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CHINA'S FIRST LENINIST PARTY-STATE, 1927–1949

The April 12 massacre of 1927 has been recorded as a milestone in the annals of modern Chinese history. From this point forward, the textbooks tell us, the Chinese Communists abandoned the cities in favor of a peasant-based revolution. Meanwhile, the Nationalists proceeded to dismantle the Communists' achievements in labor mobilization, attacking leftist unions and unleashing White Terror on the urban populace. Less often noted is the continuing interplay between KMT and CCP initiatives in the cities, particularly in the realm of social control. As China's first Leninist party to attain state power, the KMT drew heavily upon the experiences of its rival party, and in turn established important precedents for subsequent state-building under the PRC.

In light of later historical developments, it is hard to appreciate the immense excitement that surrounded the Nationalists' accession to power. C. Martin Wilbur reminds us of the expectant mood at the time:

> Seen from the perspective of late 1928, China's future seemed bright. It was a time of optimism that verged on jubilation. The Nationalists had destroyed the corrupt and bankrupt Peking government and a new government was in place, staffed by well educated and patriotic men who had long been concerned for the condition of the country, and who intended that the new government should solve the nation's many political, economic and social problems. The leaders of the Nationalist Party planned to control the government and to set its policies; they conceived

their role as a stewardship during a period of tutelage. Theirs was a popular party in 1928 . . . It had a respected revolutionary history, and had just proved itself an effective organization for mobilizing and channeling power to achieve popular goals.[1]

The key to the KMT's recent successes, explains Wilbur, lay in its Leninist organizational structure and approach toward mass mobilization:

> Four years of close Russian involvement with the Kuomintang [Guomindang] had left upon it a Leninist stamp. It was very different from the loosely linked congeries of revolutionaries that had coalesced around Sun Yat-sen from time to time. Now it practiced "democratic centralism," with the inevitable emphasis on centralism and dictation by a very few. The party was better prepared to exercise tutelage than it had been before its reorganization in 1924. It had improved its propaganda techniques, though keeping nationalism as the central theme, and it had learned the utility of mobilizing "the masses," as well as some of the risks involved.[2]

Recent archival discoveries underscore Wilbur's point. Steve Smith, drawing on Comintern documents, emphasizes the Soviets' catalytic role in remaking the KMT as a centralized party, capable of waging revolution:

> [T]he opening of the Comintern archives has reminded us how critical was the contribution made by Soviet Russia to the national revolution in China in the 1920s. By far and away the most important aspect of the contribution was the reorganization of the GMD [KMT] along centralized, hierarchical lines and the creation of an effective party-army. Without the vast organizational, military and financial assistance of the Comintern, the GMD would never have been in a position to bring the national revolution to fruition, however compromised that revolution ultimately turned out to be. By comparison with this achievement, the creation of a CCP was a relatively minor element in the Soviet contribution to China's history.[3]

In reshaping the KMT into a formidable Bolshevik-style party, buttressed by substantial military power, the Comintern had prepared the ground for China's first experiment in Leninist state-building.

INSTITUTIONAL INVERSION UNDER THE GUOMINDANG

As a Leninist revolutionary party, the KMT appreciated the importance of mobilizing elements of society for its own political projects. The New Life Movement was but one of a series of orchestrated (if inept) efforts by which the Nationalist regime sought to construct a militarized model of citizenship.[4] To this end, the party-state absorbed and adapted preexisting institutions, converting civilian groups into government agencies whose primary loyalty would be to state dictates rather than to societal demands. Of special interest were armed militias. While the CCP had already demonstrated an impressive institutional virtuosity in this arena, infiltrating and reshaping extant organizations for its own revolutionary purposes, the Nationalist government went further still. As part of a concerted campaign to discipline the populace in order to strengthen the nation (thereby purging it of Communist elements), the KMT incorporated ongoing societal practices as official state programs.[5] Here we have what Lenin might well have termed a "replacement of one type of institution by others of a fundamentally different order . . . a case of 'transformation of quantity into quality.'"[6] But rather than signal the retreat of the state, as Lenin had intended, institutional inversion was a critical step in the strengthening of the modern Chinese state.

Defense Leagues

The various defense leagues (*baoweituan*), which had been established in Shanghai and other cities as merchant-sponsored protection associations years before, were now systematized under direct government aegis. The central authorities issued weapons for the leagues, while training sessions and uniforms were supplied jointly by municipal governments and influential citizens.[7] Composed largely of unemployed workers, the reconstituted defense leagues served as an adjunct to urban police forces. But reorganization was no guarantee of discipline. Charged with preserving local order, the leagues were nonetheless inclined to many of the same transgressions as their predecessors had been during the warlord era. Government reports

in late 1927 and 1928 are replete with tales of league misdeeds such as unauthorized wearing of uniforms and improper use of firearms, mistaken arrests, intimidation of ordinary citizens, and brawls. A Guomindang directive to defense league captains, which depicted the Nationalists as the revolutionary liberators of the Chinese masses, attributed the league's persistent lapses in discipline to the lingering influence of "bandit-like" mass mobilization techniques on the part of the rival Communists and their erstwhile allies within the KMT:

> We have forcefully swept away the obstacles to revolution—warlordism and imperialism—liberating the masses from oppression. We're no longer a sheet of loose sand. But, contrary to expectation, in recent years the rampaging Communist Party has used bandit-like methods to incite the ignorant workers and peasants in order to realize their ambition of a proletarian dictatorship . . . This has lowered popular trust in our party. Those who carried out mass movements in the past didn't pay attention to this, which was a big mistake and a major cause of the decline in public trust.[8]

The authorities tried to impress upon league leaders that their attacks should be directed against latent political dangers (i.e., Communists), rather than against the populace at large.

The defense leagues functioned as an auxiliary police and military force throughout the duration of KMT rule. In the 1930s, they were deployed against Japanese troops during their assaults on Chinese cities.[9] After the Japanese defeat, the defense leagues were reinstituted in Shanghai with considerable fanfare. At this time, their major assignment was to suppress labor unrest. The government was responsible for supplying weapons, as in other municipalities, and a committee of local magnates—including Green Gang leader Du Yuesheng, industrialist Liu Hongsheng, and financier Wang Xiaolai—provided money for training and uniforms. On the eve of the Communist takeover in the spring of 1949, government reports credited the defense leagues with helping to put down Communist disturbances by patrolling Shanghai neighborhoods.[10] Chiang Kai-shek was sufficiently impressed by the Shanghai defense leagues that he instructed his military history committee to write them up as a textbook example of citizen activism.[11]

Industry Defense Corps

The KMT's absorption and adaptation of merchant-sponsored defense leagues was not entirely unexpected, considering the close connection that had once obtained between merchant militias and local governments (see chapter 1) as well as the support that at least some members of the bourgeoisie initially lent the Nationalist regime.[12] In the countryside as well, the Nationalists promoted and regulated elite-led militias as a weapon in their struggle against the Communists.[13] More surprising was the fact that the Nationalists also emulated aspects of Communist labor policy. Standard histories emphasize the hostility with which the Nationalist government treated the labor movement, viewing it as the handmaiden of Communist political ambition. Generally unmentioned, however, are the many ways in which KMT policy actually perpetuated and perfected CCP strategies.

While the CCP had justified its arming of the proletariat by reference to Karl Marx's observations on the Paris Commune, the KMT—at least after its bloody break with the Communists—could plead no such ideological excuse.[14] But lack of doctrinal rationale did not deter the Nationalists from imitating and "improving" upon the tactics of their adversaries. The innovations of the KMT, in turn, were instantly appreciated and incorporated by Communist spies and strategists. As William Kirby has argued, the basic features of the Chinese party-state developed out of just such interactive borrowing.[15]

One important area of mutual emulation was in the matter of an armed worker militia, where the KMT undertook an extraordinary experiment in institutional inversion. Within weeks of the Nationalists' establishment of a new government in Nanjing on April 18, 1927, an Industry Defense Department (*hugong bu*) was organized. The department was responsible for coordinating the operations of an Industry Defense Corps (*hugong dui*), whose activities directly mirrored—and enlarged upon—those of their picket forerunners. Working in close cooperation with military intelligence forces, the Industry Defense Corps was assigned the task of investigating factories and unions to ferret out suspected Communists.[16]

Exactly who joined the Industry Defense Corps is unclear, but there was apparently considerable membership overlap with the previous Communist-sponsored pickets. In Shanghai, the Industry Defense

Department complained that the Commercial Press, a hotbed of Communist picket activity only a few weeks before, was now "falsely using the name of the Industry Defense Corps."[17] Officers in the Defense Corps were often described as converted Communists.[18] To what extent this continuity between pickets and corps represented purposeful infiltration, as opposed to simple opportunism on the part of a lumpen-proletariat desperate for some form of gainful employment, is uncertain. Since the Commercial Press had been the initial site of Zhou Enlai's successful effort to insinuate his pickets into enemy defense leagues only a few months earlier (see chapter 2), it is possible that radical workers at the press were carrying on what they considered a revolutionary tradition. In any event, the disciplinary problems characteristic of the pickets continued to plague their successors. Department archives attest that public criticism of the corps was widespread.[19]

To alleviate these shortcomings, letters of recommendation from guarantors and background checks were required of all Industry Defense Corps members. A training program for new recruits was instituted in June 1927. The curriculum included instruction in military commands and etiquette as well as in the meaning of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. Guns for the corps were purchased in Nanjing. Uniforms, made of domestic cloth to reflect national pride, were grey in color and cut in the Sun Yat-sen style (later known in the West as the Mao jacket). The training and equipment evidently bore results. In addition to patrolling government-sponsored demonstrations and clearing the streets of vegetable vendors to facilitate traffic, the corps was soon assigned duties that had previously been reserved for military intelligence forces.[20]

Trusted corps members were dispatched to every Shanghai factory to "secretly investigate the situation of each worker." At union meetings, corps members were supposed to be on tap "to lecture about the benefits of the Three Principles of the People and the disastrous consequences of Communism."[21] For the Communist pickets, sustaining strikes (often through terrorist tactics) had been a key focus; for the KMT's Industry Defense Corps, strike-breaking (often through coercive means) was an important aspect of the job. To end a silk filature strike in Hongkou, for example, corps members forcibly escorted women workers back to their factories. When the Shanghai Pole-

Carriers' Union reported that armed Communists were blocking their movements, corps members moved in to provide protection. A report from the Jianchang Machinery Factory, complaining that arms had been hidden on the premises as part of an attempt to foment a strike, was met by a quick deployment of corps members to the scene. The corps also maintained order at large public meetings and demonstrations by posting sentries around the perimeter of assembly halls and alongside marchers. On numerous such occasions, corps members detained suspected Communists who were then handed over to military or police authorities for interrogation and often execution.[22] Revolutionary state-making, like state-breaking, was a brutal process.

Although KMT-sponsored worker militias appear to have been most active in Shanghai, they were not limited to that city. In Hubei and Fujian provinces as well, the Nationalists approved the formation of armed worker militias to provide protection to their newly established unions.[23] Ironically, in Shanghai the Industry Defense Corps (and its sponsoring union, the notorious Unification Committee) was headquartered at the very same Huzhou Guild Hall that the Communist pickets (and their General Labor Union) had previously occupied. A petition from tramway workers in July 1927 complained about the abuses of the new occupants of the Huzhou Guild Hall, site of the bloody confrontation between gangsters and pickets only three months earlier:

> The "wolf-like" Industry Defense Corps beat up women silk workers in Hongkou, injuring many. They also act as watchmen for factory management, spying on the workers and serving happily as the capitalists' running dogs. This organization has become completely gangsterized and bureaucratized. To enter the Huzhou Guild Hall is to enter the devil's gate. Going there is like going to a dictator's yamen. It takes forever for a worker to get a hearing. The staff are all gangsters. Some smoke opium. This angers the workers, who ask "with this crew running the union, how can the national revolution be completed?"[24]

As this complaint charges, the Industry Defense Corps was indeed dominated by gangster elements. In return for its role in disarming the Communist-sponsored pickets, the Shanghai Green Gang had

been rewarded by the KMT regime with a major voice in the direction of the labor movement.[25] Gang bosses and bureaucracy went hand in hand with the construction of the Nationalist party-state.

COMMUNIST MOBILIZATION EFFORTS

While the Nationalists fashioned their new urban order, remnant Communists persevered in efforts to mobilize an armed force capable of garnering revolutionary victory. Most of the Communists who survived the April 12 bloodbath fled to the relative safety of the countryside, turning their attention from the labor movement to a peasant movement that would in time come to be seen as the hallmark of Maoist revolutionary strategy.[26]

Rural Red Guards

In August 1927 Mao Zedong returned to his home province of Hunan to help organize the Autumn Harvest Uprising. The insurgency would be centered near the Anyuan Coal Mine where Mao—together with Liu Shaoqi and Li Lisan—had fomented the first major CCP-led strike five years before (see chapter 1). To complement the worker pickets that remained active at Anyuan, the Communists also mobilized peasant Red Guards (*chiweidui*).[27] The combined worker-peasant force stormed the Liling county seat and placed an Anyuan worker in charge of the newly declared Red Regime (*hongse zhengquan*). Their victory was short-lived, however. Within a week the KMT had brutally recovered the area, sending Mao and 120 remnant followers packing toward the hills of Jinggangshan.[28]

The Autumn Harvest Uprising was soundly defeated, but the practice of organizing Red Guard militias lived on—albeit in altered form. When the Communists established their first soviet in November 1927 at Hailufeng in southeastern Guangdong, they immediately ordered every village in the area to establish Red Guards as a volunteer militia to provide protection for the new government. At the same time that a nascent Red Army was being developed to confront the Nationalist military forces, the Red Guards were intended to defend the fledgling revolutionary regime. An incipient institutional inversion (parallel to the KMT's urban effort) was being undertaken by the Communists in the countryside: agents of state-breaking were being transformed into organs of state-making.

A telegram sent to the CCP Central Committee on the founding day of the Hailufeng Soviet boasted that the formation of Red Guards was "unique in the history of China, even of the entire world, save for Soviet Russia."[29] The Hailufeng Red Guards in fact differed from their Russian prototype in two crucial respects: first, whereas the Russian Red Guards had been factory workers, in Hailufeng (following the precedent of Mao's Autumn Harvest Uprising) the Red Guards were composed of peasants; and second, rather than a spontaneous manifestation of popular discontent as had initially been true of the Russian Red Guards, the Hailufeng militia was consciously created by the Communist Party as part of its project of constructing a new revolutionary polity.

These features pointed to fundamental differences in the nature of the Russian and Chinese revolutions. The Bolsheviks in 1917 grew by synthesizing preexisting proletarian organizations.[30] Ten years later, the Chinese Communists—although still more than two decades shy of political victory—were already actively engaged in the process of state-building. In the dexterous hands of this emerging party-state, revolutionary citizenship was a highly malleable concept. Denied access to the urban proletariat, the CCP began to recruit its revolutionary militias from among the peasantry. Under the Hailufeng Soviet, which established a countywide Peasant Association with district and village branches, "the peasants were the real citizens."[31]

Open to both male and female volunteers from sixteen to forty years of age, the Hailufeng Red Guards could be deployed at village, district, and county levels. Numbering 37,800 ill-trained peasants armed with only 12,500 rifles in 1927, their fighting capacity was limited. As a historian of the Hailufeng Soviet notes, the Red Guards "were good enough, though, to undertake village security and implement the 'Red Terror,' especially in their home regions."[32] Within each village and district, Red Guards were charged with the surveillance of suspected enemies and the investigation of land contracts and rent arrangements.[33] Inasmuch as the official policy of the soviet called for the liquidation of all counterrevolutionaries, including

any recalcitrant landlords, public executions were commonplace. A Red Guard who served as the official executioner for the soviet government was initially paid a fee for his services. But within two weeks, "such monetary inducement had become unnecessary, so enraged were the Red Guards by that time."[34] Once aroused, the Red Guards of Hailufeng rampaged through the countryside, destroying temples, ancestral shrines, religious icons, and other symbols of "feudal" thought.[35]

Although the CCP's first soviet had been established in the countryside, the party hoped that revolutionary fervor would soon envelop nearby urban centers, with worker insurrections then delivering the cities to the Communists. This optimistic line of thinking received some encouragement less than a month after the inauguration of the Hailufeng Soviet. On December 11, 1927, several thousand worker Red Guards (many of whom had served as pickets in the Canton–Hong Kong strike two years earlier) briefly occupied the city of Canton and declared the inauguration of China's first urban soviet government—headquartered, ironically enough, in the building of the former Public Security Bureau.[36] The Canton uprising was the product of a decision by the Communist Party Politburo, which (after its secret return to Shanghai a few months earlier) had drawn up plans to travel "down the Bolshevik road of a new era."[37] The road map for the journey was not entirely unfamiliar, however. For one thing, the size, membership, and organizational structure of the Red Guards were virtually identical to those of their picket forerunners during the Canton–Hong Kong strike.[38] For another, a Red Terrorist Squad was formed in the image of its Shanghai predecessor as one of the key pillars of the Canton Soviet's Red Guards.[39]

The Canton Soviet survived a mere sixty hours, demonstrating once again the folly of urban insurrections at a time when the Nationalists had gained the upper hand in China's major cities. As Arif Dirlik observes, "The Red Guards by all accounts fought fiercely, but they were without weapons, without training, and without leadership. Language divided them both from the leadership and the cadets with whom they fought side by side."[40] The suppression was merciless; some two thousand Red Guards—identifiable by the residue of red dye from the rain-soaked kerchiefs worn around their necks during the uprising—were slaughtered by government forces.[41] In all, nearly

six thousand people lost their lives in five days of terrifying bloodletting.[42] On December 29 the CCP ordered any remnant worker Red Guards to evacuate the towns and cities and flee to the mountains.[43]

The Communists' ongoing experiments in rural soviets would have greater staying power—thanks in no small part to the efforts of peasant Red Guards. Congregating along the Hunan-Jiangxi border where Mao had sought refuge, the displaced Communists continued to organize Red Guards as a volunteer rural militia to counter local landlord defense forces and complement the nascent Red Army.[44] One of the first acts of Mao's "red government" was to order the organization of ten-to-thirty-person groups of Red Guards in every township "in order to eliminate reactionary forces and safeguard the new regime." By October 1931, the Jinggangshan Red Guards numbered more than 71,000 members, while the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi revolutionary base area as a whole soon boasted a Red Guard force of nearly 600,000.[45] Other Communist border regions developed similar Red Guard militias, which played a key role in promoting land reform and facilitating the expansion of the Red Army.[46]

The contribution of rural militias to the eventual success of the Chinese Revolution was considerable. One historian observes, "It was Red Guard methods of fighting that came to constitute guerrilla tactics later."[47] During the eight-year war with Japan, rural militias provided the backbone of popular resistance to the foreign invasion, prompting Mao to declare in 1938 that "militias are the basis for victory."[48] By April 1945, Communist-sponsored militias under Red Army command were estimated to have enrolled 2.2 million members.[49] Further expansion occurred during the civil war years of 1945–1949, when militia membership reached an impressive 5.5 million.[50] Now that peasants had replaced workers as the mainstay of the Communists' fighting force, the seeds of future battles over the parameters of revolutionary citizenship were germinating.

Proletarian Pickets

The significance of rural militias in Mao's successful formula for peasant revolution has been widely recognized and analyzed.[51] Less well studied is the urban revolution after 1927.[52] While soviets were

being established in the remote countryside, a few intrepid organizers—many of whom would later be accused of Trotskyist tendencies—stayed behind in the cities to brave the hostility of the KMT. Despite the inhospitable environment, Li Lisan, who headed the underground Communist Central Committee in Shanghai, remained adamant about promoting armed proletarian insurrections in the major cities.[53] In the spring of 1928, to commemorate the first anniversary of the Third Workers' Armed Uprising, the Shanghai Communists distributed handbills intended to stir the workers of the city:

> The united strength of the working class is sufficient to prevail over anything! The united strength of the working class is sufficient to create a new society! Chiang Kai-shek's April 12 massacre made us realize we cannot coexist with the Chinese capitalist class. When we engage in future uprisings, can we cooperate with them and let them seize power? Absolutely not! We must prepare for a fourth workers' armed uprising.[54]

The following summer, a handbill entitled "Expand pickets' organization; prepare for Shanghai's Fourth Uprising" claimed that "Now the Shanghai workers' struggle is moving toward a political general strike, so organizing worker pickets is extremely important in order to prepare for a fourth uprising to defeat imperialism, the Guomindang, and the capitalists."[55] By July 1929 the Communist-sponsored Shanghai Federation of Unions claimed to have recruited eight hundred pickets.[56] A month later, however, the number was said to have dropped to two hundred—and even these had no direct communication with the Communists' picket department.[57] On anniversaries of revolutionary events abroad and at home, recruitment appeals took on added urgency. Thus, in 1930 on March 18 (the anniversary of the founding of the Paris Commune) and again on March 21 (the anniversary of the victory of the Third Workers' Armed Uprising in Shanghai), strident handbills called for expanding the worker pickets to pave the way for a fourth uprising: "Long live the memory of the March 18th Paris Commune! Long live the success of the world proletarian revolution! Long live the revolution of the Chinese working class! Carry out a general strike!"[58] On May 29 of that year, Communist organizers tried to instigate a general strike—this time to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the May Thirtieth Movement.[59] Futile as these initiatives turned out to be, the radicals did not abandon hope. They continued to call for expansion of worker pickets, believing that the proletarian patrols could serve as an urban counterpart to the peasant Red Guards then being formed in the hills of Jiangxi.[60]

Considering the hostile political setting, it is hardly surprising that Li Lisan and his fellow urban operatives—concentrated in Shanghai though they were—did not score major victories in these initiatives. A confidential party report in November 1929 expressed frustration with the situation: "Every district should concretely, methodically undertake picket organization. They must also develop detailed regulations, concrete methods and training on such matters as how to beat running dogs and protect meeting places. Never mind if it's red terrorism. We just need to lead it."[61] The little response that CCP operatives did evoke was centered in the western part of the city, in the mill district where the May Thirtieth Movement had originated and where leftist unions remained in place. In July 1930 a new worker pickets' unit was established at the union of the West Shanghai cotton mills. Terrorism was an important mission of the revived pickets, whose founding manifesto emphasized the importance of dog beating. Such activities, it was claimed, would increase the success rate of strikes and prepare the ground for a fourth armed uprising.[62]

The following month, the CCP systematized these clandestine operations under the rubric of Red Vanguards (*chise xianfengdui* or *chixiandui*). In contrast to the pickets, over whom they were supposed to exercise leadership, the Red Vanguards were a secret organization under direct party supervision. Yet, despite repeated reminders that the vanguards were intended merely to stimulate—not to supplant—the open mobilization of pickets among ordinary workers, party leaders admitted that Red Vanguard members (many of whom were unemployed) outnumbered pickets by a wide margin. Among regular workers, the CCP was making few inroads.[63] The operations of the Shanghai underground may have become somewhat more restrained with the demotion of Li Lisan who, charged with "left-wing adventurism," departed at this time for a fifteen-year exile in the Soviet Union.[64] Nevertheless, Li's successors

continued to emphasize the formation of armed militias as a prelude to urban insurrection.[65]

It is unclear how many individuals actually enlisted in the pickets during this difficult period. A few application forms from 1932 have survived, however, providing some indication of the criteria for recruitment. The forms contain thirteen entries. First is the number assigned to the applicant (actual names were presumably kept on a separate list for security reasons). Then come basic demographic and employment data: age, native place, current work unit and number of years employed there, and previous work experience. This information is followed by political questions. Had the applicant ever participated in demonstrations and uprisings? When and where? Had he (or she) been a member of political parties or unions? When and where? For what reasons was he applying to join the pickets? What ideas did he have concerning workers' liberation? Had he ever been a soldier? Could he claim any battle experience? When and where? Finally, the application form asks for the applicant's current address and the name of his or her guarantors.[66]

To publicize their recruitment drive, CCP cadres posted notices around the city calling for the withdrawal of Guomindang forces and their replacement by a proletarian force. On the sixth anniversary of the April 12 massacre, in 1933, posters declared: "We demand that the government transfer all its soldiers and airplanes to the North and permit the people to maintain armed security! Workers, arm yourselves to oppose the white terror!"[67]

Although workers do not seem to have taken much notice of these efforts, the police certainly did. That year the British police reported on the Shanghai Communists' organization of dog-beating groups to attack their enemies with axes and iron bars and to foment factory disputes with the aim of bringing about a general strike in the city.[68] Despite the departure of Li Lisan and subsequent transfer of the Communist Party Central Committee from Shanghai to the Jiangxi Soviet, sporadic Communist-sponsored terrorist acts continued. One of the dog-beating brigades, led by a Communist printer at the Commercial Press along with two other workers and a Red Gang boss, remained active until 1936.[69]

Communist-instigated subversion was, however, severely constrained by the prevailing political climate. More than a few labor leaders were inclined to make their peace with the new regime. Underground cadres complained, for example, that efforts to carry out sabotage at the British Tramway Company repeatedly failed because the captain of the worker pickets there enjoyed close relations with a KMT running dog.[70] Even more problematic was the fact that many of the top Communist labor activists were defecting to the Guomindang side, thereby depleting the ranks of the urban leadership and endangering the security of those who remained.

The defection in 1931 of Gu Shunzhang, who had directed the pickets and Red Terrorists during the third armed uprising (see chapter 2), and who had continued to oversee the CCP's secret-agent operations after April 12, provided an intelligence bonanza for the KMT. After his defection, Gu served briefly as a propagandist for the Nationalists, openly criticizing the CCP's recklessness and lack of discipline. In a self-serving statement to young Communists, Gu characterized his conversion to the KMT cause as a reluctant reaction to the CCP's failure to patrol the revolution:

> From the time I entered the Communist Party in 1924, from the bottom ranks up to the position I held at the time of my conversion, I felt that I was always the most hard working and the most courageous, standing at the very front line of the party, serving as the extreme vanguard of the party, never once fearing death. Moreover, during the last three years when I was in charge of secret agent work for the Central Politburo, at times when the party's economic circumstances were extremely dire I even led comrades in dangerous kidnapping adventures so as to relieve the party's economic crisis. You can ask the Communist Party organization about these matters. What comrade in the Center is unaware of them? Who doesn't acknowledge that I was one of the most loyal in the party? But in the end I left you and converted. Why was this?
>
> To put it simply, I grew disappointed and saddened by everything about the Communist Party. If we talk only about the party organization, its so-called iron discipline is nothing but another name for methods of deception and cruelty. For example, Xiang

Zhongfa was the general secretary of the entire party, whose position was second to none, but he raped a lower-level female comrade and seized the wife of another lower-level comrade. At the same time, he took money from the party coffers to procure a wife. This squandering of money for his own personal use was well known to all the Central leaders, including Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan and Xiang Ying. But not only did they not use that so-called iron discipline to correct and restrain him, they even allowed him to remain as your highest leader. How can something like this happen in a revolutionary party? . . .

We believe that the revolution is a sacred endeavor and the revolutionary party is a brilliant organization. But from amongst the self-important leaders of the Communist Party came this dark and shameful situation. How can it not disappoint us? How can it not sadden us? . . . Politically, they ignore the real Chinese situation and blindly rush forward, sacrificing the masses of workers and peasants, scattering and destroying their families. This has caused the masses throughout the country to despise the Communist Party. What kind of revolutionary program is this? In order to liberate my spiritual suffering, in order to be true to my original intention in joining the revolution, after a lengthy period of reflection I have decided to leave you and convert. . . . I hope you will quickly awaken and strive together for the national revolution of the Three People's Principles.[71]

Gu's betrayal did not go unavenged. In retaliation, his former superior, Zhou Enlai, presided over a massacre of Gu Shunzhang's family members in the French Concession of Shanghai. Although Gu subsequently tried to reestablish contact with the CCP, he was eventually executed by the KMT in Nanjing.[72]

Decimated by such defections and deeply compromised by the revelations of the turncoats, remnant members of the Communist Party underground suffered from attenuated relations with higher echelons of the party. In contrast to the rural Red Guards, whose development and deployment were supported by a coordinated state-building effort, the urban pickets survived only as scattered diehards bereft of central leadership. A report from the Communist-sponsored Shanghai Federation of Unions in September 1933 noted with alarm that it had become almost impossible even to contact the provincial party committee.[73]

RECOVERING THE CITIES

The Japanese takeover of much of urban China during the Second World War further complicated the mobilization efforts of KMT and CCP alike. Although anti-Japanese guerrilla forces sprang up around many urban areas, these outfits frequently eluded control by either political party.[74] Before the war drew to a close, however, both parties scrambled to reoccupy the cities. Once again, worker militias figured centrally in their designs.

The CCP's Workers' Underground Army

In June of 1944, more than a year before the Japanese surrender, Communist Party Central issued a directive on urban work that advocated instigating armed uprisings to complement anti-Japanese military operations and facilitate the takeover of major cities. Two months later, the party's Central China Bureau decided to establish a Shanghai Workers' Underground Army (*Shanghai gongren dixiajun*) for the purpose of spearheading an armed uprising in coordination with the New Fourth Army's anticipated advance on the city.[75]

A member of the New Fourth Army's Urban Work Department, Gao Jun, recalled the inspiring explanation offered by his superiors when he was instructed to go to Shanghai to help organize a workers' armed force: "They emphasized that Shanghai was the birthplace of the party, with a relatively concentrated working class. Having been toughened by the three armed uprisings, there were many advanced workers there with a high level of political consciousness. They had deep feelings toward the party as well as practical experience in undertaking armed struggle in a major city. This was a very good force upon which to rely."[76]

Gao would soon discover, however, that the problem of defining revolutionary citizenship among the workers of Shanghai presented no less of a challenge to CCP operatives at this juncture than it had twenty years earlier. Rao Shushi, secretary of the Central China Bureau, suggested that despite its proletarian appellation, the new Workers' Underground Army should actually be recruited principally from among the urban underclass of bandits, thieves, and gangsters—rather than factory workers. Employed workers, he cautioned,

were too fearful of losing their jobs to be able to fight with revolutionary determination.[77] Accordingly, an initial enlistment effort was targeted at rickshaw and wheelbarrow pullers, pedicab drivers, and unemployed workers. As Gao Jun explained the rationale: "These poor people, who eked out a living at the lowest rungs of society, had no choice but to risk their lives to survive. They evaded all kinds of barriers imposed by the Japanese Army and Chinese traitors, braving bayonets and wolf hounds to transport rice from the suburbs into the city to sell. They were accustomed to struggling at the brink of starvation and their hearts were filled with hatred toward the evils of society and the depredations of the enemy."[78]

As it turned out, however, wartime survival skills were not enough to build a proletarian army. The difficult task of coordinating this motley Workers' Underground Army fell to Zhang Qi, then head of the Communist labor movement in Shanghai. He later recalled his search for leaders of the new force:

> I came up with three people in western Shanghai. One was a petty gang leader; one was a thief whose nickname was "water rat" because he specialized in stealing rice, coal, oil and cotton from boats in Suzhou Creek; and one was a bandit chieftain whose claim to fame was armed extortion and kidnapping. They had all once worked at Japanese cotton mills, had participated in the May Thirtieth strike, and had served as worker pickets during the Great Revolution. After the defeat of the revolution, however, they were all fired and, following a long period of unemployment, were forced onto a criminal path.[79]

Unhappily for Zhang Qi's plans, however, the new recruits made three demands as a prerequisite for cooperating with the Communists: guns, money, and titles. When Zhang could satisfy only the last request—offering them military ranks in the New Fourth Army—they were uninterested in pursuing the invitation further.[80]

Exasperated by the insatiable demands of the Shanghai lumpenproletariat, Zhang and his colleagues among the party underground—like Zhou Enlai two decades before—returned to the recruitment of ordinary factory workers. Under cover of organizing brotherhoods and mutual aid societies, the revolutionaries made

gradual inroads.[81] By early 1945 their Workers' Underground Army could claim more than 260 warriors—of whom more than 50 had also joined the Communist Party.[82]

Both Communist sympathizers and gang members among the work force were targeted for recruitment. Enterprises that had supplied an unusual number of worker pickets during the armed uprisings of 1926–1927 were a special focus of attention. At the French Tramway Company, for example, Communist cadres cultivated fifty workers to serve as a branch of the Workers' Underground Army.[83] Recruits were told that the New Fourth Army was advancing on Shanghai, and that they would be expected to rise up in response to outside military forces just as they had during the Workers' Three Armed Uprisings. Workers who had been active during the three uprisings were encouraged to recount their adventures of twenty years ago in order to inspire a new generation of militants.[84] The draftees were drawn both from the Mechanics' Savings Association (a CCP front) and from Red Gang followers in the Traffic Department. Contacts were made with gangsters along the docks to search for weapons.[85]

When Voice of America broadcast news of the Japanese surrender on August 10, 1945, Zhang Qi proposed that the Workers' Underground Army oversee the formation of factory pickets to protect machinery and materiel in preparation for the New Fourth Army's arrival.[86] At the Jiangnan Shipyard, more than three hundred workers enlisted in the pickets, standing guard around the clock to prevent sabotage by enemy forces. Meanwhile, members of the underground army plastered posters on walls across the city, welcoming Liu Changsheng (secretary of the Shanghai underground party) as the new mayor of Shanghai.[87]

At this moment of high anticipation, Party Central—acting on the Central China Bureau's boast that the Communists could count on the support of 200,000 sympathizers in Shanghai—approved a workers' armed uprising in the city. Operatives on the scene were more cautious, aware that the 260 members of their Workers' Underground Army commanded a mere forty pistols and a hundred grenades.[88] Nevertheless, they hoped that by first occupying one or two outlying industrial districts they might trigger a city-wide response. Accordingly, a decision was made to seize the Xinyi Machine Factory, located to the west of

the city not far from Qingpu County. The factory was deemed a suitable site for the headquarters of a proletarian uprising, in part because it had been a major supplier for the Japanese military, and in part because it contained a large storehouse of grain. With sixty members of the Workers' Underground Army as the core of its fighting force, the CCP mobilized more than seven thousand workers from surrounding textile mills, machine plants, and other enterprises to occupy the Xinyi Factory. Armbands were issued, identifying the recruits as pickets.[89]

While the excited workers awaited orders to convert their factory occupation into an armed insurrection, international events were rapidly conspiring against them. The Soviet Union, having just signed a treaty of friendship with the Nationalist government, signaled to the Chinese Communists to throw their support behind Chiang Kai-shek. In Shanghai and elsewhere, the KMT—not the CCP—would replace the retreating Japanese as the rulers of urban China. Once again the Comintern made a critical intervention in the course of the Chinese Revolution; and once again the KMT, not the CCP, was the primary beneficiary of Soviet support. Only hours after it began, the Xinyi Factory takeover was abruptly called off. Many of the underground army members, their identities having been revealed in the abortive uprising, were transferred to liberated base areas in Northern Jiangsu, Shandong, and elsewhere.[90]

The KMT's Workers' Loyal National Salvation Army

With Communist plans for a proletarian uprising thus foiled, the Guomindang countered by deploying twelve thousand soldiers and its own Workers' Loyal National Salvation Army (*gongren zhongyi jiuguojun*) to assume effective control over Shanghai.[91] The Workers' Loyal Army had been organized by KMT labor movement czar Lu Jingshi a few months before the Japanese surrender. A member of the Shanghai Green Gang and closely associated with its leader, Du Yuesheng, Lu had been active in union affairs in the city since the 1920s.[92] In contrast to the Communists' Workers' Underground Army, the KMT's Loyal Army was well armed thanks to a generous cache of weapons supplied by Secret-Service Chief Dai Li. This worker militia organized by Lu Jingshi helped to preside over the Nationalists' recovery of the city in 1945.[93]

A classified KMT report on the Shanghai labor movement, compiled in October 1945, noted that Lu Jingshi's Loyal Army had been recruited primarily among unemployed workers in the city. Apparently the KMT's gift of weapons proved more enticing to the Shanghai lumpen-proletariat than had the Communists' offer of empty titles. Members of Lu's army, dressed in plainclothes but carrying guns, strutted through the city streets, randomly searching and detaining passersby and generating widespread unease. Meanwhile, Lu Jingshi's rivals within the KMT were arming their own contingents of Shanghai workers in a bid to counter the labor czar's growing power.[94]

CIVIL WAR: KMT-CCP MIMESIS

Lu Jingshi's Workers' Army was demobilized soon after the Japanese withdrawal, but his ambitions of directing a loyal proletarian force did not subside. In June of 1946, Lu established a new organization known euphemistically as the Shanghai Workers' Welfare Committee (*gongren fuli weiyuanhui*), the primary purpose of which was to recruit in every factory KMT members who would provide intelligence on the labor movement to government authorities. Finances for the Welfare Committee came from a combination of workers' dues and contributions from both government and capital.[95] Lu Jingshi served as director of the sixty-one-member Welfare Committee, which supervised the operations of thousands of labor movement cadres. The cadres were divided into three categories. Level-one cadres, in addition to the committee members, included directors of many of the top industrial and factory unions. Numbering about two hundred, they received monthly stipends and were each issued a revolver and a special travel pass. Level-two cadres, who numbered nearly one thousand, were drawn mostly from among other major union directors. Level-three cadres, several thousand strong, included leaders of smaller factory unions and others with KMT leanings.[96]

Under the auspices of the Welfare Committee, training sessions were held for cadres of all the major unions. Underground Communists serving as union cadres also participated. Publicly, the training

sessions were advertised as a means of promoting production and fostering harmony between labor and management. Privately, they were intended to cultivate secret agents who would then ferret out Communist activists within the labor movement. At the end of the one-week sessions (which included political instruction as well as military exercises), trainees were collectively inducted into the KMT.[97]

In a decision that would have lasting ramifications by muddying the distinction between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries, Communist participants were directed by their superiors in the party to enroll as KMT members so as not to attract attention to themselves. A few months later, a second and more rigorous round of training was held during which military uniforms were issued and instruction was offered in such techniques as surveillance and arrest. Approximately two hundred underground Communist labor movement organizers entered the KMT at this time.[98]

Communist infiltration of the KMT labor movement was a nagging embarrassment to the authorities. When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek journeyed to Shanghai to review a citizens' parade at the race course, a large contingent of protesters suddenly emerged from among the ranks of marching workers. Wearing red-and-white armbands on which were written the characters for "pickets" (*jiuchayuan*), they pulled pieces of chalk from their pockets to scribble slogans on the cement or on parked vehicles: "Oppose dictatorship!" "Eliminate secret agents!" "Down with capitalists!" "Help unemployed workers!" "Labor is sacred!" "Thoroughly implement democracy!" Although the Garrison Command determined that one of the pickets (a young man wearing a black Sun Yat-sen jacket) sported an armband that identified him as a member of a labor union in western Shanghai, they reported shamefacedly that they had been unable to capture him, or for that matter any of the other culprits involved in the incident.[99]

Frustrated in his efforts to eliminate the Communist challenge, Lu Jingshi officially revived the paramilitary cadre of workers (again supplied and trained by military intelligence and the secret police) known as the Industry Defense Corps (*hugong dui*). In keeping with its prewar namesake, this was an armed unit whose raison d'être was to combat Communist influence among the Shanghai proletariat. Young men

were recruited with the alluring promise that service in the Industry Defense Corps would substitute for military conscription.[100]

The Industry Defense Corps operated under the auspices of the Workers' Welfare Committee and reported directly to Green Gang leader Lu Jingshi. The training and overtime wages of corps members were supposed to be covered by their factories, on grounds that keeping a dozen or two armed informers on the payroll was a small price to pay for countering leftist influences among one's workforce. The Industry Defense Corps was a costly enterprise, however. To support its nine-thousand-member force of twenty battalions, one hundred squadrons, and three hundred platoons, the reincarnated corps required a budget of 26.4 million yuan in its initial year for routine operations, wages, and travel expenses. Employers sometimes refused to defray the cost.[101]

Communist labor organizer Zhang Qi learned about the revival of the Industry Defense Corps a couple of months before its formal inauguration. According to his memoirs, however, Zhang decided against trying to forestall this development, unwelcome as it was. Chastened by the recent debacle of his Workers' Underground Army, Zhang reasoned that any effort to block Lu Jingshi's initiative would prove to be a fruitless struggle in which Communist identities would be needlessly revealed. Instead, following in the footsteps of Zhou Enlai some twenty years earlier, Zhang recommended that his fellow Communists attempt to infiltrate the Industry Defense Corps en masse and use it as a cover for pursuing their own revolutionary exploits.[102]

This systematic Communist infiltration of the Industry Defense Corps was explicitly approved by the head of the Shanghai party underground, Liu Changsheng, who reported it to Party Central.[103] Although a few of the Communist infiltrators defected to the opposition, the vast majority remained loyal to the CCP.[104] At the China Textile Company, which was targeted by the KMT for development of an Industry Defense Corps chapter, the fifty-four members who enlisted included ten underground Communists. The director was a Communist, as was the training instructor. Many of the other members, moreover, were labor movement activists with a progressive orientation. As a result, the chapter often proved more of a hindrance

than a help in carrying out KMT directives. When the unit was ordered to suppress strikes at nearby mills, for example, the director demurred on the pretext that all the corps members were skilled mechanics whose services were sorely needed on the job.[105] Similarly, when asked to help conduct a surprise census in the city as part of Chiang Ching-kuo's effort to uncover hidden Communists, it did so only perfunctorily.[106]

Nevertheless, the activities of the Industry Defense Corps amounted to more than a minor annoyance for the CCP underground. The corps posed real challenges to the Communists, not least because the styles of the two groups were remarkably congruent. Tellingly, government reports often used the terms *hugong dui* (Industry Defense Corps) and *jiucha* (pickets) interchangeably. Application forms for the Industry Defense Corps read like carbon copies of those for worker pickets. Just as pickets were to serve as an appendage of the Communist Party, so corps members were pledged strictly to obey the dictates of the KMT. The handbook for Industry Defense Corps members, while stressing the anti-Communist mission of their organization, reveals numerous parallels to their ostensible enemies: "The Industry Defense Corps is composed of outstanding workers who are highly principled and wage unremitting struggle against traitors, gangsters, and scabs. Its members are not soldiers, but must evidence military discipline. They are not secret agents [*tewu*], but must keep secrets and display revolutionary commitment. They must protect workers' safety, guard production, defend the unions, and promote industrial development."[107] Corps members swore personal fealty to the supreme leader, pledging to serve as "loyal and courageous warriors for our revolutionary commander, Chairman Chiang." They also promised to act as "capable cadres" for their more immediate patron, Mr. Lu Jingshi.[108]

Members of the Industry Defense Corps, like their Communist counterparts, were subjected to periodic political and military training sessions that sometimes raised concern on the part of employers, particularly when factory management was asked to contribute additional fees to finance these exercises. For example, the Cassia Restaurant fired a corps member who had waited tables there for more than three years without incident after he presented a bill for

his training session. When the Bureau of Social Affairs investigated the matter, the restaurateur insisted that his former employee had pocketed money from a wedding banquet.[109] In August 1946, the printing house of the Yizhong Tobacco Company (a branch of the British American Tobacco Company) balked at the idea of paying full wages to two Defense Corps workers sent to Nanjing for "summer camp"—despite repeated prodding from the Bureau of Social Affairs. Ironically, that same month Lu Jingshi wrote to the chief of the bureau objecting to Communist training sessions for workers at the same Yizhong Tobacco Company. According to Lu's complaint, the Communists were also planning to send two workers off somewhere—probably to a New Fourth Army camp in Subei, he surmised—for two months of military and political instruction.[110]

The striking similarities between KMT and CCP approaches to labor mobilization were evident in the educational regimen for Industry Defense Corps members. A seven-week training session included, in addition to military practice, lectures on revolutionary spirit, labor movement history, politics, and surveillance techniques.[111] Just as Communist training sessions exposed pickets to rudimentary lessons in Marxism-Leninism, so Nationalist instructors lectured Industry Corps members on Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People.[112] Psychological techniques of shaming and confession, associated with Chinese Communist methods of "thought reform,"[113] were also deployed by the KMT. Two corps members, for example, sent to Nanjing for special training, returned to their factories "ashamed that they had so many shortcomings." In a manner reminiscent of Communist practices, they undertook numerous self-criticisms (*ziwo jiantao*) to improve their attitude.[114] Industry Corps members, like their Communist counterparts, were also subject to an elaborate system of rewards for meritorious behavior and punishments for misdeeds.[115]

Despite such efforts to impose discipline, members of the Industry Defense Corps were not immune to misbehavior. The Bureau of Social Affairs was frequently forced to investigate allegations of illegal arrests, assaults, and extortions instigated by the Defense Corps. It was common practice for corps members, brandishing weapons, to board public buses without tickets. When told to buy a ticket, they

would flash their Defense Corps identification cards, claiming to be military personnel.[116] Even Lu Jingshi admitted that discipline was lax and that grassroots leaders were using their positions to enrich themselves through extortion. Sounding a good deal like his Communist counterparts, Lu complained that "Shanghai is an environment filled with evil, while ours is a revolutionary organization that must be committed to improving society. We must tighten checks on cadres at all levels."[117]

Many of those who were attracted to Industry Defense Corps work, like their cousins in the Communist camp, were unruly individuals. A detailed police report, complete with photographic evidence, described one unseemly, but probably not unusual, case in point. A corps member by the name of Lin Zhende happened to be clearing his throat from an upstairs window one morning just when the manager of the Xinshen Silk Factory was walking by in the street below. Hit squarely by Lin's spittle, the irate factory manager—assisted by an employee of his factory—went after Lin. Lin later gathered eight or nine fellow corpsmen from his own factory to march to the Xinshen Silk Factory to settle the score. Although the manager himself was nowhere to be found, his hapless aide was beaten severely in the revenge assault.[118]

In an attempt to promote pride and probity among its membership, the Industry Defense Corps issued new blue-colored uniforms—the cost of which was to be borne equally by workers and their employers. Men were to sport military-style hats and white gloves with their new uniforms. Women were to don blue *qipao* (or cheongsam, a traditional Chinese-Manchu dress) accented by white gloves. All were required to display numbered badges as well. At some enterprises, the number of Defense Corps volunteers more than doubled when the snazzy new uniforms were introduced.[119] The distribution of uniforms and identifying badges also marked the evolution of the Industry Defense Corps from a secret to a semipublic organization.[120] Guns were to be better controlled through a licensing procedure overseen by the Garrison Command. To add more of a martial flair, trumpets were purchased for every corps unit. But such efforts did not necessarily improve the

situation. Uniformed corps members waltzed brazenly into dance halls and theaters, creating public disturbances.[121] They also posed as policemen, interfering with crime control. Corps captains were admonished to see that members under their supervision did not wear their uniforms when off duty, in hopes of reducing such flagrant abuses of authority.[122]

As Lu Jingshi often warned, lack of discipline on the part of KMT-sponsored militias created "opportunities for Communists to seize the advantage."[123] Communists were indeed gaining the upper hand: a planned May Day display of Industry Defense Corps prowess, scheduled to be held at the Shanghai race course, had to be canceled for fear that Communist infiltrators would disrupt the festivities.[124] Lu Jingshi candidly admitted the mounting problems in an "Open Letter to Comrades" issued on the second anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Welfare Committee in June 1948. He noted presciently:

> A year ago, my open letter warned of grave difficulties posed by the Communist reactionaries. This year the situation is even more serious. And the year ahead will determine the nation's fate. This Committee is a revolutionary organization whose work is essential to the future of the party and people. Despite successes in rounding up Communists at the power companies, the department stores, the machine tool shops, and the textile mills, there are still many hidden Communists preparing to link up with their army in Subei to launch a joint attack.
>
> The Industry Defense Corps needs to be reorganized. They were originally a workers' self-defense force with a special mission. In step with the demands of the current situation, a general headquarters has been established which is in contact with the city's top military authorities.
>
> Our revolutionary mission requires that we stay close to the masses. We must treat the masses as the recipients of our service, not as our own political capital.[125]

Even on the brink of defeat and retreat, KMT officials were still voicing revolutionary aspirations. The theme song of the Industry Defense Corps, the words to which were written at this time by Lu

Jingshi himself, expressed the hope—but certainly not the reality—of the corps' raison d'être:

We are the workers' defense.
Firm and brave, an armed self-defense force.
We carry out our tasks, obey commands, and advance forward.
We root out traitor bandits, liquidate desperadoes, protect industry, stabilize society.

We are the workers' fortress.
Loyal to party, patriotic, resolute.
The workers' future is bright.
Long live the Chinese workers.
Long, long life![126]

Although the life span of the Industry Defense Corps would be cut short by the Communist victory in 1949, the organization did generate serious difficulties for its opponents before its demise. Thanks to the intelligence provided by corps members, numerous Communists and Communist sympathizers within the labor movement were arrested and often executed by the Nationalist state. In the process, countless strikes were foiled.[127]

Corps activities intended to boost social mobilization and bolster state control extended outside the factory gates as well. In August 1948, five thousand members of the Industry Defense Corps helped conduct a household census organized by Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to uncover subversives harbored within the Shanghai city limits. The corps was also instrumental in mobilizing votes for Lu Jingshi in the National Assembly elections. During union elections, Defense Corps members—carrying guns—manned the doors to ensure that voting followed the recommendations of Lu's Workers' Welfare Committee.[128]

In a campaign that eerily foreshadowed the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign of the early 1950s, in which Communist pickets would play a critical role (see chapter 4), trained members of the Industry Defense Corps in 1948 spearheaded a Liquidate Traitors Campaign (*xiaojian yundong*) to smoke out workers

suspected of Communist ties. A light sentence for those targeted in this movement was job dismissal.[129] At the same time, an Oppose American-Support-for-Japan Campaign (*fan meifuri yundong*) was launched in conjunction with the May Day celebrations of 1948. Recognizing its delicate position, the Workers' Welfare Committee cautioned that this campaign must be conducted in such a way as not to undermine the authority of the KMT government or to buttress the prestige of the CCP (which was vociferously decrying the rebuilding of Japan under the U.S. Occupation).[130]

Even during its heyday the Industry Defense Corps did not go unrivaled. And the challenge came not only from the Communist underground, but from warring factions within the Guomindang as well. Lu Jingshi faced persistent opposition from leaders of the Shanghai branch of the Three People's Principles Youth Corps, who had their own designs on the industrial work force. In a classified report submitted in July of 1947, an infuriated Lu Jingshi accused the Youth Corps of organizing a secret society at some of the city's cotton mills and issuing revolvers, armbands, and identification cards to workers who took the oath of allegiance. Dramatically, Lu threatened to resign unless the Youth Corps bowed out of the Shanghai labor movement—charging that the Youth Corps' actions were encouraging Communist infiltration of the workplace. Although the Youth Corps heatedly denied the accusation, its labor movement agency was dissolved on orders from Chiang Kai-shek. This did not end the problem of internal KMT rivalries, however. A year later, a confidential police report to the mayor of Shanghai expressed concern that Lu's Industry Defense Corps was in direct competition with a China Labor Advancement Society (*Zhongguo laogong xiejinshe*) headed by the Central Statistical Bureau, a military intelligence office that reported to Chen Lifu (a leader of the KMT's CC Clique). According to the report, the conflict between the two factions had generated a rash of strikes at mills and utility companies across the city. Both groups were directing armed workers under their command to harass each other, creating a perfect opening for Communist inroads.[131] As Lloyd Eastman argues, such factional strife sowed the "seeds of destruction" that ultimately undid the Nationalist regime.[132]

LIBERATING THE CITIES

Skirmishes between Guomindang factions afforded valuable opportunities to the Communists, who were not shy in taking advantage of them. In early 1949, Communist organizers sponsored the formation of a Factory Defense Corps (*huchang dui*) to serve as a direct counterweight to Lu Jingshi's Industry Defense Corps.[133] The Factory Corps was charged with fingering KMT agents and preventing their removal of factory equipment in anticipation of a Communist victory. As the New Fourth Army approached Shanghai that spring, armbands were issued to members of the Factory Defense Corps—who began to call themselves Factory Defense *Pickets* in order to link their cause to that of their forebears two decades before.[134]

In March the Communists issued detailed regulations on picket organization. The picket units were to be composed primarily of factory workers, along with office workers and the urban poor, and were to direct their attention toward protecting factories and labor leaders, monitoring secret agents and running dogs, countering reactionary armed forces, and generally assisting in the liberation of Shanghai by preserving public order. Significantly, workers who had participated in the KMT, the Three People's Principles Youth Corps, or other organizations considered reactionary were permitted to join the pickets so long as they indicated an intention to break with these previous affiliations. The regulations explicitly advocated taking advantage of entities such as KMT's Industry Defense Corps, in order to "simultaneously utilize and undermine" them.[135] On May 10, two weeks before the Communist takeover of the city, Lu Jingshi reported to the Garrison Command on the CCP's organization of illegal armed factory defense units, and called upon KMT unions to send their own special forces to infiltrate and assume control of these enemy outfits.[136]

The imminent liberation of Shanghai raised expectations among underground Communist cadres that at long last the fourth—and final—workers' armed uprising was about to be realized. Zhang Qi, who was still in overall command of the Communist labor movement in Shanghai, recalled his excitement when he learned that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was marching toward the city:

> From that time on, I was always mentally calculating how to organize the Shanghai workers to carry out armed uprising, to coordinate inside and outside [*liying waihe*], to liberate Shanghai. This thinking of mine was not baseless, but founded on historical precedent. In March 1927 the beloved Zhou Enlai had led the workers' armed uprising in Shanghai to complement the Northern Expedition Army which victoriously occupied the city . . . Despite the reversal of April 12, the idea of armed uprising to eliminate the enemy and liberate Shanghai remained deeply ingrained among the Shanghai workers.
>
> In August 1945 when the Japanese surrendered . . . we organized an underground army that occupied the Xinyi Machine Factory in western Shanghai. More than ten thousand workers participated in that action, which took Xinyi as a base from which to mobilize a Shanghai workers' armed uprising that would complement the New Fourth Army in liberating Shanghai. Although Party Central later decided that the New Fourth Army wouldn't advance on Shanghai and the Shanghai underground called off the uprising, the idea of armed uprising and of coordinating inside and outside was firmly embedded in the minds of many party underground members. I too spent day and night dreaming about how to organize a mass armed uprising. But this mentality was soon to change.[137]

Contrary to the dreams of the underground cadres, however, Party Central—sobered by its experience with unruly workers in North China—was not about to encourage an armed workers' uprising in the nation's industrial capital. In the northern city of Shijiazhuang, the Communist advance had prompted armed pickets to turn criticism meetings into indiscriminate slaughter sessions. The party quickly issued an order prohibiting anyone but public security officials from conducting arrests and executions or carrying out property confiscation during the liberation process.[138] When the Sixth All-China Labor Congress was convened in Harbin in August 1948, a resolution outlining procedures for liberating the cities stressed the importance of maintaining order, protecting machines and equipment at all public and private enterprises, and guarding against sabotage and theft. No mention was made of a proletarian uprising.[139] A few months later, Zhang Qi and a half dozen other comrades from

the Shanghai underground attended a Communist-organized training program in Hong Kong on how to liberate a city, based on the party's experiences in North China. Again the emphasis was upon preserving the industrial infrastructure, not on fomenting a workers' armed uprising. As Zhang Qi later explained, "In this way, my thinking was clarified. Armed uprising wasn't the only method of coordinating inside and outside."[140]

Although in 1949 the Communists' design for liberating Shanghai departed substantially from their more radical strategy twenty-two years earlier, there were nonetheless some important points of continuity. When Zhang Qi returned from his Hong Kong training, the Communist underground in Shanghai was reorganized along territorial lines. Much as in 1927, Communist cells in different districts of the city prepared for street battles against an enemy that might decide to fight rather than abandon the nation's biggest and richest city to the revolution. By arranging their forces horizontally (*kuaikuai*), instead of vertically (*tiaotiao*), the Communists were hoping to strengthen the capacity of neighborhoods across the city to wage independent warfare—if necessary—in defense of their factories, schools, offices, and homes.[141] In further imitation of the 1927 pattern, worker militias organized by district were to play a key role in these local battles.

Despite the continuity in territorially-based modes of mobilization and militarization, however, a fundamental change had taken place in CCP strategy over the intervening years. In contrast to spirited debates about citizenship during the three armed uprisings, now there was no suggestion that neighborhoods might serve as the building blocks of a representative form of municipal self-governance. A centrally coordinated party-state, with two decades of experience in the countryside under its belt, stood ready to bend the cities to its will. Not community solidarity, but class struggle, would serve as the catalyst of state-building under these changed conditions.

On the eve of liberation, the underground party committee in Shanghai established a secret force—known as the People's Peace Preservation Corps (*renmin baoandui*)—to coordinate the activities of the various factory defense corps, picket forces, and other pro-Communist worker outfits operating around the city. Each of the six

district branches of the People's Peace Preservation Corps (PPPC) included thousands of workers from dozens of factories, with workers divided into three functional units to handle combat, propaganda, and medical assistance.[142] In all, the PPPC numbered more than sixty thousand lightly armed workers, and their efforts were largely responsible for blocking KMT plans to dismantle and remove factory equipment.[143] Reading the handwriting on the wall, many members of the KMT's Industry Defense Corps switched over to the PPPC at this time; more than a few of these renegades would soon enlist in the Communist Youth League and even the Communist Party.[144]

Despite—or perhaps precisely because of—its compromised membership, the PPPC played a significant role in delivering the city of Shanghai to the Communists. Described by its general command as an "armed self-defense force composed mostly of workers," the corps not only assisted the PLA in maintaining public order and preventing industrial sabotage, it also went factory by factory to round up people on the CCP's list of war criminals as well as anyone found destroying equipment, accounts, or archives. Its operations proved critical to the smooth Communist takeover of the industrial sector. At the Shanghai Number One Cotton Mill, for instance, eight hundred of the more than one thousand factory pickets active at this time later received meritorious service awards for their role in ferreting out enemy agents.[145] The corps was authorized to arrest, but not to punish, suspected culprits. Although the corps was encouraged to conduct factory surveillance (*kanguan*), the actual takeover (*jieguan*) of work units required action by the Military Control Commission.[146]

One week before the liberation of Shanghai, armbands—written with red characters on white backgrounds—were issued to all PPPC members to be worn when the PLA soldiers arrived, in order to prevent enemy forces from infiltrating their ranks (see photo 3.1). In the confusion that surrounded the approach of the New Fourth Army, however, pro-KMT elements sporting counterfeit PPPC armbands (emblazoned with black rather than red characters) attempted preemptive takeovers of factories in eastern Shanghai.[147] But as soon as the PLA marched triumphantly into the city—with far less opposition from the retreating KMT forces than feared—the new authorities publicly designated the red-character-armband PPPC as "the



Photo 3.1. Identification badge worn by People's Peace Preservation Corps member during the Communist takeover of Shanghai in May 1949. Taken from Zhongguo gongchandang 70nian tuji, *Volume I, p. 839.*

authentic revolutionary organization of the party underground." In recognition of this status, the New Fourth Army sent a congratulatory banner to the members of the corps—much as Chiang Kai-shek had honored the pickets in an earlier era (see chapter 2)—praising them as factory-protection heroes.[148]

CONCLUSION

From the vantage point of later historical developments, it seems natural enough—after the break of April 1927—to ascribe to the CCP and KMT the respective designations of *revolutionary* and *counterrevolutionary*, and to see the eventual founding of the PRC as a complete repudiation of the failed political system that preceded it.[149] In contrast to the marked effectiveness of PRC rule, the Nationalist regime is commonly depicted as hobbled by weak and incompetent institutions that were staffed by reactionary officials. As Lloyd Eastman puts it, "Ineffectual administration was perhaps the most debilitating feature of Kuomintang [Guomindang] rule, for the revolutionaries of

the Northern Expedition had quickly been transmogrified into the traditionalist bureaucrats of the Nanking [Nanjing] period."[150]

This study of worker militias under the KMT does not question Eastman's portrait of weak political institutions, riddled by factional conflict.[151] But it does remind us that the Nationalist regime was more than a congeries of traditionalist bureaucrats. True to its Leninist roots, the KMT party-state continued to avow commitment to a revolutionary enterprise right up to (and even after) its stinging defeat at the hands of the Communists in 1949.[152] From this perspective, the interactive borrowing and bettering of mobilization strategies between these two partisan rivals is less surprising.

As competitors in the same "organizational field" of modern revolutionary politics, the KMT and CCP were engaged in an interdependent process of imitation and innovation.[153] Moreover, both parties—upon the acquisition of state authority—incorporated previous revolutionary practices as an instrument of political control. Institutional inversion was central to Nationalist and Communist state-making experiences alike. In this view, the PRC (like the transplanted KMT regime on Taiwan) represents not a repudiation, but a consummation, of the Nationalists' fledgling attempts at state-building.[154] The origins of the modern Chinese state, in other words, must be sought in Nanjing as much as in Yan'an.[155]

Central to the agendas of both regimes was an effort to conjure up a modern citizenry that would at once reflect, represent, and reinforce the legitimacy and power of the nation-state itself. In the words of one anthropologist:

> [T]he Nationalist and Communist governments claimed to represent a modern, civilized Chinese nation. In order to realize their claim to a specifically "modern" (as opposed to "feudal," "imperial," or "warlord") form of state and nation, they had literally to call into being the modern citizens who would comprise that nation. Moreover, by claiming to be the representative of these idealized citizens, both governments also sought to produce themselves as the legitimate source of the constitutive power derived from this "calling into being."[156]

To highlight their parallel projects of constructing a modern citizenry is most certainly not to argue that there were no discernable differences between these two parties or the political orders that they each established. Although they shared a similar ancestry and ambition, the KMT and CCP were not identical twins. By the late 1920s the two parties articulated competing political visions and, as I have argued elsewhere, attracted different social elements—even within the working class—to their respective causes.[157] They also developed distinctive methods of mass mobilization, with the Communists proving far more adept at emotional engineering than their competitors.[158] And yet, like other regimes born from revolutionary conflict, they faced the common challenge of converting the means of popular contention into mechanisms of political control.

In the case of militias, this state-building task was further complicated by the fact that the recruits—many of whom were not employed workers—often entertained conceptions of their mission that were quite different from the conceptions of the parties that had enlisted their services. As a result, and in contrast to the work force as a whole, militiamen were unusually mercurial in their political affiliations—switching from one partisan patron to another as the opportunity presented itself. The overlap in membership between ostensibly opposed worker militias is a phenomenon that has been observed in the case of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary militias elsewhere in the world as well.[159] Such shifting constituencies, in turn, provided a justification for repeated rectification campaigns to cleanse the revolutionary citizenry of counterrevolutionary elements.

The similarities and continuities between the KMT and CCP help account for the seemingly irrational fear of hidden enemies that beset both parties' parallel efforts at revolutionary mobilization and state-building. The violence and terror that issued from this surreptitious shadow dance was as much a product of the revolutionary dynamic itself as it was of any separate counterrevolutionary reaction. In contrast to France and Russia, where Arno Mayer argues that a philosophy of counterrevolution is "at least as deeply anchored and durable" as that of revolution,[160] political leaders in twentieth-century China, from Sun Yat-sen forward, have all claimed revolutionary inspiration and legitimation for their actions.

Emulation and infiltration on the part of KMT and CCP alike encouraged mutual suspicions that often bordered on the paranoid. A poignant case in the late 1940s culled from the archives of the Shanghai Police suggests that the Nationalists were no less immune to this tendency than the Communists would prove to be. The case involved a young woman worker from a Shanghai textile mill, who had taken leave from her job and was found late one night muttering unintelligibly and wandering aimlessly along the docks in the northern Jiangsu town of Jiangdu. Although the woman insisted that she was only trying to find her way home, the KMT police suspected that she was a Communist picket planning to join the New Fourth Army. Why else, they reasoned, would a young woman worker from Shanghai be headed to Subei in such a frenzy? They promptly tossed her in prison, but after some months during which the inmate screamed incessantly and refused to eat, she was sent to Shanghai's Mercy Hospital, a missionary institution for the mentally ill, to undergo psychiatric evaluation. The doctors there recorded her babble:

> Every night when I go to bed, a fox spirit enters my room. It either sits on the bed and makes strange noises, threatens me, and assaults and rapes me, or else it possesses my body. So sometimes my words and behavior are controlled by the fox spirit and are not my own intentions. Sometimes someone else sleeps with me. Sometimes the ghosts turn into foreign infants on my bed and suck my blood. Because I was evil in a previous life, today the fox spirit is wreaking revenge. Last year when I was arrested it was all because of the fox spirit. I often hear voices saying, "a bundle of firewood, a peck of rice, a leg, and so forth." I also see people in the shadows. I'm surrounded by dead ghosts. Fortunately, I am aided by the Goddess of Mercy. The howling winds and falling snow are stilled by my sincere prayers.

Having been instructed by the police that their patient was a crafty Communist feigning mental illness, the doctors admonished the hapless woman repeatedly that she could be discharged as soon as she no longer saw ghosts or fox spirits. Still the suspected picket continued to describe her terrifying apparitions. Finally the physicians concluded that the young woman could not possibly be pretending, and diagnosed her as

"schizophrenia paranoid." After months of incarceration and interrogation, at state expense, she was transferred to the Shanghai women's shelter from whence she disappears from the archival record.[161]

The plight of this mentally disturbed woman, extreme as it surely was, indicates the extraordinary lengths to which the emerging party-state would go in trying to ferret out its supposed enemies. Here too was a pattern that would long outlive the Nationalist regime. As China's first Leninist party to grasp the reins of state power, the KMT was setting the stage for a more enduring—and more effective—form of rule. In Mao's China, mass campaigns to purge the revolutionary citizenry of infiltrators, infidels, and other impure elements would emerge as a principal means of government control. Militias, transmuted from state-breakers into state-makers, were central players in these lustration campaigns. Their job of patrolling the revolution did not end with political victory.

NOTES

1. C. Martin Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923–1928* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 191.
2. Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China*, 191.
3. S. A. Smith, *A Road is Made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920–1927* (Richmond, Va.: Curzon, 2000), 209.
4. Henrietta Harrison, "Martyrs and Militarism in Early Republican China," *Twentieth-Century China* 23, no. 2 (April 1998): 62–63; Arif Dirlik, "The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution," *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 4 (August 1975): 972–73, 976; Stephen C. Averill, "The New Life in Action: The Nationalist Government in South Jiangxi, 1934–37," *China Quarterly*, no. 88 (December 1981): 594–628.
5. For a case study of this effort in Hunan Province, see Edward A. McCord, "Local Militia and State Power in Nationalist China," *Modern China* 25, no. 2 (April 1999): 115–41. For a more general analysis, see Huang Jinlin, *Lishi, shenti, guojia: jindai Zhongguo de shenti xingcheng, 1895–1937* [History, body, and the state: The construction of the modern Chinese body, 1895–1937] (Taipei: Lianjing Press, 2001).
6. V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932), 37.
7. In Shanghai, the defense leagues were folded into Bai Chongxi's Northern Expeditionary Song-Hu Defense League Office, under the command of Dai Shifu. With the establishment of the Shanghai Special Municipality in July 1927, Li Xianmo took over as director. In November 1929, the Song-Hu Defense League was transformed into the Defense League Preparatory Committee, headed by Sun Baorong. In April 1931 it was renamed the Defense League Management Committee, and three years later, the Shanghai Municipal Defense Committee. During World War II, the Japanese set up a Security League (*baoandui*) under their Shanghai Security Headquarters. After the war, the Shanghai Security Committee was established in November 1945 with Mayor Qian Dajun as director. Under it was the General Defense League, headed by Rong Youlue. In June of 1946, the municipal government ordered the dissolution of the General Defense League, in favor of relying exclusively upon police forces for the maintenance of local order, but in fact the district branches remained in place until the Communist takeover in 1949. Shanghai Municipal Archives, ed., *Shanghaishi dang'anguan jianming zhinan* [Concise introduction to the Shanghai Municipal Archives] (Shanghai, 1991), 49.
8. SMA, Q169-1-27.
9. SMA, Q1-7-53.
10. SMA, Q169-1-9.
11. SMA, Q169-1-13.
12. The relationship between the bourgeoisie and the KMT was in fact quite complicated, varying both by divisions within the bourgeoisie and over time. See Parks Coble, *The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Richard C. Bush, *The Politics of Cotton Textiles in Kuomintang China* (New York: Garland, 1982); Joseph Fewsmith, *Party, State and Local Elites in Republican China: Merchant Organizations and Politics in Republican China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); and Marie-Claire Bergere, *The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1917–1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
13. McCord, "Local Militia and State Power in Nationalist China," 127.
14. Sun Yat-sen had explicitly declared, in his lecture on people's livelihood, that "in China, where industry is not yet developed, class war and the dictatorship of the proletariat are unnecessary." Sun Yat-sen, *San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People* (Shanghai, 1929), 440–41.
15. William C. Kirby, ed., *Realms of Freedom in Modern China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), chap. 5. See also the chapters by Joseph Esherick and Paul Cohen in *Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches*, ed. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (New York: Routledge, 2003).
16. Number Two Historical Archives, Nanjing, #627-667 (1927).
17. Number Two Historical Archives, #627-667 (1927).
18. Kuomintang Party History Archives, Taipei, #7499 (June 21, 1927). Kuomintang Party History Archives, Taipei, #7499 (June 21, 1927).
19. Number Two Historical Archives, #627-667 (1927).
20. Number Two Historical Archives, #627-667 (1927).
21. Number Two Historical Archives, #627-667 (1927).
22. Number Two Historical Archives, #627-667 (1927).

23. Kuomintang Party History Archives, Taipei, #1279 (August 1927 report from Hubei Workers' Armed Corps); and #1283 (September 21, 1927, report on Fujian labor movement).

24. Kuomintang Party History Archives, Taipei, #7506 (July 24, 1927, petition from the Shanghai French Tramway Company).

25. Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), chap. 5; Brian G. Martin, *The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 168–72.

26. Roy M. Hofheinz, *The Broken Wave: The Chinese Communist Peasant Movement, 1922–1928* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).

27. Important as these rural militias were, Mao nevertheless complained about the undisciplined and scattered nature of the village Red Guards. Wu Zhenlu and Qiu Hengcong, *Qiushou qiyi jishi* [Annals of the Autumn Harvest Uprising] (Beijing: Liberation Army Literary Press, 2002), 294.

28. Liu Mingkui and Tang Yuliang, eds., *Zhongguo gongren yundong shi* [History of the Chinese labor movement] (Guangzhou: Guangdong People's Press, 1998), 4:23–26.

29. Quoted in Fernando Galbiati, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985), 281.

30. Tim McDaniel, *Autocracy, Capitalism and the Revolution in Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

31. Galbiati, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet*, 314.

32. Galbiati, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet*, 300.

33. Galbiati, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet*, 294.

34. Galbiati, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet*, 333.

35. Galbiati, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet*, 306.

36. Marcia R. Ristaino, *China's Art of Revolution: The Mobilization of Discontent, 1927 and 1928* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987), chap. 6.

37. "Zhongyang tonggao di shisan hao" [Central circular number thirteen] (October 24, 1927); *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* [Collected central documents of the Chinese Communist Party] (Beijing: Central Archives Press, 1989), 3:395.

38. Arif Dirlik, "Narrativizing Revolution: The Guangzhou Uprising (11–13 December 1927) in Workers' Perspective," *Modern China* 23, no. 4 (October 1997): 371.

39. He Yümin, *Zhongguo renmin gong'an shigao* [Draft history of the Chinese people's public security] (Beijing: Police Officers Education Press, 1997), 18; Shi Guang, ed., *Xinghuo liaoyuan* [A single spark can light a prairie fire] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1994), 93.

40. Dirlik, "Narrativizing Revolution," 385.

41. Liu and Tang, *Zhongguo gongren yundong shi*, 27–31.

42. Dirlik, "Narrativizing Revolution," 363.

43. Galbiati, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet*, 326.

44. Samuel B. Griffith, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1967), 266. The official organizational blueprint for the Red Guards can be found in Hyobom Pak, ed., *Documents of the Chinese Communist Party, 1927–30* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1971), 439–40. On the landlord defense forces, see McCord, "Local Militia and State Power in Nationalist China," 115–41.

45. Fu Qiutao, *Zhongguo minbing* [Chinese militia] (Beijing: People's Press, 1983), 71–79.

46. Fu Qiutao, *Zhongguo minbing*, 82–97. For example, the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi base area had 258,300 Red Guards by 1935; the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base had more than 300,000 by 1932; the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia base had 91,000 Red Guards in 1936.

47. Galbiati, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet*, 301. In later years, however, a distinction was made between Red Guards (*chiweidui*) and guerrillas (*youjidui*), with the former providing for local defense while the latter engaged in mobile warfare.

48. Mao Zedong, "Lun chijiuzhan" [On protracted warfare], *Mao Zedong xuanji* [Selected works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: People's Press, 1964), 478.

49. John Gittings, "China's Militia," *China Quarterly*, no. 18 (April–June 1964): 101. Gittings notes that the militia at this time were composed of crack members of the People's Anti-Japanese Defense Corps, a civil defense operation whose membership had expanded to ten million (out of a total population in the liberated areas of nearly one hundred million) by April 1945.

50. *Dangdai Zhongguo minbing* [The contemporary Chinese militia] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1989), 10.

51. See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962); Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Tetsuya Kataoka, *Resistance and Revolution in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Chen-ya Tien, *The Mass Militia System and China's Modernization* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1982); Thomas C. Roberts, *The Chinese People's Militia and the Doctrine of People's War* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983); Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Odoric Y. K. Wou, *Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994); Odoric Y. K. Wou, "Community Defense and the Chinese Revolution," *Modern China* 25, no. 3 (July 1999): 264–302.

52. Important recent contributions to our understanding of the urban scene are Gregor Benton, *China's Urban Revolutionaries: Explorations in the History of Chinese Trotskyism, 1921–1952* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1996); and Patricia Stranahan, *Underground: The Shanghai Communist Party and the Politics of Survival, 1927–1937* (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).

53. SMA, D6-8-125.
54. SMA, D6-8-74.
55. SMA, D6-8-125.
56. Qian Gendi, ed., *Shanghai gonghui lianhehui* [Shanghai Federation of Unions] (Shanghai: Shanghai Municipal Archives Press, 1989), 74. This is a collection of archival materials, spanning the years 1929–1934, from the Communist labor front organization known as the Shanghai Federation of Unions. The federation operated under the direct supervision of the Jiangsu Communist Party. Hereafter cited as *Shanghai lianhehui*.
57. *Shanghai lianhehui*, 182. To compound the problem, the cadre in charge of picket work for Zhabei District was said to speak in a dialect that was virtually unintelligible to the local workers. *Shanghai lianhehui*, 184.
58. SMA, D6-8-226, D6-8-227.
59. SMA, D6-8-246.
60. SMA, D6-8-276.
61. *Shanghai lianhehui*, 239–40.
62. SMA, D6-8-559, D6-8-480.
63. *Shanghai lianhehui*, 415–45.
64. For an argument that the Returned Students, who took over leadership of the Shanghai underground after Li Lisan, were considerably more moderate in their approach to mass mobilization, see Lawrence R. Sullivan, "Reconstruction and Rectification of the Communist Party in the Shanghai Underground: 1931–1934," *China Quarterly*, no. 105 (March 1985): 78–97.
65. A discussion of the continuing problems with left-wing adventurism under Li Lisan's successor, Wang Ming, can be found in Jin Liren, Li Huaming, and Li Xiaosu, *Wang Ming "zuo" qing maoxian zhuyi zai Shanghai* [Wang Ming's "left"-wing adventurism in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Far East Press, 1994).
66. SMA, D6-8-354.
67. SMA, D6-8-375.
68. *Shanghai Municipal Police Files* (held in the U.S. National Archives), D-2554/36.
69. Xu Meikun, "Yi qiyi qianhou" [Remembering before and after the uprising], *Shanghai gongyun shiliao*, no. 2 (1987): 1. For more on dog beating at the Commercial Press, see SMA, D6-8-517.
70. SMA, D6-8-559, D6-8-480.
71. Gu's statement is contained in a special collection of former Communists' confessions, compiled by the KMT, entitled *Zhuanbian* [Conversion], (1933), held in the archives of the Bureau of Investigation, Taipei, #245.3/841.
72. On Gu's defection and demise, see Frederic Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai, 1927–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 151–60, 253; Wu Jimin, *Zhou Enlai yü Shanghai miemen xuean* [Zhou Enlai and the bloody case of wiping out a family in Shanghai] (Taipei, 1998); Yu Ming, "Gu Shunzhang shijian yü Wu Hao qishi" [The Gu Shunzhang affair and the Wu Hao expose] in *Hongchao zaixiang: Zhou Enlai renge jiepou* [Prime Minister of a Red Dynasty: Dissecting the personality of Zhou Enlai], ed. Jin Zhong (Hong Kong, 1998), 223–29.

73. SMA, D6-8-379.
74. Nevertheless, both parties took their share of credit for supporting such guerrilla efforts. For an account from the KMT perspective, see Chen Gongshu, *Shanghai kangri dihou xingdong* [Shanghai's anti-Japanese actions behind enemy lines] (Taipei: Zhuanji Literary Press, 1984); a CCP perspective can be found in Shanghai Party Committee Party History Research Office, ed., *Shanghai jiaoxian kangri wuzhuang douzheng shiliao* [Historical materials on the armed struggle against the Japanese in Shanghai's suburban counties] (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1986).
75. Jiang Kelin, "Zongshu Shanghai gongren dixiajun" [A general narrative of the Shanghai Workers' Underground Army], *Shanghai gongyun shiliao* [Historical materials on the Shanghai labor movement], nos. 2–3 (1988): 2.
76. *Shanghai minbing douzheng shiziliao* [Historical materials on the struggles of the Shanghai militia] (December 1980), bk. 1, 7:2.
77. Rao's advice stemmed from his own unhappy experience in organizing tens of thousands of workers in the Japanese-owned cotton mills of western Shanghai for a strike in the fall of 1931. After the Japanese attack in early 1932, many of the strike activists fled the scene, leading Rao to conclude that employed workers were unreliable. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions Labor Movement Gazetteer Office, ed., *Shanghai dixiajun jishi* [Annals of the Shanghai Underground Army], (Shanghai, 1995), 8.
78. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 1, 7:4.
79. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions Labor Movement Gazetteer Office, *Shanghai dixiajun jishi*, 9.
80. Zhang Qi's requests to Party Central for a supply of weapons were rebuffed with the rebuke: "He Long started a revolution with two vegetable cleavers" (*Shanghai dixiajun jishi*, 1995), 28.
81. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions Labor Movement Gazetteer Office, *Shanghai dixiajun jishi*, 9–10. KMT intelligence reports make clear that the Communist effort to organize an army of unemployed workers at the end of the war was being closely monitored (SMA, Q6-31-51).
82. Jiang Kelin, "Zongshu Shanghai gongren dixiajun," 4.
83. On the role of French Tramway Company workers in providing workers pickets during the three armed uprisings, see *Shanghai Fadian gongren yundongshi* [History of the labor movement at Shanghai's French Tramway Company] (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Press, 1991), 36–47.
84. Chen Longxiang, "Dang zai Fadian zuzhi gongren dixiajun de qingkuang" [The conditions of the party's organizing of a workers' underground army at the French Tramway], *Shanghai gongyun shiliao* [Historical materials on the Shanghai labor movement], nos. 2–3 (1988): 31–32.
85. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions Labor Movement Gazetteer Office, *Shanghai dixiajun jishi*, 46–48.

86. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions Labor Movement Gazetteer Office, *Shanghai dixiajun jishi*, 10–11; Jiang Kelin, "Zongshu Shanghai gongren dixiajun," 5.
87. Jiang Kelin, "Zongshu Shanghai gongren dixiajun," 6.
88. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions Labor Movement Gazetteer Office, *Shanghai dixiajun jishi*, 12.
89. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions Labor Movement Gazetteer Office, *Shanghai dixiajun jishi*, 49.
90. Jiang Kelin, "Zongshu Shanghai gongren dixiajun," 6–7; Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions Labor Movement Gazetteer Office, *Shanghai dixiajun jishi*, 13–14. Those who remained in Shanghai became the backbone of the left-wing labor movement in the city, and many later served as leaders of the Factory Defense Corps (*huchang dui*) and People's Peace Preservation Corps (*renmin baoan dui*) that would prove so instrumental during the Communists' takeover in the spring of 1949. See *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 1, 7:14.
91. Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions Labor Movement Gazetteer Office, *Shanghai dixiajun jishi*, 10–11; Jiang Kelin, "Zongshu Shanghai gongren dixiajun," 5.
92. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike*, 96–100.
93. SMA, Q6-31-58.
94. SMA, Q6-31-58.
95. SMA, Q7-4.
96. Zhang Qi, "Daru gongfuhui neibu de douzheng" [The struggle to infiltrate the Workers' Welfare Committee], *Shanghai dangshi* [Shanghai party history], no. 2 (1992): 26; "Pohuai gongren de 'gongren fuli weiyuanhui'" [The antiworker "Workers' Welfare Committee"], in Chen Yiliang, ed., *Qunmo zuilian* [Exposing demons] (Shanghai: East China People's Press, 1951), 54–56.
97. *Shanghai diyi mianfangzhichang gongren yundongshi* [History of the labor movement in the Shanghai Number One Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mill] (Beijing, 1997), 97–99.
98. Zhang Qi, "Daru gongfuhui neibu de douzheng," 27.
99. SMA, Q6-31-88.
100. SMA, Q6-31-265.
101. SMA, Q6-31-145, C1-2-5219; Feng Baokui, "Shanghai gongren fulihui jiankuang" [A summary of the Shanghai Workers' Welfare Committee], *Shanghai dangshi* [Shanghai party history], no. 2 (1992): 33. As Lu Jingshi complained to the Bureau of Social Affairs, the Sino-American Kerosene Company had dismissed all six of its Defense Corps members rather than pay the attendant expenses. SMA, Q6-31-161.
102. Zhang Qi, *Shanghai gongyun jishi* [Annals of the Shanghai labor movement] (Shanghai: Chinese Encyclopedia Press, 1991); *Shanghai diyi mianfangzhichang*, 116.
103. Zhang Qi, *Shanghai gongyun jishi*, 179.
104. Zhang Qi, *Shanghai gongyun jishi*, 28.
105. *Shanghai diyi mianfangzhichang*, 117–19.
106. *Shanghai diyi mianfangzhichang*, 120.

107. SMA, Q7-307.
108. SMA, Q6-31-19, Q7-2, Q7-307.
109. SMA, Q6-8-458.
110. SMA, Q7-293, Q6-6-1065.
111. SMA, Q6-31-34.
112. SMA, Q7-307.
113. Robert J. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of Brainwashing in China* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963).
114. SMA, Q6-31-240.
115. SMA, Q7-307. For the equivalent Communist system, see C1-2-491.
116. SMA, Q6-31-135, Q6-31-45, Q6-31-538, Q6-31-230.
117. SMA, Q6-31-139. For a comparable condemnation of Shanghai from the Communist side, see Chen Duxiu, "Shanghai shehui" [Shanghai society], *Xin Qingnian* [New Youth], vol. 8, nos. 1–4 (1920), reprinted in *Shanghai gongchanzhuyi xiaozu* [The Shanghai Communist Small Group] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1988), 67–71.
118. SMA, Q6-8-531. The story did not end there. The wounded Xinshen employee hired more than ten soldiers who were recuperating at a nearby hospital to ambush Lin on his way home from work one day. Unsuccessful in locating Lin himself, the veterans proceeded to trash his abode. Judging from the police photos, they were remarkably thorough in their efforts.
119. Recruitment among young men increased greatly at this time, aided by the promise, as noted in the text, that corps service exempted one from military conscription. SMA, Q6-31-265.
120. SMA, Q6-31-132; Q6-31-133; Q6-31-566. Although the identification booklets for Industry Defense Corps members were stamped *secret* on the front, the wearing of uniforms obviously undermined any pretense at secrecy. SMA, Q6-31-529.
121. SMA, Q6-31-230, Q6-31-529, Q6-31-261.
122. SMA, Q6-31-241.
123. SMA, Q6-31-132.
124. SMA, Q6-31-34, Q6-31-299.
125. SMA, Q6-31-34.
126. SMA, Q6-31-34.
127. SMA, Q1-7-49, Q6-31-566; Feng Baokui, *Shanghai diyi mianfangzhichang gongren yundongshi*, 34; Perry, *Shanghai on Strike*, 123–124.
128. SMA, Q6-31-265, Q6-31-566.
129. SMA, Q6-31-38, Q6-31-59, Q6-31-143.
130. SMA, Q6-31-143.
131. SMA, Q1-7-56, Q6-31-132.
132. Lloyd E. Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937–1949* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984).
133. The rival KMT and CCP organizations sometimes even went by the same names. For example, in 1949 the Central Mint of the Nationalist government

established a Factory Defense Committee (*huchang weiyuanhui*) to provide protection in the event of a crisis. The Committee was composed of seven departments, of which one was the Picket Department (*jiucha zu*). Number Two Historical Archives, #450-597.

134. *Shanghai diyi mianfangzhi chang*, 163–77.

135. SMA, ed., *Shanghai jiefang* [The liberation of Shanghai], supplemental volume (Shanghai: Sanlian Bookstore, 1999), 133–35.

136. "Jinghuhang jingbei zongsilingbu disanci gongyun huibao jilu" [Minutes of the third labor movement report to the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Garrison Command], in SMA, ed., *Shanghai jiefang* [The liberation of Shanghai] (Beijing: Archives Press, 1989), 358–59.

137. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 8:75–76.

138. He Yumin, *Zhongguo renmin gong'an shigao*, 168–70.

139. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 8:76-77.

140. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 8:78.

141. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 8:78.

142. Shanghai Historical Materials Committee, ed., *Guanghui licheng* [Glorious course] (Shanghai: Shanghai Xinhua Publications, 1996), 255; Shen Han, "Huiyi Shanghai renmin baoandui" [Remembering the Shanghai People's Peace Preservation Corps], *Shanghai gongyun shiliao* [Historical materials on the Shanghai labor movement], no. 3 (1984): 16–20.

143. Zhu Hua, *Shanghai yibainian* [Shanghai century] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1999), 290.

144. SMA, Q6-31-566.

145. *Shanghai diyi mianfangzhi chang*, 163–77.

146. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 8:90–94.

147. In all, the PPPC confiscated more than forty different varieties of counterfeit armbands. See Zhang Qi, "Ji Shanghai renmin baoandui" [Record of the Shanghai People's Peace Preservation Corps], *Shanghai zhanyi* [The battle of Shanghai] (Shanghai: Xuelin Press, 1989), 219.

148. *Shanghai minbing*, bk. 2, 8:88.

149. See, for example, James E. Sheridan, *China in Disintegration* (New York: Free Press, 1975).

150. Lloyd E. Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 9.

151. For a work that does challenge Eastman's arguments, see Julia C. Strauss, *Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927–40* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 191. "Far from being the 'yamenized' den of corruption, patronage and endless paper-pushing described by Lloyd Eastman, the National Government was, at least in the critical sectors of tax and foreign affairs, capable of building strong and proactive institutions under exceptionally difficult circumstances." See also Strauss, "Strategies of Guomindang Institution Building: Rhetoric and Implementation in Wartime *Xunlian*," in *Defining Modernity: Guomindang Rhetorics of a New China, 1920–1970*, ed. Terry Bodenhorn (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Chinese Studies, 2002), 195ff.

152. Dirlik underscores the revolutionary aspirations behind the KMT's New Life Movement: "The leadership intended the New Life associations to be vehicles for the revolutionary reorganization of society that it envisioned . . . Its own claim to popular support was based on being more, not less, revolutionary than its opponents." Dirlik, "Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement," 953, 975.

153. On the concept of organizational fields in explaining institutional imitation and innovation, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," *American Sociological Review* 48 (April 1983): 147–60; and Neil Fligstein, *The Transformation of Corporate Control* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).

154. On the Leninist legacies in both contexts, see Bruce J. Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

155. Robert E. Bedeski, *State-Building in Modern China: The Kuomintang in the Prewar Period* (Berkeley: University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981), 1–7.

156. Sara L. Friedman, "Civilizing the Masses: The Productive Power of Cultural Reform Efforts in Late Republican-Era Fujian," in Bodenhorn, *Defining Modernity*, 152.

157. Elizabeth J. Perry, "Labor Divided: Sources of State Formation in Modern China," in *State Power and Social Forces*, ed. Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chap. 6.

158. Elizabeth J. Perry, "Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution," *Mobilization* 7, no. 2 (May 2002): 111–28.

159. Mark Traugott has shown that in the June Days of 1848, opposing worker militias in Paris (the National Workshops and the Mobile Guard) were virtually identical in their social composition. Mark Traugott, "Determinants of Political Orientation: Class and Organization in the Parisian Insurrection of June 1848," *American Journal of Sociology* 86, no. 1 (July 1980): 32–49, and *Armies of the Poor: Determinants of Working-Class Participation in the Parisian Insurrection of June 1848* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002).

160. Arno J. Mayer, *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 7.

161. SMA, Q1-7-59.