

MA in Cultural Astronomy and Astrology
Introduction to Cultural Astronomy and Astrology
Week 7 Philosophy: Philosophy: Fate and Freewill in the Cosmos

Weekly Introduction

Bernadette Brady – Notes on Determinism, Fate, Fatalism and Free Will.

The following are some brief notes on these key terms that we will be dealing with this week. For those who wish to explore these ideas further then there are many references in these notes that you can peruse as well as the readings listed for the week.

We need to begin by defining some of the key terms.

Determinism

Determinism is a modern concept based in the laws of physics. William James (1842–1910) offered a definition of determinism in 1896 as follows:

It professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb: the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible.¹

James defined determinism based in causation and the laws of physics. Nancy Cartwright points out that determinism is demonstrated in the equation, $f \text{ (force)} = m \text{ (mass)} \times a \text{ (acceleration)}$ — and, today, is accepted as universal in that it is considered valid for all organic and inorganic matter.² Determinism is based in antecedent causality and is an impersonal, objective law of physics. As all events are the result of a previous event, determinism ‘drives’ and shapes the present out of the consequences of past events and although the future is not yet formed it is already shaped by the past. In such a world, as supported today by the sciences, the question is how can humanity, or any other life force, undertake any action freely? This is called the ‘free will’ dilemma and has been the focus of philosophical debate since the seventeenth century.

¹ William James, *The Will to Believe. Essays in Popular Philosophy* (London, New York: Longmans, Green and co, 1912), p.150.

² Nancy Cartwright, *The dappled world: a study of the boundaries of science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.43-46.

Classical terms

Before nature was separated from theology the terms used and the arguments around the existence of free will within the laws of the material world were very different. Within classical literature the idea of fate was used to embrace humanity's perception of living with necessity – the laws of nature. For the Greeks, fate or the Fates were the personification of the *Moirae*. Mircea Eliade argued that the *Moirae* were goddesses of both destiny and birth.³ B.C. Dietrich supports this idea when he wrote: 'Normally the explanation offered is that *Moirai* or the *Moirae* appear to bring luck or bear gifts to the new born infant.'⁴ Richard Onians also talked of the idea of *moira* as weaving or spinning concept which was a 'binding process on the part of the powers determining man's fate.'⁵ Thus *moira* was a web which bound us in some way and it was associated with living in sympathetic cosmology. Additional to the idea of *moira* was the concept of *ananke* which was Necessity and J.O. Urmson pointed out it had a variety of meanings as both Plato and Aristotle used it not only as the logical and necessary result of earlier actions — Plato, *Timaeus*, 40d and Aristotle *An. Pr.* 24b 18 — but also to denote both the necessity of the compulsion of a force and the necessity of the consequences of how the world was constructed.⁶ There was also the later word *heimarmene*, defined in the second century C.E. text by Pseudo-Plutarch, *De Fato*, as 'a law because it has laid down the consequences which follow upon occurrences, as in the legislation of a state.'⁷ So we have necessity, *heimarmene* and determinism, all suggestion of the same concept but necessity and *heimarmene* come are the consequences sympathetic cosmology which was a blend of the laws of the material world with the will of the divine, while determinism is the central theme of a divine free, Newtonian cosmology.

Plato and Fate

F.J.K. Soontjens commented that for Plato the harmony of the sympathetic cosmos was expressed as a teleological force embedded in each soul which gave it a desire to return to the divine source.⁸ In order to allow for the return to the divine source Plato considered that

³ M. Eliade, *Traité d'Histoire des Religions* (Paris 1949), p.163.

⁴ B. C. Dietrich, "The Spinning of Fate in Homer," *Phoenix* 16, no. 2 (1962): p.94.

⁵ Richard Broxton Onians, *The Origins of European Thought About the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate* (London: Cambridge University Press, [1951] 1954), p.349.

⁶ J.O Urmson, *The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary* (London: Duckworth, 1990), p.20.

⁷ Ps-Plutarch, *De Fato*, vol. VII, *Moralia* (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1959), 570B.

⁸ F. J. K. Soontjens, "Evolution: Teleology or Chance?," *Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie* 22, no. 1 (1991): p.133.

humanity had been given the gift of reason. Francis Cornford commented on Plato's notion of 'reason' wrote that with this gift of divine reason man's purpose was to become like the divine 'by reproducing in his own nature the beauty and harmony revealed in the cosmos.'⁹ Thus fate was the consequence of the divine sympathetic cosmos pulling the individual towards reuniting with the divine (teleological) and 'reason' was the instrument that one used to either alter this fate or avoid this fate.

In the *Timaeus*, Plato argued that in order to help the soul with its journey back to the divine, this gift of reason, given to each soul, could be strengthened by reflecting on the divine heavens. Indeed he argued that the very purpose of sight was in order to watch the heavens:

Let us rather declare that the cause and purpose of this supreme good is this: the god invented sight and gave it to us so that we might observe the orbits of intelligence in the universe and apply them to the revolutions of our own understanding. For there is a kinship between them, even though our revolutions are disturbed, whereas the universal orbits are undisturbed. So once we have come to know them, and to share in the ability to make correct calculations according to nature, we should stabilize the straying revolutions within ourselves by imitating the completely unstraying revolutions of the god.¹⁰

Plato returned to this theme later in the *Timaeus* by writing:

We should redirect the revolutions in our head that were thrown off course at our birth, by coming to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the universe and so bring into conformity with its objects our faculty of understanding, as it was in its original condition. And when this conformity is complete, we shall have achieved our goal: that most excellent life offered to humankind by the gods, both now and forevermore.¹¹

For Plato one could become more attuned to the divine by learning the harmony of the rotation of the heavens and using this knowledge to redirect 'in our head' what was thrown off course at the time of our birth. Thus the harmony of the heavenly spheres could produce harmony in one's soul.

⁹ Francis M Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1935, 1997), p.34.

¹⁰ Plato, *Timaeus*, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, ed., *Plato Complete Works* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 47b-c.

¹¹ Plato, *Timaeus*: 90d.

D. J. Allan noted that for Plato the soul was, ‘... the active principle which alone can initiate change.’¹² The soul therefore was accountable for such changes and hence was the holder of the individual’s moral responsibility. Josiah Gould, also argued that Plato saw ‘character’ as a part of soul, he wrote that, ‘Plato sets forth in fairly straightforward language the proposition that character formation is exempt from whatever causal nexus governs other things.’¹³ The very purpose of the union of body and the immortal soul was to allow for the refinement of the immortal character, contained in the soul, to enable it to prepare itself for its eventual reunion with the World Soul.¹⁴ This refinement happened in two ways, firstly through the soul’s use of divine reason to resist the physical desires of its current mortal body; and secondly, in its spirit state after death, where it was able to use its developed wisdom to choose the nature of its next incarnation.¹⁵ For Plato, therefore, free will was associated with the soul and the soul was not mortal thus was not made of the same substance the material world and was therefore could be free of the influences of necessity – the laws of nature. This view, that our free will was independent of the material world was later defined within contemporary philosophy a **dualist** argument, the cosmos is made of two different substances one influenced by fate and the other not. Adopting a dualist solution to the free will dilemma is defined as **libertarianism** — the view that there is not a ‘free will dilemma’ as determinism does not infringe on our free will. In this regard Plato’s arguments around free will are considered to reflect a dualist, libertarian position.

Stoic Fate

One of the differences between Plato’s views on fate and that of the Stoic is the differing views on the nature of the divine. For Plato the divine was both transcendent and immanent, unmoving and thus the prime causal agent in the chain of causation. In Plato’s schema the divine could never be subject to change — it was unmoved. However, the Stoic view, as pointed out by Gerard Randall, was that the divine was *only* immanent and must *be moving*, as it comprised the actual matter of the world, and the divine needed to be changed, and created, by the world.¹⁶ Brad Inwood and Lloyd Gerson argue that in the Stoic cosmology the human being,

¹² D. J. Allan, "The Inaugural Address: Causality Ancient and Modern," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 39 (1965): p.8.

¹³ Josiah B. Gould, "The Stoic Conception of Fate," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 35, no. No. 1 (1974): p.19.

¹⁴ Plato, *Timaeus*: 42c.

¹⁵ Plato, *Republic*: 618c.

¹⁶ Gerald H. Randall, "Immanence, Stoic and Christian," *The Harvard Theological Review* Vol. 14, no. No. 1 (1921): p.4.

possessed of consciousness, had a moral responsibility to help the creation of the whole. On this basis, they argue, the Stoics considered that the individual was empowered by reason and accountable for one's own actions; and since humans were a part of the world of matter they were a part of the immanent divine, and in fact humanity was partly responsible for the actual creation of God.¹⁷ Thus God was a 'work in progress' and one was held moral responsibility to help create God. This is in contrast to Plato's view of moral responsibility which was associated with a return to an already created perfect God and that this journey was embedded with the personal reward of ensuring a better future life through the instrument of reincarnation. Plato's model promotes individualism while the Stoic model promotes altruism.

This differing Stoic view of the divine lead to the need to place soul, fate, free will, and moral responsibility *all* within the material realm as there was no 'other place' where freedom or soul could reside. This is known within contemporary philosophy as a **monist** argument as it does not allow for a mind/body or soul/body split where the soul or the free will can residue in another place separate, in some manner, to the influence of fate. Life for the Stoics was fated but one was free and morally responsible to embrace mental self-agency. This self-agency could be used to find inner happiness and harmony in one's life through the acceptance of life events. This approach to fate is seen in the words of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus (55—135) who wrote:

I must die. But must I die groaning? I must be imprisoned. But must I whine as well? I must suffer exile. Can anyone then hinder me from going with a smile, and good courage, and at peace?¹⁸

Thus Stoic views on freedom were very different to Plato's in that one was free in one's mind to be peaceful in the face of fated events. This position however, showed that the Stoic belief was that one's very thoughts were free from fate or necessity.

It was the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), who built on this idea of the freedom of one's thoughts. Hume believed in determinism and he pointed out that if the world was *not* governed by determinism then all events would be random and thus one's actions must also be random. Consequently one's actions could not be determined by personal desires, preferences, or values. But if one's actions were not determined by these things, then a person could not be

¹⁷ Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson, *The Stoics Reader*, trans. Brad Inwood (Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2008), p.xiv.

¹⁸ Epictetus, *Discourses Books 1 and 2*, trans. P.E.Matheson (New York: Dover Publications Inc, trans. 2004), Book I, ch. 1 on p.5.

held responsible for the random events they performed. Thus, within Hume's arguments, moral responsibility required determinism for free will could only exist if determinism was valid. Hume's arguments were used later to define what is known as classical **compatibilism**. Compatibilism is the view that both free will and determinism can co-exist in some manner. Hume achieved his compatibilist argument by effectively redefining the notion of free will. Hume accepted that all our actions and all our thoughts are dictated by determinism however, as long as we think we are free of coercion then we are free. This is now referred to as 'the freedom worth having'. Thus Hume's solution to the free will dilemma can be considered as a monist compatibilist argument.

Fatalism

Another term that requires defining is that of fatalism. Robert Solomon points out that fatalism differs from determinism which to reiterate holds that the future is already embedded in the past and is a logical extension of a causal chain.¹⁹ In contrast, fatalism is inevitable teleology, and thus a 'pulling' concept defined by Pascal Massie as a belief that '...what will be will be no matter what causal path brings it about.'²⁰ ; Evander Bradley McGilvary characterises this as the inevitability of an event placed in our future in which 'our wills have no part in determining the outcome.'²¹ By this definition, fatalism (not linked to any antecedent causal agent) is the belief that a certain event will occur in the future regardless of the pathway an individual takes to reach that point in time.²² For example, one's inevitable death is a fatalistic statement as this event is independent to any actions that are taken. There is no action that you can take that will remove this event from your future.

Sarah Broadie notes that fatalism, when accepted on a daily level, can lead to futilism and points out that this is the classical 'Lazy or Idle Argument', the doctrine that, if an event will happen in the future regardless of one's actions, then there is no point in taking any action.²³ However, Suzanne Bobzien argues against fatalism leading to futilism by pointing out that lack

¹⁹ Solomon, "On Fate and Fatalism," p.443.

²⁰ Pascal Massie, *Contingency, Time and Possibility, an essay on Aristotle and Duns Scotus* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011), p.52.

²¹ Evander Bradley McGilvary, "Freedom and Necessity in Human Affairs," *International Journal of Ethics* 45, no. 4 (1935): p.382.

²² Mark H. Bernstein, "Fatalism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.65; Steven M Cahn, *Fate, Time and Logic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p.8; Daniel C. Dennett, *Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), p.104.

²³ Broadie, "From Necessity to Fate: A Fallacy?," pp.21-22.

of action or resignation is a choice, just as action is a choice, so futility is a mental state which leads to its own set of actions.²⁴

Saint Augustine: providence and theological fatalism

For Saint Augustine (354-430) the sympathetic cosmos was the potentially fatalist concept of God's providence. Nicholas Campion cites Augustine as a major figure in the attempt to 'de-spiritualise the universe.'²⁵ This endeavour of de-spiritualising the universe was the result of Augustine's twin objectives: the glorification of God, and the removal of any potential challenge to God's omnipotent power.²⁶ With this as his apparent motivation Augustine wrote a polemic against astrology. In *City of God* he dismissed astrologers and their heavenly fate, claiming that fate and destiny were the work of God:

'Fate'; a name given by some people not to the position of the stars but to a chain of causes dependent on God's will. There are those who use the name 'destiny' to refer not to the conjunction of stars at the moment of conception, or birth, or beginning, but to the connected series of causes which is responsible for anything that happens. ...For in fact they ascribe this orderly series, this chain of causes, to the will and power of the supreme God, who is believed, most rightly and truly, to know all things before they happen and who leaves nothing unordered.²⁷

Augustine thus removed fate from the heavens and placed it in God's hands. His logic was simple: 'It is beyond anything incredible that He should have willed the kingdoms of men, their dominations and their servitudes, to be outside the range of the laws of His providence.'²⁸ Placing humanity within God's providence and removing the soul-cleansing mechanism of reincarnation, there was now no longer room for personal involvement with the creation of one's fate, nor the ability to use the planets as intermediates. One was subject to God's providence and, as Gerald Bonner points out, God already knew which souls would reach the kingdom of heaven; these souls were predestined for salvation while all other souls were condemned to

²⁴ Susanne Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1998] 2005), p.192.

²⁵ Nicholas Campion, *The Dawn of Astrology. A Cultural History of Western Astrology, The Ancient and Classical Worlds* (London, UK: Continuum Books, 2008), p.283.

²⁶ Saint Augustine, *City of God*, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Classics, [1972] 2003), V.9.

²⁷ Augustine, *City of God*: V.8.

²⁸ Augustine, *City of God*: V.11.

eternal damnation, regardless of their actions, good or evil, within their lifetime.²⁹ This was theological fatalism, as nothing one could do would influence the predestined fact of whether one was saved or damned.

This attitude then generated an unresolved paradox as follows: on the one hand individual choice is necessary if forgiveness from sin and salvation is to be achieved but, on the other, if God is omnipotent he knows the future, if he knows the future the future must already be written, and individual salvation is therefore also predetermined. This paradox opened up questions around whether individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions. There have been different solutions posed to this paradox and one such solution was put forward by the Stoic Boethius in the 5th century CE, who suggested the idea that God existed in eternal time rather than what is now called 'flow time'. In eternal time the past, present and future all exist simultaneously and therefore all things are known, God knew all things, but this eternal time still required the unfolding of events in flow time. Eternal time could be equivalent to the Platonic 'Being' and flow time to Platonic 'Becoming'. Another argument was put forward by Calcidius a 4th century Christian who created a Platonist model of determinism to challenge the dominant Stoic position. His solution was to suggest that God only knew 'universals' but not 'contingencies', defined as variations that happened within the wider concepts of universals. Thus God's knowledge was limited. This view was swept aside by Augustine, God's Providence was and still is, a form of fatalism, a belief in an invertible future which is still the Calvinist position and is also found amongst many evangelical and apocalyptic Christian groups.

Contemporary fate

Fate today is generally considered to be a force acting on life that had intent and purpose, and it tends to be teleological for it is pulled forward to a event or situation in the future. Robert Solomon argues that fate has an 'otherness' to it. He suggested that, 'Fate provides something by way of "hands" in which we can place ourselves whether or not we have confidence in their goodness.'³⁰ Sarah Broadie wrote that the experience of fate was as '...an agency concerning which all we know is that it has a certain purpose... and is clever and foreknowing and powerful

²⁹ Gerald Bonner, *Freedom and Necessity - St Augustine's Teaching on Divine Power and Human Freedom* (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), p.23.

³⁰ Robert Solomon, "On Fate and Fatalism," *Philosophy East and West* Vol. 53, no. No. 4 (2003): p.442; Also see Sophie Botros, "Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy," *Phronesis* 30, no. 3 (1985): p.279.

enough to carry out this intention no matter what.³¹ In this regard the modern use of the term fate tends to describe the encountering of a pattern which appears to have no causal agent and exists in a future which is being 'aimed for' regardless of our actions.³²

Two differing views on fate and astrology

Alan Leo (1860–1917) was an English astrologer and a prolific writer of astrological texts. According to Campion he was the most influential astrologer of the early twentieth century.³³ Alan Leo accepted Blavatsky's teachings and undertook to reform astrology in the light of the theosophical doctrines; thus he embedded within astrology a version of Platonism. Leo saw the soul entangled with the fate of matter:

...the spirit and the body (or "matter"), man's soul is at some times bound, at others free — never wholly free, nor wholly bound, but linked to both states of existence by subtle bonds and thus ever harnessed to the Circle or "Wheel" of Necessity.³⁴

Leo's views on fate were Platonist as he believed that the soul was 'immortal or perpetual' and that each individual soul, 'was symbolised by the Moon in its ebb and flow...'.³⁵ However, in this union the soul held the 'will' and in this way Leo considered it superior to matter: '...Matter is fated while the spirit is free. ... Matter is fated to assume shape and form, yet the life within that form is destined to control it sooner or later.'³⁶

Leo further mirrored Platonist concepts by writing: '...Man is a spirit, or to speak more correctly a SOUL, with a body. His "spirit", which he also defined as character, is free, immortal, undying and permanent, but his soul is imprisoned in the "matter", or bodies, through which it manifests on the lower planes.'³⁷ He then placed the moral responsibility of one's life in one's own hands by teaching that one's past lives produce the quality of the current life, and this was reflected in the horoscope which was filled with fated matter. The fated horoscope therefore was to be

³¹ Sarah Broadie, "From Necessity to Fate: A Fallacy?," *The Journal of Ethics* 5, no. 1 (2001): p.28.

³² Broadie, "From Necessity to Fate: A Fallacy?," p.27.

³³ Nicholas Campion, *A History of Western Astrology Volume II* (London, UK: Continuum Books, 2009), p.231.

³⁴ Alan Leo, *Astrology for all*, 4th ed. (Fowler, 1969 (1974)), The Introduction (CD version of this book).

³⁵ Bessie Leo, *The Life and Work of Alan Leo* (London: L.N.Fowler, 1919), p.11.

³⁶ Alan Leo, *Astrology for All*, 1998 ed., vol. 2007, The Works of Alan Leo, Astrology CD No. 1 (London, UK1910), paragraph 320; Alan Leo, *The Progressed Horoscope* (London: L.N. Fowler, [1905] 1929), p.6.

³⁷ Leo, *The Progressed Horoscope*: p.11; For one example of this in Plato see Plato, *Alcibiades I*: 130c-133c.

transcendent to enable the spirit to be free. Leo wrote of fate and the horoscope when he stated:

The horoscope of any man is the outcome of his thoughts, desires and motives in previous lives. These have materialised into a web or garment, as it were, in which the soul is clothed; and this constitutes his “karma, fate or Destiny”.³⁸

Leo thus adopted a dualist libertarian solution to the free will dilemma.

Working from a different point of view was the British astrologer Margaret Hone (1892–1969) who, along with Charles Carter, was one of the founding members of the Faculty of Astrological Studies in London in 1948. Thus Hone adopted a Plotinus like symbol-driven, sympathetic cosmos (see the Sympathetic cosmology notes for Plotinus). Plotinus had written that ‘...All teems with symbol; the wise man is the man who in any one thing can read another, a process familiar to all of us in not a few examples of everyday experience.’³⁹ Thus Hone stressed the idea that the horoscope was symbolic rather than factual.

With the horoscope filled with symbols Hone focused on the attributes of the horoscope. Since the time of Plato the will had resided in the human soul. In the thirteenth century Saint Thomas Aquinas made it clear that the will/soul was not contained in the horoscope. However, Hone adopted a Stoic rather than Platonist’s position and argued that the soul/will was not a separate entity to the body and both were located within the psyche which was itself reflected in the horoscope.⁴⁰ For Hone *all* was thus contained in the horoscope. Hone considered that the will which was reflected in the horoscope was, in some manner, free to select the expression of the ambiguous symbols in one’s life. One’s freedom was limited to the parameters of the symbols but these parameters were ambiguous. Hone argued for an attitude of acceptance to the difficulties that may be seen in the horoscope and that such acceptance allowed for,

a shifting of the viewpoint, a beginning of a detached attitude, from which the person becomes the *observer of the doer*. The acceptance of the pattern of life, ... is perhaps one of the greatest lessons which can be learnt and one most likely to produce true understanding of life.⁴¹

³⁸ Leo, *The Progressed Horoscope*: p.xiv.

³⁹ Plotinus, *The Enneads*: II.3.7.

⁴⁰ Hone only mentions the soul three times but each time is to dismiss it as the holder of free will: Margaret E. Hone, *The Modern Text-Book of Astrology*, 5th ed. (London: L N Fowler & Co. Ltd, [1951] 1973), p.30, p.79 and p.151.

⁴¹ Hone, *The Modern Text-Book of Astrology*: p.302.

Hone also made another radical shift in the relationship between astrologers and their personal horoscope. Leo, for example, had seen the horoscope as reflecting the person's past lives, a unique signature of the spiritual self however Hone argued that:

The expression "your" horoscope has been used so freely that he [the client or astrologer] does not realise that it is not "his" at all, but is a snapshot of a fleeting moment of time, with the developments of which his life has continued to correlate.⁴²

For Hone the world was not, as Plato had argued, a benefic place designed for the good of the human soul but was instead emergent and thus changing. Humanity was born into this emergent pool of Jungian archetypes and the individual's psyche, reflected in the horoscope, was a personally-lived expression of the state of this emergence at the time of birth. Evident in Hone's astrology is that she saw humanity as a part of the natural world and one's fate was to be reflective of that world. By extension the complexes of the human psyche were a reflection of the state of the world at the time of birth.⁴³

Thus where Alan Leo was a Platonist, applying dualistic and libertarian views to how he saw the horoscope, Margaret Hone was more Stoic which meant she saw the horoscope as a far more empowered instrument containing all of life, body and soul. The view of fate that an astrologer holds will alter the attributes they assign to the horoscope.

In Summary

Fate is a set of personal views which embraces the nature of the soul, the meaning of existence and the role of the divine within the individual's life. Depending on these views fate may be seen as an inevitable or a non-inevitable influence or animated force that may be accepted or can be altered, transformed, or co-created. Within the practice of astrology questions about fate lead to questions about the attributes of the horoscope. In these brief notes Alan Leo's thinking on fate and the horoscope have been compared with those of Margaret Hone. Leo considered that the horoscope represented the world of matter, was created by the individual's previous actions and that the soul, spirit and thus human will, were not reflected within in the horoscope. In contrast Hone taught that all was contained within the horoscope – body, soul, spirit, psyche

⁴² Hone, *The Modern Text-Book of Astrology*: p.303.

⁴³ See chapter 18: Hone, *The Modern Text-Book of Astrology*.

and will and furthermore it was a reflection of the state of the world at the moment of birth – at times easy while at other times difficult. These examples of Leo and Hone are just two examples of the different styles of thinking on fate and the horoscope contained within contemporary astrology.