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PATROLLING THE REVOLUTION

Worker Militias, Citizenship,
and the Modern Chinese State

ELIZABETH J. PERRY

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For Nara and Roosevelt

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book began as a companion volume to my earlier study, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). Whereas the first volume had concentrated on the social origins and political inclinations of the Shanghai work force, I planned in the second volume to explore more broadly the connections between the labor movement and the development of the modern Chinese state (under Nationalist and Communist regimes). The present study remains largely faithful to that original intent, but early in the course of research the project took an unexpected turn. Discovering substantial archival material on the operations of worker militias during both the Republican and the Communist periods, and inferring that this abundance of material reflected the importance that the militias held for insurgents and state authorities alike, I decided to concentrate my investigation upon this single institution. Citizen militias, it occurred to me, provided an illuminating entrée to the otherwise opaque process by which revolutionary activism is converted into state power. And, as I followed contemporary debates about the deployment of the U.S. National Guard in Iraq, I realized that this issue applied not only to China, but to other modern states as well.

In an effort to probe larger questions about the relationship between revolutionary citizenship and state building, *Patrolling the Revolution* traces the evolution of China's worker militias, from their origins in labor protests to their emergence as pillars of state control. Unlike much of my previous work, this study is not primarily

concerned with explaining patterns of protest in terms of societal divisions (though such cleavages do play an important role in this account as well), but rather with understanding how the construction of citizenship during the course of revolutionary protest shapes distinctive and enduring configurations of state-society relations. The general line of inquiry, I believe, is as apposite for my own country as for China.

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INTRODUCTION

The modern state was born of revolution. Beginning in the eighteenth century, a series of anciens regimes fell to popular insurgencies that proceeded to fashion more powerful political institutions—whose authority lay in their professed representation of a newly awakened citizenry.¹ The revolutionary movements that gave rise to these modern polities were far from uniform in either origins or outcomes. They shared, however, a common challenge of mobilizing ordinary members of society, first to break and then to remake the machinery of state.² The political entities spawned by these violent struggles, while invariably more intrusive and effective than their predecessors, differed in how they imagined and incorporated the emergent citizenry. The argument of this book is that such distinctions in “revolutionary citizenship” generated markedly divergent patterns of state-society relations that long outlived the insurrection.

This study examines the construction of revolutionary citizenship and its subsequent implications for state-society relations in contemporary China. These days, following decades of reforms that have demolished much of the former Maoist system, it is easy to forget the revolutionary origins of modern China. In the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy, when the People's Liberation Army turned on its own people, one is hard pressed to recall those early years when the Red Army—bolstered by revolutionary militias in city and countryside alike—emerged and flourished by virtue of popular support. Pondering the history of the Chinese revolution is of more than antiquarian or nostalgic interest, however. For in fact, contemporary

policies and events, including the post-Mao reforms and the Tiananmen massacre, cannot be understood without it.

To link China's revolutionary past to its reformist yet repressive present is to raise broader questions about the impact of a revolution upon subsequent political developments. The point is relevant not only for China; with modern states having been forged in the crucible of revolutionary struggles, the inquiry holds considerable comparative promise as well. The manner in which a particular revolution develops and devolves depends upon a host of contingencies and idiosyncrasies that elude even the most subtle and sophisticated efforts at social science analysis. Despite such imponderables, all revolutions face the daunting task of creating popular institutions capable of seizing political power by violent means—and then, if successful, of converting these militant practices from methods of state-breaking into modes of state-making.

Citizen militias, as instruments of both revolutionary conflict and postrevolutionary control, offer a revealing window into this complex process of institutional transformation. How revolutionaries have gone about the task of constructing and reconstructing such insurgent institutions—not only in China, but in America, France, Russia, and Iran as well—tells us much about their movements and the outcomes of those movements. More specifically, the criteria of membership by which some elements of society were included or excluded from these revolutionary and state-building operations profoundly shaped subsequent political trajectories. Modern revolutions all require popular mobilization, but the long-term effects of this mobilization vary according to the particular understandings of citizenship that become embedded and institutionalized in the course of a revolution and its aftermath.

REVOLUTIONARY STATE-BUILDING

The storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, gave birth to the modern concept of revolution. Whereas previously the term had encompassed any sudden change, whether accidental or intentional, the French Revolution generated a new meaning of revolution as the

purposeful act of reconstituting a state through popular uprisings.³ The French Revolution, like the earlier American Revolution and a number of other revolutions that followed in its wake (including the Chinese Revolution of 1911), claimed legitimacy on the basis of a popular sovereignty whose constitutional authority required the election of a community-based representative assembly. This revolutionary template underwent major mutations in the early twentieth century, however. While the Franco-American exemplar remained influential, alternative conceptions of revolutionary citizenship and its appropriate institutional expression emerged.

Among these latter-day variants was the Bolshevik model of revolution, in which *class* (and vanguard party) replaced *community* (and elected assembly) as the agent of revolutionary representation and transformation. The Russian Revolution of 1917, which took a dramatic turn between the insurrections of February and October, demonstrated this fundamental shift in the basis of political authority:

The February uprising was understood quite conventionally as a rising of the sovereign people whose will was to be expressed through the election of a Constituent Assembly. But the October uprising brought the Bolshevik Party to power—which dismissed the Constituent Assembly and claimed for itself the right to rule, not on the grounds of popular sovereignty, but on the grounds that it represented the interests of the proletariat. The Bolshevik model, hence, operated a double shift in the older “constitutional” model of revolution. It shifted the ultimate claim to legitimacy from sovereignty of the people to sovereignty of the proletarian class and it shifted the mode of representation of the sovereign from an elected assembly to a vanguard party.⁴

In part, this change in the meaning of revolution reflected the distinctly different conditions of late-eighteenth-century America and France and early-twentieth-century Russia. But the grounds for a drastic reworking of the process and purpose of revolution so as to empower a proletarian party had of course already been prepared by the writings of Karl Marx. The image of the militant worker, waging class warfare on behalf of Communism, lies at the very heart of Marx's revolutionary theory. To show that this scenario was not

without historical basis, Marx invoked the example of the Paris Commune of 1871.

Marx was thrilled by the Commune because, in his (mis)interpretation, it represented a new form of governance generated by working-class insurgency.⁵ As Marx stated famously, "Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."⁶ Central to Marx's understanding of the Commune was the institution of a worker militia (the Parisian National Guard) in promoting and preserving political transformation:

Paris could resist only because, in consequence of the siege, it had got rid of the army, and replaced it by a National Guard, the bulk of which consisted of working men. This fact was now to be transformed into an institution.⁷

According to Marx, arming the proletariat was tantamount to liberating the citizenry at large. There was a certain tension in Marx's characterization of the National Guard as representing, at once, "working men" and "all Parisians," yet he saw the proletariat as the vanguard of the people as a whole. As a concentrated (and thus potentially conscious) class, which embodied the extreme effects of exploitation and alienation, the industrial proletariat was in a unique position to act as an emancipating force. In sundering the shackles of capitalism, workers would realize the promise of a fulfilled humanity—not only for themselves, but for all citizens.⁸ Worker militias would play a pivotal part in this process.

In Marx's view, a key lesson of the Paris Commune was that revolution required a fundamental transformation of state institutions:

From the very outset the Commune was compelled to recognize that the working class, once come to power, could not go on managing with the old state machine . . . [T]his working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repressive machinery previously used against it itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials by declaring them all, without exception, subject to recall at any moment.⁹

Revolutionaries would first need to smash, and then to radically refashion, preexisting state institutions. Citizen militias, as the armed ex-

pression of the working class, offered the means by which this twofold task could be accomplished. Marx wrote approvingly of the "Paris Revolution" that led to the Commune: "All Parisians capable of bearing arms had enrolled in the National Guard and were armed, so that now the workers constituted a great majority."¹⁰ Only two days after its establishment, Marx observed, "the Commune abolished conscription and the standing army, and declared the sole armed force to be the National Guard, in which all citizens capable of bearing arms were to be enrolled."¹¹ With the National Guard composed largely of workers, the government that it established "was essentially a working-class government . . . the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labor."¹² In Marx's eyes, the Paris Commune stood as a model to "all the great industrial centres of France," and "even the smallest country hamlet." In cities and rural districts alike, communes were depicted as an ideal political form for handling administrative affairs.¹³ Militarily, the communes would be supported by a "national militia, with an extremely short term of service."¹⁴ In this formula the contradiction between class and community would be resolved through the institution of the citizens' militia.

Marx's appreciation of the special role of a popular militia in establishing political order echoed a familiar theme in modern political theory.¹⁵ Niccolò Machiavelli, often regarded as the founder of modern political thought, while serving as defense secretary in sixteenth-century Florence substituted a citizens' militia for the prevailing mercenary system. For Machiavelli, previous reliance upon mercenary soldiers was a major source of Italy's political weakness. He contended that militias, by virtue of recruiting ordinary members of the citizenry, provided a far more dependable means of political power for would-be rulers.¹⁶ Militia service was in Machiavelli's formula tantamount to citizenship. In J. G. A. Pocock's words, Machiavelli's "debt to the militia tradition in Florentine theory, plus his experience . . . in actually organizing a militia, leads him to ground citizenship upon military virtue to the point where the former becomes the outgrowth of the latter."¹⁷ In highlighting the political significance of militias, Machiavelli was grappling with a central concern for rulers and revolutionaries alike; with good reason, Hannah Arendt anointed him "the spiritual father of revolution."¹⁸

Militias have been touted both as instruments of state-breaking and as implements of state-making. This two-sided image of the connection between militias and state power is reflected in Lenin's voluminous writings on the topic. In *State and Revolution*, Lenin (citing Engels) defines the state as "special bodies of armed men"—that is, police and standing armies.¹⁹ He then observes that "every great revolution" raises the same issue: "namely, the question of the relationship between 'special bodies of armed men' and the 'self-acting armed organisation of the population.'"²⁰ In other words, the relationship between state military might and citizen militias is for Lenin the universal revolutionary question. As the "self-acting armed organization of the population," worker militias are described by Lenin as democratic institutions "of a fundamentally different order" from the repressive standing armies and police forces of the states that they seek to supplant. To elucidate this point, Lenin refers to Marx's portrait of the Paris Commune:

The Commune . . . signifies a gigantic replacement of one type of institution by others of a fundamentally different order. Here we observe a case of "transformation of quantity into quality": democracy, introduced as fully and consistently as is generally thinkable, is transformed from capitalist democracy into proletarian democracy; from the state (i.e., a special force for the suppression of a particular class) into something which is no longer the state in the accepted sense of the word.²¹

Lenin concludes that "[t]he Commune is the first attempt of a proletarian revolution to *break up* the bourgeois state machinery and constitutes the political form 'at last discovered,' which can and must take the place of the broken machine."²² The institutions created by the armed proletariat, Lenin here insists, do not constitute a new state inasmuch as they liberate—rather than oppress—the working people. Yet, his insistence upon the retreat and replacement of the state notwithstanding, Lenin's description of the postrevolutionary political order—the "proletarian dictatorship"—is in fact remarkably statist:

The proletariat needs state power, the centralised organisation of force, the organisation of violence . . . The transition from capi-

talism to Communism will certainly bring a great variety and abundance of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be only one: *the dictatorship of the proletariat* . . . Abolishing the bureaucracy at once, everywhere and completely, is out of the question . . . We are not Utopians, we do not indulge in "dreams" of how best to do away *immediately* with all administration, with all subordination; these Anarchist dreams, based upon a lack of understanding of the task of the proletarian dictatorship, are basically foreign to Marxism . . . But if there be subordination, it must be to the armed vanguard of all the exploited and the labouring—to the proletariat.²³

Armed workers are championed by Lenin (citing Marx's analysis of the Paris Commune) not only as agents of revolution, but also as rulers of a new postrevolutionary political order. Although Lenin carefully refrains from referring to the administrative apparatus that will accompany the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a "state," he nevertheless presents the armed workers as relying upon "state power" to subordinate recalcitrant elements of the population.

WORKER MILITIAS

The Russian Revolution of 1917 departed in many respects from classical Marxist doctrine, but it was marked nonetheless by the substantial participation of worker militias.²⁴ Voluntary bands of armed workers, which came to be known as Red Guards, were a key ingredient in the October Revolution.²⁵ Thus it is hardly surprising that, from its inception, the Bolshevik-inspired Chinese Communist Party (CCP) devoted great attention to the issue of proletarian power. Despite the awkward fact that its own victory would depend primarily on peasant—rather than proletarian—support, the CCP has always emphasized the signal importance of the working class in enabling and sustaining its revolutionary enterprise. In confirmation of this exalted status, China's workers have been assigned key responsibilities as vanguards and guardians of the revolution. Nowhere is this clearer than in the institution of worker militias, a case study of which constitutes the empirical core of this book.

This study focuses on the city of Shanghai, both because of the special significance of that city in the annals of the Chinese revolution and because of the exceptional richness and accessibility of its archival collections. This is by no means to suggest that Shanghai was typical of Chinese cities, let alone of the country as a whole. Developments in Shanghai have, however, played an unusually influential role in modern Chinese politics. An attempt will be made to place the Shanghai case in a broader national perspective, but the paucity of comparable sources for other locales imposes unfortunate, if unavoidable, limits on this effort.

When the CCP was founded in Shanghai in the summer of 1921, its enthusiastic new members turned at once to the question of proletarian revolution. Taking their cue from Marx and Lenin, the young revolutionaries set about the task of arming the working class. Worker militias were the very first vehicle that the Chinese Communists employed to conduct armed insurrection, and militias have remained an important means of gaining and retaining political power, for state authorities as well as for would-be revolutionaries, ever since.

Students of Chinese history have no doubt encountered the worker militias in narratives of the White Terror of 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek and his henchmen slaughtered countless militia members in a brutal effort to rid Shanghai and other cities of leftist influence.²⁶ Even non-China specialists may be familiar with the militias from André Malraux's poignant (and only thinly fictionalized) account of their role in the Shanghai workers' insurrections of 1926–1927, as depicted in his classic novel, *Man's Fate*.²⁷ The bloody demise of the worker militias precipitated the Communists' hasty flight to the countryside, converting their revolution from an urban to a rural movement. But although the "proletarian patrols" make few other appearances in our history texts, they outlived the White Terror by many years. Indeed, they have continued to play a critical role during turning points in China's revolution right up to the present. The swift Communist takeover of the cities in the late 1940s, the suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign in the early 1950s, the establishment of people's communes during the Great Leap Forward, the ascendancy of rebel workers during the Cultural Revolution, the suppression of the April Fifth Movement in 1976, and the

demise of the mass protest movement in June of 1989 were all facilitated by militias. Today, the transformation of this once proud revolutionary institution into an adjunct of economic reform symbolizes the current plight of China's industrial proletariat as it confronts the specter of mass unemployment and the loss of many of the benefits previously bestowed upon it by the Communist state.²⁸

One reason the militias merit attention, therefore, is that they are of substantial historical significance. They serve, moreover, as a revealing prism through which to view the dynamics of state-society relations in China (and other revolutionary settings as well). Although originally an impromptu workers' protest tactic, militias came to be embraced by all manner of political authorities to serve their own statist designs. In tracking the contradictions and tensions that have surrounded this institution from the outset, we learn much about the shifting contours of state and society under different political regimes in modern China. While the development of the militias into a vehicle of government repression bespeaks an impressive accretion of state power over the past century, at certain critical moments militias have also provided an important means for nonstate actors to assume influential political roles. As previous studies of militia activities in China have shown, "in different periods, or even in different places in the same period, militia mobilization could lead either to an increase of local autonomy or to the expansion of state control."²⁹ The close interplay between control from above and contention from below forms a central theme of contemporary Chinese politics, as the changing status of the militias makes clear. The availability of archival and other primary sources spanning nearly a century permits a study of worker militias under revolutionary and postrevolutionary conditions. Yet the history of the Chinese revolution, with few exceptions, has been written without reference to this institution.

REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

The institutionalist turn in contemporary American social science reflects the pivotal role that political institutions have come to occupy in the modern world.³⁰ Central to this approach is the concept

of "path dependence," which highlights the tendency of institutions to perpetuate previous patterns of behavior through a dynamic of increasing returns.³¹ As historical institutionalists have emphasized, however, institutions also change.³² Arrangements that were created for one political task may be converted or subverted to serve a radically different purpose—a phenomenon that I refer to as *institutional inversion*. The causes of such a dramatic role reversal (or, as Lenin might have phrased it, the "transformation of quantity into quality") are various. During the revolutionary struggle, the imitation and infiltration of successful institutional initiatives by rival political entrepreneurs may precipitate these shifts. In the postrevolutionary scene, the modification and manipulation of previous revolutionary practices in the service of new government agencies often triggers the dynamic of institutional inversion as well.

The concept of institutional inversion is related to Philip Selznik's classic idea of "institutional cooptation."³³ There is an important distinction, however. Selznik emphasized "the process by which an institutional environment impinges itself upon an organization and effects changes in its leadership, structure, or policy."³⁴ My focus, by contrast, is less upon environmental imperatives than upon the conscious—and contingent—choices of political leaders and their constituencies to utilize preexisting structures for new ends.

The most politically significant instances of institutional inversion involve the transformation of entities established for the purpose of state-breaking into powerful mechanisms of state-making—and vice versa. When revolutionary initiatives are recast as a means of regime consolidation (or, conversely, when state-sponsored agencies turn against the state itself), institutional inversion signals a fundamental reconfiguration of state-society relations. The latter pattern, in which the state loses control of its own agencies to societal challengers, has been analyzed as a key factor in the collapse of authoritarian regimes.³⁵ But the prior experience of state formation, whereby postrevolutionary regimes (authoritarian and nonauthoritarian alike) incorporate revolutionary institutions to enhance and enforce their governing grip on society, is equally worthy of consideration. These seemingly opposite processes of political development and disintegration are, moreover, interconnected; the ways in which

state socialism unraveled in different Communist countries varied along preexisting institutional lines.³⁶

This study traces the history of institutional inversion as it unfolded in one key agency of the Chinese revolution. By examining the worker militias from their beginnings, we see how an entity praised by Marx and Lenin as the vanguard of a struggle for human liberation from economic and political oppression devolved into an instrument of state-sponsored tyranny. Although a case study of a single institution (which assumed many different organizational forms), this discussion illuminates the inherent tensions between revolutionary designs and repressive departures in the making of the modern polity. As the organized expression of the revolutionary citizenry, militias embody contradictions that lie at the very heart of the revolutionary enterprise.

Revolutions are by their very nature an exceptionally challenging subject for social science analysis. The fact that they constitute ruptures, rather than repetitions, of established social patterns renders revolutions more susceptible to the historian's eye for idiosyncrasy than to the social scientist's pursuit of uniformity. Moreover, a recent generation of researchers—historians and social scientists alike—has come to doubt the once widely accepted view that transforming events must be explained in terms of equally imposing causes. Such an assumption, central to nineteenth-century social theory, once fueled a search for deep structural explanations of revolutionary change. Today, however, revolutions—like events in the natural world—are more often understood as the precarious outcome of a series of accidental origins and unanticipated consequences.³⁷ As a new sociological study of the Iranian Revolution argues, "mass protest is truly unpredictable, not just in advance but also retroactively. The vale of confusion that accompanies such phenomena washes out all attempts to link preconditions with outcomes."³⁸ In such confused and contingent circumstances, impromptu acts and utterances may wield as decisive an impact on the direction of a movement as the weight of prerevolutionary social structure.

Although revolutions grow out of a welter of uncertain and unique events, their subsequent development nevertheless conforms to certain identifiable (albeit neither uniform nor unalterable) trajectories. Thus we speak of Jeffersonian, Jacobin, Leninist, Maoist, and

Khomeinian revolutions, aware that the foundational choices made by revolutionary actors—contingent and contentious though they may be—exert a profound influence on the shape of political arrangements to come. While neither liberal democracies nor communist dictatorships were predestined by the culture or class composition of the ancien regime, these dissimilar regime outcomes reflect stark differences in the resolution of contradictions common to all revolutionary situations. In deciding, for example, how to recruit and reward participation—whether on the basis of community, class, creed, or any other criterion—revolutionaries configure citizenship in ways that exert an enduring impact on state-society relations. Militias, as institutional embodiments of the revolutionary citizen, epitomize alternative solutions to universal revolutionary dilemmas.

In observing the changing functions and fortunes of the militias, we are compelled to question a good many of the dichotomies that have conventionally structured social science analyses of revolutionary politics in general and of contemporary China in particular. The lines between revolution and terrorism, revolution and counterrevolution, and state and society, as well as between Communists (the CCP) and Nationalists (KMT), or between pre- and post-1949 China become—if not obliterated—at least extremely blurred. To chronicle the vicissitudes of one relatively recondite, yet remarkably resilient, political institution invites reconsideration of some of the most basic categories for interpreting revolutionary change.

REVOLUTIONARY CONTRADICTIONS

Among the many tensions that characterize revolutionary movements, especially those inspired by Bolshevik precedents, is the distinction between open mobilization and clandestine operations. China's twentieth-century worker militias, which (in both CCP and KMT incarnations) oscillated repeatedly between transparency and secrecy, offer an illuminating illustration of the larger strains that beset Leninist revolutions. Access to internal party archives (for KMT and CCP alike) permits us to explore this matter in some depth. While both of these Leninist parties prescribed an important public

role for armed workers, the clandestine uses to which each put the worker patrols under their control were often more significant—and terrifying. Such secrecy, adopted in order to skirt detection and suppression by hostile forces, contributed to serious problems of control and accountability.

Revolutionary discipline may be threatened by many factors. Perhaps even more daunting than the danger of enemy infiltration is the difficulty of sustaining commitment and constraint on the part of the revolutionaries (and postrevolutionaries) themselves. The tendency to abandon initial ideals for a more pragmatic style of politics is present in any social movement. More specific to civil wars and revolutions is a temptation to resort to terrorism (or the use of targeted assassination and mass executions) in place of patient efforts at popular mobilization.

Terrorism

The terrorist strain runs deep in the Bolshevik revolutionary tradition. The Russian populist party, *Narodnaya Volya* or "people's will," was widely credited with having created a "revolutionary situation" in the absence of a mass movement when it assassinated Alexander II in 1881.³⁹ The twenty or so radicals who comprised the party's executive committee directed their terror squarely against state authority, not against social injustice or incipient capitalism. Yet they bequeathed a respect for terrorist tactics to later partisans—the Socialist Revolutionaries (or SRs) and the Bolsheviks—who sought to combine such methods with a broader agenda of mass mobilization and socioeconomic transformation. Formed in 1902, the SRs explicitly advocated the integration of mass agitation of workers and peasants with terrorism. Terrorist activities—directed at economic as well as political targets—were conducted by a separate agency of the SR Party, known as the Combat Organization. The autonomy of the Combat Organization, however, made it very difficult for party leaders to exercise effective control over these operations.⁴⁰

Lenin's concept of a new type of party, noted for professional revolutionaries, democratic centralism, and front organizations, was intended as an answer to such dilemmas. Yet, as his Chinese apostles would soon discover, the creation of a Bolshevik party provided no

panacea for enforcing revolutionary discipline; instead, these parties spawned their own varieties of indiscipline. Worker militias established under the auspices of Leninist parties for the purpose of ensuring revolutionary order have often led to disorder instead.⁴¹

Indiscipline

Although revolutions are launched in the name of freedom, their success depends ultimately upon the enforcement of discipline. One reason that Leninist parties face such difficulty in controlling their worker militias is that these purportedly proletarian patrols are often composed predominantly of marginal elements who lack the restraint of regular jobs or family dependents. In contrast to ordinary workers, members of the unemployed underclass are more likely to possess the martial skills and violent inclinations demanded of militiamen. "Lumpen-proletarians" may be more capable and willing than gainfully employed workers to undertake militia service, but they also tend to be less amenable to discipline and direction. In the case of Shanghai, gangster connections compounded the problem of unruly inclinations. Moreover, even when recruited from among regular factory workers, rank and file militia members (and their grassroots leaders) seldom shared the ideological commitment of top-echelon revolutionary partisans. For many militiamen, securing the next meal was a more pressing concern than establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat. If rival forces seemed better able to provide for material needs, patrolmen were quick to jump ship.

Much of the attention of the party leaders responsible for militia organization was directed toward the challenge of patrolling the patrols. In China, KMT and CCP partisans devoted considerable energy and resources to militia training sessions intended not only to instill military skills, but also to enhance commitment and compliance on the part of headstrong recruits. Both Leninist parties required that new militiamen be introduced by reliable guarantors and swear oaths of party loyalty. Visible accoutrements of membership—numbered armbands, distinctive military-style uniforms—were also routinely issued to militiamen in an effort to improve morale and accountability. As we shall see, however, these disciplinary measures often had effects contrary to those anticipated by the partisan leaders

who introduced them. Established practices could be hijacked for alternative purposes.

Counterrevolution

Recent theories of institutional innovation, which stress the importance of emulation, help to make sense of the considerable tactical overlap between ostensibly opposite political parties. These approaches stress that organizations in a given field will adopt similar structures, strategies, and ideologies over time. Initial diversity gives way to uniformity as competitors copy successful models in their field.⁴² But if the basic mechanics of institutional imitation are well established in the sociology of organizations' literature, the implications for revolutions have not been fully appreciated. As this study will demonstrate in the case of the CCP and KMT, revolutionaries mimic counterrevolutionaries and vice versa. Moreover, precisely because revolutionary organizations develop through a process of infiltration and emulation of their opponents, the suspicion of betrayal from within is pervasive. Fear of hidden traitors is a recurring theme in revolutionary movements, from the Jacobin Terror in France and Stalin's purges in the Soviet Union to the Cultural Revolution in China. Such phenomena are not simply the product of paranoid imaginations on the part of revolutionary leaders (though there is usually an element of that), but are also the reflection of fundamental contradictions that lie at the heart of the revolutionary process itself.

Revolutions, which often go hand in hand with civil war, are family battles. The enemy is one's own flesh and blood, and the level of mutual awareness—and aversion—between the parties is thus unusually intense. Under these circumstances, the fear of penetration and pollution by the opponent is of constant concern. Revolutionaries are ever on the lookout for signs of perfidy, but when their opponents also claim to be revolutionaries, the challenge of purifying the party is far from straightforward. From the KMT New Life Movement and Liquidate Traitors Campaign, to the CCP Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign and Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, worker militias were assigned the daunting task of detecting and destroying counterrevolutionaries lurking deep within their own ranks.

UNINTENDED AND INTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The concept of an armed citizenry, whether justified as an instrument of state power (à la Machiavelli), as a vehicle of class revolution (à la Marx and Lenin), or as a guarantee against tyranny (à la Jefferson) has occupied a central place in modern political theory.⁴³ The practical consequences of these conceptions, however, have often strayed far from the ideals of their proponents. In contemporary America, armed militias claiming Jeffersonian roots have been linked to a string of terrorist activities against the federal government.⁴⁴ Just as we grapple in the United States with the appalling crime rates attendant upon our revolutionary right to bear arms,⁴⁵ so the Chinese have repeatedly seen their proletarian patrols devolve into instruments of terror in service to one political faction or another.

Changing circumstances alter the operations of such institutional arrangements, however laudable their initial aims, presenting unforeseen challenges to later generations. The story of the worker militias is thus in part one of unintended consequences, of the gap between political theory and historical reality. In tracing the evolution of China's worker militias over a century in time, we witness the impact not only of conscious design, but also of pressing economic problems (in the form of unemployment and industrial restructuring), recurring political competition (among parties and bureaucratic agencies), and widespread social strife (as crime and contention expand the jurisdiction of the militias).

The gulf separating revolutionary vision from revolutionary practice is often—à la Selznik—attributed to objective environmental conditions beyond the control of either the leaders or their followers.⁴⁶ An equally compelling explanation, however, lies in the motivations and actions of those directly involved in revolutionary activities. Marx's theories have foundered not simply because of structural barriers erected by the ancien and nouveau regimes, but perhaps even more importantly because many have found in his ideas and the institutions they have engendered the means for pursuing alternative agendas.

Such agendas are shaped by personal interests, of course, but they are also conditioned by the political culture within which individuals

operate. In the case of China, an idealized tradition of state-sponsored paramilitary forces boasts an ancient and influential pedigree.⁴⁷ The late imperial experience with militia building, in which substantial power devolved to the local elite, dramatized for reformers and revolutionaries alike the political perils of decentralized control.⁴⁸

The warlord conflicts of the early Republican era convinced China's newly emerging political parties of the need for a strong, centralized state defended by a military force under tight party command.⁴⁹ Thus it is not surprising that twentieth-century Chinese partisans—Nationalists as well as Communists—should embrace militias not only as instruments of revolution, but also as sinews of state power. Moreover, revolutionary movements are themselves "a type of state-building, since armed revolutionaries are attempting to construct an organization that can monopolize the principal means of coercion in a territory."⁵⁰ As we have seen, the postrevolutionary political potential of militias was anticipated in Marx's interpretation of the Paris Commune as the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—and was further elaborated in Lenin's writings on the subject. When the Chinese Communists constructed soviets and wartime base areas in the 1920s–1940s, militias were a key means of organizing popular support and buttressing political power.⁵¹ For many reasons, then, China's militias have contributed forcefully to the rise of the mobilizational state.

REVOLUTIONARY CITIZENSHIP

Despite its Bolshevik roots, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was by no means a faithful facsimile of the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communists' continuing commitment to mass mobilization highlights a key distinction between Chinese and Soviet variants of Communist state-building. In the Soviet Union, unlike the PRC, worker militias were quickly dismantled and incorporated into the secret police (see conclusion). Moreover, Stalin was largely content to rely upon the police to carry out his purges,⁵² whereas Mao Zedong insisted upon popular involvement in the form of mass campaigns. Such widespread participation, Mao argued, was necessary in order

to ensure the continuation of the revolution under socialism.⁵³ Rather than treat revolutionary class struggle as a one-time event to be followed by a more restrained brand of political and economic consolidation, Mao and his comrades deployed the techniques of mass mobilization repeatedly during his reign—and after. Militias, as the organized expression of the revolutionary citizen, were an integral part of this project. The outcome was a powerful state, to be sure, but one with an unusually large role for popular involvement.⁵⁴

The chapters that follow trace the contribution of worker militias to China's state-building process, from their origins in social protest to their subsequent role as enforcers of government policy from below. This is a tale of ideals betrayed over the course of the Chinese Revolution and its aftermath. But this is also a story of the unfolding of fundamental (and foundational) tensions that exist within any revolutionary movement and that provide both obstacles and opportunities for those seeking to challenge state authority. Contradictions between spontaneity and submission, between daring and discipline, between contention and control, and between state destruction and state construction are inherent in every revolutionary undertaking. Equally inherent are the strains between inclusion and exclusion. Just as state-breaking and state-making are partners in the revolutionary enterprise, even so do both processes entail emancipation for some elements of the populace along with oppression for others. The particular ways in which these common issues are resolved determines not only the nature of the revolution, but to a considerable degree the character of the postrevolutionary political order as well.

By asking recruits to risk their personal safety for the future of the polity, revolutionary militias place extraordinary demands on ordinary people. Militiamen may, however, be driven by concerns that diverge markedly from the precepts and projects of those who enlist their participation. Citizenship, after all, is a two-way street by which common people as well as elites give shape to the meaning of political membership.⁵⁵ If militiamen see their participation as merely a means of survival or as an opportunity to exact revenge on personal enemies, for instance, the nature of the institution is thereby transformed. Maverick militias, moreover, can propel a movement in unexpected directions.

As instruments of revolutionary violence, militias are at once empowering (to those included) and alienating (to those who suffer the effects of exclusion and repression). Much of the tension inherent in any revolution concerns the matter of popular participation. Definitions of *revolutionary citizenship*, which identify particular elements of society as the vanguard, moving force, and primary beneficiaries of struggle, have a profound impact on the legitimization and distribution of power. Revolutions demand the involvement of ordinary citizens in armed conflict. But not everyone participates equally in these events.

Revolutionary citizenship may be based upon a number of overlapping criteria, of which perhaps the most common are *class* (membership in a particular socioeconomic group), *community* (residence in a particular territory), and *creed* (faith in a particular set of religious or ideological beliefs).⁵⁶ These conceptions of political representation are highly fluid and subject to competing interpretations: Should class be determined by one's relationship to the means of production, by one's revolutionary consciousness, or by state decree? And which class, or coalition of classes, should play the vanguard role at which stage in the revolutionary process? Should community be delimited by one's neighborhood, city, or nation? And is local community more or less capable of inspiring revolutionary action than national or international citizenship? Is one's creed best judged by one's revolutionary behavior? Or are true believers inherently revolutionary regardless of their behavior?

Any actual revolutionary process reflects complex and changing conceptions of the criteria for inclusion and exclusion, for benefit or blame. In the case of France, for example, Roger Gould traces a shift from class to community as the basis of "insurgent identity." Parisians, he argues, participated in the Revolution of 1848 as members of a working-class struggle for labor rights, whereas in 1871 they joined the Commune as neighbors fighting for urban autonomy.⁵⁷

The Chinese Revolution embodies an uneasy and unstable amalgam of contradictory conceptions of citizenship. At the founding of the CCP, the principal consideration was class. As Marxist-Leninists, China's revolutionary leaders stressed the salience of class—the proletariat augmented by the peasantry—as revolutionary agent.

But class was not the only basis of revolutionary citizenship. As nationalists, the Chinese Communists also emphasized the significance of community—the Chinese people as a whole—in combating imperialism. This identity became particularly pronounced after the Japanese invasion, when Mao called for a united front in opposition to foreign aggression.⁵⁸ Over the course of the Yenan period, however, adherence to creed—or “Mao Zedong Thought”—emerged as a key criterion for admission to the revolutionary ranks.⁵⁹ This quasi-religious approach intensified over time, reaching its apogee during the Cultural Revolution.⁶⁰ The post-Mao leadership has struggled with the conflicting implications of this complex legacy.

Such basic tensions, further complicated by geographical and tactical considerations, spawned different kinds of militia organizations. The urban wing of the revolution—associated with Li Lisan among others—favored a reliance upon proletarian patrols (*jiuchadui*) under union and party control. By contrast, the rural wing—led by Mao Zedong—embraced all-village militias (*minbing*) under military command, open to any patriotic peasant.⁶¹ Although this study focuses on the urban scene, comparisons to rural militias will also be drawn. Each side, in turn, harbored its own contradictions. As historian Chen Yung-fa has noted of village militias during the war with Japan: “Outwardly the militia was a nationalistic force, but inwardly it possessed a class character . . . [T]he main importance of the militia is to be found not in its battles with the Japanese, but in its role as an agent of domestic control; there it was vital to the larger goal of rural state-building.”⁶²

The tortuous history of the revolution, which unfolded in vastly dissimilar settings over a protracted period, fostered competing claims to representation and legitimacy that would fuel political struggles in China for generations to come. During the Cultural Revolution, when creed—or loyalty to Mao Zedong Thought—was highlighted as a marker of revolutionary authority, these conflicts became particularly virulent and violent. Whether conducted as behind-the-scenes bureaucratic maneuvers or as public brawls among the populace at large, disagreements over the composition and authority of the militia were at heart battles about the meaning of revolutionary citizenship itself: Who would serve as protagonists and protectors of the revolutionary struggle? And who would savor the fruits of political victory?

Revolutions have paved the road toward more intrusive states—in America, France, Russia, China, and Iran alike.⁶³ Yet they have done so in markedly different ways. In France (like the United States), revolutions were declared in the name of the people; in Russia and China, they were proclaimed in the name of the proletariat; in Iran, in the name of the pious. All of these formulations rested on political fictions: the American and French revolutions were hardly more representative of the entire populace than the Russian and Chinese revolutions were of the industrial proletariat or the Iranian revolution was of the Islamic faithful. In all of these cases, assertions of revolutionary citizenship served as pretexts for elite-led state-building projects. But, as we shall explore in the concluding chapter, the content of their founding myths was far from irrelevant to the political outcomes that ensued.

While class, community, and creed could be invoked to justify top-down initiatives that strengthened the coercive capacity of the state, they could also be read as an invitation to bottom-up social activism with the potential to challenge state hegemony. The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as elaborated by Marx, Lenin, and Mao,⁶⁴ conceived of a powerful state apparatus capable of identifying and neutralizing its domestic enemies. Yet the concept served as well to encourage popular involvement in politics, especially under a Maoist regime that claimed legitimacy on the basis of a “mass line” and that periodically reminded its citizens “to rebel is justified.”⁶⁵ The commitment to a privileged proletariat found further expression in the special entitlements enjoyed by state workers in Mao’s China.⁶⁶

This study proceeds chronologically, following the course of worker militias under a series of successive authoritarian regimes: warlord, Nationalist, early Communist, Cultural Revolution, and post-Mao. The process of state-building was to some extent incremental, with later regimes inheriting and extending the institutional foundations laid down by their predecessors. But never were the outcomes either uncontroversial or entirely predictable. With diverse, and at times conflicting, elements of both state and society advocating alternative projects, political patterns were protean and hotly contested. At certain key junctures, abrupt departures from past practice occurred.⁶⁷ Redefinitions in the meaning of revolutionary citizenship marked

each of these turns in the tumultuous history of China's militias, from the 1920s to the present day.

As citizen armed forces, militias present an important battleground for conflicts over the domain and dominion of state power; they serve therefore as sensitive barometers of fluctuations in state-society relations. While the next six chapters focus on the Chinese (and especially the Shanghai) experience, the concluding chapter is a comparative foray into the fate of militias in four other revolutionary societies: the United States, France, Russia, and Iran. In all of these countries—whether democratic or authoritarian—leaders and followers formulated new understandings of political membership (institutionalized in militias) that underwent substantial transformation and reinterpretation in the course of implementation. Alternative constructions of citizenship, this comparison suggests, have contributed to diverse patterns of state-building that are not entirely captured by conventional distinctions of regime type.⁶⁸ None of these trajectories, moreover, presents a smooth or unproblematic resolution of the inherent tension between engineering a stronger state, on the one hand, and encouraging continued citizen involvement, on the other. For any regime, the challenge of trying to blend revolutionary practices and promises with the imperatives of state-building is a tall order.

NOTES

1. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), chap. 6. Arendt describes the French Revolution as a "conflict between the people and a mercilessly centralized power apparatus which, under the pretense of representing the sovereignty of the nation, actually deprived the people of their power" (247). On the meanings of political representation, see Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); on the relationship between citizenship and modern state-building, see Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly, eds., *Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).
2. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

3. William H. Sewell, Jr., "Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille," *Theory and Society* 25 (1996): 841–81.
4. Doug McAdam and William H. Sewell, Jr., "It's About Time: Temporality in the Study of Social Movements and Revolutions," in *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, ed. Ronald R. Aminzade et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 114.
5. See Roger Gould, *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) for a persuasive argument that the Communards, although mostly workers, saw the Commune as an expression not of economic class but of urban community. It was, in other words, as Parisians fighting for the autonomy of their city, rather than as proletarians resisting the exploitation of the bourgeoisie, that they took up arms.
6. Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1977), 262.
7. Marx, "The Civil War in France," 291.
8. As Marx put it, the working class "cannot emancipate itself without . . . emancipating all other spheres of society . . . and hence can win itself only through the complete rewinning of man." Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 3:186.
9. Marx, "The Civil War in France," 261.
10. Marx, "The Civil War in France," 255.
11. Marx, "The Civil War in France," 256.
12. Marx, "The Civil War in France," 294.
13. Marx, "The Civil War in France," 293.
14. Marx, "The Civil War in France," 292.
15. Militias existed in premodern times as well, of course. The ancient Greek city-states demanded short stints of military service from their free male citizens. And in the Middle Ages, militias contributed directly to the growth of municipal governments on the Iberian Peninsula. See James Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
16. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses* (New York: Random House, 1950), 49–53, 345–51.
17. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 203.
18. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 30.
19. V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932), 10.
20. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, 11.
21. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, 37.
22. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, 48.
23. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, 23, 31, 42–43.

24. Diane Koenker, *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981); S. A. Smith, *Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); David M. Mandel, *The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1983).
25. Rex A. Wade, *Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984).
26. See, for example, Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (New York: Atheneum, 1966), chaps. 8-11; Nicholas R. Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolution of the 1920s* (Middlebury, Vt.: Middlebury College Press, 1991); Brian Martin, *The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), chap. 4.
27. André Malraux, *Man's Fate [La Condition Humaine]* (New York: Modern Library, 1936).
28. On the declining status of the Chinese proletariat, see for example, Dorothy J. Solinger, "The New Crowd of the Dispossessed: The Shift of the Urban Proletariat from Master to Mendicant," in *State and Society in 21st-century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation*, ed. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (New York: Routledge, 2004), 50-66.
29. Edward A. McCord, "Local Militia and State Power in Nationalist China," *Modern China* 25, no. 2 (April 1999): 119.
30. See especially the work of Douglass C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1981); and *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
31. Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 251-67.
32. Kathleen Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 208-40; Gerard Roland, "Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-Moving Institutions," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 38, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 109-31.
33. See Philip Selznik, *TVA and the Grassroots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
34. Selznik, *TVA and the Grassroots*, 13.
35. For a discussion of what they term "state conversion," see Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986); and X. L. Ding, "Institutional Ambiguity and the Transition from Communism: The Case of China," *British Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 3 (July 1994): 293-318.
36. Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
37. Jack A. Goldstone, "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions," in Mahoney and Rueschmeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, 76-84.
38. Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), viii.
39. Astrid von Borcke, "Violence and Terror in Russian Revolutionary Populism: The *Narodnaya Volya*, 1879-1883" in *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century Europe*, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 48.
40. Maureen Perrie, "Political and Economic Terror in the Tactics of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party before 1914," in Mommsen and Hirschfeld, *Social Protest, Violence and Terror*, 65-70.
41. Militias established under the wing of Leninist parties are not uniquely prone to terrorism, of course. The conclusion to this book will trace the terrorist strain as it developed in other revolutions as well. Indeed, terrorist tactics can be found in virtually all revolutionary militias. For another case, see James Ross, *Out of Control: Militia Abuses in the Philippines* (New York: Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, 1990), 2-20.
42. James March and John Olson, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (1984): 734-49; Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
43. As Jefferson put it in his eighth annual presidential message in 1808: "For a people who are free and who mean to remain so, a well-organized and armed militia is their best security." See Julian P. Boyd, ed., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953). An interesting effort to theorize about the political contributions of an armed citizenry to a socialist state is Jean Jaurès, *L'organisation socialiste de la France: l'Armée nouvelle* (Paris: Rouff, 1911). An abbreviated English translation of Jaurès' book, edited by G. G. Coulton, appeared as *Democracy and Military Service* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972).
44. Joshua D. Freilich, *American Militias: State-Level Variations in Militia Activities* (New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2003); Lane Crothers, *Rage on the Right: The American Militia Movement from Ruby Ridge to Homeland Security* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); D. J. Mulloy, *American Extremism: History, Politics and the Militia Movement* (London: Routledge, 2004).
45. Despite fierce contemporary debates over the meaning of the Second Amendment's provision that "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed," it is clear that the Founders' intention was not to facilitate terrorism or increase violent crime rates! Robert J. Spitzer, *The Right to Bear Arms: Rights and Liberties under the Law* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2001).
46. Important structuralist explanations of revolutionary movements include Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant*

in the *Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon, 1966); Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*; and Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For an interpretation of Maoism as an adaptation to the objective conditions of early-twentieth-century China, see Brantly Womack, *The Foundations of Mao Zedong's Political Thought, 1917-1935* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1982).

47. Gu Jiguang, *Fubing zhidu kaoshi* [A study of the fubing system] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1962).

48. See the discussion in Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

49. Edward A. McCord, *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 312-14.

50. Goodwin, *No Other Way Out*, 12.

51. Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), chap. 5.

52. Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times, Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov, eds., *Stalinism as a Way of Life* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000).

53. Mao Zedong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," in *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tsetung* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1971), 432-79.

54. Elizabeth J. Perry, "Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution," *Mobilization* (May 2002); Elizabeth J. Perry, "'To Rebel is Justified': Cultural Revolution Influences on Contemporary Chinese Protest," in *Beyond Purgé and Holocaust: The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited*, ed. Kam-ye Law (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

55. For discussions of this process in the case of China, see Henrietta Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911-1929* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Merle Goldman and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., *Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).

56. One might also include ethnicity, or identification with a particular language and lineage, but conflicts based primarily on this self-definition tend to be wars of independence or aggression, rather than revolutions. Nevertheless, revolutions that are undertaken in the name of class, community, or creed are often accompanied by strong ethnocultural claims as well.

57. Gould, *Insurgent Identities*.

58. Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962).

59. See the discussion of the development of a Maoist cult in Maurice Meisner, *Marxism, Maoism and Utopianism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982).

60. On Maoism in the Cultural Revolution as a religion, see Robert J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1968).

61. On the different origins and outcomes of China's urban and rural revolutionary traditions, see John W. Lewis, "Leader, Commissar, and Bureaucrat: The Chinese Political System in the Last Days of the Revolution," in *China in Crisis: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System*, ed. Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, vol. 1, bk. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 449-86.

62. Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution*, 294-95.

63. On the relationship between revolutions and state-building, see Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*.

64. In 1949 Mao characterized his nascent regime as a "people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and the Communist Party." Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in *Selected Readings*, 379. Despite his use of the term *people*, Mao left no doubt about the critical role of the proletariat: "The people's democratic dictatorship needs the leadership of the working class. For it is only the working class that is most far-sighted, most selfless and most thoroughly revolutionary" (384).

65. Maurice Meisner, "Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China," *China Quarterly*, no. 45 (January-March 1971): 2-3; Frederick Wakeman, Jr., *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives on Mao Tse-tung's Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

66. Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Xiaobo Lü and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., *Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

67. On critical junctures and institutional change, see Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

68. For stimulating efforts to explain political change in terms of regime type (colonial, totalitarian, authoritarian, democratic), see Robert M. Fishman, "Re-thinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy," *World Politics* 43 (1990): 422-40; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); and Goodwin, *No Other Way Out*.