

Pauliina Remes • Juha Sihvola
Editors

Ancient Philosophy of the Self



Springer

Editors

Pauliina Remes
Uppsala University
Sweden
and
University of Helsinki
Finland

Juha Sihvola
Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies
University of Helsinki
Finland

ISBN 978-1-4020-8595-6

e-ISBN 978-1-4020-8596-3

Library of Congress Control Number: 2008928521

© 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

Printed on acid-free paper

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

springer.com

Two Kinds of Subjectivity in Augustine's *Confessions*: Memory and Identity, and the Integrated Self

Gerard J.P. O'Daly

There are several explorations of subjectivity in Augustine's thought.¹ One is the so-called Augustinian Cogito, where the phenomenon of my awareness of my mental activities (even the awareness of being mistaken) is the basis of epistemological claims about the attainability of certainty. But in one of his Cogito discussions, in Book 10 of his work *On the Trinity*, Augustine seems to take the argument further, developing the concept of the human mind as a self-thinking subject that is totally present to itself, an argument that is heavily influenced by Plotinus and Porphyry.² To these one should add Augustine's accounts of inwardness, the concepts of the mind as an "inner space" and of the "inward and upward" turn of its discovery of itself and God, in texts where the themes of interiority and mental ascent are, once again, influenced by the Neoplatonists.³ This paper considers two further exercises in Augustinian subjectivity, one familiar, on memory and identity, one less so, on the congruity (or lack of it) between "inner" and "outer" in certain emotionally-charged states. In both cases, the most important texts are in the *Confessions*. In my conclusion, I consider briefly some general implications of these texts.

¹ Versions of this paper were delivered at a conference in honour of Peter Brown at University College Dublin in 2001, and at a CNRS colloquium on aspects of the self in ancient philosophy at Paris-Villejuif in 2004.

² On Augustine and Descartes' Cogito see Gareth B. Matthews, *Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1992; Stephen Menn, *Descartes and Augustine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998; Emmanuel Bermon, *Le Cogito dans la pensée de Saint Augustin*, Paris: Vrin 2001 (the fullest discussion of Augustine, also containing detailed comparisons with Husserl); Richard Sorabji, *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life, and Death*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006, 212–229 (an important discussion of *On the Trinity* 10); *De trin.* 9 and 10: see Gerard O'Daly, "Subject and Substance: Self-Knowledge in Augustine's *On the Trinity*", in Matthias Vorwerk (ed.), *Augustine and Augustinianism. Contributions on Augustinian Philosophy and Its Reception*. Catholic University of America School of Philosophy Fall Lecture Series 2006 (Washington, DC, forthcoming).

³ The terms "inner space" and "inward and upward" turn are taken from Philip Cary, *Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self. The Legacy of a Christian Platonist* (New York: Oxford University Press 2000), whose account of Augustine's views is persuasive, but who underestimates the influence of Plotinus.

Augustine on Memory and Identity

The discussion of the phenomenal memory of a certain Simplicius in *On the Nature and Origin of the Soul* 4.9–10 raises a question about identity. The issue is: what has changed, if Simplicius knows something about himself that, though being apparently the same person, he did not know before – if, for instance, he realizes the power and extent of his memory, which enables him to recite passages of Cicero or Virgil from any given place in the works chosen by his questioners? Augustine makes heavy weather of this phenomenon. He realizes that it raises the same question as does the case of forgetting what I once knew. Something has changed in me, but if this is a change of our identity, of “what we are”, then we are changing all the time. A concept of the unconscious or of latent awareness – such as that of Plotinus – might have solved Augustine’s dilemma here. Augustine employs such a concept in *On the Trinity* 14, arguing that when the mind is not actively thinking of itself, it none the less knows itself, just as someone who knows geometry is not ignorant of it if he is not actually thinking of it. His knowledge is stored in his memory.⁴ Alternatively, Augustine might have tried to distinguish between the kind of memory or knowledge that makes me what I am, and other kinds that do not. As we shall see, he appears to make this distinction in other texts.

I turn now to some aspects of Augustine’s account of memory, which raise the question of memory’s relation to the individual’s identity. Of the “power of memory” (*vis [...] memoriae*) Augustine says “my mind is this thing; I am this thing” (*et hoc animus est, et hoc ego ipse sum, Conf. 10.17.26*).⁵ On a minimalist reading of this kind of assertion, we could argue that Augustine is talking here about the status of memory in humans as a mental activity, as the mind engaged in certain activities. Previously I adopted such a minimalist reading, suggesting that ‘mind’ and ‘memory’ have here, in Frege’s terms, the same reference (*Bedeutung*) but a different sense (*Sinn*).⁶ I am not sure now that this fully exploits what Augustine means when he says that my mind – that I – am my memory.

To begin with, Augustine considers parts of his life of which he has no conscious memory, such as infancy, to be no more “his” than the period prior to his birth: “what does it matter to me now, seeing as I cannot recall any traces of it?” (*quid mihi iam cum eo est, cuius nulla vestigia recolo? Conf. 1.7.12*). So “I would be [...] reluctant to consider that life to be of a piece with the one I now live in this world (*piget me adnumerare huic vitae meae, quam vivo in hoc saeculo, ibid.*)”. This puzzle remains. My sense of what I can remember defines the parameters of what I can

⁴Eric R. Dodds, *The Ancient Concept of Progress and Other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1973, 135–136; Gerard O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind*, Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press/London: Duckworth 1987, 149–150. See Plotinus, *Enn.* IV.4 [28] 8, IV.8 [6] 8; Augustine on latent memory, *De trin.* 14.8–9.

⁵Here and in the rest of this paper I use (modifying it occasionally) the excellent recent translation of *Conf.* by Philip Burton: *Augustine: The Confessions*, London: Everyman 2001.

⁶O’Daly 1987, 135–136.

intelligibly call "mine". Augustine appears to be saying that what I cannot remember does not contribute to my identity, even if it has been part of my experience.⁷

Consider another passage in Augustine's account of memory in Book 10 of the *Confessions*.

It is I who remember, I, the mind. It is not so strange if what I am not is far from me; but what is closer to myself than I am? And yet the power of my memory is not comprehended by me, since I cannot name myself without it.

(*Conf.* 10.16.25)⁸

The context here is the phenomenon of forgetting. Martha Nussbaum observes on this passage: "A really successful dissociation of the self from memory would be a total loss of the self – thus of all activities to which a sense of one's identity is important". And she adds that this sense of oneself as a temporal being with a history is crucial to the individual's progress in the quest for goodness and knowledge (of self, of God), even if "this temporal history may be a nonnecessary property of his soul".⁹ This is a non-Platonic view of human moral progress, in which temporal memory is crucial to moral self-knowledge, because memory recalls what we were, what we have become, and in what ways the force of habit still constrains us. Thus, in *Confessions* (in a part of the *Confessions* to which I return later in this paper), reflecting on Monnica's death and his inability to weep or be helped by prayer, Augustine writes:

[...] All day long my deep grief was hidden and with a disturbed mind I besought you, as best I could, to heal my grief. But you did not heal me, perhaps wishing to impress on my memory by this one example how the chain of every habit is opposed to a mind which feeds on the Word in whom there is no deceit

(*Conf.* 9.12.32)¹⁰

That is to say, we are vulnerable, not merely to our own imperfections, but also to divine grace, and particularly to divine use of our memory as a means of understanding both ourselves and God.

At the same time, Augustine stresses our lack of self-knowledge, the opacity to ourselves of what we really are. For him, this is a consequence of original sin. So is our lack of transparency to each other.¹¹ The early sections of *Confessions* 10 explore aspects of this. *Confessions* 10.2.2 speaks ambiguously of the "depths of human conscience" (or consciousness, *abyssus humanae conscientiae*).¹²

⁷ On memory and personal identity over time see Sorabji 2006, 94–111, here 99–100 on Augustine. For memory in the afterlife see the passages in *De civ. D.* 22 and *De trin.* 14 discussed below.

⁸ "ego sum qui memini, ego animus. non ita mirum, si a me longe est quiddam ego non sum: quid enim propinquius me ipso mihi? Et ecce memoriae meae vis non comprehenditur a me, cum ipsum me non dicam praeter illam".

⁹ Martha Nussbaum, "Augustine and Dante on the Ascent of Love", in Gareth B. Matthews (ed.), *The Augustinian Tradition*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1999, 61–90, see 68.

¹⁰ "[...] toto die graviter in occulto maestus eram et mente turbata rogabam te, ut poteram, quo sanares dolorem meum, nec faciebas, credo, commendans memoriae meae vel hoc uno documento omnis consuetudinis vinculum etiam adversus mentem, quae iam non fallaci verbo pascitur".

¹¹ *Conf.* 10.8.15, 10.16.25, 10.32.48, 10.37.61, 13.31.46.

¹² For the ambiguity see Cornelius Mayer, "Conscientia", in C. Mayer (ed.), *Augustinus-Lexikon* 1, Basel: Schwabe 1994, cols. 1218–1228.

Others cannot know, and can only believe, on the basis of what I confess, "what I myself am within" (*quid ipse intus sim*, *Conf.* 10.3.4). We seem to be dealing with a concept of the private 'me', of a 'me' known only to God. This is to be distinguished from the 'inner man' (*homo interior*) of *Conf.* 10.6.9, who knows that he is a created being, just as it is to be distinguished from memory. Now, although these opening chapters of *Conf.* 10 immediately precede the account of memory, they are a prelude to the book in general, and in particular they anticipate the moral self-examination of *Conf.* 10.28.39–43.70. For the self which Augustine finds puzzling at the beginning of *Conf.* 10 is the morally complex and contradictory self analysed in these later chapters, where dreams (10.30.41), curiosity (10.35.54–7), and attitudes to the approval of others (10.37.61) surprise and dismay Augustine. The self-analysis is an examination of conscience. O'Donovan stresses Augustine's moralizing interpretation of Platonic spirituality through the identification of the inner self with conscience-consciousness (*conscientia*). Self-scrutiny becomes a constant spiritual discipline, of which *Conf.* 10 is perhaps the prime example.¹³

In paradise, by contrast, our lack of self-knowledge and of knowledge of each other will give way to reciprocal knowing: "the thoughts of each of us will lie open to the other" (*patebunt [...] cogitationes nostrae invicem nobis*, *De civ. D.* 22.29). We will see things through the Spirit. But Augustine suggests elsewhere, adapting 1 Corinthians 2.11–12, that when we do so, it is not we who see, but God who sees in us (*Conf.* 13.31.46). What Augustine appears to be arguing is the Pauline belief that I should aspire to a state where "my" vision is supplanted by God's vision in me. However, it is clear that Augustine does not wish to suggest that this involves a loss of personal identity. For he also maintains that we continue to have memory of temporal things in the afterlife. We will recall the contents of our temporal religious faith then, just as we now recall past events of our lives (*De trin.* 14.4–5). Faith, and presumably other recollected experiences of our lives, will leave "a trace in the imagination" (*imaginarium vestigium*, *De trin.* 14.5). Why does Augustine maintain this? Passages like *De civ. D.* 22.20–1 and 22.30 suggest that these traces of our temporal lives have something to do with the fact that our resurrected state is bodily, that our final state, though eternal, will be durational, with memories. The damned will have the same sense of duration and memory as the saved.¹⁴ At the same time, Augustine suggests that awareness of the difference between, for instance, former faith and present knowledge (seeing God face to face) marks the continuing distinction between creator and creature. Awareness of what I once was, compared with awareness of what I now am, is not merely a feature of this life (as *Conf.* 9.12.32, referred to above, shows), but also of the afterlife.

In *Confessions* 10.40.65 Augustine argues that memory entails a 'force' (*vis*) of the mind, distinguished from *ego*: "nor was it I who discovered [...] nor was it I who did all this – that is, the force that is in me by which I did it" (*nec ego ipse inventor*

¹³ Oliver O'Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1980, 70–72.

¹⁴ For the damned see *De civ. D.* 21.9–13, 17–24.

[...] *nec ego ipse, cum haec agerem, id est vis mea, qua id agebam*). This “force” scans sense-perception and ideas, and is aware that it is not God – “nor were you that force” (*nec ipsa eras tu*) – but that God is (a) the light or teacher of the mind, working through the “force” whereby the mind remembers, and (b) the “place” in which the mind subsists, and finds coherence and stability. God is the *sine qua non* of the memory's operation. Augustine's characteristic illumination-doctrine is implied here.¹⁵ The “I” that memory reveals is not an autonomous agent.

Confessions 10.2 summarizes, and clarifies, some of these ideas in a striking way, by considering the purpose of writing confessions. It is not to reveal something about me to God of which God would otherwise have been unaware – for God is omniscient – but to prevent my hiding God from myself, and hence to prompt my moral self-awareness. In a context of self-scrutiny, confession uncovers some of the secrets of myself to me. My sense of my moral failings and inadequacy is highlighted by an understanding of divine perfection, and of the divine as an object of love and longing. Confession is exposure to divine goodness. Self-examination and self-revelation are means to this end. The language has Platonic overtones, but it also reminds us of the kind of self-scrutiny that we find, for instance, in Seneca. Augustine has a concept of identity, and memory plays a crucial role in it. But some kinds of memory are more important than others. The memories that matter are those that reveal to us our moral condition, and our progress in understanding our relationship to the divine.

Friendship and the Self

I turn now to what I read as two related accounts of friendship (*amicitia*) in the *Confessions*, accounts that express something important about Augustine's sense of self in relation to another person. One of these is the well-known narrative of the death of a friend of Augustine's youth in Book 4 of the *Confessions*, and Augustine's reaction to it. The other is not usually read as an account of *amicitia*, but I shall argue that it is: I refer to Augustine's description of the death of his mother Monnica in Book 9, and his reaction to it. What we have to do with in these two episodes, as is frequently the case in the *Confessions*, is the use of narrative, with reflective inserts, as a way of philosophizing.

Philosophically delineated friendship, properly understood (a non-selfish, non-possessive relationship), is Augustine's model for inter-personal relations.¹⁶

¹⁵ O'Daly 1987, 204–207.

¹⁶ Cicero's *On Friendship* is Augustine's principal source for philosophical ideas on friendship. On Cicero and his Greek sources see Jonathan G.F. Powell, *Cicero: On Friendship and the Dream of Scipio*, Warminster: Aris & Philips 1990. Christian friendship in Augustine's day, see Carolynne White, *Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992. Friendship in Augustine, above all, *Letter 258*; Marie A. MacNamara, *Friends and Friendship for St. Augustine*, Staten Island, NY: Alba House 1964.

In *Confessions* 9, Augustine and Monnica exemplify this approved friendship (the contrast with *Confessions* 4 is deliberate, as we will see), and their dialogue (the so-called Ostia vision) conjures up an image of what eternal life must be like. The insight that the conversation of friends achieves has a similar function to the uses of memory in moral self-awareness discussed above.¹⁷

Now, in *Confessions* 4 the easing role of grief at his friend's death reveals what I shall call an inner/outer congruity, that is, there is a consistency between Augustine's feelings and his external behaviour. But this congruity is then analysed as flawed and unstable. In *Confessions* 9, the difficulty of grieving at Monnica's death reveals an inner/outer incongruity that is only partly overcome by the release of grief through weeping that is (we must assume) divinely granted, and that is finally resolved in an objectifying transformation of grief, as Augustine realizes what true friendship is.

But before we turn to these two passages in more detail, let us recall some relevant aspects of philosophical friendship, particularly in Cicero's account in his *On Friendship* (*De Amicitia*), which influences Augustine strongly, both verbally and conceptually. The characteristic features of friendship that Cicero enumerates are considered by Augustine to be those of the virtuous life in general. Friendship provides stability (*stabilitas, constantia*), friends see into each other's heart (*apertum pectus*), the life of true friends exemplifies the workings of rationality in their lives. Augustine sees in friendship the true realization of the scope of our moral and intellectual development.¹⁸ By contrast, false friendship – like evil – is, for Augustine, “incomprehensible” (*investigabilis, Conf. 2.9.17*), ultimately not accessible to rational investigation. Moreover, discussions of friendship in the tradition of which Cicero's *On Friendship* and Augustine's accounts are a part express the friendship relation in terms of one's relation to oneself: one merges one's identity with the friend's; a friend is a second “me”; friends have all things in common; two friends share one soul; one can talk to a friend as if with oneself – and so on.¹⁹

In *Confessions* 4.4.7, Augustine characterizes his friendship as false friendship (by contrast with the true variety, understood here in explicit Christian terms, with

¹⁷Dialogue permeates the *Confessions*. Dialogue between God and Augustine is the means of unfolding the workings of divine grace in a human life. Even the conversion-scene (*Conf. 8*), intensely personal though it is, has dramatic dialogue features, involving Augustine and others: his closest friend Alypius (8.8.19), his old “girl-friends” (*amicae*) the vices (8.11.26), personified Continence (8.11.27), Scripture (8.12.29). We have here one real person, two personifications, and one interaction with a text: but the element of dialogue is common to them all. The act of will that is conversion – a subjective, personal moment – is thus contextualized socially. Its consequences are implemented socially, in Augustine's change of career and lifestyle. Augustine's conversion may be personal, but it is in no sense private. It carries Alypius in its wake, and Augustine's completes its narration by the involvement of Monnica in it (8.12.30).

¹⁸Stability, see Cicero, *De am.* 62–65. “Open heart”, *ibid.* 97. Friendship and the good/wise life, *ibid.* 18–21 and *passim*. Augustine on friendship and the life of reason/wisdom, see *Soliloquies* 1.7, 20, 22; *Ep.* 10 and 258.

¹⁹For references to these *topoi* see White 1992, 273.

a link made between love and the Holy Spirit), but none the less “sweet” because of the “interests” shared, and “ripened” (*cocta*), by those interests, namely, the shared Manichaeism of the two friends. When his friend dies, Augustine writes that he could not account for his sense of grief and loss (4.4.9). Yet he grieves spontaneously. Tears flow. There is an inner/outer congruity, but it is not understood by Augustine. In retrospect, he sees his wretchedness as an indulgence, based on too great attachment (4.5.10). His “other self” – the traditional description of the friend since Aristotle²⁰ – was dead. Did he stay alive to keep his friend alive? “I did not wish to live, a half” (4.6.11). When he reviews this passage late in his life, in *Retractations* 2.6.2 he finds it to be “a frivolous oratorical display” (*declamatio levis*), not a “serious avowal” (*gravis confessio*). There is a correlation, he implies, between false sensibility and the falsity of his rhetoric.²¹ To return to the *Confessions* narrative: after his friend's death, “[...] everything was an object of horror [...] I had become to myself a place of unhappiness [...] my error was my god” (*horrebant omnia [...] et ego mihi remanseram infelix locus [...] error meus erat deus meus*, *Conf.* 4.7.12). The “place of unhappiness” (or, possibly, “barren place”) here should be linked to Augustine's descriptions elsewhere of the human condition as a “place of want” or “place of unlikeness”.²² In retrospect, he finds this state of mind compounded of “tainted emotions” (*Conf.* 4.6.11).²³

Grief, nevertheless, runs its course, subsides (*Conf.* 4.8.13). Augustine has not understood the nature of mortality. Other living friends provide solace, but his love for them – again seen in retrospect – is a substitute for love of God. His condition is a “great myth, a long lie” (*ingens fabula et longum mendacium*, *Conf.* 4.8.13). He loved a mortal person as if he would never die, “pouring out his soul on to the sand” (*ibid.*): there was no stability (*constantia*) in his condition (see above).

Yet into this highly self-critical narrative Augustine inserts (4.8.13) a description of friendship that is uncomplicated and spontaneous, and that is not, for once, evaluative. It is the apparent acceptability of friendship of this kind – the sense in which it is, in part, understandable – that makes Augustine's critique of his friendship with his dead friend complex. To a certain extent, it imitated true friendship.²⁴ It was reciprocal. Augustine and his friend loved each other (*amare-redamare*, 4.9.14); they lived Cicero's friendship, wishing the other well (*benivolentia*, 4.8.13); their plurality had become a unity (*ex pluribus unum*, 4.8.13),²⁵ even if, in retrospect, it is seen to have been inadequate.

²⁰ Arist. *EN* IX 4, 1166a 31–32 (for further references to Aristotle and others see Powell 1990, 91).

²¹ Cf. Augustine's critique of oratory in *Conf.* 1.9.14, 4.2.2, etc.

²² Burton translates *infelix locus* as “a barren land”. For the “place of want” (*regio egestatis*) see *Conf.* 2.10.18; for “place of unlikeness” (*in regione dissimilitudinis*), *Conf.* 7.10.16, influenced by Plotinus 1.8.[57]13.16–17, which derives in turn from Plotinus' reading of Plato, *Statesman* 273d6–e1.

²³ “*me mundas a talium affectionum immunditia*”, lit. “the taint of such feelings”, *Conf.* 4.6.11.

²⁴ The subtext here is Augustine's belief that evil is a “perverse imitation” of the good, a travesty of self-love. For this theme see O'Donovan 1980, 93–111.

²⁵ Cf. Cicero, *De am.* 92 (*unus [...] animus [...] ex pluribus*); *benivolentia* in *De am.* 26; *redamare*, *ibid.* 49.

The narrative of the death of his mother Monnica in *Confessions* 9 is a meditation (not often recognized as such) on Christian friendship. Christian attitudes forbidding expression of grief and mourning²⁶ create tension in Augustine, who initially will not, and subsequently cannot, grieve for his mother: he “weeps” internally, but sheds no tears (9.12.29). The boy Adeodatus, on the other hand, can weep unself-consciously (*ibid.*). In 9.12.30 Augustine defines his and Monnica’s relationship in terms of the ‘habit’ (*consuetudo*) – not necessarily a positive term – of friendship. At the end of the passage the theme of friendship (the “one life” of Augustine and Monnica) dominates.²⁷ His sense of loss is linked to his feelings for his dead friend in *Confessions* 4. In the later narrative the metaphors for his grief are vivid: he is wounded, torn to pieces (9.12.31, 9.13.34). What, if anything, has changed in the converted Augustine of Book 9?

As in *Confessions* 4, Augustine’s reflective narrative is self-critical. “I rebuked my affection [...] for its lack of toughness” (*inreprobam mollitiam affectus mei*, 9.12.31). But there is a radical change, due to his suppression of his grief. Now there is a contrast and tension between his inner and outer selves, between the unemotional exterior and the turbulent interior. His sense of his human weakness causes in him a “twofold sadness” because he grieves for the very existence of his grief.²⁸

At Monnica’s funeral Augustine still experiences this inner/outer incongruity. He is still dominated by his passions, by habit (9.12.31). Later, however, he will weep. The “carnal passion” (*carnalis affectus*, 9.13.34) of his incongruous state gives way to “another kind of tears” (*ibid.*) for Monnica and for himself (*de illa et pro illa, de me et pro me*, 9.12.33). Augustine alludes here to the view that ritual expressions of grief are a psychological comfort for the survivors.²⁹ But more is happening at this stage of the narrative. The linkage of grief for himself with grief for his mother reworks the theme of the friend as one’s other self. Moreover, in weeping for Monnica and for himself, he weeps for imperfect humans, who are mortal, and need divine mercy. Monnica’s death and Augustine’s grief are objectified. In the increasingly liturgical context of the prayer for the dead (which Augustine extends to his dead father) in 9.13.35–7, she becomes God’s servant (*famula tua*, 9.13.37) – at one level, depersonalized: but she is also given an identity separate from the mother-son relationship by being named (as appropriately in the

²⁶ Attitudes shared with, and often influenced by, Greek, especially Stoic, philosophical positions. see J.H. David Scourfield, *Consoling Heliodorus: A Commentary on Jerome Letter 60*, Oxford: Clarendon 1993: 22, 130–132.

²⁷ Cf. *Conf.* 4.8.13.

²⁸ His grief in *Conf.* 9.12.31 is the passion of *tristitia*. Cf. the earlier instances in this passage of the language of the passions: “the softness of my affection” (*mollitiam affectus mei*), “flood of sorrow” (*fluxum maeroris*).

²⁹ Cf. *De civ. D.* 1.12–13; Gerard O’Daly, *Augustine’s City of God: A Reader’s Guide*, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, 76–77. For Jerome’s attitude to the appropriateness of Christian grief for the dead, in many respects like Augustine’s, but more inclined to accept expression of grief, see his *Ep.* 60.2, 7, and Scourfield 1993, *ad loc.*

liturgical context here as it would be in a tomb-inscription) “Monnica” here (*ibid.*), the only time in Augustine’s writings that she is so named. The “chain of faith” (*vinculum fidei*, 9.13.36) supersedes the “chain of habit” (*vinculum consuetudinis*) of 9.12.32. The emotion of grief is not eradicated, but transformed: the inner/outer tension is resolved. Augustine has achieved a metamorphosis of grief that he could not have achieved at the stage of his friendship of *Confessions* 4. By situating his grief in the appropriate religious context, he overcomes its self-absorption, overcomes also the “unlikeness” (*dissimilitudo*) between his inner and outer selves (see above): we could speak of an integrated self. As well as this integration of the inner and the outer, there is a realization that we must act in the world, in relation to others, and not in isolation. At the same time, the experience is humanizing, for, rather than suppressing his grief, he can now appropriately give way to it. The experience is one of self-transformation, through realization of what true friendship entails.

Concluding Thoughts

The exercise of memory is quintessentially subjective and personal (if one sets aside such phenomena as folk memory and collectively remembered historical experience, which Augustine does not consider). In that sense, Augustine’s account of memory in the *Confessions* and some other texts is like those kinds of self-scrutiny – the Cogito and the inward turn and ascent – mentioned at the beginning of this paper. On the other hand, the theme of inner/outer congruity and its opposite in *Confessions* 4 and 9 depends on an account of the self in relation to others. But common to all the kinds of subjectivity referred to or discussed in this paper, with the exception of the Cogito (to which, in turn, the discussion of self-knowledge in *On the Trinity* 9 and 10 is an exception), is the linking of this strand of reflection to the individual’s moral and religious progress. Augustine is often less concerned to formulate a concept of the self than to exploit the moral implications of various forms of subjectively oriented discourse.

University College London, UK