

Navigating the One-on-One Model of Accountability: Lessons for Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables through the Lens of Principal–Agent Theory

Matthew Davies* and Jayme Johnson**

Abstract Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs)—single, locally elected politicians—were introduced in 2012 with the intention of strengthening local control over policing, by shifting oversight of chief constables away from the Home Office and police authorities. This article examines the new power dynamics that have emerged with this shift, paying particular attention to the role of conflict in relationships between PCCs and chief constables. It argues that in some instances, the reform introduced conflict between incumbent chiefs and newly elected PCCs, compounded by the one-on-one dynamic between PCCs and chiefs. The article presents principal–agent theory as a theoretical framework that can better understand how conflict can be managed, and draws upon observations from two distinct—albeit related—pieces of research conducted in England and Wales and the USA to make recommendations on how PCC–chief constable relationships can be navigated.

Introduction

Under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (PRSRA) 2011, the Coalition government introduced directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in England and Wales. In November 2012, 41 PCCs outside London were elected by citizens in their local police force areas. One objective of the PCC concept was an attempt by the political right to rattle a police service, which they perceived to be steered by a group of liberal minded, remote, and overly influential chief constables who had lost their way in a mist of

bureaucratic accountability (Loader, 2013). These concerns arose from long running arguments about a lack of local responsiveness in policing (Reiner, 2013). PCCs were seen as the part of the solution—figureheads who would unequivocally reset the balance of power in favour of local communities (Davies, 2014).

In order to perform their oversight role, PCCs were given statutory powers under the PRSRA to appoint and dismiss chief constables (Section 38), set force priorities and budgets, with the

* Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. Email: matthewwilliamdavies@gmail.com

**Department of Criminology, Society and Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA

expectation of simultaneously scrutinizing force practices and performance by holding chief constables to account. In some cases, this power shift resulted in conflict between incumbent chiefs and newly elected PCCs. The novel one-on-one system of accountability presented a further challenge for PCCs and chiefs and took on a more personal dynamic than the previous committee system of police authorities.

Although there has been some high profile media coverage of fallouts between PCCs and chief constables, there has been little research on how relationships between PCCs and chief constables have unfolded (see e.g. Wells, 2015), and nothing on how the management of these relationships might be improved.

This article has three goals. The first section ('How have relationships between PCCs and chief constables unfolded') sketches out the unfolding relationships between PCCs and chief constables under the new one-on-one dynamic. The authors argue that the one-on-one model offers little protection for chief constables and PCCs where conflict does occur. Under this dynamic, conflict becomes more personal, and resolving these issues comes down to the personal abilities of the PCC and chief to negotiate differences.

In the subsequent section ('Applying principal-agent theory'), the authors set out key principles for managing one-on-one relationships by drawing upon 'principal-agent' theory. The authors argue that principal-agent theory offers valuable insights in this new world of police governance because it addresses the management of conflict between two actors—a principal and an agent. This model has particular relevance to managing conflict in the one-on-one relationships that characterize the PCC structure. We take a broad working definition of conflict: 'the process which begins when one party perceives that another has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his' (Thomas, 1976, p. 891). Using principal-agent theory, we argue that conflict is not necessarily something to be avoided. In fact, it is important to have tension

and challenge in the relationship as the basis of accountability (Gailmard, 2012). Rather, conflict is something that ought to be managed so that relationships remain stable and functional.

Finally, guided by two central hypotheses from principal-agent theory, the final section ('Practical recommendations to guide future PCCs and chief constables') presents key recommendations to support PCCs and chief constables in order to manage conflict effectively.

The article is based on two independent, yet related pieces of research. 'How have relationships between PCCs and chief constables unfolded' and 'Applying principal-agent theory' sections draw upon research findings from a doctoral thesis that entailed interviews with 32 PCCs, three chief constables, and 25 further interviews with a range of policing and crime stakeholders at local and national levels (herein referred to as the 'PCC research'). 'Practical recommendations to guide future PCCs and chief constables' section draws upon a combination of lessons from the PCC research, as well as a separate study conducted in the USA, which comprised interviews with 31 police chiefs, eight elected officials (or their representatives), and three further interviews with US policing specialists (herein referred to as the 'US research'). Although there are clear differences between the various US models and the new British model of police governance (Newburn, 2012; Sampson, 2012), the PCC and American 'strong mayor' systems share some substantive points of commonality. This is by no means a coincidence. Reference to the 'strong mayor' cities of New York and Baltimore in the reform's originating document (by centre right think tank *Policy Exchange*) affirms more than a mere side glance across the Atlantic (Loveday and Reid, 2003). Strong mayors hold a far broader set of responsibilities across numerous agencies beyond just policing and criminal justice, but, like the PCC model, sees two individuals—one politically appointed, and the other a representative of the police—in a similar power dynamic. By drawing on experiences from both the English

and Welsh and American contexts, the authors illustrate how conflict can be managed in one-on-one models of accountability. With the second set of PCC elections due to take place in May 2016, it is essential that chiefs and PCC candidates consider how best to navigate these relationships in the future.

How have relationships between PCCs and chief constables unfolded?

There was significant variability in how relationships played out between PCCs and chief constables. There were examples of constructive working relationships, and also relationship breakdowns. Most high profile was the series of clashes between PCCs and chief constables reported in the media in the first few months after the first PCC elections in November 2012.¹ Interviews with chief constables revealed that there were also clashes behind closed doors that resulted in some chiefs leaving their posts. In total, 16 out of 41 chief constables had moved on within eight months of the arrival of their PCC.

In some instances, this churn was not overtly related to tension between PCCs and chief constables (some retired, for example). In other cases, departures were driven by conflict between the two parties. This movement among chiefs might arguably be evidence that PCCs resemble a 'disruptive technology' designed to break the status quo in policing by giving local communities power to make changes and establish a new generation of chief constables (c.f. Loader, 2013). But the volatility of the relationship between PCCs and chief constables since 2012 might be regarded as a vulnerability at the heart of the model. The one-on-one relationship between PCCs and chief constables creates a highly personalized environment whereby it becomes very easy to fall into a hostile

(or overly amicable) position given the need for the PCC to simultaneously hold to account the same individual he or she has to work with co-operatively in order to deliver an effective and efficient force.

One chief constable interviewed as part of the PCC research explained the danger of the one-on-one model:

... if you're seeing somebody on a one-to-one, and then you're doing stuff ... you know going to meetings together, you're different, but the risk is that it becomes more supportive than challenging ... It's much easier to have that kind of scrutiny-committee relationship with a group of people you don't see very often ... So what you're saying is we don't want to fall out because we can't afford to fall out because I lose my job ... [but] we shouldn't be too close. But to get that mid-way, it's very tricky. (Chief Constable No. 2)

Several PCCs who were also interviewed as part of the research highlighted how the one-on-one dynamic has been helpful in streamlining decision-making and reducing bureaucracy around police governance. This transition from a committee structure towards a single elected official is linked to the localism agenda, which argued for greater local responsiveness and accountability in police governance (see e.g., Carswell, 2002). However, as intimated by the quote above, the one-on-one dynamic ultimately rests on the condition that both the PCC and the chief constable work professionally together. This is not always possible given the difficulties involved in finding an appropriate midpoint between scrutiny and support. Conflict is an important part of the dynamic and it cannot be avoided. Instead, PCCs and chief constables should find ways to manage conflict so that it

¹ Most notably in Avon and Somerset (Hough, 2012), Lincolnshire (Laville, 2013), and Gwent (Guardian, 2013).

results in a healthy tension. Principal-agent theory offers a theoretical framework to better understand how such one-on-one relationships can be managed.

Applying principal-agent theory

Principal-agent theory has been applied broadly in a variety of disciplines: in economics (Ross, 1973), business (Jenson and Meckling, 1976), political representation (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Mansbridge, 2009), organizations (Moe, 1984; Galaskiewicz, 1985), regulation (Spulber, 1989), and public administration (Waterman and Meier, 1998; Meier and Krause, 1999). We apply principal-agent theory to the PCC and chief constable relationship for the first time, as a framework to better understand the dynamic.

Pratt and Zeckhauser's (1985) definition of principal-agent relationships is our starting point: 'Whenever one individual depends on the action of another, an agency relationship arises. The individual taking the action is called the agent. The affected party is the principal' (p. 2).

In our case, the PCC is the principal, who directs, oversees, and holds to account the agent, the chief constable. This one-to-one principal-agent arrangement offers potential advantages. For example, with only two individuals involved, the potential for very swift decision-making is high. But the authors wish to focus on how principal-agent scholarship might help a PCC and chief constable better understand the relationship when conflict arises. Fundamentally, principal-agent theory identifies two conditions that will likely lead to conflict: goal divergence and information asymmetry (Waterman and Meier, 1998). Goal divergence occurs when a principal and an agent pursue competing objectives in their respective roles. Information asymmetry occurs when the principal and agent do not source or share with the other party the information that they can each access. If these two conditions are not recognized

and managed, conflict is likely to occur between a principal and an agent which may destabilize the relationship.

It comes as no surprise that conflict is likely if the goals of a newly elected PCC diverge from those of the sitting chief. Similarly, it is unsurprising that if a PCC has the opportunity to select a chief, the PCC will likely make their selection based on the candidate who shares their mission and objectives. More importantly, principal-agent theory infers that, even when goals are aligned at the start of the relationship, both parties must make conscious efforts to keep goals aligned as pressures and circumstances inevitably change.

In the PCC research, an interview with one PCC revealed the importance of sharing an agreed agenda. Both the PCC and chief sought to reaffirm their goals through regular communication in a number of settings. The PCC correlated their highly functional partnership with consistent reaffirmation of their shared goals:

I think [our relationship is] very good. I think we have a common understanding of policing, particularly policing as a vocation. [The Chief Constable is] comfortable and I think understands my agenda ... we are in contact one way or another pretty much every day. So we will talk on the phone, we will text each other, and then we will have regularly at least one to one meetings a fortnight, but we actually meet at other meetings quite regularly. (Independent PCC No. 4)

In contrast, if goals are allowed to diverge between principal and agent, the likelihood of a relationship remaining functional and healthy is slim.

Information asymmetry should also be anticipated by PCCs and chief constables. If we describe an archetypal relationship, the PCC is attuned to local politics and the disparate needs of the electorate (having won the election). The

archetypal chief constable has access to different information: a career's expertise in policing, direct access to police data, and working relationships with strategic partners in the criminal justice system. This was articulated by the following US police chief as part of the US research:

The PCC has unique access to the public during campaigns and as a citizen independent of the police. The Chief has the unique position of listening to the public with years of policing experience and expertise. These opinions undoubtedly conflict at times, but the system intends that to get the very best for the public. (US police chief, Respondent No. 31)

Principal-agent literature warns of the dangers of informational asymmetry. If either the PCC or the chief constable holds a disproportionate amount of information, conflict is likely to arise. The PCC and chief must furnish one another with the information to which they each have access, rather than intentionally or unintentionally shield information from one another. If this is done, both parties have the best information available to make the very best decisions in both positions.

The balance of information varies depending on circumstance and the backgrounds of the PCC and chief constable. This PCC explains how he was unable to access the information he required from his sitting Chief Constable:

When I took office I found myself with a very traditional, very macho Chief Constable ... who didn't agree with PCCs ... Put it this way, when I arrived in the force, the force was locked down. I had no access ... basically, I wasn't allowed anywhere ... I had a couple of near misses with him where he went absolutely berserk, he

has manufactured a few problems for me. (Conservative PCC No. 4)

In this instance, the chief constable made overt efforts to restrict the PCC's access to information about the force. The relationship broke down and the chief constable took early retirement. Not every case of information asymmetry is so stark. Break down can be incremental and subtle, and both parties must be attuned to this possibility.

In 2016, as some PCCs are elected to a second term, it is fair to assume their knowledge and awareness of both their political and policing environments will be greater than before. But principal-agent experience warns that, if this increased knowledge is not continually shared, conflict with the chief is likely to arise.

If goal divergence or information asymmetry occur, conflict is likely. And this example illustrates the inherent risks of the one-on-one model. Once conflict occurs, a one-on-one relationship is so confined that breakdown is difficult to avoid. It is therefore imperative that both PCC and chief constable resolve to take every action possible to avoid goal divergence and informational asymmetry. Below, we set out a series of recommendations that may help PCCs and chief constables achieve this.

Practical recommendations to guide future PCCs and chief constables

When considering how to manage conflict between a PCC and chief constable, US respondents offered consensus on four recommendations: two interventions at the very beginning of the relationship to build a sound footing, and then two on-going interventions to consistently monitor and review the partnership's goals and how information is shared. The four recommendations combine to present a comprehensive framework. Notably, respondents in the US study steered clear of

incentives, often used in other principal-agent contexts, but incentives should not be dismissed as a possible tool in the future (Meier and Krause, 1999, p. 9).

Recommendation 1: Agree mutual goals and values from the start

The goals and values must be understood, and shared, from the start. Without this, goal divergence is inevitable. Twenty percent of respondents in the US study admitted their relationship failed because a shared philosophy and strategy were not in place, as this former big city chief described:

I was fired by the Mayor after 18 months. My failing was to not sit down with her and understand what she wanted and articulate what I believed. She didn't know my values or ambitions for the city, and nor I hers. It was a disaster. (US Respondent No. 4)

Some relationships face obstacles at selection or the first meeting, because parties fail to effectively communicate their agendas at the start. A former mid-sized city chief described the first few meetings as:

where a shared mission is borne, strategy set, and you agree what is right and wrong, what you both feel and believe about the police department. Without this, the relationship is built on sand. (US Respondent No. 12)

In a similar vein, PCCs reported positive relationships with their chief constables where they had made efforts to work under one shared goal:

The Chief Constable and I sat down on day one and were absolutely determined—I said to him ... we're going to make this work, and he agreed. And I said regardless of what either of us think of this or each other, we are going to make this work because this matters too much for people [in the

force area]. And I think we have that in mind all the time and we've actually formed quite a healthy, professional mature relationship. (Conservative PCC No. 6)

By agreeing priorities from the outset, PCCs and chief constables can minimize goal divergence.

Recommendation 2: Set out clear lines of authority and communication

The lines of authority and communication must be drawn from the outset. Without this, information asymmetry is likely to spread. To protect against this, both PCCs and chief constables need to ensure their respective roles are defined and that mechanisms are in place to facilitate communication. A serving big city mayor explained how he drew the lines of authority:

The chief serves at my pleasure and works for me, and this is how it appears to be set in the new UK law. My Chief cannot work autonomously: I'm in charge. This makes him accountable, responsive and keeps the Chief focused on my priorities. It's a tremendously productive and close relationship. (US Respondent No. 33)

Similarly, a chief from a different big city was clear on his role and the role of his elected boss:

The line between politics and operations must be drawn and not crossed. Most elected officials do not even try because the chief carries the operational risk, and it's not necessary—and pretty dumb—to carry that as a politician. (US Respondent No. 35)

Respondents unanimously agreed, the better the communication, the more effective the relationship. The exact type of communication between PCC and chief constable will vary considerably, but an agreed system is crucial to avoid conflict.

This is a particular challenge, given the difficulties associated with defining 'operational independence'. The Patten Inquiry (1999) attempted to overcome the issues associated with operational independence by using the term 'operational responsibility' instead. Patten noted that 'long consideration has led us to the view that the term "operational independence" is itself a large part of the problem' (p. 33). The term 'operational responsibility' is helpful as it clearly places chief constables in charge of police operations, but simultaneously holds them answerable later on for their actions. Despite Patten's attempts, it remains unclear where the line lies between operations and oversight.

Furthermore, PCCs interpreted their role in various ways, ranging from police managers to crime reduction co-ordinators (Davies, 2014). This was unsurprising given the novelty of the position and the diversity of PCC backgrounds. It is not our intention here to explore the conceptual problems with the PCC term, but we wish to highlight the importance of ensuring PCCs and chief constables set at an early stage what they understand to be their respective responsibilities.

Once elected, PCCs had a choice to retain direct employer responsibilities for non-warranted staff (in HR or administration, for example), or could delegate that responsibility to the chief constable (referred to as 'stage two transfers'). Such legal, formal agreements are one way of clearly marking the boundaries between one another's role. It is crucial that PCCs and chief constables discuss such demarcations at the earliest stage, and ensure information asymmetry does not spread as both parties seek to secure control and influence.

Recommendation 3: Ensure space for mutual learning

Education must be continual, universal and not just be of the elected official, but of the Chief Constable and by the

public. (US Respondent No. 3, former big city chief)

All American politicians and over half of chiefs interviewed in the US research gave equal weight to the education of the chief as they did to the politician. Interviewees consistently advocated for both parties to be continually educated about the public and by the public. A comprehensive programme of education was seen as a key tool to ensure goals were regularly and openly discussed and reviewed, and information was regularly and openly shared, thus avoiding conflict and preserving a healthy relationship.

There were some early examples of information exchange in the PCC research. Two chief constables reported hosting PCC candidates on visits to the force to help learn about the priorities and challenges. Two other PCCs reported meeting with officers across the force, such as local area commanders, in order to learn more about the challenges faced by local police. PCCs must always be wary of crossing the boundary of operational independence, but must, at the same time, gather sufficient information to avoid being left in the dark and compromise the ability to make good decisions (information asymmetry).

There were no reported instances of PCCs formally educating chief constables about the PCC role or wider politics, but it could be helpful if PCCs were to invite chiefs to learn more about the political aspects of the job. While this may happen informally, there may be some scope for PCCs to facilitate formal meetings or orientations to allow chief constables to better understand the broader political landscape in which PCCs operate. This may help to support ongoing informational exchange, which in turn helps to secure goal convergence and information symmetry. This might be an area for collaboration between the respective national associations, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC), and the National Police Chiefs Council. Indeed, the majority of PCCs who were interviewed as part of the PCC research

spoke in positive terms about the ability of the APCC to coalesce opinion and project a powerful voice on policing at the national level. This perception may give the APCC more credibility among PCCs, giving it a potentially influential role in training PCCs.

Recommendations for training of PCCs are not new. According to Lord Wasserman—one of the protagonists of the PCC policy—the government ‘missed a trick’ by not providing a transition period to teach PCCs about reading crime figures and dealing with finances (Barrett, 2014). In line with this, the Home Affairs Select Committee (2014) called for an induction period for PCCs to formally learn about the role. It also suggested that as part of this, both PCCs and chief constables could have training on the Policing Protocol, which forms the basis of the PCC and chief constable relationship. This would be a welcome introduction to facilitate knowledge exchange between both PCCs and chief constables.

Recommendation 4: Make use of middle agents

The US research highlighted the value of the role of the ‘middle agent’ to regulate the flow of information between politician and chief and ensure their goals remain aligned as circumstances change around them. ‘Middle agents’ in the USA take various forms, including a City Manager (a career administrator who coordinates all municipal agencies on behalf of the mayor) or the Commissioner of Police in New York City (a civilian administrator with no sworn powers who serves at the will of the mayor and oversees the Chief of Department). PCC legislation caters for the ‘middle agent’ to play a significant role, with Deputy PCCs and Chief Executives both included in statute. In the US research, the following big city chief presented the case:

Find a middle agent to neutralize both egos, contribute rationality and negotiate calmly and buy time—this has been

extremely useful and constructive for me. I have been able to remain overtly positive in my dealings with the elected official, despite disagreements. (US Respondent No. 15)

There was a slow take up of the ‘middle agent’ role, with only 10 PCCs appointing deputies 6 months into the role (Home Affairs Select Committee, 2013). In interviews with PCCs, the PCC research identified some reluctance to appoint deputies, fearing public or media criticism for wasting scarce money. In the same way that deputy PCCs might offer value as middle agents, deputy chiefs could also play a similar role. By allowing such actors greater influence, relationships between PCCs and chiefs might become more transparent and ultimately more accountable. There is scope for other bodies to fulfil the middle agent function, such as Police and Crime Panels (PCPs). According to the PRSRA, their role is to both scrutinize and support the work of PCCs, by reviewing the PCCs’ Police and Crime Plan and policing budget and by conducting hearings on the appointment of chief constables and senior staff among other powers. In theory, PCPs could fulfil a middle agent role between the PCC and chiefs, but in practice they have been under-resourced and ill-defined (Lister, 2013; Chambers, 2014). Redrawing PCPs as middle agents has the potential to enhance the accountability of both chief constables and PCCs.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) could also act as another form of middle agent. Indeed, HMIC has been restructured to act as a more distant body to ensure it can play an effective oversight role to support the delivery of local policing (Hussain, 2012). Some PCCs reported using HMIC to advise in key decision-making, such as the appointment of chief constables (Davies, 2014). This role for HMIC may evolve further. Both PCCs and chiefs should actively consider ways in which they can open the relationship to external input and scrutiny to

increase the likelihood of information exchange and the alignment of both parties' goals.

Conclusion

The first electoral term for PCCs has brought much disruption and unpredictability to policing in England and Wales. Relationships between PCCs and chiefs have ranged from strong partnerships to total breakdown. With the Conservative Party majority in the 2015 General Election came a guarantee that PCCs will remain a part of the British policing landscape for some years to come. In fact government policy for PCCs continues to develop. There is the prospect of the PCC purview extending to local public services beyond policing and criminal justice (see House of Commons debate on Police and Fire Shared Services in November, 2015). As such, there might be more agents for which this article is relevant in the future. As the first cohort of PCCs considers a second term (with elections in May 2016), this article warns that both the PCC principal and their agents should be cautious of goal divergence and information asymmetry as the primary causes of conflict. But if both set goals and lines of responsibility from the start, and then educate, communicate, and use middle agents throughout the relationship, constructive, functional partnerships are more likely to develop. The ultimate aims of the PCC reform—namely increased accountability, transparency, and responsiveness in local policing—are only possible when the relationship between a PCC and chief constable is functional and stable.

References

- Barrett, D. (2014). 'Police Commissioners Should Have Been Trained, Says Government Adviser.' *The Telegraph* [online]. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10588071/Police-commissioners-should-have-been-trained-says-Government-adviser.html> (accessed 22 December 15).
- Carswell, D. (2002). *Direct Democracy: Empowering People to Make Their Lives Better*. London: C-change.
- Chambers, S. (2014). 'Who Is Policing the Police and Crime Commissioners?' *Safer Communities* 13(1): 32–39.
- Davies, M. (2014). 'Unravelling the Role of Police and Crime Commissioners.' *Papers from the British Criminology Conference* 14: 17–30.
- Gailmard, S. (2012). 'Accountability and Principal-Agent Models.' In Bovens, M., Goodin, R., and Schillemans, T. (eds), *Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 90–105.
- Galaskiewicz, J. (1985). 'Interorganizational Relations.' *Annual Review of Sociology* 11: 281–304.
- Guardian. (2013). 'Gwent Police Chief "Told to Retire or be Humiliated" by Crime Commissioner' [online]. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/jul/02/gwent-police-chief-crime-commissioner> (accessed 8 July 2014).
- Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC). (2013). 'Leadership and Standards in the Police.' Third Report, Session 2013–2014, HC 67-II. 1 July.
- Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC). (2014). *Police and Crime Commissioners: Progress to Date*. London: The Stationary Office.
- Hough, A. (2012). 'Avon and Somerset Police Chief Quits after Being Told to "Reapply for his Job' *The Telegraph* [online]. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9695236/Avon-and-Somerset-police-chief-quits-after-being-told-to-reapply-for-his-job.html> (accessed 8 July 2014).
- Hussain, D. (2012). 'Home Secretary Clarifies HMIC Role' [online]. <http://www.policeprofessional.com/news.aspx?id=14698> (accessed 27 June 2014).
- Jenson, M. and Meckling, W. (1976). 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.' *Journal of Financial Economics* 3: 305–360.
- Laville, S. (2013). 'Court Overturns "Irrational" Decision to Suspend Lincolnshire Chief Constable.' *The Guardian* [online]. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/28/lincolnshire-chief-constable-suspension-overturned> (accessed 8 July 2014).
- Lister, S. (2013). 'The New Politics of the Police: Police and Crime Commissioners and the 'Operational Independence' of the Police.' *Policing* 7(3): 239–247.
- Loader, I. (2013). 'Why Do the Police Matter? Beyond the Myth of Crime Fighting.' In Brown, J. (ed.), *The Future of Policing*. London: Routledge.
- Loveday, B. and Reid, A. (2003). *Going Local: Who Should Run Britain's Police, Policy Exchange*. London: Localis.
- Mansbridge, J. (2009). 'A "Selection Model" of Political Representation.' *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 17(4): 369–398.
- Meier, K. and Krause, G. (1999). *Politics, Policy and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy*. Ann Arbor (MI): University of Michigan.

- Miller, W. and Stokes, D. (1963). 'Constituency Influence in Congress.' *American Political Science Review* 57(March): 45–56.
- Moe, T. (1984). 'The Economics of Organization.' *American Journal of Political Science* 28(4): 739–777.
- Newburn, T. (2012). 'Police and Crime Commissioners: The Americanization of Policing or a Very British Reform?' *International Journal of Law Crime and Justice* 40(1): 31–46.
- Patten, C. (1999). *A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland*. Northern Ireland: Independent Commission for Policing.
- Pratt, J. and Zeckhauser, R. (1985). *Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Reiner, R. (2013). 'Who Governs? Democracy, Plutocracy, Science and Prophecy in Policing.' *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 13(2): 161–180.
- Ross, S. (1973). 'The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.' *American Economic Review* 63(2): 134–139.
- Sampson, F. (2012). 'Hail to the Chief?—How Far Does the Introduction of Elected Police Commissioners Herald a US-Style Politicization of Policing for the UK?' *Policing* 6(1): 4–15.
- Spulber, D. (1989). *Regulation and Markets*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Thomas, K. (1976). 'Conflict and Conflict Management.' In Dunnette, M. (ed.), *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*. Chicago: Rand McNally, pp. 889–935.
- Waterman, R. and Meier, K. (1998). 'Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?' *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 8(2): 173–202.
- Wells, H. (2015). 'Grey Areas and Fine Lines: Negotiating Operational Independence in the Era of the Police and Crime Commissioner.' *Safer Communities* 14(4): 193–202.