

The doctrine of self-overcoming

Introduction

With an understanding of Nietzsche's theory of perspectivism and the conception of the self that it is built upon, we are now in a position to tackle another of Nietzsche's most famous doctrines: self-overcoming. Self-overcoming has arguably been Nietzsche's most referenced idea in the philosophy of education journals over the last thirty-plus years. The problem is that, just like perspectivism, his theory of self-overcoming has been largely misunderstood. This is unfortunate because, as we shall see over the next several chapters, self-overcoming has tremendous pedagogical value for contemporary educators. In this chapter, we set the stage for the later chapters by offering an in-depth analysis of self-overcoming. Understood properly, Nietzsche's philosophy of self-overcoming lays the groundwork for a powerful methodology for encouraging student agency in democratic classrooms.

Our chapter begins by examining a series of arguments about self-overcoming made in the late 1980s and early 1990s by Aharon Aviram, James Hillesheim and Eliyahu Rosenow. Contrary to their positions, we argue that self-overcoming is not the creation and re-creation of one's self, nor the radical rejection of one's internalized moral convictions, but it is something much closer to the traditional sense of self-mastery.¹ In this we agree with Walter Kaufmann (1982) who asserts that the goal of self-overcoming is not self-realization or self-transcendence or self-reformulation but rather self-mastery through the restraining and overcoming of passions and desires so that the energy found therein can be channeled into more life-affirming activities (p. 238–255). The ultimate form of life-affirmation is the ability not to be governed by our desires. This does not mean that we should attempt to extirpate our desires, but rather we should try to master them and use them in ways that promote further self-mastery.

Self-overcoming according to Aviram

In his article *Nietzsche as Educator*, Aviram (1991) weighed in on a debate about Nietzsche's educational philosophy that had occurred throughout the 1980s. His article was extremely ambitious and helpfully identifies some of the ambiguities

in Nietzsche's philosophy that were fueling the debates. Unfortunately, his arguments concerning self-overcoming were problematic. While Aviram illuminated some of the tensions within the debate, his ultimate conclusion regarding self-overcoming – that it is the ability to reject one's own self-identity – is untenable. Aviram's understanding of self-overcoming is founded on a misconstruction of Nietzsche's concept of perspectivism and his repudiation of the transcendent self. With the proper understanding of those concepts offered in the last two chapters, we will be able to identify where Aviram goes wrong.

Aviram (1991) begins his analysis of self-overcoming by a general definition of what it means. "Self-overcoming" suggests the subjection of one layer of the individual's personality to another" (p. 220). This notion of self-overcoming is vague as it stands, and therefore Aviram offers further elaboration. His explanation leads to a very thorough, highly delineated explication of the various senses of the epistemological, ontological and psychological aspects of both authenticity and self-overcoming. Within each of these senses there are further subdivisions, qualifications and elaborations. In order to understand his analysis one has to keep track of a vast number of categories and definitions on the way to Aviram's ultimate formulation of self-overcoming. Fortunately, for the purposes of our argument, it is not necessary to outline all of these categories and definitions. Instead, we will focus on the final formulation of the two types of self-overcoming and illustrate the fundamental problem with them.

Aviram distinguishes between two types of self-overcoming. There is the self-overcoming found in what he calls "overman (a)" and the self-overcoming found in what he calls "overman (b)." While he offers two versions of the overman, he believes overman (b) to be the "real" overman (p. 224). Overman (b) is the individual who aspires "to eliminate his subjective ego" (p. 223), who provides the "maximal expression of the . . . will to power . . . once . . . he surrenders his subjective shadow ego" (p. 223) and who is "capable of acknowledging that he has no particular identity" (p. 224). Aviram bases these claims on what he considers to be one of Nietzsche's underlying metaphysical principles, namely the "universal principle of the eternal change of perspectives" (p. 225). According to Aviram, Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism posits the radical relativity of human perception (p. 223). All humans apprehend the world from their own perspective and have no basis by which to evaluate other perspectives. For Aviram's Nietzsche, as for Ramaekers after him, any perspective is as good as any other. The overmen are the ones who recognize this fact and live in a perpetual self-reformulation in which they favor one "arbitrary" (p. 224) perspective after the next and in so doing repeatedly redefine who they are based on the continual and arbitrary change of perspectives. To become an overman of the highest type one must be able to use various perspectives to subject one layer of one's personality to another layer.

Aviram recognizes, however, that this interpretation does not entirely square with what Nietzsche affirms about the overman. He admits that Nietzsche frequently offers images of the overman that are dominated by a particular

perspective, rejecting all others. To rectify this problem he systematically explains what Nietzsche means by his other versions of the overman, thus creating a hierarchy of overmen, in which various versions are placed along a continuum (pp. 224–226).

The problem is that not only is this distinction between overmen dubious but it is completely unnecessary. Aviram's misstep begins when he asserts, "On the epistemological level . . . there is the contradiction between Nietzsche's perspectivism, on the one hand and his positive and categorical presentation of the overman as the only human ideal worth striving towards, on the other" (p. 221). It is the former – perspectivism – that leads Aviram into his confusion. Aviram argues correctly that Nietzsche promotes the overman as an ideal being who embodies certain intellectual, moral and physical qualities that should be emulated. But Aviram argues incorrectly that Nietzsche's perspectivism is inconsistent with any hierarchy of intellectual, moral and physical qualities. As we have seen, this is not a correct interpretation of perspectivism. When perspectivism is properly understood it is not inconsistent with Nietzsche's concept of the overman but actually supports it.

The problem stems from the fact that Aviram (1991) gives *The Will to Power* equal status as Nietzsche's published works. The ideas expressed in *The Will to Power* can serve to illuminate concepts in the published works but should never define them.² If the ideas in *The Will to Power* conflict with the ideas in the published works, one must rely on the latter to clarify the readings of the former. Thus, when one comes to the concept of perspectivism and its relationship to the overman, one must rely primarily on the published works. This is something Aviram does not do. He uses the concept of the overman found in the published works but uses the concept of perspectivism found in *The Will to Power*. In fact, every one of his references to perspectivism is from *The Will to Power*. This embroils him in the supposed contradiction between perspectivism and the idea of the overman.

Nietzsche's concept of perspectivism found in *The Will to Power* is, for the most part, more radical than the concept in his published works. Why is that? We can never know with certainty. What we do know is that the generally weaker form found in the published works is what he wanted the public to see. This does not mean that the radical version cannot inform our understanding of the published version. But it can inform our understanding of the published version only if it does not undermine other aspects of the published works. Unfortunately, the relativistic perspectivism found in *The Will to Power* does undermine the published works, which, as we have seen, distinguish between falsar perspectives and truer perspectives. The goal of having diverse perspectives is not to encourage the "arbitrary changing of socially defined life-styles" (p. 224) that Aviram (1991) recommends, but rather it is to choose perspectives that increase and refine our knowledge and power.

Aviram's misconception of perspectivism leads him to believe that the doctrine of self-overcoming, in its most developed form, necessitates the denial of

the self, when the opposite is the case. As we have seen, Nietzsche's perspectivism is formulated as a reaction to the notion of pure objectivity, which claims that perspectives colored by subjective interests are therefore false, illusory or unreliable. Nietzsche advances a new notion of objectivity to replace this one, according to which our knowledge of a thing is increased when it is viewed from a variety of perspectives, each of which possesses its own affective substructure within the self. Perspectivism thus leads us *back* to the self by repudiating the idea of the transcendent self that underlies the notion of pure objectivity. Nietzsche believes in vital and evolving selves and impassioned knowledge – not in the eternal, changeless and static selves and the dispassionate knowledge of Descartes and Kant.

As we saw in the first chapter, however, Nietzsche does reject the notion of an ontologically independent “self” behind our actions. He asserts for instance in a much-quoted passage: “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything” (GM I:13). While this seems like an overt repudiation of the self, it is actually only a refutation of a neutral, independent, unembodied, unemotional entity that can objectively choose between a variety of actions. In other words, Nietzsche is repudiating a Cartesian notion of the self. This is seen if we read a few lines immediately preceding the previously quoted passage.

For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not to do so.

(GM I:13)

The operative word is “neutral.” There is no neutral, unbiased and ontologically independent entity behind our actions. There is, however, a self behind our actions, but it is a self that is imbued with the will to power. The self cannot be abstracted from power because the self is power. But does this not prove that there is no self-identity? On the contrary, if there is no self, there is no power; if there is no power, there is no self. Strong individuals – if they are truly strong – will not try to escape from their self-identity as if it were a mask but will find ways to make their self-identity even stronger. Contrary to what is implied by Aviram's (1991) position, an individual does not reach the status of the overman once he or she is “psychologically capable of acknowledging that he or she has no particular identity” (p. 224). Rather, as we will argue in subsequent sections, individuals approach the status of the overman when they consistently choose activities that expand the strength of their self-identity – that is, when they become self-overcomers.

From this analysis we see that Aviram's supposed contradiction between Nietzsche's perspectivism and the ideal of the overman is misconstrued.

Perspectivism, properly understood, is consistent with the overman because the overmen are the ideal beings who, through the ability to take different perspectives, always choose activities that make them more powerful. Perspectivism is not the foundation for the belief that there is no self but rather that there is a self: a self that can either be strengthened or be diminished.

Having arrived at the end of our analysis of Aviram's misconstruction of self-overcoming, and before we offer an alternative conception of self-overcoming, it will be helpful to briefly examine the debate to which Aviram was responding. The debate is important because it reveals the other pole of interpretation concerning self-overcoming. While Aviram holds that self-overcoming entails the non-identity of the self, Rosenow (1989) and Hillesheim (1990) argue that self-overcoming necessitates a radical break with all of one's personal and cultural values. Rosenow and Hillesheim understand that Nietzsche does not advocate the loss of self-identity; however, they partially misconstrue Nietzsche's "revaluation" of the traditional concept of self-mastery.

Self-overcoming according to Hillesheim and Rosenow

Two of the principal factions within the debate over self-overcoming to which Aviram was responding were James Hillesheim and Eliyahu Rosenow. Hillesheim and Rosenow traded articles over a four-year period in which they attempted to explain Nietzsche's position regarding self-overcoming. Hillesheim (1986), in an article entitled "Suffering and Self-cultivation: The Case of Nietzsche," argued that Nietzsche's concept of self-overcoming could be appropriated in the classroom. Hillesheim's argument rests on the belief that self-overcoming (Hillesheim actually uses the translation "self-surpassing") could be used as the "universal principle of individual creativity" (p. 173). He claims that "with the doctrine of man as something 'unfinished,' as a being with the potential to be forever transcending itself," Nietzsche has provided us with one essential ingredient of a philosophy of education – a vision of "what man can become" (p. 173). "What man can become" is, for Hillesheim, a forever self-realizing and self-transcending being whose main goal is perpetual creativity and self-creativity.

Rosenow (1989) responded to Hillesheim in a paper published three years later called "Nietzsche's Educational Dynamite." In this paper, Rosenow argues that Hillesheim was incorrect to translate *Selbstüberwindung* and *Selbstaufhebung* as "self-surpassing" because it fails to take into account the fact that Nietzsche did not want to improve the self through self-creation but rather deconstruct the self through "overcoming and annihilating the self" (p. 308). Rosenow's main argument rests on his conviction that "Nietzsche's self-overcoming is a rendering – or, to use his terms, a revision and 'revaluation' – of the traditional concept of self-mastery or self-control" (pp. 308–309). For Rosenow, self-mastery is the ability to use reason to overcome one's passions in support of morality and social conventions.

The traditional concept of self-mastery was based on a dualistic notion of the self, according to which our desires and passions are in a constant struggle with our reason. On this understanding, reason was seen as the highest and most important component of a human being. People were considered human to the degree that they were reasonable. On the other hand, our bodily passions and desires were seen to be unruly and animalistic. In order for us to be human, reason must subjugate the passions. To give into the desires of the body was to be enslaved; to be free meant that reason must master the passions. Education was seen as the social practice that trained students in the use of their reason so that they could learn to overcome their “evil” instincts, thereby becoming fully human. Informing this conception of the fully human being was the ideal of complete social and psychical harmony. Moderation was, in this sense, the most desirable and praiseworthy virtue that human beings could possess and political harmony the best condition a community could obtain.

Rosenow (1989) asserts that this traditional picture of self-mastery is denied by Nietzsche. Indeed, self-overcoming is nearly the opposite of self-mastery, claims Rosenow. He argues that Nietzsche advocates throwing off all rational strictures that limit the expression of our animalistic selves. Ultimately, Rosenow argues that self-overcoming (as opposed to self-mastery) is therefore dangerous:

[O]vercoming morality, reason, and the conventions of cultural tradition is a dangerous enterprise. Nietzsche, who repeatedly refers to himself as a psychologist who is familiar with human nature, is well aware of this. If authenticity can be gained by giving up reason and by surpassing morality, then man may throw off all restraints and set free his most sinister impulses.
(p. 311)

Thus, unlike Hillesheim, Rosenow thinks that self-overcoming is not something that should be haphazardly introduced into education.

Hillesheim (1990) responded to Rosenow the following year in “Nietzschean Images of Self-Overcoming: Response to Rosenow.” In his response, Hillesheim agrees that “traditional educational thought has made much of the concept of ‘self-mastery’ or ‘self-control’ and that it is this doctrine that Nietzsche challenges” (p. 212). Hillesheim also agrees that self-overcoming entails the negation or discarding of the self. Hillesheim thinks, however, that there is a way of mitigating some of the consequences that Rosenow fears.

If one is to embark on this dangerous journey of self-overcoming, or if one wishes to guide others, there is something that one can do to minimize the risks by providing direction and encouragement. This can be done, Nietzsche argues, through the use of example, through images of people who have created selves worthy of attention and possible emulation – that is people, real or imaginary, who are worthy of being our educators.

(1986, p. 213)

The point in bringing up this debate between Rosenow and Hillesheim is that they explicitly and clearly lay out the recurrent conception of self-overcoming found in the philosophy of education literature, a conception that we challenge. The belief that Nietzsche regards self-overcoming as the mere re-creation of the self in any manner is problematic. For Nietzsche, self-overcoming is much closer to the traditional notion of self-mastery than Hillesheim and Rosenow seem to realize. In a crucial passage from *The Wanderer and His Shadow* already discussed in the Introduction to this book, Nietzsche draws an explicit connection between self-overcoming, self-mastery and reason.

All those who do not have themselves sufficiently under their own control and who do not know morality as continual self-mastery [*Selbstbeherrschung*] and self-overcoming [*Selbstüberwindung*] practised in great things and in the smallest, involuntarily become glorifiers of . . . that instinctive morality which has no head but seems to consist solely of heart and helping hands. It is, indeed, in their interest to cast suspicion on a morality of reason [*Vernunft*] and to make of that other morality the only one.

(WS 45)³

Several sections later, Nietzsche promotes practicing an everyday abstemiousness as way of clearing the path to eventually achieve the “joy” of self-mastery.

A lack of self-mastery [*Selbstbeherrschung*] in small things brings about a crumbling of the capacity for it in great ones. Every day is ill employed, and a danger for the next day, in which one has not denied oneself some small thing at least once: this gymnastic is indispensable if one wants to preserve in oneself the joy of being one’s own master.

(WS 305)

Furthermore, in the 1886 preface to *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche closely associates “health” with the concept of self-mastery: “the way is still long to that tremendous, overflowing state of security and health . . . to that *mature* freedom of the spirit, which is equally self-mastery [*Selbstbeherrschung*] and training of the heart” (HH P:4). This association of health and self-mastery constitutes a crucial moment in Nietzsche’s corpus, since “health” becomes the concept alongside “power” that Nietzsche increasingly uses in his later work to refer to a state of human flourishing.

The notions of self-creation, self-surpassing, self-realization, self-transcendence and self-reformulation – all words used to describe self-overcoming in the philosophy of education journals – have missed this crucial connection between self-mastery and self-overcoming. But if the two ideas so closely coincide, why does Nietzsche use the term “self-overcoming” at all, we might ask? Why not just say “self-mastery”?

Self-overcoming as modified self-mastery

The answer to this question lies in the way Nietzsche takes up the traditional idea of self-mastery. Nietzsche, it is true, does modify or “revalue” the traditional conception of self-mastery, as Rosenow and Hillesheim observe, just not in the way they believe he does. Nietzsche revalues the traditional model of self-mastery in two central ways. First, Nietzsche replaces the ideal of social and psychical harmony, the *raison d’être* of self-mastery, with the increase of human *power*. Second, he reinterprets the role of reason in the self-mastering soul, updating it with his psychological insights into the human subject. In particular, he hopes to replace the dualistic and intellectualistic sense of reason embedded in the traditional sense of self-mastery – i.e. reason as Socratic rationality – with a notion of *embodied reason*. The result of this revaluation of self-mastery is a uniquely Nietzschean sense of *gift-giving egoism*.

Harmony vs. power

For Nietzsche, the will to power is the final, irreducible motive for all human behavior. “A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results” (BGE 13).⁴ Humans, as humans, crave power above all else, even more than pleasure. This craving is not just one among many other desires and passions we might have; it is the ultimate governing principle of human nature (Kaufmann, 1982, pp. 178–206).⁵ But not only is power the driving force behind all of our actions, it is also the glory of life (A 2). Nietzsche admired, revered and extolled those individuals who expressed their wills to power most powerfully. But how does one demonstrate power most powerfully? Not by mastering others (an inferior form of power in Nietzsche’s mind) but by mastering one’s self, that is to say one’s desires and impulses. “This is the apotheosis of power, and there can be no question but that Nietzsche agreed with that ancient tradition . . . that the man who conquers himself shows greater power than he who conquers others” (Kaufmann, 1982, p. 252). (We will return to Nietzsche’s concept of power over others vs. power over one’s self in Chapter 7.)

At first glance, this endorsement of self-mastery appears to contradict Nietzsche’s frequent laudations of the passions. Nietzsche characteristically rejects any attempt to rid oneself of passions and desires in favor of one’s supposed disinterested decision-making or inquiry.⁶ As Solomon (2003) points out: “Nietzsche is one of the few philosophers to attempt an unrestrained defense of the passions” (p. 70). And this is what concerns Rosenow (1989) so deeply; if all expressions of the passions are equally viable in Nietzsche’s thinking, how do we avoid moral and aesthetic anarchy?

The answer is that Nietzsche believes there are certain expressions of the passions that lead to greater power. The goal for Nietzsche is not that individuals should merely discharge the will to power behind their passions in haphazard

and impulse-driven ways but that they should moderate, control and direct it thoughtfully, even rationally. While the passions *are* in themselves expressions of power, they are not the ultimate expressions by themselves. What leads us to more powerful expressions of the passions, then? It is in fact a process of “sublimation” [*Sublimierung*] (D 202; GM II:7) or “spiritualization” [*Vergeistigung*] (e.g. BGE 229, 271; A 57; TI “Morality as Anti-Nature” 1, 3) of the passions that leads to higher, more robust expressions of the will to power – that is, the simultaneous redirection of their trajectory and exploitation of their motivational force. Rosenow, Hillesheim and Aviram seem to miss this all important aspect of Nietzsche’s doctrine of self-overcoming. They offer no tenable criteria to distinguish between these expressions of power.⁷ Not only this, the image that Rosenow (1989) conjures up of the individual who uses Nietzsche as an excuse to “throw off all restraints and set free his most sinister impulses” (p. 311) is an image that Nietzsche would abhor.

A man who is not willing to become master over his wrath, his gall and vengefulness, and his lust, and who tries to become a master in anything else, is as stupid as the farmer who lays out his field beside a torrential stream without protecting himself.

(WS 65)

This individual is not powerful, free-spirited or praiseworthy but “stupid.” Nietzsche has little patience for those looking for an excuse to throw off their restraints in the way Rosenow has in mind. Likewise, the individual who, lacking needed self-control, tries to wholly extirpate his or her passions also falls under Nietzsche’s “stupid” category. As Nietzsche claims:

All passions have a phase when they are merely disastrous, when they drag down their victim with the weight of stupidity. . . . Formerly, in view of the element of stupidity in passion, war was declared on passion itself, its destruction was plotted. . . . *Destroying* the passions and cravings, merely as a preventive measure against their stupidity and the unpleasant consequences of this stupidity – today this strikes us as merely another acute form of stupidity. . . . The same means in the fight against a craving – castration, extirpation – is instinctively chosen by those who are too weak-willed, too degenerate, to be able to impose moderation [*ein Maass*] on themselves.

(TI “Morality as Anti-Nature” 1–2)

While it is true that any expression of a passion is, at root, an expression of the will to power, Nietzsche thus clearly demonstrates that there are inferior and even dangerous expressions of this will. Rather than these inferior and dangerous expressions, Nietzsche envisions someone who harnesses the tremendous psychical energy of these impulses and channels them into less “stupid” expressions. His goal is not to eliminate the passions, nor to give them free reign, but to

“spiritualize” them. As individuals choose to act in less “stupid” ways, a radical change in their conception of power simultaneously occurs. Whereas before they felt powerful only when they were overcoming some external obstacle, now they realize that the greatest obstacle to the most powerful expressions is not external but is rather internal; the obstacles are the desires within themselves. In other words, their greatest source of power is to be found in their own self-mastery.

You shall become master over yourself [*Du solltest Herr über dich werden*], master also over your virtues. Formerly *they* were your masters; but they must be only your instruments beside other instruments. You shall get control over your For and Against and learn how to display one and then the other in accordance with your higher goal. . . . You shall above all see with your own eyes where injustice is always at its greatest: where life has developed at its smallest, narrowest, neediest, most incipient and yet cannot avoid taking *itself* as the goal and measure of things and for the sake of its own preservation secretly and meaning and ceaselessly crumbling away and calling into question the higher, greater, richer.

(HH P:6)

Importantly then, Nietzsche does not completely repudiate the harmony ideal that guides the traditional doctrine of self-mastery – indeed his doctrine of self-overcoming itself seems to point to its own ideal of self-harmonization in the notions of spiritualization and sublimation. Rather, by accentuating the role of power in the self-mastering individual, he hopes to call attention to both the inevitability of personal struggle in the process of self-mastery as well as its moral importance. The more affective energy one has to sublimate, the greater potential this person has to create and do good in the world. As Nietzsche puts it in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, “one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star” (Z P:5).

Socratic rationality vs. embodied reason

Nietzsche’s insistence on the need to sublimate the passions and channel them into the proper direction is connected to his suspicion of “pure” rationality. While Nietzsche unequivocally promotes and praises “reason,” he criticizes the disembodied, purely logical form of rationality that has become the hallmark of science and philosophy. For Nietzsche, reason is deeply connected with the affects; the two must work in tandem for a person to become a flourishing and self-empowered human being. Put differently, choosing to act in ways that increase our power is what it means for Nietzsche to act in accordance with reason. Reason is the obverse of that “stupidity” described previously that gives free reign to one’s passions and affects, or else attempts to extirpate them.

This formula may strike some readers as surprising given the fact that it is common for interpreters to regard Nietzsche as fundamentally opposed to

reason (Sigad, 1986; Aviram, 1991; Levine, 1995) and that Nietzsche himself often decries rationality, at least as he sees it embodied in Socrates and the *Wissenschaftler* of his day. This criticism of intellectualistic rationality has led some to read Nietzsche as opposed to reason *tout court*, while others suggest that, for Nietzsche, reason is merely one way of viewing the world, no more valuable than any other (Nehamas, 1985; Schrift, 1990). Alan Schrift (1990), for example, makes precisely this latter claim (p. 182). According to Schrift, there are no grounds for believing the claims of reason as opposed to any other claim. He lumps reason together with “metaphysics,” “morality,” “religion” and “physics” (p. 182); all of these ways of viewing the world are no less legitimate than any other. But Schrift goes even further, arguing that not only are reason and the belief that some things are truer than others merely two out of a countless number of equally legitimate perspectives, but they are actually harmful to the development of the individual because they “rob existence of the ‘marvelous uncertainty and rich ambiguity’ which permit the production of fresh interpretation” (p. 155).⁸ This means that any “truth” that an individual upholds is itself continually open to revision. In fact, Schrift argues that not only does Nietzsche claim that all “truths” are open for revision but that he also believes that to regard one perspective as truer than another is to diminish the enjoyment of life.

But this is *not* Nietzsche’s position. Indeed, his position is nearly the opposite. To reiterate the theme of Chapter 2, not all perspectives are as good as others, and in order to determine which is better, one must use one’s reason. As becomes clear in many of Nietzsche’s statements on the self-mastery ideal, reason is a crucial faculty for the self-overcoming individual. The ideal individuals he is advocating for are those who are able to exercise their reason to a high degree, both employing and suppressing it at the right times. Reason is the very instrument through which self-mastery occurs and power is increased. As Kaufmann (1982) indicates:

While Nietzsche thus comes to the conclusion that reason is man’s highest faculty, his view is not based on any other principle than the power standard. Reason is extolled not because it is the faculty that abstracts from the given, forms universal concepts, and draws inferences, but because these skills enable it to develop foresight and to give consideration to all the impulses, to organize their chaos, to integrate them into a harmony – and thus to give man power: power over himself and nature.

(p. 230)

Nietzsche does not want to overthrow reason; on the contrary, he wants it to be more pronounced than ever before. This does not mean that Nietzsche, in the end, embraces the cold, dispassionate rationality of the Cartesian, Kantian or logical positivist, or believes that self-overcoming individuals should subjugate their passions to reason, or worse, eliminate them altogether. Indeed, it is precisely this false opposition between reason and passion that Nietzsche attempts

to repudiate. Nietzsche's revaluation of self-mastery seeks to replace this dualistic conception of reason with a conception of reason as itself imbued with passion. Put differently, reason, for Nietzsche, is *embodied*; it is a faculty combining intelligence and affect that, at least in theory, governs our passions in ways that heighten our expressions and feelings of power. Nietzsche contrasts this embodied conception of reason with a disembodied rationality that he attributes to Socrates and his descendants.

When one finds it necessary to turn *reason* into a tyrant, as Socrates did, the danger cannot be slight that something else will play the tyrant. Rationality was then hit upon as the savior; neither Socrates nor his "patients" had any choice about being rational: it was *de rigueur*, it was their last resort. The fanaticism with which all Greek reflection throws itself upon rationality betrays a desperate situation; there was danger, there was but one choice: either perish or – to be *absurdly rational*. . . . One must be clever, clear, bright at any price: any concession to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads *downward*.

(TI "The Problem of Socrates" 10)

In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche adumbrates a notion of reason that avoids the "absurdly rational" character of Socratic intellectualism. Nietzsche upholds the value of reason while he simultaneously affirms its affective basis.

But what are goodheartedness, refinement, and genius to me when the person possessing these virtues tolerates slack *feelings* in his believing and judging and when he does not consider *the desire for certainty* to be his inmost craving and deepest need – as that which separates the higher human beings from the lower! Among some pious people I found a hatred of reason and I was well disposed towards them for that; for this at least *betrayed* their bad intellectual conscience!

(GS 2)

Reason is thus wrapped up with the passions in its attendant "desire" for certainty and endangerment by "slack feelings." Nietzsche's conception of reason as imbued with passion becomes even more pronounced if we keep reading into the next section of *The Gay Science*. Here Nietzsche distinguishes the reason of "higher individuals" from that of "lower individuals."⁹ Lower individuals cannot understand the reason of the higher because they are, according to Nietzsche, moral and aesthetic philistines who "cannot comprehend how anyone could, for example, risk health and honor for the sake of a passion for knowledge" (GS 3).

Thus, on this analysis, self-overcoming is not the abnegation or destruction of one's self in favor of a new, entirely original self, nor is it the rejection of all rational strictures. Rather self-overcoming is the ability to choose, by means of

the faculty of embodied reason, to overcome aspects of the self (certain passions, desires, emotions, thoughts, etc.) that do not maximize our power – the aspects of ourselves that passionately cry out to be expressed. The self-overcoming individual is the person who has enough self-discipline and reason to master those aspects and sublimate them into greater expressions of power. This person is the higher individual, the “spiritualized” individual who no longer has to extirpate his passions, nor give free reign to them. Thus, reason

gives man mastery over himself; and as the will to power is essentially the “instinct of freedom” (GM II:18), it can find fulfillment only through rationality. Reason is the “highest” manifestation of the will to power, in the distinct sense that through rationality it can realize its objective most fully . . . a strong spirit need not make war on the impulses: it masters them fully and is – to Nietzsche’s mind – the acme of human power.

(Kaufmann, 1982, pp. 230–233)

Self-sacrifice vs. gift-giving egoism

One of the important upshots of the following discussion is that Nietzsche’s doctrine of self-overcoming advances a unique conception of egoism. It is Nietzsche’s advocacy of egoism that has led MacIntyre (1981) and others (Rosenow, 1989; Johnston, 1998; Thiele, 1990) to misinterpret Nietzsche as radically individualistic. Paraphrasing an aphorism in *The Gay Science* (335), MacIntyre argues that Nietzsche is an “emotivist” who believes that because modern humanity has lost a proper conception of order of rank, the only morality left that has any validity is that of willful, egoistic self-assertion. According to MacIntyre, Nietzsche’s ethical egoism requires that individuals make moral decisions based solely on their own desires, without regard for the impact these decisions will have on others. MacIntyre (1981) interprets Nietzsche thus:

If there is nothing to morality but expressions of will, my morality can only be what my will creates. There can be no place for such fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest happiness for the greatest number. I myself must now bring into existence “new tables of what is good.”

(pp. 113–114)

While MacIntyre is correct that Nietzsche advocates egoism, he is incorrect when he suggests that individuals must therefore ignore the impact these decisions will have on others. On the contrary, Nietzsche insists the self-overcoming egoist *must* take into account the impact moral decisions will have on others – it is just that the accounting should avoid making moral decisions *solely* for the sake of others, which is what Nietzsche believes modern morality requires.

At the root of Nietzsche’s notion of egoism lies a contrast he draws between obeying the precepts of morality because custom demands and choosing to

act in accordance with a set of values because it makes one more powerful and whole. Nietzsche describes the detrimental effects that morality as custom has had on humankind. Because we operate under the assumption that “[t]he most moral man is he who *sacrifices* the most to custom,” we call for “[s]elf-overcoming [*Selbstüberwindung*] . . . *not* on account of the useful consequences it may have for the individual, but so that the hegemony of custom, tradition, shall be made evident in spite of the private desires and advantages of the individual” (D 9). Nietzsche goes on to contrast the detrimental self-overcoming found in the morality of custom with the beneficial self-overcoming found in the egoism of those individuals who obey laws they prescribe to themselves as means of their own advancement and elevation.

Those moralists, on the other hand, who, following the footsteps of Socrates, offer the *individual* a morality of self-control and temperance as a means to his own *advantage*, as his personal key to happiness, *are the exceptions* . . . [in so doing] they cut themselves off from the community, as immoral men, and are in the profoundest sense evil.

(D 9)¹⁰

The fact that Nietzsche calls the second, beneficial kind of valuations “evil” is instructive. Whenever he refers to himself as an “immoralist” or promotes “immorality” he is not promoting anarchy and lawlessness but only a refusal to “do what is right” for the sake of custom. Nietzsche implores us to “do what is right” only if it will actually be beneficial both for ourselves and, as we shall see, for humanity as a whole. Importantly, doing what is beneficial for ourselves and humanity in fact very often amounts to doing those things that Western culture would also be inclined to call “moral.” As Nietzsche asserts later in *Daybreak*: “It goes without saying that I do not deny – unless I am a fool – that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged – but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto” (D 103). Many of the moral behaviors that we now perform should continue to be cultivated, but only because they make us “happier” and more powerful, not because they are sanctioned by “morality.”

Nietzsche’s egoism must be qualified in a second way, however. Not only does Nietzschean egoism often share principles and actions that are also found in the edicts of morality, it is also *not* completely self-interested.¹¹ On the contrary, the egoism that Nietzsche seeks is one that confers benefits on others as well as oneself. This is a widely misunderstood aspect of Nietzsche’s advocacy of egoism. A full treatment of Nietzsche’s cultural vision and the role of the individual within it will have to wait until Chapter 5,¹² but it is important to point out now that, for Nietzsche, the health of the individual cannot be separated from the health of the community. The community is healthy only as the individual members of the community are healthy; to be healthy is to

desire the health of others. Nietzsche asserts that having healthy and powerful community members (D 449, 554, HH I: 300), friends (GS 14) and even – in his late works – enemies (EH “Why I Am So Wise” 7) is essential to one’s own sense of power and well-being. Nietzsche believes that the most powerful and healthy (the most egoistic) always desire power and health in others because (1) power and health are beautiful to behold (and beholding beautiful things makes us powerful through inspiration) and (2) desiring the power of others demonstrates a “spiritualization” of our will to power. Instead of seeking to exercise our power by the domination of others, we exercise it by *dominating our need to dominate others*. Fully egoistic individuals never act out of duty or self-sacrifice but out of a desire for health and power; and they also desire to increase and support the health and power of their community – including both their friends and enemies.

Nietzsche’s advocacy of egoism is therefore meant to make the individual maximally healthy, but this occurs only when the community is maximally healthy. In other words, the egoism is valuable to the individual only insofar as it increases the health of the community. In contrast to Christianity, as he sees it, Nietzsche does not believe that humanity will be best served when individuals sacrifice their own happiness and well-being. He believes that humanity at large will be best served only when individuals seek their *own* happiness and well-being.

It is in this *state of consecration* that one should live! . . . This is *ideal selfishness*: continually to watch over and care for and to keep our souls still, so that our fruitfulness shall *come to a happy fulfillment*! Thus, as intermediaries, we watch over and care for to the *benefit of all*; and the mood in which we live, this mood of pride and gentleness, is a balm which spreads far around us and on restless souls too.

(D 552)

For Nietzsche, egoism is meant for the benefit of the individual and the “benefit of all.” Importantly, as should be clear, Nietzschean egoism is not a license to do whatever one wants, to whomever one wants, whenever one wants. On the contrary, Nietzsche’s conception of egoism has nothing to do with selfishness as we might conventionally understand it. The egoism that Nietzsche recommends has to do with improving one’s *health* and *power*, not gratifying one’s *desires*. In fact, gratifying one’s desires without consulting whether it would be healthful to do so is a sure sign of one’s *unhealth*. In Nietzsche’s mind, unreflectively gratifying our desires is as unhealthy to us and our community as “self-sacrifice” is.

The reason Nietzsche despises “self-sacrifice” is that he believes that those who promote it are intentionally sabotaging the moral, physical, intellectual and spiritual strength of human beings. These individuals need human beings to be weak so that they can feel strong. Nietzsche will later call this nihilistic expression of the will to power *ressentiment* (see Chapter 7). “Self-sacrifice” is the moralistic code word that attempts to disguise the real motivation: *ressentiment*.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that egoists should not care about being generous with others. In the foreground of his conception of egoism is “a feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would give and bestow: the noble human being, too, helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from pity, but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power” (BGE 260). Nietzsche believes that true egoists will, like Zarathustra, be “gift-givers,” who give themselves for the sake of the world, while all the time acting egoistically:

Verily, I have found you out, my disciples: you strive, as I do, for the gift-giving virtue. . . . This is your thirst: to become sacrifices and gifts yourselves; and that is why you thirst to pile up all the riches in your soul. Insatiably your soul strives for treasures and gems, because your virtue is insatiable in wanting to give. You force all things to and into yourself that they may flow back out of your well as the gifts of your love. Verily, such a gift-giving love must approach all values as a robber; but whole and holy I call this selfishness. . . . With its rapture it delights the spirit so that it turns creator and esteemer and lover and benefactor of all things.

(Z I: “On the Gift-Giving Virtue” 1)

To summarize, for Nietzsche, the egoism of self-overcoming is paradoxically the only way to help others. To sacrifice oneself – to become smaller and weaker – will ultimately only make others weaker as well. The only hope to improve others is to choose a lifestyle that increases one’s power. But to increase one’s power one must not merely do whatever one wants and make others weaker. Rather, one must develop “self-control and temperance” (D 9) so that one has the strength to behave with nobility, magnanimity and generosity, thereby making others stronger.

The self-overcoming free spirit

Having provided an alternative to Aviram’s, Rosenow’s and Hillesheim’s interpretation of self-overcoming, and having outlined Nietzsche’s power-centered, embodied and egoistic revaluation of self-mastery, we need to examine one other expression of the self-overcomer that Nietzsche employs repeatedly throughout his corpus: *the free spirit*. The standard interpretation of the free spirit is similar to Rosenow’s (1989) account of the self-overcomer, i.e. individuals that must overcome “morality, reason, and the conventions of cultural traditions” (p. 311). According to the standard view, the free spirit is

someone who manages to free himself from the dominion of his culture. . . . The free spirit is not necessarily better off to be free from the shackles of society. Rather, the free spirit has achieved a considerable feat by liberating himself from society, even if he has merely attained a less correct view.

(Mintz, 2004, p. 164)

Mintz (2004) believes that what characterizes free spirits is not their ability to use reason and self-mastery to guide their choices regarding which perspectives and attitudes make them more flourishing and powerful individuals. Rather, according to Mintz, it is their willingness to deny the perspectives of their culture, even if their denial diminishes their knowledge of the truth. In her analysis of the free spirit, Amy Mullin (2000) argues similarly, claiming that “free spirits are not characterized by values that they have in common, but are instead identified by their ability to shake loose of contemporary value judgments and to interpret differently” (p. 387).¹³ It would appear that for Mullin and Mintz free spirits will *always and necessarily* take a different view from that of their culture. This is not the case, however. If we take a careful look at the passages in *Human, All Too Human* where Nietzsche defines the free spirit, we will see that it does not indicate the radical interpretation that the standard view recommends.

He is called a free spirit who thinks differently from what, on the basis of his origin, environment, his class and profession, or on the basis of the dominant views of the age, would have been expected from him. . . . [W]hat characterizes the free spirit is not that his opinions are the more correct [*dass er richtigere Ansichten hat*] but that he has liberated himself from tradition [*dass er sich von dem Herkömmlichen gelöst hat*], whether the outcome has been successful or a failure.

(HH I: 225)

From this passage alone one could easily assume that Mintz’s and Mullin’s conception of the free spirit discussed previously is correct. However, to leave it at that is to miss the context in which this passage is found. To begin with, we must consider the last sentence of the aphorism, which immediately follows the previous passage. It says: “As a rule, though, he [the free spirit] will nonetheless have truth on his side, or at least a spirit of inquiry after the truth: he demands reasons, the rest demand faith [*Er fordert Gründe die Anderen Glauben*]” (HH I: 225). The first important thing about this passage is that it already denies the claim that “free spirits are not characterized by values that they have in common” (Mullin, 2000, p. 387). Nietzsche states plainly that what the free spirits have in common that distinguishes them from those who follow herd values is that they “demand reasons,” whereas the herd “demand[s] faith.”

The importance of these attributes is reemphasized in the first lines of the next aphorism. “The fettered spirit takes up his position, not for reasons, but out of habit; he is a Christian, for example, not because he has knowledge of the various religions and has chosen between them” (HH I: 226). This passage illuminates what makes the fettered individuals unfree. It is not that they believe and act on ideas that are untrue but rather that they believe and act on ideas *without reasons for doing so*. This is in contrast to free spirits, who believe and act on ideas because they have reasons for doing so. This implies that, were free spirits to examine various religions, they would choose to follow one or the other based on reasons, not on faith.¹⁴ But if this is what characterizes free

spirits, then it is entirely conceivable that they could actually choose to follow the herd while remaining free all of the time, assuming of course that they have reasons for doing so. All that matters is that free spirits examine what the herd does and determine that what they do is consistent with living a flourishing and powerful life. Thus, it seems that a free spirit could adhere to the same ideas as fettered spirits while still remaining free.

Does this mean that Nietzsche is being inconsistent? On first glance it would appear so. However, when we more carefully examine Nietzsche's definition of the free spirit from HH I:225, we begin to see differently. To recall, the free spirit is one who "thinks differently from what . . . would have been expected from him" and who "has liberated himself from tradition" (HH I: 225). It would be easy to interpret this passage as indicating that the free spirit does not believe what society believes and does not value what society values. This is not what the passage claims, however. Nietzsche argues that a true free spirit is one who "thinks differently" about ideas and values, not that the free spirit necessarily has "different ideas or values." Nietzsche is arguing that the *way free spirits think* about their culture's ideas and values is different; specifically, free spirits examine ideas and values, and through their "spirit of inquiry" determine whether there are any *reasons* to affirm them. This is not the case with the fettered spirits, who do not examine their culture's ideas or values at all but merely take them on faith or by tradition. Thus, the free spirit and the fettered spirit think differently about values even if they happen to affirm the same values. The same goes for the notion of being "liberated" from one's tradition. The operative word here is "tradition." To be liberated from tradition means to no longer base one's opinions on what others have historically affirmed, even if one continues to believe the same thing on the basis of reasons.¹⁵

Conclusion

Truly free spirits are thus those who do not believe and act on faith or because of tradition but instead believe and act because of reasons. Free spirits must evaluate every perspective of their culture (and other cultures), as well as their own history, to determine whether or not they should adopt these perspectives. And free spirits must use reason and self-mastery to evaluate every perspective in the right way. Thus, the image of the free spirit properly understood is the embodiment of Nietzsche's doctrine of self-overcoming. Far from being a call to continual self-reformulation or to a dangerous individualism, self-overcoming is a plea to become masters of ourselves, to deeply embody the dictates of reason, to inquire into the foundations of our cultures and traditions so as to participate in them reflectively and thus to practice a form of egoism that benefits all.

This statement leads us back to the question of how to help individuals develop this "self-mastery and discipline of the heart." As Nietzsche writes in *Daybreak*, we rarely achieve this state of self-mastery and "reasonable free-spiritedness," as we might call it. Rather, we remain as "children" and

rarely learn to change our view; most of us are our whole lives long the fools of the way we acquired in childhood of judging our neighbors (their minds, rank, morality, whether they are exemplary or reprehensible) and of finding it necessary to pay homage to their evaluations.

(D 104)

So what must we do to become the masters of ourselves that Nietzsche calls us to be? This question forms the central concern of the next chapter.

Notes

- 1 By “traditional” we mean the concept of self-mastery that refers to the moderation of one’s passions and desires by one’s rational faculty. Nietzsche’s concept is distinct from the traditional, but it shares more with it than do the alternative notions of self-overcoming that we will examine.
- 2 This fact is echoed by Solomon and Higgins (2000) when they say: “A curious perversity in Nietzsche scholarship is that some commentators have preferred Nietzsche’s scrambled notes to his masterful publications” (p. 83). Other authors who oppose the unrestricted use of Nietzsche’s *Nachlass* include Magnus (1988); Clark (1990); Alderman (1977); and Leiter (1994).
- 3 Translation amended. The original translation renders “*Selbstbeherrschung*” as “self-command” and “*Vernunft*” as “rationality.” An extended discussion of why “self-mastery” and “reason” are better renderings of “*Selbstbeherrschung*” and “*Vernunft*” occurs in the following section.
- 4 See also GM II:12, where Nietzsche claims “that in all events the will to power is happening” and that “the essence of life [is] its will to power.”
- 5 There is a tendency in contemporary scholarship to treat Kaufmann as a historically important but ultimately unreliable reader of Nietzsche. This is troublesome because this means that there are very few arguments repudiating his reading of Nietzsche – one noteworthy counterexample is Robert Solomon who frequently engages Kaufmann’s “mistakes.” Generally, however, Kaufmann is discounted by offhand comments often related to the belief that his reading of Nietzsche is “too humanistic.” Undoubtedly, there have been more sustained and rigorously argued repudiations of his interpretation; the problem is that no one, in our experience at least, is referencing those repudiations. It almost seems that Kaufmann is ignored or dismissed primarily because he is considered outmoded. Indeed, as one anonymous reviewer of an earlier work of ours suggested, “Many contemporary students of Nietzsche, especially those in Education and opinion-makers upon which philosophers of education are apt to rely, consider Kaufmann old-fashioned and superseded. This judgment regarding Kaufmann, while no doubt flawed, is widely and unreflectively held.” This is not to say that Kaufmann’s interpretation is not without its flaws. But it behooves readers of Nietzsche, especially educators, to offer him a fair hearing. Does his interpretation square with what Nietzsche affirms or does it not? That is the question that must be asked. It must be asked because Kaufmann’s interpretation may help to protect us from allowing our culturally embedded biases to predetermine our reading of Nietzsche; Kaufmann’s ideas may have been expressed decades ago, but that is precisely why they may afford important insights into Nietzsche’s writings and our own cultural biases.
- 6 See also TI “Morality as Anti-Nature” 1–2.
- 7 As we have seen Aviram does try to distinguish between the forms of power, but because his conception is based on a fundamental flaw, his distinction between the forms of power loses its force.

- 8 This is indeed a concern of Nietzsche's. However, his solution is not to diminish the need for reason but to emphasize the additional need for aesthetic, emotional and physiological capacities as well. In *The Gay Science* he begins to assimilate these modes of reason into what might be called a "philosophy of the body" (GS P:2).
- 9 See also Nietzsche (D 109).
- 10 It is important to note that, unlike in the early period, when Nietzsche is suspicious of Socrates, the Nietzsche of the middle period generally regards him as a free spirit who taught us much about how we should live (WS 86).
- 11 In this vein, Young (2006, pp. 66–67) takes issue with Nietzsche for not properly distinguishing between selfishness and self-interestedness. Young claims that Nietzsche's attribution of selfishness to any individual who benefits from a set of principles is incorrect, suggesting that an individual in this case may be self-interested but not selfish. Young's point is entirely correct; if an individual experiences pleasure from supporting his or her friend financially, this does not mean that the individual helped his or her friend only because, or even primarily because, he or she experienced pleasure. He or she may have helped the friend because he or she believed that helping one's friends is a good thing to do.
- 12 Thus, while Mintz (2004), for example, correctly identifies Nietzsche's criticism of morality's attempt to force every individual to "serve society rather than his own selfish goals" (p. 163), he fails to appreciate the ambiguity in Nietzsche's concept of egoism. For Nietzsche, egoism is not an individual's insistence on serving "his own selfish goals" but is rather his insistence on becoming a more powerful and more whole individual, which according to Nietzsche necessarily benefits the whole of culture and the individuals in that culture as well. Thus, the best way to serve society for Nietzsche is not to sacrifice one's self but to elevate one's self so that the entire community can benefit.
- 13 This explanation of the free spirit corresponds to Mullin's (2000) most mature level of free-spiritedness. In her detailed analysis of the various kinds of free spirits, Mullin identifies eight different levels of free-spiritedness that appear throughout Nietzsche's writings. Because the goal of this study is to find the *ideal* human and the education that will produce that human, we focus only on the highest stage of the free spirit.
- 14 Of course, to those who do not profess the religion it may appear that the religious person has no reasons for professing the religion and only does so out of "faith"; but, as Nietzsche indicates in his example, there are those that profess a religion based on an unwillingness to explore the reasons why their religion might be justified on empirical, aesthetic or metaphysical grounds. These individuals are religious only by faith and are, from Nietzsche's point of view, unfree spirits. Free spirits, on the other hand, base their religious profession on grounds that are empirical, aesthetic, metaphysical and so on.
- 15 Take, for example, a young woman considering going to college who refuses to attend the college that her parents and grandparents attended because that is where they suggest she goes. In doing so, the woman may appear to be a free spirit who has rejected tradition. But before we can determine whether she is actually a free spirit we need to determine whether she has broken with tradition out of *faith in another tradition* (say, because her boyfriend was going to a different school, where his parents and grandparents went) or for her own reasons. As it turns out, when we ask her why she is refusing to attend the school that her family recommends, she says the *reason* is that she wants to go to the school that has the best theater department in the country (her parents want her to be a doctor). According to the criteria Nietzsche offers in the previous passage at least, we can safely determine that she is a free spirit. We are now excited to discover which school she will end up attending, and therefore we go with her to the bookstore where she can find books that rank theater departments. As we begin to examine the books with her, we are as shocked as she is to discover that the school with the best theater department happens to be the school her family recommended she attend. Of course, we are at a

bit of a loss and ask her what she will do. Her answer resolves the apparent contraction in the previous passages. She argues with perfect lucidity that her goal in rejecting her parents' request was not that she did not want to go to that school but that she believed that doing something merely out of tradition was to place oneself in fetters, whereas to do something for reasons one developed for oneself was to liberate oneself, even if the decision ended in the same action. If she then chose not to follow the reasons she had discovered merely so that she would not have the appearance of following tradition, then she would be as unfree as if she had followed tradition in the first place. She therefore chooses to attend the school that her parents desired, but she does so for reasons and not for tradition. By this, she is a free spirit, even though to an outside observer she might appear to be fettered.

Nietzsche's Philosophy of Education

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