



The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus
after the Fourth Crusade

Author(s): David Jacoby

Source: *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (Oct., 1973), pp. 873-906

Published by: [Oxford University Press](#) on behalf of the [American Historical Association](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1858345>

Accessed: 03/04/2013 09:06

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Oxford University Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The American Historical Review*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus after the Fourth Crusade

DAVID JACOBY

THE SECOND HALF of the eleventh century witnessed the turning of the tide in the history of the eastern Mediterranean. The Norman conquest of Byzantine Italy and Muslim Sicily and the growing activity of Western merchants in the Byzantine Empire, the Muslim Levant, and Egypt provide two facets of the same phenomenon: together they may be considered as the initial thrust of a rejuvenated West, announcing its imminent military, economic, and demographic expansion eastward. The Crusades were part and parcel of this general phenomenon of Western or Latin expansion, yet they have made a particular imprint in its framework. They brought to Byzantine and Muslim territories the establishment of permanent Latin rule imposed by conquest, resting upon a Latin elite, and reinforced by immigration from the West. The initial phase of conquest is tied to the First Crusade, which enabled the creation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Latin states of Tripoli, Antioch, and Edessa; Byzantine Cyprus was captured by Richard I of England almost by accident in 1191. A second wave of conquest came in the wake of the Fourth Crusade, when Western knights, the Venetian state, and several adventurers acting in their own behalf imposed their rule on Byzantine territories. Finally, Catalans conquered the duchy of Athens in 1311, and Genoese the island of Chios in 1346.

As a result of conquest relations between the Latins and the population of these areas underwent a major change. Commercial activity of Western merchants in Byzantium or Muslim countries in earlier years had called for purely economic and social intercourse with local inhabitants. Temporary or even permanent residence had no bearing on their position as aliens, a status that was further emphasized by their enjoyment of commercial and judicial privileges. But conquest, whether gradual or abrupt,

This is a thoroughly revised version of a paper read in Washington, D.C. on December 28, 1969, at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. I wish to express my thanks to Professor Bryce Lyon, of Brown University, and Professor Charles M. Brand, of Bryn Mawr College, as well as to other commentators, who have prompted me to clarify or stress certain aspects of the problems I dealt with.

created a problem of a completely different nature: the relationship between an elite of conquerors, their descendants, and the Latins who joined them, on the one hand, and the indigenous population on the other, had to be defined and a pattern of permanent coexistence between the two groups devised. Feudalism transplanted from the West was imposed by a feudal nobility upon areas wrested from the Muslims. In former Byzantine territories the nature of the ruling class of conquerors was more diversified. Norman Italy, Cyprus, and the Peloponnesus witnessed the establishment of feudal rule, while elsewhere a nonfeudal elite wielded authority and held the reins of government. Such was the case in areas subjected to the direct dominion of Venice, especially Crete, as well as in the Catalan duchy of Athens and Genoese Chios. In each instance the very nature of the ruling class as well as the structure of the local society determined to a large extent the character of their encounter, which evidently generated changes in both groups. An investigation of this complex phenomenon in Frankish Morea might well serve as a case study.

ON APRIL 13, 1204, a combined force of Crusaders and Venetians captured Constantinople; the so-called Fourth Crusade had come to an end.¹ The disintegration of the Byzantine Empire, already initiated toward the end of the twelfth century, was accelerated, and within a year large portions of its territory were occupied by Latin conquerors. One of these areas, the Peloponnesus, or the Morea, was invaded in November 1204 by Western knights who gradually extended their rule over the whole peninsula, with the exception of Coron and Modon, which remained under Venetian rule. Although major changes occurred in its boundaries, the Frankish principality of the Morea remained in existence for more than two centuries, eventually disappearing in 1432.² The length of Latin rule and the relative wealth of evidence relating to this territory enable us to describe in a fairly accurate way the impact of feudalism on the indigenous population, especially on the Greek upper class, and the changes wrought by this encounter within the Frankish knightly class.

Before dealing with the evolution of society in Frankish Morea, it is,

¹ On the Fourth Crusade, see Edgar H. McNeal and Robert L. Wolff, "The Fourth Crusade," in Kenneth M. Setton, ed., *A History of the Crusades*, 2 (Philadelphia, 1962): 153-85; Antonio Carile, "Partitio Terrarum Imperii Romanie," *Studi Veneziani*, 7 (1965): 125-305; Charles M. Brand, *Byzantium Confronts the West, 1180-1204* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 232-69; and Donald E. Queller and S. J. Stratton, "A Century of Controversy on the Fourth Crusade," *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, 6 (1969): 233-77.

² The most recent general surveys of Frankish rule in the Morea are by Jean Longnon, *L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée* (Paris, 1949), and by Antoine Bon, *La Morée franque. Recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la principauté d'Achaïe (1205-1430)* (Paris, 1969). Unfortunately, many studies on specific subjects published in recent years have not been taken into account by the last author. William of Champlitte assumed the title of prince in 1205. Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 74.

however, imperative to dwell at some length upon the social structure of Byzantium. Despite basic common features, its social structure lacked uniformity: ethnic, economic, and geopolitical factors account for wide diversity within the Empire,³ and therefore special emphasis should be placed, in our context, on its western provinces. Many important problems relating to the evolution of Byzantine society remain unsolved or open to controversy. This is partly so because evidence is not always available and also because scholars have traditionally focused their attention on fiscal and institutional history. On the other hand, the distinctive features of feudalism as it evolved in the areas of the West from which the Latin conquerors came are better known. Undoubtedly, striking differences existed between Byzantine and feudal societies. Nevertheless, their encounter in Frankish Morea is marked by adaptation, compromise, and integration, a process whose character, stages, and limitations require definition.

TWO OF THE MOST important features of Byzantium, especially when compared with feudal society in the West, are the continuous existence of the state and the nature of Byzantine law. These two closely connected factors exerted a powerful influence on the molding of Byzantine society and made their imprint upon the Byzantine mind. Byzantium inherited from Rome its bureaucratic centralization and an all-embracing administration as well as the basic principles of the political and legal tradition of the Greco-Roman world. These fundamental characteristics were upheld, although time and again the authority of the emperor was challenged and the Empire as a whole submitted to severe strains and stresses. Such was the case shortly before the Fourth Crusade.

The abstract concept of *politeia*, or *res publica*, implied the existence of public law and public taxation. The emperor, who personified the state and was the depository of political and judicial authority, was also the source of all grace and responsible for the implementation of the law.⁴ On occasion he granted privileges to individuals, ecclesiastical institutions, or, collectively, to the inhabitants of a city or a territory. These privileges were mostly of a fiscal nature, such as exemption from

³ See, for example, Speros Vryonis, Jr., "Byzantium: The Social Basis of Decline in the Eleventh Century," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 2 (1959): 161-62.

⁴ See Franz Dölger, "Die Kaiserurkunde der Byzantiner als Ausdruck ihrer politischen Anschauungen," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 159 (1938-39): 229-50, reproduced in Dölger, *Byzanz und die europäische Staatenwelt* (Ettal, 1953), 9-33; Louis Bréhier, *Le monde byzantin*, 2, *Les institutions de l'empire byzantin* (Paris, 1949), 1-16, 63-65, 173, 218-19; Herbert Hunger, *Prooimion, Elemente der byzantinischen Kaiseridee in den Arengen der Urkunden* (Vienna, 1964), especially 84-154; Agostino Pertusi, "I principi fondamentali della concezione del potere a Bisanzio," *Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo e Archivio Muratoriano*, 80 (1968): 1-23; and Joachim Scharf, "Ius divinum. Aspekte und Perspektiven einer byzantinischen Zweigewaltentheorie," Peter Wirth, ed., *Polychronion, Festschrift Franz Dölger zum 75. Geburtstag* (Heidelberg, 1966), 462-79.

taxes due to the state or the right to collect taxes within the boundaries of an estate and retain them, in part or entirely, instead of passing them on to the imperial fisc. Even so, taxes retained their public character. When access to an estate was forbidden to imperial officers, its possessor or holder was evidently to replace those officers in the exercise of certain functions. Such a grant did not, however, entail the development of private jurisdiction; at best it is comparable to the immunity granted by rulers in the Merovingian and early Carolingian West. In the Empire the concession of administrative, fiscal, or limited judicial powers or exemptions did not amount to a definitive alienation of state prerogatives. The emperor never surrendered his supreme jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the Empire. The limited character both in time and scope of the grants, clearly expressed in the charters delivered, is further illustrated by their renewal at the request of the beneficiaries. The latter were always considered to be imperial agents, empowered by delegation to exert the authority of the state.⁵ Nevertheless, when the control of the central government weakened, great landowners in the provinces took hold of the administrative machinery and usurped imperial powers. Such was especially the case in the last years of the twelfth century, shortly before the Frankish conquest.

Among the various grants awarded by the emperors, the *pronoia* has enjoyed particular attention. Literally "provision," it consisted of a concession of state revenues to an individual who collected them directly; to this effect, the emperor transferred to the recipient peasants and the imperial land they cultivated. The *pronoia* originated under the reign of the Comnenoi, toward the end of the eleventh or, more likely, in the early twelfth century, and became more widespread under Manuel I, who ascended the imperial throne in 1143. According to George Ostrogorsky, it was the counterpart of the Western fief; granted on a conditional basis in return for military service, it enabled the recruitment of mounted knights and became the basis of the Byzantine military system. Moreover, it strengthened the landed wealth and power of greater or lesser feudal lords at the expense of the state. The transfer of imperial authority over peasants to the recipients of *pronoiai* had important social

⁵ On the nature of the grants, see George Ostrogorsky ("Pour l'histoire de l'immunité à Byzance," *Byzantion*, 28 [1958]: 165-97, 235-46), who has, however, overstressed their judicial aspects. A more balanced view is to be found in Anastasio I. Mouratides, "The Byzantine Immunity System" (Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 1965), i-xvi, 80-94, 166-223. See also Nicolas Oikonomides, "The Donation of Castles in the Last Quarter of the 11th Century," *Polychronion*, 413-17; Hélène Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, "La concession des droits incorporels; donations conditionnelles," *Actes du XII^e Congrès international des Études byzantines* (Belgrade, 1964), 2: 103-14, and "Charisticariat et autres formes d'attribution de fondations pieuses aux X^e-XI^e siècles," *Recueil des travaux de l'Institut d'Études byzantines* (Belgrade)-Zbornik Radova, 10 (1967): 1-5; see also Paul Lemerle, "Un aspect du rôle des monastères à Byzance: les monastères donnés à des laïcs, les charistaires," *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Comptes-rendus* (Jan.-Mar. 1967), 10.

implications and was a further symptom of the feudalization of Byzantium before 1204.⁶ Considering all these factors, it is obvious that the *pronoia* is particularly relevant to our subject—a study of the interaction of Byzantine society with Western feudalism. The question is made the more pressing because twelfth-century sources relating to the *pronoia* are rather scanty, and Ostrogorsky has supplemented them by later evidence drawn from Frankish Morea, in order to clarify both the nature and diffusion of this institution.⁷ This procedure casts heavy doubts, however, on the identification of the *pronoia* with the fief in the early thirteenth century.

The later evidence adduced by Ostrogorsky is to be found in the Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea*, which was composed for a Greek audience in the Peloponnesus in the second half of the fourteenth century, most likely between 1341 and 1388, at least 137 years after the Frankish conquest. This chronicle provides ample information about holders of *pronoiai*, who fought on horseback and were followed by their dependents. *Pronoia* appears in it as identical to fief, and the Greek *archon*, as the counterpart of the Western knight; yet these equations should not be taken at face value. One cannot infer from this late-written source that the meanings of its terms were the same as they had been in the early thirteenth century, nor can one prove thereby the identity of institutions, such as *pronoia* and fief, at the time of the Frankish conquest. This is especially so because the Greek version derives from a French chronicle written for the Frankish feudatories and describing the life of the Moreot princes, barons, and their vassals, as well as their feats of arms, military obligations, mores, way of life, and outlook.⁸ The numerous *pronoiai* mentioned in the Greek version are therefore mostly fiefs, and their holders were Frankish feudatories, not members of the Greek upper class.

A careful analysis of the feudal vocabulary used in the Greek version and of several articles of the *Assizes of Romania*, a legal treatise compiled in the Morea between 1333 and 1346, points to two important qual-

⁶ See George Ostrogorsky, *Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine* (Brussels, 1954), especially 9–61 for the period under consideration here; see also Ostrogorsky's *History of the Byzantine State* (New Brunswick, 1969), 330–31, 371–72, 392, 425. Answering criticism, the author has recently restated his basic views while slightly correcting them, in "Die Pronoia unter den Komnenen," *Recueil des travaux de l'Institut d'Études byzantines-Zbornik Radova*, 12 (1970): 41–54; see also his "Observations on the Aristocracy in Byzantium," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 25 (1971): 11–12, 14, 17–18.

⁷ As emphasized in Ostrogorsky, *Pour l'histoire*, 55, and *History*, 371 n. 2.

⁸ On the Greek version, see David Jacoby, "Quelques considérations sur les versions de la *Chronique de Morée*," *Journal des Savants* (July–Sept. 1968), 150–59, 188. An English translation of this version has been published by Harold E. Lurier, *Crusaders as Conquerors: The Chronicle of Morea* (New York, 1964), but see the numerous corrections by Peter Topping, in a review published in *Speculum*, 40 (1965): 737–42. On the French version, see Jacoby, "Quelques considérations," 134–50, 181–87.

ifications.⁹ In the first place, the Greek upper class in Frankish Morea did not hold any *pronoia*, in spite of the use of this term by the Greek version to describe their landed estates; second, the term is not used in a legal or technical way and stems anyhow from a late period. The *pronoia* gradually evolved in Byzantine territory into a hereditary tenure, and its military nature became more pronounced under the Palaeologoi, in the second half of the thirteenth century. Because it then resembled the fief the Greeks of the Morea were obviously prompted to use the term *pronoia* to describe the Western institution, and its adoption for this purpose should therefore be placed at that time or perhaps even in the early fourteenth century.¹⁰

In conclusion, neither backward projection nor generalization on the basis of the Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea*, as propounded by Ostrogorsky, are warranted. Evidence on the hereditary *pronoia* appearing at a late period cannot be adduced to describe the institution at the time of the Frankish conquest. The same holds true of the portrayal of the mounted knights and their dependents by the Greek version: as Franks are described in this source, the latter provides no clue as to the true nature of the military service performed by the Greek holders of *pronoiai* prior to 1204.¹¹ Moreover, as the Greek version offers no conclusive evidence about the existence of the *pronoia* in the Peloponnesus at that date, one of the main arguments in favor of its wide diffusion in the whole of the Byzantine Empire has to be dismissed.¹²

Even though only meager evidence remains after the Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea* has been rejected, it still appears that the *pronoia* of the twelfth century was basically different from the Western fief in several respects. It was granted only for the lifetime of the recipient and could be neither alienated nor enfeoffed, subinfeudation being non-existent in Byzantium. *Pronoiai* were not always conceded in return for military service, and there is no indication whatsoever that their holders constituted either an important factor in the Byzantine army or a military class.¹³ Finally, it should be stressed that the concession of a

⁹ For the dating of the *Assizes of Romania*, see my book *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale. Les "Assises de Romanie": sources, application et diffusion* (Paris, 1971), 75–82. The text of this treatise has been edited by Georges Recoura, *Les Assises de Romanie* (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Etudes, fasc. 258) (Paris, 1930) (hereafter *Assises*). An English translation has been provided by Peter W. Topping, *Feudal Institutions as revealed in the Assizes of Romania, the Law Code of Frankish Greece* (Philadelphia, 1949), 15–99.

¹⁰ Criticism of Ostrogorsky is to be found in my study "Les archontes grecs et la féodalité en Morée franque," *Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de recherche d'histoire et civilisation byzantines*, 2 (1967): 421–65. Ostrogorsky has obviously misread my article. See "Die Pronoia," 52–53. I have never claimed that the *pronoia* as an institution had been introduced in the Peloponnesus when it was under Frankish rule, but that such was the case with the *term* used to describe it.

¹¹ Contrary to the assertion of Ostrogorsky, *History*, 371 n. 2.

¹² In favor of a wide diffusion, see Ostrogorsky, *Pour l'histoire*, 55; cf. Jacoby, "Les archontes," 479–81, to the contrary.

¹³ Contrary to Ostrogorsky ("Die Pronoia," 42–43), who has recently emphasized again the

pronoia did not entail a grant of public authority or jurisdiction over the peasants tilling its land.¹⁴ The nature of political power and the distribution of authority in Byzantium before 1204 do not warrant the assumption that a process of feudalization was under way in the Empire, nor did the *pronoia* necessarily play a significant part in undermining its strength.¹⁵

Considerations about the social structure of Byzantium provide additional evidence that fundamental differences existed between twelfth-century Byzantium and feudal society in the native countries of the conquerors. Byzantine law and society inherited the clear-cut distinction between slaves and free men. Legally, all free men, whether relatives of the emperor, imperial officials, members of the Senate, or "commoners," were the *douloi*, or servants, of the ruler¹⁶ and were governed by the same law system regardless of their social status or their relationship to him. On the whole, it was the aim of the emperor to ensure that all his subjects should enjoy the same treatment in law courts,¹⁷ but in practice, judicial discrimination could not always be prevented: judges were often impressed by the social standing of the parties appearing before them, and the exertion of social and economic pressure or the use of bribery were evils that beset Byzantium as they did other medieval societies.¹⁸ Still, as the nature of imperial grants shows, preferential treatment in law courts was not based on a legal concept of differentiation. Whether conceded to landlords, dignitaries, officials, or soldiers, titles and priv-

exclusively military character of this institution, and to "Observations," 11 and 14, where the author implies the existence of contingents of holders of *pronoia*, for which no evidence can be adduced. I shall return elsewhere to this subject. On the composition of the Byzantine army in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, see mainly Paul Lemerle, "Recherches sur le régime agraire à Byzance: la terre militaire à l'époque des Comnènes," *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale*, 2 (1959): 265-81; see also Hélène Ahrweiler (*Byzance et la mer* [Paris, 1966], 205-22, 397-407), who relies, however, too heavily on Ostrogorsky in relation to the diffusion of the *pronoia*.

¹⁴ See above, n. 5. The presumed analogy of the *pronoia* with the Western fief has already been discarded by Miloš Mladenović, in "Zur Frage der Pronoia und des Feudalismus im byzantinischen Reiche," *Südost-Forschungen*, 15 (1956): 123-35, 137-39.

¹⁵ Ostrogorsky ("Observations," 8-9) waters down the concept of feudalism by stating that its expression is "the presence of the seigneurial estate peopled by dependent peasants," which might apply to many countries and societies, even in antiquity. A penetrating analysis is offered by Claude Cahen ("Réflexions sur l'usage du mot de féodalité". A propos d'un livre récent," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 3 [1960]: 4-20), who emphasizes the importance of the exercise of public authority and prerogatives by private persons as an essential ingredient of feudalism.

¹⁶ Jean Verpeaux, "Les oikeioi. Notes d'histoire institutionnelle et sociale," *Revue des études byzantines*, 23 (1965): 96-97.

¹⁷ See Bréhier, *Le monde byzantin*, 2: 173, 219. The same principle was restated at a later date, in 1334, by Emperor Andronicus III. Paul Lemerle, "Le juge général des Grecs et la réforme judiciaire d'Andronic III," *Mémoires Louis Petit, Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire byzantines* (Bucharest, 1948), 299-300.

¹⁸ In case of abuse one could seek redress from the emperor. A suggestive study on the discrimination against the poor in contemporary American society is provided by Jerome E. Carlin, Jan Howard, and Sheldon L. Messinger, "Civil Justice and the Poor: Issues for Sociological Research," *Law and Society Review*, 1 (1966): 9-90, also published separately (New York, 1967).

ileges were always bestowed on an individual basis and never collectively upon a specific group enjoying the same social standing.¹⁹ They provided no exemption from regular judicial procedure for individuals, nor did they give rise to a class endowed with a particular legal status or governed by a particular set of laws.

Legal equality in Byzantium should not be mistaken for social or economic equality, nor did it necessarily afford equal chances of promotion in society.²⁰ High-ranking birth was often emphasized; the "well born" or children of "well-born parents" were favored at the outset²¹ and upstarts utterly despised.²² Definitions of class boundaries remained vague, however. Terms such as "powerful" (*dynatoi*) or "poor" (*aporoï, ptochoi*) implied mainly a social and, additionally, an economic standing, not necessarily identical.²³ Yet high-ranking birth or differences in social status, economic status, power, or prestige never assumed a legal character and were never sanctioned or perpetuated by law.²⁴ This fundamental characteristic of Byzantine society stands out in sharp contrast to feudal society as it evolved in the native countries of the conquerors: in the feudal West of the late twelfth century, social classes were synonymous with legal classes, and status had become hereditary. To be sure, aristocracy existed in Byzantium as a social class, and certain families belonging to this group played a dominant role in the evolution of the Empire,²⁵ but no hereditary nobility enjoying a particular legal status is to be found.²⁶ Moreover, the absence of clearly defined legal classes²⁷ or a rigid system of stratification enabled a constant trend of upward mobility and inclusion within the elite of the Empire. To some extent Byzantine society

¹⁹ The individual character of the privileges should be stressed in our context. See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 466–67, especially nn. 231, 236.

²⁰ This is especially the case for the *paroikoi*, who by the late twelfth century formed the major part of the Byzantine peasantry; although legally free, they were subjected to severe personal restrictions. I shall deal elsewhere with this subject.

²¹ See Romilly J. H. Jenkins, "Social Life in the Byzantine Empire," *Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, pt. 2, ed. Joan M. Hussey (Cambridge, 1967), 99–100, and below, n. 25; see also Ostrogorsky, "Observations," 4–5.

²² See, for example, Brand, *Byzantium Confronts the West*, 143.

²³ See especially Paul Lemerle, "Esquisse pour une histoire agraire de Byzance: les sources et les problèmes," *Revue historique*, 219 (1958): 268–80.

²⁴ Evidence to this effect is found in Monemvasia, in the southern Peloponnese. See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 466 n. 231.

²⁵ See, for example, Vryonis, "Byzantium," 161–64; see also Nicolas Svoronos, "Société et organisation intérieure dans l'empire byzantin au XI^e siècle: les principaux problèmes," *Thirteenth International Congress of Byzantine Studies* (Oxford, 1966), Main Papers, 12: 1–7.

²⁶ See Rodolphe Guiland, "La noblesse de race à Byzance," *Byzantinoslavica*, 9 (1947–48): 307–14; Guiland, "La transmission héréditaire des titres nobiliaires à Byzance," *Kodaiigaku (Palaeologia)*, 8 (1959): 137–43; and Guiland, "La noblesse byzantine. Remarques," *Revue des études byzantines*, 24 (1966): 40–42, 49–52. The first two studies have been reprinted in Rodolphe Guiland, *Recherches sur les institutions byzantines*, 1 (Berlin, 1967), respectively 15–22 and 65–72. See also the important remarks by Franz Dölger, in his review of Philip P. Argenti, *Libro d'Oro de la noblesse de Chio* (Oxford, 1955), published in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 49 (1956): 126–27.

²⁷ With the exception of slaves and *paroikoi*. See above, n. 20.

was an "open" society and remained so toward the end of the twelfth century. One can find many instances in which *homines novi*, even of lowly origin, gained access to the upper class;²⁸ several of them were to ascend the imperial throne. Inclusion within the elite of the Empire was not necessarily attained in the wake of dynastic changes. Education and intellectual achievement were highly valued in Byzantium;²⁹ so were administrative efficiency and military valor. The imperial bureaucracy, the army, and serving powerful men³⁰ provided avenues for social promotion and consequently afforded chances to acquire land and power, sometimes on a large scale.³¹ The progressive development of a class of rich townspeople, beginning toward the end of the tenth century, added a new factor of mobility. From about the middle of the eleventh century, emperors appointed several of them to the Senate and to high imperial offices.³²

Powerful men, dignitaries, and great landowners occasionally had armed retainers; great landowners also exerted some authority over the free peasants tilling their lands, especially when these landowners were vested with certain fiscal or administrative powers granted to them by the emperor. Personal bonds of dependence, however, always retained their private nature and were never recognized by law or sanctioned by custom.³³ Vassalage as it was known in the West was alien to the Byzantine political structure and to Byzantine thought. Obviously, contact with Latins, even before the First Crusade, had acquainted Byzantium with feudal institutions, although the encounter did not prepare the ground for their acceptance in the Empire or change the relationship of the emperor with his subjects. Significantly, vassalage appeared in Byzantium only when the emperor established such a relationship with Latins, which

²⁸ Such as Philokales, formerly a peasant, mentioned in a novel of Emperor Basil II dated 996. See Lemerle, "Esquisse," 277-78. An English translation of this text is provided by Charles M. Brand, *Icon and Minaret: Sources on Byzantine and Islamic Civilization* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1969), 91-97, and see especially 93. For the twelfth century, see the example mentioned in Brand, *Byzantium Confronts the West*, 143. Many eunuchs were of lowly origin; on their importance, see Rodolphe Guiland, "Les eunuques dans l'empire byzantin," in *Recherches*, 1: 165-97. See also below, n. 30. Ostrogorsky ("Observations," 4-5, 9, 29) insists upon the existence of a hereditary aristocracy, but the evidence adduced throughout his study is not convincing and, besides, points to upward mobility into the upper class. A thorough study of this phenomenon is still wanting.

²⁹ On which see Jenkins, "Social Life," 80; Ostrogorsky, "Observations," 29-30; and Paul Lemerle, *Le premier humanisme byzantin* (Paris, 1971), 255-56.

³⁰ See especially Hans-Georg Beck, "Byzantinisches Gefolgschaftswesen," in *Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, Jahrgang 1965* (Munich, 1965), 5: 1-31; Verpeaux ("Les oikeioi," 89-99), who also deals with the period following the Fourth Crusade; and Ostrogorsky, "Observations," 12-16.

³¹ The successful career of an intellectual of lowly origin is described by Nicoletta Dujé, "Un haut fonctionnaire byzantin du XI^e siècle: Basile Malésès," *Revue des études byzantines*, 30 (1972): 167-78.

³² See Svoronos, "Société et organisation intérieure," 8-10.

³³ See above, n. 30. Ostrogorsky ("Observations," 14-15) agrees to this fact, but nevertheless arrives at the surprising conclusion that dependents occasionally were not directly subject to the emperor.

explains the exclusive use for this purpose of Western feudal terminology, transliterated or translated into Greek.³⁴

Great landowners played a dominant role in the provinces of the Empire. Their estates—a source of wealth, prestige, and power—assured them of leadership on a regional or local scale and of support by their dependents, whether these were inhabitants of small cities or small landholders.³⁵ Yet many great landowners strove to enhance their social status and strengthen their influence by acquiring administrative or military functions within the imperial machinery of government. Honorary titles, which assured a standing in the imperial hierarchy, were eagerly sought and, if not granted, bought from the emperor.³⁶ It is therefore not surprising that the same word, *archon*, applied to great provincial landowners as well as to imperial officials, the latter vested with administrative or military authority. One occasionally would make a distinction between the rich landlord, or *ktematikos archon*, and the official in charge of civilian administration or the army officer, known respectively as *thematikos* and *tagmatikos archon*.³⁷ Although many *archontes* derived their social status from rural estates, those of the Western provinces of Byzantium seem on the whole to have resided in cities.³⁸ As some of these cities served as administrative and military centers, it is not surprising that they afforded a powerful asset when *archontes* took advantage of the weakness and eventual collapse of imperial authority on the eve of the Latin conquest. Several such cases in the Peloponnesus are also illustrative of the dual position of many *archontes* as great landowners and imperial officials, a position fully exploited to foster political ambitions.

Among these *archontes* Leo Sgouros achieved the most spectacular career. In Nauplia he inherited the powerful standing of his father, who had been the virtual ruler of the city. He appears to have been an imperial officer in 1198 and seems to have borne an official title in 1203.

³⁴ See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 440, 476, and Verpeaux, "Les oikeioi," 93–94. Bohemund of Antioch uses Western terminology to express the relationship of the princes of Lesser Armenia to Emperor Alexius I. Anne Comnène, *Alexiade*, ed. Bernard Leib (Paris, 1945), 3: 134 (ll. 1–4).

³⁵ For the eastern provinces, see above, n. 25. In the Peloponnesus this is apparent in Monemvasia and in the case of Sgouros, on whom see below.

³⁶ For the tenth to twelfth centuries, see Paul Lemerle, "Roga et rente d'état aux X^e–XI^e siècles," *Revue des études byzantines*, 25 (1967): 77–100; Armin Hohlweg, *Beiträge zur Verwaltungsgeschichte des oströmischen Reiches unter den Komnenen* (Munich, 1965), 34–40.

³⁷ See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 465–66, and below, on Sgouros and Chamaretos; see also Hélène Glykatzī-Ahrweiler, "Recherches sur l'administration de l'empire byzantin aux IX^e–XI^e siècles," *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 84 (1960): 83 n. 4.

³⁸ Nicolas G. Svoronos, "Recherches sur le cadastre byzantin et la fiscalité aux XI^e et XII^e siècles: le cadastre de Thèbes," *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 83 (1959): 67–77, 141–44; Henri de Valenciennes, *Histoire de l'empereur Henri de Constantinople*, ed. Jean Longnon (Paris, 1948), par. 672, mentions the welcome of *papas*, *alcontes*, and other inhabitants of Thebes to the Latin emperor Henry in 1209. On the *kastrenoi* of Athens toward the end of the twelfth century and the *archontes* of the Peloponnesus, see Jacoby, "Les archontes," 427–28, 466–67, and below.

From Nauplia he extended his power in 1202 by seizing Argos and Corinth and allied himself with pirates of Aegina and Salamis in order to subdue Athens, but to no effect. He successfully assaulted Thebes and advanced in Thessaly in 1204–05, his power finally collapsing when he faced the Frankish invaders. Another *archon*, Leo Chamaretos, who bore the official title of *proedros* of Lacedaemonia, in 1205 managed briefly to impose his authority on the area surrounding Sparta.³⁹ At about the same time an *archon* of the region of Modon, in the southwestern Peloponnesus—his identity and exact standing cannot be ascertained—⁴⁰ allied himself with Geoffrey of Villehardouin, one of the leaders of the Franks, hoping to conquer the peninsula with him. The position of the Slav *archontes* was somewhat different. Several groups of Slav population who settled in Byzantine territory from the late sixth to the early ninth century preserved their particular features and their tribal structure—and this was especially the case in the Peloponnesus. The imperial government included them within the framework of its military organization and, in return for military service, granted them fiscal privileges. Moreover, the emperor recognized the authority and strengthened the traditional status of their chiefs by conferring on them imperial titles, and it is therefore not surprising that they were considered *archontes*.⁴¹

As leaders of the local population at the time of the Frankish conquest, the *archontes* of the Peloponnesus headed the struggle against the invaders. Some *archontes* perished, others fled;⁴² most of them came to terms with the Latin invaders or were eventually compelled to accept their rule. A major change was to take place in their status.

THE FRANKISH ARMY that conquered the Peloponnesus included knights from widely scattered areas in the West, extending from Flanders to Provence, though most of them came from Champagne and Burgundy.⁴³ Despite differences in their backgrounds they brought with them institutions, traditions, attitudes, and values common to feudal society in the

³⁹ See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 466–67; Brand, *Byzantium Confronts the West*, 152–54, 244–45; Antoine Bon, *Le Péloponnèse byzantin jusqu'en 1204* (Paris, 1951), 123, 172–73, 204–05, nos. 67 and 68.

⁴⁰ Geoffroy de Villehardouin, *La conquête de Constantinople*, ed. Edmond Faral (Paris, 1938–39), 2: 134–36, pars. 325–26. Karl Hopf (*Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf unsere Zeit, Ersch-Gruber Encyclopädie*, 85 [Leipzig, 1867–68], 212 b) identified him with a member of the Kantakouzenos family, but this is without foundation. See Donald M. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus), ca. 1100–1460, A Genealogical and Prosopographical Study* (Dumbarton Oaks Studies, 11) (Washington, 1968), 7 n. 15.

⁴¹ This is obvious in the case of the Melings living in Laconia. See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 465–66, also 443–44; in addition see Hélène Ahrweiler, "Le sébaste, chef de groupes ethniques," *Polychronion*, 34–38, especially 36–37.

⁴² Such a case is mentioned in a letter by Michael Choniates. Spyridon Lampros, *Michael Akominatou tou Choniatou ta sozomena* (Athens, 1879–80), 2: 276–80 (in Greek).

⁴³ Jean Longnon, "Problèmes de l'histoire de la principauté de Morée," *Journal des Savants* (Apr.–June 1946), 86–87.

northern part of the Capetian kingdom and neighboring areas, such as the county of Burgundy, toward the end of the twelfth century.⁴⁴

Feudal society in these territories was by then strictly stratified, basic social status being synonymous with legal status and, most important, transmitted by heredity. Each class was governed by a particular legal system. Since the eleventh century there were, to be sure, constant streams of mobility within the various social classes, which lacked both social and economic homogeneity. But, whether vertical or horizontal, this mobility had no bearing on the legal status of an individual. Non-nobles serving on a permanent basis in the administration or as horsemen in the armies of kings, dukes, counts, and barons thereby could enhance their social and economic position and enjoy special prestige, although they were prevented by a legal barrier from joining the ranks of the nobility. Neither did the holding of a feudal tenement by *ministeriales* or serjeants, attested to in the twelfth century, entail any change in their personal status.⁴⁵ Social promotion involving the crossing of class boundaries was by then essentially restricted to the lower strata of society.⁴⁶ Servile peasants became free by moving to new lands or by settling in towns; townspeople acquired personal freedom in different ways. The change in their social and legal status implied a legal procedure or some formal act to this effect, such as the grant of an individual, or collective, charter by a feudal lord or, in the case of a peasant who had settled in a town, testimony as to the length of his stay there. Legal procedure of this nature was especially imperative in order to gain promotion to the upper class of feudal society. The development of class-consciousness within the ranks of the feudatories, illustrated by the ceremony of dubbing to knighthood, made access to the latter status most difficult, although not impossible. By the late eleventh century nobility was already considered a matter of blood, and by 1200 chivalry had become an order, with its specific ritual, morals, and obligations.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, one could still acquire noble status by being knighted. It is true

⁴⁴ On this matter and on the discussion that follows, see especially Marc Bloch, *La société féodale* (Paris, 1939-40), whose views have been corrected on several points; Georges Duby, *La société aux XI^e et XII^e siècles dans la région mâconnaise* (Paris, 1953), and, by the same author, "Une enquête à poursuivre: la noblesse dans la France médiévale," *Revue historique*, 226 (1961): 1-22; Jean Richard, *Les ducs de Bourgogne et la formation du duché du XI^e au XII^e siècle* (Dijon, 1954); and Robert Boutruche, *Seigneurie et féodalité, 2: L'Apogée (XI^e-XIII^e siècles)* (Paris, 1970). The county of Burgundy was included in the Empire, but family ties and constant contacts account for an evolution of feudalism close to that of the duchy of Burgundy. See Richard, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, and Jean-Yves Mariotte, *Le comté de Bourgogne sous les Hohenstaufen, 1156-1208* (Paris, 1963).

⁴⁵ See Duby, *La société*, 241, 381-96, 436-37; Boutruche, *Seigneurie et féodalité*, 2: 285-87.

⁴⁶ On the other hand, downward mobility is frequently attested for members of the nobility. See Duby, *La société*, 241-43, 411-18, and Edouard Perroy, "Social Mobility among the French Noblesse in the Later Middle Ages," *Past and Present*, no. 21 (Apr. 1962): 25-38.

⁴⁷ See the full discussion of the problem by Duby, *La société*, 230-45, 411-18, 630-33; see also Duby, "Les origines de la chevalerie," in *Ordinamenti militari in Occidente nell'alto medioevo* (Settimane di studio del Centro italiano di studi sull' Alto Medioevo, XV, 2) (Spoleto, 1968), 739-61.

that the privilege of granting knighthood tended to become restricted to a few and that the number of beneficiaries remained on the whole small. But this restriction belongs to the first half of the thirteenth century and grows out of the sharp economic rise of certain burgesses as well as the constant progress of royal power in Capetian France, both of which had been initiated in the preceding century.⁴⁸

The impersonal concept of state remained alien to the mind of feudal society. Personal bonds, of a private nature, provided the backbone of social and political hierarchy; they were sanctioned by custom, governed by strict rules, and had legal force. The organization of society was reflected in institutions and practices such as homage, fealty, and fief. Knights formed the dominant class of society, but wide differences in standing, power, and wealth can be perceived within their ranks. Judicial and legislative authority as well as the right of taxation were vested in private hands and exercised by the upper ranks of feudal lords, although, as a result of centralization, the kings of France and the various counts and dukes also exercised public authority in these matters. Most knights lived on their own rural estates or in the court of a rural lord. Warriors by vocation, they strictly refrained from any direct involvement in economic activity, whether in agriculture or in commerce. Although this attitude was an integral part of their social ethos, it did not prevent them from occasionally pursuing a conscious economic policy implemented by their servants or subjects. In the twelfth century knights in the areas from which the conquerors came normally enjoyed exemption from regular taxes or payments of a rent in money; commutation of military service, relief, aids, and general levies were not, of course, considered as such.⁴⁹ The very style of life of the knights reflected their values and mentality. Feudal vocabulary itself faithfully expressed their sense of social superiority and their attitude toward the inferior classes. As the occasional performance of homage by non-nobles suggests, the ethos and concepts of the nobility pervaded the whole of society.⁵⁰

IT COULD HARDLY be expected that feudalism, with its particular social structure, political organization, and institutions, would be transplanted from the West to the Peloponnesus without undergoing any changes. While retaining its essential characteristics, it had to adapt to new cir-

⁴⁸ See Duby, *La société*, 522–23, 579–81, 623, 629, 634–36, and Boutruche, *Seigneurie et féodalité*, 2: 284–89; see also Perroy, “Social Mobility,” 25–38, but the evidence adduced from the Forez does not necessarily warrant generalization.

⁴⁹ Some small fiefs were, however, liable to periodic payments and services instead of military service, but this was rather exceptional. See Boutruche, *Seigneurie et féodalité*, 2: 202–03.

⁵⁰ On this last point, see Georges Duby, “La féodalité? Une mentalité médiévale,” *Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 13 (1958): 765–71; Duby, “The Diffusion of Cultural Patterns in Feudal Society,” *Past and Present*, no. 39 (Apr. 1968), 3–10; see also Kenneth-John Hollyman, *Le développement du vocabulaire féodal en France pendant le haut moyen âge* (Geneva, 1957); Boutruche, *Seigneurie et féodalité*, 2: 164–65, 170–72, 287; and Jacoby, “Les archontes,” 463.

cumstances, to make compromises and adjustments. Gradations of power and rank within the conquering host were inevitably reflected in Morea. In addition the Franks had to take into account a virtually permanent state of war, first during the period of conquest, and again, from 1262 on, when Byzantium sought to expand her rule in the Peloponnesus after regaining a foothold in the peninsula.⁵¹ Finally, the existing structure of Byzantine society was to exert an influence on the class of Frankish knights.

In their native countries the knights who conquered the Morea had with few exceptions belonged to the intermediate and lower ranks of the nobility. One discovers among them a small group of leaders adorned with special prestige. They in turn were followed by knights and serjeants, many of whom had already been their vassals and dependents in the West, while others had joined them in the course of the Crusade or the conquest of the Peloponnesus. The initial gap between leaders and vassals persisted and even widened when the conquerors settled in the Morea. For lack of land only a small number of baronies was created, most of them consisting of four to eight fiefs.⁵² Enfeoffment of knights and mounted serjeants was necessarily restricted by the prince and the barons, a relatively large demesne being essential for the preservation of their political, social, and economic ascendancy. Grants of land did not exceed one-third of their fiefs,⁵³ a rule imposed on petty feudatories to ensure the performance of the military service to which they were liable.⁵⁴ It is therefore not surprising that many knights held only one fief or part of a fief and mounted serjeants half a fief or even less;⁵⁵ grants were occasionally restricted to the lifetime of the recipient

⁵¹ This situation accounts for many of the rules governing the fief and military service in the Morea. See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 434-35, 447-51, 459-60, and "La féodalité," 54-55; also below, about the *archontes*. Yet relations between Byzantium and Frankish Morea were peaceful for long periods. Jacoby, "Un régime de coseigneurie gréco-franque en Morée: les 'casaux de parçon,'" *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire publiés par l'École Française de Rome*, 75 (1963): 111-25.

⁵² For all this, see my study "La Morée franque. Bilan et perspectives de recherches," to appear in *Le Moyen Age*.

⁵³ As illustrated by the grant by Prince William II of eight fiefs, out of twenty-four belonging to the barony of Akova, to Marguerite of Passavant. See the French version of the *Chronicle of Morea*, ed. Jean Longnon, *Livre de la conquête de la principauté de l'Amorée, Chronique de Morée (1204-1305)* (Paris, 1911) (hereafter *French chronicle*), pars. 525-27, 531.

⁵⁴ *Assises* (see above, n. 9, in fine), arts. 30, 46, 72; see also art. 107 and Jacoby, "Les archontes," 450.

⁵⁵ After enumerating the baronies, the Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea* states: "The knights who had one fief each and also the serjeants who were enfeoffed I do not name because of the amount of writing it would require." *The Chronicle of Morea, To chronikon tou Moreos*, ed. John Schmitt (London, 1904) (hereafter *Greek chronicle*), v. 1965-67. For parts of fiefs, see above and previous note; also *Assises*, arts. 57, 89, and the examples provided below. Mounted serjeants as a rule held a serjeanty, a feudal tenement providing an income worth half that of a fief liable to a knight's service. Jacoby, "Les archontes," 449. Serjeants enfeoffed with part of a serjeanty are mentioned in the Aragonese version of the *Chronicle of Morea*, ed. Alfred Morel-Fatio, *Libro de los fechos et conquistas del principado de la Morea* (Geneva, 1885) (hereafter *Aragonese chronicle*), pars. 133, 139.

or of the donor.⁵⁶ The existence of money fiefs and of household knights further emphasizes the strong position of the prince and the barons on the one hand and on the other, the precarious standing of most members of the knightly class and of the serjeants.⁵⁷

All these factors account for the particular structure of the feudal hierarchy in Frankish Morea. It had only three ranks below the prince, who headed the pyramid. Next to him came his direct vassals, whether lieges or feudatories of simple homage; among the lieges the barons of the principality enjoyed a special position as his tenants-in-chief and were referred to as “peers of the prince.”⁵⁸ In turn, all the lieges of this first rank could have vassals of their own, and such was also the case with lieges of the latter rank.⁵⁹ The rite of homage performed was directly related to social and legal status; all noble feudatories did liege homage whereas non-noble serjeants did plain homage, a difference which accounts for the fact that the latter could have no vassals of their own.⁶⁰ Differences in rights and prerogatives between barons, other lieges, and feudatories of simple homage are illustrated in the field of jurisdiction.⁶¹ Like the prince, barons had rights of low and high justice, the latter including criminal jurisdiction, whereas the other lieges enjoyed only the exercise of low justice.⁶² As for the feudatories of simple homage, they did not participate in formal court gatherings convened by their lords, had no court of their own, and their judicial competence was restricted to civil cases of their dependent peasants, the *villani*, or vil-

⁵⁶ *Assises*, art. 98; Jacoby, “Les archontes,” 451, 459.

⁵⁷ On money fiefs, see Jacoby, *La féodalité*, 135–36, 186, 224; household knights are mentioned below.

⁵⁸ On the barons as peers of the prince, see *Assises*, art. 43 (first part); as lieges of the prince, see *Assises*, arts. 2, 48, where the translation should read: “the liegemen (i.e., laymen) and prelates who have a barony”; see also arts. 22, 49. The most recent treatment of liege homage is by Boutruche, *Seigneurie et féodalité*, 2: 162–70.

⁵⁹ *Assises*, art. 12, on feudatories of a baron or a “chavalier”; this last term is synonymous with liege, as illustrated by the enumerations in art. 14 (“baron, cavalier o feudatario”), art. 2 (“baroni et homeni ligii . . . et li altri afeudadi”), and arts. 49 (“baroni et altri cavalieri e feudatarii ligii”), 207, 216, barons and lieges have their own lieges; see also art. 28, where the first “feudatario” (l. 2) is a liege, and art. 216. In art. 94 “baron” is synonymous with liege of the prince.

⁶⁰ “Que todos los varones et los cavalleros et los nobles escuderos fiziessen omenage de ligious, et los otros escuderos et nobles Griegos fizieron omenage de plano.” *Aragonese chronicle*, par. 137. The noble squires mentioned in the first category were of noble descent, but had not yet been dubbed, as we shall also see below. The non-noble squires were serjeants, to whom the “noble Greeks” were assimilated. This process also will be examined below. The rite of liege homage is described in *Assises*, arts. 3, 68. The feudatories of simple homage had no court of their own and therefore no vassals. Lieges were entitled to hold additional fiefs by simple homage (*Assises*, arts. 34, 68) or several fiefs from different liege lords (arts. 46, 63, 99).

⁶¹ See the classification in *Assises*, art. 1 (where *fedeli* is identical to *afeudadi* in art. 2); see also arts. 2 (cited above, n. 59), and 143 (“de la corte de algun baron, de legio o de feudatario”). On judicial prerogatives, see *Assises*, arts. 42, 43, 48, 49, 72, 94, 143, 151, 162, 186, 203, 207.

⁶² In the feudal West high justice included criminal cases involving the death penalty or mutilation as well as important civil cases relating to the legal status of persons and property. Low justice was exercised in criminal as well as civil cases of minor importance, concerning rents and dues for land, for example.

lains.⁶³ It is apparent, then, that social differentiation within the Frankish elite was most pronounced. The power of the barons, their extensive prerogatives, which included the right to erect castles,⁶⁴ their style of life, in the midst of their vassals and dependents, all these singled them out as an exclusive group.⁶⁵ The cleavage between the vassals of simple homage, the lowest stratum of the feudal hierarchy, and other feudatories was no less marked. Although feudatories, they were not members of the knightly class, a fact that proved to be of particular importance to the evolution of Moreot society and that accounts partly for the attitude adopted by the Franks toward the Greek upper class.⁶⁶

Despite vast differences within their ranks, the Frankish knights displayed common values and attitudes, which were shared by the Western knights who joined them in the Morea in the second half of the thirteenth and in the fourteenth centuries.⁶⁷ They were imbued with a powerful class-consciousness that had matured in the native countries of the conquerors and was further enhanced by the successful conquest and conditions prevailing in the Morea. Their numerical inferiority in the midst of a large Greek population was especially obvious in isolated castles and rural mansions; nevertheless, they manifested no fear of being submerged. Confidence in their own survival as a ruling class was inspired by a genuine sense of social and military superiority, most pronounced in the baronial group. This sense of superiority is reflected in the matrimonial policy pursued by the knights: many of them married daughters of noble families in France and subsequently brought their wives to the Morea; others wedded Latin women from various areas of the West or the Morea, while intermarriage with Greeks is seldom attested.⁶⁸ Their relative seclusion and particular style of life afforded additional guarantees of social continuity. Most of them lived in the repaired or enlarged acropolis of a city, an isolated mountain-castle or a fortified rural mansion, apart from Greek society and its economic activity, but this did not prevent them from residing occasionally in the houses they held in cities.⁶⁹ Festive

⁶³ See especially *Assises*, arts. 72, 42. At the end of art. 72 it is stated that "a liege man has a court while a man of simple homage cannot have one." See also Jacoby, "Les archontes," 468–69.

⁶⁴ *Assises*, art. 94.

⁶⁵ In 1304 the powerful Nicholas III of Saint-Omer insisted that Vincent de Marais, vassal and counselor of Prince Philip of Savoy, should leave the princely court gathering, for "he was not worthy nor a man [of sufficient standing]" to take part in judicial proceedings involving a daughter of Prince William II and a baron. *French chronicle*, pars. 954–72, especially par. 961. See also Jacoby, *La féodalité*, 46–47.

⁶⁶ This attitude will be examined below.

⁶⁷ On later arrivals, see Jacoby, *La féodalité*, 82–83, 85–86, and Bon, *La Morée*, 168–69, 238–40.

⁶⁸ *Crònica de Ramon Muntaner*, ed. E. B. (Barcelona, 1927–51), chs. 244, 261, in fine; *Assises*, art. 111 ("the prince or another lord cannot deny permission to his vassal to leave the principality . . . if he wishes to contract a marriage," obviously in the West); see also Jacoby, *La féodalité*, 41–42. Intermarriage with Greeks is attested, and for the princes of the Morea was obviously prompted by political considerations.

⁶⁹ A most suggestive description of building activity is to be found in *French chronicle*. "Li baron dou pays et li autre gentil homme si comencèrent a faire fortresses et habitacions, quy chastel, qui maisons sur sa terre, et changier leurs soumons et prendre les noms des fortresses

meetings, tournaments, such as the one held in 1304 in Corinth,⁷⁰ the historical literature and romances in French read aloud at court gatherings and circulated in the Morea,⁷¹ the frescoes painted on the walls of the castle of Saint-Omer in Thebes, "depicting how the Franks conquered Syria," or in the mansion of the archbishop of Patras, "representing the story of the destruction of Troy,"⁷² all these afford a glimpse of the life, values, and outlook of the knightly class of the Morea.

THE MOST OBVIOUS RESULT of the conquest was the abolition of Byzantine imperial rule and administration as well as the replacement of the independent local *archontes* by new masters. The imposition of a group of foreign conquerors on the indigenous population heralded the introduction of a new system of government, with corresponding institutions and a change in the structure of society, both in conformity with feudal concepts and principles. The new social and political regime is clearly reflected in the realm of jurisdiction and taxation, the foremost expressions of political authority; previously vested in the emperor and usurped for a few years by the local *archontes*, they now became the exclusive prerogative of feudal lords. Moreover, the whole structure of society underwent a metamorphosis. It was now divided into two distinct groups: on the one hand, the Latin conquerors and Western immigrants who joined them; on the other, the indigenous Greeks and Slavs. Although religious differences did not constitute a primary factor in the relations between the two groups, they nevertheless became a criterion of basic social status and provided a convenient means of social identification. Latins or Franks, by definition free,⁷³ were those who recognized the sole authority of Rome in religious and ecclesiastical matters. Although formally subjected to the pope in these fields,⁷⁴ the Greeks re-

qu'il faisoient" (pars. 218-19). On the architectural features of these Frankish buildings, see Bon, *La Morée*, 601-84, especially 680; on the social aspect, see Ernst Kirsten, "Die byzantinische Stadt," *Berichte zum XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten-Kongress* (Munich, 1958), 33-34, 39-40. On Frankish feudatories living in cities, see below.

⁷⁰ See respectively *Crònica de Ramon Muntaner*, ch. 244, and *French chronicle*, pars. 1015-24; see also Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 192.

⁷¹ The original version of the *Chronicle of Morea* was written in French between 1292 and 1320 and belonged to Bartolomeo II Ghisi, one of the most powerful barons in the Morea, until it was destroyed in 1331 or 1332; a shorter version with interpolations, also in French, was finished between 1341 and 1346; finally, a copy of this version was shipped from the Morea to the West in 1397. See Jacoby, "Quelques considérations," 134-50, 181-89. The inventory of the books left on his death in 1281 by Leonardo da Veroli, chancellor of the principality and trusted counselor of Prince William II, mentions fourteen romances. See Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 213. They were obviously in French, which was also used for the *Assizes of Romania*. See Jacoby, *La féodalité*, 82-88.

⁷² The fresco in Thebes is mentioned in *Greek chronicle*, v. 8071-92; see also *French chronicle*, pars. 553-54. It belongs to the period of Nicholas II of Saint-Omer, lord of the castle from 1258 to 1289; see also Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 216. On the fresco of Patras, see Bon, *La Morée*, 452, 597, and n. 4; it is mentioned toward the end of the fourteenth century but cannot be dated.

⁷³ In opposition to *Grecus*, *Francus* was synonymous with Latin, but it also meant "freeman," hence the verb *affrancare*, to free from the bonds of slavery or servitude.

⁷⁴ See Bon, *La Morée*, 89-102, on the Church in the Morea.

maintained on the whole faithful to their own Church;⁷⁵ with few exceptions, they were considered unfree by the conquerors.

The conquest of the Peloponnesus by the Franks proved to be more difficult than expected, was slow to proceed, and came to a successful end only in 1248. The difficulty of the enterprise and the smallness of their army induced the Frankish leaders to come to terms with the local population whenever possible and to conciliate it by promises formulated in written privileges delivered to the *archontes* or local leaders. The Franks guaranteed the maintenance of the Greek Church and the Greek clergy as well as the implementation of Byzantine law. In the words of the Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea* they promised "that from now on, no Frank will force us to change our faith for the faith of the Franks, nor our customs and the law of the Romans."⁷⁶ Other promises dealt with the integrity of landholding, the preservation of individual privileges, and the retention of the Byzantine fiscal system.⁷⁷ Yet absolute continuity was not to be expected. As the conquest proceeded, estates of the Byzantine state, absentee landowners, Greek ecclesiastical institutions, and local *archontes* were confiscated, partitioned, and granted as fiefs to Frankish feudatories.⁷⁸ The use of Byzantine law ceased completely in the public sphere and was severely restricted in private matters.⁷⁹ The transfer of jurisdiction and taxation into private hands—that is, to the feudal lords—implied the introduction of a new concept of society.

The imposition of a political superstructure imported from the West and lacking any roots in the Peloponnesus arrested the natural evolution of Greek society, which was henceforth subjected to the influence of the conquerors, and even its internal structure was altered. The approach of Western knights to the Greek population depended to a very large extent upon their own political and institutional traditions, on concepts, values, and outlook that had evolved in the feudal society of the West. The Franks conceived society as strongly stratified and based upon a strict hierarchy of personal, private links. Depicting Byzantine society,

⁷⁵ A most convincing testimony about the attitude of the Greeks is provided by Marino Sanudo Torsello (*Istoria del Regno di Romania*, in Charles Hopf, *Chroniques gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues* [Berlin, 1873]), who refers to Cyprus, Crete, Negroponte, Rhodes, other islands, and the Morea. "Benchè detti lochi siano sottoposti al dominio de Franchi e obbidienti alla Chiesa Romana, non dimeno quasi tutto il popolo è greco e inclina a quella setta, e il cuor loro è volto alle cose greche, e quando potessero mostrarlo liberamente, lo farianno" (p. 143). Although the *Istoria* was written between 1328 and 1333, more than a century after the conquest, this description no doubt reflects a permanent situation. Sanudo expressed the same opinion in a letter written on April 10, 1330, published by Friedrich Kunstmann, "Studien über Marino Sanudo den Älteren, mit einen Anhang seiner ungedruckten Briefe," *Königliche bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Historische Klasse, Abhandlungen*, (Munich, 1855), 7: 777. There is, however, evidence that some Greeks joined the Roman Church in the thirteenth or fourteenth century. See below. The Slavs were in the same category as the Greeks.

⁷⁶ *Greek chronicle*, v. 2093–95.

⁷⁷ See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 430–31.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 423, 426–27, 441–42.

⁷⁹ See Jacoby, *La féodalité*, 34–38.

Western chroniclers of the early thirteenth century often speak of "fealty and homage" performed by Greeks to their emperor, implying thereby the existence in the Empire of a political and social structure similar to that of the feudal West.⁸⁰ Their description reflects a complete lack of understanding on the part of the Latins for societies other than their own. It is therefore not surprising that Frankish knights viewed the Greek society of the Morea as basically divided into two classes: on the one hand, the *archontes*, considered as free, on the other, the *villani*, or villains, subjected to the authority and jurisdiction of their lords and enjoying only severely limited personal freedom and legal capacity.⁸¹ Free Greeks who did not belong to the class of *archontes* are seldom mentioned; numerically few, they represented a marginal element within the Greek society of Frankish Morea.⁸²

The Franks not only perceived Greek society as divided into two classes but also considered that each of these, again in conformity with Frankish concepts, should be governed by its own set of laws. Characteristically the Franks translated social and economic realities into legal terms, and what had been, under Byzantine rule, a relatively "open" Greek society became a highly stratified system of sociolegal classes, the social status of the Greeks becoming hereditary. Crossing the basic lines of divisions became extremely rare and difficult and presumed a legal procedure to achieve it. Neither wealth nor education were of any weight, and upward mobility was solely dependent upon the favor of the Frankish princes and barons.

In spite of the cleavage between Latins and Greeks, the *archontes* gradually achieved some measure of integration within the ranks of the Moreot feudatories, the first step having already been taken at the time of the conquest. The agreements between the conquerors and *archontes* contained, among other clauses, provisions for homage and an oath of fealty performed by the *archontes* to the first leader of the conquerors, William of Champlitte, and, later, to his successors, the princes of Morea. As vassals the *archontes* were included in the class of feudatories owing simple homage, the lowest stratum in the feudal hierarchy, together with the Frankish mounted serjeants who were not of noble descent.⁸³ The first stage of integration therefore had a limited scope. It applied to the *archontes* only on a personal level and did not imply any grant of fiefs; it had a solely legal character but did not result in social integration within the nobility. Nor did it involve any change for the *archontes*

⁸⁰ See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 439-40.

⁸¹ *Assises*, arts. 178, 194; art. 198 speaks of the *Griego villan*, to be distinguished from the Greek, who is an *archon*.

⁸² For the time being, see David Jacoby, "Un aspect de la fiscalité vénitienne dans le Péloponnèse aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles: le 'zovaticum,'" *Travaux et Mémoires*, 1 (1965): 419 and n. 81.

⁸³ See above, n. 60. On *archontes* who achieved a higher status, see below.

in the status of their hereditary estates, the transmission and alienation of which were governed by Byzantine law, as before the conquest.⁸⁴

The integration of the *archontes* within the ranks of the feudal hierarchy gradually proceeded beyond the legal and personal aspects already described, and a new stage was reached by the middle of the thirteenth century. That political as well as military considerations account for this process is perfectly illustrated by Moreot chronicles and Angevin documents. In 1248, after Monemvasia in the southern Peloponnesus had surrendered to him, Prince William II granted fiefs to three *archontes*, members of the three most influential families of this city, who thereby enlarged their landed wealth.⁸⁵ Grants of this nature also took place toward the end of 1261 or in the first months of the following year. When the Latin emperor of Constantinople, Baldwin II, traveled to the West after his capital had been recaptured by Byzantine forces, he stayed a few months in the Morea. Some of his vassals, among them Greek *archontes*, settled in the principality and were enfeoffed by Prince William II.⁸⁶ Prior to his death in 1278 the prince endowed the grandfather of John Sideros with feudal land.⁸⁷

About the same time a new factor of integration appears. During the war waged in 1262 by Geoffroy de Briel, baron of Karytaina, against Byzantine forces in the southern Peloponnesus, this Frankish lord, using a stratagem suggested to him by the Greek warriors in his service, managed to vanquish the enemy. After achieving victory Geoffroy "gave to his Greeks many fine presents in land and other kind, and from the noblest amongst them he made knights." According to the story there was an intimate relationship between the Frankish baron and Greek members of his household: "he had nourished and brought them up," and they were his vassals,⁸⁸ obviously by simple homage, as was customary.⁸⁹ He endowed them with feudal tenements, which was not unusual by that time. Special attention, however, must be given to his attitude toward the "noblest amongst" the Greeks, who were no doubt of higher social status and probably belonged to the class of *archontes*. They were dubbed by their lord and, as a result, became knights in the same way as

⁸⁴ *The Assizes of Romania* devote four articles to the status of the *archontes* and their estates, arts. 71, 138, 178, 194. See also Jacoby, "Les archontes," 451-63.

⁸⁵ *Greek chronicle*, v. 2955; Jacoby, "Les archontes," 470.

⁸⁶ *French chronicle*, par. 87. For the approximate date of the enfeoffments, see Jacoby, "Quelques considérations," 165 and nn. 150-51.

⁸⁷ See below, n. 98.

⁸⁸ *Aragonese chronicle*, pars. 311-31, especially 313, 319, 331 ("et de los mas nobles fizo cavaleros"). The dating by the editor of this version ("1264") is erroneous and should be corrected by taking into account the sequence of events following the return of Prince William II to the Morea (see above, n. 86), as related by *Aragonese chronicle*, pars. 308-12; the episode took place before the arrival of a second Byzantine army to the Peloponnesus in 1263, on which see Bon, *La Morée*, 129.

⁸⁹ See above, p. 887 and n. 60.

the Franks.⁹⁰ The ceremony of dubbing sanctioned their firm and definitive integration within the ranks of the feudal nobility; once granted to a Greek, the status of knight obviously became hereditary. On the basis of fourteenth-century sources it seems that Greek knights henceforth bore the title *dominus*, or its French or Italian equivalents,⁹¹ and rose to the rank of lieges by performing the appropriate rite prior to the investiture of their new fiefs. Added to vassalage and fiefholding, already fused, the knighthood granted by Geoffroy de Briel to some of his Greeks completed the process of social integration within the feudal nobility. And although no such evidence is available for vassals of the princes in the thirteenth century, one may assume that several of them enjoyed the same privilege.

It should be stressed that this integration was not achieved by all *archontes*, nor was it restricted to members of their class. In the fourteenth century two different groups of Greeks achieved integration in varying degrees. The largest group consisted, to be sure, of Greek feudatories, mostly *archontes*, who had performed simple homage; although feudatories, they did not become members of the knightly class. Significantly, they appear together with Frankish squires or mounted serjeants, who had not been dubbed, in the host assembled in 1304 by Nicholas of Saint-Omer to wage war against the Greeks of Epirus.⁹² Besides *archontes* one finds in 1354 other Greeks among the feudatories of simple homage, such as the son of a *papas*, or Greek priest, and a *magister*, both undoubtedly of lowly origin and generally considered unfree by the Franks.⁹³ This clearly emphasizes that social promotion involving the crossing of class boundaries was entirely dependent, in Frankish Morea, upon the favor displayed by Frankish barons, princes, or representatives of princes. The integration of Greeks, mostly *archontes*, within the lowest stratum of the feudal hierarchy, initiated by the middle of the thirteenth century, seems to have gained considerable impetus thereafter. This phenomenon was no doubt concomitant with a decline in the number of Frankish feudatories and the growing need for military forces and administrative personnel.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 470-71.

⁹¹ Jean Longnon and Peter Topping, *Documents sur le régime des terres dans la principauté de Morée au XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1969), respectively 21, l. 11 (in a document dated 1336); 128, ll. 5-6 (of 1354 or later): "per messere Johanni Misito," who was a liege (see below, p. 895 and n. 101), "et altri nobili de lo paese"; "per dominum Stephanum Cutrullum, militem" (on whom see below).

⁹² *French chronicle*, par. 885. Among eighty-nine cavalrymen, there were "xiiij chevaliers adoubés, et li autres estoient escuier et gentil homme dou pays et tramontains"; "gentil homme dou pays" refers to Greek *archontes*. See also Jacoby, "Les archontes," 471. For later evidence on such *archontes*, see below.

⁹³ "Magister Manollus Vorkas" and "Theodorus Papa Stamatopulus." Longnon and Topping, *Documents*, 101, ll. 38-39. When "papa" appears between the first name and the name of the father, it should read "pape" and is related to the latter; see, e.g., "Ebreto Pape Leonis," "Xena" (a woman), "Pape Chimacopulo." *Ibid.*, 49, l. 3; 60, l. 41.

⁹⁴ For this process, see below. That most Greek feudatories were indeed *archontes* is illustrated

A second, smaller group of Greek feudatories consisted of those who were granted knighthood by barons, princes, or representatives of the latter. These feudatories as a rule held the rank of lieges,⁹⁵ thereby achieving integration within the feudal nobility. Besides *archontes*, one also finds among them the son of a *papas*, liable to six months a year of mounted service, according to a source dated 1354.⁹⁶ His social ascent is particularly impressive and does not seem to have been an isolated case. Although it is impossible to know how many of the Greek knights were not *archontes*, the number must have remained small. As the status of Greek knights was hereditary, it is not surprising to find some families active throughout the fourteenth century, but only a few attained prominent positions in the feudal elite and played a dominant part in the history of Frankish Morea. In spite of their power, landed wealth, and prestige in the principality none of them gained access to the baronial group. Only Franks and a few Italians became barons, and none of their families intermarried with Greek lieges.

The position of Greek feudatories as members of the social and political elite of the principality is well documented. Among "the ten best men of the country" of Chalandritsa in 1316, one finds two Latin lieges and three Greeks, presumably feudatories of simple homage.⁹⁷ John Sideros, scion of a family of Greek feudatories, was the grandson of a man who had received feudal lands from Prince William II prior to 1278. When a group of barons decided in 1341 to hand over the principality to Byzantine rule, Sideros, perhaps because of his knowledge of the Greek language, was chosen as one of the two emissaries who submitted the plan to Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos.⁹⁸ George and Basil Galentini, sons of a Greek knight, along with the two sons of the powerful baron Centurione I Zaccaria and other "noblemen" in 1374 asked the bailiff Francesco de San Severino to grant them knighthood, while the lists of feudatories who guaranteed the agreements concluded with Venice in 1387 and 1396 on behalf of the principality include several Greek lieges.⁹⁹

by the *Assizes of Romania*, arts. 71, 138, 178, 194; this treatise refers only to them when discussing the position of Greeks in the context of the feudal elite.

⁹⁵ See the list of Latin and Greek feudatories in Longnon and Topping, *Documents*, 73, ll. 1–12. The first two are lieges bearing the titles "meser" and "dominus" (on which see above, p. 893 and n. 91), whereas the others are feudatories of simple homage. The correspondence between liege homage and knighthood has already been emphasized above.

⁹⁶ "Dominus Theoderus Papa Chyriacopulos, tenetur servire sex mensibus cum serviicii stivoriis." *Ibid.*, 101, ll. 33–34. On the *stivoria*, see Jacoby, *La féodalité*, 135–37.

⁹⁷ Johan Janopolo, Raynalt Jalomati, and Mamallera Vazilaqui are Greeks. *Aragonese chronicle*, sec. 590. The two Latin lieges are entitled "micer," on which see above, nn. 91, 95.

⁹⁸ By 1341, sixty-three years had elapsed since the death of William II. It does not seem likely that the father of John Sideros was the beneficiary of the grant, as suggested by Hopf (*Geschichte*, 1: 433 a) and Bon (*La Morée*, 208, where "1302" should be replaced by "1304," and 242); see also *ibid.*, 212–13.

⁹⁹ *Aragonese chronicle*, pars. 718–21; see also Jacoby, "Les archontes," 474.

A most spectacular rise was achieved by two families, whose members took advantage of their position as high-ranking officers in the princely administration. The knight Stephen Cutrullus, or Koutroules, was in 1336 *protovestiarus* of the principality and as such handed out fiefs on behalf of the prince, controlled their content, and sold the products of the princely demesne. His son Nicholas, active since 1354 at least, was one of the most powerful feudatories in 1379, while John, son of Nicholas, was still a squire (*scudarius*) in 1375, having not yet been dubbed.¹⁰⁰ John Misito was granted several fiefs between 1313 and 1316, which were confirmed in 1324 by Prince Jean de Gravina when Misito was captain of Kalamata on the prince's behalf. John Misito was succeeded three years later in his fiefs by his son Nicholas, who died in 1344 and appears among the most influential men of the principality at that time.¹⁰¹ The third member of this dynasty of Greek lieges was John II, one of the mightiest landlords of the Morea in 1377, who died before 1391.¹⁰²

The knight's fief, or *feudum nobile*, of the Morea provided as a rule a revenue of 1,000 hyperpers and the standard fief of serjeanty half this income; feudatories holding such fiefs were liable to mounted service during the whole year.¹⁰³ Whether vassals of princes or of Frankish lords, most Greek feudatories were endowed with small fiefs, for which they had to perform only a small amount of military service. A servant of Catherine of Valois, mother of Prince Philip of Taranto, received together with his wife, prior to 1338, a fief supplying a revenue of twelve gold ounces or 189 hyperpers, with an obligation to provide the corresponding service, two months a year.¹⁰⁴ In 1354 one of the Greek feudatories of simple homage in Krestena was liable for one and a half months of mounted service, another for three months, and a third for a whole year; Nicholas Cutrullus, a knight, owed six months.¹⁰⁵ In several other cases, the small feudal tenements held by Greeks were obviously parts of

¹⁰⁰ Longnon and Topping, *Documents*, 21, ll. 11–12; and 45, l. 8, mention Stephen in 1336 and 1337; 73, l. 3; 150, l. 10; and 198, l. 6, refer to Nicholas, respectively in 1354, 1361, and 1379; see also Jacoby, “Les archontes,” 472 and nn. 261, 265, as well as 473–74. On the functions of the *protovestiarus*, see Longnon, *L'empire latin*, 198, 205. The unpublished document mentioned in Jacoby, “Les archontes,” 474 n. 271 (in fine), refers to John in 1375 and not in 1405, the year it was drafted. On other Greek squires, see *Aragonese chronicle*, pars. 718–21, and Jacoby, “Les archontes,” 474.

¹⁰¹ See Hopf, *Geschichte*, 1: 423 b, 435 b; Bon, *La Morée*, 204–05, 213–14, 242, 427 (where “Florent de Hainaut” should be replaced by “Louis de Bourgogne”).

¹⁰² Longnon and Topping, *Documents*, 127, l. 28–30; 149, l. 22–150, l. 9 (as liege of Prince Robert of Taranto); 198, l. 16; 214, l. 22. See also Bon, *La Morée*, 242, 252, 253 n. 1, 275, and Jacoby, “Les archontes,” 473.

¹⁰³ See Jacoby, “Les archontes,” 449–51, and *Aragonese chronicle*, par. 139; see also above, n. 55.

¹⁰⁴ Longnon and Topping, *Documents*, 58, ll. 8–10; comment in Jacoby, “Les archontes,” 472–73. On the rate of exchange of the ounce, see Longnon and Topping, *Documents*, 21 n. 8; on the ratio of the tournois to the sterling and hyperper (1:4:80), see Jacoby, “Un régime de coseigneurie,” 122 n. 7.

¹⁰⁵ Longnon and Topping, *Documents*, 73, ll. 6, 9–11. For other small fiefs of Greek feudatories, see *ibid.*, 95, ll. 18–22; 101, ll. 33–36; on Nicholas Cutrullus, see also above.

larger grants comprising scattered plots of land.¹⁰⁶ The fragmentary state of our documentation does not enable a definitive assessment of the income provided by the fiefs of Greek feudatories, especially of the lieges, who were entitled to hold more than one fief and to have holdings from several lords.¹⁰⁷ It seems obvious nevertheless that many of the fiefs held by Greek feudatories were insufficient to supply a livelihood to their holders. One may therefore safely assume that several of the latter had additional sources of income, primarily hereditary estates.

This was to raise many intricate problems, as hereditary estates held by Greeks were governed by Byzantine law. Compared with fiefs they enjoyed preferential status; they were what medieval Western jurists would have called allodial lands. They could be divided among heirs into equal parts, in true Byzantine fashion, whereas the fief could not be partitioned. Many of these estates owed no military service at all, and in cases where such service was to be performed, it could be evaded; indeed, at times it was difficult, if not impossible, to assess the amount of that service, because of the continuous process of partition.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, it was to be expected that, in some cases at least, Greeks holding fiefs would try to assimilate them to their hereditary estates, in order to escape the obligations and restrictions implied in the status of their feudal land. One can, then, easily understand the stress laid upon a clear-cut distinction between these two categories of landholding, a distinction that is once again to be found in the *Assizes of Romania*. It is not surprising that among the Frankish feudatories, especially of the lower rank, to whom most of the *archontes* and Greek feudatories were assimilated, a certain antagonism to the *archontes* should have built up in connection with the holding of nonfeudal land. These Frankish feudatories urged the imposition of military service on all land held in the principality by members of the feudatory class, whether Franks or Greeks, regardless of the legal regime by which this land was governed. The compiler of the *Assizes of Romania* expresses his support for this trend, but there is no evidence that it gained the upper hand. There can be no doubt, however, that some tension prevailed between Greek and Latin feu-

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, documents drafted in 1337 and 1338 that reflect a situation prior to these dates. *Ibid.*, 43, l. 27-44, l. 4; 45, ll. 10-22; 62, ll. 12-31, which should be compared with the parallel data provided by a document of 1354, in *ibid.*, 113, l. 22-114, l. 20.

¹⁰⁷ See *Assises*, arts. 34, 46, 63, 68, 99.

¹⁰⁸ *Greek chronicle*, v. 1644-48, relates that it had been agreed upon at the time of the conquest that *archontes* of certain areas would perform military service according to the size of their estates. See Jacoby, "Les archontes," 430-31. Among the vassals of Niccolò Acciaiuoli, one Greek was liable to five months of mounted service "pro suo de redetago," i.e., *hereditagio*, or hereditary estate, while another owed six months of a serjeant's service: "tenetur de uno scutiferu mesibus [*sic!*] sex per anno redetago suo"; at Glyky, Goti Murmuru owed only one month of unspecified service for the same reason. Longnon and Topping, *Documents*, 77, ll. 9-12; 83, l. 5. Goti Murmuru, or Mourmoures, was probably a member of the well-known family of officials, on which see *ibid.*, 298, s.v. Murmuru. On the problems relating to the hereditary estates of the *archontes* and other Greek feudatories, see Jacoby, "Les archontes," 451-58; see also 430-31, 442-45.

datories in the third and fourth decades of the fourteenth century, the period in which the *Assizes* were compiled.¹⁰⁹

In spite of this tension the integration of Greek feudatories within the feudal class of Morea proceeded even further than I have indicated. The most striking expression of this phenomenon is to be found in the second half of the fourteenth century; it is embodied in the Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea*. The original version of this chronicle, no longer extant, was, as we have seen, written in French approximately between 1292 and 1320. In the true fashion of the *chansons de geste* it gave a glowing account of the epic of conquest, linking events in the Morea during the early thirteenth century with the First Crusade and the conquest of Jerusalem. The chronicle glorified the deeds of the conquerors and their descendants, emphasizing their military superiority and high morality. The author displayed an intense interest in judicial procedure as well as a thorough dislike and contempt for the Greeks. The original *Chronicle of Morea* was a typical product of the knightly class of the Morea; it was clearly intended for the members of this class and was to be read aloud when they assembled.¹¹⁰

The Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea* was composed at a later date on the basis of a shorter French version and various oral traditions. Evidence seems to indicate that its author was a Greek feudatory, a member of the court of Erard III, lord of Arkadia in the southern Peloponnesus.¹¹¹ Being a Greek he felt the need to emphasize his hatred against the enemies of Frankish Morea, but significantly refrained from attacking the Greeks of the principality. The anti-Greek tendency of the French version of the *Chronicle*, heightened to a considerable extent in the Greek version,¹¹² is directed exclusively against the Greeks of Byzantium and of the despotate of Epirus: "Who will put faith in them, believe their oath, since they do not respect God nor love their ruler? They do not love each other except with guile."¹¹³ From his attacks against the Orthodox Greeks, whom he accuses of being schismatics,¹¹⁴ one may infer that the author accepted the subjection of the Greek Church to the pope, as established in the Morea at the time of the conquest, and therefore, in the religious and ecclesiastical sphere, clearly distinguished the Greeks of the principality from other Greeks.

It is apparent, then, that the author of the Greek version espoused entirely the cause and ideals of the conquerors, considering himself a Frank in the same way as did the feudatories of Western descent. When he

¹⁰⁹ For the evidence, see Jacoby, *ibid.*, 455-56, 458-59.

¹¹⁰ For its dating and characteristics, see Jacoby, "Quelques considérations," 181-87; see also 134-35, 136-38.

¹¹¹ See *ibid.*, 140, 155, and especially 157.

¹¹² See especially the additions due to the author of the *Greek chronicle*, v. 724-30, 754-841, 1260-62, 3932-37, 3940, 3974-75.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, v. 728-30.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, v. 798-800.

refers to the Latins camping outside Constantinople in 1203, he speaks of "our people,"¹¹⁵ which implies, on his part, full identification with the interests, values, and attitudes, even with the past of the Frankish feudatories. To be sure, the author did not express only personal views, nor were his views put forward solely in order to impress them upon other Greeks. The Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea* was undoubtedly intended for Greek-speaking feudatories who identified themselves with the Franks in the same way the author did. The political verse in which it was written suited the taste of a Greek public; the language, a Greek strongly tainted by French and Italian influences and saturated with feudal terminology, reflects the Greek dialect spoken in the Morea in the fourteenth century.¹¹⁶ At the same time that the Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea* illustrates the attitudes and outlook of at least a section of the Greek *archontes* and feudatories, it also measures the extent to which they had achieved integration within the class of feudatories and points to their growing class-consciousness.

Some Greeks even went a step further. In 1245 Manuel Mourmouras, whose family was to play an important role in the administration of Frankish Morea,¹¹⁷ built a church at his own expense in the area of Kranidion, in Argolis; its dedicatory inscription, besides mentioning this Greek landlord, seems to indicate that the latter had joined the Roman Church.¹¹⁸ Similarly, a Greek epitaph found at Kalamata in the southern Peloponnesus and dated 1354, according to the Christian era used by the Franks but without any Byzantine dating, may have been ordered by a Greek who embraced the Roman faith.¹¹⁹ Such cases, prompted by the desire to achieve full assimilation to the Franks, must have remained quite exceptional, most Greeks remaining faithful to their own Church. Indeed Latins started to adhere to the Greek rite, a convincing testimony to the weakness of the Latin clergy, which was bitterly denounced by Pope John XXII in 1322.¹²⁰

Although achieved on a legal, social, and at times even religious level, the integration of Greeks was not complete. To be sure, many Greeks, especially feudatories, were bilingual. The very existence of a Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea* is nevertheless significant, as it emphasizes that a gap persisted between Franks and Greeks in the cultural sphere. The same holds true in the religious field, although some

¹¹⁵ *Greek chronicle*, v. 636.

¹¹⁶ See Jacoby, "Quelques considérations," 157-58, 187.

¹¹⁷ See above, n. 108, in fine.

¹¹⁸ See Georgios Soteriou, "He Hagia Trias tou Kranidiou," *Epeteris tes hetaireas byzantinon spoudon*, 3 (1926): 193-205 (in Greek), and Bon, *La Morée*, 115.

¹¹⁹ See Nikos A. Bees, "Christianikai epigraphai Messenias," *Deition tes historikes kai ethnologikes hetaireas tes Hellados*, 6 (1904): 375 (in Greek), and Bon, *La Morée*, 591 n. 3, in fine.

¹²⁰ Caesar Baronius, *Annales ecclesiastici*, 24 (Bar-le-Duc, 1872): 187-88, anno 1322, par. 48 (Oct. 1, 1322); the same letter also mentions Greeks attending services of the Latin Church. On the Greeks, see also above, n. 75.

Greeks had joined the Roman Church. Relying on an earlier, presumably oral, tradition,¹²¹ the author of the Greek version relates that the conquerors had promised that “no Frank will force us to change our faith for the faith of the Franks”¹²²—the use of “us” for those who belong to the Greek Church in itself being highly significant. Many Greek feudatories resided in urban centers, while Frankish knights lived mostly in castles; intermarriage between the two groups is seldom attested and must have been rare in any event. All these factors evidently prevented social fusion of the two groups, a fact illustrated by a most revealing remark in the *Greek Chronicle*. While following the French version, which speaks of the arrogance of Gautier V de Brienne, duke of Athens, the author of the Greek version points out that this “is a trait of the Franks.”¹²³ In spite of his strong identification with the Frankish feudatories, he viewed himself as part of a different social group, and such presumably was the feeling of most *archontes* and Greek feudatories.

CONSIDERING THE ATTITUDES and values common to the Frankish knights at the time of the conquest, the integration of Greeks within the class of feudatories seems at first glance surprising, but the conjunction of several factors explains how this phenomenon was brought about: the class-consciousness and self-confidence of the Frankish knights; their approach to the *archontes*; their practical needs; and, finally, the eagerness of the Greeks to achieve integration. The pattern of integration can be safely reconstructed.

Although imbued with a powerful class-consciousness, the Frankish feudal elite was willing to a certain extent to loosen its rigid system of social and legal stratification, so as to allow for the entry of Greeks within the lower rank of the feudatories. The Greek *archontes* could easily be viewed by the Frankish conquerors as Greek counterparts. Their traditional standing in Greek society; their leadership, combined with the exercise of a certain measure of authority; their style of life, different to some extent from that of other Greeks—all these seemed familiar to the Frankish knights. Besides, many *archontes* had undoubtedly been granted fiscal privileges by the emperors prior to the conquest. In the West, as we have seen, exemption from regular taxation on the whole distinguished the knightly class from other classes of society.

Therefore, when political, administrative, and military needs made it imperative Frankish princes and barons encouraged the integration of Greeks into the class of feudatories. The first stage was restricted to a

¹²¹ On oral traditions incorporated in the Greek version, see Jacoby, “Quelques considérations,” 153, 155.

¹²² *Greek chronicle*, v. 2093–94.

¹²³ Compare *French chronicle*, par. 500, and *Greek chronicle*, v. 7263–7300, especially 7290, loosely translated here.

personal and legal aspect; on the whole, it was a convenient device, in conformity with the attitudes and outlook of the conquerors, to ensure the loyalty of the leaders of the local Greek and Slav population as well as the fruitful cooperation of Greek *archontes* with the conquerors in the administration of the principality. Even in the early years of Frankish rule, prior to 1210, several *archontes* assisted Frankish leaders as they carved out fiefs in the conquered areas;¹²⁴ the use of Byzantine land lists in this procedure depended upon the knowledge of the Greek language and of the intricate Byzantine fiscal terminology. As late as the fourteenth century fiscal documents were still drafted in Greek,¹²⁵ which partly accounts for the importance of the Greeks among the administrative personnel of the principality.¹²⁶ Integration grew in scope and intensity when the military position of Frankish Morea worsened in the sixties of the thirteenth century. Greeks, who started to display interest in the process, were obviously prompted more by social considerations than by material concerns such as the acquisition of fiefs, which were mostly small. Especially if he was dubbed, the Greek feudatory gained access to a new, superior status in society, adorned with special prestige; in relation to other Greeks, he greatly enhanced his social position. The pressure on the part of Greeks to receive knighthood must have gradually increased in the fourteenth century, and, correspondingly, so did the willingness of the princes and barons to grant it.¹²⁷ In view of the precarious political and military position of the Franks and the constant pressure exerted by Byzantium, the full cooperation of the Greeks was essential. Integration in the long run implied acceptance of the standards, values, and attitudes of the Frankish knights. The eagerness to achieve complete identification with this class is convincingly illustrated by the Greek version of the *Chronicle of Morea*.

It should be stressed that integration within the ranks of feudatories and, more specifically, within the knightly class was not restricted to Greeks and should be viewed in a wider context. The same general considerations that prompted the Frankish feudal elite to display a favorable attitude toward the *archontes* proved beneficial to Slav leaders¹²⁸

¹²⁴ See *French chronicle*, pars. 107, 120, and *Greek chronicle*, v. 1641–50, 1830–35. On the circumstances, see Jacoby, “Les archontes,” 441–42, and *La féodalité*, 54, 223–25.

¹²⁵ “In quodam practico in greca scriptura scripto, facto per dictum Johannem Murmurum” in 1337. Longnon and Topping, *Documents*, 52, ll. 14–15. “E o facti li inventarii in greco,” in 1361. *Ibid.*, 147, l. 9.

¹²⁶ See above on the families Murmurus, Cutrullus, and Misito; in 1297 Vassilopoulos appears as *protovestiarius*, on whose functions see above, n. 100. Nikolakos of Patras was governor of the castle of St. George of Skorta in 1319 or 1320. *French chronicle*, par. 829, and p. 404, the latter confirmed by *Aragonese chronicle*, par. 647; see also below, n. 143. Many minor officials were Greeks.

¹²⁷ Which explains the growing number of Greek knights in fourteenth-century documents. See Bon, *La Morée*, 238–39, 260 n. 1, 266 n. 3. The same trend is perceptible in regard to Latins; Egidius de Leonessa, a *physician*, is granted a vineyard “in feudum et ligiam” in 1397. Text in Ernst Gerland, *Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Erzbistums Patras* (Leipzig, 1903), 185–86, doc. no. 7, and see Jacoby, *La féodalité*, 179–81.

¹²⁸ *Greek chronicle*, v. 3008–31, provides details about the submission of the Melings and the homage of their leaders to William II.

and even to Turks. When in 1263 Turkish mercenaries remained in Frankish Morea, William II ordered them to be baptized, and thereafter the prince made two of their leaders knights, endowed them with fiefs, and gave them wives—at least one of whom was a Frankish noblewoman, presumably of low rank.¹²⁹ Pressing—and well attested—military needs at this period and the establishment of Turkish troops in the principality account for these steps.¹³⁰ Far more important was the trend, beginning in the second half of the thirteenth century, toward the integration of Italian non-nobles, several of whom served in the princely administration. Leonardo da Veroli, for example, chancellor of the principality during the reign of William II, married the daughter of a Frankish baron.¹³¹ When princes granted knighthood and fiefs to Italian merchants and bankers they did so primarily for economic reasons. Pietrono da Siena, a resident of Glarentsa, the most important harbor of Frankish Morea, was a liege of the prince since the sixties of the thirteenth century. Other Sienese and Florentines, among them members of the Acciaiuoli family, were endowed with the same status and fiefs in the late thirteenth and in the first half of the fourteenth centuries, presumably in return for the financial help they had extended to the princes; they in turn were joined by several Genoese and Venetians.¹³²

The entrance of growing numbers of Greeks and Italians into the ranks of feudatories, especially of the knights, inevitably affected the nature of Frankish society, and of the knightly class in particular. Many Greek and presumably all Italian feudatories of non-noble descent with few exceptions¹³³ resided in urban centers, the Italians concentrating in the maritime cities of the Morea.¹³⁴ The extension of Byzantine domination in the Peloponnesus, initiated in 1262, gradually reduced the rural areas under the rule of the principality and prompted newly arrived Italians to join their brethren in the cities.¹³⁵ Greek lieges, several of them active in the administration of the principality, mingled with Frankish knights. At the same time Italian merchants and bankers combined their economic activity with a newly acquired knightly status, violating thereby the code of chivalry so cherished by Frankish knights. No con-

¹²⁹ *French chronicle*, par. 397; *Greek chronicle*, v. 5730–38; *Aragonese chronicle*, par. 363.

¹³⁰ On the area in which they settled, see Bon, *La Morée*, 337–38.

¹³¹ On Leonardo, see Bon, *La Morée*, 127, 128, 149, 156, 160, and above, n. 71.

¹³² On Italians in the Morea, see Jacoby, *La féodalité*, 84–85; see also 227, 234; the Venetians endowed with fiefs were not always resident in the Morea.

¹³³ Such as those who became barons, the Ghisi and Zaccaria.

¹³⁴ It should be emphasized that Frankish knights and barons, although resident in rural areas, sometimes had houses within the cities. Lise des Quartiers had one in Glarentsa prior to 1337. Longnon and Topping, *Documents*, 48, l. 29; see also Bon, *La Morée*, 323–24. In 1375 Erard III Mavros, lord of Arkadia, had a house in Venetian Modon. See Jacoby, “Quelques considérations,” 149 n. 68. A princely residence existed in Andravida, considered the capital of Frankish Morea, as well as in other cities. See Bon, *La Morée*, 677; some of the vassals attached to his court may have settled in them permanently.

¹³⁵ Examples for 1353, 1414, and 1429 are found in Gerland, *Neue Quellen*, 155, ll. 11–15; 199, ll. 4–6; 210, ll. 16–18. Italian knights appear in a list of 1344. Bon, *La Morée*, 238–39.

tradition between the two was perceived in Italian cities. By 1320, therefore, as a result of the integration of Greeks and Italians within its ranks, the knightly class of Morea had already lost its homogeneous character.¹³⁶

The dual process of social integration and subjective identification of the Greek *archontes* and feudatories with the Frankish feudatories also had an important effect on the Greek society of Frankish Morea. It stripped this society of a leadership willing to favor Byzantine expansion in the Peloponnesus. Moreover, as the Greek Church lacked the support of the *archontes*, it could not become the backbone of opposition to foreign rule, as it did in Venetian Crete at the same period.¹³⁷ The interests of the Greek feudatories obviously lay with the Franks, which explains why the Greeks of Frankish Morea on the whole remained as faithful to their rulers and fought as bravely in their armies as they did in 1264 and 1304. Only two instances of regional revolts on their part have been recorded during the two centuries of Latin rule. With the reappearance of Byzantine forces in the Peloponnesus in 1262, when it seemed as if the Empire would regain its lost territories in the peninsula, unrest was generated within the Greek and Slav population. The Greek inhabitants of Lacedemonia left their city for Byzantine Mistra, and the Greeks of Skorta, in the western Peloponnesus, rose in arms against their rulers. After the Byzantine armies had been repelled and the revolt crushed, Greeks remained in peace for about forty years.¹³⁸ Those of Skorta rebelled again in 1304 under the leadership of a Greek priest and several *archontes* when Prince Philip of Savoy imposed taxes on the *archontes*, a step that was rightly considered a breach of faith. The *archontes* of Skorta had been promised fiscal exemption, presumably at the time of the conquest; moreover, the prince's action also deprived them of their privileged status and of the benefits of integration into the class of feudatories.¹³⁹ Other revolts against the Franks broke out only in areas inhabited by Slav populations, which had retained their firm tribal structure, traditional leadership, and spirit of independence. Such was the case of the Slavs of Tsaconia and the Taygetos Mountains who participated in the rising of 1263–64¹⁴⁰ and of others who seized Kalamata in 1292 or 1293.¹⁴¹ Two cases of treason should also be mentioned in this connection. In 1296 a Greek who wished to avenge an outrage inflicted on him by a Frankish

¹³⁶ See Jacoby, *La féodalité*, 86.

¹³⁷ On Crete, see Freddy Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au moyen âge. Le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XII^e–XV^e siècles)* (Paris, 1959), 288–93, 301–02, 403–06, 429–33.

¹³⁸ See Bon, *La Morée*, 129–34, and on Skorta, 363–406.

¹³⁹ *French chronicle*, pars. 920–51, especially 921–23 and 950; see also Bon, *La Morée*, 178, and, for the time of the conquest, Jacoby, “Les archontes,” 430–31 and n. 50, where the date should be corrected.

¹⁴⁰ See Bon, *La Morée*, 129–34, 498–502, on these Slavs.

¹⁴¹ *French chronicle*, pars. 693–745; see also Bon, *La Morée*, 168, 505–07; the erroneous date “1295” on 506 should be corrected.

knight bribed officials of the prince of the Morea, inducing them to deliver the castle of St. George to Byzantium.¹⁴² Then, after the castle had been returned to Frankish rule, it was once again handed over to Byzantium, in 1319 or 1320, by its venal commander, a Greek official of the prince.¹⁴³ On both occasions, personal reasons prompted these Greeks to betray their ruler. These cases obviously do not reflect the attitude of Greek society at large. Furthermore, no Greek revolt has been recorded for the principality of the Morea after 1304, precisely the period of the impressive integration of Greek feudatories. The encounter of Western conquerors and local population had produced profound changes both in the knightly class and in the Greek society of the Morea.

THE ENCOUNTER OF Latin conquerors and indigenous populations in the areas bordering the eastern Mediterranean has on the whole not yet been properly explored. Even so, it is quite possible to identify some distinctive features of the relationship between the two communities and to describe their respective evolution. In all these areas, just as in Frankish Morea, religious affiliation provided the basic criterion of social stratification. The Latins or Franks constituted the society of the rulers. Whether one was Muslim or belonged to one of the numerous Oriental churches, a local inhabitant and his descendants were relegated to a lower status. Beyond this, one might have expected that nonfeudal groups of conquerors, who would not be bound by the social prejudice that stems from a strong class-consciousness, would be more accommodating toward the ruled. Evidence, however, points to the contrary. Exclusiveness is the dominant feature of the attitude adopted by the conquerors in Venetian Crete, Catalan Athens, and Genoese Chios. Local inhabitants were strictly excluded from joining the ruling elite and prevented from infiltrating into its ranks or encroaching upon its positions. Even adoption of the Roman creed could not alter their social status.

In Venetian Crete, where intermarriage between Latins and Greeks was prohibited and strictly enforced during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Greeks were also barred from holding military tenures provided by the Venetian government and, as a result, from becoming members of the Cretan *Maggior Consiglio*, the most important local assembly participating in the government of the island. Only a small number of families of Greek *archontes* were granted special privilege to hold military tenures, and fewer still could wed Latin women. Besides, Greeks had no access to important administrative posts and could not serve as

¹⁴² *French chronicle*, pars. 802–16. For the site of this castle, see Bon, *La Morée*, 381, 513.

¹⁴³ The exact date cannot be ascertained. See Jacoby, "Quelques considérations," 142 n. 37, and Bon, *La Morée*, 202.

mercenaries, while Latins who had married Greek women were to be dismissed. In practice the local Venetian authorities did not always hold to these rules and occasionally had to be reminded of them by the central government, but the official Venetian policy was clear, and, as far as the *archontes* were concerned, it was indeed implemented. As I have already suggested, this situation accounts for the role played by the latter as leaders of the Greek opposition to Venetian rule.¹⁴⁴

In Catalan Greece the marriage of Latin women to Greeks was forbidden, a restriction that remained valid even in the rare cases when the latter were granted the status enjoyed by Franks or conquerors.¹⁴⁵ Catalan legislation was more lenient than was Venetian legislation in Crete, as it did not totally prohibit intermarriage, and Latins could marry Greek women; but it nevertheless prevented Greeks from integrating into the Latin elite. In Chios members of the Greek upper class were ousted from the citadel of the city shortly after its conquest in 1346 by the Genoese, and the descendants of those who participated in the conquest combined to form an association, the *albergo* of the Giustiniani, to which only few Greeks gained access.¹⁴⁶

The special significance of these three cases is that the ruling elite did not belong to a feudal nobility. Unlike the feudalized areas, no link existed here between occupation and social status. The conquerors and those who joined them dwelt in urban centers, together with the indigenous Greek population, and pursued various economic activities similar to those of their neighbors. Everyday life brought them into close contact with the ruled, and hardly any factor save religion differentiated the two groups. Constant social and economic intercourse exerted a corrosive influence upon the social supremacy and political prerogatives acquired by conquest and permanently threatened them. As the danger of assimilation to the local Greek society, which was numerically far superior, was clearly perceived by the conquerors at the outset, they resorted to such measures of self-defense as total or partial prohibition of intermarriage to create an efficient barrier between themselves and the ruled, especially the upper class. Segregation was the most suitable means to preserve their separate group identity.

By contrast, the areas into which feudalism was transplanted underwent a different social development. In the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem the feudal conquerors did not face any problem of integration, as the members of the local elite were exterminated or fled the cities captured by the Crusaders at the time of the conquest. Exclusiveness and class-

¹⁴⁴ For the time being, see Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, 131-32, 134-35, 291-93.

¹⁴⁵ As attested by a privilege bestowed upon a Greek inhabitant of Livadia, presumably in 1311; for the dating of this document, see David Jacoby, "La 'Compagnie catalane' et l'état catalan de Grèce. Quelques aspects de leur histoire," *Journal des Savants* (Apr.-June 1966), 88-89.

¹⁴⁶ See Philip P. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island, 1346-1566* (Cambridge, 1958), 1: 332-33, 582-612.

consciousness as displayed by the knights were encouraged by the rapid success of the conquest and the encounter with a basically agrarian population, whose occupation was considered an attribute of lowly social status.¹⁴⁷ Almost since its conquest by the Crusaders in 1191, Cyprus was closely connected with the Kingdom of Jerusalem, from which there came both the special brand of feudalism introduced into the island and many of the knights who settled it. In Cyprus as in Frankish Morea the knightly class confronted an existing Greek elite, although conditions in Cyprus were different from those in the Peloponnesus in the early thirteenth century. The conquest of the island was rapid, and two revolts were ruthlessly crushed thereafter, within less than a year. These events account for the uncompromising policy adopted toward the indigenous population. Besides, one may safely assume that the attitude and concepts of the Cypriot knightly class were molded to a large extent by those that had previously evolved in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Integration of local notables was therefore excluded, the few exceptions encountered in the fourteenth century merely confirming the rule.¹⁴⁸

Of all the areas mentioned above, Norman Italy is certainly the one whose social evolution most closely resembles that of the Morea. Descendants of the Greek and Lombard notables were fully integrated into the knightly class and held fiefs, both feudal and patrimonial land, or only the latter. In this last case, they were considered "knights who hold nothing" (*militēs qui nihil tenent*), an expression that implies a tendency to assimilate these notables and their patrimonial estates respectively to the Norman conquerors and their fiefs, which carried military service. The survival of Byzantine and Lombard law in Norman Italy and its application to patrimonial estates offers yet another parallel to Frankish Morea,¹⁴⁹ although the analogous social evolution should not be ascribed to the influence of the Angevins, heirs of the Norman kingdom of Sicily, who also ruled Frankish Morea since 1278. It is at least partially attributable to the conditions of the conquest, which was slow and progressive in both areas and which, therefore, induced the conquerors to adopt a realistic and conciliatory attitude toward the indigenous population, especially the local upper class.

As is evident from this brief discussion, many complex problems arose from the encounter of Western conquerors and local society in the eastern Mediterranean, problems that suggest the benefits to be gained from

¹⁴⁷ The latest study on the subject is by Joshua Prawer, *The Crusaders' Kingdom. European Colonialism in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1972), especially 46–76, 504–33. The author does not distinguish, however, between the attitude of the knights and that of the burgesses toward the local population. His assertion (on p. 68) that knights married local women is not supported by any evidence, and the *pullani*, or *poulains*, of mixed stock were obviously children of Frankish burgesses and native mothers.

¹⁴⁸ See Louis de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852–61), 1: 135–40; George Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1948), 2: 8.

¹⁴⁹ See Claude Cahen, *Le régime féodal de l'Italie normande* (Paris, 1940), 53–54, 124–27.

intensive comparative study. The social, legal, and institutional evolution generated by this encounter can be fairly well reconstructed. But, beyond this evolution, such a study might enable us to discover the mental patterns underlying the attitudes and behavior of individuals and, especially, of social classes and societies reacting to each other in conquered areas.