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War at Sea in the Second Punic War. Steinby (2004)

Steinby writes about Ancient Naval strategy and works at the University of Helsinki. The article was published in *Ancient Society*, a journal focused on the Greek Hellenistic Roman world. This paper rebuts the idea of the Second Punic War (218-201 BC) being primarily a land war and investigates the strategic roles of both Roman and Carthaginian navies. The paper discusses controlling coastal areas and harbours as a successful conflict strategy. Steinby discusses key naval engagements and strategies and their effectiveness as employed by the Roman and Carthaginian Navies. Steinby draws heavily on primary sources like Polybius and Livy, acknowledging their limitations and biases, especially as both sources were not primarily focused on naval warfare. The sources are biased; they are Roman; Steinby doesn't draw on any Carthaginian sources, as none are available. The Roman sources omit navy battle details and only mention how they affected the land war. Rome's early sea victories were critical to the upcoming land campaigns. Steinby says the naval battle off the coast of Africa in 207 BC to secure freedom of movement for grain and groups was a turning point for Rome. The Roman navy had secured the sea. This paper demonstrates the impact of naval power on the overall course of the war and the eventual Roman victory. This article was easy to read and follow and valuable in getting a detailed overview of Naval strategy and its importance in the Second Punic War. This paper was written twenty years ago and may contain an academic bias of that period; however, the research sources are primary. It would be helpful to see if there is a more modern source or if Steinby has updated their work.

Mercenaries and Citizens: A Comparison of the Armies of Carthage and Rome. Taulbee (1998)

Taulbee is a Professor Emeritus at Emory University, specialising in International Politics, Law, and Foreign Policy. This article was published in the journal *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, which publishes research on historical, political, social, economic and psychological aspects of insurgency, counterinsurgency, limited war and irregular warfare. Taulbee, in this paper, examines the military strategies and structures of Carthage and Rome during the Punic Wars. The paper questions the assumption that the victor Rome was inherently superior to Carthage. Rome built a standing army, whereas Carthage used a mercenary army. The paper offers a detailed description of each army's recruitment and battle order. The paper cites the differences between Rome and Carthage's forces, detailing each other's strengths and weaknesses. However, Taulbee argues that the outcomes of the wars

were determined by political decisions and how the armies were deployed, as opposed to the type of army deployed. The article uses the Mercenary War and the Second Punic War to focus on the key tactical figures. By concentrating on individuals and how they played their part in the Punic Wars, Taulbee built a case that Carthage's ultimate defeat stemmed from poor political choices and resource limitations, not from its reliance on mercenaries.

This piece is thorough, thought-provoking and interesting as it takes an alternate viewpoint. Taulbee was able to connect a late 20th-century eye to ancient warfare and give an inside into the political intrigues that beset both armies. The article is twenty-six years old, and Taulbee used references that were pre-1980s, so 45 years old, which means it will almost certainly exhibit the academic and cultural bias of its time.

Hannibal's Stratagems. Strehie (2023)

Strehie is a professor of ancient history and classical languages. This article was written for the National Defence University of Romania. Strehie explains why Hannibal was effective as a leader and tactician and is still relevant in the 21st century. By examining Hannibal's military strategies during the Second Punic War, Strehie argues that the conflict is seen as Hannibal's war due to his command and control over the campaign. Strehie looks at Hannibal's main successes: surprise attacks, the use of diverse troops, Iberian and Numidian Mercenaries and Elephants, and the subsequent terrorising of Roman society. The paper describes Hannibal's skill in exploiting his opponent's weaknesses and how his actions led to the counter-development of the Roman army. The paper analyses Hannibal's actions within the context of later war theories of Clausewitz, Machiavelli and the early concepts of Sun Tzu. Hannibal was schooled in the tactics of his time, but Strehie describes how Hannibal developed his war strategies that align with these other tacticians. The paper effectively argues why Hannibal is considered worthy of study in a modern military setting Strehie and his lasting influence on military thought.

The article is written to showcase Hannibal. It doesn't reflect in detail on his failures. So, therefore, it is only helpful as partial knowledge of the other kinetic factors that happened during the Second Punic War. The paper is a good study of battlefield leadership. It was written explicitly for the Defence University for Romania and works within that remit. It is a recent article published in 2023, using the current research.

Roman Seaborne Raids during the Mid-Republic: Sideshow or Headline Feature. Bragg (2010)

Bragg submitted there DPhil in 2007 at Wadham Oxford University. This paper was published for the Classical Association journal, Greece & Rome; it states that it has a wider audience in mind. This article stuck to this principle, clearly laid out, and easily understood.

Bragg examines Roman seaborne raids during the mid-Republic of Rome. The paper looked at the Naval strategic significance of these raids, as opposed to the view that the raids were only for plunder. Bragg looks at longer-term economic benefits, psychological warfare, and the raid's intimidation factor, as well as how they impacted Rome's domestic politics. The

paper examines two case studies of Roman naval raids during the Third Macedonian War (171-168 BC) and the Second Punic War (218-201 BC). Bragg describes how terror tactics were used to intimidate the enemy and gain military intelligence and Roman political propaganda within its citizenry. Bragg challenges the existing academic thought in 2010 that underestimates the complexity of the raids and their impact. The paper argues that Rome's seaborne raids were as much political as they were military or financial. Bragg uses the primary sources of Livy and Polybius but includes contemporary authors to discuss Roman morale, suggesting the raids were like the American Doolittle raid (1942) on Japan after Pearl Harbour. There isn't any evidence of how Carthage felt about these raids. Still, Bragg's view is a partial perspective; contemporary scholars may have attempted to bring in colonial writers to give a different standpoint.

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