

BSc (Hons) Professional Police Practice

LEVEL 5 - 40 Credits

Workbook title: Competency Based Workbook 2 (PCDA)

**(SOUTH WALES POLICE, GWENT POLICE AND
UWTSD)**

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FACULTY OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE PROGRAMME

Module title: Professional Police Practice 2 (PCDA) BMPP5000D

Workbook Guidance

Please read these notes carefully; they provide essential information.

What is the workbook for?

The purpose of this workbook is to enable learners to demonstrate and provide evidence of how they meet the learning outcomes set by the College of Policing, for the BSc programme. Essentially, you are being asked to outline your experiential learning based upon your theoretical understanding in a range of operational situations.

- **Wellbeing and Resilience**
- **Decision-making and Discretion**
- **Vulnerability and Risk**
- **Public Protection**
- **Maintaining Professional Standards**
- **Leadership and Team-working**
- **Policing the roads**
- **Information and intelligence**
- **Conducting Investigations**

You may wish to use the same incidents as you've outlined in the Occupational Competence Portfolio.

How should the workbook be presented?

Blank electronic copies can be found on Moodle of this workbook. You must submit this document electronically therefore it is important that you save your work regularly and upload the final typed version through Turnitin on Moodle.

Word count policy can be found in chapter 7 of the Academic Quality under section 7.7 (this applies to presenting work above and under the specified word count).

(https://www.uwtsd.ac.uk/media/uwtsd-website/content-assets/documents/academic-office/aqh-chapters/chapters---en/Chapter_07_Assessment-Taught_Programmes_Pages_72-79-UPDATED-05-11-2019.pdf)

Reflective practice is a core aspect for your workbooks and although there is a variety of useful resources on Moodle, there is one particular book, that is specifically based on reflective practice in policing, here is a link to one chapter from Selina Copley's Reflective Practice for Policing Students:

https://moodle.uwtsd.ac.uk/pluginfile.php/298870/mod_resource/content/1/Reflective%20Practice%20for%20Policing%20Students%20-%20Selina%20Copley%20Chapter5.pdf

How is the workbook assessed?

Advice and support about the completion of this workbook will be provided by university staff as part of your initial training day. Your tutor constable and in-force

training staff will not be involved in assessing or marking your workbook after it has been submitted.

Dates of workbook submission will be made available during the initial training day and posted on Moodle.

Once submitted your workbook will be assessed and marked independently.

Confidentiality

It is important that no individual can be identified either directly or indirectly from the information in the workbook. Therefore, you must:

- adhere to guidance in the Student Handbook about unfair practice and plagiarism.
- not identify individuals including witnesses, victims or offenders by name.
- not write information that enables any individual to be identified indirectly through the description you provide. This includes references to names, colleagues, places (including hospitals, schools, town, villages, streets) specific incidents which were high profile and could be identified due to past publicity, other professionals or any other personal information including medical or other conditions.
- take personal responsibility for adhering to confidentiality rules.
- not include any dates of any incidents or anything that specifically identifies an actual incident.

Please be aware that any content that is deemed to be inappropriate, disrespectful, or abusive will not be tolerated. Following review of any content of this nature the information will be shared with the employer of the student responsible.

Should any health and wellbeing concerns be raised because of disclosures made by the student within this workbook, the employer of the student will be informed.

NOTE

Your workbook will be submitted electronically via Turnitin on Moodle. Guidance on this is in the Student Handbook.

Remember that the workbook is YOUR responsibility you must not rely on the assessor or anyone else to pick up any confidentiality breaches as this is your work and you must accept full responsibility for confidentiality. Meeting all the confidentiality requirements is very important.

Dyslexia and other special circumstances

If you have any condition that you feel may affect your ability to deal with any part of the programme, please see the Student Handbook for further guidance. The University has a Student Services Unit that may be able to help but ***it is the learner's individual responsibility to contact them.***

Guidance:

- *Your workbook must contain the items specified in the table below (clearly identified and in the order given);*
- *You should use this particular document to insert your text / answer within each section of this workbook;*
- *You should upload your completed document as a saved pdf file of this workbook; if this is not possible then a Worddoc file is acceptable. Do not send a scanned file from a photocopier, an apple.dot file or a Microsoft publisher file as Turnitin will not be able to assess them, despite you being able to upload them.*

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Task 1

Relevant areas of the National Policing Curriculum: Wellbeing and Resilience

Having achieved Independent Patrol Status, **reflect** on the impact of organisation culture within policing on your wellbeing and resilience (organisation change, retaining personal values in a wider organisational culture).

Consider the risks of conforming to organisational culture.

Illustrate your strategies for maintaining wellbeing and resilience.

1250 words (+/- 10%: include your actual word count at the end of each section)

ANSWER:

The negative aspects of the organisational culture within policing are well-documented: the existence of a toxic culture of misogyny and racism and in some instances, illegal behaviour and gross misconduct have been highlighted by reports since the Macpherson report (Macpherson, 1999), and more recently the Casey (Baroness Casey of Blackstock, 2023) and HMIC reports, as well as the murder of Sarah Everard (met.police.uk, n.d.) and negative newspaper reports (Collins and Al-Othman, 2022). Less talked about are the positive aspects of the culture: a powerful sense of mutual support in the face of adversity, and an understanding of how policing differs from other careers can help officers maintain their resilience.

The Schein model of organisational culture (Juneja, 2022) is a useful way to analyse any organisation. Schein identifies layers of culture-creating features: artefacts, espoused values, and shared core assumptions. Broadly, shared core assumptions are central to an organisation's culture. They are virtually unshiftable inner aspects of human character and, therefore, depend on the recruitment and retention of the right people. Espoused values, such as the thought processes and attitudes of employees, also impact culture. These are taught in a variety of ways, formal and informal, within the organisation. Creating this part of a culture is difficult and time-consuming. Finally, artefacts are the externally apparent aspects of a culture. Some, such as logos and slogans, are easily changed, although this may not change the values beneath; others are more subtle: for example, facilities and dress codes may alter espoused values, and codes for the behaviour of employees may regulate the expression of some values and, over time, either expose those with core assumptions that do not fit, or alter espoused values to fit.

Artefacts in the police service can affect officers' well-being. Obvious examples are insufficient or broken facilities, such as failure to provide all PPE or training for basic needs like taser or blue light use, and the failure to provide on-site parking, which means officers can be physically vulnerable, as well as sending a message that you are not cared for - I have had to walk to my car in the middle of the night. An unsuitable uniform, especially for women - trousers and footwear tailored to fit a female body shape are not available - can give a message that you do not belong in the

organisation. Stress is added where the structure of the organisation means that the only person to whom you can feedback about this does not have the power to do things differently and so might resent complaints. I face violent offenders without taser training, and this undoubtedly impacts my well-being.

Artefacts such as behaviour codes can negatively impact resilience when the behaviour of employees is not called out. It results in uncertainty and a sense of not belonging; it does not demonstrate that you are important and worth providing for. Subtle mocking, which I have experienced this year, proved hard to challenge when it occurred, something I mention below.

Schein looks at the way values are created, embedded and reinforced. He describes “primary” embedding mechanisms as the ways that behaviours are explicitly encouraged. This includes criteria for promotion, how performance is measured, and formal or informal punishments. “Secondary” reinforcements are often more accidental, and include some artefacts, mission statements and repeated myths and legends about an organisation.

Particular issues arise when these two mechanisms are in conflict. For example, it is common, in my experience, for high-ranking officers to say they welcome feedback (an assurance that the door is always open for officers to report misogyny, for instance: a secondary reinforcement) while in reality, the senior management team have an array of informal punishments at their disposal if they resent the feedback. In my experience, officers become aware of this tension quickly, and the result is a chilling effect on complaints about breaches of stated cultural aims. Officers are aware that if their “face does not fit”, they may be made at best very uncomfortable.

Problems happen when there is a clash between supposedly shared core assumptions and the values that are espoused by some officers. Officers at junior rank may have a legitimate expectation that others will have core assumptions that align with their own, and with the espoused values of the organisation. If, in fact, a senior officer does not share those assumptions (on gender or race equality, for example), they are unlikely to take on board criticisms of their behaviour and can use informal punishments in plausibly deniable ways. While this is not something I have experienced this year, the awareness has never been far from my mind.

Over the last year, I have predominantly found the culture within the police force to be supportive. However, one incident has had a few ramifications that have caused me to reflect on the culture.

Soon after being independent, while we were managing an aggressive prisoner, a colleague took hold of my (gloved) right index finger, mistaking it for the prisoner’s (ungloved) thumb, and broke it. Obviously, it was that officer’s fault, as my gloved finger should have been easily distinguished. I had to have an operation, stitches and daily physiotherapy. I was on light duty for 2 months until I could restrain someone safely.

I made use of this time by learning from the file team how to properly do case files so I could help the team out with this and also boost my confidence by knowing how to compile a file. My Sergeants were supportive with adjusting shifts around

appointments and not pushing me to go back to full duties too soon. At the same time, I was financially out of pocket as I lost overtime, was unable to drive or do self-care, had trips to the hospital and so on. While I was never told that I should not make a claim, it was made clear that it would be inconvenient for the officer who had broken my finger if I did, so I did not feel comfortable claiming. A culture is embedded where officers will ignore their own injuries (not a shared value I expected) in favour of preserving others.

There were further consequences. I applied for permission to do a voluntary role outside the police. The senior officer to whom the application went commented negatively on how few arrests I had made, something that a few officers on my shift also did. If I had made the claim, this might have been seen differently. The ongoing subtle mocking (they put up a big sign when I made an arrest, for example) on the part of a few (no doubt well-meaning) officers is an issue that I am working to resolve with my Sergeant.

Developing a good working relationship with my Sergeant and a number of my colleagues has been a major strategy for me in maintaining my resilience. Other useful strategies include going to the gym, prioritising sleep and eating well which I mostly do. As my responsibilities grow, one thing I have learned this year is to make sure I take regular days off to avoid burnout.

It is important to retain personal values - honesty, integrity, and accountability - within a large organisational culture because it is by upholding these values that core assumptions we share are asserted. This of course contributes to a good culture that the police need.

Conforming to an organisational culture - especially one that is historically poor, which is certainly the case in policing - is always a risk. Putting your head above the parapet can seem risky, but if you submit to a prevailing poor culture, you risk becoming an officer that the public does not trust, which will make you less effective. You also open yourself to a finding of misconduct. Policing requires you to conform to a certain extent so that the organisation functions - especially if your own core assumptions do not align with those of the police - but it remains important to be yourself. If you disagree with the culture the leadership is creating and setting an example of, but you ignore it, then you go against your own personal values and the poor culture never changes or improves.

Word count: 1365

Task 2

Relevant areas of the National Policing Curriculum:

Decision-making and Discretion, Vulnerability and Risk, Public Protection.

You must choose an incident, for example a domestic related incident, and reflect on how you made decisions in complex and unpredictable circumstances using dynamic risk assessment.

Give a brief description of the problem including social and legislative contexts and any relevant cultural, ethnicity and language issues.

Evaluate decisions made during the incident and your use (or otherwise) of the National Decision Model. Explain the rationale behind your decisions and your considerations when recording details of the incident. Consider your ethical approach to the decision. Outline the consequences of your decision making.

1750 words (+/- 10%: include your actual word count at the end of each section)

ANSWER:

We received a call from a family asking for police to remove their son/brother (aged 19) as he was “kicking off”. The family were known to me from earlier incidents involving issues with the same male. I was tasked to go alone but as it happened, attended along with my colleague. You can't know for sure what the complete circumstances are until you arrive, but based on what information had been passed we were prepared for a case of removing the male under a Breach of the Peace, or perhaps a minor Public Order offence. Upon arrival by car, we saw that the family, consisting of the daughter/sister, her friend, and the subject's mother, were outside the front of the house. The family is local, of a white British background, and speaks English.

The friend approached me to say the subject now had a knife and was threatening to burn the house down. Within moments, he appeared at the front door, brandishing a large kitchen knife. The family outside started making their way towards me further down the garden path. I instructed them to come towards me, exit the garden through the gate behind me and make their way towards the police car. The appearance of the weapon immediately increased the risk factors due to the potential injuries the male could cause with it, either to himself or others. The offence being committed also became more serious as it was now probably Affray (s3 Public Order) and potential Criminal Damage.

I therefore made the dynamic risk assessment that we as a team could no longer handle this situation alone. I communicated with the Force Control Room (FCR) to ask for more units and update them that the male had a weapon. I asked for more units because the risk to the public had increased, more officers were needed to control the area, and specially trained and more suitably equipped officers were required to deal

with the increased threat. Neither my colleague nor I were carrying any Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) useful to create distance as we only had a standard kit of a baton and PAVA spray, which requires getting close to the subject. It is safer for all involved for Taser and/or Firearms officers to attend in these instances.

The subject started walking briskly down the path towards us with the knife saying 'I'll chop you up'. Dynamic assessment showed that we could not safely remain in close proximity. We retreated towards the police car, and he continued to come down the path towards the gate. I told the family to get inside the police car, then moved the police car to the road where we all had hard cover from the car, but still had eyes on the male. He then went inside the house and in the upstairs window I could see him set a tea towel alight. More units then arrived, initially the Taser officers, then Firearms and the Fire Service. I passed on information to my colleagues, and with the developing situation and further police available, neighbouring houses were evacuated to mitigate risk in case he did set the house on fire. My colleague and I stayed with the family, who were becoming upset at the developing situation. Meanwhile, other units covered the back entrance in case he ran away. Taser units negotiated with him until Firearms arrived. When Firearms arrived, the subject came downstairs and gave up the weapon. Inside, the Fire Service checked over the house and found a burnt tea towel and a burnt rug. They referred the family for a fire safety check to have fire alarms installed/checked. The subject was arrested for Affray and Criminal Damage. He said he had drunk bleach and was sick so was taken to hospital by other officers before going to custody.

One of the challenges of this incident was the way in which it escalated, which is where the National Decision Model (NDM) (College Of Policing, 2013) is excellent to refer to when making decisions about how to deal with a situation. The first step is to gather information and intelligence. On a recent, previous occasion, the subject had been kicked out of the house by the family as part of an ongoing domestic situation, and the police were called because he had thrown a brick through the window. This was known to me beforehand. However, there were no markers following this for weapons, and at the time of the call, he was not reported to be in possession of a weapon. The situation also developed in other ways; for example, after he had shown the knife and the family came closer to me, they said they thought he had taken some drugs, possibly Cocaine. The situation in which I found myself was therefore much riskier than had been anticipated on the basis of the call.

The next step of the NDM is to assess the threat and risk. Prior to arrival, based on information passed on from the call, the threat was low as the family was just asking for the police to remove him - no offences were disclosed so the situation was more like a Breach of the Peace. However, this changed as soon as we arrived because the family said he had a knife which almost immediately afterwards, he appeared with. The threat of harm to us, to the family and to the subject himself increased, and the risk escalated because there was now a sharp weapon present and in the hands of someone clearly not of sound mind.

Using the NDM, my working strategy was that we would need to take action immediately because of the threat of the weapon combined with the words he was saying that he might use the weapon against us. Also, I needed to consider that I was

not carrying a Taser - neither I nor my colleague was Taser trained - which would help create distance and potentially de-escalate the situation quickly.

In any situation, particularly one where weapons are present, our duty of preserving life is the number one priority as is taught and emphasised throughout training and day-to-day work. Therefore, I made keeping everyone safe my top priority, above apprehending him, for example, or leaving to keep myself safe. I had to bear in mind that I had no Taser option. My available PPE were not appropriate as he was bearing a weapon and neither the baton nor the spray could create distance. Creating distance is taught during our safety training - you do not want to be within someone's 'fighting arc', meaning within their arm's reach, body swing and step distance, as the risk of harm is greatly increased being this close.

I then considered my powers and policies. Stay safe principles taught me that in this situation the order of priority was to run, hide, and tell. This was carried out well as I was able to get the family away first ("run") with simple and clear instructions, and then myself away from the threat. In the situation in which I found myself, the car was safest for the family as well as for me, but at the same time, in order to preserve the safety of neighbours, I could not leave the scene altogether. In order to hide, therefore, I used the best hard cover available, the police car, while monitoring the situation for the benefit of others in the vicinity. Having achieved those objectives, I then used my radio to communicate with FCR to upgrade the call and ask for additional and specialist units to attend, fulfilling the "tell" requirement.

On arrival, I identified that the options were to negotiate to put the weapon down or instruct the family to retreat and swiftly follow. Detain and arrest straight away was not an option due to the presence of a bladed weapon and accompanying verbal threat. Once he started walking towards us saying 'I'll chop you up', negotiation was no longer possible as I would be unable to defend myself, and would put the family, my colleague and myself at risk if I engaged with him. The only option was therefore to retreat and keep everyone safe and to keep FCR informed whilst more appropriate resources arrived. I assessed that, should the male continue towards the police car where we had taken hard cover, there was the option to drive to a safer place, or to use the car as a defensive weapon if necessary and proportionate to maintain safety.

The action decided on in this case was to do less and not escalate the situation. I assessed that I would make matters worse by using inappropriate force and that it was not appropriate to try to negotiate with someone high on drugs, especially as I had not got suitable PPE and nor had my colleague. Decisions like this, while informed by the model and training, are always to an extent personal, but I am confident I followed the model here. Although it is always tempting to feel that you can deal with a situation yourself, after reflection, I still think this was the right choice to ask for help. I ordered the family to leave and take hard cover, and also retreated myself. Trying to arrest the suspect would have placed us all in danger and protecting life is the number one priority.

I was pleased with my ability to stay calm and communicate with FCR to update them about the severity and unpredictability of the situation and to ask for more units who are better equipped to deal with the weapon. In recording the incident I made sure that intelligence logs reflected the drug use, use of a weapon, attempted arson and self

harm. Reviewing the incident, despite a weapon and an attempt to start a fire, and that there were a number of vulnerable female family members present, nobody was hurt, and the male was arrested and detained, the only harm being minor damage to property and the consequences to him of having taken drugs. This is what I consider a good outcome which was in part made possible by using the NDM as direction for how to handle the rapidly changing and risky situation.

Word count: 1710

Task 3

Relevant areas of the National Policing Curriculum: Maintaining Professional Standards, Leadership and Team-working

Evaluate theories of team dynamics as a means of developing team cohesion (reasons why some teams cannot function, theories and models relating to team dynamics, ways to improve team cohesion).

Consider why inter-personal conflict can occur within a team and outline what strategies can be adopted to enhance individual and team performance.

Consider how team dynamics within the police service can result in failing to comply with professional standards requirements (Code of Ethics, policies, procedures, protocols or legislation).

1750 words (+/- 10%: include your actual word count at the end of each section)

ANSWER:

There are many theoretical models to help analyse how teams work together (Boogaard, 2022). All try to identify team members' behaviours and categorise them in various ways. Three of the most commonly referred to are the forming-storming-norming-performing-adjourning (FSNPA) model, the Lencioni Model, and the Hackman Model. The FSNPA model looks at why interpersonal conflict can occur and how to work with it across the life cycle of a project. The Lencioni Model helps to prevent team problems by identifying what does not make a successful team. Finally, the Hackman Model considers ways to improve team cohesion.

The FSNPA model was developed in the 1960s, by psychologist Bruce Tuckman, who observed that project teams move through four stages, which he called forming, storming, norming, and performing (adjourning was added later). His work, and that of others since, focused on identifying the things that leaders could do to help their teams collaborate to move from one stage to the next in order to complete their project (Jones, 2019). Essentially, leaders need to move from leading to structuring to implementing.

The biggest limitation of the FSNPA model as applied to police work is that it really is designed for new teams who do not know each other, and for time-bound projects, where you have one task that you need to get done quickly and then the team disbands. The emphasis is not on team cohesion, it is a task-focused model. The sort of situation it is made for might work if you were pulling together a team to do an investigation and wanted to involve individuals from teams who did not know each other, perhaps from different forces or from different departments, civilians and so on. However, most police work is done in a shift that works together all the time, with new members added occasionally. The work is rarely project-based. The shift does not manage tasks as a team over a period of time to completion; it focuses more on

dealing with tasks as they arise, and then each is dealt with by an individual to completion. Even how that individual is chosen is almost random in the work I do. If you take a call, you will have that task on your workload until it is finished.

Turning to the Lencioni model, this is a model that looks at the sorts of problems that arise in teams that stop them from working together. It can help managers work out why things are not going well, or help members to understand what is happening if they are feeling uncomfortable. Lencioni's 2007 book in which he set out his theory is discussed in this blog 'What Strong Teamwork Looks Like' (Boogaard, 2022). One criticism levelled at Lencioni is that the model is not academically- or research-based. This is true, but it is also tested and critiqued by academics (Aggarwal, 2023).

Lencioni "identified the five dysfunctions of the team as absence of trust, fear of conflict, lack of commitment, avoidance of accountability and inattention to results". These are all linked to and can overlap one another. The absence of trust can be as simple as feeling that an individual will not respond positively to suggestions, which is linked to fear of conflict, or it might be that you cannot trust someone to complete a task, which might be a lack of commitment, or inattention to results, and so on. More recent academics have added another reason why teams might not work - that an individual in the team is functionally incompetent.

Looking at the model, it can be quite useful as a way for members of a team to reflect on their own team. For example, someone who is conflict-avoidant might reflect and see how that might impact others, like they might not always give feedback when they have been treated in ways that make them distrustful of others. A team member who is watchful might notice that some officers prefer to do the quicker, high-profile arrests and not the time-consuming business of taking statements and following up with victims, a lack of commitment. Part of a good leader's task is to listen, to be present in the team and to demonstrate the organisation's values so that the first fundamental dysfunction - the absence of trust - does not happen in their team.

The model is not as useful in helping to solve problems. Unless the team leader recognises the problems, they will not be easily fixed. Sometimes, the leader can be the problem. One good strategy for team members is to learn to be more open about perceptions with leaders, giving accurate feedback so that team members can be the eyes and ears of their managers. Another problem with the model is that being attentive to results can be counterproductive, depending on how results are defined. For example, if what is being measured is quite superficial, such as the number of arrests, cases completed, or stops and searches by each officer, these might not reflect the actual goals of the organisation. Metrics for results need review to make sure they do not make the team dysfunctional.

Finally, there is the Hackman model. This model is aimed at team cohesion. Hackman identified five conditions necessary for successful teamwork: The team must be a real team, rather than a team in name only; it must have a compelling direction for its work; it has an enabling structure that facilitates teamwork; it must operate within a supportive organisational context; and it has expert teamwork coaching (Stark, 2019).

The limitation of this model is that it does not really tell leaders what they need to do to achieve these things. Hackman himself said that leaders should do "whatever they

can". Another problem is its focus is on leaders taking action, rather than helping team members to find strategies to build cohesion. He says that teams of about six are as big as they should be, but police shifts are bigger. Team leaders in police work do not always have control over the "organisational context" because funding and legislation are far outside their power. Time for training to be a coach and time for coaching is limited.

Despite the limitations of all the models as applied to the police in general officers do stick together. Most of us feel we are doing an important job that is made difficult by external things such as lack of funding and that a lot of people who we are policing know "the system" and how to take advantage of it. Mostly, we respect each other because we are all trying to solve the same problems. In some ways, the risk is not that the team might not be cohesive but that there is pressure to stick together, with a "them versus us" attitude.

The so-called "blue code", that the police will place loyalty to one another above other considerations, has been explored on many occasions by academics such as by Westmarland (Westmarland, 2005) and more recently by Westmarland and Conway (Westmarland and Conway, 2020). One of the findings in the second report was that people were more likely to overlook wrongdoing by officers outside the working day, suggesting that perhaps core assumptions are not always in line with espoused values.

Team dynamics are important in this. Going back to the Lencioni model, four of the five possible dysfunctions could be at work in a case where there was wrongdoing that a team member wanted covered up. Any other team member who knew about a cover-up would feel an absence of trust because you know that the person covering something up has no integrity. You also could not trust them because they know you have knowledge of the cover-up and that leads to a potential blackmail situation for both of you. This could in turn lead to worse cover-ups.

If you know about a breach, then the second dysfunction, fear of conflict, kicks in. Could you risk upsetting the team by passing on information that might ruin the career of someone who you know quite well? This is made even worse if you are junior, or less popular. Although in theory whistleblowing is anonymous, in reality in most cases there would be a limited pool of people who it could be and it is not likely to be hard to work out who has blown the whistle. Not many people would willingly risk that sort of conflict with other team members.

Another consequence of refusing to go along with ignoring a breach of the code is that it could be interpreted by some people as a lack of commitment to the team, another dysfunction. Some people might think that you were not prepared to put yourself on the line for your fellow officers. On the other hand, if you do go along with it, you are then committed to sticking by those people. Since the commitment really needs to be to the core values of the organisation, not to corrupt members of it, you end up committed to something that is at odds with the real values you are supposed to be holding, and that is dysfunctional.

Finally, obviously, aiding a colleague in a cover-up of something that they have done wrong is avoidance of accountability. The whole point of the code of ethics and the

legislative framework in which police work takes place is that you are accountable for behaving as a police officer should and covering up failures means that someone is not held accountable.

Word count: 1585

Task 4

Relevant areas of the National Policing Curriculum:

Policing the roads, information and intelligence and conducting investigations.

Explain how information and intelligence can be used in the disruption of the more prevalent criminal activity (e.g. drug smuggling, human trafficking, child sexual exploitation, counterfeit goods, organised crime groups and 'county lines') by effective policing of the roads.

Outline how ANPR can be used as investigative resource when disrupting criminal activity.

1750 words (+/- 10%: include your actual word count at the end of each section)

ANSWER:

Information and intelligence are not the same thing. Information is raw data which has been obtained for a policing purpose whereas intelligence is taking that data, analysing and evaluating it to assess its reliability. There are three categories of intelligence: strategic, tactical and operational (National Crime Agency, 2019). Strategic intelligence is 'material that informs us and partners where we should be deploying our resources against the greatest threats.' Tactical intelligence could be a route used for trafficking or a means of recruiting gang members. Operational intelligence would be the description of the vehicle used for said trafficking. Intelligence can come from numerous sources, such as local knowledge, CHIS (covert human intelligence sources), PNC (Police National Computer), PND (Police National Database) to name a few.

Organised crime is large-scale in terms of people involved, areas covered and amount of illegal items being moved, for example, modern-day slavery or producing and supplying illegal drugs, as opposed to other types of crime which may involve one or two people, one victim and be spontaneous and petty, such as minor thefts. Organised crime is sophisticated in how it works and involves a significant amount of movement - either of people or items or both - planning, coordination, and knowledge, especially of how to avoid or minimise detection. All of these elements present significant challenges when it comes to policing, as it can be difficult and relentless to establish exactly what is happening, who is involved (in particular those in charge at the top of the hierarchy as they often do not appear to be linked at all) and how far-reaching the crime is. Further examples of organised crime include preying on vulnerabilities by committing child sexual exploitation or human trafficking, moving commodities like firearms trafficking, or focusing on economics in cybercrime or money laundering. (Crown Prosecution Service, 2019).

Running an Organised Crime Group (OCG) requires a significant number of resources. Taking the example of producing and supplying illegal drugs, such as Cannabis, an OCG would need physical space and equipment to grow the plants,

people inside the premises to look after the plants and turn them into a moveable and saleable product, different people to transport the product to various locations where it can then be distributed and sold, more people to handle the orders (generally via a dedicated phone line), payments and enforce any debts. Intelligence is a useful tool for police in disrupting this kind of activity in that they may spot or be informed of unusual activity, for example changes to an address which houses a Cannabis factory which is then dismantled, meaning a new location needs to be found and set up by the OCG. Low-level drug dealers may commit other offences or be caught with items on them linked to drug dealing (for example the drugs themselves in measured bags, cash, or a burner phone). There may be intelligence for a certain vehicle known to transport drugs, which is stopped on the road and, therefore, prevented from reaching its destination.

Organised crime has developed and grown in both volume and complexity (National Crime Agency, 2018). For example, many threats are now online rather than geographic, the dark web is used instead of the regular internet, threat areas overlap, and there have been technological advancements both in hardware and software. This makes policing more difficult for a variety of reasons, two of them being there are very stringent rules surrounding monitoring and accessing online data and the lack of physical resources (staff) within policing organisations to actually investigate and process the information and intelligence which could be found online.

The ways in which OCGs communicate are now more spread out, for example, they might use WhatsApp, Signal or Telegram, as well as the chat rooms of online games (Page 26, National Crime Agency, 2021). Another operation showed how sophisticated the OCGs were in communicating using specially adapted EncroChat phones to avoid detection. These have location data turned off, and chats can be easily deleted by inputting a code, which can be done if the owner is asked to unlock their phone (BBC, 2023).

In addition, the way payments are made makes them harder to trace or observe. For example, some people traffickers use a complex honour and barter system to receive payments, known as 'hawaladr'. This means that things that might be caught by normal safeguards around money laundering can be missed (Page 28, National Crime Agency, 2021).

Although policing the ever-changing ways OCGs operate is challenging, it is not impossible. As previously mentioned, one common factor in most OCG operations is movement, and the main method of transport is the vast road network in the UK. As well as working to enforce road safety and reduce collisions on the roads, disrupting criminal activity on the roads is a priority for many forces. In their report (Avon and Somerset Constabulary, 2015), Avon and Somerset police detailed their aim of disrupting organised criminal activity on their roads and collaborated with neighbouring forces on regional operations with the same aim. Examples of operations include Op Transchem which 'focuses on the movement of dangerous goods across the strategic road network' and Op Tourist which targets 'illegal transportation and passenger safety on coaches/buses'. They also targeted theft of plant and equipment.

A vital tool at the police's disposal is Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), which identifies a vehicle based on its number plate. ANPR has been in existence since the 1970s and was developed by British Police. Today, the technology is used

by both publicly owned (e.g. motorway cameras) and privately owned (e.g. car parks) networks. Privately owned data needs to be accessed separately (Howell, 2007). Whether a vehicle was involved in the commission of an offence should always be considered when carrying out an investigation. If it is thought a vehicle was used, then ANPR can help identify the vehicle without any other details being known (College Of Policing, 2023).

The National ANPR Service (NAS) holds data on the location of all the ANPR cameras. This, together with the network of cameras and infrastructure, is called the National ANPR Capability (NAC). The NASPLE (National ANPR Standards for Policing and Law Enforcement) set out the requirements that police and other law enforcement agencies (LEAs) must comply with to access the National ANPR Capability (NAC). Data can only be used for law enforcement, including investigations by police. There are detailed criteria for its use, relating to who can access it, what data standards they must meet, and so on.

The College of Policing suggests the following uses for ANPR in investigations: 'locate lost or stolen vehicles, identify the movements of a vehicle(s) involved in a crime and information associated with vehicle(s), research the movements of the victim's vehicle to assist with victimology, research alibis, identify the vehicle(s) in a particular location during particular time periods to assist in identifying a suspect, potential victims, or potential witnesses, for example, linking crimes or identifying witnesses to an incident' (College of Policing, 2023). Mobile ANPR systems can be used and deployed quickly if an urgent response is needed, which may be the case when trying to tackle serious and organised crime. This also helps avoid the problem that OCGs may be aware of camera locations, and can reduce the cost and visibility of surveillance.

ANPR has been proven time and again to be successfully used to tackle serious and organised crime. One documented case among many, for example, was in Greater Manchester during Operation Flood, a 'proactive multi-agency approach to tackle an estimated 200 drugs lines operating within and outside of Greater Manchester'. 37 arrests were made, and 75 intelligence logs were submitted to be used as part of ongoing investigations (Greater Manchester Police, 2021). Another example is from Northern Ireland, where police disrupted four gangs involved in organised high-value shoplifting across the United Kingdom by using ANPR. The report draws attention to the fact that these gangs are "highly mobile", demonstrating that this is an area that police can and do tackle with ANPR (PSNI, 2022).

Despite its use, ANPR also has its limitations. Amongst the barriers to success are that ANPR cameras nationally submit about 60 million pieces of data per day. The amount of data can be overwhelming. This is made worse by the fact that vehicles can be cloned (Metropolitan Police, n.d.). A 2019 academic study considered the problems in using ANPR to tackle Modern Slavery. Among other limitations, it found that without specific information about which vehicles were being used, it would be an intrusion into others' privacy to do the amount of tracking of vans that would be needed, because Modern Slavery is so rare and there are so many vans moving (Brennan, 2019). Another limitation is that data is only stored for a year, which prevents investigators from going back far enough, often, to trace the movements of those who have been convicted and catch more of those involved.

There have been movements towards developing artificial intelligence models to help analyse this huge amount of data. For example, the University of Surrey worked with Thames and Surrey Police to analyse “pattern of life” movements among lorry convoy drivers, looking for unusual movements, as part of Operation POLARBEAR. There are limitations, though, because the strict rules about ANPR information limit how much private companies can be involved. One academic (Brennan, 2019) suggests seconding or recruiting more data scientists.

In conclusion, intelligence gathered from road policing is a vital and continuous source used to inform decision-making at all levels of policing when it comes to tackling serious and organised crime. Many elements of serious and organised crime can be hidden as communications and financial transfers are done in increasingly covert ways. However, moving goods and people is always going to be harder to hide. Using tools like ANPR is an excellent way to track what is happening on the roads and to disrupt organised crime. But with its benefits comes barriers and the biggest limitation is the plethora of information from ANPR systems. Urgent work is needed to develop technology to analyse the data in order to keep up with the ever-changing world of OCGs. For public policy reasons, this needs to be secure and therefore probably ‘in-house’.

Word count: 1705

Task 5

Individual Learning Plan

The second learning outcome identified in the accompanying module descriptor (BMPP 5000D) asks that you create an individual learning plan to meet your identified needs through reflection upon your continuing practice. This shows confidence in your ability to manage your own learning in response to evolving circumstances in the workplace.

This task differs from the PDPs that you have completed in your previous workbooks in that this learning plan allows you to assess what level you believe you are in key knowledge, skills and experience against where you believe you (and the force) consider you should be – now and in the coming 6 to 12 months of your placement. This should then be used to target future development need.

1500 words equivalent. Please note that this is not the actual number of words used in completing the table, the count reflects the thought and research behind it.

It will count towards the overall equivalent word count of 8000 words expected from this module.

ANSWER:

Knowledge, Skills and Experience Assessment

	REQUIRED			RATING			DEVELOPMENT NEED
KNOWLEDGE	Low	Med	High	Low	Med	High	
Different Public Order offences - what they are, how to identify which level is being committed. When policing the town this is the most common offence	1-4	5-7	8-10 9-10	1-4	5-7	8-10 8	I know the difference between the different offences but there are finer details such as whether they can be committed inside/outside, who can be

(aside from Drunk and Disorderly) so it's useful to be able to quickly decide which offence, if any, is being committed and whether it's necessary to arrest for it.							alarmed and what the intention is that I need to develop/revise my knowledge on to be able to make quicker, more accurate decisions.
Domestic Violence (DV) policies at calls, specifically separating the parties, establishing who the victim is (if any), getting a first account (either on bodyworn video or pocket notebook), offering a DASH, safeguarding/safety advice, assessing risk and completing a PPN.			10			9	Dealing with DV calls well is a force priority so knowing the necessary steps to be able to support the victim and deal with the risk appropriately is important and something I feel I understand and do well.
Voluntary Attendance (VA) procedure - knowing why we do this as opposed to arrest and bring into custody, which offences it is suitable for, and the practical side of it i.e. where the right room is, where to do disclosure, organising a solicitor.		7			6		I haven't completed that many VA's so the practical side of how to complete them is easily forgotten when you don't do them that often. However, the most recent one I did was good, everything was organised and on time and the subject understood and was happy with the procedure. An

Case files - knowing the different types of case file, where to apply them, how to complete them correctly.		5			7	area of development would be to make a VA checklist so I have it written down for each time I need to do one so I don't have to ask a colleague. As mentioned in Task 1, I injured my finger and during my recovery I learnt from the File Team the basics of completing a file correctly. For complex or remand files, they generally take over, but if it can be done quickly to speed up either a charge or sending across to CPS, then knowing how to complete one helps. I actively sought out the file team, made notes and feel confident in completing a file now (PCR file, DVPO file, CPS advice file both GAP and NGAP). Case file requirements often change and the more rarely needed documents I
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							could improve my knowledge on.
SKILLS Diffusing and de-escalating high-tension situations and managing conflict between people (between 2 people, families, large groups...)	Low 1-4	Med 5-7	High 8-10 9	Low 1-4	Med 5-7 7	High 8-10	Being able to diffuse situations and bring them down to a calm level so you can find out what's happened and get to an outcome is a core part of being a police officer. I think I am good at de-escalating situations as I approach them calmly and try to either be lower or match the level the people are at, not go in above unless it's called for. As I am not blue-light trained yet it is often the case I am not first off at an incident so being in control of the situation myself doesn't always happen. I am also still learning this skill myself so if I am at a call with an even less experienced

Taking detailed statements - making sure to follow the correct template, include dates, times, descriptions, exhibits and the points to prove of each offence.			8			8	officer, it can be hard to know exactly what to do in all situations. This skill will develop and improve with time and by going to more calls. A good statement should cover all the details listed and being able to get this information involves listening to the victim/witness and pulling out of them the information you need by asking the right questions. I rate myself as being good at this as I like asking questions and getting to the bottom of things, so I'm not afraid to ask people for details and to clarify exactly what it is they know. You can always take a second statement if needed but sometimes the first time may be your only opportunity to have someone on board so it's important to get
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Volume investigations - e.g. burglary, stalking/harassment, offences covering multiple force areas.		7			6	the relevant information included. I enjoy investigating things so I find it comes naturally when these bigger jobs come in to be able to organise the information we have, break things down into smaller chunks so I can work out what's outstanding and what should be done to get the information needed to then be able to reach an outcome. An example is a rapidly developing stalking job where the subject was using several different means of contacting the victim. Instead of getting overwhelmed, I was able to deal with the offender to reduce the immediate risk and then make a plan for what to do next. The investigation is ongoing but I learnt a lot of
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							useful things I can use in the next similar job. There will always be a development need here as no two jobs are the same and they will vary a lot by which offence it is that has been committed.
EXPERIENCE	Low	Med	High	Low	Med	High	
	1-4	5-7	8-10	1-4	5-7	8-10	
Arresting offenders in dynamic situations.			8		6		I do not have as much experience as I'd like to have in arresting offenders in dynamic situations i.e. following an emergency call or if something spontaneous happens in front of me. As I do not have blue light training I am not always first off at calls so I am more experienced at dealing with victims afterwards. I am confident with arresting people and know the caution, necessity and booking in custody process, however most of

Alternative disposals e.g. TOR or Community Resolution	4			3		my experience with this has been for pre-planned arrests where I have been able to establish this information beforehand. I think development of this will come with time and going to more calls, so I am exposed to more situations and take the lead instead of more experienced colleagues. I took part in Op Utah which is a Road Traffic Operation combined with the DVSA and VOSA whereby vehicles are brought in to be checked over after they are suspected to have for example, bald tyres, insecure loads, and incorrect insurance. The reasons why you can give out a TOR (Traffic Offence Report) are vast and mostly easy to check and the
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							form to complete is straightforward. Other means of alternative disposal e.g. Community Resolution is not something I am experienced with as the situation where this would be applicable and the best outcome do not happen that often. However I will be sure to keep this outcome as a consideration in future incidents.
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The bibliography should only include sources referenced within the workbook using the Harvard referencing system. Information about referencing in written assignments and how to avoid plagiarism can be found on Moodle. It is important that you are aware of the importance of ensuring that the work submitted is your original work.

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