

## 24 Protagonist strategies that help end violence

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We examine the choices that particular organizations make as they contend against each other. We examine the various goals adversaries set, the strategies they adopt to progress toward them, and how and why such choices are made. Because the choice of objectives and the means to attain them impact each other, both are discussed. The focus throughout is on non-violent strategic choices.

### Conflict circumstances

Resource asymmetry is evident in most conflicts and profoundly affects the equity of their resolution (Mitchell 1995). Asymmetry is often discussed as the relative capacity to exercise coercion, particularly violence, and although this is important in many struggles, it is never all important. Noncoercive capacities also can be decisive, such as the commitment to a struggle, as evident in the Vietnam War. Conflicting partisans have access to and actualize different resources as group capacities, which then impact each side's choice of strategies. Adversary groups therefore differ in their capacities to use both noncoercive and coercive inducements to affect each other's conduct.

The resources available to a party in any particular conflict environment are social, economic and demographic. Social resources may include relationships with allies and external powers, strong leadership, cohesive identity, or perceived legitimacy. Such resources affect the conflict when actualized as organizational capacities, but may be used either for violent or non-violent strategies. Strong leadership, for example, may influence the capacity to conduct long and costly military operations, such as the leadership of George Washington, but it may also be required, as in the case of Mohandas Gandhi or Martin Luther King, for a campaign of non-violence.

Likewise, economic resources can be utilized to purchase weapons, hire mercenaries, train troops, or to build defensive or offensive infrastructure. Alternatively they can be used to import supplies during a boycott, support striking workers, hold anti-war rallies, or build monument to peace.

Finally, demographic resources can be actualized to struggle for various ends. The character of a population, whether large or small, well or badly educated, homogenous or heterogeneous, young or old, is influential; but it does not dictate a particular strategy of conflict. A large, young population may be turned to peaceful protest just as it is to violent rioting.

Most conflict resources persist over time, but some change significantly and quickly. Thus, states that regard as criminals the leaders of a challenging organization may kill or imprison them, depriving that organization of a critical resource. In 1992, for example, the Peruvian government captured Abimel Guzman, the primary leader of the Shining Path

Sendero Luminosa), greatly diminishing the capacities of that organization (Thomas and Casebeer 2004: 49). In 1999, the Turkish government imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which contributed to modifying their conflict (Radu 2001).

Similarly, many partisans throughout the world suddenly lost important external support when the Cold War ended, staunching the flow of arms and money from the US and the Soviet Union. What might previously have been considered long term resources in these environments were suddenly eliminated, and affected parties were forced to change strategies or even goals.

Significantly, perceptions of relative resources and the anticipation of future changes can also have large effects on a party's goals and strategies. White South Africans, anticipating becoming a smaller proportion of the population, had reason to move toward an accommodation sooner rather than later. Similarly, many Jewish Israelis, foreseeing a growing Palestinian population, favored a territorial separation that could preserve a predominantly Jewish Israel.

It is therefore insufficient to view power differences only in terms of relative coercive capabilities and the ability to exercise them (negative sanctions). Power is also based on non-coercive inducements (Boulding 1989). One set of such inducements result from a capacity to promise benefits to reward desired conduct (positive sanctions). Noncoercive inducements can also be based on persuasive arguments derived from shared norms and values or on shared identities based on ideology or religion. In actuality, power is exercised in various combinations of these inducements, depending in part upon organizational capacities and characteristics.

### *Organizational characteristics*

For qualities characterizing contending organizations are particularly relevant for the materials analyzed in this volume. They are: structure, ideology, relations with other organizations, and attachments to violence. The internal and external factors affecting these features will be discussed, taking into account the effect of resource availability and decisions regarding their actualization.

### *Structural features*

The distinction between state and non-state entities is often based on their structural differences, but this can be exaggerated. States are often regarded as having clear boundaries, clearly defined members (citizens), and clearly recognized decision-making procedures, yet they vary in these regards. Conversely, while non-state entities may tend to have fewer of such attributes, many have them to a significant degree.

Both differ in the extent to which rank-and-file members follow the directions of their official leaders, the degree to which particular groups of supporters influence or direct the official leaders, and the degree to which rivals can mobilize and direct people they regard as their constituents. Both state and non-state actors may sometimes incorporate armed groups, functioning somewhat autonomously, and leaders of both tend to make broad claims about who they represent and can control. For example, government officials, who may or may not have been acting independently of their official leaders, have been known to operate in cooperation with armed militia groups in South Africa, Colombia, and Guatemala. Such features of command structures within state hierarchies are similar to splits within non-state armed groups such as Hamas.

The internal structure of the adversaries may also vary greatly over time as the circumstances of the conflict change. Thus, the increase in international governmental and non-governmental organizations increasingly affects the structure of contending parties through the provision or restriction of resources that influence their strategies. For example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) contributed to the largely peaceful transitions and transformations among and within the countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics (McMahon 2007; Möller 2007). Similarly, expanding transnational linkages can strengthen some groups in particular countries, affecting the structure of societal and organizational political processes and relative influence. Expanding diaspora communities, which sustain relations in their former homelands, may provide economic and social resources that further influence the group's structural characteristics there.

### *Ideologies*

The diverse groups in each adversary camp often have some sense of shared identity. Members of each group try to define both themselves and the other. They may define themselves exclusively and believe they have certain rights relative to other persons within or outside their own camp. These identities may not be precisely formulated and articulated, or be contradictory and shifting as circumstances change. Yet some aspects of these identities can become dominant within an ideology and drive the choice of violent strategies.

Some ideologies are highly institutionalized, incorporated in legislation and with special agencies dedicated to their maintenance. This is the case, for example, in states that are constituted to embody or to serve a particular religion, ethnicity, or political ideology. They also may be vigorously challenged by minority groups who object to the subordinate treatment they suffer. Alternatively, secular democratic governments may be challenged by organizations to establish a state that gives priority to an exclusive religious, ethnic, or political ideology. Such matters are prone to conflicts that are waged violently, such as in Afghanistan during the 1980s, but can also be waged peacefully, such as the Hizbut Tahrir movement for a global Caliphate, active in over 40 countries (Cornell 2002).

Additionally, changes in major ideologies, norms, and belief systems can significantly impact the ideologies of local organizations. The breakup of the Soviet Union not only ended Soviet material assistance to Marxist governments and revolutionary movements, it also reduced the adherence to Marxist ideologies and the concern among others about their threat. Conflicts became more frequently couched in ethnic and religious terms. In this way different ideological characteristics became salient, as one ideological resource was replaced by another.

### *Relations with other organizations*

As highlighted above, each organization in a conflict is affected by its interaction with other organizations in the conflict environment, including its primary adversaries, organizations allied with the adversaries, and non-engaged third parties. Furthermore, each side usually consists of a coalition of organizations, each with internal factions and sub-groups. It is useful to keep this complexity in mind, even if a particular subunit is the primary one in the choice and employment of strategies.

The autonomy or dependency, for example, of a particular conflict unit in relation to supporting, allying, and ruling organizations affects its leader's options. An adversary may

be highly dependent upon an outside government for material support and adhere to the goals and interests of that outside government in order to maintain its assistance. This was evident during the Cold War for the organizations relying greatly on American or Soviet support. Global economic and technological developments have greatly contributed to increasing inter-dependence and transnational linkages. For example, the increasing scope of international trade and investment, combined with increased capital mobility, enhances governmental interdependence, while also increasing vulnerability to policies of major corporate actors and particular IGOs, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

### *Attachment to violence*

The capability and readiness to use violent methods by various contending groups must receive special attention. Factions and groups who prepare for and carry out violent actions are significant components of most major conflict organizations. The army, police, and other armed units may be highly influential components of larger organizations. In many societies membership in such armed groups is attractive because alternative ways of earning a living are few. These factors both increase the chances of escalation and hamper the de-escalation and settlement of conflict.

In addition, various beliefs serve to sustain an attachment to violence. There is often little popular knowledge or faith in alternative means of struggle and the enemy is often regarded as "only understanding force." Indeed, channels for non-violent pressure, influence, and persuasive efforts are often closed by the opposing party or competing internal factions, cutting off potential alternative choices.

Outside actors and influences also sometimes contribute to local reliance upon violent methods. For example, during the 1960s some leaders and interpreters of war of national liberation and revolutionary change influentially argued that violence could help establish conditions needed for a successful revolution (Fanon 1966; Debray 1967). Recourse to violence was romanticized and those ready to commit violent deeds celebrated. This glorification of violence was a resource for partisan actors, but one that could only be actualized in strategies utilizing violence, thus it restricted strategic options. Such influences contributed to the adoption of violent strategies by the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Currently, some strands of Islamic religious beliefs are used to legitimate such violence against civilians deemed enemies of Islam. Terrorist attacks with transnational support have some novel features, but terrorism has a long history, and is an important means of struggle at particular times. Strategies within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka are prominent examples.

Interestingly, however, in recent years, non-violent methods of struggle also have gained adherents through their successful application in the Philippines, Poland, the Ukraine and many other countries and through external actors' encouragement of non-violent methods and provision of training and counseling. For example, El Servicio de Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ), a non-violent human rights organization, resisted military dictatorships in many Latin American countries, in the 1970s and 1980s (Pagnucco and McCarthy 1992; Pagnucco 1997). Gene Sharp's analyses of, and his prescriptions for, non-violent action have also been translated into many languages and organizations in many countries consider adopting those strategies (Sharp 1973).

Each of the four partisan characteristics we highlight here is a function of available resources and decisions regarding their actualization. In each case the characteristic's development is

influenced not only by group leadership decisions, but by the impact of external third parties, allies, internal divisions, and the contending party. Having analyzed both conflict circumstances and organizational characteristics, we now turn to protagonists' strategic choices.

### *Strategies of protagonists*

Partisan strategies differ in many ways: by time frames and in the combination of inducements used; by who is undertaking them and toward whom they are directed; and by the stage of the conflict in which they are undertaken. This discussion is organized in terms of the latter, the major conflict stages in which strategies are employed: (a) escalation; (b) de-escalation and settlement; and (c) post-violence recovery. We stress the de-escalation and settlement stage but highlight those strategies at each stage that may best allow for a later transition to non-violent struggle. For each stage we examine partisan strategies directed internally, toward various members of the protagonists' own side, and externally, towards members of the opposing side.

This discussion is not limited to carefully considered strategies, consciously selected after comparing many alternatives. Actions may be taken with little reflection, being regarded as the only possible choice under the circumstances. In such cases we sometimes note alternatives that were not considered or were rejected by the protagonists. We infer a strategy and its objectives from the sequence of actions undertaken by contending groups and by the reasons that they give for their conduct. Admittedly, the reasons may be misleading, as the actors seek to justify their goals and how they strive to achieve them, and do so in ways that they think will win them support from other people. Further complicating matters, goals and strategies are often re-formulated, after the fact in order to justify past actions or to claim success.

We focus on strategies, both proactive and reactive, employed by each side, and intended, presumably, to affect the conduct of the other. However, it should be recognized that actions directed toward the adversary may be chosen for their effects on the perpetrator's own side. Thus they may be intended to reassure constituents that "something is being done," or to satisfy the desire to "get even." Alternatively, they may provide benefits to some members of the acting group, ranging from looted goods, control of resources, or constituents' rewards such as increased regard. Such considerations should not be ignored, since they frequently affect the choice of strategy and also the targeted adversary's responses. Furthermore, such considerations often account for the selection of strategies ill-suited to influence the external opponent.

Additionally, strategies that may be effective at one stage may be ineffective or even counter productive at the next and the transitions between stages are fraught with difficulties. Some of the goals and strategies of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) illustrate this. The PLO leadership had great difficulties in building an independent Palestinian organization after 1948, and these difficulties increased after the 1967 war. Rashid Khalidi observes of the PLO that "the deviousness and subterfuge that were indispensable for a weak PLO in dealing with the predatory more of the states that dominated Arab politics were much less well adapted to . . . other arenas" (Khalidi 2006: 174). Most notably, he observes, such strategies were ill-suited to dealing with the Western powers and were a major contributing factor in the failure of the PLO to develop the infrastructure for a Palestinian state.

Finally, it is also important to recognize that strategies directed internally, at the various constituent elements and individual members of the organization, shape what strategy choices are available for waging the external conflict. The strategic choices of protagonists, therefore, are not only directed in two directions, internally and externally, and vary depending on the conflict stage, but are also temporally and casually related, with the

external conflict strategy chosen by each protagonist being reliant on previous internally directed capacity building strategies.

### ***Escalation***

The strategies adopted by an organization as it begins to escalate a conflict have great import for the violent or non-violent trajectory of the conflict. Conflict escalation is often regarded as necessarily involving the use of violence, but it is important to consider the many non-violent ways partisans can increase a conflict's scope and intensity. We note the choice of policies that are conducive to non-violent escalations as well as violent ones.

### ***Directed internally***

Escalation generally requires the devotion of increased resources to the struggle. This usually necessitates greater mobilization of people. One strategy to achieve this is to arouse emotions of fear and hatred, forming a negative identity for the enemy relative to the group's own members. By depicting the enemy as subhuman or evil, leaders justify extreme methods of struggle. Such a strategy, however, tends to make de-escalation, settlement and recovery very difficult because the creation of polar identities limits future strategic options.

A contrary policy would be for leaders to stress differences within the opposing side. Constituents may be assured that not everyone in the adversary camp is an enemy, that many share important values and concerns with them. This has the effect of isolating the enemy within the opposing side, providing the opportunity later to revert to peaceful, or at least nonviolent, relations with the bulk of the adversary's population.

Unfortunately, one internally directed strategy is to attack internal factions that are considered rivals; dissenters are threatened, intimidated and killed. This may be the result of seeking greater power, ideological purity, or unity about goals and means. For such reasons the LTTE leadership has suppressed rival Tamil groups in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora, as discussed by Orjuela in this volume. As a result, consideration of alternative strategies hardly occurs and Tamils are relatively isolated. Other options then might be available to the group if additional resources were available; alternative leadership, knowledge, identity; have been denied them because of the internally directed strategy of factional elimination.

Since conflicts are interlocked, acts of violence may occur on many fronts at the same time. Wars of national liberation and civil wars often incorporate fights among clans, tribes, and families. Leaders of one sub-group may exploit the larger conflict to defeat a rival. As the number of parties increases and their interrelationships become more knotted and entangled, the odds of the two main parties clearly communicating their readiness to de-escalate become less favorable.

In many cases, however, some factions and elements within the adversarial camps have interests, values, or beliefs that tend to constrain violent escalation or to foster non-violent goals and strategies. This occurs when business, religious, educational, and other leaders cooperate with similar people in the opposing camp. Such connections potentially limit escalation in order to protect those relationships.

### ***Directed at the external adversary***

Many contending groups initially escalate their conflict through non-violent means such as petitions or demonstrations. However, if they believe that these efforts have been ignored

or forcibly repressed, some resort to violent means. This has been true in South Africa, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere. Alternatively, a government's response recognizing that the challengers feel aggrieved and offering some concessions may avert violent escalations. This was the case in Belgium, Malaysia, and Canada, where protests did not escalate into destructive, protracted violence.

An obstacle to such accommodating responses is that challengers are often protesting policies the government deems to be appropriate or even essential. In such situations government officials are limited in how responsive they can be. Furthermore, they may believe that any concession is a sign of weakness inviting greater demands, or feel constrained by the expectations of their constituents. Consequently, they resort to violent suppression.

In many conflicts, this dynamic results in each side claiming that it is the aggrieved party, threatened by the other side. Both sides claim to be acting defensively and become locked into violent reciprocating escalation, with both internally and externally directed strategies of confrontation channeling the party's options ever more narrowly in the direction of greater violence.

The dynamics of violent conflict escalation can be a trap for both sides. A challenging group may use violence to provoke government overreactions, which serve to isolate government leaders (Debray 1967). This seems to have occurred in Cuba in the 1950s when Fidel Castro's small group of revolutionaries conducted attacks against the government. In response, Fulgencio Batista, the self-appointed president, undertook increasingly harsh and indiscriminate countermeasures, antagonizing many segments of the population. The government became isolated and fell in January 1959. Che Guevara considered this strategy to be an effective way to foment revolution and he and many others attempted to follow the strategy in several countries. These efforts failed when countermeasures were limited, and sometimes handled as police, rather than military matters. In these situations the government proved effective by not responding too aggressively against challenging parties. Overreaction is a severe risk in responding to challenges, often proving to be counterproductive (Mueller 2006). As discussed below, relying on violence can entrap the initiating challengers.

The goals set by the opposing sides greatly affect the likelihood of destructive escalations. Some group goals threaten the existence of the opposing side but more often groups seek changes, not elimination. In many cases the opposing groups contend over the control of particular territories or of other valued resources, such as in the case of ETA.

These varying goals provide an important context for choosing the means of struggle, and their effects on the opponent. The goals and strategies adopted by the ANC in its conflict with the South African government illustrate their importance in reaching a non-violent and negotiated settlement. Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders consistently proclaimed the non-racist character of their party and the South African society they sought. They reassured the whites of South Africa that they were viewed as another people enjoying equal protection under the law in the new rainbow nation.

In addition, early decisions regarding organizational goals fostered the possibility of non-violent conflict and de-escalation in the future. At the beginning of the struggle the ANC relied on non-violent methods, in the tradition of Mohandas Gandhi as a young lawyer in South Africa. The decision to use violence, but also the kind of violence chosen, had implications for turning away from it at a later time. This was recognized, for example, in the explicit decision by ANC leaders to eschew terrorism in order to negotiate later (Mandela 1994).

Using particular violent methods requires specific human capabilities and non-human materials. The development of such resources then creates a vested interest in continuing to

rely on those methods. Members and leaders gain status and other rewards as fighters. Yielding benefits in a peaceful accommodation with the adversary may not be attractive. In addition, committing violent acts binds fighters to their organizations, and armed fighters and their leaders develop skills for combat and may lack the skills needed for alternative means of making a living. Because the skills needed for non-violent governance are not developed, if a peaceful accommodation is reached, implementation is difficult.

When the fighters are only one wing of a broader entity some difficulties in transitioning into non-violent relations with an opponent may be alleviated. Organizations with open, democratic structures are more likely than authoritarian organizations to avoid such limitations and to make the transformation from relying on violence to struggling non-violently (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2006; Pace and Kew 2008; Kew forthcoming). The social resources provided by such structures provide for the development of non-violent capacities that can then be utilized in later conflict stages.

Finally, we discuss escalating actions taken at the grass roots and mid-elite levels within adversary camps. Forming connections between particular groups or persons who are members of opposing sides not only adds resources but weakens the solidarity of the opposition. This was true in the US during the civil rights movement where blacks and whites together formed CORE. Similarly, religious organizations and trade unions have often provided channels for mobilizing people across ethnic or class lines in escalating struggles for improved conditions for particular groups (Rose 2000).

In short, carefully controlled strategies may escalate conflicts in ways that set the stage for de-escalation and sustainable mutual accommodations. This was the case as opposition against apartheid surged across the black townships of South Africa in 1985. Nationally the United Democratic Front (UDF) undertook low-key acts of defiance, such as rent boycotts, labor strikes, and school stayaways. The blacks of Port Elizabeth launched an economic boycott of the city's white-owned businesses. The country was becoming ungovernable under apartheid. Such acts escalated the conflict between whites and blacks, between the ANC and the National Party, but it also developed the capacity for non-violent conflict and set the stage for later de-escalation and settlement.

A comparison of the first and second Palestinian intifadas is also illuminating (Hammami and Tamara 2001). During the first intifada, beginning in 1987, the Palestinians engaged in various forms of non-violent resistance including boycotts of Israeli goods. Lethal weapons were eschewed and the image of stone-throwing youths pursued by heavily armed Israeli soldiers won widespread sympathy for Palestinians. The second intifada, which erupted in 2000, was conducted by armed Palestinian militias and security forces, with relatively little popular engagement. The Israeli military suppression of the armed struggle was widely seen as justified. The chosen strategies of the first intifada contributed to the Israeli belief that a negotiated two-state resolution was desirable, whereas those of the second convinced many Israelis that negotiation was not feasible (Kriesberg 2002).

### ***De-escalation and settlement***

The stage of primary interest is that of de-escalation and settlement. Even the most intractable violent conflicts eventually become tractable or otherwise terminated. Often militias and other armed groups abandon violence because they are defeated, and they submit to the other side, suffer separation, or even disappear as an organized entity. However we are particularly interested here in the transformation of conflicts and the adoption of non-violent means of contention.

***Internally directed***

Because persistent conflicts generate strong feelings of fear and hatred, as well as a strengthened commitment to winning in order to justify accrued losses, compromising with the enemy is very difficult. Leaders at all levels must prepare their constituents to accept some unpleasant realities. Preparing for a settlement, and therefore broadening strategic options, can help ensure successful implementation of later accommodations. The ANC was thoughtful in this regard, encouraging higher ranking persons to become educated in ways relevant to governance, thus ensuring that they added a resource necessary for the capacity to govern, and developed new strategic options. Interestingly, some of the ANC leaders carried out such studies while imprisoned on Robben Island.

Reaching a sustained accommodation is often obstructed by factionalism and spoilers on each side of a conflict, including governments. The partisans in any large-scale conflict consist of varying autonomous subgroups and coalition partners, some of which may not accept the de-escalation movement. They may take covert or overt actions that undermine the reaching and implementing of any joint agreement. For example, when the negotiations for ending apartheid were underway a third force, some elements within the South African security agency, supported black South African groups that attacked the ANC. How contending groups on a de-escalating course handle challenges to that process is critical. If they are able to demonstrate increased commitment, they may be able to prevent the breakdown of the de-escalation movement. In South Africa, winning a general referendum helped isolate and marginalize the would-be spoilers (Kydd and Walter 2002).

Subversion is another complication that must be dealt with handily. Leaders of the de-escalating adversaries may make concessions to some members or factions of their constituencies and coalition partners in order to keep their support. The concessions may however be viewed by the opposition as evidence of unwillingness or inability to take the necessary steps to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation. This was evident in the Israeli-PLO peace process of the 1990s during which Jewish settlements were expanded in the occupied territories and episodes of terrorist attacks by Palestinians recurred. Strategies that take these matters into account can contribute to maintaining de-escalating momentum. It may be helpful to make such considerations explicit.

And finally, just as they can promote non-violent strategies of escalation, grass roots and mid-level leaders sometimes campaign to pressure their own official leaders to de-escalate. Finding their interests harmed by the diversion of resources to a destructive escalation, they pressure their own leaders to end the fight. This has played a role in the transformation of many international conflicts, including the US-Soviet Cold War (Suri 2003). Peace Now is a good example in Israel.

***Directed externally***

At some point particular members of one or more sides employ strategies directed at the adversary that promote a joint de-escalation (Evangelista 1999). These strategies range from tentative signals and probes to bold unilateral de-escalating gestures. The adoption of one or another strategy arises from the convergence of several sets of conditions. A positive response to a unilateral de-escalatory action, so that joint moves are made, requires the convergence of even more developments. This may require the shared perception of a hurting stalemate and a feasible better option.

Several developments within and between adversaries, as well as external to them, affect

the belief that better options than painful stalemate are possible. Formerly impossible options become credible when one side can demonstrate the existence of its internal differences or can act on the recognition of differences within the other side. One strategy is for at least one side to initiate gestures that convey that it desires de-escalation and it can be trusted to deliver what it is promising (Mitchell 2000; Kriesberg 2007). Once de-escalation has been initiated additional strategies are useful in consolidating the early progress. Tools such as confidence-building measures (CBMs) proved successful during the Cold War.

Calling upon and utilizing external actors can also help undertake and consolidate de-escalation steps. One adversary may attract allies and so increase its resources relative to its opponent. This may enhance coercive strength, but it may also provide increased moral sanction for its side, a powerful social resource that opens up new strategic options. Undoubtedly, the ANC's success in winning widespread condemnation of apartheid undermined the conviction of many white South Africans that apartheid was morally defensible, thus promoting alternate strategies. Outside parties may also be drawn into a conflict as mediators, as guarantors of agreement and as providers of joint benefits for the antagonists.

De-escalating initiatives are sometimes undertaken by grass roots and mid-level leaders from the opposing camps. When the violence in Northern Ireland was high in 1976, Máiread Corrigan Maguire and Betty Williams organized weekly peace marches and demonstrations. Very quickly over half a million people throughout Northern Ireland, as well as in England and the Republic of Ireland, came out on marches. The women co-founded the Community of the Peace People to continue their peace-making initiatives and were later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Such strategies break down bi-polar conceptions of group identities and promote the choice of non-violent strategies.

Academics and various NGOs can initiate and facilitate meetings, workshops, and exercises in dialogue which accomplish similar outcomes. For example, in December 1984 an Afrikaner sociologist, Hendrik W. van der Merwe, organized a series of meetings between ANC officials and Afrikaner newspaper editors (Van der Merwe 1989; Van der Merwe 2000) which contributed to the recognition that the different peoples in South Africa were all South Africans, thus promoting de-escalation.

An additional strategy practiced by some NGO and grass roots organizations is the establishment of "Zones of Peace." This has been accomplished in both the Philippines and in Colombia (Hancock and Mitchell 2007). Such zones enable people in a particular locality to opt out of the fighting, demonstrating that security can be achieved without complying with the demands of any armed party.

### *Post-settlement and recovery*

Establishing secure and equitable relations between former enemies and avoiding a recurrence of violence has become a matter of high concern since the 1980s. Increased recognition is being given to the value of positive peace (Paris 2004; Mac Ginty 2006). Many analyses of peacebuilding focus on external intervention, but the partisans themselves bear the greatest burden in building a stable and just peace.

### *Directed internally*

One method of consolidating peacebuilding is for leaders of formerly contending groups to secure access to education, employment, and social welfare for their followers. Such assurances of well-being help ensure that not only the leadership but their constituents

commit to a non-violent future. Additionally, competence in governance is necessary for transformation to endure. Moving from reliance on violence to active governance is very difficult and some organizations simply fail to make the transition. The PLO is one such example.

Another strategy is for the leaders of each group to undo the damage caused by the creation of polar identities. Just as leaders painted the other as evil or subhuman, it is also possible for them to reaffirm the similarities and shared humanness of the antagonists (Boudreau and Polkinghorn 2008). Religious and civic leaders have important roles to play in this process and at times actively engage their constituencies in this redefinition of the self and the other. Closely related to this is the need for leaders to promote the acceptance of what cannot be changed. Leaders can help their constituents accept unpleasant realities, since some compromises usually have to be made. Of course, the more sober the group's initial goals, the easier this process will be.

### *Directed externally*

Reaching out to former enemies and demonstrating at least minimal respect for them are fundamental elements of many strategies to establish enduring peace. This is often expressed in policies and laws ensuring basic human rights for all. One common strategy in post-violence environments is the creation of Human Rights Commissions, Commissions of Inquiry, War Crimes Tribunals, and other official bodies tasked with ensuring the rule of law. Additionally, resources are very often provided for the restructuring and retraining of military and police forces in order to ensure their purging of rogue factional elements or war criminals. These policies often contribute to building confidence between the former antagonists.

Other strategies are geared toward the construction of a shared identity by creating common symbols such as new anthems, flags, and monuments. Such symbols can blend elements from old symbols of the formerly contending groups, signifying their unity and shared future (Ross 2007).

Reconciliation is receiving growing attention and is an important aspect of post-violence recovery. But reconciliation is not a single condition that does or does not exist: rather, it is multidimensional and varies over time for different members of the previously antagonistic sides (Kriesberg 1999). Considerable attention has been given to the establishment of various forms of truth commissions in order to foster reconciliation, most notably the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. They are thought to contribute to managing resentments between members of the formerly antagonistic sides.

Grass roots and local level accommodations are also important, since it is at the grass roots level that relationships are built and communities are restored after violence (Pouligny *et al.* 2007). A stable peace is fostered by small acts between individuals, such as friendships or marriages across lines of division. Groups that foster mutual understanding may be established in neighborhoods and cities such as dialogue circles, neighborhood redevelopment schemes and economic cooperatives.

Finally, for agreed-upon settlements to endure, it is important to build institutions, both to handle conflicts, and to deliver mutual gains (Paris 2004). Such institutions can help ensure an equitable distribution of resources among the parties. The failure to adopt such a strategy risks a return to violence in the future by those who feel newly aggrieved by the post-conflict disposition of resources.

## Conclusion

Adversaries in a violent conflict can use a wide variety of strategies to transform their struggle and continue to engage each other without relying on the threat or commission of violence. The process of transformation, however, is usually very lengthy and requires different strategies at various conflict stages. Important strategies are directed both internally and externally, but sometimes inconsistently in regard to advancing conflict transformation.

The strategies are joined together in complex, sometimes contradictory, sometimes complementary ways, and often constituting campaigns that change over time with externally directed strategies being reliant on prior internally directed and capacity creating strategic decisions. Adding to the complexity, different persons and groups within each adversary camp enact particular strategies, consistent with or contrary to the primary campaign.

Some general patterns regarding the choices and the consequences of different strategies and their combinations were suggested. Certainly much more research is needed to verify, correct, amplify and specify them. However, since every conflict has unique features, no body of theory and research can prescribe the precise set of strategies that will maximize the diverse set of goals which members of one or another side in a conflict seek to advance. Recognition of many possible alternative strategies and likely responses to them nevertheless can improve the chances of avoiding destructive conflict escalations. Thinking ahead about possible responses and subsequent counter-responses to a chosen strategy is a sound principle for policy making.

Finally, we wish to acknowledge that people rarely regard the resort to violence as the worst possible means of struggle. People often assert that there are some goals for which it is worth both dying and killing to advance. In retrospect, however, after periods of extreme violence, many people come to believe they were mistaken. These considerations are important, but they go beyond this chapter's parameters.

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