tōn lexeōn pachytētos tēn timēn eis ton mellonta dēmiourgeisthai*, "Homily 8 [Gen. 1:26]," in *Homilies on Genesis 1-17* [FC 74:108; PG 53.71]).

Seventh Question

From the use of the luminaries posited by Moses can judiciary astrology be built up? We deny against the astrologers and planetarians.

What is judiciary astrology?

I. The astrology discussed in this question is not natural (or the science of the natural order and motion of the heavenly bodies, deservedly held in estimation and of great use in human life), but judiciary. The latter is an art full of rash curiosity and superstition by which judgment is made from the stars and their constellations concerning man, his inclinations, actions, pursuits, events, fortune, and so of life and death. It also concerns the changes of empires and republics and the like which occur in civil society and which are from them predicted as certainly and indubitably to take place.

II. In the past, the Priscillianists, the impious spawn of the Gnostics, held the affirmative. Among other monstrous errors, they connected men with fated stars and taught that the body of man itself was composed according to the twelve signs of heaven (as Augustine testifies, *De Haeresibus* 70 [PL 42.44]). They were followed by the planetarians, astrologers and nativity-casters (*genethliaci*), who near the time of generation or nativity, consult the constellations (i.e., the position, aspect and influx of the stars) and from these foretell the nature and fortune of the child. The orthodox, however, constantly hold the negative.

Statement of the question.

III. The question is not whether the heavenly bodies have a great power over these sublunary and elementary things (and even over the body of man himself) and by their various motions and position and influx of light and heat, affect bodies in different ways, causing them to grow or decrease, to become altered and variously changed (which not only the Scriptures, but universal experience approve). Rather the question is Do they exercise this power equally over the minds of men (which are spiritual in their nature) so that a certain judgment can be formed thence of their inclinations, actions and future course? This we deny.

IV. The question is not whether the luminaries can be called natural signs (of the seasons, cold, heat, the various changes of the heavens, the eclipses of the sun and moon, and other natural effects which spring from the different motions and positions of the stars); or civil and economical signs depending upon the natural (as the time for plowing, sailing, sowing, etc.); or moral signs (partly of the perfection of the Creator, beheld in these wonderful works, partly of the duty

of creatures, bound to look up to and worship the great Artificer); or mystical signs of various events, either in anger or in favor (as when the sun stood still on Gibeon [Jos. 10:12], when it went ten degrees backward in the days of Hezekiah [2 K. 20:11], and when God will send "wonders in the heavens and in the earth," Joel 2:30), whose signification, as being extraordinary and not natural, ought to depend upon a peculiar revelation. But the question is Are they necessary and natural signs of future events; not only of natural and necessary, but also of voluntary and contingent (and consequently of the life and death of men), so that it may with certainty be known with what fate each one is born and what will happen to him? This we deny.

Proof that there is no judiciary astrology.

V. The reasons are: (1) God severely prohibits and condemns such astrology in his word—"Regard not them that have familiar spirits, neither seek after wizards" (Lev. 19:31). Nay he commands the soul which turns itself to them to be cut off from the midst of his people: "A man also or woman that hath a familiar spirit, or that is a wizard, shall surely be put to death: they shall stone them with stones: their blood shall be upon them" (Lev. 20:27). Elsewhere God threatens astrologers of this kind with confusion, folly and madness (Is. 44:25). He reproves the worthlessness both of the art and of its practitioners and the credulity of their dupes: "Stand now with thine enchantments, and with the multitude of thy sorceries, wherein thou hast labored from thy youth . . . . Let now the astrologers, the stargazers, the monthly prognosticators, stand up, and save thee from these things that shall come upon thee. Behold, they shall be as stubble" (Is. 47:12-14*). God also told the Israelites "not to learn the way of the heathen, and not to be dismayed at the signs of heaven, at which the heathen are dismayed" (Jer. 10:2). "Therefore hearken not ye to your prophets, nor to your diviners, nor to your dreamers, nor to your enchanters, nor to your sorcerers, which speak unto you, saying, Ye shall not serve the king of Babylon" (Jer. 27:9).

VI. (2) The Scriptures deny to man the knowledge of future things and transfer it to God alone as the criterion (*kritērion*) for distinguishing the true God from idols: "Produce your cause, saith the Lord; bring forth your strong reasons, saith the King of Jacob. Let them bring them forth, and show us what will happen" (Is. 41:21, 22). "There is a God in heaven that revealeth secrets, and maketh known to the king what shall be in the latter days" (Dan. 2:28). Now if those things could be known from the stars and foretold by men, why didn't the Chaldean astrologers know them, and why does Daniel attribute this as peculiar to God alone?

VII. (3) The manners and actions of men are voluntary and free and cannot, therefore, be deduced from a natural cause such as a constellation. Otherwise a more than adamantine fate and an irresistible necessity of all things would be established in nature with respect even to second causes. (4) If morals and events depend on the stars, the morals and fate of all those whose horoscope and point of nativity are similar would be the same. Experience, however, evinces the falsity of this. Many are brought into the world in one and the same moment of time who are, notwithstanding, most dissimilar in morals and nature and are pressed by the most diverse fates (as even the single example of the twins, Esau and Jacob, proves). Thus the studies, the strength, the events and fortunes of a male

and female born about the same time from the same womb, are different. Also many whose horoscope is most diverse die by the same kind of death (as they who fall in the same battle, whom the same destruction involves—the fall of a house, an earthquake, an epidemic disease or any public calamity). For example, did the stars in the same position at nativity shine upon the firstborn of the Egyptians smitten in like manner by the angel of the Lord; or upon the Egyptians overwhelmed in the Red Sea; or the Canaanites slain together; or the infants of Bethlehem murdered at the same time? Again, are not the dispositions also and fates of those born under most diverse positions of the stars often alike?

VIII. (5) The time of the conception and birth of man (from which the horoscopes are usually taken according to the observations of the hours) is uncertain. Indeed, of conception, because it is often unknown to the parents themselves; of nativity because it may be premature or prolonged on account of weakness. Besides, no mortal can ever accurately ascertain the point of nativity since it is not the result of a moment (motion being usually connected with it). Who does not know that a mistake is easy in the few moments of an hour (in which there is a great change made in the position of the sun and the stars on account of their most rapid movements)? Hence the constellation being changed a different fate concerning the different members of the same man would be ascertained. Again, since the fortunes and the life of men depend upon the will and desires of not one, but different men, how can they be foretold from the horoscope of one man? And what is far greater, how can the fates not only of individual men, but of an entire city, region and kingdom (arising from such a complication [*symplokē*] of things and counsels) be deduced from the stars?

IX. (6) If the most natural events can be foretold only probably from the stars, how much less can casual, fortuitous, voluntary and free events be known and foretold? The astrologer cannot predict either heat or a shower, whether the farmer ought now to hope for clear weather and then to fear a storm. Nor is he able to discover clearly the end of anyone's life, the counsel men are about to take in a particular case, nor the manner of their death, nor (which is far more difficult) the grace each man is about to obtain for his conversion (which depends alone upon the grace of the Holy Spirit and the perfectly free and secret decree of God).

X. Finally (to omit many other arguments) that juggling art cannot but be rash and impious which strives to break into the secrets of God and presumes with awful daring to define the future known to God alone; assigns the causes of sins and crimes to the stars and consequently to their Creator himself, so that men cease to reproach themselves and ascribe the cause of all the evil they do or suffer, not to themselves as in duty bound, but to the stars or to God; binds men more to the contemplation of the stars than to the veneration and worship of their Creator; either torments them with senseless threatenings or fills the minds of the credulous with a vain hope, loosens the buckle of security and emboldens to every wickedness those to whom the temerity of astrologers promises a long life; is opposed both to the Scriptures and right reason and interferes with true piety and the public tranquility. Hence it has often been proscribed by the humane laws of emperors. Augustus banished astrologers from the city; Tiberius and Claudius from Italy; and Vitellius from the world and life, as a race of men faithless to the powerful, yet deceitful to those hoping to become so. Thus in

book 9 of the Justinian Codex (which treats of the crime of magic), mathematicians are joined with sorcerers and magicians and subjected to the punishment of the Cornelian law. And in the same source, it is said: "This art is damnable and altogether prohibited" (*Corpus Iuris Civilis, II: Codex Iustinianus* 9.18.2, 5, 6, pp. 379-80). The fathers everywhere inveigh against it and execrate the frauds and impostures of the planetarians. In the Council of Braga (A.D. 563) (cf. Hefele, 4:381-84) and of Toledo I (A.D. 400) (PL 84.327-34), the followers of Priscillian are condemned and proscribed under the punishment of anathema (cf. Augustine, CG 5.1-3ff. [FC 8:241-62]).

Sources of explanation.

XI. To be natural signs of seasons, days and years (as is said of lights in Gen. 1:14) differs from to be signs prognostic of future events; not only necessary and natural, but also contingent and free (which is not asserted of them).

XII. When "the stars" are said to "have fought against Sisera" (Jdg. 5:20), the Holy Spirit wished simply to intimate that it was a heavenly victory; one obtained not by human strength, but by the auspicious favor of God alone (to show that all things favored the Israelites for victory, and the very stars are said to have fought, as it were, for them by a poetical exaggeration). Or they are said to have fought not by a natural influence, but by a supernatural direction; not by an ordinary, but by an extraordinary action; effectively rather than formally, inasmuch as God could use them out of their order to produce various meteors, thunderings, lightnings, hail (by which Sisera with his army suffered a terrible defeat).

XIII. The star which indicated to the wise men the birth of Christ (Mt. 2:2) cannot favor the calculation of nativities (*genethliacis*). (1) The example is singular from which a general rule cannot be drawn. If this happened to Christ on account of his superior nature (*hyperochēn*), it does not follow that it can also with equal truth be applied to others. (2) That star was extraordinary; its rise was not natural, but supernatural. (3) That star was accompanied with both an internal and external revelation to declare its signification. (4) Although the birth of Christ was pointed out by it, yet no one would infer from this that the point of his nativity was indicated by it or collected from it, much less that the life, morals and death of Christ depended on the influx of that star (as formerly Faustus Manichaeus quibbled). Augustine speaking of the star replied to Manichaeus: "It did not rule over Christ for a decree, but served him for a testimony; nor subject him to its sway, but pointed him out for regard" (*Reply to Faustus the Manichaean* 2.5 [NPNF1, 4:158; PL 42.212]).

XIV. It is one thing to know the approach of a storm from the appearance of the heavens, or a coming drought, or things which are natural and depend on natural causes; another, however, to know the events of future things and the free movements of the human will. The former is said in Lk. 12:54, 55, but not the latter. The foreknowledge (*prognōseis*) of astrologers can indeed be allowed within its own sphere, as long as they confine themselves within the boundaries of their own art. Otherwise they are to be proscribed as audacious and deceitful.

XV. Although the heavens have their powers (*dynameis*, Mt. 24:29) by which they act upon these lower things by their light, motion and influx, it does not follow that they act equally upon all things, even upon the will and counsels of men. And when (in the same place) Christ adds that there will be signs in heaven to foretell the day of his last appearing, he does not treat of that affection of the stars which happens from the stated and ordinary course of nature, but concerning a certain

extraordinary event to which nothing is exactly similar and with which nothing agrees (to wit, concerning the signs and wonders which God will accommodate properly and peculiarly to the advent of Christ, to warn believers of it and to render unbelievers more and more convicted and inexcusable). This could not be equally understood from the motions and aspect of the stars, since they will change that common motion and order on which astrologers usually rest the principal foundation of their art.

XVI. It is one thing for the heavenly and sublunary bodies to be mutually connected, various impressions of the former upon our bodies to be granted and various alterations consequent upon them by which the human mind is in different ways affected by an indirect motion, the humors being changed (which we grant). It is another, however, for the stars to influence the will and human actions by a motion either direct or necessary (which we deny). The former is an inorganic and immaterial power, while the latter depends upon partial and proximate causes (in different ways specifying the influx of a common cause).

XVII. Joseph and Moses are said to have been instructed in the wisdom of the Egyptians, Daniel in that of the Chaldeans (Acts 7:22; Dan. 1:17). But they are not on that account said to have practiced those vain and impious divinations. Their wisdom could have been concerned with hieroglyphics, the liberal arts, numbers, geometry and even natural astrology (but reasonable and resting upon solid principles, not the vain and impious divination [*astromantikēn*] by the stars, from which they were always far removed). If they uttered prophecies or interpreted them, these were derived not from the stars, but from the revelation of God (to whom they ascribed them).

XVIII. Various answers can be given to the arguments usually brought forward. (1) Many of them are of slight faith and doubtful authority, recorded by foolish and superstitious writers. (2) Many rest upon slippery and ambiguous opinions and are capable of being turned on either side (such as the oracles of Apollo, the Interpreter [*Loxiou*]) so that in whatever way the thing happens, they seem to have exactly described it. (3) If certain of their predictions are borne out by the event, it does not follow that the knowledge was certain and built upon true foundations. There are innumerable others whose untruthfulness the event mocked and proscribed. (4) The truth of the events is not to be attributed to that worthless art, but either to the cunning of the prophesiers (because when the genius, inclination, morals, pursuits and counsels of those with whom they deal are known to them, it is easy to predict many things which they neither have gained from the stars [as they pretend] nor could gain from them); or to the credulity of their dupes (turning fortuitous chances into a fulfillment of the predicted thing); or to the help of the Devil (inspired by whom they anticipate many things which he either presages and conceives as probable or knows for certain—either by divine revelation or by the experimental knowledge of so many thousand years, or by his exalted activity, by the aid of which he can immediately announce elsewhere what has been done in the most distant places and to run before the quickness of every speed); or, finally, to the secret and most just judgment of God, who by that mockery often chastises the foolish minds of men by sending the efficacy of error upon those who believe a lie, that they may be more deceived who believe and study those arts. (5) The truth of predictions does not immediately prove the art to be legitimate and approved, nor that its professors

should be consulted. For the Devil sometimes also predicts the truth (as that spirit falsely assuming the appearance of Samuel, whom the Pythoness evoked from the shades to please Saul, 1 S. 28:15, 16) whom no one would say ought to be consulted. Nay, God expressly forbids us to hear a false prophet (Dt. 13:1) even foretelling the truth, if he wishes to lead us away to the worship of strange gods. He does this to teach us that although the things which are contrary to God and his word may have the appearance of truth, they are not to be followed, but are to be carefully abstained from. Since then it is plain that this art is woven together of mere delusions and impostures (against the providence of God, the liberty of man, the tranquility of republics and empires, the peace of conscience, injurious and opposed to the Scriptures, reason and experience), we say it should be deservedly discarded and proscribed.

EIGHTH QUESTION

Was Adam the first of mortals, or did men exist before him? And is the epoch of the created world and of men's deeds to be referred much farther back than Adam? The former we affirm; the latter we deny, against the Preadamites.

I. Although the Preadamic fiction is so absurd in itself and foreign to all reason (no less than to the Scripture revelation itself) as to deserve rather the contempt and indignation of believers than a laborious refutation, yet in this very latest age (so productive of most dangerous heresies) there was found not so long ago one who did not blush to obtrude this fiction or fable upon the world. He endeavored to confirm it by various arguments in an exercitation (cf. Isaac de la Peyrere, *Praeadamitae sive exercitatio . . . capitis quinti Epistolae D. Pauli ad Romanos* [1655]) and systematic theology (*A Theological Systeme upon that Presupposition that Men were before Adam* [1655]) prepared for this purpose. Thus the question must be touched upon briefly that not only its folly and falsity, but also its impiety may be the more clearly seen.

Statement of the question.

II. The question then comes to this—Was Adam the first man created by God; or were there many created before him? For he, with whom we here treat, pretends that Adam, whose creation is recorded in Gen. 2, was the father only of the Jew and not of all men, and that his formation was different from the creation of the man referred to in Gen. 1 (from whom, he holds, the Gentiles took their rise). Thus even before Adam, many myriads of men inhabited the earth, and many ages intervened between Adam and those other men. But the constant opinion thus far not only among Christians, but also among the Jews (yea even among the Mohammedans themselves) has been that Adam was created in the beginning of the world and was the first man, the father not only of the Jews, but also of all men universally. Of this assertion, there are many invincible proofs.

Proof that the Preadamic theory is false.

III. The first is the voice of Scripture itself, which often sets Adam before us as the first of mortals, before whom no man existed and from whom all have sprung. "The first man Adam was made a living soul" (1 Cor. 15:45); "The first man is of the earth, earthy" (1 Cor. 15:47). Hence he is called "the first made of the earth" (*prōtoplastos patēr kosmou*, Wisdom

7:1). And Eve was so named because she was "the mother of all living" (Gen. 3:20), which would be untrue if only the Jewish nation sprang from her (innumerable other peoples acknowledging a different origin and that a far more ancient one). Also the Scriptures, in reckoning genealogies, as they begin from Adam in descending, so end in him in ascending (Gen. 5; Lk. 3:23-38). And Paul asserts that "God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth" (Acts 17:26). But how could "all nations of men" (*pan ethnos anthrōpōn*) have arisen from one blood if the Jews and Gentiles have a different origin and have not the same blood and the same parent?

IV. Vain is the objection that Adam could be called the first of men (relative to Christ), although not the first of all, as Christ is called the second Adam and the last (*eschatos*, 1 Cor. 15:47), although neither the second Adam nor the last. For Adam is called the first not only relatively to Christ (because he preceded him), but also to other men (who were to bear his image). As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy (1 Cor. 15:48, where there is a manifest allusion to the original production of man from the dust of the earth). (2) Christ is called the "second" not because he was the second individual of the human race, but by reason of communication and origin (because he was the "second" root and the origin of men). An opposition is made between Adam and Christ as two heads: the former communicating animal life and with it sin and death to his own; the latter, however, imparting spiritual and eternal life with his righteousness to his own. The apostle refers to this when he says, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. 15:22, i.e., as many as are vivified). He is well called "the last" not because he was born last, but both because he succeeded Adam and because after him no one can sustain the same relation of head. Nor does the Preadamite escape better when he says that Adam is called the first and the father of all men, inasmuch as all men sinned in him and he is the first and the father of all sinners. For the words of the apostle imply that he is called not only the first in the order of sinning (although this also is true), but also in the order of being, inasmuch as from him men draw both their earthy (*to choikon*) and animal being (*to psychikon*).

V. (2) The male and female, said to have been created on the sixth day (Gen. 1:27) are no other than Adam and Eve. Gen. 2 discusses them where what had been described rather briefly in the first chapter is repeated and explained more distinctly. This is evident: (a) from 2:1, 2, 3, where a recapitulation is made of the primeval creation of the heaven and the earth spoken of in Gen. 1. Therefore, what is added in the following chapter about the creation of male and female belongs to the same. (b) In both places, the origin of the same Adam is described because the same name occurs in both and the same reason for the name (his production from the earth), which could not be said if this is to be understood of two different persons. (c) If two Adams were meant, either it will not be evident concerning the second that he was made after the image of God (for nothing is said of that in Gen. 2) or it will not appear concerning the first that he was endowed with a rational soul (for nothing is said about the breathing of life into his nostrils, which is not mentioned until chapter 2). (d) It would follow that no law of marriage was imposed upon the first pair (to whom it was said: "Be fruitful and multiply"—which is found only in Gen. 2) against the express word of Christ (Mt. 19:4, 5), who asserts that God made them male and female at

the beginning and imposed this law upon them—that "for this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: because they twain shall be one flesh." By this it is clearly intimated that the first creation of male and female (made from the beginning) was the production of Adam and Eve (upon whom this law was imposed). Thus Adam and Eve were the male and female mentioned in Gen. 1:27, whom God made from the beginning (*ap' archēs*, viz., from the beginning in which he created the heavens and the earth). (e) Dominion over animals (Gen. 1:28) was given to the first pair (which is confirmed in 2:19 when all animals were brought to Adam that he might give them their particular names and receive that dominion as it were by a solemn investiture). (f) As herbs, vegetables, the fruit of trees were given to them for food (Gen. 1:29), so the same law is repeated in 2:16 and is recognized by Eve (Gen. 3:2), the tree of the knowledge of good and evil being excepted. By the latter, God wished to make trial of their faith and obedience. (g) Since in Gen. 2:5, 7, God is said to have formed Adam of the dust of the earth when "there was not a man to till the ground."

VI. Nor is the Preadamite to be listened to when he maintains that the creation of the first chapter differs from that described in chapter 2 in various particulars: that in the former, God by one act created at the same time male and female, but in the latter the production of Adam and Eve must have been successive (both because God moulded Adam, forming him from the dust of the earth which could not be done without delay and because there must have been an interval during which the animals were brought to Adam for him to name; and because no helpmeet for Adam could be found among them, a deep sleep was sent upon him during which one of his ribs was taken out for the formation of Eve). For two false hypotheses are supposed here: first, that the creation of the male and female (dealt with in the first chapter) was made at the same time by a single act; while two subsisting substances are plainly intimated in Gen. 1:27: "Male and female created he them." Indeed there is a mutual dependence upon the declaration of the Holy Spirit who relates that Adam was formed "first" (1 Tim. 2:13) and "the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man" (1 Cor. 11:8*). Second, that what is related of the creation of Adam and Eve in Gen. 2 could not have occurred on the same day. Since the creation was finished in six days and God is said to have rested from his work, the production of male and female ought to have been completed on the sixth day. Nor do the things adduced to support the contrary have any force. Although it is evident from them that Adam and Eve were not created together and at one time (but successively), yet you would thence falsely infer that they were produced on different days. Why could God not in one moment have molded Adam from the dust of the earth, in another have sent sleep upon him and in a third have taken a rib out of his side and of it formed Eve?

VII. Third, he is deservedly reckoned to be the first man from whom sin and death passed upon all men. And yet from Adam sin and death are derived unto all: "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men" (Rom. 5:12). That one man, however, is no other than Adam "in whom all" are said "to die" (1 Cor. 15:22). To no purpose does the Preadamite here distinguish "natural and legal transgression and death": the latter introduced by Adam, but the former preceding his creation many ages in the Gentile Preadamites who were liable to sin and natural death from their innate

corruptible and mortal nature (Peyrere, *A Theological Systeme upon that Presupposition that Men were before Adam*, Bks. 1 and 3 [1655], pp. 1-54, 129-99). We answer that sin cannot be called natural without impinging upon God himself the author of nature; nor ought death to be called natural, as if man was necessarily to die even if he had not sinned (the fiction of Pelagius and Socinus adopted by the Preadamite against the express words of Paul who asserts that by sin death entered [Rom 5:12] and the wages of sin is death [Rom. 6:23]). False also is the pretense that there can be any sin which is not against law, since it is nothing else than lawlessness (*anomia*). It is also false that there can be a death which is not legal, since from no other source than from the power of the law and by its sanction was it ordained that man should die once.

VIII. Fourth, men are called "the sons of Adam" (*bhny 'dm*, Ps. 49:2; 62:9 and elsewhere). Adam, therefore, was the first parent of all. Nor can it be said that the Jews alone are called "the sons of Adam" in the singular, while the Preadamite Gentiles are called "the sons of men" in the plural (because they drew their origin not from one man, but from the many men of the first creation). That appellation ("sons of Adam") is applied promiscuously to both Jews and Gentiles. If they are ever called "sons of men" in the plural, it is for no other reason than because reference is made to intermediate causes and succeeding generations, and not only to the first root of the human race.

IX. Fifth, if innumerable men had been created before Adam, there would have been no need of a repeated creation of men from the dust (since ordinary generation would have been abundantly sufficient). And it cannot be said that there could not have been found for man a helpmeet similar to himself, if myriads of women already existed; nor would man have been alone, as is said in Gen. 2:18; nor would Adam at length have had to give names to the beasts. For the Preadamites, to whom dominion over them had already been given many ages before, had undoubtedly distinguished them by some names.

X. Finally, if innumerable men had existed before Adam, a new world, a new church and a new method of salvation would have to be devised for these new men. For the whole economy of human salvation pertains to the posterity of Adam, not to the race of Preadamites. Therefore as both the Mosaic history and the entire Scripture and right reason crush this figment (as also the consent of almost all the Gentiles among whom the memory of the first man, although variously corrupted and obscured by many fables, was nevertheless not wholly obliterated and destroyed), everyone sees that it should be deservedly rejected by all the pious as most false and impious. It has no other tendency than to overthrow the truth of the Mosaic history and the authenticity (*authentian*) of the divine word and to expose our religion to ridicule.

Sources of explanation.

XI. The garments and sheepskins which Adam and Eve wore after their sin, do not prove that there were tanners and furriers. God is said to have made those coverings for them immediately from the skins of animals (Gen. 3:21). And even if at that time it was the custom to be clothed in skins, why did Adam and Eve remain naked? And what need was there after they knew their nakedness to sow together fig leaves to cover it, since they might easily have obtained for themselves garments from some other source?

XII. If Adam divided his goods among his children (while he gave to Cain the tilling of the earth and to Abel the feeding of sheep), by dividing he "made" the right and did not "find" it. He divided his goods only among sons and did not separate them from other different stocks then living. Hence it is evident that they were the first after Adam who (sprung from his loins) began to inhabit and labor upon the earth. Before Adam (it is said), no man existed to till the earth (Gen. 2:5).

XIII. Although it is indubitable that agriculture was the first kind of life (which Adam followed with his sons and most especially employed himself in husbandry and the care of flocks and herds because the first care of men ought to have respect to the first and most necessary supports of this life, which are principally drawn from both of these), it is not to be supposed on this account that there were before Adam various artificers to prepare the implements necessary for their exercise. This is so because agriculture could be practiced far more easily and successfully than now and because from the very family of Adam (which had by the divine blessing multiplied in a wonderful manner) many could have sprung devoting themselves to these arts. This is indicated afterwards concerning Tubal Cain, the third from Cain (Gen. 4:22). He was an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron. If Abel had to guard sheep, we are not therefore to suppose that there were thieves among the Preadamites whom he had to drive off. There could already be those of his own brothers and descendants whom he would fear for himself (not to mention wild beasts, against whom he would have to guard his sheep).

XIV. When Cain was made an exile and a wanderer from the face of God, he is said to have feared "that everyone that found him would slay him" (Gen. 4:14). There is no need to feign Preadamites whom he feared, for there were many children of Adam, also many sons and grandsons of Abel himself (more than a hundred years old when he was killed) whom he could then fear as avengers of fraternal and paternal blood. These words properly indicate a disturbed conscience which usually fears all safe things and expects the just punishment of divine wrath to be inflicted by the ministry either of men or of beasts.

XV. Although Moses intended to give the special origin and history of his own nation and to describe the first beginnings of the church, yet he was unwilling to stop in that, but wished to set forth the origin of the world itself. Thus he went back to the very commencement and refers to the first beginnings of the church and the genealogy of his own people from the very cradle of the world. This is clearly confirmed by the fact that from the three sons of Noah (descendants of Adam), all nations in the whole world sprung (as is evident from Gen. 10:32). The celebrated Bochart has abundantly demonstrated this in his *Geographiae sacrae pars prior: Phaleg seu de dispersione gentium* (1646). This could not have been said if (besides Adam from whom Noah was to spring) a great many more men had been created. Hence also it is evident that the Jews only are most absurdly said to be Adamites, since other nations (most foreign to the Jews) drew their origin from Adam and Noah.

XVI. The expression of Eve at the birth of Seth ("God hath appointed me another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain slew," Gen. 4:25) does not signify that there were absolutely no other sons of Eve, but only that none existed similar in piety and virtue to Abel recently killed, whom the pious mother hoped and desired to be in some measure restored to life in Seth. Nor (if Moses says nothing

about the names of daughters born to Adam and Eve because he wished to weave the genealogy of men, which is commonly drawn from the males and not from the females) does it follow that they had none, since the patriarchs are said "to have begotten sons and daughters" (Gen. 5).

XVII. Although Paul says "until the law, sin was in the world" (Rom. 5:13), it does not follow that there were sinful men before Adam. It is falsely and gratuitously supposed that by the law here the apostle means the Adamic (viz., the one enacted with Adam about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil). But no other than the Mosaic Law can be meant. This is evident because: (1) Paul uses as equivalent "until Moses" and "until the law"; for as he says, "sin was in the world until the law," so he says, "death reigned from Adam to Moses." (2) No other law can be understood than that about which he speaks in the whole epistle, in order to show that no one can be justified by the law (whatever the Jews may pretend). This relates to no other than the Mosaic law. (3) He speaks of that law which followed the transgression of Adam (not what preceded it) because he says, "The law entered that the offence might abound" (Rom. 5:20). Although the law imposed upon Adam was indeed the first of all laws, it ought not on that account to be called simply law by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*) since it was merely positive and symbolical. Hence the Scriptures nowhere give it the name of law (which is frequently done in the case of the Mosaic law). It is not indeed to be denied that even before the law of Moses there was a natural law (from whose transgression arose sin and from sin death) because otherwise, as the apostle says, "where no law is, there is no transgression" (Rom. 4:15), nor death which results from it. But no one would on that account (except falsely) infer that the law (before which sin was not imputed) was the Adamic. In truth, what is added concerning "them who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression" (Rom. 5:14) cannot be extended to the Preadamites, but must be referred to infants (who have not sinned actually like Adam, but are infected only by the original taint, subjecting them to condemnation and death). Hence although they may well be called sinners equally with Adam, yet they cannot be said equally to have sinned actually after his similitude, not only specifically (in which sense no one even of adults can sin after the similitude of Adam's sin, which was peculiar to him), but also generically (in which sense all actual sins are similar to his).

Ninth Question: The Creation of Man

Was man created in puris naturalibus, *or could he have been so created? We deny against the Pelagians and Scholastics.*

I. In order to better understand this question between us and the ancient and more modern Pelagians, we must before all things ascertain what is meant here by a state of pure nature or by pure naturals.

The different senses of the word "natural." What are pure naturals and the state of pure nature?

II. Natural can be taken in three ways: either for what constituted nature and is its essential or integral part; or for what immediately and necessarily follows the constituted nature (as its property); or for what is born with and agreeable to nature, adorning and perfecting it (such as is the habit born with us). We do not treat here of naturals in the third sense, but in the first and second, i.e.,

either in the constituted or the consecutive (called "pure" in opposition to accidents or separable qualities). Thus man is said to be in pure naturals (*puris naturalibus*) who consists of his own parts and essential properties without the gift of original righteousness and without any superadded qualities or habits (good or evil). It is called a state of pure nature (*status purae naturae*) by a negative not a positive purity (by which namely he has nothing good or evil superadded to his nature).

III. The question is not whether we can conceive of man in pure naturals by thinking of his essence and essential properties and by not thinking of his goodness or depravity (which is confessed on both sides). Rather the question is whether man, as he came from the hand of God, was created in such a state (or at least could have been). This is what we deny.

IV. We deal here with the old and new Pelagians. The former, in order to destroy original sin and establish free will, pretended that man at the beginning was created (and even everyday is born) in a state of pure nature. Pelagius (quoted by Augustine) says, "All the good and evil by which we are either praiseworthy or culpable, does not arise with us, but is done by us; for we are born capable both of good and evil, but not in possession of these qualities; for in our birth we are equally destitute of virtue and vice; and previous to moral agency, there is nothing in man but that which God created in him" (*A Treatise on the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin* 2.14 [13] [NPNF1, 5:241; PL 44.391]). The latter, however, agree with the former in this that they may the more easily prove original righteousness to have been a supernatural gift, superadded to nature (as a golden bit and a remedy to the languor and disease of nature, arising from the condition of the material). Hence they hold that a pure and fallen nature differs in no other way than a "naked" from a "despoiled" (as Bellarmine expresses it, "De gratia primi hominis," 5 in *Opera* [1858], 4:24). These differ only in that the one has lost what the other never had. Thus the pure nature has the relation of a negation, but the fallen nature of a privation, and so they maintain that Adam was created in pure naturals. It is true that all are not of this opinion and that there are some who, according to Medina, "by man constituted in pure naturals, understand man constituted in innocent nature, with a gifted and vigorous healing nature, so that he might remain in good and the practice of virtue, and perseverance if he wished, which undoubtedly appears to have been the opinion of Augustine" (*Expositio in primam secundae . . . Thomae Aquinatis*, Q. 109*, Art. II [1580], p. 579). Jansen shows this at length in his *Augustinus* in the three books concerning the state of pure nature (Bks. 1-3 [1640/1964], 2:677-980). But the majority hold the opinion of Alensis (Alexander of Hales), Bonaventure and the Jesuits (with whom the Socinians and Remonstrants, following in the track of Pelagius, here agree).

Man was not created in a state of pure nature.

V. However, we maintain that man was never created in a state of pure nature so called, nor do we think he could have been so created. The reasons are: (1) because man was made in the image of God (Gen. 1:26) and thus morally good and upright (Ecc. 7:29). For since that image (as it is afterwards said) consisted principally of original righteousness, he cannot be said to have been created in a state of pure nature who was adorned with this from the beginning. (2) He was made to glorify and worship God (Prov. 16:4;

Rom. 11:36), duties he could not perform unless endowed with the necessary gifts (viz., wisdom and holiness).

VI. (3) Where two things immediately opposed belong to any subject, one or other of the two must necessarily be in it. Now righteousness and sin are predicated of man as their fit (*dektikō*) subject and are directly (*amesōs*) opposed to each other. Therefore one or the other must necessarily be in him; nor can there be a man who is not either righteous or a sinner. To no purpose is the example of infants brought forward, who can neither be called righteous (because they do not act justly), nor sinners (because they cannot sin). For although an infant cannot be called righteous or a sinner by actual righteousness or sin, still he can by habitual and congenital (as he is rightly called rational because he has reason in the first act [*in actu primo*], although not as yet having actually reasoned or being able to reason).

VII. (4) That state of pure nature is a sheer figment; it never was, nor could be. Not in man's perfect state because in it he should be entire and innocent; not in the state of sin because he is born a child of wrath; not in the state of grace because he is born again a child of God; not in the state of glory because then his holiness and happiness will be consummated.

Sources of explanation.

VIII. The state of pure nature is not so called in opposition to an impure (for thus the state of integrity might properly be called because the nature was then pure and innocent), but in opposition to gifts and spiritual habits of righteousness and holiness (which the Romanists hold to be supernatural for the purpose of patronizing the integrity of free will and to make concupiscence natural in the first man).

IX. God could, indeed, have not created man. But it being posited that he willed to create him, he could not have created him lawless and not imposed a law upon him when created. For as there is always an essential physical dependence of the creature upon the Creator in the genus of being, so there must also be an ethical dependence in the genus of morals. Nay, although God had not subjected him to an external law, conscience and the dictates of right reason would have been a law to him (which the apostle calls "the work of the law," Rom. 2:15).

X. Since the very want of original righteousness is sin, man cannot be conceived as destitute of it without being conceived to be a sinner (especially since that defect would not be a mere negation, but a privation of the rectitude that ought to be in him).

XI. There may be a man who is not righteous or who is not a sinner; but not one who is neither righteous nor a sinner. The former denies one of two things concerning the subject (which often occurs), but the latter denies both (which never occurs).

Tenth Question

In what consisted the image of God in which man was created?

I. As the image of God is the principal glory of man (by which he far excels other animals and approaches nearer to God), it becomes of the highest importance for us to know in what it most especially consists. Theologians explain it in dif-

ferent ways. In the first place, we will show negatively (*kat' arsin*) in what it does not consist; and second, we will see affirmatively (*kata thesin*) in what it does.

II. We must, however, premise that the Scriptures mention a fourfold image of God. The first is of the Son of God who is called "the image of the invisible God" (*eikōn tou Theou aoratou*, Col. 1:15); the second of Adam who was made in the image of God; the third of the renewed who are said to be "renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created them" (Col. 3:10); the fourth of man who in a peculiar manner is called "the image of God" above the woman, who is "the image of the man" (1 Cor. 11:7). The Son of God is the essential image of most perfect equality, having the same numerical essence with the Father. Adam is the accidental and analogical image of inadequate and imperfect similitude (as to nature, gifts and state). The renewed are the spiritual image (as to supernatural gifts). Man compared with woman is the image of authority (as to the power he has over his wife).

III. Again image signifies either the archetype (*archetypon*) itself (after whose copy something is made) or the things themselves in God (in the likeness of which man was made); or the ectype itself, which is made after the copy of another thing, or the similitude itself (which is in man and the relation to God himself). In the former sense, man is said to have been made in the image of God; in the latter, however, the very image of God.

The image of God does not consist in a participation of the divine essence.

IV. First, this image (negatively, *kat' arsin*) does not consist in a participation of the divine essence (as if the nature of man was a shadow [*aposkiasmation*] of the divine and a certain particle of the divine breath, as the Gentiles hold). For in this way the Son of God only is "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15)—the essential and natural, and no mortal can attain to it because the finite cannot be a partaker of the infinite. And if we are said by grace to be "partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet. 1:4), this is not to be understood of an essential, formal and intrinsic participation, but an analogical, accidental and extrinsic participation (by reason of the effects analogous to the divine perfections which are produced in us by the Spirit after the image of God).

Nor in the figure of the body of God.

V. (2) Nor does it consist in any figure of the body or external bearing in which man resembles God (the delirium of the Anthropomorphites of old). For although we do not think that every relation of that image should be altogether denied of the body and see some rays of it glittering there, whether we regard man's immortality of which his body is also in its own manner a partaker; or that majesty of bearing which Ovid thus elegantly expresses, "Whilst other animals look downwards upon the earth, he gave man a lofty face, and ordered him to look at heaven, and lift his countenance upwards towards the stars" (*Metamorphoses* 1.85 [Loeb, 3:8-9]); or attend to the admirable structure, symmetry and use of the organic body and all its members; still it is certain that image shone in the body not so much formally as consequently and effectively (inasmuch as both the figure of man itself and the majesty resulting from it testify to the power of man over the rest of creatures, and thus of his having a soul fitted for contemplation and knowledge; and thus the proper seat of the divine image is the soul and not the body). If human members are attributed

to God in the Scriptures, it does not therefore follow that the image is to be placed properly in these, since they are ascribed to him after the manner of men (*anthrōpopathōs*) and must be understood in a manner becoming God (*theoprepōs*) not formally and properly, but figuratively and analogically.

VI. Second (affirmatively, *kata thesin*), this image consisted in gifts bestowed upon man by creation. These were not only essential or only accidental, but both at the same time: internal as well as external, by which he was placed in such a degree of nature, perfection and authority that no visible creature was either more like or more closely allied to God. It consists in three things most especially:

But (a) in nature; (b) rectitude; (c) dominion and immortality.

(a) In his nature; (b) rectitude of nature; (c) the happy state founded upon both. Antecedently in nature (as to the spirituality and immortality of the soul); formally in rectitude or original righteousness; consequently in the dominion and immortality of the whole man (which was the brightness of that shining image and the rays striking out in all directions which illumined the whole man).

(1) In the substance of the soul.

VII. The first part of the image, therefore, pertains to the substance of the soul and that too spiritual and incorruptible (or immortal intrinsically and as to its faculties, viz., the intellect and will and the liberty arising from both). All of these belong eminently and most perfectly to God. Hence man even after sin is said to be made in the image of God (Jam. 3:9), and the killing of man is called the destruction of the image of God (Gen. 9:6). In the latter, the killing of man made after the image of God is forbidden, which could not be said unless a certain part of the divine image was implanted in the very nature of the soul. If Scripture refers the image of God more often to righteousness and holiness (because these are its best parts), it does not on that account speak to the exclusion of it and deny that it also pertains to the soul itself. Nor is it absurd (*asystaton*) that the image should be said to be partly lost and partly conserved, and that in the same subject there is the image of God and of the Devil in different respects (*kat' allo kai allo*). The former indeed, in the essence of the soul and in the gifts remaining after the fall; the latter, however, in depravity and pollution. Hence sinners in it are said to be like their father, the Devil, by doing his works (who yet do not cease to resemble their author by reason of spirituality and incorruptibility). Nor therefore is the error of Flacius recalled, which was not that he made the image to consist in the essence of the soul, but that he thought sin had injured the essence of the soul (which is false).

(2) In original righteousness.

VIII. (2) To it pertains rectitude and integrity, or the gifts bestowed upon man, usually expressed by original righteousness, which was created with man and bestowed upon him at his origin, embracing wisdom in the mind, holiness in the will, and rectitude and good order (*eutaxian*) in the affections. It bespeaks such a harmony among all his faculties that the members obey the affections, the affections the will, the will reason, reason the divine law, and thus the man exists upright and innocent and without sin, but yet in a state always mutable, endowed with a fourfold liberty: (a) from coaction; (b) from physical necessity; (c) from sin; (d) from misery (of which hereafter).

It is proved against the Socinians that original righteousness was given to Adam.

IX. Here the Socinians loudly contradict, the more easily to overthrow the truth and nature of original sin. They are not only willing to acknowledge that this righteousness belongs to the image of God, but absolutely deny that man was created in such righteousness. They indeed confess that man was made without the corruption of sin (which now is), but they deny that he was wise, just and holy and without the divorce and rebellion of the reason and the appetite. Thus innocence and the want of sin may be truly ascribed to him, but not righteousness. And thus they hold the image of God to be placed in dominion alone (see Socinus, *Praelectiones theologicae* 3 [1627], pp. 7-10). The Remonstrants follow him here (Colla. Hagi. p. 250+). However we think that man was created with that righteousness and the principal part of the image consists in it. We prove our position by the following arguments.

X. First, because man was created upright and good and so originally righteous. Moral goodness and rectitude necessarily include righteousness; nay, it is the righteousness of which Moses speaks, "God saw every thing that he had made, and behold, it was very good" (Gen. 1:31). "God hath made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions" (Ecc. 7:29). Socinus, however, falsely pretends that *tvb* in Gen. 1, does not signify rectitude of soul or righteousness, but the aptitude and fitness to that which God had proposed to himself (and is extended to all the works of creation). Because although this may be said of all God's works in general, yet it ought to pertain in particular to each one and should be applied peculiarly to man (according to the state of his nature and suitably to the end for which he was destined by God). Therefore as brutes and other creatures are called good by a natural goodness, man (who is a rational creature and should be in moral subjection to God and his law) is declared to be good by a moral goodness, without which he could not attain his appointed end (viz., the glory and worship of God). The word *yshr* in Ecc. 7:29 cannot only denote a negation of unrighteousness and a want of sin (with an indifference to good and evil), but necessarily marks the possession of righteousness by which he is reckoned upright and perfect (i.e., conformed to the law). It is frequently rendered in the Septuagint (in accordance with the subject matter) by *dikaion*, *katharon*, *kalon* and *agathon*. The antithesis confirms this because he opposes moral pravity in the vain reasonings of men to the rectitude in which man was created.

XI. Second, as is the image restored in us by grace and to be made perfect in us in glory, such ought it to have been as bestowed upon man in nature because he is renewed "after the image of the Creator" (*kat' eikona tou ktisantos*, Col. 3:10). Now that image is no other than the regeneration of man consisting in the illumination of the mind and holiness of the will. Hence we are said "to be transformed in the renewing of our mind" (Rom. 12:2) and "to be renewed in knowledge (*eis epignōsin*)" (Col. 3:10 and Eph. 4:24). "The new man" (which is the very image itself reformed in us) is said to be "after God, in righteousness and true holiness," i.e., either in true righteousness and holiness or in the righteousness and holiness which arise from the truth. So the image of glory will be none other than a perfect likeness to God in knowledge and absolute holiness (Ps. 17:15; 1 Jn. 3:2).

XII. Third, God created man perfect, thus with original righteousness because this is the perfection of a rational soul. To no purpose does our opponent reply

that the perfection of man is voluntary righteousness, not natural (which is obtained only after the use of free will). He takes for granted that voluntary righteousness is only such as is acquired by acts of the will, since it was given to man originally (and so connate, not acquired). Therefore it can be called both natural and voluntary: natural because created with man; voluntary both subjectively (because in the will) and effectively (because it produced free and voluntary acts).

XIII. Fourth, because man was made by God to acknowledge and worship his Creator and to exercise dominion over the other creatures. But he could do neither without original righteousness. For how could he either wisely and justly hold dominion over creatures or serve God, if not endued with wisdom and holiness?

Sources of explanation.

XIV. It is one thing to have original righteousness; another to have it immutably. If he had it in the latter manner, he could neither sin nor be pressed by any temptation. But because he had it mutably, he could do both (as the event teaches). Therefore, original righteousness was neither an absolute impotence of sinning, nor simply sinlessness, but the power not to sin from mutable righteousness (which indeed took away the will to sin, as long as he stood, but not the ability). Nor ought that image to place incapability of sinning in man (such as exists in God) because the similar is not the same. He could indeed imitate the holiness and righteousness of God and approach it, but still be far off from the holiness of God (which is essential, perfect and immutable).

XV. Although it may fairly be gathered from Gen. 1:26 that the image of God also consists in dominion (or draws that after it consequently), yet this ought not to be understood as exclusive of righteousness. This dominion necessarily requires and presupposes that (since the simple exercise of it demands reason—the just and mild, wisdom and righteousness, the perpetual and constant—perpetually).

XVI. Adam after his fall had the image still (as also his posterity even now have), since they are said to be made after the image of God. Yet this must be understood only relatively (as to certain natural remains of that image) and not absolutely (as to spiritual and supernatural qualities which are evidently lost and must be restored to us by the grace of regeneration).

XVII. The righteousness of grace and of glory in Christ, the second Adam, differs from the righteousness of nature. The former is immutable and incapable of being lost; the latter is not. Hence it is not strange (*mirum*) that the just man fell because he was mutably righteous.

XVIII. As flesh and spirit (taken physically) are disparates, not contraries, so also are the appetites, inclinations and habits of both in themselves. The repugnancy now found in them arises accidentally from sin. There was before the most complete harmony and good order (*eutaxia*) in the appetites, since the body obeyed the soul and the flesh reason (not violently, but naturally).

XIX. The wisdom of Adam shone forth in various things: both in giving names (*onomathesia*) to animals (which was not done at will and as a mere distinction, but from reason and agreeable to the nature of each, Gen. 2:19) and in the knowledge of the miraculous origin of his wife, Eve, whose nature and office he declares by a prophetic spirit (Gen. 2:23). If the eyes of our first parents are said to have been "opened" after sin, so that they perceived their nakedness, it does not follow that they did not know this before. They are said to have been opened, not as they were created by God, but as they had been obscured by the

Devil (who had deceived them with the hope of divine knowledge and dignity, which after the fall they learned by bitter experience they had failed to obtain). Therefore they acknowledged that they were naked, not because like children they were ignorant of it before (because in Gen. 2:25 it is expressly said "they were both naked and were not ashamed"), but because they did not know that they needed garments. Original righteousness having been lost, they began to be confounded with their own baseness and to fear the eye of the Judge and the injury of the elements. Therefore their twofold nakedness must be considered: the one of innocence and holiness (which they acknowledged before the fall, nor did they blush on account of it because it was attended by no disorder and baseness [*ataxia*]); the other of guilt and turpitude after their sin (which could not but suffuse them with shame as soon as conscience awoke and their eyes were opened to behold it).

XX. The wise and upright man does not sin in the compound sense (and as such), but he can sin in the divided sense when he falls from the wisdom and righteousness bestowed upon him (which Adam did). Although Adam knew theoretically what God had threatened about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, yet he did not practically apply that threatening of God (of which he was conscious) as he ought to have done, in order to resist the temptation of the devil.

XXI. The same righteousness which is restored by Christ was given at first to Adam (as to the thing had, but not as to the mode of having). For the former was in him from his origin and by nature; the latter, however, only supernaturally and by grace; the first mutably, the second immutably and incapable of being lost.

(3) The image consists also in dominion and immortality.

XXII. The third part of the image of God consists in the dominion and immortality of man. Dominion is the power which was given to him by God as the chief over all lower creatures, by which he has the right to use them at pleasure. All are bound to serve him as their master and to minister to his use (which was an emanation [*aporroē*] of the divine image and an impress of the supreme dominion of the Creator, whose preeminence (*hyperochē*) in this respect was in some measure communicated to man). Hence his dominion is mentioned immediately in connection with the formation of man in the image of God. "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion" (*vyrdhv*) (or in order that they may have dominion, or who may have dominion) "over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth" (Gen. 1:26*). Now it was a dominion common to both (with respect to other creatures) although the man had it peculiarly (because having power over his wife, in which sense the man is called singularly the image of God, 1 Cor. 11:7). However although by the fall that dominion was very much broken and diminished, yet it did not on that account wholly perish. Hence it was confirmed to Noah after the flood (Gen. 9:2, 3), which was not so much the first grant of power as the restitution in some sort of the ancient authority given before. But whatever that dominion was even before the fall, it differed infinitely from the dominion of God, which is independent, natural, absolute and unlimited. However man's, on the other hand, is dependent, precarious and circumscribed within its own limits.

XXIII. Immortality is here to be added, not only of the soul itself (which still remains after sin), but of the whole subsisting substance (*suppositi*); not absolute

as that of the saints (which is an inability to die), but conditional (which is the power not to die if he had not sinned). We will treat the latter hereafter in a separate question.

Eleventh Question

Was original righteousness natural or supernatural? The former we affirm, the latter we deny against the Romanists.

I. This question is urged by the Romanists and would not seem to be of great importance if it were a controversy only about a name. But because (under this shell) our opponents introduce various errors, it becomes necessary in order to understand the nature of the state of integrity, the truth of original sin and the condition of free will.

Natural is used in four ways: (1) originally; (2) constitutively; (3) perfectively; (4) transitively.

II. However because much logomachy is usually connected with this question (on account of the multiple signification of the words natural and supernatural), we must speak of them first. Natural is taken in four ways: (1) originally and subjectively, drawn from nature and concreated or born together with it and most deeply implanted in it (which is opposed to the adventitious); (2) constitutively and consecutively, constituting the nature of the thing or following and flowing from the principles of nature (such as are the essential part or properties of a thing which is opposed to the accidental); (3) perfectively, agreeing with the nature and adorning and perfecting it (opposed to that which is against nature); (4) transitively, which ought to be propagated with the nature.

III. Again, nature can be considered either as whole or as corrupt. Some things are natural as to the first, which are supernatural as to the second. That was said to be natural to man in the entire nature, not only that which constituted his nature essentially (or necessarily followed it), but that which was so suitable to the nature and implanted in it that without it the nature could not be entire. But that is said to be supernatural which approached the entire man for his perfection above the principles of nature and endowments of the soul.

Statement of the question.

IV. The question is not whether original righteousness may be called natural constitutively *a priori* or consecutively *a posteriori* (as if it either constituted or followed the nature itself). No one of our divines asserts this. Nor is the question Is it such originally and transitively, drawn namely from the origin and which would have been propagated to his posterity if man had remained entire? No Romanist denies this. The question is not Is it natural with respect to the corrupt state? We readily allow that it is so alien from fallen man that he is not able to recover it without the supernatural gift of grace. But the question is—Is it natural with respect to the entire state, necessary to the perfection of the entire nature and pertaining to the native gifts of entire man? For thus man is not considered simply physically as man, but theologically and morally as sound and entire.

V. The Romanists hold original righteousness to be a supernatural gift, superadded to the native gifts and power of the entire man. Bellarmine explains the reason why they determine this to be so. There was in man naturally a contest between the flesh and the spirit, the reason and the appetite, from which flowed a certain disease and languor of nature, arising from the condition of the material. Therefore God added original righteousness as a "golden bridle," to repress that conflict and to cover like a precious garment their nakedness, and as a remedy to heal that weakness ("De gratia primi hominis," 5, 6 in *Opera* [1858], 4:23-29). This is the more common opinion among them, although the Jansenists and others exclaim loudly against it. Whence arose this expression of the Scholastics: "Naturals remained untouched, but the supernaturals only were lost."

Proof that original righteousness was natural.

VI. However the orthodox (although not denying that this righteousness may be called supernatural with regard to the corrupt state and holding that it is not natural constitutively or consecutively) yet think it may well be called natural originally and perfectively (with regard to the pure state because created with it). Thus it is so necessary to the perfection of innocent man that without it he could not have been such.

VII. The reasons are: (1) Because goodness and rectitude are natural to man in a state of innocence, then original righteousness was also (which is made up of these). As was the relation of goodness to the remaining creatures, so also was the relation to man. Now goodness was natural to the remaining creatures (Gen. 1:31); therefore, also to man. The same is true with regard to rectitude, since it is ascribed to man from his creation as opposed to what is adventitious (Ecc. 7:29). Therefore it must have been natural.

VIII. (2) Whatever is transmitted to posterity must be natural; righteousness was to have been propagated to posterity if man had remained innocent (since indeed he would beget a like to himself). (3) Original sin, which is derived from parents to their children, is natural. Hence they are called "by nature children of wrath" (Eph. 2:3). Therefore the original righteousness opposed to it must also be natural. (4) The remains of the divine image are called natural because they are the work of the law (which the Gentiles do by nature, Rom. 2:14); therefore also the whole image itself.

IX. (5) If original righteousness were supernatural, then there would have been natural to Adam the privation of righteousness and all that must necessarily be present in a capacious subject, from which righteousness is absent (viz., ignorance, propensity to vice, concupiscence of the flesh, rebellion of the inferior against the superior part and other things of like kind—called by Bellarmine "diseases and languors of nature"). And yet this cannot be said without ascribing the same to the author of nature who consequently must be considered the author of sin. For as to Bellarmine's reply that the concupiscence (which is now the punishment of sin) was then only a weakness and disease of nature (which was not from God, but from the condition of the material, as an ironmonger is not the author of the rust which the sword made by him contracts), it does not solve the difficulty. For (a) it is taken for granted that there was a weakness and disease in the sound nature; (b) it was assumed that this disease was not sin (while it is certain that that concupiscence and headlong propensity to vice contended against the law of God, was the cause of many sins and so must be itself sin). (c) The

comparison of the iron worker does not apply here because rust follows the material of iron (which the workman does not make, but finds). However God made the very matter of man and indeed (according to Bellarmine) such as this disorder (*ataxia*) and rebellion would necessarily follow. Hence, as he was the author of the material, he must be called the author of that defect which necessarily follows it. Thus there will be cast upon the most wise Creator (*dēmiourgō*) either unskillfulness or impotency because he either did not foresee the taint of concupiscence necessarily arising from the condition of the material, and the whole disorder (*ataxian*) of the flesh against the spirit or could not remove it without injuring a most noble work. Both of these are equally impious and blasphemous.

X. (6) The natural end of man ought to suppose natural means for obtaining it. Happiness was the natural end of man, therefore it ought to have natural means (which could be no other than original righteousness). Nor ought it to be replied that it can be called the end as to appetite, but not as to consecution (*consecutionem*). Since the appetite of the first man could not be fruitless in his innocent nature, it ought to draw after it the obtainment—if not as to the event, at least as to the possibility so that the thing would be not only desirable, but possible. Otherwise it might be said that God had begrudged and denied to man alone (his most excellent work by far) what he had bestowed upon each thing created by him (viz., to be able to accomplish by fit power their own operation).

Sources of explanation.

XI. It is one thing to speak of the essence of man; another of his integrity and perfection. At the taking away of a part or of some essential property, there follows in truth the destruction of the thing; but not forthwith at the privation of that which contributes to the integrity and perfecting of nature (such as original righteousness was). The nature indeed remains mutilated and depraved (since it has lost what perfected it), but is not destroyed as to essence.

XII. Although original righteousness may be said to have been natural to Adam, it does not follow that it is the same with the righteousness of God because God alone is righteous naturally in every way—essentially, independently and immutably; but man is so only in a certain respect and relatively—mutably, precariously and independently.

XIII. That anyone may be called "a natural son of God," it is not sufficient that he has something natural on account of which he may be called a son of God. Rather it is required that he have the same numerical nature with the Father, which can be said of Christ alone (the essential image of God) and not of our first parent, who obtained the name of son of God only by reason of a certain likeness.

XIV. To him who is dust according to all parts of his essence, natural original righteousness cannot belong. But man is called dust (Gen. 3:19) only relatively and with respect to his body. So as it is natural for man to be earthy on the part of the body (which was formed from the earth), so it ought to be natural for him to be just and holy as to the image of God in which he was created. Again, fall and liability to fall must be distinguished here: the one is to have a fall born with him; the other however to be able to fall. Man as dust had a liability to fall by which he could sin, but not a fall itself by which he must actually sin. The former denotes a state of mutable nature, but no disease or languor in it. The latter denotes a state of sin, which could not be in an innocent nature.

XV. So far is the inferior part of the soul from contending of itself with the superior that on the contrary (according to the Philosopher), it was born to obey (*peitharchein pephyke*) and is naturally subordinated to it (Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 10.9.4 [Loeb, 628-29]). The propensions of both can be diverse, but not contrary in themselves (rather only accidentally on account of sin). Man could be carried naturally towards both sensible and spiritual good, but in their own order and without a rebellion between the flesh and the spirit. Thus the soul would always hold dominion and the flesh obey and subject all its own motions and inclinations to it. The sensible good is contained in the intelligible good and the object of the sensitive appetite stands related to the object of the natural (as the means to the end). Therefore, as long as man regarded the sensible good as the means, there was no vice in him. But when departing from God, he began to be drawn to the object of the sensitive appetite as his ultimate end and highest good (which was effected by sin). At length, the disorder (*ataxia*) arose which disturbed the order constituted by God. Therefore, we must accurately distinguish here the appetite (which was natural and ordinate) from that which was preternatural and inordinate. The latter is repugnant to reason, but not equally the former.

XVI. Although original righteousness can properly be called "grace" or "a gratuitous gift" (and so not due on the part of God, just as the nature itself also, created by him), it does not follow that it is supernatural or not due to the perfection of the innocent nature. For although God owed nothing to man, yet it being posited that he willed to create man after his own image, he was bound to create him righteous and holy.

XVII. Besides the habit infused by grace and acquired by practice, there is another connate and bestowed for the perfection of the creature. Nor is it confounded with natural power because the latter regards the constitution of nature in the genus of being; the former regards the perfection of the constituted nature in the genus of morals.

Twelfth Question

Did the first man before his fall possess immortality, or was he mortal in nature and condition? The former we affirm; the latter we deny against the Socinians.

I. As the Socinians deny that original righteousness was given to Adam, so they are unwilling to acknowledge his immortality (which ought to be the consequence of righteousness) and maintain that death was the result of nature, not the wages of sin, so that man would have died even if he had never sinned. Their design is to overthrow original sin (which is built upon death as its proper effect in infants) and to deny the satisfaction of Christ for us.

Statement of the question.

II. The question does not concern essential and absolute immortality (in which there is neither an extrinsic nor intrinsic cause of destruction). This belongs to God alone, who is therefore called "the only immortal" (1 Tim. 6:16). Rather the question concerns comparative and participative immortality. (2) It does not concern the immortality of the soul in the genus of being and as to the state of nature (belonging to it in any state), but concerns the immortality of

man in the genus of morals and as to happiness. (3) It does not concern the immortality of glory, which is placed in an absolute impotence of dying (suiting the saint alone, according to which they can die no more); but concerns the immortality of the way, which is placed in the conditional power not to die (by which man could not have died if he had not sinned). (4) It does not concern a remote mortality, in which sense that is called mortal which has a remote power of death (viz., which is composed of earthy and elementary matter). Thus Adam can be called mortal remotely because his body was of dust and composed of contrary qualities. Rather it concerns a proximate mortality on which the act immediately depends and which implies the necessity of dying. The question is whether Adam was so mortal by a proximate power as that he would necessarily and certainly have died even if he had not sinned. The Socinians affirm this. "Natural death, so far forth as it is natural and common to all, is not the wages of sin, but the proper result of our nature, which Adam himself received at his creation" (Socinus, *De Iesu Christo Servatore*, Pt. III.8 [1594], p. 294). This he endeavors to confirm by various reasons (*Praelectionis theologicae* 1 [1627], pp. 1-2). The orthodox, however, deny that Adam, although mortal remotely by reason of his body (which was resolvable into its principles), was mortal proximately. They think he would never have died if he had persevered in his integrity because the holiness of the soul would have preserved his body from death and corruption.

Proof that Adam was immortal.

III. The reasons are: (1) Man was made in the image of God, which contains these two principal rays—holiness and immortality. As there are two in God—the good (*to agathon*, which is related to moral goodness) and the blessed (*to makarion*, which puts on the form of physical good)—so these two ought to correspond in the creature which bears God's image, so as to be assimilated to him in holiness and happiness, in righteousness and life. Nor does it follow from this that man could no more die than God. For that image was not essential (and of all kinds of equality) as was the case with Christ, but analogical (and only of a certain likeness), which falls very far below the immortality of God.

IV. (2) If Adam was righteous, he ought to have been immortal because there is a necessary connection between righteousness and life. (a) From the order of God who has joined righteousness and life in the law by an indissoluble bond (as he joined closely together sin and death: "Do this and thou shalt live; the soul that sinneth it shall die"). (b) From the nature of the thing itself, which demands that homogeneous things should not be separated from each other. Now moral good and physical good are homogeneous, as moral evil answers to physical. Hence they necessarily follow each other and cannot be divided. For as the highest virtue cannot always consist with a life by far the most miserable, so neither can the highest depravity be consistent with perfect happiness. Although for a time and by dispensation, righteousness and life could be separated (as was seen in Christ), yet this cannot be the case perpetually. Nor does a consideration of the wisdom and goodness of God allow this. Since God cannot but love himself (as the object of supreme love), he cannot also help loving his own creatures (in whom he sees his image shining); and if he loves, he cannot but wish them well; and by wishing them well, to do them good, so as to make them partakers of his own life and happiness (since he can do what he wills).

V. (3) Because Adam by his sin contracted the death threatened as the punishment of sin (Gen. 2:17; 3:19). Hence it is said to have entered by sin as its wages (Rom. 5:12; 6:23). He would have been free from this if he had not sinned (which could not be said if it was a result of nature). Nor does it help them to object that it refers to eternal, not to temporal death; for we must not limit what the Holy Spirit does not limit. The Scriptures speak in general about death. Thus under it is comprehended whatever comes under the name of death in the Scriptures (and so bodily no less than eternal death must be understood). This is evident even from the fact that it is described by a return to dust (Gen. 3:19; Ecc. 12:7) and is extended to infants in this life (Rom. 5:14), who are subjected to temporal death. To no purpose is it also added that the sentence (Gen. 2:17) is only threatening (*comminatoriam*), not definitive (since Adam did not indeed die on the very day he sinned). Although the punishment of death was not inflicted on man at the very moment or day in which he sinned (as to all his parts), yet it began to be inflicted both as to guilt and the necessity of dying (to which he was exposed), as to spiritual death and as to the beginnings of bodily death (which he began to feel in himself in the miseries, diseases and other preludes of death to which he was exposed).

VI. (4) Because what is against nature cannot be a result of nature, since all things in the state of innocence were very good and agreeable to his nature. Yet death is against nature as destroying the composite and resolving the body into dust. Thus it happens that men by nature dread and turn away from death.

VII. (5) Because there were no causes of death in man before the fall: neither internal, such as sin, contest of affections, bad temperament (*dyskrasia*) of humors, and warm and humid natural defects (whence languor and diseases); nor external, as the corruption of the elements, want of aliment, or external force to act against man. For as the perfect constitution of man hindered the former, so the special care and protection of God removed the latter. Hence the Milevan Council (416) utters an anathema against him "who says that Adam, the first man, was made mortal, so that whether he sinned or not, he would die in body, not by the demerit of sin but by necessity of nature" (Mansi 4:327; cf. Hefele 2:455).

Sources of explanation.

VIII. The absolute immortality of the goal differs from the conditional of the way. To the former belongs likeness to the angels (*isangelia*) and the negation of procreation and offspring (of which Christ speaks in Lk. 20:35, 36). But this cannot be said equally of the latter because in it the human race is to be propagated. Although the procreation of offspring did not belong to the conservation of the species (as now, after sin and death were introduced into the world, in the corrupted nature), yet it was necessary for its multiplication according to the primeval blessing (Gen. 1:28). The same ought to be said of the necessity of food and drink, which will not be necessary in the immortality of glory, but which was to be necessary in the immortality of nature (which God wished not to procure immediately but by the intervention of food for the support of the animal life). Nor if it is said that the stomach will be destroyed with food (1 Cor. 6:13), does this properly refer to Adam as innocent, but to men after the fall. This must not be understood so much with respect to nature (since the whole man will rise again) as with respect to the role of the stomach and the necessity of food (which will cease).

IX. Although the body of Adam was in origin earthy (and as composed, so also resolvable, through the indisposition of matter), yet it could have been immortal through the dignity of original righteousness and the power of God's special grace. There were indeed present the remote causes of death in the corruptible material and elementary mixture and his body was subject to pain and vulnerable. But the proximate cause (sin) not being granted, they could never be brought out into act. For the soul (free from the corruption of sin) removed corruption from the body and original righteousness was (as it were) connate salt (which prevented corruption, which would otherwise have arisen from the condition of the material).

X. The tree to life was not given to Adam to prevent death (as if his life depended upon eating of that tree). It was given partly to seal the immortality of man in that state, to be to him a pledge and a sacrament (both that he would not fall from the happiness in which he had been created [provided he did not fail in duty and also that he would obtain at length the immortality of the goal] and partly to preserve his life always in equal vigor [as other food was not to serve for the reparation of worn powers, but only for their conservation]).

XI. The *psychikon* (or "animal" body) as opposed to the *pneumatikon* (or "spiritual") can be understood in two ways: either in its physical being only (as recently given to Adam in his state of integrity, in which he ought to pass an animal and earthly life and had need of the support of food, as also sleep and rest); or in its physical and moral being together (as after sin, it is transformed by generation into a corrupt animal life). In the latter sense, actual corruptibility belonged to him; but in the former only a potential corruptibility inasmuch as man (left in the hand of his own counsel) could fall from God. With that potential and remote corruptibility and mortality, actual immortality and incorruptibility cannot stand. Although therefore the body was not spiritual (such as bodies after the resurrection will be, not by nature, but by qualities, which it behooves not to be able to die), still it was immortal (inasmuch as it was perpetually vivified by the holy soul and consequently could not die). When Paul treats of the animal body (*psychikō*, 1 Cor. 15:44, 46), he does not speak of Adam's body in his innocent state, but as it was after the fall. For he treats of the body sown by death in "corruption, in dishonor, and in weakness" (*en phthora, en atimia . . . astheneia*, 1 Cor. 15:42, 43*), which can be said morally only of the animal body corrupted by sin. Again, it speaks of Adam in relation to the manner in which we bear his image in opposition to Christ (1 Cor. 15:49), i.e., not only in nature, but in sin (Gen. 5:3). And what the apostle adduces concerning the first man made a living soul (1 Cor. 15:45) does not apply here to prove that Adam had simply an animal and corruptible body, but only to describe the subject (which could fall into such a state as had been described before because it was in a mutable condition and capable of falling—in which therefore it could be made actually corruptible and mortal by sin).

XII. Although Christ has not freed us from being exposed to death, still he has delivered us from its penalty because it is no more the wages of sin to believers, but the passage to a better life; no more a curse, but a blessing (Rev. 14:13). Second, although Christ has not as yet taken away mortality actually, yet he has already taken it away deservedly on the cross (and will actually take it away by his efficacy in the resurrection with other calamities flowing from sin, 1 Cor. 15:26, 54, 55).

XIII. What is generative is also corruptible, by a remote power, but not immediately by a proximate power. (2) The axiom avails in a corrupt, not in a perfect state. Neither is it necessary for the same body generated in integrity, to be actually corrupted (an internal cause, to wit, holiness being present, to keep off that corruption). The concourse of elementary qualities mutually destroying each other can indeed now effect corruption. Afterwards by sin these contrary qualities began to contend and conspire for the ruin of the body. But before, when equably tempered between themselves, they concurred in a friendly manner to the conservation of man, no actual corruption could intervene (as there could be none in the body of Christ and will be none in the glorified body).

Thirteenth Question: The Origin of the Soul

Are souls created by God, or are they propagated? We affirm the former and deny the latter.

I. Although there are various opinions of theologians and philosophers about the origin of the soul, yet principally there are two to which the others can be referred: one asserting the creation, the other the propagation (*traducem*) of the soul. The former holds all souls to have been immediately created by God and by creating infused; thus to be produced from nothing and without any preexisting material. The latter, however, maintains that souls are propagated. The former is the opinion of almost all the orthodox (with many of the fathers and Scholastics). The latter is embraced by the Lutherans. Tertullian was the author of propagation (*traducis*) in *Treatise on the Soul* (ANF 3:181-235), whom the Luciferians and many of the Latins followed. Augustine suspends his judgment (*epechei*) on this point and, although often discussing the question, still would not determine anything about it (cf. Letter 166 "To Jerome" [FC 30:6-31]; Letter 190 "To Optatus" [FC 30:271-88]; *The Retractions* 1.1 [3] [FC 60:9-10]). He testifies that "he still did not know what was to be held" (ibid., 2.82 [56] [FC 60:244; PL 32.653]).

II. Those who believe in propagation do not all think and speak together. Some hold the soul to be propagated from the semen of the parents and produced from the potency of matter. But this is rejected by most as less likely because if it depended upon the virtue of the semen, it would also be corporeal and subject to corruption. Others hold it to be from the soul of the father by propagation, yet in a manner inscrutable and unknown to us (Martinius, *Miscellanearum Disputationum*, Bk. 3, Disp. 7 [1603], pp. 541-42). Others maintain that the soul of the father procreates the soul of the son from a certain spiritual and incorporeal seed (as Timothy Bright). Finally, others (the more common opinion) think the soul is propagated by the soul, not by a decision and partition of the paternal soul, but in a spiritual manner, as light is kindled by light (so Balthasar Meisner and most Lutherans).

The creation of souls is proved.

III. However, we endorse the creation of the soul: (1) from the law of creation; (2) from the testimony of Scripture; (3) from reasons. (1) From the law of creation, because the origin of our souls ought to be the same as of the soul of Adam; not only because we ought to bear his image (1 Cor. 15:47, 48), but also because his creation (as the first individual of the whole species) is an example of

the formation of all men (as the wedlock of our first parents was an example for the rest). But the soul of Adam was created immediately by God, since "he breathed into his nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2:7). Thus it is evident his soul was not produced from potent material, but came to him extrinsically through creation and was infused into the body by the breath of God himself. Nor ought it to be objected that we cannot argue from Adam to ourselves because the same thing might be said of the origin of the body (which nevertheless is not the case, since ours is generated from seed, while that of Adam was created from the dust of the earth). Although there may be a disparity by reason of the efficient cause on account of the diversity of the subjects (because as the body is elementary and material, it can be produced by man through generation; but the soul, being immaterial and simple, cannot spring from any other source than God by creation), yet with respect to the material cause a comparison may rightly be made. For as the soul of Adam was created out of nothing, so also are the souls of his posterity; and as his body was formed of the dust of the earth, so also our bodies from seed (which itself also is earthly and material). Therefore the mode of action with respect to Adam was also singular, yet the nature of the thing is the same in both cases. This is confirmed by the production of Eve herself whose origin as to the body is described as from a rib of Adam, but of the soul no mention is made. Hence it is plainly gathered that the origin of her soul was not different from that of the soul of Adam because otherwise Moses would not have passed it over in silence (his purpose being to describe the origin of all things). And Adam himself would have mentioned this origin, yea he would have declared it specially; he would have said not only "this is bone of my bones," but "soul of my soul" (Gen. 2:23). This would have set forth more strongly the bond of wedlock, which should be not only in the bodies, but also in the souls. Finally, if Adam's soul and ours had a different origin, they could not be said to be of the same species because his was from nothing. Ours, however, would be from some preexisting material wholly dissimilar.

IV. Second, from the testimony of Scripture, in which God is spoken of as the author and Creator of the soul in a peculiar manner distinct from the body: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it" (Ecc. 12:7). Here a manifest difference is marked between the origin and the destruction of the body and the soul. The one is said to return to the dust (whence it was taken); the other, however, to return unto God (who gave it). Therefore since the body returns thither whence it had its origin, so also the soul. This is more clearly confirmed by the fact that God is said to "give the spirit" (which cannot be understood of the common giving by concourse with second causes). For he also gives the body itself no less than the soul because he is the first cause of both (nor would he well be said by antithesis [*kat' antithesin*] to have given the spirit). Rather this is understood concerning the proper and peculiar mode of origin (which does not belong to the body). Nor ought it to be said that this is to be referred to the first creation of Adam. The scope, the words and circumstances of the text prove that it treats of the ordinary birth and destruction of men. Accordingly their bodies return to the dust (i.e., to the earth) whence they were taken, while their spirits return unto God, the Judge, who gave them (either for glory or for punishment).

V. "The word of the Lord, which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him" (Zech. 12:1). Whence a multiple argument is drawn for the creation against the birth of the soul (*psychogonian*). (1) He is said to form the spirit of man within him; therefore he ought to produce it immediately without the intervention of man. (2) The formation of the spirit is joined with the stretching out of the heavens and the founding of the earth, as of the same order and grade. Therefore since the former two are works of omnipotence, made immediately by God and without second causes, so the last ought to be also. Nor can this be referred to the mediate production of God because thus man would be admitted to a participation of causality, which the text does not allow (since it asserts the production of the soul as well as that of the heaven and earth to be peculiar to God). However, this is falsely restricted to the first production of man since it ought to be extended equally to all. Hence when it speaks of the production of the soul elsewhere, the Scripture does not use the singular (as if referring to the one soul of Adam), but the plural (Ps. 33:15; Is. 57:16). But man here is not taken individually for Adam, but specifically for any man.

VI. "We have had fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence: shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits, and live?" (Heb. 12:9). And Peter calls him in a peculiar manner a "faithful Creator of souls" (1 Pet. 4:19). In Num. 16:22, God is called "the God of the spirits of all flesh." So too Is. 57:16: "For I will not contend forever, neither will I be always wroth: for the spirit should fail before me, and the souls which I have made." Now why should God be called "the Father of spirits" in contradistinction to "the fathers of the flesh" unless the origin of each was different? And yet if souls are propagated, the parents of the body and the soul should be the same. Indeed "the flesh" here cannot signify the old man or inborn corruption because then it would not be opposed to spirits (*pneumasi*) in the plural, but to spirit (*pneumati*) in the singular. Rather it designates the body, and they are called "fathers of the flesh" who generate the flesh. So the word "spirit" ought not to be referred to spiritual gifts (which are not treated of here), but to the other part of man opposed to the body. Nor can the omission of the pronoun *hēmōn* (with respect to the flesh) be a hindrance because it is to be repeated *apo koinou* (since he speaks about the same according to the principles and origin of the diverse parts). Hence in Num. 16:22, he is called "the father of the spirits of all flesh" (i.e., of all men). Again he cannot be called "the Father of spirits" mediately, as he is called "the father of the rain" (Job 38:28) because he is its author (although not immediately). Thus the antithesis between the fathers of the flesh and the father of spirits would not stand, and the force of the apostolic exhortation to afford greater obedience to God than to earthly fathers would fall. Nor if the concourse of God is not excluded from the production of the flesh (although attributed to earthly fathers because he is the universal first cause), ought the concourse of man in the production of the spirit to be excluded (because he is the particular second cause).

VII. Third, the same thing is proved by arguments from reason. The soul is propagated by generation, either from both parents or from one only; either as to its totality or only as to a part. But neither can be said. Not the former because thus two souls would coalesce into one and be mingled. Not the latter, for if from

one (either the father or the mother only) no reason can be given why it should be propagated by the one rather than by the other (since both parents are equally the principle of generation). If the whole is propagated, then the parents will be without it and so will be deprived of life. If a part, it will be divisible and consequently material and mortal. Nor can it be reasonably replied here that neither the whole soul nor a part of it is propagated, but a certain substance born of the soul and (as it were) an immortal seed of the soul. For it is taken for granted that there is a seed of the soul by which it either generates or is generated; yet such a seed cannot be granted (which does not fall from the soul), and therefore proves it to be material and divisible.

VIII. Again, all modes of propagation are pressed by the most serious difficulties; nor can they be admitted without overthrowing the spirituality of the rational soul. Not the first, which is held by those who consider the soul to be produced from the power of seed so that it is begotten with the body. For the effect cannot (in the total genus) be more noble than its cause; nor can things corporeal and elementary be so elevated as to produce a spiritual and rational thing. If generated from seed, with the seed also it will be corrupted. Men and brutes would have the same origin and consequently the same destruction. Not the second, which is held by those who think the soul of the son to be from that of the father in a manner inscrutable and unknown by us. This entangles rather than unfolds the matter. For the father produces the son either from some preexistent matter or from none; not from none because he would thus create; not from some because either it would be the corporeal substance of a seed (which has just been proved to be false) or it would be a certain spiritual substance of the soul (which again cannot be said). This is true because that spiritual substance is made either from the whole soul of the father or from a part only. Not from the whole because thus the soul of the father would vanish and be converted into that spiritual seed. Not from a part because thus the soul of the father would be divisible into parts, and because that substance is corruptible and perishes in the very instant the soul is produced. But then it will no longer be a spiritual or incorruptible substance. Thus it would follow that there are two spirits in the begotten man: the soul of the son and the spiritual substance from which his soul was produced. Besides, it is repugnant to the nature of seed for it to remain after the generation of the thing (because it ought to be transmuted into what springs from the seed).

IX. Not the third even though it may seem preferable to others. They hold that it is said to be propagated not by alienation, but by communication (as when light is kindled from light without any division of the other). (1) But the communication made of one and the same thing and without any alienation occurs only in an infinite and not in a finite essence (in which the same numerical essence cannot be communicated to another, but a similar only is produced). (2) The soul of the son cannot be produced from that of the father; neither terminatively (because the *terminus a quo* perishes, the *terminus ad quem* being produced), nor decisively (because the soul is without parts [*ameristos*]), nor constitutively (because the soul of the father is not a constitutive part of the soul of the son). (3) The similitude of the light does not apply. Besides the fact that the flame and candle are corporeal substances (while here the subject is a spiritual), it is certain that light is produced from the potency of the material. Nor can it be

kindled without a decision of fiery particles transmitted from the lighted to the extinguished torch (which cannot be said of the soul).

X. Since, therefore, the opinion of propagation labors under inextricable difficulties, and no reason drawn from any other source forces us to admit it, we deservedly embrace the option of creation as more consistent with Scripture and right reason. This was also evidently the opinion of most of the heathen philosophers themselves. Hence the following expression of Zoroaster according to Ficinum: "You must hasten to the sunlight and to the father's sunbeams: thence a soul will be sent to you fully enslaved to mind" (*Chrē speudein se pros to phaos, kai pros patros augas Enthen epemphthē soi psychē polyn hessamenē noun, Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum* 10 [1559], p. 160). Aristotle asserts that "the mind or intellect, and that alone enters from without, and is alone divine" (*ton noun thyrathen epeisienai kai theion einai monon, Generation of Animals* 2.3.27-28 [Loeb, 170-71]). Cicero says, "No origin of the soul can be found upon earth for there is nothing in the soul mixed and concrete that seems to be or born from the earth and made. . . . Thus whatever that is which perceives, knows, wishes and flourishes, is heavenly and divine and on that account must necessarily be eternal" (*Tusculan Disputations* 1.66 [Loeb, 76-79]).

Sources of explanation.

XI. God is said to have rested from all his work (Gen. 2:2), not by retiring from the administration of things, but by ceasing from the creation of new species or individuals (which might be the principles of new species). Thus he works even now (Jn. 5:17) by administering the instituted nature and multiplying whatever was; not, however, by instituting what was not. Now the souls which he creates every day are new individuals of species already created.

XII. Although the soul is not propagated, the divine blessing given at first (Gen. 1:28) does not cease to exert its power in the generation of men. For God always cooperates with the generators and the generation, not only by preserving man's prolific power, but also by infusing the soul into the disposed body.

XIII. It is not necessary in order that man may be said to generate man that he should generate all natures or essential parts of the compound. Otherwise, the blessed virgin did not beget true God and man. Rather it suffices that he prepares and works up the material and renders it fit for the introduction of form and attains the union of the soul with the body (by which man is constituted in his being as man and is made such a physical compound). For generation tends to the compound, not however to the production of both parts. As man is said to kill a man (who dissolves the union of the soul with the body although he does not even touch the soul), so man generates man because he joins together those parts from which man springs although not a soul-begetter (*psychogonos*). Nor ought he who generates the whole man to be forthwith the producer of the whole of man.

XIV. Adam can be said to have begotten man after his own image, although he did not produce the soul. The cause of the similitude is not the propagation of the soul, but the production of bodies of the same temperament with the parents. For from the different temperament and humors of the body, different propensities and affections are also born in our souls.

XV. When souls are said to have "gone out of the loins of Jacob" (Gen. 46:26), they are not understood properly, but synecdochically for the "persons" (a most

usual manner of expression with the Scriptures). Moreover, there was no need that Jacob should contribute anything to the production of these souls. It suffices that he concurred to their conjunction or subsistence in the body mediately or immediately. Therefore they are said to have gone out, not as to being or substance simply, but as to subsistence in the body and union with it.

XVI. Although Christ was no less in Abraham (according to the flesh) than Levi (who was tithed in his loins, Heb. 7:9-10*), it does not follow that Levi was in him according to his soul (so that the soul of Levi was propagated and that a distinction may be preserved). Rather Levi (with respect to person) was in Abraham according to seminal mode and the natural powers of the father and mother (from whom he was to be born). But Christ was in him only as to the human nature with regard to the mother; not, however, as to his divine nature and person. Thus his person could not be tithed; but as a superior he tithed Abraham and blessed him in Melchizedek (his type), not as man, but as the Mediator, God-man (*theanthrōpos*), performing a kingly and priestly office.

XVII. The propagation of original sin ought not to cause a denial of the creation of souls and the adoption of propagation because it can be sufficiently saved without this hypothesis (as will be demonstrated in its place). Although the soul is not materially from Adam (as to substance), yet it is originally from him as to subsistence. And as man is rightly said to beget man (although he does not beget the soul), so an impure progenerates an impure, especially (the just judgment of God intervening) that by which it was established that what he had bestowed upon the first man, he should at the same time have and lose for himself as well as his posterity. Now although it is curious to inquire and rash to define why God infuses a soul tainted with sin and joins it to an impure body, it is certainly evident that God did not will (on account of the sin of man) to abolish the first sanction concerning the propagation of the human race by generation. Thus the order of the universe and the conservation of human nature demanded it.

Fourteenth Question: The Immortality of the Soul

Is the soul immortal in virtue of its intrinsic constitution? We affirm.

I. The true origin of the soul having been proved, its immortality must also be demonstrated. We must labor the more diligently upon this (atheists and libertines using great efforts to impugn it) in order the more easily to take away from the world all sense of the divinity and desire of piety. The pious, on the contrary, embrace it as a primary head of faith. There can be none more strongly exciting to piety, nor more efficacious in life as well as in death. It is an argument of consolation since belief in immortality (*athanasias*) is the foundation of blessedness (*euthanasias*).

II. However, there have been different opinions about this question. (1) Those denying—such as were formerly the Sadducees and the Epicureans and atheists of our day, who hold that the soul is entirely extinguished with the body. They who think the soul dies with the body, but believe it will afterwards be raised with it, do not differ much from these. This was the heresy formerly of some Arabians, according to Eusebius (*Ecclesiastical History* 6.37* [FC 29:62]) and Augustine (*De Haeresibus* 83 [PL 42.46]). It is renewed in this age by the milder Socinians and Anabaptists who, pressing in their footsteps, presume to defend at

least a night of the soul (viz., that souls either sleep and are without all sense or are extinguished until the resurrection). Smaltzius says, "The soul after death is endowed with no sense" (*Refutatio Thesium D. Wolfgangi Frantzii*, "De Extremo Iudicio," Disp. VII [1614], p. 412). (2) Those doubting—such as the sceptics and academics, old and new. (3) Those affirming—such as were the sounder philosophers and now all the orthodox.

III. Immortality may be either extrinsic (having no external principle destructive of itself); or intrinsic (having in itself a principle of corruption and destruction). Again immortal is said extrinsically, either with respect to the first cause or with respect to second causes. The question here is not whether the soul is immortal extrinsically. For although with respect to second causes it may properly be so called (because no second cause can resolve it into its principles, which has none), yet it cannot be so called with respect to the first cause (because God who created can annihilate it). But the question is properly about intrinsic immortality or its incorruptibility.

IV. Again, immortal is such either by nature strictly considered (to whose nature it is simply repugnant for it to fail in any way) either extrinsically or intrinsically; or broadly (which has by natural constitution no intrinsic principle of destruction). The question is not whether the soul is immortal in the first sense (which belongs to God alone, 1 Tim. 6:16), but in the second.

V. Finally, immortality in the genus of being and as to the conservation of the soul, differs from immortality in the genus of morals and as to its glory and happiness. We do not treat here of the latter (which has been spoken of in Question 12), proper to the souls of believers alone (while others lie in spiritual and eternal death), but of the former (which belongs to the soul in every state).

Proof of the immortality of the soul. (1) From Scripture.

VI. Now that such is the condition of the rational soul, Scripture frequently teaches and reason confirms. First, Scripture establishes it most clearly in the celebrated passage where Christ (dealing with the Sadducees who denied the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body) argues from the federal promise given to the patriarchs, in which God testified that he is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Mt. 22:32; cf. Ex. 3:6). However, since "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living," thence he necessarily gathers both that their souls were immortal and that their bodies would be raised. There are three foundations for this reasoning. First, the covenant which God made with man necessarily demands the existence of those with whom the covenant was made. Otherwise there could not be the relation (*schesis*) between God and men, nor could the benefits (which tend to the communion of life and happiness) be communicated to them. Second, the covenant of God is not temporal, but eternal, remaining even after death. Thus even after their death, God is called their God. Third, this covenant was made with the whole man and not with the soul only (the one part). Hence it follows that the patriarchs (with whom God made the covenant) ought to exist, not only for a time, but also after death and forever; not only as to the soul, but also as to the body (which, moreover, in its own time ought to be raised). This invincibly proves both the immortality of their souls and the resurrection of their bodies. For they (of whom God is the God by an eternal covenant) ought also to live forever. Now God is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and calls

himself such even after their death. Therefore they ought to live even after their death, if not as to the body yet as to the soul because as Luke adds "all live unto him" (*pantes autō zōsin*, Lk. 20:38), until at the last day the whole man himself both in body and soul shall enjoy the life of God. Although this passage speaks directly of the happy immortality and resurrection of believers in virtue of the covenant, it is with no less propriety extended to the immortality of nature (because the one necessarily supposes the other). And if the souls of believers are to live forever that they may enjoy the happiness promised to them, the relation of the justice of God demands that the souls of the wicked should never perish, that they may be visited with the punishments denounced by him.

VII. Second, the same thing is proved by the passages which set forth a different exit of the body and the soul. Thus, when "the body" is said to "return to the dust and the spirit to return to God who gave it" (Ecc. 12:7), it is manifestly intimated that the soul subsists after the destruction of the body; for if extinguished with the body, how is it said to return to God? It returns, therefore, to God as the extrinsic and efficient principle of its origin; not to be extinguished, but either to be made happy or to be punished by him. The body returns to the dust as its material and intrinsic principle into which it is resolved. Ps. 146:4 applies here: "The breath of man goeth forth," while "he" (as to the body) "returneth to his earth." Now if the soul is extinguished with the body, why is it said to go out of him? So Christ would falsely distinguish between men (who can kill the body and not the soul) and God (who can destroy both soul and body in hell) if the soul could be destroyed with the body: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both body and soul in hell" (Mt. 10:28). Nor should it be said that he here treats of ruin and destruction because by *to apolesai* is not signified extinction or destruction, but only punishment (because he speaks of hell whose torment is said to be eternal). Luke sets this forth by "to cast into hell" (*to embalein eis tēn geennan*, Lk. 12:5, viz., that man may be tormented forever in soul and body).

VIII. Here belong all those passages which either promise eternal life to believers or threaten the wicked with eternal punishment; and those which treat of the last judgment, as of eternal judgment (Heb. 6:2), because on it is adjudicated the eternal reward or eternal punishment (Mt. 25:34, 41). All these would be false if death ended all things in man and nothing remained in him after death.

IX. If the soul perishes with the body or is sunk in a heavy sleep, how does Paul (with believers) after the dissolution of the earthly tabernacle expect a building and house eternal and not made with hands (*acheiropoiēton*) in heaven? How does he with them wish "rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord" (*ekdēmēsai ek tou sōmatos kai endēmēsai pros ton Kyrion*, 2 Cor. 5:1, 8) and elsewhere desire "to depart" (or to go to the Lord) "and to be with Christ" (Phil. 1:23)? How is the soul of Lazarus carried after death to the bosom of Abraham, where it sweetly rests, while that of the rich man, on the contrary, is most miserably tormented in hell (Lk. 16:19-31)? How are the souls of the martyrs represented "under the altar, clad in white robes" (symbols of the glory they enjoy) "crying out" and calling for the judgment of God (Rev. 6:9-11*)? How are the spirits of the wicked said to be "bound in prison" (*en phylakē*, viz., the infernal, 1 Pet 3:19), where they suffer the deserved punishment of their contumacy and perfidy?

(2) From the providence of God, his truth, his wisdom, religion, the desire of immortality.

X. Manifold reason also proves it. First, the immortality of the soul is demanded by the providence and justice of God to render good to the good, evil to the evil. Since, in the most wise counsel of God, this is not always done in the present life, it ought necessarily to be looked for in the other (in which that distribution of rewards and punishments may be made). The truth of God also demands it, for he promises the highest happiness to the pious and extreme misery to the wicked, not only in this but also in the future world. His wisdom and goodness demand it; he cannot suffer the destruction of men and brutes to be the same, but as their origin is different, so he wishes a different end to each. Religion and piety demand it; for to no purpose is God worshipped and are believers anxious about the promotion of their holiness, nor do they deny themselves and bear patiently the yoke of calamities and the cross, if the same end awaits the pious and the impious with the beasts. The Epicureans would be the most wise, who pamper their bodies and have no thought but how they may indulge their passions and wallow in luxurious delights: "Let us eat and drink," they say, "tomorrow we die" (1 Cor. 15:32). The desire of immortality, innate in all, demands it; also that infinite appetite which can never be satiated except with eternal and infinite good. For, since this cannot be a vain and deceitful desire implanted in individuals by the deity and by nature, the immortality of the soul must be granted that it may be fulfilled.

(3) From its spirituality.

XI. Second, its spirituality proves it. For whatever is spiritual and free from the contagion of matter is immortal. For being in the highest degree simple and indivisible, it is devoid of contrariety (which arises only from contrary qualities), and there is nothing by which it can be corrupted intrinsically or perish. That at length is mortal which is material and compound and consists of contrary qualities contending against each other. If, therefore, the soul is spiritual, it neither is produced from the power of a material, nor depends upon it—not in becoming, or in being—because it has a peculiar mode of subsistence and so does not die with the body, but can subsist separated from it. That the soul is spiritual is not proved better than from its operations, which indicate *a posteriori* the kind of principle whence they spring. If they are spiritual, the soul itself also must be spiritual.

(4) From its independence of the body.

XII. That its operations are spiritual is gathered certainly from their being independent of the body (whence also follows the independence of the soul itself). For if the soul can act independently of the body, it can also subsist independently of the body, for the mode of operating follows the mode of being. And that the soul operates independently of the body is evident even from the sole understanding of God, angels and the soul itself (which by a reflex act beholds itself) and from exstatic (*extaticis*) motions. For that such acts are spiritual and independent of the body, the thing itself exclaims. This is so both by reason of the object (because the mind is occupied about things spiritual and incorporeal and eternal) whither it could not rise (unless spiritual and incorporeal, for the effect is not in its whole genus more noble than its cause); and with respect to the mode (because it is occupied with

those objects in a spiritual manner and without the use of the bodily organs, which have no proportion to the spiritual and incorporeal object). Hence the more the mind is carried out of and abstracted from the senses, the purer and more acutely is it accustomed to understand.

XIII. It is one thing for the soul to depend upon the body (as upon a subject and efficient); another to depend upon it as an object and occasion. When Aristotle says, "The perceiver ought to look at phantasms" (*On the Soul* 3.7 [Loeb, 8:176-77]), he notes the latter dependency, not the former. For understanding is not made ordinarily without a phantasy (initially, conditionally and objectively) because the phantasm is the object about which the mind is occupied. Rather it does not depend upon the phantasy effectively or subjectively because it is neither elicited by it nor received in it, but is effected by the intellect alone and received in it alone. Yet on account of its union with the body, the soul does not work through the intellect without first working through the phantasy, so that by an operation through the phantasy and at the presence of phantasms, it is excited to work through the intellect. Again, it is not true that understanding always depends upon the phantasy. Although it is so with respect to external sensible things and singulars, it cannot be so equally with respect to universals and immaterial things. For the understanding of God (for instance) and of angels depends upon no phantasm, under which no such objects can fall. And since the soul understands itself (being intimately present with itself), it does not need the help of a phantasm, but can have a naked and intuitive knowledge of itself through itself. Even this alone sufficiently proves that there is a certain operation peculiar to the rational soul and independent of the body.

XIV. However, although the soul does not use a bodily organ for understanding, it does not follow that the soul can understand in every place (because it does not in every place have the aid of the senses which it must use while in the body, but only in the brain). Nor (if this is denied) could a reason be given for fury and madness, which cannot belong to the soul unless on the part of an injured organ. These do not fall upon the soul except by accident on account of the ministering senses and faculties being vitiated and corrupted. Thus the corruption of the brain can cause fury and delirium from the bad disposition of the phantasy or common sense (by which it happens that confused and disturbed objects are presented to the intellect, which being thus preoccupied, can judge nothing rightly). Hence if insanity is sometimes cured by hellebore or other corporeal remedies, the entire cure pertains to the injured brain (which must necessarily be healed that the soul may exercise its operations). The same must be said of the diversity of the soul's operations in regard to the age of man. It is not necessary that a change should be made in the soul, but in the organs of the body (whose ministry it uses in eliciting sensations). Hence it is that in the infant from the beginning, it reasons either little or not at all because either no (or a few) phantasms (on account of the weakness of the organs) are as yet present from which to receive the occasion of reasoning. In decrepit age, it cannot reason any more (or only weakly, as old men in second childhood) because the phantasms are either wholly or in great part destroyed, and what survive are obscurely presented to the intellect. It sometimes also happens that, the powers of the body declining, there is a great strength in the soul, and the more the body is depressed and weakened, the higher the mind rises (as if rejoicing to depart from this prison of the body).

From the consent of nations.

XV. To the confirmation of the same truth, the consent of nations adds great weight. These have all approved it by their vote, and especially those considered the wisest men in them (a few Epicureans alone excepted, whom Pliny, *Natural History* 7.55 [Loeb, 2:633-35] favored, who seem to have spoken rather in accordance with their wishes than real belief). It would be useless to heap up testimonies here. They may be read in Plesseus (*A Worke Concerning the truenesse of Christian Religion* 15 [1617], pp. 240-69), Vives, Zanchius and others who have openly followed this argument.

Sources of explanation.

XVI. It is one thing to speak of the truth of a thing; another to speak of the opinion of the carnal man who judges from appearances and external events (which fall under the senses). When Solomon says, "That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no preeminence above a beast" (Ecc. 3:19*), he does not speak in the first sense, but in the second (to teach that from external things cannot be gathered the difference between man and the brute, since the same necessity of death hangs equally over them). Thus he proves the vanity of human sense, which, not rising higher than these external things, knows not how to distinguish between the end of man and of the brute. For in other places (speaking from the light of faith and according to the truth of the thing), he sufficiently testifies that he is of a different opinion when he says that "the body returns to the dust, as it was; but the spirit shall return unto God who gave it" (Ecc. 12:7); this is the whole duty of man, "to fear God, and to keep his commandments" (Ecc. 12:13*) which he would say to no purpose if he believed the soul to be extinguished with the body. Again, "who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward" (Ecc. 3:21) (i.e., enjoys eternal life); for no mortal from the external state and the light of reason without the light of the Holy Spirit can be certainly assured of this. In the same sense, he says, "No man knoweth either love or hatred" (i.e., from external events), as he immediately adds, "There is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; to the good and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not" (Ecc. 9:1, 2). It can also with truth be said that the Preacher here compares man with the brute in the truth and necessity of death. The particles "as is," "so is" are not shadowing forth the mode, but only the necessity and truth of the thing itself (as often elsewhere). And when the spirit of brutes and of men is said to be the same, the soul itself is not meant, but only the breath (as it occurs frequently in Scripture in this sense, Job 9:18; Jam. 2:26).

XVII. The dead are said not to praise God (Pss. 30:9; 88:12; 115:17; Is. 38:18), not absolutely and simply (as if they ceased to exist, for elsewhere the dead in the Lord are called "happy," Rev. 14:13), but relatively (regard being had to the praise due to him in the church militant from believers in the communion of saints by which other travellers are built up and excited to the same duty, which cannot be the case with the dead who cherish no longer any intercourse with the living). If the dead are said not to be—"spare me, that I may recover strength, before I go hence, and be no more" (Ps. 39:13)—this cannot be understood absolutely, but relatively (as to the whole compound) and inasmuch as they are no more among men and enjoy no communion with them.

XVIII. What has an origin can also have an end, in the manner in which it had its origin. What is generated can be corrupted. But what is created (if it is spiritual) can only be annihilated. So what has a natural and material origin, also has destruction. But the soul has a supernatural origin.

XIX. Although in the disembodied soul there can be no species or sensible ideas arising from phantasms, it does not follow that there are no intelligibles which exist in the soul itself. For besides common notions (*koinas ennoias*) which were impressed upon it from the beginning, the habits of vice which it contracted in the body, and the supernatural habits of virtues (which God infuses into the hearts of believers) ought to remain in it. Nor can faith and love, once produced in the soul by grace, ever be blotted out from it.

XX. Although the separated soul does not have organs and phantasms (by the intervention of which it may understand), it does not follow that it remains torpid and at rest. For there is one mode of understanding in the soul united to the body; another, however, in the soul separated. It can understand with the help of such phantasms, as can the angels.

XXI. Some operations of man are organic and material, others inorganic and immaterial (or spiritual). The former (sensation, vision, etc.) depend on the body and can be performed only in the body. But the latter are performed even without the body.

XXII. Although for the most part, nothing is in the understanding which was not before in some sense (because the soul, as long as it is in the body, uses bodily organs to exercise its operations, if not to elicit, still as to imperate acts, and ordinarily needs phantasms as objects about which to exercise itself), yet this is not true absolutely and simply. For God, who is in the intellect, was never in any sense; and the soul, which beholds itself and reflects upon itself, cannot be said to have been in any sense.

XXIII. When men are said to be "a wind that passeth away, and cometh not again" (Ps. 78:39), by the wind (*spiritum*) is not designated the soul, but the wind (*ventus*). This is done to denote the shortness and frailty of human life which, like the wind, quickly passes (as Job 7:7 says, "O remember that my life is wind").

XXIV. When the dead are said to sleep (Jn. 11:11; 1 Cor. 11:30; 1 Thess. 4:15 and elsewhere), this is not to be understood with respect to the soul (which is received into heaven and lives with Christ), but with respect to the body (which must be recalled to life as from a sleep to an awakening). Death is often on this account compared to sleep, which is called its brother and image. Hence elsewhere they are said "to sleep in the dust" (Dan. 12:2), which can be referred to the body alone.

XXV. Inchoate blessedness differs from consummated blessedness. The passages which promise happiness after the resurrection do not thereby imply that souls sleep or are excluded from the vision of God before that time. Rather they treat of the consummation of blessedness which began immediately on the death of the believer.

SIXTH TOPIC

THE ACTUAL PROVIDENCE OF GOD

FIRST QUESTION
Is there a providence? We affirm.

I. As the works of nature are usually distributed into the works of creation and providence, the doctrine of creation is rightly followed by an examination of providence (*which cannot be ignored without serious loss or be known without singular consolation*).

Meaning of the word "providence."

II. The word "providence" was called by the Greeks *pronoia* because *proteron noei* (as Favorinus says, *Dictionarium Varini Phavorini* [1538], pp. 1569-70) embraces three things especially: *prognōsin*, *prothesin* and *dioikēsin*—the knowledge of the mind, the decree of the will and the efficacious administration of the things decreed; directing knowledge, commanding will and fulfilling power, as Hugo St. Victor expresses it. The first foresees, the second provides, the third procures. Hence providence can be viewed either in the antecedent decree or in the subsequent execution. The former is the eternal destination of all things to their ends; the latter is the temporal government of all things according to that decree. The former is an immanent act in God; the latter is a transitive action out of God. We here treat principally of the providence of God in the second respect (*schesei*).

Is there a providence?

III. The first question (concerning providence—whether there is any) ought scarcely to come up among Christians (unless not a few atheists may still be found among them who, professing the name of Christ, yet deny the truth of Christ both with their tongues and in their lives and not only question that saving doctrine, the true inheritance of the church, with the old Epicureans, but presume to deny it altogether, ascribing all things to fortune and chance and either endeavor to remove God himself away from the world or make him listless [*apronoēton*], caring for neither his own nor other things). Against such human monsters, the orthodox truth must be confirmed. From this it will be evident that there is a providence in the world by which all things (even the smallest) are not only at the same time most wisely and powerfully directed, but also so connected with the divinity that it cannot be wholly denied without at the same time denying God.

Providence is proved: (1) from nature and the consent of the nations.

IV. To demonstrate this primary head of faith and religion (and so overthrow the impiety of the scoffing enemies of God [*theomachōn*]) even the very voice of nature and the consent of nations, and the vote of the wisest among the heathen can suffice. They all with one mouth (if you except a few Epicureans) have borne constant testimony to

this truth. Plato, in his discourse concerning God, lays down this foundation: "The gods have a care for all things, small and great" (*hōs eisin epimeloumenoi theoi pantōn mikrōn kai meizonōn, Epinomis* 980d [Loeb, 12:448-49]). Aristotle, or whoever is the author of the book: "What the helmsman in the ship, the charioteer in a chariot, the leader in a choir, the law in a state, the general in an army is, the same is God in the world" (*hōsper ev nēi kybernētēs, en harmati hēniochos, en chorō de koryphaios, en polei de nomos, en stratopedō hēgemōn, touto theos en kosmō, On the Cosmos* 6 [Loeb, 402-3]). The Stoics constantly maintain this. So frequently and solidly is it asserted by them, says Lipsius, that they were a joke and sport to their opponents who were accustomed to calling this the prophesying old woman of the Stoics. Seneca proves it by many arguments in a special treatise dealing with why evils happen to good men: "Providence is over all and God takes care of us"; and afterwards, "It is superfluous at present to obtrude the truth that so great a work cannot stand without a guardian and that this certain revolution of the stars is not by fortuitous impulse and that what chance incites is often disturbed and quickly destroyed; that this uninterrupted velocity proceeds under the government of eternal law, that this order is not wandering matter" (*De Providentia* 1.1, 2 [Loeb, 1:2-4]). Cicero solidly builds it up by various arguments from the motion, situation, etc. of the heavens; the stability, form, adornment of the earth and other similar arguments (*De Natura Deorum* 2 [Loeb, 19:122-285]). And providence (*pronoia*) was made so much of among the heathen that she was worshipped as a goddess in Delos because she assisted Latona in labor (to wit, under this covering signifying that nature, designated by Latona, can do nothing without the midwife providence, who assists her as if pregnant and laboring in birth, i.e., that second causes can do nothing without the first).

(2) From the Scriptures.

V. It is more strongly and clearly established by the testimony of Scripture. Scripture is accustomed to joining the creation of things with their providence. It sets forth God, who is not only the Creator (*ktistēs*), but also the *pronoētēs* (not only the momentary Creator, departing immediately from the work made by him, but also the constant provider, cherishing and sustaining his own work by his continual influx and taking perpetual care of it); "for neither as one departs from the structure of the house he has built and, he stopping and departing, his work stands, can the world so stand even an instant if God withdraw from it his control" (as Augustine says, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* 4.12 [ACW 41:117; PL 34.304]). "To make well and so take good care of what is made both belong to God" (*kalōs poiēsai, kai tōn genomenōn kalōs epimelēthēnai*, Nemesis, *The Nature of Man* 42.2* [1636], pp. 594, 595-96; PG 40.788). There is no need to heap up the Scripture passages establishing this point. They are almost as many as there are pages in the Bible, since nothing is inculcated more frequently, nothing more clearly in the word of God. You may consult Job 12, 38, 39, 40, 41; Pss. 19, 91, 104, 107, 136; Prov. 16, 20; Jer. 10; Mt. 6, 10; Acts 14, 17. Christ says, "My father worketh hitherto" (Jn. 5:17), not as if creating new things, but conserving and governing those already created. Thus "not even one sparrow can fall without the will of our heavenly father, and the very hairs of our head are all numbered" (Lk. 12:6, 7). And Paul says, "God has not left himself without witness (*amartyron*) in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness" (Acts 14:17). He testifies,

"God giveth to us life, and breath and all things, and we live and move and have our being in him" (Acts 17:25, 28*). And elsewhere he teaches that "God works all things according to the counsel of his own will" (Eph. 1:11); "the Son upholds all things by the word of his power" (Heb. 1:3); and "by him all things consist" (Col. 1:17) and so in innumerable passages. This very thing is also shadowed forth by various symbols, but most especially by the threefold type: (1) Mount Moriah (Gen. 22:8), where God gives a most illustrious proof in the conservation of Isaac and the substitution of a ram in his place, whence the church claims this symbol as proper and peculiar to herself—"the Lord will provide" (*yhvh yr'h*). (2) Jacob's ladder (Gen. 28:12, 13), called by Philo the heavenly ladder (*ouranoklimaka*, *On Dreams* 1.3 also 1.159 and 2.3 [Loeb, 5:294-95, 380-81, 442-45]), in which God is represented as sitting upon the ladder, governing and regulating most wisely all heavenly, earthly, visible and invisible things. (3) The chariot of Ezk. 1 in which not only "the eyed wheels" with the vital spirit in them, by which they were moved, indicates not only intimate providence (which has both an eternal and most piercing eye, beholding all things [as it is elsewhere described, Zech. 4*.10*] and a most efficacious power by which it is moved); but a wheel is also placed "in a wheel" (the lesser in the greater) to denote the concatenation and dependence of second causes upon the first.

(3) From the nature of God.

VI. Third, the same thing is proved: (1) from the nature of God himself. "For if God is, he is assuredly provident" (Lactantius, *The Wrath of God* 9 [FC 54:75; PL 7.98]). Nor can the world consist without him anymore than it can be created because the same reasons which impelled him to create also impel him to govern. (2) From his independency and causality, by which all created things and second causes must depend upon him both in being and in operation. (3) From his wisdom, power and goodness. For if God does not care for the world, it is either because he does not know or because he cannot or because he does not wish to. But how can this be said without the greatest blasphemy against him, since he is most wise (foreseeing all things and for all) and most powerful (with whom nothing is impossible [*adynaton*]) and the best (who as he created the world at first with the highest goodness, so he cannot but conserve and govern it when created by the same).

(4) From the nature of created things; (5) from the harmony and order of the world; (6) from predictions; (7) from the revolutions of empires; (8) from blessings and judgments; (9) from conscience.

VII. Fourth, the same thing is demonstrated *a posteriori*. (a) By the nature and condition of created things. For since they were produced from nothing, they neither have of themselves any power of subsisting nor could they subsist even for a moment, if not continually sustained by the same hand that formed them. "Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth" (Ps. 104:29, 30). Besides since many of them neither foresee nor can foresee their end (and yet are carried towards it by certain laws and a constant course), they must be directed altogether by a superior mind prescient of all things. (b) The admirable harmony and order observable in the world among so many things (both confused in species

and mutually opposed to each other) cannot be granted without a superior ruler and governor. (c) The predictions of future events a long while before they happened, which (without a divine providence) could be neither granted nor conceived. For unless all things were disposed (and happened) by his immutable will such predictions would be merely conjectures and would rest upon an uncertainty. (d) The establishment and revolutions of empires and republics in which the secret providence of the deity intervenes—taking away and conferring crowns at pleasure, raising up and putting down, transferring and constituting kings, changing times and seasons (as even the worst men are compelled to confess). For whence is it that empires are erected in the world and are conserved when established, that a regard is paid to law and political order, and that the world does not become a hive of robbers (since the multitude of evilly disposed persons is always greater, who wish the laws to be removed, than of the good, who defend them)? Assuredly it cannot be supposed that this happens without God, and that it can be directed by another than him "by whom kings rule" (Prov. 8:15); "who ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will" (Dan. 4:32). (e) The extraordinary blessings and judgments which God pours out either upon the good or upon the evil (beyond and above all order or apparatus of human things). (f) The sense of conscience; for "the conscience is a God to all mortals" (*brotois hapasin hē syneidēsis Theos, Menandri sententiae* 107 [ed. S. Jaekel, 1964], p. 39). For if there is no providence, and all things are directed by chance and fortune, why does conscience accuse and excuse men (Rom. 2:15)? Why do they tremble at the recollection of crimes and the sense of the judgment? Why do the wicked, driven by the furies of their own evil conscience, "tremble and turn pale at every flash when it thunders; and also sink under the first murmur of heaven" (as Juvenal says, *Satires* 13.223-24 [Loeb, 262-63])? Why can this witness and inexorable judge not be driven out altogether so that it can never return? For what is more vain than this fear, if, the care of the universe being neglected, God regards and esteems equally the piety and wickedness of mortals?

VIII. Finally, all the arguments by which we have already proved the existence of God favor also his providence. For providence is so connected with the divinity that it cannot be asserted or denied without either asserting or denying God himself. Hence the Scriptures everywhere separate God from idols by the argument of providence (Is. 41:22, 23; 42:8, 9; Job 12:7-9). By the heathen, God and providence (*theos kai pronoia*) are used promiscuously. Not only they who deny the existence, but also they who deny the providence of God, are condemned as atheists (*atheotētos*).

Sources of explanation.

IX. The providence of God neither takes away the contingency of things (because it always remains indifferent with respect to the second cause, what becomes necessary by providence with respect to the first cause); nor overthrows the liberty of the will (because the hypothetical necessity of the decree brings no coaction to the will, but permits it to exercise its own movement most freely, although inevitably); nor does away with the use of means (because the certainty of the end does not take away, but supposes the necessity of the means). The concourse of the first cause does not exclude the concourse of second causes; yea, it draws this after itself, since as God decreed to produce such an effect by

the action of providence, he decreed equally to carry it out by the intervention of means and second causes. Nor does it abolish the relation of punishments and rewards because the necessity which providence brings is not absolute, physical and compulsory (which does destroy liberty), but relative (from the hypothesis of the decree of immutability, which indeed renders man dependent and accountable [*hypeuthynon*], but always leaves him rational and free, and so worthy of reward or punishment in good and evil deeds).

X. Sin (which is repugnant to the divine will) cannot be produced by the providence of God effectively; but nothing hinders it from being ordained by his providence permissively and directed efficaciously without any blame upon divine providence (as will hereafter be proved more fully).

XI. Things so confused in themselves as to be incapable of being reduced to order in any way cannot be said to be governed by providence. But in this sense, nothing can be called confused and disordered (*atakton*) in the world. For if some things seem confused and disarranged, they are so only with respect to us (who cannot see the causes of things, their modes and ends), not in themselves and with respect to God (by whom they are most wisely directed). For nothing appears to be so disturbed to us, yet still shines with a remarkable order of divine wisdom and justice. Thus in the selling of Joseph and the crucifixion of Christ, there was a horrible disorder (*ataxia*) as to the counsels of men, but a most wise order as to the decree of God (who as he elicits light from darkness, so also good from evil). Thus he wished to manage these events to the manifestation of his own glory and the safety of the church, since nothing was done here which "the hand and counsel of God had not even before decreed to be done" (Acts 4:28). "Ye thought evil against me," says Joseph to his brethren, "but God meant it unto good" (Gen. 50:20).

XII. Although the happiness of the wicked and the calamities of the pious often inspired the heathen with doubts concerning providence; yea, have frequently tried even believers themselves and most holy men of God (who so often complained of them as we find in Scripture), yet this ought not to weaken our belief in providence. (1) Because the relation of providence and justice indeed demands that it be well with the good and evil with the wicked, but does not equally demand that it be always well with the good and always evil with the wicked; yea, God's wonderful wisdom shines out in this dispensation of things, while he wishes many wickednesses to be punished now in this life (that men may be instructed concerning justice and providence), but many also he leaves unpunished here to intimate that another world exists after this life (in which he will render to each according to his deeds). Augustine unfolds this excellently: "If every sin should now be punished with manifest punishment, it would be supposed that nothing would be left for the last judgment. Again, if the divinity did not now openly punish any sin, it would be supposed that there is no providence" (CG 1.8 [FC 8:29; PL 41.20]). He had already given the reason for this dispensation: "It has pleased divine providence to prepare good things for the righteous hereafter which the unrighteous will not enjoy, and evils for the wicked with which the good will not be tormented. He wished, however, those temporal goods and evils to be common to both so that neither the good should be sought too eagerly, which the wicked also are seen to have, nor the ills be ignobly shunned, with which the good also are for the most part affected" (ibid.,

p. 28; PL 41.20). (2) If we enter into the shrine of God, we will readily discover that neither are they properly evils by which the faithful are exercised (although they seem so to us) because the issue is good to them (Rom. 8:28); nor are the goods (in which the wicked abound) such to them because they are turned into their destruction. For to the good, even the very worst things are turned into blessings; so to the wicked even their best things issue in evil. "Assuredly thou didst set them in slippery places," says Asaph, "thou castedst them down into destruction, how are they brought into desolation, as in a moment" (Ps. 73:18, 19*). Claudian beautifully follows this out: "The thought has often entered my wavering mind, whether the gods above have a care for the earth or no ruler is present and mortal things flow along by uncertain chance. For when I had sought the covenants of the arranged world, and the prescribed boundaries of the sea, and the ebb and flow of rivers, and the changes of day and night, then I supposed all things to be established by the counsel of God . . . But when I beheld the affairs of men involved in so great darkness and the wicked flourishing long in joy and the pious troubled, again weakened religion totters . . . At length the punishment of Rufinus removes this tumult and absolves the gods; now I do not complain that the unjust have reached the height of prosperity, they are raised on high that they may experience a greater fall" (*The First Book Against Rufinus* [Loeb, 1:26-29]). Nor otherwise Seneca: "When you see good men and accepted of God labor and sweat and toil, while the wicked grow wanton and roll in pleasures, think that we are pleased with the modesty of children, the license of slaves; that the former are restrained by a severer discipline, and the boldness of the latter is encouraged. The same thing is evident to you concerning God; he does not hold the good man in pleasures; he tries, strengthens and prepares him for himself" (*De Providentia* 1.6 [Loeb, 1:6-7]). "Calamity is the occasion of virtue. Anyone would rightly call them miserable who become sluggish with too great happiness, whom inactive tranquility holds as it were on a motionless sea. Whatever happens to them comes new; adversity presses more those who have never experienced it. The yoke is grievous to the tender neck. The recruit grows pale at the mere thought of a wound; the veteran looks at his gore without flinching because he knows that he has often conquered after blood. And thus God strengthens, examines, exercises those whom he approves and loves, while he preserves for many evils to come those whom he seems to favor, and spares" (*De Providentia* 4.6-7 [Loeb, 1:26-28]). There are in the same place many other similar things worthy to be read in which the most wise providence is established from this distribution of good and evil. So it is a wonder that Christians should doubt concerning providence on account of that from which the Gentiles themselves elicit an undoubted argument in favor of it.

SECOND QUESTION

Is the providence of God rightly called "fate," and is a fatal necessity properly ascribed to it? We distinguish.

Occasion of the question.

I. The question is necessary not only that it may be evident what ought to be the use of the word "fate" among Christians (about which divines are not agreed), but also

that our doctrine may be freed from the calumnies of Romanists and others (who continually oppose to it the tables of the fates and the fatal and Stoical necessity of all things and events).

Derivation of the word "fate."

II. The word *fatum* is Latin derived from *fando* (i.e., "speaking" as if the utterance or word, decree, command and will of God). Priscian says, "Speaking after the manner of the Gentiles it was called fate because Jupiter spoke that to the fates who inscribed his will upon brazen tablets, or because the Parcae spoke it" (cf. Priscian, *Opera* 1 [ed. A. Krehl, 1819], pp. 396, 627). Minucius Felix says, "What else is fate than what God has spoken of each one of us?" (*Octavius* 36 [ANF 4:195; PL 3.365]). By the Greeks, it is called *eimarmenē*, from the verb *meirō* ("I divide, distribute, appoint"), and *to peprōmenon* (i.e., ordained, determined) from *apo tou peratoō* ("I end, finish") because by it things are determined by God. The Stoic philosophers used this word to signify providence, from whom the Christians, both ancient and more modern, borrowed it and frequently use it.

How many kinds of fate are there?

III. However, it is used in many ways by authors, whence a fourfold fate arises, as Pico della Mirandola observes—"physical, mathematical, Stoical and Christian fate" (*Disputationes Adversus Astrologiam Divinatricam* 4.4 [1943], pp. 442-56). First, physical fate, which is nothing else than the order and series of natural causes defined to their effects (whose necessity is natural). Its principle is nature or the power of acting (which God imparted to things in creation). The effects are all those events which depend in themselves upon natural causes. Such as depend upon the free will of man or also happen by chance are opposed to this.

2. Mathematical.

IV. Second, fate is mathematical, of the Chaldeans and astrologers (called by Bradwardine "astral"). It is the necessity of things and events arising from the position of the heavens and of the stars (or from constellations) by which not only the elements and mixed bodies, but also the wills of men are said to be necessarily impelled to their acts. In this sense, Manilius often uses the word fate: "The fates have given to you the laws of life and of death" (*Astronomica* 4.23 [Loeb, 224-25]). Augustine says, "When men hear the word fate, they understand nothing but the force of the position of the stars, such as it is when anyone is born or conceived" (CG 5.1 [FC 8:242; PL 41.141]). This fate he elsewhere calls foolish: "If thy heart were not foolish, thou wouldst not believe in fate" ("Tractate 37," *On the Gospel of St. John* [NPNF2, 7:216; PL 35.1674]). Indeed it contends against Scripture, right reason and universal experience. To this some refer the Jewish and Pharisaical fate, concerning which Josephus (speaking of the Pharisees) says that they ascribe to fate whatever happens, which belongs to nothing else than the astrological fate as sufficiently appears from their trite axiom, "all things depend upon planets" (*hkhl thlwy bmtsl*, AJ 18.13 [Loeb, 9:10-11]). They "ascribe all things to fate and to God" (JW 2.163 [Loeb, 2:384-85]). However Josephus teaches this, it must be understood with a certain limitation, since he says, "The Pharisees attribute some, not all things to fate" (AJ 13.172 [Loeb, 7:310-11]).

3. Stoical fate.

V. The third is the Stoical fate, which (according to Chrysippus) "is a certain natural order and connection of all things from eternity, some being consequent upon others, and an immutable complication of this kind remaining" (in Gellius, *Attic Nights* 7*.2.3 [Loeb, 2:94-95]); or (according to Cicero) "the order and series of causes when cause woven with cause produces the thing from itself" (*De Divinitate* 1.55.125 [Loeb, 20:360-61])—to which they subject and bind God himself. Seneca says, "One and the same chain of necessity ties God and men. The same irrevocable and unalterable course carries on divine and human things. The very maker and governor of all things that write the Fates, follows them. He did but once command, but he always obeys" (*De Providentia* 5.8 [Loeb, 1:38-39]). But the real opinion of the Stoics on this subject is not very clear (viz., whether they held that all causes by fate were natural and defined, so that the liberty of the human will and the contingency of events would be taken away by it; and God would be so bound to the order of causes or of things made by him that he could not act otherwise—which is commonly ascribed to them; or whether they wished only to assert the immutability of the divine decrees, not however to take away either the liberty of man or the contingency of events). The latter Lipsius maintains and many with him (*Physiologiae Stoicorum* 1, Diss. 12 [1604], pp. 28-32). Augustine unfolds this opinion in these words: "who call by the name fate not the constitution of the stars just as it is, when anything is conceived or born or begun, but the connection and series of all causes by which everything is done which is done; we must not labor and contend with them in a controversy of words since they ascribe to the supreme will and power of God that order and certain connection of causes, who is believed best and most truly both to know all things before they happen, and leaves nothing unarranged, from whom are all powers, although not the wills of all. And that they so call fate especially the will itself of the supreme God whose power is insuperably perceived through all things, is thus proved" (CG 5.8 [FC 8:254; PL 41.148]). If this is truly the genuine opinion of the Stoics (as seems to be evident from Seneca), they are not to be disturbed as they approach very near to the truth. But because it is the custom among many to impute a different fate to the Stoics which (namely) imposes a fatal and ineluctable necessity upon all things and an eternal and natural series of causes and things among themselves (to which God himself is subjected), we profess to be most widely separated from them. For since they are said commonly to place a necessity out of God in the perpetual and eternal connection of things, we place it in God himself and his eternal decree. They subject God to necessity, we subject necessity to God. They pretend that all causes are natural and defined; we constantly maintain a difference between natural and free causes and believe that both depend on the providence of God. Hence it is evident that the Stoical fate understood in this sense cannot without injustice be charged against our doctrine. For although we hold that all things happen by an inevitable necessity through providence, still there is nothing common to us with them. We do not urge an absolute necessity in the causes themselves (as they do), but only a hypothetical from the decree. Nor do we feign a natural and eternal series of causes and so inevitable even as to God, but a temporal (as are the causes themselves, made by God himself—to whose good pleasure and rule it is so subject that he can at pleasure either change or hinder or take it away).

4. Christian fate.

VI. The fourth fate (which we call Christian) is the series and order of causes depending on divine providence by which it produces its own effects. In this sense, the fathers frequently used the word "fate" and Thomas Aquinas proves it at length and establishes its certainty and immobility (ST, I, Q. 116*, pp. 566-68). However, this is now taken actively for the divine decree itself (and so does not differ from providence), then passively, for the very complexion and disposition of all causes to their own effects (according as they depend upon the immutable providence of God). Thus it is distinguished from providence by reason of the subject (because providence is in God, while fate is from God in second causes) and by reason of order (because fate depends on providence, not the contrary) and in the object (because all things lie under providence, but not under fate; those, for instance, which take place immediately by God). Boethius thus defines it: "An immovable disposition inherent in movable things, by which divine providence weaves together each in its own orders" (*The Consolation of Philosophy* 4*.6.34-35 [Loeb, 358-59]).

VII. Hence we readily gather the answer to be given to the proposed question of whether providence is rightly called "fate" or whether we may properly use the word "fate" in this argument. For although we grant it may be used in a sound sense and do not believe that a controversy ought to arise on that account, if it is evident concerning the thing itself and nothing else is understood by the word than the Christian fate (just explained by us). Still we think it safer with Calvin to abstain from the word in the Christian school (ICR 1.16.8, p. 207-8). First, because it is contaminated by heathenism, superstition and impiety and belongs to the number of those whose profane novelties Paul commands us to flee. Second, because it is too much exposed to the calumnies of opponents, who with the name charge us with receiving also the doctrine and so endeavor to fasten its odium upon the truth of God. Nor can there be the same reasons against the word "providence" (also used by the heathen to confirm their own figments) because this is handed down to us in Scripture itself. Fate, however, by no means appears in Scripture. This was the opinion of Augustine: "If anyone calls the very power and will of God fate, let him hold the opinion, but let him correct the language" (CG 5.1 [FC 8:242; PL 41.141]).

THIRD QUESTION: THE OBJECT OF PROVIDENCE

Do all things come under providence—small as well as great, contingent and free, natural and necessary? We affirm.

The occasion of the question.

I. The occasion for the question arises from those who, although seeming to acknowledge the providence of God, still shut it up in too narrow limits. These either restrict it to heavenly things only, so that in the sublunary there is room for chance and fortune and the contingency of things (as the Peripatetics); or extend it to the sublunary also, but natural, not free and contingent (as the Pelagians, who to make men free have made them sacrilegious); or refer it to great things, the mean and minute being excepted, which after the Peripatetics some of the Scholastics also held. Thomas Aquinas especially asserts

this: "Although God may know the number of individuals, yet the number of oxen and gnats and other similar things was not preordained by him" (ST, I, Q. 23, Art. 7, p. 131). However, we believe that all things without exception are under divine providence: whether heavenly or sublunary, great or small, necessary and natural or free and contingent. Thus nothing in the nature of things can be granted or happen which does not depend upon it.

All things are under providence.

II. The reasons are: (1) God created all things, therefore he also takes care of all things. For if it was glorious for God to create them, it ought not to be unbecoming in him to take care of them. Nay, as he created, he is bound to conserve and govern them continually, since he never deserts his own work, but ought to be perpetually present with it that it may not sink back into nothingness.

III. Second, Scripture most clearly establishes this both in general and in particular. In general, in those passages which claim the care and government of all things for God: "Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth, and all things that are therein, and thou preservest them all" (Neh. 9:6); "He giveth to all life, and breath, and all things; for in him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts 17:25, 28); "He upholds all things by the word of his power" (Heb. 1:3); "The eyes of all wait upon thee; and thou givest them their meat in due season. Thou openest thine hand, and satisfieth the desire of every living thing" (Ps. 145:15, 16); and so in innumerable passages.

Even the smallest.

IV. In particular, in those passages which subject to the providence of God all the species of things and especially those which come into controversy, the smallest things no less than the greatest are said to depend upon it. What is more insignificant than "the hairs of our head"? And yet "all" are said to be "numbered by God" (Lk. 12:7). What is more unimportant than a sparrow? Yet not one of them falls to the ground without the will of the heavenly Father (Mt. 10:29) who feeds all the fowls of the air by his providence (Mt. 6:26) and gives food to the young ravens (Ps. 147:9). What is of less importance than the grass and the flowers of the field? And yet God clothes and makes them grow (Mt. 6:28, 30). What is more mean than lice, frogs, locusts, worms and other insects? Yet God is said to raise up these for the execution of his judgments (Ex. 8:16, 17; 10:12); nay, they are called "his strong army, executing his word" (Joel 2:11).

V. Although the providence of God is exercised about rational creatures far more illustriously and efficaciously, other things are not therefore to be withdrawn from it, since it extends to both (Ps. 36:6; 145:15, 16). And what Paul says ("Doth God take care for oxen?" 1 Cor. 9:9) must not be understood simply and absolutely because oxen are a care to God who conserves and nourishes them (Ps. 36:6); but only relatively, to teach that the command ("muzzle not the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn") has most special reference to the minister of the gospel and is given for their sake, that men may know what is their duty towards those who minister to them (an argument from the lesser to the greater). If God wishes the ox to live by his labor, much more just is it that the minister should live by the gospel (which is clear from the antecedents and consequents). Nor does Paul here speak properly so much of providence that he

may bring oxen under it, as of the legislation which was instituted; not so much for the sake of beasts as of men for whose institution alone it was appointed.

VI. God is so great in great things as not to be small in small. Nor is he said to have so given the earth to the sons of men (Ps. 115:16), but that from the heaven of heavens he always looks down upon and retains them in his care. The psalmist means this—that God, content with his own glory, inhabits the heavens and does not need to seek anything out of himself, but has made the earth for the use of men and has enriched it with all goods that they might want nothing. Therefore he is said to have preserved the heavens for himself, as a seat of glory and the sanctuary of his majesty, and to have given the earth to men; not for supreme dominion and absolute power, but only for use with a dependence on his providence.

VII. If it was not unworthy of the majesty of God to create even the meanest and smallest things because they contribute to the greater demonstration of his wisdom and the perfection of the universe in so great a variety of creatures, why should it be derogatory to his glory to conserve them? It is not beneath the glory of the sun to illuminate with his rays the very lowest places (nay, even filthy and polluted); but in this way the greatness of its splendor is rather shown. Nor must we say (with Corvinus) that God does not care for the smallest things. For this has no relation of goodness and justice, since indeed it cannot be said that goodness or divine justice can shine forth from the smallest creatures. Besides the fact that there are other properties of God by the manifestation of which (in the smallest things) his glory is illustrated (to wit, wisdom and power), it is certain that God wished to exhibit his goodness even in things most mean, often to exercise justice through the smallest animals—frogs, vermin, worms, etc. See Topic III, Question 12, Section iv, where the passage of Jerome on Hab. 1 is explained and excused (*Commentariorum in Abacuc* 1 [PL 25.1275-88]); to this add Sixtus of Senensis (*Bibliotheca sancta* 5, annot. 257 [1575], 2:193-94) who from Jerome himself (*Commentariorum in Evangelium Matthaei* [PL 26.68-69 on Mt. 10:29-30]) and from Lombard (*Sententiarum* 1, Dist. 39 [PL 192/2.630]) softens his words and draws them to a better sense.

2. Contingent and fortuitous.

VIII. Second, Scripture in many places asserts that contingent and fortuitous events fall under providence. Nothing is more contingent than the killing of a man by a woodcutter contrary to his own intention, and yet this is ascribed to God, who is said to deliver him into the hand of the slayer (Ex. 21:12, 13; Dt. 19:4f.). Nothing is more casual and fortuitous than lots, and yet their falling out is referred to God himself: "The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord" (Prov. 16:33). Nothing was more contingent than the selling of Joseph and his incarceration and exaltation, yet Joseph himself testifies that these were all ordered in the providence of God: "So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God" (Gen. 45:8). "Ye meant it for evil, but God meant it for good, that he might preserve in life a great people as he has done this day" (Gen. 50:20). Innumerable similar events, plainly contingent and fortuitous, are expressly ascribed to providence (cf. Gen. 22:8, 13; 24:12, 13ff.; Gen. 27:20; Prov. 21:31; Mt. 10:29, 30).

IX. Therefore, nothing in the nature of things can be granted as so fortuitous and casual as not to be governed by the providence of God and so not happening necessarily and infallibly with respect to the divine decree. Hence we proscribe

the impious and blasphemous voices of the heathen who substitute Fortune (blind and standing upon a rolling globe) for the most wise and powerful providence: such as that of Pliny who holds that "Fortune alone fills both pages in the account-book of mortals" (*Natural History* 2.5.22 [Loeb, 1:184-85]); and Juvenal, "Thou hast no divinity, O Fortune, if there be prudence; but we make thee a goddess, and place thee in heaven" (*Satires* 10.365-66 [Loeb, 220-21])!

X. Still it must not on this account be supposed that all contingency is removed from the world. For God, who works all in all, so governs and rules second causes as not to take away their nature and condition. Rather he keeps, conserves and permits them also to exercise and act out their own motions (as the prime mover may be considered so to hurl along the lower spheres that nevertheless their own proper and special motion remains to them and that does not cease to be the considered contingent with respect to the second cause, from which the denomination and specification of the act is taken, whose mode of acting is contingent and not determined to one direction, which still happens certainly and infallibly from the immutable disposition of divine providence). For that infallibility of the event from the hypothesis does not take away their contingency from the condition of second causes and from their mode of acting (in which there is always an intrinsic faculty and indifference to the opposite). So it was necessary for Joseph to be sold by his brethren and to go down to Egypt because it had been so determined by God for the preservation of Jacob's family. Yet it was contingent with respect to the brothers of Joseph who might either have killed him or not have sold him. Therefore things which are absolutely and in every way necessary (both as to their futurition and as to the mode in which they are done and produced) differ from those which are of a hypothetical necessity from the divine ordination. The former cannot consist with contingency, but nothing prevents those things (which as to mode of production take place contingently with respect to second causes) from still having a necessity of consequence or of the infallible futurition of the event from the order of providence (cf. Topic IV, Question 4).

3. Voluntary and free.

XI. Third, it is evident from the Scriptures that free and voluntary things, which are in our power (*eph' hēmin*) and are done with purpose (*ek proaireseōs*), are governed by providence. "The preparations of the heart in man, and the answer of the tongue, is from the Lord" (Prov. 16:1); "A man's heart deviseth his way: but the Lord directeth his steps" (Prov. 16:9); "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will" (Prov. 21:1); "O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself: it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps" (Jer. 10:23). "From the place of his habitation he looketh upon all the inhabitants of the earth. He fashioneth their hearts alike; he considereth all their works" (Ps. 33:14, 15). This is clearly confirmed by the examples of Laban (Gen. 31:29), Esau (Gen. 33:4), the Egyptians (Ex. 12:36), Balaam (Num. 22, 23), Saul (1 S. 24:15, 18; 26:17) and others. Manifold reason also convinces us of it. As man depends upon God as to essence and life, so he must depend upon him as to the actions and movements of his soul (the better part of man). For to pretend that man is independent in will and action is to make him independent in being because whatever he is in acting such he is in being. Finally, if free actions do not depend upon God and are not governed by

him, they would be performed, God being either ignorant and unconscious or neglecting or unwilling (which cannot be said and thought without impiety). In what way the providence of God concurs with the will of man (yet without destroying his liberty) will be seen in what follows.

Fourth Question: The Acts of Providence

Is providence occupied only in the conservation and sustentation of things; or also in their government (through which God himself acts and efficaciously concurs with them by a concourse not general and indifferent, but particular, specific and immediate)? We deny the former and affirm the latter, against the Jesuits, Socinians and Remonstrants.

I. This question has two parts: the first, concerning the conservation of things; the second, concerning the government of them. By these two acts, God's providence is usually described. Conservation is that by which God conserves all creatures in their own state (which is done by a conservation of essence in the species, of existence in individuals and of virtues to their operations). Government is that by which God governs universals and singulars, and directs and draws them out to ends foreappointed by him.

Statement of the question.

II. As to the first, the question is not whether the providence of God is concerned with the conservation of things. This is acknowledged on both sides. Scripture teaches (Neh. 9:6; Ps. 36:6; 104:27, 29; Heb. 1:3; Acts 17:28) and reason approves it. As things could not have been made without God, so neither without him could they subsist even for a moment; otherwise they would be independent, which pertains to God alone. But the question is whether the whole relation of providence consists in that conservation and in this—that God gives and conserves to second causes the power of acting and permits them to act; or whether it consists also in government by which God himself acts and efficaciously concurs with his creatures.

Opinion of Durandus.

III. The controversy here is with Durandus and some of the Romanists who agree with him. They place providence and the concourse of God only in this—that to the creature, previously made capable of acting, he merely conserves the strength and permits actions at pleasure (as if sufficient of itself alone to act). Louis de Dola thus explains this: "For God to concur is either to create a free will, as in natural acts, or to give in supernatural the potency of habit of acting or not acting, by which the will itself performs the whole in every supernatural act, and without any other concourse of God actually exciting the action" (*Disputatio . . . de modo coniunctionis concursuum Dei et creaturae* [1634]+). He so approved this comment as to think it the only means fit to remove the controversies which have been agitated for so many years between the Dominicans and Jesuits about the method of the divine concourse.

Of the Jesuits.

IV. The Jesuits (although confessing that God's providence does not consist in the mere conservation of things, but also in the influx and concourse of God) still (when they come to the explanation of concourse) maintain it to be only general and indifferent, determined by second causes: as the sun, the universal generating

cause, is determined by man generating as a particular cause—hence not a horse is generated but a man, since the influx of the sun is of itself indifferent to the generation of a man and of a horse. So they hold the influx of the first cause to be indifferent to this action or the contrary. Nor is it antecedent and previously moving, but on the contrary the second cause determines itself before the first cause acts (which does not excite the second cause to motion, but the second cause is the occasion of the acting of the first cause). This is the common opinion of the Jesuits followed by the Socinians and Remonstrants. Both profess to have embraced it principally for two reasons: one is to vindicate God from the causality of sin; the other to establish the liberty and indifference (*adiaphoria*) of the human will in all acts (especially in conversion) and to reconcile it with divine providence.

Of the Thomists.

V. But far differently do the Thomists and Dominicans in the Romish communion determine, who urge a physical predetermination, that all second causes are predetermined to acting by God, and he not only acts with the second cause in the effect, but also immediately on itself, and so the will is by him determined to will or nill this in particular, not only in good but also in evil actions. Hence Thomas Aquinas says, "When the free will moves itself, this does not exclude its being moved by another, from whom it receives the very power to move itself" (ST, I, Q. 83, Art. 1, p. 418). Elsewhere he places the concourse of God in these five things: (1) inasmuch as he gives to second causes the strength and faculty to act; (2) inasmuch as he keeps and sustains them in being and vigor; (3) inasmuch as he excites and applies second causes to acting; (4) inasmuch as he determines them to acting; (5) inasmuch as he rules and directs them that they may accomplish the ends determined by himself (ST, I, Q. 105, pp. 515-21; *Summa Contra Gentiles* 3.70 [trans. J.V. Bourke, 1956], pp. 235-37). Alvarez, the Dominican, has written copiously on this subject (*De auxiliis divinae gratiae* [1620]). The orthodox approach is the last of these. As much against Durandus as against the Jesuits, Socinians and Arminians, they maintain that the providence of God consists not only in the conservation of things, but also in the concourse of God; not indifferent and general, but particular and specific (by which it flows immediately into both cause and effect).

Providence does not consist only in the conservation of things, but also in a particular and immediate concourse.

VI. First, because Scripture everywhere ascribes to God (as the first cause) the actions of causes. This would not be truly said if the whole method of providence consisted in conservation alone and the sustentation of faculties, and God did not effectively concur with them. Thus God is said to have "sent Joseph into Egypt" (Gen. 45:7); "to have the heart of the king in his hand and so turn it whithersoever he will" (Prov. 21:1); "to use the wicked as an axe," rod, saw, staff, for his work (Is. 10:15, 26; 13:5). For as these do not work of themselves unless the artificer concurs, so second causes (compared to these instruments) do not act by their own power alone, but are moved at length by the first cause. Nor can it be objected that God can be said to concur, inasmuch as he gives to creatures the faculty of acting and preserves it (although he does not concur effectively with them). It is one thing to concur with the conservation of faculties; another with their opera-

tions. God, however, in the adduced passages is said to have concurred with the actions themselves, and the similitude quoted proves this necessarily. For although instruments may themselves have the faculty of operating, yet they cannot operate without the concurrence of the artificer and the application of his hand.

VII. The following passages in which we are said "to live and move and have our being in God" (Acts 17:28; cf. Col. 1:17) apply here. For in and by whom we are and are moved, from him all our actions must also effectively depend. To these, others can be added in which the works of believers are ascribed to God. For how can God be said "to work in us to will and to do" (Phil. 2:13) and "to work all things in us" (1 Cor. 12:6 and others of the same kind), if his providence consists only in the preservation of faculties or in a general and indifferent concourse?

VIII. (2) Because God is the regulator and Lord of the world and by consequence of all that exists or is done in it. This cannot be done by mere conservation or a general concourse because to regulate is so to preside over that he who presides, rules by a destined order (which embraces both the settling of the end and the ordination of the means). Thus because he is the Lord of singulars, he holds subject to his sway all and every motion, action and event—external and internal, good and bad.

IX. (3) As the creature has itself in being with respect to God, so also it ought to have itself in working, for the mode of working follows the mode of being (for these walk side by side). Now every creature depends upon God in being, therefore also in operation. But if God by his providence is occupied only with the conservation of things (or with a general and indifferent concourse determined by the second cause), the creature in working will not depend upon God; nay, God will rather depend upon the creature, and the first cause will be made the second and the second the first. Nor will this second be any longer subordinate, but coordinate and independent. So there will be many first beings and first principles; yea as many principles as there are causes and wills of men and angels. For as Thomas Aquinas well remarks, it is essential to a first principle that it can act without the help or influence of a prior agent.

X. (4) If only a general concourse of God is granted, in vain is he prayed to for obtaining anything because he can neither avert evil nor confer good, unless just as it pleases men to determine the motion of God himself. To no purpose also do we give thanks for blessings procured through free agencies; to no purpose do we trust and hope in God and patiently submit our wills to him. For God concurring, the good or evil which we hope or fear can as much not happen as happen.

XI. (5) On the ground of a general and indifferent concourse, God will be no more the cause of good than of evil since he is not determined to species or quality; nor is either able to be determined from God himself, but it will be determined and specificated by the human will. The absurdity of this is evident in many ways: (a) because the providence of God about human things would lie under men themselves or their will; (b) the parts of man's will would be better and prior and God (being inferior) who would only follow man's will; (c) the determination of the influx indifferent to this or that particular action (and the very action in particular) would be independent, resting upon the mere will of man. All these are blasphemous and atheistical (*atheologa*); also contrary to what is written (*antigrapha*) since Scripture repeatedly testifies that God is the cause of all good, whether natural or moral (Jam. 1:17; 1 Cor. 4:7; Rom. 11:36; Gen. 1:31).

XII. (6) If God concurs with creatures only by conservation or by a general and indifferent concourse: (a) the disposing of lots could not be said to be from God, because from the concourse of God plainly indifferent to this or that lot, the falling out of this rather than of that lot is not, but it is either from fortune or the hand taking up the lot; (b) the fall of a sparrow will not be from God because the flying rather than the not flying is not determined by God; (c) all these things will be false: "God gives the snow, showers, ice, winds, food to ravens, wings to the stork, strength to the horse" (Job. 37, 38, 39; Pss. 104, 147); "food to the famished"; "opens the eyes of the blind"; "helps orphans and widows"; "brings to death, and raises from the sepulchre" (1 S. 2:7-9; Ps. 146:7, 8 and the like, attributed in Scripture to him). All these effects are determined and cannot be ascribed to an indifferent and indeterminate concourse of God, on which these effects no more than the contrary can depend. This holds good also as to free acts. Nor can Bellarmine escape while he maintains "that the human action is evidently wholly from God and receives from him not only generic, but also specific and singular being; but it receives that by a concourse determined to such action by the human will or by the creature, and therefore does not receive specific being from the mode of God's acting, but from the mode of acting of the human will" ("De amissione gratiae et statu peccati," 2.18* in *Opera* [1858], 4:117). He either speaks absurdly (*asystata*) or takes for granted what must be proved. For if the whole human action has from God specific being, how is it said afterwards not to have it from the mode of God's acting? (2) If the action of God is determined to such action by the human will, the event ought therefore to be ascribed to the human will principally, not however to the concourse of God who is indifferent to this effect.

XIII. (7) Finally, the general and indifferent concourse being posited: (a) the decree of God would be rendered uncertain and prescience fallible because both these would depend upon the mutable will of man. (b) The operations of the will would be withdrawn from the dominion of God; man would become independent and from a subject become an ally of God (on whose nod God himself ought to depend). (c) The creature would act more than God because the special motion is better than the general; he would be more perfect because what determines is more perfect than that which is determined. (d) The special reason of piety (situated in the dependence of our will upon the will of God) would be subverted. We could no longer say, "If the Lord will, we shall do this or that" (Jam. 4:15). Rather God (as if reduced to order) ought to say, "If man wills to do, let this or that be done."

Sources of explanation.

XIV. There is one universal cause (relatively so called) acting by a physical necessity (as the sun and the stars); another, however, universal absolutely, most wisely and freely operating (such as God is). The former indeed concurs only by a general and indifferent influx, but not the latter. It is so universal with respect to objects distinct in species that as to mode of concourse it acts also particularly and, as it wishes, concurs with second causes.

XV. Although God conserves the free will (because he created it), it does not follow that he ought to govern it by a general concourse only. The liberty of the will is not absolute and independent, but limited and dependent upon God (to whose condition it suffices that man act by his own motion and from preference

[ek proaireseōs]). This is not taken away by a special and determinate influx (which does not overthrow the nature of things), but acts suitably to their properties.

XVI. The power which is absolutely and every way indifferent and inderminate and depends upon no other thing cannot be determined by the providence of God. The human will is not so called indifferent; rather relatively (inasmuch as if considered in itself), it is indifferent to various objects, although otherwise it depends upon God and his providence (by which it exists and is moved). Although it determines itself, this nonetheless does not hinder it from being determined by God because the determination of God does not exclude the determination of man.

XVII. The determination made by the manner of efficient cause differs from that made by the manner of a formal and subjective cause. Effects are determined by second causes by manner of a formal and material cause, but by the first cause by way of the efficient cause.

XVIII. The particular cause which concurs by a particular influx is denominated from its effect, since it is not only efficient, but also proximate (formal and subjective) and produces the effect of itself. But in this sense God cannot be called the particular cause (although he concurs by a particular influx) because he is not the proximate or formal cause, but only the efficient cause working in another.

XIX. The general influx is falsely maintained to be necessary either to preserve the liberty of man or to remove from God the causality of sin. For neither follows from a particular influx, as will be proved in the following question.

Fifth Question: The Concourse of God

Does God concur with second causes not only by a particular and simultaneous, but also by a previous concourse? We affirm.

I. Since the question concerning the concourse (*concursus*) of God is one of the most difficult in theology (in the explanation of which, if anywhere else, great labor must be employed) and error is most dangerous, it demands a peculiar and accurate discussion.

Physical and moral concourse.

II. On the state of the question observe: (1) One concourse is physical by which one concurs and acts after the manner of a physical cause, i.e., truly and efficaciously and really flows into the effect by a certain positive influx; another is moral by which he operates after the manner of a moral cause, i.e., by persuading or dissuading or by proposing or removing the objects and occasions. We do not treat here of moral, but of physical concourse.

Mediate and immediate.

III. 2) One concourse is mediate; another immediate. For a cause can be said to act either mediately or immediately both as to the subsisting substance and as to virtue. That cause acts immediately by the immediation of the subsisting substance between which and the effect no other singular subsisting substance (subsisting of itself) is interposed (which previously receives in itself the action of the agent, as water which washes and cools the hand). The other, on the contrary, acts mediately by the mediation of the subsisting substance between which and the effect another subsisting substance falls (as the chisel between the artist and the statue). A cause acts immediately by the immediation of virtue

which acts by a virtue or power proper to itself and not received from any other source (as fire warms by its own heat). A cause acts mediately, however, by the mediation of virtue which operates by a virtue not its own or proper to itself, but received and borrowed from another source (as when the moon by light borrowed from the sun illuminates the earth, she is said to illuminate mediately by a mediation of virtue, i.e., the virtue of the sun mediating). Now God concurs with second causes immediately by an immediation both of virtue (because he acts by his proper power not furnished from another source) and of subsisting substance (because by his own essence he attains the thing). Nor, if he uses second causes as means, does it follow that he does not act immediately also. For he uses them not with respect to the action of the creature and consequently of the effect itself (as if he did not reach it immediately), but inasmuch as he subordinates second causes to himself (by flowing into which he also reaches the effect itself immediately).

3. Concourse by way of principle and by way of action.

IV. (3) Again, concourse is so called either by way of principle or by way of the first act by which God conserves the power of the second act and permits it to act; or by way of action, inasmuch as God is the proximate principle of the operation put forth by the second cause so that the operation and action of God concurring is the very same as that which is included in the action itself of the creature (as if by itself also and immediately tending to the same end to which the action of the creature tends). With regard to the end, the latter is the same with the very cooperation of God. We do not treat here of the first, but of the second.

4. Previous and simultaneous concourse.

V. (4) Finally, one concourse is called previous and predetermining; another simultaneous or concomitant. The previous is the action of God by which he, flowing into causes and their principles, excites and previously moves creatures to action and directs to the doing of a particular thing. Simultaneous, however, is that by which God produces the action of the creature as to its being or substance by which he is supposed to flow together with creatures into their actions and effects, but not into the creatures themselves. Although they do not differ really, but only in reason (because the simultaneous concourse is nothing else than continued previous concourse which not only flows into the causes themselves, that it may work in them, but into the effect itself, so as to act with them), yet they can be considered distinctly.

Statement of the question.

VI. However, what is understood by previous concourse (with greater propriety termed "preconcourse"), that very thing is usually designated by the name of predetermination or premotion, by which God excites and directs the second cause to acting. Thus antecedently to all operation of the creature or before the creature operates by nature and reason, he really and efficaciously moves it to act in single actions so that without this premotion the second cause could not operate, but (this premotion being posited) it would be impossible in the compound sense for the second cause not to do that same thing to which it was previously moved by the first cause. The question therefore about concourse comes to this—whether it is only simultaneous or also previous. There are various opinions among Romanists about this. For some (as the Jesuits who maintain a middle knowledge)

recognize only a simultaneous concourse and deny the previous or predetermination (maintaining that God indeed flows in, but not into the second cause, but with the second cause into its action). However others (as the Thomists and Dominicans) stand up for a previous concourse or predetermination. They are therefore called "Predeterminers" and hold the predetermination of God to be necessary in all the acts of his creatures, whether natural or free. Some of our divines admit the previous concourse only as to the good works of grace, but think the simultaneous is sufficient in all others. Others think that both the previous and simultaneous should be joined together here in order that the whole method of God's providence may be truly explained. Now although weighty reasons are not wanting on both sides (by which the negative or affirmative opinion may be strengthened), still we believe the latter to be the truer and safer.

Previous concourse is proved.

VII. Besides the arguments adduced in the preceding question to prove the particular concourse of God, the following also favor this opinion. (1) From the nature of the first cause and the subordination of second causes. The first cause is the prime mover in every action so that the second cause cannot move unless it is moved, nor act unless acted upon by the first. Otherwise it would be the principle of its own motion and so would no longer be the second cause, but the first. Nor can it be objected that the second cause is always subordinated to the first, both by reason of simultaneous concourse (which is by nature and order prior to the concourse of the creature) and by reason of the sustentation of the faculties through which the second cause acts. We answer that neither can save the dependence of the second cause in acting. Not the former, because where only a simultaneous concourse is granted, there God operates indeed with the creature, but not in it; so the first and second causes are partial and allied causes of the same action (like two horses drawing a chariot) and so each uses its proper and peculiar influx (which it has from itself) so that in flowing in it does not depend upon the influx of the other cause as upon a cause truly efficient (although the effect depends on both). Not the latter, because the conservation of its nature and powers makes the second cause depend upon God in being, but not in operating and causing (which is what the question is about). Since we deal here with the motion and determination of the second cause, which (if not maintained to be done by God, but from the creature alone) on that very account it will be independent in acting and God could not be considered as the first cause of that motion (which as an entity ought still to depend upon him).

VIII. (2) What is of itself indifferent to many acts, to act or not act, must necessarily be determined to act by another because what is potential (*in potentia*) cannot be reduced to actuality except by something which is in act (*in actu*). But every second cause (especially the will of man) is such. Therefore it is necessary that it be determined to actuality by some other external principle (which can be no other than God himself). Nor ought it to be said that the indifference of the will or of the second cause does not hinder them from determining themselves when the proper objects are presented to them. Although second causes have sufficient power to act in the order of second causes and can determine themselves to act in a particular way, yet they do not cease to have need of the previous motion of God in order to obtain the certainty of the event. Otherwise no prescience of

God could be held certain concerning them, since from their own nature they are indifferent.

IX. Third, if God does not concur by a previous concourse (by determining the creature antecedently to his act), neither could he be joined in acting with the creature by a simultaneous concourse. That two free wills may be joined together and agree to elicit the same common action at the same time and immediately (and proximately and undividedly) and that not casually and fortuitously but infallibly and so certainly as to imply a contradiction for one to elicit such an action without the other, either both ought to be conjoined by a very powerful superior cause to elicit the same action in the same point of time or both are by their own nature determined to that operation so that they cannot help producing it; or one determines the operation of the other and consequently determines the other cause to act. Besides these no other method of conjunction and of concurrence for the production of one and the same operation can be imagined. But no one of these three (except the third) can belong to the first cause. Not the former, because since God is the first cause (having none above himself), he cannot be subordinated to a third superior cause. Not the latter, because God is not determined necessarily to operating, since in all external concourse he is perfectly free. Nor do many second causes act from necessity of nature, but freely (which therefore ought to be masters of their own acts, so however as to depend always upon the first cause both in being and in operation). Hence it follows that the infallibility of the event cannot arise from any other cause than the divine predetermination.

X. Fourth, God by an absolute and efficacious will decreed from eternity all acts (even free) antecedently to the foresight of the determination of the free will itself. Therefore he ought also in time to predetermine the will to the same acts; otherwise God's eternal decree could be frustrated. The reason of the consequence is drawn from the connection of God's decree with its execution. Whatever he decreed, that he follows out; and whatever he performs in time, he decreed from eternity. The antecedent is proved because since the futurition of things depends upon no other than God's decree, nothing can be done in time which has not been decreed by him from eternity. The objection is frivolous that God did not decree to effect all things, but only to permit many. For although the decree is only permissively occupied about the wickedness of the act, it nevertheless does not hinder it from being effectively occupied about the physical entity of the action itself (as will be more fully proved hereafter).

Sources of explanation.

XI. Predetermination does not destroy, but conserves the liberty of the will. By it, God does not compel rational creatures or make them act by a physical or brute necessity. Rather he only effects this—that they act both consistently with themselves and in accordance with their own nature, i.e., from preference (*ek proaireseōs*) and spontaneously (to wit, they are so determined by God that they also determine themselves). Now although what is predetermined is not any more indifferent to act or not to act in the second act and in the compound sense, yet it can always be indifferent in the first act and in the divided sense (as the will, when it determines itself, can still be in itself indifferent). The fount of error is the measuring of the nature of liberty from equilibrium (*isorropia*) and making indifference (*to amphirrepes*) essential to it. Liberty must be defined by willingness and spontaneity (as will be seen in the proper place).

XII. The necessity carried into things by predetermination is not destructive of liberty because it is not consequent. Nor does it make either the cause itself to be necessary or the effect to proceed just as from the cause itself, but of consequence which only secures the action of a cause of this kind and indeed agreeably to itself and so spontaneously and willingly. Hence these two can at the same time be true: man wills spontaneously, and, with respect to providence or premotion, he cannot help willing. For that premotion of God is such that it takes place in accordance with the nature of things and does not take away from second causes the mode of operation proper to each.

XIII. Although creatures (in the genus of second causes and dependent upon God) have sufficient intrinsic power to act, it does not follow that the extrinsic premotion of God is unnecessary by which they may be excited to operation. Rather because they ought to be subordinated to the first cause and depend upon it, that premotion must necessarily be supposed in order that they may elicit their own acts. And it cannot be concluded from this that creatures are only passive because that premotion secures the action of creatures and elicits their own actions from themselves (which both their diverse essences and also faculties and strength, of which there would be no need if they did not act, show). Therefore it does not follow from the premotion of God that second causes do nothing, but only do nothing independently.

XIV. Although God previously moves second causes, still he cannot be said to produce the actions of second causes (for instance, to make warm or to walk). These actions belong to God only efficiently, but to creatures they belong not only efficiently, but also formally and subjectively (as from them the creatures are better denominated than God himself).

XV. Although creatures are the instruments which God uses for the execution of their own works, they do not cease to have a proper influx and to hold the relation (*schesin*) of principal causes (not indeed with respect to God, but to the remaining causes subordinate to him). Nor is it absurd that there should be two totally acting causes of the same numerical effect of a different order, since the action of both causes is only one, by which they concur to the effect.

XVI. Although the premotion of God is extended to evil actions, it does not on that account make God guilty of the fault or the author of sin. It only pertains to actions inasmuch as they are material and entitative (*entitative*), not however as they are moral, i.e., to the substance of the act, but not to its wickedness. Nor is it a new thing for one and the same action to be considered in different ways, either physically or morally. The magistrate is the cause of the death inflicted on the guilty person by the executioner, but is not the cause of the cruelty exhibited in that execution; the harp player is the cause of the sound, but not of the dissonance arising from the strings; and he who drives a lame horse is the cause of the motion, but not the lameness. Nor is it an objection that the wickedness is necessarily and inseparably annexed to such action. Hence it would seem to follow that he who is the cause of the action, must also be the cause of the wickedness because the created will is otherwise the moral cause of the wickedness, except inasmuch as it is the material cause of the act, to which the wickedness is necessarily bound. We answer that it is falsely supposed that the created will is not otherwise the cause of the wickedness than inasmuch as it is the cause of the act to which wickedness is annexed. The will, as a physical agent, is the physical

cause of the act; but as a moral agent, the will is the moral cause of the wickedness, not simply because it produces the act, but because it produces such an act against the law to which man is subject. Therefore, the reason why wickedness may be imputed to the human will is not simply because it produces the act in the genus of being (as a physical agent), but because it is man subject to the law who performs a forbidden act (as a moral agent). Hence moral wickedness does not follow intrinsically and from the nature of the thing to the act (as the act is in the genus of nature), but as it proceeds from a deficient created will (to which moreover the causality of sin must be attributed and not to God). Finally, reason no less contends against simultaneous concourse than against previous because according to it God concurs even truly and efficiently to the material act of sin, therefore he ought also to be the cause of the wickedness annexed to it. The sounder Scholastics agree with us. Thomas Aquinas says, "God in an action connected with deformity, does what belongs to the action, does not do what belongs to the deformity; for although in any effect there are many things inseparably connected, it does not behoove that whatever may be the cause of it as to one, should also be the cause as to the other" (2 Dist. 37, Q. 2, Art. 2+). Thus Cajetan: "Thirdly, it follows that it is not the same to concur with such an act according to what it has from the agent as such, and according to what it has from the agent as deficient, just as it is not the same to be an agent and to be deficient" (*Commentaria in Summam Theologicam Divi Thomae*, I-II, QQ. LXXI-CXIV [1948], p. 50 on I-II, Q. 79, Art. 1). Alvarez says, "It does not follow that God is the cause of sin because he determines to the act; because the deformity follows the act, not as it is in the genus of nature, but as it is in the genus of morals and as it is caused by the free will" (lib. 2, cap. 9+).

XVII. Since in every moral action we must necessarily distinguish the substance of the act in the genus of being from the goodness and wickedness of the same in the genus of morals—the action of understanding and willing simply (which has a material relation) from the action of understanding and willing this or that lawful or unlawful object (which has a formal relation)—it is evident that no action can be called essentially good or bad, but only as it is here and now circumstantiated in the genus of morals, i.e., with a relation (*schesei*) to this or that good or bad moral object. Thus the volition of stealing reduplicatively and circumstantiated here and now, is indeed essentially evil with regard to another's property; but the volition, to which that circumstance happens by which it is a volition to steal, is not essentially evil in like manner. Therefore, nothing hinders God from being the cause of the action itself, except inasmuch as it is a singular action simply in the genus of being (with regard to materiality, but not with regard to its formality) and inasmuch as it is an action circumstantiated in the genus of morals to such an action, i.e., inasmuch as it is an act of stealing. The same can be said of hatred of God which is objected by various persons as intrinsically and essentially evil. For although hatred of God reduplicatively and formally as such and circumstantiated to such an object, is intrinsically evil and can be nothing else than sinful, yet if considered simply as a physical action abstracted from this object, it can have a metaphysical goodness of being and be morally indifferent and so far can be from God. Although therefore on the determination of God as to the substance of the act, transgression (*anomia*) necessarily follows (marked in hatred of God), yet it must not be thought to depend

effectively on it, so that the causality of sin can be referred to it (for that determination is only physical, not moral—which alone is sinful).

XVIII. The predetermination of God in evil acts is not repugnant to his permission because they are not occupied about the same things. The former regards the substance of the act, the latter, however, its wickedness; the former reaches the material (effecting it), but the latter the formality (leaving it to the free will of man, which alone is the deficient moral cause). For as in an evil act, there is, as it were, a twofold formal relation (one having the relation of effect, the other having the relation of defect), God can move and predetermine to that which has the relation of effect, but can only permit the other which has the relation of defect.

XIX. Since the will of precept and of decree respect diverse objects, nothing prevents God from willing a thing by his will of decree which he does not will (but prohibits) by his will of precept. Thus what is contrary to the revealed will of sign can be done according to the secret will of good purpose. God was unwilling that the brethren of Joseph should sell him and that the Jews should crucify Christ, since they were most heinous crimes against the law. Yet he is said to have willed, yea, even to have done these things (Gen. 45:7; Acts 4:28).

SIXTH QUESTION

How can the concourse of God be reconciled with the contingency and liberty of second causes—especially of the will of man?

Difficulty of the question.

I. This question is no less difficult than the preceding; nay somewhat more difficult and incapable of being sufficiently explained, unless we follow the light of the divine word and religiously restrain ourselves within the bounds prescribed by it. These two things we derive most clearly from the Scriptures: that the providence of God concurs with all second causes and especially with the human will; yet the contingency and liberty of the will remain unimpaired. But how these two things can consist with each other, no mortal can in this life perfectly understand. Nor should it seem a cause for wonder, since he has a thousand ways (to us incomprehensible) of concurring with our will, insinuating himself into us and turning our hearts, so that by acting freely as we will, we still do nothing besides the will and determination of God. Thus here deservedly, if anywhere else, we may exclaim: "O the depth (*ō bathos*) how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!" (Rom. 11:33).

II. Now although the method of this reconciliation cannot in this life be clearly and perfectly explained by us, still it can in some measure be described as far as is sufficient for salvation by the previous light of the divine word. Before all things, this must always be remembered, that things the most certain and evident of themselves are not to be called into question on account of other uncertain and inevident things (i.e., we must distinguish the thing from the mode of the thing). Although ignorant of the mode of a thing, still we ought not on that account to deny the thing itself. With regard to the latter there is a certainty, since numberless things are most true which yet in the very highest degree surpass our

comprehension. Therefore these two things are indubitable: that God on the one hand by his providence not only decreed but most certainly secures the event of all things, whether free or contingent; on the other hand, however, man is always free in acting and many effects are contingent. Although I cannot understand how these can be mutually connected together, yet (on account of ignorance of the mode) the thing itself is (which is certain from another source, i.e., from the word) not either to be called in question or wholly denied.

False methods of reconciliation must be rejected; the first by prescience.

III. Many attempts at reconciliation have been made, but with little success. For whether we look to the prescience of God or to his permission or to the indifferent influx of providence (the three principal modes of reconciliation brought forward by our opponents), it is easy to show that they are not only vain and fictitious, but false, impious, contrary to the Scriptures and derogatory to the providence of God. And indeed as to the last, nothing more need be said here because we have fully treated of it in the preceding question. Of the other two, the same thing must be briefly demonstrated—that they will by no means suffice. For as to prescience, it is first gratuitously supposed that the providence of God is contained in the act of prescience alone by which future things are known. But since it also includes an act of will (by which their infallible futurition is decreed) so all contingent and free causes must have a relation (*schesin*) to providence, not only inasmuch as they are known before by God as future, but also inasmuch as from eternity they were decreed to be future and in time should be infallibly moved and ordained to their effects. (2) Again it is falsely supposed that there is no connection of foreknown things with prescience and that it imposes no necessity upon them. Yet Scripture teaches both most clearly in numberless passages (Mt. 18:7; 26:54; Mk. 8:31; Lk. 24:7, 46; 1 Cor. 11:19); and reason proves it. Otherwise (unless there existed this necessary connection between them), the prescience of God could be deceived and his decree changed (both of which are blasphemous).

2. By permission.

IV. They who have recourse to permission succeed no better. Although permission ought to have its own place in explaining the providence of God in evil (as will hereafter be seen), yet it is falsely used for this reconciliation: both because more acts of God than a bare permission are granted here (implying his special and efficacious concourse), and because it is improperly supposed that the permission is conjoined with the indifference of sinners as to the event. The permission of God being posited, sin necessarily follows; if not on the part of man's free will, yet on the part of God's decree. Otherwise that action might be prevented and thus the decree of God concerning it be frustrated; for example, the selling of Joseph or the crucifixion of Christ, which nevertheless Scripture denies and the nature of the thing itself forbids.

The true method is founded upon the order of causes and the mode of acting proper to them.

V. The true method of harmonizing them must therefore be sought from some other source (viz., from the order of causes among themselves and the mode of acting proper to them). This can be explained in the following propositions. First, the concourse of providence and of the human will is not of collateral and equal causes, but of unequal and subordinate. The reason is drawn from the nature of each. Since the former is the concourse of the Creator

and the latter of the creature (the one a concourse of the first, universal and hyperphysical cause; the other, however, of the second, particular and physical cause), there cannot be granted a coordination between them such as exists between allied and partial causes joined together to the production of one and the same effect (to which they do not singly suffice). Rather a subordination must necessarily be admitted by which the first presides, the second are subject; the former act independently, the latter, however, dependently. This is so necessary that without the second causes neither can exist nor be even imagined.

VI. Second, God so concurs with second causes that although he previously moves and predetermines them by a motion not general only but also special, still he moves them according to their own nature and does not take away from them their own proper mode of operating. The reason is because as the decree of God is occupied not only about the determination of things which ought to be done, but also of the means according to which they are to be done relative to the nature and condition of each, thus actual providence (which is the execution of this decree) secures not only the infallible futurition of the thing decreed, but also its taking place in the very manner decreed (to wit, agreeably to the nature of each; i.e., necessary things take place necessarily, free and contingent things, however, freely and contingently). For as there are two kinds of causes, some definite and general (always acting in the same way—as fire which burns, the sun which shines), others indefinite and free (which can act or not act in this or that way); so God conserves their nature and concurs in acting with them according to it. With the definite, he himself determines them without a proper determination; with the indefinite and free, however, they also determine themselves by the proper judgment of reason and the free disposition of the will (which God does not take away from man because he would thus destroy his own work, but leaves and strengthens it). And further, that admirable force of providence here displays itself by which it so joins itself to the nature of each thing that although infallibly and necessarily carrying out the thing decreed, still this is accomplished conveniently to its nature by the intervention of the second cause by reaching from end to end strictly and disposing all things sweetly.

VII. Third, it follows, since providence does not concur with the human will, either by coaction (compelling the unwilling will) or by determining it physically (as a brute and blind thing without judgment), but rationally (by turning the will in a manner suitable to itself), that it may determine itself as the proximate cause of its own actions by the proper judgment of reason and the spontaneous election of the will so that it does no violence to our will but rather kindly cherishes it. These two are the only kinds of necessity which destroy liberty and are incompatible (*asystatoi*) with it: natural and coactive necessity. The others (arising from God's decree and the motion of the first cause or from the object and the last judgment of the practical intellect) so far from overthrowing liberty, rather defend it, because they turn, do not compel, the will and make it willing from unwilling. For whoever does spontaneously what he wills from a judgment of reason and a full consent of will cannot help doing that freely even if he does it necessarily (from whatever source that necessity flows, whether from the very existence of the thing [because whatever is, when it is, is necessarily] or from the object efficaciously moving the mind and the will or from a first cause decreeing and concurring).

VIII. Fourth, God so concurs with the human will as still to determine it differently in good and evil. For in the good actions, God so previously moves the will as to be the author of them (not only in the genus of nature, but also according to their moral goodness) by determining the will not only as to the thing (i.e., the good) either in general or in particular, but also as to the mode so that what is done should be well done. He does this partly by giving to it good qualities through special help or supernatural grace, partly by exciting them when given (helping and leading into act through their cooperation [*synergeian*]). Hence while he suggests pious thoughts to man (2 Cor. 3:5), he causes man also to consider his own way (Prov. 16:9; Hag. 1:5); while he gives a new heart and puts a new spirit within us, he makes us also to walk in his commandments (Ezk. 36:27); while he works in us both to will and to do, he sees to it that we ourselves also work out our own salvation with fear and trembling (Phil. 2:12, 13). In evil actions, however, he so concurs as neither to effect, assist, nor approve of them, but to permit and efficaciously direct; not by infusing wickedness, but by so determining rational creatures physically to the substance of the act in the genus of being, that they (when left to themselves failing from the law) move and determine themselves to bad actions in the genus of morals, performing them freely and voluntarily (*hekousiōs*). Hence the guilt rests upon them alone, from which God is therefore free (as will be more fully proved in the following question).

Sources of explanation.

IX. Absolute and independent liberty (belonging to God alone) differs from the limited and dependent (proper to creatures). By the former, God so determines himself as to be ruled and determined by no other; but the determination of another consists best with the latter because man does not cease to act spontaneously and from preference (*ek proaireseōs*), although these motions are excited and ordered from another source.

X. Although the will (relative to providence and with respect to the second act) while exerting its operation cannot be indifferent to doing or omitting this or that thing (because it is determined to one of opposites), yet this does not prevent it (considered in itself and in the first act) from being indifferent in its own nature and undetermined to many things and from freely determining itself. It is indeed certain that there cannot be a determinate effect of an indeterminate cause, if this is the only one; but if to produce one and the same effect, a superior cause concurs with the human will (acting not only by it but also with it), the proximate causes (of themselves indeterminate of the effect) can be so determined by that superior cause that it does not do violence to the will, but suffers it to act by its own motion and free will. Nay, it uses this very liberty to execute its own counsels because God also decreed that man should spontaneously and freely serve his decree. The same must be said of contingency which can be attributed to the effect with respect to the second cause which in other respects is necessary with respect to the first cause (as has already been seen). The other matters belonging here were discussed in the preceding question.

XI. Moreover if any scruple still remains in a most obscure subject or anything which surpasses our comprehension (as indeed it must not be denied that many things here are impervious to us), it is more satisfactory to be humbly ignorant than rashly to define. It is fitting that we remember that the ways of God are not our ways; they are to be admired, not thoughtlessly searched into. And we (insig-

nificant mortals) ought to be satisfied with firmly retaining the fact (*to hoti*) (which is most clearly revealed in the word), although it is not granted to us now to know fully the why (*to dioti*) or the how (*to pōs*).

SEVENTH QUESTION: THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD IN EVIL
Do sins fall under providence, and how is it applied to them?

I. In this question, which all confess to be the most intricate and difficult among those agitated concerning providence, two extremes occur which are equally dangerous and to be avoided. First in defect, wherein an otiose permission about sins is ascribed to God. The other in excess, when the causality of sin is charged upon God. The former clashes with the providence of God, but the latter with his justice and holiness. Into the former, the Pelagians, who refer the method of God's providence about evil to a bare and idle permission, run (as if he put forth no action in reference to it, but only indifferently beheld and permitted it). On the latter, however, the Manichaeans, Simonians and Priscillianists formerly struck who made God the cause of wickedness and of sins. This sinners readily seize to excuse their crimes: as Homer's Agamemnon, "I am not to be blamed, but Jupiter and fate" (*egō d' ouk aitios eimi, alla Zeus kai Moira, Iliad* 19.86-87 [Loeb, 2:342-43]); and Lyconides in the *Aulularia* of Plautus, "God was the instigator, I believe the gods wished it" (*The Pot of Gold* [Loeb, 1:310-11]). This impiety is indulged by the Libertines of the present time.

Pelagians sin in defect.

The Manichaeans and Libertines in excess.

II. The orthodox hold the mean between these extremes, maintaining that the providence of God is so occupied about sin as neither idly to permit it (as the Pelagians think) nor efficiently to produce it (as the Libertines suppose), but efficaciously to order and direct it. However, in order that this may be readily understood, we must treat of it a little more distinctly.

III. First, three things must be accurately distinguished in sin: (1) the entity itself of the act which has the relation of material; (2) the disorder (*ataxia*) and wickedness joined with it (or its concomitant) which puts on the notion of the formal; (3) the consequent judgment called the adjunct. God is occupied in different ways about these. As to the first, since an act as such is always good as to its entity, God concurs to it effectively and physically, not only by conserving the nature, but by exciting its motions and actions by a physical motion, as being good naturally (in which sense we are said "to live, move and have our being in him," Acts 17:28). As to the third (which is related to the judgment of God) which is joined with sin, not of itself in relation to the sinner (who thinks or intends no such thing, Gen. 50:20; Is. 10:5-7), but accidentally in relation to God permitting sins and ordaining them to a good end beyond their own nature—God holds himself also positively and efficaciously, since what as such has the relation of good must be from God. And although both the fault and the punishment can be the same materially, yet formally and

How God concurs to the act of sin.

To the adjunct.

according to different relations (*scheseis*) vice and judgment, wickedness and guilt can always be distinguished in the same evil action.

To the wickedness.

IV. As to the second, which is the lawlessness (*anomia*) itself, God can be called neither its physical cause (because he neither inspires nor infuses nor does it) nor its ethical cause (because he neither commands nor approves and persuades, but more severely forbids and punishes it). Thus God is said to nill iniquity (Pss. 5:4-6; 45:7), so to detest as not to be able to endure it: "He is of purer eyes than to behold evil" (Hab. 1:13); "God tempts no one, nor can he be tempted by any man" (viz., to sin, Jam. 1:13) because he is guiltless of evil (*kakōn anaitios*). But yet sin ought not to be removed from the providence of God, for it falls under it in many ways as to its beginning, progress and end. As to its beginning, he freely permits it; as to its progress, he wisely directs it; as to its end, he powerfully terminates and brings it to a good end. These are the three degrees of providence about sin of which we must speak.

1. As to the beginning, God acts: (a) by permission.

V. The first grade respects the beginning of sin, about which we say God is occupied permissively (about which Scripture frequently testifies: "I gave them up to their own hearts' lusts," Ps. 81:12; and "God in times past suffered all to walk in their own ways," Acts 14:16). But because this permission is not explained by all in the same way, its true method must be distinctly stated before all other things.

Which is not ethical, but physical.

VI. First, this permission is not ethical or moral (which is of right by a relaxation or dispensation of the law, which is opposed to prohibition). In this sense, if God permitted sin, he would also approve it as lawful or just (which is absurd). Rather this permission is physical (which is of fact by a not hindering, which is opposed to effecting). The former regards God as legislator and Judge; the latter, however, as the supreme Lord and ruler of the world, governing and regulating the events of all things according to his will. The former is done by justice when he gives the license to do something; the latter by power when he does not exert the strength which could actually prevent this or that from being done.

Not idle, but efficacious.

VII. Second, this permission must not be conceived negatively, as if it was a mere keeping back (*anergia*) or cessation of his will and providence in evil works (by which God, sitting as it were on a watchtower, should behold only the event of the permitted action and who, therefore, would be left uncertain and doubtful—as the old Pelagians thought and as their followers of the present day hold obtruding upon us the comment of an otiose and inert permission; cf. Bellarmine, "God does not hold himself towards sins positively to will or nill, but negatively not to will" ("De amissione gratiae et statu peccati," 2.16 in *Opera* 4:107). But it must be conceived positively and affirmatively; not simply that God does not will to hinder sin (which is an otiose negation), but that he wills not to hinder (which is an efficacious affirmation). Thus the permission involves a positive act of the secret will by which God designedly and willingly determined not to hinder sin, although he may be said to nill it as to the revealed will of approbation. In this sense, our divines do not refuse to employ the

word "permission" with the Scriptures. And if at any time they reject it (as Calvin, Beza and others), they understand it in the Pelagian sense of otiose "permission" which takes away from God his own right and sets up the idol of free will in its place. Hence Beza: "If by the word permission is meant this distinction (to wit, since God does not act in evil, but gives them up to Satan and their own lusts) that I repudiate not in the least. But if permission is opposed to will, this I reject as false and absurd; its falsity appearing from this, that if God unwillingly permits anything, he is not certainly God, i.e., Almighty; but if he is said to permit anything as not caring, how much do we differ from Epicureanism? It remains, therefore, that he willingly permits what he permits. Will then is not opposed to permission" (*A Little Book of Christian Questions and Responses*, Q. 179 [trans. K.M. Summers, 1986], pp. 72-73).

VIII. However when we say that permission is occupied positively with sin (if not on the part of the term, at least on the part of the principle, inasmuch as it includes a positive act of the will), this we understand not as if the divine will has sin as an object precisely of itself. For since his will can have for its object nothing but good, it cannot will evil as evil, but as terminated on the permission of that which is good. God, therefore, properly does not will sin to be done, but only wills to permit it. And if at any time sin is called the means of illustrating God's glory, it does not follow that God (who wills the end) ought also to will sin as such (which is the means to it). For it is called the means not so much causally and effectively (as if concurring finally to effect that end) as materially and objectively (because it is the occasion from which God illustrates his own glory). Again, it is not the means of itself because this rather obscures than illustrates the glory of God, but by accident from the wisdom of God (who elicits good from evil, as light from darkness). (3) He who wills the end wills also the means, but not always by the same volition. If the means are of a diverse nature, he can will the end by an effective volition because the end is of itself good; but he wills the means only by a permissive volition (if it is evil) not so much willing the means itself as the use of the means (to wit, the permission and ordination of sin itself).

IX. However, because it seems strange that God should permit sin, inquiry was made into the causes of that permission. The Arminians think the cause (either sole or principal) is that God is unwilling to help the free will granted to the creature by himself. But this cause does not avail because besides the fact that it is falsely supposed that providence cannot efficaciously concur with the sinning will without doing violence to the free will (which we have already refuted), if this were so, God could never hinder sin, lest the free will be compelled (which nevertheless he evidently often does). Therefore the causes of this permission must be sought elsewhere, and they can be various according to the various states of the creatures. For if innocent creatures are referred to, Scripture says nothing expressly as to the reason why he permitted angels or men to fall. However, because nothing takes place without his knowledge or against his will, it ought not to be doubted that it happened by a certain and deliberate counsel (which it is safer to admire than curiously to pry into). Of this only ought we to be certainly persuaded—that God has done nothing in this business either repugnant to his justice (because he was not bound to hinder sin; or to his wisdom, because since he willed the condition of the creature to be mutable, there was no reason to oblige him to do anything towards it exceeding the mode of nature) or to his

goodness (because the love with which he pursues the creature, as long as he continues in his integrity, does not forthwith proceed so far as to be bound to keep him from falling, especially since he can even from that evil elicit also good). Having this in view, Augustine says, "God knew that it pertained more to his most almighty goodness, even to bring good out of evil, than not to permit evil to be" (*Admonition and Grace* 10 [27] [FC 2:278; PL 44.932]). For if he had not permitted evil, his punitive justice would not have appeared, nor his pardoning mercy, nor the wisdom by which he turns evil into good, nor that wonderful love manifested in sending his Son into the world for the salvation of the church. As to the fallen creature, it is easier to assign the causes of the permission of sin because, since he is already corrupt, God can most justly permit sin either as a punishment (that preceding sins may be punished) or for chastisement (that the faithful, being thus admonished of their natural depravity, may be anxious to correct it) or for an example (that some may learn from the fall of others and walk more cautiously).

X. Now although the man is a partaker of the fault who does not turn anyone away from sin when he can, it does not follow that God in permitting sin becomes in any way guilty of sin because men are bound to hinder sin, both in themselves and in others. Hence the fault of his sons is imputed to Eli (whom he had by his indulgence permitted to sin, 1 S. 3:13); but God is bound to this by no law. Again, that permission bespeaks no influx and causality with respect to the creature sinning as to lawlessness (*anomian*), but a mere suspension of a hindrance; nor does it take away the spontaneity and choice (*proairesin*) of the creature, nor prevent it from acting most freely. Nor if sin infallibly follows upon the permission, can he therefore be called its cause but only the antecedent (which is necessarily supposed).

(b) By desertion.

XI. To permission, desertion must be added, by which God, in order not to hinder man from sinning, deserts him by withdrawing the grace opposed to sin or by not giving it so efficaciously as to enable him to overcome the assailing temptation. This withdrawal is either privative (when he takes away the grace given before) or negative (when he does not furnish new grace necessary to persist). In the former sense, God deserts sinful men when he takes away from them the light they abuse and draws back his restraining Spirit. (In consequence of the removal of this barrier they rush with loosened reins into wickedness.) In the latter way, he deserted Adam by not giving (with the help without which he could not stand and by which he had the power if he wished) the help by which he might actually stand and might have the will which could.

Desertion is threefold: of exploration; of correction; penal.

XII. However, this desertion can be threefold: (1) of exploration, when God deserts man to prove him, such as is attributed to Hezekiah when he admitted the Babylonian ambassadors and opened all his treasures to them. God is said to "have left him, to try him, that he might know all that was in his heart" (2 Ch. 32:31). So he deserted Adam, when, permitting the temptation, he did not give him efficacious help by which he might resist it. God, as it were, retired to a distance in order to show how great is the weakness of human nature without the help of the Creator. (2) Of correction, with respect to the church and believers whom God is said to

desert for a time that he may afterwards gather them with his everlasting mercies (Is. 54:7; Ps. 125:3 [?103:4]). (3) Penal, of the judgment, such as is denounced against sinners (2 K. 21:14; Jer. 7:29; 23:33) and is attributed to the Gentiles, whom he is said to have left in and given over to their own impure desires (Rom. 1:24).

XIII. The cause of this desertion, however, is always just and holy with God. At one time, it is manifest (as the desertion of sinners who deserve it on account of their preceding sins), at another it remains concealed (as in the first sin of Adam). In the meantime, its causality cannot in any way be ascribed to God because by that desertion he neither compelled him to fall, nor breathed into him the will to fall, nor took away any internal grace given in creation. He only denied the undue grace of confirmation (not given) by the most free good pleasure of his own will (by which he dispenses of his own as he will—the equally free denier and bestower of his own gifts). Now although the necessity of the fall was with a denial of that grace, yet the liberty and spontaneity of man sinning was not destroyed. Rather it was shown that God willed that man should certainly fall. But as God willed his certain fall by an eternal decree, so at the same time he willed him to fall most freely; nor did his fall cease to be most free on account of that concourse of God denied to his actual perseverance any more than on account of the most free concourse of God with a necessary cause, the operation of that cause ceases to be necessary or natural.

XIV. However whether besides God's permission and desertion, there is a certain ulterior operation on his part is not undeservedly questioned. Some sharply contest, others assert it: the former, lest they should bring upon God some taint of wickedness or injustice (which would make him the author of sin); the latter, that they may not withdraw anything from divine providence. It is not indeed to be denied that many passages of Scripture, actively enunciating, can and ought to be explained passively, so that one may be said to do what he only permits and does not hinder: as when David is said to have "kept the Moabites alive" (2 S. 8:2), i.e., did not kill them; and Noah to have kept the animals alive (Gen. 6:19), i.e., conserved them. Thus certain passages which indicate action concerning the providence of God in evil, can be explained of his permission or the simple denial of grace (as Augustine often explains "to harden" by "not to soften"). Scripture, however, speaks too emphatically (*emphatikōteron*) to allow us to rest in permission alone; and we think something more is signified by those efficacious expressions employed, in which not only a certain withdrawal and not hindering on God's part is marked, but also a certain efficacious action is designated. Hence the Holy Spirit uses verbs not only in the Hiphil, but also in the Piel, by which the action is strengthened: as when he says "God hardened Pharaoh" (Ex. 4:21; 7:3); and elsewhere the Scripture says, "The wives of David were given to his son Absalom by God to be violated" (2 S. 12:11); yea, "God told Shimei to curse David" (2 S. 16:10); "Evil spirits were sent by God being commanded to injure" (1 K. 22:23); "He sends a spirit of error" (Is. 19:14); "fills with drunkenness" (Jer. 13:12,13); "sends strong delusion that they should believe a lie" (2 Thess. 2:11); and innumerable other passages which are too strong to be explained of bare permission. Otherwise many of God's judgments (executed by the reprobate) would be weakened and be the work of bare permission. And so it would be of the death of Christ itself on which our whole redemption hangs; nevertheless, the Holy Spirit expressly testifies that Herod and Pontius Pilate did

nothing but what the hand and counsel of God (i.e., his efficacious decree) had determined before should be done (Acts 4:28).

The efficacy of providence appears: (1) in the presentation of occasions.

XV. No mortal, however, can either conceive or sufficiently explain what that efficacy of providence is. Three things most especially belong to it: (1) the offering of occasions; (2) the delivering over to Satan; (3) the immediate operation of God in the heart. First, the offering of occasions which can be procured only by the peculiar providence of God by the concourse of circumstances and the proposition of objects, fitted to move faculties constituted in this or that way (in which manner God does not infuse wickedness into the minds of men, but draws out into action the wickedness latent there). So for the sale of Joseph, he made the Midianite merchants come along; he willed the avarice of Achan to be excited by the sight of the Babylonian garment (Jos. 7:21); and that David's lust should be inflamed by the nakedness of Bathsheba. Such things affecting the senses are said and done as that although good in themselves and of a kind by which they ought to be softened, yet the impious falsely abuse them and are hardened by their own fault (as the commandments of God, the Egyptian plagues and the miracles wrought before Pharaoh; and the miracles of Christ: the former ought to have turned the heart of Pharaoh, the latter the hearts of the Jews, yet they hardened them the more).

(2) In delivering over to Satan.

XVI. (2) He not only presents occasions and objects, but delivers men over to Satan and their own evil desires (as God is said to have "given the Gentiles over to their own vile lusts, and to a reprobate mind" [Rom. 1:24, 26, 28] as a punishment of previous sins). So "an evil spirit from the Lord" is said to have "troubled Saul" (1 S. 16:14) and a lying spirit to have been sent by God into the mouth of the false prophets (1 K. 22:22). Hence God, loosening the reins, works efficaciously in the "children of disobedience" (Eph. 2:2). For although actuated by so great a hatred against God and men as to be spontaneously intent upon all occasions of injuring and thus needing no spur, yet because he cannot attempt or carry out anything against the pleasure of God, he is sometimes sent by God and by his command is said to fulfil his own wicked designs. Now as Satan can be considered in three ways with respect to man (either as a tempter or an accuser or an executioner and tormenter), God can deliver men over to him in these three ways. As a tempter, when he sends the efficacy of error that men may believe a lie and be blinded by Satan (2 Thess. 2:9, 11; 2 Cor. 4:4); or as an accuser, when he exposes men to his accusations, as was the case with Job (cf. chap. 1) and Joshua (Zech. 3:1); or as an executioner and tormenter, when he delivers man to be vexed by him both in body and soul (in which sense the incestuous person is "delivered to Satan" by Paul [1 Cor. 5:5], and Hymenaeus and Alexander, 1 Tim. 1:20).

XVII. Satan, however, acts upon men in two ways: either externally by tempting the heart, now by the proposition of objects pleasing to the flesh, so as to impel them to license and rebellion (as was the case with our first parents) then by the sending of calamities and evils to cast them down into despair (as observed in Job and others); or internally by acting on the fancy and through the fancy affecting the intellect (by the representation of those phantasms which can seduce men

and excite to evil or recall from good; or by operating on the humors and by the humors exciting the bodily appetites, either to inflame lust, or excite anger or to do other things to kindle the passions [*to thymikon*] or the desires [*to epithymētikon*] whose power is great especially in the unrenewed). In this sense, he is said to send into the heart of man what may persuade him; yea, to enter into man himself, as is said of Judas (Jn. 13:2, 27).

(3) In the internal operation of God.

XVIII. Third, besides the delivering over to Satan, there is also sometimes a certain internal operation of God in man by which he turns the heart of man to the execution of his counsel. Solomon refers to this when he says, "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord: he turneth it whithersoever he will" (Prov. 21:1). Augustine says, "God operates in the hearts of men to incline their wills whithersoever he will, whether to good according to his mercy, or to evil according to their desert, as by his own judgment, now open, then secret, yet always just" (*On Grace and Free Will* 43 [NPNFl, 5:463; PL 44.909]). However this can be done either by an internal proposition of objects (which can move the mind and will) or by the impression of thoughts (which although good in themselves, are yet accidentally converted into evil by the vice of corrupt man). Thus the brothers of Joseph think that he is loved by his parents and is honored with dreams by God; these are good thoughts which they impiously abused. Wresting them to envy, they take counsel concerning the removal of him. Pharaoh after the death of Joseph thinks he should see to it that the empire suffers no harm; a good thought undoubtedly sent from God, but falling into an evil mind was perverted to the destruction of the people. So what came into the mind of Caiphas, "It is expedient that one man should die for the people" (Jn. 11:50), was good, but was most wickedly abused to the nefarious slaughter of Christ. Again, God internally works in man when he causes objects to move him in a particular direction. For since man is prone to every evil (as containing in himself the seeds of all vices), yet that he inclines to this rather than that arises from no other source than the secret providence of God, inclining him rather in this than in that direction, not otherwise than a stream flowing downwards is turned by the industry of the conduit master in this rather than that direction. Since to men there lie open many ways of injuring, God (shutting others up) leaves one open that they may be moved in that way. Thus the wicked serve to execute his judgments, when he wishes to use them either to punish the wickedness of anyone or to test the faith of the pious or to arouse them from slothfulness. A remarkable instance of this occurs in Nebuchadnezzar drawing out an army against Judea rather than against Egypt (Ezk. 21:21-24). Therefore, since in these and other wonderful and ineffable ways, God can operate in men to execute his own judgments, it is not without reason that their actions are ascribed to the efficacious power of God.

Second, providence is occupied about the progress of sin by termination.

XIX. Thus it is occupied about the beginning of sin. It exerts itself also as to its progress by a powerful termination of it, placing limits to it, both of intension (that it may not grow out into immenseness) and of extension (that it may not spread more widely) and of duration (that it may not continue longer and so do more injury both to the sinner himself and to others). This he does either internally (by enlightening

the mind to perceive the turpitude of sin and the greatness of the punishment due to it or by restraining and curbing the depraved desires) or externally (by repressing the fury of Satan and the world, removing the occasions of evil and also by calling away from sin by commands and threatenings). All this appears from the examples of Laban, Esau, Balaam, Sennacherib and many others (and especially from the history of Job and of Christ).

Third, about the end, by direction. XX. Finally, as to the end in its wise ordination and direction, when beyond the nature of sin and the will of the sinner, by his wisdom and power he converts the evil into good and directs and draws it to a good end. "Ye thought evil against me," said Joseph (Gen. 50:20), "but God meant it unto good." Similar examples occur in Is. 10:5-7, Job 1:20-22, 2:9, 10, Acts 3:13-15. Now this ordination is not to be understood *a posteriori* (as if God, the existence of sin being foreseen, thought concerning its end), but *a priori*, by which God proposes an end to himself which he wills to bring about by sinners and their sinful actions (to which he also directs them by his providence because otherwise that ordination of the end would be only occasional and accidental).

XXI. But whatever may be the action of God about sins, still his providence always remains holy and free from all fault (as the solar rays are not affected although they may flow into filth or a carcass). And if at any time the same work is ascribed to God, to the Devil and the wicked (as the selling of Joseph, the hardening of Pharaoh, the calamity of Job, the deceit of Ahab, the numbering of the people, the death of Christ), yet it is ascribed to them in different ways: to God indeed as a most holy work because from a good principle it tends to a good end; to men, however, as most wicked because from an evil principle, by evil means, they tend to an evil end. So the work which the Assyrian was about to perform by the command of God in the abduction of the people was good with respect to God (who willed in this way to chastise his own people). He is on this account called "the rod of God's anger, to whom he gave charge to take the spoil" (Is. 10:5, 6). Yet it is evil with respect to the Assyrian because he had no other end in view than the cutting off of the people and the fulfilling of his own desires: "I will send him against a hypocritical nation . . . . Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so; but it is in his heart to destroy and cut off nations not a few" (Is. 10:6, 7). Therefore as a judge rightly employs lions and other wild beasts for the punishment of the guilty, a physician leeches (yea, even vipers) to cure the sick, so in this, the most wise counsel of God and his admirable power shines forth—that he uses the sins of creatures beyond their intention to good end; not by making the wills or actions of creatures evil, but ordaining them to a good end. As, however, the concourse of God's providence does not excuse the sinner (because he takes away neither liberty nor choice [*proairesin*] nor spontaneity), so neither can God be made guilty of sin (because he is always most holily employed in the most wicked works of men and for a good end). Now it is known that impelling and final causes make differences of actions and when there are many causes of the same effect (some good, others evil) such effect is good with respect to the good causes and evil with respect to the evil. "Since the Father delivered up the Son, and Judas delivered up his master, why in this delivery is man guilty and God righteous, unless because in the one thing which they did, the cause on account of which they did it is not the same?" as Augustine says (*Letter* 93, "To Vincent" [FC 18:63; PL 33.324]).

Sources of explanation.

XXII. God can rightly be called the cause of what he wills and decrees simply and by itself. But he did not decree sins simply, but relatively (inasmuch as they are actions); nor by themselves (inasmuch as they are evil works), but by accident (inasmuch as by these actions he willed to carry out his secret judgments). So he willed and decreed the selling of Joseph and the crucifixion of Christ, but with the best end. The former, that the family of Jacob might be preserved; the latter, that the church might be redeemed. Each work was just and holy on the part of God although he willed to follow it out by the wickedness of men (which he did not will to effect, but only to permit). Bellarmine, however, falsely maintains that Gen. 45:7 and Acts 4:28 are not to be referred to the evil works, but to the "good passions" in them (as what on the part of the agents were most grevious crimes, on the part of the patients, Christ and Joseph bearing with equanimity the selling and the death, were works of the highest patience and consequently very good); cf. "De amissione gratiae et statu peccati," 2.2 in *Opera* (1858), 4:79. For Scripture ascribes to God not only the suffering of Joseph and of Christ, but also the action expressly from which that suffering arose. Joseph does not speak passively of himself—"I was sent hither by God"—but actively—"God sent me hither." The apostles do not say God willed that Christ should die, but actively the counsel and hand of God predetermined the very thing which Herod and Pontius Pilate did. Besides, since action and passion differ not really but rationally, whoever decrees the passion must also decree the action itself. If God willed Joseph to be sold and Christ to be crucified, he also by that very thing willed that the brothers should sell Joseph, and the Jews should nail Christ to the cross.

XXIII. He who impels men to evil (making good wills bad, either drawing them unwilling and nilling or inciting them morally to evil as evil by precept or suasion) is the cause of sin. But God is said to impel wills in themselves evil and spontaneously rushing into evils; not to evils as evils, but as they are his secret judgments. So that he is here to be regarded not simply as Lord (freely permitting the creature to fall), but as a most just Judge (punishing sin by sin) who, therefore, cannot be considered the author of sin, but only the administrator of punishment. Therefore there is one impulsion properly so called (of compulsion) by which violence is done to the free will; another improper and relative which conspires with liberty and involves only a necessity of consequence; or a conditioned necessity (not absolute and consequent). The former is faulty and makes him who uses it the author of sin; but not the latter which God employs towards the wicked.

XXIV. The common axiom—action and effect belong rather to the principal than the instrumental cause; hence it would seem to be inferred that God is the cause of sin because he uses Satan and the wicked as instruments for his work. This common axiom suffers various limitations. (1) It holds good in homogeneous causes, when both causes (the principal as well as the instrumental) are either positive or privative, physical or moral. For example, the word of God as an instrument sanctifies us; therefore much more the Holy Spirit by the word; the false prophet seduces Ahab, therefore much more the devil who acts through him. In the first, each cause is positive; in the last, each is privative. But this is not the case in heterogeneous causes when one (viz., the principal) is positive and physical, the other (viz., the instrumental) is privative and moral; or when

one is subject to law, the other, however, irresponsible (*anypeuthynos*) and above law (or incapable of law). Hence the following do not hold good because the causes are heterogeneous: the sword as an instrument killing a man is not the culpable cause of the homicide, therefore neither is the man wielding the sword; or the executioner, as the instrument of a just judge, punishes the guilty animated by revenge, therefore much more the just judge. In the first, the principal cause is privative, obnoxious to law and moral; the instrumental cause is physical, positive and amenable to no law. In the other, however, the principal cause is positive, moral and congruous with law, but the instrumental is privative, moral and dissonant to law. So here God is the positive, physical, irresponsible (*anypeuthynos*) cause; men, however, are the privative and moral cause and obnoxious to law.

XXV. (2) It holds good in proper, pure and irrational instruments which borrow whatever they are and do from the principal agent and have nothing of their own intermixed. For there is no principal causality in them, but only an organic which flows from the virtue of the principal agent (as the cause of the homicide, committed with the sword, ought to be imputed not to the sword, but to the man who used it, because the sword is a pure and irrational [*alogon*] instrument). But it does not hold good in metaphorical and mixed instruments which have something of their own mixed (by which they work), and this they do not borrow from the principal cause. For example, the following does not hold good: a horse struck by the spur of its rider goes lame, therefore the rider himself is more lame. This is not the pure instrument of the rider, but such as has something of its own mixed in the motion of lameness in which it is not subordinated to the rider (viz., a loosened shin bone) which is the adequate and principal cause of the lameness. Thus sinners are not proper and pure instruments, but rational, metaphorical and mixed (which have wickedness from themselves as the proper and adequate cause of sin). (3) The axiom holds good when the action of the principal cause is morally the same as the action of the instrument (as the disciple of Pelagius has a poor opinion of grace, therefore much more Pelagius himself; here the moral action of each cause is the same, of the principal and of the organic). But not equally, when the action is indeed the same materially and physically, but not morally. For then not only is the action of the organic cause not to be ascribed more especially to the principal cause, but it is not to be ascribed at all to it (as the Scholastics rightly teach: "Not from the substance of the real physical act arises the specification of the act as to moral being, but from the diverse moral circumstances"). For the same physical action can be just or unjust according to the diversity of agents, either of those subject to the law or of those unbound by law. And yet here, as was just said, the action of God is not morally the same as the action of the instrument, but only physically. Hence the fault in the instrument is not to be attributed to the principal cause.

XXVI. God commanded Shimei to curse David (2 S. 16:10) by a command of providence, not by a legal command; by a command physically directive, not morally suasive; by a judicial command of the will of good pleasure, as he is a just Judge, punishing and castigating, not by an approving command, of the signified will, as a lawgiver commanding; by a command not properly so called which he made known to Shimei and willed him to obey, but improper and figurative; as God is said to have commanded the fish to throw up Jonah (Jon. 2:10). In David's

case, this is nothing else than the efficacious motion of God by which he inclined the evil will of Shimei to this sin for the punishment of David. Augustine explains it thus: "The Lord said to Shimei, curse David, not by commanding where obedience would be praised, but because he inclined his will, evil by his own proper fault, to this sin by his just and secret judgment" (*On Grace and Free Will* 1.20 [NPNF1, 5:461; PL 44.906]). Thus when God is said to have sent a lying spirit to deceive Ahab (1 K. 22:22), it is not of him approving, but permitting and efficaciously ordaining it for the punishment of the wicked king. He did not give to that lying spirit the license to lie, but loosened the reins to it desirous and offering its aid.

XXVII. The cause of a cause is also the cause of the thing caused, holds good: (1) in adequate causes, provided another true and proximate cause of the thing caused itself does not intervene; (2) in causes by themselves, which produce the effect, inasmuch as they are such when they cause and when it is the cause both of the cause and the thing caused by itself; (3) in causes subordinated essentially and by necessity of nature and mutually depending on each other. But not in like manner, if it is indeed the cause by itself of the cause, but of the thing caused only accidentally (when the inferior cause produces the effect not simply from its own nature, but from some acceding defect). So this does not hold good—the human will is the cause of sin; God is the cause of the human will; therefore he is the cause of sin—for when the created will sins, it turns aside and fails from the order of the first cause. And God who is the cause of the will per se, cannot be called the cause of the evil action, which is from the will not simply in the genus of being (as it is from God), but from the will failing as to the law in the genus of morals.

How hardening and blinding are ascribed to God.

XXVIII. God is said to blind and to harden men not only negatively (by not enlightening and softening) and privatively (by withdrawing his grace whatever it may have been after men have abused it) and permissively (by not hindering), but also positively. Not by bringing in blindness or hardness (which is natural to man), but both objectively by presenting external objects to them which although ordained to another direction by their own nature, yet he knows will be drawn in a different way by their vice; and judicially by smiting them internally with blindness (the light which they abused being taken away or extinguished); and by loosening the reins to their lusts and delivering them up and enslaving them to Satan; and acting in many other inexplicable ways by which he exercises the judgment of just blinding and hardening upon the contumacious. Yet this does not hinder the wicked also from blinding and hardening themselves by the abuse of those things by which especially they ought to be softened (such is the longsuffering and kindness of God, Rom. 2:4). The light of the word and the sweetness of the gospel, which becomes to them "a savor of death unto death" (2 Cor. 2:16), and the very castigations of God by which they ought to be corrected, make them more obstinate—"O Lord, thou has stricken them, but they have not grieved; they have made their faces harder than a rock" (Jer. 5:3). So one hardening is culpable on the part of men who harden themselves; just and penal on the part of God who hardens them by his righteous judgment for the punishment of previous sins.

And temptation.

XXIX. Temptation may be of trial or of seduction; the former good, the latter evil; that belongs to God, this to the Devil (who on that account is called the tempter [*ho*

peirazōn] because as he tempted Adam and Christ, so every day he tempts believers to evil). In this sense, James says "God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man" (1:13) because God has nothing in himself which inclines in the slightest degree to sin (nay, which is not most widely separated from it). Thus he cannot be said to solicit others to sin, either by commands or counsels or any internal persuasion. If at any time he is said to tempt men (as Abraham [Gen. 22:1] and the Israelites [Dt. 8:2]), this must be understood of the temptation of trial, not of seduction. It is done to explore the faith and constancy of man (not that he is ignorant of them who is omniscient, but to make them known to man himself and to others). When we seek in the Lord's Prayer, "Lord, lead us not into temptation," we do not depreciate the former temptation (which is good), but the latter (which is evil). Into the latter, God can be said to lead us when he not only permits us to fall into it, but delivers us over to our lusts and to Satan (by which we are tempted). Thus we seek from the hypothesis of the divine will (i.e., if it so pleases God) that he may so provide for us that we be not led into the danger of temptation. But if it otherwise pleases God, either to permit it and to deliver us over to the will of our spiritual enemies that we should succumb to their temptations, but that strengthened by grace we may overcome them. Thus "he will not suffer us to be tempted above that we are able; but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that we may be able to bear it" (1 Cor. 10:13). Hence Augustine says, "What is it, however, we say every day—Lead us not into temptation—except that we be not delivered over to our lusts, for each one is tempted being drawn away and allured by his own lusts?" (*Against Julian* 5.4* [FC 35:259; PL 44.793]). And "Lead us not into temptation, means, permit us not to be drawn into it by desertion" (Letter 157 [89], "To Hilary," 2.5 [FC 20:321; PL 33.675]).

And seduction Jer. 20:7.

XXX. What is said in Jeremiah ("O Lord, thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived," 20:7) is not to be so understood as if God led him into dishonesty and error. For although God is said at one time to have put a lying spirit into the mouth of the false prophets of Ahab, yet it cannot be said that any of the holy prophets, whom God inspired, ever so erred as to predict a false thing in his name; or ever wandered from the truth in the prophetic office (although otherwise not infallible). But it can be understood in different ways. Either *phthh* (whence the Greek *peithō* seems to be derived) may be taken in a good sense for "to allure," "entice" or "persuade" (as also elsewhere, Gen. 9:27; Prov. 25:15; Hos. 2:14); or in this sense, "Thou hast allured me, and I was allured," i.e., to enter upon and perform my office, thou alone art to me the author of my calling and thou hast in some measure constrained me refusing. Or if it is taken in a bad sense for seduction (as in Ezk. 14:9), it must be understood hypothetically: if I am seduced that I may seduce others (as my enemies calumniate me), thou, O Lord, hast seduced me. But this is false, therefore that is too—intimating that their calumnies fall upon God (the author) or his doctrine. Or the words are humanly spoken according to the carnal sense and perturbation of mind (to wit, Jeremiah from weakness and the judgment of the flesh complains of being deceived by God and that too, because from the words of God falsely understood, he had experienced far otherwise than he thought God had indicated to him; not with the fault of the speaker, but of the hearer; for God had not said that he would not

suffer, but that he would deliver him). If elsewhere he is said to seduce prophets or the people (Ezk. 14:9; Jer. 4:10), this is rightly referred both to God's permission and desertion because he permits men to be deceived and opposes no obstacle; and to the delivering over to Satan because he gives them up to Satan and impostors to be deceived.

Error, Job 12:16, 17.

XXXI. When it is said "the deceiver and the deceived are God's" (Job 12:16*), it can be understood in two ways: either in the dative ("the deceiver and the deceived are to God") to intimate that both the ignorance of deceived man and the wickedness of impostors and deceivers serve God (i.e., divine providence) as if his ministers, while God performs his secret (*euarestias*) will by them who resist his revealed will (*eudokias*) (inasmuch as he elicits good from evil). Or it may be understood in the genitive ("the deceiver and the deceived are of God") because each is in his power, so that no one errs or leads into error unless so far forth as it pleases him to permit (who can, if he will, both hinder and remove the error and the seduction; or because the very act of erring, when anyone seduces, is from God).

XXXII. When God says, "I gave my people also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live" (Ezk. 20:25), he seems not only to permit, but to command sin. The passage is explained in different ways. Some by "statutes not good" understand the idolatrous precepts of the Gentiles to which God in anger subjected his people (whose observance would bring eternal death upon them). Thus he may be said to have "given" because he permitted them to be given or because he blinded them by his just judgment (as unworthy of his government and enslaved to the empire of Satan) to obey a lie (which is the same as, I have taken away their understanding so that, my laws being despised, they may make severe and destructive laws for themselves). Others more fitly hold that they designate the very law of God, moral as well as ceremonial. Thus it is called "not good" either because it is useless for salvation (being "weak through the flesh," Rom. 8:3) or because ungrateful and unpleasant (as good is often taken for agreeable, Gen. 3:6) and so it is called elsewhere a grevious and intolerable yoke (*abastakton*, Acts 15:10); or because noxious and deadly, not per se, but by accident on account of the perversity of man (in which sense it is elsewhere called "the letter which killeth" and "the ministry of condemnation," 2 Cor. 3:6, 9*).

XXXIII. When we say with the Scriptures that the sins of men are permitted by God and efficaciously directed to a good end, we do not mean that the sins and crimes of the wicked are good works. Rather in the works done by the wicked, the motions and actions are good works in the genus of being and just judgment of God, as the lawlessness (*anomia*) of the motions and actions is morally evil and from evil persons. So the evil intention of man is not from God in the genus of morals, but only in the genus of being. And if the end is said to conciliate goodness and loveliness to the means, it does not follow that sins (because ordained by God to a good end) are good. The axiom avails only of means (which of themselves tend to a good end) not of those which (beyond their own nature) are directed to it by the wisdom and power of God (such as sin is).

XXXIV. The rule of the apostle "We must not do evil, that good may come" (Rom. 3:8) does not apply here. It is one thing to do evil, but another to permit

it, or to direct it to a good end and turn it into good. The former indicates injustice; the latter wisdom, goodness and power. (2) It is not lawful for men, who are accountable (*hypeuthynoi*), either to do evil, or to permit it; nor can such permission be granted in them without fault. But this cannot be said of God, who is not responsible (*anypeuthynos*), who has the best and wisest reasons for permitting. (3) If at any time Scripture says that God does evil, it does not mean evil reduplicatively as evil (in which sense it cannot have the relation of good), but inasmuch as it has the relation of judgment and is conducive and ordainable to the manifestation of his own glory (in which sense it has the relation of good).

XXXV. Whatever may be the action of God about sin, no reason for excuse can on that account be brought forward by the sinner: whether because he fulfils the will of God (because the will is not revealed and signified, proposed for a rule of life, but secret and of good purpose, which he does not know and least attends to, not approving or commanding, but most justly decreeing); or because that will cannot be resisted by man (because whatever of necessity is here happens by reason of the event, not by reason of the mode of action; of infallibility, not of compulsion; of consequence and relative, not of the consequent and absolute). Hence Paul, stopping the mouth of the wicked, says, "Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?" (Rom. 9:19, 20). Or because God himself is said to harden and to blind (because the action of God does not overthrow man's liberty of action, for he is so hardened and blinded by God that he also most freely blinds and hardens himself; and because God's action is judicial, which men have already deserved on account of their previous sins).

Eighth Question

Whether it follows and can be elicited by legitimate consequence from our doctrine that we make God the author of sin. We deny against the Romanists, Socinians, Remonstrants and Lutherans.

I. Although the innocence of the orthodox doctrine about this argument has been often so clearly and solidly proved by our divines (against the atrocious calumnies of illiberal flings commonly directed against it by our opponents) that there would be no need to labor in its vindication; yet because they do not cease to renew that most unjust accusation and to traduce the purity of our faith in every way they can, it is just that we should drag the falsity of that calumny into the open light and free the religion we profess from their unjust criminations.

II. Before all things, however, we must observe that the question is not new and recently coined, but old. It was started even formerly by the Pelagians and assailed by Augustine (as his books against Julian abundantly testify). The occasion of the question was no other than this—that in the sins of men, Augustine maintained that God is not a bare permitter and idle spectator, but a most holy governor and most just Judge. There is no other reason why modern Pelagians endeavor to make the orthodox doctrine infamous (whose mouth it is not difficult to stop by the example of Augustine).

Statement of the question.

III. The question here, however, is not whether we in express words assert God to be the cause of sin! For although some do not blush to charge this blasphemy

upon us (openly calumniating us as confirming this hypothesis by the words and examples of Scripture), yet others (more modest) do not dare to prefer this charge and acknowledge that no such thing is brought forward by us. "And if the question should be so formed," says Bellarmine, "there would be none, since not only the Catholics, but also the Calvinists deny this" ("De amissione gratiae et statu peccati," 2.2 in *Opera* [1858], 4:79). But the question is whether any such thing can be deduced necessarily and evidently from our doctrine. They charge us with really thinking what we do not dare to profess in words and "if not in express words certainly by necessary arguments." Tirinus says, "They make God the author and cause of all sin" (*Theologicae elenchticae . . . controversiarum fidei*, Cont. 1.12, number 8 [1648], p. 604). In this he follows the footsteps of Bellarmine (ibid., 2.3f. in *Opera* [1858], 4:80-85) and of Becanus (*Summa Theologicae Scholasticae* 2.2.6 [1651], p. 264); with whom agree Brochmand ("De Providentia Divina," 2, Q. 3 in *Universae theologicae systema* [1638], 1:527-37), Eckhard (*Fasciculus controversiarum Theologicarum* 1.10 [1631], pp. 205-11), Graverus (on Article 19*, "De causa peccati," in *Graverus redivivus . . . praelectiones . . . in Augustanam Confessionem* [1659], pp. 1036-68) and other Lutherans; Crellius ("De Deo et Ejus Attributis," 1.25 in *Opera* [1656], 4:75-89), Tilenus (*Traicte de la cause et de l'origine du peche* [1621]), Episcopius ('De Providentia,' in "Institutiones theologica," 4 sec. 4 of *Opera Theologica* [1678], pp. 360-400) and other Remonstrants in the synodical writings, p. 249+.

IV. To draw the sting of this calumny, however, even the following alone suffices: the public confessions of the Reformed churches, in express, careful and authoritative words condemn and censure this impiety: as the Augsburg, Art. 19 (Schaff, 3:20), the French, Art. 8 (Cochrane, 147), the (Second) Helvetic, chap. 8 (Cochrane, 236-37), the Belgic, Art. 13 (Cochrane, 197), the Canons of the Synod of Dort, First Head, Art. 1, 5, 15 (Schaff, 3:581-82, 584). To these are to be added the catechisms, defenses and other symbolic writings, the public and established testimonies of our innocence (which the adversaries themselves cannot distrust). Hence they are accustomed to drawing nothing from public standards to prove their calumnies, but only from the writings of private divines from which they falsely weave consequences.

V. Concerning the public and received opinion of any church, a judgment cannot and ought not to be formed from the writings of private persons. Thus it would be lawful, without compromising the doctrine of the Reformed churches, to pass over this crimination as a matter foreign to the subject and to leave it with its authors because we do not stand or fall with the judgment of each private divine, however illustrious. Still because we are persuaded of the sincerity of the doctrine of Zwingli, Luther, Calvin, Martyr, Beza and other distinguished servants of God (charged with this crime), and it is evident that considerable injury has been done to these great heroes (deserving the gratitude of the church of God), and because it is also known that through them the doctrine of our churches is maliciously aimed at and blasphemously assailed, justice and equity demand that we permit them not to be overwhelmed by these unjust calumnies, since they furnish us with so many arguments to defend them.

VI. First, although they sometimes used harsh and not sufficiently accurate and fit phrases in explaining a difficult thing, they are not on that account to be violently attacked or abused. It is evident that their meaning was sound and

pious, which they often professed both orally and in their writings concerning God, the sole author of all good and the strict punisher of evil. For it is calumnious to feign heresy in words which heresy "is in things, not in words" according to Jerome, with whom Luther agrees—"it is wicked to determine heresy in words, since it is in the meaning alone, not in the words." Second, no expressions are found so harsh in any of them that analogous ones do not exist in the Scriptures; as when they say God blinds, hardens, seduces, sends the efficacy of error, gives men over to a reprobate mind. If these phrases are properly explained and vindicated by our opponents themselves according to the analogy of faith, why may not even the same similar phrases occuring in our divines be equally drawn to a kinder and more suitable sense according to the canon of charity? Nor ought the reply to be made here that the consequence does not hold good, both because men are variously deceived and err (especially about the divine mysteries), while God cannot err or be deceived; and because Scripture so fully and plainly declares itself that there can be no room for such a charge. We answer that the consequence remains unshaken whose force rests not upon the parity or equality of the authority of human and divine writings, but upon the identity or similarity of the phrases employed in both. As indeed such veneration is deservedly due to Scripture that what seems to be said more obscurely or even harsher in one place should be understood and explained according to others more clear; why should not a like equity be extended according to the law of charity to the men of God (as often as they strive not only to think but also to speak with Scripture)?

VII. Third, nothing is said by our party on this subject which cannot also be culled from our various opponents who speak more harshly; nay, stronger words have not been asserted by whole societies in the Romish communion. For it is known that the Thomists and Dominicans agree here with us and sometimes used even harsher phrases. It is known that Occam and Gabriel Biel (according to Bartolomo Medina, in *Expositio in primam secundae . . . Thomae Aquinatis*, Q. 79*, Art. II [1580], p. 419) did not fear to maintain that "God in strictness and propriety of speech is the cause of sin." But to omit others, Bellarmine, who fired with such a frenzy for calumniation inveighs against our divines, may be convicted of the same impiety and blasphemy. For he says, "God not only permits the wicked to do many evils, nor only deserts the pious, but also presides over the evil wills themselves, and rules and governs them, he twists and turns them by his invisible operation, that although by their own fault they are evil, yet by divine providence they are ordained to one evil rather than another, not positively, but permissively" ("De amissione gratiae et statu peccati," 2.13 in *Opera* [1858], 4:100). Nothing harsher than these words occurs among our divines. When, however, he adds that it is done permissively not positively, he shamefully contradicts himself. For he opposes that action by which he twists and turns the will of the wicked to bare permission. The thing itself cries out that the words "govern," "twist," "rule," "bend" signify a positive act and not a bare permission. Here belongs what he brings forward from Thomas Aquinas in the same place: "that God not only inclines evil wills to one rather than another thing, by permitting them to be carried to one and not permitting them to be carried to another, as he rightly taught but also by positively inclining them to one and turning them away from another" (ibid.). Thus in chapter 14 he says, "When in Scripture God is said to harden, to blind, he does that as a just Judge,

and from God intervenes the punishment and ruin of those who are hardened and blinded" (ibid., 2.14, p. 104). So Cornelius a Lapide says, "God holds the wills of all men in his hand, so that he can bend them in any way whatsoever; now the will of man can exert itself in no work at all, whether good or evil, except God loosens the reins of his permission to it, nay, positively concurs and cooperates with it to produce this action and work" (*Commentaria in Sacram Scripturam* [1854], 1:316 on Ex. 7). Yet our divines intend nothing else, while asserting the efficacy of providence in evil. In this sense many others speak: as Pererius (*Selectarum disputationum . . . super libro Exodi* [1607], "In Cap. xi Exodi: De induratione Pharaonis," pp. 308-39), Suarez ("De Concursu et Efficaci Auxilio Dei," 2.3 in *Opera* [1856-78], 11:106-16), Ruiz and others. Arminius acknowledges that besides permission there "is the presentation of occasions and objects and the concourse of God which is necessary to the production of every act, since nothing at all can have any entity, unless from the first and highest being immediately producing it; this concourse, however, is not an immediate influx into the second cause, but the action of God immediately flowing into the effect of the creature, so that the same effect is produced by one and the same total action by God and the creature at the same time . . . So God is at the same time the effector and permitter of the same act" (Disputation 10, 'On the Righteousness and Efficacy of the Providence of God Concerning Evil,' "Public Disputations," 9 in *Works* [1956], 1:517). The same might easily be shown of the Lutherans and of that great man of God, Luther, who followed out this argument in far stronger terms than our divines when he says, "It is to torture the Word for anyone to say the sense of these words, I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, is 'I will permit it to be hardened,' 'I will give the occasion of hardening, while the sinner is not at once corrected' " (*On the Bondage of the Will* [LCC 17:223]); "The expression must be taken simply, as the words sound;" "since God works in evil and by evil, the evil is indeed done, yet God cannot do evil, although he does evil by evil persons, because being himself good he cannot do evil, yet he uses evil instruments which cannot escape the seizure and motion of his power. It is a fault therefore in the instruments, which God does not allow to remain idle, that they do evil, God himself employing them" (ibid., pp. 232-33). "In us, that is, by us, God works evil, not through his, but our own fault" (ibid., p. 234). "God deserting and Satan sinning, the will of Satan and of man being made evil, in working is seized by God and moved whithersoever he wills"; "the words of God, 'I will harden the heart of Pharaoh,' must be thus understood, 'I will cause the heart of Pharaoh to be hardened,' or 'that it be hardened, I operating and making it so' " (ibid., p. 235). He says the same in innumerable other passages of like import which are not dissimilar to the expressions of our divines. Therefore if these have a sound sense in the judgment of Lutherans, why can they not explain the words of our divines kindly also from the same charitable judgment?

VIII. Fourth, our divines so clearly explain their meaning and so expressly condemn this impious dogma in their writings that it cannot be charged upon them without the most gross injustice. Here belong the passages of Zwingli, Calvin, Beza, Peter Martyr and others (cited by Bellarmine, "De amissione gratiae et statu peccati," 2.2 in *Opera* [1858], 4:79-80 and Becanus, *Manuale controversariarum* 3.5.6 [1750], pp. 462-65). Calvin indeed was not only clearly the first, nay almost the only one to refute the Libertines in asserting the holiness of God. Also in his

book concerning predestination (*Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God* [trans. J.K.S. Ried, 1961], pp. 168-82), he authoritatively strikes down this calumny (cf. also ICR 1.17.3*, pp. 214-15). Beza in this matter fully vindicates both Calvin and himself, and shows at length that from the doctrine of Calvin and his own "none of these blasphemies follow as consequences, to wit, either that God is the author of sin or delights in iniquity or even wills iniquity; or that Satan or men, doing wickedly, obey God, or inasmuch as they do evil, do what God wills, and so far forth are without blame. Let all blasphemies of this kind," says he, "be removed as far as possible not only from our tongues, but also from our thoughts" ("Ad Sebastioni Castellionis calumnias . . . aeternam Dei praedestionem," in *Volumen tractationum Theologicarum* [1582], p. 372). See also his refutation of the calumnies of Heshius, where he explains the same thing at large (*Kreophagia, sive Cyclops* [1561]).

IX. Fifth, if the foundation of the charge is examined, it will be evident that it is drawn from no other source than certain truncated words and phrases, twisted and by sophistical consequences drawn to a sense most foreign to their intention and scope. Hence, since they neither saw these consequences nor acknowledge them as their own (nay frequently express their hearty detestation of them and pronounce an anathema upon those holding such opinions), they cannot without great injustice be imputed to them, as if this was their genuine meaning and proper doctrine; especially since the antecedent from which they elicit them is from Scripture itself and for the most part expressed in its proper words.

Sources of explanation.

X. Although God may be said from eternity not only to have foreseen and permitted, but also to have willed and predestinated, the fall of man, and that all things are done not only with the permission but even with the will of God (as Calvin asserts, ICR 1.18.1, pp. 228-31 and 3.23.6, 8, 9, pp. 953-55, 956-58), it does not follow that God is held by him to be the author of sin. For he only can be esteemed the author of sin who decrees and wills sins as to efficiency and approbation, not however as to permission and ordination only. That this is the meaning of Calvin, the passages cited prove. They have no other object than to oppose the will of God to the figment of bare and idle permission (which the Pelagians and most of the Scholastics obtrude), and to teach that the sin of Adam happened and that other things which take place in the world turn out, not at random and fortuitously, but by the certain counsel and providence of God. For God is occupied not only in permitting, but also in governing, terminating and directing them to a good end. It is one thing therefore to will sin itself, but another to will its permission and event; the latter Calvin says with Scripture, not the former.

XI. The dispensation of God by which crimes are said to be committed (Calvin, ICR 1.17.8, pp. 220-21) is not the efficiency of crimes, but the permission; yet not idle permission, but the governing of them and directing them to certain objects and ends. Nor if by that just dispensation of God, it is said that "whatever enemies" do "wickedly against us is not only permitted but also sent in by him" (ibid., p. 221) does it follow that the causality of sin is ascribed to God, because that application of Calvin is not the infusion of wickedness but the direction of the enemies (in whom wickedness is congenital) to certain objects by God, to execute his just judgments (as when bears were brought against the children at

Bethel [2 K. 2:24] and the lion against the disobedient prophet [1 K. 13:24]). Thus he is said to have raised up Pharaoh against the Israelites (Ex. 9:16; Rom. 9:17).

XII. The secret nod of God, without which men are said to effect nothing (ICR 1.18.1, pp. 228-31), is not the complacency of God in their sins or an impulse to sins as such. Rather it is the motion: (1) physical; (2) judicial (in those whose sins are punished by sins by God as a just Judge); (3) directive to objects and certain ends (as when a rider with the bit drives and directs a horse whithersoever he wills, it does not become lame by the fault of the rider).

XIII. When Calvin says that the devil and all the wicked conceive, attempt and commit no evil deed except as God has permitted (nay, as far as God has commanded since they are compelled to perform his service), there is nothing to favor the crime charged against him (ICR 1.17.11, pp. 224-25). (1) Because he says here nothing beyond what is written (*ater graphēs*). The phrase is Scriptural for it says that God commanded Shemei to curse David. (2) The command is understood not of moral preception (against the express prohibition of God, Ex. 22:28), but partly of prophetic prediction (2 S. 16:10), partly of secret motion and direction towards objects. (3) Coaction is not involved (or a violent impulsion or an inclination to evil of the will either indifferent or good), but a necessity only of infallibility, depending partly objectively on the natural wickedness of the devil and the impious, partly dispositively on the immutable counsel of God. (4) The passage is adduced in bad faith against the meaning of Calvin, for his design there is to console the pious against the fear and anxiety by which they are disturbed that they may know that the devil and the wicked are not permitted to torment them at pleasure, but are restrained by the powerful rein of providence that in all things (though raging and champing) they are subject to it, and their fury is turned even into the salvation of believers. "But," says he, "when they recall to mind that the devil and the whole cohort of the wicked are so thoroughly restrained by the hand of God as by a bit, as not to conceive any evil deed against us, nor attempt it when conceived, nor can move a finger to perpetrate what they consummately plot, unless so far as he permits, nay, unless so far as he commands, nor are held bound by fetters only, but even compelled by the bit to render obedience; they have a source of abundant consolation" (ibid., p. 224). Now who does not see that it is one thing for God to restrain the devil and the wicked as with a bit that they may not attempt and conceive evil deeds against the pious, but another for God to compel them to evil deeds? He wishes to intimate that they are compelled not to the evil deed (which they do voluntarily), but to obedience, that in acting badly they may serve God's counsel and do his will beyond their own mind and will.

XIV. If Calvin says that God works in the minds of the wicked and as the first cause does by them as instruments all those things which with respect to men are and are called true sins (ICR 1.17.5, pp. 216-17 and 1.18.1, 2, pp. 228-32), he ought not on that account to be accused of introducing *theomartēsian*. (1) He follows Scripture which frequently so speaks (as we have already seen). (2) God is said to work evils, but not as evils formally and in the abstract, but in the concrete and materially (inasmuch as they are works) or judicially (inasmuch as they are his just judgments). (3) That God can use the wicked as instruments, yet without any taint of disgrace in himself, has been shown before. (4) Calvin so explains and vindicates himself that no room for the charge can remain: "Still what the

Lord does stands always at a great distance from what Satan and the wicked undertake. He makes the evil instruments which he holds in his hand and can turn in any direction he pleases, to serve his justice. These, as they are evil, bring into effect the wickedness conceived by the depraved soul" (ICR 2.4.5, p. 313). In the work *Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God*, he shows at length that God so acts that by the wicked even themselves (although unconscious and unwilling) he fulfils what he has ordained; nor on that account is he either a partaker of any fault, nor are the evil instruments free from sin. But he explains his meaning more clearly still in his *Contre la secte phantastique des Libertins* (1545). After saying that those (who maintain that the providence of God effects all things) mingle all things and not only confound heaven with earth, but also God with the devil, he adds "this results from their not paying the slightest attention to two very necessary exceptions. The former is that Satan and the wicked are not so instruments of God that they also do not themselves act their own part. The other exception to which these unhappy persons pay no regard is this—that there is a great difference between the work of God and the work of the wicked, since God uses him in place of an instrument. For the wicked man is incited to his own crime by avarice or ambition or envy or cruelty and has in view no other end. And thus from that root, that is, from the affection of his mind and the end it has in view, the work derives its quality and is deservedly judged to be evil. But God has an altogether contrary relation, to wit, to exercise his justice for the preservation of the good; he uses his grace and goodness towards believers, but punishes the ill-deserving. Behold how we are to distinguish between God and men, that on the one side in the same work we contemplated his justice, goodness and judgment; on the other the wickedness of the devil and unbelievers" (CR 35.188-89; cf. also his *Calumniae nebulonis cuiusdam . . . de occulta Dei Providentia* [1558], where he answers the calumnies of the abandoned man who traduced his doctrine as impious and blasphemous). Nor dissimilarly Beza ("Ad Sebastioni Castellionis calumnias . . . aeternam praedestionem," in *Volumen tractationum Theologicarum* [1582], pp. 337-424, where he refutes the slanders of Heshius) who clearly explains the mind of Calvin and his own; the passages in both should be consulted. (5) Bellarmine cannot find fault with Calvin for such modes of expression, since he himself used harsher when he says God "twists and bends wills, working invisibly in them" (as was noted before).

XV. When Peter Martyr says, "God is in some way the cause of sin" (*Most learned . . . commentaries . . . upon . . . Romaines* [1568], p. 26); and "God in a certain measure willed the sin of Adam, and is its author, so far" (ibid., p. 302), it must be understood in a sound sense, not that he can be called the cause properly, but improperly and abusively (*katachrēstikōs*), to denote the adjoined antecedent, or the cause *sine qua non*, or to point out only the cause of action and not of the bad quality connected with it.

XVI. When Zwingli says, "Nor can anyone say, the robber is innocent; for he acted, God impelling him; for he sinned against the law. And yet you will say, he was forced to sin. I grant, I reply, that he was forced, but in this, that the one should be translated and the other crucified" (*On Providence* 6 [ed. S.M. Jackson, 1922], p. 183). Although the words may be a little too harsh if pressed closely, still they admit of a sound sense if impulsion and coaction are taken improperly for the efficacious and determinate motion not to the sinning but to the acting.

Hence he does not say, "the thief sinned, God being the impeller," but only "he acted." It is one thing to act; another, however, to sin. Again, he does not assert properly that he was compelled, but as if by concession he says, "I grant that he was forced" (which is the expression of one granting, but not always of one approving the hypothesis).

XVII. From these, not to consume time in enumerating or pointing out other passages, it is clearly evident that the reputation of these great men is most unjustly traduced (as if they made God the author of sin, since it appears that they were the farthest removed from that blasphemy and more than once solidly refuted it; nor can any such thing be elicited from their writings except by false and violent consequences). But it is evident that this blasphemous opinion is still unjustly attributed to our churches, which our public confessions, and symbolical writings constantly reject and treat with detestation. Other defenses against these calumnies can be found in Topic IV, Question 14, "On the Absolute Decree of Reprobation."

Ninth Question

Is there a use and an abuse of the doctrine of providence?

I. As they err in many ways theoretically about providence who either entirely deny it or are ignorant of it or corrupt its true nature and mode of operation (concerning whom we have already spoken), no less dangerously do they sin against it practically who are ignorant or neglect the right and lawful use of the doctrine.

Providence is sinned against as to the past: (1) by murmuring; (2) by desperation.

II. A manifold sin can be committed whether it is concerned with the past or the future. For as to the past, it is sinned: (1) by murmuring, when sinners rave against the providence of God and charge it with injustice. This is attributed to the wicked (Ezk. 18:29), as if they were visited undeservedly on account of others' sins, while yet they might find in themselves the most just causes of punishment (Ezk. 33:20). This sometimes happens to the pious also through the impatience of the flesh when they see the prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the pious (Job 21:7, 8; Ps. 73:2, 3; Jer. 12:1). To this must be opposed a most humble submission which always adores the ways of providence as most holy, whatever they may seem to be to our flesh: such as in Job (1:21; 2:10), in David (Ps. 39:9), in Eli (1 S. 3:18) and others. (2) By desperation, when they sink into despair in evils as if it was all over with them and no hope of restoration remained: examples of which are found in Cain, Saul, Judas and others. Such was the young man in Plautus. As if seized by the fates, in his desperation, he plunged into destruction. "Unstable," said he, "is the lot of things; the fates drive men at pleasure. I will take myself to the precipice that I may there end the matter with my life" (cited in Calvin, ICR 1.17.3, p. 214). To this must be opposed a firm trust in God which will make us immovable and unshaken in the midst of trials and the high waves of calamities, when all things seem desperate on the part of men and second causes. Such was the hope of Job ("though he slay me, yet will I trust in him," 13:15) the faith of David (Ps. 23:6), the constancy of the three companions of Daniel (Dan. 3:16, 17).

(3) By the excusing of crimes.

III. Third, by the excusing of crimes when sinners set the providence of God over against their wickedness; for nothing is done except as God wills and permits (and nothing is more wicked than this thought). For although sins are not committed without the providence of God, yet neither does God come into alliance with the sin, nor are the wicked on that account freed from blame because they obey not the will of God, but their own lust. For true obedience answers to the revealed will set forth in the word, not to the secret will hidden in God. He obeys God who, being informed of his will, goes where he is called by it. But if men attempt anything against his command, it is not obedience, but rebellion and transgression (although otherwise they fulfil God's secret will). He, contrary to their intention, uses their evil works by his most wise and just ordination to execute his judgments (as has already been said).

As to the future: (1) by security and sloth; (2) by anxiety and distrust.

IV. As to the future, providence is sinned against: (1) by security and sloth by those who, wantonly despising the means most wisely instituted by divine providence, seek hiding places for their idleness and torpor in this most holy doctrine and, under the certainty of providentially ordained events give themselves up to carnal security, neglecting the means necessary for their conservation and salvation (as if the certainty of the end could take away the necessity of means, and the same God, who preordained the future event, did not also appoint beforehand the means to be used by men according to his precept and will). If he bounded man's life by certain limits, he committed the care of it to man and instructed him in the methods and helps for conserving it; made him also prescient of dangers, lest they should come upon him unawares; suggested cautions and remedies which he should use. Here belongs the rashness of those who (with an overweening confidence, without a call and necessity) refuse not to rush into dangers of any kind and are unwilling to use second causes (which are at hand) and the means divinely appointed (which is to tempt God). For although he can preserve us no less without than with means, yet because he wills ordinarily that our desire and care also should be exercised, we cannot without guilt neglect those things which he willed to appoint for our use, whether in avoiding danger or averting evils. (2) By anxiety and distrust, when we are concerned unduly about the morrow's food and clothing and the necessities of life, as if God was not a provident Father making abundant provision for all. The words of Christ are very pertinent here: "Therefore I say unto you, take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment" (Mt. 6:25). He does not wish his creatures to divest themselves entirely of all care, since indeed men were born under this law that they should have some care; nay, this is not the last part of the miseries which the Lord has imposed upon us in punishment in order to humble us. But he condemns only the anxious care and superfluous solicitude with which the unbelieving and heathen usually distress themselves (arising from a distrust of providence), as if God (inactive) slept in heaven or paid no attention to human things. He therefore wishes believers to rest in the fatherly goodness and care of God and tranquilly to expect from him, in the exercise of their lawful calling, whatever they feel to be necessary for themselves.

(3) By a too great reliance upon second causes.

V. (3) By a too great reliance upon second causes; for as they who entirely neglect them tempt God, seeking whether he will even without means conserve them, no less do they also sin against him who ascribe too much to them, placing their confidence in them and clinging to these certain means as it were to a spike (*clavo*), leave no room for divine providence on account of their distrust (as for example Asa "who in his disease sought not to the Lord, but to the physicians," 2 Ch. 16:12). For although we ought to love and honor creatures (since God condescended to employ them in some part of his work), yet we are permitted to trust in God alone and to rest upon him as their most wise and provident Father (who is never wanting to them in time of need).

The use of providence.

VI. However, the use of this doctrine is far more fruitful and excellent, both in asserting the glory of God (to whom is here ascribed the praise of the highest wisdom, power and goodness) and in cherishing our faith and increasing our confidence which, when involved in the storms of trial, the persuasion of providence strengthens, like a most sure anchor in the sea of this wicked world. Here, therefore, is the first duty of the pious man—as to intellect, that he should not only raise his eyes to God as the first and primary cause of all things (being persuaded that nothing happens by chance, but that all things are directed by the most wise providence of God)—but also cherish the thought that the singular and special providence of God watches for his safety, whether his business is with men or with other creatures. This is taught not only by the clear promises of Scripture (Pss. 34; 37; 55; 91; Zech. 2:8; Is. 26:3; 49:15; Mt. 6; 10; Lk. 12; 1 Pet. 5:7), but also by the examples of the saints (whose ways he everywhere reads were guarded by God). The various passages which teach that all creatures are under the power of God so that they can attempt to perform nothing without his nod, favor this view.

Whence arises: (1) a desire of holiness; of gratitude; of patience; of repentance?

VII. (1) From this contemplation of God's providence, there ought to arise in the hearts of believers an earnest desire: (a) of holiness, that we may be made more cautious in our daily life because we are everywhere acting under the eye of God, who always stands nearest to us and from whose presence we can never withdraw ourselves, whatever we may do because "he sees and hears all things" (*pant' ephora kai pant' epakouei*). (b) Of gratitude, that we may in prosperity and favorable circumstances not sacrifice to our net, but tenderly kiss and reverence with a grateful mind the benevolent providence of God (Ps. 115:1), ascribing the glory not to ourselves, but to his name. He is the primary benefactor, whose beneficent hand embraces all second causes, whether they be men or inanimate creatures (Hos. 2:21, 22). (c) Of patience and humility in adversity by the example of Christ (Lk. 22:42), of Joseph (Gen. 45:8; 50:20), of Job (1:21), of David (2 S. 16:10*; Ps. 39:9), that in all things which happen somewhat harshly to us we may acquiesce without a murmur in the will and providence of God (to which the Gentiles themselves were not strangers). "Our mind," says Seneca, "being adopted to this law, follows and obeys it and thinks whatever is done ought to be done, nor wishes to find fault with nature; it is best to suffer what you cannot alter and to follow without murmuring, God from

whom as the author all things proceed. He is a bad soldier who follows his general with groans. Wherefore let us zealously and with alacrity take up his commands, nor desert this march of a most admirable work, into which whatever we suffer is woven" (*Epistle 107.9-10* [Loeb, 3:226-29]). And this must be done the more willingly because it becomes us to be persuaded that the evil deeds of even the bitterest enemies are both permitted and sent only by the just dispensation of God, since not even the devil himself comes forth to assail us without the nod of God; and so all things work together for good to us (*synergein*, Rom. 8:28), and the cups offered by so friendly a hand, although bitter to the flesh, are yet healthful to the spirit (Heb. 12:11). (d) Of repentance, for as the blessings of God invite us to gratitude, so adversities are his scourges which call us to repentance (Lam. 3:39; Is. 45:7; Am. 3:6; Heb. 12:9, 10).

2. Consolation.

VIII. Finally, from the belief in providence arises the greatest consolation and incredible tranquility of mind for the pious. It causes them, resting peacefully in the bosom of God and commending themselves entirely to his paternal care, always to hope well from him in the future, not doubting but that he will ever perform the office of a Father towards them in conferring good and turning away evils: examples of which are given in David (1 S. 17:37; Ps. 23:1, 4, 6) and in Paul (2 Tim. 4:17, 18). They feel that under his protection (who has all creatures in his power) nothing is to be feared by them, while walking in their proper calling. Hence, neither supinely neglecting means, nor carefully trusting to them, but prudently using them according to his command, they cast all their care upon the Lord (1 Pet. 5:7), and in all their perplexities always exclaim with the father of the faithful, "The Lord will provide" (*yhvh yr'h*).

SEVENTH TOPIC

ANGELS

FIRST QUESTION
Whether and when angels were created.

I. Among the creatures (about which the providence of God is occupied) angels excel. Their dignity is so much the greater as they approach nearer the divine nature and are free from all contact with matter. The investigation of them is rightly stated before the rest.

Various names of angels: from their nature, power and dignity, office.

II. To premise something concerning them, their names are various in Scripture. Some are essential (*ousiōdē*), drawn from their nature, such as spirit (*pneumatos*); others are nonessential (*epousiōdē*) from the power, virtue and dignity with which they are endowed, such are the names "Seraphim" and "Cherubim" and "thrones," "dominions," "powers" (of which hereafter); others relative (*schetika*) and referring to the office or duty demanded of them, such as the name "angel" (signifying "legate") and "sent" or "ambassador" and the name "ministering spirits" (*pneumatōn leitourgikōn*, Heb. 1:14).

The existence of angels is proved.

III. The existence of angels is proved by many arguments, whatever the Sadducees of old said (and the false Christians of our day say, who press in their footsteps). (1) The grade of beings and the complement of the universe: for as God has made in it creatures merely corporeal which strike the senses (as bodies); others partly corporeal and visible, partly spiritual and invisible (as men); so it was fitting to the perfection of the world that the merely spiritual should be created (such as are angels). (2) The various proofs drawn from wonderful effects surpassing human strength: from the oracles put forth among the Gentiles; from the apparition of specters; from the possessed speaking in foreign tongues. Since these could not proceed from God, nor agree with those men, they betray evil genii as their authors. And if they exist, the existence of good ones also ought not to be denied since they must have been good at least from the beginning. (3) The voice of Scripture which, in teaching this everywhere, supplies us with an apodictic argument beyond all exception.

IV. Since in truth mention is so often made of them in the books of Moses and the entire Scripture, it can seem a wonder how the Sadducees (who received the books of Moses) could fall into the error of denying the existence of angels, saying, "There is neither angel, nor spirit" (Acts 23:8). Hence some are unwilling that this should be understood absolutely, but think they referred only to guardian (*paredrous*) angels, placed over individuals for their protection. But others

more truly think they wrested the passages of Scripture, either understanding by angels (there treated of) qualities produced by God in the imagination of him whom he wished to teach concerning anything; or by conceding that God indeed produced spirits when he wished to avail himself of their help, but afterwards (their function having been performed) they vanished with their bodies.

Proof that angels were created.

V. That angels are not coeternal with God (as the Peripatetics held), but created by him, not only reason proves (which evinces that all other entities are by participation from God as the highest being), but Scripture expressly asserts: (1) in general, when it affirms that heaven and earth (and thus all that are in them) were created by God (Gen. 1:1); (2) in particular, when it says, "The heavens were finished, and all the host of them" (Gen. 2:1). However, nothing is more familiar to Scripture than for angels to be called "the host of heaven" (Ps. 103:20, 21; 148:2; Lk. 2:13). Hence God is called "the Lord of hosts," principally from the angels who stand around him (Dan. 7:10). Unless they were created by God, David and the apostle after him could not have said, "God made his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire" (Ps. 104:4; Heb. 1:7), "to be ministering spirits, sent forth to minister unto the salvation of believers" (Heb. 1:14).

VI. Paul clearly establishes this when he says, "By Christ were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him" (Col. 1:16*). For as by "visible," he wished to embrace all corporeal creatures (whether heavenly or sublunary), it is most certain that by "invisible," he wished to denote spiritual and intelligent creatures (to wit, angels).

In the Mosaic beginning.

VII. However, angels were created not before the Mosaic beginning, as the Socinians hold. Many of the ancient writers, especially the Greek fathers—Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzus, Basil and others (cited by Vossius, *De Theologia Gentili . . . de origine ac progressu idolatrie* 1.17 [1641/1976], 1:129-30)—agree with them. Among the Latins, Jerome (*Commentariorum in Epistolam ad Titum* [PL 26.589-636]) and Ambrose (*Hexameron* 1.5 [19] [FC 42:18]) also concur. Some however think they speak not so much of the Mosaic beginning, as that they were created in the beginning before other creatures (as John of Damascus, *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 2.2, 3 [NPNF2, 9:18-20] explains their opinion). Rather they were created in the very beginning of the world with all other creatures.

VIII. The reasons are: (1) because the Mosaic beginning is the beginning both of time and of every creature before which (from the style of Scripture also) nothing can be conceived but the abyss of eternity. Therefore the angels could not have existed before that beginning without existing from eternity. (2) Whatever was before the world is God because this prerogative is claimed for him in Scripture (Ps. 90:2; Prov. 8:22; Jn. 1:1). (3) Moses says expressly, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," i.e., both those bodies and all things which are contained in heaven and earth—to wit, in the beginning of time and of creation, as Lyranus expresses it (*Biblia sacra cum glossa ordinaria* [1617], 1:4 on Gen. 1:1). Therefore, angels were not created before that beginning. This is more evidently asserted in Ex. 20:11: "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and all that in them is"—therefore angels also.

IX. Although Moses does not mention expressly the creation of angels, it does not follow on that account that he is altogether silent concerning them. As has been said, he could embrace them under the hosts of heaven or under the first born light or under the heavens and the earth. The cause of his silence was not either the idol-loving (*phileidōlon*) disposition of the Israelites (strongly inclined to idolatry) because he ought thus equally to have omitted the mention of them in his books (which however is not the case); nor the slowness of the people to whom he wished to set forth in suitable style the origin of the visible world (since indeed by the tradition of the elders at least, angels were not unknown to the Israelites); nor was there need to explain fully the angelic nature to a rude people, but only to set forth its origin. Rather the silence of Moses arose from his design to weave a history of the church and to trace its origin from the beginning of the world. Thus he considered it sufficient to delineate the origin of the world from which the church took its rise, speaking now and then also of angels (as the nature of his purpose in adorning the history of the church demanded). The same is true in the histories of the kingdoms when mention is not always made of the origin of neighboring kingdoms.

X. The passage in which the morning stars and the sons of God are said to have sung together for joy when he founded the earth (Job 38:6, 7) proves indeed that they were created in the beginning and immediately broke forth into praise of their Creator. But there is nothing here whence it can be inferred that they were created long before the Mosaic beginning. Yea, since it is evident from this that they were a part of the universe, no reason can be given why that part remained separated from its own whole through as many ages. Furthermore what need was there to create those ministering spirits at so great a distance of time before men existed to whom they could be sent and unto whom they could minister?

SECOND QUESTION

Are angels spiritual and incorporeal substances? We affirm.

Two opinions: (1) of those who give bodies to angels.

I. Theologians hold two opinions about this question. The first denies that angels are mere spirits, free from all matter; the other affirms it. Many of the fathers (after the Platonists) followed the first, attributing proper bodies to angels: as Tertullian, *On the Flesh of Christ* 3 (ANF 3:523) and ?*Against Praxeas* 7 (ANF 3:602), Augustine, CG 15.23 (FC 14:470-75) and *The Trinity* 2.7 (FC 45:66-67), Bernard, "Sermon 5," *Song of Solomon* (trans. S.J. Eales, 1984 repr.), pp. 24-28, the author of the book *De Ecclesiasticus Dogmatibus* 12* (PL 42.1216) (which is preserved in volume 3 of the works of Augustine), who openly defines angels to be corporeal, whom Vorstius follows (*Doct. Conradi Vorstii Apologetica Exegesis* 7 [1611], pp. 29-33). However, the second is the common and received opinion among the Romanists as well as among our divines (which we retain).

(2) Of those who deny it, which is proved.

II. First, Scripture expressly calls them spirits (*pneumata*); now for what purpose would they be called "spirits" if they are corporeal? Spirit is diametrically opposed to body: "A spirit hath not flesh and bones," says Christ, "as ye see me have" (Lk. 24:39). For the same reason they

are classed among things "invisible" (*ta aorata*, Col. 1:16) and are thus distinguished from all the works of God which strike the senses. Although they are compared to winds and flames of fire, they are not therefore to be termed corporeal. Otherwise a body must be ascribed to God (who willed to shadow himself forth often under these similitudes). Rather they are so called analogically, to teach that they are like the winds and the lightning—most swift messengers of God.

III. Second, spiritual faculties and operations are attributed to them which cannot proceed from a corporeal nature (such as intellect and will, and the acts elicited by them) and which, therefore, necessarily demand a spiritual and immaterial cause. Third, if they were corporeal they would have quantity and so would be impenetrable, and more than one could not be at the same time in the same place (which nevertheless did happen, for a "legion" of demons is said to have been in one possessed, Lk. 8:30). Fourth, if they already had bodies, they could not and ought not to assume other bodies. However, they evidently often did when they presented themselves to be seen in assumed bodies.

IV. Although they are called spiritual, still they are not to be considered as rejoicing in an absolute and the highest simplicity (which belongs to God alone from whom they are infinitely distant); not that they coalesce with matter, but because they are subjected to accidents. Thus in them are always distinguished the genus and *differentia* (the distinguishing quality), power and act, subject and accident.

Sources of explanation.

V. Body either is opposed to shadow or apparition (*phasei*) and phantasm; or denotes a thing truly existing; or properly denotes what is material and composed of quantitative parts. In the former sense, a body is attributed to God by Tertullian (*Against Praxeas* 7 [ANF 3:602; PL 2.162]), and thus angels could be called corporeal, but very loosely (*akyrōs*). Or body is said of all that is composed in any way and mutable; thus every created substance might be called corporeal with respect to God who is most simple and immutable. "The soul with respect to the incorporeal God is corporeal, nothing should be believed to be invisible and incorporeal by nature except God alone, who is so called because he is infinite and uncircumscribed" (Augustine, *De Spiritu et Anima* 18 [PL 40.793; now spurious]). Thus John of Damascus understands it: "for the deity only is really immaterial and incorporeal" (*monon gar ontōs aulon to theion esti kai asōmaton*, *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 1*.4 [NPNF2, 9:3; PG 94.800]). Thus the Scholastics reconcile the sayings of the fathers—that they called angels, spirits with respect to us, but bodies with respect to God (which indeed would modify their opinion, without however removing altogether their improper phraseology [*akyrologian*] and error).

VI. The apparitions of angels in which they exhibited themselves to men do not prove them to be corporeal because they appeared not in bodies of their own, but in assumed bodies. Hence they were visible and tangible, not of themselves, but only incidentally. What those bodies were, however, will be seen hereafter.

VII. Although angels are said to be in a certain *ubi* or "place," it does not follow on that account that they are corporeal (as if bodies alone can be said to be in a place and spiritual things could not otherwise be said to be anywhere than by efficaciously acting, as the more modern philosophers maintain). The circumscriptive "where" (belonging to bodies alone) is falsely confounded with the

definitive "where" (belonging to spirits). Nor can it be immediately denied that a thing can be in a place, although not coextensive with the space in which it is. Nay, so necessary is it that everything which is should be somewhere, that it has been well said that it is not which is nowhere. As Augustine rightly expresses it, "Whatever is, cannot be nowhere" (*The Immortality of the Soul* 1 [FC 4:16; PL 32.1021]). Whatever is finite, for that very reason, ought to be bounded by its own certain "where," i.e., may be so here as not to be there. Nor can virtual presence be separated here from substantial, since the former necessarily supposes the latter as its principle. For as to operate supposes existence, so every cause ought to be where it operates. However although the presence of angels may be known *a posteriori* from their operation, it does not follow that the whole relation of presence consists in operation alone, since it is not always necessary for it to operate at least outwardly. Nor is it more absurd for an angel to be somewhere by essence than by operation, since both are spiritual. Now although contact between body and spirit cannot be conceived, yet we can well understand that there may be a relation between them (as between two things mutually coexisting with each other) which suffices for founding the relation of presence or whereness (*ubietatis*) in a spirit. As therefore an angel does not by essence have a relation to place, as if it occupied and was coextensive with it, still it does not cease to have a relation (*schesin*) to the locality in which it is by the finiteness of its essence (indivisibly and without the extension of itself).

VIII. The corporeity of angels is no better collected from their motion. For although local motion properly belongs to bodies (in which there is a mover and a thing moved), yet there may be granted without repugnancy, if not a change of place, at least of the definitive locality (in finite beings of whatever kind), when one locality having been left, they settle in another. And, moreover, there is no need of quantity or dimension properly so called; for although the placing is divisible and extended, yet the thing placed always remains indivisible, and only virtually can be said in any way to be coextended with space by an intrinsic definition of essence. In vain, however, is it objected here by some that motion cannot be ascribed to an angel, except insofar as it changes in operation. Since it cannot operate except where it is, it cannot change its operation without a change of its substantial locality. Scripture clearly intimates this when it speaks concerning the advent and departure of angels. Indeed they could not descend to earth without leaving heaven, nor go up to heaven without departing from the earth (and so changing their previous "where"; otherwise they would be everywhere).

IX. Although "eternal fire" is said to be prepared for the devil and his angels (Mt. 25:41), it does not follow that angels are corporeal because it is not necessary that a material and corporeal fire should be understood. Rather a spiritual and figurative fire describes the most excruciating torments of hell (as the joys of eternal life are usually adumbrated under the symbols of the most pleasant and agreeable things).

THIRD QUESTION: ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE

What is the mode and what is the object of angelic knowledge?

Statement of the question.

I. The question is not whether angels are endowed with the gift of understanding (for this all confess). Even the name of "intelligences" alone, given to them on account

of their surpassing knowledge, sufficiently proves this. Rather the question is how and what do they understand; or what is the mode and what is the object of their knowledge? For as the former is denied by no one, so the latter is known by no one perfectly; and Scripture being silent, it must not be rashly defined by us. Thus the vain and curious questions of the Scholastics being dismissed (who wish to enter into what they have not seen [*embateuein eis ha mē heōrokasi*]), we must here be soberly wise from the word.

II. Angelic knowledge in general can be distinguished into four kinds: natural, revealed, experimental, and supernatural. (1) The natural is what was given to angels from the beginning of the creation, common both to the good and the bad ones. (2) The revealed, by which they know many things from the revelation of God, of which they were before ignorant (as to Dan. 9, the mystery of the seventy weeks is revealed by the angel Gabriel; and in the Apocalypse, God revealed many things to the angels that they might announce them to men). (3) Experimental and acquired, arising from the things which are done in the world and especially in the church (concerning which cf. Eph. 3:10 and Lk. 15:10). (4) Supernatural, belonging only to good angels, with which they were furnished by God in confirmation; by which they so perfectly behold him that they constantly cleave to him, nor do they wish to leave him forever.

All things are not the objects of angelic knowledge.

III. The object of angelic knowledge is: (1) negatively (*kat' arsin*) not all things (a) because Christ testifies that "they do not know the day of judgment" (Mk. 13:32); (b) because they learn many things every day from revelation which they did not know before (Eph. 3:10), whence they are said by Peter to desire to look into (*parakypsai*) the gospel mysteries (1 Pet. 1:12), i.e., from an earnest desire to learn the mysteries of piety they stoop and as it were bend their heads (alluding to the cherubim of the ark whose eyes looked towards the mercy seat, Ex. 25:20); (c) because omniscience belongs to God alone, who is an infinite being; but finite ought also to be the knowledge of all creatures whose essence is finite and circumscribed by certain limits. Now although the angels see God who sees all things, it does not follow that they see all things in the essence of God. Since he is a voluntary agent, he does not necessarily expose all things to their sight, but only as he wills. They see therefore as much as he wills them to see. So he, who sees the sun illuminating all things, does not immediately see all things.

Not future contingencies.

IV. (2) Not future contingent things depending on the free will of God and which can be known by the creature certainly only from his revelation. For he claims the knowledge of them as peculiar to himself and incommunicable to others (Is. 41:22, 23; 42:8, 9; 44:7, 8). The created intellect cannot predict future things, except by looking into the causes from which they spring; but future contingencies have no definite causes, consequently the created intellect cannot by its own proper light see through them. And if angels sometimes predicted future things, it does not follow that these events fell under their natural knowledge. They could have done this either from divine revelation exhibited to them that they might disclose them to men or from mere conjecture (as in evil angels, which is ascertained to be for the most part deceitful, as is evident from the oracles of the Gentiles).

Not the heart. V. (3) They do not know the heart because God reserves this for himself (Jer. 17:9; 2 Ch. 6:30, to wit, in itself and immediately; although in its effects and external signs they can in some measure know their thoughts). They can indeed apprehend the phantasm about which the intellect is exercised, but they cannot know immediately and of themselves the judgment of the mind concerning these phantasms. This is proper to God alone.

But God. VI. Affirmatively (*kata thesin*): (1) they know God and divine things; not that they comprehend the divine essence (because a finite cannot contain the infinite), but inasmuch as they so far apprehend the rays of his majesty and glory, as the weakness of the creature can endure. Hence they are said "always to behold the face of God in heaven" (Mt. 18:10).

Angels and men. (2) Themselves and men, because if they did not, they would be less perfect in understanding than men who know themselves and others; nor could they take care of men and keep guard over them, if they did not know them. (3) Other creatures of God, celestial as well as sublunary, universals as well as singulars, as much indeed as their nature allows, far more perfectly than men.

What is the mode of angelic knowledge? VII. But it is more difficult to understand the mode of angelic knowledge, concerning which bold and anxious questions are raised by the Scholastics. Leaving these to them, we will only remark briefly: (1) that the angelic knowledge is only intellectual, not sensitive (the latter is organic and belongs only to bodies, which the angels have not). Hence no corporeal act is properly ascribed to them. Neither do they need corporeal organs or external senses which, as windows, they may open to objects. (2) That angels do not understand by their own essence; for thus the angelic essence would contain all things and be the cause and image of them (which belongs to the infinite God alone). Rather they understand by certain representations and ideas or similitudes of things, partly inborn and implanted from the first creation of things (which they know naturally), partly acquired (of things which they know either from divine revelation, God presenting such ideas to their intellect), or from experience (by representations abstracted from the things themselves). However although we do not know how they can abstract such representations or images from things (since they are destitute of external senses), we are not on this account to deny that this is done by them. Nor does anything seem to prevent them from having the power to abstract images from things and to represent them to their intellect (as may be gathered even from this, that in their conversations with the saints, they hear their voices and answer them). Now although we say that an angel understands other things by images, yet we do not suppose these are required for the knowledge of himself which can be obtained immediately through his own essence. This is not because the intellection of an angel is its own essence (since no substance is constituted in its substantial being by its own operation, and the cause must always be distinguished from its effect and the principle of intellection from its act and exercise), but because the essence of an angel is the reason and principle of knowing himself without any intelligible representation superadded (for since it is actually intelligible and intimately present to the angelic intellect, he has no need of an image for the understanding of himself).

VIII. (3) The knowledge also is not intuitive and cognizable by the intellect, but discursive and ratiocinative. To know intuitively belongs to God alone, since he sees things themselves in their essence immediately and has no need of reasoning to collect one thing from another. But all creatures, being finite and depending upon images, cannot perceive things intuitively. Therefore the angel does not see through all things by a simple and instantaneous intuition, but in a manner analogous to our reasoning (but far more perfect, not languid, imperfect and obscure [such as ours is], but most penetrating and subtle).

IX. That there is mutual communication among the angels, Scripture testifies when it speaks of angelic colloquies (Zech. 2:3) and introduces them shouting to each other (Is. 6:3; Rev. 7:2; 14:18). But what it is and how it is conducted, neither Scripture informs us, nor can any mortal affirm (whatever the Scholastics may here rashly prattle about the "speech of angels" as if they had heard them talking). Some hold that in the angelic intellect its knowledge shines as in a mirror; others that the angelic intellection is impressed by one angel upon the intellect of the other; others that by the will is covered and revealed the secret which is shut up by the will alone. But all these are curiously searched into and rashly defined. It is sufficient for us to hold the fact (*to on*) or the thing, although we are ignorant of the how (*to poion*) or the mode. Here belongs the expression of John of Damascus speaking of angels: "There is no need of tongue and hearing, but without spoken words they mutually exchange their own thoughts and desires" (*ou glōssēs kai akoēs deitai, all' aneu logou prophorikou metadidoasin allēlois ta idia noēmata kai bouleumata*, *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 2.3 [NPNF2, 9:19; PG 94.868-69]). What the apostle says of the tongues of angels ("Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," 1 Cor. 13:1) does not belong here because he speaks hyperbolically and hypothetically for greater emphasis, to denote the most excellent and eloquent tongue (such as the tongues of angels would be, if they spoke; the most beautiful and attractive face is called an "angelic face" [Acts 6:15]; and the "food of angels" [Ps. 78:25] means exquisite and the best food).

Fourth Question

What is the will and the free will of angels? Do affections belong to them?

I. The will follows the intellection of angels which is most free and far more perfect than man's will (which is often disturbed by passions and bodily motions). What its method is, however, Scripture does not teach, nor is it of much importance to know.

II. This is certain—that their will is neither independent (because always in subjection to God) nor operative (as if they operated by their own will). To operate by mere will and most powerful control belongs to God alone. All creatures, however, besides will, need power to be the effective principle of operations outwardly and to really flow into the effect. Rather it is a most free principle of willing, from which manifold and various acts are spontaneously elicited in relation to the objects, according to the dictate of the practical intellect.

III. Now from both faculties arises their free will (of which angels are partakers; indeed, in a more noble sense than men). Then free will, although from the beginning undetermined to good and to evil, afterwards in the good (determined

indeed by the confirmation of God) is only to good; in the bad, however (by their own sin) to evil only, according to the just desertion of God.

IV. As angels have no sensitive knowledge, so neither do sensitive appetites, nor affections, nor passions (*pathē*) properly belong to them. Although Scripture sometimes ascribes these to them (as when they are said to love God, to hate evil, to rejoice at our repentance and salvation; and on the other hand to be sad at our sins and to weep over our calamities), such affections properly so called (to which we are liable in this mortal state) are not to be imagined as existing in angels, which have their seat in an irascible (*thymikō*) and concupiscible (*epithymētikō*) subject. Rather they are ascribed analogically only because (the perturbation of the passions being removed) they are placed in the simple act of right will, which belongs to their spiritual nature and by which they either love good (or are averse to evil) and concerning these either rejoice or are sad. In almost the same way, the same affections are attributed to God humanly speaking (*anthrōpopathōs*) which nevertheless must be understood in a manner becoming to him (*theoprepōs*).

Fifth Question
What is the power of the angels?

I. After having explained the directive and imperative principle of acting in the angels, there follows the executive principle which refers to power. The greatness of their power, not only Scripture testifies when it calls them "excelling in strength" (Ps. 103:20) and in contradistinction to "flesh and blood" (as denoting infirmity), "principalities and powers" (Eph. 6:12), nay, even *dynameis* and "mighty angels" (2 Thess. 1:7); but also the wonderful and stupendous effects produced by them sufficiently prove.

What is the power of the angels?

II. Now whatever that power (the greatest of all created power) may be, still it is finite and circumscribed by certain limits, so that although they can do many things, still they cannot do all things (since this power to do all things [*pantodynamis*] belongs to the omnipotent God alone), rather those things only which do not surpass the order and strength of a created nature. Therefore, the angels can act above the order of particular nature, but not above the order of universal nature. They can do what surpasses human power and seems wonderful to us, but not miracles properly so called, which surpass the power of entire created nature. God alone is the author of miracles (who alone does wonderful things, Ps. 71:19) because infinite virtue is required for them. And if at any time God is said to use the help of angels to perform them, they were only moral instruments (at whose presence God operated) not however causes properly so called (concurring with them by a real physical influx).

What they can do in bodies.

III. As to bodies, there is no doubt that they have great power over every elementary and sublunary body to move them locally and affect them in different ways. Also, it is certain that they can act upon the external and internal senses to excite or bind them. As to the rational soul, they can do nothing immediately to it because to God alone (who knows and searches and holds the heart in his hand) per-

In souls.

tains also the bending and moving it whithersoever he wills; rather they can act mediately only by phantasms or by the irascible (*to thymikon*) and the concupiscible part (*to epithymētikon*); not effectively and physically by infusing something into or by efficaciously operating upon it, but objectively and morally by preventing phantasms and exciting and influencing the affections, by which the will is impelled to do this or that (if not by infallible persuasion, still by powerful suasion) which to a great extent obtains its effect in men on account of their corruption.

IV. If the Devil is said to "work (*energein*) in the children of disobedience" (Eph. 2:2), this is not so to be understood as if he operated immediately upon the rational soul itself, but because in diverse ways he acts upon the external and internal senses by evil suggestions and temptations; on the fantasy by the proposition of objects, on the concupiscible part by the excitation and irritation of the affections. And if the same word is used with respect to the operation of the Holy Spirit acting immediately upon the heart (while he is said to "work" [*energein*] to will and to do, Phil. 2:13), it does not follow that it has the same meaning precisely with respect to the Devil as to principle and mode (since the operation of God differs far from that of the Devil), but only as to event which arises not so much from the power of Satan, which cannot act further than by suasion and would be inefficacious if man willed to resist it, as from the depraved disposition of the subject rushing of its own accord into evil at the instigation of Satan. Nor if Satan is said to "have filled the heart of Ananias" (Acts 5:3), ought he to have acted immediately upon it. He could do this by the proposition of objects and the irritation of concupiscence, which so kindled up his heart that in order to fulfil it he did not hesitate to lie wickedly to the Holy Ghost. So he is said to have "entered into the heart of Judas" (Jn. 13:2*; cf. v. 27), not by entering the rational soul, but by insinuating himself into the sensitive soul and the affections (whence he could lay siege to and take by storm the heart itself).

Whether they can produce substances.

V. As to the production of substances, although they may be able occasionally and dispositively to concur to it by an excitation of causes (by applying active things to passive), yet they cannot properly and physically produce anything. There are two modes of production (by creation and generation) and neither belongs to them. Not the former because infinite power is required for it; not the latter because since they are incorporeal, they are not capable of generation. They who here hold the angels to differ in sex, by whom the giants and others were begotten (the opinion of many of the Jews, as of Josephus, AJ 1.3* [Loeb, 4:35] and of Philo, *On the Giants* [Loeb, 2:443-79] and adopted by very many Christians from them) can be sufficiently refuted even from the authority of Christ alone when he says that the saints in the resurrection will be like the angels (*isangelous*), who neither marry nor are given in marriage (Mt. 22:30). What is drawn from Gen. 6:2, however, to confirm this error concerning "the sons of God," who are said "to have taken wives from the daughters of men," whatever may have been the opinion of the ancients (which Pererius, on this passage, rightly judges to be false and immodest, cf. *Commentariorum et disputationum in Genesim* [1601], 2:378 on Gen. 6:2) cannot be used here. "The sons of God" referred to are no other than the posterity of Seth, who on account of still retaining the purer worship of God, are distinguished from the profane posterity of Cain or "the sons of men."

Whether they can raise the dead.

VI. Since there is naturally no return from a total privation to a habit, the raising of the dead is a work surpassing angelic power and peculiar to God alone. And if the examples brought forward by Philostratus and others in Delrio (*Disquisitionum magicarum* 2, Q. 29, Sec. II [1608], p. 157) of persons said to have been raised by demons are not feigned, they were either diabolical specters in the shape of dead men or dead bodies for the time carried and moved by the Devil; or men not really dead, but overcome by a deep syncope (as apoplexy, hysterical passion and similar affections) were considered to be dead; or were so lulled to sleep by the Devil (their motion and sense being restrained and hindered) that they seemed to be dead to the bystanders. As to what is said of "Samuel raised by the witch" (1 S. 28:12), it is certain this was not the true Samuel or his soul (whatever the son of Sirach [Eccl. 46:20] may say about Samuel prophesying after his death). Rather it was a specter of Satan because it is said to have been raised out of the earth (1 S. 28:13), while the souls of the saints are in heaven in the hand of God and not in the power of Satan.

Sixth Question: The Apparitions of Angels

What were the apparitions of angels, and what bodies did they assume?

I. The question is not whether angels have appeared to men (for Scripture so often mentions such appearances, presented either to the patriarchs before the law or to the fathers under it or to the saints of the New Testament, that this is established beyond the shadow of a doubt); rather the question is What were these apparitions, and what bodies did they assume when they appeared?

II. We read of a threefold angelic appearance (*angelophaneias*). Some occur in a dream, such as happened to Jacob in the vision of the mystical ladder "on which he saw angels ascending and descending" (Gen. 28:12); to Joseph, to whom "an angel of the Lord appeared in sleep" (Mt. 1:20); and to Paul, "by whom an angel of God stood at night, saying, Fear not, Paul" (Acts 27:23, 24*). Others occur in merely ecstatic vision such as happened often to the prophets and to John in the Apocalypse. Or in sensible vision and in a form striking the senses, which happened to seeing and wakeful men (such as were most of the apparitions exhibited to the patriarchs). In the first apparitions, there was no need of the assumption of bodies because by simple intimation (*chrēmatismon*) without the determination of any form, the revelation could be made; nor also in the ecstatic vision. In the others, however, bodies must have been assumed by them to appear under a sensible species to men. The question is principally of these—whether true bodies were assumed by them, and how?

III. Now the bodies in which they appeared were neither empty specters and phantasms (with which they might deceive men), nor proper bodies hypostatically united to them, but economical and borrowed (according to the prescription of God). By free will, they were assumed for a time in order to perform the ministry demanded of them.

IV. However, what they were and whence assumed (whether created from nothing or from some preexisting but incapable matter, or adopted and combined from condensed air, or indeed from some other compressed material), it is

curious to inquire and rash to define (Scripture being silent). It is better to be ignorant without crime than to search with peril.

V. It cannot be denied that angels often assumed true bodies (whether these were created new immediately by God or were the already existing bodies of living men), gliding into which they performed certain economical actions (the fancy of those to whom they belonged being for a little while averted) so that they themselves did not know what was done in and by them. The operations of the angels in such bodies and the conversations they held with men and the hospitality they received, sufficiently testify of this. Also all the holy men's senses (well disposed and not deceived by any vain imagination) acknowledged it, so that they were often regarded as true men.

VI. They were, however, so united to these bodies that they could not on this account be called truly men because the union was not personal and internal (such as that of the soul and body), but external and accidental (after the manner of assisting forms) that they might manifest themselves (as the movers are united with the thing movable) by putting on and laying aside those bodies as garments (as Augustine says "Second Discourse on Psalm 25," 3 [ACW 29:241; PL 36.189]), using them as helps, not as coequals, but as instruments to perform their work. If, therefore, they are called "men" (*'shym*), this is as to opinion (*kata doxan*) and on account of the external form in which they appeared, not from the reality of the thing. And yet they cannot on that account be said to have imposed upon the fathers who so judged concerning them. For they did not assume them with the intention of pretending to be men or professing themselves to be such, but only that they might hold familiar intercourse with men and so perform the work assigned to them. Although, therefore, the fathers were deceived concerning them, still they cannot be said to have deceived them.

VII. The operations performed by the angels in those bodies (such as talking, walking, eating) cannot properly and strictly be called vital. For these must be done in a living subject, animated by a soul hypostatically united with a body and intimately moving it (as belong to men alone) because a second act supposes a first necessarily. But nothing prevents their being called vital broadly and improperly because they are efficiently from a living principle. As to eating, if it is taken simply for the mastication of food, they can be said to have eaten; but if used for the taking of food convertible into substance and its digestion in the stomach, it cannot belong to them.

VIII. What became of the bodies assumed, after the work for which they were sent had been performed, is a superfluous question. Scripture tells us only that they disappeared from the time that the angels departed—whether those bodies were resolved into their own principles (whence they were composed), or reduced to nothing, or, if they had been the bodies of living men, restored to their pristine state.

IX. As God at "sundry times and in divers manners" (*polytropōs kai polymerōs*) willed to communicate himself to the fathers under the Old Testament (especially before the law, in the time of the patriarchs, when the word of God had not yet been committed to writing, and when a still obscure night shrouded the heaven of the church), so it is no wonder that he willed to use then more frequently these appearances of angels for the consolation of believers and the confirmation of faith. But now, since the clear light of the gospel has arisen, the Son

of God, the Lord of angels in whom God addresses us, having been manifested in the flesh; since the Holy Spirit was poured out most copiously upon the church and the canon of Scripture was closed and sealed—that dispensation has become less necessary because the church does not need such helps any more. Hence, although under the beginning of the gospel there were still some angelic appearances (*angelophaneiai*) to serve as ministers to Christ and conciliate belief in his doctrine, yet they afterwards left the confirmed church. Although he always uses their invisible ministry, whether in the church or in the world, yet he no more (or most rarely) makes them conspicuous to men.

Seventh Question: The Orders of Angels

Is there any order among the angels and are there distinct hierarchies among them? The former we affirm; the latter we deny against the Jews and Romanists.

I. The question concerning the order of angels can be understood in two ways: either concerning order simply (which exists among equals by nature—whether there is any order among the angels); or concerning an order of excellence or power or jurisdiction (whether there is such an order by which one angel differs from another, not only in species, but has power and authority over him, whence arise certain hierarchies). We must answer the question under each form.

There is an order among angels, but what it is we do not know. What are the hierarchies of Dionysius?

II. As to the first, we do not deny that there is an order among the good angels, since there is no disorder (*ataxia*) in heaven. The names "heavenly hosts" as also "thrones," "dominions and powers," "archangels," "angels," seem with sufficient clearness to indicate some such thing, whether they depend on the diversity of offices assigned to them or on the mere will of God. With respect however to evil angels, the thing is also undoubted because there is often mention of the prince of demons in Scripture (to whom angels are attributed) when "eternal fire" is said "to be prepared for the devil and his angels" (Mt. 25:41). But what and of what kind that order is (Scripture being silent) no one ought too curiously to inquire, much less rashly to define. This is the opinion of Augustine: "I most firmly believe that there are seats, dominions, principalities, powers in the heavenly arrangements, and I hold with firm faith that there is a difference between them. But although you may despise me whom you think to be a great teacher, I know not what they are, and what is the difference between them" (*Ad Orosium contra Priscillianistas* 11 [PL 42.678]). Condemning the disquisition of these persons, he says, "Rash presumption seems to be more blamable in these than cautious ignorance" (ibid.). Elsewhere speaking of the various names given to them by Paul, he says, "How these words differ let them say who can, if however they can prove what they say; I confess that I do not know" (*Enchiridion* 15 [58] [FC 2:418; PL 40.259-60]).

III. But this is not the opinion of the Romanists and especially of the Scholastics. The more easily to obtrude their figment of an ecclesiastical hierarchy, they have feigned another hierarchy of angels in heaven, whose orders, duties and properties they describe as if they had lived there for many years and had learned accurately that whole polity. They put forward as the author of this opinion Dionysius the

Areopagite (falsely so called) who divides all angels into three classes or hierarchies, which he calls *treis, triadikas, diakosmēseis* ("highest, middle and lowest"). These again embrace three classes each under them, so that there are altogether nine classes and again many thousand angels in the single spheres. The highest class comprehends cherubim, seraphim and thrones; the second, dominions, principalities and powers; and the third or lowest, virtues, archangels and angels. Now he holds that these denominations were imposed upon them according to the properties in which they excel or according to the offices entrusted to them. They are called "cherubim" who excel in the light of knowledge and illuminate others with wisdom; "seraphim" who burn most ardently with the divine love and enkindle others; "thrones" who contemplate his judicial glory and equity and rule over others in judgment. In the second class, "dominations" regulate the duties of angels; "principalities" preside over peoples and provinces; "powers" restrain the power of devils. In the third, "virtues" have delegated to them the working of miracles; "archangels" embassages in the more important affairs; "angels" in lesser. Thus again he thinks angels should be distinguished by reason of knowledge. The angels of the first class behold God and from their contemplation of him perceive the reasons of things. The second rank know universal causes according to God. The third rank ascertain the causes of things as they are gathered from the consideration of proximate causes (which are particular). All these the aforesaid Dionysius has in his book "Celestial Hierarchy," 6.2 in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works* [trans. C. Luibheid, 1987], p. 160). John of Damascus, the Master of Sentences (Peter Lombard), Thomas Aquinas and all Scholastics have drawn the same.

IV. The Jews, however, had trifled before them. They also distribute the angels into various classes, constituting ten hierarchies, mutually distinguished by wisdom, dignity and power. The highest are below the throne of majesty; the lowest living with men and sometimes conversing with them. Among the superior, whom they hold to be denoted by "chief princes" (Dan. 10:13) and by those "standing by" (Is. 6:2; Dan. 7:16) (the similitude being taken from the chief servants or ministers of a king who are said to "stand before him" and to "see his face"), they maintain are meant seven principal and more eminent, as among royal ministers there are some of nearer admission. This seems to be gathered from Tobit 12:15 where Raphael says, "He is one of the seven holy angels, who present the prayers of the saints, and who go in and out before the glory of the Holy One." But these are all figments of men, abusing their time and talents, "intruding into those things which they have not seen, vainly puffed up by their fleshly minds" (Col. 2:18).

Who is not the Areopagite?

V. No one will find any difficulty in acknowledging this who examines the matter a little more closely. For to say something in passing concerning that Dionysius (who is mentioned as the author of this *Hierarchy of Heaven*) many arguments prove that the name "Areopagite" is falsely given to him and is anything else than him whom Luke (Acts 17:34) says clave unto Paul preaching (whatever Baronius, Possevinus, Bellarmine and other Romanists assert to the contrary). To the latter, we can oppose: (1) domestic witnesses who not only doubted concerning the truth of this comment, but also openly confessed that this Dionysius was different from the Areopagite; and the far more modern, such

as Cardinal Cajetan on Acts 17 ("In Acta Apostolorum . . . Commentarii," in *Quotquot in Sacrae Scripturae* [1639], 4:467); Godell, Bishop of Venice, *Hist. Eccles. Galli.*, lib. 1. an. c. 99+. Godell's words we think proper to quote because they embrace many things in a few words: "Concerning the books which are circulated under the name of Dionysius, the judgments of men differ very much. Almost all the learned seem to me to doubt whether they are truly the production of Dionysius. It cannot indeed be denied that the style of the writer is very different from the simplicity of the apostolic age itself, redolent of the Platonism of the following times, but neither does it seem to have been easy for the church of the age, in which the author is said to have lived, to have already employed all those ceremonies which he narrates and wonderfully sets forth, because both the persecutions arising from the very beginning prohibited the observance of such a discipline, and it appears from other writers to have been really instituted later." Of the same opinion are Sirmondus ("Iacobi Sirmondi . . . Dissertatio in qua Dionysii Parisiensis et Dionysii Areopagitae," 8 in *Opera varia* [1728], 4:256-58), Petavius (*Opus de Theologiciis Dogmatibus* 2.1 [1700], 3:55-57), Launoyus, a teacher of the Sorbonne, in *J. Launoii . . . varia de duobus Dionysiis* (1660), Morinus (*Commentarii de sacris ecclesiae ordinationibus* [1686], Pt. II, 1, pp. 27-31) and others; not to mention here Erasmus, Valla, Rhodiginus, Nicholas Faber and many others who agree with them.

VI. Second, if any such book had been written by the Areopagite, undoubtedly among so many and so different Greek and Latin writers, there would have been some (nay, many) who would somewhere have mentioned the book, the name of the author and his genius even most deservedly celebrated (as also his other writings). However, for about five centuries, they were wholly unknown and unspoken of. Neither Eusebius in his history, nor Jerome, nor Gennadius (who most diligently collected the books of the ancients) make any mention of these books. And it could easily be shown from Irenaeus, Augustine, Cyril of Jerusalem, and others that all this *Heavenly Hierarchy* was unheard of. Third, the style of the books confirms this very thing. It is not simple and unaffected, suiting the style of the apostles or apostolic men, but bombastic, inflated and smart. In it, the author, catching at the appearance of sublimity, secured a certain faulty grandiloquence and, as Maximus truly observes, "by many heaped up words obscures the sense" (*dia polyplēthias lexeōn skotoi ton logon*). He studiously avoids the customary words and those received by the use of the church, as if little adapted to the loftiness (*onkon*) at which he aimed. Most especially he labors in coining words, polishing epithets, exaggerating the sense and composing the whole discourse for display (from which desire apostolic men were evidently in the highest degree removed). Fourth, he writes much about temples, altars, sacred places, the choir, catechumens to be placed outside the door of the temple ("Ecclesiastical Hierarchy,"* in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works* [trans. C. Luibheid, 1987], pp. 195-259). These could not have had a place in the age of the true Dionysius, since Christians were compelled to assemble in secret places on account of persecutions, and there had prayers and meetings (as Hospinian shows "De Templis," 5.6 in *De Origine Templorum* [1681], pp. 19-24). The same is evident from the fact that he speaks of monks and of their consecration ("Ecclesiastical Hierarchy," ibid., p. 239) who did not then exist among Christians. Our opponents cannot deny this for they write that Paul and Anthony were the first fathers of the monks. These

certainly lived some ages after Areopagite. We omit many other pertinent arguments which can be seen in Rivet (cf. "Critici sacri," 1.9-11 in *Opera* [1651], 2:1079-84) and Casaubon (*De rebus sacris et . . . exercitationes . . . Baronii* 1, Apparat, Num. 99 [1614], pp. 150-56). John Daille in a special treatise has most solidly pursued this argument and most clearly demonstrated that the books of which we speak were not written before the fifth century; and to gain greater authority for them the author published and sold them under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite (*De scriptis, quae sub Dionysii Areopagitae* [1666]).

Comment of the heavenly hierarchy refuted.

VII. But the vanity of that heavenly hierarchy (excogitated by the Pseudo-Dionysius) is to be more clearly exposed. First, Paul preserves a deep silence concerning it, from whom nevertheless Dionysius boasts of having received it. He frequently uses many different names of angels. Yet there are nine orders of them in three classes so distributed that three are contained under each class, and those comprised in the first are either thrones or seraphim or cherubim. Paul nowhere and not even most slightly, even by a single word, decrees that they should be so defined. Nor must we have recourse to unwritten (*agraphon*) tradition as if he taught these mysteries orally, not in writing, but to his disciples. It is gratuitous to suppose that any such tradition can be granted. That it is also false is ascertained from this, that neither Timothy nor Titus nor the other disciples of Paul (to whom undoubtedly he would have delivered these, no less than to Dionysius) have left anything in their writings about them. (2) If from the different appellations, various hierarchies are to be instituted, a threefold ternary would not be sufficient; for angels are also called "watchmen," "the army of God," and "sons of God." (3) The apostle disarranges all these orders when he calls all "ministering spirits" (Heb. 1:14). If they are drawn down to a lower class, the force of the apostle's argument will be lost, for he labors to prove that the angels are not equal to Christ (which must be understood of all entirely). (4) No properties, which are not common to all the angels, are drawn out from the meaning of these words, for all see God, glow with love to him and are sent. (5) In the first hierarchy are placed those who always stand near God and are sent nowhere into the world; yet in Scripture we read of the seraphim and cherubim being sent and acting upon the earth (Is. 6:6; Gen. 3:24). (6) These things savor of Platonism and not of Paulinism. For they distinguished their genii into supercelestial, celestial and subcelestial as may be seen in Iamblichus (*?Jamblichi De Mysteriis Liber* 1.19 [ed. G. Parthey, 1857], p. 58), and in Proclus on the Alcibiades of Plato (*?Proclus: Alcibiades* 1 [ed. W. O'Neill, 1971], p. 73).

VIII. The various appellations given to the angels by Paul (Col. 1:16) do not prove different classes of them because there we do not find the number which they speak of, no mention being made by him here of cherubim and seraphim, nor of archangels and angels. But he thus speaks either from the Platonic hypothesis of the Angelics (against whom he disputes) who adorned angels with such epithets to denote their multiplied classes; or they are the utterances of these blessed spirits which they make, both to celebrate the majesty of God (attended as it were by a royal suite, for these shine out among kings who have other kings and princes as attendants) and to commend the dignity of the angelic nature and denote the multiple variety and efficacy of the duties to which they are called (the names being drawn from those in use among men to designate a variety of

offices and honors). For in governments are "thrones," belonging to monarchs and kings; there are "dominions" (*kyriotētes*), belonging to inferior kings; there are "rulers" (*archai*) appointed by kings and chiefs over provinces and cities; finally, there are "authorities" (*exousiai*) (viz., magistrates) constituted in the lowest place, who also receive the name *Podesta* among the Italians. Hence therefore it can indeed be gathered that there is an order among the angels, but what it is cannot thence be defined. Elsewhere Paul, neglecting the order which he here follows, mentions indeed "principalities, power and dominions," but not "thrones" (Eph. 1:21).

IX. In Rev. 12:7 mention is made of Michael and his angels who fought with the dragon, yet nothing can be collected from this to favor the heavenly hierarchy. (1) Michael can well be understood as Christ himself, the Lord of angels, who is truly as God (or equal to God), the leader and prince of the heavenly army (Jos. 5:13; Is. 55:4; Heb. 2:10). The antithesis from the passage of Paul (Rom. 16:20) demands this, and the first gospel oracle (Gen. 3:15) confirms it. Under this name he seems also to be designated in Dan. 12:1. Nor ought Dan. 10:5, 6, 21 to be otherwise explained where Michael is spoken of as compared with Rev. 1:13 (who is called "one of the chief princes" [Dan. 10:13] because he is the head and prince of angels). In the same sense, mention is made of "Michael the archangel, who contended with the devil about the body of Moses" (Jd. 9). This is evidently said of Christ, since what is here ascribed to Michael ("the Lord rebuke thee") is attributed to Jehovah in Zech. 3:2. When, however, it is said that he durst not "pronounce a curse," this was not because of impotence, but of moderation; abstaining from curses not through fear of laws, but restraining himself, to afford an example of patience to us. Thus to "dare" is frequently put for to "bear" and to "will" something. (2) If a created angel is meant (as some think), the name denoted a temporary order and an office committed to him for a time, to carry out the judgments of God by a certain economy, which (the embassy being finished) is again laid down. Still from this cannot be inferred an order of perpetual power and jurisdiction.

X. The archangel (mentioned in 1 Thess. 4:16) is not the prince of all angels, but as it were a forerunner of the remarkable majesty of Christ among the angels and a promulgator of his will (after the similitude of earthly kings). Nor does the article *tou* seem to have been omitted without reason, in order that no one might hence maintain him to be the singular and only chief over all the angels.

XI. Although among fallen angels there is one eminent above the rest, who is called "the Devil," "Satan," "the dragon," "Beelzebub," the "God of this world," the "prince of the world," it does not follow that among the good also, one angel presides over the others. This prefectship is more rightly called the privilege of Christ (Col. 1:18).

Eighth Question: The Ministry of Angels

Why and for what does God use the ministry of angels? Is a particular angel assigned as a perpetual guardian to each believer? We deny.

I. No one can doubt that God uses the ministry of angels, since they are called "ministering spirits" (*pneumata leitourgika*, Heb. 1:14), "ministers of God" (Ps.

104:4), who continually stand before him and minister unto him (Dan. 7:10) and do his will (Ps. 103:21). But it can be enquired why he willed to use their help.

Why God uses the ministry of angels.

II. A multiple reason can be given: not from necessity and indigence, as if he stood in need of them (for he is alone sufficient in himself, and as he created all things by his word alone, by it alone also could he govern all things), but from indulgence and love. (1) For the good of the angels themselves whom God has thought worthy of this honor, wishing them to be as it were co-workers (*synergous*) with him in the government of the world. (2) For the consolation of believers who thence know how much of a care they are to God, since he wills to use for the promotion of their salvation the ministry of creatures (not only corporeal, but also spiritual) far excelling themselves as to nature. (3) For the promotion of greater friendship among angels and men; for it is evident that friendships are entered into and increased by the bestowal of mutual kindnesses and offices. (4) For the good order (*eutaxian*) of the universe that thus all creatures (superior and inferior, visible and invisible) answering in turn to each other and woven together by certain sure bonds of offices might establish more firmly the harmony of the world. (5) Especially for the glory of God himself who is the ultimate and principal end of all his works; a glory which shines forth most illustriously from the ministry of such noble creatures.

And for what: (1) with respect to God, to praise him and to obey him.

III. Now a multiple office is assigned to them in Scripture: (1) with respect to God; (2) among themselves; (3) with respect to the world; (4) with respect to men. First, in respect of God, inasmuch as they are perpetually occupied in celebrating and adoring him. To this belongs the thrice holy of the seraphs (Is. 6:3) repeated in Rev. 4:8; 7:11, 12; also the anthem which they sung in unison at the birth of Christ "Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace, good will toward men" (Lk. 2:13, 14)—to which duty they are also invited in Ps. 97:7; 103:20; 148:2. In reference to this, Gregory Nazianzus calls them "chanters of the divine majesty" (*hymnōdous tēs theias megaleiotētos*, *Oratio* 28.31 [PG 36.72]) and Theodoret says the "service of angels is hymning" (*hē angelōn leitourgia estin hymnōdia*, *Serm. 3, de Angelis*+). (2) In holy obedience, prompt and full, rendered by them (Ps. 103:20). Hence they are said "to stand before him" as attendants and ministers; "to behold his face," to receive and execute his commands; "Thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him" (Dan. 7:10). "I saw the Lord sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left" (1 K. 22:19). Here belong "the wings" attributed to them in Is. 6:2; for as by the two with which "they covered their faces" is denoted their supreme reverence towards God (being unable to bear the blaze of so great majesty); and by the two with which "they covered their feet," the "desire" of immaculate holiness is intimated (concealing those parts which modesty requires to be covered in men and which designate their weakness relatively to God, Job 4:18); so the two with which they flew adumbrate their alacrity and zeal in performing God's commands. Here is referred the ministry exhibited by them to Christ as their head and Lord, both in adoring him (which they engaged in from the beginning according to the divine command, "Let all the angels adore him" [Heb. 1:6] and which they daily perform [Rev. 5:11, 12]) and

in the actual ministry rendered to him in his: conception (Lk. 1:26-38); birth (Lk. 2:9-15); temptation (Mt. 4:11); agony (Lk. 22:43); resurrection (Mt. 28:2-7); and ascension (Acts 1:10, 11); and what they will render at the last day when they will attend him in his coming: "He shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels" (2 Thess. 1:7).

(2) In respect of themselves.

IV. In respect of themselves; for as they are a well-ordered heavenly society, they undoubtedly perform various mutual duties to each other, by a mutual communication of things to be either known or done (although we cannot tell what and of what nature is the mode of that communication). Hence they are said "to cry one unto another" (Is. 6:3) as if stirring each other up to celebrate the praises of God. Elsewhere they are introduced speaking to each other (in Zechariah and in the Apocalypse).

V. From Dan. 10:13, a conflict and disagreement between good angels cannot be gathered. For "the prince of the kingdom of Persia" (who is said to have withstood the angel Gabriel and to use all efforts to retain the Jews perpetually under the Persians) is not a good angel set over the kingdom of Persia by God because he could attempt nothing without the command of God (who willed to free them from captivity). Rather this is best referred to Cambyses, the son of Cyrus, who (while his father crossed the sea) was fighting in Asia against the Scythians, was hostile to the restoration of the Jews and issued a cruel edict to prevent them from going on with the building of the temple. Hence it was necessary for the angel Gabriel to tarry there for some time to restrain the fury of Cambyses (to wit, lest he should rage increasingly against the people of God). Verse 20 confirms this, where the same angel says, "Now will I return to fight with the prince of Persia: and when I am gone forth, lo, the prince of Grecia shall come." Undoubtedly this intimates that he was about to labor still according to the plan of God in restraining the cruelty of the king of Persia against the people of God, until the prince of Javan (i.e., of the Greeks—Alexander the Great) would come who was to overthrow the Persian kingdom.

(3) In respect of the world.

VI. Third, the office of angels in respect of the world does not consist in their moving the heavenly orbs (as Aristotle thought), but in defending and conserving created things and their order (by ministering to divine providence). Here pertain "the angels descending and ascending" (seen on the ladder of Jacob), and when God is said "to make his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire" (Ps. 104:4). Hence Athenagoras says, "We say there is a multitude of angels and ministers, whom God the maker and *dēmiourgos* of the world distributed by his word, and set over the elements, and the heavens, and the earth, and whatever is in them, and the good order of these" (*plēthos angelōn kai leitourgōn phamen ous ho poiētēs kai dēmiourgos kosmou theos, dia tou par' aitou logou dieneime, kai dietaxe peri ta te stoicheia einai, kai tous ouranous, kai ton kosmon, kai ta en autō, kai tēn toutōn eutaxian, Embassy for the Christians* 10 [ACW 23:41; PG 6.909]). Hence Rev. 14:18 treats of angels who had "power over fire" and of "the angel of the waters" (Rev. 16:5). Yea, God frequently uses them for the protection of kingdoms and empires (as appears from Dan. 10 and 11).

(4) In respect of men.

VII. Fourth, in respect of men (the good as well as the bad). As to the wicked indeed, in inflicting the judgments of God (as is evident in the case of the Sodomites [Gen. 19:11]; the Egyptians [Ex. 12:29]; the army of Sennacherib [2 K. 19:35; Is. 37:36]; Nebuchadnezzar [Dan. 4:13, 14, 23, 31; Herod [Acts 12:23] and the reprobate whom at the last day they will hurl into eternal punishment [Mt. 13:41, 42]).

VIII. As to the elect and believers—whether in chastising them (exemplified in David and his people, 2 S. 24:16) or in dispensing the blessings of God to promote their salvation (Heb. 1:14). Now they benefit the pious in three ways: (1) by teaching; (2) by consoling; (3) by guarding them. First, by teaching, when God uses them to put believers in mind of their duty or of future things (which was the object of the various angelic appearances [*angelophaneiai*] in the Old Testament, Gen. 16; 18; 19; 28; 32; Dan. 6; 9; 10; 11; Zech. 1; 2; Ezk. 1). In the New, they perform the office of evangelists announcing the birth of Christ (Lk. 1:11; 2:10) and foretelling his resurrection (Mt. 28:2-7) and ascension (Acts 1:10, 11). In the Revelation of John, they give warning concerning future things. Second, by consoling them, as well against present as against impending dangers. Obvious examples occur in Hagar (Gen. 16:7-12); Jacob (Gen. 32:1); Daniel (Dan. 10:10-21); Elijah (1 K. 19:5-7); Mary (Lk. 1:26-38); the apostles (Mt. 28:7-8). Third, by guarding them, because they encamp round about them that fear the Lord (Ps. 34:7; Gen. 32:1, 2); protect them (Ps. 91:11); fight for them (Dan. 10:13); guard infants (Mt. 18:10); deliver believers from the hand of enemies, from prison, death and imminent peril (as is evident in Lot [Gen. 19:15-17], Elisha [2 K. 6:17], the inhabitants of Jerusalem [2 K. 19:35], the three companions of Daniel [Dan. 3:25, 28], Daniel himself [Dan. 6:22], the apostles [Acts 5:19] and Peter [Acts 12:7]). Here belongs also the ministry exercised towards believers in death—carrying their souls into the bosom of Christ (as they bore the soul of Lazarus into Abraham's bosom, Lk. 16:22), and what will be exhibited by them at the end of the world in gathering believers that they may be glorified by Christ.

Whether each believer has a guardian angel from his birth.

IX. Here belongs the question concerning guardian angels—whether to individual believers a certain particular angel is assigned by God from the very birth to be their perpetual companion and guardian even until death. This opinion is held by the Romanists. On it, they rest the religious worship of angels and the daily veneration of the companion angel by name. However we, although acknowledging angels to be given to believers for a guard and defense (as was proved before), nor doubting that certain angels can now and then be appointed and sent to believers (either to reveal mysteries of God or to console and protect them, as was seen often among the patriarchs, in the case of Daniel, Joseph, Mary and others), still we deny that it can rightly be gathered from this that a guardian and tutelary angel is assigned to each believer; or that this opinion, although held by many of the fathers, can be received as if inwritten (*engraphon*).

The negative is proved.

X. The reasons are: (1) Scripture (which speaks so often of the ministry of angels towards believers) nowhere mentions a guardian angel (which nevertheless it would not have passed over in silence if to each believer had

certainly been assigned a particular angel from his birth, to perpetually attend and take care of him). Yea, while the Spirit testifies that they are sent by God freely in all directions to minister unto them who shall be heirs of salvation (Heb. 1:14), he sufficiently intimates that they are not bound and responsible to particular individuals.

XI. (2) One angel is often sent to guard many believers and many are appointed over one. One angel relieves the siege of Jerusalem (Is. 37:36); one angel encamps around them that fear the Lord (Ps. 34:7). Many also are often assigned to one: "He shall give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways" (Ps. 91:11); "The mountain was full of horses and chariots of fire round about Elisha" (2 K. 6:17); "The angels of God met Jacob, and when he saw them, he said, This is God's host" (Gen. 32:1, 2).

XII. (3) This opinion has a pagan origin; for it is known that the Gentiles thought there was given to each man a peculiar genius or demon. The words of Arrian in Epictetus refer to this: "God has placed over each one a peculiar demon as a prefect, and delivered him to his guardianship, and watchfulness, and he cannot be deceived" (*Theos epitropon hekastō proestēse ton hekastou daimona, kai paredōke phylattein auton autō, kai touton akoimēton, kai aparalogiston, The Discourses of Epictetus as Reported by Arrian* 1.14.12 [Loeb, 1:104-5]). The verses of Menander confirm it: "A demon is the leader of the whole life of each man as soon as he is born" (*Hapanti daimōn andri tō genomenō hapantos esti mystagōgos tou biou, Ammianus Marcellinus* 21.4* [Loeb, 2:166-69]). Nor was this opinion foreign to the Jews from whom it passed over to the Christians. It ought therefore to be deservedly suspected by us, on this account even the more because it greatly helps the papal superstition about the worship (*thrēskeia*) of angels.

XIII. The two passages of Scripture usually adduced for its confirmation cannot prove it. In Mt. 18:10, they are called "the angels of the little ones." This shows that angels are given as a guard to children no less than to adults; but it cannot be gathered from this that a certain particular and peculiar angel is granted to individual infants for a perpetual guard. It is not said definitely that an angel of each of these little ones beholds the face of God, but indefinitely only ("their angels"), whether many are assigned to one or one to many (to wit, intimating that they are kept under the guardian care of angels in general).

XIV. No better proof is derived from Acts 12:15, where mention is made of Peter's angel. (1) It is not the voice of Scripture, but of some who speak as Jews; converted indeed, but not yet sufficiently instructed in the Christian doctrine. And if this is related by Luke, it is not forthwith approved by him, since many things are recounted in Scripture narratively, not approvingly. (2) If the words be referred to an angel, it can be collected from it that a certain angel was then present with Peter, but not that a particular and perpetual guardian was given to him. For he is said "to have come upon him" (v. 7); as when "the physician and servant of the king" is alluded to, not a particular one is understood, but indefinitely he who performs that office (which many can perform successively). (3) The thing in controversy is taken for granted—that it treats of an angel properly so called. Nothing prevents us from taking the word *angelou* here for "messenger" (a frequent use of the word, Mt. 11:10; Lk. 7:24, 27; 9:52), for "it is a messenger sent by him" to announce something concerning him (as they who are in chains are accustomed to use messengers to report their condition). Nor is it an objec-

tion that the maid Rhoda is said to have recognized the "voice of Peter" because she was disbelieved. It might be that mention of Peter, having been made by his messenger, they who talked with her might have supposed that she received the thing otherwise.

XV. What is said in 1 Cor. 11:10 ("For this cause ought the woman to have power on her head, because of the angels") shows indeed that the angels are present in sacred assemblies and are witnesses of the piety or impiety, of the humility or pride of the men present (whom on that account the woman ought to revere). But nothing can be carved out of this in favor of a guardian angel, as if a particular angel was assigned to individuals. Some things should here be said concerning the confirmation of the good angels and the sin of the fallen angels; but we have already treated of the former in Topic IV, Question 8, and of the latter we will hereafter treat in the Topic on Sin.

Ninth Question: The Intercession and Worship of Angels

Are angels our intercessors with God, and is any religious worship due to them? We deny against the Romanists.

I. From the angelic ministry, of which we have already treated, a twofold question still arises: first (concerning their intercession)—whether their office is so extended as to embrace intercession and mediation (*mesitai*) for us with God, who either pray for us or present our prayers to God, and render them acceptable by their own prayers and merits. The other concerns the worshipping of them—whether any religious worship is due to them. We will briefly discuss both.

II. As to the first, the question is whether mediation and intercession pertain to their angelic ministry, by which they not only pray for us, but also carry our prayers up to God, and by their patronage and petitions render us acceptable and commendable to him. The Romanists affirm; we deny this.

Angels are not our intercessors.

III. First, he alone can intercede for us who died for us. He alone can be our Paraclete (*paraklētos*) and advocate who is our only sacrifice (*hilasmos*) and propitiation. These are joined together by the apostle by an indissoluble bond, as parts of one and the same sacerdotal office, mutually subordinated to each other and mutually dependent. For as propitiation is the cause and foundation of intercession (which it draws after itself necessarily), so intercession necessarily supposes a propitiation, that it may be rightly performed (as under the Old Testament the priest could not perform the act of declaration [*emphanismou*] who had before fulfilled the act of sacrificing [*hilasmou*] and to him alone it belonged to offer incense, Ex. 30:34-38). Now Christ alone satisfied for us and therefore he alone can intercede for us (cf. Rom. 8:34, 35; 1 Jn. 2:1, 2 where these two functions are ascribed to Christ alone to the exclusion of others).

IV. Second, to present the prayers of others to God is a part of the mediatorial and priestly office, which Scripture claims for the Son of God alone (who is the sole Mediator between God and men, 1 Tim. 2:5). Nor can the distinction into secondary, mediate and ministerial mediators, and primary, immediate and principal be admitted, since Scripture recognizes no mediator save one only who (alone as God-man [*theanthrōpos*]) can perform the office of mediator. Hessel

(Estius), Professor of Louvain, on this passage, sees this denying that angels and saints can be our mediators with God because they cannot of themselves appease him (*In Omnes Pauli Epistolas* [1891], 2:536 on 1 Tim. 2:5).

V. Third, he alone can carry up our prayers to God who can wash off their corruption and expiate their impurity and imperfection and sanctify them (which belongs to no created angel). For since God can approve nothing except what is good, our prayers (which are not free from blemishes) could never be acceptable to him, unless covered by the merit of the most perfect righteousness of Christ, and purged, as the high priest of the Old Testament had to bear and take away the iniquity of the holy offerings of the children of Israel (Ex. 28:38).

VI. Fourth, the angels ought either to offer all or only some. If all, then they ought to offer those also which are only mental (which they could not do because they are not "searchers of the heart" [*kardiognōstai*]). If only some, they ought therefore to be determined by them and not to be offered indefinitely. But no reason can be given why some should be carried up rather than others. Finally, although they might know prayers as to the material (viz., the external words), they cannot know them as to the formal (viz., their sincerity), which belongs to God alone.

VII. Fifth, the opinion concerning the intercession of angels is drawn from the heathen, among whom demons were constituted mediators (who performed the office of interpreters and ferrymen [*portitorum*] to transmit divine things to men and human things to the gods). See the Banquet of Plato where Diotimas instructs Socrates. "For the whole demon-kind," says he, "is between a god and mortal. It interprets for, and transmits to, the gods what is sent from men; and for and to men what is sent from the gods; from men, their petitions and sacrifices; from the gods, their commands and returns for sacrifices" (Plato, *Symposium* 202E [Loeb, 3:178-79]).

Sources of explanation.

VIII. Although we need the guardian care of angels in all our ways, they ought not on that account to present our prayers to God because this does not make any (much less the principal) part of angelic guardianship.

IX. The angel who prays for the people (Zech. 1:12) is not a created, but an uncreated angel (the Son of God who interposes his own intercession both here and elsewhere with the Father on behalf of the church; who is now called "angel" by reason of office, then "man" by reason of the nature to be assumed; who is introduced praying for the restoration of the church and standing ready to fight for it indeed "among the myrtle trees" [i.e., in the church, well adumbrated by this plant, weak in appearance, but useful and always fragrant and green]). He has connected with him various angels as ministers who are bound to report to him (Zech. 1:11), described under the emblem of various horses, to designate the manifold dispensation of God towards men. For as "red" horses denote instruments of severity; "white" of grace; so are the symbols of "correction" tempered with kindness and severity, "variegated."

X. Job 33:23 does not favor the intercession of angels because it does not treat of an angel according to nature, but only according to office; nor of the oblation of prayers made to God on the part of man, but of annunciation of God's will made to man on the part of God. (2) *Ml'k mlyts* is not well referred to an angel because "one among a thousand" is added to designate the variety of these

monitors—that scarcely one among a thousand can be found; and to the making a choice of them, since all angels are such dispensers (prudent and faithful), who can zealously perform this. (3) It is fitly understood concerning any minister of God who is rightly called *ml'k* (i.e., a "messenger" or ambassador sent from God—as often elsewhere, Mal. 2:7; Rev. 1:20); and *mlyts* (i.e., "interpreters of the divine will") who is here introduced to a man cast down by a sense of his sins and of divine punishments and chastisements (announcing "his uprightness" [*yshrv*], i.e., the duty God demands of him, that he may obtain pardon—to wit, faith and repentance—which the compassion of God follows); also "he will be gracious unto him" (viz., if he repents) pardoning his sins and restoring to him his original soundness, as the words following declare.

XI. The angel who is said "to stand at the altar, having a golden censer; and to whom was given much incense, that he might offer it with the prayers of all saints upon the golden altar which is before the throne" (Rev. 8:3) cannot be a created angel, but the uncreated (to wit, Christ who performs this office). (1) This angel is distinguished from the seven other angels spoken of in v. 2, and he is said to be "another," not so much in number as in species (especially if, as Lyranus thinks, the universality of angels is meant by the number seven; cf. *Biblia sacra cum glossa ordinaria* [1617], 6:1459 on Rev. 1:4). (2) This angel is set before us as a priest who offers incense. Now this office is elsewhere claimed for Christ alone (Heb. 9:24), as the one who alone is our Mediator and advocate with God (1 Tim. 2:5; 1 Jn. 2:1). (3) It treats of the prayers of "all saints," which cannot be offered by a created angel. (4) He is said to have received a censer and to have filled it with the fire of the altar and to have cast it into the earth; whence "there were voices, and thunderings, lightnings, and an earthquake" (Rev. 8:5), which belong to Christ alone who says, "I am come to send fire on the earth" (Lk. 12:49*), on account of the discords and contentions which sprung up on account of the gospel from the malice of men; so that the same fire which cherishes and purges the elect burns up and consumes his enemies; the same death of Christ ministers to some salvation, to others condemnation. Therefore, Christ, the great angel of the covenant, is introduced here as the high priest of the New Testament; with his incense (i.e., the sweet-smelling savor [*euōdia*] of his own merit), he offers our prayers to God and renders them acceptable to him (an allusion to the typical priest of the Old Testament, who, when about to intercede for the people, placed incense upon the golden censer—which was said to exhale an odor pleasing to God). Nor can it be objected to this exposition: (1) that Christ is never so called absolutely; for the contrary is evident from Gen. 48:16; (2) that this angel is distinguished from the golden altar (which is Christ) because it is certain that many types refer at the same time to Christ; so that he is shadowed forth according to his various relations (*scheseis*), by the priest burning incense, the altar, the candlestick and the shewbread: "priest" in respect of person, "altar" of whole burnt offering on the cross, "incense" in intercession, "candlestick" in the gospel, "table of shewbread" in the blessings he bestows on us; (3) that "incense is given to him" because the customary style of the Old Testament is employed in which odors were usually given to him who offered incense. Thus as the mediatorial office and all things are given to Christ by the Father and the Spirit without measure (Mt. 11:27; Jn. 3:34), there is no repugnancy in incense being given to him also by God and acceptableness to his merits by which the

prayers of the saints become pleasing to God. Again, this incense is not said to be given to him because he was without it, but that he might offer it according to his office to his Father. Finally, it must be observed that this whole vision is allegorical. It shows nothing else than that the only protection of believers in the tremendous calamities which the angels were preparing themselves to send, would be the prayers of believers offered by Christ and acceptable on account of him (which God will most certainly answer for their salvation).

XII. The passage in Tobit 12:15, where the personated angel treated of ascribes to himself an office proper to the Son of God alone (professing himself "to be one of the seven angels, who present the prayers of the saints") since drawn from an apocryphal book (filled with falsehoods and superstition) is deservedly rejected. He wanders no less from the truth here than when he professes himself to be Azariah, the son of the great Ananias of the children of Israel; and in Tobit 7:3 to be of the tribe of Naphtali, from the Ninevite captivity.

The worship of angels.

XIII. Now as angels are not our intercessors with God, so neither are they to be considered objects of religious worship (as the Romanists wish) after the ancient Angelics (whom Augustine numbers among heretics as inclined to the worship of angels, *De Haeresibus* 39 [PL 42.32]). Hence a second question arises about the worship of them. Concerning this take notice that the question is not whether any honor and veneration is due to them (for we do not deny that honor is to be paid to them by reason of their dignity, that we may acknowledge and celebrate their excellence, revere their presence, obey their admonitions, imitate their example and repay their intense love for us by reciprocal affection—which is the sentiment of Augustine: "We honor them not by divine worship but with love," *Of True Religion* 55 [110] [LCC 6:281; PL 34.170]). But we treat properly concerning the religious worship of them. For whatever the dignity of the angelic creature, we maintain that they cannot be considered the objects of religious worship.

Statement of the question.

Proof that angels ought not to be worshipped: (1) from Col. 2:18.

XIV. The reasons are: (1) *Thrēskeia* or "the worship" of angels is expressly condemned by Paul: "Let no man beguile you of your reward in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels, intruding into those things which he hath not seen, vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind" (Col. 2:18). Here are various latent arguments: (a) The apostle says they who cherished that error "beguiled believers of their reward" (*katabrabeuein*) or kept them from the proposed reward (to wit, by leading them aside from the right way or by turning them from their legitimate goal and scope because they withdrew them from Christ [who is the goal of our course] and from the true worship of him). (b) They do it voluntarily, to intimate this worship is voluntary, not commanded; paid from man's own will and caprice, not however from a command of God. (c) They affect humility (which is also the pretext of the Romanists in our day) and are nonetheless "puffed up by fleshly mind" because the comment of that false worship is a mark of pride, by which they wish to appear wiser than God. (d) They do not hold the head because they fall off from Christ himself, who connect another ally with him in worship. Finally, "they intrude into those things which they have not seen" assuming the right to speak of unknown things and to utter their own fictions as oracles.

XV. To no purpose is it here excepted: (1) by Perronius that *thrēskeian* or "the worship of angels" is to be understood originally, not objectively; not the worship paid to angels, but the worship given by angels (to wit, the law or Jewish religion which was delivered by the ministry of angels, from which Paul wishes to recall Christians). We answer: (a) Paul speaks of voluntary worship which cannot be referred to the Mosaic law (whose author is God); (b) that use of the word in Scripture is unheard of, for as often as it employs the word *thrēskeias* (as in Acts 26:5; Jam. 1:26; Wis. Sol. 14:27), it signifies worship given either by someone or to someone. Now it cannot be taken here in the former sense; therefore the worship paid to angels must be understood. Nor is it excepted: (2) that the veneration of angels is not condemned, but only that which is proper to God (or which is given to angels, Christ being omitted) because they are said "not to hold the head" or that which may be referred to the tricks of magicians and superstitious worship. We answer that Paul condemns all worship (*thrēskeian*) of angels absolutely, not what is rendered to them as to the supreme God (for the Angelics profess their acknowledgment of God), but as mediators, inferior to him, who are said not to hold the head. (Not that they entirely ignore Christ, but because professing him, they deny him by their deeds—setting up another object of adoration besides him: as the false apostles, who urged circumcision, are said to have fallen from Christ [Gal. 5:4] although they still professed Christ).

(2) From Rev. 19:10; 22:9.

XVI. Second, an angel repudiated such worship (Rev. 19:10). When John wished to prostrate himself at his feet, the angel immediately said to him, "See thou do it not; worship God; I am thy fellow-servant, and of thy brethren." Nor can it be said that the angel refused the worship from modesty and in a courtly manner (as Lorinus and Estius think; cf. *Biblia Magna Commentariorum literalium* [1643], 5:1206 on Rev. 19:10) either on account of reverence for the mystery of the incarnation or on account of the prophetic light and priesthood which he beheld in John. The twofold reason given by the angel from the object of lawful adoration and from his own ministry sufficiently proves the vanity of others. It teaches that the angel did not refuse only the relative worship otherwise due to him, but as absolutely undue and to be given to God alone. Now who can endure Bellarmine and Estius, who hold that they who do what John did, cannot be reproached because as he was filled with a divine Spirit, it is not lawful to suspect that he was either forgetful or ignorant; nay, that his act is deserving of imitation by all. For if John acted properly in adoring the angel, the angel sinned in refusing that worship as unlawful. Nor is it an objection that John (being filled with the divine Spirit) could not have been ignorant of its unlawfulness because the Spirit gave infallibility in doctrine and words, but not in life and practice. Although he knew theoretically that angels were not to be adored, yet he could (from the perturbation of mind caused by the sight of the angel) stray from that theory in his practice and go beyond measure in the honor which he wished to render him. Thus he did not sufficiently understand what he was doing; as we read of something similar happening to Cornelius with respect to Peter (Acts 10:26), who for the same reason refused the worship offered to him by Cornelius. Not unsuitably, some hold that John erred more in fact and person, than in right, supposing that angel to be not a created, but the uncreated angel (to whom such worship was due). Hence the angel instructs him as to his nature and condition, lest while he was a servant, he should be mistaken for the common Lord of both.

(3) From Mt. 4:10.

XVII. Third, Scripture claims religious worship for God alone: "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve" (Mt. 4:10) which is quoted from Dt. 6:13 and 10:20 (where although the word "alone" is not expressly given, yet it is necessarily implied, as Servator remarks). To no purpose do our opponents meet us with this: that *latreian* (supreme religious worship) alone is here appropriated by God, not *douleian* (inferior worship) which may properly be given to the heavenly beings themselves. Satan did not seek *latreian*, but only *proskynēsin* (bowing down before); nor is any mention made here of *douleias*. Again, it is a fictitious and empty distinction, since among both sacred and profane writers the signification of *latreias* and *douleias* is interchangeable (as can easily be shown and has been fully proved by us, cf. Disputatio 2, "De Necessaria secessione nostra ab Ecclesia Romana" in *Opera* [1848], 4:31-50).

(4) From reason.

XVIII. Fourth, no one can be an object of religious worship and invocation who is not omniscient and omnipotent. The necessities and prayers of all everywhere no one can know except the omniscient and knower of hearts (*kardiognōstēs*); nor help them, except the omnipotent. Therefore to no purpose is worship and invocation directed to one who is not such. But omniscience and omnipotence are properties peculiar to God alone and incommunicable to any creature.

XIX. Fifth, if the worship (*thrēskeia*) of angels was lawful, some command or promise or approved example of it would be given in Scripture. Since, however, our opponents can adduce no such thing, it is evident that it is mere will-worship (*ethelothrēskeian*). The examples which are brought forward by them do not belong here, as we will soon show.

XX. Sixth, this worship is frequently condemned by the fathers in the ancient church. We give a few from the many testimonies. Tertullian says, "The school of Simonian magic serving angels is placed among idolatries and is condemned by the apostle Peter in Simon himself" (*Prescription Against Heretics* 33 [ANF 3:259; PL 2.46]). Augustine asserts that the Angelics were so called because they inclined to the worship of angels (*De Haeresibus* 39 [PL 42.32]). These he refutes: "We believe that the best angels and most excellent ministers of God themselves wished this, that we together with them should worship God, in whose contemplation they are happy. . . . Wherefore we honor them with love, not with servitude; nor do we build temples to them, for they do not desire to be so honored by us, because they know that when we are good, we are ourselves temples of the supreme God" (*Of True Religion* 55 [110] [LCC 6:281; PL 34.170]). Origen defends at length the Jews and Christians from the charge of worshipping creatures (*Contra Celsum* 1.5, 6 [trans. H. Chadwick, 1965], pp. 9-10; ibid., 5.1-13, pp. 264-74), and at the end teaches that "they refuse to worship anything besides God, the Lord of all, and his Word, the first born of every creature" (ibid., 7.70, p. 453). Lactantius: "Religion and veneration must be paid to God alone" (*Divine Institutes* 1.20 [FC 49:78; PL 6.223]). The Council of Laodicea, which met in the year 364, Canon 35, expressly condemns the worship of angels and decrees "to call angels by name and to make societies, is to leave the church of God, to be employed in secret idolatries, and to forsake Christ" (Mansi, 2:580). Charlemagne says, "It is not a moderate error, when any other is adored with religious worship besides him who said, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God" (*Capitulare de Imaginibus* 1.2* [PL 98.1012]).

Sources of explanation.

XXI. One kind of worship is that of religious adoration due to him alone whom we apprehend as the principle of our creation and redemption; another of civil subjection, exhibited to anyone by reason of the peculiar preeminence (*hyperochēs*) and dominion held over another (with which we reverence parents, magistrates, and others constituted in authority); another of moral reverence, exhibited to persons on account of the excellence of these considered of themselves, without the dominion of the honored or the servitude of the one honoring. Angels can be reverenced with this last kind of worship, but not with the first (which belongs to God alone).

XXII. Either the examples drawn from the Old Testament for the adoration of angels are to be referred to the civil adoration of those who appeared to them in human form (according to eastern manners) and who were supposed to be men (as Bellarmine, "De Sanctorum Beatitudine," 13 in *Opera* [1856], 1:442-45 does not deny); or they pertain to the uncreated angel (viz., the Son of God, who before his incarnation often appeared to the fathers under such a form). This is easily gathered from the circumstances of the passages where: (1) Abraham prostrated himself before one of the angels who addressed him, from which he knew that he was God, and so he calls him "Jehovah" (Gen. 18:3); (2) he prays to him for the safety of Sodom; (3) he calls him "the Judge of the whole earth" (v. 25). The angel who wrestles with Jacob (cf. Gen. 32:24-30) was God according to Hos. 12:3*, 4, where Jacob is said "to have had power with God" (which the name "Israel" confirms, and the blessing he demands from him, and the name given to the place, "Peniel" [*pny'l*] because he is said "to have seen God face to face," Gen. 32:30). Jacob speaks of the angel Goel (Gen. 48:16) who delivered him from all evil and of whom he sought a saving benediction for the sons of Joseph (who could be no other than the uncreated angel). Joshua adores the uncreated angel because he is called "the captain of the host of God" (Jos. 5:14) (which suits Christ alone, the head of angels and of men, cf. Rev. 19:11, 12). He commands Joshua to take off his shoes on account of the presence of the deity, which Moses was commanded to do in the sight of God (Ex. 3:5, 6).

XXIII. The "seven spirits" mentioned in Rev. 1:4 are not created, but the Holy Spirit, who (on account of a multiple variety of gifts and relatively to the seven Asiatic churches, to whom he was to be communicated) is so called. This is evident: (1) because they are placed in the rank with the Father and the Son in invocation, by which "grace" and "peace" are sought for the churches (i.e., blessing of all kinds, which belongs to God alone). (2) They are put before the Son himself, not on account of priority of nature or anteriority in order of existence, but both on account of the economy of office undertaken by Christ (who is considered as the first-begotten from the dead, who washes their sins in his own blood, Rev. 1:5, 6) and on account of the series of the following words, which treat of Christ. And if these spirits are said to be "before the throne," it does not follow that they are inferior to God. The Son himself also (who is consubstantial [*homoousios*] with the Father) is said "to stand before the throne" according to a certain relation (Rev. 5:6), who according to another does not cease to sit upon the throne itself (Rev. 4:2). Rather only a personal distinction from the Father is intimated. In addition, it is one thing to be before the throne essentially (*kat' ousian*); another apparently (*kata phanerōsin*) in prophetic vision.

XXIV. Diversity of excellence in subjects demands indeed diversity of worship, but not a diversity of religious worship. As the latter has for its object only an infinite and uncreated excellence, it cannot be multiple but must be one alone.

XXV. Civil worship means either strictly that which (as much causally, as formally, i.e., as much by reason of cause, as by reason of mode) is such, given on account of merely civil causes; broadly that which is only civil in the latter sense (as distinguished from the religious). In this sense, it is attributed to the angels.

EIGHTH TOPIC

THE STATE OF MAN BEFORE THE FALL AND THE COVENANT OF NATURE

FIRST QUESTION
What was the liberty of Adam in his state of innocence?

I. Since man can be viewed in a fourfold state—the instituted (*instituto*) of nature, the destitute (*destituto*) of sin, the restored (*restituto*) of grace and the appointed (*praestituto*) of glory—his liberty ought also to be considered in different ways in reference to them. We treat here of the first only.

II. By the state of innocence, we mean the first condition of man created after the image of God in internal goodness and external happiness. As it abounded in all goods (of the body as well as of the soul) necessary for obtaining true happiness in that state, so it experienced the most holy and agreeable government of God. Hence it consists principally of two parts: the happy condition of man and the federal government of God around him. His happiness arose from the image of God in which he was created. It consisted especially in original righteousness and the immortality and dominion consequent upon it (of which we have spoken before in the Topic on Creation). To it also belonged his liberty, the subject of this question.

III. However, that we may be able to reason more correctly about the liberty of upright Adam, various species of liberty should (before all things) be distinguished, in order that it may be evident what kind could belong to him and what not.

Fourfold liberty: (1) of independence; (2) from coaction; (3) from physical necessity; (4) from slavery.

IV. Liberty is fourfold: (1) the liberty of independence which belongs to God as the first being; this is opposed to the necessity of dependence which belongs to all creatures. (2) Liberty from coaction by which man acts spontaneously and with freedom; this is opposed to the necessity of coaction seen in those who act through force. (3) Rational liberty from brute and physical necessity by which man acts from choice (*ek proaireseōs*) and not by a brute instinct and blind impulse; this is opposed to the physical necessity of inanimates and brutes. (4) Liberty from slavery by which man is subject to the yoke of no slavery, either of sin or of misery; this is opposed to the necessity of slavery in sinners.

Which necessity agrees with liberty; which is incompatible with it?

V. Not every necessity contends with liberty, nor agrees with it. A certain extrinsic necessity destroys liberty; another agrees with it. A certain intrinsic crushes it and another perfects it. The necessity of coaction, which is extrinsic, is incompatible (*asystatos*) with liberty; but a

hypothetical necessity, arising either from a decree of God or from the existence of the thing, conspires with it. Intrinsic necessity (arising from a physical and brute determination to one thing) takes away liberty; an intrinsic necessity (flowing from the rational determination of the will by the intellect) not only does not destroy liberty, but preserves and fosters it.

The liberty of Adam was: (1) from coaction; (2) from physical necessity; (3) from slavery.

VI. The liberty of Adam was not the liberty of independence (as if he was irresponsible [*anypeuthynos*] and absolutely his own master) because he ought always to be in subjection (as a creature to his Creator, as a second cause to the first and to depend upon his will). It was not the liberty of a will undetermined by the practical intellect; for this would have changed the will into an irrational appetite, so that he would have sought evil as evil. This would not have been so much liberty as an unbridled license, incompatible (*asystatos*) with the image of God. But there was in him another threefold liberty: (1) from coaction; (2) from physical necessity; (3) from slavery (both of sin and of misery). The former two constituted his essential liberty. It belongs to man in whatever state constituted and has two characteristics: preference (*to proairetikon*) and will (*to hekousion*), so that what is done may be done by a previous judgment of the reason and spontaneously. But the latter was accidental because it comes in upon the essential liberty and can be separated from it (since true liberty exists where such freedom from slavery does not exist, as in the state of sin).

VII. However, although he was free from the slavery of sin (because created just and upright) still he was not free from mutability (because whatever his holiness and righteousness, he was mutable, from which in consequence he could fall). Adam was placed in such a state in which he could stand and fall, sin and not sin. Although this argues less perfection than the state of grace (which is immutable), still it denotes no fault or imperfection (since immutability is by no means a gift of nature, but of grace). Still that mutability cannot belong to the liberty of Adam (although sometimes it is so termed) because that condition did not fear to be adorned with so illustrious a description which placed a limit to both the liberty and happiness of man; rather it was only an appendage of the Adamic liberty, so proper to it that it neither has been nor can be in any other man.

VIII. However, from this mutability indifference arises. This is commonly attributed to Adam and with regard to it, it is enquired whether his liberty consisted in it. To this we answer negatively. (1) Such an equilibrium (*isorropia*) or equal propensity to good and evil, contends with the nature of the will which necessarily follows a dictate of the intellect. (2) Such an equilibrium contends with the state of creation in which the created will was very good (being made after the image of God in righteousness and holiness). It would not have been very good, if it had been disposed to vice equally with virtue. (3) It contends with the law given to man, commanding him to love God with all his mind and strength. Assuredly he had already departed from this, if he had been constituted in such an equilibrium. If therefore a certain indifference (*adiaphoria*) must be attributed to it, it must not be understood in the second act and as to the power of simultaneity; as if it could at the same time and at once (remaining in that state) be actually carried to good and to evil (which is absurd [*asystaton*] because then man must be supposed to have been at the same time upright and fallen). Rather this

certain indifference must be understood in the first act, as to simultaneity of power, because the power or faculty of Adam was so disposed through the mutable condition in which he had been created that it could be determined to evil no less than to good (but successively and in the divided sense, not at the same time and in the compound sense) which sad experience taught too well.

IX. Although natural liberty agrees in essentials with the liberty of man constituted in other states, still it differs greatly in accidentals. For the liberty of glory in blessedness is not to be able to sin (*non posse peccare*). The liberty of sinners in the state of sin is not to be able not to sin (*non posse non peccare*). The liberty of believers, in grace, is to be able to sin, and not to sin (*posse peccare et non peccare*). But the liberty of Adam was to be able not to sin (*posse non peccare*). The first was an absolute incapability of sinning; the second an incapability of acting well; the third the power of sinning and of acting well. The fourth was the power of not sinning. Augustine explains this excellently: "We must diligently and attentively examine if these good things differ, to be able not to sin (*posse non peccare*), and not to be able to sin (*non posse peccare*), to be able not to die, and not to be able to die, to be able not to leave the good, and not to be able to leave the good. For the first man was able not to sin, not to die, not to leave the good" (*Admonition and Grace* 12* [33] [FC 2:285; PL 44.936]). And afterwards: "Therefore the first liberty of will was to be able not to sin (*posse non peccare*), the last will be much greater, not to be able to sin (*non posse peccare*). The first immortality was the power of not dying, the last will be much greater, the incapability of dying. The first was the power of perseverance, the power to not desert the good, the last will be the happiness of perseverance, the want of power to desert the good" (ibid., pp. 285-86).

Second Question
Did Adam have the power to believe in Christ?

I. This question lies between us and the Arminians who, to defend their hypothesis concerning the necessity of a certain universal sufficient grace, have introduced this opinion—that Adam never had the power of believing in Christ and so could not have lost it by sin. Nor, as a consequence, can God now in the gospel demand faith in Christ from us, unless he had previously bestowed sufficient grace for it because no one is bound to an impossibility. Hence they maintain that God either gives or at least is prepared to give to all the power of believing if he will. Thus they endeavor to prove two things at the same time: first, that we falsely assert that Adam lost the power of believing in Christ because he never had it; second, that the grace of faith ought to be universal from the justice and equity of the new covenant. Arminius says, "I say and affirm, asseverate, profess and teach that Adam before his fall had not power to believe in Christ because there was no need of faith in Christ; and therefore that God could not have demanded this faith from him after his fall (to wit, by this right) because Adam had criminally lost that power to believe" ("Apology or Defence . . . Against Certain Theological Articles," 19 in *The Writings of James Arminius* [1956], 1:333). Corvinus maintains and labors to prove the same thing against Tilenus and Molinaeus.

II. The question is not whether Adam had actual faith in Christ. It is certain that he did not actually believe in an unrevealed object. Rather the question is whether he could have it, if it had been revealed to him (i.e., whether he had a potential faith not only in what was revealed, but also in what was to be revealed). Whether just as he believed by actual faith every word of God actually revealed, so he could by potential faith believe not only the word already revealed, but also further to be revealed (if it so pleased God). The orthodox think that Adam (indeed before the fall) did not actually believe in Christ as the Redeemer because Christ had not been revealed to him; nor had he need then of redemption. Notwithstanding, in creation he received sufficient strength from God to believe every word revealed or to be revealed. Consequently even in Christ the future Redeemer, if this had been revealed to him by God (i.e., both that he was about to fall and that after the fall God would give his own Son as the price of redemption).

III. The reasons are: (1) Adam received the power to believe every word of God. Therefore he also received the power to believe the word of the gospel, if it had been revealed to him. Faith in Christ is the part and species contained under the general notion of faith. Now that he had received the power of believing every word of God is evident from the perfection of the nature in which he was created. He who is perfectly holy is bound to render unto God faith and obedience of all kinds; otherwise there would be some defect in him because he would have proved himself unbelieving and on that account not upright by not believing the word of God. Again, if he could not believe, this would be either because the intellect was blinded by some error and the will impeded by some rebellion. But neither can be said concerning a holy man made after the image of God. To no purpose does Corvinus prate that Adam indeed had the power of believing every revealed word of God, but that pertained to the legal covenant and not to the gospel covenant, because this latter was not absolutely credible to upright man without a contradiction. We answer that although the word of the gospel was not credible as necessary and saving for that time (i.e., in the state of integrity), yet it could be credible with respect to the future time (which would follow his fall) if God had revealed it to him (even as to Peter was revealed his fall and his rising after the fall by Christ). Again, if the gospel was not credible in the state of integrity, this did not arise from a defect of power, but only of the revelation of the object.

IV. (2) Before the fall, he had the power to love God and obey him in all things; for love supposes faith, a part of obedience. For he who is commanded by law to love God and obey him is also commanded to believe him when he speaks. Nor is the exception of force that the power to believe God differs from the power to believe Christ because the word of the law and of the gospel are opposed in their total genus; and in the law he was indeed commanded to love and obey God, but only by reason of the state in which he was constituted by creation (that he should worship his Creator), not in which he was to be restored by redemption (that he should believe in him). Although as to the peculiar formula the law and gospel differ from each other, yet they agree in this: that they are equally the word of God and so the object of our faith and the rule of obedience. Hence he who is bound to believe God speaking in the law and has strength sufficient for it, also is able and ought to believe the gospel (if it is revealed

to him). Nor can a greater love or obedience be conceived than that which is enjoined upon us in the law.

V. Third, from the revelation of God the upright angels knew the promised Redeemer to be manifested in his own time and rejoiced in him (1 Pet. 1:11, 12; Eph. 3:10). Therefore man in his state of integrity could know by a revelation of God the future Redeemer from the fall and believe in him; for there is the same reason for both.

VI. Fourth, the reason of mercy, repentance (and other virtues) in the state of integrity is the same for faith in the Redeemer also. The former, being actually received, are no less repugnant to the state of integrity than faith in the Redeemer. Yet no one can deny that man in innocence could have been affected with compassion and repentance, if the object of each had been presented to him. Therefore he could also have had faith in Christ, if he had been predicted to him.

Sources of solution.

VII. That power is not therefore to be called frustrated which is not occupied about some special object belonging to its sphere. It can have many other objects about which to be occupied and powers are not always in nature according to the exercise of act, but often on account of perfection of nature (as the power of mercy and love was not useless in upright Adam [while there were none miserable and needy] because it made Adam perfect). So the power of believing was not to no purpose in Adam (although it could not exercise itself about some certain object on account of the absence of the object) because it occupied itself about many things. Power is then called vain and idle (which does not act), when it ought to and can act. This is not granted here.

VIII. Although upright Adam could not believe in the remission of present sins (which were not), this did not hinder him from having the power of believing that there would be remission, if it pleased God to reveal to him both his future fall and recovery from it. It was absurd (*asystaton*) in respect to the same, to believe himself to be upright and a sinner, but in different respects (*kat' allo kai allo*). The same man who is now upright can believe that he is about to fall afterwards and therefore may need the grace of God and faith in Christ.

IX. Although faith in Christ is not prescribed specifically and expressly in the law (which does not know Christ), still it is contained in it generically and implicitly (inasmuch as the law commands us to believe every word of God and all his promises). Thus no one could obey the law who was not prepared also to believe the word of the gospel (if it had been revealed by God).

X. He who received the power to rise from the fall had no need of new powers for rising, unless he lost that power by the fall. This was the case with Adam, who by sinning lost all that power with original righteousness. Therefore if after the fall, he could not rise by his own strength, it was not because he had not received it in creation, but because he lost it by the fall. Nor can it be said that he could not have lost it because there was a use for it after the fall. It ought to have exerted itself before the fall no less in preventing than in correcting it (if it had remained in man).

THIRD QUESTION: THE COVENANT OF NATURE
Whether God made any covenant with Adam, and what kind it was.

I. Since a covenant among men is commonly called "a mutual agreement between two or more persons concerning the mutual bestowal of certain goods and offices for the sake of common utility," it principally demands these conditions. (1) The persons must be equal, either simply or at least in a certain order. (2) They must have in their own power the goods or duties which they should mutually bestow, and that as to them they should be perfectly independent (*autexousioi*). (3) They should not be bound without that agreement to perform those duties. Hence it is certain that a covenant of God with man strictly speaking cannot exist. (a) There is no equality or proportion between God and man; not between the goods which God promises by his covenant or the duties which man is bound to perform (from which no utility approaches to God, who is in the highest degree self-sufficient [*autarkestatō*, cf. Ps. 16:2]). (b) Man is in no respect perfectly independent (*autexousios*) and is bound even without any agreement to render obedience to God. (c) Man can bring nothing to it from himself, but depends wholly upon God (as to both the promised good and the enjoined duty, to perform which God furnishes him with the power). Still God through his infinite condescension (*synkatabasin*) willed to enter into a covenant with his creatures.

II. By his own right, God could indeed have prescribed obedience to man (created by him) without any promise of reward. But in order to temper that supreme dominion with his goodness, he added a covenant consisting in the promise of a reward and the stipulation of obedience. As he wished to assert more strongly his own right over man, so he demonstrated the highest benignity in this—that he (himself in need of nothing) willed to invite to a nearer communion with him (and more powerfully allure by that bond of love and mutual obligation), the creature (already subject to him by right of creation and owing him all things from natural obligation) by entering into a covenant with him, so that man now excited by the promise of God can certainly expect happiness, not from his mere philanthropy (*philanthrōpia*) alone, but also from a covenant (on account of his truthfulness and fidelity).

III. Covenant is sometimes taken more broadly for a simple promise of God without the stipulation of any obedience on the part of the creature—such as is the covenant he made with men and living things of the earth, not to destroy them anymore by a flood (which was also sealed by the rainbow, Gen. 9:9-11); and that mentioned in Jer. 31:35 and 33:25 which disposes and preserves the changes of day and night and the ordinances of heaven and earth (called moreover one-sided [*monopleuron*] because it consists in the disposition of promise of one party only). Yet strictly and properly, covenant denotes the agreement of God with man by which God promises his goods (and especially eternal life to him), and by man, in turn, duty and worship are engaged (certain external signs being employed for the sake of confirmation). This is called two-sided (*dipleuron*) and mutual because it consists of a mutual obligation of the contracting parties: a promise on the part of God and stipulation of the condition on the part of man.

Twofold covenant: of nature and grace.

IV. This double covenant is proposed to us in Scripture: of nature and of grace; of works and of faith; legal and evangelical. The foundation of this distinction rests both on the different relation (*schesei*) of God contracting (who can be considered now as Creator and Lord, then as Redeemer and Father) and on the diverse condition of man (who may be viewed either as a perfect or as a fallen creature); also on the diverse mode of obtaining life and happiness (either by proper obedience or by another's imputed); finally on the diverse duties prescribed to man (to wit, works or faith). For in the former, God as Creator demands perfect obedience from innocent man with the promise of life and eternal happiness; but in the latter, God as Father promises salvation in Christ to the fallen man under the condition of faith. The former rests upon the work of man; the latter upon the grace of God alone. The former upon a just Creator; the latter upon a merciful Redeemer. The former was made with innocent man without a mediator; the latter was made with fallen man by the intervention of a mediator.

Why called the "covenant of nature."

V. The covenant of nature is that which God the Creator made with innocent man as his creature, concerning the giving of eternal happiness and life under the condition of perfect and personal obedience. It is called "natural," not from natural obligation (which God does not have towards man), but because it is founded on the nature of man (as it was at first created by God) and on his integrity or powers. It is also called "legal" because the condition on man's part was the observation of the law of nature engraved within him; and of "works" because it depended upon works or his proper obedience.

The existence of a covenant of nature proved.

VI. Episcopius, and with him the Remonstrants, deny that a covenant of nature was made with Adam ("Institutiones theologica," 2.1 in *Opera theologica* [1678], p. 23); but it can be proved. (1) There are granted the essential parties of a covenant, God and man. God, who as the Creator of man, must also be his governor and from this, his legislator, and because good in his own nature, the rewarder also of those who seek him (Heb. 11:6), so that he would not only give him a law for his direction, but also hold forth a reward to him for keeping it (although bound by no right to that). Man who, because a creature, must also wholly depend upon God and, because upright, could keep the inscribed law, and because rational, ought not otherwise than in a rational manner (i.e., by the intellect and will) be governed, both by the prescription of a law, the promise of rewards and the threatening of punishment. Also since he was created after the image of divine holiness, he ought to have been led to a communion of that happiness also which is the inseparable attendant of holiness.

VII. Second, a law was imposed upon Adam, which necessarily implies a federal agreement and contract. For he who receives it, binds himself officially to obedience under the punishment denounced through the same; he who gives it (for the very reason that he exacts obedience) is bound to furnish indemnity and security to the one obeying. Although Moses sets forth only one part of that federal sanction (referring to punishment, Gen. 2:17), still he proves that the former

concerning the promise should not be excluded, both from the sacrament of the tree of life (by which it was sealed) and from the threatening of death (which by reason of contraries had the implied promise of life and from the various passages of Scripture which express more clearly the nature and sanction of the law, as Lev. 18:5—"If a man do these, he shall live in them," cf. Dt. 27:26; Ezk. 20:11; Mt. 19:17; Gal. 3:12).

VIII. Third, the passage in Hos. 6:7 seems not obscurely to intimate this: the Israelites are said to have "transgressed the covenant like Adam" (*hmh k'dhm 'bhrv bhryth*). For although these words may also be explained of the inconstancy of men (that they may be said to have transgressed the covenant as men are wont to do, who are naturally false and fickle, and often deceive expectation), still nothing prevents their being referred also to Adam (that they may be said to have violated the covenant like Adam, their first parent, who miserably broke the covenant contracted with him by God). A similar locution occurs in Job 31:33: "If I covered," says he, "my transgressions as Adam [*k'dhm*]." Here is a manifest reference to the fact of Adam's endeavoring to excuse and hide his sin (Gen. 3:12).

IX. Fourth, such a covenant was demanded not only by the goodness and philanthropy (*philanthrōpia*) of God (which could not exert itself more fitly than by receiving nearer to himself and making happy with his communion the man seeking him), but also by the state of man and the desire of happiness impressed upon his heart by God. Since it cannot be doubted that it was right and lawful, it could not be empty and frustrated, but ought to be fulfilled on the ground of man's obedience (unless we hold that God wished to feed man with a vain desire and thus deceive him—which even to think is blasphemous).

The contracting parties: God and man. God as Creator and Lawgiver.

X. In this covenant we consider: (1) the subject or contracting parties; (2) the pact itself. The latter includes the things agreed on both sides. On the part of God, in the promise of a blessing, as well as on the part of man in the stipulation of duty. The contracting parties are God and man. God contracts as Creator and Lord. Under this relation (*schesei*), two things are included: legislatory power and goodness in remunerating. The former because as Creator he cannot but govern the creature, nor can he govern except suitably to his nature (i.e., rationally [*logikōs*] by the imposition of fit laws). The latter because he could not help loving and rewarding the creature doing his duty.

Man as just and as the first.

XI. Man must be viewed under a double relation (*schesei*)—either as just or as the first. In the former respect, he had the power to perform the prescribed duty. Thus there arose the obligation of fulfilling it (which otherwise could not have had place since no one is bound to an absolute impossibility). In the latter, Adam in a certain manner included the whole human race, which was to spring from him, both as the root and the seminal principle from whom the whole human race was to descend (Acts 17:26); and as a public person and representative head, because he represented all men who were to spring naturally from him. Hence that covenant pertained not only to Adam, but to all his posterity in him. The illustrious Amyrald acknowledges "as he was the first man, he, as it were, represented the whole human race, which

was to be born from him" ("Theses Theologicae de Tribus Foederibus Divinis," 8 in *Syntagma Thesium Theologicarum* [1664], p. 213). Now the foundation of this union arises from the twofold bond connecting men with Adam: the one natural, according to which he was the common father of all and they his sons; the other forensic, by which from the most wise providence of God he was constituted the chief and head of the human race, who should contract for himself and his, and hold or lose the goods bestowed upon him, as goods common to the whole of nature.

2. The pact consisting: (a) in the exaction of duty or of the obedience due to the law.

XII. The pact consists of two parts: on the one side, the exaction of duty on the part of God and a restipulation on the part of man; on the other side, the promise of blessing on the part of God and the acceptation on the part of man. The duty was partly general, partly special (according to the twofold law given to him: the moral or natural and the symbolic). The general was the knowledge and worship of God, justice towards his neighbor and every kind of holiness; the special was abstinence from the forbidden fruit (in which obedience to the whole law was contained as in a compendium and specimen). The former was founded on the law of nature not written in a book, but engraven and stamped upon the heart (of which Paul says, "All do by nature the things contained in the law, and show the work of the law written in their hearts," Rom. 2:14, 15). Thus they who are without the written law are not without the engraven law since they (through the dictates of conscience) are a law unto themselves. The latter was founded upon the symbolic and positive law. The former was principal and primary; the latter, however, only secondary. For although he was bound to obey each special precept or that symbolic law given to him, still most especially was obedience to the natural law required of him (for exploring of which this symbolic precept only served, as will be shown hereafter).

What it ought to be.

XIII. The obedience which the law demanded ought to have these marks; (1) with regard to principle—sincerity, to be true and sincere from the whole heart, not hypocritical and external of the body only; (2) with regard to the object—universality, to extend not to certain things only, but to all the precepts of the law without exception; (3) with regard to degrees—intension, to be perfect and absolute; (4) with regard to duration—perseverance, to be constant and perpetual even unto the end without interruption.

XIV. Although man was already bound to this obedience by a natural obligation as a rational creature, necessarily subject to the dominion of God and his law, yet he was more strongly bound by a federal obligation which God so stipulated that man—by the powers received in creation—could perform it, although in order that he might actually perform it, he still needed the help of God both to actuate these faculties and powers and to preserve them from change. This help did not tend to the infusion of any new power, but only to exercising the efficacy of that power which he had received. Now this did not belong properly to the covenant of nature, but always depended on the most free good pleasure (*eudokia*) of God; otherwise the covenant of nature had been immutable, and man had never sinned.

(b) The sanction of the covenant.

XV. The sanction of the covenant attended the exaction of duty. It consisted both in the promise of reward and gain and in the threatening of punishment. The promise was of the highest happiness (of eternal life) to be passed not on earth but in heaven. The threatening was of death and whatever in Scripture comes under the name of death to express punishment of all kinds (into which man by his own sin deservedly fell).

XVI. However, from this pact arises the mutual obligation of the parties, differing according to their condition. With respect to man, not only was it from the pact, but absolute and simple from the nature of the thing (and on the account of God, to whom man as a creature to the Creator, the beneficiary to the Benefactor, owed himself wholly and whatever he had to God and was bound to love him with his whole heart). But with respect to God, it was gratuitous, as depending upon a pact or gratuitous promise (by which God was bound not to man, but to himself and to his own goodness, fidelity and truth, Rom. 3:3; 2 Tim. 2:13). Therefore there was no debt (properly so called) from which man could derive a right, but only a debt of fidelity, arising out of the promise by which God demonstrated his infallible and immutable constancy and truth. If the apostle seems to acknowledge this right or debt (Rom. 4:4), it must be understood in no other than a respective sense; not as to the proportion and condignity of the duty rendered to God by man (Rom. 8:18; Lk. 17:10), but to the pact of God and justice (i.e., the fidelity of him making it).

XVII. If therefore upright man in that state had obtained this merit, it must not be understood properly and rigorously. Since man has all things from and owes all to God, he can seek from him nothing as his own by right, nor can God be a debtor to him—not by condignity of work and from its intrinsic value (because whatever that may be, it can bear no proportion to the infinite reward of life), but from the pact and the liberal promise of God (according to which man had the right of demanding the reward to which God had of his own accord bound himself) and in comparison with the covenant of grace (which rests upon the sole merit of Christ, by which he acquired for us the right to life). However, this demanded antecedently a proper and personal obedience by which he obtained both his own justification before God and life, as the stipulated reward of his labors.

FOURTH QUESTION: THE TREE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL

Why is it called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and why did God give Adam a law about not tasting it?

I. The question has two parts. (1) With respect to the name, i.e., How did the tree of knowledge of good and evil obtain this name? (2) With respect to its use, i.e., Why God used it for a symbolic law to test man?

II. To no purpose is the question raised What sort of a tree was it? Was it a fig tree (as some think because after the fall man made an apron of its leaves); or was it an apple tree (as appears to others from Cant. 8:5 because the spouse is said to have been raised up and brought forth under the apple tree)? Since Scripture tells us nothing about it, nothing certain can be ascertained. It would be a rash

no less than a useless curiosity to inquire into those things which God has willed to conceal from us.

Whence called the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil"?

III. It would be better to see why it obtained this name. Now we think it was so called not formally (as if it was in itself rational [*logikē*] knowing good and evil); not effectively (as if of itself it was scientific which, when eaten, was either the producer or assistant of knowledge, as was held by some of the Jews and by the Socinians after them); not putatively, from the false nomenclature and promise of the serpent (the opinion of Rupert, Tostatus and others) because there is no reason why Adam or Moses should wish to impose a name upon the tree derived from a most barefaced lie (the fraud of the imposter being fully known). Rather it is so called both sacramentally (because it was an exploratory sign and a warning to avoid the experimental knowledge of evil equally with good) and eventually *a posteriori* by anticipation (inasmuch as from eating of it, he was really about to experience the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience, so that he who was unwilling to discern by precept, might discern by experiment; and he was to be taught by his own evil how much good he had lost, how much evil on the other hand he had drawn upon himself, from what a height of happiness, into what a profound abyss of misery, he had precipitated himself by sin).

IV. God selected this tree then, to explore (*explorandam*) the obedience of Adam. Thus arose the special law given to him concerning not tasting its fruit: "of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shall not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die" (Gen. 2:16, 17). This is called "a positive law" because it did not bind man from the nature of the thing (which was in itself indifferent), but from the mere will of God. It is also called "symbolic" because it was given for a symbol and trial of the obedience of man. For in it, as a matrix, the whole natural law was included. As Tertullian says, "that primordial law given to Adam in paradise, was, as it were, the matrix of all God's precepts" (*An Answer to the Jews* 2 [ANF 3:152; PL 2.599]). By fulfilling it, he would have testified his uncorrupted love and obedience towards God; by violating it, he professed that he threw off the dominion of God and preferred his own will (yea even the voice of the Devil) to the divine will and voice.

Why a symbolical law was given.

V. Therefore that exploratory law was necessary in addition to the natural law impressed upon the conscience of men. (1) In order that God, who had granted the dominion of all things to man, might declare himself to be the Lord of man and man might understand himself to be a servant bound to obey and adhere to him. Although the natural law had already clearly declared that, yet because someone might think the natural law to be a property of nature and not a law, he wished therefore (by a peculiar law about a thing absolutely indifferent) to declare this more clearly. Thus on the one hand, the dominion of God might appear (who by his own pure free will forbids that of which no other reason can be found beside his will); on the other, the duty of man (searching into no reason for the command or interdict, but composing himself to render obedience on account of the will of the enjoiner alone). (2) That sin might be made more conspicuous by that external symbol and the evil of the

concealed ulcer be dragged to the light (or the virtue of obedience be far more clearly exhibited). For the virtue of obedience would have been the more illustrious as the evil was because forbidden of God. "For," says Augustine, "how great an evil is disobedience could not be better and more carefully impressed upon us, since therefore man became guilty of iniquity, because he touched that thing contrary to the prohibition; which, not prohibited, if he had touched, assuredly he had not sinned" (*The Literal Meaning of Genesis* 8.13 [ACW 42:52; PL 34.383-84]). (3) To declare that man was created by him with free will; for if he had been without it, he would not have imposed such a law upon him. (4) That by interdicting the fruit of a beautiful tree, he might teach that his happiness does not consist in the enjoyment of earthly things; otherwise God would not have wished to prevent his using it. (5) To teach that God alone and his service must be sought before all things as the highest good and that we should acquiesce in it alone.

VI. To make this trial of man, God might indeed have enjoined upon him or prohibited something great and difficult (as he tried the faith of Abraham by a severe and difficult command). However, he wished to give a law concerning a thing neither great nor difficult in order that obedience might be easy, and man be deprived of every excuse if he should transgress. Hence Augustine says, "Whoever thinks the condemnation of Adam either too great, or unjust, assuredly knows not how to measure the great iniquity of sinning where there was so great a facility of not sinning; as therefore the obedience of Abraham is deservedly celebrated as great, because the slaying of his son, a most difficult thing, was commanded; so also in paradise by so much the greater was the disobedience as that which was commanded was not of difficulty" (CG 14.15 [FC 14:385; PL 41.423]).

VII. God gave this precept to man for his trial. It was not that he was ignorant of his mutability or of the event. Rather it was partly to make known to man himself his own weakness (in order that he might find out by the event itself the great difference between the Creator and the creature); partly also that God might have an occasion of more distinctly declaring his glory about man, which without this would have remained hidden in its principal part (viz., as to the exercise of mercy and justice, to which the way was opened by sin).

Fifth Question: The Tree of Life
Why was it called the tree of life?

I. Another tree (by which, as a sacrament, God wished to seal the promise given) was the tree of life. Regarding this name opinions differ.

Why called "the tree of life"? Not effectively.

II. Some maintain that it was so called effectively because it had an innate power of vivifying man (i.e., of keeping off not only diseases and weaknesses, but also death itself) and of conferring upon him absolute immortality (the opinion of Bellarmine and other papists, but deservedly rejected by Scotus, Thomas Aquinas and others). A finite power could not have an infinite efficacy of extending life to an infinite time. Besides, since its fruit no less than its sap was liable to corruption, it could not absolutely free man from destruction, unless another cause intervened. It can indeed be

determined probably that its fruit was the best and most efficacious aliment for preserving life (having the power of strengthening the nutritive faculty, repairing the weak radical and preserving an equable state of health and vigor) until it should be carried to the heavenly life. Yet on this account, it ought not to be distinguished by this peculiar name because other trees also had the same power, if not equal strength.

But sacramentally. III. Far better therefore is the opinion of others that the tree obtained this name principally by reason of signification. It was a sacrament and symbol of the immortality which would have been bestowed upon Adam if he had persevered in his first state. Augustine says, "He had nourishment in other trees; in this, however, a sacrament" (*The Literal Meaning of Genesis* 8.4 [ACW 42:38; PL 34.375]). Now this signification can have a threefold relation (*schesin*). (1) With respect to past life, it was a symbol putting him in mind (*mnēmoneutikon*) of the life received from God. As often as he tasted its fruit, he was bound to recollect that he had life not from himself, but from God. (2) With respect to future life, it was a declarative (*sēmantikon*) and sealing (*sphragistikon*) sign of the happy life to be passed in paradise and to be changed afterwards into a heavenly life, if he had continued upright. (3) With respect to the state of grace, it was an illustrious type of the eternal happiness prepared for us in heaven; also a type of Christ himself who acquired and confers it upon us and who is therefore called "the tree of life in the midst of the paradise of God" (Rev. 2:7); "the tree of life yielding her fruit twelve times every month, whose leaves are for the healing of the nations" (Rev. 22:2).

IV. Therefore the life which this tree signified and sealed was not properly either the longevity or the immortality of the body alone; rather it was the eternal happiness to be obtained at length in heaven (which comes under the name of eternal life in Scripture and which no food can impart, but with which the use of food and drink rather contends). Hence it is said that God will abolish both the stomach and food, so that man may see God not in this animal body, but in a spiritual. This will be proved hereafter in a separate question.

V. When God expelled man from paradise "lest man put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever" (Gen. 3:22), it cannot thence be rightly inferred that there was a physical power in this tree of so great efficacy that it could (its fruit having been once tasted) rescue even sinful man from mortality. These words denote only the cause of his ejection from paradise on account of sin (by which, as by his own fault, he had cut himself off from that life, which was the thing signified). Thus he ought no longer to have any right to its sacrament. God speaks not with reference to the thing itself or its event (as if that tree would actually preserve his life even after sin), but in relation to the preposterous opinion of Adam who could think this, not understanding the true reason of the name. That he might not, therefore, endeavor (though vainly) to render void the threatening of God, he is expelled from paradise. Not that God envied the immortality or the longer life of man, but because it was not right that he should longer enjoy the sign of the immortality which he had lost. For this purpose he also willed to station the cherubim with a flaming sword at the gate of paradise in order that our first parents might be kept away as much from the garden as from the tree.

How did the tree of life signify Christ?

VI. What was interdicted to them in that pristine state is now not only made lawful to us, but also commanded and promised in the state of grace (in which easy access is given to us to the heavenly paradise and to Christ, the true tree of life). This is the truth and mystery shadowed in this ancient type: the tree of life—not earthly, but heavenly; not material and irrational (*alogos*), but mystical and rational; not only significative and sealing of life, but truly the bestower of it. "In him was life" (Jn. 1:4, i.e., the fountain and cause of all life). This life is as much natural in the world (because in him we live and move and have our being, Acts 17:28), as spiritual in the church through grace (because as Mediator, he is the prince of life giving life to the world and eternal life in heaven by glory; for he is "the resurrection and the life" who will most certainly bestow upon his own eternal life). Truly he is the only tree because no one except Christ is the author of eternal life (nor is there salvation in any other, Acts 4:12). No one except Christ is in the midst of paradise (Rev. 2:7) and of the street of the city (Rev. 22:2). Christ is in the midst of the church (as a more honorable and suitable place) to be near all and diffuse his vivifying power among all; to be seen by all, as the center in which all the lines of faith and love ought to meet, that they may acquiesce in him. The fruit-bearing tree (Rev. 2:7), which bears the sweetest and most exquisite fruit for the support of believers (Cant. 2:3), bears twelve kinds of them (Rev. 22:2), i.e., the most abundant and richest, sufficing for the twelve tribes of Israel (i.e., for all the members of the church, which from his fullness draw all gifts necessary for them). It bears them every month (i.e., perpetually) because the power and efficacy of the righteousness and spirit of Christ are perpetual and unceasing for the consolation and sanctification of believers. Its leaves (never falling and perpetually green) are appointed for the healing of the nations because it has the virtue not only of aliment (to feed our souls), but also of medicine (most healthful to cure all our diseases, Is. 53:5; Mt. 11:28).

VII. Hence it is evident that these two trees of paradise are not free from mystery. For as the first was a sacrament of trial (which prescribed to man his duty) and the second a symbol of the reward (by which God wished to remunerate his obedience), so each shadowed forth to us in the best manner, the mode of God's acting in the church by commands and promises. The former prescribed to man his duty and explored his obedience (well signified by the tree of the knowledge of good and evil). The latter exhibited the blessing and most ample reward of God by which he wishes to crown our obedience (fitly expressed by the tree of life). Second, the law and the gospel can also be contained under this double symbol. For the law (as the tree of the knowledge of good and evil) is given to us as a trial of obedience and by sin (no less than that) is made the occasion of death and the minister of condemnation. The gospel, however, is the saving and quickening tree of life because it is "the word of life" (Jn. 6:68). Third, the former exhibits the image of Adam from whom sin and death flowed; however the latter exhibits Christ from whom righteousness and life arise (1 Cor. 15:22).

SIXTH QUESTION

Whether Adam had the promise of eternal and heavenly life so that (his course of obedience being finished) he would have been carried to heaven. We affirm.

Statement of the question.

I. This question is moved against us by various persons. First, by the Socinians who, in order to establish the mortality of the first man and prove that death is not the punishment of sin (but a consequence of nature) maintain that the covenant of God with Adam was not spiritual; rather it concerned the goods of the animal and earthly life alone, and that no other happiness was to be expected by him than an earthly and animal (which he enjoyed in paradise, depending upon eating and drinking and other necessities of life) which could also be interrupted by death. Hence they refer the promise of eternal life to the blessings of the New Testament. They contend that no hope of it was given to the first man or that only a certain very obscure signification was to be gathered from the enigma of the tree of life (cf. Socinus, *Praelectionis theologicae* 1 [1627], pp. 1-2 and Volkelius, *De vera Religione* 3.11 [1630], pp. 56-72).

II. Second, those who constitute a threefold covenant (natural, legal and evangelical) so explain the promise annexed to each that the evangelical alone was of eternal life to be passed in heaven. The legal consisted in the most perfect happiness both of soul and body to be enjoyed in the land of Canaan. However, the promise annexed to the natural covenant had no other reference than to "the life, perpetual and abounding in all kinds of good, which can belong both to the soul and the body of man constituted in the state of upright nature, and that to be enjoyed in the earthly paradise" (as the illustrious Amyrald expresses it, "Theses Theologicae de Tribus Foederibus Divinis," 11 in *Syntagma Thesium Theologicarum* [1664], p. 214).

III. However, the received opinion among the orthodox is that the promise given to Adam was not only of a happy life to be continued in paradise, but of a heavenly and eternal life (to which he was to be carried after the course of perfect obedience and perseverance had been run and which God had prescribed to him as a trial of his faith). Hence it is evident that the question is not whether Adam had the privilege of immortality in his upright state (which we have proved before against Socinus). The question is not whether the promise was given to him of happiness and life perpetually to endure, if he had persisted in integrity (which the learned men, with whom we here dispute, do not deny). Rather the question is whether that happiness and life were to be passed in heaven or only upon the earth and in paradise. The latter, they affirm; we the former.

IV. The reasons are: (1) The law of works had the promise of heavenly and eternal life; therefore also the law prescribed to Adam. In each instance, it is the same law as to substance. The former is evident from "who doeth these things, shall live by them" (Lev. 18:5); "if thou wilt enter into life" (namely, the heavenly) "keep the commandments" (Mt. 19:16, 17); and "the commandment was ordained to life" (Rom. 7:10) assuredly, not earthly, but heavenly. Since however, after the fall, the law can justify no one, this promise must necessarily have had place in upright Adam.

V. Second, it is confirmed by this—Christ acquired the eternal and celestial life which he bestows upon us in no other way than that (being made under the law) he fulfilled the righteousness (*dikaiōma*) of the law for us (Rom. 8:4; Gal. 4:5). This could not have been done unless the law had promised heavenly life to the obedient. For as he rendered to God the Father no other obedience than what the law demanded, so by fulfilling the law, he acquired no other life than what was promised by the law. Besides, since Christ died that through him we might recover what we lost in Adam and merited for us eternal life, it is necessary that it should have been lost for us in Adam and that Adam would have attained it, if he had persevered in obedience. Nor would Christ be called the tree of life, if he had not restored that life to us whose promise this tree sealed to our first parents.

VI. Third, the threatening of death denounced against the transgressor embraces both temporal and eternal death to be suffered in hell; for that death is understood, the empire of which the Devil obtained on account of sin (Heb. 2:14). Now he has the empire of eternal death to be suffered in hell. Thus also the promise of life (opposed to it) includes heavenly and eternal life. The reason of the consequence depends on the goodness of God, which is no less than his justice. If legislators are wont to inflict milder punishments upon transgressors and so reward the obedient more fully, how much more ought this to be said of God (the best and most munificent lawgiver) who is slow to wrath and plenteous in mercy? Would God take delight in aggravating punishments and lessening rewards; threatening spiritual, eternal and infernal punishments, and bestowing only earthly promises?

VII. Fourth, the state of the highest good of God communicative of itself demands this. For it cannot but communicate itself to the rational creature created for it (and capacious among all God's creatures). It ought also to exhibit itself to be enjoyed fittingly to his nature (i.e., in a spiritual manner). To profess corporeal and terrestrial goods is not to enjoy him as God (i.e., as the solid and immutable good); especially since the covenant into which he receives him promises not any kind, but the most excellent goods in intimate communion with God (which can be no other than eternal and heavenly).

VIII. Fifth, the dignity of man himself demands the same thing. Since his noblest part is spirit (even of heavenly origin) touched with a vehement desire of heavenly goods (by which alone its infinite appetite for the highest good can be satisfied), he could not obtain on earth his full felicity, but must be gifted with it at length in heaven where he can enjoy the fullest and most perfect communion with God, in whom his highest good resides. For although on earth he could in some measure give himself to be enjoyed, it is certain that the immediate and absolute fruition of God is not to be sought apart from the beatific vision which can be looked for only in heaven.

IX. Sixth, because the state of the way (*status viae*) ought to differ from the state of native country (*status patriae*): the place of contest and trial, and the place of reward and wages. Now the earthly paradise was the place of trial and the life enjoyed in it, the state of the way. Thus another place ought to be assigned to the state of residence, in which the reward was promised (which could be one other than heaven). Otherwise it would follow that no good was promised to him (of which he had not been made partaker before perfect obedience rendered

to the law) for already in paradise he enjoyed a happy life overflowing with all kinds of good. I pass over the argument that if Adam had persevered in obedience, it would have been impossible for him and all his posterity to remain perpetually upon the earth. For they, increasing in number by generation and no one being translated to heaven, within two thousand years the earth would have been too small to contain the whole human race. How much less could one garden of Eden hold and support them all? From all this it appears that the promise given to Adam was not only of a happy life to be passed on earth, but a heavenly and eternal life. Calvin observes: "The earthly life indeed would have been temporal; into heaven, however he would have migrated without destruction and uninjured" (*Commentary on Genesis* [1947], 1:127 on Gen. 2:17).

Sources of solutions.

X. The natural covenant is not so called because it conferred nothing above nature and condition (which man had from creation), but because it depended on the powers of nature and the obedience (which according to them) he ought to render. Nor, if a proportion is not granted between the prescribed duty and the blessing of heavenly life, does it follow that such a promise cannot have a place. It is gratuitously and falsely supposed that the promises of God are regulated according to the proportion of our merit. On the contrary, they depend upon God's will and goodness. For there was no proportion between the constancy of angels keeping their original estate and the infinite reward of a confirmed heavenly life. For as God punishes this side of condignity, so he rewards far beyond desert.

XI. Although the Scripture does not make express mention of a heavenly life to be conferred on Adam, it is with sufficient clearness gathered by legitimate consequence from the opposed threatening of eternal death and from the sacramental seal of this promise by the tree of life (the signification of which was surely known to man). For although Moses describes it obscurely (as most of the things pertaining to that covenant, upon which, as the shadow of a fleeing image, he throws only scattered rays of light to represent its evanescence [*aphanismon*]), yet there can be no doubt that these things were more distinctly revealed to the first man.

XII. Christ alone gives us promises of eternal life in the state of sin. Yet in the state of nature, Adam might have had them by his own obedience, according to God's pact.

XIII. The promises of the new covenant are said to be "better" than those of the old (Heb. 8:6), not as to substance (because the same heavenly and eternal life is promised in both), but as to mode (because, as they were acquired in a far nobler manner through Christ, so they are set forth far more clearly and efficaciously and are applied more certainly and firmly in the hand of a Mediator) inasmuch as there is granted to us not only the help without which we could not persevere (as to Adam), but the help with which we can certainly persevere. Again, they can be called "better" as to the condition of the objects. The covenant of works promises life only to the man perfectly just and deserving; but the covenant of grace promises not only life, but also salvation to man altogether undeserving and unworthy (namely to the sinner).

XIV. Although this covenant of nature was without a mediator, still no less could it promise and confer upon Adam (persevering) heavenly life (even as the angels could, without a mediator, be confirmed in good).

XV. The happiness and perfection of the way must differ from that of the residence. Although nothing was wanting to Adam in paradise for the happiness and perfection suitable to the state of the way, still many things could be wanting which are required for the happiness of the residence.

XVI. When Paul says the first Adam was made a "living soul," but the second a "quickening spirit" (1 Cor. 15:45, 46) (the one animal and earthly, the other spiritual and heavenly), he does not wish to indicate what was or was not promised to Adam. He only indicates what was the condition of each Adam, and what they ought to communicate to their posterity (viz., Adam only an animal life, but Christ a heavenly and eternal life through his quickening spirit). But as the second Adam was not so from heaven with respect to his divinity (but that he also could have something of the earthy [*tou choikou*] in our flesh which he assumed), so neither was the first Adam so animal (*psychikos*) and earthy with respect to his body formed from the earth (and with respect to the animal functions, necessary for the propagation of the species and the preservation of the individual) but that he might also be moral and spiritual, endowed with wisdom, righteousness and holiness; and thus adorned with those gifts by which he was capable of eternal and heavenly life.

XVII. Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 15:50), not inasmuch as they are considered simply physically and substantively (otherwise the resurrection of the flesh could not be believed), but only morally and qualitatively (as liable to corruption through sin, which did not belong to Adam in the state of nature). Although Adam in that state could not have received heavenly life without some change, in order that he might pass from a state of animality (depending upon food, sleep and rest, and other necessities of life) to a state of glory (in which he would be deprived of them), it was not necessary forthwith that the mode and reason of that change should be revealed to him. It was sufficient for Adam to know the fact (*to hoti*), although ignorant of the how (*to pōs*).

SEVENTH QUESTION: PARADISE

Does the earthly paradise still exist? We deny.

Statement of the question.

I. The question here is not what or of what nature was the garden of Eden; or what place on earth did it occupy (concerning which the opinions of the learned are various and discrepant, which Bellarmine laboriously brings together and examines in his book "De Gratia Primi Hominis," 12 in *Opera* [1858], 4:39-41). It is easy to gather, from the narrative of Moses and the topography of paradise given by him, that it should be sought nowhere else than in Mesopotamia about Babylon. But we speak here only of its present existence: whether that garden still exists at this time, in whatever part of the earth it may be.

II. This question lies between us and various papists who assert that the garden still exists "in a place indeed unknown to us, yet defined in a new earth and remote from the visits of sinners, where Enoch and Elijah live until coming forth thence against Antichrist they may contend with him." Their design in this is not obscure: it is undoubtedly to persuade the common people that their pope is

not the Antichrist (as he is wont to be called by us) since he is to come forth only at the end of the ages (Enoch and Elijah returning, who have not yet appeared). This is the opinion of Bellarmine ("De Gratia Primi Hominis," 14 in *Opera* [1858], 4:42) and of Sixtus Senensis (*Bibliotheca Sancta* 5, anno 36 [1575], 2:30).

III. However not a few of the papists differ from them on this point (as Pererius, Jansen, Suarez, Viegas, Cornelius a Lapide and others). They agree in asserting that that garden was submerged by the waters of the flood and, on that account, so changed and destroyed that it no longer exists. We do not deny that the place indeed remains about the Euphrates in Mesopotamia, but maintain that the garden was long ago ruined and laid waste by the universal deluge (or even by some singular judgment of God unknown to us) that men might not desire a return to it and might know that another far more excellent should be sought (viz., the heavenly) which can be destroyed by no deluge, but will eternally endure for the happiness of the pious.

Proof that paradise does not exist.

IV. The reasons are: (1) The waters of the flood are said to have so prevailed over the whole world, as to cover even the highest mountains fifteen cubits (Gen. 7:19, 20). Therefore they must also have destroyed that garden. However what Bellarmine says (that it is to be believed that the waters of the flood did not penetrate into paradise, and what is narrated of the mountains which the waters covered must be understood of those mountains which were dwelt upon by sinners in the inhabited earth) is rejected with the same facility with which it is gratuitously and without foundation proposed. Yea, Scripture openly impugns it, speaking not only of certain mountains, but of all: "And all the high hills, that were under the whole heaven were covered" (v. 19). Now a universal proposition ought not to be restricted unless the exception is made in Scripture itself or necessary reason demands it (neither of which is granted here). As to the safety of Enoch, it will hereafter be refuted. Yea, Bellarmine himself (destroying his own argument) afterwards confesses that the water penetrated into paradise and, if it did not entirely destroy, still it received some damage (but not total "because it did not change the situation of the place, nor the temperature of the air, nor root up or wither all trees").

V. Second, no trace any longer exists of paradise, nor can it be ascertained. Not in Mesopotamia where, as we said, it most probably was because it is a most pleasant region, where the rivers of paradise (the Euphrates and the Tigris) are found, where the land of Eden is which gave its name to paradise (Gen. 2:8), near Haran (2 K. 19:12; Ezk. 27:23); not anywhere else.

VI. Third, if paradise had been preserved of God by a special privilege and had been unharmed by the waters of the deluge, to no purpose would Noah have spent so much time and labor upon the ark for his reception (since he might easily have gone into paradise with his family and other animals, where he would have been safe from the flood).

VII. Fourth, if paradise had been preserved, it must undoubtedly have been preserved for some reason and end. But no reason can be given for it. For what the opponents invent (viz., that Enoch and Elijah might be transferred thither to have a place suitable to their state, until the time comes for their attack upon Antichrist, when they will exchange life with death) is a fictitious and absurd fable resting upon no foundation. There is indeed no doubt that Enoch and Elijah

were translated to paradise where they ought to live forever; but it was the heavenly, not the earthly paradise—that paradise in which Paul heard "unutterable (*arrēta*) words" (as Irenaeus has it, *Against Heresies* 5.5* [ANF 1:531; PG 7.1135]). It is evident that Elijah was carried up by a whirlwind into heaven (2 K. 2:11) and that Enoch was translated (viz., to heaven) that he should not see death (Heb. 11:5). However, he would not have been exempted from death, if still kept in Eden for martyrdom.

VIII. The Son of Sirach indeed asserts that "Enoch pleased the Lord and was translated" (viz., from the world to heaven, 44:16). The addition (translated "into Paradise") does not exist in the Greek manuscript, but was inserted by an ancient interpreter and falsely approved by the Council of Trent. Besides, it is one thing to be translated into paradise, another to be translated into the earthly paradise. The former is asserted by the Son of Sirach (according to the old version, but not the latter).

IX. To no purpose, Bellarmine (to prove that Antichrist has not yet come, so that he may not be forced to recognize him in his pope) feigns that Enoch and Elijah are kept in paradise and will come forth at the end of the world, to fight with and to be slain by him ("De Romano Ponitifice," 3.6 in *Opera* [1856], 1:434-35). Not the slightest trace of such a comment occurs in Scripture. What is said of the coming of Elijah (Mal. 4:5) was evidently fulfilled in John the Baptist (Lk. 1:17). Christ himself testifies to it: "If ye will receive it, this is Elijah, which was for to come" (Mt. 11:14); "I say unto you, That Elijah is indeed come, and they have done unto him whatsoever they listed" (Mk. 9:13). The Jews believed that Elijah was to be sent before the Messiah began his reign. Christ himself confesses that to be true, but testifies that he had already come. Therefore to say that Elijah (who according to the prophecy of Malachi was to be sent before the first advent of the Messiah) has not yet come is necessarily to confess that the Messiah has not yet come. Nor can it be replied that Malachi speaks of the final advent. He calls it "the great and terrible" day of the Lord, and the Hebrew word (*hnvr'*) signifies not only "terrible," but also to "be revered." Again, the first advent of Christ is so called because "it is great to the saints, terrible to sinners," as Jerome says; "for if Christ had not come to the Jews, they had not had sin" (Jn. 15:22). But since they rejected Christ coming, he had smitten their land with a curse according to the prophecy of Malachi (4:6). And moreover with respect to this judgment and destruction which was to follow the advent of Christ, the coming of Christ itself is described as terrible (Mal. 3:2), as also by John the Baptist (Mt. 3:10). Nor if Elijah is said to "be about to come" (Mt. 17:11) is this so to be understood as if he was still to come, but because (according to Malachi) formerly he was about to come and to restore all things. Abulensis (Tostatus) thus explains who is "about to come" (i.e., "who was about to come, for he had now come, but it is said, who is to come because he is promised as about to come in Scripture," "Quatrapars Abulensis super Mattheum," in *Opera* [1507-31], p. 168 on Mt. 11). In the same manner, John the Baptist interrogates Christ through his disciples, "Art thou he that should come?" (Mt. 11:3). Christ had come for some time and yet is said to be about to come; not because then he was about to come, but because according to the prophecies of the sacred Scripture he was about to come (as the Scripture frequently is wont to retain the old name, the state being changed).

X. The two witnesses mentioned in Rev. 11:3 cannot be referred to Enoch and Elijah. Being once gifted with immortality, they are not any more liable to death (so that they can neither be slain by Antichrist), nor have they need of a resurrection. But they refer, either to the Old and New Testament (bearing testimony to Christ and which the beast impiously prohibited and defiled); or to the preachers of the word who preceded the Reformation and opened the way for it (who are more fitly said "to oppose themselves to the beast, to be slain, to have dead bodies, not to be buried, to be made alive" in their successors). These are called two, whether on account of their fewness (a certain number being put for an uncertain) or because, as generally, God in inaugurating his church sent two together—as Moses and Aaron, Elijah and Elisha, Zerubbabel and Joshua (in the Old Testament) and in the New, two disciples together were sent to preach (Mk. 6:7). In the Reformation, he raised up John Hus and Jerome of Prague in Bohemia, Zwingli and Oecolampadius in Switzerland, Luther and Melanchthon in Germany, Calvin and Farel in France.

XI. Although not a few of the ancients adopted the comment about the duration of paradise and the residence of Enoch and Elijah in it, it does not follow forthwith that it must be received. It is not supported by the word of God; yea is plainly repugnant to it. The source of error seems to have been opened partly in a Greek translation (corrupted in two places at Mal. 4:5). According to the true Hebrew text, this is read: "I will send you Elijah the prophet." The Greek version has "Elijah, the Tishbite" (*Elian ton Thisbitēn*) as if to be understood of the person of Elijah, the Tishbite. Also 2 K. 2:1, 11, where in the Hebrew we read that Elijah was "to be taken up" or was "taken up into heaven," but in the Greek "as if into heaven" (*hōs eis ton ouranon*). This comes partly from a certain tradition of very doubtful faith, which seems to have taken its origin from Papias of Hierapolis. He recommended it to posterity delivered by the elders of Asia (disciples of the apostles) with many other fables and follies. He was a man of little judgment and the inventor of many fables, as what he relates concerning the five-fold age of Christ on earth and his millenary kingdom (cf. Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* 3*.39 [FC 19:202-6]).

XII. The olive branch, which the dove broke off and carried to Noah in the ark, may not necessarily have been obtained in paradise. Already the waters had lessened and for many days the ark had stood on Mount Ararat unmoved. Thus the olive (which always flourishes) could have leaves which the dove plucked; "for the olive is perpetually green, never sheds its leaves," according to Pliny (?*Natural History* 15.40.134 [Loeb, 4:378-79]).

XIII. But not without mystery does God seem to have wished this paradise to be destroyed, to intimate that another far more pleasant is now to be sought by us. It is prepared for believers by God through Christ, not on earth but in heaven (Lk. 23:43; Rev. 2:7); filled with innumerable mystical and divine trees bearing the most healthful fruits (Rev. 22:2); watered by the perennial stream of living water and rivers of pleasure (Ps. 36:8), whence sin and death are forever banished; from which Satan, once driven out, can never return; into which the believer having once been received can never be cast out; approach to which angels do not prohibit, but thither bear our souls, so that they may enjoy in the vision of God all happiness and spend an eternal Sabbath.

NINTH TOPIC

SIN IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR

FIRST QUESTION
Whether the formal reason of sin may rightly be said to consist in illegality (anomia). *We affirm.*

I. From the state of integrity, we proceed to the state of sin into which man (by his voluntary defection from the highest good) precipitated himself and became, at the same time, wicked and miserable. For an easier understanding of it, we must treat two things: (1) of sin in general; (2) of the same in particular, i.e., of the fall of angels and Adam, original and actual sin.

Etymology of peccatum.

II. *Peccatum* is commonly called in Hebrew *cht'h*, which properly means "deflection" from a design. It is applied to slingers and archers who do not hit the mark. This best explains the nature of sin—a true deflection and wandering from the end proposed to us both in creation and in the law of God. *Hamartia* in Greek answers to it—as if *hamarptia* ("a not reaching") as *hamartanein* means "to miss a mark" (*tou skopou apotynchanein*). Hence it is called by Suidas *hē tou agathou apotychia* (*Suidae Lexicon: Graeca et Latine* [repr. 1986], 1:262). Cicero, referring to this etymology, says "peccare" is "tanquam lineas transire" ("to cross over the lines," *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 3 [Loeb, 4:270-71]). Others derive it from *mrdh* which means "to rebel." In Latin, *peccatum* (cf. *pecuatum*, "from cattle") as *peccare* is to act irrationally (*alogōs*) like beasts. Hence Scripture compares sinners to dogs, swine, vipers, lions and animals of like kind. Isidore maintains the sinner to be (as it were) "a rake" (*pellicatorem*) and *peccare* to mean "to indulge in lust" (*pellicari*, *Etymologiarum* 10 [PL 82.391]).

What is sin in the concrete; what in the abstract?

III. However, sin may be viewed in two aspects: either in the concrete and materially (with the subject in which it inheres); or in the abstract and formally for vitiosity itself (whether actual or habitual). In the former sense, Augustine defines sin as a "desire, word, deed contrary to the law of God" (*Reply to Faustus the Manichaean* 22.27 [NPNF1, 4:283; PL 42.418]); but this is not sufficiently accurate because it pertains only to actual sin (and indeed sins of commission). More correctly therefore, it is called an inclination, action or omission at variance with the law of God; or lacking the legal rectitude which ought to be in it. In the latter, it is nothing other than *anomia* or "discrepancy from the law." John defines it: *hē de hamartia estin anomia* ("sin is the transgression of the law," 1 Jn. 3:4) because "where no law is, there is no transgression" (Rom. 4:15).

IV. By law here is meant the law of God alone by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*) (who is the "only lawgiver, who can save and destroy," Jam. 4:12), whether natural and implanted (*emphytos*) (impressed upon the consciences of men) or revealed and inwritten (*engraphos*) (committed to writing in the Word of God). Human laws do not bind the conscience primarily, directly, immediately and of themselves; but secondarily only, indirectly and mediately by the law of God according to which we are bound to obey our superiors.

***The formal reason of sin is* anomia.**

V. Hence it follows that the formal reason of sin consists in *anomia* and privation, denoting the want of the rectitude or goodness which ought to be in the rational creature according to the prescription of the law (whether it belongs to the nature or qualities or actions themselves, for it deprives all these of conformity with the law and so constitutes them guilty of sin). But this privation is not pure or simple, but corrupting; not idle, but energetic; not of pure negation, but of depraved disposition, by which not only is the due rectitude taken away, but also an undue unrectitude and a depraved quality laid down, infecting all the faculties. Just as a physical disease is not only a removal of the temper of the humors, but also a corrupt disposition and disorder (*dyskrasia*) of them, so sin (which holds the relation of a moral disease of the soul) is not only the negation of a good, but the position of a corrupt disposition. Therefore inasmuch as it is the want of righteousness that ought to be in, it is well called privation; even so, inasmuch as it taints and corrupts the soul, it is called a corrupt quality and is usually described as a stain and disease. Hence Thomas Aquinas: "As bodily sickness has something of privation, inasmuch as the equality of health is taken away, and has something positive (viz., the humors themselves inordinately disposed), so original sin . . . is not a pure privation, but a certain corrupt habit" (ST, I-II, Q. 82*, Art. 1, p. 956).

VI. In this respect, some attribute a certain positive being to sin, not absolutely and physically (as if it was a subsistence having a physical entity and created by God), but both logically (because it is truly affirmed of the subject) and ethically (inasmuch as it is a corrupt habit infecting the moral faculties and the acts flowing from them). It is opposed to a mere nothing because it is one thing to do nothing, another to do badly; or to a simple privation, which deprives the subject indeed of the due rectitude without positing any contrary quality.

VII. Not everything which includes something positive is altered by good or being. But what properly and in every way is positive (especially substantial) and which in its own conception does not imply privation or defect, such also alone is from God and is desirable. Yet there is not the same relation of that which is called positive only relatively or logically or ethically, as is the case with sin.

VIII. Although sin in its conception involves privation, yet there does not cease to be a distinction between sins of omission and commission. The former assail the affirming precepts; the latter the denying. In the former, privation takes away the whole substance of the act and its objective goodness; in the latter the substance of the act is not taken away, but only its actual goodness. The privation of omission immediately exists in the power by which man was bound to have acted, but the other is immediately in the action which is destitute of the due morality.

IX. Although infants are not susceptible of law as to act, still they are as to habit (being rational creatures to whom the law prescribes every kind of holiness—habitual as much as actual). Hence original sin is rightly said to be against the law because it is a privation of the original rectitude which the law demands in man.

X. The virtues of the heathen can be according to the law with regard to the substance of work; although against the law with regard to mode of operating (which in many ways wanders from it).

SECOND QUESTION

Whether the hekousion *or voluntary (inasmuch as it is of him who knowingly and willingly does anything) is of the essence of sin. We deny against the papists and Socinians.*

I. The papists and Socinians agitate this controversy with us, the more easily to obscure the true nature of original sin and to deny the first motions of nature (however foul and base, which are not in our power [*eph' hēmin*] and lack the full assent of the mind) to be sins. And thus they wish nothing to have the relation of sin except what is equally voluntary (to wit, what is done knowingly and from choice [*ek proaireseōs*]); cf. Bellarmine, "De amissione gratiae," 1.1 *Opera* (1858), 4:52-53; Smaltzius*, *Refutatio Thesium D. Wolfgangi Frantzii*, Disp. II (1614), pp. 41-62.

Statement of the question.

II. We clear the question by a twofold distinction. First, voluntary may be taken either strictly or broadly. In the former sense, it means that which is done by an actual movement of the will; in the latter, that which in any manner either affects the will and inheres in it or depends upon it. Here, however, we do not treat of voluntary broadly so called. For we do not deny that sin is in the will and thus far it can be called voluntary, at least subjectively. Rather we treat of voluntary strictly so called, which involves an act of choice (*proaireseōs*) and will. In this sense, we deny that every sin is voluntary (*hekousion*).

III. Second, involuntary may be taken in two ways: either positively or negatively. The former is the same as unwilling which is such by a positive nolition. In this sense, we grant that no sin can be involuntary. The latter is what is done (the act of will ceasing) when the will ought to have acted (which is said to be such by a negative nolition). In this sense, every sin is not necessarily voluntary.

IV. The reason is that this requisite does not belong to every sin—not to it alone, nor always. Not to all because it cannot be said of original sin (which precedes all use of the will and liberty). Although it is in the will subjectively, still it is not from it originally. Not to "sins of ignorance and imprudence" (*hamartiai akousioi* in the Septuagint, Num. 15:27), called as much from induced ignorance (like that of Noah and Lot who sinned when intoxicated) as from simple ignorance (like that of Abimelech seizing the wife of Abraham, and of Paul in 1 Tim. 1:13). Not to it alone because the voluntary (*to hekousion*) is a common affection of all actions (which are done from choice [*ek proaireseōs*]). Not always because sometimes there is a wrestling in sinful actions—as when Paul did the sin which he would not and hated it (Rom 7:15*).

V. The very first motions of concupiscence do not cease to be sins, although they are neither wholly voluntary nor in our power. "I had not known sin, but by

the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet" (Rom. 7:7). Those very unbridled motions of concupiscence he not only calls "sin," but "sin exceeding sinful" (*kath' hyperbolēn hamartōlon*, Rom. 7:13). Although indeed these motions may not be in our power (*eph' hēmin*), yet because they were such in the beginning and ought to be in accordance with the duty of man, they do not cease to be sins.

VI. Desire is contradistinguished from sin; not simply, but from a certain species of it (viz., sin "finished") which is carried out by the external members (Jam. 1:14, 15).

VII. Ignorance can indeed excuse from so much, but not from the whole; and ignorance not of the law, but of action; not vincible, affected and drawn upon one's self (*epispastos*), but invincible and involuntary; not of depraved disposition (which is also called a culpable error), but of pure negation (which is called nescience [*nescientia*]).

VIII. When Augustine says, "Sin is even so voluntary that it is not even sin, unless it be voluntary" (*Of True Religion* 14 [LCC 6:238; PL 34.133]), this is not to be understood of any sin whatsoever, but only of actual (*actuali*) sin. He explains, "In vain do you suppose that on this account there is no fault in little children because it cannot be without will, which they have not. For this is properly said on account of each one's proper sin, not on account of the original contagion of the first sin" (*Against Julian* 3.5 [FC 35:116; PL 44.707]).

IX. The voluntary is twofold: either radically in the signified act (*actu signato*), or actually in the exercised act (*actu exercito*). Sin is not always voluntary actually and in the exercised act because original sin is granted; but it can be called voluntary radically because the proper seat of sin is the will in every sin.

X. What is necessary by a physical necessity (or of coaction) cannot have the relation of sin; but what is necessary by a hypothetical and rational necessity does not forthwith take away sin.

THIRD QUESTION

Whether guilt is the formal of sin, or its inseparable adjunct, or only its effect. And whether it may well be distinguished into guilt of culpability and of punishment.

Two effects of sin: pollution. and guilt.

I. The effects of sin are commonly said to be two: pollution and guilt. The former is the spiritual and moral pollution with which the soul of man is tainted. Guilt is obligation to punishment from previous sin. The former inheres in man; the latter however adheres to him in the sight of God. The former makes man wicked; the latter makes him miserable. According to the first relation (*schesin*) sins are called "impurities," "diseases," "wounds;" according to the latter, they are called "crimes," "offenses," "debts." The former can remain, the latter being removed. The latter answers to the blessing of justification by which Christ takes away our guilt by the imputation of his own righteousness. However, the former answers to the grace of sanctification by which pollution is washed away through the efficacy of the Holy Spirit.

What is guilt and of how many kinds? Potential and actual.

II. Politically, guilt is nothing else than the state and condition in which the accused are until they are either acquitted or condemned. Theologically, however, it is called "the obligation to punishment arising from sin." That obligation can be considered either in the first act for obnoxiousness (*obnoxietate*) or the desert of punishment; or in the second act for the obligation itself or actual ordination of punishment from the judgment of God. Hence a twofold guilt arises: one called potential, denoting the intrinsic desert of punishment inseparable from sin; the other actual, separable from it by the mercy of God (viz., by remission), which is properly the actual removal of guilt. The former belongs to the demerit of sin and its condemnability (*to katakritikon*) (which always adheres to sin); the latter, however, to the judgment of demerit or the condemnation (*to katakrima*) which is taken away from those whose sins are pardoned.

Guilt is not the formal of sin.

III. Hence it is evident that guilt is not with sufficient accuracy called by the Scholastics the formal (*formale*) of sin; it is only its consequent, arising from its illegality (*anomia*). For as the law can be viewed in respect of the command or of the sanction or of the added threatening, sin has a twofold relation (*schesin*) to it. With regard to the former (inasmuch as it is referred to the sentence of the law commanding or prohibiting something), it is called *anomia* ("illegality"); inasmuch as it is referred to the threatening, it is called guilt. Hence it follows that guilt (at least actual guilt concerning which we especially treat) can be separated from sin. In the renewed, there is illegality (*anomia*) and not guilt (Rom. 8:1). In Christ, on the contrary, there is guilt (Is. 53:5; 2 Cor. 5:21) because he is our surety, but yet no illegality (*anomia*) (1 Pet. 2:22; 1 Jn. 3:5; Jn. 8:46). Therefore illegality (*anomia*) is one thing, but the condemnation (*krima*) attending it is another. The former constitutes the nature of sin; the latter, however, follows it and necessarily depends upon it.

IV. However, guilt follows sin, partly from the natural and indispensable right of God (founded on his justice and the intrinsic demerit of sin because it is a thing in its own nature evil and base, which God cannot help hating, Rom. 1:32; Hab. 1:13), partly from the sanction of the divine law threatening sin with punishment (which must be fulfilled).

V. Although the sanction of the law ought necessarily to be fulfilled (and in this sense guilt can never be separated from sin), yet because a surety can be substituted in the place of the sinner (who takes his guilt upon himself), it happens that it can be separated from the person sinning (not indeed through nature or from the law [which ignores such substitution], but through grace from the gospel).

VI. Falsely, however, is guilt distinguished by the papists into guilt of culpability and of punishment. The guilt of culpability (*reatus culpae*) according to them is that by which the sinner is of himself unworthy of the grace of God and worthy of his wrath and condemnation; but the guilt of punishment (*reatus poenae*) is that by which he is subject to condemnation and obliged to it. The former guilt, they say, is taken away by Christ. The latter, however, can remain (at least as to the guilt of temporal punishment). But the emptiness of the distinction appears from the nature of both. Since culpability and punishment are related and guilt is nothing else than the obligation to punishment arising from culpability, they

mutually posit and remove each other so that culpability and its guilt being removed, the punishment itself ought to be taken away necessarily (as it can be inflicted only on account of culpability). Otherwise culpability cannot be said to be remitted or its guilt taken away, if there still remains something to be purged from the sinner because of it.

VII. Some punishments are still visited by God upon believers after the remission of culpability (as upon David and others) because they are only improperly so called (i.e., they are medicinal and castigatory—for their correction); not indeed properly so called and satisfactory—for their punishment. Yet it does not follow that, the culpability being remitted or its guilt removed, there still remains any guilt of punishment.

FOURTH QUESTION: VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN

Whether all sins are of themselves and in their own nature mortal. Or whether any venial sin can be granted. The former we affirm; the latter we deny against the papists.

Opinion of papists concerning mortal and venial sin.

I. It is well known that among the various divisions of sin, the papists press this beyond others, distributing sin into mortal and venial. Their design in this is not obscure (viz., to curry favor for the perfection of righteousness, supererogatory works, the merit of works and purgatory), although indeed it displeases various persons among them (as Gerson, Almayno, Roffensius and others). Bellarmine does not conceal this ("De amissione gratiae," 1.4 in *Opera* [1858], 4:54-57). Still it is received by most of them and is confirmed by the Council of Trent (Session 6*, Schroeder, pp. 37, 45).

II. According to them, mortal sins are those which turn man entirely away from God and to which eternal punishment is due (like deadly wounds which immediately extinguish life). Venial sins, however, are those which do not indeed wholly turn away from God, yet hinder progress to him and are easily expiated. Or they are those which of themselves and in their own nature are so light and minute as not to be sufficient to deprive anyone of divine grace or make him an enemy of God or render him worthy of eternal death. The former they hold to be such either from their own kind or from the imperfection of the work; the latter those which have for their object an evil and inordinate thing, yet a thing not repugnant to the love either of God or of our neighbor (such as an idle word or joke, excessive laughter, an officious lie). Those which are judged to be venial on account of imperfection of work are again twofold: (1) from subreption, which are not perfectly voluntary (such as the sudden motions of desire, anger, vengeance, etc. arising in the mind before the reason can fully deliberate whether they are to be entertained or not); (2) from the smallness of the matter, which are committed in a small thing (for instance, the theft of a farthing, which neither sensibly injures one's neighbor, nor is of such a kind as to take away friendship among generous men).

Statement of the question.

III. Hence it appears that the question does not concern the equality of sins or gradual inequality, but their essential demerit. The question is not whether all sins are equal to each other (the paradox of the ancient Stoics and falsely

charged upon us by our opponents). If all sins agree in being mortal, it does not follow that they are equal in all things because they can differ from each other as to degree of demerit, so as to deserve a greater or lesser punishment. Rather the question is only whether they are equally mortal.

IV. (2) The question is not whether sins can be called mortal or venial from the event. We confess that as to the event (through God's grace) many sins are venial (viz., are pardoned by God). In this sense, we think all the sins of believers can be called venial because there is not one which is not eventually pardoned through God's mercy. Also we think that all the sins of reprobates are mortal because not one of them obtains pardon. But the question is whether they are such per se and in their own nature, so that some are mortal (i.e., deserving death), others venial (of themselves deserving pardon).

V. (3) The question is not whether a distinction relative to the administration of divine providence in the covenant of grace in punishing the sins of believers can be admitted; whether certain sins in believers can be called mortal because they are grievous and atrocious, which more deeply wound and injure conscience, hinder the act of justifying faith and take away present fitness for the kingdom of heaven (upon which therefore he denounces wrath and indignation; yea, threatens exclusion from the kingdom of heaven and eternal death, like those treated of in 1 Cor. 6:10 and Col. 3:5); whether others, however, may be called venial, which are lighter and of daily commission, not hindering the rule and operation of grace, nor taking away the sense of God's favor or the confidence of the pardon of sin (such as the rebellious motions of concupiscence, of which Paul complains in Rom. 7—defects and blemishes adhering even to the best works of the renewed). There are some of our party who think the distinction of mortal and venial sin can be retained in this sense, as Robert Baron, following the theologians of Great Britain, in his *Judicio de Perseverantia* (?*Disputatio theologica de vero discrime peccati mortalis et venialis* [1633]), although it does not seem sufficiently appropriate on account of our opponents; the distinction of heavy and light sins is better. The question simply concerns the nature of sins in themselves according to the strictness of the law. We think all are mortal, none truly venial.

VI. The question therefore comes back to this—whether all sins per se and in their own nature are mortal (not that they are always actually punished with death, but are worthy of it and can justly be so punished); whether some are mortal and some venial (not from the event and through grace, but in their own nature and according to the law). The latter our opponents hold; we maintain the former.

Proof that no sin is venial: (1) from Rom. 6:23.

VII. The reasons are: (1) "The wages of sin is death" (Rom. 6:23) and "the soul that sinneth, it shall die" (Ezk. 18:20). These deal not with any sin in particular, but with sin in general. Mention is made of sin indefinitely to mark sin of any kind. Thus either venial sin is not sin or it deserves death and so is not venial. It is however gratuitously supposed that Paul treats only of heavier sin contending with grace and righteousness because he discourses about any sin, even concerning the remains of sin in the renewed (as he proves by his own example exclaiming at the end: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death?" Rom. 7:24). His design

proves this, which is to warn Christians from sins; not from some only, but from all because they have no other wages than death.

(2) From Dt. 27:26.

VIII. Second, the terrible formula of the law proves this very thing: "Cursed be he that confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them" (Dt. 27:26; Gal. 3:10). If every deviation from the law deserves a curse and every sin is illegality (*anomia*), no sin can be granted (even the smallest) which does not bring upon it the curse. Nor can it be said that Moses treats only of certain more heinous sins referred to in the preceding verses—idolatry, incest, homicide. We answer that the universal particle embraces all. As Paul explains it (Gal. 3:10), attending to the sense more than to the sound, he adds from the Septuagint the universal syncategorematic words "everyone" and "in all things," and makes mention of "the law" simply, not of "this law," that the curse may apply to the whole law. Nor does it follow that if actually and in fact all sinners are not cursed, all sin does not deserve to be cursed; but only that they obtain the pardon of it from grace.

(3) From Jam. 2:10.

IX. Third, "whosoever offends in one precept, he is guilty of all" (Jam. 2:10). The apostle treats here not only of crimes, but of any sins indefinitely, as is proved both by his general words "whosoever shall offend in one" and the example of "respect of persons" (*prosōpolēpsias*) adduced by him. A multiple reason can be given why man by violating one precept becomes guilty of all. (a) From the author, because there is the same author of all the precepts, so that in the violation of one the majesty of the lawgiver is offended against. (b) From the connection of sins, because all the precepts are summed up in the one of love; this being violated the whole law is violated. (c) From the end of the law which demands an obedience, not partial, but universal; so that he who violates one precept is guilty of the violation of the whole law and can no more obtain life from the law.

(4) From Mt. 12:36.

X. Fourth, in the day of judgment account must be given even of an idle word (Mt. 12:36), as of that which of itself can be a cause of condemnation. Hence to show that those idle words mentioned in v. 36 (venial sins on the hypothesis of our opponents) are a sufficient cause of condemnation, he adds, "by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned" (Mt. 12:37). The design of Christ (to show that the sin against the Holy Ghost can never be pardoned) confirms the same thing as an argument from the lesser. For if an idle word deserves condemnation, how much more such dreadful blasphemy?

(5) Because it is opposed to the glory of God.

XI. Fifth, every sin is opposed to the glory of God and is injurious to his infinite majesty. Thus it has in its measure infinite culpability, if not intensive and intrinsic, at least objectively (inasmuch as it is committed against infinite good) and extensive (by reason of duration) because its stain or pollution continues forever (as far as the sinner is concerned; for he of himself or by his own powers can never wipe it out). Hence, apart from the mercy of God condemning, it would exclude the sinner forever from the heavenly kingdom (because nothing unholy can be admitted there) and subject him to infernal punishments. If, therefore, the culpability is infinite, the punishment also due to

it must be infinite; if not intensively (which is repugnant to a finite creature), yet objectively (because it separates from the infinite good [to wit, God]) and extensively (by reason of duration).

XII. Sixth, the very lightest sins cannot be remitted. Since indeed the pardon of the elect is wholly gratuitous (from which God could therefore abstain without injustice), therefore they can be eternally punished justly (which could not be said if they were not worthy of eternal punishment). Seventh, Christ died for all sins, even the most trivial: therefore all are mortal.

Sources of solution.

XIII. Mortal sin differs from sin producing death. The former denotes what sin deserves; the latter whither sin leads us if we suffer ourselves to be lead away and deceived by it. Every sin is mortal in its own nature. Yet not every sin really and actually leads to death, on account of the intervention of grace.

XIV. Sin when it is finished is said "to bring forth death" (Jam. 1:15), not to the exclusion of conceived or inborn sin, but as the proximate cause. Yet it is ascribed to lust as the remote cause. As therefore what is the cause of the cause is also the cause of the thing caused, because lust is the cause of actual sin bringing forth death, it is deservedly held to be the cause also of the death itself. James does not distinguish the various species of sins, but the different degrees of the same sin and the process of temptation in which an advance is made from the first to the second act (from the internal to the external) and so to death itself. The first stage is placed in the temptation of lust or its first motion; the second in the conceiving of lust by its imperfect consent; the third in the bringing forth by a full and perfect consent; the fourth in the consummation of sin by external work, which brings forth death.

XV. The "hay" and "stubble" discussed in 1 Cor. 3:12, do not denote venial sins, but new, vain and curious doctrines. Although they do not overthrow the foundation, they are not homogeneous with it. Thus they cannot bear the examination of the divine judgment or the light of the word and the efficacy of the Spirit (represented by "the fire trying every man's work," v. 13). (2) Although those who build such things upon a solid foundation will not be condemned, it does not therefore follow that their sins are not worthy of death; but that the grace of God pardons them.

XVI. The sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be unto death (1 Jn. 5:16) by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*), not only because it deserves death, but since it is wholly unpardonable, death necessarily and infallibly follows it. Others are not unto death; not because they are not mortal per se and worthy of death, but because from God's grace they are pardonable and often obtain remission.

XVII. Christ says nothing to favor venial sins, although seeming to consign some only to hell fire (Mt. 5:22, 23). His design is indeed to show that there is an inequality of punishments from the inequality of sins and in particular that homicide does not consist only in the external act (as the Pharisees maintained, according to Josephus, ?AJ 13*.294 [Loeb, 7:374-75]). Rather sin also consists in internal passion and irritating insults (but not that any sins are venial, since even the smallest degree of punishment is capital, as the smallest degree of sin is illegality [*anomos*]). He wishes to teach that even the first degree of passion is, in the sight of God, worthy of death because he who is bound by it, is said to be "in danger of the judgment" (*enochos tē krisei*) (viz., in the same sense in which the

Pharisees wished the homicide to be in danger of the judgment [*enochon tē krisei*], as it is said in the preceding verse—to wit, as to the punishment of death). (2) The words of Christ are not to be pressed to the letter, as if he were treating properly in the first two degrees of punishment (viz., of "the judgment" and of "the council"—concerning human judgments), in the third, however, of "hell fire" (concerning the divine judgment only or eternal death). It would follow that anger conceived within and not breaking forth into act was liable to human judgment and that a sin could be granted which did not render the sinner liable to the judgment of God (which is absurd). Rather they are to be understood figuratively, to describe the diversity of degree of punishments in the judgment of God by analogy and allusion to the diverse grades of judgments and capital punishments common among the Jews. Besides the lowest judgment, which was triumviral (which took cognizance of fines or pecuniary punishments), there were still three degrees of capital punishment among them. The first was of the judgment (viz., of twenty-three men constituted in particular cities to which belonged the judgments of souls [*dhyny nphshvth*], i.e., capital causes). The second was that of the great council or Sanhedrin, consisting of seventy men (in imitation of the seventy assessors of Moses mentioned in Num. 11:16), which met only in Jerusalem and took cognizance of the most heinous crimes. The third was that of hell fire, which was the greatest torment of all, exceeding both the sword and the stoning inflicted by the judgment and the council (whether this is referred to the burning alive [*srphh*] or to the abominable sacrifices made in the valley of the sons of Hinnom where, from a bad imitation [*kakozēlia*] of Abraham's sacrifice, human blood and [indeed by parents] children were offered to Moloch, the idol of the Ammonites: infants were either drawn between two fires, that they might perish by a slow death, or bound to the glowing hot arms of the statue of Moloch and were there consumed with dreadful sufferings). Hence that place was considered infamous, where a continual fire was kept up for the purpose of consuming the bodies of the condemned (2 K. 23:10; Jer. 7:31). For that reason, it is often symbolically taken for hell in the Scriptures. The meaning therefore of the words of Christ is this. By this law ("Thou shalt not kill"), you think that only external homicide is condemned. However I, declaring the sense of this law to you, say that any act as much internal as external strikes against that law. Even the affection of anger rising up against a brother, although internal, is a certain species of homicide and deserves the heavy punishment of death (such as was inflicted by the judgment of the twenty-three men). However, if it breaks out into injury and insult, it is a more serious sin, to be punished also with a severer punishment, like that inflicted by the council. And if it proceeds to savage abuse, so that the brother is called a fool, it is worthy of the severest punishment, analogous to that seen in the valley of the sons of Hinnom. So Gehenna here is not used simply for hell (as if to this degree alone of anger the punishment of hell or eternal death is due), but allusively it denotes the severest punishment. (3) Not a few of the papists agree here with us. Maldonatus (on this passage) acknowledges that the degree, not the kind of punishments is distinguished and that they are capital in each case (*Commentary on the Holy Gospels: Matthew* [1888], 1:158-63 on Mt. 5:22). Salmeron ingeniously teaches that the phrase "to be in danger of the judgment" must be understood not only of the judgment of temporal death, but also of damnation and eternal destruction in the divine judgment. Barradas says that

these three grades of punishment signify the infernal punishment appointed for every deadly crime.

XVIII. When sins are compared with a "mote" and a "beam" (Lk. 6:41) and to a "camel" and a "gnat" (Mt. 23:24), indeed, it is proved that some are heavier or lighter than others (which we do not deny). But it cannot thence be elicited that some are venial. (2) The Pharisees are said to "strain out a gnat" and to "swallow a camel" by a proverbial way of speaking because they were falsely superstitious in the least (viz., in ceremonials), while they neglected the greatest commands (i.e., the moral).

XIX. In Eph. 5:4, 5, Paul does not distinguish certain vices from others as mortal from venial, but rather joins all together as homogeneous by the copulative; they also all depend upon the same verb in construction. Hence to the whole belongs what is said in v. 6: "Because of these things the wrath of God cometh upon the children of disobedience." Also in Gal. 5:19, all are reckoned as works of the flesh. When he says that "lust," "avarice" and "uncleanness" exclude from the kingdom of heaven, it is not because these only are mortal, but because they are heavier than the rest.

XX. Although a formal and expressed aversion from God does not occur in every sin, yet there is a virtual and implied aversion even in the lightest. For the creature is preferred to the Creator and is loved more than God, while man is turned to it as to his highest good and ultimate end.

XXI. They who extenuate sin honestly estimate neither the majesty of God, nor the justice of the law, nor the hideousness of sin, nor their own most humble condition in God's sight. As no small thing is rebellion, no small crime is treason; so sin which is committed against the best and greatest God (and therefore infinite) cannot be considered an insignificant thing. For although often it is a small thing about which sin occurs, yet the guilt does not cease to be heavy. The latter is estimated not from the smallness of the object, but from the majesty of the lawgiver. Since this is violated, on this very account it incurs his wrath and curse; if not in fact, at least of right and demeritoriously. This is the balance of the sanctuary in which sins are to be weighed that their true heaviness and guilt may be ascertained; not the false and deceitful balances of men which relax piety and induce lethargy and carnal security.

Fifth Question: The Fall of the Angels

What was the sin of the angels by which they are said to have rebelled against God?

I. Sin in particular is distinguished with regard to the subjects in which it inheres: the sin of the angels, who became devils by it; and the sin of men. These alone, as rational creatures, are capable of sin. We must first speak of the sin of the angels; but briefly because Scripture tells us very little about it.

Statement of the question.

II. To no purpose is it inquired how angels could sin. It is evident from Scripture that they did sin and reason persuades us that they could fall into sin since they were created capable of falling. To no purpose also is it inquired concerning the time of their fall: whether they stood for a long time in integrity; or whether they fell at the beginning of creation (as some of the Scholastics

think). Scripture is silent on that point. In general, only this is evident—their fall preceded the fall of man. That some interval occurred between the creation of angels, the work of God and their defection (the action of demons) is asserted with reason. If their first operation is maintained to be vicious, it does not seem that the cause of the vice should be charged against God, the Creator, as the nearest efficient. Nor is it very likely that they fell before the work of creation was finished because then all that God had created was still very good (Gen. 1:31). If the Devil is said to have sinned "from the beginning" (1 Jn. 3:8), it does not follow that he sinned from the very beginning of creation; for some movement of time does not hinder us from saying a thing was done from the beginning.

III. The question does not concern the manner and order of this sin—whether they all sinned at the same time; or whether one was the leader and the author of the rebellion. For although the latter pleases many (nor does it seem improbable that the others sinned through the exhortation and persuasion of one [called "the prince of devils"] and they his angels), yet it can be gathered from no solid reason or clear proof of Scripture. And Scripture being silent, it is better to leave it undecided than to inquire too curiously without necessity and benefit. But the question here concerns the species of this sin.

IV. There are various opinions about it among theologians, especially among the Scholastics. For to say nothing of licentiousness which is absurdly said to have been their sin, not only by Josephus and Philo with the Jews, but by many of the fathers (Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Lactantius and others) from Gen. 6:2 (falsely understood); there are two principal opinions among the learned. The first of those who think it was envy and hatred of man arising from the decree revealed to them concerning the advancement of the human nature in Christ above the angelic (who was to take upon him by incarnation not angels, but the seed of Abraham). The other (more common among the Scholastics) is that of those who maintain that it was pride; cf. Anselm, "The Fall of the Devil," 4 in *Anselm of Canterbury* (ed. J. Hopkins and H. Richardson), 2:139-41 and after him Lombard, *Sententiarum* 2, Dist. 5.1 (PL 192/2.661).

V. However, since Scripture was unwilling to define expressly the species of this sin and only sets forth its genus when it asserts that they sinned, nothing certain can be determined about it. Nor should we indulge in too great curiosity. It is sufficient for us to hold that their desertion was spontaneous by which "they abode not in the truth" (Jn. 8:44). This was not gospel truth, as if they were unwilling to acquiesce in the gospel truth concerning Christ proposed to them from the beginning (which seems to some little likely, since this decree was not revealed before the fall), but the truth of the fidelity which they owed to God (as subjects to their king) and of the integrity in which they were created (and so in the communion with God himself, the highest truth). Here belongs Jd. 6, where they are said to have "kept not their first estate, and to have left their own habitation." By "estate" is meant God, their Creator, or the original holiness and rectitude in which they were created. Falling from this by their own voluntary apostasy, they lost the happy mansions of heaven in which they had been placed as in their own proper habitation with the other angels. Thus being hurled from it, they can never to all eternity return there (Lk. 10:18).

VI. We cannot doubt indeed that pride stood out above other things in that sin. They wished not only to shake off the yoke of God, contemptuously rising

against him and his law impressed upon them, but also in affectation of equality with God. Paul seems not obscurely to intimate this in 1 Tim. 3:6. He does not want the novice (*neophyton*) to push forward, "lest being lifted up with pride (*mē typhōtheis*) he fall into the condemnation (*eis krima*) of the devil," i.e., into the punishment of diabolical sin. Besides, since this has always been the special desire of the Devil (who bears himself as God and prince in the world and wished to be regarded and worshipped as such from the beginning, 2 Cor. 4:4; Jn. 12:31), it is not without reason that he may be said to have fallen into this sin. Third, to this kind of sin he tempted Adam in the beginning and drives men to it every day.

VII. Still we think that pride so exercised itself here that a thoughtlessness and decreased attention about the contemplation of God must have preceded it. The angel, becoming somewhat remiss in the contemplation of God, began to turn the sharpness of his intellect from God to himself and to admire himself; to be carried on from the admiration and overweening love of self to pride. This was followed by rebellion. Thus a certain error must necessarily be admitted here —not indeed speculative (as if he was ignorant of what he was bound to know), but practical, through which (blinded by self-love) he preferred the pleasurable good to virtue. Nor should it seem a wonder that into the angelic intellect (which was not pure act and immutable) such thoughtlessness and error (producing rebellion and pride) could creep.

VIII. That this sin was most heinous, the very severest punishment following it sufficiently proves. They were excluded from communion with God, so that no hope forever either of pardon or of restoration to integrity remains; but being thrown into the horrid and pitch-dark prison of hell and bound with chains under darkness, they will be kept unto the judgment of the great day (Jd. 6). Hence some (but less solidly) wish to gather that theirs was the sin against the Holy Ghost, since the object of such a sin is (according to Scripture usage) no other than the grace of the gospel. However Thomas Aquinas, Cajetan and others are deceived, who think that they could not (if it so pleased God) be restored to their former state because they are inflexible in their own nature. For what is in its own nature inflexible (if it seems proper to God) can be bent by the powerful efficacy of divine grace (as was done in the case of men's sins). Therefore the true cause of that severity is to be sought nowhere else than in the most free good pleasure of God who, as he willed to demonstrate his mercy in fallen men, so in the apostate angels he willed to demonstrate his justice and severity (*apotomian*). See above Topic IV, Question 8, section 18.

IX. Although that fall did not happen without the intervention of divine providence, still its true cause must be sought in the angels alone and by no means in God. It must not be sought in him either with regard to prescience (which only foresees a thing as future, but does not make it so); or to his decree (which was permissive, not efficient); or to his actual permission (which is not moral, but physical, by a not hindering to which he was not bound); or to a deficiency of sustentation (because this grace is entirely undeserved, which he owes to no one officially, but bestows upon whomsoever he pleases from his good pleasure alone). The sole cause, therefore, was the proper will of each devil by which individuals of their own accord turned from good to evil. They fell because they willed to fall; they could fall because they were created mutable and capable of falling. As to their punishment, see above Topic IV, Question 8, section 20.

Sixth Question: The Fall of Adam
What was the first sin of man—unbelief or pride?

I. The first sin of man (from which the others flow as from a fountain) is the voluntary apostasy of the first man from God, his Creator. In eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, he transgressed not only this special interdict, but also in it the whole law of nature engraved upon his heart. This is called by Scripture in general and eminently (*kat' exochēn*), *parakoē*, *parabasis* and *paraptōma*.

II. In assigning its species, theologians exceedingly disagree. Two opinions are more common than the others: the first of most (of the papists) referring it to pride; the latter (held by our men) placing it in unbelief and incredulity.

The first sin was not simple, but an aggregate of many sins.

III. It is certain that we must not regard that fall as any particular sin, such as theft or adultery, but as a general apostasy and defection from God. It was a violation not only of the special positive law about not eating the forbidden fruit, but of the whole moral law included in it, and thus also of the obedience which man owed to God, his Creator (especially by reason of the covenant entered into with him). Thus here is, as it were, a complicated disease and a total aggregate of various acts, both internal and external, impinging against both tables of the law. For as by unbelief and contempt of the divine word, ingratitude, pride and profanation of the divine name, he transgressed the first table, so he transgressed the second by want of affection (*astorgia*) towards his children, by homicide (precipitating himself and his children into death), by intemperance and gluttony, theft and appropriation of another's property (without his consent), unlawful love and depraved concupiscence.

Hence its heinousness is gathered.

IV. Hence the heinousness of this sin is easily gathered against those who assert that it was venial and quite insignificant: on the part of the person sinning (endowed with so many gifts, the receiver of so many blessings, free from all vice and a partaker of all good necessary to him). On the part of the object about which he sinned (from which he might easily have abstained amid the great abundance of other fruits); thus there was a great iniquity in sinning where it was so easy not to sin (as Augustine says, *Contra Juliani imperfectum opus* 2.189 [PL 45.1223]). On the part of the law violated (not special, but universal, by violating which he grievously sinned against God and his posterity and himself). On the part of the act, the wickedness of which was the highest (i.e., a total apostasy from God, the symbol of the covenant being trodden under foot and a departure of thought, word and deed from duty). On the part of the place and time (because scarcely having issued from the hands of the Creator and placed in a most delightful paradise, he immediately fell at the onset of temptation). And on the part of the most direful effects and punishments following it (under whose weight even now at this day, nature universally groans).

V. If it is further inquired what was the beginning or the first step of this sin, theologians do not agree. Some place it in sensuality, others in the will and others again in the intellect. Although we do not think it should be zealously disputed about the order of the acts themselves or the first step of this sin (consisting of a complication of many acts, as we have already said, and among which

an interval of nature rather than of long time intervened), yet we can safely assert that the first stage of this sin is not to be sought in external acts of inducement (which pertain to execution only) or in the internal acts (either of the appetite or the will) because in that state they were still subject to the intellect, the governing faculty (*to hēgemonein*). Rather we must rise to the acts of the directive faculty (to wit, of the intellect) to which belongs the judgment of the truth and falsity of things and on which the error and unbelief (holding the first place in that sin) properly fall. Now although man (not unwilling, but freely of his own accord) made that judgment, it does not follow that it was an act of the will and not of the intellect.

Unbelief the first stage of sin.

VI. Hence it is evident that the beginning of sin is better referred to unbelief than to pride, although in it both are joined. (1) There ought to be the same order in the sin that was in the temptation. Now in the temptation man was first solicited to unbelief before pride. For by his interrogation, the tempter first urges him to doubt the word of God (Gen. 3:1), then to deny it ("Ye shall not surely die," v. 4) before he incites to pride by the promise of divinity ("the knowledge of good and evil," v. 5).

VII. (2) Pride could not have place in man except on the positing of unbelief. As long as man remained constant in belief of the divine word, he never could be impelled to pride, nor shake off God's yoke, nor dare to affect a superior degree (partly of knowledge, partly of excellence) unless he did not believe the threatening of death annexed to the prohibition to be true (or at least have doubts of it).

VIII. (3) Scripture expresses the sin of man by seduction (2 Cor. 11:3; 1 Tim. 2:14) and mentions the "cunning" of the serpent (Gen. 3:1), which wholly pertains to deceiving. Fourth, the first man (without signal error) could not believe it to be a virtuous and good thing for him not to depend upon God, since this is the basest thing of all. Fifth, if the Devil first tempted man to pride, he either believed his words or he did not. If he did, he erred by that very fact; if he did not, he could not aim at that which was proposed by the Devil.

IX. But unbelief could not have place in man, unless first by thoughtlessness he had ceased from a consideration of God's prohibition and of his truth and goodness. If he had always seriously directed his mind to it (especially in the moment of temptation), he could never have been moved from his faith and listened to the tempter. Hence, therefore, unbelief or distrust flowed first. By this man did not have the faith in the word of God which he was bound to have, but shook it off at first by doubting and presently by denying; not seriously believing that the fruit was forbidden him or that he should die. Again, note the credulity by which he began to listen to the words of the Devil (engendering a false faith from his lies), believing that God envied him the fruit and that he would be like God and omniscient. Thus he made an erroneous judgment by which he determined that the object presented by the Devil was good for him. Hence presently his appetite and the inclination of concupiscence and its motions influenced the will to the eating of the fruit. At length, the external action followed. This inconsideration may well be called the beginning or first stage of sin. As it could fall on man mutable, so it could not be exercised in act by man standing (rather already beginning to recede from God and to corrupt himself through his own mutability and the seduction of the Devil).

Sources of solution.

X. Although in the fall of Adam (which the apostle calls "disobedience," Rom. 5:19), pride is included (as was said before), it does not follow that this was the first stage. As the first act of pride was the unwillingness to obey God, so the first fount of pride was the unwillingness to believe God's words. For pride never could have entered the heart of man if his faith in the words of God had not before been weakened and overthrown.

XI. As in every motion, the point of commencement is prior to that of termination, so the turning away from the uncreated good (unbelief) ought to precede the turning towards the created good (pride). For as long as he adhered to the uncreated good (viz., to God), he never would have turned himself through pride to creatures and to himself.

XII. Although in a choice well disposed and by direct ratiocination, the end must first be presented to the mind before we can think of the means, this does not always have place in oblique ratiocination such as seduction (in which this order is often inverted). It is evident that Satan used the latter in the temptation of man. (2) Although the act of pride was occupied with the end, it does not follow that unbelief had the relation of means, but rather of cause (from which pride arose). For unless man had fluctuated in belief, the desire for deity (an act of pride) could not have entered his heart; nor could that end have been presented to the first man without great error and unbelief.

XIII. The passage of the Son of Sirach, "The beginning of pride is departure from God" (10:12), besides being apocryphal, is not repugnant to our opinion. If apostasy is the beginning of pride, unbelief (in which it is placed) must necessarily have preceded pride. Nor does what is added ("Pride is the beginning of all sin," v. 13) prove the contrary because it must not be understood simply and absolutely of every sin (even the first and that which he had said was the beginning of pride), but relatively concerning other beginnings which draw their origin for the most part from pride.

SEVENTH QUESTION

How could a holy man fall, and what was the true cause of his fall?

I. Two questions are involved here: the first concerns the possibility of the fall; the other concerns its true cause. Each is difficult to explain, and in the explaining of each, there are a variety of sins.

The first question concerns the possibility of the fall.

II. As to the first, the difficulty is not great in assigning the origin of all the sins which have sprung from the fall of Adam. Since men are corrupt, nothing is easier to conceive than why they sin daily. A depraved concupiscence can put forth no other than depraved and inordinate motions. But in innocent man, while no error had place in his mind, nor did any disorder (*ataxia*) in his will (in whom was original righteousness) hinder a fall (and incompatible [*asystatos*] with it), it is most difficult to imagine in what way at length man in a state of integrity could fall.

It cannot be explained by the opinion of Pelagians concerning the inclination to sin.

III. In order to free themselves from this difficulty, the ancient and more modern Pelagians, papists, Socinians and Remonstrants attribute to innocent man (as created by God) a headlong inclination to vice, from which arose the first sin (although not so vehement and inordinate as it is now). But this opinion is manifestly injurious to God and can easily be shown to be false. (1) If an inclination to sin was in man by nature, God must be considered its author; thus the sin will be cast upon God himself (as was proved before, Topic V, Question 11, Section 9). (2) The inclination to love and worship God (such as Adam possessed by original righteousness) is incompatible (*asystatos*) with an inclination to sin. (3) All things were very good in man before the fall, since he was made in the image of God. Yet the inclination to sin cannot be good because it is repugnant to the law. Hence it is evident that the mutability which was in Adam without any stain is not to be confounded with such an inclination to sin (which could not but be defective).

But by his mutability.

IV. Another method of removing the difficulty must therefore be sought. No other more suitable can be granted than by returning to the mutability and liberty of the first man, as one who was created indeed just and holy, but mutably. Thus he could indeed stand if he wished, but could also if he wished become evil. This the event itself sufficiently proves (if nothing else could teach it).

V. Although that mutability indicates the possibility of the fall and is the cause *sine qua non* (or the antecedent of the fall), still it cannot be considered its cause proper and of itself. This is so not only because it was a condition created together with innocent man by God (which was also in the elect angels before their confirmation without any defect), but also because it is indeed the negation of some good. It is not the privation of a good due to the creature, but undeserved and so did not take away any perfection required in a state of nature. So we must accurately distinguish here between the mutability itself (which is a condition suitable to the creature) and the act of that mutability (by which man inclined to a change). The former denotes a power which could be inclined to evil, but was not yet inclined; the latter, however, designates the actual inclination to evil itself (condemned by the law of God) and the fountain of all sin.

The free will of man the true cause of sin.

VI. The proximate and proper cause of sin therefore is to be sought nowhere else than in the free will of man (who suffered himself to be deceived by the Devil and, Satan persuading though not compelling, freely departed from God). So neither as whole properly did he fall, nor as corrupt; but as imbued with a false idea, he corrupted himself and (the habitual knowledge implanted by God being neglected) received the error suggested by Satan. Nor ought it to seem strange that man (created capable of falling and mutable) changed and fell, no more than that a beginning of motion takes place in one perfectly at rest. For where there is a power to change, the transition from power to act is easy.

VII. Although man fell, still he had the ability to stand if he wished. Otherwise God would have placed him in an impossible condition. Hence a twofold

help or assistance is commonly distinguished: help without which (*auxilium sine qua non*) or the power of not sinning (by which he had strength sufficient to stand if he wished); and the help by which (*auxilium quo*) or efficacious grace (which gave not only the ability if he wished, but to will what he could). The former was after the manner of a habit and faculty in man; the latter, however, after the manner of an action or efficacious motion to good. The former was necessary to his ability to persevere, but the latter to his actual perseverance. The former help was never absent from Adam, not even in the very moment in which he sinned; but the latter, God withheld from him freely as he was not bound to give it. Notwithstanding, neither can man be excused (because he sinned voluntarily and was impelled by no force) nor God be accused (because as a most free dispenser of his own goods, he was bound to the bestowal of that grace by no law, as will hereafter be more fully shown).

VIII. Therefore man alone was the cause of his evil. He willingly sinned and freely and of his own accord without any compulsion or external force transgressed the command of God, though he was furnished with such strength and helps that he might easily have avoided sin, if he had wished. This spontaneity, neither providence removes (which brings on the infallibility of the event, but does not change the condition of nature), nor the temptation of Satan (which, however vigorously plied, could have effected nothing had it not been willingly admitted by man himself; and which he could with ease have resisted, if he had wished).

Satan, the external cause of sin.

IX. Besides that internal moving cause, there was also another external assisting cause. This again is twofold: the one, principal; the other, instrumental. The principal cause is Satan who, envying the glory of God and the happiness of man, instigated the first creatures to apostasy. The instrumental cause is the serpent, used by him for this work. In it, he wished to attack man not by force, but by cunning. In proportion to his cunning, the serpent was the more suitable for this service and more pleasing to Satan from similarity (although the special reason is to be sought in the providence of God who so directed the affair that Satan should select such an animal in whom a perpetual monument would exist of Satan's insidious craftiness, and the supreme hatred directed against the human race, and of the curse into which he fell by that temptation and of the victory to be gained at one time over Satan by the seed of the woman; this could not have been done with an animal necessary to human use). Hence Augustine says, "He chose as a vehicle of expression a slippery animal and moving with tortuous windings suitable to his work" (CG 14.11 [FC 14:377; PL 41.419]).

X. That Satan was the author of the temptation, Scripture does not allow us to doubt. It calls him that "old serpent," "the dragon" (Rev. 12:9; 20:2); "a murderer, and a liar from the beginning" (Jn. 8:44); "the tempter" by way of eminence (*kat' exochēn*) (1 Thess. 3:5; 2 Cor. 11:3), who holds the empire of death (Heb. 2:14), to destroy whose works Christ came (1 Jn. 3:8). Although Moses (writing a history and adhering to visible and sensible things) thought it sufficient to relate what the woman tempted saw and heard (and so brings forward not the tempting Satan, but only the serpent in whom he lay concealed), yet it can sufficiently be gathered from the history of the temptation. Since speech was not in the serpent by nature (much less skill to argue), it necessarily ought to

have proceeded from some intelligent creature (which could then have been no other than Satan). Besides, an effect morally evil (such as the temptation and seduction of the first creatures) ought to have had a cause morally evil (which is not to be sought out of Satan). Finally, the punishment inflicted on the tempter, so bears upon the external serpent that far more truly and fully it agrees with the Devil who was trodden under foot by Christ (Heb. 2:14; Col. 2:15; Rom. 16:20).

XI. Now that the Devil was not only present here, but concealed and speaking under the serpent, many things prove: the simple and unadorned relation of Moses (which is not rashly to be turned into an allegory); the description of the serpent as the most cunning of all the beasts of the field; and finally, the punishment inflicted upon it as the instrument of seduction, no less than upon Satan (just as the judge condemns the forger together with his pen; the cutthroat with his weapon; and the horn pushing ox God wished to be slain together with his master, if through his negligence he killed anyone, Ex. 21:29). Hence it is evident that their opinion is not to be entertained who (following Cyril and Eugubinus) hold that the serpent here was not real, but that Satan deceived our first parents under the flesh of that animal; or those who (following Cajetan) admit here not even the external form of the serpent, but hold that the whole thing was carried through by Satan alone, the name "serpent" being here applied to him. The whole history of the temptation exclaims against it. To no purpose is thrown in the mention of the serpent and of all the things done and said by him to arrest the sight and hearing of our first parents, if Satan alone, by an internal temptation, had executed this.

XII. Nor did this altogether escape the Gentiles themselves. They seem not obscurely to refer to this. See what is related by Pherecydes of Syros concerning Ophion, whom he calls the leader of the demons (whom Jupiter hurled from heaven); and what is said by others concerning the serpent Python killed by Apollo; and concerning him to whom the Cumaean Sibyl in Virgil (*Eclogue* 4.4-6 [Loeb, 1:28-29]) threatens destruction (the virgin returning and the illustrious offspring of god; the great increase of Jove bringing back the Saturnian kingdom); also what is related concerning the dragon, the watchful guardian of the golden apples in the garden of the Hesperides (*Aeneid* 4.484 [Loeb, 1:428-29]). Nor for any other reason did Satan seem to have had so much zeal for the introduction of religious worship to serpents by the Egyptians and others, unless he had successfully employed the serpent in the seduction of man. Hence the ancient Ophites, of whom Augustine (*De Haeresibus* 17 [PL 42.28]) and Epiphanius (*The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis* 37 [trans. F. Williams, 1987], 1:241-48) speak, held the serpent in the highest veneration because he had opened the eyes of our first parents and introduced them to wisdom.

XIII. However because neither man nor Satan could have done anything without the providence of God, it remains to be seen how it was most holily occupied still without any causality of sin. Neither can an event of such moment, almost revolutionizing the whole world, be said to have happened—he being either an ignorant or an unwilling or only an idle spectator (a thing, too, tending to wrest from God the government of the universe). In different ways, however, the fall can come under the providence of God: either as to prescience because he infallibly foreknew it; or as to decree because he immutably decreed its futurition; or as to actual permission in time because he permitted it to take place

most freely and directed it most wisely. But in whatever way occupied, he always exerted himself most holily about it. On this account, not even the slightest taint of sin can be ascribed to him, neither because he foreknew (because prescience is not the cause of things, nor do things take place because they are foreknown; rather they are foreknown because they are to be); nor because he decreed (because he decreed indeed to permit, but not to effect); nor because he permitted the temptation (because he neither breathed into Satan the will to tempt, nor impelled him to it). He only permitted physically by not hindering (as bound by no law to furnish it), not morally by approval and consent.

XIV. I confess that with permission here is involved the negation of the efficacious grace and help by which man might actually stand. If such help had been given, Adam would not have fallen. But neither can he be said to have come into fellowship with sin because he took away from him no internal grace given before, nor impelled nor forced him to admit or consent to the temptation. Rather he only did not give the new grace of confirmation or the efficacy by which the grace in him might be actuated (which he was neither bound to give, nor in his most wise counsel did he will to give) in order to test the obedience of the creature. If without such help, Adam could not avoid falling, it does not follow that he was free from culpability. That necessity did not destroy his liberty, nor hinder him from sinning freely and with the greatest spontaneity, for he was being impelled to it by no necessity or compulsion of nature.

XV. Some are wont to express this negation of grace by desertion; not privative (as if internal and habitual grace already given were taken away), but negative (by which that not yet given is suspended). But since desertion seems properly to suppose some antecedent culpability of the one deserted, it is better to use the word negation or "not-giving," so that God may be said not to have given to man actual grace efficaciously determining Adam to stand (from which negation sin would indeed follow necessarily by a necessity of consequence and hypothetical on the part of God, but still freely on the part of man who was conscious that he was impelled to sin by his will alone through no internal necessity).

XVI. It is not to be denied that here we truly meet the depth (*bathos*) of the wisdom of God—rather to be wondered at than to be pried into, far surpassing the reach of reason (viz., how God willed to deny that grace to man yet undeserving, without which he foresaw he could not avoid that fall). Hence there are those who (in order that God may not seem to have deserted man, before man deserted him) maintain that God was ready to bestow upon Adam the grace of confirmation, if man had wished to betake himself to it and use it; but since he neglected to apply for the help at hand (and whose use God had permitted at his will), it should not seem strange that God withheld it. The difficulty occurring here cannot be disposed of in this way. That neglected use of divine help or application to God for it was a sin or it was not. If it was not sin, the help of God ought not on that account to have been suspended. If it was sin, there is granted some sin before the first. Again, since for every act man needs God's grace, the question returns concerning the use of that help—whether for its exercise the efficacious grace of God was given by God or not. For if it was given, man could not help using it. If, however, it was denied, the negation already preceded the neglect of man. It is better therefore to acquiesce here in the sole most free good pleasure of God, either giving or withholding his own

grace at pleasure without injury to anyone. On this account, it is safer because he had not only already from eternity determined not to give his grace (even before man could neglect or reject it), but also because unless such a denial of grace is posited antecedently to the neglect of man, the certainty of the futurition of his fall could not be saved. Consider also the truth of the divine prescience. If it had been put within the power of man to use that grace or not (since man was indifferent in his own nature), he could not be determined certainly to such an event except by some superior cause. Moreover the causality of sin cannot be charged upon God; no more than from his eternal decree or temporal permission (upon which sin necessarily and infallibly follows) can it be ascribed to him.

XVII. Hence it is evident that he can well be said to have been able not to sin and yet not to be able not to sin. The former with respect to the habitual and internal grace of Adam and the powers bestowed upon him by creation (which were such that he had the power to obey the law given to him provided only he had wished to make a good use of them); the latter by reason of the decree and the suspension of actual external grace (or of the divine concurrence without which no action could be performed by him). It was therefore possible for Adam not to sin in the divided sense and with regard to himself, but it was impossible in the compound sense, when viewed in relation to God's decree and the permission of sin and the denial of grace. This the celebrated Twisse well explains: "We say that Adam had sufficient grace to enable him to obey the law given to him; we deny that he had efficacious grace which would cause him actually to obey the law. That he had the power to obey the law and that it could not happen that the law should be obeyed, are not contradictory; just as the soldiers were not deficient in the power to break the bones of the Savior, yet the decree of God in opposition being posited, they could not be broken. By parity of reasoning, although Adam had the power to obey the law of God, yet God's decree to deny efficacious grace being posited, it could not happen that he should obey the law. God did not remove the grace which he had granted (to wit, sufficient), he only did not bestow grace effectual to the avoiding of sin. God, however, not giving efficacious grace, it was necessary that Adam should sin" (*Guilielmi Twissi . . . ad Jacobi Arminii Collationem cum Francisco Junio* [1649], p. 68).

XVIII. If anything further still meets us in this dispensation of God (which cannot easily be seen through by us), let us remember that the ways of God are not our ways and that we must here be wise with sobriety, lest searching into his majesty, we be overpowered by his glory. Let it be sufficient to hold together these two things: that this most dreadful fall did not happen without the providence of God (but to its causality, it contributed nothing); and that man alone, moved by the temptation of Satan, was its true and proper cause.

EIGHTH QUESTION

Whether Adam by his fall lost the image of God. We affirm.

I. As the sin of Adam was most heinous, so it could not but draw after itself the most dire effects, both in himself and in his posterity. As regards the faculties of man, these can be distinguished into moral or physical. The moral are guilt and pollution. By the former, he incurred the curse and wrath of God with his

descendants; by the latter, he contracted universal corruption and impurity for himself and his. The physical effects are the miseries of all kinds (which pressed upon him in battle array) and death itself (both temporal and eternal) to which he became exposed.

II. Among the moral effects is usually placed the loss of the divine image (or original righteousness). Concerning this, the Remonstrants (following the Socinians) raise a controversy with us; therefore the orthodox truth must be briefly established against them.

Statement of the question.

III. By the divine image, we do not understand generally whatever gifts upright man received from God (spoken of in Gen. 1:26, 27) or specially certain remains of it existing in the mind and heart of man after the fall (in which sense we understand Gen. 9:6 and Jam. 3:9). Rather we understand it strictly of the principal part of that image which consisted of holiness and wisdom (usually termed original righteousness). In this sense, we treat of it in the present question.

IV. The Socinians indeed deny that image was lost in any way by the fall of Adam, maintaining that it still remains complete (Socinus, *Praelectionis theologicae* 3 [1627], pp. 7-10 and Smaltzius, *Refutatio Thesium D. Wolfgangi Frantzii*, Disp. VII [1614], pp. 211-71). However the Remonstrants confess that by his fall Adam deserved that God should take original righteousness away from him. But they deny that he lost it by the act itself. They assert this in order that they may not be compelled to acknowledge that man lost all original righteousness and that free will no longer remains in him.

V. On the other hand, we maintain that the loss of the divine image (or of original righteousness) followed the fall of Adam doubly—both meritoriously and morally (on account of the divine ordination) and efficiently and really (on account of the heaviness of that sin).

VI. The reasons are: (1) It was a total aversion and apostasy from God as the highest good and ultimate end. Now the ultimate end being changed which in morals holds the relation of the most universal principle (on which the rest depend), all moral things must necessarily be changed. Thus man, now wholly turned away from God and drawn into himself, was absolutely driven from his happy condition; nor could he be restored to his integrity except by the singular mercy of God.

VII. Second, that sin was not particular, but universal, drawing after itself a violation of the whole law. Hence it could not but shake off every habit of rectitude and devastate the conscience, so that no residuum was left except certain planks and rubbish of the unhappy shipwreck, allowed by God still to remain (both in order that from these the excellence of the former entire image might be recognized and to be a bond of external discipline in political society, to prevent the world from becoming a den of robbers; and that from these ruins he might erect a new work and form a new man after the same image in which we were at first created, Col. 3:10).

VIII. Third, the nakedness of fallen men denoted the loss or privation of goods in which they before rejoiced. And the sense of that nakedness and shame proved that there was something in man to be ashamed of, such as could not be thought of in a work of God without casting disgrace upon the Creator. This was

not so much a nakedness of body (which was indifferent of itself, yea which might have been glorious) as a nakedness of soul (from a privation of illustrious gifts with which it had been, as it were, clothed and adorned and on account of which he ought deservedly to be covered with shame).

IX. Fourth, God threatened him with this privation. The death denounced against him (sinning) embraced no less a spiritual (in the privation of original righteousness and in the state of sin) than a temporal and eternal (as will be seen in its own place).

X. Fifth, as man is now born, so was Adam after the fall; for whatever he has by nature takes its origin from Adam himself. Now he is born with universal corruption, not only privative of good before received, but also positive of superinduced evil (whether as to blindness of mind or disorder [*ataxian*] of will); hence he is called not only blind, but blindness and darkness itself; he is said to be not only corrupt and sick, but "dead" (i.e., in a state of total impotence to good).

XI. The proposition "one act cannot destroy an entire habit" cannot be universally admitted, not even according to the philosophers themselves (according to whom there are granted some acts so enormous as to take away the whole antecedent habit: for example, an incestuous act takes away the whole habit of chastity; a patricidal act, paternal love; and the like). (2) This is the desert of even the least sin—to remove man from communion with God and break up their mutual peace and friendship. Now man excluded from communion with God, and altogether unenlightened by the Spirit, is by this very thing most corrupt and can perform nothing good. (3) Although the axiom may be granted as to other sins, yet there is a peculiar relation of that by which the covenant was broken and forthwith all the blessings of the covenant lost. (4) It is confirmed by the parity in angels who by their sin so shook off the habit of holiness and righteousness (by not standing in the truth, Jn. 8:44) as to draw upon themselves an incurable (*aniaton*) evil. (5) The opponents themselves confess that the Holy Spirit can be lost by any very heinous sin.

XII. If in the renewed, the habit of holiness (although imperfect) is not shaken off by their sins (which was shaken off by the fall of Adam although it was perfect), this does not depend upon the nature of sin, but upon the grace of perseverance. For believers have the promise of perseverance, which Adam did not have.

Ninth Question

Whether the actual disobedience of Adam is imputed by an immediate and antecedent imputation to all his posterity springing from him by natural generation. We affirm.

I. Although all Christians agree in acknowledging the sin of Adam, yet they differ not a little among themselves as to its effects; especially as to imputation, which by various persons is either called in doubt or openly denied.

Who deny the imputation of sin?

II. This was the opinion of the old Pelagians who held that Adam's sin injured himself alone and not other men (his posterity). Hence they restricted the passage of the apostle in Rom. 5:12 to an example of imitation. Their footsteps in this particular (as in almost all others) the Socinians press, who

expressly deny that the whole human race sinned and fell in Adam; or that God willed that on account of that one fall the whole human race should be guilty of sin. Socinus says: "Although all men descending from Adam are exposed to perpetual death, it is not because the sin of Adam is imputed to them, but because they are begotten by him, who was devoted to eternal death by a divine decree. And so that happens to them not on account of the imputation of sin, but on account of the propagation of the race" ("De statu primi hominis . . . Responsio . . . Francisci Puccii," chap. 10 in *Opera Omnia* [1656], 2:347-69 and *De Iesus Christo Servatore*, Pt. III.8 [1594], p. 291).

III. The Anabaptists do not differ from them. They deny that the posterity are guilty on account of the fall of their first parents. The opinion of the Remonstrants is the same. Although from the beginning they speak ambiguously (so as to leave it uncertain what they did hold), yet afterwards they plainly testify their agreement with the Socinians, retaining indeed the name of imputation, but ignoring the thing itself. They write that "the sin of Adam is imputed by God to his posterity not as if he really thinks them guilty of the same sin and fault with Adam, but inasmuch as he willed them to be born liable to the same evil to which Adam by sin had made himself liable" ("Apologia pro confessione sive declaratione . . . Remonstrantes," 7 in Episcopius, *Operum theologicorum* [1665], Pt. II, p. 151). This, Curcellaeus confirms more clearly still when he rejects all imputation of sin ("De Jure Dei," in *Stephani Curcellaei Opera Theologica* [1675], pp. 735-38).

IV. Nor do those only of the opposite party (*hoi ex enantias*) impugn this imputation. Among our own men, the celebrated Joshua Placaeus, professor at Saumur, adopted this comment of the adversaries. While constituting the whole relation of original pollution in habitual, subjective and inherent corruption, propagated to individuals by ordinary generation, he rejects that imputation and with great labor endeavors to overthrow it in "De statu homis lapsi ante gratiam" (in *Syntagma Thesium Theologicarum in Academia Salmuriensi* [1665], pp. 205-11) and in the various treatises on this argument.

V. This was opposed by the decree of the National Synod which met at Charenton in 1644, which sanctioned and confirmed the doctrine received in our churches concerning the imputation of Adam's first sin and the hereditary corruption flowing upon all. The words of the decree are as follows: "Whereas a report has been made to the Synod of certain writings, printed and manuscript, by which the nature of original sin is made to consist solely in the hereditary corruption, originally residing in all men, but the imputation of the first sin of Adam is denied; the Synod condemns the aforesaid doctrine so far as it restricts the nature of original sin to the mere hereditary corruption of Adam's posterity, excluding the imputation of the first sin by which he fell; and, under the penalty of censures of all kinds, forbids all pastors, professors and others who may treat this subject, to depart from the common opinion of all Protestant churches, which, besides corruption, have always acknowledged the aforesaid imputation to the whole posterity of Adam. And commands all synods and classes, in taking steps . . ." ("Third Synod of Charenton," 14 in Quick, *Synodicon* [1692], 2:473-74).

VI. In order to escape the force of this Synodical decree, Placaeus afterwards distinguished imputation into immediate and antecedent and mediate and consequent. The former was that by which the action of Adam is imputed to all his posterity (Christ excepted) proximately (immediately) for the very reason that

they are the sons of Adam, as much in reference to the privation of original righteousness as to eternal death, antecedently to inherent corruption. The latter was that which follows the beholding of the hereditary corruption derived to us from Adam and is made through it mediating. By the participation of the latter corruption, he maintained that we share in the sin of Adam and habitually consent to it and moreover are worthy to be reckoned with Adam, the sinner. He wishes the Synod to assert the latter (his view), but not the former. But if we look at the matter more closely, it will plainly appear that this distinction was devised to raise a smoke; retaining the name of imputation, in fact it takes away the thing itself. For if on this account only the sin of Adam is said to be imputed to us mediately (because we are constituted guilty with God and become liable to punishment on account of the hereditary corruption which we draw from Adam), there will be properly no imputation of Adam's sin, but only of inherent corruption. This the Synod wished to proscribe because it constituted two parts of original sin: inherent corruption and imputation. This could not be said if imputation could be made in no other way than by the intervention of corruption. For it is one thing to lie under exposure to the wrath and condemnation of God on account of inherent and native corruption, propagated by generation; another, on account of the sin of Adam imputed to us.

Statement of the question.

VII. On the state of the question, it must be observed: (1) that we do not treat here of any sin of Adam, but of the first; nor of the first habitual inhering in himself, but the first actual by which he violated the primordial law and broke the covenant entered into with him by God.

VIII. (2) The question does not concern all his posterity who in any way were to spring from him, but only those who descend from him in the ordinary way of generation (so that Christ may be excluded, who not in the ordinary way, but in an extraordinary and supernatural way, was conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost, not in virtue of the blessing given before the fall, but in virtue of the special promise following the fall concerning the seed of the woman which should bruise the head of the serpent; not according to personality, but according to humanity only and evident extraordinarily).

IX. (3) It is not inquired whether the sin of Adam may be said to be imputed to us because (on account of original sin inherent in us) we deserve to be viewed as in the same place with him, as if we had actually committed his sin (just as "uncircumcision" is said by the apostle "to be counted for circumcision," Rom. 2:26, i.e., to be viewed as in the same place as if he had been circumcised; for thus it would be treated of the comparison of different persons or of the parity between different sins with relation to punishment or guilt). But it is inquired whether the actual sin of Adam is so in fact imputed to all that on account of it all are reckoned guilty and either suffer punishment or at least are considered worthy of punishment.

X. Imputation is either of something foreign to us or properly ours. Sometimes that is imputed to us which is personally ours (in which sense God imputes to sinners their transgressions whom he punishes for crimes properly their own; in reference to what is good, the zeal of Phineas is said to be "imputed to him for righteousness," Ps. 106:31). Sometimes that is imputed which is without us and not performed by ourselves. Thus the righteousness of Christ is said to be imputed

to us, and our sins are imputed to him, although neither has he sin in himself, nor we righteousness. Here we speak of the latter kind of imputation, not of the former because we are treating of a sin committed by Adam, not by us.

XI. However when we say that the sin of another is imputed to anyone, we are not to understand the sin which is simply and in every way another's, but that which in some way belongs to him to whom it is said to be imputed (if not properly, singularly and personally, yet commonly, on account of the union existing between him and its proper author). No imputation of another's sin can be granted, except on the supposition of some peculiar connection of the one with the other. Now this union may be threefold: (1) natural, as between a father and his children; (2) moral and political, as between a king and his subjects; (3) voluntary, as among friends, and between the guilty and his substitute. Hence appears the foundation of the twofold imputation between Christ and us by which our sins are imputed to him and his righteousness in turn imputed to us (2 Cor. 5:21). We do not here refer to the last union (in which we confess previous consent to be necessary), but only to the former two (in which it is not necessary, in order to a just imputation, that he who bears the punishment of another's sin should either actually consent to it or sometime have consented to it). For the bond between Adam and his posterity is twofold: (1) natural, as he is the father, and we are his children; (2) political and forensic, as he was the prince and representative head of the whole human race. Therefore the foundation of imputation is not only the natural connection which exists between us and Adam (since, in that case, all his sins might be imputed to us), but mainly the moral and federal (in virtue of which God entered into covenant with him as our head). Hence Adam stood in that sin not as a private person, but as a public and representative person— representing all his posterity in that action and whose demerit equally pertains to all.

XII. For Adam to be a public and representative person, it was not necessary that that office should be committed to him by us, so that he might act as much in our name as in his own. It is sufficient that there intervened the most just ordination of God according to which he willed Adam to be the root and head of the whole human race, who therefore not only for himself only but also for his (posterity) should receive or lose the goods. Hence all are said to have been one man. "How many soever," says Augustine, "were to spring from that one, were one man in that one" (Letter 186, "To Paulinus" [FC 30:206; PL 33.824]) by a unity not specific or numerical, but partly by a unity of origin (because all are of one blood), partly by a unity of representation (because one represented the person of all, according to God's arrangement).

XIII. Many arguments prove this to have been the ordination of God. (1) The covenant made with Adam (discussed before) was not particular with Adam alone, but general and public—entered into with the whole human race (which, accordingly, having been broken by that first parent, involved his whole offspring in the same calamity). Otherwise God ought to have covenanted with the individuals. (2) The relation of the divine image and of original righteousness (which Adam received for himself and his, not as a personal good and peculiar to himself, but as a common good to be transmitted to his posterity, if he had stood in his integrity; but of which his posterity was also to be deprived as soon as he fell); so that Adam here was like a beneficiary who, receiving a gift from his master,

receives it both for himself and his posterity on this condition—that if he rebels against his master, he loses the benefit not only for himself but also for his posterity. Article 10 of the French Confession clearly states: "The things which God gave unto Adam were not given to him alone, but also to all his posterity; and therefore we in his person being deprived of all those good gifts, are fallen into all this misery and curse" (Cochrane, p. 148). (3) The communion of punishments (general as well as special) spreading abroad among his posterity no less than in Adam (which could not justly be inflicted, except on the supposition of a common law and a common guilt). For if the punishment of the broken covenant is extended to all, the covenant also and the law ought to be extended to all. (4) The comparison between Adam and Christ instituted by Paul (Rom. 5; 1 Cor. 15). This cannot be sufficiently carried out, except on the supposition of the imputation of sin answering to the imputation of righteousness, as will hereafter be proved.

XIV. The punishment brought upon us by the sin of Adam is either privative or positive. The former is the want and privation of original righteousness; the latter is death both temporal and eternal and in general all the evils visited upon sinners. Although the second necessarily follows the first from the nature of the thing (unless the mercy of God intervenes), still it ought not to be confounded with it. As to the first, we say that the sin of Adam is imputed to us immediately for privative punishment because it is the cause of the privation of original righteousness and so ought to precede corruption (at least in the order of nature); but as to the latter, it can be said to be imputed mediately as a positive punishment because we are liable to that punishment only after we are born and are corrupt.

XV. The question returns to these limits—whether the sin of Adam (not any, but the first; not habitual, but actual) is imputed to all his posterity naturally springing from him, by an imputation, not mediate and consequent, but immediate and antecedent. They with whom we treat here either absolutely deny imputation or admit only a mediate imputation. However, we (with the orthodox) affirm both that imputation is granted, and that it is immediate and antecedent.

The imputation of sin is proved: (1) from Rom. 5:12.

XVI. The reasons are: (1) Paul clearly builds up this imputation—"As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Rom. 5:12ff.). From these words various arguments are drawn. (a) From the scope of the apostle, which is to prove by an illustrious type the doctrine of justification by the imputation of Christ's righteousness (of which he had spoken in chapters 3 and 4). It might seem strange and unusual for one to be justified by another's righteousness. Thus the apostle (by a comparison between Adam and Christ) proves the foundation of that mystery from its opposite—the condemnation which God willed to be derived upon all on account of the imputation of one sin. Therefore just as Adam was constituted by God the head and root of the human race (together with the guilt of his sin), and from his sin death was spread through all; even so Christ, the second Adam, was made the head of all the elect, so that by his obedience justification might come upon all the elect. (b) He speaks of the sin which "entered into the world" and "by which death passed upon all men." This cannot be referred to the original, inherent sin (which the actual already supposed), but to the first actual sin by which death in fact pervaded both Adam and his posterity. This is evident from v. 18 where the answering

clause of the similitude is given and mention is made of "that one sin." (c) That sin ought to be understood concerning which it can be said that all have sinned, since sin entered by one man into the world (and by sin death, which is the force of Paul's reasoning): "As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men" *eph' hō pantes hēmarton*, "in whom" or "because all have sinned." Now the word *hēmarton* cannot properly be drawn to a habit of sin or to habitual and inherent corruption, but properly denotes some actual sin and that, also, past (which can be no other than the sin of Adam itself). For it is one thing to be or to be born a sinner; another, however, actually to sin. Therefore since they did not yet exist in the nature of things, they are said to have sinned in another and must undoubtedly be considered (he committing sin) to have also themselves committed it. Now Paul says of all (while not yet in existence) that they sinned in Adam. Therefore, he sinning, they are considered also themselves to have sinned (which could not be said without the imputation of sin). (d) Paul not only speaks of sin, but of "the one sin" and "the offense of one" whose guilt has spread over all (vv. 17, 18); "As by the offense of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one grace came upon all men unto justification of life" (v. 18); "As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous" (v. 19). Why should the apostle so often mention the one man sinning (and the offense and disobedience of one in the singular) whose guilt passed upon all men unto condemnation, not once, but five times in a few verses, unless this one disobedience (which can be no other than the actual transgression of Adam) was imputed to his posterity? For if we are guilty not by the imputation of Adam's sin but only by the propagation of corruption, not now from one sin can guilt and condemnation be said to have passed upon all, but from innumerable inherent sins. (e) This is more strongly confirmed by the comparison between Adam and Christ, instituted here by the apostle with respect to justification, of which he treats, for the sake of which he calls "Adam the figure of him that was to come" (*typon tou mellontos*, v. 14). We are constituted sinners in Adam in the same way in which we are constituted righteous in Christ. But in Christ we are constituted righteous by the imputation of righteousness; therefore we are made sinners in Adam by the imputation of his sin; otherwise the comparison is destroyed. (f) The death which reigned by sin holds in its embrace spiritual death from God's threatening. This is nothing else than a privation of original righteousness together with hereditary corruption. Hence besides this, some previous sin ought to be acknowledged as its cause (which can be no other than the actual sin of Adam).

XVII. It is no objection here (1) that *eph' hō* is not to be translated "in whom" relatively, but causally for "in that"; or "because" as Calvin, Martyr, the French version and others give it. We answer that for in whatever way *eph' hō* is translated, whether relatively, "in whom" (which the ancients with great unanimity, Greek as well as Latin, retain and Augustine urges against the Pelagians, *Against Julian* 6.12 [FC 35:344; PL 44.843]—for it is not unusual for the preposition *epi* to be taken for *en* as appears from Mk. 2:4; Acts 2:38; Heb. 9:10, 17; Mt. 13:14, in which sense also we are said to die in Adam, 1 Cor. 15:22), or causally, it amounts to the same thing. The reason is given by the apostle why death passed upon each and every one (to wit, because all have sinned); not as if actually and per-

sonally in themselves because they were not yet in existence, but in Adam sinning (viz., by that first sin which by him entered into the world). Thus the opinion of the apostle must necessarily be supplied, and we must thus translate "on this account that" (viz., in that one man "all sinned," which the French version puts in the margin when it adds); or "in whom" (viz., "inasmuch as they are comprehended in the person of Adam in whom each one was"). (2) The similitude between Adam and Christ is in the thing, but not in the mode of the thing (i.e., that the apostle indeed teaches that Adam brought over to his posterity guilt and condemnation; Christ, however, brought justification). But it does not teach that it was done by both by imputation. Otherwise hands would be joined with the papists, and we must acknowledge with them that our justification depends upon the imputation of Christ's righteousness and the infusion of inherent righteousness, so that our condemnation springs as much from propagated sin as from imputed (which Bellarmine urges in "De Justificatione," 2.3 in *Opera* [1858], 4:507-11). We reply that this objection ought to be not a little suspect from the fact of its having Socinus as its author ("De Iesu Christo Servator," 4.16 in *Opera Omnia* [1656], 2:221-27). It is advanced to escape the force of the argument which we draw from it—to confirm the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Second, it is here gratuitously supposed that the similitude of the apostle is only in the thing, not in the mode of the thing, since that too enters into the nature of the thing about which inquiry is being made. As was observed before, the scope of the apostle is to treat of the matter of justification (i.e., not only of the communication of guilt or of righteousness in general, but of the mode of that communication, inasmuch as it is made by the offense or obedience of one, i.e., by the imputation of it). Moreover no approach is made to the papists because the words of Paul are not to be extended beyond his scope (which is not to treat of the communication of inherent righteousness [made by sanctification, concerning which he treats professedly in Rom. 6], but only of imputed righteousness). (3) That sin is meant by the apostle which can be said to have entered into the world and to have passed upon all men (which cannot fitly be said of the actual sin of Adam, but only of inherent corruption). We answer that actual sin is said to have entered into the world and to have passed upon men, no less than corruption; if not with relation to the act which passes over, still with relation to the guilt which remains, inasmuch as on account of that action, another is reckoned guilty and lies under punishment. Nor ought it to seem strange if the apostle meant this actual sin rather than habitual sin because he proposed to treat here of justification, not of sanctification. (4) All are said to have sinned in the same way in which sin is said to have been in the world from Adam until the law (v. 13) because he proves the former from the latter. Yet this sin which was in the world cannot be said to be the imputed actual (since the apostle adds that sin is not imputed when there is no law), but only inherent. We answer that the apostle is so far from wishing to deny that that sin was imputed that he rather strives to prove the contrary which he gathers from the dominion of death which "reigned even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression" (to wit, infants who cannot be said to have sinned actually like Adam; cf. v. 14). However because the imputation of sin for punishment cannot be made when a law does not exist (since indeed sin is illegality [*anomia*], and where there is no law, there is no transgression, Rom. 4:15), Paul thence

elicits that some law was given before the written law of Moses, according to which sin can be said to have been imputed. This can be no other than the primordial law given to Adam and in him to all his posterity. (5) "Many" not all are said to "have been made sinners" (Rom. 5:19). We answer that the "many" are equivalent to all, as is taught by the comparison of vv. 15 and 19 with vv. 12, 18 and 1 Cor. 15:22. They are called "many" not to restrict the subject and contract the power of the sin as if opposed to others (who, springing from the same parent, remained innocent), but to Adam himself who was only one and to whom the many as well as the all are properly opposed (in order to better institute the antithesis between the multitude of believers who are made righteous by the obedience of Christ and the multitude of sinners who draw guilt from Adam).

(2) From 1 Cor. 15:22.

XVIII. (2) "In Adam all die" (1 Cor. 15:22), that is, incur the guilt of death and condemnation. Therefore in the same one they also sinned and are held in a common blameworthiness with him. No one can in anyone deserve the punishment of death unless he had with him and in him a common sin, the cause of death. Nor does it suffice to be said that all die in Adam efficiently because we draw from Adam original sin (which is the cause of death). In the same way, we can be said to die in our parents and ancestors, from whom we draw sin immediately (which nevertheless Scripture nowhere says, but concerning Adam only because we were in him in a peculiar way, not only as the seminal principle, but also as the representative head). Thus we are said to have sinned in him not only by reason of efficiency (because he is the cause by which sin is propagated to us), but also by reason of demerit (because his criminality drew guilt upon us). In the same manner, "all" are said in the same place "to be made alive" in Christ, not only efficiently by the vivifying Spirit, but also meritoriously by the imputation of his righteousness.

(3) From the imputation of the sins of others.

XIX. (3) By the just judgment of God, the sins of parents frequently pass over upon children and are imputed to them. Therefore much more can be said of the first sin, which was both more serious than all which sprang from it and not particular to the person of Adam, but universal of the whole nature. Now that such an imputation is granted is not only proved by the threatening of the law (by which God proclaimed himself as "a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation," Ex. 20:5), but also various examples give evidence: Achan (Jos. 7:24, 25); the Amalekites (1 S. 15:2, 3); the sons of Saul (2 S. 21:6-9); Jeroboam (1 K. 14:9, 10); Ahab (1 K. 21:21, 22) and others. Hence the church acknowledges that she bears the punishment of the crimes committed by the fathers (Lam. 5:7). And Christ threatens the Jews that there will come upon them the punishments of those crimes which had been committed by their forefathers long before, "that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias" (Mt. 23:35). From this it evidently appears that the imputation of another's sin is not to be traduced either as unusual or unheard of (since it can be proved by so many examples) or as absurd, unjust and cruel (since God himself professes to be the visitor of the crimes of parents upon their children). Nor was this unknown to the Gentiles themselves, many of whom confess that this right belongs to the deity—to demand

the punishment of one man's sin from others. Plutarch proves it by various arguments (*On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance* [Loeb, 7:180-299]). Proclus says this is the work of Jove—to bring a common punishment upon cities on account of the unjust punishment of magistrates; he brings forward many examples to the point (*Scholia Vetera in Hesiodi Opera et Dies* [1955], 260-62:89-90). Thus Hesiod introduces Justice (*Dikēn*), the goddess, asking Jove: "until the people pay for the mad folly of their princes" (*Works and Days* 260-61 [Loeb, 22-23]). In the same place, he says, "Often even a whole city suffers for a bad man" (ibid., 239-40 [Loeb, 20-21]). And Horace says, "Whatever folly the kings commit the Achaeans pay the penalty" (*Epistles* 1.2.14 [Loeb, 262-63]). Hence undoubtedly it is that we often read that the imputation of crimes took place among the heathen themselves. Cicero remarks that in the Grecian states the children of tyrants were punished in the same way as their oppressors (*Epistulae ad Brutum* 25*.6 [Loeb, 28:724-25]). Curtius says a law was observed by the Macedonians that they who plotted against the king should be visited with death together with their relatives near and distant (*History of Alexander* 6.11.20 [Loeb, 2:104-5]). Among almost all people, it was the custom in crimes of treason to devote to punishment the children with the guilty parents. Here belongs the sanction of the law of Arcadius and Honorius in reference to treason. "His sons, to whom we, with imperatorial lenity, grant life (for they ought to perish with the father's punishment, in whom the examples of paternal, that is, hereditary, crimes are remarked) are to be esteemed aliens from the maternal and ancestral inheritance and succession. They can receive nothing from the wills of strangers, let them be in want and poor; let their father's disgrace always attend them; let them come to no honors at all, to no oaths; finally let them be such that to them, groveling in perpetual, extreme poverty, both death may be a consolation and life a punishment" (cf. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* 32 [Modern Library, 1932], 2:201). Hence it is evident that neither with God nor with men is it simply unjust for one to be punished for the sin of another. The renowned Amyrald proves this by various reasons and examples (*Treatise Concerning Religion* 3.7 [1660], pp. 437-59).

XX. It is no objection here: (1) that there are various differences between the imputation of Adam's sin and that of other sins. We answer that although they do not agree in all respects, still it clearly appears that the imputation of another's sin is neither unusual nor contrary to divine justice (which alone is sought in these examples). (2) It is no objection that the sons who are punished on account of the sins of their parents are not better than their parents; so it ought not to seem surprising, if from the occasion of the sins of fathers, they should be punished for their own sins. We answer that it is one thing to be punished on occasion of another's sin; another however to bear his punishment. Although no one (except he be guilty and corrupt in himself) is smitten on account of another's sin, yet while he endures the punishment of another's sin, he is not regarded as guilty in himself, but in another person; nor is he said to bear the punishment of his own but of another's sin. (3) It is no objection that not the sons properly, but the parents are punished in the sons, who are a part of them. We answer that although the fathers are punished in the children, this does not hinder us from saying that the sons themselves also are punished, while punishments by order of divine justice are inflicted upon them on account of the sins of their parents. He who bears the punishment of another's sin must necessarily have had that sin imputed to him.

(4) From the propagation of sin.

XXI. Fourth, the immediate imputation of the first sin being denied, the principal foundation of the justice of the propagation of sin is removed. Nor can a sufficient reason be given why God willed that hereditary and inherent stain to be transmitted from the parents to their posterity. Since it holds the relation not only of base evil (*mali turpis*), or pollution, but also of sad evil (*mali tristis*) or punishment, it ought necessarily to suppose some antecedent sin on account of whose guilt it is inflicted by the justice of God. There is no punishment except from sin; for both sin alone is punished and that only which is punished is sin. Now it cannot be our proper and personal sin because we were not then actually in existence. Therefore it is the sin of Adam which is imputed to us. Hence it is evident that the law of nature alone is not sufficient to preserve the truth and justice of propagation, according to which as man generates man and a leper, a leper, so a corrupt one, a corrupt. For not only the order of nature, but the exercise of justice must be attended to as well as the most holy, although secret and wonderful, judgment of God. For why did God (who could have hindered that propagation if he pleased) either by creating men independent of each other (like the angels) or in some other way, notwithstanding will all to be born corrupt from one corrupt man and so the whole human race to be separated from him by sin and to incur an eternal curse (i.e., to be subjected to the severest punishment), unless he had already willed to exercise an act of justice on man on account of some sin committed before? Thus how does it happen that the souls of men (which are not propagated by generation, but are immediately created by God) are not created with original righteousness (as the souls of the first parents), but destitute of this ornament? No reason can be assigned for this difference unless we rise to the secret judgment of God by which he wills to smite the children of Adam on account of the sin of the parent. Calvin most excellently unfolds this: "Nor did it happen merely in a natural way, that all should fall by the sin of one parent" (ICR 3.23.7, p. 955). And afterwards: "The Scriptures openly declare that all men were bound over to eternal death in the person of this one man. Since this cannot be ascribed to nature, everyone plainly sees that it proceeded from the wonderful counsel of God" (ibid.). In the same place: "Again I ask, how did it happen that the fall of Adam involved so many nations together with their infant children in eternal death without remedy, unless it so pleased God? It becomes tongues otherwise so eloquent to be still here. I confess indeed the decree to be dreadful, yet no one can deny that God foreknew what exit man would have before he created him and he therefore foreknew it because he had so ordained it by his decree" (ibid.).

XXII. Now that the privation of original righteousness and hereditary taint is not only sin, but also holds the relation of punishment, is readily inferred from the following arguments. (1) The infliction of the greatest evil (both of loss and of sense) cannot be the infliction of punishment. By that propagation, the greatest evil is inflicted upon the creature, both of loss (by the privation of righteousness and good due in him and separation from God) and of sense (by a deprivation of the whole nature and dreadful disorder [*ataxian*] of the faculties of man). (2) Both these evils hold the same relation in us as in Adam, since indeed from him they are spread over us as his heirs. It held the relation of punishment in Adam, since indeed it was spiritual death which flowed from his actual sin according to God's

threatening. Nor does it hinder that this privation of righteousness with respect to man holds the relation of sin because it deprives him of the rectitude due in him because it does not cease to hold the relation of punishment on the part of God ordaining it to the loss of the creature on account of sin (if not his own and personal, still public and common—as hardening which on the part of man's hardening himself is sin; on the part of God's hardening man is the severest punishment). That both however can subsist at the same time will be proved below.

XXIII. (5) Adam was the germ, root and head of the human race, not only in a physical sense and seminally, but morally and in a representative sense. He entered into covenant for himself and his posterity (as was seen before) who just as he received the gifts which he possessed for himself and his, so he lost them for himself and his. It is evident that the things principiated are contained in the principles and announce their condition. And just as Adam had received the condition and promise of life not only for himself but also for his prosterity (if he had stood), so he ought to have contracted the guilt of death by his fall, not only for himself, but also for all his. For to whom the benefits pertain, to them also it is most just the burdens and disadvantages should also pertain.

XXIV. (6) The denial of the imputation of Adam's sin would not a little weaken the imputation of Christ's righteousness (which answer to each other and upon which is founded the principal part of the antithesis instituted by Paul between the first and second Adam). For the descent from the negation of the former to the denial of the latter is most easy. Hence there is no one of the heretics who have denied the imputation of sin who have not for the same reason opposed the imputation of Christ's righteousness (as is seen in the Pelagians, Socinians and Arminians). Hence the reasons by which the imputation of Adam's sin is opposed can no less be turned back against the imputation of Christ's righteousness; those upon which the imputation of Christ is built also serve to establish the imputation of Adam's sin. Nor is it a hindrance that the imputation of Christ's righteousness is of grace, while the imputation of sin is from justice. Grace can give to another what is not due to him, justice cannot. For grace bestows favor upon the undeserving, justice inflicts punishment upon none except the deserving. For in the imputation of Adam's sin, the justice of God does not inflict punishment upon the undeserving, but upon the deserving (if not by a desert proper and personal, still participated and common—founded upon the natural and federal union between us and Adam).

XXV. (7) As Levi was tithed by Melchizedek *dia Abraam* (Heb. 7:9), i.e., either "by" Abraham (as an intermediate person) or "in the person of Abraham" (inasmuch as he was as yet potentially in his loins, so that he was considered as rightly tithed in him and with him who then bore the person of all his offspring); so much more can the posterity of Adam be considered to have sinned in him, since they were in him as branches in the root and the members in the head. Not that the foundation of imputation is to be sought in that fact (differing from it in many things), but only that it may be illustrated through analogy by a similar thing. Nor do the words adduced by the apostle ("as I may so say," *hōs epos eipein*) imply a tropical and figurative thing, as if Levi figuratively only (not properly) may be said to have paid tithes in Abraham. This is contrary to the design of the apostle, who wishes from that tithing to gather the inferiority of the Aaronic priesthood to that of Melchizedek (for he who pays tithes is inferior to him who

receives them). They either soften the somewhat harsh phrase concerning the tithing of Levi, since goods properly are tithed not persons; or signify that the apostle wished to express the whole matter in one word, nor to spend his strength in explaining it further ("to speak in one word and briefly"). If the faith of Abraham and his sins were not imputed to Levi (although he was tithed in him), it does not follow that the imputation of sin cannot well be gathered. Abraham sustained the person of Levi or of the Aaronic sacerdotal order to arise from him in that solemn action by which he payed tithes to Melchizedek; but not in his particular actions which were purely personal either as regards faith or sin.

Sources of solutions.

XXVI. Purely personal sins differ from those which are common and public. The former should not be imputed to posterity. Of them, the law must be understood: "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin" (Dt. 24:16). However nothing prevents the latter from being imputed, and such was the sin of Adam. (2) The law imposed upon men differs from the law to which God binds himself. Barriers are placed to human vengeance because it might be abused, but not to divine justice. In this passage, God undoubtedly shows what he wishes to be done ordinarily by men, but not immediately what he wishes to do or what he can do from the order of justice. Otherwise he could not have said in the law that he would visit the iniquities of parents upon their children, nor would he have confirmed this by many examples.

XXVII. The passage where God declares, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, but the soul that sinneth, it shall die" (Ezk. 18:20) is not to be absolutely and simply understood as it sounds. Otherwise there would be a contradiction to the law and a denial of the substitution of Christ in our place. Rather it ought to be explained: (1) of adult sons who depart from the iniquity of parents and do not imitate them (as appears from v. 19—"Why? doth not the son bear the iniquity of the father? When the son hath done that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live." Now such are not the sons of Adam, who are transgressors from the womb). (2) Of personal and particular sins, not of common and general, which can involve many, such as the sin of Adam. (3) There is not established here a general rule of providence and justice in accordance with which God either before always acted or will hereafter conform all his judgments. For he ordained in the law otherwise and proceeded in examples. Rather it treats of a business peculiar to the Jews on whom God bestowed this by a special concession; not to act with them in that strictness of justice which he could observe (as to impute others' sins to them), but to punish their own sins in themselves, that in this way their mouth might be entirely closed. On this pretext, the Jews carped at the divine judgments that the undeserving were punished for the sins of their parents, as is evident from the proverb they used: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge." God answers that he would not deal with them thus in the least, but would punish each one for his own sins, as we read in v. 30. Therefore he wishes in the present affair to draw and to bring them to this confession—to acknowledge God to be just in his judgments and that there was no need for him to seek sins in the fathers in order to punish the sons; that there was sufficient criminality in themselves (even apart from the imputation of the sins of others) to justify the infliction of the punishment

they had already suffered and even greater still. So there is not here any definition of right, but only the declaration of a special agreement. He does not say what he can rightly do, but against the complaints of the people, what he wills to do. The scope of the prophet and the connection of the words lead us to this. Finally, the highest right differs from the forbearing (*epieikeia*) right. In accordance with the former, God can visit the sins of parents upon their children, but in accordance with the latter he extends the punishment no further than to sinners themselves. Thus the prophet, speaking of the New Testament times, says among other things: "In those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity" (Jer. 31:29, 30*). He says this to teach that God would deal with them more gently than before.

XXVIII. The act of one cannot be and be called that of the whole if it is a merely personal act. Of this kind are the sins committed every day by individuals. Yet it cannot be understood of a common or universal act pertaining to the whole human race, such as was the act of sinning Adam. Adam was indeed one individually, a singular person; but in this act, he is not viewed as a singular person but rather as the principle and head of the whole race (with whom, in him, God made the covenant). Therefore the will of Adam can be called singular by pecularity of act; universal by right of representation; singular because proceeding from one among individual men; universal because that individual represented the whole human race. Thus the righteousness of Christ is the act of one and yet may well be called that of all believers by divine imputation; as what one has done, all may be considered to have done—"If one died for all, then are all dead" (2 Cor. 5:14).

XXIX. Adam in sinning bore the person of all (not equally in obtaining remission) on account of our being equally in his loins. The state from which he fell was natural, therefore his fall involved all. But his restitution ought not to pertain to all as it was supernatural and gratuitous and accordingly personal also.

XXX. He who was in Adam in no way, neither in power nor in act, cannot be said to have sinned in him. But although we were not in act and personally in him, yet we were in power, both seminally (inasmuch as we were contained in him as the root of the whole species, Acts 17:26) and representatively (inasmuch as from the order of God he bore our person and God made the covenant with the whole human race in him). Thus although we were not actually in Christ when he died for us, still his death is properly imputed to us on account of the union existing between us and him.

XXXI. It is repugnant to divine justice to punish anyone for another's sin (which is simply and in every way another's); but not which (although it be another's with regard to person) is yet common in virtue of representation or some bond of union, by which its guilt may involve many. That this may justly happen, the threatenings of the law and the judgments by which they are executed, and the example of Christ to whom our sins were truly imputed, demonstrate.

XXXII. Although the disobedience of Adam was imputed to us, it does not equally follow that his death also should be imputed to us. By his death (which was his personal punishment), he holds no charge for us, as by his disobedience. Thus it could not be communicated to us morally and by imputation as the latter, but only by a real and physical transmission.

XXXIII. Although the first sin was not really voluntary with respect to us (because we did not sin by our own will), still it can be called voluntary morally because the will of Adam is considered in a measure ours on account of our union with him.

XXXIV. As the righteousness (*dikaiōma*) of Christ (which is unique) can still be communicated by imputation to innumerable others; and as the guilt of the sins of parents (imputed to their posterity) is one and equal (which passes upon all); so nothing hinders us from saying that the guilt of Adam's sin is unique and equal, passing upon all by imputation. It does not pass to them by division, but by union inasmuch as it renders them all worthy of that punishment.

XXXV. God is the author of the covenant made with Adam, in accordance with which the sharing and imputation of Adam's sin follows. On that account, he can or ought not to be regarded as the author of sin. Sin did not arise of itself from that covenant, but only accidentally on account of man's transgression (*anomian*). Nor can he be considered the author of that sin more than its cause, on this account—that sin took place or is propagated to us because he willed to permit it and that it should be propagated to us.

XXXVI. The other sins committed by Adam differ from the first which is imputed to us. The others were personal sins simply (as much with respect to beginning as to end) after the covenant God made with him had been violated and the public person (which he sustained) had been laid aside. For although after his first sin, Adam did not cease to be the head by way of origin, yet he did cease to be the representative head by way of covenant. Although the first was personal as to its beginning (because proceding from a single person), still it was not such as to its end (because it was common to more).

XXXVII. The want of original righteousness can be viewed either passively (inasmuch as it is subjectively in man) or actively (inasmuch as it is judicially sent by God): either with respect to base evil (which it includes) or with respect to sad evil (which it draws after itself by reason of the deformation of the creature and its separation from God). In the former sense, it is rightly called sin because it is a privation of due rectitude, repugnant to the law; but in the latter sense, it holds a relation to punishment.

XXXVIII. Since imputation to punishment is only a moral act, it ought not to seem strange if, as the first act of sinning is imputed to us, so the first act of generating (which is purely natural) should not in like manner be imputed.

XXXIX. Although the act of Adam's disobedience could be imputed to us for condemnation, it does not immediately follow that the act of his obedience ought to be imputed to us for justification because guilt arises from the one act of disobedience, but righteousness requires a full complement and perseverance of obedience. Again, the righteousness of Adam as finite and due from him could not be communicated to others for their justification; especially since the condition of his posterity ought not to differ from that of Adam (who was always mutable) and to whose perseverance alone justification and life were promised.

XL. But that this doctrine concerning the imputation of Adam's sin was received in our churches has been shown fully by those very celebrated men (deserving the highest regard of the church): Andrew Rivet, in a remarkable treatise on the subject (published by him) where he proves that all Protestants agree upon this point ("Decretum Synodi Nationalis Ecclesiarum Reformatorum

Galliae . . . De imputatione primi peccati omnibus Adami posteris," in *Opera* [1651], 3:798-826); and Professor Antony Garissolius, in an excellent book written in defense of the Synodical decree (*Decreti synodici Carentoniensis de imputatione primi peccati Adae* [1648]). Therefore here there is no need of laboriously gathering testimonies from all quarters. Still because the learned men with whom we here treat frequently allege the authority of the greatest theologians (and especially of Calvin, Martyr and Chamier, as if they secretly disapproved of this imputation by their silence or even openly disapproved it in express words), it will not be without use to show briefly how much they are mistaken.

XLI. Many things prove that this was the opinion of Calvin. He does not mention imputation whenever he speaks of original sin, either because it had not yet been called into controversy or because he disputed against Albert Pighius and Ambrose Catharinus (who made the entire nature of original sin to consist solely in the imputation of the first sin, recognizing no inherent corruption) where he was not to labor in proving imputation (which alone the adversaries acknowledged), but only in asserting inherent corruption. Still it is easy to show that this doctrine was not unknown to, but approved by, this distinguished man. We cite a few of the many passages which might be adduced. In the formula of the Confession of Faith written by him and by which all of the Genevan school held themselves bound: "I confess that all our corruption and the vices under which we labor thence flowed, because Adam, the common father of all, by his rebellion, alienated himself from God; and the fountain of life and all good being forsaken, he rendered himself liable to all miseries. Hence it comes to pass that everyone of us is born infected with original sin and from the very womb of our mother we are under the curse of God and condemned not only on account of the crime of another, but on account of the depravity which is then within us, though it does not yet appear" (*Formula confessionis fidei . . . tenentur omnes studiosi publicae scholae* CR 37.724). And *tr. adversus Franciscanum*+: "By nature we are heirs of eternal condemnation, since the whole human race was cursed in Adam." And afterwards: "We say that God by a just judgment cursed us in Adam and willed us to be born corrupt on account of his sin, in order that we might be renewed in Christ." In his reply to a bitter calumniator concerning the secret providence of God: "But if it is proposed by you to subject God to the laws of nature, will you condemn him for justice because for the sin of one man we are all held implicated in the guilt of eternal death? One sinned; all are led to punishment; nor is that all, but from the sin of this one, all have contracted contagion; so that they are born corrupt and infected with a death-bringing pollution" (*Calumniae nebulonis . . . adversus doctrinam Iohannis Calvini de occulta Dei providentia* CR 37.289). And a little further on: "although Adam lost himself and his, still it is necessary to ascribe corruption and guilt to the secret judgment of God because the guilt of one man would be nothing to us if the heavenly Judge had not devoted us to eternal destruction . . . hence this condition, that we are liable not only to temporal miseries but to eternal death, also [unless because] on account of the guilt of one man, God cast us together into a common guilt" (ibid., pp. 289-90). "If the cause of the curse is inquired, resting upon all the posterity of Adam, it is said to be another's sin and the sin of each one; another's because when Adam fell from God in his person, the whole human race was despoiled of rectitude and intelligence; again all parts of the soul are corrupted,

so that each one in himself is lost" (*Commentaries on the Prophet Ezekiel* [1948], 2:241 on 18:20). There are more expressions of this kind in the ICR 2.1.1, 5, pp. 242, 246-48; 3.23.7, pp. 955-56; on Gen. 9:25 (*Commentary on Genesis* [1948], 1:305-7; "Sermon 53," *Sermons . . . on Job* [1584], pp. 247-51 on Job 14); on Rom. 5:12, 17 (*Epistles of Paul to the Romans and Thessalonians* [trans. R. Mackenzie, 1961], pp. 111-12, 116-17) and elsewhere. They prove our point, but we omit them for the sake of brevity.

XLII. Beza followed and frequently confirmed this opinion of Calvin. "There are three things which make a man guilty in the sight of God: (1) guilt flowing from this, that all sinned in the first creature (Rom. 5:12); (2) the corruption which is the punishment of that guilt, imposed upon Adam as well as upon his posterity; (3) the sins which adults commit" (*Apologia pro Justificatione* [1592], p. 127). The same thing he more strongly asserts on Rom. 5:12ff.: "Two things should be considered in original sin, namely, guilt and corruption; which, although they cannot be separated, yet ought to be distinguished accurately" (*Annotationes maiores in novum . . . testamentum, Pars altera* [1594], p. 60 on Rom. 5:12). Nor did those who followed him and taught in this church think differently. This is abundantly evident even from the vote of those celebrated theologians deputed to the Synod of Dort (John Diodati and Theodore Tronchin on Article 1, thesis 1, when they say that "God from eternity, according to the mere good pleasure of his own will, decreed in Christ to call a certain number of men from the seed and posterity of Adam, in and with him fallen, guilty and corrupt, by and on account of Christ according to the same good pleasure (*eudokia*) particularly designated by the Father to this end" (*Acta Synodi Nationalis . . . Dordrechti* [1619-20], 2:58-59). This opinion and belief (as they profess) belongs to the Genevan Church.

XLIII. Nor did Peter Martyr hold a different opinion. For although while disputing against Pighius he is wholly occupied in establishing the corruption, denied by him, and states nothing about imputation, still with sufficient clearness he establishes it elsewhere when he teaches that our original corruption is the punishment of Adam's sin (*Common Places*, Pt. II [1583], p. 216). "Indeed no one doubts," says he, "that original sin is inflicted upon us as the punishment of the first fall" (*In epistolam S. Pauli apostoli ad Romanos* [1559], p. 63 on Rom. 1:26). And: "Adam sinning it was just as if all had been present and sinned together with him" (*Most learned . . . commentaries . . . upon . . . Romaines* [1568], p. 115 on Rom. 5:14; cf. *In selectissimam D. Pauli priorem ad Corinthos* [1551], pp. 408-12 on 1 Cor. 15:21, 22).

XLIV. Chamier more clearly establishes this very thing: "We deny that we could be made inherently unrighteous by one man, unless the unrighteousness of this one man were imputed to us" (*Corpus theologicum* 21.2.9 [1653], 3:850). And: "We grant that the disobedience of Adam and the obedience of Christ do efficiently and meritoriously constitute us unrighteous and righteous; for this we never denied; for we deny that they could render us righteous or unrighteous, unless they were first imputed" (ibid., 21.17.11, 3:902). And soon after: "Therefore the very sin of Adam, I say his own personal disobedience, must be imputed to his posterity. And so also in regard to the obedience of Christ: because the whole human race was considered as in Adam by nature; and because the whole multitude of believers were in Chrst, by grace. Hence it comes to pass that we are not

only made sinners by Adam, but are declared to have sinned in him, which is a very different thing" (ibid.).

XLV. Nor does this celebrated man alone agree here with the other orthodox, but also other learned men (who do not differ in other things from the hypotheses of the renowned Placaeus) do not recede from the common opinion; cf. the very distinguished Amyrald who lengthily proves that another's sin can justly be imputed to those connected by some bond with the author, although they have not participated in the criminality (*Treatise Concerning Religions* 3.7 [1660], pp. 437-59). "As in crimes of treason, the perpetrators are so punished that the misery of their punishment passes over even to their posterity, for example, the demolishing of houses, deprivaton of office, loss of reputation, and other things of the same kind; so the punishment of the first man on account of his own sin ought to be extended even to his posterity in their suffering the numerous miseries following it" (*Brief Traitte de la Predestination* 5 [1634], pp. 57-58). "Wherefore," says he, "it is clear, how the apostle understands the doctrine of justification, viz., that as the condemnation by which we are condemned in Adam, does not signify an inherent quality, but either the obligation to punishment, or the declaration of that obligation by a superior power; so the righteousness by which we are justified in Christ, is not an inherent quality, but either the right of obtaining absolution in the divine judgment, or the absolution itself from the Judge" (*De la Justification contre les Opinions de Monsieur de la Milletiere* 3 [1638], pp. 34-35). He proves this more clearly still in what follows. Thus the very celebrated Mestrezat: "The justice of God could not impute to us the sin of Adam unless we were in Adam, and as it were in his loins, viz., by considering Adam as the head of his posterity" (*De la Communion a Iesus Christ* 2 [1625], p. 5). "The corruption of Adam has descended to us really and inheres in us, but I say that the imputation of his disobedience precedes, and corruption is derived to us by generation because we sinned in Adam as in our head" (Mestrezat, *Discours de la Grace . . . addresse a . . . Milletiere* [1638], p. 43). So the renowned Testard: "The first man was the root of the human race, both naturally with respect to species, and economically with respect to the covenant: to wit, he owed not only human nature, but either happiness, or misery, the latter by sinning, the former by persevering in divine rectitude, because God entered into covenant with him, not as with a private man, but as the head and surety of the whole race" (*Eirenikon seu Synopsis Doctrinae de Natura et Gratia*, Th. 12 [1633], p. 9).

TENTH QUESTION: ORIGINAL SIN

Whether any original sin or inherent stain and depravity may be granted, propagated to us by generation. We affirm against the Pelagians and Socinians.

I. Although nothing is better known than original sin for discussion, nothing is more difficult to understand as Augustine says (cf. *The Way of Life of the Catholic Church* 22 [40] [FC 56:34; PL 32.1328). Yet it is a doctrine of the highest importance to the surer perception of the misery of man and the necessity and efficacy of saving grace. Thus it is deservedly placed among the primary doctrines of the Christian religion.

II. Original sin is sometimes used more broadly to embrace imputed and inherent sin, into which as two parts it is said to be resolvable (thus it is taken by

Ursinus, Zanchius and others). Sometimes it is used more strictly to denote inherent alone; the imputed, as the cause and foundation, not being excluded but supposed (in which way Bucer, Calvin and Bullinger frequently speak of it). In this sense, it is now used here by us.

III. There are three questions in reference to it: (1) as to its existence or whether it is; (2) as to its nature or what it is; (3) as to its propagation or how it passes over us. The first we now discuss; the others we will take up afterwards.

IV. The term "original sin" was first brought into the church by Augustine (called into a controversy concerning sin by the Pelagians) in order that he might have a certain term to use in his disputes with them. The schools retained it as suitable to express exactly the nature of that sin. It is however so called not by reason of first origin (which man created by God had), but by reason of second origin (which it had from the first parent, both by reason of its principle [because it is from originating sin] and by reason of the mode of propagation [because it inheres in us from our origin] and by reason of its effects [because it is the origin of actual sins]).

Whether original sin may be granted.

V. As to the question of its existence, various heretics err here who follow the negative. (1) The ancient Pelagians, following their master, the British Pelagius, denied original sin as to all its parts, maintaining that Adam's sin hurt no one but himself; or if it may be said to have hurt others, it does so only as to example and imitation, not as to propagation (cf. Augustine, *De Haeresibus* 88 [PL 42.47-50]). (2) The Socinians, who although recognizing the possibility of sinning in all (because God gave a will free both to good and to evil), yet deny expressly that any original sin can be granted. Socinus says, "In man when born, neither criminality nor punishment on account of Adam's sin can have place" ("Praelectionis theologicae," 4 in *Opera Omnia* [1656], 1:540). And afterwards: "We conclude therefore that there is no original sin, even improperly speaking" (ibid., p. 541). Volkelius asserts the same thing (*De vera Religione* 5.18 [1630], pp. 544-49). But the Racovian Catechism more clearly states their opinion where to the proposed question, whether free will is vitiated by original sin, the answer is: "There is no such thing as original sin; the Scripture teaches no such doctrine; and the will of man could not be vitiated by a cause which had no existence. The sin of Adam being a single act could not corrupt his own nature, much less had it power to deprave the nature of all his posterity" (*Catechesis ecclesiarum quae in Regno Poloniae* 10* [1609], pp. 249-50; cf. *Racovian Catechism* 10* [1818], pp. 325-26). (3) Nor do the Remonstrants differ from them holding (as certain in their *Apology*, whatever Augustine and others may have judged to the contrary) that God willed to devote to eternal torments no infants of whatever condition or birth, dying without actual and proper sins; or could justly devote them on account of the sin called original; that this opinion is opposed to the divine goodness and right reason; yea, that it is uncertain whether in it greater absurdity or cruelty preponderates. Curcellaeus openly denies the same ("Secunda dissertatio theologica: De Peccato originis," in *Stephani Curcaelli Opera Theologica* [1675], 1:892-918). (4) Among the papists, Pighius and Catharinus restrict original sin to imputation alone, denying propagation. The Anabaptists, treading in the footsteps of their predecessors, call original sin "the figment of Augustine" (Frankenthal Colloquy, Act. 2, Art. 4+).

Now to all these the orthodox church has always opposed herself and constantly retained the affirmative.

Statement of the question. VI. Therefore, the question between us and our opponents is not whether any first sin originating in Adam can be granted, from which that Iliad of evils, resting upon the human race, flowed to us, either by example and imitation or by propagation. Rather the question is whether there is any inherent depravity (called original sin) propagated from Adam to all his posterity springing from him by natural generation. They deny; we affirm.

Original sin is proved from Gen. 6:5. VII. The reasons are: (1) "Every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart is said to be only evil, continually" (Gen. 6:5) even "from his youth" (Gen. 8:21). Here occurs the judgment of God himself concerning his own work (corrupted and polluted, by which is denoted not only the corruption of men, but universal corruption as much habitual of the heart, as actual of the thoughts; indeed from the very beginning of life born with us and continual). Nor if these things are said of the inhabitants of the first world are they to be understood exclusively of other men and their natural constitution. Yea, that hypothesis must be transferred to the thesis, and the same must be inferred of others because all in a state of sin have the same nature in them (without restraining or converting grace). This is evident most clearly from Gen. 8:21 where the same things are said no more of that ancient world (which he had destroyed by the avenging waters on account of its crimes), but of the new world which he was about to produce from the surviving offspring of Noah. Nor are actual sins so referred to as to prevent habitual sins from being joined with them because the things principiated cannot be corrupt without the principles themselves being also corrupt. Hence it is not only treated of evil actions and thoughts, but also of the evil figment of the heart (called by the Jews *ytsr hr'*, their usual term for original sin). On this account the more, it is not called evil only from some but for all time and even from infancy itself; for this *n'vrym* also signifies (cf. Lam. 3:27; Jer. 22:21; Ezk. 4:14; 16:22; Hos. 2:15), not only youth, as the Socinians wish. Reason favors it because it treats of the cause of the deluge in which infants also perished (to whom actual wickedness does not belong, yet who are punished without cause or unjustly). Therefore original depravity ought to be connoted with actual. To pretend that the Holy Spirit here by way of hyperbole exaggerates the crimes of the old world (not as if all were flagitious, but because the majority were corrupt) is to take for granted what must be proved. For hyperbole is admissible in the Scriptures only where the words taken literally are repugnant either to reason or sense or experience or to other parallel passages. But here all things are just the contrary.

(2) From Gen. 5:3. VIII. Second, the same thing is proved from Gen. 5:3 where Adam is said to have begotten Seth "after his image" (i.e., a corrupt one begat the same). Now he could not be corrupted in generation in any other way than by contracting original corruption. Here we must notice the antithesis between the image of God (after which Adam was formed, spoken of in Gen. 5:1) and the image of Adam (after which Seth was formed). As therefore the former morally designated both wisdom of mind and holiness of will, so from the opposition

the image of Adam ought to denote the inherent and hereditary corruption of his mind as well as of his will. The apostle expresses this in 1 Cor. 15:49 where he contrasts the image of the first and second Adam: the former, indeed, earthy and corruptible; the latter, however, celestial and incorruptible. To no purpose is this referred either to the physical and specific image of Adam or to a likeness in form, figure and external lineaments. In no other way ought the image (after which Adam begat his children) to be understood than in that in which it is taken when man is said to have been made after the image of God, not physically, but morally. However what need was there to relate distinctly (*diakritikōs*) with so emphatic an expression and a repeated word, what was certain of itself and common to man with the brutes? But there was a peculiar reason why he should state this concerning Seth rather than of Abel who was childless (*ateknos*); and of Cain to whom on account of his abominably wicked life this might seem to have been peculiar (viz., in order that the Holy Spirit might designate that the prerogative of the holy seed, whose head he ought to be, did not hinder his being corrupt by nature, as begotten in the likeness of corrupt Adam).

(3) From Job 14:4.

IX. Third, from Job 14:4—"Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? not one." Here purity is removed from all men (not even one being excepted), and uncleanness is ascribed to them (not simply external of the body, which can easily be taken away, but internal of the soul). The latter is inevitable, cannot be purged by nature and renders one liable to the judgment of God (Job 14:3); not actual only and transient, but permanent and hereditary, derived from the parent to the offspring (which can be no other than original sin, whatever is meant by the word *tm'*, whether "seed" or "man"). Nor is it an objection here that this uncleanness is not universal because Job elsewhere shows sufficiently that he was not such (Job 31). We answer that although he was not such through the grace by which he was born again, yet he was such by the nature from which he was begotten (or the uncleanness is comparative [like that attributed to the angels] not absolute). We answer that the discourse concerns such impurity as cannot bear the judgment of God, as is evident from the words immediately preceding. Now that impurity is simply sinful, not the comparative imperfection of one creature or essence with another. For God does not bring the latter into judgment, unless he would condemn his own work.

(4) From Ps. 51:5.

X. Fourth, from Ps. 51:5—"Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." David, by ascending from the consideration of actual sin committed by him to the first taint of evil, confesses before God that he was corrupt even from the womb and inclined to sin. Hence an invincible argument flows for original sin. One conceived in iniquity and nourished in sin cannot be without original sin. Nor does what Volkelius urges here with his associates (to escape the force of this passage) avail: either that David does not speak here of men in general, but only of himself; nor simply, but in reference to his fall. We answer that although he speaks of himself, why can it not be extended to others in the same condition who are in a similar manner conceived and born (as his birth was common to him with others, so also his native corruption)? Yea (from the greater) if David, a man after God's heart, was conceived in sin, how much more others? Or he speaks not of his own original sin, but of

the actual sin, either of his parents in common or principally of his mother in particular. We answer that it is certain that David makes confession of his own sin (whose pardon he seeks for himself, not of another's sin) as the whole connection clearly demonstrates (which would be entirely destroyed, if a leap was made to another's sin). Besides that, it is falsely supposed that his parents sinned in his generation (as if he was born in unlawful wedlock). Nor can the words be so distorted. The verb *chvllthy* ("I was conceived") cannot be referred to the parents' act of begetting, but to the formation of the begotten body in the womb. *Ychmthny* does not signify "to beget" or "to conceive" (which belongs to both parents), but "to be made warm" and "to be cherished" (which refers to the fetus already formed and warmed in sin).

(5) From Jn. 3:5.

XI. Fifth, all are by nature "flesh and born of the flesh" (Jn. 3:5, 6). For "except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh." Here is pointed out: (1) the necessity of a supernatural regeneration, which supposes natural generation to be corrupt; (2) the universality of corruption infecting all because all are flesh; (3) the universality of traduction (*traductionis*), while flesh is born of flesh. Nor can it be said that "flesh" here must be understood "physically" for frailty of nature. For although it is sometimes used in Scripture in that sense, yet it cannot be so taken here. Rather it is understood morally because he is speaking of flesh as opposed to spirit; also inasmuch as it has need of regeneration (i.e., of our unregenerate nature opposed to that as renewed) in which sense it is frequently taken. Again, physical frailty necessarily supposes moral corruption as its cause; hence it cannot be separated from it.

(6) From Eph. 2:3.

XII. Sixth, all (Jews as well as Gentiles) are "the children of wrath" (Eph. 2:3). "And we were by nature the children of wrath, even as others." Here are pointed out not only the actual sins by which they are said to "have fulfilled the desires of the flesh," but also original sin because they are called "children of wrath" (i.e., exposed to divine wrath not by imitation and custom, but by nature [*physei*] [not upright, but corrupt] to intimate that the evil is inherent from the womb and not only comes upon us after actual sins). Nor ought it to be said that we are called children of wrath because we are begotten of Adam, since he had already become a child of wrath on account of sin. He is not speaking of Adam but of his posterity—that they are the children of wrath by nature (which could not be said except they were already by nature sinners).

(7) From Rom. 5:12.

XIII. Seventh, "wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin" (Rom. 5:12). Here the apostle rises to the first taint of evil and unfolds the origin of sin and of death (to wit, the first sin of man which entered into the world [to wit, into men] both by imputation and by propagation). This the apostle proves from death (the necessary effect of sin) because it reigns over all: both external and temporal, internal and spiritual, and eternal —not only actual death, but also exposure and obligation to death. Nor can it be said to have passed by imitation (as Pelagius held) because it could not be said to have passed upon infants (for they are not capable of imitating). (2) Thus it ought to be known to all, while yet innumerable persons have heard nothing

about Adam. (3) It could no more be said to have passed by one man, than by the Devil (who is the father of sinners).

(8) From the necessity of death; of redemption; of regeneration; of circumcision; and baptism.

XIV. Eighth, various reasons prove the same thing. (1) The universal necessity of death imposed upon all, even upon infants. For if death reigns over all, sin ought necessarily to reign over them because that is its wages; nor can death be where sin is not. To recur here to a consequence of nature (as the Socinians wish, as if death was natural, not penal) is their radical error (*prōton pseudos*), confuted before by us in Topic V. (2) The necessity of redemption for all to be saved; there would be no need of redemption except upon the supposition of sin. (3) The necessity of regeneration without which no one can see the kingdom of God (Jn. 3:3). For why ought man to be renewed by regeneration unless he is naturally corrupt by generation? (4) The necessity of the sacrament to be administered to infants recently born, of circumcision in the old and of baptism in the new covenant (of which they would have no need at all unless, on account of the demerit and inherence of sin, they are both guilty and evil). Here belongs also the necessity of the purification prescribed to women in labor in the Old Testament (which could not have had place if there was no corruption and uncleanness connected with the generation of man). (5) The common law that everything begotten is like the begetter; as much as to species as with regard to the accidents belonging to the species. Generation is the communication not only of essence, but also of the qualities and accidents belonging to the species (as therefore a man generates a man, so a sinner can generate no other than a sinner). (6) Experience which teaches that depravity to be latent in infants themselves, even before the use of reason. Hence the proneness to lying, desire of revenge, love of excess, their little gloryings, amusing vanity and the like are so apparent in many that the parents can recognize in their children the image of their own native corruption and perverseness.

Sources of solution.

XV. What is involuntary by a positive volition cannot be sin; but what is not voluntary by a positive volition does not cease to be sin, provided it is contrary to the law (as was proved before). Although original sin is not voluntary in act, still it is in origin; in his will from whom it is, although not properly in his will in whom it is; inherently and subjectively because it adheres to the will and impairs it, although not elicitly because it is not drawn out by any act of the will; radically with regard to its principle, although not formally with regard to its exercise.

XVI. If innocence is at any time attributed to infants in Scripture (as Ps. 106:38; Jon. 4:11), this is not to be understood absolutely and in itself, as if they were destitute of all sin; otherwise neither would they be liable to death. Rather it is to be understood relatively as compared with adults who actually sin. The twins of whom Paul speaks in Rom. 9:11 had as yet done no good or evil, to form a distinction between them; but still they were both conceived in sin in the mass of corruption.

XVII. Although the law prohibits no one to be born with original sin because it supposes man to be holy, yet it condemns as illegality (*anomian*) the hereditary and inherent corruption of man (because it is opposed to that righteousness and holiness which the law demands from all).

XVIII. When Christ says that the man born blind had not sinned (Jn. 9:3), he does not absolutely assert that he was free from all sin (whose punishment this calamity of his was), but only comparatively denies that he sinned more than others that he was so afflicted; that his native blindness was the punishment of some special sin, either of the blind man himself (according to the false hypothesis of the Jews who supposed that infants in the womb could sin) or believed the Pythagorean metempsychosis (*metempsychōsin* or transmigration of souls) or of his parents (according to the doctrine taught in the Jewish schools that children were often born lame and deformed on account of the sins of their parents). Therefore Christ, in order that no singular and personal sin might be imputed either to the blind man himself or to his parents, says that this happened in order that the works of God might be manifested (i.e., that God willed by this example to make known his works of justice and power in punishing and his works of mercy and omnipotence in healing).

XIX. Although sin is pardoned in the parents, still nonetheless it can be transmitted to their posterity because the guilt being remitted, the taint always remains; if not wholly, at least in part. Hence as a circumcised person begets an uncircumcised, so a believer and renewed man begets a corrupt and unrenewed. He does not generate by grace, but by nature (as from a grain cleared of chaff is produced a grain with the chaff).

XX. The children of believers are holy (1 Cor. 7:14), not as to immunity from all sin (in which sense no mortal lives without sin, 1 Jn. 1:8), but as to communion with the church, from which those considered unholy and unclean are excluded. This holiness therefore is rather relative and federal than inherent. And although they may be called holy inherently, the truth of original sin is not on that account overthrown because that holiness would be a blessing of grace, not a privilege of nature. They do not have it from themselves or from their parents, but from the Spirit of Christ renewing believers.

XXI. Although the blessed virgin was truly "highly favored" (*kecharitōmenē*), loved and chosen by God above other women that she might conceive and bring forth the Son of God and may truly be called "mother of God" (*theotokos*), still that distinguished and evidently singular privilege by which she was raised to the highest degree of happiness did not hinder her from being conceived and born after the common manner of other mortals—in and with original sin. (1) That taint is in Scripture predicated of all men universally, no one but Christ excepted. He was not begotten in the ordinary way, but extraordinarily conceived by the Holy Spirit and sprang from Adam as the material principle only, not as the active principle. (2) She herself had need of a Savior, whom she celebrates as hers (Lk. 1:47). (3) She was bound to offer the sacrifices of the old law, which could not be done without the confession of sin. (4) The effects of that sin are found in her, as are actual sins. On account of this, we read that she was rebuked even by Christ (Jn. 2:4; Lk. 2:49; 8:19-21), calamity and trials (which are the fruits of sin) piercing through her soul (Lk. 2:35). How great were the contentions about this argument in the Romish church among the Dominicans, Franciscans and Jesuits. The latter asserted the immaculate conception of the blessed virgin; the former denyed it. This is known to everyone. The error seems to have arisen first from the Council of Lyons about the year 1136, from the excessive worship of the virgin (refuted by Bernard, "Letter 174" [PL 182.332-36] and the Scholastics

of that age). However, the controversy was more sharply renewed afterwards about the year 1300 and onward even until the year 1439 when the Council of Basil pronounced in favor of the Franciscans (Session 36, Mansi, 29:182-83). Sixtus IV afterwards confirmed this in the year 1476. It was approved by the Council of Trent and was at length sanctioned by a new bull from Alexander VII in the year 1661, so that it might after that be held as a doctrine of the church. He who desires more should consult the celebrated Heidegger ("Dissertatio 8*, De Conceptione B. Virginis Mariae," in *Dissertationum selectarum* [1675], 1:177-241), who has entered fully into the history of this controversy.

XXII. In the propagation of sin, an accident does not pass over from subject to subject. The immediate subject of sin is not the person, but human nature vitiated by the actual transgression of the person which, being communicated to posterity, this inherent corruption in it is also communicated. Therefore as in Adam, the person corrupted the nature; so in his posterity, the nature corrupts the person.

XXIII. Although the mode of the propagation of sin is obscure and difficult to explain, the propagation itself (which Scripture so clearly asserts and experience confirms) is not on that account to be denied. However what is to be thought of the mode of propagation will be discussed in a special question.

ELEVENTH QUESTION

Whether original sin has corrupted the very essence of the soul. Also whether it is a mere privation or a certain positive quality too.

I. There are two extremes to be equally avoided about the nature of original sin: (1) in excess, of those who think original sin is placed in the corruption of the very substance of the soul; (2) in defect, of those who wish it to consist in the mere want and privation of righteousness.

Error of Flacius Illyricus.

II. Flacius Illyricus defended the first error in a former age, the more strongly to oppose Victor Strigelius (his colleague) who extolled the free will of man in conversion and diminished corruption. Illyricus maintained that sin corrupted the very essence of man. Cyriacus Spangenberg followed him, with whom this monstrous opinion seems to have vanished. Hence not without calumny does Bellarmine attribute this error to those who have fought against it ("De Amissione Gratiae," 5.1 in *Opera* [1858], 4:182-83).

III. The orthodox constantly maintain that sin is to be distinguished from the substance itself, as an accident and vicious quality from its subject. (1) Every substance was created by God and in this sense is good (Gen. 1:31; 1 Tim. 4:4). (2) Scripture makes a distinction between nature and the sin adhering to it when it calls the latter "that which easily besets us" (*euperistaton*), "present with us" (*parakeimenon*), dwelling in us and a garment to be put off. (3) Thus it would follow that Christ in assuming our nature assumed also sin and corruption itself; and that man after his sanctification and resurrection is different from what he was before. (4) Sin cannot be predicated of man in the question What is it? (because it would be either a genus or species); but only in the question What is its quality?

IV. Whatever is *anomon* ("lawless" in the abstract) or *anomia* ("lawlessness") is really sin, but not forthwith what is called "lawless" (*anomon*) in the concrete because it has sin in itself. In this sense, human nature is called "lawless" (*anomos*); not that it is sin itself, but because having sin in itself it is well called "sinful."

V. A "new heart" is said to be made in us by regeneration not physically, but morally. The same substance which was corrupted by sin must be restored by grace. If it is said that "the old man" must be put off and "the new put on," nothing else is meant than that the corruption of sin (which is morally called "the old man" because he descends from old Adam) must be thrown aside by man in order that the work of regeneration (signified by "the new man") may be begun and carried forward. The same must be said of the other phrases connoting sin or grace, drawn from the substance itself of man. These are taken morally, not physically; nor so much in the abstract as in the concrete to express more powerfully the magnitude of our corruption.

VI. Original righteousness and sin are mutually opposed to each other, but the image of God is sometimes used more broadly (inasmuch as it is extended to the spiritual and immortal substance of the soul itself).

The opinion of papists concerning the nature of original sin. Opinion of the orthodox.

VII. The papists sin in defect who restrict the whole nature of original sin to the mere want or privation of original righteousness. They define corruption of nature by the loss alone of the supernatural gift without the access of any evil quality. Anselm and after him most of the Scholastics maintain this, and it is the more common opinion among the papists ("The Virginal Conception and Original Sin," 26* in *Anselm of Canterbury* [ed. J. Hopkins and H. Richardson, 1976], 3:176). Their design is to prove that man after the fall differs from man before the fall no more than a weak or sick from a strong and healthy man, a bound from a free man. They do this in order to establish the will free to good; that there is not so much impotency in it as a difficulty of acting rightly, especially as they make original righteousness supernatural. However we think two things are here necessarily included: first, the privation of original righteousness; second, the positing of the contrary habit of unrighteousness.

VIII. The reasons are: (1) Scripture describes that sin not only privatively (*sterētikōs*) and by way of negation (Rom. 3:23; 7:18; 1 Cor. 2:14; Eph. 4:18), but also positively (*thetikōs*) and by way of affirmation, when it calls it "flesh," "concupiscence," "the law of the members," "indwelling sin," "body of death," "old man," etc. (Jn. 3:6; Rom. 7:18, 20, 23, 24; Eph. 4:22).

IX. (2) In act and subjectively, it inheres in man and continually excites evil desires in him. In fact, it passes over to posterity by generation, which cannot be said of mere want or privation.

X. (3) Men are not only destitute of righteousness, but also full of unrighteousness; incapable of good, but also inclined to evil; turned away from God, as the immutable and eternal good, but also turned toward the creature and inclined to every vice. Disease and a bad disposition of body (producing pain) do not bespeak a mere privation of health, but also a disorder (*dyskrasian*) of the temperament and humors. As leprosy is not only the privation of pure blood, but also a corruption of it, so sin (which is compared to a disease) is not only the privation of

rectitude, but also positive corruption. It introduces a universal disorder (*ataxian*) into nature and all its faculties and is usually described by folly, blindness and ignorance in the mind; wickedness and contumacy or rebellion in the will; and disorder or hardness (*pōrōsin*) in the affections, by which man is not only averse from good, but also prone to every evil.

XI. (4) It is not only privatively opposed to original righteousness, but also contrarily as original unrighteousness (as among philosophers vices are opposed to virtues, not only as privations, but also as contrary habits).

XII. (5) The effects of original sin are not only privative, but also positive; not only sins of omission, but also of commission, which on that account demand a cause of the same kind. Hence sinners (before grace) are called "foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts" (Tit. 3:3). "Evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, false witness" (Mt. 15:19) are said to proceed out of the heart and the flesh is said "to lust against the Spirit" (Gal. 5:17).

XIII. (6) Not a few papists hold this opinion. Thomas Aquinas calls it "a corrupt habit in which there is something privative (viz., the privation of original righteousness) and something positive (viz., a disordered disposition of the parts of the soul)" (ST, I-II, Q. 82, Art. 1, p. 956). Cajetan on this place: "privation bespeaks negation in the aptly born subject; corruption, however, adds a positive contrary, founding that negation" (*Commentaria in Summam Theologicam Divi Thomae*, I-II, QQ. LXXI-CXIV [1948], p. 61 on I-II, Q. 82, Art. 1). Bellarmine attributes this opinion to Lombard, Henry (of Ghent), Gregory of Ariminum, whom moreover he charges with error and endeavors to refute ("De amissione gratiae," 5.15 in *Opera* [1858], 4:222-23).

XIV. A positive physically (in which sense being and good are convertible, and there is nothing positive which is not from God) differs from a positive morally and logically (which is affirmed of the subject in which it inheres, whether it is good or evil). Sin is called positive, not in the former, but in the latter sense. Thus it can have a positive cause not physically (because thus it is only a deficient cause), but logically and morally (because it introduces a positive quality).

XV. Original sin (not on this account) is not a vicious (*vitiosus*) habit because it is neither infused nor acquired. There are various innate habits, as appears from the example of conscience, original righteousness, the common notions about God and the difference between right and wrong.

XVI. Nothing prevents original sin from being a privation and at the same time a positive quality. Privation is not bare and simple (or of pure negation), but highly active and efficacious and of wicked disposition (which does not take away the subject itself, but by depriving it of the due rectitude, badly disposes and corrupts it; nor extinguishes the internal principles of action, but depraves them—as disease in the body and rottenness in an apple).

XVII. Further that hereditary taint corrupts not only the inferior part of the soul (or the sensitive, *to aisthētikon*), as the papists wish (for the purpose of favoring free will), but also the superior part (or the logical [*to logikon*], to wit, the intellect and the will). Hence blindness and ignorance of mind, rebellion and contumacy are attributed to the will, and the whole man is said to be altogether corrupt, so that he can neither know any truth nor do any good and so needs regeneration and sanctification, as to both parts of himself.

XVIII. The word "flesh" is sometimes taken strictly for the corruption of sensuality or of the body (as 2 Cor. 7:1); other times, it is taken broadly for the universal corruption of the soul extending to the mind itself. Hence mind (*phronēma*) is attributed to the flesh (Rom. 8:6). Heresies are called "works of the flesh" (which however are in the intellect) and heretics are said to be puffed up by their fleshly mind (Col. 2:18). In this sense, original sin is called "flesh."

XIX. Concupiscence is used either philosophically and means the same as concupiscible appetite; or theologically and popularly, in which sense evil propensities of the will belong to it. In this sense, the flesh is said "to lust against the Spirit" (Gal. 5:17). Original sin is defined by Augustine as "concupiscence" from which (as a bad and corrupt root and tree) corrupt branches and the worst fruit are produced.

XX. Now this concupiscence is sin not only in the unbelieving and unrenewed, but also in believers and the renewed (whatever the papists may assert, who hold that it can be called a weakness and disease of nature and a depravation, the effect of sin and the cause of sins, but deny that it has the relation of sin properly so called). This was sanctioned by the Council of Trent, Session 5, Canon 5: "If anyone denies that the guilt of original sin can be remitted through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, bestowed in baptism, or even asserts that all that which has the true and proper relation of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only nipped off and not imputed, let him be anathema" (Schroeder, p. 23). And a little further on: "This concupiscence, which the apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be sin, which is truly and properly sin in the renewed, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin. If anyone, however, thinks the contrary, let him be anathema" (ibid.).

XXI. Now although by regeneration we hold that the guilt and pollution of original sin is taken away as to dominion (because it is neither imputed to them anymore for condemnation, nor does it reign in them), yet we deny that it is absolutely taken away as to existence and whatever holds the relation of sin in it. Paul repeatedly gives to it the name of "sin" (Rom. 6; 7), as it cannot be referred to anything else than sin properly so called. He treats of the sin for which Christ was delivered, sin to which we are dead in baptism (Rom. 6:3) and crucified with Christ (Rom. 6:6), sin whose wages is death (Rom. 6:2, 6, 12, 23), sin which is repugnant to the law (Rom. 7:7), which works all manner of concupiscence (Rom. 7:8), and which becomes exceeding sinful and renders man carnal and sold under sin (Rom. 7:14); whose mind (*phronēma*) is enmity against God and is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be (Rom. 8:7), the cause and origin of all sins (Jam. 1:15). All this belongs to sin properly so called. Hence Augustine maintains concupiscence "to be both sin, because disobedience is in it against the domination of the mind, and the punishment of sin, because it is rendered to the merits of the disobedient, and the cause of sin, by the defection of the one consenting as also by the contagion of the guilty" (*Against Julian* 5.3* [FC 35:249; PL 44.787]).

XXII. Although concupiscence is said to "bring forth sin" (Jam. 1:15, i.e., actual, finished and external), it does not cease to be sin. On the contrary, it ought to be sin because the offspring is of the same nature with the parent; an evil effect necessarily argues an evil cause, as a tree is known by its fruits.

XXIII. It is one thing that there should be no condemnation in the renewed; another that they are worthy of condemnation and of hatred. The former Paul states in Rom. 8:1 because actual guilt is removed by the grace of justification, but not the latter. As long as sin remains in us (as it does until our death), so long does potential guilt remain (or the intrinsic merit of sin, by which he is really worthy of hatred and of condemnation in his own nature, although by the accident of grace he is not actually condemned).

Twelfth Question: The Propagation of Sin

How is original sin propagated from parents to their children?

The question concerning the mode of propagation difficult.

I. The wickedness of heretics and the eager curiosity of searching into all things started this question. The Pelagians have urged it the more strongly in order that from the difficulty of the propagation of sin they might the more easily deny its truth. So hard and difficult to explain did it seem to Augustine, that in unravelling it he never could satisfy himself. Hence, two modes of propagation being proposed, either that both are faulty when derived from man or that the one is corrupted in the other (as in an impure vase), he adds "which of these, however, is true I am more willing to learn than to say, and do not dare to teach what I am ignorant of" (*Against Julian* 5.4*.17 [FC 35:261; PL 44.794]). Therefore writing elsewhere, he goes so far as to say, we should the rather earnestly enquire how we may be freed from that evil by Christ than dispute how we may have drawn it from Adam; as the man who has fallen into a well ought not to be so anxious to know how he fell into it, as to ascertain the method of getting out of it (Letter 167, "To Jerome" [FC 30:33]).

To this it is answered: (1) generally that it is impure generation.

II. Now although in a question of the highest difficulty all difficulties cannot be removed, still such things can be brought forward from the word of God as can satisfy the humble mind so that we may firmly and indubitably hold the thing, although we cannot fully and clearly understand the mode. A twofold answer can be given to the proposed question, either general or special. First, generally, the mode of this propagation is the impure generation by which we are born corrupt and sinners from those who are corrupt and sinners. For as a man begets a man and a leper a leper, it ought not to seem strange for a sinner to beget a sinner also like himself. This both the nature and condition of all those generating demands (who beget a species similar to themselves, as to the substance and accidents of the species and the law of generation established by God, no less after the fall [Gen. 9:1] than before it) requires. As therefore before the fall God willed an upright nature to be propagated, so after the fall he willed a corrupt nature as the punishment of sin.

III. Thus sin is properly propagated neither in the soul nor in the body taken separately, but in the man because neither the soul nor the body apart, but man in Adam sinned so far as there was power in him (in the body with regard to substance, in the soul with regard to subsistence).

IV. Nor is it an objection that natural generation does not seem to be able to propagate what is moral. For that hereditary taint is so moral objectively that it does not cease to be natural originally because it is an inseparable attendant of the corrupt nature; just as original righteousness, which was moral, yet would have been propagated by natural generation, if man had persisted in integrity.

V. However although this mode of general propagation is evident and is sufficient for establishing the truth of the traduction of sin; whence since Julian sought through what chinks sin could have entered, since he does not sin who is born; he does not sin who begat; he does not sin who made—Augustine answers, "Why does he seek a concealed crack, when he has a wide open gate? By one man. . . . What does he seek further; what clearer; what more impressive?" (*On Marriage and Concupiscence* 2.28 [NPNF1, 5:302; PL 44.464]). Still because the importunity of our opponents is wont to attack this mode violently as impossible (because sin can neither pass by the soul, which is created by God and is not drawn from the body, nor by the body which is brute and incapable of sin), let us see what can be said here more particularly to untie the knot which they think cannot be loosed.

VI. Some have thought that the difficulty can be gotten rid of in no better way than by the traduction of the soul (which not a few of the ancients believed and Augustine himself seems occasionally to incline toward). Undoubtedly in this way, all difficulty would seem to be removed; but because (as we said before) this opinion is consonant neither with Scripture nor with sound reason and is pressed by great difficulties, we do not think recourse should be had to it.

VII. Others (as Lombard and most of the Scholastics) hold that the soul is vitiated by the body (*Sententiarum*, Bk. II, Dist. 31 [PL 192/2.724-26]). It is indeed created pure by God, but tainted by the body into which it is put (as when pure liquor poured into an unclean vessel is corrupted). But Bellarmine impugns this opinion on this ground especially, that it cannot be understood how flesh (which is a body) can corrupt the soul (which is a spirit) ("De amissione gratiae et statu peccati," 4.12 in *Opera* [1858], 4:168). And we must confess that so far, it is not satisfactory, if nothing further is added.

(2) Or specially, by three degrees of propagation of sin. (a) In conception from an unclean seed.

VIII. In order therefore to explain this mode in the best way possible, we hold three degrees of that propagation: (1) in the conception of the body from an unclean seed; (2) in the creation of the rational soul with the want of original righteousness; (3) in the constitution of the whole compound by the union of the soul with the body. The first is in the conception of the body from an unclean seed, for as is the material, such ought to be the product: "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?" (Job 14:4). "What is born of the flesh is flesh" (Jn. 3:6). Now although the body of itself is not the receptive (*dektikon*) subject of sin (so that it may be said to be in it consummately, formally and perfectly), yet there is nothing to prevent its being said to be in us inchoatively, dispositively and radically (as in the proper residence of the soul, soon to coalesce in the same person with the soul). The tinder of that sin is derived in the conception itself and is impressed upon the fetus through the vital and animal spirits (as children are want to draw from parents not only diseases themselves in act, as the gout and gravel, but their seeds and certain impressions which are the principals of those diseases).

(b) In the creation of the soul destitute of original righteousness.

IX. The second degree is in the creation of the soul. Although created without any stain by God, still it is not created with original righteousness like the soul of Adam, in the image of God, but with a want of it as a punishment of the first sin. So that we must here distinguish between a soul pure, impure and not pure. That is called "pure" which is furnished with the habit of holiness; "impure" which has the contrary habit of unrighteousness; "not pure" which, although having no good habit, still has no bad habit, but is simply created with natural faculties (such as it is supposed to be created by God after the fall because the image of God, once lost by sin, cannot anymore be restored except by the blessing of regeneration through the Holy Spirit).

X. Now although souls are created by God destitute of original righteousness, God cannot on that account be considered the author of sin. It is one thing to infuse impurity; another not to give the purity of which man has rendered himself unworthy in Adam. Nor is God bound to create pure souls; yea, he can most justly deprive them of such a gift as a punishment of the sin of Adam. This privation (although on the part of man culpable because it is a privation of due rectitude) still is not so with respect to God (because it is an act of vindicatory justice by which he avenges the first sin).

XI. Although souls were not in Adam as to origin of essence (because they are created by God), still they can rightly be said to have been in him as to origin of subsistence (inasmuch as they were to be joined with bodies as the constituent parts of those men who are the children of Adam and which in this respect are well considered guilty in Adam).

XII. Nor ought it to be considered unworthy of the divine goodness that the soul should be placed in a corrupt body. From the beginning, he sanctioned (by a certain and immovable law) that he would place a soul in every organized human body. This law ought not to have been abolished on account of the sin of man.

(c) In the union of the soul with the body.

XIII. The third degree of propagation is in the union of the soul with the body. For then what had been sin only initiatively and radically becomes such formally and consummately. As man by that union is constituted in his being, so also sin is filled up; not only privatively (by a want of righteousness), but also positively (by the position of the contrary habit of unrighteousness).

XIV. Now it ought not to seem surprising if the soul is corrupted by the body, since Scripture and experience testify that the sympathy (*sympatheian*) between the soul and body is so great that as the body is affected by the soul, so also in turn the soul is affected by the body. Hence the morals of the soul are said to follow the temperament of the body. And Scripture asserts that the soul is weighed down by the corrupt body: "Take heed to youselves, lest at any time your hearts be overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness, and cares of this life" (Lk. 21:34). "For the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things" (Wisd. 9:15).

XV. If, however, it is enquired how the soul (which is spiritual) can be corrupted by the body (which is a brute and material thing), the knot cannot be untied (as is done by some) saying that the soul needs an organized body and cannot operate

except through bodily organs. Thus if the organs are well disposed, the action of the soul becomes right, but if on the contrary they are corrupt and badly disposed, the operation of the soul is also corrupted. However this might avail to demonstrate the actual corruption of the operations of the soul, still not its habitual corruption (about which it is enquired). Thus original sin would not exist in the soul of infants, but would arise only when the soul began to operate through the body.

XVI. Far more fitly and truly do they speak who maintain that this is not brought about by any action of the body upon the soul (as if the body in acting and the soul in suffering were gradually depraved because original sin is of nature, not of action). Nor can the body rise beyond the sphere of its own activity so as to act upon a spirit immediately and physically; nor even by physical contact (as of liquor in a vessel), which cannot apply to an immaterial soul. Rather by the very strict connection of soul and body in one person, the intimate sympathy (*sympatheian*) of both, the mutual appetite for each other and the nice balancing (*rhopēn*) by which they embrace most closely and affect each other, and as the body tends towards the soul as its perfection and good, so the soul tends towards the body as its own proper domicile and organ of its actions; and as the soul communicates its affections to the body, so the body communicates its dispositions to the soul, whence also results the diversity of inclinations in different men.

XVII. This can be done the more easily because (since the soul is deprived of original righteousness) it can no longer govern the body and hold it in subjection (which it could easily do in the state of integrity); but the image of God having been lost (which principally bestowed preeminence [*hyperochēn*] upon it), the natural order is disturbed so that the flesh (which ought to obey) now commands, while the soul (which was made to govern) has now passed in some measure into the power of the other (subjected to the flesh and drawn downwards). Here not so much the order of nature as the law of divine justice, and its most just sanction is to be recognized, avenging by this evil of punishment that evil of criminality, by which our first parent willingly subverted the power of the spirit over the flesh.

XVIII. Now in this way God cannot be considered the author, but the avenger of sin. He is the author of the union as his own work; but not of the sin (another's fault). He unites the soul to the body to preserve the species; he joins the soul deprived of righteousness to a corrupt body for a punishment of sin. Nor is God the cause of the corruption, if in joining the soul to the body he carries out an established law of nature (from which man proceeds properly, but the sinner only accidentally).

XIX. However although all difficulty occuring in the explanation of this mode of propagation may not seem to be removed, still its truth (so clearly delivered in Scripture and confirmed by experience) must be retained with no less certainty. Nor if we cannot understand the how (*to pōs*), must we on that account deny the fact (*to hoti*) or call it in question. It is better here with Augustine to acknowledge this mode to be just (whatever it may be) and to confess that it is secret.

THIRTEENTH QUESTION
Actual sin and its various divisions.

What is actual sin?

I. Actual sin is the aberration from the law of God (in internal and external acts) proceeding from original sin as the effect from its cause, a river from the fountain and the second act from the first. Or according to others, a desire, word, deed or omission contrary to the law because it is performed as much by an omission of things to be done, as by a commission of things prohibited: either by the heart through the thoughts and unlawful desires; or by the mouth through impure words; or by work through wicked action. It is called "actual" not so much because it exists in act (because this belongs no less to original sin) as because it is in actions and not in habit.

Of how many kinds? (1) With respect to its object, against God and our neighbor.

II. As actual sins are manifold, so their divisions are various. In passing, we mark here the principal in which there seems to be any difficulty. (1) With respect to the object, against God and against our neighbors (under whom the man himself who sins is contained because he cannot sin against either God or his neighbor without sinning against himself). The former is committed against the first table of the law; the latter against the second. This, however, must be understood of the object taken materially and not formally because thus God alone is the proper object of sin (Ps. 51:4).

(2) With respect to form: into sins of commission and omission.

III. (2) With respect to form, first into sins of commission and sins of omission. By the latter, the good commanded is omitted; by the former, a forbidden evil is committed. Now although each is placed in privation, yet they do not cease to be mutually distinguished because the sin of commission is against negative precepts and that of omission against affirmative precepts. In the former, the substance of the act is not taken away, but only its actual goodness; in the latter, the very substance of the act is taken away. The former is immediately in the action (which is without the due virtue); the latter, however, in the faculty itself (by which man ought to have operated). Now although the omission of a prescribed act is not an act (and so neither seems to be actual sin), still it is properly so called. (a) Directly and univocally, while it is connected with an internal act of the mind and will by which the sinner meditates and wills the omission of an external act (Jam. 2:15, 16). (b) Analogically and remotely, inasmuch as it is conducted back to some antecedent act which may be either the cause or the occasion or the impediment of the omitted act (as excessive drinking is the cause of neglect of divine worship) which therefore is referred to it. (c) If a sin of omission is not an actual sin naturally, still it is such morally inasmuch as on account of that omission man opposes the law and contracts guilt.

Sin of itself and accidental.

IV. Second, one sin is of itself, another accidental: the former as to substance or such as to act (which of itself is prohibited by the law, when either the prohibited act is done or the commanded act is omitted); the latter as to

the mode (when an act otherwise good is performed badly). The former is found in acts of themselves evil and forbidden by the law; the latter however in acts good in themselves, but not well done. Thus the works of piety and justice of believers are of themselves good, but accidentally become sins when they are not performed in the way which God commands. It is faulty either with regard to principle (if they do not spring from a heart purified by faith) or with regard to the end (when they are not referred to the glory of God) or with regard to the mode (when they are not exercised sincerely and honestly). Here belong the virtues of the Gentiles which, although they may have been good as to substance of act, yet were vicious as to manner and nothing else than "splendid sins."

(3) With respect to principle: into sins of ignorance and knowledge.

V. (3) With respect to principle, into sins of ignorance or of knowledge. Now this ignorance is not to be understood broadly for every sin arises from ignorance since the will cannot seek evil as evil, but under the idea of good (rather false and apparent), it cannot but suppose error in the mind. Hence Scripture calls all sinners fools and senseless (*anoētous*) and designates sins errors (*agnoēmata*, Heb. 9:7). Rather it is to be understood strictly to denote the special ignorance which prevails in the one sinning, such as was the sin of Paul who is said to have sinned ignorantly (1 Tim. 1:13) and of the Jews who are said to have crucified Christ "through ignorance" (*di' agnoian*).

VI. Again, the ignorance called sin is not of mere negation (which is rather nescience [*nescientia*] than ignorance), nor is it usually considered criminal (when anyone is ignorant of what he is not bound to know); rather it is of depraved disposition or privative and culpable (which puts away the thought which ought to be in man). Not ignorance altogether invincible and involuntary (when anyone is ignorant of what he cannot know, however he may wish, because the object is not revealed to him), but conquerable and induced (when anyone is ignorant of what he can know if he wishes); not so much of deed and person (as he who kills a man thinking him to be a wild beast) as of right (when anyone is ignorant of what he is in duty bound to know).

VII. Sin against knowledge is committed by those knowing, as the sin of the wicked servant who knows the will of his master (Lk. 12:47). This again is twofold: either against knowledge judging evidently and distinctly and more from a contempt of God and the divine law than from any passion or perturbation of mind (belonging to the unrenewed and to those who are said to "sin willfully [*hekousiōs*] after they have received the knowledge of the truth," Heb. 10:26); or against knowledge judging from passion and perturbation; or from fear and weakness and not from a resolute contempt of the law or of God (such as belongs even to the renewed).

VIII. A sin of ignorance denies all knowledge, both theoretical and practical. But a sin against knowledge does not deny indeed theoretical knowledge, but has not practical knowledge. A sin against conscience has theoretical and practical knowledge, but absolute not comparative.

Sins of weakness and of depravity.

IX. Sin is either of weakness or of depravity; either wholly voluntary or relatively involuntary. In the Old Testament, sins committed through "error and weakness" (*bshggh*, Num. 15:25) are distinguished from those com-

mitted "presumptuously" (*bydh rmh*, Num. 15:30), when the sinner adds to the evil he perpetrates, contumacy and pride, by which he sins with full consent and deliberate wickedness and glories in his sin. So errors and secret sins (Ps. 19:13) are distinguished from "presumptuous," i.e., sins of obstinacy and open rebellion. Paul (speaking of himself) says "the evil which I would not, that I do" (Rom. 7:19); but elsewhere he speaks of those "who sin wilfully" (*hekousiōs*, Heb. 10:26).

Sins of weakness. X. Thus a "sin of weakness" and voluntary is one which arises from ignorance, subreption or any great passion suddenly distorting the judgment (such as the fear of death) even with a struggle or resistance, but ineffectual on account of passion or temptation. Or it is one which is done without any certain purpose of committing it (which appears in the daily sins of the renewed).

Sins of depravity. XI. However a "sin of depravity" is that which is committed not from ignorance or weakness or fear, but from wickedness and contumacy and with a purpose of commiting it. Either it is only actual, arising from some more vehement passion, oppressing as it were the judgment of the reason and driving the man astray (which happens even in the renewed); or it is habitual and actual at the same time, since it is committed not with resistance and struggling but with a deliberate and full consent of the mind against the knowledge of the truth (such as the sin of those who are said by the apostle to sin wilfully [*hekousiōs*, Heb. 10:26], not broadly, but strictly and most properly—it is observed in most apostates and especially in those who sin against the Holy Spirit, of which afterwards).

(4) With respect to the adjuncts: indwelling and reigning sin. XII. (4) With respect to the adjuncts, one is indwelling only; another reigning. The former the sinner resists both in the act itself and beyond it (although he yields to it on account of weakness which does not take place without some struggling, either antecedent or concomitant or subsequent, as is the case with the people of God). The latter, however, occurs without struggling, and the sinner in every way serves, both antecedently (by a propension or purpose actual and habitual) and consequently; partly through delight, partly through a continuation of the sinful act (such as is found in those whom Christ calls the servants of sin [Jn. 8:34] and who are said to "commit sin" [1 Jn. 3:8]—who, namely, practice the art of sinning, and of whom this is, as it were, a continuous work [*ergon*]).

XIII. The kingdom of sin is either absolute and total (as to state) or partial and comparative (as to act). The former belongs to the unregenerate alone; but the latter sometimes belongs to believers themselves when they fall into grievious sins and for some time continue in them (as was the case with David, Solomon and others).

Pardonable and unpardonable. XIV. Second, one is pardonable; another unpardonable. The former can be remitted by the grace of God, but the latter neither obtains nor can obtain pardon by justice (as is final impenitency common to all reprobates, and especially the sin against the Holy Spirit, which is described as unpardonable above all others, to which pardon is never granted, nor indeed can be granted). Of this the following question treats. The distinction of venial and mortal sins has been thoroughly discussed before.

FOURTEENTH QUESTION

In what consists the formal reason of the sin against the Holy Spirit? Also why is it unpardonable?

Statement of the question.

I. The question is not whether there is any sin said to be particularly against the Holy Spirit. This is so clear from Scripture that we can have no doubt of it. Christ expressly mentions the "sin and blasphemy against the Holy Ghost" (Mt. 12:31; Mk. 3:29, 30). John speaks of a "sin unto death" (1 Jn. 5:16) for which we are not to pray, which can be no other than a sin against the Holy Spirit. But what is its nature, the opinions of theologians vary. Augustine says, "No greater and more difficult question is found in Scripture" (Sermon 71, "De Verbis Domini [11]," *PL* 38.449).

Why called "the sin against the Holy Spirit"?

II. When the Holy Spirit is said to be the object of this sin, he is not taken so much hypostatically (*hypostatikōs*, with regard to person), as energetically (*energētikōs*, with regard to office and operation). For as there is a common essence to the three divine persons, so there is an "undivided dignity" (*ameristos axia*), as Athanasius expresses it (*De Communi Essentia Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti*, PG 28.39-40); so that one separated from the others can be neither offended nor glorified. It is true that in the economy of salvation there are peculiar operations belonging to the individual persons by appropriation: as to the Son, redemption; to the Holy Spirit, illumination. Hence the sins more specially committed against the operation of the Son or of the Holy Spirit are said to be committed against the Son or the Holy Spirit (to wit, by reason of their operation).

In what it does not consist.

III. This sin cannot be said to consist simply in final impenitency (as Augustine held) because all reprobates die in it, who nevertheless cannot be said to sin against the Holy Spirit. Much less can it be made to consist of six species (as many papists maintain): presumption, desperation, resistance to recognized truth, hatred of fraternal grace, obstinacy and impenitency. Scripture makes this sin of one species, nor ought either the parts of any sin or the degrees and dispositions to it to be changed into species of it.

In what it does consist.

IV. We say it is a universal apostasy from true Christianity or of the truth of the gospel (of which one is convicted in his conscience); a total and persevering denial, hatred and resistance (whether sophistical or tyrannical) proceeding not from a common human weakness, but from special and deliberate wickedness and direct, diabolical hatred of it, joined with a contempt for all the means of salvation and final impenitency.

The first mark: opposition to gospel verity.

V. Hence it is evident that there are various characteristics of this sin. First, that it be committed against the knowledge of the truth not only legal, but especially gospel; not only theoretical and historical (for whoever sins against knowledge would sin against the Holy Spirit), but practical and convictive (although not persuasive). Conviction is when anyone

not only knows the truth of the gospel, but is also convinced in his own mind of its goodness, so that he cannot even mutter against it (although he may wish to). Persuasion is when anyone is so persuaded that not only is he not able to contradict, but he does not even wish to do so. Therefore, they who sin from ignorance (as Paul, when he blasphemed Christ and persecuted the church, and the Jews who crucified Christ) did not sin against the Holy Spirit because they acted through ignorance (*di' agnoian*) and without conviction.

VI. That it may more clearly appear what knowledge is here required and how it differs from the saving knowledge of believers, we must distinguish the threefold judgment of the practical intellect: (1) absolute and simple; (2) first comparative; (3) last comparative called the last practical. For as objects under various respects are represented to the intellect and with various circumstances (which are wont to vary the thing exceedingly), so it is accustomed to form diverse judgments, now absolute (if the thing is considered simply and in itself or *in thesi*), now comparative (if compared with others *in hypothesi*). However, a comparison can be made in various ways. Hence the comparative judgment can be manifold: one prior, another posterior. Since, therefore, the will in execution of the thing usually follows the last practical judgment of the intellect, hence the known and apprehended truth can be rejected not only by the absolute but also by the comparative practical judgment (provided it be not the last). Therefore they who sin against the Holy Spirit differ from believers in this—that they have indeed some comparative practical knowledge, but not the last (which necessarily draws the will after it to sanctification, such as is in the regenerated whom the Holy Spirit so enlightens that although there is often a severe struggle in the intellect, still at last the practical saving knowledge, being produced by invincible and irresistible grace, gains the victory).

VII. Again, the light of the Holy Spirit can be conceived as fourfold: (1) merely theoretical and instructing, consisting in illumination; (2) restraining; (3) convincing; (4) converting and sanctifying. The theoretical light enlightens the minds of hypocrites; the restraining affects the mind of the temporary (*proskairōn*) to abstain from more gross sins and retain some moral honesty (at least external); the convincing penetrates the hearts of those sinning against the Holy Spirit and convinces them of the truth and goodness of the gospel proposed to them (various motives being added by which they should be impelled to embrace it). But the persuading and converting light is given to believers alone and extends so far as not only to pour into their minds some theoretical knowledge, not only to restrain the affections raging within and to repress them within certain limits of external morality, not only to convince of that saving truth, but also to persuade them intimately and by leading to true holiness to fill them with solid consolation.

VIII. If it is inquired whence arises the diversity of this knowledge which is convictive, not persuasive, the reason can be drawn from the different relation (*schesei*) under which the gospel is presented to the minds of men: under the idea either of virtuous or useful or pleasant good. In believers, the idea of the virtuous good prevails (to wit, an intimate sense of the mercy of God in the pardon of sins and in the grace of sanctification). But in others, the idea of useful or pleasant good prevails. They apprehend the gospel and follow it for a time, either as a pleasant and delightful good, alluring the minds of men to itself either by novelty or by sweetness and liberty or as a certain admirableness of the doctrines them-

selves and that which diffuses an unaccustomed pleasure (whence they are said to receive the word with joy [*meta charas*, Mt. 13:20]); or they regard it as a good useful and suitable to themselves which can bring to them some remarkable good in this life. But they do not rise to the relation of the true and saving good, consisting in communion with God through holiness and eternal happiness. For so great is its efficacy towards guilty and miserable man that he who once rightly apprehends it under this relation (*schesei*) cannot help immediately embracing and constantly retaining it.

The second mark: total defection from the truth.

IX. Second, to constitute this sin is required a total defection from the truth and its wicked rejection and denial; not from fear simply and the weakness of the flesh, as he who denies Christ through fear of death or some terrible impending evil or burns incense to idols (as Peter denied Christ and many in the ancient church departed from the faith [and even now in our day depart] through fear of losing their lives or the power and dignities they enjoy); not from desire of gain and the hope of increasing their fortunes (like Demas who loved the present world and those temporary ones [*proskairoi*] in whom the deceitfulness of riches and the cares of the world choke the good seed). For these sin altogether more grieviously and are far more inexcusable than others (who deny through fear) and come nearer the sin which we treat. Hence as their repentance is usually rarer, so they with more difficulty obtain the pardon of their sin. Still it is not absolutely impossible (*ek tōn adynatōn*). For although this sin partakes of not so great a degree of involuntariness (*akousiou*), as is observed in that arising from fear, still it always has some degree of it. Indeed, that desire by which man is enticed and which is not without some perturbation, seems to bring a certain violence to the reason and to extinguish its light. Hence that sin does not seem to be committed voluntarily (*hekousiōs*) altogether. It remains therefore that that denial of the truth should proceed from pure wickedness and petulance (arising from deadly hatred and obstinate contempt of it).

X. I say that hatred and contempt of the truth has place here because what we are most averse to and hold in contempt, we are accustomed to reject and put away from as much as we can. And concerning contempt indeed there seems to be no obscurity: for if they would properly value the gospel in proportion to its worth, they never could be induced to reject it. Therefore their rejection and denial proceed from their despising and considering it of no worth. Here belongs what Paul says of "trampling under foot the Son of God, and counting his blood an unholy thing" (Heb. 10:29), which could not be done without intolerable contempt. The example of Esau proves the same thing. He is usually set forth as a type of those sins whose criminality is placed in this—that he sold the right of primogeniture for a mess of pottage (to wit, considering it of no value). The gospel seems to them not only as a thing of no value and most vile, but also as a most troublesome and infamous thing; thus opposed to their affections and worthy of hatred. Hence it happens that hatred is joined with contempt from which opposition and persecution of the gospel arises (which is also contained in this sin). We are accustomed to persecute and contend against no other things than those we are averse to. Here belongs the example of the Pharisees whom Christ charged with the sin against the Holy Ghost because from bitter hatred of him they boldly

rejected his doctrine and miracles and persecuted his person. The very word "blasphemy" (by which it is usually designated) necessarily implies this; also the word "despite" (*hybreōs*) by which the apostle expresses insult offered to the Holy Spirit (Heb. 10:29) and which draws after it the bitterest hatred and detestation.

Third mark: a pertinacious assault upon it.

XI. The third mark is not only the denial of the recognized truth, but also a pertinacious opposition to it. For as they persecute it with the deepest hatred, it is no wonder that they endeavor with all their might to overturn it (whether artfully by sophistical pursuit or martially by tyrannical persecution). This is evident in the Pharisees, the philosopher Porphyry, Julian the Apostate and others guilty of this sin. Here belongs what is related of Julian by Theodoret, namely, that he, wounded by a cavalry spear in the midst of his own men, threw a handful of blood towards heaven with these blasphemous words against Christ: "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean" (*Ecclesiastical History* 3.20 [NPNF2, 3:106; PG 82.1119]).

Fourth: final impenitency.

XII. Finally, the fourth mark is stubborness of mind and perseverance in wickedness even unto the end. These words of Athanasius pertain to this: "God has not said, pardon is not granted to the blasphemer repenting, but to the blasphemer (viz., persevering in blasphemy)" (*Quaestiones ad Antiochum ducem*, Q. 72* [PG 28.643]). This reason impelled Augustine to make the essence of this sin to consist in final impenitency, which although it cannot be admitted to the full extent (because this is common to it with all the sins of reprobates), still there is no doubt that it is included in this sin.

Whence arises the unpardonableness?

XIII. And hence the unpardonableness of that sin, which is its inseparable adjunct. This is intimated by Matthew when he asserts that blasphemy against the Holy Ghost "shall not be forgiven, neither in this world, neither in the world to come" (Mt. 12:31, 32), i.e., "never forever" (as Mark interprets, 3:29). And for this reason peculiarly it is called a "sin unto death" (1 Jn. 5:16, 17), not only because it deserves death in its own nature (for so all sins are unto death), not only because it is unpardoned and at last is actually punished with death (which is the case with all the sins of reprobates), but because it is such as to be absolutely unpardonable in itself.

XIV. This unpardonableness, however, is not only comparative and relative because it is pardoned with great difficulty (as Bellarmine maintains, "De Sacramento Poenitentiae," 2.16 in *Opera* [1858], 3:662-66 and Gregory of Valencia, *Commentariorum theologicorum*, Disp. I, Q. 14 [1603-09], 3:427-32 following Thomas Aquinas, [ST, II*-II, Q. 14, pp. 1233-37] who although holding it to be unpardonable on its own part, yet thinks that God can pardon it), but absolute and simple, not only what is never actually pardoned, but what absolutely cannot be pardoned by God.

XV. Now this unpardonableness does not arise from a defect in either the mercy of God or the merit of Christ (as if the former were not immeasurable or the latter of infinite worth and value). Rather it rises from the very nature of the sin, which is such that it excludes the very condition requisite to pardon (viz., repentance—"for it is impossible for those to be renewed again unto repentance," Heb. 6:6). For as no one is excluded from pardon who repents, so he who cannot be

renewed again unto repentance, cannot obtain pardon. If indeed you ask, Why is repentance of such a sin impossible? the answer is easy. It depends both upon the greatness of the sin itself (which rejects the only principle of repentance, i.e., the Spirit of grace) and upon the will of God itself who, according to the order established in the dispensation of salvation, cannot bestow the grace necessary to it. For since the one only sacrifice of Christ has been appointed by God for the expiation of sins and regeneration is solely one through the Holy Spirit, he (who once rejects both benefits, as is done by those sinning against the Holy Spirit) can have no other means by which he can either obtain remission or be renewed again unto repentance. And the apostle intimates this when he charges this double crime upon apostates (that "they tread under foot the Son of God and do despite unto the Spirit of grace," Heb. 10:29); hence he teaches that they reject both the power of Christ's sacrifice and the efficacy of the Spirit. On this account, he asserts that there remaineth no more sacrifice for them and no hope of pardon (which is founded only on the oblation of sacrifice), just as his disease is desperate who rejects all the remedies by which he can be cured and attacks the physician himself. Here belongs what the apostle says in the same epistle: "It is impossible to renew them again unto repentance, seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God, and put him to an open shame" (Heb. 6:6). Exceeding their furlough and boldly rejecting the sacrifice of Christ, they must seek some other propitiatory (*hilastikon*) sacrifice by which to be saved. Since there is none apart from Christ, there would be a necessity for Christ to be crucified again and exposed to ignominy. As this is impossible, it is equally impossible for them to be renewed unto repentance.

XVI. This will be made still clearer from the diversity of operations belonging to the particular persons in the economy of salvation. For as the Father supports the majesty of offended deity and is the guardian and vindicator of the enacted laws; the Son holds the place of Mediator and Surety (who made satisfaction for our sins); and the Holy Spirit sustains the part of sanctifier (who puts the finishing stroke to the work of salvation by bringing us to Christ, and by Christ to the Father). Thus he who has violated the laws of the Father can have a remedy in the satisfaction of the Son; he who has injured the person of the Son and the dignity of his satisfaction by unbelief and ignorance, some hope remains for him in the grace of the Spirit (who can cure his ignorance and correct his unbelief). But he who despises the Holy Spirit and rejects his operation, for him there remains no more any source of hope because there is no other divine person who can help him (and the operation of the Spirit is the last in the business of salvation, after which no other help of grace can be expected).

XVII. Where sin abounds, grace much more abounds (if man has recourse to it in faith and repentance); but if the sinner obstinately rejects that grace, it cannot exert its power over him. Christ heals every disease in the people, but on the basis of all the conditions being complied with (to wit, in those who do not impudently reject the physician).

XVIII. This sin belongs to no one of God's elect, whose salvation is sure, both on account of the immutability of election and the eternity of God's love (Mt. 24:24; 2 Tim. 2:19); and because through the intercession of Christ (Jn. 17:20) and the perpetual protection of God (1 Pet. 1:5) and the Spirit's blessing of regeneration, they are kept free from reigning sin so that they neither commit nor can commit the sin which is unto death (1 Jn. 3:9). Nor if the apostates (of whom

Paul speaks in Heb. 6:4, 5) are said to "have been sanctified," "to have tasted the good word of God" and "the powers of the world to come," does it follow that they had been true believers. They are called "sanctified" rather sacramentally and externally, than internally and spiritually. Having been received into the church through the sacrament of baptism (called by way of metonymy "the blood of the covenant," as its seal), they were considered no longer heathen and unclean —as they were called "sanctified" who were sprinkled with the blood of bulls (Heb. 9:13). So they are said to "have tasted the good word of God" with the lip and superficially, not intimately and radically; and "the powers of the world to come," i.e., not the sweets of paradise, the firstfruits of eternal life, but the powers of miracles and extraordinary gifts which were then conferred upon the church (which is called "the world to come," Heb. 2:5).

XIX. However although this sin belongs to reprobates alone, still not to all. Rather it belongs to those only who, from hatred and determined wickedness, reject and oppose the truth of God offered to them, of which they are sufficiently convinced with themselves—either tyrannically, as Julian, or sophistically, as Porphyry. Now although it is certain that it is principally committed under the gospel (because a far more full light shines upon men), still it could also occur under the law and in those who have not yet professed the truth. Thus three degrees of it may be constituted. The first, in those who trampled under foot the doctrine of Moses as deadly and with determined mind rejected it: as those who are said to have sinned with "uplifted hand" and "through pride" and grieved the Spirit of holiness (Is. 63:10). The second, in the Scribes and Pharisees, who although they would not receive the gospel, still with settled malice persecuted Christ and his doctrine and miracles as diabolical (Mt. 12:24). Although indeed they are said not to have known Christ ("for if they had known, they would not have crucified him," 1 Cor. 2:8), this must be understood of a practical and saving knowledge, not of a theoretical and historical because what they did know, they maliciously denied and detested. The third is in those who once having professed the gospel, afterwards against the light of the Spirit by which they were convinced of its excellence and sweetness, from hatred and obstinacy despise and designedly proclaim war against it, trampling under foot the Son of God and his blood; and thus reject the whole covenant of God (which exactly fits the notorious apostates mentioned by Paul, Heb. 6 and 10).

XX. This wickedness is not to be rashly charged upon anyone and can more easily be defined in the abstract than explained in the concrete—both on account of our ignorance of internal principles and acts and on account of the different seasons of calling grace. We cannot indeed deny that it is cognizable because it is described in Scripture with all its circumstances and because if this were not the case Scripture would not have prohibited us from praying for such persons. However that knowledge is either divine (made by a revelation from God) and extraordinary by the gifts of the trying of spirits (which obtained in the apostolic church); or it is human, arising from effects and circumstances. The former has now ceased; the other still remains. And as it is ascertained only from external signs (from which a knowledge of it cannot be infallibly obtained), therefore we must proceed very cautiously and be more prone to cherish a good hope in charity than to condemn rigorously.

FIFTEENTH QUESTION
Whether sin can be the punishment of sin. We affirm.

I. The ancient Pelagians stirred up the question, strenuously denying sin to be the punishment of sin, both to establish the bare and idle permission of God in reference to sin and to prove that original sin is not properly a sin, but only a punishment of an antecedent sin, a defect and weakness of nature (*cf.* Augustine, *Against Julian* 3.3 [FC 35:112-14]). The Jesuits, Socinians and Remonstrants of our day follow them. With them, some of our men agree, denying the imputation of the first sin. They do this the more easily to deduce thence that inherent original sin is not the punishment of that first sin, as is commonly asserted by the orthodox.

Statement of the question.

II. The question is not whether sin formally and reduplicatively as sin and in relation to the law which it opposes, is punishment. For thus it is a base evil contrary to the law. Rather the question is whether sin considered materially and specifically (i.e., that which is sin by reason of the act lying under and in relation to the subject which it corrupts) can be punishment. This our opponents deny; the orthodox affirm.

III. Sin, however, can be called punishment in three ways: either with respect to itself; or with respect to the antecedent sin in him who is punished; or with respect to another's sin. (1) It is the punishment of itself; as virtue is its own best reward, so sin is the punishment of itself. Hence Augustine: "Thou, O Lord, hast commanded, and so it is, that every disordered mind should be its own punishment" (*Confessions* 1.12 [FC 21:20; PL 32.670]). It is an accident disagreeing with the subject and hurtful, bringing the greatest loss to the creature by separating it from God our highest good and depriving it of holiness (the best part of our happiness) and most foully branding man's conscience (by which he is rendered not only wicked, but also miserable). (2) It is the punishment of preceding sin, as the idolatry of the heathen is punished by the abominable lusts to which they are delivered (Rom. 1:24-27). (3) On account of another's sin, as the sin of David is punished by the incest of Absalom.

Proof that sin is the punishment of sin: (1) from 2 S. 12:11, 12.

IV. That sin is rightly called the punishment of sin is proved: (1) Scripture expressly establishes this—the incest of Absalom is put forward as a punishment of David sent by God: "Thus saith the Lord, Behold, I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house, and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbor, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun. For thou didst it secretly: but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the sun" (2 S. 12:11, 12). Nor can it be objected that "there was nothing penal here, only a bare permission and that the incest itself was not punishment formally." We answer that the punishment of David ought to be a public disgrace and loss inflicted upon him before the sun and all Israel, and it was a pollution of David's bed. Now the divine permission was neither formally a detriment to David, nor made publicly before the sun, but secretly in the impure heart of Absalom. Again God does not threaten David with that permission as a punishment, but with a permitted thing, namely, the injury and disgrace of a polluted

bed. For these words contain a just proportion from the law of retaliation (*lex talionis*) between sin and punishment: Thou hast violated the only wife of an innocent man; I will deliver up your many wives to be violated. Thou secretly and unknown to Israel and with this married woman hast committed adultery; I will punish you openly before the sun and Israel (as witnesses). Thou hast injured thy neighbor by adultery; I wish to inflict upon you the punishment of incest. Now there would have been no punishment here if that punishment had consisted in a bare permission.

(2) From Rom. 1:24-26.

V. Second, from Rom. 1:24-27 where God, as a punishment of the idolatry of the Gentiles, is said to have given them up to foul lusts and to a reprobate mind (*dia touto paredōken autous ho Theos*): "for this cause" (viz., on account of idolatry spoken of in v. 25) "God gave them up unto vile affections . . . receiving in themselves that recompense (*antimisthian*) of their error which was meet." Thus I infer: this change of the natural use of their bodies into vile lust against nature is a just recompense (*antimisthia*) for the idolatrous change of the glory of God into the glory of the creature and of the truth of God into a lie; this is sin and at the same time the punishment of their sin. Now this "impurity" (*akatharsia*) and "shamelessness" (*aschēmosynē*) (foul sin) is called the "recompense" (*antimisthia*) of the preceding wickedness. Similar to this is the other passage where God is said "to have sent them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness" (2 Thess. 2:11, 12*). For what God inflicts upon men because they have not received the love of the truth (that not believing the truth they might be condemned) must be penal. Nor can it be said that such sins are called punishment by a metonymy of the cause because they are deserving of greater punishment (as Arminius wishes). It is one thing to deserve a new punishment; quite another to be itself punishment and the just recompense of crime (which is here said of the crimes of the Gentiles).

(3) From 1 K. 22:20.

VI. Third, from the lying spirit in the mouths of the false prophets and the lie which Ahab believed for undertaking an unjust war, was a most grievous sin. Still it was a punishment sent by God to destroy him: "And the Lord said, who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-Gilead?" (1 K. 22:20). "Now therefore, behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets, and the Lord hath spoken evil concerning thee" (v. 23). These words are so clear as to have extorted even from Vorstius unwillingly the confession of truth. "This discourse is of a judicial, or if you prefer, of a certain penal action of God punishing, and that too rare and extraordinary, which always argues the consequent will of God, by which he permitted the impious king to be deceived and suffer merited and severe punishment; yea in some measure cursed him" (*Amica duplicatio ad Iohannis Piscatoris . . . Apologeticam* 3 [1617], p. 179).

(4) From the passages which join sin and punishment together.

VII. Fourth, from the other passages of Scripture which have the relation of sin and punishment. The defection of the ten tribes was undoubtedly a heavy sin, but at the same time a punishment of Solomon's idolatry (1 K. 11:31, 33). The oppression of the nation by the Assyrians and

Chaldeans was a grevious sin on the part of the enemies of the people of God (Is. 10:7; 14:3; Jer. 50:6-8); yet the same on the part of God was a punishment of the defection and idolatry of the people (Is. 7:17, 18; 39:6-8; Jer. 1:12-14). The suicide (*autocheiria*) of Judas was a dreadful crime and at the same time a just punishment of the betrayal of the Savior. The same can be said of the hardening of Pharaoh (Ex. 4:21), the numbering of the people (2 S. 24:1) and the blinding of the Jews (Is. 6:10; Jn. 12:40; 9:39). Augustine collects many passages of this kind in which sins are enumerated which are also punishments. "Is not sin the punishment of sin when we read 'The Lord sent upon them a spirit of error'? . . . Is not sin also the punishment of sin when God says by the prophet, 'O Lord, why hast thou made us to err from thy ways?' (Is. 63:17) . . . Is not sin also the punishment of sin, when we read of the nations whom Joshua destroyed 'because it was of the Lord to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly' (Jos. 11:20)? Many others we might enumerate in which it plainly appears that by a secret judgment, perversity of heart took place, so that he should not hear the truth spoken, and thence sin, and sin itself be the punishment of preceding sin" (*Against Julian* 5.3 [FC 35:253-54; PL 44.790]).

VIII. Fifth, because God (as a punishment for transgression of the law) does not denounce only calamities and troubles which are simple punishments, but also various sins (viz., blindness of mind, hardening and the like, Dt. 28:28, 29; Lev. 26:14-33), which are mixed punishments.

IX. Sixth, because justice and holiness can bear a relation of moral and physical good. Therefore nothing hinders these two relations (*scheseis*) of guilt and punishment from being joined together in sin. As the highest good of the creature is to be united with God by holiness; so his highest evil is to be separated from God by sin.

Sources of solution.

X. It is not absurd that of one and the same thing there should be contrary differences, if they are contrary and diverse relations according to which both can be predicated of it in different relations (*kat' allo kai allo*) (as man can be called mortal and immortal in different respects). The same action can be called both praiseworthy and just on the part of God decreeing it for punishment and so be blamed and unjust on the part of man committing it as sin. The horrible lusts of the Gentiles were just with respect to God inasmuch as he gave over the nations to them as a just recompence (*antimisthian*) of preceding sins. Hence it is added that it "behooved them" to suffer it. Yet they were unjust with respect to the Gentiles. Hence they are said to have done "those things which are not convenient" (*ta mē kathēkonta*). Augustine mentions and refutes this argument of the Pelagians, saying that God in the punishment of men uses the wickedness of Satan and men, which however no one would say is praiseworthy (to wit, that the wonderful wisdom of God brings light out of darkness and makes the sins of creatures the material for his own judgments; cf. *Against Julian* 5.3 [FC 35:247-56]). Thus sin can be regarded with reference either to the internal producing cause or to the external ordination or divine judgment. It is unjust and culpable with respect to the former inasmuch as it belongs to disobedient man. But in the latter respect it can have praiseworthiness inasmuch as it pertains to God's ordaining and judging. Hence Biel: "The same privation, which is sin, ordains and disarranges, is culpable and praiseworthy; it disorders, inasmuch as the sinner by it

recedes from the rectitude of the law and from the order of rewarding justice; ordains, inasmuch as the sinner is punished under the order of punishing justice; it is culpable as to the sinner voluntarily deserting; praiseworthy as far as God justly permitting him to fall."

XI. An honest and moral good answering to the law and opposed to base evil differs from a useful good consistent with justice. The approving complacency of the revealed will differs from the permissive and directive complacency of the will of good purpose. Sin cannot please God as an honest and moral good by approving complacency. But this does not hinder him from being pleased by a permissive complacency with it (as a good conducive to the manifestation of his justice).

XII. Action and suffering are one and the same really. They differ only in manner. Hence sin can in a different respect be both action and suffering: action as committed; suffering as inflicted and a sad evil (just as beating is an action as proceeding from the agent and suffering is an action as received by the patient).

XIII. It is of the nature of punishment to be evil in the one punished: either in itself and in the first act; or in the punished so thinking and in the second act. Although punishment is not always felt by the man as a hurtful and injurious thing, but is apprehended by him as something pleasant and agreeable (through a false judgment of the intellect), still not on that account ought it to be considered the less punishment in itself. It ought rather to be esteemed the more heavy that he does not feel it to be punishment at all; yea, considers it as a useful and pleasant good. Thus that God did not punish the whoredoms of the daughters of Israel is threatened as a punishment of their whoredoms (Hos. 4:14), but the not being punished by God was to them in the highest degree pleasant.

XIV. It is not essential to punishment that it be always voluntary, as it is not of the nature of sin to be always voluntary. It suffices that it be such as the will ought to oppose, if rightly estimated. Hence Becanus: "It is not necessary that punishment be such as that the will is actually repugnant to it; it is sufficient to be such as the will would oppose if it rightly estimated and weighed it" (*Summa Theologicae Scholasticae* 2.2.8 [1651], p. 284). Gregory of Valencia says, "It is sufficient that punishment be in its own nature opposed to man's inclination and so be involuntary in the first act" (*Commentariorum theologicorum*, Disp. VI, Q. 17, Punct. 2 [1603-09], 2:686 on I-II, Q. 87*).

XV. What is illegal (*anomia*) cannot be legal (*ennomia*) in the same respect, but in a different respect. Sin is illegal (*anomia*) in reference to the command of the law. In this respect, it is true that it never can be legal (*ennomian*) for then it would be both forbidden and commanded (which is contradictory). But still it can be called legal (*ennomia*) in relation to the sanction of the law, as what is against the commanding law still may be in accordance with the sanctioning law. Thus it is termed punishment inasmuch as it bespeaks an evil hurtful to the creature according to the sanction of the law (which wishes the creature to be afflicted on account of guilt).

XVI. No just judge avenges the transgression and injury done to himself by another transgression or injury which he himself does or permits to be done because he is bound to put a stop to all injury. Yet there is nothing to prevent God's avenging the injury done towards him by another injury, which he by a most wise and just judgment permits to be done to the injury of the creature. He is

bound by no law to hinder that; yea, he has most weighty reasons for permitting it to the greater manifestation of his own justice.

XVII. Although the civil magistrate does not punish sins by sins, it does not follow that God cannot do so justly. The human court differs far from the divine both with respect to the justice of God (which is stricter) and with respect to his power (which is far greater, extending to the soul itself and so even to spiritual punishments). Nor can this mode of punishing be termed repugnant to the glory of God because in this way sins are heaped up to a great height which cannot be expiated by eternal punishments; yea, there would seem to be a progress into infinity and the glory of God would seem injured rather than promoted. If sins are heaped up, this is not through the fault of God punishing, but the crime of the subject suffering. Nor can sins be expiated because the reprobate never cease sinning. And so the glory of God will be promoted not by a correction of wickedness in the subject, but by the continuance and duration of punishment in him. It is not surprising therefore that while they continue forever in sins, they should be forever punished.

XVIII. It is absurd for the debt to be increased by its payment and for guilt to be increased and diminished by the same thing. It is false that there is any full payment of debt when sins are punished by sins or that guilt is diminished or taken away. This is done only by simple punishment and where there is a perfect satisfaction (which does not occur here).

XIX. Every simple punishment is from God effectively, but it suffices for mixed punishment to be from him directively. However there are three distinct things in sin: (1) the physical act, which holds a material relation; (2) the illegality (*anomia*) itself, which holds a formal relation; (3) the judgment of God (or punishableness), which attaches to both. The first proceeds from God, the mover; the second departs only from the Devil and the sinner; the latter however depends upon God, the Judge.

XX. Although Christ was bound to bear in our place all the punishment in general due to us, it does not follow that he was bound to bear all species of punishments. He was indeed made a curse for us (Gal. 3:13), but he ought not on that account to bear all the species of curse enumerated in Dt. 27 and 28. So he is said to have borne our diseases (Is. 53:4; Mt. 8:17); still he cannot be said to have either borne or healed all kinds of diseases. Hence penal defects are usually distinguished into criminal (*diablētous*) and culpable (to which Christ could not be liable), unblameable (*adiablētous*) and innocent (which Christ could assume); but not all innocent whatsoever (as personal which from particular causes belong to certain persons), but only natural and common (pressing upon the whole race). So he is rightly said to have borne all simple punishment, but not necessarily mixed punishment. Yea, he neither could, nor was he bound to bear this. He could not because this applied only to a corrupt and depraved subject. He was not bound because by suffering he was bound to take away sin, not to heap it up. It suffices therefore that by bearing the simple punishment, he took away also the mixed.

XXI. Although sin is the punishment of sin, it cannot be inferred that the justice of God demands that it should be violated and that God should be offended for his satisfaction; but only that God can, in accordance with his wisdom and justice, from a violation of that directive justice revealed in the law, elicit against

the intention of the sinner and the nature of sin itself, a manifestation of vindicatory justice. The same argument can be used against the permission of sin. If God permits sin for his glory, therefore the glory of God requires that sin should be done, and so by it the glory of God be manifested (by which it was obscured). Yet it is evident that this is a false conclusion because sin not per se but accidentally contributes to the glory of God (which properly and per se it obscures). The other questions which can be agitated in reference to the punishment of sin will be discussed in their proper place when we treat of death.

TENTH TOPIC

THE FREE WILL OF MAN IN A STATE OF SIN

FIRST QUESTION

Whether the term "free will" or self-determining (autexousiou) *power should be retained in the Christian schools. And to what faculty of the soul does it properly belong—the intellect or will?*

I. The greatness of the corruption brought upon the human race by sin we have already shown. We have seen the source of evil in original sin and the muddy streams thence flowing into actual sins. Now more properly the miserable state of man and the most degrading servitude of free will under sin must be considered. I confess it is a sad spectacle, but still most useful and highly necessary, in order that we may fully know the greatness of our misery and the more certainly understand and the more earnestly seek the necessity of medicinal grace. For this reason, the argument is the more diligently to be pursued because the weightiest controversies have been set on foot about it by various adversaries almost from the very beginning and are even now in our day urged (in the discussion of which great talents have been and are now employed). And not to mention here the most futile errors of heathen philosophers who (ignorant of the corruption of nature) contended that man could be the builder and architect of his own fortune and by making men free made them sacrilegious. Who is ignorant of the gigantic attempts of the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians on this subject! They deny either wholly the impurity of nature or extenuate it most astonishingly to extol the strength of free will. Neither the authority of various councils, nor the labor and industry of the brightest lights of the church (Jerome, Augustine, Prosper, Hilary, Fulgentius and others) broke so much as to prevent their renewing and causing to sprout again the very same things in succeeding ages; so that you would say these enemies had been triumphed over rather than entirely conquered by the fathers. Nor do the Jesuits, the Socinians and Remonstrants of our day labor for anything else than on this subject (as also in various others) to bring back (either openly or secretly and by burrowing) Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism and to place the idol of free will in the citadel. This is the Helen whom they so ardently love and for whom they do not hesitate to fight as for their altars and firesides. It is of great importance, therefore, that the disciples of true and genuine grace should oppose themselves strenuously to these deadly errors and so build up the misery of man and the necessity of grace that the entire cause of destruction should be ascribed to man and the whole glory of salvation to God alone. Here belongs the doctrine of free will, concerning which we now dispute.

The term "free will"—whence derived.

II. However, because a controversy is usually plied with us here by the papists (as if we could not bear the term "free will" any more than the thing itself), a few remarks must be premised concerning the term. The word "free will" (as also "self-determining power" [*autexousiou*] used by the Greek fathers) does not occur in Scripture. It was received by the Christian schools as more suited to designate that faculty of the rational soul by which it spontaneously does what it pleases, a judgment of the reason going before. For they are mistaken who think they have found it in what Paul calls "the power of his own will" (*exousian peri tou idiou thelēmatos*, 1 Cor. 7:37). With him, *exousia* does not mean freedom of will, but facility of executing; nor does *to thelēma* signify an act of the will, but an object (as often elsewhere). Therefore the origin of this word seems rather to be drawn from the Platonic school, the followers of which many of the fathers were before they turned to Christ. What the Peripatetics called *eleutheran proairesin* and the Stoics *to eph' hēmin*, the Platonists called *autexousion*.

III. However although this name seems too proud, if considered precisely in itself (as if man was in his own power who belongs properly to God alone, who moreover is truly perfectly independent [*autexousios*] and irresponsible [*anypeuthynos*], so of his own right that he does not depend nor can depend absolutely upon anyone). However man is always responsible (*hypeuthynos*) and under authority (*hypexousios*). For this reason, some have desired it to be removed from the use of the church to take away the abuse of the Pelagians who have spread their poison under it. Still because it has now been received in the church by a long usage, we do not think it should be dismissed to the philosophers from whom it seems to have been derived, but should be usefully retained, if its right sense is taught and its abuse avoided. Hence it cannot without calumny be charged upon us that we can bear neither the name nor the thing (free will). For we are about to demonstrate (afterwards in reference to the thing) that we establish free will far more truly than our opponents; so the writings of our men abundantly teach that we by no means repudiate this term when properly understood.

IV. The subject of free will is neither the intellect, nor the will separately, but both faculties conjointly. As it belongs to the intellect with regard to the decision of choice (*proaireseōs*); so it belongs to the will with regard to freedom. Hence you may rightly call it a mixed faculty or a wedlock and meeting (*synkyrian*) of both—the intellect as well as the will. Nevertheless you would not properly say it consists rather in each faculty; for as the decision of the intellect is terminated in the will, so the liberty of the will has its roots in the intellect. Hence the philosopher, leaving this undetermined, says that it is either the "appetitive intellect" (*noun orektikon*) or the "intelligent appetite" (*orexin dianoētikēn*) (Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 1*.13.18, 20 [Loeb, 66-67]).

V. Nor ought this to seem unusual since the intellect and will are mutually connected by so strict a necessity that they can never be separated from each other. Nor does there seem to be a real and intrinsic distinction here, but only an extrinsic with regard to the objects (as one and the same faculty of the soul both judges by understanding and by willing embraces what it judges to be good; and it is called "intellect" when it is occupied in the knowledge and judgment of things, but "will" when it is carried to the love or hatred of the same). Thus what is in the intellect affirmation and negation, that in the will is desire and avoidance,

as the philosopher says (*hoper en dianoia kataphasis kai apophasis tout' en orexei diōxis kai phygē*, ibid., 6.2.2 [Loeb, 328-29]).

VI. In the soul, besides the essence, there are only three things: faculty, habit, act. In the common opinion, the "decisions" denotes an act of the mind; but here it signifies properly neither an act nor a habit because both singly can be separated from man and determine him to only one of contraries—a faculty, not vegetative and sensitive (common to us with brute things in which there is no place for virtue or vice), but rational, from which we are not indeed good or evil, but can be by its act and habit.

SECOND QUESTION

Whether every necessity is repugnant to freedom of will. We deny against the papists and Remonstrants.

I. Before speaking of the nature and formal relation of free will, we must first discuss the proposed question on account of our opponents (of whom this is the capital error [*prōton pseudos*] upon which they erect their erroneous doctrine about the essence of liberty being placed in indifference)—that undoubtedly "necessity of every kind is opposed to the freedom of the will and necessity and freedom are diametrically (*antidiērēmenōs*) opposed; nor can a free will be conceived or understood with a determination to one thing or with a necessity determining it antecedently." Their design is no other than to take away the will of man from the necessity of divine determination and government and to make it uncontrolled (*adespoton*) and the master of its own acts.

Not every necessity is repugnant to liberty, only a certain.

II. To this assertion of Pelagians is opposed the orthodox truth which maintains that not every necessity is at variance with liberty, nor that every necessity agrees with it; but that one is incompatible (*asystaton*) with it, while another cordially unites with it (which has been noticed before in passing, Topic VIII, Question 1). It must now be explained a little more distinctly.

III. Liberty is variously distinguished. Some (as Bernard, *Tractatus de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* 3.7 [PL 182.1005] and after him Lombard, *Sententiarum* 2, Dist. 25 [PL 192/2.708]) make liberty threefold: first from necessity; second from sin; third from misery. He calls the first of nature (which he bestows upon us in the condition of nature); the second of grace (because we are restored to it in grace); the last of glory (because it is reserved for us in glory). By the first, we excel other animals; by the second, we subject the flesh; by the third, death. The first is so natural to man that it cannot in any way be wrested from him. The other two were lost by sin. This distinction we readily receive, provided that under the word necessity we understand a physical necessity as well as a coactive (which are incompatable [*asystatoi*] with the nature of liberty).

IV. But to make the whole subject clearer, we distribute liberty and necessity into six heads: that the will can certainly be considered either with respect to the external agent; or with respect to material and internal sense; or with respect to God, or the practical intellect, or the goodness or wickedness of the object proposed, or the event and existence. Hence a sixfold necessity arises. First, the

necessity of coaction arising from an external agent (he who is compelled, contributing nothing). Second, physical and brute necessity occurring in inanimates and brutes who act from a blind impulse of nature or a brute instinct and innate appetite, without, however, any light of reason (as the necessity in fire to burn, a combustible object being supplied; the necessity in a horse to eat the straw or grass put before him) and without any choice (*proairesei*). The third is the necessity of the creature's dependence on God, as much as to right and the law established by him as in reference to fact (to wit, the government of providence: [1] in the antecedent decree; [2] in the subsequent execution). This necessity is called hypothetical both of infallibility (with respect to prescience) and of immutability (with respect to the decree and actual concourse). Fourth, rational necessity of the determination to one thing by a judgment of the practical intellect (which the will cannot resist). Fifth, moral necessity or of slavery arising from good or bad habits and the presentation of objects to their faculties. For such is the nature of moral habits that although the acquisition of them be in our power, still when our will is imbued with them, they can neither be unexercised nor be laid aside (as the philosopher rightly teaches, *Nichomachean Ethics* 3.5 [Loeb, 143-53]). Hence it happens that the will (free in itself) is so determined either to good or to evil that it cannot but act either well or badly. Hence flows the slavery of sin or of righteousness. Sixth, the necessity of the existence of the thing or of the event, in virtue of which, when a thing is, it cannot but be.

Coactive and physical necessity repugnant to liberty.

V. There are two principal characteristics of free will in which its formal nature consists: (1) the choice (*hē proairesis*), so that what is done is done by a previous judgment of reason; (2) the willingness (*to hekousion*), so that what is done is done voluntarily and without compulsion. The former belongs to the intellect; the latter belongs to the will. Two species of necessity also contend with it. The first is physical and brute necessity; the other the necessity of coaction. The former takes away the choice (*proairesin*); the latter, however, the willingness (*hekousion*). For the things done from a physical necessity by natural agents determined to one thing by nature and without reason, cannot be done freely, i.e., with the previous light of reason. And the things done by force and compulsion cannot be done voluntarily. There is no controversy about these between us and our opponents. We will say only this in passing; Bellarmine and other papists slander our men when they charge them with holding that freedom from coaction is sufficient to constitute free will (because besides this they require also immunity from physical necessity) (cf. Bellarmine, "De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio," 3.4 in *Opera* [1858], 4:332-37). When they say that man is free from coaction and not from necessity, they do not mean physical necessity (about which there is no controversy and which is sufficiently excluded of itself, both by the condition of the subject [which is rational] and by the acts of judging and willing [which are incompatible with it]); but a dependent, slavish and rational necessity.

But the necessity of dependence upon God agrees with it.

VI. But if these two species of necessity mentioned by us contend against free will, it is not so with the others which can exist with it and by which it is not so much destroyed as preserved and perfected (which can be shown singly as to the four kinds of necessity before indicated).

First, as the necessity of dependence upon God, free will does not exclude, but supposes it (whether we understand the moral dependence of right in reference to the divine law from which the rational creature can never be exempted; or the physical dependence of deed as to the concourse of providence, by which things so depend upon God, as the highest ruler and first cause in being, becoming and operating that they can neither be, nor do anything except in dependence upon him; or a dependence of futurition as to foreknowledge and the decree, from which arises the necessity of infallibility and of immutability). For however great may be the liberty of the creature in its operations, still they are necessary in these respects, otherwise the foreknowledge of God could be deceived and his decree changed.

(2) Rational necessity.

VII. Second, as to rational necessity of determination to one thing by the practical intellect. For since the will is a rational appetite, such is its nature that it must follow the last judgment of the practical intellect; otherwise it could seek evil as evil and be turned away from good as good (which is absurd [*asystaton*]). For if the last judgment of the practical intellect is brought to the point of judging that this object, here and now (all the circumstances being weighed) is the best, and the will should be opposed to this judgment, then it would be turned away from good as good. Nor ought it to be objected that the will frequently seeks evil. It does not seek evil as evil, but as an apparent, useful or pleasant good.

(3) Moral necessity.

VIII. Third, as to moral necessity arising from habits. For as the will can be called "free" if it is devoid of habit, so it can rightly be called "slavish" if by habit it has been determined to a certain manner of acting. Still this servitude by no means overthrows the true and essential nature of liberty. Otherwise it would follow that habits destroy the will (which they rather perfect and facilitate to operation). Hence moral habits are twofold: good and evil. A twofold servitude also is thence born: the one of righteousness in good; the other of sin in evil and misery. This belongs to man in a state of sin, of which John says, "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin" (8:34); and "Ye were the servants of sin" (Rom. 6:17). That characterizes him in a state of grace, of which Rom. 6:18 treats: "Being then made free from sin, ye became the servants of righteousness." This servitude is true liberty, as there is no more real and miserable servitude than that of sin. For he who serves sin by no means does what he wills. He does it by a particular inclination which he least wills by a universal. For all, by a universal and natural appetite, always seek good and happiness for themselves.

IX. Hence it is evident that the adversaries (and especially Bellarmine, ibid., 4.6, pp. 363-64) falsely charge our men with saying the will is a slave in the state of sin, as if its liberty were destroyed by that very thing. Scripture beforehand so calls it and indeed with a twofold limitation: (1) that "servant" should be understood not absolutely and physically, but relatively, after the fall in a state of sin; (2) not simply about every natural, civil or externally moral object, but especially about a spiritual object good per se (in which manner inability [*adynamia*] to good is more strongly asserted, but the essence of liberty is not destroyed). Although the sinner is so enslaved by evil that he cannot but sin, still he does not cease to sin most freely and with the highest liberty. Hence Jansen acknowledges

that Luther did not first introduce the term "free will" ("De statu naturae lapsae," 3.5 in *Augustinus* [1640/1964], pp. 441-46), but followed Augustine who had so spoken of it long before (*Enchiridion* 9 [30] [FC 3:395] and *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians* 3.24 [8] [NPNF1, 5:414]). He is angry with those of his own party who maintained that the term "slavish will" was unknown before Luther. "Free will but not freed; free of righteousness, yet a slave of sin, by which some more, others less, but all evil, are involved by different hurtful desires" (Augustine, *Admonition and Grace* 13 [42] [FC 2:297; PL 44.942]). "Man using free will badly, lost both himself and it" (Augustine, *Enchiridion* 9 [30] [FC 3:395; PL 40.246]).

(4) Necessity of event. X. Fourth, as to necessity of the event. For although whatever is, when it is, is necessarily (so that it can no more but be); still not the less freely or contingently is it said to be done as depending upon free or contingent causes. The certainty and truth of the existence of a thing cannot change its essence.

Sources of solution. XI. Although the will is free, this does not prevent its being determined by God and being always under subjection to him. This is so because liberty is not absolute, independent and uncontrolled (*adespotos*) (the characteristics of God alone), but limited and dependent. Otherwise if no faculty is free except it is in subjection to no one, either a free will does not exist in creatures or every second cause will be the first.

XII. The will is said to be the mistress of its own actions, not absolutely and simply (as if it depended upon it always to elicit or not elicit them—for in this way it cannot but be in subjection both to God and to the intellect); but relatively with regard to imperate acts which it governs with inferior powers; not with regard to elicit acts which cannot properly be said to be under the control of the will, since they are the very command of the will by which it governs the acts of other faculties subjected to itself.

XIII. The will can be viewed either in relation to the decree and concourse of God or in contradistinction to the intellect. In the former sense, it is rightly said to be so determined by God as also to determine itself (because, as was seen before, God so moves creatures as to leave their own motions to them). But in the latter sense, it cannot be said to determine itself (because it is determined by the intellect whose last judgment of practical intellect it must follow).

XIV. If the will is always determined by God, it can be called his instrument in a popular sense. In this way, the relation of instrument is attributed in Scripture to wicked men when they are called "the axe," "the hammer," "the rod of God." But not in a philosophical and proper sense in which that is called an agent which has within itself no principal causality and has such a nature as to produce an effect more noble than itself (as the heat of the sun, which is inanimate, produces living animals). For the will does not produce an entity nobler than itself and does not cease to be the principal cause; if not absolutely, still in its own genus (to wit, of second cause).

XV. Although the will can oppose the theoretical judgment of the intellect or the absolute judgment and of simple practical intellect; whither pertain those words of Medea in the poet—"I see the right and approve it too, and still the worse pursue" (Ovid, *Metamorpheses* 7.20-21 [Loeb, 1:342-43])—yet it can never oppose the decided and last judgment.

XVI. In the first sin, the will of Adam did not follow the first and absolute judgment of the intellect (by which it judged that the fruit must not be eaten) because God had prohibited its use under penalty of death (Gen. 3:3). Rather it followed the decided and last judgment by which it is said that the woman saw the fruit of the tree to be good to her for food (v. 6) and judged it to be desirable to the eyes (viz., according to the deceitful promise of Satan that they would be like God).

XVII. In the sin against the Holy Spirit, the will indeed opposes the judgment of the practical intellect, even the first decided. Otherwise it could not be said to be committed against conscience and the knowledge of the truth. Still it is not repugnant to the last decided judgment in which the flesh (all things being considered) judges here and now that the gospel should be denied and Christ forsaken.

THIRD QUESTION

Whether the formal reason of free will consists in indifference or in rational spontaneity. The former we deny; the latter we affirm against papists, Socinians and Remonstrants.

Free will in the genus of being.

I. Free will can be viewed either in the genus of being and absolutely (as belonging to a rational being in every state); or in the genus of morals and in relation to various states (either of sin or of righteousness). In this question, we treat of it in the former sense; in the following, we will discuss it in the latter sense.

It is not placed in indifference, but in willingness.

II. Concerning the formal reason of free will, it can be disputed: (1) *kat' arsin* and negatively that we may see in what it does not consist; (2) *kata thesin* and positively that it may be evident in what it does properly consist. As to the former, we must oppose the error of the adversaries who place its formal reason in indifference. As to the latter, we must establish the orthodox truth which asserts that it is placed in rational willingness.

III. We contend here against the Jesuits, Socinians and Remonstrants who (following Pelagius) place the essence of free will in indifference (*adiaphoria*) and are wont to define it as "the faculty by which all things requisite for acting being posited, the will can act or not act." Now those are called requisites to action without which the action cannot be performed (such as the decree of God and his concourse; the judgment of the mind; and other circumstances which belong here).

Statement of the question.

IV. Hence it is evident that it is not inquired here concerning indifference in the first act or in a divided sense, as to simultaneity of power which is called passive and objective (to wit, whether the will considered absolutely from its natural constitution, the requisites to action being withdrawn, is determinable to various objects and holds itself indifferently towards them). We do not deny that the will of itself is so prepared that it can either elicit or suspend the act (which is the liberty of exercise and of contradiction) or be carried to both of opposite things (which is the liberty of contrariety and of specification). We also confess that the will is indifferent as long as the intellect remains doubtful and uncertain whither to turn itself. But concerning indifference in the second

act and in a compound sense (as to simultaneity of power called active and subjective)—whether the will (all requisites to acting being posited; for example, the decree of God and his concourse; the judgment of the practical intellect, etc.) is always so indifferent and undetermined that it can act or not act. This our opponents pretend in order that its own liberty may be left to the will. We deny it.

Liberty does not consist in indifference.

V. First, such an indifference to opposites is found in no free agent, whether created or uncreated: neither in God, who is good most freely indeed, yet not indifferently (as if he could be evil), but necessarily and immutably; nor in Christ, who obeyed God most freely and yet most necessarily because he could not sin; nor in angels and the blessed, who worship God with the highest willingness and yet are necessarily determined to good; nor in devils and reprobates, who cannot help sinning, although they sin freely. So neither the constancy and immutability of the former in good destroys, but perfects their liberty; nor the inextricable obstinacy and firmness of the latter in evil prevents them from sinning most heinously and so deserving the heaviest punishment.

VI. What objection can be made here? (1) Is the divine liberty the same as ours? We answer that just in proportion to God's liberty being more perfect than ours, so ought it to be farther removed from indifference (which instead of being a virtue is a defect of liberty). (2) That Christ, although he never sinned, still was not absolutely unable to sin; and that it is not repugnant to his nature, will or office to be able to sin? This blasphemy Episcopius and other Remonstrants have not blushed to put forth. We answer that far be it from us either to think or say any such thing concerning the immaculate Son of God whom we know to have been holy (*akakon*), undefiled (*amianton*), separate from sinners; who not only had no intercourse with sin, but could not have both because he was the Son of God and because he was our Redeemer (who if he could have sinned, could not also have saved us). Nor if he could be miserable could he for the same reason be a sinner. Misery for a time is not opposed to his most holy nature and contributed to the execution of his office because he was bound to pay the punishment of our sin and so to bear it by suffering. But he could not deserve it. (3) That the liberty of the saints on earth and in heaven is different? We answer that since the formal reason of liberty ought to be the same as to essentials, if the latter have a most perfect liberty without indifference, it cannot be said to belong to its essence.

VII. Second, the will can never be without determination as well extrinsic from the providence of God, as intrinsic from the judgment of the intellect (as has been shown). Bellarmine himself proves this by various arguments ("De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio," 3.8 in *Opera* [1858], 4:338-40). Therefore when all the requisites for acting are posited, it cannot act or not act. Otherwise it would neither be created (because it would not depend upon God); nor rational (because it would act against the judgment of reason and seek evil as evil). Nor is it an objection that it is said to be of the nature of free will to determine itself (because subordinates do not contend against each other). It is indeed of the nature of the will to be determined by itself, but not by itself alone. Thus the determination of the will does not exclude, but supposes the determination of God.

VIII. Third, the volition of the highest good and of the ultimate end cannot be without the highest willingness. And yet it is not without great and unavoidable necessity. From the consent of our opponents themselves and the decisions of philosophers, we cannot abstain from seeking the highest good because no one can bring himself to wish to be miserable. Nor can it be said that free will is not occupied about the highest good or ultimate end, but only about the election of means. In the seeking for the highest good (true or false), the relation of virtue or of vice is principally situated. It is necessary that liberty (without which there is no relation either of virtue or of vice) should be occupied about it no less than about the means. Again, since the means are granted (having a necessary connection with the end and about whose election the will is occupied), it will be occupied freely indeed in electing them, but yet necessarily.

IX. Fourth, the indifference of the will being assumed: (1) the use of prayers and exhortations is taken away because God is asked to convert and sanctify us in vain, exhortations are employed in vain, if (any action of God being posited) the will cannot be moved from a state of equilibrium, and it remains always in its power to convert itself or not; (2) the promises of God concerning the production of holiness, and the efficacy of grace would be vain because he could not perform what he promised; for whatever he would perform about the will, it would always remain in equilibrium and indifference (*adiaphoria*). Now how could he thus be said to give to will and to do and so make a new heart? (3) All our consolation is gone because in whatever manner God acts in us, we can never be certain of grace if it depends always upon the will to admit or reject it and thus to frustrate every operation of God. (4) The empire of God over the will is destroyed (which would be independent of its own right) if, all the requisites for acting being furnished, it can act or not act. So man will be the author and principal cause of his own conversion, not God, because all the operations of grace being supplied, the will will always be in equilibrium, nor be determined by any other than itself.

Liberty is placed in willingness.

X. Since, therefore, the formal reason of liberty is not placed in indifference, it cannot be sought elsewhere than in rational willingness, by which man does what he pleases by a previous judgment of reason. Thus two things must here be joined together to its constitution: (1) the choice (*to proairetikon*) so that what is done is not done by a blind impulse and a certain brute instinct, but from choice (*ek proaireseōs*) and the previous light of reason and the judgment of the practical intellect; (2) the voluntariness (*to hekousion*) so that what is done may be done spontaneously and freely and without compulsion. Hence the philosopher calls it *hekousion probebouleumenon* (Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 3.2.17 [Loeb, 132-33]).

XI. That this is the formal reason of free will is plainly gathered from this that it agrees with all, alone and always. Thus there is no free agent (either created or uncreated) in which these two characteristics are not found; nor for a time only, but always, so that this rational willingness being posited, liberty is posited; removed it is taken away. Hence it follows that it is an inseparable adjunct of the rational agent, attending him in every state so that he cannot be rational without on that very account being free; nor can he be deprived of liberty without being despoiled also of reason. This also proves that free will absolutely considered

and in the genus of being can never be taken away from man in whatever state he may be. If this is denied by some to man in a state of sin, it ought to be understood not so much physically and absolutely as morally and relatively (not so much with regard to essence, as with regard to strength, as will afterwards be shown).

Sources of solution.

XII. The principle of election can be in its own nature indifferent and undetermined in the divided sense—as to the first act and simultaneity of power; but not in the compound sense—as to the second act or the power of simultaneity. To be free, election ought to enjoy an immunity from coaction and physical necessity; but not from the extrinsic necessity of dependence upon God and the intrinsic of determination by the intellect. And so far is the determination to one thing (made by the reason) from taking away free election, that it rather makes it perfect. It therefore elects this or that because determined to it by a judgment of the intellect.

XIII. The natural brute, not knowing itself, does not have a relation of vice or virtue; but only the natural rational. Sin is called natural not as nature is opposed to free will, but as nature is opposed to grace. A place is granted for obedience or disobedience even without indifference and with a determination to one (as in Christ immutably determined to obey the Father and in the devils necessarily determined to disobey him, yet still sinning most freely and worthy of the severest punishment). The nature of obedience is not placed in this—that man can obey or not obey; but in this—that man obeys freely and without compulsion from previous reason.

XIV. So far is the use of exhortations and commands from being taken away by our opinion, that it is the rather more strongly asserted. For if it is certain that the will is determined by the intellect, the intellect must first be persuaded before it can influence the will. And yet how can it be persuaded except by reasons and exhortations? Although a compliance with the exhortation is impossible by us without grace; still not the less properly can it be addressed to us because it is a duty owed by us.

XV. That a place may be granted for reward or punishment, it is not necessary that there should be indifference in the will to either of two opposites. It suffices that there be a spontaneity and willingness depending upon a judgment of the reason (such as there is in all men).

FOURTH QUESTION

Whether the free will in a state of sin is so a servant of and enslaved by sin that it can do nothing but sin; or whether it still has the power to incline itself to good, not only civil and externally moral, but internal and spiritual, answering accurately to the will of God prescribed in the law. The former we affirm; the latter we deny, against the papists, Socinians and Remonstrants.

I. In the preceding question, we treated free will absolutely (as to nature, in the genus of being). Now we treat of the same relatively (as to the state of sin and its powers in the genus of morals). There we saw what it is; now we are to see what it can do in reference to good. This is the primary controversy on this head of doctrine between us and the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians.

Statement of the question.

II. The question is not about the essential freedom from coaction and physical necessity (called such with reference to the subject and principle because it is always the same everywhere in every state of man, as has been said before), but about the accidental freedom from the slavery of sin, with reference to the object (about which the will is occupied, whether it is only evil or also good).

III. The question is not about civil and externally moral good. We do not deny that some strength still remains in man after the fall as to those external and civil good works, so that he can exercise justice and temperance, put forth acts of mercy and charity, abstain from theft and homicide, and exhibit the operations of similar virtues, with the antecedent concourse and general help of God, to which the virtues of the heathen belong (of which hereafter); but the question is about spiritual and supernatural good, pleasing and acceptable to God: whether man in the state of sin is so corrupt that the powers of his free will as to the latter good, are not only weakened and diminished, but wholly lost, so that he can neither know any saving truth, nor do any good thing; or, whether his will is always wavering (*amphirrepes*) and indifferent to each of the opposites. The orthodox affirm the former; our opponents affirm the latter.

IV. The question does not concern the natural power or faculty of the will (from which proceeds the willing or nilling itself, which can be called the first power and the material principle of moral actions). This always remains in man and distinguishes him from the brutes. Rather the question concerns its moral disposition to willing well (which is called the second power or formal principle of those actions). As from natural power the willing flows, so from the moral disposition flows the willing well.

V. Therefore the question returns to this—whether unregenerate man still has such strength of free will as to be indifferent to good and evil and is able not to sin without the grace of regeneration. The adversaries affirm; we deny.

VI. Here we have as opponents the old and new Pelagians (who place the idol of free will in the citadel) and to make men free, make them sacrilegious. Although the more modern anxiously desire to remove the odious name and doctrine of Pelagius from themselves (nor dare to profess openly what he maintained, that man could by his own strength do something for the heavenly life), still they agree with him no less, while they are not ashamed to associate man and God in the business of salvation as partial causes. Thus they hold that the strength of free will even to good survives in fallen man. Concerning the Socinians, it is clear. "For if in the first man," says Socinus, "before the fall there was free will, there is no reason why he should be deprived of it on account of the fall, since neither the nature of the thing itself demands, nor the justice of God suffers it" (*Praelectionis theologicae* 5 [1627], p. 14 [13]). However, although he afterwards confesses that there is in man after sin a great proclivity to sinning and feeble strength to do what the law commands, still he holds that it is not so small "as that man, the help of God approaching" (i.e., external help, as he interprets it) "if he wishes, to do violence to himself, cannot obey the divine law." Volkelius maintains the same opinion and others with him (*De vera Religione* 5.18 [1630], pp. 544-49).

VII. As to the papists, although sometimes seeming to acknowledge the depravation of nature and to press the necessity of grace, still they do not cease

to extol beyond measure the strength of free will. Thus Bellarmine asserts that "man in things pertaining to piety and salvation can do or will nothing without the special grace of God" ("De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio," 6.4 in *Opera* [1858], 4:438). Also "that man cannot by his own strength dispose himself to grace, or do anything on account of which divine grace is bestowed upon him" (ibid.). Elsewhere he takes off this mask when he maintains and endeavors to prove that "man can without special help do some moral good, if no temptation presses" (ibid., 5.9, p. 391). Nor does the Council of Trent have a different bearing when in Session 6 it denounces an anathema upon him who says that "the free will, moved and excited by God, cooperates nothing with him assenting and calling, by which it disposes and prepares itself to the grace of justification, nor can dissent if it wishes" (Canon 4, Schroeder, p. 42). Also "if anyone says that after the sin of Adam the free will was lost and extinguished . . ." (Canon 5, ibid., p. 43). Not to refer here to the similitudes used by them to describe the sinner (such as that of a sick and wounded man whose strength is indeed weakened and broken, but not wholly lost; and of a fettered and chained man, who indeed has strength, but cannot exert it unless unbound). Nor can they think differently who pretend that its indifferency (*adiaphorian*) always remains to the will and hold that there are good dispositions and merits of congruity in man to grace. Still it is true that not a few papists (as many of the Thomists, Dominicans and especially the Jansenists) hold a different opinion, acknowledging the total inability (*adynamian*) of man and earnestly contending against the idol of free will.

VIII. As to the Remonstrants, so plausibly indeed do they establish the corruption of man and the necessity of grace that it would appear that nothing beyond could be said when they confess that "man in the state of defection and sin can of himself think, will, or do nothing good, which indeed is truly good, such as saving faith, but that it is necessary for him to be regenerated, renewed in mind, affections, or will, and all his faculties by God in Christ through his Holy Spirit, to be able to know, will and perform any good thing" (*Collato scripto habita Hagae Comitis*, Art. 3 [1615], p. 225). They said this because it was an odious thing to impugn openly the grace of God. But if we search more deeply into their mind, it will plainly appear that they (no less than the papists) contend for the idol of free will and again call back Pelagianism when they make freedom of will to consist in indifference (*adiaphoria*) and assert free will to be flexible in either direction even without grace, according to Arminius ("Iacobi Armini . . . Examen Modestium Libelli . . . Gulielmus Perkinsius . . . de Praedestinationis," in *Opera Theologica* [1631], p. 604). They always make grace resistible, so that it is always in the power of man's will to receive or reject it. They acknowledge that spiritual life in the animal man is not wholly separated from the mind, nor truly and properly from the will and that the will remains so free in itself that it can be excited to good before it is properly made alive or receives any new strength (*Collatio scripto habita Hagae Comitis* [1615], p. 298). They say with Grevinchovius (pages 209, 210+) that the grace of God and the free will are at the same time "partial causes" or "co-causes"; so that the free will can indeed do nothing by itself (that is alone), but still can do something with grace. All these things sufficiently indicate that whatever they loudly proclaim about the corruption of nature is said for the purpose of raising a smoke, to deceive the incautious reader and that their genuine opinion is that the free will has still sufficient strength to work its own

salvation with grace. Nor would they so laboriously endeavor to meet all the arguments by which we are in the habit of proving inability (*adynamian*), unless they felt themselves to be attacked; so that you can really perceive that they are pleading their own cause. On the other hand, the orthodox, although maintaining that the free will of man always remains as to essentials, still think that no power to good survives in it.

The impotency of free will is proved: (1) from the servitude of sin.

IX. The reasons are: (1) man is called the "servant" of sin (Jn. 8:43) and a servant so bound by the fetters of concupiscence as to yield his members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin (*eis anomian*); and to be under the dominion of sin (Rom. 6:12, 14) who, bound by Satan, is brought into bondage to him (2 Pet. 2:19); under whom, as the prince of this world, he fulfils evil desires and does what pleases him whom nothing but evil pleases (Jn. 8:44); and in whom he most efficaciously works (Eph. 2:2); who, finally, cannot be brought into liberty except by Christ, the deliverer (Jn. 8:36). Now who would say that this most miserable slavery in evil can consist with the golden liberty to good; that the sinner enslaved to the flesh can do anything to free himself from the yoke of tyranny to which he has voluntarily submitted? Especially since that servitude (although most burdensome) still is pleasing to him and so far from desiring or seeking liberty, he rather kisses his chains and refuses deliverance. However in order to express more strongly the severity of this servitude, the Scripture attributes to us all kinds of servitude (as well of those who are born in a servile condition at home who are called "family slaves" when it says that we are "by nature the children of wrath," Eph. 2:3) and therefore servants of punishment (as of those who were bought with a price and taken in war, when it asserts that we are sold under sin and driven into captivity by corruption and by Satan, Rom. 7:14; 2 Pet. 2:19; 1 Tim. 3:7; Heb. 2:14, 15).

X. The objection is vain: (1) that the servitude of sin is not opposed to the liberty of the sinner because he serves not necessarily, but freely. We answer that although it is not opposed to the liberty of nature (by which he differs from brutes, because he always acts spontaneously whatever he pleases), yet it is opposed to liberty from sin (concerning which we dispute) because he is held so bound by conquering and enslaving desires that although he sins most freely, still he sins necessarily and cannot help sinning. (2) That believers are called the servants of righteousness who nevertheless are not free from all sin; so men can be the servants of sin although some liberty to good still survives in them. We answer that the nature of these two kinds of servitude is diverse. For the servitude of righteousness (which is true liberty) is not perfect in this world on account of the remains of sin adhering to us (from which we are not freed before death). Rather the servitude of sin is full and entire, so that man perfectly serves sin and lives wholly in it. Besides, when Paul thus speaks (Rom. 6:18), he refers not so much to the very life of believers as to their duty (to wit, that being freed from sin they should devote themselves wholly to God and indulge in not even the slightest sin, not otherwise than before they were entirely bound to sin and did not even dream of God). (3) That servitude does prevent man from being able to shake off the yoke of sin by his own strength, but does not hinder him from being able to be freed from sin by free will with the assistance of grace. We answer that

man is able to be freed by free will with the help of God is said ambiguously. For either it is understood of passive liberation, that the free will itself may be delivered by grace (which we grant); or of active liberation, by which the free will applies itself to the assisting grace of God and by its own powers (although not alone) cooperates with it (which we deny).

(2) From spiritual death, Eph. 2:1.

XI. Second, man is "dead in sin" (Eph. 2:1), not only on account of afflictions (which in Scripture are called so many deaths, 2 Cor. 11:23); not only on account of the mortality of the body (which on account of sin is said to be dead, Rom. 8:10); or on account of the guilt of eternal death (in which sense the Lord says that the unbelieving shall die in their sins, Jn. 8:21, 24); but especially on account of the dissolution of union with God and the privation of holiness (which is truly life, as the life passed in sin is not life), and they are dead who live in the pleasures of the world (1 Tim. 5:6). The same impotence therefore in the dead man to restore himself to life must be said to be in the sinner as to obtaining good or spiritual life.

XII. To escape and blunt the point of this dart (which troubles them sorely), the adversaries make various objections here. First, the similitude should not be pressed because there are various differences between a dead man and the sinner. We answer that as we do not deny that this simile is dissimilar in various points, so it is precise in the point which the Holy Spirit especially urges here (viz., as the dead man is deprived of the life of nature and so of all sense and motion, so the sinner is destitute of the life of grace and loses all spiritual sense and motion; so that he can neither know anything true nor do anything good, any more than a dead man can bring himself to life). (2) This death does not hinder what little remains of spiritual life from surviving in sinful man sufficient to know God and to worship him in some measure. We answer that such remains do not kindle spiritual life or hinder the death (properly so called) of the soul because they are not of the same order and species with the spiritual life bestowed on us by Christ. They can also exist in the hardened (yea even in Satan himself, who although of most acute sight, does not cease to be dead, in its proper sense, in sin). (3) They who are said to be dead are also termed "sleepers" and "sick" to intimate that strength survives in them (although bound and hindered). We answer that this ought not to seem a wonder since in Scripture the dead are said to sleep and their resurrection is (as it were) a rousing from sleep: "Awake thou that sleepest and arise from the dead" (Eph. 5:14). In this sense, the death of Christ is called a blow, a stripe and wound. Thus Scripture uses various similitudes to describe the same thing; not that one and another should be considered apart or one be weakened by the other, but rather that what is wanting in one the other may supply. Thus the same sinner compared in some to a sick man and a sleeper, in others is well represented by a dead man in order that we may know that there is here not only a binding of the senses or feebleness of life, but a total extinction of life and privation of strength. (4) Death in sin designates rather the state of condemnation and the punishment of death with which they are to be visited, than the state of corruption in which they lie: "When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, he shall die in his sin" (Ezk. 18:24); "Ye shall die in your sins" (Jn. 8:24). We answer that to be dead in sin in the past differs from to be about to die in the future. The former denotes a state of punishment to be brought on. The latter

however denotes the state of present corruption. (5) Finally, believers are said to "be dead to sin" who nevertheless are not destitute of strength to sin; so they can be called dead in sins who still have some strength left for good. We answer that to "be dead to sin" differs from "being dead in sin." That is said of believers who so crucify the old man as to abolish the body of sin and have no more intercourse with it, nor are any longer under its dominion, since laws have no power over the dead. But this is said of sinners who, being destitute of the life of God, walk in sins and lie entirely in them. Therefore, the phrases are diametrically opposed to each other; the one is not to be thoughtlessly explained by the other. Again "to die to sin" marks a total abolition of sin: (1) as well with reference to justification, so that its guilt is entirely taken away, and there is now no condemnation to believers (Rom. 8:1), as with reference to sanctification (if not as to fulfillment, still as to baptism—the symbol of entire regeneration); (2) as to duty, as believers are said to be perfect and holy because they ought to be so; thus they are called dead to sin because they are bound to extinguish and devote to death sin in themselves; (3) as to event because this will certainly and undoubtedly be the case; for thus the Scriptures speak of such, just as if they had already actually reached it.

(3) From the blindness and hardening of man.

XIII. Third, man has no strength for heavenly things either in his intellect or will from which faculties the free will arises. For as to the intellect (the eye of the mind), not only is he called "blind" and "darkened in mind" (Eph. 4:18), but also "darkness itself": "Ye were sometime darkness" (Eph. 5:8). As to the will, not only is he said to have a "depraved" and "deceitful" heart to be corrected, "unclean" to be purged, "shut up" to be opened, "uncircumcised" to be circumcised, but "stony" (Ezk. 36:26), which ought to be broken and taken away, rather than what is able to be softened and admit life. As therefore the blind man (especially from nature) has no power to see, and he who has a stony heart is devoid of sense and motion, so the sinner can know nothing true, nor do anything good, no more than a blind man can see or a stone think or move itself.

XIV. Nor in passing must we omit the figure of the stony heart (Ezk. 36:26). It is most emphatic (*emphatikōtaton*) whether drawn from natural things (as from the culture of fields and the seed which does not take root when thrown upon a stony place) or from the nature of spirit and life (of which a stone is not a receptive [*dektikon*] subject) or from the origin of waters (which cannot be pressed out of stones except by a miracle) or from artificial things, as from the sculptor's art (because a stone is not ductile or malleable, but hard—rather to be broken than softened). As a stone neither is a subject receptive (*dektikon*) of life nor can feel or be moved or turned or softened, but is inflexible, insensible and impenetrable; so the heart of the unregenerate hardened in sin neither possesses spiritual life nor can dispose itself to it, but is inflexible to the Spirit, insensible to the word and the judgments of God, impenetrable to grace. It not only does not receive grace, but resists and obstinately struggles against it. Moreover, God wished to give a plain symbol of this thing in the writing of the law upon stony tables to intimate that the law is borne in a stony heart and cannot turn it (because devoid of the Spirit); but the gospel is borne in the fleshy tables of the heart because, animated by a life-giving spirit, it renews hearts and turns them to obedience (2 Cor. 3:3).

XV. To weaken the force of this argument, it is vainly objected: (1) that they are also called "blind" who believe the gospel (as the Laodiceans, Rev. 3:17), not because they could not understand at all, but because they were too negligent in doing their duty. We answer that there is one blindness (comparative and relative) attributed to the angel of Laodicea, on account of the vain boasting in which he indulged, as if he was rich and could see, while he should have professed that he was by nature poor, naked and blind. There is another, however, absolute and total, ascribed to the unregenerate, depriving them of all saving knowledge. (2) That believers are called "light in the Lord" (Eph. 5:8) who nevertheless are beclouded with their own darkness. We answer that the consequence does not hold good from the pious to the impious. They are called "light" not in themselves, but "in the Lord" (to wit, inasmuch as they are new creatures made by him, although not without darkness, because they are not as yet perfectly regenerated). But in the wicked there is not a double man, but only one nature—totally unregenerate and pure darkness.

XVI. No more solid is the argument brought against the similitude of the stony heart, that it is a figurative expression not to be pressed. We answer that figurative expressions have the force of common expressions when they are explained by Scripture itself, and when it is clear in what sense and for what purpose they are used. As in Ezekiel many simple words occur, explaining the figure itself, as that in the same place God promises to give "a new heart" and "a new spirit," in order that we may walk in his ways. In vain, however, does Arnoldus (Corvinus) anxiously bring together the differences between the heart and a stone. In the one thing (concerning which it is here treated), the comparison is most apt (to wit, that just as a stone cannot soften itself, nor of itself become flesh, so neither can the unregenerate heart turn or dispose itself to regeneration; rather that can be done by the sole efficacy of God's Spirit).

(4) From the passages which attribute impotence to man.

XVII. Fourth, Scripture everywhere attributes to sinners inability (*adynamian*) to good, when it is said that the imagination of the thoughts of man is evil continually from youth (Gen. 6:5), the force of which passage we have explained before. So Christ says "without me ye can do nothing" (Jn. 15:5). He does not say, without me ye can do little or can do something with difficulty, but without me ye can do nothing. He does not say, without me ye do nothing or will do nothing, but ye can do nothing (which excludes not only the act, but the power itself). Thus Paul: "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned" (1 Cor. 2:14). "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything of ourselves" (2 Cor. 3:5). "The carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be" (Rom. 8:7). "Neither can a corrupt tree" (such as men are by nature) "bring forth good fruit" (Mt. 7:18); not only does not, but cannot bring forth because the effect is like the cause. "How can ye, being evil, speak good things?" (Mt. 12:34). "No man can come to me, except the Father draw him" (Jn. 6:44). Now why should the Holy Spirit so often insist upon that impotence except to take away from man all power to good and ascribe to grace alone the entire work of regeneration and salvation?

XVIII. Falsely is it said here: (1) that "not to be able" does not always denote absolute inability (*adynamian*), but only its unusualness (i.e., that the thing is not accustomed to be done ordinarily or is not done easily). We answer that those passages prove that total impotence is meant and such that it is no more possible for man to overcome than for a dead man to raise himself, an Ethiopian to change his skin, a leopard to change his spots and a corrupt tree to bring forth good fruit. Otherwise if the Holy Spirit had intended to mark only the difficulty of the thing, why did he not think it sufficient to assert that the natural man receiveth not the things of God? Yet he immediately adds "neither can he"; not only that the flesh is not subject to the law, but "neither indeed can be" and the like (which clearly intimate that Paul takes away from man not only the act, but also the very power of doing good).

XIX. Nor do they make a better escape who pretend this impotence to be moral, not natural; and thus a thing not absolutely and simply impossible to man, but that man can do it if he wishes. We answer that whether this impotence be called natural or moral (of which hereafter), it is certainly inextricable to man. In vain is it said that man can do this or that if he will, since it is evident that he is not able to will; not because he is destitute of natural power to will (because thus he differs from brutes), but because he is without the disposition to will what is good (concerning which alone we are speaking in this question).

(5) From 1 Cor. 4:7.

XX. Fifth, man cannot separate himself from another and possesses nothing good which he has not received from another source. "Who maketh thee to differ?" says Paul (1 Cor. 4:7). "And what hast thou that thou didst not receive? now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?" And yet if after the fall the free will has still some strength by which it can dispose itself to good and admit the offered grace, man will make himself to differ from another and will have what he had not received and of which he may boast because the admission of grace (his own act) distinguishes him from another who rejects it. Thus man will rightly be called the architect of his own fortune, and the principal cause of his conversion and difference from others. Nor does the objection avail that man cannot do this without the grace of the Holy Spirit operating through the word. We answer that whatever may be held as to the action of the Holy Spirit through the word (since the word is presented equally both to the elect and the reprobate, and common things do not make a difference), the reason of the difference between one and another (why this one believes, that one does not) cannot depend upon the word or the Spirit operating through the word alone, for it ought to have had the same effect upon both. Rather it depends upon the free will, which in the one determines him to receive grace; in the other, however, to reject it. And the more certainly is this proved that on the hypothesis of our adversaries (whatever may be the operation of grace posited), the will always remains in equilibrium, so that it can use it or not. When, therefore, it makes a good use of it, it owes this to itself, not to the grace which is common. Bellarmine does not conceal this while he reproves Molina and his followers (without mentioning his name). "Cannot the believer say that he is distinguished from the unbeliever by free will because he received the inspiration which the other rejects? Could he not glory against the unbeliever because he cooperated with the grace of God which he despised? But the apostle prohibits

all this" ("De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio," 1.12 in *Opera* [1858], 4:291). No more successfully do they extricate themselves who wish the divine motion to be considered as twofold: either absolutely in itself (and so *in thesi* to be indifferent); or relatively with respect to the annexed congruity (as Bellarmine has it) or with respect to the due application (as others), and that hence arises the difference because the same alms do not affect equally the sated and the starving. For that congruous application of grace must either be referred to grace itself alone or to the free will alone or to both. If to the will, either in whole or in part—then Pelagius has conquered, not Paul. If to grace alone, then the idol of free will is demolished and grace will not be equal because a congruous application was wanting to one which the grace of another included. Nor ought it to be said that inequality of grace is granted in the genus of blessings, but not in the genus of motions; that the same motion of grace is applied to both on the part of God, but on account of the diverse dispositions of the objects and the opportunity seized by the offerer it produces different effects. For if, on account of the diverse dispositions of those to be converted, a different effect of the same motion results, this difference (whatever it may be) does not flow from the grace, but from the promptitude of the recipient superadded. Therefore he makes himself to differ (contrary to Paul) and has what he did not receive, whence he may glory.

(6) Because the work of grace is a creation.

XXI. Sixth, the work of our conversion is a creation, resurrection, regeneration and the production of a new heart by which God not only gently persuades but powerfully effects in us to will and to do. As, however, man can contribute nothing to his creation, resurrection and regeneration, so neither can the sinner contribute anything to his conversion. He ought rather to ascribe it wholly to the grace of God. Nor is it an objection that the same action ascribed to God in conversion is often also enjoined upon man (as when we are commanded to rise and make for ourselves a new heart, Ezk. 18:31; Eph. 5:14). We answer that although conversion is enjoined upon us by God as a duty owed to him, it does not cease on that account to be promised as a gift by God in the covenant of grace; so that as it were a twofold conversion must be conceived (or rather two parts of one conversion)—one brought about by God, the other by man (of which the church speaks, "Turn thou us unto thee, and we shall be turned," Lam. 5:21). The former precedes, the latter follows; that is always ascribed to God (not to man), this always to man, never to God. In the former, the will is acted upon and does not act; in the latter, it is acted upon and acts (or itself reacts) when first acted upon by God. In the first, the grace of God is called "operating" because it alone operates; in the second, "cooperating" because now it operates not only in the will but with it. In the first, the will is a passive subject, but both capacious and conscious of grace; in the second, it is not only a capacious subject, but also a fit and living instrument of divine grace, being its "handmaid" (as Augustine frequently terms it) and an animated organ (*organon empsychon*). These words of Bernard apply here: "What does the free will do? I answer briefly, It is saved. This work cannot be accomplished without two: one by whom it is done, the other in whom it is done; God the author of salvation; the free will only capacious of it" (*Tractatus de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* [PL 182.1002]). And these of Hugo St. Victor: "Repairing grace breathes first into the free will that it may exist, then inspires it that it may be moved; first it works

it, then through it" (*On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith* 1.6.17 [trans. R.J. Defarrari, 1951], p. 106; PL 176.274).

Sources of solution.

XXII. When God sets before the Israelites the choice between life and death (Dt. 30:15) and wishes their conversion (Dt. 32:29), he addresses those already instructed and enlightened that they may work in accordance with the liberty given. He does not address unbelievers and those lying in native depravity and darkness (of whom we now treat). Again, if any were still unregenerate in a state of sin (as undoubtedly many of them were according to 1 Cor. 10:5 and Heb. 4:6, 9), he does not at the same time give them in this way for choosing good, the power to chose it without grace. Rather he teaches their duty that they may know what it is better for them to choose, and what they ought to seek from God, that through the promised grace they may be able to choose it. Finally, if they are unwilling to choose the good, they would be rendered inexcusable.

XXIII. God's commands are not the measure of strength, but a rule of duty. They do not teach what we are now able, but what we are bound to do; what we could formerly do and from how great a height of righteousness we have been precipitated by Adam's fall. Nor is it always true that the precepts which cannot be fulfilled are unjust. The intemperate man who has rendered himself callous by habit and cannot restrain himself from lust or drunkenness (habit being turned into nature) is still bound by the laws of sobriety and temperance. So from the debtor (who has lost by gambling a large sum of money borrowed on interest) not in vain nor unjustly is the debt demanded nor has the creditor lost his right by the crime of the debtor. Since, then, man by his own fault has contracted an inability to obey God, not in vain nor unjustly does God demand from him the obedience which he owes. It is not just that sin should be an advantage to man and he be irresponsible because he has corrupted himself by his own crime.

XXIV. Although man cannot fulfill the commands enjoined upon him, still they cannot be called useless because they always obtain the end intended by God. For instance: (1) representation of God's right and man's duty; (2) a proposition of the rule of righteousness, that no one can offer ignorance as an excuse for his sins; (3) a conviction of our impotence, that it being recognized, we may the more earnestly seek the assistance of grace. Augustine urges, "O man, in precepts acknowledge what you ought to do; in correction know that you do not possess by your own fault; in prayer recognize whence you may receive what you desire to have" (*Admonition and Grace* 3 [5] [FC 2:249-50; PL 44.918-19]). In particular, the ends of uses of the commands are multiplied with regard both to the pious and the impious. As to the former, the precepts serve to prepare them for the reception of grace by a consciousness of their own impotence; (2) to begin and carry forward the work of regeneration itself because the gospel commands are not only imperative, but also operative (which, with the prescription of duty, have the power of the Spirit working within what it commands without). As to the impious, however, the commands tend first to a knowledge of duty and of their own impotence; (b) to the affording of external obedience which can in some measure be done by them (Rom. 2:14, 15); (c) to reveal their latent hypocrisy and wickedness—to their inexcusableness (*anapologēsin*) and just condemnation.

XXV. No one is bound to an impossibility: (1) such absolutely and simply and in every state, for which man does not now have and never had power; but it

does not hold good of that which is such relatively and in a certain state only (such as is the impotence of the sinner). (2) It holds good of an altogether involuntary and purely physical impossibility, arising either from coaction (as he who is bound with chains cannot run) or from a defect of natural power (such as the inability in the blind to see, in the dead to rise). But it does not hold good of an induced (*epispastō*) voluntary impossibility, arising from a depravation of powers and joined with great willingness of mind (such as the inability [*adynamia*] of the sinner). Although, therefore, the blind man is in vain ordered to see and the dead to rise (and they cannot be blamed for not seeing or not rising), the sinner is not forthwith in vain ordered to convert himself. The blind man, being deprived of the faculty of sight, is not bound any more to see; nor is the dead man (life being lost) bound to restore it to himself; but there is no impotence of man which absolves him from the debt of obedience to God.

XXVI. From the words of God to Cain (Gen. 4:7), nothing can be drawn to favor the strength of free will. Neither when he asks him, "Why art thou wroth?" For these words indeed show that he had no cause and reason for anger, but do not absolutely imply that Cain was able not to be angry. Again, although he might have been able not to be angry in the divided sense (because man is not necessarily determined to this or that sin), it does not follow that he was able to do any work truly good. Nor from what is added, "If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door." For thus is indeed denoted the connection of antecedent with consequent, between a good work and the reward, sin and punishment; but it is not implied that man has the power to do well. Nor from those which the adversaries insist upon especially: "Under thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him." First because it is not said "under thee," but "unto thee" (*pros se*). (2) Although the relative should be referred to sin, it would point out only the duty of Cain (viz., to bring sin into subjection to himself and not his strength or the event). (3) It cannot be referred to sin, whether taken properly for the crime or improperly for its punishment (in which sense the words immediately preceding must be taken—"sin lieth at the door"). This is evident from various reasons: from the scope; for what would the liberty of will ruling over sin conduce to the hatred conceived by Cain against Abel, or the assigning the cause why Abel's sacrifice had been more pleasing to God? Again, although the desire of man can be said to be in some measure towards sin, still not without absurdity is the desire of sin or of punishment said to be "under man" or "unto man." Third, it is unheard of in Scripture that man (especially one unrenewed, as Cain) rules over sin, since on the contrary he is everywhere called the servant of sin. But this is best referred to Abel, both because this phrase is always used elsewhere of a person and not of a thing. Thus God addressing Eve: "Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee" (Gen. 3:16, 17). Nor because the pronoun "his" manifestly denotes the subject of the desire, which is no other than Abel himself (whose name, indeed, in this conversation of God with Cain is not expressed, but whose case, however, is treated of); for neither was Cain angry with any other one than his brother; nor does the address of God have any other object than to soothe his mind. This follows principally by three arguments: first, to teach him that the reason why he was not esteemed by God as his brother was not in his brother but in himself, who had not done well—"If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?" Second,

if he continues to do badly, he would not escape punishment—"if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door" (i.e., the punishment of sin overhangs and is prepared for thee). Third, he should cherish his brother and subject him to him by the love as it were of a first born: as if he should say, Is it just for you to be angry with or to injure your younger brother who is under your power, whom therefore you are bound to love and from whom as an inferior you need expect no injury? Thus the Septuagint explains the words *pros se hē apostrophē autou* (to wit, of Abel, not "of sin" [*hamartias*]; cf. Chrysostom, "Homily 18*," *In Genesin* [PG 53.158], Cyril of Alexandria, *In Genesin* 1* [PG 69.31-50], Procopius, *Commentarii in Genesin* [PG 87.240] and others).

XXVII. Common works are attributed to the wicked and the pious, such as "to love," "to do good," "to lend" (Lk. 6:32, 33), but only in external appearance before men, not however of internal goodness before God. Of this kind were the sacrifices of Abel and of Cain (Gen. 4:3, 4); the gift of the rich man and of the poor widow (Lk. 21:1, 2); the prayers of the Pharisee and of the publican (Lk. 18:10-13).

XXVIII. It is one thing "to do the things contained in the law" as to preception (i.e., to perform the office of the law, in commanding, prohibiting, promising and threatening); another, however, to do them as to obedience, by fulfilling its commands. The former is said of the Gentiles (Rom. 2:14, 15), who (since they have not the written law) "are a law unto themselves," as their conscience does the things contained in the law by commanding and prohibiting. Nor if their thoughts are said to excuse them, this is not to be understood in the court of heaven, but of earth; nor from the whole, but from so much, in those who by abstaining from heavier crimes are not indeed absolutely better than others, but only less evil. Otherwise Paul wandered far from his design, for he declares in the same place that the Gentiles who sin without law, shall perish without law.

XXIX. The example of the midwives does not help our opponents (Ex. 1:15). First, they were not Egyptians, but Hebrews. Even if the Scriptures did not tell us when it calls them "Hebrew midwives," still the very names Shiphrah and Puah (the two who seem to have held the chief place among many others), which have a Hebrew origin, would sufficiently teach. Nor is it very likely that the Hebrew women had not obstetricians of their own nation, especially since there was a mutual alienation between the Egyptians and Hebrews. Again, even if they were Egyptians (as many after Josephus maintain, AJ 2.206 [Loeb, 4:253]), their fearing God would indeed imply that they were influenced with some fear and reverence for him from the remains of natural light and sense of conscience (which dictated to them that the slaughter of innocent infants would be detestable to God). However it does not prove that they were also filled with a filial fear of God springing from faith.

XXX. No more to the purpose is the example of Rahab, the harlot, because by faith she is said to have received the spies and to have obtained salvation (Heb. 11:31); or of Cornelius (Acts 10:31), whose alms came into the sight of God, and who is called "a just man, of good report, and one that feareth God" (*dikaios, eusebēs, kai phoboumenos ton Theon*, v. 35). These praises cannot belong to the unregenerate and unbelieving. Cornelius, therefore, was a Gentile by birth, but in religion a proselyte. He believed with the Jews in the Messiah about to come, although he did not yet know him to be Jesus who had come (which he was taught by Peter). His faith, therefore, could increase and be strengthened by the

preaching of Peter that he might know Jesus *in hypothesi* to be the Messiah, but had not just then its beginning. He had, therefore, before an implicit, if not explicit knowledge of Christ; and the Spirit as to ordinary gifts and grace making acceptable (although not as to extraordinary gifts and as to grace given to the grateful).

XXXI. All that is adduced concerning the virtues of the heathen shows indeed that there still remains in fallen man some strength for external and civil good (especially when special help is granted unto them, without which they could not perform even this). But this does not prove that he has any ability in reference to spiritual good, as will hereafter be more fully shown.

XXXII. Man is called a "coworker" (*synergos*) with God (1 Cor. 3:9), not as corrupt, but as renewed (who acts from the grace bestowed upon him). Again, he is not speaking there properly about cooperation to repentance, but to ecclesiastical functions.

XXXIII. When Paul says, "I labored more abundantly than they all: yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me" (1 Cor. 15:10), he does not wish to divide the cause of the good work between himself and grace. Rather he ascribes the whole to grace, as is evident to one attending to the Greek text. The apostle does not say *hē charis theou syn emoi* ("grace of God with me," as the Vulgate improperly renders it), but *hē charis tou theou, hē syn emoi* ("the grace of God which was with me"). Thus he does not wish to come into a companionship of labor, but what he had said of himself, he corrects by a certain epanorthosis and wishes to ascribe it to grace alone. Finally, this labor has reference to his ministry and not to his regeneration.

XXXIV. Although God is said "to stand at the door" (Rev. 3:20) and to "knock," it does not follow that man has the power to open it of himself. Either he stands by the regenerate and knocks that they may use the grace already bestowed to open it by faith and obedience; or by the unregenerate who are either elected (to whom by knocking he gives by the Spirit the strength to open) or the reprobate (whose heart is not knocked at in vain, but in order to manifest that man is justly condemned, since God has witheld none of those things which conduce to conversion).

XXXV. From innocent to corrupt man the consequence does not hold. The Son of Sirach treats of the former, not of the latter when he says "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his counsel" (15:14) (in order to describe the state of innocence and the condition and liberty of the first man). Nor if life and death, good and evil, should be said to be set before corrupt man (in order that he might obtain that which he himself chose) should the liberty of positive indifference to either opposite be ascribed to him. Rather only a rational liberty should be ascribed to him that he may do nothing except what is done spontaneously and deliberately.

XXXVI. Although the unrenewed can be unwilling to come and can resist the call of God, it does not follow that they can equally will to come and follow that call. The former is a disease and imperfection of men so peculiar to them in the state of fallen nature that they can neither do nor will anything else. The latter belongs to restoration by grace and its special work in us. Therefore the censures and rebukes administered to them do not show what good they are able, but are in duty bound to do, and how voluntarily they have broken its laws.

XXXVII. The evils of punishment are deservedly said to be inflicted upon sinners for their crimes (Jer. 32:23), not because they were able to act rightly in their state of natural corruption (the contrary of which Jeremiah himself teaches: "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil," Jer. 13:23), but because this is the law of God—that they who do such things are worthy of death. Nor in the punishment of crimes ought attention to be paid to what men could do, but what they are in duty bound to do. It suffices for their conviction that they commit evil deliberately, willingly and of their own accord, against what they knew perfectly well should be done by them.

XXXVIII. The cause of the difference between good and bad men, better and worse, is not to be sought in their natural indifference and inclination to good equally with evil without grace. For we are all born equally prone to evil; nor is anyone found better or worse than another. Rather it consists with respect to the regenerate in distinguishing grace by which they are separated from others (1 Cor. 4:7). However, with respect to the unregenerate, it consists in the operation of common providence by which God does not indeed cleanse and renew the nature, but restrains and represses its wickedness and corruption in some more and others less (without whose presence, man would without restraint plunge into every excess and crime and the world would be turned into a robber's den). However since he wishes human society to be preserved, he does not permit the wantonness of all equally to rage, but restrains some by a fear of punishment. Others he incites by the love of reward; otherwise there would prevail the greatest confusion, if in proportion to the proneness of all to every evil, they would break forth into them. Now to produce these results God sometimes employs certain means and second causes such as: (1) goodness of nature (*euphyia*), from which there is a greater or less inclination of vice according to the temperament; (2) education and instruction, of great force in the formation of morals and the correction of life; (3) custom and intercourse with others, having great influence on either side; we are almost such as those with whom we live; (4) civil discipline about rewards and punishments by which Plato said the republic is held together (cf. *The Republic* 2.6-9 [Loeb, 1:127-45]); (5) fear of disgrace usually attending vices and crimes, and the preservation of a good reputation (held by the wiser heathen in the highest estimation). Hence the latter said that life and honor walk abreast and that fame was to be preserved above other things, according to this: "If you lose all things, remember to keep your reputation."

The inability of the sinner can be called neither simply moral nor natural, but is well said to be both in a different respect.

XXXIX. The inability of sinful man is not to be called simply moral (in contradistinction to natural, as that is called by moral philosophers morally impossible which is such rather by habit than by nature; and what is indeed done with difficulty, still is at one time done); nor ought it to be reckoned among those things which are absolutely impossible (*adynata*) (since this inability [*adynamia*] is in us innate and insuperable); nor simply natural (as that is natural from which we are called neither good nor bad; while this inability is certainly vicious and culpable); or as natural is contradistinguished from voluntary (as in a stone or brute there is a natural inability to speak). Our inability is in the highest degree voluntary; or as

that is called natural which arises from a defect of natural faculty or power (such as the inability to see in the blind, to walk in the paralytic, to rise in the dead). Our inability does not exclude, but always supposes in man a natural power to understand and will. Still it is best said to be both natural and moral in a different respect. Moral (1) objectively because it is conversant with moral duties; (2) originally because it is induced (*epispastos*), arising from moral corruption and voluntarily brought on by the sin of man; (3) formally because it is voluntary and culpable, reflected upon the habit of a corrupt will. Natural also (1) originally because it is born with us and from nature; not created by God, but corrupted by man, on account of which we are said by Paul to be "by nature children of wrath" (*physei tekna orgēs*, Eph. 2:3), and by David "to have been shapen in iniquity and conceived in sin" (Ps. 51:5)—as poison is natural to the serpent and rapacity to the wolf. (2) Subjectively because it taints our whole nature and implies a privation of that faculty of doing well (which was given to the first man and was natural, which was original righteousness). (3) Eventually because it is unconquerable and insuperable, no less than the purely natural inability of the blind man to see and of the dead man to rise. For the sinner can no more convert himself than the blind man can see and the dead man rise. As therefore it is rightly called moral and voluntary to prove the guilt of man and render him inexcusable, so it is best termed natural to heighten the magnitude of the corruption and demonstrate the necessity of grace. For as it is born with man, so it is incapable of being overcome by him so that he cannot shake it off in any other way than by the almighty and heart-turning grace of the Holy Spirit.

XL. Therefore a man laboring under such an inability is falsely said to be able to believe if he wishes, as if faith (so expressly called by Paul "the gift of God," Eph. 2:8) belonged to the things in our power (*ek tōn eph' hēmin*). For although the phrase can in some measure be tolerated when understood of the natural power of willing (never taken away from us in whatever state we may be; as that by which we are distinguished from the brutes), still it cannot be admitted when we speak of the moral disposition of the will to good; not only to willing, but to willing well. Concerning this alone we dispute with our opponents; unless we wish to pass into the camp of Pelagius who wished good will to be placed in the power of man. For although by sin man did not lose the faculty of willing (in the genus of being), still it is so corrupt in the genus of morals that it neither does nor can do anything good. Besides, since to will to believe and to believe do not differ (since indeed he who wills to believe actually believes, as he who wills to love God and his neighbor really loves God and his neighbor), to say that man can believe if he will is to say that man is able to believe if he has already believed (which is mere trifling). (3) In vain is man said to be able to believe if he will, since it is certain that he cannot of himself will. It is of no use to reply that it is owing to the wickedness of man that he is not able to will; that nothing prevents his believing except his will. For although it is true that this inability is voluntary and culpable, so that its cause can be ascribed to no one but man alone, still it cannot be said absolutely that the will of man alone prevents his believing. As the want and privation of grace (which being furnished, he would believe and without which it is impossible for him to believe) prohibits that also negatively; so it also prohibits it positively; not simply his will, but that native corruption which taints the will and by which (as a spiritual chain) he is so

bound down to sin that he can never snap it asunder or shake it off by himself and in his own strength (without grace).

Fifth Question: The Virtues of the Heathen

Whether the virtues of the heathen were good works from which the power of free will to good can be inferred. We deny against the papists.

Occasion of the question.

I. This question arises from the preceding. In order to show that strength for good survives to the free will in a state of sin, the papists use the common example of the heathen who strove after virtue above others or were distinguished for illustrious deeds (whose virtues they deny to have been sins, deserving the disapprobation of God, but rather consider good works, meriting favor). Thus the Council of Trent: "Whoever says that all works done before justification, in whatever way done, are truly sins, or deserve the hatred of God, or that the more earnestly one strives to dispose himself to grace, so much the more seriously he sins, let him be anathema" (Session 6, Canon 7, Schroeder, p. 43). Bellamine endeavors to prove "that man can without faith, with special help and even without it, perform some moral good, if no temptation presses" ("De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio," 5.9, 10 in *Opera* [1858], 4:391-98).

II. However we say two things. First, although we confess that some good can be found in these actions (as to the external honesty of the act commanded by God and which therefore cannot but be good), still we deny that they can be called properly and univocally good works as to the truth of the thing and mode of operation (to wit, internal rectitude of heart and intention of the end). We assert with Augustine that they were nothing but "splendid sins." Second, whatever good or less evil they performed, was not owing to their own strength, but to God's special help.

III. The former may easily be gathered from what has been already said. Since it has been shown that the inability (*adynamian*) of the sinner to good is total and Scripture ascribes it to all without exception, it is evident that no works truly good can be performed by the unrenewed man.

IV. This is still further strengthened by the conditions of a good work. Three things are altogether required for a good work. First, on the part of the principle, that it proceed from a heart purified by faith (Acts 15:9), because whatever is not of faith is sin (Rom. 14:23) and is displeasing to God (Heb. 11:6); for "unto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure; but even their mind and conscience is defiled" (Tit. 1:15). Second, on the part of the form or mode, that it be done according to the law of God, not only in the external work, but especially with the internal obedience of the heart which the spiritual law of God requires from sinners (Rom. 7:14). (3) On the part of the end, that it be done to the glory of God (1 Cor. 10:31). It is certain that the virtues of the heathen are defective in these three particulars. For in reference to the principle, they could not proceed from faith or a clean heart (of which they were destitute); so as to the mode, they had no internal and spiritual obedience; and as to the end, no direction to the glory of God (since they struggled for their own advancement and glory). Now a good work is from an entire cause, but an evil work from even a single defect.

V. The Athenians are said to "worship (*eusebein*) the unknown God" (Acts 17:23). Not as if with a true and saving worship they adored the true God, but according to opinion (*kata doxan*) because they supposed they offered a true worship to the true God although unknown. Thus by an admirable accommodation (*synkatabasin*), the apostle strove to gain them over to Christ by tempering his rebuke with praise. He did not simply call them "too superstitious" (*deisidaimonesterous*), but "as too superstitious" (*hōs deisidaimonesterous*) that he might not seem too harsh. Thus he does not say simply "ye worship" (*eusebeite*), but "ye ignorantly worship" (*agnoountes eusebeite*) to prove the vanity of their worship, that no one might accuse him of flattery.

VI. As the moral actions of the heathen are not sins per se (and as to substance of the work), but by accident (and as to the mode of operation) in the essential conditions (on account of the various defects mentioned before); not on that account is it better to omit than to perform them, lest we sin (but the defects should rather be corrected and supplied). What are of themselves sins forbidden of God should be omitted; but what are only accidentally such from some defect of circumstances should not be omitted, but corrected.

VII. Earthly reward does not prove true virtue and a good work because it is only of perishable things which God bestows promiscuously upon the reprobate and the elect. This is a remarkable proof of the divine justice, to teach how much true piety pleases him when he not only remunerates true virtues by eternal rewards, but also the images of virtues by temporal blessings not on account of the adhering depravity, but on account of the apparent external good (in order that even unbelievers may have nothing to complain of concerning the justice of God).

VIII. Since the humiliation of Ahab (1 K. 21:27, 28) was dissembled and hypocritical (from fear of punishment rather than from love of virtue), it could not per se be pleasing to God. Nor did God grant to him an absolute remission of the punishment before threatened, but only some delay; not in order to testify that the external humiliation of the wicked king was accepted by him, but to show to others what is to be expected by one seriously and heartily repenting. The repentance of the Ninevites cannot be reckoned among the works of the heathen, since they are said to have repented at the word of God and from the operation of faith in God (which is expressly ascribed to them, Jn. 3:5; Mt. 12:41).

IX. Whatever, moreover, was done by the Gentiles in reference to this subject (by which they were made no better than others, but at least less evil) does not prove remaining strength for good in their free will because not even this could be done without God's special help. If some were more observant than others of justice and goodness; if some excelled in learning, genius, fortitude, justice and temperance and other virtues (as among them Aristides was celebrated for justice; Scipio for continence; Socrates for wisdom; Alexander for bravery; others for other virtues), these are not to be ascribed to their better nature, but are to be recognized as the gifts of God who gives some over to their own lusts, but restrains the depravity of others from breaking forth. Nor were the heathen themselves ignorant of this, who acknowledged that "virtues are inspired only by the divine breath," and "there never was a great man without divine inspiration" as Plato frequently says and Cicero after him (cf. Cicero, ?*De Republica* 3.3 and 6.8 [Loeb, 16:186-87, 260-61; *De Natura Deorum* 2.167 [Loeb, 19:282-83]). Reason itself also persuades us. For why should the sons of heroes be so degenerate? Why

should twins be so unlike? Why should those enjoying the best education become savage beasts? The cause, therefore, of this difference is to be sought only in the providence of God. While it permits some to sink with impunity into every enormity, it restrains and represses others as with a bit that they may not rush into the same unbridled license with others. Hence they are not common gifts of nature, but special graces of God dispensed variously to men (inasmuch as he knows that it conduces to the preservation of the universe).

X. Whatever knowledge of God is found in the heathen cannot be considered a good work because if they confess with the mouth, they deny him in their works. They had a knowledge of God, but held the truth in unrighteousness, neither glorified him as God (i.e., they did not truly know him). This was the height of their crime—being unwilling to acknowledge him of whom they could not be ignorant, and forming for themselves innumerable gods in place of the one God (whom they could know from his works). Well, therefore, are they called atheists by the apostle (Eph. 2:12) with their own crowd of gods because they were ignorant of the existence of the true God and of his will towards us. So the Lord gave them indeed a slight taste of his divinity that they might not offer ignorance as an excuse. He has driven them at times to say some things by the confession of which they themselves might be convicted; but they so saw what they saw as by no means to be directed by the sight to the truth, much less to attain it. It is like the flashing of lightning at night, surrounded by which the traveller sees far and wide for a moment, but so evanescent that he is again involved in the darkness of night before he can move a step—so far is he from being prospered in his journey by such a help.

XI. This was the constant opinion of Augustine which he often established against the Pelagians: "True virtue exists in no one who is not righteous; and no one is truly righteous who does not live by faith. Moreover, who of those who wish to be considered Christians, except the Pelagians alone, or even thou alone perhaps among them, would say that the just man is enslaved by the devil?" (*Against Julian* 4.3 [17] [FC 35:181; PL 44.745]). And elsewhere: "However highly the works of unbelievers may be extolled, everything which is not of faith, is sin" (*On the Proceedings of Pelagius* 34 [NPNF1, 5:198-99; PL 44.341]). So Prosper, a disciple of Augustine: "Without the worship of the true God, even what seems virtue is sin, nor can anyone please God without God; and he who does not please God, whom does he please except himself and Satan" (*The Call of All Nations* 1.7* [ACW 14:34; PL 51.653-54]). And in his precious little book *Carmen de Ingratis:* "Every virtuous deed is a sin, unless it rises from the seed of true faith; it becomes a source of guilt, and its barren glory heaps up punishment for itself" (16.407-409 [trans. C.T. Huegelmeyer, 1962], pp. 66-67; PL 51.117). Whoever wishes more on this question should consult Jansen *Augustinus* where this entire argument is fully and satisfactorily discussed ("De statu naturae lapsae," 3, 4 [1640/1964], pp. 429-678).

XII. Now this is the nature of free will in a state of sin. But how it is constituted in the moment of calling and in the progress of sanctification will be treated of in the proper place (with the favor of God). May the Father of mercies grant that, seriously acknowledging our nothingness (*oudeneian*) and inability (*adynamian*), we may learn to depend entirely upon him and to ascribe all our salvation to his grace, saying with the psalmist, "Not unto us, O Lord, but unto thy name be all the glory" (Ps. 115:1). Amen.