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Manchukuo: A Historical Overview

The region known in Chinese as northeastern China, or simply the Northeast, was, from at least the eighteenth century, referred to as Manchuria by Europeans and the Japanese. The rapid settlement of the region by Han Chinese from north China in the latter half of the nineteenth century began to integrate the region with China more closely, making it a distinct part of the Chinese nation. However, I continue to use the term Manchuria for this period so as not to foreclose what was still an open-ended historical situation by imposing the perspective of subsequent historical developments and nationalist historiography.¹

Today Manchuria is "unalterably Chinese," in the words of the Lytton Commission, largely as a consequence of the demographic and cultural integration that took place in the first half of the twentieth century and not because of some primordial or age-old claim to it.² This period was thus one characterized by a contest over whether Manchuria would remain autonomous or be fully incorporated into the Chinese nation. Such an incorporative process was not only challenged by the Japanese, Russians, and other historical groups of the region, there were also considerable differences within Chinese groups as to how, and under what conditions, the integration might take place.

An Interpretive History of a Contested Borderland

The representation of Manchuria as a distinctive space is perhaps traceable most of all to the Manchu emperors themselves, who ruled China from 1644 until 1911. After the Manchu conquest of China, the emperors determined to turn their own homeland into a preserve of Manchu heritage unspoiled by Chinese or other foreign immigration. The Manchu policy of "seal and prohibit" (*fengjin*) sought to restrict Han Chinese to lands within the Willow Palisade. The palisade represented a symbolic division of the Manchurian territory into a northern Manchu preserve, a Mongol domain in the west, and the region of southern Fengtian (roughly today's Liaoning) long occupied by Han Chinese. The Manchu desire to restrict Han immi-

gration beyond the palisade was not only connected to a sense of identity, but was also political and economic. Perhaps most significant of all was their keen awareness that an alliance between the Han and indigenous peoples, both Manchu and non-Manchu, could pose the same threat to the rulers of the Chinese empire from the strategic launching pad of Manchuria that they had themselves done. There were also lucrative trades in ginseng and furs that the Manchus sought to monopolize. A threefold strategy was designed to secure the cultural isolation of the region: the ban on Chinese migration, an alliance with the non-Manchu Tungus and Mongol peoples based on the tribute system, and the establishment of the system of banner garrisons throughout as the principal means of political control of the region. The hereditary bannermen, originally drawn from different ethnic groups, had been the principal instrument of the Manchu victory, and were transformed in Manchuria as elsewhere in the empire into a kind of a loyal military caste designed to keep alive the separate identity of the Manchus.³

Through the eighteenth century, as the policy of cultural isolation was being challenged both by the Sinicization of the banners and the increasing penetration of the region by Chinese, the emperors tended increasingly to romanticize and reify Manchu identity and the region in various ways. Sacrificial rituals to ancestors, which were part of Manchu shamanic tradition, were performed at Manchurian locations such as Mukden and especially Changbai mountain. The latter—which Korean nationalists also regarded as the ancestral birthplace of the Korean nation (see part III)—was declared the ancestral birthplace of the Manchus and sacrifices there were institutionalized early by the Kangxi emperor. Because all members of the tribe were considered to be descendants of a single ancestor, this practice was intended to memorialize the homeland for every Manchu.⁴

The Qing court also sought to ritualize shamanism, a historically fluid and multi-form practice in the region. Shamanism can be generally described as the belief in the effective determination of the living, visible world by invisible spirits that the shaman seeks to control. The court imposed a form of petrified, patriarchal shamanism upon Manchus and other Tungus groups to symbolize ethnic exclusivism and frontier manliness.⁵ In the hands of the Qianlong emperor, shamanism came to represent the pure culture from the frontier, which would revive the center corrupted by Chinese society.

By examining historical maps of the region, Mark Elliott has recently shown that the toponym Manchuria was by no means absent in the Manchu and Chinese imagination. Although Chinese maps of the early twentieth century mostly refer to the region by the name of the three northeastern provinces, there are a good number of them that refer to *Manzhou* (Chinese for Manchuria) as well, including the largest publisher of the time, Commercial Press. Elliott suggests that it was the atlas of China commissioned by Kangxi and produced through the mapping techniques of the Jesuits around 1720 that did the most to generate the notion of Manchuria as a separate territorial entity. The atlas was designed to define the imperial territory (particularly in response to Russian advances), but it also had the effect of enhancing

Manchu identity. The first map in the atlas was that of greater Mukden, showing the full range of the Manchu ancestral territories. Visualizing the extent of their homeland apparently filled the Manchus with pride, and their special identification with it was indicated by writing all place names on the map north of the Great Wall in Manchu, in contrast to those south of the wall, which were written in Chinese.⁶ In this way, we may see how the toponym Manchuria may be traced to the Manchu cultural construction of the region in the eighteenth century.


No matter how much the Manchu emperors sought to boost Manchu identity and preserve the region as the land of the Manchus and their allies, in practice, of course, the policy of cultural isolation was a failure, particularly after the flood of immigration beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century. Even before the Manchu invasion of China and the subsequent policy of isolation, political forces in Manchuria tended to become involved in China. Whereas Mongolia was a radically different, nonagricultural society, there was historically greater mutual interaction between China and Manchuria. Nor was Manchuria merely a frontier region of imperial China. Indeed, the region defies the usual spatial classifications of historical regions. According to Owen Lattimore, a significant part of the region—particularly the south, which had contact with imperial China—functioned as a “reservoir.”⁷ The physical characteristics and resources of the reservoir were such as to enable successive historical groups, or more strictly speaking, alliances, to gain and maintain control over China itself. Before the Manchus, the Tungus in the region had produced the Jurchen or Jin dynasty (1125–1234) and the Khitan (907–947) and Liao (947–1125) dynasties emerged from the Mongols.

The peculiar capacity of the region to generate the resources to dominate the Chinese empire derived from several factors. First, it was able to avoid control by a foreign group from within China proper. The region was too vast and varied for premodern imperial Chinese armies to supply and sustain an extended campaign. This diversity extended to different modes of livelihood—the Mongol nomads of the west, the hunters and gatherers of the mountains and forests, the agricultural communities of Chinese to the south, and rice-farming Koreans to the east. More so than was true of other frontier civilizations, Manchuria sustained a hybrid culture and permitted more contact with China. The successful, dominant groups in the region were able to access and absorb Chinese goods, techniques, and culture. They were thus able to strengthen themselves and, while eluding Chinese control, could at least partially use these resources to create alliances with different communities within Manchuria. In these ways, the region would provide the dominant groups with the necessary resources, whether they sought to control China or already did so. For this reason as well, the importance of the Chinese frontier for Manchuria far surpassed that of the Korean, Siberian, or Mongolian frontiers.

But if Manchuria was historically destined to be entangled with China, it retained its sense of independence right until the end of the nineteenth century. Lattimore has suggested that the regional importance of the reservoir transcended racial and cultural differences. A Chinese population moving into the reservoir

All of these factors—the reservoir function, the sense of autonomy, the “turning back” to China—were to be dramatically affected by the migration flood of the late nineteenth century. The imperial court’s decision to relax the ban on Chinese immigration, gradually extended to the entire region by 1902, was made in response to the Russian and, later, Japanese expansionist designs in the region. The land hunger of an overpopulated north Chinese countryside, the capacity of the railroad to transport immigrants to remote places (and also ensure military control of the region), and the lure of high-value crops like opium led to one of the largest population transfers and the most rapid colonization movements in the twentieth century. Between 1890 and 1942, an average of half a million migrants and sojourners flowed into the region every year, and over eight million people were added to the population from outside during this period.¹⁰ This rivaled the heaviest flow of European immigration to the United States over a comparable period in the nineteenth century. Already by the end of the Qing, the demographic profile of the two newly created northern provinces, Jilin and Heilongjiang, which had historically had a far smaller Han population than the southernmost province of Liaoning, was completely transformed. In 1787 the total Jilin population was 150,000, and in 1850 about 327,000. By 1907 the Chinese population alone in Jilin was 3.8 million, and the banner population was about 400,000. In 1808 the Heilongjiang banner population was 136,000. In 1887 it was 252,000. By 1907 the total population was 1.5 million, of which only 81,000 were in areas where non-Chinese were in the majority.¹¹

In many ways, the Chinese immigrants transformed the landscape in the image of their natal villages in north China. The wood and mud-walled banner garrisons surrounded by settlements of soldiers and farms of the early Manchurian frontier towns gave way to the architecture and material culture of northern China in villages, temples, schools, and residences where Chinese became the common spoken language.¹² But even as the Manchu clan villages and the landscape were becoming Sinicized, there were also significant spatial differences between these new settlements and those in north China. Yasutomi Ayumu has recently shown that Manchurian villages were unlike those south of the pass, where economic relationships were largely embedded in the periodic market communities that G. W. Skinner has called the standard marketing town.¹³ Villages had little direct ties with the most important extremity of administrative power, the county seat, even during the Republic. However, such periodic market towns were largely absent in central and northern Manchuria and appeared only in the south, the area of traditional Chinese settlements



Principal Railroads and Agricultural and Natural Features of Manchukuo
CER = Chinese Eastern Railroad; SMR = South Manchurian Railroad

west of the Liao River. Even here, Yasutomi finds these markets to be more thinly distributed than in north China and declining in number during the Republic. Consequently, marketing activities in Manchurian villages came to be concentrated in the county seat, which corresponded to a mid-sized market town.¹⁴ The coextensiveness of the economic and political realms enabled the county administrative power to exercise much greater control over the villages than elsewhere in China.

In Yasutomi's analysis, railroads were not the only factor behind this spatial pat-

tern, since there is evidence that it preceded the building of certain lines. Soya, which was the overwhelmingly dominant agricultural product, could be transported on horse carts (plentifully available because of Mongolian ponies and lumber) on frozen rivers, roads, and fields from village to county seat and railroad station, obviating the need for periodic markets. The small retail needs of the villagers were met by itinerant traders traveling from village to village. Merchant associations, together with local landlords, were able to control the soya bean trade from the county seat. At the same time, they were susceptible to domination by—or compelled to share power with—the political power based there.¹⁵ Thus, climate together with commerce and transportation technology contributed to this novel space of power.

The soya export boom was closely entwined with the distinctive political economy of the Manchurian locality. The emergence of the county as the basic marketing sphere and transportation hub encouraged peasants to specialize in soya production, resulting frequently in the increased dependence of peasants on county soya merchants for their capital and consumption needs. The financial base of the warlord Zhang Zuolin clique (see below), built upon foreign exchange acquired from its control of banks and soya trading houses, derived ultimately from the ability to control the merchants who in turn controlled the soya producers throughout the county. Yasutomi also attributes the rapidity with which the Guandong Army (*Kan-tōgun*) acquired control of the entire region after the Manchurian Incident—in contrast to the rural quagmire that sank this very army in north China—to the unprecedented concentration of state power at the local level.

Meanwhile, by the end of the nineteenth century, the agrarianization of the landscape increasingly transformed the older spaces of forested mountains inhabited by hunters, ginseng diggers, woodsmen, and miners, and of the grasslands to the west, dramatically affecting the livelihood of the Mongol, Manchu, and other Tungus communities. Manchu relations with the largely Tungusic tribespeople of the region had been one of patronage. Although large numbers of the Tungus, along with their tribal culture, were decimated or absorbed during the Manchu ascendancy over Manchuria between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, once they controlled the Chinese empire, the Tungusic groups, like the Mongols to the west and northwest, became firm allies of the Manchus in the latter's effort to keep the region as the pristine land of the Manchus. The tribal command of the region was part of a strategy of maintaining it as a buffer zone, not only against a potential Han-tribal alliance, but against the emerging power of Russia to the north. The Manchus sought to secure tribal fealty by honoring the elites and establishing a tribute system in which the tribes received a fair exchange for their valuables, such as sable furs and ginseng. To be sure, tribals were also exploited by local officials in the later part of the nineteenth century, but observers of the tribute system such as Mamiya Rinzo, the Japanese explorer who observed the tribute scene on the banks of the Amur in 1809, described it as official but warm.¹⁶ Thus the Manchus succeeded in maintaining equilibrium in their relations with the tribal groups until the end of the nine-

teenth century, when the massive migration of Han Chinese into the area inevitably upset this arrangement.

The conversion of vast primeval forests into agricultural lands led to the shrinkage of hunting and fishing grounds. Added to this was the competition of Chinese hunters and fishers, and undermining of the tribals' traditional lifestyle.¹⁷ V. K. Arseniev wrote in 1907,

These aborigines having adopted Chinese culture could not absorb it, and succumbed to the influence of the Chinese themselves. As farmers and tillers of the soil they could not live, and they forgot the arts of the hunter and trapper. The Chinese have taken advantage of their spiritual poverty and made themselves indispensable to them. From that moment the natives lost all independence and became converted into slaves.¹⁸

With the establishment of the Frontier Agricultural Settlement Bureau in 1908, lands were increasingly appropriated from the tribals as well as the Mongol herds-men. Conflicts between Mongol herdsmen and Chinese cultivators became especially acute after the Republic, when expropriation and agricultural colonization became a matter of national policy.¹⁹

Thus, toward the end of the Qing dynasty, the distinctive characteristics of Manchuria, guarded by the banner garrisons and the tributary system, gave way to the demand to integrate the region more closely with China proper. The turnabout in Qing policy toward the isolation of Manchuria and Manchu identity can be understood in terms of Benedict Anderson's notion of "Russifying nationalism," whereby the dynasts' effort to distinguish their lineage from those whom they ruled was reversed because of the pressure from nationalism below and from imperialism without. Indeed, Manchuria became the laboratory to experiment with administrative, judicial, and legislative reforms conducted by the Qing in the last decade of their rule. At the same time, these reforms spelled the end of the banner governance of the frontier and the ascendancy of Han administrators, politicians, and militarists over the region.²⁰ The reservoir function also fell away, as immigrants sought not to "turn back" to China proper but to push ahead and colonize the vast interior.

The irony of the Chinese demographic and administrative domination of the region by the early twentieth century was that it was taking place at the same time that, and to some extent because, outside claims on the region were being made by the imperialist powers of Russia and Japan, who financed and ran the first railroads. The victory of Japan over China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and the Japanese demand to cede the Liaodong peninsula was reversed by the Russian-led intervention. In turn, Russia acquired the right from the Qing imperial government to build, and maintain military and territorial control over, the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The Boxer crisis of 1900 gave the Russians military control over the entire region. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which concluded the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, while acknowledging in theory China's sovereignty in Manchuria, granted Japan the Russian lease on the Guandong peninsula and the South Manchurian Railroad.

From this time onward, Japan replaced Russia as the dominant foreign power in the region, with its interests and influence growing particularly after the annexation of Korea in 1910 and during the imperialist power vacuum in East Asia during World War I. Through Group II of the Twenty-one Demands that it imposed on China in 1915, Japan acquired privileged economic rights in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, secured by several railway, industrial, and loan contracts and agreements. The Republican government, however, succeeded in resisting the demand that Japanese be permitted to own (as opposed to lease) land in the region, a resistance that thwarted Japanese efforts to colonize the land with settlers and agricultural corporations.²¹

The economic and political affairs of these leased territories were managed by the Guandong government and the South Manchurian Railroad Company, a quasi-governmental corporation with many subsidiary enterprises beyond railroads and one of the largest research organizations in the world until 1945. The establishment of the railroads linking the southern port of Newchwang to regions as far north as Harbin, and the opening of several ports in the first decade of the twentieth century, including Dairen (Dalian), which would come to rival the Shanghai port facilities, led to rapid economic growth, particularly in agriculture. Agriculture was stimulated both by demand from the increasing population, which appears to have more than doubled between 1898 and 1908,²² and by the continuous rise in export demand for soya.²³ The soya bean and its derivatives, which probably constituted as much as 80 percent of the export of Manchuria in the early years of the twentieth century, continued to be the most important export of the region until the late 1920s, with the region producing 59 percent of total world soya production.²⁴ Destined largely for Japan, it later found a market as European cattle feed. Lacking growth rate figures for the economy as a whole during this period, economists look at the high rate of export growth—11 percent per year from 1907 to 1929—as indicative of the dynamism of the economy.²⁵ Cities like Harbin and Dairen, enriched by agricultural growth, trade, and foreign investments, began to rival Shanghai and, according to Lattimore, were more modern than mainland cities like Nanjing and Beijing.²⁶

As the Manchurian economy grew, both mainland Chinese and Japanese interests in the region developed correspondingly. Between 1903 and 1928, the Manchurian share of the foreign trade of China went from 3.5 percent to 32.5 percent, and the bulk of it was with Japan.²⁷ In 1931, Manchuria was still principally an agrarian economy, but one with a growing factory industry, chiefly devoted to production of consumer goods. It was an important source of agricultural goods for China, Japan, and Korea, and, of course, a most important outlet for the surplus population of rural north China. Perhaps almost as important were the financial remittances to the rural economy of north China.²⁸ As for the Japanese, they controlled the major coal and iron mines, the foreign trading and shipping companies, the electric supply, and the trunk railway lines, and also provided the financial backing for many Chinese railroads. By 1927, 85 percent of Japanese foreign investment was in China, and 80 percent of this was in Manchuria. The investment of the South Manchurian

Railroad Company in 1920 alone was 440 million yen. By 1932, Japan's share of the total industrial capital in Manchuria was 64 percent, while China's share was 28 percent.²⁹

The incorporation of Manchuria into the Chinese nation during a period of high imperialism presented considerable problems. While its demographic Sinicization should have made the political claim of Chinese nationhood easy, it was precisely the historical image of Manchuria as a frontier, a virgin land of "primitive" and martial peoples unrelated to the Chinese, that was to undergird imperialist—especially, but not only, Japanese—claims to the area. Thus Manchuria became a contested borderland where China, Russia, and Japan were the main competitors, though at another historical moment the Koreans and the Mongols could have been included as well. The notion of a borderland has been introduced by American historians Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aaron to distinguish this political condition from both the premodern imperial frontier and the boundaries of the modern territorial nation-state.³⁰ The borderland is a kind of a liminal and indeterminate historical space often characterized by warfare, but also by opportunities for local elites who are able to play off one outside power against another.

To be sure, Manchuria does not fit with this scheme in all respects, but it allows us to comprehend the rise of the illiterate soldier-bandit Zhang Zuolin—as well as almost every other warlord leader in Manchuria—to governor of Fengtian province (now Liaoning) and supreme warlord in all Manchuria. Zhang assisted the Qing government against the Russians in the aftermath of the Boxer uprising. But whereas other bandit leaders supported the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War, he supported the Russians. Nonetheless, he was able to convince the Japanese of his usefulness to them. It is possible that he played a double game; but despite many frustrations on both sides, the Japanese backed him all the way until 1928, when they finally murdered him.³¹

There are two paradoxically contrary ways in which the Manchurian case does not fit the borderland model. First, the original model of Adelman and Aaron presupposed the borderlands to be inhabited by ethnically and culturally different indigenous peoples, whereas by our time Manchuria was overwhelming populated by Han Chinese. Second, despite this ethnic domination by Chinese, the political ambitions of elites like Zhang Zuolin were not restricted to carving out a temporary political space by eluding the domination of a single power; rather, their ambitions could attain imperial heights: Zhang was bent on bringing China itself under his sole command. In this way, the relevance of Lattimore's insight into Manchuria as a reservoir—a resource base for the domination of China—had not quite faded despite many fundamental reversals. At the same time, given these reversals, such ambition could only be sustained because the borderland situation allowed him to maximize his political resources.

In his splendid study of Zhang Zuolin, Gavan McCormack has outlined the fundamental political tensions in the region during the period of Zhang's ascendancy, 1911 to 1928.³² Zhang and the Japanese needed each other to satisfy their ambi-

tions. The Japanese were caught in a contradiction: they had economic and considerable political power in the region, but no sovereignty. They were interested in cultivating Zhang as a strongman who could protect their interests. Zhang, on the other hand, needed Japanese financial and military support not only against his warlord rivals within Manchuria, but even more, against the other warlords vying for control of Beijing itself. For the sake of this latter goal, which occupied a good deal of his energies till the end of his life, Zhang had already fought several exorbitant and unsuccessful wars bankrupting the Fengtian provincial treasury and causing much hardship on the people. Despite his continental goals, however, Zhang had developed a good relationship with many in the Fengtian provincial assembly and implemented several state-building and modernizing reforms. He had built up a significant core of civilian support in the Mukden clique which by the mid-1920s was moving him in the direction of increasing independence from Japan.

But Zhang's ambition to control Beijing took primacy over all and so weakened his support even among the loyal supporters in his administration, such as Wang Yongjiang. The administrators and assemblymen launched a campaign to contain his ambitions called the *baojing anmin* movement (to protect the borders and secure the people of the region), which has been interpreted widely, and especially by the Japanese, as a movement of regional autonomy. Indeed, Zhang himself had set the precedent in 1922 when he declared the independence of the three Eastern provinces, Rehe, Chahar, and Inner and Outer Mongolia. Zhang was responding to President Xu Shichang's dismissal of him as governor of Fengtian because of his role in the 1922 Zhili Fengtian war. He even entered into independent treaties with nations like the Soviet Union.³³

For somewhat different reasons, a similar declaration of regional autonomy was made by the Association of the Three Provincial Assemblies, the chambers of commerce, education associations, and many other groups.³⁴ This popular upsurge was part of south China's spreading federalist movement, which sought the autonomy of the region to implement democratic reform at a time when the center was chaotic and oppressive. The *baojing anmin* movement of the later 1920s appears to have been triggered by a similar impetus, although, dominated as it was by conservative administrators and assemblymen, it was rather cautious about mass nationalism and democratic change.

While their interests were different, the disillusionment of the assemblymen and administrators with Zhang coincided with the frustration of the Japanese, who began to fear that Zhang's increasing military involvement south of the Great Wall would devastate the economy, and even more, that his defeat would bring in a government hostile to the Japanese.³⁵ When both sides decided to abandon him, Zhang's end was clear. But nothing was solved for the Japanese. While some members of the Mukden clique were anti-Japanese and succeeded in moving Zhang towards their position, Zhang was no modern nationalist. As McCormack has said, he was a traditional dynast waiting in the wings for the dragon throne.³⁶ However, the times had changed and Zhang had been caught up in a growing nationalist

movement he did not fully comprehend. His son, Zhang Xueliang, who succeeded him in power, while subject to charges of corruption and drug use, was distinctly more nationalistic. Besides, he was surrounded by a dynamic group of intellectuals and bureaucrats who would go on to form the nucleus of the Northeast National Salvation Society (*dongbei jiuguohui*); they were fervently devoted to the nationalist cause.³⁷

At the end of 1928, Zhang Xueliang hoisted the national flag and declared his allegiance to the KMT government of a unified China. But it was not only the political allegiance that caused the Japanese to strike down the regime. Two other major issues, equally representative of the growing Chinese nationalist feelings, caused the Japanese military to believe that it would need to become the dominant political power in Manchuria. One was the younger Zhang's continued building of railway lines competitive with the South Manchurian Railroad Company (SMR); the other was the denial of landownership to Japanese nationals. Many Chinese were discouraged and disallowed from leasing land to the Japanese, who used Koreans with Chinese citizenship in Manchuria for this purpose. Koreans working on large-scale Japanese farms (leased originally from the Koreans) competed with Chinese farmers—a displaced expression of the Sino-Japanese competition that sometimes erupted in violence. One such flare-up helped to instigate a reaction against Chinese in Korea and provided the provocation for the Japanese to strike down the Zhang Xueliang regime.³⁸ On September 18, 1931, the Guandong Army set a bomb on an SMR line near Mukden and used the explosion as an excuse to occupy all of Manchuria by the end of 1932. In March of 1932 it proclaimed the independent Republic of Manchukuo.

The League of Nations and Sovereignty Claims

Manchukuo had a global significance as the first important test put to the new international institution for settling disputes peaceably and nonimperialistically within the nation-state system, the League of Nations. Certainly, the verdict delivered by the League condemning Japanese expansionism lived up to the new rhetoric of the age of anti-imperialism. But the details and practical actions taken revealed the severe limits of the new system. The failure to back its verdict with suitable action suggests a number of questions: Was the system truly representative of the interests of nationalism, or was it a disguised tool of imperialist nations? Did it point to the limits of nationalism itself, shaped by the expansionary impulse of the modern territorial state? Manchukuo presents us with a similar set of problems.

The verdict of the League, delivered in the fall of 1932, was based on the voluminous report of the Lytton Commission, which was submitted to the League in September 1932 after six months of intensive investigation. However, from the start, the League was impotent to impose sanctions or take action against Japan because of the contrary opinions of Great Britain and the nonparticipation of the United States in the League. It could do little more than declare nonrecognition of the new

state and call for the evacuation of Japanese troops in Manchuria from outside the railway zone. It also recommended beginning negotiations for the reorganization of Manchuria under Chinese sovereignty, but with considerable autonomy.

The Lytton Commission report deemed the crisis to have arisen from a situation where both parties claimed to have rights and interests that were not clearly defined by international law. Moreover, although the Commission recognized the disputed territory to be legally an integral part of China, this territory had a local administration of sufficiently autonomous character to carry on direct negotiations with Japan on the matters that lay at the root of the conflict.³⁹ Thus, on the one hand, the Lytton report was unambiguous in its view that Manchuria had been formally a part of China at least since the Manchu conquest of 1644, and was influenced by Chinese culture long before that. It was also unambiguous in condemning Japan's actions in the Manchurian Incident as unlawful, a violation of China's sovereignty and international law. As we shall see, Japan sought relentlessly to demonstrate that China was not an organized state and therefore not a nation. It seized upon the "Law of Nations" invoked by the Lytton report—"a State must possess and continue to possess one supreme Government"⁴⁰—arguing that China lacked precisely this condition. The Lytton Commission, however, was satisfied that China, as "a nation in evolution," was in the process of gradual but distinct modernization.⁴¹ The report did express concerns about antforeignism in China, which tended "to kindle patriotism with the flame of hatred, and to build up manliness on the sense of injury," but attributed this more to the communists than to the established government.⁴²

On the other hand, as the dispute was complex and characterized by a lack of clarity regarding rights on both sides, the report did not come out completely on the side of Chinese nationalism. Indeed, it often tended to take a middle position between the Chinese and Japanese. For this reason, although KMT officials endorsed the Lytton report, the communists denounced it.⁴³ The first principle the Commission report proposed was that the League's decision should be compatible with both Chinese and Japanese interests. The fourth principle stated that the "rights and interests of Japan are facts that cannot be ignored,"⁴⁴ and the report even went on to argue that seeing Manchuria as part of China would better promote Japan's interests as well. It recommended that the government of Manchuria should be modified so as to secure, in a way consistent with the sovereignty and administrative integrity of China, a large measure of autonomy designed to meet the local conditions and special characteristics of the three provinces.⁴⁵

The verdict of the assembly of the League of Nations based upon the Lytton Commission report also reflected its framework of understanding. While the League clearly acknowledged Chinese sovereignty, it also sought to recognize the historical autonomy of Manchuria and acknowledge the treaty rights of other powers such as the Japanese and the Russians in the region. In other words, while the League acknowledged that sovereignty was based upon historical claims of belonging and culture, it also was wary of denying the rights of states—states that had imperialisti-

cally acquired rights in an earlier period. Other realpolitik concerns also weighed heavily in the verdict, as in the report: the need to strengthen the KMT against the communists in China and the fear that Japanese rule in Manchuria would affect the Open Door policy and principles of free trade, and thus harm foreign interests (in addition to the people of Manchuria).⁴⁶ As the Chinese communists never tired of pointing out, the great powers that dominated the League of Nations were hardly free and neutral agents themselves. In a way, the practical if not always rhetorical ambivalence of the League, given the preponderant role within it of imperialist powers, matched the practical role of Japanese expansionism in contrast to its rhetoric. However, the rhetoric did not merely seek to hide an old and ugly reality. In both cases, the rhetoric and some of the innovations reflected the power of new forces that would have significant effects.

In their response, the Japanese side rejected the fundamental assumptions of the Lytton Commission report and finally withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933. Where the report of the League emphasized Manchurian autonomy but not independence from China, the Japanese emphasized the *de facto* independence of Manchuria. The Japanese representative to the League, Matsuoka Yosuke, rejected the Commission's claim that Manchuria had historically been an integral part of China. He asserted that the union of Manchuria with China had only been "temporary and accidental." Matsuoka cited the authority of M. Escarra, an advisor to the Nanjing government, who had argued that Manchuria was never a vassal of China, since, on the contrary, it was the Manchu family that conquered the Chinese empire.⁴⁷ The empire had been the product of a personal union and could not be considered a question of China's rights over Manchuria. M. Escarra was of the view that imperial and national claims to sovereignty were simply incommensurable. He urged that since the Manchu family had disappeared, another juridical formula had to be developed to explain the reconnection of China and Manchuria.

Not only did Matsuoka deny the claim that Manchuria was an integral part of China in the deep historical perspective, he rejected the claim that the recent history of the settlement of Manchuria by Han Chinese made Manchuria a part of the Chinese nation—a denial that few non-Japanese would find acceptable. He invoked the idea of common political consciousness as the basis of nationhood. Manchuria's numerical domination by Chinese did not mean that it was part of the nation, because "the Chinese have *not* a keen sense of nationality."⁴⁸ However, Matsuoka had to walk a thin line here. He had to show that while the Chinese inhabitants of Manchuria may not have had a Chinese national consciousness, they had a sense of Manchurian identity. He pointed to the presence of the *baojing anmin* movement, "a movement based on Manchurian independence,"⁴⁹ not only during the rule of Zhang Zuolin but also under Zhang Xueliang, who had declared allegiance to the KMT. He suggested that these aspirations came together spontaneously after the Manchurian Incident.

When the authorities who, under General Chang Hsueh-liang, were responsible for the maintenance of order in Manchuria disappeared, as they mainly did after the

events of September 18th, some organization was evidently necessary in order to carry on the normal machinery of daily life; local vigilance committees were formed by the local leaders, and the Japanese Army welcomed their co-operation and assisted them. . . . [T]hat these nuclei of government eventually coalesced and developed into a genuine State is no matter for astonishment. . . .⁵⁰

While we need not accept Matsuoka's interpretation of these committees (whom we will encounter again), they were quite critical to the reestablishment of order in the region.

At the same time, Matsuoka asserted that China had neither a strong state nor an acceptable nationalism.

[S]ince the Revolution of 1911, [China has] fallen into a condition of confusion bordering upon anarchy, and remains in the same condition at the present moment. . . . [U]nder present circumstances, it is entirely impossible to tell when China may come to have a strong and permanent central government, even if we grant the ultimate possibility of that event.⁵¹

Thus, not only was it incapable of governing Manchuria (or restraining the warlords there), it could not ensure the security of foreigners' life and property, guaranteed by treaty rights. Matsuoka seized on a statement in the Lytton report that held anti-foreignism in China—particularly the economic boycott and antiforeign education—to have also contributed to the present conflict. While the report found this antiforeignism to be an expression of a negative rather than a positive nationalism, Matsuoka sought to draw the lesson that China was anarchic and possessed of neither nation nor state.⁵²

The position of the government of the Republic of China as publicized to the outside world was perhaps best summarized by Chih Meng, associate director of the China Institute in America, in its 1932 publication *China Speaks*. Meng's view was supported in most respects by the most authoritative account of the conflict at the time, that of W. W. Willoughby. Willoughby, an American professor who had served as a legal advisor to the Chinese government between 1916 and 1919, and W. W. Yen, China's chief delegate to the League of Nations, both endorsed Meng's account in their respective prefatory comments to the book, in which Chih Meng claimed that "Manchuria is part of China because of priority in political affiliation and by explicit international recognition."⁵³ By the former he meant that since China and Manchuria were ruled jointly by the Manchus, Manchuria had been part of China for nearly three hundred years. Although, according to Meng, there was a period of time in the Qing when the government attempted to stop Chinese migration into Manchuria "to reserve the land for the Manchus," that law was never effectively nor strictly enforced. He added the argument that China needed Manchuria more than did Japan. It is noteworthy that Meng's argument for establishing Chinese sovereignty included a mix of recent historical developments and practical factors. It was by no means the deep historical view that later emerged.

More important than the historical claim was Meng's effort to establish China's sovereignty over Manchuria by means of its recognition in legal statements, international law, and international precedents. Meng cites the constitution of China and, more importantly, Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 1 of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, which recognized China's sovereignty over the region.⁵⁴ Even the recent historical process of Han Chinese colonization that he had cited gains its significance by international comparison: "The Manchus in Manchuria today are somewhat in the position of Indians in the United States, except that the Manchus have been entirely assimilated into Chinese culture."⁵⁵ The appeal to international precedent in order to establish sovereignty claims appears again in the bid to demonstrate that China was a genuine nation-state. Meng says that although China is an ancient and the world's most continuous civilization, it had also begun recently to awaken to a modern nationalism:

The seemingly unchanging China has been changing, and rapidly, during recent years. China has awakened. She instinctively thinks first of self-preservation. She discovers Nationalism, the secret power of the modern nation, and the modern definition of sovereign rights. . . . Call it anti-foreignism, if you wish; it is anti-foreign injustices [*sic*]. In this sense, the Thirteen Colonies of America were also "anti-foreign."⁵⁶

Thus Meng acknowledges, through his complex argument integrating antiforeignism with nationalism by way of international precedent, the systemic principle that only nation-states have the right to reject foreign occupation.

Manchukuo as event allows us to observe how history becomes central to the claims of nationhood. One is hard pressed to find Chinese historical scholarship laying deep historical claims on Manchuria, whether based on racial, cultural, or political ties, at the time of the Manchurian Incident. As Feng Jiasheng, who was to subsequently publish his historical researches on the Northeast, pointed out in an early issue of *Yugong* in 1934, the history and geography of the Northeast had been utterly neglected by the Chinese and was far behind the scholarship of the Russians and the Japanese.⁵⁷ The very few extant works on Manchuria in Chinese published before 1931 seem to have been written precisely to alert Chinese to the impending Japanese threat. They bemoan the ignorance and indifference towards the region among the Chinese, who had tended to regard it as an insignificant wasteland. They too do not delve into long-term historical questions. Even a historian like Fu Sinian, who was close to the political establishment, writing on the first anniversary of the Manchurian Incident in 1932, emphasized how it was the recent colonization of Manchuria in the last century by thirty million immigrants from the provinces of Shandong and Hebei that had changed it into Chinese territory.⁵⁸

Moreover, historians at the time were also conscious of the problems of making deep historical claims. Among the century's finest and most provocative historians, Gu Jiegang, wrote a brilliant essay in which we may see how the spatial representation of China as the eternal geo-body had been historically constructed during

momentous political transformations such as the Qin–Han unification of 221 B.C. In his 1926 essay on the image of the world during the Warring States (fifth–third century B.C.) and its transformation after the Qin unification, Gu showed that spatial conceptions of the world as the “four seas” or the “nine *zhou*” from earlier eras such as the Xia and the Zhou were mistakenly regarded as literal and unchanging representations. Thus people from times following the Qin believed the territorial extent of China to have been continuous with these earlier representations. Gu showed that in fact these abstract spatial representations not only hid changing territorial realities, but were hypothetical. They represented a scheme for unification that only took place under the Qin. Gu was interested in exploring the functions of this “laughable ignorance” of history.⁵⁹

A few years after the Manchurian Incident, historical writing on Manchuria developed a momentum and tended to make deep claims. Although there developed more complex strategies by professional historians to claim the region historically as a part of China, the more crudely nationalist writing relied on flimsy evidence. Thus Wu Shangquan wrote, twenty years after Gu’s piece, that the Northeast was a distinct part of the nine *zhou*. He even sought to naturalize the relationship between the Northeast and China proper by showing how the mountain chains are linked to the mainland, and how the northeastern rivers belong to the same system as those in the mainland.⁶⁰ Such deep historical claims continue to this day. For instance, considerable historical energy has been spent on demonstrating that 1998 was not the hundredth anniversary of the founding of Harbin (by the Russians, who built the China Eastern Railroad). Instead, unconnected historical traces have been utilized to construct a historical claim to the region for many hundreds of years before 1898. Søren Clausen and Stig Thøgersen have grasped the means whereby this history was created: “Since Manchu and Mongols and others are today incorporated in ‘Chinese people’ (*Zhonghua minzu*), the area can be said to have been inhabited by Chinese for a very long time.”⁶¹

Doubtless, the appropriation of Manchuria into the Chinese geo-body within Chinese historical writing has to be understood in the context of the inefficacy of the League and the Japanese denial of Chinese sovereignty, whether in the long or short history. Matsuoka’s claim discussed above was consistent with Japanese historical scholarship before 1931, which held that it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that efforts were made to integrate Manchuria with China. As Nishimura Shigeo has pointed out, scholarship after the Russo–Japanese War and the annexation of Korea was conducted increasingly under the dominant ideology that Japan had special rights in Manchuria and Mongolia because these regions represented Japan’s lifeline.⁶²

Thus, long before 1931, Japanese historians tended to celebrate the autonomy of the region. Consider the detailed introduction to Inaba Kunzan’s 1918 history of the region written by the great Sinologist Naitō Konan. In Naitō’s view, both the Chinese and Japanese developed their political interests in Manchuria during the Koguryō rule of the region, which lasted for seven hundred years, from the late Han

until the Tang. During the succeeding three hundred years of rule by the Bohai, the ancestors of the present Manchus, the state’s political and economic ties with Japan were actually closer than those with China. Indeed, if it had not been for the Khitan, who occupied the region between them and the Chinese proper in western Liaoning, the Bohai could have established their power over China. Later it was the Jin or Jurchen, also ancestors of the Manchus, who defeated the Song dynasty in China. While the Jurchen suffered a setback during the Yuan–Ming period, their Manchu descendants went on to found the Qing empire in China. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the Qing began to encourage Han settlement in Manchuria. Naitō evokes the image of a region with an autonomous history disrupted only recently by accidental developments. For three thousand years, he writes, the land has had its own natural history, its own monuments, routes, and relics. Only in the last two to three hundred years has this pattern changed with the intrusion of agriculture and other developments. It is also in recent centuries that we have become aware of this ancient history and its importance for understanding the present. At the same time, Naitō urges against a historical determinism. The future, he says, can always unfold a different history.⁶³

The main text by Inaba Kunzan fills out this natural history with thick descriptions of primeval peoples hunting in the green woods, fishing, pearl diving, digging for ginseng, and trapping for fur. Of course they had periodic contact with Chinese culture, but they always returned to their primeval forests and mountains. The policy of the Qing to ban agricultural settlement by outsiders reinforced the nonagricultural character of the region. The Han had always dreamed of this virgin land as a vast agricultural garden, and Inaba fears that they had made it so in recent years, and not only in Manchuria proper but in Mongolia and Siberia as well. He warns his compatriots to fear the Chinese. Poor and weak as they seem, they have strong national ties and will make a formidable foe!

The historical narrative sketched by Naitō and Inaba seemed to structure many of the official publications that poured out of Manchukuo. The introduction to the official 1940 text known as *Kōmin* (citizen or civic person), produced by the Police Department for the instruction of police officers, constructs its own deep history of Manchuria, celebrating in particular the Koguryō period of rule over much of this land and Korea over 1,600 years ago. It follows through with the Bohai and their close links to Nara and Heian courts, and then settles down to the Khitan/Liao and Jin ancestry of the Manchu clans. Subsequently, the Russians are blamed for encroaching into the region and releasing the modern period of ethnic struggles. The historical segment closes with a discussion of how notions of ethnic harmony and the “kingly way” have finally brought peace to the region. Note, however, that the Chinese are not even mentioned.⁶⁴

In a way, Japanese historical scholarship was not too distant from the view of Western historians like Lattimore with regard to the history of Manchuria as frontier. Yet the contemporary population of Manchuria overwhelmingly by Chinese did not lead the majority of these Japanese scholars to acknowledge Chinese sovereignty

either, although, as the League report pointed out, neither did they deny this sovereignty before September 1931. After the Manchurian Incident, Matsuoka and others sought to hammer home the point that the autonomy of Manchuria had also meant that the region had no sense of Chinese nationhood. The historical narrative of an autonomous Manchuria suddenly became the history of an independent Manchukuo.

Note also the transformation of Chinese sovereignty claims. Chih Meng and others did not initially make deep historical claims, emphasizing instead the practical needs of an existing population. This was in accord with the Lytton report: "China, at first, showed little activity in the field of development in Manchuria. She almost allowed Manchuria to pass from her control to that of Russia. . . . Meanwhile the immigration of millions of Chinese farmers settled the future possession of the soil, and Manchuria is now unalterably Chinese."⁶⁵ Yet the basis of the claim to sovereignty transmuted into a deep historical one. Given the Japanese use of history, there were presumably few alternatives. However unsuitable or inapplicable it may have been in sorting out territorial claims, history, in the sense of a long and continuous presence, had become implicated in the claim to national sovereignty. In the same essay cited above, Gu Jiegang captures the painful moral dilemma presented to the historian—who is both professional and national—by the use of historical malapropisms.

It is laughable that people identify the territory of the Warring States period with that of the earlier Xia, Shang, and Zhou periods without historical knowledge. But we really should not laugh at them. We need to know if the capacity of China for unity has to depend on such a preposterous historical view. We can only eliminate racial prejudices and create the territory of China as an organized federation if we have such a notion of "past unity." In the past, when Chinese saw the tattoos on the people of Wu and Yue and heard the butcherbird-like sounds of the Chu people, they thought of them as disgraced convict-soldiers of the Zhou. Once, however, they developed the concept of the "nine *zhou*," everyone felt that we and they were of the same family. No matter that they lived at some distance from each other, we all developed a familiarity. Since then, the various Chinese states (*zhuxia*) and the barbarians began to feel a sense of natural intimacy. Moreover, when the ancestors of each state were strung together in a single lineage, it caused the people to feel as if they were all the descendants of the Yellow Emperor, and this generated a still greater intimacy among them.

Nowadays we hear of the "Republic of Five Races," but we cannot generate any feelings of friendship of the Han people towards the Manchus, the Mongols, the Muslims, and the Tibetans. This is because the Han have known them to have been "barbarian states" (*fanbang*); they harbor arrogance towards them in their minds and cannot feel an intimacy. If the Han today were ignorant in the same way as the ancients and followed those who constructed a false history, believing that the territories of the Manchus and the Mongols were in the realm of the Yellow Emperor, Yao, and Shun, and that the people of those regions were descendants of these sage kings, then they would see the Manchus and the Mongols as the same as one from the eigh-

teen central provinces, and the five races could *truly* become a republic (*wuzu jiu zhen keyi gonghele*).⁶⁶

This is an extraordinarily revealing passage that suggests that the fabrication of a deep history is necessary for the production of true national loyalty. Once the Japanese invasion had occurred, Gu's work became increasingly torn between relatively objective historical research and propagandistic historical writing.⁶⁷ As we shall see later, Gu and other concerned historians would try to conceive of the relationship between national unity and historiography at a different epistemological level—one that would perhaps transcend what Benedict Anderson has characterized as the "necessary forgetting," or, as Gu himself put it, a "laughable ignorance." For the moment, however, we may wonder if a legitimate nationalism called up to defend people who have been attacked may not have transmuted into an essentialist doctrine demanding unconditional loyalty—one that, in being purposefully forgetful of other histories, is also homogenizing, exclusive, hierarchical, and unable to distinguish between defense and aggression.

Manchukuo

Historical cases like Manchukuo present the historian with a facile clarity. A great deal is written about them, but what is written tends not to stray from the accepted narrative shaped by the judgment of the case, here Manchukuo, as an unspeakable abomi-*nation*. When writing of the experiences of people, whether ordinary or elite, the expectation is that they cannot but be reduced to symbols of victimization, collaboration, or resistance. My objection to this position is not that we should not denounce a brutal regime, but that this narrative itself is shaped by a nationalist politics that channels history into very narrow passages. This is true not only of contemporary Chinese writings, but also of much Western and postwar Japanese historiography.

Manchukuo was established in March 1932 as the Republic of Manchukuo and was subsequently renamed an empire. Despite the claims to independence, there is no question that the real power behind it was the Japanese Army—hence the Western historiographical designation of it as a "puppet state." Chinese scholarship refers to it as the "false Manchukuo" (*wei Manzhouguo*), its falsity referring to its illegitimacy. While both designations capture important aspect of the polity, these characterizations tend to shape the kind of scholarship that is produced and obscure a wide range of historical issues. Until recently, much scholarship tended to concentrate on the negative effects of state policies on people's lives. The wider effects of Manchukuo's massive industrialization, urbanization, and modernization—perhaps more massive than elsewhere in Asia during the period—have barely been probed.⁶⁸ Socially, the vast range of activities and complex responses to political power that do not conform to victimization, collaboration, or resistance are deemed to have little consequence. Finally, the puppet designation suggests a scarcely veiled colo-

nialism and cannot capture the novel institutional arrangements that produced results very different from the old colonial states.

I have found it useful to think of a fourfold distinction in discussing the polity of Manchukuo: its power structure, regime form, state form, and sovereignty claims. The puppet state designation clarifies the *power structure* of the polity, which was a form of disguised imperialism. Real power resided with those whose principal loyalty was often to Japan or to Japanese groups. However, while the power structure did influence policy and institutions, it was not as central or overwhelming as we have believed. Many of the institutions, policies, and experiences were shaped by the other three factors.

I will define *state form* here as the rationale, goals, and "rationalities" that enable the legal exercise of power in society. The state form is capable of encompassing several different regimes and I believe Manchukuo belongs to the modern state form that we have identified as "governmentality." To be sure, governmentality cannot be applied mechanically to Manchukuo or East Asia generally. We will consider later how Foucault's slighting of the distinction between state and civil society does not aid our understanding of governmentality in this region. Moreover, specific expressions of governmentality articulate with historical representations from the East Asian modern, regarding, for instance, gender and morality (*jiaohua*), which equally shape lived experience. But as a modern state form, Manchukuo is to be distinguished not only from premodern states, but also from most nineteenth-century colonial states. These states usually sought to reproduce the difference between rulers and ruled, and were not preoccupied with the rationalities of the modern state except insofar as they needed to implement them to extract resources or maintain the colonial order.

The *regime form* specifies the decision-making institutions and methods of implementing policies. We may characterize the regime form of Manchukuo as "military fascist" to emphasize the central role of the Guandong Army in place of the supreme leader.⁶⁹ To be sure, fascism here is to be construed loosely, and there are aspects of the central European model that do not apply, most conspicuously and ironically Manchukuo's commitment to a multicultural polity in opposition to fascism's homogenizing imperative. But similarities include the nondemocratic and narrow circle of decision-makers, policies of state-led industrialization and modernization, implementation through a state-sponsored mass organization (the Concordia Association, *Xiehehui*, *Kyōwakai*), and a corporatist system in which each group has its place and function within the state. Finally, the Manchukuo state severely restricted individual rights and often exhibited a dictatorial and brutal conduct. Interestingly, both the Japanese and the Chinese KMT state also shared important features of this fascist model and thus bear a closer resemblance to the Manchukuo regime than might appear at first sight.

Finally, in its *sovereignty claims*, Manchukuo devised, deployed, and sometimes pioneered the rhetoric of the emerging anti-imperialist nationalism. It made the rather outrageous claim that it was not merely a nation, but one that embodied

utopian ideals. While it soon became clear that these ideals were often appropriated for militaristic purposes, they nonetheless shaped several policies and the lives of many people. One of these was the multiculturalism embodied in the Concordia Association; another was the redemptive universalism of the many religious and "Eastern" civilizational organizations that flourished in Manchukuo; and a third was the effort to realize a modern utopia blending the best of East and West—which could only be attained in this last frontier of the East. Although the bulk of this book is devoted to exploring the historical process whereby cultural formations and practices were transformed into sovereignty claims, this process cannot be grasped apart from each of the other dimensions. Most of all, any understanding of Manchukuo will have to grapple with the contradiction between a disguised imperialist power structure and the three other dimensions, without reducing the latter to the former.

Visions: Utopian and Colonial

Why was Manchukuo established as an independent, civilian nation-state, however formal, rather than as a colonial and military state? To be sure, key elements of the Guandong Army that drove out the Zhang Xueliang government were not necessarily committed to its independence from the start. Senior officer Ishiwara Kanji, perhaps the single most forceful figure behind the creation of Manchukuo, initially saw the Japanese possession of Manchuria as necessary for the survival of Japan and its continued control over Korea. The "strategic autarky" or "Japan's lifeline" argument, which had gained currency in the army from the end of World War I, always figured Manchuria at the center of a sphere of self-sufficiency that would be critical to the outcome of any battle in the future. According to Tak Matsusaka, Japanese military analysts came to this conclusion after observing the close relationship between state and resource mobilization during World War I. Manchuria and China would be necessary for the sphere of Japanese self-sufficiency, whether through voluntary cooperation or, if necessary, occupation and coercion. In other words, an imperialist intent distinctly pervaded the enterprise.⁷⁰

The general view regarding the proclamation of independence is that it was a fig leaf designed to mollify the League of Nations and fend off Chinese nationalist charges. But it is noteworthy that Manchukuo remained a formally independent nation even after the withdrawal of Japan from the League and at a time when Japan and other powers continued to possess colonies. Two other factors merit consideration. First, in order to effectively attain its goals, the Japanese military had to develop an alliance with key groups in Manchukuo, both Chinese and Japanese. In order to do so meaningfully, it was compelled to champion the rhetoric of these allies, which included the framework of a sovereign state. Ishiwara and his associates in the Guandong Army, Itagaki Seishiro and Doihara Kenji, recognized that they could ignore the new discourse of rights and autonomy only at their own peril.⁷¹

Second, ideas of strategic autarky and an "economic bloc" came to be interpen-

trated by pan-Asianist discourse. While figures like Ishiware were motivated by Japanese nationalism, this nationalism was itself framed by a vision of the inevitable confrontation between East and West. The cooperation of China and Manchuria under Japanese leadership was necessary for success in this holy war or righteous duty (*zhengyi, seigi*).⁷² Ishiware became a convert to the pan-Asianist idea of the formal equality of Asian nations; there was no contradiction between viewing the alliance as representing the supposed difference between Asian ideals and Western imperialism and treating it as a tool in the final war for global dominance.⁷³

Thus, while the idea of an autarkic Japan-Manchuria bloc was influenced by models of autarky in Europe, it was grasped within the civilizational discourse of pan-Asianism. The bloc idea grew by the mid-1930s into the East Asian League (*Tōa renmei*) and the East Asian Community (*Tōa kyōdōtai*), and still later into the idea of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere (*Dai-Tōa Kyōeiken*). Indeed, figures associated with the propagation of these ideas, such as Ozaki Hotsumi, Kada Tetsuji, and Shinmei Masamichi (whose lecture tours in Manchukuo were sponsored by the SMR), were critical of Nazi ideas of racial superiority and emphasized cooperation with the Chinese in a regional alliance under Japanese leadership.⁷⁴ Commitment to the idea of an alliance—and even that Japanese should renounce extraterritoriality in Asian countries—hardly meant that the Japanese were not thought to be intrinsically superior or that Asian nations need not accept the leadership of Japan. Yet it is impossible to fully understand why the military encouraged the rapid modernization and industrial buildup in Manchuria without grasping its framing within pan-Asianism.⁷⁵

The discourse of Manchuria as an autonomous place fostering a new type of polity had been advocated by a variety of Japanese groups within Manchuria. Some were idealistic and some even utopian, finding in Manchuria a frontier where they could realize a vision that many considered impossible to achieve in the established society of Japan. Yamamuro Shinichi has said that in the entire history of Japanese expansionism, Manchuria is arguably the only place that held a romance for Japanese. Idealists and visionaries of every hue saw there a frontier of boundless possibilities. And yet, as he further notes, the reality of the Japanese imperial system stood in their way; indeed, convinced as they were of the superiority of Japanese personal-ity and institutions, it stood *inside* their way as well.⁷⁶

Groups like the *Mantetsu Shainkai* and the *Daiyūhōkai* were formed by employees of the SMR. The former advocated the ideals of racial harmony and a new state, while the latter was inspired by Buddhist universalist ideas of divine compassion.⁷⁷ Another important group whose ideas informed the new Manchukuo state was the Manchurian Youth League (*Manshū Seinen Renmei*), formed by the Japanese settler society in Manchuria. This group was particularly sensitive to the rise of Chinese nationalism and, although a paramilitary outfit, it was painfully aware that Japanese interests in Manchuria were doomed without some kind of compact with the Chinese communities or a framework of Sino-Japanese coexistence. Under its idealistic leader Yamaguchi Jūji, the League developed the idea of *kyōwa*, or cooperation

between races or nationalities and the rejection of colonialist attitudes. This idea would ultimately incarnate in a fascist mass organization in Manchukuo known as the Concordia Association. Though fascist, the association was built upon a rhetoric of eternal peace embedded in East Asian ideals and a framework of mutual cooperation among the different peoples. It advocated anti-imperialism and even conceived of a new type of anticolonial state that would replace all imperialist powers—including the Japanese.⁷⁸ Although the history of Manchukuo since the mid-1930s is one of subordination to Japanese expansionism, the effects of these early ideas and policies should not be underestimated.

In all these groups—although with different emphases or in different combinations—we see the modern progressive, even radical, ideals of the equality of gender and peoples combined with notions of the distinctiveness of Eastern civilizational traditions. Thus Buddhist thinkers such as Kasagi Ryōmei of the *Daiyūhōkai* and Ishiware emphasized Easternness, while the Youth League and Tachibana Shiraki sought more progressive ideals. But it was really Tachibana Shiraki who synthesized this duality in a way that was suitable for the new state. A well-respected Sinologist and a journalist in Manchuria, Tachibana began to work for the influential SMR Research Department in 1925.⁷⁹ He was perhaps more sympathetic to Chinese nationalism than most other Japanese, and his goal was to create a new East that was modern, progressive, and socialistically egalitarian.⁸⁰ At the same time, he was convinced that the East was organized around different ethical and spiritual principles than the West. He was much struck with Sun Yat-sen's appeal to *wangdao*, or the way of the ethical monarch of Chinese antiquity, as a means of countering the "way of the hegemon" represented by both Western powers and the local warlords.

Ironically, the Manchukuo state would seek to deploy precisely such Chinese ideals as *wangdao* and their own supposedly more genuine version, the Republic of Five Nationalities of 1912, in the *minzu xiehe* (Concordia of Nationalities). Not only did both these ideas refer to Sun's rhetoric, they also alluded (as had Sun) to Chinese civilizational categories, including the Qing notion of the federated empire. As creative as he was in his efforts to synthesize the modern West and ancient East, and to channel Japanese expansionist energies toward the construction or restoration of China and other Asian societies, Tachibana's desire to see Asia unified under Japan led him to work with the military.⁸¹ Tachibana's implication in the core reality of the military power, like that of all the other idealists who dreamed of building a new world on the frontier, would lead him to compromises and even the reversal of his ideals.

In 1931, Tachibana became associated with the Manchurian Youth League by accepting the editorship of their journal *Manshū Hyōron*.⁸² At the same time, because of his connections to the economic research group of the SMR, which in turn was actively allied with the radicals in the Guandong Army, he was well positioned to represent the different Japanese interests in Manchuria and serve as the architect of the new state.⁸³ In the immediate aftermath of the Manchurian Incident on September 18, his principal political task was to direct the Self-Government Guidance

Department (*zizhi zhidaobu*), which sought to build the apparatuses of local administration from among local elites who had been associated with the earlier autonomy movement and who probably saw de facto Japanese rule as their best available option. In March 1932, when the guidance department was disbanded, Tachibana threw himself into building the Concordia Association, which replaced the Manchurian Youth League. He sought to build upon the ideas of Yamaguchi, who had articulated the vision of a new society in which all the different groups in "Man-Mo" (Manchuria and Mongolia) would "participate in politics equally and without discrimination."⁸⁴

Despite Japanese military control, there was no shortage of Chinese—autonomists, opportunists, "Eastern" religious salvationists, revolution-fearing elites, and war weary masses—who could be persuaded or coerced to join the "peace maintenance committees" that served as the effective administration under the Self-Government Guidance Department. At the top level, most of the important military generals, such as the Manchu Xi Xia in Jilin, Zang Shiyi in Fengtian, and Zhang Jinghui in Heilongjiang, swiftly switched sides and became the new provincial governors. Thus, by January 1932 pro-Japanese regimes had been established in all three provinces. At the local level, a group of Chinese politicians, merchants, and local notables formed the Peace Maintenance Committee of Liaoning Province, with Yuan Jinkai as its chairman. There is considerable scholarly consensus that the most significant basis of Chinese support for the Manchukuo regime came from the landed classes who tacitly promised support in return for stability and anticommunism.⁸⁵ In large measure because of the ways in which corrupt officials and land companies distributed the land for settlement and cultivation in the late nineteenth century, Manchuria had an extremely unequal profile of land distribution. The investigation of the Land Records Bureau, set up in 1936, revealed that 3 percent of the rural households in northern Manchuria owned 50 percent of the land, and 4 percent of the rural households in southern Manchuria owned 40 percent of the land, while 84 percent of rural households in the north and 65 percent in the south owned very little or no land.⁸⁶ It is for this reason that the first reform item on Tachibana's agenda—radical agrarian reform, which grew out of his socialist agrarian philosophy (*nōhonshugi*)—was shelved, and the rural sector remained stagnant during the entire period. In general, the refusal of the Guandong Army to interfere with the interests of the landed classes made several of the projects of the radicals impossible.

The leader of the Guidance Department, Yu Chonghan, was a representative of landed interests and also had financial interests in an SMR company.⁸⁷ Yu had been an advocate of the autonomist *baojing anmin* movement and was also a leader of a group of top civilian administrators in the Zhang administration known as the *wen-zhipai* (civilian rule group). When he came out of retirement to accept the offer to lead the department, Yu declared the necessity of constructing a new, independent state based upon the principles of *wangdao*, which involved, among other things, reform of the taxation, official compensation, and police systems. He also advocated

an industrialization policy and, most curiously (although consistent with the spirit of *wangdao*), the abolition of the national defense forces, a policy that Tachibana also advocated in the early stages.⁸⁸


Rana Mitter has shown how various forms of local alliances, in particular, the county-level peace maintenance committees, were crucial to ensuring a relatively smooth takeover by the Guandong Army of much of Manchuria.⁸⁹ The economic integrity of the county and the effective control of county elites was perhaps most in evidence in the financial panic following the Manchurian Incident, when the Guandong Army seized the banks of the old government. Many counties were able to forestall the slide into economic and political chaos by issuing their own currencies. That these currencies circulated countywide—unlike other parts of Republican China, where one could find multiple currencies in a single county—not only reflects the integration of county power, but Yasutomi Ayumu and Fukui Chie argue, it also permitted the relative ease of political control in Manchukuo.⁹⁰

Once regular administration was reestablished, particularly after the formation of the Republic of Manchukuo in March 1932, these county-level committees were formally dissolved, but the spirit of (doubtless forced) cooperation that lay behind them was to be sustained through two institutions: the Concordia Association and the principally Chinese associations that I have called the modern redemptive societies, such as the *Daodehui* (Morality Society) and the *Hongwanzihui* (Red Swastika Society). The tacit alliance that the Manchukuo state formed with Chinese landed groups, local elites, autonomists, and redemptive societies, as well as modernizing bureaucrats and modernizing elements in the Concordia Association, shaped the rhetoric of its sovereignty claims.

Political Economy: Violence and Development

The political structure of Manchukuo exemplified the contradictions between its sovereignty claims and strategies (based on social alliances) and the structure of power. At the same time, its broader macrosocietal agenda indexed its difference from the older colonial model and revealed many of its contradictions to be characteristic of modern governmentality, particularly as expressed in the Manchukuo regime form. This governmentality was expressed in its slogan of *jianguo* or *kenkoku* (founding the nation-state).

Despite the rhetoric of self-rule or local self-government, the political structure was carefully controlled by the Guandong Army. Puyi, who had reigned as child emperor until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in the Republican revolution of 1911, was designated head of state in 1932 on the model of the KMT presidency, and became emperor again in 1934.⁹¹ Much has been written and at least two movies made about this somewhat tragic, if colorless and powerless, emperor. In his role as the titular ruler of an independent state, Puyi was initially considered equal to the Japanese emperor. After the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, he was increasingly subordinated to the Japanese emperor. He was induced to worship at holy shrines



Provinces, Cities, and Principal Railroads of Manchukuo

of Ise, and in 1939 a shrine for Amaterasu was installed in his palace in Xinjing, the new capital built in the old city of Changchun. In 1940, Puyi underwent a ritual rebirth from the womb of Amaterasu, thus becoming the younger half brother of the Japanese emperor. In the view of the authoritative Chinese history of Manchukuo, such an act made "the Chinese people into Japanese imperial subjects."⁹² By 1937, and especially after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the symbolic indepen-

dence of Manchukuo was seriously compromised, as it increasingly became an important supply base for the Japanese war machine in inland China.

Initially, the army sought to control the administrative structure directly, and Muto Nobuyoshi, commander in chief of the Guandong Army, was also appointed governor of the Guandong-leased territory (as well as Japanese ambassador to Manchukuo). The civilian governorship was separated from the other posts soon after,⁹³ and by the mid-1930s army officers had to share power with a host of "reform bureaucrats" from Japan who envisioned Manchukuo as a "modern national defense state" that would serve as a model for Japan. Totalitarian in conception, the vision of these bureaucrats involved the rational and efficient mobilization of material, political, scientific, and cultural resources under state control. Although more closely identified with Japan than were the Guandong Army officers, their conception also involved winning the "hearts and minds of the people" through propaganda and the Concordia Association, which developed into an administered mass organization.⁹⁴

The reform bureaucrats and the army controlled the wider administration through the General Affairs Board (*zongwuting*) of the State Council, the most powerful administrative body. It consisted of the six bureaus of planning, legislation, personnel, accounts, statistics, and information. The board made the budget and supervised all important hiring and firings. Most of the top political and administrative positions in the government as a whole were occupied by Chinese, although they were closely supervised by a high-level Japanese who was said to report to the board. The director general of the General Affairs Board was always Japanese.⁹⁵ The first prime minister was Zheng Xiaoxu, a Qing loyalist and Confucian scholar who apparently hoped for a genuine return to the principles of Confucian governance. He was gradually ousted from power and replaced by the former warlord Zhang Jinghui in 1935.⁹⁶ Many of the Chinese administrators were locals, frequently educated in Japanese institutions in the SMR-leased regions or in Japan itself.⁹⁷

Manchukuo did not have a formal constitution, but bureaucrats and scholars referred to the Proclamation of the Establishment of the State (*Jianguo xuangao*) of 1932 and the Government Organization Law (*Zhengfu zuzhifǎ*) as containing the fundamental laws of the state. According to these laws the political system was a modern one, containing an executive, a legislature, and a judiciary. However, there was no true separation of powers and Yamamuro has aptly called the system "apparent constitutionalism." The language of the laws frequently referred to the rights and duties of citizens (although there was no explicit citizenship law), but couched as it was in the familiar imperial Japanese metaphor of the family-state, the obligations of the citizen overwhelmed her rights: "National citizenship is the expanded version of family membership. Just as the family member has an obligation to obey the family unconditionally, so does the citizen have to obey the state."⁹⁸

Groups and nationalities, rather than individual citizens, were more frequently seen as rights-bearing units: "No matter what race or religion, all the people are guaranteed to enjoy equality in the nation. . . . We are a country of different nation-

alities/races (*minzoku*) and religions, and the nation-state guarantees equality among them."⁹⁹ Such legal statutes underpinned the corporatist organization of society, which was managed at an everyday level by the Concordia Association and the various redemptive societies. The political constitution of Manchukuo was a sham as far as democratic rights and checks were concerned. But the regime was by no means an old-style colonial power moved to intervene in society simply in order to secure its power and profits. It was a fascistic regime whose laws were designed to produce its vision of a disciplined and mobilized society. As the war beyond its boundaries expanded, it became ever more committed to mobilizing the population, regardless of ethnicity, for its political, economic, and ideological projects.

The most modern part of the state was the economic system, particularly the urban, industrial sector.¹⁰⁰ The modern sector of the economy grew more rapidly and developed a more advanced industrial base than any part of Asia outside Japan. Kung-tu Sun calculates that industrial production tripled between 1933 and 1942, and producer goods output grew the fastest.¹⁰¹ The establishment of a unified currency equivalent to the Japanese yen was very important to the economic recovery of the region after years of fiscal irresponsibility. It also enabled Manchukuo to integrate with the Japanese economy, forming a "yen bloc." The banking system was reorganized and unified. There was a dramatic rise in Japanese investments—according to Louise Young, to almost 6 billion yen between 1932 and 1941 (in 1941 exchange rates), a figure far greater than that for any other transfer from a metropole to colony. By 1945, Japanese investment in Manchukuo exceeded the combined total of investment in Korea, Taiwan, and the rest of China.¹⁰² This economic growth meant that immigration from China continued to rise as a whole, although the Japanese made efforts to control and reverse it during the early period, when they hoped to settle the land with Japanese and Koreans.¹⁰³ As a result of these efforts, migration into Manchuria from north China in 1931–1938 fell to below half the levels of the preceding years, but with the industrialization drive of the war years immigration picked up again, to an average of 1.2 million per annum between 1939 and 1942. Most of this labor force went into the industrial sector.¹⁰⁴

Ramon Myers has argued that the establishment of Manchukuo marked a break from the older colonial pattern of economic domination, which involved the emergence of a small Westernized industrial sector alongside a much larger, traditional agricultural sector. There was also little transfer of capital or technology or significant economic integration between colony and metropolis. Myers argues that between 1931 and 1945 the Japanese military and government began to create a "modern enclave" economy in Manchukuo and, later, north China, comprising the full panoply of modern economic enterprises and services such as hospitals, schools, and research centers. Capital assets in this sector far exceeded the size and value of Chinese-owned mining and manufacturing south of Manchukuo. As Louise Young says, "The truly radical and novel facet of Manchurian development lay in the plans for heavy industrialization and the hope to make Manchukuo the advance guard of Japanese industrial capitalism. By turning Manchukuo into a testing ground for

industrial management and planning techniques, Japan departed from existing colonial practices."¹⁰⁵ The modern enclave economy idea fits our efforts to characterize the complexity of Manchukuo. On the one hand, the massive modernization of economic and social life is continuous with the modern state's imperative of governmentality. On the other hand, this buildup was itself designed to create a war machine dominated by an imperialistic power structure.

Scholars have tended to divide economic development during the fourteen-year period from 1931 to 1945 into three stages. In 1931–1936, the Guangdong Army was relatively responsive to the various Manchuria based Japanese utopian and visionary groups, such as the *Daiyūhōkai*, the *Mantetsu Shainkai*, the Manchurian Youth League, and others.¹⁰⁶ This early influence by no means precluded the establishment of Japanese dominance, but rather emphasized the independence of Manchukuo from both the Japanese government and from *Zaibatsu* capitalists.¹⁰⁷ From the mid-1930s, the bureaucrats arriving from Japan increased their influence, and by 1936 the government announced the first of a series of five-year plans based on extensive state control of the industry and commerce that had been built up over the preceding years. Special companies in charge of a particular industry were set up, usually as state corporations in which the government was a principal or important shareholder. However, since the available capital was still insufficient, the army began to abandon its vestigial anticapitalism and invited the *Zaibatsu* to establish joint ventures with the state corporations.¹⁰⁸ Most important among the houses was the new and supposedly less plutocratic *Nippon Sangyō Kaisha*, or Nissan, headed by Ayukawa Yoshisuke.¹⁰⁹

The dependence on Nissan grew after the invasion of China proper in 1937, as it became increasingly clear that Manchukuo would serve as a principal supply base. Nissan became a holding company controlling most of the state enterprises—increasingly at the cost of the South Manchurian Railroad Company, which was reduced to a transportation company and research organization.¹¹⁰ Thus, while the period before 1936 saw considerable industrial development, it was far surpassed by industrial growth in 1937–1941.¹¹¹ There are no reliable statistics for the second five-year plan, which began in 1942, because of the wartime statistical blackout, but most economists believe that production increased still faster, judging from available data. In 1945, total thermal and hydroelectric production was around 3 million kilowatts, compared to the unmet annual target of 1.4 million from 1937 to 1941.¹¹² The maniacal increase in industrial production and the diversion of resources to feed the war machine came at a terrible price. Inflation and increased taxes began to burden the people as early as 1937. But it is after the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 that we get a palpable sense of the reduction in living standards, especially among the urban Chinese population.¹¹³ The increasing costs of maintaining the Japanese armies led to shortages and still more stringent state control of the distribution system, which in turn led to popular dissatisfaction and black-marketing. This period was increasingly shaped by the fascistic regime structure and tensions gener-

ated by a Japanese imperialist racism, which blatantly contradicted the sovereignty claims of the multicultural ideology of Concordia.¹¹⁴

In addition to these wartime problems, Chinese authors have pointed to many injustices produced by the inequality between Japanese and Chinese. They note the monopolistic nature of the industrialization drive; the Manchukuo government and Japanese houses controlled 72 percent of the total invested capital, making it hard for Chinese capital to compete.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the wage differential between Chinese and Japanese workers in the factories was staggering; in 1939, for every one hundred yuan made by a Japanese, a Chinese worker made 29 yuan.¹¹⁶ Conditions of work in the mines were especially appalling. In the agricultural sector not only was there no reform, but the means used by the government to settle Japanese and Korean farmers produced much tension and conflict. The Land Records Bureau set up in March 1936 turned out to be a means to grab the best land for Japanese settlers.¹¹⁷ Chinese farmers were evicted with a token compensation of 5 yuan, or else their land was bought in August, when the price was lowest. By the end of 1939, over one million hectares of land—representing about one-sixth of all the cultivable land in Japan—was under Japanese cultivation. Nineteen percent of this land had already been under cultivation.¹¹⁸

The brutality of the regime cannot be doubted. Some of this was, not unexpectedly, directed at resistance forces. Given Chiang Kai-shek's policy of nonresistance, followed, however reluctantly, by Zhang Xueliang, most of the existing military forces in the Northeast either fled Manchuria or capitulated to the Japanese. A few warlord armies, most famously that of Ma Zhanshan in Harbin (studied by Rana Mitter) and such disparate entities as student groups, "patriotic landlords," and secret societies, particularly in the old Chinese regions of southern Liaoning, offered resistance, but they were routed by 1933.¹¹⁹ After 1933, as the Soviet Union felt more emboldened to encourage the Chinese Communist Party to attack the Japanese, the CCP brought together many of the resistance forces into the *Yiyongjun* (or Righteous/Volunteer Army) and put up considerable resistance. Communist-led uprisings continued, particularly in the Korean-dominated Jiandao region, but the Manchukuo and Japanese armies were able to decimate them by the late 1930s. Whole villages were wiped out, including the killing of 2,500 villagers in the Pingtingshan massacre. Altogether almost 66,000 people were slaughtered between 1932 and 1940.¹²⁰ According to Lee Chong-sik, the principal reason for Japanese success lay in their draconic counterinsurgency measures. In response to suspected peasant support for anti-Japanese guerillas in the Jiandao border region with Korea, 5.5 million rural residents were forcibly relocated, by the end of 1937, to 10,629 hamlets. These concentration camplike hamlets came with three-meter-high walls, barbed wire, and squads of forced labor.¹²¹ As Japanese forces cut off supplies to the guerillas, the latter were forced to raid the hamlets themselves, which gradually led to the deterioration of villager-guerilla relations.

In contravention of the 1925 Hague Convention ban on bacteriological warfare and experimentation, the Japanese government sanctioned germ warfare experimen-

tation in Manchuria and elsewhere in China. Unit 731 in Harbin, where over 3,000 deaths took place between 1937 and 1945 alone,¹²² has become the most notorious symbol of this cruel experimentation with humans, but there is evidence of experimentation in Xinjing and other places as well. Colonel Ishii Shiro ran his own bacteriological factory in Pingfang (Unit 731), equipped with a private airstrip, railway line, and other facilities. Here they experimented with the transmission of deadly infections such as the plague and typhoid; they also conducted vivisection, freezing, and dehydration experiments on people.¹²³ Recently the Japanese government has undertaken to clean up the site.

Manchukuo presents us with two faces. On the one hand, we have a record of cruel violence; on the other, one of a developmental state. Nishimura Shigeo has plotted these recurring phenomena as the plunder and development phases.¹²⁴ However, it is worth noting that it was the same state that underwent both phases. Although the contrast between development and violence seemed particularly sharp in Manchukuo, Foucault has pointed out that this antinomy is typical of the modern state.

In all history, it would be hard to find such butchery as in World War II, and it is precisely this period, this moment, when the great welfare, public health, and medical assistance programs were instigated. . . . One could symbolize such a coincidence by a slogan: Go get slaughtered and we promise you a long and pleasant life.¹²⁵

If the modern state is increasingly driven by the autonomous logic of governmentality to intervene to take care of men as population, it does so for its own sake. And since population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, says Foucault, the state is also entitled to slaughter it, if necessary.¹²⁶ The case of Manchukuo suggests that we also need to invoke the "regime of authenticity" to grasp how the distinctions between authentic and inauthentic groups of people—based on ethnicity, class, or gender, even within the nation—could generate such contradictory forces within governmentality.

Even while it killed people mercilessly, the Manchukuo state sought to ensure high levels of investment, enjoyed considerable success in state building, eliminated banditry, and disciplined the warlord armies, turning them into the Manchukuo army. A very important propaganda item of this regime was that it had brought security from warlord disorder. With regard to infrastructural development—the construction of world-class dams, ports, railroads, planes, automobiles, and spectacularly modern cities—its achievements were greater than those of most other states in Asia. Japanese city planners who failed to realize their dreams in Japan sought to do so in Manchukuo. Xinjing, for instance, was designed as a futuristic world-class city to showcase the progressive Japanese leadership of Asia. Indeed, the state was the precursor of the postwar Japanese "construction state" (*doken kokka*), endlessly building Manchukuo.¹²⁷

Other aspects of governmentality include the punctiliously detailed censuses and

surveys; the extensive and complex plans for settlements; the close attention to hygiene and welfare, making available education, drinkable water, and shelters; and the mobilization of the population for forced inoculations—sometimes at gunpoint.¹²⁸ No state in the region had ever been so busy classifying, surveilling, managing, and directing the lives of the people. Suk-jung Han's important work has shown how the Ministry of Civil Affairs (*Minzhengbu*) under one-time warlord Zang Shiyi

pok[ed] its nose into all realms of daily life, even examining bathroom designs of new buildings, dogs, carts, and checking the health conditions of prostitutes monthly. . . . Each provincial office was a small scale replication of the ministry with similar sections (such as personnel, finance, statistics, police, welfare, land, construction). The ministry sent a hundred directives annually to local officials for them to report on endless items (from the condition of roads to that of Confucian shrines). . . . It also devised an extreme measure for directing local offices. It finally graded them for their achievement in various fields.¹²⁹

There is perhaps no better symbol of the antinomian structure of the modern state in Manchukuo than the police. According to Han, who is fascinated by the multifarious and moralized role they were assigned, Manchukuo had a huge police force that was relatively well paid and regularly trained, and that engaged in every kind of supervisory, surveillance, regulatory, mobilizational, and educational activity.¹³⁰ Indeed, they appear to have occupied the much broader role of the *polizeistaat*, which according to Foucault heralded governmentality in eighteenth-century Europe.

The rationality at work in hygiene and welfare was also at work in the elaborately planned isolation of peasants in their hamlets, the cold-blooded science of human experimentation with lethal bacteria, and the mobilization of the population for a deadly war. But many modern states exhibited this duality. The governmentality that characterized Manchukuo was typical of the modern nondemocratic regimes of the inter-war years, such as fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the Stalinist Soviet Union, and Japan. Even KMT China sought to emulate these examples. In contrast to the democratic regimes of the period, in which the functions of governmentality were distributed between state and nonstate organizations of civil society, in this other type of regime the administration itself and its extensions—what Gregory Kasza has called “administered mass organizations”—reached into every sector of the population to control and manage. The particular combination of the state form and the fascistic regime form characterized the governmentality of Manchukuo. What made it different from other modern states was that it did not have the legitimacy of a nation. Governmentality does not eliminate the need for sovereignty, and sovereignty in the post-World War I era was increasingly embedded in the discourse of nationhood. The failure to secure recognition from the League on the basis of state rights pitted the Manchukuo government all the more against the deep claims made by Chinese nationalism. The story of Manchukuo—at least during the early

phase—is the story of a state in search of a nation. Let me turn to one of its principal claims to be a sovereign nation: what it regarded as its prized innovation, the Concordia Association.

Sovereignty, Mobilization, and the Concordia Association

In conception, the Concord of Nationalities, the doctrine of the Association, was supposed to be two stages ahead of the old colonial ideas of the nineteenth-century West. Not only was it supposed to reject exploitation and the reproduction of difference between ruler and ruled, it was also designed to counter the homogenization of differences produced by nationalism itself, which had led to such insoluble conflicts in the early twentieth century. By allegedly granting different peoples or nationalities their rights and self-respect under a state structure, it saw itself as a nation in the mode of the Soviet union of nationalities or today's multicultural nations.¹³¹ But where in the eyes of a Yamaguchi or Tachibana or even an increasingly sympathetic Ishiwara, the Concordia Association was to represent the will of the people and was ultimately destined to replace the Guandong Army, by mid-decade it was purged of its original leadership and made into an instrument of the army and government.¹³² It became less the means of ethnic, cultural, and occupational representation than of their surveillance and mobilization. Nonetheless, in the process, it could not avoid confronting the problem of identity politics of modern nationalism.

As a mediator between local structures and the center, the Concordia Association enrolled all officials, teachers, and important figures in society. Several scholars have referred to it as a totalitarian party, and indeed the Guandong Army decided against calling it a party precisely because parties were too closely associated with partisan interests and hence insufficiently “total.” According to the commander in chief of the Guandong Army, it was in theory “the ideological mother of government.”¹³³ Members often wore uniforms and served as propaganda agents, whether through making films, training youth, or organizing meetings, while also undertaking lower-level administrative functions, such as surveillance and even labor mobilization during the Pacific War. As an organ for mass mobilization, all youth aged sixteen to nineteen were compulsorily enrolled in the Concordia Youth League from April 1937. McCormack notes that the Association's numbers grew from 1 million in early 1938 to 4.28 million by June 1943 (of a total population of approximately 40 million).¹³⁴ While the CCP enrolled 5 percent of the population, it enrolled over 10 percent.¹³⁵ Gradually, as in “administered mass organizations” of this kind of regime, most of the population was organically woven into one part or another of the Concordia Association structure.

The Concordia Association was also the nucleus of a fascistic *corporatism*. Analysts of fascism have used the notion of corporatism to describe the actualization of

twentieth-century fascist theories of "organic society" into social organizations that emphasized solidarity of the national community rather than competition between individuals or classes. The Concordia Association claimed to be both anticapitalist and anticommunist, and sought to overcome class and other divisions by organizing people through their communities. These communities were occupational or professional, cultural (generational, gendered), and ethnic. Developed originally as a framework to represent the different ethnic communities, such as Mongols, Manchus, or Hui Muslims, the association was particularly important for mobilizing the support of the elites of these ethnicities who allegedly represented the masses in their communities. These elites were themselves often divided into an older, traditional group and a younger, modernizing one, reflecting a split within Concordia ideology.

Many Japanese ideologists, such as Tachibana, did not see any contradiction between the modern ideals of republicanism, equality, and modernization and "Eastern" values of community solidarity and the moral state (*wangdao*). After all, had not Japan exemplified the synthesis and represented the best of both worlds? As Tachibana declared,

Since the Manchurian Incident, the warlord regime in the Northeast has collapsed. With this collapse, the 30 million people of Manchuria and Mongolia (Man-Mo) and the 300 million Chinese people have been liberated from the shackles of semifeudalism. Moreover, this liberation has directly awakened the Asian essence (*honshitsu*) of Manchurian society. By turning to these traditions (*dentōteki seikatsu shisō*; literally, traditional life ideas) and self-governing capacities, a new *ōdō* (*wangdao*) nation has been created. Hence, the establishment of the *ōdō* nation-state possesses a historical and social inevitability.¹³⁶

Yet when these ideas were the bases not merely for talking points but for different interests and programs, the tensions were very real.

On the one hand, having declared its sovereignty to be founded upon the distinctive and superior essence of Asia, the corporatism of the Concordia Association necessitated a notion of Asiatic traditionalism. This form of corporatism often strengthened the regime's control of local society because it preserved the existing power structure intact. It was similar to the *baojia* system of community self-surveillance, an imperial Chinese method of local control that the Association also implemented among the Han Chinese communities in Manchukuo. By the 1940s, the Concordia Association was organizing Hui mosque communities, Mongol lama monasteries, and Manchu villages, among others. To promote the goal of solidarity, the Association sought to emphasize the so-called values of communalism or *kyōdōtai* within religion; to celebrate pan-Asianism, which they allegedly found even among Muslims and Central Asian peoples; and to support the religious leadership among these peoples, such as Mongol lamas, Manchu and Daur shamans, Muslim ahongs, Buddhist monks, and Confucian moralists. Thus traditional pan-Asianism was an important aspect of maintaining the specific nature of corporatist control in

this fascist regime. At the same time, we can see how the regime form in Manchukuo served to bolster or even produce its sovereignty claims based on the implicit compact with conservative forces in the society.

However, the sovereignty claims of the regime also incorporated modernity; indeed the modernity of Asian tradition was implicit in the idea of the "kingly way." It was expressed most clearly in the forms of governmentality that characterized state power. We have already attended to the large-scale state projects of modernity such as cities, dams, ports, hygiene programs, five-year plans, and the like, whereby the modern state performs—or perhaps, calls up—the modernity through which it will legitimate its rule. James Holston writes,

Like prophets gathering flocks, modern states invent nations where they do not yet exist and create polities to which they later belong. And like prophets, they often do this inventing by means of public works that are supposed to demonstrate their capacity to create an imagined, usually alternative future and to fashion new subjects and subjectivities for it. . . . [S]uch projects aim to cultivate the belief that states can produce the future-modern by accelerating history ("Fifty Years of Progress in Five") [and] dematerializing distance ("National Unification through Highway Construction").¹³⁷

Technocrats, bureaucrats, and other modernizing elites tied in one way or another to state projects were the advocates of this vision.

It should not be forgotten that the Concordia Association was originally designed to realize a visionary modern polity. Many of its early recruits, especially among the younger elite of the minorities, turned out to be quite fiercely iconoclastic. Thus Mongol tribal youth who served in border armies were decidedly against the lama priests and demanded modern education. A Daur intellectual and member of the Association wrote a savage critique of shamanism. Even Japanese reformers were appalled at the massive state expenditures in building temples to Chinese gods such as Guandi and others. At the highest level, Chinese supporters of the regime were fiercely divided between those who wanted to keep Manchukuo a modern republic and those, such as Zheng Xiaoxu, who sought to make Puyi, the last Manchu emperor, an emperor once again—a goal they realized with the declaration of the Manchukuo Empire in 1934. At the same time, even when subordinated to the Guangdong Army, the state still needed the cooperation of modern elements among the Japanese, the Han, and the minorities in order to become strong and modern.

This tension was particularly apparent after the Pacific War. The Concordia Association became increasingly involved in the war effort, and through the forties one of its most important function was to encourage unrealistic increases in factory production while ensuring that workers did not rebel under these harsh conditions. Japanese representatives were quite candid about their dissatisfaction with this impossible task, and one member wrote in the society's journal *Kyōwa Undō* that the fanatical need to increase production existed basically in the Japanese head alone!

But what was most aggravating was the policy from about 1942 of involving the religious or redemptive societies in this twin effort to increase production and reduce tension. As a representative wrote in the same journal, the various religious organizations appeared to have very little comprehension of the goals of the mobilization campaign and refused to cooperate in the least. The city authorities now planned to change the format and use seminars and lectures to teach the activists of the redemptive societies.¹³⁸

Although we can find this tension in its distilled form in the Concordia Association, it characterized the state and society beyond it; we may think of it as the fault line in the ideology of this Asian fascist regime. The survival of the regime depended upon maintaining a balance between, on the one hand, constructing a traditionalist corporatism and supporting redemptive societies, and, on the other, developing a modernizing project that was compatible with its state-building goals. Support from significant, but mutually hostile, communities depended upon the commitment to attaining both aims. Both were also crucial to the sovereignty claims of a state that was increasingly being recognized by other states.¹³⁹ Thus the regime functions of fascist corporatism appealed to ideas of Asian essentialism, whereas the imperative of governmentality in this particular time and space called for a rhetoric of modernizing legitimation. While, as we have seen, this was a characteristic tension of the temporality of the modern nation-state, and was doubly intense for non-Western nations, in Manchukuo it was triply intense because Asianism was so central to its claim to sovereignty. Like several East Asian regimes around it, the Manchukuo state sought to resolve the tension by re-presenting the authentic tradition in such a way that it could exclude what it did not like. By so deploying the East Asian modern, the ideologists of the regime sought to contain the aporia of modern time and its particularly heavy political fallout. This containment effort often assumed—as we shall see below—the figure of the modernity-of-tradition.

In an effort to escape the judgment that forecloses or severely restricts so many studies of Manchukuo, I determined to de-compose the categories of political analysis so that we could arrive at a more differentiated understanding of the situation without at the same time losing sight of the power structure in the regime. The underlying question posed by this mode of analysis is whether the imperialist power structure implied by the terms puppet state, false Manzhouguo, and even informal empire played such an important role as to make the experience substantially comparable to a colonial one. Does the ability of power-holders to influence and manipulate institutions and rhetoric overwhelm the effects of new institutions and policies in the changed domestic and international circumstances after World War I?

There are many ways in which power-holders are able to manipulate institutions not necessarily designed for their benefit. We can see this not only in the reduction of the autonomy of Manchukuo and the decision to go to war in Asia, but perhaps more strikingly through informal attitudes and everyday practices. Two recent and excellent Japanese studies by Yamamuro Shinichi and Komagome Takeshi both

point to this factor as pivotal. For Komagome, the racist ideology of the consanguineous descent group (*ketsuzoku*), identified with a unique Japanese people, tended to prevail over whatever other sentiments of affinity, built through cultural and linguistic ties, the Japanese may have felt with the peoples they came to colonize or dominate. No matter how radically sympathetic a Japanese activist in Manchuria may have been towards Chinese and others, it was, more often than not, premised upon a presumption of the acceptability of a naturally superior Japanese leadership.¹⁴⁰ Yamamuro points to the apparatus of control and the arbitrary authority of the police and the army. But he finds that the Japanese failure in Manchukuo lies less in the institutions they designed than in their attitudes and practices. The rhetoric of concord was contradicted in everyday practices such as the discrimination against Chinese in the military school or the consumption of ethnically differentiated rationed items—rice for the Japanese, sorghum for Chinese—at the same table during the war.¹⁴¹

To be sure, there is evidence that there were forces working for autonomy even within the power structure in Manchukuo. There were several occasions when special Japanese rights were attacked by the Guandong Army, most notably in 1936, when extraterritorial rights for Japanese citizens were abolished and a series of very real privileges began to unravel. The Japanese government also raised tariffs against the overwhelming exports from Manchukuo.¹⁴² More recent research by Han, Young, and others takes seriously the Guandong Army's autonomy from the despised civilian governments at home—at least until the war in Asia. Nonetheless, these tendencies towards autonomy pale in comparison to the growing subordination of Manchukuo to the growing Japanese war machine.

The novelty of Manchukuo emerges from the institutional consequences of imperial nationalism in an emergent postcolonial time of mobilization and identity politics. Whether it be corporatist governmentality or the development of the “yen bloc,” Manchukuo was considerably different from the colonial “night watchman state” or previous patterns of economic relationships between metropole and colony. Its locus as the site of the most advanced forms of design, mobilization, and experimentation had as much to do with the changing climate, demands, and strategies of the globally ambitious military as with metropolitan Japanese discourses and attitudes towards Manchuria. For many reformers and radical militarists, reform here was the starting point for reform in Japan.¹⁴³ It was also different because of reasons “ex-centric” to the metropole. Because Manchukuo was created at a different time and space from the conquest of Taiwan and Korea, the Japanese military had to work with Chinese allies and employ Chinese political and ideological forms in the creation of the political system.

In a general sense, as an aspect of Japanese imperialism, Manchukuo was of a piece with Korea and Taiwan, and we shall explore their role in the East Asian modern in the concluding chapter. As Komagome has revealed, this imperialism contained tendencies toward assimilation and alliance on the one hand, and racial exclusivism and reproduction of difference on the other.¹⁴⁴ But Manchukuo as a

multinational state was only conceivable after the March 1919 Korean anticolonial movement, when groups both within the colonial regime and outside began to rethink the nature of Japanese expansionism. The need to avoid the repercussions of nationalism by seeking to co-opt it came to be intertwined with pan-Asianism, particularly after anti-immigration legislation in the United States and other developments in the 1920s fueled the Japanese self-perception not only as imperialists, but as victims of Western imperialism.¹⁴⁵ Soon after World War I, elements in the military began to conceive of a "strategic autarky" within an economic defense perimeter. Thus, the logics of territory and economics, which fused into a new type of regional hegemony sought by the Japanese—justified in the language of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine—found expression in Manchukuo.

In several ways, Manchukuo was more continuous with the informal empire in Manchuria before 1931 than with Korea and Taiwan. As Tak Matsusaka has pointed out, many of the projects and policies carried out in Manchukuo, such as defense-related industrialization, managed economy, utopianism, and "techno-nationalism"—had been undertaken by the SMR long before 1931. Moreover, the plan for strategic autarky could never have been carried out without the partnership of Zhang Zuolin in the 1920s.¹⁴⁶ When he withdrew from this alliance, those who founded Manchukuo had to find other, more malleable allies. While imperialism was certainly preserved in this hegemony, it also dictated relations between center and periphery different from those of the older colonies. The new program involved more alliance, autonomy, investment, development, identity, and competitiveness. In many ways, Manchukuo prefigured the phenomenon of a junior partner or a client state dominated by hegemonic states such as the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar period.

What kind of nation was Manchukuo designed to be? Official writings insist upon the special character of Manchukuo nationality and its difference from the colonies well into the Pacific War. But it was clearly a weak sense of territorial nationality, emphasizing civilizational character, nationality policies, and, of course, the ties to Japan. Anonymous Hegelian dialecticians from the flagship Jiangsu University grappled with the relationship between nationality and the state.

All nationalities in their life-worlds (*seken seikatsu*) must progress from the simple to the complex, from the unenlightened to the enlightened. The organizations, institutions, and culture of the various people express the spirit of universal citizenship (read, state) in form; but it is the special national character that determines the content. The objective existence of spirit is not exhausted (by this content); but it is external and moves from the outside to the inside. In the process, the institutions, organizations, and culture accept spirit, and national culture becomes the basis for the realization of spirit.¹⁴⁷

The state would shape nationality, even as nationality was the basis of the state.

In philosophy, mobilizational strategy, identity formation, the production of

authenticity, and the representation of sovereignty, Manchukuo resembled the modern nation-state. These strategies drew upon circulating resources and the most sophisticated technologies in East Asia. But the goal or object of these techniques of producing authenticity and citizenship was open-ended, variable, and confused. Apart from loyalty to the state (*jianguo*), Manchukuo failed to settle upon a vision of community—ethnic nationality, civilization, Manchukuo nation or empire, Japanese empire—because of the imperialist power structure and differences within it. In some ways, the regime "overimagined" the nation, presenting itself as the custodian of whatever cultural practice could appear as authentic. By the same token, it gives us the opportunity to examine these processes, not only in Manchukuo but in East Asia.

Notes

1. I still use the term Northeast when I quote or cite authors who use that designation.
2. League of Nations Commission of Enquiry on Manchuria [Lytton Commission], *The Far Eastern Problem: Official Texts and Summary of the Lytton Report* (Worcester, Mass.: New York Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, 1933), 63.
3. Robert H. G. Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 184.
4. Mark C. Elliott, "The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies," *Journal of Asian Studies* 59 (August 2000): 614. See also Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
5. Caroline Humphrey, "Shamanic Practices and the State in Northern Asia: Views from the Center and Periphery," in *Shamanism, History, and the State*, ed. Nicholas Thomas and Caroline Humphrey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 191–228.
6. Elliott, "The Limits of Tartary," 619–24.
7. Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (New York: Macmillan, 1935), 39–42.
8. Lattimore, *Manchuria*, 41.
9. Lattimore, *Manchuria*, 60–61, 70. Christopher Atwood has revealed that a good many of Lattimore's ideas, particularly relating to the Mongols, derived from the views of Merse, a Daur Mongol intellectual and progressive Mongol nationalist; see Atwood, *Young Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia's Interregnum Decades, 1911–1931* (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).
10. Thomas Gottschang, "Economic Change, Disasters, and Migration: The Historical Case of Manchuria," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 35 (1987): 461.
11. R. Lee, *Manchurian Frontier*, 78.
12. R. Lee, *Manchurian Frontier*, 113.
13. G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 24 (1964–65): 3–43, 195–228.
14. Yasutomi Ayumu, "Teikiichi to kenjō keizai—1930 nen zengo ni okeru Manshū

nōson shijō no tokuchō" (The rural marketing system in Manchuria around 1930: Periodic markets and the economy of the county town) (paper submitted to *Ajia Keizai* 2002), 1–9.

15. Yasutomi, "Teikiichi to kenjō keizai," 19.
16. R. Lee, *Manchurian Frontier*, 40–55, and Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Through Ethnographic Eyes" (unpublished paper, n.d.), 6–7.
17. Akamatsu Chijō and Akiba Takashi, *Manmo no minzoku to shūkyō* (Peoples and religions of Manchuria and Mongolia) (Tokyo: n.p., 1939), 161–64.
18. V. K. Arseniev, *Dersu the Trapper*, trans. Malcolm Burr (1941; reprint, New York: McPherson, 1996), 72–73.
19. R. Lee, *Manchurian Frontier*, 123, and Lattimore, *Manchuria*, 132–45.
20. R. Lee, *Manchurian Frontier*, 138–40.
21. C. Walter Young, *The International Relations of Manchuria: A Digest and Analysis of Treaties, Agreements, and Negotiations Concerning the Three Eastern Provinces of China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), 136–52.
22. Kang Chao, *The Economic Development of Manchuria: The Rise of a Frontier Economy* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1982), 5. Chao believes that the reported population increase—from roughly 7 million to 17 million—is likely to be an exaggeration and probably represents a considerable underestimate of the population before that date.
23. Chao, *Economic Development of Manchuria*, 7.
24. F. C. Jones, *Manchuria since 1931* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), 7–8, and Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911–1928: China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 7.
25. Chao, *Economic Development of Manchuria*, 10.
26. Lattimore, *Manchuria*, 260.
27. McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin*, 7.
28. Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 12.
29. McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin*, 7–8.
30. Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States and the Peoples in Between in North American History," *American Historical Review* 104 (June 1999).
31. McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin*, 16–18.
32. McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin*, 59–72.
33. See also the recent study by Ronald Suleski, *Civil Government in Warlord China: Tradition, Modernization, and Manchuria* (New York: Peter Lang, 2002). Suleski reveals just how much Zhang was indebted to Wang Yongjiang for developing the economic and fiscal base of the region. For details of administrative reform, see chaps. 3 and 4.
34. McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin*, 79.
35. McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin*, 223.
36. McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin*, 253.
37. Mitter, *Manchurian Myth*, 132–34, and ZDLSG, 54–56. For an excellent account of the making of Chinese nationalism and its growth during the 1920s, see James H. Carter, *Creating a Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International City, 1916–1932* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). Albeit focused on the city of Harbin, Carter's discussion of the growth of nationalism and its subsequent unraveling after 1928, as the interests of radical nationalists and security-seeking merchants began to diverge, is also relevant more generally to the region. He finds that many of the officials who had promoted this nationalism in the 1920s also promoted the new nationalism of Manchukuo in the 1930s.

38. ZDLSG, 27–30, and Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 17–18.
39. Westel W. Willoughby, *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935), 400.
40. See Yosuke Matsuoka, *The Manchurian Question: Japan's Case in the Sino-Japanese Dispute as Presented before the League of Nations*, Observations of the Japanese Government on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Memorandum of the Japanese Delegation (Geneva: League of Nations, 1933), 27–28.
41. League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, *Far Eastern Problem*, 60–63; Willoughby, *Sino-Japanese Controversy*, 385.
42. League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, cited in Willoughby, *Sino-Japanese Controversy*, 387.
43. This was also because it was an anticommunist report.
44. League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, *Far Eastern Problem*, 80; Willoughby, *Sino-Japanese Controversy*, 404.
45. League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, *Far Eastern Problem*, 81.
46. Willoughby, *Sino-Japanese Controversy*, 399.
47. Matsuoka, *Manchurian Question*, 25–26.
48. Matsuoka, *Manchurian Question*, 28.
49. Matsuoka, *Manchurian Question*, 47.
50. Matsuoka, *Manchurian Question*, 48.
51. Matsuoka, *Manchurian Question*, 65.
52. League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, *Far Eastern Problem*, 62. Matsuoka, *Manchurian Question*, 19–20.
53. Chih Meng, *China Speaks: On the Conflict between China and Japan* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), 4. For Willoughby see Hatsue Shinohara, "Forgotten Crusade: The Quest for a New International Law" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996), 61.
54. Chih Meng, *China Speaks*, 182.
55. Chih Meng, *China Speaks*, 5.
56. Chih Meng, *China Speaks*, 65.
57. Feng Jiasheng, "Wode yanjiu dongbei shidi de jihua" (My research plan of the history and geography of the Northeast) *Yugong* 1, no. 10 (1934): 2–6.
58. Wang Qingyu, *Dongbei wenti* (The problem of the Northeast) (Shanghai: shangwu chubanshe, 1931), and Hua Qiyun, *Manmeng wenti* (The problems of Manchuria and Mongolia) (Shanghai: Dadong shuju, 1931). Fu Sinian, *Dongbei Shigang* (Outline of Northeast History), 1932, in *The Complete Works of Fu Sinian*, vol. 5, 74–85. Taipei: Lianjing Press, 1980.
59. Gu Jiegang, "Qin-Han tongyide youlai he zhanguoren duiyu shijiede xiangxiang" (The origins of Qin-Han unification and the image of the world during the Warring States) (1926; reprint in *Gushibian*, ed. Gu Jiegang, vol. 2., no. 1, Beijing: Pu she, 1930), 1–6.
60. Wu Shangquan, *Dongbei dili yu minzu shengcunzhi guanxi* (The relationship of the geography of the Northeast and the survival of the nation) (Chongqing: Duli chubanshe, 1944), 57–68.
61. Soren Clausen and Stig Thøgersen, *The Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin* (New York: Sharpe, 1996), 9.
62. See also Hatada Takashi, *Chūgoku sonraku to kyōdōtai riron* (Chinese villages and the theory of village community) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1976), and Nishimura Shigeo, *Chū-*

goku kindai tōhoku chiuyushi kenkyū (A regional history of Northeast China) (Kyoto: Hōritsu bunkasha, 1984), 2, 234–54.

63. Naitō's views on Manchuria and Manchukuo were quite ambivalent. In 1922, he had written that Manchuria was under Chinese sovereignty, but he was of the opinion that it was so because Japan had wrested it back from Russia. He regarded Manchukuo as the realization of a multiethnic and nonmilitarist state, but believed strongly that it had to be a Sino-Japanese partnership, a cooperative venture nourished in its own national conditions. However, he came to fear and mistrust the Guandong Army and refused to provide his knowledge to the propagandists of wangdao; see Joshua Fogel, *Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naitō Konan, 1866–1934* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 252–60.

64. Chianbu keisatsushi (Law and Order Ministry, Police Department), ed., *Kōmin* (Citizen) (Shinkyō: Manshūkoku toshō kabushiki geisha, 1940), 2–4.

65. League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, *Far Eastern Problem*, 63.

66. Gu Jiegang, "Qin-Han tongyide youlai," 4–5.

67. Laurence A. Schneider, *Ku Chieh-kang and China's New History: Nationalism and the Quest for Alternative Traditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 293.

68. Recently, the views of younger Chinese scholars appear to be changing. In personal conversations at least, they are prepared to acknowledge the higher levels of achievement in aspects of modernization such as life expectancy and information gathering in Manchukuo and Taiwan as compared with mainland China during the Republic. Indeed, one scholar believes that censuses in Manchukuo were more comprehensive than those conducted on the mainland in 1990. He has, however, yet to publish these findings.

69. Mark Peattie has suggested that Ishiwaru Kanji, the architect of Manchukuo, could be described as a "military fascist"; see Mark R. Peattie, *Ishiwaru Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 253–54.

70. Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 214–23. The security argument was underpinned by the rising threat of communism in China and Korea and the expectation of inevitable confrontation with the Soviet Union. Note here the way in which the argument for territorial security becomes a rationale for territorial expansion, how nationalism and imperialism were inseparable in this thinking.

71. Komagome Takeshi suggests that this decision should be seen in the trajectory of Japanese failed experiments with the participation of the colonized in government, particularly in Korea; see *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka Tōgō* (The cultural integration of the Japanese colonial empire) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 236–37.

72. Yamamuro Shinichi, *Kimera: Manshōkoku no shōzō* (Chimera: A portrait of Manzhouguo) (Tokyo: Chuō kōronsha, 1993), 42–48.

73. Peattie, *Ishiwaru Kanji*, 167, 281, 335. Note, however, that the special privilege of Japan and the supreme power of the Guandong Army was preserved by the signing between Japan and Manchukuo of two treaties, secretly settled beforehand; see Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 162.

74. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation* (London: Sharpe, 1998), 97–101; L. Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 203–5, 221–27. Many of these people were associated with the Showa Research group.

75. One of the old questions of the historiography on Japanese expansion into Asia after the Manchurian Incident of 1931 is the extent to which the civilian government and the

military headquarters in Japan were involved in its premeditation. While scholars like James Crowley (1966) emphasized the importance of autonomous actions by local military officers, especially of the Guandong Army, others, such as Gavan McCormack, have preferred to view Japanese expansionism as a long-term process that preceded such unilateral military action. Louise Young's recent work leaves no doubt of the many sectors of society—especially the mass media—involved in whipping up mass support and even hysteria within Japan for the intervention in Manchuria. See James B. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin*; and L. Young, *Japan's Total Empire*.

76. Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 14–15.

77. Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 99–101.

78. Gavan McCormack, "Manchukuo: Vision, Plan, and Reality" (unpublished paper, 1987), 4, and Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 94–95.

79. Lincoln Li, *The China Factor in Modern Japanese Thought: The Case of Tachibana Shiraki, 1991–1945* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 17.

80. Li, *China Factor*, 104, and Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 113–17.

81. Li, *China Factor*, 13.

82. Li, *China Factor*, 46.

83. Ito Takeo, *Life along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo*, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1988), 118–20; Kenichiro Hirano, "The Japanese in Manchuria 1906–1931: A Study of the Historical Background of Manchukuo" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1983), 400–403; and Li, *China Factor*, 49.

84. McCormack, "Manchukuo: Vision, Plan, and Reality," 4.

85. Hirano, "Japanese in Manchuria," 407; Komagome, *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka Tōgō*, 251–52; and Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 172–74. For biographical sketches of some of the military men and Yu Chonghan and details of provincial administrative reforms, see Suleski, *Civil Government in Warlord China*, 10–20.

86. *ZDLSG*, 304.

87. Mitter, *Manchurian Myth*, 95; Hirano, "Japanese in Manchuria," 403–4; Li, *China Factor*, 57.

88. Hirano, "Japanese in Manchuria," 419.

89. Mitter, *Manchurian Myth*, 102–110. See also Suleski, *Civil Government in Warlord China*, 193–201, for the extent to which the warlord government had been dependent on local control over county officials and elites for their activities.

90. Yasutomi Ayumu and Fukui Chie, *Manshū no kenryūtsūken* (Manchuria and county currencies) (paper submitted to *Ajia Keizai*, 2002).

91. Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 228. Scholars have speculated about why Pu Yi was subsequently made emperor. Actually, Pu Yi himself was quite disappointed at not having been made emperor in 1932. Many of his Chinese supporters, led by Prime Minister Zheng Xiaoxu, sought to reinstate him as emperor, but were opposed by other Chinese republican groups as well as the Youth Alliance and the *Daiyūhōkai*; see Hirano, "Japanese in Manchuria," 409, and Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 151. His instatement as emperor in 1934 was, according to Yamamuro, due to pressure from other colonial administrators to make his position more consistent with the Japanese imperial system and thereby facilitate greater Japanese control of Manchukuo; see Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 226–27.

92. *ZDLSG*, 277–280, and Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 41–42.

93. Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 26.
94. Janis Mimura, "From 'Manchukuo' to Japan's 'New Order': Bureaucratic Visions of a Totalitarian State" (unpublished paper, 1999), 11–15.
95. ZDLSG, 95–97, and Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 25.
96. ZDLSG, 100.
97. Hirano, "Japanese in Manchuria," 419–23, and Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 26.
98. Chianbu keisatsushi, *Kōmin*, 41.
99. Chianbu keisatsushi, *Kōmin*, 54–55.
100. The rural sector remained sluggish through the period.
101. Kungtu C. Sun with Ralph W Huenemann, *The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1969), 101–2.
102. Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 183–84, 213–15; Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 139.
103. Although at the height of the campaign to encourage rural settlement it was hoped that as many as five million Japanese settlers would migrate to Manchukuo by the mid-1940s, the rural settler population from Japan never did exceed 250,000. Potential settlers appeared to have a good enough idea of the harsh conditions of settlement among a hostile Chinese population who had often lost land to these alien settlers, and of the difficulties of learning a new terrain and climate while also engaging in military defense. Obviously, this knowledge was sufficient to dampen their enthusiasm for the whipped-up patriotic campaign to settle in Manchukuo; see Young, *Japan's Total Empire*.
104. Gottschang, "Economic Change, Disasters, and Migration," 465; Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 169–70.
105. Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 240.
106. Ito, *Life along the South Manchurian Railway*, 134–51.
107. Sun, *Economic Development of Manchuria*, 76–78. Lattimore observed early in the regime that the Guandong Army's vision was not to have direct colonialism, but to create an "economic bloc." This demanded the ruthless subordination of the Manchurian economy "to forms that will supplement but not compete with the interests of Japan; but it also demands the suppression of interests in Japan which have a natural appetite for exploiting a region like Manchuria by extracting its wealth and transferring it to Japan"; see Lattimore, *Manchuria*, 306.
108. Ito, *Life along the South Manchurian Railway*, 152–55, and Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 145–47.
109. Sun, *Economic Development of Manchuria*, 80–81, and Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 146–48.
110. Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 148, and ZDLSG, 313–19.
111. See Sun, *Economic Development of Manchuria*, for figures.
112. Compare Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 157, with Sun, *Economic Development of Manchuria*, 82.
113. Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 139. Jones believes that the cost of war to the people in Manchukuo was perhaps comparable (though not more than) to that borne by the people in Japan themselves.
114. ZDLSG, 300–304, Myers, "Creating a Modern Enclave Economy," 158, 155.
115. ZDLSG, 131–38, 317–20.
116. Gavan McCormack, "Manchukuo: Constructing the Past," *East Asian History* 2 (December 1991): 122.
117. ZDLSG, 304.
118. McCormack, "Manchukuo: Constructing the Past," 119–20.
119. ZDLSG, 60–76, 190–210.
120. See Lee Chong-sik, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Nishimura, *Chūgoku kindai tōhoku chiyushi kenkyū*; and McCormack, "Manchukuo: Constructing the Past."
121. ZDLSG, 160–74; Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria*, 271.
122. ZDLSG, 380–84.
123. Clausen and Thøgersen, *Making of a Chinese City*, 120. The brutality and ruthlessness of the Japanese military is not in question, as it may be for the Japanese right wing. The nationalist lenses through which we have approached the understanding of this brutality is, however, quite limiting. There is often an assumption that these kinds of acts were a product of Japanese national character or something intrinsic to the Japanese. This is no more provable than it is for any other systematic act of violence by any people. Moreover, this kind of essentialist allegation tends only to reproduce the cycle of hostile or resentful nationalist consciousness, obscuring the will to see these acts of barbarism in cross-nationally discursive, political, and institutional terms.
124. Beginning around 1935 we see the decline of the plunder function and a rise in the developmental function. This is reversed in 1937, and once again there is a rise in the developmental function in 1939. With the Pacific War in 1941, the developmental function begins to decline steeply. See Nishimura Shigeo, "Research in Japan on the History of North-East China: Present State and Problems," trans. Gavan McCormack (unpublished manuscript, 1992), 10–14.
125. Foucault, "Political Technology of Individuals," 147.
126. Foucault, "Political Technology of Individuals," 160.
127. David Vance Tucker, "Building 'Our Manchukuo': Japanese City Planning, Architecture, and Nation-Building in Occupied Northeast China" (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1999), 27–28. Tucker believes the Manchukuo state was the "metaphorical precursor" for a "people that existed only in a metaphorical sense." See also David D. Buck, "Railway City and National Capital: Two Faces of the Modern in Changchun," in *Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950*, ed. Joseph Esherick (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000); Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 54, 157, 207–13; and Lattimore, *Manchuria*, 260, 264.
128. Han, "Puppet Sovereignty," esp. chaps. 3 and 4.
129. Han, "Puppet Sovereignty," 10.
130. Han, "Puppet Sovereignty," 122–30.
131. See, for instance, the authorless and limited circulation publication entitled *Soren no minzoku seisaku* (Soviet nationality policy) (Shinkyō: Kenkoku Daigaku kenkyūin kan, 1940). In Tachibana's original plan for a national assembly, later rejected by the Guandong Army, the apportionment of seats was to follow the ratio: Han 7, Manchu 3, Korean 2, Muslim 2, Mongol 2, Japanese 7, and white (Russian) 1. However, a general principle of representation was maintained within the bureaucracy and for mobilization purposes; see Komagome, *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka Tōgō*, 262.
132. Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji*, 171, 174.
133. Cited in ZDLSG, 180; Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 50.
134. McCormack, "Manchukuo: Constructing the Past," 5.

135. ZDLSG, 177.
136. Tachibana, quoted in Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 115–16.
137. James Holston, "Alternative Modernities: Statecraft and Religious Imagination in the Valley of the Dawn," *American Ethnologist* 26 (August 1999): 605.
138. Fujiwara Kazuo, "Hoten ni okeru shokuba kōjō undō no genjō" (The circumstances of the workplace labor movement in Fengtian [Mukden]), *Kyōwa undo* 5 (September 1943), 43–47.
139. Manchukuo was recognized by Japan, El Salvador, the Vatican, Italy, Germany, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Thailand; see Tucker, "Building 'Our Manchukuo,'" 93–94, n. 33.
140. Komagome, introduction to *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka Tōgō*. Mariko Tamanoi has written a sensitive study of different Japanese identities in Manchukuo, including peasant immigrants, students, and officials; see "Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classifications: The 'Japanese' in 'Manchuria,'" *Journal of Asian Studies* 59 (May 2000): 248–76.
141. Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 279–80.
142. Han, "Puppet Sovereignty," 257–58; Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 205, 211.
143. Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 227.
144. For Komagome, Japanese nationalism was, as is well known, at the heart of its imperialism. At the same time, he is more aware than most other critics of the different possibilities in the Japanese political system and of its integrative tendencies, based on assimilation (*dōka*) by language and culture. But whenever the question of incorporating a colony appeared, the exclusionary principle of blood descent raised its head by inventing new forms of institutional, legal, or even attitudinal exclusion of non-Japanese in the empire. Imperial ideology made for a powerful and efficacious nationalism within what came to be thought of as the national core or inner territories (*naichi*) of Japan, but was unable to find sufficient cultural resources within to negate or transcend itself when this nationalism became expansionist in the outer territories (*gaichi*). Komagome thus wants to investigate the hypothesis that "in the history of imperial Japan's colonial domination of other people, the opportunity for the self-negation of nationalism carries within it a clarification of the deepening contradiction within this nationalism"; see *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka Tōgō*, 8.
145. See Oguma Eiji, "The Green of the Willow, the Flower's Scarlet: Public Debate on the U.S. Exclusion Movement and the Colonization of Korea under the Japanese Empire," trans. Joseph Murphy (unpublished paper).
146. Matsusaka, *Making of Japanese Manchuria*, 393–95, 403.
147. Soren no minzoku seisaku, 1–2.

PART TWO

CIVILIZATION AND
SOVEREIGNTY