



PRIFYSGOL CYMRU

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
UNIVERSITY OF WALES

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


The Psychology of Nationalism, Supranationalism, and Prejudice in the Brexit Vote

Dr Paul B. Hutchings CPsychol Csci AFBPsS

- ▶ What is nationalism/patriotism?
 - ▶ What is supranationalism?
 - ▶ What is prejudice?
 - ▶ How do they all interact?
 - At a national, supranational, and global level
- 

Nationalism and Patriotism

- ▶ People like to be positive about themselves and the groups they belong to
 - Fundamental basis to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986)
 - ▶ But what is 'healthy' national pride?
 - Akin to individual pride? But what about hubris? Narcissism?
 - ▶ Patriotism as a valuable identity asset
 - ▶ Nationalism as the detrimental facet
 - Kosterman & Feshbach
- 

- ▶ SIT view (Tajfel & Turner, 1986)
 - Nationalism as intergroup differentiation
 - Uncritical support
 - Patriotism as positive ingroup evaluation
 - Affective ingroup attachment – belongingness, responsibility and pride
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
Supranationalism

- ▶ Transfer of state government authority to centralised institution
 - USA/European union
 - Can vary from some elements to complete
- ▶ Strongly opposed across Europe
 - UKIP (UK)
 - National Front (France)
 - Party for Freedom (Netherlands)
 - Ideologically opposed to supranational government (Hutter et al. (2016))

► Four cornerstones of supranationalism


1. Willingness to participate in supranational projects
2. Belief in supranational problem-solving capacity
3. Commitment to binding rules outside of individual national control
4. Desire to see supranational institution play greater role in global governance

(Nugent, 2006; Tallberg, 2002)





- ▶ Research evidence that popular support for Brexit was substantially driven by concerns about UK sovereignty and EU membership (Clarke, Goodwin, & Whitely, 2017; Pietz, Dhont, & Seyd, 2018)
- ▶ But... there is a problem
 - Opposition to supranationalism is highly correlated with prejudice, RWA and SDO
 - So that is where we will start looking...

▶ **WE MEASURE PREJUDICE**

- ▶ And we're very good at it
 - ▶ Explicit prejudice – consciously aware, can be brought to mind
 - ▶ Implicit prejudice – beyond conscious awareness, often unnoticed, subtle in behavioural influence
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
Implicit Association Test (IAT)




Disease

Honour

Critical Trial 1




Disease




Honour

Critical Trial 2



Honour



Disease

IAT (d' calculation) based on RT difference
between responses to critical trials 1 & 2

More negative d' = higher prejudice

Explicit Prejudice Questionnaire (EPQ)

▶ 15-item questionnaire


- *If people move to another country they should be allowed to maintain their own traditions*
- *Those immigrants who do not have immigration documents should be sent back to their countries (Reverse scored)*


1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Agree						Strongly Disagree

Higher score = higher prejudice


Son-Hing et al. (2008) dual-process model

- ▶ Interaction between implicit and explicit prejudice
 - Low implicit/Low explicit = Egalitarian/Truly Low Prejudice
 - High implicit/Low explicit = Aversive racist
 - Low implicit/High explicit = Principled conservative
 - High implicit/High explicit = Modern racist







THE IMMIGRATION STUDY



Sullivan, K. E., & Hutchings, P. B. (2018a, May). Symbolic and realistic threat attitudes toward legal and illegal migration. Paper presented at British Psychological Society Annual Conference, Nottingham, UK.



- ▶ Legal migration – granted authorisation to live and work within the EU (if from outside of the EU) or meets the criteria if moving between member states within the EU
- ▶ Illegal (Irregular) migration – violating the immigration laws of the destination country/state, usually involving illegal entry or overstaying
- ▶ Refugee status – fled own country due to well-founded fear of being persecuted (after five years can apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain)
- ▶ Asylum seeker – someone who has applied to home office for refugee status (or other form of international protection)

Sources:

- Gov.UK
- Geneva Convention on Refugees
- European Commission

Immigrants as a 'Threat to Society'


- ▶ Realistic threat – challenging the welfare of the majority
 - Threat to resources such as jobs
 - Threat to societal resources (health care, schools)

 - ▶ Symbolic threat – challenging morals, values and identity of the majority
 - Threat to customs and ways of doing things
 - Threat to general 'way of life'
-
- Ceobanu & Escandell (2010); Murray & Marx (2013); Stephen, Ybarra, & Bachman (1999).

Our study

- ▶ Do people differ in attitudes toward legal and illegal migration, particularly in terms of realistic and symbolic threat, in accord with their prejudice sub-type classification?

- ▶ Online study – SurveyGizmo and Inquisit carried out March – June 2017
 - Measure implicit prejudice (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998)
 - Measure explicit prejudice (EPQ; adapted from Lepore & Brown, 1997)
 - Attitudes toward legal/illegal migration (Murray & Marx, 2013, adapted from Stephan & Stephan, 2000)

 - ▶ 411 participants
 - 290 provided eligible data from UK (completion of all measures)
- 

Integrated Threat Measure

(adapted from Murray & Marx, 2013)

- ▶ 14 statements Legal/Illegal
 - Strongly agree – Strongly disagree, 1 – 9 scale
 - 7 Realistic Threat, 7 Symbolic Threat
 - 14 – 126 range, higher score = higher perceived threat


- ▶ ‘Legal immigrants should be eligible for the same healthcare benefits (e.g., NHS National Health Service) as those received by British citizens’ (*Realistic*)
 - 7 – 63 range for *Realistic Threat*

- ▶ ‘The values and beliefs of legal immigrants regarding family issues and socialising children are basically quite similar to that of British natives’ (*Symbolic*)
 - 7 – 63 range for *Symbolic Threat*

- ▶ 290 participants (168 Female; 120 Male; two unknown, $M_{\text{age}} = 36$ years, $SD = 12.15$ years)
- ▶ IAT d' dichotomous split at $-.44$
- ▶ EPQ dichotomous split at 50

	Egalitarian	Principled Conservative	Aversive Racist	Modern Racist
n	74 (25.52%)	69 (23.79%)	74 (25.52%)	73 (25.17%)

Attitudes toward legal and illegal migration as a function of prejudice type




Main effect of migration type $F(1, 286) = 511.28, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .64$

Main effect of prejudice type $F(3, 286) = 83.2, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .47$

Legal: Egal=AR < PC=MR

Illegal: Egal < AR < PC/MR

Symbolic and Realistic Threat attitudes toward legal and illegal migration as a function of prejudice type



Main effect of threat type $F(1, 286) = 21.82$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$

Interaction of threat type & prej subtype $F(3, 286) = 7.32$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$

Interaction of threat type & immigration type $F(3, 286) = 315.69$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .53$

Legal: Egal=AR < PC < MR

Illegal: Egal < AR < PC < MR_(ST)
Egal < AR < PC = MR_(RT)

Overall findings:

- ▶ Clear differences exist between our prejudice sub-type groups regarding attitudes toward migrants
 - ▶ Definition of legal/illegal influences all sub-types
 - ▶ Symbolic and Realistic threats are viewed differently by prejudice sub-type groups
 - ▶ AR similarity to Egal for legal but not illegal major finding in AR prejudice literature
- 



Terrorism

Sullivan, K. E., & Hutchings, P. B. (2017, May). Right-wing authoritarian responses to the Paris terror attacks. Paper presented at British Psychological Society Annual Conference, Brighton, UK.

October 2015

- ▶ Carrying out research on attitudes toward same-race/other race immigration
 - Online data collection of explicit prejudice measures (adapted version of Lepore & Brown, 1997); RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1981)
 - Lab-based data collection of implicit prejudice (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998)
- ▶ Data from 138 participants
 - Anonymous data – unique ID code


Friday 13th November 2015

9.16pm

- ▶ Football match at Stade de France (France V Germany) with President Hollande in attendance
- ▶ Terrorists attempted to enter stadium armed with explosives
 - Stopped and detonated explosives outside of ground


Friday 13th November 2015

9.25pm

- ▶ Gunfire reported on corner of Rue Bichat and Rue Alibert
 - ▶ Shooting of patrons inside and outside le Carillon restaurant
 - Media (Sky News etc.,) start breaking the story, social media (Twitter etc.,) show spike in 'on the ground' reports
- 


Friday 13th November 2015

9.40pm

- ▶ Gunfire reported on Boulevard Voltaire
 - ▶ Initial reports of possible attack around area of Bataclan Theatre
- 

Friday 13th November 2015

10.00pm

- ▶ First reports of hostage situation inside Bataclan Theatre
 - Over 1,500 people attending concert/working inside building
 - Media outlets across the world now reporting on attack
 - Social media providing pictures, videos, messages (including from inside Bataclan Theatre)
- 

Saturday 14th November 2015

12.23am

- ▶ Police storm Bataclan Theatre, killing three attackers
 - 89 innocent victims found dead inside theatre

Paris Terror Attack, November 2015

- ▶ All occurred in just over three hours
 - ▶ 130 people dead, a further 368 injured
 - ▶ Global news coverage almost continuously from outset
 - ▶ #prayforparis and ability to incorporate French flag into profiles on Twitter and Facebook
- 

► Our study:

- Did the Paris attack influence people's RWA and explicit prejudice scores in the immediate aftermath?
- Participants from our October study (n = 138) invited to complete study online
 - Attitudes and opinions relating to issues of ethnicity, religion, migration and authority
 - Study opened at 9.16am on Saturday 14th November (exactly 12 hours after start of Paris attack)
 - Study closed at 9.16pm on Sunday 15th November (48 hours after start of Paris attack)
- **36 hour window**

Explicit Prejudice

- ▶ Adapted from Lepore & Brown (1997)
 - 15 questions, reverse scoring etc.
- ▶ ‘The rights of immigrants should be restricted’
- ▶ ‘Those immigrants who do not have immigration documents should be sent back to their countries’
- ▶ ‘It makes sense for minority groups to live in their own neighbourhoods because they share more and get along better than when mixing with Whites’

Strongly Agree

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Right Wing Authoritarianism

- ▶ Zakrisson (2005) Short version
 - 15 questions, reverse scoring etc.
- ▶ ‘There are many radical, immoral people trying to ruin things; society ought to stop them’
- ▶ ‘Situations in today’s society would be improved if troublemakers were treated with reason and humanity’
- ▶ ‘If society so wants, it is the duty of every true citizen to help eliminate the evil that poisons our country from within’

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

1

2


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
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
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- ▶ Follow-up in October 2016 (identical to study carried out in October 2015) of original 138 participants (116 remaining)
 - ▶ Provided data at three time points:
 - Pre-attack
 - Immediate post-attack
 - 11 month post-attack
 - ▶ 46 participants completed the immediate post-attack study
 - Two self-reported non-white/non-British excluded
 - Two did not complete post attack study in October 2016 so excluded
- 

- ▶ Overall study:
 - 42 white British participants
 - 32 female; 10 male
 - (30% of original October 2015 sample)

 - ▶ Range of both scales = 15 – 105
 - ▶ Counterbalanced across scales
 - ▶ Scores on both scales for 42 participants did not differ significantly from 138 in October 2015
 - No reason to suspect a sub-group
 - All alphas > .75
 - Manipulation check – all aware of Paris attack
- 


Time	RWA	Explicit
1 (October 2015)	51.62 (8.91)	47.45 (12.78)
2 (November 2015)	55.62 (8.39)	53.00 (14.17)
3 (October 2016)	52.00 (10.38)	47.17 (11.88)




RWA significant effect of time $F(2, 82) = 3.34, p = .02$ (one-tailed), significant quadratic trend, $F(1, 41) = 10.05, p = .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .2$ with T_2 sig higher than T_1 ($p = .02$) and T_3 ($p = .01$), no diff T_1 to T_3 ($p = .85$)

Explicit prejudice significant effect of time $F(2, 82) = 3.45, p = .04$ (two-tailed), significant quadratic trend, $F(1, 41) = 7.39, p = .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .15$ with T_2 sig higher than T_1 ($p = .04$) and T_3 ($p = .02$), no diff T_1 to T_3 ($p = .91$)

Conclusions

- ▶ Real-world events such as terrorist attacks appear to significantly increase RWA attitudes toward agreeing with more authoritarian measures
 - Not draconian, but possibly enough to be sympathetic to suggestions of 'increased security'
 - ▶ Explicit prejudice appears to mirror RWA findings
 - ▶ Not long-term, reverts to pre-levels over time
- 



THE BREXIT VOTE

Sullivan, K. E., & Hutchings, P. B. (2018b, July). Prejudice and the Brexit vote. In: Andreouli E (Chair), *The Politics of Prejudice and Social Change*. Symposium conducted at the meeting of International Society of Political Psychology, San Antonio, Texas.

In case you missed it...

- ▶ 23rd June 2016
- ▶ Binary vote question
- ▶ “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?”
 - Remain a member of the European Union **48%** **(16,141,241)**
 - Leave the European Union **52%** **(17,410,742)**
 - Turnout = 72.2%
 - Leave: England **54%**
 - Leave: Wales **52.5%**
 - Leave: Scotland **38%**
 - Leave: Northern Ireland **44%**

- Source: Electoral Commission (2016)

Reasons for Voting for Brexit (2016)

▶ At an individual level

- Migration
- Economy
- Sovereignty

- ▶ 'Highest Brexit support in struggling areas where average incomes, education and skill levels are low and there are few opportunities to get ahead' (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016).
- ▶ Recent change in area prosperity not correlated with Brexit vote (Resolution Foundation, 2016) but 'long-term entrenchment' may play a role (JRF, 2016)

Reasons for Voting for Brexit (2016)

► Immigration

- Did migration to a specific area lead to higher Brexit voting in that area?
 - No correlation (Colantone & Stanig, 2016)... but 'Import shock'
 - Sudden influx (5 – 10% of specific population change in last 10 years) more likely to vote leave (JRF, 2016)
- As number of foreign immigrants increases, correlation with respondents saying 'immigration is one of most important issues facing the country' increases (Ipsos, 2016)

Reasons for voting for Brexit (pre-2016)

- ▶ Attitudes toward Legal Immigrants in 2005 National Survey (Abrams & Houston, 2006)
 - 17% Negative
 - 35% Neutral
 - 48% Positive
 - ▶ Migration Observatory 2014 Survey: Perceived costs and benefits of migration (EU and non-EU workers)
 - 53% Negative
 - 20% Neutral
 - 21% Positive
- 


Prejudice Data

- ▶ British Social Attitudes Survey 2002/2011
 - People self-reporting as having prejudice toward ethnic out-groups
 - 2002 = 36%
 - 2011 = 38%
 - Our data from psychological studies with students was consistently at 35 – 38%
 - So fairly robust findings from experimental methods


Reasons for Voting for Brexit (2018)

- ▶ Studies on Brexit and prejudice/nationalism
 - Concern about immigration
 - 73% voted Leave (British Social Attitudes Survey, 2017)
 - Self-report prejudice
 - 26% (NatCen, 2017)
 - RWA, SDO, and Narcissism link to immigration attitudes and Brexit (Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & Simão, 2017)
 - Cognitive inflexibility linking to nationalism, authoritarianism and conservatism linked to vote (Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2018)
 - Islamophobia, integrated threat and conspiracist beliefs shaping voter intention (Swami, Barron, Weis, & Furnham, 2017)

Our study

- ▶ Did people differ on voting behaviour in accord with their prejudice sub-type classification?
 - ▶ How do these prejudice sub-type classifications relate to political party affiliation?
- 

- ▶ Online study – SurveyGizmo and Inquisit (March – May 2017)
 - Measure implicit prejudice (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998)
 - Measure explicit prejudice (EPQ; adapted from Lepore & Brown, 1997)
 - Voting behaviour in EU Referendum
 - Political party affiliation

 - ▶ 226 participants (all UK nationals, residing all over UK)
- 

- ▶ 226 participants (127 Female; 97 Male; two Other, $M_{\text{age}} = 37.17$ years, $SD = 12.45$ years)
 - No sig diff between Leave/Remain voters on age
- ▶ IAT d' dichotomous split at $-.47$
- ▶ EPQ dichotomous split at 50

Table 1. Prejudice type categorisation; number of participants (percentage of the sample in parentheses).

	Egalitarian	Aversive Racist	Principled Conservative	Modern Racist
n	57 (25.2%)	59 (26.1%)	49 (21.7%)	61 (27.0%)

How did they vote?

- ▶ 226 participants
 - 151 Remain
 - 75 Leave

Table 2. Prejudice type categorisation and vote; percentages of categories (number of sample participants in parentheses).

	Egalitarian	Aversive Racist	Principled Conservative	Modern Racist
Leave	9.3% (7)	10.7% (8)	30.7% (23)	49.3% (37)
Remain	33.1% (50)	33.8% (51)	17.2% (26)	15.9% (24)

Vote by Prejudice Type




Table 3. Prejudice type and voting behaviour; percentage of categories (number of sample participants in parentheses).

	Egalitarian	Aversive Racist	Principled Conservative	Modern Racist
Leave	12.28% (7)	13.56% (8)	46.94% (23)	60.66% (37)
Remain	87.72% (50)	86.44% (51)	53.06% (26)	39.34% (24)

Sig relationship between prejudice sub-type & voting behaviour:

$$\chi^2 (3, N = 226) = 49.14, p < .001.$$


Association was of moderate strength: $\Phi = .49$, prejudice type accounted for 24% of the variance in the voting behaviour of this sample.

At individual level the only cell to show a significant difference at $< .05$ was the Modern Racist Leave vote, $\chi^2 (3, N = 226) = 14.89, p = .002$.

Who do they vote for?


Seven political preference categories analysed: *Conservative Party* ($n=46$); *Labour Party* ($n=60$); *Liberal Democrats* ($n=31$), *Green Party* ($n=22$), *UK Independence Party* (*UKIP* [$n=12$]); *No political preference* ($n=36$); and *Other* ($n=19$).

Political affiliation by Prejudice sub-type



Sig relationship between prejudice sub-type & political party preference:
 $\chi^2(18, N = 226) = 42.0, p=.001$.
Association was of moderate strength: $\Phi = .43$, prejudice type accounted for 18% of the variance in the political preference of this sample.
At individual level no cells showed a significant difference at $<.05$.

Which way did party pref vote in EU Referendum?



Sig relationship between political party preference and voting behaviour:

$$\chi^2(6, N = 226) = 40.07, p < .001.$$

Association was of moderate strength: $\Phi = .42$, party allegiance accounted for 18% of the variance in the voting behaviour of this sample.

At an individual level no cells showed a significant difference at $< .05$.

Overall findings:

- ▶ Prejudice type appears to have played a significant role in EU


Referendum voting behaviour

- Particularly explicit prejudice
 - 80% of Leave voters in this sample scored high on explicit prejudice (PCs & MRs)

- ▶ Prejudice type also appears to play a significant role in political party affiliation

- The strange case of the Aversive Racists...
 - Cf many job-hiring studies that find them behave differently in ambiguous situations
 - Not an ambiguous situation to them? Need to explore further

A tangled web

- ▶ Elements of prejudice, rejection of supranationalism, RWA, and SDO all mixed up in this
 - ▶ Even before we include age, education, SES, import shock, life opportunities
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A tangled web

- ▶ Brexit right now is far from simple
 - The economics
- ▶ National identity issues are likely to be even more complex
 - Require complex analysis and interpretation
- ▶ Working with others to examine these complexities

Hutchings, P. B., & Sullivan, K. E. (2019). Prejudice and the Brexit vote: A tangled web. *Springer Communication*, 5.

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