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NATIVE REVOLTS IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE*

I

One of the most persistent phenomena related to the extension of Roman conquest and control in the Western Empire was the sudden, widespread native revolt. This is not the initial resistance to the Roman advance, but an uprising among people who are regarded as basically conquered and in the process of Romanization. Some of these are local movements. Others engulfed whole provinces, and in one case led to the complete loss of an area to Roman control. As a repeating social movement in the process of acculturation, they are worthy of study both for the ancient historian and the more general student of social history.

Many examples could be included in such a survey. Some additional uprising such as the slave revolts and the Jewish revolts manifest characteristics that are in part typical of these movements. However, I have selected five major examples that best illustrate the characteristics that I feel are common to this phenomenon. These are the revolt of Vercingetorix, the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt, the revolt of Arminius, the revolt of Boudicca and the Batavian revolt. All were major rebellions encompassing large areas of a province. All occurred in the early stages of the imposition of Roman military and administrative control. All shared certain common causes and patterns of leadership. Moreover, although documentation for these five is by no means adequate, especially for anyone trying to do socio-psychological history, it is still more abundant than that for some of the smaller but potentially interesting revolts within the Roman Empire.

I have several reasons for making a comparative study of this type. First of all, the similarity of these revolts is sufficiently striking to make one wonder whether they do not raise common problems on the nature and limitations of the Romanization process. However, they have generally been considered in the individual context of particular provinces, which has often led to nation-

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alistic or partly nationalistic interpretation. Comparative study is necessary to change this tendency and allow these movements to be seen as the outcome of a more general social development. In addition to their interest for the student of Roman history, these revolts should be brought to the attention of anthropologists and historians interested in acculturation and colonial history. Such uprisings recurred frequently during the spread of modern colonialism. The classical examples can provide information on the similarities and differences of this type of social movement in a varied social, historical and cultural context, and thus aid in the formation of sounder models of cultural change. For the classical scholar, a knowledge of this type of revolt as it appears in later, better documented historical contexts will allow him a fuller understanding of the possible anthropological, psychological and historical circumstances that produced them in antiquity.

This paper will be divided into two major parts. In the first, I will discuss in detail the five revolts I have selected. Special attention will be paid to the structure of native society and how this had been affected by the process of conquest and acculturation; the pattern of native leadership during these revolts; circumstances resulting from either native tradition or Roman administrative practice that might have fostered native unity; the various causes of the rebellions; any attendant psychological or religious factors; and finally the experience and reaction of the Roman officials.

The second part is concerned with a more general discussion of the common qualities of these revolts and their relation to our evidence on modern native movements. In this I will try to employ some recent historical, anthropological and psychological information and theory. Such a discussion cannot be definitive, because of the writer's limited acquaintance with these varied fields and the complexity of the problem. However, a general discussion is better begun with an acknowledgement of the limitations than avoided; for it is in the area of contribution to general social and psychological theory that the study of the several uprisings would seem to have its greatest importance.

The first revolt to be discussed is also the earliest in time. This is the rebellion of Vercingetorix against Caesar. It is the best recorded of the revolts from contemporary sources and thus allows a more detailed analysis of its origin and development. Of course, the limitations of Caesar should be kept in mind, but we should be grateful for the relatively large amount of useful information that he gives.¹ Supported by other historical sources and by the archaeological evidence, the Commentaries allow a fuller understanding of the process of native revolt than can be achieved in the later examples.

¹ I do not belong to the school of modern scholarship represented by M. Rambaud, *L'art de la déformation historique dans les commentaires de César* (Paris, 1966), or G. Walser, *Caesar und die Germanen* (Wiesbaden, 1956), that doubts strongly the credibility of Caesar, but believe that he should be treated with caution; → my article "Caesar and the Natives", *Classical Journal*, 63 (1968), pp. 341—46.

Of prime importance in understanding native political movements is the degree of contact that the indigenous people had with the higher Mediterranean cultures (Greek and Roman) before and during conquest. The changes and tensions that lead to such movements often start with initial trade contacts which involve the natives in the social and economic sphere of the higher culture and create often a desire for elements of this culture in the native society. This must certainly have been the case in Gaul. Extensive evidence exists for large quantities of trade goods entering Gaul for several centuries before the Roman conquest.² The territory of the Arverni, a natural depot for trade in this area of France, presumably was exposed early to Mediterranean influences.³ Very likely connected with these influences was the growth of a relatively strong central power in the Arvernian tribe. The first Arvernian that appears in our historical sources is Luerius, father of Bituitus, who is represented as building up a powerful clientage by the extravagant use and display of wealth. (Strabo 4.2.3; Athenaeus 4.152 D—F). His financial resources most likely reflect rebates or imposts from trade. Bituitus, who was the ruler of the Arverni at the time of the war against the Romans in 121 B. C., was also a person of great wealth (Florus 1.37.5—6; Appian, *Celtica* XII). In light of the assumption that the “Empire” of Bituitus was basically a system of alliances and of the fact that Vercingetorix used cash to consolidate his system of alliances (*B. G.* 7.31.1—2), Bituitus’ wealth may have played a significant part in his political success. If this wealth is indeed a by-product of the growth of trade with the Mediterranean, the related growth of concentrated political power can be regarded as an indirect result of acculturation.⁴

The defeat by the Romans and the removal of its leaders to Italy in 121 destroyed the “Arvernian Empire” (Appian *Celtica* 1.2; Pliny 7.166; Orosius 5.14.3). However, their territory now marched with both the Roman protectorate over Massiliote territory and also parts of the territory under direct Roman supervision.⁵ The three results of this were the continued growth of trade, the furtherance of native political instability and the cultivation by the Romans of a sympathetic party in the local tribes.⁶

² J. J. Hatt, *Histoire de la Gaule romaine* (Paris, 1959), chaps. 1—2; for the earlier Greek influence see F. Benoit, *Recherches sur l'hellénisation du Midi de la Gaule* (Aix-en-Provence, 1965).

³ C. Jullian, *Vercingétorix* (Paris, 1901) p. 50 Strabo (4.2.3.) noted that the “Arvernian Empire” extended to the borders of both Massilia and Narbo, the two major trading centers of south Gaul.

⁴ An analogy for the way in which outside trade affects local political power can be found in the case of the slave trade in West Africa and its impact on the development of states in the area; see B. Davidson, *A History of West Africa* (New York, 1966), p. 197—300.

⁵ See E. Badian, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic* (Oxford, 1967) p. 23 and note 30 for the argument that an actual province was not established after the conquest of the Arverni.

⁶ For a general discussion of the background to this period, see J. J. Hatt, *op. cit.*, p. 35—48.

Trade was continuous. As for the political instability, the best, although fragmentary witness is the father of Vercingetorix. Celtillus is described as “principatum Galliae totius obtinuerat et ob eam causam, quod regnum appetebat, ab civitate erat interfectus” (*B. G.* 7.4.1). This sounds very much like the type of activity that Luerius and Bituitus had engaged in and an anticipation of the efforts of Vercingetorix himself.

For the cultivation of a sympathetic native group by the Romans, there is considerable evidence both implicit and explicit. No trouble is recorded among the Arverni between 121 and the rebellion of Vercingetorix. When Vercingetorix planned his uprising, the rest of the chieftains did not think that the adventure should be hazarded and temporarily expelled him from the community (*B. G.* 7.4.2—3). Epasnactus, who turned over the rebel Luciterius to Caesar, is described as “amicissimus populi Romani” (*B. G.* 8.44.6). Even Vercingetorix may well have had a previous “friendship” with Caesar. Caesar himself does not mention it, but it is explicitly stated in Dio (40.41) in a tradition that probably goes back to Livy and Asinius Pollio.⁷ Considering the record of friendship with the Romans found among other leaders in the revolt (see below), this is not unlikely.

The Arverni thus appear to have accepted initial Roman control without notable resistance and to have had a reasonably large group among the aristocracy sympathetic or at least not overtly hostile to the Romans. The same was true of the Aedui. However, the Carnutes were a greater source of trouble. This area was regarded as the center of Gaul and held the assembly place of the Druids (*B. G.* 6.13.10). The Carnutes probably displayed more intransigence than any other Gallic tribe. In 54 B. C. Tasgetius, the king appointed by Caesar, was murdered by members of his own tribe (*B. G.* 5.25.1—4). Caesar sent in troops and punished the ringleaders. In the same year, they were active in the planned revolt of Indutiomarus (*B. G.* 5.56.4—5). The following year, they initially refused to send representatives to the general assembly called by Caesar (*B. G.* 6.3.4). Finally, they are the tribe that sparked the revolt of Vercingetorix with the massacre at Cenabum (*B. G.* 7.2—3). Even the events of Alesia did not subdue them completely. They harassed the Biturges so that Caesar had to lay waste their land (*B. G.* 8.4—5). Finally they surrendered (*B. G.* 8.31.4), and Caesar forced them to hand over Gutuatis, one of the ringleaders of the Cenabum massacre (*B. G.* 8.38.3—5). In spite of this history of trouble, there was at the time of the uprising a sizable colony of Roman traders among them and Caesar thought the area sufficiently secure to place his headquarters for his grain supply there (*B. G.* 7.2—3).

The fourth tribe that played a principal role in the revolt was the Senones. They were described as “civitas in primis firma et magnae inter Gallos aucto-

⁷ M. Gelzer, “Vercingetorix”, *R. E.* vii, A1, p. 982—83.

ritatis" (*B. G.* 5.54.2). Caesar had appointed a ruler for them, taking pains, as he had in the case of the Carnutes, to select him from a family that had strong claims to the office (*B. G.* 5.54.2). This man, Cavarinus, was expelled by his countrymen, but apparently restored (*B. G.* 6.5.2—3). The Senones joined the rebellion of Indutiomarus (*B. G.* 5.56.1). Acco tried to raise another Senonian rebellion, but was stopped and executed in the "Roman manner" (*B. G.* 6.4; 44.2—3). This execution caused great concern among the Gauls (*B. G.* 7.1.4—5). The only evidence of Romanization that Caesar gives is that he used Senonian cavalry in his army (*B. G.* 6.5).

Thus, of the four tribes that seem to have been the center of the rebellion, one was an old ally of the Romans, one had been pacifistic but had been the center of considerable power in Gaul and of previous major resistance to the Romans, and the other two had a history of agitation against the imposition of Roman rule by Caesar. However, in all of these a Roman faction existed, all seemed pacified and in all, the beginnings of Romanization through trade and military service had commenced. In none had the basic system of native leadership been radically altered, but merely adjusted to suit Roman needs.

The next question, after ascertaining the general history of contact and acculturation, is to determine the degree of Romanization of the native leadership class. Here, of course, the key person to be considered is Vercingetorix. Caesar centers his narrative on him, perhaps excessively. The revolt had begun before he joined it and continued after his defeat. Other men played an important role.⁸ However, his essential achievement in giving unity to the rebellion cannot be denied. I have noted above that there is some evidence that he was friendly with Caesar before the revolt. The degree of his formal Romanization is unknown. We are not told if he, like Arminius, Varus or Civilis, had served with the Roman forces. His ability both to control the motley Gallic levies and to counter Roman tactics and strategy suggest this.

However, as regards his power position, his tribe and place within the tribe were more important. The Arverni had in the second century B. C. been the leader of the Gauls. Memories of this certainly had survived and possibly also something of the traditions of interaction that had made this earlier union possible.⁹ Furthermore, Vercingetorix was the son of a man who had tried to become king of the Arverni. Although the father had been executed, the son evidently retained much of his resources, both in terms of clients

⁸ For Caesar's disproportionate interest in Vercingetorix, see the useful if exaggerated comments of M. Rambaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 303—4. For Vercingetorix in general, see M. Gelzer, "Vercingetorix", *R. E.*, vii, A1, pp. 981—1008.

⁹ For the ways in which the memories of an earlier native empire helped start a revolt, see T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia* (Evanston, 1967), pp. 6—15.

(*B. G.* 7.4) and money. All of the means for exercising leadership in the Gallic society were available for Vercingetorix. This and his undoubtedly charismatic qualities gave him the position of supreme leader.

Some of the other leaders also bear study. Commius is the most interesting. Next to Diviciacus, he was probably the Gallic chieftain regarded as most loyal and useful by Caesar. Caesar had made him king of the Atrebates and had used him in a scouting and diplomatic mission to Britain (*B. G.* 4.21.7; 4.27). He was left to watch over the Menapii (*B. G.* 6.6.4). Yet when the revolt came, Commius became one of its leaders. Caesar analyzed his action in this way:

“Huius opera Commi, ut antea demonstravimus, fideli atque utili superioribus annis erat usus in Britannia Caesar; quibus ille pro meritis civitatem eius immunem esse iusserat, iura legesque reddiderat atque ipsi Morinos attribuerat. Tamen tanta universae Galliae consensio fuit libertatis vindicandae et pristinae belli laudis recipiendae, ut neque beneficiis neque amicitiae memoria moverentur, omnesque et animo et opibus in id bellum incumberent”. (*B. G.* 7.76.1—2).

This perceptive statement of Caesar brings out the strong psychological motives that drove the Gauls to rebellion.

Commius had a leading place in the revolt. He was one of the leaders of the relief expedition to Alesia (*B. G.* 7.79) and continued to fight on after the defeat of Vercingetorix (*B. G.*, 8.6—7). Labienus had tried to have him assassinated, but the attempt failed (*B. G.* 8.23). Caesar’s account of the military action in Gaul ends with the last desperate attack of Commius on the Roman forces and his final yielding on the condition that “ne in conspectum veniat cuiusquam Romani” (*B. G.* 8.48.9). To fulfill this pledge, Commius fled to Britain (Frontinus, *Strategemata* 2.13.11).

Of the other chieftains who led the relief expedition to Alesia, Eporedorix and Viridomarus were also what might be called loyal natives. Eporedorix had served with Caesar (*B. G.* 7.39.1—2) while Viridomarus had been recommended to Caesar by Diviciacus and had been advanced from “ex humili loco ad summam dignitatem” (*B. G.* 7.39.1—2), yet both betrayed the Roman cause. Among the Aedui, Convictolitavis, who had received his magistracy through the decision of Caesar, also joined the rebellion (*B. G.* 7.37.1; 7.55.4). Not only old loyalty to Rome was forgotten, but also old rivalry. Eporedorix and Viridomarus had been active rivals (*B. G.* 7.39.2—3). Yet another example of this type of defection was Teutomates, king of the Nitoburges, whose father had been saluted as a friend of the Roman people (*B. G.* 7.31.5).

I have already mentioned the existence of some tradition of a strong “empire” among the Gauls. Another potential source of unity was the assembly of natives. There was some local tradition for this, but its strength as a uni-

fying force for Gaul has been disputed.¹⁰ It existed in some form before Caesar and Caesar continued to use it for his own end, calling assemblies often to deal with troubles in Gaul (*B. G.* 1.30.31; 6.3.4–6). The effects of these councils at which the Gauls were made conscious of both their unity and their state of common oppression in fomenting rebellion should not be underestimated. Speaking of the ambition of Vercingetorix, M. Gelzer remarks:

“Soon his ambition gave him ideas of becoming king in a national Celtic state, an ideal that had only become a possibility because Caesar had forced the multifarious Celtic states into the framework of a united province, thus making the Celts conscious of their national unity as being no less a political unity.”¹¹

In spite of certain modern nationalistic concepts, the statement emphasizes well the importance of the Gallic national assembly. As another student of Caesar’s conquest concludes:

“Ainsi, cet organisme représentatif dont César aurait voulu, après l’heureuse expérience de 58, faire un instrument de tutelle, s’est usé très vite, pour passer en bloc à la rébellion.”¹²

The importance of these assemblies for Gallic unity is shown by the calling of such a convocation at Bibracte at the height of the rebellion to decide on leadership and strategy (*B. G.* 7.63.5–9).

The outbreak of the rebellion seems to have been the result of both immediate provocation and deeper underlying psychological fears. I have already noted above that there had been recent trouble in several of the tribes. The execution of the Carnutian rebel leader Acco had caused great discontent among the Gallic chieftains and fear for their position. This was represented as one of the major stimuli toward revolt (*B. G.* 7.2.4–5). Caesar speaks of secret meetings and oath takings as cementing the alliance. However, beyond immediate provocation there seems to have existed a deeper underlying fear that unless Roman rule was expelled from Gaul, it would change the society beyond recognition. The speech of Critognatus makes this clear:

“Romani vero quid petunt aliud aut quid volunt, nisi invidia adducti, quos fama nobilis potentisque bello cognoverunt, horum in agris civitatibusque considerare atque his aeternam iniungere servitutem? Neque enim ulla alia condicione bella gesserunt. Quod si ea quae in longinquis nationi-

¹⁰ The two most recent studies on the Gallic assemblies are A. Christopherson, “The Provincial Assembly of the Three Gauls in the Julio-Claudian Period”, *Historia*, 17 (1968), p. 353 and J. Deininger, *Die Provinziallandtage der römischen Kaiserzeit* (München, 1965), p. 23–4. J. Deininger stresses the influence of eastern models on the Gallic assembly. A. Christopherson stresses the native origins. ¹¹ M. Gelzer, *Caesar Politician and Statesman* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 155.

¹² J. J. Hatt, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

bus geruntur ignoratis, respicite finitimam Galliam, quae in provinciam redacta, iure et legibus commutatis, securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitute." (*B. G.* 7.77.15—16).

Caesar elsewhere bears witness to the "tanta universae Galliae consensio . . . libertatis vindicandae" (*B. G.* 7.76.2). The expression of these sentiments (which I think we can presume were not purely a product of Caesar's imagination or ancient historiographical or rhetorical convention) combined with the widespread nature of the uprising which brought together enemies and rallied Roman allies to the Gallic cause suggests that we are dealing here with more than a mere political action, but an event that is in part political, but in part socio-psychological, what is called in modern anthropological studies a nativistic or revitalization movement.

I want as much as possible to reserve general discussion to the end of the paper. However, for the sake of clarity, I should now define how I use this term. By it, I mean an effort by a native people whose cultural and political identity is under assault by a superior culture to assert its independence and self-identity. Such movements are very common in contact situations when the "native" group realizes the potential finality of their subjugation. This often leads to a sudden, massive effort to expel the invader, many times accompanied by evidence of a changed, disturbed psychological state which sometimes displays itself in the rise of new religious movements.¹³

To define Vercingetorix's rebellion as a nativistic movement, it should conform to general anthropological definitions of this concept, keeping in mind, of course, that these movements differ widely in detail when they appear in modern contact situations, and that the amount and type of evidence from the ancient world is not the best for solid anthropological analysis. Probably the first characteristic would be that the society producing the movement be in a period of stress, often the result of the impact of stronger outside forces.¹⁴ As noted above, evidence exists that this state of stress was present in Gallic society at the time of Caesar. A second important factor in this is the presence of a dynamic leader, either religious or political. To quote an authority in the field:

"Whether the movement is religious or secular, the reformulation of the mazeway generally seems to depend on the restructuring of elements and subsystems which have already attained currency in the society and may even be in use and which are known to the person who is to become the prophet or leader. The occasion of their combination in a form which constitutes an internally consistent structure and of their acceptance by the

¹³ For general comments on this, → R. Linton, "Nativistic Movements", *American Anthropologist*, 45 (1943), pp. 230—→ A. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements", *American Anthropologist*, 58 (1956), pp. 264—81; V. Lanternari, *Religions of the Oppressed* (New York, 1965).

¹⁴ A. Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 269—70.

prophet as a guide to action is abrupt and dramatic, usually occurring as a moment of insight . . . The reformation also seems normally to occur in its initial form in the mind of a single individual rather than to grow directly out of group deliberations.”¹⁵

Vercingetorix would seem to display qualities that allow him to be typed as this kind of charismatic leader. As noted above, he came from a distinguished family, but had not apparently played a major role previously in the anti-Roman resistance. Suddenly he emerges as the leader of a rebellion that sweeps much of Gaul and threatens to topple Roman domination. His ability to inspire his followers is made clear from the beginning (for instance *B. G.* 7.4.3—5 where he is described as easily firing up his clients). Shortly after seizing power among the Arverni, he was hailed as *rex* and could demand obedience and hostages from a number of tribes. He imposed extreme discipline on the Gauls with the most severe punishments for transgressors (*B. G.* 7.4.5.—10). He forced the Gauls to adopt a scorched earth policy, even to burning their own towns (*B. G.* 7.14—5). When doubts arose among the Gauls as to his policy and loyalty, he could silence them by his rhetoric and win the approval of the natives once again (*B. G.* 7.20—21). The siege of Avaricum and its capture by the Romans confirmed the judgement of Vercingetorix and strengthened his hold upon the Gauls. He demanded from them the unfamiliar labor of fortification (*B. G.* 7.30.4). He even won the supreme command over the jealous Aedui (*B. G.* 7.63.1—7).

The important place of Vercingetorix in Gallic society gave him some basis for leadership. His personality and oratorical ability certainly strengthened his position. Whether like many leaders in modern nativistic movements, he called upon spiritual support is not stated. However, one statement in Caesar on the final actions of Vercingetorix just before the surrender at Alesia contains the possibility of “religious” associations.

“Postero die Vercingetorix consilio convocato id bellum se suscepisse non suarum necessitatum sed communis libertatis causa demonstrat et, quoniam sit fortunae cedendum, ad utramque rem se illis offerre, seu morte sua Romanis satisfacere seu vivum tradere velint.” (*B. G.* 7.89.1—3).

The terms in which Caesar expresses this speech of Vercingetorix sound as though he is incorporating some elements of the Roman concept of *devotio*, that is the ritual self-sacrifice of a leader for the sake of the state. It is even possible that Caesar was attempting to convey in Roman religious imagery the idea that Vercingetorix saw himself in some special relation to the divinity.¹⁶ However, this is only inference and should not be pushed too far.

There are other possible but equally tenuous associations of the revolt of Vercingetorix with Gallic religion. The uprising started in the territory of

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

¹⁶ For the whole concept of *devotio*, see *R. E.* v, 277—80.

the Carnutes, the tribe which was the central location for Druidical activities (*B. G.* 6.13.10–11). Furthermore, one of the leaders of the Carnutes in the initial rebellion was called Gutruatus (*B. G.* 8.38.3–4).¹⁷ This name Gutruatus is obviously related to the word *gutuat*, the designation of a priestly official among the Gauls.¹⁸ If we regard the name in the text as accurate, we have the possibility that the Carnutian held some priestly office. The title *gutuat* is attested on several inscriptions in Gaul. However, these date from the period of the Empire and were set up by individuals heavily involved with the Romans, men not likely to have been connected with the Druids who were regarded with disfavor by the Roman Imperial administration.¹⁹ Furthermore, if the Druids themselves had been involved in the uprising, one would think that Caesar would have mentioned it. Considering that the only Druid known by name is Diviciacus, the truest friend of the Romans, I tend to regard the role of the Druids in the resurgence of Celtic “nativism” as doubtful in the extreme.²⁰

Thus it would appear that either the Roman observers failed to note evidence of religious movements associated with Vercingetorix or that this type of manifestation was not a major factor in the revolt. In a sense, this should not be unexpected. While modern imperialism has usually been coupled with the missionary activity of Christianity, the Roman threat was mainly political and social. It is true that the Romans were later to take punitive action against the Druids, but there is no evidence that this had begun under Caesar.²¹ It was rather in response to the social and political threat that Vercingetorix arose and it was in his socio-political message that he incorporated elements that can be defined as revivalistic or nativistic.²² It is perhaps not coincidental that the leader emerged from the Arverni, the tribe that had been the source of the strongest previous unifying movement in Gaul and had raised the greatest previous challenge to Roman power in the area. The calls for asserting the liberty and ancient renown of the Gauls in military affairs (*B. G.* 7.76.2) may be in part the rhetorical contribution of Caesar, but I think that they also represented a genuine feeling that spurred the warriors to their last great effort against the invader. This would have especially ap-

¹⁷ It should be noted that there is a textual problem here since in *B.G.* 7.3.1 what appears to be the same leader is called Cotuatus.

¹⁸ N. Chadwick, *The Druids* (Cardiff, 1966), p. 38–40. The relation between the *gutuat* and the Druids is not completely clear.

¹⁹ For a cogent discussion of the inscriptions, see T. D. Kendrick, *The Druids* (London, 1928), pp. 135–8. N. De Witt “The Druids and Romanization”, *TAPA*, 69 (1938), pp. 319–332 argues strongly against any anti-Caesarian role for the Druids.

²⁰ For Diviciacus, see C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule* v. 3 (Paris, 1920), p. 162–4.

²¹ S. Piggott, *The Druids* (London, 1968), pp. 127–30.

²² For a discussion of the varied orientations that these movements can take, see A. Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 275–6.

pealed to the younger men such as the young Aedui who rallied around Litaviccus (*B. G.* 7.37.1), forgetful both of past compromise and past defeat.²³

The timing of the revolt was related both to the events of the past couple of years and the immediate activities and movements of Caesar. The years 54—3 B. C. had seen checks to Caesar's arms in Gaul. The destruction of the units under Sabinus and Cotta by the Eburones (*B. G.* 5.26—38) and another near-disaster at the hands of the Germans (*B. G.* 6.36—41) had undoubtedly shaken confidence in Caesar's invincibility. Moreover, conditions were so disturbed in Rome following the death of Clodius that Caesar felt obliged to cross the Alps and survey events in Rome from the near vantage point of Cisalpine Gaul (*B. G.* 7.1).²⁴

A decline of prestige for the colonial power as the result of some defeat and its distraction by events elsewhere has often in both ancient and modern times been one of the preconditions of revolt (see below). Caesar had completely misjudged the situation, and regarded Gaul as being pacified (*B. G.* 7.1.1). Shocking to him was both the fact of rebellion and its speed and extent. Caesar remarked that the deeds done at Cenabum at sunrise were known by the end of the first watch in the territory of the Arverni 160 miles away (*B. G.* 7.3.2—3). Caesar might well have agreed with the remarks of a modern native commissioner made at the time of the 1896 outbreak in Rhodesia:

"The outbreak was got up as a matter of fact so quickly and in opposition to all our native lore that we feel almost unable to venture any further opinion on natives at all except this — that they are not for one moment to be trusted".²⁵

Romans were massacred (*B. G.* 7.3.1—2; 42.2—4; Dio 40.37—8) and soon the whole country was engulfed by rebellion. Only Caesar's rapid return and some desperate military action saved the situation. The depth of the discontent was demonstrated by the fact that even after Alesia many of the Gauls continued to resist Roman arms.

In summary, the revolt of Vercingetorix has several salient characteristics that point to a modified type of revivalistic movement. The culture was in the advanced contact phase, partly acculturated and reaching the point where it felt its cultural identity threatened. The leadership class was still in existence, but feeling increased insecurity. There was some tradition of unified action and some institutions that encouraged this. In the midst of these circumstances arose a leader who came from an important tribe and family (although not himself up to this time an important leader in Gaul) and who

²³ For a modern example in which the younger warriors played an important role in pushing the older men into war, see E. Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk* (New York, 1958), p. 36.

²⁴ For the political events in Italy and Rome in this period, see M. Gelzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 145—154.

²⁵ Cited in T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 1.

possessed definite charismatic qualities. He and the rest of the leadership group had been associated with the Romans and were probably more acculturated than the majority of the Gauls. The suddenness and savageness of the rebellion caught the Romans by surprise. With the defeat of the major leader, the back of the rebellion was broken, although resistance continued among subsidiary leaders.

The second of the major revolts that the Romans faced was that in the Pannonian-Dalmatian area. "Gravissimum omnium externorum bellorum post Punica" is the description of Suetonius (*Tiberius*, 16). Four years, an army of fifteen legions plus auxiliaries, and the skills of Rome's best general were needed to once more bring the territory under Roman control.

As in Gaul, the Romans had had relatively long contact with certain sections of the Pannonian-Dalmatian area while others had been subject only to nominal conquest. They had first come into the area of southern Dalmatia as the result of the first Illyrian War of 229–228 B. C. (Appian, *Ill.* 2.7).²⁶ In the second century B. C., their armies had also begun to penetrate the northern and central regions. Marcius Figulus in 156 B. C. reached as far as Delminium in the territory of the Delmatae (Appian, *Ill.* 2.11; Livy *Per.* 47). In 129 B. C., Sempronius Tuditanus with the support of Decimus Junius Brutus defeated the Iapydes in northern Dalmatia (Appian, *Ill.* 2.10; Livy *Per.* 59), but the conquest was only temporary. In 119 B. C. Caecilius Metellus campaigned against the Segestani and the Delmatae and wintered at Salonae (Appian, *Ill.* 2.10–11). Still the region was largely uncontrolled by the time of Caesar and the local tribes inflicted defeats on units of his army (Appian, *Ill.* 3.12.–15). It took three campaigns of Octavian (35–33 B. C.) to bring the coastal regions under Roman control and establish an inland base on the Save at Siscia.²⁷ Tiberius and other generals undertook the conquest of the interior in the years 13–9 B. C.²⁸ The population was harried, large numbers sold into slavery and the rest supposedly disarmed (Dio 54.31.3–4). Revolts followed in 11 B. C. (Dio 54.34.3); in 10 B. C. (Dio 54.36.2–3) against the collection of tribute; and in 9 B. C. (Dio 55.2.4). The exact extent of permanent control in the interior is uncertain. It seems that the basic Roman defense line at the time of the revolt was on the Tilurium-Burnum axis. This would mean that it was designed mainly for the protection of the coastal settlements. There were some garrisons farther inland and these bore the brunt of the initial rebel attack.²⁹ Traders were circulating in the interior (Vell. Pat.

²⁶ For the background to this, see E. Badian, "Notes on Roman Policy in Illyria", *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (New York, 1964), p. 1–33.

²⁷ For the campaigns, see *Cambridge Ancient History*, v. 10, pp. 84–8.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 355–8.

²⁹ G. Alföldy, *Bevölkerung und Gesellschaft der römischen Provinz Dalmatien* (Budapest, 1965), pp. 171–2.

2.110.6) and there was a sufficient degree of acculturation in some areas to allow Velleius (2.110.5) to claim that:

“Omnibus autem Pannoniis non disciplinae tantummodo, sed linguae quoque notitia Romanae, plerisque etiam litterarum usus et familiaris animorum erat exercitatio.”

With apparently firm Roman control on the coast and some garrisoning and trade in the interior, the situation must have been rather similar to that of Gaul at the time of Vercingetorix.

Unfortunately, we know relatively little about the background of the native leaders who excited the revolt. The most important figure was a man named Bato from the mountain tribe of the Daesitiates. Dio (55.29.2–3) implies that he was among the Dalmatians who had joined the army of Tiberius for his German campaigns. If so, he, like Arminius and Civilis, had Roman military experience. Once the revolt had started, he became the backbone of the resistance to the Romans, holding out until the bitter end. In fact, the Romans gave him the dubious honor of designating part of the war *bellum Batonianum*.³⁰ It was he who arranged the capture and execution of Bato the Breucian who had turned Quisling for the Romans (Dio 55.34.4). However, when he was finally forced to surrender, he came to terms with the Romans and not only was spared, but was established in relative comfort at Ravenna (Suetonius, *Tiberius* 20; Dio 56.13.2–3; 56.16). Suetonius claims that this good treatment was given in return for the fact that Bato had previously spared a Roman army. The evidence is spotty, but does suggest a clever native leader with some degree of Romanization who could fight and bargain with the Romans to good effect.

Bato from the Pannonian tribe of the Breuci is the only other leader about whom anything significant is known. He was an early and active participant in the uprising. At some time, however, he came to terms with the Romans and was established as a client ruler over the Breuci and apparently also some neighboring tribes (Dio 55.34.4). Again, while there is no unimpeachable proof, there is the strong suggestion that the Romans were dealing with a partially acculturated native whom they thought they could trust.

The causes of the revolt were both the general tensions that were the result of the transformation from native to colonial rule and the specific abuses in the system of colonial administration. Tribute was mentioned as a specific irritant (Dio 55.29.1) while the remark of Bato the Daesitiatian that “You Romans are to blame for this; for you send as guardians of your flocks, not dogs or shepherds but wolves” (Dio 56.16.3) suggests regular and specific administrative abuses.

³⁰ *CIL* V. 3346; R. Rau, “Zur Geschichte des pannonisch-dalmatischen Krieges”, *Klio*, 19 (1925), p. 342.

The Romans from their knowledge and experience of the tribes in Dalmatia and Pannonia had little reason to expect much unified action. While among the Ardiaei of the south there had developed a reasonably elaborate social organization, in most of the central and northern province, tribal structure and leadership appear to have been weak and the basic social strength lay in the clan.³¹ However, in 34 B. C. the Dalmatians had banded together under the leadership of a certain Versus to oppose the advance of Octavian (Appian *Ill.* 5.25). Whether the memory of the organized state of Queen Teuta survived is impossible to tell, but we can be sure that they knew of the efforts of Maroboduus to create a sophisticated state outside of the reaches of Roman power.³² All or some of these examples could have stimulated the followers of Bato to unite in a stronger political unit. Moreover the Romans themselves had helped to forge links of unity by employing native troops in their armies. In fact, it was this assembly of native troops that made clear to the natives their collective strength and helped pave the way for rebellion (Dio 55.29).

As with the revolt of Vercingetorix, the Romans were taken by surprise. Tiberius, who knew the area, evidently did not think revolt was imminent and was turning all his attention to the impending campaign against Maroboduus. In fact, the rebels may have purposely used this time when the commander's attention was turned elsewhere to plan and execute their uprising. The words of Velleius (2.110.5—6) convey the reaction of the Romans:

“Itaque hercules nulla umquam natio tam mature consilio belli bellum iunxit ac decreta patravit.”

The slaughter of Roman citizens, veterans and traders followed swiftly and soon the whole region was engulfed in war. The commander in Illyria Mesalinus was caught equally by surprise by the sudden rebellion and had to beat off an attack of the enemy with a half-strength legion (Vell. Pat. 2.112.2).

I do not intend to discuss the course of the rebellion in detail.³³ Its origins and strength lay in the mountainous interior although it did penetrate to the coast and even appears to have threatened Italy. The nature of the terrain and the extent of the rebellion prevented a rapid solution. The enemy was able to assemble enough forces to bring a large Roman army to the point of disaster at the Volcaean Marshes (Vell. Pat. 2.112.4—6; Dio 55.32.3). The total Roman army was the largest that had been seen since the Civil Wars of Octavian and Mark Antony. In the end, a combination of persistence, a burnt-earth policy and the considerable use of Roman diplomatic skills brought victory and the re-assertion of administrative control.

³¹ G. Alföldy, *op. cit.*, pp. 166—71.

³² For Maroboduus, see E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, (Oxford, 1965), pp. 67—70.

³³ See E. Kornemann, “Der pannonisch-dalmatinische Krieg, 6—9 n. Chr.,” *Hermes*, 81 (1953), pp. 345—78; *Cambridge Ancient History*, v. 10, pp. 369—73.

Unfortunately, the source material for the Dalmatian-Pannonian revolt is considerably sparser than that for Vercingetorix. However, the general nature of the two uprisings seems similar. The province was undergoing Romanization and the interior regions were getting the first real sense of what Roman conquest meant for native customs and power structure. There was a native leadership class intact and this apparently had had some contact with Roman military skills. Like the Gallic assemblies, joint levies for armed service must have given the natives some sense of strength and unity. This plus the increasingly uprooted and desperate psychological state of a people undergoing cultural change created the “nativistic atmosphere” that helped to overcome local differences and produce a unity that completely surprised the Romans. Bato the Daesitatian was the most outstanding leader and in some respects seems the equivalent of Vercingetorix, although we do not have enough detailed evidence to make a close comparison. The revolt persisted longer than that of Vercingetorix because the natives could use their terrain better and were able to avoid the decisive encounters that destroyed Vercingetorix. No signs of religious manifestations are recorded, but this may reflect deficiencies in our sources.

The rebellion of Arminius was the most famous native rebellion in Roman history and the one whose nature has been most discussed and clouded with many pseudo-historical assumptions prompted by modern nationalism. Arminius has become a national hero as the huge statue in the Teutoburger Wald testifies. Certainly, of all the revolts discussed in the paper, it is the only one that was successful, but I do not believe that its success should be allowed to obscure its basic similarity to the others.

The degree and speed of Romanization in Germany beyond the Rhine has been the source of considerable debate.³⁴ However, literary evidence suggests that acculturation was taking place and that Varus caused difficulties by speeding it up. Dio remarks:

“The Romans were holding portions of it (Germany) . . . and the soldiers were wintering there and cities were being founded. The barbarians were adopting themselves to Roman ways, were becoming accustomed to hold markets and were meeting in peaceful assemblies. They had not, however, forgotten their ancestral habits . . . Hence, so long as they were unlearning these customs gradually and by the way, as one might say, under careful watching, they were not disturbed by the change in the manner of life and were becoming different without knowing it.” (56.18.1–3).

This process was undoubtedly accelerated by the penetration of traders into the area, which increased markedly with the Roman occupation of west-

³⁴ An interesting argument against assuming too great a degree of Romanization, especially in the form of provincial organization, is given by W. Oldfather and H. Canter, *The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus* (Urbana, Ill., 1915).

ern Germany in 12—9 B. C.³⁵ This trade and contact produced changes in such things as agricultural technique and increased wealth and power for members of the ruling class.

With Varus, more rapid administrative change began to happen:

“... he strove to change them more rapidly. Besides issuing orders to them as if they were actually slaves to the Romans, he extracted money as he would from subject nations.” (56.18.4).

Some have expressed doubts that Varus found Germany in a sufficient state of development to allow taxation,³⁶ but it seems by no means impossible that the Romans thought the time had come to attempt some form of financial impositions. As will be seen in the case of Boudicca’s rebellion and in the case of many revolts in modern colonial territories, the imposition of regular taxation is often the action that produces a native-colonial crisis.

Our second major source for the revolt and the only contemporary one is the Roman officer Velleius Paterculus. He had a soldier’s jaundiced and experienced view of natives and a low regard for Varus, but he essentially confirms the statement of Dio:

“is cum exercitui, qui erat in Germania, praeesset, concepit esse homines, qui nihil praeter vocem membraeque haberent hominum, quique gladiis domari non poterant, posse iure mulceri. Quo proposito mediam ingressus Germaniam velut inter viros pacis gaudentes dulcedine iurisdictionibus agendoque pro tribunali ordine trahebat aestiva.” (2.117.3—4).

While Dio and Velleius disagree about the degree of genuine Romanization that was taking place among the Germans, they both confirm that Varus was making special efforts in that direction. Probably he saw every reason to do so. Roman armies had traversed the territory up to the Elbe several times under Drusus and Tiberius.³⁷ Extensive contacts had been made with the leadership class of the Germans, including those of the Cherusci which had provided some of the stiffest resistance to the Romans. Some of these were in Roman service. An altar had been set up at Cologne, apparently for some form of provincial cult similar to that of Lugdunum in Gaul.³⁸ Altogether, the situation with its fluid, limited control sounds very much like Pannonia-Dalmatia or even Gaul at the time of Vercingetorix.

Important in the Roman miscalculation was the fact that they thought they had won strong support among the most important Germans. No better example of this exists than Arminius himself. Whatever Teutonic hagiography may have made of the man, there can be little doubt that we are dealing with a highly Romanized native. He had seen service in the *militia eques-*

³⁵ E. A. Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 20—8.

³⁶ W. Oldfather & H. Canter, *op. cit.*, p. 98—9; *Cambridge Ancient History*, v. 10, p. 374.

³⁷ For the campaigns of Drusus, see D. Timpe, “Drusus’ Umkehr an der Elbe”, *Rheinisches Museum*, 110 (1967), pp. 289—306.

³⁸ J. Deininger, *op. cit.*, p. 24—5.

tris together with Velleius Paterculus (2.118.2) and both his rank and prestige mark him as a native exceptionally well regarded by the Romans.³⁹ His extensive contact with the Romans undoubtedly gave him an appreciation of Roman military ability and technique. He arranged his army in Roman military fashion (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.45).

While the Romans undoubtedly regarded this Latin speaking German (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.10.3) as a true friend, Arminius was retaining his foothold in the native society as well. His tribe had a tradition of strong resistance to the Romans. They had withdrawn in the face of Drusus, thus avoiding overwhelming defeat.⁴⁰ They had risen in revolt in 1 B. C.⁴¹ Tiberius was forced to campaign against them in A. D. 4 (Vell. Pater. 2.105.1). Connections with a people with such a reputation of anti-Roman resistance would prove useful to Arminius when the time of rebellion came.⁴²

However, Arminius had created for himself a position that extended well beyond the leadership of a group of disunited Germans. At the height of his powers, he was able to rally sufficient forces to destroy three legions, check Germanicus and defeat the formidable Maroboduus. Unfortunately, we know too little about his detailed activities. Speeches are mentioned several times and undoubtedly part of his power lay in his ability at persuasion. Presumably his financial resources had been increased by his years in the Roman service.⁴³ His achievements certainly mark him off as a charismatic leader who took advantage of the confused socio-psychological state of the Germans to build himself a power—position beyond that of customary German leaders. With the passing of the crisis, older values asserted themselves. Arminius was accused of seeking a kingship, an aim that ran counter to the feelings of his countrymen and met his end by assassination (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.88). The parallel with the father of Vercingetorix is striking.

As with many of the rebellions where Roman historians concentrated on the major leader, we do not know much about the subsidiary chieftains who rallied to Arminius. However, the two cases mentioned suggest that the same pattern developed as in the rebellion of Vercingetorix, that is “dependable natives” rejected the Roman cause and joined the rebellion. The first example is the youthful Segimundus, the son of the pro-Roman Segestes. Tacitus

³⁹ On the background of Arminius and especially his Romanization, see E. Sander, “Zur Arminius-Biographie”, *Gymnasium*, 62 (1955), pp. 83–98; E. Bickel, “Römisch-germanischer Namen-Nimbus im deutschen Mittelalter”, *Rheinisches Museum*, 98 (1955), p. 223–39; E. Hohl, *Um Arminius. Biographie oder Legende?* (Berlin, 1951). ⁴⁰ D. Timpe, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

⁴¹ *Cambridge Ancient History*, v. 10, p. 368.

⁴² For the strength of Arminius with the Cherusci and his family connections, see E. A. Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 34 note 2, 72, 79–80.

⁴³ For a discussion of how service in the Roman army aided the social and political position of native chieftains, see G. Kossak, “I Germani”, *L’Impero romano e i popoli limitrofi* (ed. F. Millar, Milano, 1968), pp. 336–7.

tus (*Annals* 1.57.2—3) says that “quippe anno quo Germaniae descivere sacerdos apud aram Ubiorum creatus ruperat vittas, profugus ad rebelles.” The fact that he was a priest at the altar of the Germans and the son of a man who had been made a Roman citizen (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.58.2) shows his strong Roman connections and their confidence in his faithfulness. The second rebel Inguiomerus did not join the revolt at the time of the defeat of Varus, but during the second attack of Germanicus. At that time he was described as “veterem apud Romanos auctoritate” (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.60.1—2). He was the uncle of Arminius, and while he fought well against the Romans, he later joined Maroboduus against Arminius (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.45).

In addition to their confidence in the pro-Roman attitudes of many German chiefs, the Romans also erred in underestimating the potential for unity among the Germans. From their experience, they thought that the Germans would not cooperate, even in fighting a common enemy. The admonition of Tiberius, a man with vast experience with the Germans, shows this clearly:

“posse et Cheruscos ceterasque rebellium gentes, quoniam Romanae ultionis consultum esset, internis discordiis relinquere.” (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.26.3—4).

The famous prayer of Tacitus (*Germania* 33.2) on preserving the disunity of the Germans to save Rome echoes this sentiment.

However, certain aspects of Romanization were bringing about changes in this German political situation. I have already mentioned that Arminius and a number of the other German leaders had seen service in the Roman army (for this see the classic debate between Arminius and Flavus, Tacitus, *Annals* 2.9—10). This certainly provided them with the opportunity to see their united strength and appreciate the weakness of traditional tribal fighting. The importance of auxiliary service in fostering the native sense of unity has already been discussed in the case of the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt.

A second element that may have helped to foster German unity was the cult at the *ara Ubiorum* at Cologne. Although relatively little is known of this cult, it was intended to include more than the Ubii (Segimundus was from the Cherusci) and probably was intended, like the cult at Lugdunum or later at Camulodunum, to unify the province.⁴⁴ In Gaul and very likely in Britain, this use of native assemblies may have had the reverse effect of giving the natives a sense of unity against Rome. Perhaps the same thing happened in Germany.

The accelerated process of acculturation, started under Varus, was the principal cause of the revolt, bringing as it must have attendant strains and fears. Perhaps related to this is the religious activity that is mentioned in connection with the uprising. The most famous of these comes in the account of the

⁴⁴ J. Deininger, *op. cit.*, pp. 24—5.

visit of Germanicus to the site of the battle in the Teutoburger Wald. Among the things described are the groves where the centurions and tribunes were sacrificed (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.61.5–6). Velleius confirms these sacrifices (1.120.5). While human sacrifices were not unknown among the Germans (*Germania* 9.1–2), they do not seem to have been normal. Caesar (*B. G.* 6.21.1–2) says of the Germans “neque sacrificiis student.”⁴⁵ Tacitus describes an instance of mass sacrifice as the result of a communal vow taken before a battle between the Chatti and the Hermunduri (*Annals* 13.57.3). If the sacrifice of the Romans is a parallel to this, it would suggest that Arminius had invoked the highest religious sanctions of the society to rouse the people for battle. Human sacrifices will also be noted as an element in both the Boudicca rebellion and the Civilis rebellion.

The second reference to religion is relatively minor, but not without significance. When the Germans were preparing to march against Germanicus, they mustered at the sacred forest of Hercules (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.12.1–2). Hercules was the prime war deity of the Germans (*Germania* 3.1), and this deity of war and his sacred area no doubt filled with dedication from past triumphs were used to heighten the emotions of the German warriors.⁴⁶

As in the case of the other two rebellions, the Romans were taken completely by surprise. Varus thought he was setting out to suppress a distant rebellion and was passing through territory considered friendly and pacified when he was ambushed by what must have been a sizable force of Germans (Vell. Pater. 2.118). Our sources tend to denigrate the ability of Varus, but this may be due to the fact that he became a posthumous scapegoat for the failure of the policy of Augustus. Certainly the posts that he had held, first as legate of Syria (6–4 B. C.) and then in Germany show that he was highly regarded.⁴⁷ While his experience was concentrated mainly in the East, even there he had to deal with a most troublesome and unpredictable native people, the Jews, and he evidently handled them with skill. His service in North Africa also would have given him experience in dealing with peoples in the process of Romanization. Furthermore, he inherited an experienced army with, we can presume, a developed intelligence network, and officers who knew how to interpret this. He was, for instance, warned of the pending revolt of the Germans but rejected the evidence (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.55.3–4). All this suggests that again the authorities misjudged their natives and found themselves faced with a combined action of natives that their past experience gave them no reason to expect.

⁴⁵ For the German religion of the period, see G. Kossak, *op. cit.*, p. 340–1.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 340–1 describes these places of dedication associated with war.

⁴⁷ For the career of Varus, see E. Kornemann, “P. Quinctilius Varus”, *Neue Jahrbücher*, 49 (1922), pp. 42–62. Although Varus married the grand-niece of Augustus, I do not regard this as an important reason for his receiving two very important commands.

The common elements with the other rebellions are clear. The exact degree of acculturation in Germany as compared with Gaul and Dalmatia-Pannonia may be debated, but they were all in the initial stages of Romanization. Native institutions and the native leadership class were still intact. However, it was threatened both by the gradual extension of Roman administration and the absorption of leaders into the Roman system. There was little tradition of native unity although the cult of the *ara Ubiorum* may have fostered this. The tribe that led the revolt had been one of the strongest in resisting the Roman advance, but its leaders seemed to have accepted Roman domination (Flavius, Inguiomerus, Arminius and Segimundus all came from the Cherusci and all were or had been in Roman service). In these circumstances arose a native leader who managed to produce a totally unexpected unity of action among the Germans, check both the Romans and Maroboduus and exercise his *potentia* for twelve years (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.88). Exactly how he maintained this control is difficult to determine in detail, but it seems that it was a combination of the use of existing social institutions, his extraordinary leadership ability and the prestige that accrued from his various triumphs. He fits the pattern of the charismatic native political leader.

The next revolt took place in Britain about fifty years after Arminius. The rebellion of Boudicca broke out nearly twenty years after the initial conquest of the south-east of Britain. The region had been brought into contact with the Romans initially by the abortive invasions of Caesar in 55 and 54 B. C. In the intervening century before the invasion of Claudius, trade had exposed the British to certain aspects of Roman culture. The conquest which started in A. D. 43 had been effected in part by military action and in part by exploiting the disunity of the natives and persuading certain chieftains to become clients of the Romans.⁴⁸ These clients had everything to gain from the acceptance of Roman ways and we can presume that they encouraged the acculturation process. The famous inscription of Cogidubnus from Chichester demonstrates this clearly for one client king as apparently does the impressive palace found in his territory at Fishbourne.⁴⁹ Less is known about Prasutagus, the chief of the Iceni, but he was allowed to retain control of his kingdom until his death and the phrase “*longa opulentia clarus*” (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.31.1) implies that he did quite well by Roman rule.

Within the territory under direct Roman administration we can presume that the leading natives were also encouraged to Romanize. The principal focus of this was the foundation of the Imperial Cult Center at the city of Camulodunum and the establishment of a native priesthood to serve it (Tacitus,

⁴⁸ S. Frere, *Britannia* (London, 1967) pp. 27–86 gives the general background for preconquest and early conquest period Britain.

⁴⁹ B. Cuncliffe, “The Excavations at Fishbourne”, *Antiquity*, 39 (1965), pp. 174 ff; R. Collingwood and R. Wright, *Roman Inscriptions of Britain* (Oxford, 1965) pp. 25–6 Nr. 91.

Annals 14.31.6—7). The massive, classical style temple that was the center of this cult testifies to the importance the Romans attached to this instrument of acculturation.⁵⁰

This process of Romanization also produced many social tensions which were a major contributing factor to the rebellion. Tacitus (*Annals* 14.31.4—7) summarizes the major sources of bitterness:

“... acerrimo in veteranos odio. quippe in coloniam Camulodunum recens deducti pellebant domibus, exturbabant agris, captivos, servos appellando, fiventibus impotentiam veteranorum militibus similitudine vitae et spe eiusdem licentiae. ad hoc templum divo Claudio constitutum quasi arx aeternae dominationis aspiciebatur, delectique sacerdotes specie religionis omnis fortunas effundebant.”

The callous treatment of natives by settlers is too common an experience in modern colonialism to call for any comment. The problems of expenditure by the natives in order to fulfill their obligations to Rome had been increased by an apparent financial panic and the sudden withdrawal of loaned funds (Seneca was supposed to have been one of the major investors — Dio 62.2.1) had caused considerable misunderstanding and hardship for the Britons and was a major source of rebellion.⁵¹

The second major cause was an important change in Roman administrative practice and the brutal way in which it was carried out. As I noted above, the Icenii were able to retain a strong degree of autonomy under the ruler Prasutagus. They had not been completely peaceful, for during the governorship of Ostorius Scapula (47—52 A. D.) they had planned a revolt. This has been suppressed by swift military action (Tacitus *Annals* 12.31.3—7). Evidently Prasutagus was cleared of prime responsibility for he continued to reign. He had hoped to pass on his kingdom to his daughters. “Caesarem heredem duasque filias scripserat, tali obsequio ratus regnumque et domum suam procul iniuria fore” are the words of Tacitus (*Annals* 14.31.1—2).

The device did not work. Perhaps after their experience with Queen Cartimandua, the Romans had had their fill of female rulers.⁵² They made the decision to incorporate the territory of the kingdom into the regular administrative structure of the province. The actions of the procuratorial officials showed a minimum of tact and diplomacy:

“quod contra vertit, adeo ut regnum per centuriones, domus per servos velut capta vastarentur. iam primum uxor eius Boudicca verberibus adfec-

⁵⁰ M. Lewis, *Temples in Roman Britain*, (Cambridge, 1966), p. 61—4.

⁵¹ M. Gyles, “Effects of Roman Capital Investment in Britain under Nero”, *Laudatores Temporis Acti: Studies in Memory of Wallace Everett Caldwell* (M. Gyles & E. Davis, ed; Chapel Hill, 1964), pp. 99—109. E. Bulst, “The Revolt of Queen Boudicca in A.D. 60”, *Historia*, 10 (1961), pp. 500—1 basically accepts the story of Seneca’s loan.

➔ I. A. Richmond, “Queen Cartimandua”, *Journal of Roman Studies*, 44 (1954), pp. 43—52.

ta et filiae stupro violate sunt: praecipui quique Icenorum, quasi cunctam regionem muneri acepissent, avitis bonis exuuntur, et propinqui regis inter Mancipia habebantur.” (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.31.2–4).

Thus by one action, the Romans had made a symbol of their own brutality out of one of the few surviving native royalty and antagonized the ruling class of the tribe.

This movement toward revolt was further aided by the absence of the Roman governor and most of his army.⁵³ Suetonius Paullinus was preparing the final assault on the island of Mona, the Druid center off the coast of Wales. Its dramatic and climactic character is summed up in the scenes of the attack on and destruction of the sacred groves where “cruore captivo adolere aras et hominum fibris consulere deos fas habebant” (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.30.3). Many have considered this assault on the British holy sanctuary to have had a major effect in fomenting rebellion. To quote the authors of the most recent study of the rebellion:

“To add to these grievances of their own, there was the powerful stimulant of anger at the Roman attack on the headquarters of the Druid religion, the vital element of the native Celtic culture. It can hardly be a coincidence that there was such a widespread rebellion at precisely this juncture. Though neither Tacitus nor Dio mention it, the political influence of the Druids must have been used to urge the other *civitates* to join Boudicca.”⁵⁴

Tacitus does use the expression “. . . Monam insulam ut vires rebellibus ministrantem” (*Agr.* 14.5) as justifying the attack of Suetonius, but I feel that he is using the term *rebelles* to refer to the tribesmen of Wales who were opposing Suetonius and not to the Iceni. It is true that the Llyn Cerrig Bach hoard of objects found on Mona (modern Anglesey) does show the wide contacts of the Druids with objects coming from as far away as Yorkshire. However, nothing can definitely be attributed to the Iceni.⁵⁵ No reference is made to the Druids during the course of the rebellion, even though Boudicca does invoke the aid of deities, especially the local deity Andraste. As in the case of the revolt of Vercingetorix, I feel that the role of the Druids in political, religious opposition to the Romans has been somewhat exaggerated.

These are the major causes of the rebellion. The precise area involved in it is uncertain, but it must have engulfed most of south-east Britain. Such widespread unity had not characterized earlier reactions to Roman attacks. However, there had developed in Britain in the pre-Roman period a considerable concentration of power in the tribe of the Catuvellauni and it was

⁵³ E. Bulst, *op. cit.*, pp. 496–7.

⁵⁴ D. Dudley and G. Webster, *The Rebellion of Boudicca* (New York, 1962), p. 53.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 110–1; E. Bulst, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

the rulers of this tribe that had led the resistance to both Caesar and Claudius.⁵⁶ The rebellion must have embraced much of the old territory controlled by the Catuvellauni (both Camulodunum and Verulamium were old Catuvellaunian centers) and perhaps drew inspiration from the memories of this old anti-Roman kingdom.

For this rebellion more than any other, references to psycho-religious activities which are close to those of modern nativistic movements can be found. The state of psychological unrest was reflected in the number of signs and omens that preceded the uprising (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.32.1—3; Dio 62.1.2). These were “ut Britannis ad spem, ita veteranis ad metum trahebantur” (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.32.2—3). Even the absence of the Roman army was regarded by the natives as meaning that their own gods were favoring them by removing the Romans from the area (Tacitus, *Agr.* 15.5).

This state of socio-psychological anguish can also be used in part to explain the atrocities committed by the natives. Dio gives a particularly vivid account of the treatment of upper-class Roman and Romano-British women who were stripped, mutilated and impaled. He goes to say:

“All this they did to the accompaniment of sacrifices, banquets and wanton behavior, not only in all their other sacred places, but particularly in the grove of Andate. This was their name for Victory and they regarded her with most exceptional reverence.” (Dio 62.7.3).

Tacitus also mentions the atrocities, but regards them as more purely acts of revenge (“... sed caedes patibula ignes cruces, tamquam reddituri supplicium et praerepta interim ultione festinabant”, *Annals* 14.33.6). Such massacres, with or without religious associations, are often characteristic of the early stages of nativistic rebellions. The sudden and widespread slaughter of Romans in Asia that accompanied the occupation of Mithridates seems to belong to this category (Appian, *Bell. Mithr.* 22—23). Similar patterns are found in more recent rebellions.⁵⁷ The fact that these slaughters became associated with religious rites seems to me extremely significant, providing in Boudicca’s as in Arminius’s rebellion one of the classic elements of nativistic revolts. By such massacres the suppressed population released some of their frustration against the dominant power.

The central figure of Boudicca dominates the rebellion and in fact almost completely obscures the rest of the leadership involved. As the outraged wife

⁵⁶ S. Frere, *op. cit.*, p. 35, 41—7, 63—7.

⁵⁷ For example in the revolt of 1896—7 in Rhodesia, within one week all the whites in the outlying sections of Malabeleland were killed. When questioned on motives, one of the natives replied, “These white people were our friends and so they did not expect that we were coming to kill them. They were our friends, but since we were starting to fight they might have killed us too. It is also true that we had decided to get rid of all the white men in the country”, T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, pp. 129—130.

and mother, she did assume a tremendous symbolic role in the rebellion. The reasons for her dominant political position are not completely clear. The fact of her being a woman was not necessarily a bar in British tribal politics (Tacitus notes “neque enim sexum in imperiis discernunt”, *Agr.* 16.1). Cartimandua was the Roman supported head of the Brigantes.⁵⁸ However, the Iceni had not been a leading tribe in south-east England in the pre-Roman period, even though they had successfully resisted the expansion of the Catuvellauni. Apparently, in the course of their earlier revolt, they had begun to forge links with other tribes. Perhaps also the fact that Boudicca was one of the few surviving members of the tribal royalty in occupied Britain made her a natural rallying point.

The question arises as to what degree Boudicca owed her position to her own royal power, to what degree she was the figurehead for other forces and to what degree she based her power on charismatic qualities. When one thinks of women taking parts in native revolts, the figure that comes to mind is Veleda, the German prophetess who played a major role in the Batavian rebellion. Her position and importance will be discussed shortly. However, while her religious powers were used to aid the revolt, she was not formally its leader. Also, we do not have evidence for female priest figures among the Britons.

Still there is evidence that Boudicca used her religious connections to help stimulate the revolt.⁵⁹ She uses divination to provide proof for the successful outcome of the revolt and follows this with a prayer to Andraste that stresses her close relation with divine power (Dio 62.6.1—2). In connection with this, one other point might be raised. In describing the appearance of Boudicca Dio remarks:

“In stature she was very tall, in appearance most terrifying, in the glance of her eye most fierce, and her voice was harsh; a great mass of the tawniest hair fell to her hips; around her neck was a large golden necklace; and she wore a tunic of divers colors over which a thick mantle was fastened with a brooch. This was her invariable attire. She now grasped a spear to aid her in terrifying all beholders.” (62.2.4).

The sight of a woman grasping a spear does not seem sufficient to stupify a group of tough, blood-thirsty Britons. In fact, if the description is at all accurate, it would sound as if she was using all her dress and attributes to create an impression of inspired awe in her followers. A short passage in Florus (1.33.14) describing the rebellion of Olyndicus in Spain may be of help. Olyndicus is described as shaking a silver spear as a sort of sacred talisman. Possibly the spear and other attributes of Boudicca were designed to produce a similar effect of supernatural power.

⁵⁸ I. A. Richmond, *op. cit.*, p. 43—52.

⁵⁹ E. Bulst, *op. cit.*, p. 499—500.

Beyond Boudicca we know nothing of the leadership of the rebellion, although from other uprisings, we must presume that other major figures were involved. The sources mention that other leaders of the Iceni were deprived of their lands at the same time as Boudicca. Also, resistance continued after the death of Boudicca (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.38—9; *Agr.* 16.1—4), and the province was not completely pacified until after the replacement of Suetonius Paullinus.

As for the Romans, the main fact that strikes one is again the surprise of the outbreak. Presumably the attitudes of the normal Roman official in Britain were summed up by Tacitus when he noted that:

“nec aliud adversus validissimas gentes pro nobis utilius quam quod in commune non consulunt. rarus duabus tribusve civitatibus ad propulsandum commune periculum conventus: ita singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur.” (*Agr.* 12.2).

Even the Britons themselves regarded it as a near miracle that “iam ipsos, quod difficillimum fuerit, deliberare” (*Agr.* 15.5). Suetonius had apparently sensed no danger and was about as far away as possible. He must have had his intelligence sources, but like Varus, he underestimated the signs and omens of rebellion. This failure to comprehend the native mood is again somewhat surprising when the quality and experience of the commander are considered. Varus was certainly not the complete incompetent he is generally pictured as being. Even more so, Suetonius Paullinus was a commander experienced and successful, who had been sent to Britain because of his proven skill in fighting mountain tribes in Mauretania. Since his method of fighting depended on attacking the enemy at vulnerable points, he must have fully appreciated the importance of intelligence.⁶⁰ His success in Britain up to the time of the revolt was spectacular and his handling of the military side of the revolt highly competent. Altogether, he was a successful field commander, well versed in native warfare, yet he misjudged the situation in the province completely.

I do not want to deal in detail with the military development of the revolt. The natives rallied sufficient power to destroy one legion and bring the Roman army to a hard fought battle. After the loss of this decisive encounter and the death of Boudicca, the revolt continued and was finally worn down by a combination of military action, a lack of supplies and the more lenient policy of a new commander (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.38—9; *Agr.* 16.2—3).

To review, I can cite some of the parallels that connect this and other rebellions. It started among the Romanized elements of the native population where, however, the basic older social structure was still intact. There was little previous native unity except for the kingdom of the Catuvellauni. The

⁶⁰ S. Frere, *op. cit.*, p. 87; D. Dudley & G. Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 48—9.

Romans were promoting the Imperial cult which may have also led the natives toward their own unified action. The revolt came at a critical moment in acculturation. The Roman commander was taken by surprise. Altogether, the evidence suggests that the Romans found themselves dealing with a social movement that was beyond their expectations and reflected the confused social state of the province.

The final revolt to be considered is the Batavian. In many ways this is the most complex and the most interesting. The setting was, of course, the Civil Wars of 69–70 and the development of the rebellion is intimately bound up with these events. Some have seen this revolt as largely an extension of the Civil Wars. Tacitus and Josephus stressed the native rebellion aspect, not, I believe, unjustly.⁶¹

The center of the revolt was the Batavians, a tribe whose client status with the Romans required them to provide troops, but not pay tribute. Their connection with Rome goes back to the period of Drusus; auxiliaries from this tribe had served with the Romans at least since the time of Germanicus (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.8.3).⁶² When the revolt broke out, these units were still commanded by native leaders (Tacitus, *Hist.* 4. 12.).

The man who really started the revolt was a Batavian auxiliary commander named Julius Civilis. The name shows Roman citizenship. He had served twenty-five years with the Roman army (Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.32) and claimed to have been friendly with Vespasian while the latter was still a private citizen (Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.26).⁶³ In the confused events at the end of the reign of Nero, he was arrested with another Batavian nobleman on charges of fomenting rebellion and shipped to Rome. The other nobleman was executed. Civilis was pardoned by Galba, but continued to have fears for his safety under Vitellius (Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.13). In some ways this recalls the affair of Acco which so agitated the Gallic nobility at the time of Vercingetorix, although the circumstances relating to Civilis were made more complex by the fact that he was much more highly Romanized and the politics of the period were much more confused. Certainly, by the end of his experiences, Civilis must have had a profound grasp of both Roman political developments and of Roman military tactics.

However, if he was Romanized, he was also conscious of the need to put his rebellion in as strong a native context as possible. He had originally held a high place in Batavian society. Tacitus described him and Julius Paulus,

⁶¹ R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 174–5 and 175 note 2; G. Walser, *Rom, das Reich und die fremden Völker* (Baden-Baden, 1951), p. 86–128; for a defense of Tacitus, see P. Brunt, “Tacitus on the Batavian Revolt”, *Latomus*, 19 (1960), pp. 494–517.

⁶² J. Klose, *Roms Klientel-Randstaaten am Rhein und an der Donau* (Breslau, 1934), pp. 18–26; Tacitus, *Germania* 29.1–2; J. Anderson (ed.), *Germania* (Oxford, 1938), pp. 145–6.

⁶³ Vespasian had been a legionary legate on the Rhine — Suetonius, *Vesp.* 4.

the man executed by Nero as “regia stirpe multo ceteros anteibant” (*Hist.* 4.13) and Civilis alone as “praepotens inter Batavos” (*Hist.* 1.59). He employed native customs and practices wherever it seemed to suit his purposes. For the place to initiate the revolt, he chose a ceremonial feast held in a sacred grove (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.14). Up until the destruction of Vetera and its legion, he dyed his hair red and allowed it to grow uncut, an obvious type of native vow (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.61).⁶⁴ He exacted native as well as Roman style oaths from his soldiers (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.15). Most interesting also was his association with Velea which will be discussed later. Altogether, the picture we have is of a leader who stresses his “nativism” to rally support among his people.

While not much is known about the other Batavian leaders, they almost all belonged to the Romanized military class that had received citizenship. The names like Julius Maximus (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.33), Claudius Victor (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.33), and Julius Tutor (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.55), the last a native who had been made a prefect of the left bank of the Rhine under Vitellius, all reflect this. The only name not of this type among the early leaders was Brinno of the Canninefates (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.15). Even he belongs to a family associated with the Romans since the time of Caligula. This same claim of long relationship with the Romans can also be made for the two Gauls involved in the rebellion, Julius Classicus (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.55) and Julius Sabinus (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.55;67).

Another interesting figure is Velea.⁶⁵ She was a maiden of the Bructeri who enjoyed extensive authority as a prophetess. Her power had increased enormously when she supposedly foretold the destruction of the legion at Vetera (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.61). A captured legionary legate was sent to her as a gift, very likely for some sort of sacrifice (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.61). When the people of Colonia Agrippinensis sought an advocate against the demands of the neighboring Germans, they chose Velea and Civilis. The description of their embassy offered Tacitus the occasion to describe the way the family and dependants of Velea had built up her prestige by isolating her from those who wished to consult her (*Tacitus, Hist.* 4.65). When Petilius Cerialis was trying to divide the native forces, he approached Velea and her family to persuade them to render timely services to the Romans (*Tacitus, Hist.* 5.24). The sense of religious power created by the woman is perhaps best indicated by the fact that the Romans when they captured her, apparently installed her in the service of a temple at Ardea.⁶⁶ This presence of a prophet figure asso-

⁶⁴ See Tacitus, *Germania* 31.1.

⁶⁵ For a summary of the evidence on Velea, see G. Walser, *R. E.* viii A, 620; for the inscription uncovered at Ardea E. Stefani, “Ardea (Contrada Casalinaccio), Resti di un antico tempio scoperto nell’area della città”, *Notizie degli Scavi*, (1954), pp. 29–30.

⁶⁶ E. Stefani, *op. cit.*, p. 29–30.

ciated with but separate from the war leader is a very common element in more modern native revolts, as will be discussed below.

All this adds up to a strong element of religious nativism in the revolt. I have mentioned already the use of the sacred banquet in the sacred grove and the personal vows of Civilis. At the outbreak of the war, Civilis bound his rebels “barbaro ritu et patriis execrationibus” (Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.15). As the troops enter into battle, they carried native standards (“depromptae silvis lucisque ferarum imagines, ut cuique genti inire proelium mos est” —Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.22). These references all indicate the Civilis was trying to tap as many springs of native religious feeling as possible in order to urge his compatriots to battle.

One final item in the area of religious associations should be mentioned. This is the Druid prophecy which saw in the burning of the Capitolium at Rome the sign of the end of Roman power (Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.54). This came out of Gaul rather than Germany, but for awhile this area also was threatened with rebellion. I have been skeptical of the political role of the Druids in the earlier revolts. However, Tacitus was equally cautious when he dealt with the relation between the Druids and Boudicca’s revolt. By this time, the Druids in Gaul had suffered from the attempts at their suppression by the Roman authorities and could have become a rallying point for anti-Roman sentiment.⁶⁷ The appearance of their apocalyptic prophecy does show the disturbed psychological state of the Gallo-Germanic area in the wake of the Civil Wars.

The confusions engendered by the Civil War provided the opportunity and in part the cause for rebellion. The existence of a more general discontent is shown by the rebellion of the Canninefates (Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.15–6) and the fact that the rebellion threatened to spread into Gaul.⁶⁸ The immediate cause among the Batavians is clearly stated by Tacitus. It was the abuses of the recruiting system, both in the quantity of men asked for, the excesses of the officials in carrying out the levy and the posting of the men once recruited (Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.14.; 4.12.3).⁶⁹ The heavy demands of the Civil Wars and the breakdown of administrative control were probably the major causes of these excesses.

The early stages of the revolt were a tremendous success, due in part to the skill of Civilis and in part to the preoccupation of the Romans elsewhere. So confused were the Romans that little general comment can be made on their actions in the early stages of the uprising. As noted above, the rebels found fertile ground among the Gauls as well as the Germans, although finally the Romans were able to hold the allegiance of most of the Gauls (Tacitus,

⁶⁷ On the suppression of the Druids, see S. Piggott, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–30.

⁶⁸ P. Brunt, *op. cit.*, p. 513. ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 499–502.

Hist. 4.67—9). When the Flavians gained control at Rome, they sent out a man who had already learned the hard way about native revolts. Petilius Cerialis had lost most of his legion and nearly lost his head in the rebellion of Boudicca (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.32.6—7). His military handling of the suppression of the revolt combined brilliance with carelessness. However, he did combine military action with diplomacy, an approach used by Caesar and Tiberius, but scorned by Suetonius Paullinus. As the account of Tacitus closes, this diplomacy is having its effect. Civilis has been offered a pardon and his land and houses spared (Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.23—4). Velea and her family had been approached. The *Histories* break off with Civilis making his justification to Cerialis (Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.26). His fate is not known. Velea was captured, but apparently spared.⁷⁰

The revolt of Civilis presents certain contradictions. Its leaders were the most Romanized of any of the five revolts studied. Their action trod a narrow line between Roman Civil War and native revolt politics as the varying modern interpretations show. However, it is also the revolt that shows the most striking use of native customs and religion to rally its people against Rome. This pattern of acculturated leaders fomenting nativistic revolts is fairly common in more recent uprisings as some of the subsequent discussion will show. Otherwise, the revolt of Civilis shares elements with the earlier uprisings, the semi-acculturated state of the people, the intact quality of the native leadership class and the presence of specific and general abuses.

II

In the previous pages, I have been concerned with describing in reasonable detail the background of each revolt. Some emphasis has been given to features that recur in other uprisings for it is these repeated characteristics which allow us to say that we are dealing with a common social phenomenon, arising from generally the same causes and following a basically similar course, and allows us to create an explainable model of social action.

Before discussing this model in more detail, it might be well to review once again its salient features as they appear in native revolts. First of all, the uprising takes place after initial pacification (or what appeared to the Romans as initial pacification), but before the native social structure had been changed or disrupted completely. The revolts came at a time when the Romans were accelerating their system of administration and financial control. Each of the revolts is dominated by a single leader who promoted a greater degree of social unity than had been present normally in native society.

⁷⁰ E. Stefani, *op. cit.*, p. 29—30.

These major leaders and many of the secondary leaders (when they can be identified) almost always come from the more Romanized native class. In several cases, the development of unity may have been aided in part by the memory or presence of incipient native kingdoms or by the Roman promotion of the congregation of native leaders. The revolts generally catch the Romans, including men experienced in native affairs, unawares, often with their attention diverted to problems elsewhere. There is some indication, although not an overwhelming amount, of mass psycho-religious disturbances. The duration of the rebellions varied, but in two cases (Vercingetorix and Boudicca), they survived the relatively early demise of the charismatic leader, indicating a deep resentment against Roman rule and a relatively strong subsidiary leadership system.

With this general pattern in mind, we can now turn to an analysis of more specific elements. A distinguishing feature of this type of revolt is its timing. It is not a resistance to initial conquest and does not generally include groups that led the resistance to conquest. Usually the native tribes do not realize the full impact of conquest and are more concerned with previous quarrels with other natives. Thus a tribe like the Iceni will see the Romans as an aid against the expansion of the power of the Catuvellauni or the Aedui view them as a means of checking the growth of power of the Sequani and their German supporters.

It takes a few years of partial or complete control by the foreign power to make the natives realize the full impact of the conquest. First of all, while initial dominance may have been achieved through compromise and cooperation, once this control is established, agreements tend to be forgotten and the dominant power tries to establish a more regular administrative control, often with elements unfamiliar or disruptive to native life. Their officials are often completely ignorant of native customs and are ill-controlled. This is not limited to ancient colonial administrations. One of the principal causes of the 19th century Mahdist revolt in the Sudan was the Egyptian administration which was described in the following terms:

“Egyptian rule was unpopular, not merely by its faults, but by its very nature, since it was alien, unremitting and exacting. The explosion of the Mahdi is partly to be explained by this deep-seated frustration.”⁷¹

Similar administrative failures account in part for the 1896–7 revolt in Rhodesia.⁷² Corruption and incompetence combine often with a lack of communication between the administration and the administrator. M. Perham has some interesting observations on this:

“Movements of protest, whether more or less violent among subjected peoples are worth careful study for obvious practical reasons by the immedi-

⁷¹ P. M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881–1898* (Oxford, 1958), p. 16.

⁷² T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 86–7.

ate rulers and for more general ones by the imperial authorities and student. For it is one of the gravest inherent defects in colonial power that it tends to silence the free expression of opinion and even to freeze natural social action among its subjects. Too often the Colonial Service officer lives and works in a cloudy and unreal atmosphere in which complaisant chiefs and delusive interpreters stand between him and the tribal masses who watch silently. Then, generally abruptly and quite unexpectedly, the silence is broken by the uninhibited uproar of revolt in which the true stresses and grievances, hidden perhaps for many years are suddenly laid bare in a few hours of action."⁷³

A similar combination of administrative cruelty and incompetence combined with an inability to express grievances was one of the major causes of the 1917 outbreak in Portuguese East Africa.⁷⁴

With the official administrators come, of course, traders, settlers and other unofficial and usually more obnoxious members of the ruling power. They almost universally provoke hostility. In Gaul, Dalmatia and Britain, settlers and traders were among the first objects of native attacks. This same settler tension was present in Rhodesia and of course the American Indian frontier.⁷⁵

Another factor contributing to the delayed revolts is that within ten to twenty years a new generation reaches fighting age, which does not recall either the inter-tribal conflicts that often led their fathers to cooperate with the conquerors or the initial overwhelming power of the colonial army. I have noted that among the prime movers in Vercingetorix's rebellion was the group of younger nobles. This same generation gap appeared in King Philip's War in New England, with the younger warriors pushing the older into war,⁷⁶ and the Rhodesian revolt of 1896—7.⁷⁷

The combination of the above circumstances created the climate for revolt. Often the spark is provided by either the imposition of some new administrative procedure or the acceleration of an older one. It was taxes in Britain and Dalmatia-Pannonia and possibly in Germany. In the Batavian territory, it was the increased recruiting. Similarly, in more recent revolts, the increased recruiting of natives due to World War I plus the brutalities of the officials in carrying out these measures account for the revolt in Portuguese East Africa,⁷⁸ while taxes led to the revolt in Southern Rhodesia.⁷⁹

⁷³ M. Perham, *Lugard* (London, 1960), v. 2, p. 263.

⁷⁴ T. O. Ranger, "Revolt in Portuguese East Africa: The Makombe Rising of 1917", *St. Antony's Studies* Nr. 15, (1963), p. 62—4, 68—9.

⁷⁵ T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 86—7, 89.

⁷⁶ E. Leach, *op. cit.*, p. 36, 114—5. ⁷⁷ T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 238.

⁷⁸ T. O. Ranger, "Revolt in Portuguese East Africa: The Makombe Rising in 1917", pp. 62—4.

⁷⁹ T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 87.

The most characteristic quality of these revolts in the ancient or modern periods is the importance of the single leader who to the outsider seems to crystallize and dominate the uprising. Names like Boudicca's Rebellion, the Conspiracy of Pontiac and King Philip's War show this. To a certain degree, this emphasis on a single figure may be a device of simplification by contemporary or later observers who emphasized the dramatic qualities of a single person while either ignoring or being ignorant of the whole leadership pattern. Vercingetorix, Boudicca, King Philip, etc. were obviously not the only ones responsible for their respective uprisings. However, these leaders must not be explained away by the arguments of historical neglect or inaccuracy. There is too much evidence in revolts of this type, ancient or modern, to deny that we are dealing with much stronger leaders than normally would appear in native societies. They are part of the pattern of the nativistic reaction.

The social tensions that build up in native societies undergoing acculturation are enormous. Not only is there the provocation of the representatives of the ruling power, but also the challenge implicit or explicit to the whole value system and cultural patterns of the native which in the past had proved adequate but which now has failed him.⁸⁰ Hallowell's description of an Ojibway undergoing the acculturative process brings this out well:

"As I have pointed out (chap. 20), there was once an intimate connection between the content of Ojibway belief, the source of their psychological security and the optimum functioning of inner controls in their psychic economy. While this inner control is still present at Flambeau it has been modified in a retrogressive direction so that it easily breaks down. In actual behavior, evidence of this is to be seen in the tremendous incidence of drunkenness and juvenile delinquency on the reservation and the fact that externally applied control seems quite ineffective. The behavior of many Indians is also symptomatic of the terrific inner struggle which many individuals are experiencing in reaction to the present paucity of their inner resources. An apathy is created which they cannot overcome. They are attempting to survive under conditions which, as yet, offer no culturally defined values and goals that have become vitally significant for them and which might serve as the psychological means that would lead to a more positive readjustment."⁸¹

Under such severe socio-psychological pressures, the old rules no longer follow. A scholar of nativistic movements has described the phenomenon as follows:

"Movements arising in areas at great distance from the Congo and South Africa bear the marks of experience common to all people who live under

⁸⁰ For a general discussion, see A. I. Hallowell, *Culture and Experience* (Philadelphia, 1955), p. 310—332. ⁸¹ A. I. Hallowell, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

foreign rule. This is an indication that the power of these movements to expand throughout a continent shaking some of its people at the root and threatening to engulf others in a tidal wave, comes more from the universality of racial reaction to similar circumstances than from a tradition rooted in local history.”⁸²

One need not be a profound student of social history to realize that such periods of tension and insecurity in the history of a people are ideal times for the emergence of prophet figures. Again quoting Lanternari:

“Every prophetic or messianic movement involves certain sociological and cultural conditions as well as the emergence of one or more individuals endowed with uncommon insight and natural prestige and powers.”⁸³

I have already quoted in connection with Vercingetorix (see above p. 247, note 15) what A. Wallace has to say on the role of charismatic leaders in revitalization movements. Such charismatic leaders are common as a reading of Lanternari’s book will show.⁸⁴

The prophet figure and the war-leader are not always the same person. In Pontiac’s Rebellion, the atmosphere of resistance to the influence of the white man had been prepared by the preaching of the Delaware Prophet and Pontiac built upon this.⁸⁵ This same division was true with Tecumseh’s rebellion, where Tecumseh turned the prophetic message of his brother Tenskwatawa into political and military action.⁸⁶

The relation of the leaders of the anti-Roman revolts to the modern, native charismatic leaders is a complex one. They do appear on the scene with great suddenness and in a time of crisis. They rapidly attract a following well beyond what one would expect from the previous patterns of native social and political organization. However, one major difference exists. The leaders of the Roman revolts do not seem to have based their success so strongly on supernatural associations. Only with Velleda and Civilis do we have a clear association of prophet figure and war leader. Boudicca seems to have had some elements of the prophet figure. Native religion was used by Arminius. The references are tenuous at best with Vercingetorix and lacking for the Dalmatian-Pannonian revolt. The reasons for this must lie in the lack of strong religious conflicts involved in the acculturation process. This will be discussed in more detail shortly.

Emphasis should be given to the sociology as well as the psychology of these movements. In speaking of the Melanesian Cargo Cults, P. Worsley remarks:

⁸² V. Lanternari, *op. cit.*, p. 49. ⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁸⁴ For the classic study of the charismatic type leader, see M. Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (New York, 1947), pp. 358–63; for criticisms of the use of this concept, see P. Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound* (New York, 1968), pp. 266–272.

⁸⁵ H. Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising* (Chicago, 1961), pp. 98–101.

⁸⁶ V. Lanternari, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

"The leaders usually derive their authority from the indigenous order (traditionally "big men", aristocrats, magicians, etc.) or from their special knowledge or experience of the new social order of the Whites, or from new-found wealth and power."⁸⁷

As can be recalled from the discussion above, this description fits closely many of the leaders of the Roman revolts. The basic social order was still intact, but threatened, and these men were generally important men in it. Furthermore, they all had had considerable contact with the Romans, knew their culture and in some cases must have gained new financial resources from their service.

Another thing that should be examined is the orientation of the culture. Those with a strong warrior tradition will more often express their revivalistic urges in more militant forms. In Polynesia, where there was a strong warrior tradition, the outbreaks took a more military form than in Melanesia which did not have so strong a warrior tradition.⁸⁸ A similar underlying cause may be reflected in differences between the wars of Pontiac and Tecumseh and the Peyute Cult.⁸⁹ Among the Yaqui of Mexico, the activity of the Jesuits in forming religious societies with strong military overtones contributed to the continuation of the warrior tradition and outbreak of revolts in the nineteenth century.⁹⁰ Certainly the warrior tradition was strong among the various groups involved in the Roman rebellions and was in fact continued by the Romans in their use of natives in auxiliary service.

Models of past or present unity also aid in the structuring of revolts. T. Ranger has shown the importance of these for Rhodesia.⁹¹ In several cases models of stronger native kingdoms in the past like those of Bituitus and Cunobelinus or in the present like Maroboduus were available for the natives revolting against Rome. Furthermore, the Romans by their political, military and religious assemblies had encouraged a greater degree of unity among the natives.

Preconceptions of the behavior of natives on the part of the dominant power also played a role in the revolt. I quoted about the feeling of surprise of a British official at the time of the Rhodesian revolt of 1896 (see above p. 249, note 25). A similar sense of the basically divided political structure of the native society contributed to unpreparedness at the time of King Philip's and Pontiac's uprising.⁹² As I have noted in connection with the anti-Roman

⁸⁷ P. Worsley, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

⁸⁸ V. Lanternari, *op. cit.*, p. 191—2, 209.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 80—1, 108—9, 113.

⁹⁰ E. H. Spicer, "Yaqui Militarism", *Arizona Quarterly*, 3 (1947), pp. 40—8. I owe this reference to Professor Willard Walker of Wesleyan.

⁹¹ T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, pp. 6—15.

⁹² T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 124, 311; T. O. Ranger, "Revolt in Portuguese East Africa", p. 65; E. Leach, *op. cit.*, p. 90—1; H. Peckham, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

rebellions, in each case experienced Roman officials were caught offguard by the size and speed of the revolt.

Historical circumstances, especially those that divert or divide the colonial powers, should also be considered. These often determine the timing of the revolt. The uprising in Rhodesia followed hard upon the Jameson Raid with its blow to white power and prestige,⁹³ while the Portuguese rebellion was related to the involvement of Portugal in World War I.⁹⁴ Rivalry between the British and the French spurred Pontiac toward rebellion.⁹⁵ The same was true of the Roman revolts. Caesar was more concerned with events at Rome. Varus and Suetonius Paullinus were involved in dealing with military actions at the border of their territory. Maroboduus had distracted Tiberius from Pannonia-Dalmatia and the Civil Wars turned the Romans attention from the Batavians.

Thus there are many characteristics in common between the Roman and the modern revolts. The great difference is in the sphere of religious involvement. This reflects a profound difference in the nature of the acculturative process. For the modern native, his response must be both to an overwhelming political, military, economic and social entity, and to a religion that is organized, sophisticated, and missionary. The whole fundamental structure of belief is under attack. It is in the combination of resistance and acceptance in altered form of Christian elements that many prophet figures arise.⁹⁶ Except in a few cases where they met unpalatable rituals, the Romans were not interested in attacking native religion and in fact syncretism was encouraged.

Nor could the natives generally find elements to order their rebellion in either the old or new religion. They did not have the spirit mediums and the strength of the Mwari cult in Rhodesia,⁹⁷ the spirit mediums of Portuguese East Africa,⁹⁸ or the Mahdist traditions of Islam.⁹⁹ They did not find in the conqueror's religion the traditions of the revolts of oppressed peoples like the Jews that could inspire their uprisings.¹⁰⁰ Some elements of spiritual movements were present as one would expect in a period of tension. However, if we discount the Druids (which I have tended to do), no religious movements match the force of the political movements. This latter area was where the native, especially the native leader, felt himself most threatened. It was in the desire to preserve a social and political order that they revolted and it was a "political messiah" that they followed as their leader.

⁹³ T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 124.

⁹⁴ T. O. Ranger, "Revolt in Portuguese East Africa", p. 62—5.

⁹⁵ H. Peckham, *op. cit.*, p. 96, 102—6. ⁹⁶ V. Lanternari, *op. cit.*, p. 243—54.

⁹⁷ T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 146—60; 200—6, 209—225.

⁹⁸ T. O. Ranger, "Revolt in Portuguese East Africa", p. 67.

⁹⁹ P. Holt, *op. cit.*, p. 22—3. ¹⁰⁰ V. Lanternari, *op. cit.*, 61—2, 203—4.

The central qualities of these five ancient revolts and their relation to modern studies on nativistic movements have now been traced. That they are similar and that they can best be explained by a modified model drawn from the known reaction of modern primitives to acculturation will, I hope, be convincing. Classical studies have in recent years drawn away from the social sciences. The result has been a tendency to forget that Rome, like modern Britain or France, faced basic anthropological problems of a similar nature in her colonization. Thus the classicist has lost the use of concepts and information in several vigorous fields in the study of human behavior while the social scientist has lost contact with a large reservoir of comparative information. I hope that this paper has succeeded in partially bridging the gap.

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