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Rewriting Richardson

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Rewriting Richardson

Noel King

The novel was begun in a hotel called "The Mists" which is just outside Antiquity. It was begun by several people and Richardson was one of them. Samuel Richardson was his name, he's probably dead now, he was a very old man when I knew him, and he wrote a thing called *Pamela* which established two great strains which run through all subsequent history of the novel; the use of the narrator, and boredom. The story was fairly simple and it concerned promiscuity, attempted rape, submissions and other burning issues of the day. It was basically a diary and the style was good example of what scholars refer to as "awful."¹

I

What this quotation from Fred Dagg allows me to introduce is the fact — now surely a commonplace — that any reading of a text is a rewriting of it. All criticism rewrites the object it purports to explain; some deconstructionist modes of criticism provide an extravagant celebration of this fact, while a vestigial liberal humanist criticism simply denies or ignores it. Pierre Macherey has a conveniently succinct account of this notion of rewriting: "Texts are constantly rewritten, their effects are constantly altered. It is essential to study the material history of text and . . . this history contains not only the works themselves but all the interpretations which have been attached to them and which are finally incorporated *into* them."² Or, as Fredric Jameson says at the start of *The Political Unconscious*: "Texts come before us as the always already read; we apprehend them through sedimented layers of previous interpretation."³ Some of Tony Bennett's recent work takes up this theoretical point and provides a practical working-through of it by way of a case study of "the Bond phenomenon."⁴ For an application of this notion of rewriting to the work of a particular writer, we can cite Peter Williams's article on Frank Hardy,⁵ and, for an application of it to a "single text" (although this phrase is somewhat anomalous given this theoretical perspective), we can cite Michael White's article on *Robinson Crusoe*.⁶ A body of theoretical writing is, then, developing around the concept of "consumptional production": this refers to theoretical analyses which attend to the historically variable existence and activity of texts, analyses which recognize that

“what the entire history of discourse on literature shows is how much, in how many different circumstances, a text can be made to signify.”⁷

Terry Eagleton has some worries with this view of texts to the degree that it risks suggesting that, say, the literary text is unable to constrain the possible range of its interpretations. In his review of Tony Bennett’s *Formalism and Marxism* (a book which in part stresses “consumptional production” and provides a useful mapping of the complex ways in which Literature is reproduced), Eagleton speaks of the possibility of a reductive “over-politicizing” of literature:

Does it follow from arguing that the text-in-itself is an illusion that we can never actually know that *Macbeth* isn’t about Manchester United? Doesn’t the text in some sense constrain the possible range of its interpretations? And if not, what would it mean to say that we’re discussing this text rather than another? In bending the stick against a “metaphysics” of the work, Bennett occasionally falls foul of an extreme conjuncturalism which merely collapses the work into its various moments of reception.⁸

In “The Idealism of American Criticism” he repeats this point:

The most fundamental issues in modern literary theory are on the whole epistemological ones. It is to this root . . . that many questions of meaning and value, intention and effect may be unravelled. Paramount among these issues today is the question of the determinacy of the literary text, its power to organise, constrain and disseminate meanings.⁹

And again, toward the end of a short review of P. D. Juhl’s *Interpretation: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literary Criticism*, Eagleton writes:

Left-wing critics should not be too scornful of this fear of indeterminacy: if a student tells us that he or she reads *Little Dorrit* or *Jerusalem* as a sparkling apologia for the capitalist mode of production, it is conceivable that we can dissuade him or her by pointing out “what the text means.” Juhl is not wrong in opposing sheer textual indeterminacy: he is merely wrong in locating determinacy in the author rather than the delimiting field of power—forces within which the text is both produced and consumed.¹⁰

Such questions alert us to the fact that a pure “conjuncturalism” of reading can move, politically, in either direction: it is quite as convenient for the right as for the left. Accordingly, Eagleton wants to insist that texts are not merely clay in our hands and that they *do* constrain their modes of consumption: “texts, like objects in a scientific experiment, offer certain resistances to certain modes of appropriation.”¹¹ If texts are granted a certain power to interrogate a particular reading practice, to return answers which the questions had not anticipated

(thereby throwing up new questions), then one starts to posit a more complex set of text/reading relations whereby a text reformulates the codes through which it is read in a way that helps to produce a different reading practice that now highlights other mechanisms in the text, and so on, in a potentially un-closed process.

To a significant extent Eagleton's *The Rape of Clarissa* can be read as a book which teases out this particular theoretical question of the relative degree of determinacy of texts and the relative force of an original/originary context, while also raising the related questions of what, precisely, will count as a text and a reading. I want now to spend some time outlining the "anti-originary context" position since this seems to me to be part of what Eagleton is arguing *against*.

II

In an article entitled "The Concept of Context and the Problem of Reading," Ian Hunter suggests that what is to count as literature, or the production of literary effects, is determined *in the first instance* by the iteration of definite (though shifting and divergent) techniques of reading and writing, *and then* by the specific kind of institutional ensembles in which these techniques are activated and in which literary texts are deployed.¹² The significance of Hunter's argument resides in the way it problematizes a certain tradition in Marxist sociologies of literature/culture. It is a tradition in which, broadly speaking, the principal meaning of literary texts is explained in terms of their authors' experience of, and/or determination within, a particular sociohistorical context. This experience can be *conscious*, as, for example, when Raymond Williams accounts for the meaning of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* in terms of D. H. Lawrence's reaction to the dehumanizing effects of industrialization; or it can be *unconscious*, as, for example, when Lucien Goldmann accounts for the structure of Racine's tragedies in terms of changes in class power brought about by a decline in the power of the king. (Racine need not be thought of as *responding* to these changes since they are alleged to appear in his plays in a displaced form: for example, in the representation of God.) In each case, literary meaning is thought of as the trace of a consciousness in some way determined ("actively" or "passively") by a real sociohistorical context. Yet if, as Hunter argues, literary effects are the shifting outcome of the activation of specific techniques in different discursive/institutional ensembles, then there is no reason to privilege the ensemble in which a text first appears as providing the central determinant of its meaning.

The implications of Hunter's argument are made clear in David Saunders's "The Trial of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*: Limiting Cases and Literary Canons,"¹³ which effectively shows that *Lady Chatterley's Lover* has not always been read as a text expressing its author's concern with industrial dehumanization: the fact that, for a time, it enjoyed the status of a *pornographic* text, one of a class of texts whose primary function is as an adjunct to erotic excitation, indicates that *Lady*

Chatterley's Lover is a text which has been deployed within divergent apparatuses that are capable of producing quite different effects *on and with* the text. In the case of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, the change in its deployment is accompanied by the institution of the law, which *legitimizes* a literary reading of the text and thereby permits a quite different form of circulation, one which allows it to be deployed within educational institutions where, presumably, it is not publicly used for erotic excitation. The case of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, then, provides a specific example of what it means to say that literary meanings and effects are not singular, but rather, depend upon the activation of specific techniques of reading in definite institutional ensembles. Clearly these sorts of activation are not reducible to the author's experience of/determination by an originary context. These uses, meanings, and effects of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* are not locatable at the time of its production.

What Hunter and Saunders indicate is a tendency for some Marxist literary theory to fetishize the moment of production (through an unself-conscious use of "context") and to ignore the divergent, shifting reproductions and transformations of texts. Hunter argues that such a construction of literature (insofar as it depends on a concept of an originary determination and continuous social function), risks "writing history backwards" by mobilizing a *current* deployment and valorization of the concept "literature," a notion of literature which is quite specific to its modern emergence in pedagogical institutions.

In *The Rape of Clarissa*, Eagleton can, I think, be seen to be reacting to formulations of the kind Hunter outlines. Eagleton is holding polemically to a mode of explanation that he thinks has been rather cavalierly put aside; and his reply to the statement, "There is no reason to privilege the ensemble in which a text first appears as providing the main determinant of its meaning," would be something like, "nor is there any reason to discount it altogether." Eagleton is trying to bend the stick back against recent work that he characterizes as constituting "a carnival of consumption, a fetishism of consumption": "The classic move now — while perhaps asserting parenthetically that yes, of course in some way the text does constrain the hermeneutical process — is to go on to a total hermeneutic plurality."¹⁴ It is for this reason that Eagleton allows himself to say that,

if the general eighteenth-century trend was towards the rights of women in choosing their husbands, *Clarissa* would suggest that older patriarchal attitudes were still lethally active. It is because that novel is produced at a transitional point that it can dramatise the contradictions of ruling class patriarchy as vividly as it does.¹⁵

Or, earlier, "There is a tension in Richardson's very place within material production, between local artisan and international ideologue, which becomes figured in the form of his work" (p. 10). Eagleton here is insisting that the conditions of production of the text *are* inscribed within it and that the constraining

forces of power that traverse a text and delimit meaning belong to its institutions of production as much as to subsequent institutions of reproduction. In the scramble toward a version of "consumptional production" or "conjuncturalism," this seems to have been forgotten. In a sense, remarks of this kind from Eagleton constitute a reply to, say, the kind of position outlined in the following quotation from Francis Mulhern:

What a text shows or can be made to show of its means of production is of incontestable importance. But it cannot be decisive, either theoretically or in the "politics" of criticism . . . because if a text is not an "event" but a "function" transposable in time and space, its conditions of production can have no special priority in analysis over its subsequent and variable *existence and activity*.¹⁶

By setting the (differing) positions of Hunter, Bennett, and Mulhern against Eagleton's position on this particular issue, it becomes possible to elaborate on the "either/or" dichotomy concerning the question of the determinacy of the literary text, its power to organize, to constrain, and to disseminate meaning. To some extent, some recent articles by John Frow help bridge the gap that is opening here. Frow argues that, "The boundary of the text . . . and its mode of signification are socially imposed. . . . It is made up of different modes and levels of intertextuality, each with a specific degree of cognitive privilege which is socially ascribed."¹⁷ Accordingly, one must take account of "a structured field of evaluations and the critical concepts used to produce them as objects of analysis" and *then* integrate them with the textual process: "Such a deconstruction of 'the text' should lead us to focus on the interplay between text and system and on the social determinants of that process" (pp. 37-38). Frow would agree with Hunter's dismissal of an empiricist-idealist concept of context as being the ultimate determinant and as being *external* to texts. Yet, since Frow's concern is to try to think the relationality of texts, then *some* notion of context will be necessary. Frow outlines a position midway between, say, Terry Eagleton and Tony Bennett by arguing that textual construction happens with equal validity through multiple, successive, or disparate systems. Frow sets no normative standard of determinacy but does assume that actual constraints do exist (for example, those of formal structure and of historically specific regimes of reading).

Frow also "privileges" the first "context of production" to the extent that this can be said to constitute a point of specific intertextuality (namely, the relation of the text to a normative literary system) which is held to be distinct from all later intertextual relations. To take Samuel Richardson as the example, his relation to the genres of middle-class "female" discourse and of puritan self-examination would, according to Frow's position, be crucial as a *first* level of historical explanation, one which cannot simply be *separated* from subsequent readers' investments in those texts. In his attempt to formulate a materialist theory of reading,

Frow takes up the crucial question of "the historicity of a single, verbally self-identical text," seeking to think the relation between "the time of its production (the 'internal time' of its rewriting or reproduction of prevailing literary and ideological norms) and the times of its reception (in which this internal textual process is modified by its entry into new intertextual relationships)."¹⁸ Frow's concentration is on "a fuller conception of the historicity of the text, accounting not merely for its pastness but also for its productive interaction with historically distinct systems" ("Textual Historicities," p. 16). Frow, in indicating one possible "politics of reading," outlines an activity which has much in common with the sort of things Eagleton is trying to do in *The Rape of Clarissa*.

With the positions of Eagleton, Bennett, Frow, and Hunter in mind, I want to push on with the problem of this "either/or" dichotomy. In an extreme formulation, it seems to become the case that *either* the determinations of "social being" are inscribed unconsciously in the text, allowing it to function as an object which resists, delimits our various subjective construals, *or* that there is a "pure conjuncturalism" which (in the manner of certain phenomenologies of reading) extols the limitless transformation of the work by virtue of the never-repeated encounter between reader (subject) and text (object). These two formulations (the "either/or") have two things in common: the subject-object division and (differing) single, general accounts of reading/knowledge. If we were to set this against all those activities and institutions which determine what we will call "reading" or "knowledge," however, we would notice that these activities cannot be subsumed under a single knowledge relation. For example, "reading" or "knowledge" could take the form of verbatim repetition, correlating events in the text with stories of the author's life, cataloging rhetorical and thematic figures; equally it might mean practicing the techniques of historical philology aimed at reconstructing lexical meaning or applying the various kinds of linguistic analyses ("Greimasian," etc.), and so on. From this it would seem clear that we are dealing with a network of "practical surfaces" whose work is to isolate and form the literary text as a definite type of object.¹⁹

This "network of practical surfaces" could involve, on the one hand, the school system, copyright, legal regulations (which, as David Saunders's article shows, are capable of moving a text from the realm of pornography to the realm of Art): these would constitute one set of constraining apparatuses. On the other hand, there are a set of generic forms or discursive modes (the diary, the epistle, the testimony, the confession, the anecdote) which constrain differently. This is why the moment of production cannot function as an eternal origin to which the text can always be referred. Yet, again, one is *never* dealing with a single domain of subjectivity. One's relation to the text, the surface of recognition on which it appears is not determined by a "natural" capacity for recognition, misrecognition, or invention by the reading subject, but rather, is determined by a historical

array of practical activities or institutions, contingent in their historical appearance, but determinate once installed. This last statement has three main implications: first, it means that the problem of reading is not one of securing or understanding a “correct” or “typical” relation between the two entities, reader (subject) and text (object). Rather, we understand what it means to read if we have a practical familiarity with *some* practices of reading. These have neither an essence nor a guarantee except for the warrants they give themselves. Plainly these warrants are not universal. You are unlikely to check the OED very often if you’re busy doing an “Oedipal” reading of *Hamlet*, just as a “Greimasian” reading of *Hamlet* would be unlikely to consult *The Interpretation of Dreams* with any regularity.

The second implication (in respect of the “either” half of the “either/or” formulation) is that we can give up looking for “objective” constraints on meaning without falling into relativism precisely because reading/construal does not originate in an otherwise unconstrained reading subject. This is to say that it is nonsense to think that we can make a text mean anything because “meaning” will always be the result of that limited array of *dispositifs* that determine, for us, what will count as (what we will call) “meaning.”

Finally, it also means (in respect of the “or” side of the equation) that the text will not be transformed perpetually across the shifting encounters of text and reader (and their alleged mutual constitution as described in certain theories of enunciation and subject formation). And this will be so for the reason stated earlier, namely that “meaning” is the consequence of our practical familiarity with a limited array of *dispositifs*. Consequently, there is no question of “opening text to reader” (or vice versa) because there are no general spaces where these two entities exist *outside* or *prior* to the activation of one or another of the apparatuses that determine what we call reading *in some particular case*.

Now, a particular notion of “conjuncture” *can* be retained in this account if it is understood as saying that a given cultural artifact (a film, a book) will not always stand in the same relation to the group of techniques and practices surrounding it: its institutional deployment will vary. This is a point made quite clearly by Ian Hunter in his article, “Reading Character,”²⁰ in which he outlines the differences in an eighteenth-century (George Stubbes) reading of a scene from *Hamlet* and the concept of character mobilized in that reading, and a turn of the century reading of the same scene (by A. C. Bradley in 1904), where a quite different concept of character is activated, one which, crucially, draws on the adjacent field of the newly emerged discipline of moral psychology. That is, although Stubbes and Bradley are talking about “character” within the same scene from the same play they are not talking about it in the same way: their respective discourses name quite different objects. To take another literary example, I would guess that a fable such as Samuel Johnson’s *Rasselas* probably had a quite different relation to, say, medical practices (in relation to the treatment of

character disturbances) and to moral philosophy from the one it now has to those adjacent fields. That is to say, that in a period when the giving of precepts for conduct formed part of the same series as managing diet and regulating companionship—all these being directed toward systematizing conduct and demeanor—then the textual representation of “character” in *Rasselas* will be quite different from the kind found in A. C. Bradley’s writing.

But to say this is not the same as saying that texts can mean whatever they are made to mean in particular conjunctures, where “conjuncture” functions as the equivalent of a “point-of-view.” The “precept” reading of *Rasselas* will be uniform, inescapable, for as long as those relations between medicine, moral philosophy, and fictional writing obtain. The role or function of the text in that ensemble is not open to idiosyncratic individual choices; it does not vary with a particular individual’s perspective. When it does change, the “precept” status of the text is replaced by the use of the text as an instrument of introspection and self-examination.²¹ Where those who wish to insist on determinacy of meaning are right is in the fact that we cannot escape these new roles and effects once they are established and routinized. Yet this is not because “meaning” has been locked into textual form by productive determinations; rather, we have replaced one notion of textual meaning with a concept of the conditions of deployment of texts, attending now to the way texts are stitched into larger cultural mechanisms.

In part, this simply means that there is no question of limitless transformation of texts across different enunciative positions because there is no equivalent of “all possible positions” that would put “the subject” in some sort of relation to the finite number of actual positions (that is, the relations of *fixity* or possible transformation/transcendence). There will only ever be these finite actual positions, and these are not positions of epistemological relation to an object (the text) but, rather, positions determined by actions performed, comparisons made, dictionaries consulted, categories learned and repeated. A summary remark on all of this, then, might be that political intervention in literary institutions/practices cannot be read off from an epistemological analysis of the objects and concepts located within the literary institution.

III

Deconstructionism, you understand, is not programmatic, or theoretical, or even a method; it is probably sheer coincidence that it consistently concludes, by dint of a certain reading, that literary texts haven’t a clue what they’re talking about and suggests that this is what we should keep on discovering.²²

Where the otherwise differing positions of Terry Eagleton and Ian Hunter could overlap is in relation to phenomenologies of reading (the “Black Forest

School of criticism" as Eagleton recently dubbed it) and deconstruction.²³ Part of Eagleton's insistence on the determining force of an originary context is to bend the stick back against "that vein of scepticism now sometimes fashionable on the intellectual left, which posits 'the text itself' as an unknowable *Ding-an-sich*, dissolving it into the ensemble of its reading conjunctures"²⁴—by which he means the work of people like Tony Bennett. Yet it could also be said to be working against accounts of reading in the style of Stanley Fish and the Yale school sub-Derrideans. For example, in his introduction to *The Rape of Clarissa*, Eagleton says he is "interested less in what [Richardson's] fiction 'mirrors' than in what it *does*."²⁵ This could be seen as a strategy of radically relocating Stanley Fish's description of his celebrated "literature in the reader" project ("what does this word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, chapter, novel, play, poem, *do*?")²⁶ in a firmly historical—materialist paradigm. As was the case with *Walter Benjamin, Or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism*, much of *The Rape of Clarissa* can be read as a battle against two modes of criticism which currently seem to be flourishing in the United States: on the one hand, the reader-response phenomenological work of a Stanley Fish (who has managed to make a career out of being surprised by syntax) and, on the other, the Yale school deconstructionists whose work Eagleton has termed "depressingly depoliticized" and "consciously post-political."²⁷ Eagleton demolishes the deconstructionist persona very effectively, displaying its profound limitations by way of a cussing "case-study" of William Beatty-Warner's recent *Reading Clarissa* (see *The Rape*, pp. 65–69). The following should give a fair indication of the severity of his attack on some of the excesses of the Yale school: Eagleton glosses Beatty-Warner to the effect that "the rapist is a Derridean jester misunderstood," adding that Lovelace's imprisoning of Clarissa in a brothel "is a salutary deconstruction of her metaphysical delusions, a radical, perhaps even comradely gesture" (p. 66). Further, if we properly understand comic form, then Lovelace's "shortcomings" cannot be held against him:

Clarissa, presumably, couldn't take a joke, although Warner does generously acknowledge that "something genuinely arresting" happened to her when she was drugged and raped, and informs us that, having been raped, she "feels used." It is not, however, that she has been used by a sexual oppressor but by "Lovelace's fictional machinery. . . ." (Rape, p. 67)

[Beatty-Warner's] book is an ominous exposé of the truly reactionary nature of much deconstructionist "radicalism," once divorced from the social and political contexts it so characteristically finds hard to handle. (Rape, pp. 67–68)

Because I have absolutely no quarrel with Eagleton on this issue, and because it is Eagleton at his polemical best, I want instead to make some remarks on

polemical writing, its power of purchase, its degree of efficacy, its limitations as a discursive mode. It is a mode in which Eagleton has few peers, and one to which he has a specific political-strategic commitment. Whether it be a short piece on the so-called "MacCabe affair" (in *Time-Out*) or a few pages on "The Revolt of the Reader" in *New Literary History*, or — more frequently — short book reviews, Eagleton regularly exploits the polemical mode of writing. In a recent discussion of Fredric Jameson's criticism, Eagleton ventured that Jameson's writing "appears too eirenic, easy-going and all-encompassing for his own political good. (The fact that he is in no sense a polemical or satirical writer — essential modes, to my mind, for a political revolutionary — may be taken to confirm this impression)." ²⁸ And again, alluding to Jameson's position as "intellectual appropriator and generous respecter of autonomy,"

Whatever the theoretical value of this position, it would certainly seem to confiscate — rather in the manner of Jameson's regular, curiously unimpassioned style — some of those vital *political* energies — of conflict, opposition, denunciation — without which the whole Marxist project is the merest academicism. ²⁹

Eagleton's political-strategic commitment to the polemical mode produces some powerful effects, and John Frow, in "Marxism after Structuralism," has touched on this very issue: "In its polemical oscillations this book [*Walter Benjamin, Or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism*] frequently (and often rewardingly) lacks the unscarred smoothness of an academic monologue. Key questions are not 'settled' but are taken up from different angles." ³⁰ This remains the case in *The Rape of Clarissa*, where Eagleton has no interest whatsoever in pursuing the folly of an "exhaustive" reading of Richardson's texts; instead, his aim is to produce an indicative, a provocative, account. It is the Eagleton of the broad brushstroke, tossing out suggestive comparisons which sometimes work (Richardson and Brecht) and sometimes do not (*Pamela* as an early version of such popular cultural sagas as *Superman* or *Coronation Street*). It is, in short, Eagleton being polemical.

Polemics, within literary criticism, sets up a relation between the truth of a discourse and the truth of a personage; it constitutes a form in which the moral authority of the critic allows "significance" to appear on the surface of the ethical norms he embodies. It activates this regime of truth, and its purchase and effectivity come from the historical formation of the mechanism which links the "personage" status of the writer to the truth of his discourse. To say this is not to offer any particular *criticism* of Eagleton; it is merely to indicate how the particular discursive mode he is activating (polemics) gains its considerable effects. His targets seem to me correctly to be identified (the fragility of deconstructionist ethics, the stupidity of its politics), but the mode of hitting the target, namely, the interpolation of an exemplary Marxist personage, perhaps indicates a limitation within that particular discursive mode (although, having said that, I cannot think of any *other* strategy).

IV

If your political concern is to demystify, why choose literature as an instrument? . . . If our first concern is to intervene in the processes whereby the subject of class-society is constituted we would surely not have “naturally” selected literature or even Jean-Luc Godard, as a way of doing this. The object is too remote from the lives of too many people. . . . We ought frankly to admit that we are doing it [teaching literature] as socialists because it is there. As long as literature is there then there must be socialists around it, and as long as we happen to be here, as people for whom the relation between literature and politics is a good deal more contingent than we sometimes like to think, then we are no doubt the people to be around.³¹

What then are Eagleton’s concerns in *The Rape of Clarissa*? First to place Richardson as an intellectual and a literary producer within an emergent class (the bourgeoisie) but *not* simply to read his texts as “great allegories of class warfare, narratives of alliance and antagonism between a predatory nobility and a pious bourgeoisie” (*Rape*, p. 4). As had been indicated earlier, Eagleton is interested not so much in what Richardson’s fiction might be said to “mirror” as in what it *does*:

For Richardson’s novels are not mere images of conflict fought out on another terrain, representations of a history which happens elsewhere; they are themselves a material part of those struggles, pitched standards around which battle is joined, instruments which help to constitute social interests rather than lenses which reflect them. These novels are an agent, rather than mere account of the English bourgeoisie’s attempt to wrest a degree of ideological hegemony from the aristocracy in the decades which follow the political settlement of 1668. (*Rape*, p. 4)

Richardson’s characters—Pamela, Clarissa, Sir Charles Grandison—are not simply fictional entities but are “public mythologies, co-ordinates of a mighty moral debate, symbolic spaces within which dialogue may be conducted, pacts included and ideological battle waged” (*Rape*, p. 4). Accordingly, *Pamela* is a whole cultural event (an early equivalent of what we would now call a “multi-media” event), becoming a play, an opera, a waxwork:

The literary text is not merely to be read: it is to be dramatised, displayed, wielded as cultural totem, ransacked for moral propaganda or swooned over as love story, preached from the pulpit and quoted in the salons. *Pamela*, *Clarissa* and *Grandison* are public property subject to strategic wars, lynchpin of an entire ideological formulation. (Rape, p. 5)

Richardson's novels, then, are not only or even primarily literary texts: they entwine with commerce, religion, theatre, ethical debate, the visual arts, public entertainment. They are both cogs in a culture industry and sacred scripture to be reverently conned. (Rape, p. 6)

Thus begins Eagleton's location of Richardson along lines suggested by the work of Antonio Gramsci, and it is here that Richardson's role as master printer becomes important:

Political, pedagogic, religious, cultural and juridical: Richardson's firm moved at the intersection of these mighty ideological apparatuses. . . . "Samuel Richardson" denotes a powerhouse of vital ideological interests, a discursive formation which enmeshes English society, connects with its power structures and spreads to catch the sensibility of Europe in its sway. (Rape, pp. 8-9)

What Eagleton maps onto his "Gramscian" reading of Richardson's class location (that is, Richardson as "organic intellectual") is an analysis of Richardson's writing that is informed, guardedly, by poststructuralist theories of textuality:

What threatens to proliferate beyond personal control in his writing is nothing less than *writing itself*. It is writing — that sprawling mesh of dangerously open-ended signs — which Richardson and his characters strive to leash to a personal intention. (Rape, p. 9)

A novel today is usually a finished, seamless product; Richardson's works, by contrast, are more usefully thought of as *kits*, great unwieldy containers crammed with spare parts and agreeable extras, for which the manufacturer never ceases to turn out new streamlined improvements, ingenious additions and revised instruction sheets. The second edition of *Pamela* comes complete with a table of contents intended to sharpen the moral, added footnotes, and some revised and appended passages. Later editions of *Clarissa* turn up furnished and supposedly "restored" (in fact freshly written) material, and Richardson will later publish these passages as a separate volume. . . . One text ceaselessly spawns another. . . . Constantly in motion "in itself" Richardson's text is rocked into further instability by the "supplementary" material added to ballast it. For that material is not, of course, "*hors texte*". . . : in offering to "explicate" Richardson's meaning, it finds itself sucked along by the whole turbulent textual process. "Restorations" turn out to be addenda, "addenda" attempt to plug textual gaps, textual gaps are created by "restorations." (Rape, pp. 20, 21)

Richardson is concerned to “police” his texts and their possible interpretations, insulating them against “perverse” readings (such as finding *Lovelace* preferable to *Clarissa*):

The irony of this enterprise has already been suggested: the more Richardson plugs and patches to disambiguate his writing and avert incorrect readings, the more he piles on matter for yet further misconstruction. Driven on by what must surely be seen as a quasi-pathological urge for perfection, Richardson succeeds in unravelling his text a little more, prising it open in the act of trying to spring it shut. In striving to “complete” his work, to achieve the utterly definitive text, he simply sets himself more to do. (*Rape*, pp. 23–24)

From here Eagleton probes the problem of “the ideological dilemma of form in Richardson” (p. 25). As a devout eighteenth-century puritan, how could Richardson sanction licentious readings of his work? And it is this question of ideology and literary form which prompts Eagleton’s comparison of Richardson with Brecht:

If Richardson writes before fictional realism has been formalised, epic theatre happens when it has run its course. But there is a rather more obvious parallel between the two genres: both are unashamedly didactic. Richardson springs from an ascendent bourgeoisie; epic theatre is an art form of the militant working class. The most pressing problem for both forms can then be posed as follows: how is a structural openness, the essential medium of transformed relations between producers and audiences, to be reconciled with a necessary doctrinal closure? (*Rape*, p. 22)

Epic theatre, by virtue of its variable viewpoint, disowns one traditional device for securing ideological closure: the presence of a coherent overview or “metalanguage” which may direct the audience’s response. On the contrary the “closure” such theatre seeks to effect is nothing less than the militant viewpoint that all such metalanguages must be suspected. By using the epistolary form, Richardson equally deprives himself of his main resource: you cannot have an authorial voice-over if the characters do all the writing. (*Rape*, p. 25)

Later, in setting Richardson against Jane Austen, Eagleton is able to elaborate his point about the particular ideological exigencies of Richardson’s writing:

Technically speaking, Richardson could no doubt have pulled off what Jane Austen did. . . . If Richardson is not Jane Austen, it is partly because at his historical point, certain richly effective forms of writing—moral homily, meditation, polemic, propaganda, exemplary tale—have not yet been relegated by a narrowing “formal realism” to the scrap-heap of literary subcultures. (*Rape*, p. 29)

Here Eagleton is activating *not* the contested “originary-context” explanation but a much more useful notion of historical discursive possibilities (specific, historically varying apparatuses and/or regimes of readings); and, at this moment, his position comes closer to the otherwise differing positions of Frow and Hunter.³²

Eagleton concludes his “Introduction” (*Rape*, pp. 1–39) by comparing *Pamela* with contemporary popular cultural forms:

Like modern romantic fiction [the] main effect [of *Pamela*] is . . . anodyne and oppressive—a cynical displacement of women’s sufferings into consolatory myth, a false, insulting “resolution” of sexual combat which merely consolidates patriarchal power. Yet one of the most striking aspects of such degraded fiction in our time is the demand for it: the depressing truth that it does, in however monstrously debased a form, expresses an implicit dissatisfaction with current social conditions. (*Rape*, p. 37)

The comparison of *Pamela* with contemporary popular cultural forms as a means of suggesting that, in each case, the texts circulate among their readers in a quite similar manner, seems to me rather problematical insofar as a political judgment is being delivered in advance of the detailed research that would be required to support it. Given the polemical and condensed natures of much of his argument, it is inevitable that statements such as these will risk looking like a residual “Eng-Litness” from which Eagleton has been unable to detach himself. For the time being, however, the really important thing to do is to engage in detail with the burgeoning practical-theoretical work in the field of popular culture and popular reading, rather than making an appeal to an assumed, agreed realm of literary-cultural value.³³ Throwaway remark though it is, it threatens to divert attention from the important task of investigating the conditions of intelligibility of particular literary-cultural objects. At the moment, it seems crucial to take up the issue of historically varying reading formations, to pursue work of the kind exhibited by Tony Bennett and Janet Woolcott in their case study of “the Bond phenomenon.” At the same time, it must be admitted that such detailed engagement might well result in precisely the kind of political judgments made here by Eagleton. It is just that there would be a lot more evidence on hand to support these sorts of claims.

Another area in which Eagleton has interesting things to say concerns the extent to which “ambiguity” can function as a useful term in historical materialist criticism. Commenting on the levels of ambiguity at work in *Pamela*, Eagleton writes:

As good post-Freudian readers subtly vigilant to unconscious intentions it seems possible that we have the laugh on *Pamela*; but on the other hand it may always have the laugh on us. . . . (*Rape*, p. 31)

Perhaps Pamela, as William Empson maintains, is *unconsciously* scheming; but is the novel conscious of her unconscious or collusive with it? Do we laugh with Pamela at the novel's solemn moralising of her "baser" motives, or laugh with the novel at her slippery self-apologias? Do we have the edge over both novel and Pamela, or does the novel have the edge over us all? In inviting us to indulge our fantasies, is it cruder or cleverer than we are? (*Rape*, p. 32)

Again, this *could* be mistaken for the familiar Eng-Lit delight in undecidability and ambiguity; the certitude that the text always "escapes" us to some extent. More significantly, though, remarks of this kind cling to the unhelpful "text" (object) and "us" (subject) equation. Yet if, as has been suggested earlier, "meaning" and "interpretation" are the consequence of a contingent, limited, historically varying array of *dispositifs* (which determine what will count as "meaning") then where does ambiguity reside? Surely we have to activate the apparatuses which produce the "ambiguity-effect." And ambiguity, like the open text, is one of the main things that keeps the academic publishing industry alive. Rather, the point might be to specify the different kinds of ambiguity-effects. For example, there are ambiguities that are the artifacts of specific textual organizations/audiences, as in the case of puns and *double-entendres*. There are also ambiguities arising from the fact that a single word functions as a token in radically different discourses, as with the role of the word "body" in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there is the case of those kinds of literary criticism where ambiguity is itself used as a sign of "openness," as in the poetry of E. E. Cummings. Yet here one might want to argue that "ambiguity" is no less monosemantic than "didacticism" (the term to which it is usually opposed) because it always signifies the same thing, namely, that "experience" is beyond any single accounting of it. Beyond this, however, the term says very little and thus is utterly unenlightening, becoming in fact a disguised and self-righteous didacticism.

Perhaps we have now reached the point where we can ask, polemically, what is *wrong* with closure? Eagleton has some particularly interesting things to say on this point (in relation to Richardson's efforts to disambiguate his writing):

Richardson was no Henry James, bland in the midst of ambiguities: he was a courageous spokesman for middle-class ideology, a properly didactic, propagandist writer. The historic interests he espoused were too urgent to be traded for the thrills of aesthetic ambivalence. If that later bourgeois Henry James could tolerate multiple interpretation, it was in part because strenuous ideologues like Richardson had been there before him, laying the social basis of that textual licence. Deeply ambiguous though Richardson's novels are, he would have found the modern liberal's complacent cult of confusion simply obnoxious. (*Rape*, p. 24)

. . . What makes much of *Pamela* boring and repugnant is Richardson's ideological values, not his forms. There is no reason in principle why didacticism and propaganda should not be more moving than dramatic realism. (*Rape*, p. 36)

Overall, Eagleton's treatment of Richardson's texts follows a directive he gave in his *Diacritics* interview to the effect that the best way to use a text is to try to insert it into our own context, to ask what it can give us in terms of questions of value, questions of the multiple uses of texts, questions of the relations between the cultural and the political.

Rather than place his book on the side of current writing that concentrates on, say, institutional trainings, the role of the curriculum in securing the reproduction of a dominant literary ideology (that is, addressing the way Richardson's texts are used *now* in departments of English), Eagleton offers instead a two-pronged analysis of "Samuel Richardson," simultaneously "reinserting" him into his historical-ideological context *and* relating him to a number of contemporary modes of reading. Eagleton concentrates on the moment of the productions and initial circulations of the texts, while also bringing to bear poststructuralist theories of textuality, feminist-psychoanalytic writing, and historical materialism.

At first glance, then, *The Rape of Clarissa*, when given this kind of focus, might seem an odd book to follow *Walter Benjamin*. The *Benjamin* book had marked a particular development from the earlier *Criticism and Ideology*, a book that (to quote Eagleton's own assessment) "was less overtly political in timbre and more conventionally academic in style and form."³⁴ So a book on Samuel Richardson, published by Basil Blackwell and complete with a classical Greek epigraph telling us that "the gods look fondly from afar on one who exercises his power gently," might seem a surprisingly retrograde step that threatens to move Eagleton away from the terrain of Marxist cultural criticism — to which the second section in particular of the *Benjamin* book is such an important contribution — and to return him to, precisely, a realm of conventional Oxbridge academic writing (perhaps even causing the problem of "Marxism in literary criticism" to reappear). Furthermore, given that Eagleton has doubted whether there is much to be gained from producing more writing on Restoration comedy, we might want to ask what makes Richardson such a special case?³⁵ And, although Eagleton provides an answer-in-advance by saying in his Preface that he "would be glad enough if the book simply served to make people want to read Richardson and argue with my case," this seems somewhat disingenuous. For, surely, if *The Rape of Clarissa* is to escape recuperation as conventional academic literary criticism, it must speak to situations and contexts beyond the particularity of Richardson's writing. The book should constitute something more than a "contribution to Richardson/eighteenth-century studies"; something must be

transportable, extrapolable from it. Speaking as one who teaches film and television within the context of a B.A. in Communication Studies and who is most unlikely to reread Richardson, it seems to me not principally a matter of making "Richardson" an interesting object (though that is certainly *part* of it) as it is a matter of *interesting us in a way of making certain texts interesting*.

In another sense, however, Terry Eagleton's book is perfectly consistent with his recent description of the political imperatives of a revolutionary criticism:

It would dismantle the ruling concepts of "literature," reinserting "literary" texts into the whole field of cultural practices. It would strive to relate such "cultural" practices to other forms of social activity and to transform the cultural apparatuses themselves. It would articulate its "cultural" analyses with a consistent political intervention. It would deconstruct the received hierarchies of "literature" and transvaluate received judgements and assumptions; engage with the language and "unconscious" of literary texts, to reveal their role in the ideological construction of the subjects; and mobilise such texts, if necessary, by hermeneutic "violence," in a struggle to transform those subjects within a wider political context.³⁶

Or, as Eagleton has indicated elsewhere, "it is necessary to engage in ideological struggle at the level of the texts and artifacts that the establishment has selected as ideological instruments, terrains of struggle."³⁷ While the choice of Richardson certainly satisfies the criterion of engaging with those powerful institutional interests charged with saying what will count as Literature, forcing on them a radical resituating, a rereading of one part of the Canon, there remains the basic question of whether this salvaging of Richardson (if that is the extent of the enterprise) is worth undertaking at all. There is a curious moment in the Preface when Eagleton allows that "one should be sceptical of such transcendental judgements" as calling *Clarissa* "the greatest English novel" shortly before saying that *Clarissa* is "arguably the major feminist text in the language." And, it is precisely this question of "the language" which becomes crucial for any book talking *now* about Richardson.

It is not simply the *length* of *Clarissa* that makes it such a little-read novel, and the problem of "readability" can be posed without for a moment invoking a deconstructionist perspective. Colin MacCabe has commented on precisely this question of the difficulty students have now in negotiating the Canon. MacCabe refers to

the real problem of our relation to a corpus of literary texts, many of whose cultural and ideological assumptions we no longer share and whose linguistic forms are increasingly difficult. . . . What is the point of asking students to read a piece of discursive prose from the sixteenth or seventeenth century when the current dominance of spoken forms of language, particularly on television, means that sentences of any complexity are simply perceived as unreadable? The important

educational and cultural problems are hardly addressed by the lamentable form of current debate [on the "crisis in English studies"]. Conservatives insist on defending the human values of a literature their students can no longer read while deconstructionists merely celebrate that same inability.³⁸

McCabe's point here is that arguments about theory should be displaced into arguments about history, "and history understood not as a fixed and unchanging past but as a process of holding the present in interrogative tension with the past. Only then can we grasp the complexity of our present, of the changing institutional spaces in which literature now appears."³⁹ Eagleton is certainly aware of the sorts of things McCabe is saying, and *The Rape of Clarissa* could be said to be a work which admirably "holds the present in interrogative tension with the past." From the opening section of his Preface, Eagleton makes clear his interest in the historically shifting conditions of intelligibility/readability of texts:

The German critic Walter Benajmin dismissed the view that all literary works were equally "readable" at all times. For Benjamin, a work may fall into obscurity for centuries, only to be suddenly reactivated as the history to which it belongs flashes into freshly relevant relationship to our own epoch. The task of criticism, as Benjamin saw it, was to "blast" open the continuum of history, forging conjunctures between our own moment and a redeemed bit of the past, imbuing works with retroactive significance so that in them we may better read the signs of our own times.

The wager of this book is that it is just possible that we may now once again be able to read Samuel Richardson. . . . If this happens it will be because certain new ways of reading developed in our own time, closely related to the nature of our own history and to the political interests of a Richardson, have made his texts available in a new way. (Rape, pp. vii-viii)

The question which follows from this, of course, is: available to whom and toward what ends? Here, I think, it is interesting to note that *The Rape of Clarissa* is likely to have its principal effect in combating and complicating the domains of undergraduate and post-graduate teaching and research within departments of English. To that extent the book represents a valuable intervention in one specific section of the Institution of Literature and comes at a time when it is crucial to contest what "English" or "Literary Studies" might be made to mean in the 1980s. And, insofar as "theory" remains a suppressed element in many departments of language and literature, then establishing it as a continuing element in the structure of a B.A. remains a central task. Until theoretical questions become a *routine* part of first degrees in English, then all the debate about curriculum reform and text substitution count for nothing. This is a point made very clearly by Pierre Macherey:

Far from changing the initial context by studying different material, these different materials have in fact completely reinforced the traditional categories and systems of thinking. In that sense nothing has changed — on the contrary a supplementary system of camouflage has been produced. It is not simply a question of the mechanical introduction and consideration of new material in literary studies; we must also completely change the system in which the categories of literary studies are thought out.⁴⁰

The force of Macherey's comments here do not seem to me to have been registered as fully as they deserve. English departments are like giant pieces of blotting paper, infinitely absorptive, quite capable of allowing, say, doctoral theses on Stan Lee's influence on contemporary American writers. Text substitution will not alter in the least the apparatuses through which knowledge of texts currently is transmitted in departments of English. Bringing "television drama" into the curriculum, canonizing Dennis Porter and Trevor Griffiths, will not disturb the order of things in the least. You can do a new critical reading of a comic or a television program quite easily; a new critical gaze can be directed at *Howard the Duck* and *Hill St. Blues* quite as readily as it can toward *Bleak House*. So one has to be careful about making use of such statements as the following from Francis Mulhern:

What, then, are we witnessing today? Firstly, and more generally we are witnessing — and have been for several decades now — a steady decline in the status of literature within the general ensemble of artistic practices; film, and increasingly television, now dominate this ensemble and command a correspondingly large proportion of its total energy. . . . The major aesthetic issues of today are debated across the terrain of cinema and those of tomorrow will probably — and should, in all political responsibility — be increasingly concerned with television.⁴¹

What is admirable about a remark of this kind is that it points to the way courses in film and television, cultural and communication studies have highlighted some of the more superannuated practices of departments of English: it indicates the need to construct, say, a field of "cultural studies" to replace the field of "literary studies" as it is currently constituted. Eagleton would certainly agree in principle with this move to decompose what is now known as literary studies into a wider field, but he would stop short of saying we should abandon literature for television analysis. Drawing on an implicit slogan in much of Brecht's work, "use what you can," Eagleton might argue that socialists are always materialist samplers, collecting all kinds of texts on the off-chance that one day that might be precisely what is required: "What one should be doing, for a Marxist, is always a conjunctural question."⁴² It is a notion of the critic as social strategist and, accordingly, one use to make of *The Rape of Clarissa*, one way of rewriting it, would be to see it as a transitional document, demonstrating what is involved in making a

shift from literary studies to the areas of discourse and cultural studies, while maintaining for its object of analysis a part of the canon.

To that extent, the book satisfies the demand that it should constitute a case study in politically pertinent ways of making texts interesting and provides further evidence of the importance of the work Eagleton is doing. Tony Bennett's writing, for example, is in large part produced by bouncing off Eagleton's work, deciding which bits to take up and which bits to rewrite/reformulate. Eagleton's writing is of central importance to the field of Marxist cultural criticism, and one of the most significant features of his work concerns the variety of ideological fronts on which he is prepared to engage: an article in *Critical Quarterly*, a piece in *The English Magazine*, a different kind of article again in *New Left Review*, a broadside at *Screen*'s version of Brecht in one of the Essex Sociology of Literature volumes, and a review article in *Screen* itself. And so on. This preparedness to engage on a wide range of ideological fronts is a commitment Eagleton shares with Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, each of whose writing has been crucial for the construction of a field of "cultural studies." *The Rape of Clarissa*, then, while obviously and strategically linked to the canon (in a way perhaps similar to the forthcoming series from Blackwell's of which Eagleton is the general editor), is nonetheless a book which points toward the eventual dismantling of departments of literature, demonstrating to them that a better, transitional title would be departments of literary and cultural studies. If this shift is taken seriously, if it means more than a change of letterhead and reaches into the areas of curriculum, modes of teaching and research, it could mean that theoretical questions—which currently find little space in English departments—might be raised and worked through. This would involve the recognition that the individual literary work is a text within a broader field, "one instance of signification within codes which cut through the various cultural disciplines and indeed through the cultural/social divide itself."⁴³ In short, it could allow a much wider definition of what counts as a text and as a reading and eventually might mean that "rewriting Richardson" would assume a very low priority in any program of teaching and research.

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Notes

1. Fred Dagg, "Writing a Novel," *Daggshead Revisited* (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1982), 48–49.
2. Pierre Macherey, "An Interview," trans. and ed. Colin Mercer and Jean Radford, *Red Letters* 5 (1977):7.
3. Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious* (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1981), 9.

4. Tony Bennett, "The Bond Phenomenon: Theorising a Popular Hero," *Southern Review* 16, 2 (1983).
5. Peter Williams, "Interventions and Obsessions: the Work of Frank Hardy," *Southern Review* 14, 2 (1981).
6. Michael White, "Reading and Rewriting: the Production of an Economic Robinson Crusoe," *Southern Review* 15, 2 (1982).
7. Francis Mulhern, "Marxism in Literary Criticism," *New Left Review* 108 (1978):82.
8. Terry Eagleton, "What is Literature?," *New Statesman*, 6 July 1979, 20.
9. Eagleton, "The Idealism of American Criticism," *New Left Review* 127 (1981):56.
10. Eagleton, review in *Literature and History* 7, 2 (1981):243-44.
11. Eagleton, "Interview" with James H. Kavanagh and Thomas E. Lewis, *Diacritics* 12 (1982): 56.
12. Ian Hunter, "The Concept of Context and the Problem of Reading," *Southern Review* 15, 1 (1982).
13. David Saunders, "The Trial of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*: Limiting Cases and Literary Canons," *Southern Review* 15, 2 (1982).
14. Eagleton, "Interview," *Diacritics* 12 (1982):60.
15. Eagleton, *The Rape of Clarissa* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, Ltd., 1982).
16. Mulhern, "Marxism in Literary Criticism," p. 82.
17. John Frow, "Who Shot Frank Hardy?: Intertextuality and Textual Politics," *Southern Review* 15, 1 (1982):37.
18. Frow, "Textual Historicities," *The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association* 18, 1 (Spring 1985): 15. See immediately preceding article in this issue.
19. The Foucauldian metaphor of "surfaces" really needs to be supported by examples and these would vary from case to case. The general point, however, is that the text does not appear in a single domain of observation but rather appears *to* certain capacities that have been built up by trainings in definite techniques, by the organization of specific institutions. So the hospital ward constitutes a "surface" on which disease can show up as a statistical phenomenon while the seminar in a department of English might be said to constitute a "surface" on which the literary text can appear as the object of the student's reflexive introspection and self-interrogation.
20. Hunter, "Reading Character," *Southern Review* 16, 2 (1983):226-43.
21. See Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* (London: Allen Lane, 1979) on techniques of self-interrogation.
22. Eagleton, *Literature and History*.
23. Eagleton, "The Revolt of the Reader," *New Literary History* 13, 3 (1982):449-52.
24. Eagleton, *Walter Benjamin: Or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism* (London: NLB/Verso, 1981), 122. For Bennett's reply to this, see his "Text and Social Process: the Case of James Bond," *Screen Education* 41 (1982):5-6.

25. Eagleton, *The Rape of Clarissa*, 4.
26. Stanley Fish, "Affective Stylistics: Literature in the Reader," *New Literary History* 2, 1 (1970).
27. Eagleton, "The End of Criticism," *Southern Review* 14, 1 (1981):106.
28. Eagleton, "Fredric Jameson: The Politics of Style," *Diacritics* 12 (Fall 1982):17.
29. Eagleton, "Fredric Jameson," *Diacritics* 12:19.
30. John Frow, "Marxism after Structuralism," forthcoming in *Southern Review* 17, 1 (March 1984).
31. Eagleton, "The End of Criticism," *Southern Review* 14, 1 (1981):100.
32. For a particularly interesting extension of this notion of "discursive practices" see Eagleton, "Conclusion: Political Criticism" in his *Literary Theory: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, Ltd., 1983), 194-217.
33. A suggestive set of formulations on popular reading is contained in Tony Bennett, "Texts, Readers, Reading Formations," *The Bulletin of the Midwest Modern Language Association* 16, 1 (Spring 1983).
34. Eagleton, *Walter Benjamin*, viii.
35. Eagleton, "The End of Criticism," 100.
36. Eagleton, *Walter Benjamin*, 98.
37. Eagleton, "Interview," *Diacritics* 12:54.
38. Colin MacCabe, *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 2 November 1983, 13. See also his "The Sunset of the English Empire," *The Guardian*, 28 February 1983, p. 9.
39. MacCabe, *THES*, 2 November 1983, 13.
40. Macherey, "Interview," *Red Letters*.
41. Mulhern, "Marxism in Literary Criticism":87.
42. Eagleton, "Interview," forthcoming in *Southern Review* (March 1984).
43. Eagleton, *The English Magazine*.