

## THE ELUSIVE BUDDHIST SELF: PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON ITS DENIAL

*Luis O. Gómez*  
University of Michigan

The Venerable Ānanda sat next to the Blessed One and addressed him: "Reverend Master, I have heard it said again and again 'the world is empty, the world is empty.' But in what sense is it said that the world is empty?" "Ānanda, it is because it is empty of self and of anything belonging to self that the world is said to be empty."<sup>1</sup>

### 1. Introductory

The question of what exactly is the referent of the Buddhist denial of self continues to baffle the outside critical observer. The question has a long pedigree in Asia, where it was a fundamental and divisive issue among Buddhists. But it has also a long history in the West, where, closely allied to the question of "the meaning of *nirvāṇa*," it has produced a substantial literature. The western pedigree of the "no-self question" carries us from the times when it was assumed that the object of the "Buddhist" denial was the Upaniṣadic self (or Self with a capital according to one convention) through the times when some argued for a Buddhist Self (also capitalized).<sup>2</sup> The history of the debate has taken some new twists in more recent, and by far more sophisticated analyses (Collins 1982 & 1994; Oetke 1988; Tillemans 1996).

The consensus among western scholars points in the direction of a variety of Buddhist positions, and questions the wisdom (and ultimately the usefulness) of attempting to know what the original teaching may have been. Collins (1994) and Tillemans (1996) have examined this spectrum of conclusions.

In the present essay, I would like to add two more qualifications, exploring them briefly in light of selected *Nikāya* and *Āgama* texts. The hypotheses proposed in this paper are extensions or particular applications of the principle that was expressed by Collins with regards to the constructions of self generally. Collins (1994, p. 67) argues that "[o]ne might say that human beings are articulated conceptually as agents, by themselves and in relation to each other, in different ways, in different discourses." The hypotheses can also be construed as two theoretical qualifications to the quest for the Buddhist non-self. Both qualifications raise the question of what may have been the "self" or "selves" that were the object of the Buddhist critique.

First, I propose that different Buddhist voices may interact among themselves and with non-Buddhist voices in ways that are not necessarily linear. This would mean that the terms “self” and “no-self” are not univocal. Buddhists and non-Buddhists could interact in polemics without assuming a single notion of self. Likewise, doctrinal experts and philosophers may argue for a propositional no-self, yet assume and propound other types of no-self—social, ethical, etc. These other notions of self and no-self are not necessarily linked to the ontology expressed or implied by the Buddhist philosophical critique.<sup>3</sup>

Second, the contemporary scholar’s view of the Buddhist no-self presupposes notions (explicit or implicit) of what may have been the Buddhist notions of the self that is the object of the denial. These western preconceptions cannot be separated easily from our own notions of what is self. And, yet, we do not have a single set of such notions. We have, for instance, major differences of culture, class, and individual character that affect so-called “western notions of the self.” The elusiveness and ambiguity of English selflessness, for instance, has been mentioned repeatedly in the scholarly literature. As still other examples of the problem one may mention the fact that Romance languages, for instance, have no simple, much less a natural, set of grammatical categories to distinguish self from “I.” Contemporary English, colloquial and psychological, usage of words like “self,” “ego,” “inner self,” and “identity,” is equally problematic. The picture becomes even more confusing if we also consider words like “soul,” “spirit,” “personality,” and “mind.” All of these words have a privileged status in North American and British folk metaphysics and in the construction of the English-speaker’s “selfimage” (if I may be allowed to incur in my own brand of obscurantism to make a rhetorical point).

However, slippage and confusion is not the privileged territory of the English speaker. Nor is the rhetorical or polemic exploitation of this slippage a new thing. Consider for instance a key passage in Śāntideva’s *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (La Vallée Poussin; 1914) Chapter IX, stanzas 68-71). What superficially may appear to be an argument against “the” notion of “self,” turns out to be actually, against “one” particular notion of self—and one that is clearly tied to folk usage.

The passage in question is directed at the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika notion of the ‘I’—a notion that is far from intuitive to a western observer. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, the “I” is a non-conscious, unchanging nonmaterial entity. It is under most circumstances “associated” with cognition (or consciousness), but it is not always conscious. This is, in fact, a very reasonable hypothesis. It is problematic to western folk notions only because it opens the door to the possibility of identity apart from awareness (as I would argue any theory of the self would have to assume).

Śāntideva's Buddhist critique does not bother to go into the subtleties of the phenomenology of self and identity. It attacks the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position with typical *prāsaṅgika* tactics:

IX.68. Now, an unconscious [self, such as the pure "soul" you posit,] cannot be an "I," because it is unconscious like a rag or some other [insentient object]. If on the other hand [you propose] that [this soul] cognizes through a close connection to consciousness, [then] it would follow that when it is not cognizing it is dead.

This attack is directed at the problems inherent in a non-conscious self. But Buddhist critics also find fault in the notion of an unchanging self (in fact they may find fault in almost any notion of an unchanging entity). One typical way of arguing this point is to question the possibility of a conjunction of immutability and agency. In this case Śāntideva argues by assuming that consciousness is a form of agency, and hence a form of change, which is incompatible with the notion of an unchanging self:

IX.69. If on the other hand the self is something that does not change at all, then what can consciousness do for it? [If it were as you propose,] then one could likewise think that empty space, which is unconscious and inactive, has what it takes to be a self.

The next two stanzas raise the issue of agency explicitly—the shift into this topic suggesting how close awareness and action-mutability are in the Buddhist view of self. The stanzas can be translated as follows:

IX.70. If [the opponent argues that] without a self the connection between action and its fruits would not be possible, [we say this is not the case] because who would possess [then] the fruit if [the doer] dies after he has carried out the action?

Finally, Śāntideva introduces the argument that seems to me most insightful: to describe "self" accurately one must attribute to this entity a fluidity and discontinuity that is, in the end, perfectly consistent with the Buddhist view of what self is (or is not):

IX.71. Moreover, we both agree that action and fruit have separate locations, and you think that the self is inactive. Is this polemic then not pointless?

These are all specific arguments against a particular conception of the “self.” And, as we have seen, here “self” and “I” seem to be conflated. But, are all Buddhists at all times referring to this self? Can these arguments apply to any conception of self?

I believe the answer to both questions is “no.” And this is part of the problem with attempting to understand the notion of no-self from a limited philosophical analysis of particular *śāstric* presentations.<sup>4</sup> Before we conclude that Buddhists have traditionally engaged in a deceptive game of spurious arguments about an obscure metaphysical category we need to ask ourselves if Buddhists are not denying something more than the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika abstraction.

## 2. Empty of Self

Like Śāntideva’s passage, “classical” or “canonical” passages (that is the arguments of *suttas* and *sūtras*)<sup>5</sup> have a polemical context, or a set of contexts. However, these contexts are more elusive than those of the *śāstric* passages—in part because we lack external evidence of their contexts, in part because the Nikāya and Āgama contexts present both redactional and situational complexity.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, I would like to propose that we can reach a reasonable degree of understanding by looking at the suggested situational context as well as at the wording of various statements on self and no-self. I also propose that we can increase the clarity of our understanding (or at least of our ignorance) by examining some of our own cultural and personal presuppositions about self and no-self.

The fragment quoted in the epigraph suggests one way in which the classical texts define “self” and what is not self. The passage appears to be defining the extension of the term “empty” (*suñña*) as it applies to “world” (*loka*). The passage is part of a short sutta titled *Suññaloka-sutta*, which in fact follows immediately after the *Palokadhamma-sutta* in which the question of what is meant by “world” is explained by a pun between “world” (*loka*) and “decay” (*paloca*).

But in the *Suññaloka-sutta* quoted in the epigraph we are told that the world is empty because it is empty of self and of anything belonging to self. The sutta then asks, “but what is it that is empty of self and of what belongs to self?” (*kiñca ānanda, suññaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā*). The text continues, adding what is best construed as its own commentary (SN, IV.54):

The visual organ, Ānanda, is empty of self and of anything belonging to self. Visible forms are empty of self and of anything belonging to self. Visual consciousness is empty of self and of anything belonging to self. Visual contact is

empty of self and of anything belonging to self. And whatever arises in dependence on or conditioned by visual contact (*yampidaṃ cakkhu-samphassa-paccayā uppajjati*), whether it is experienced as pleasurable or painful, or as neutral, that too is empty of self and of anything belonging to self.

Needless to say, exactly the same statements are made regarding the remaining dimensions of awareness and self-awareness that constitute the list of phenomena we have come to designate as the eighteen “elements” or “sense bases” (for lack of any reasonable English equivalent for the Indian term *dhātu*).

Now, is this passage something more than a denial of the ontological proposition “there is a substantial self underneath each and every one of these facts of awareness”? I believe the last sentence in the paragraph should be read as the culmination of the paragraph: agency and possession are misconceptions of our relationship to pleasurable, painful, and neutral feelings and sensations. If this is the way it should be read, then the passage is in fact something more than the denial of an ontological proposition. It is also stating that there is a problem in our notions of agency and possession. As we shall see presently, the problem is in good measure due to our false attribution of agency and possession to things that lack both capacities, and in the behaviors that result when we act on this false attribution.

This interpretation is reinforced by a short text following immediately after the *Suññaloka-sutta*. This text is appropriately titled “Summary of Dharma” (*Saṅkhittadhamma-sutta*),<sup>7</sup> as it presents in summary or outline form the traditional argument for the “denial of the self.” This is an outline or bare-bones version of the main argument of the so-called “Second Sermon,” labeled *Anattalakkhaṇa-sutta* by the commentarial tradition. The *Saṅkhittadhamma-sutta* version of this classical argument reads (SN, IV.54):<sup>8</sup>

“What do you think, Ānanda, is the eye permanent or impermanent?”<sup>9</sup>

“Impermanent, Reverend Master.”

“But, that which is impermanent, is it painful or pleasurable?”

“It is painful, Reverend Master.”

“But, that which is impermanent, painful, bound to change (*vipariṇāmadhamma*), is it reasonable to regard it (*kallaṃ nu samanupassitum*) in this manner: ‘this is mine, I am this, this is my self’ ?” (*etaṃ mama, eso ‘ham asmi, eso me attā*).

“No, it is not so, Reverend Master.”

The passage concludes by stating categorically that “that which is impermanent, painful, bound to change” cannot be “self.” Yet, the passage is also implying

(and here is where the proponents of a Buddhist self have missed the subtlety of the argument) that everything that we could possibly regard as self is nothing but this self of suffering.

Even if we consider this general self of suffering as an entity defined by some sort of philosophical argument, we see that it is established by an argument about human action and human expectations as much as by arguments about ontology. This is suggested by some of the variant *pericopes* that may be regarded as various versions of the same *logion* at the core of the “Second Sermon.”<sup>10</sup> Consider for instance another formulation from *Samyutta Nikāya* (SN, 111.82-83):

Bodily form, monks, is impermanent. That which is impermanent is painful. That which is painful is not self. One should regard that which is not a self for what it truly is (*yathābhūtaṃ*), with an accurate discernment (*sammapaṇṇāya*), in this manner: “this is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self” (*netam mama, neso ’ham asmi, na me ’so attā*).<sup>11</sup>

Exactly the same formula is then, predictably, applied to the remaining four *skandhas*.<sup>12</sup> Although statements of this sort can be, and have been read as tantamount to a reduction of the self to the *skandhas*, the argument is not constructed exclusively on the analysis of self or person into these five “aggregates.”<sup>13</sup>

The fourth volume of the Pāli Text Society edition of the *Samyutta Nikāya* (SN, IV.1) begins with a *sūtra* titled the *Ajjhattānicca-sutta*:<sup>14</sup>

The visual organ, monks, is impermanent. That which is impermanent is painful. That which is painful is not self. One should regard that which is not a self for what it truly is (*yathābhūtaṃ*), with an accurate discernment (*sammapaṇṇāya*), in this manner: “this is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self” (*netam mama, neso ’ham asmi, na me ’so attā*).

Thus, it is not just the *skandhas*, but the whole field of what we experience as self and through self. The formulaic argument is applied to other categories of phenomena in a *Sāṃkhya* like enumeration. Such enumerations, however, are not the only way in which the close connection between self and suffering is established.

One of several suttas titled “*Samiddhi-sutta*” in the *Samyutta Nikāya* presents a passage that is reminiscent of the passage in the epigraph, and seems to belong to a similar subgenre (SN, IV.39).<sup>15</sup>

He sat next to the Blessed One and addressed him: “Reverend Master, I have heard it said again and again, ‘sentient beings, sentient beings.’ But, what sort of thing is a sentient being, or what is meant by this concept ‘sentient being?’”

Samiddhi where you find a visual organ, where you find visual form, visual consciousness, and phenomena to be cognized by visual consciousness (*cakkhuvīññānaviññātabbā dhammā*), there you will find a sentient being or the conception of a sentient being (*sattapaññatti*).

But the text continues:

And, furthermore, Samiddhi, where you find no visual organ, where you find no visual form, no visual consciousness, and no phenomena to be cognized by visual consciousness, there you will find no sentient being nor the concept of a sentient being.

This is all followed by a long passage (IV.39-40) defining in similar fashion suffering (*dukkha*) and world (*loka*). The proximity of these passages and the similarity in structure suggests that “self,” “sentient being,” “world,” and “suffering” are near synonyms. Similarly, the notion of no-self must then involve a critique of certain constructions of the world and its connection to personal awareness, and to constructions of felicity and infelicity, as well.

The self that is being denied is something more than an ontological or metaphysical “self.” It is, of course, a vague notion of “I,” or “what I am,” and it is the vague sense in which we all, since childhood, experience ourselves as “a sentient thing,” and hence begin to experience “our self” as a separate, sentient being. But this self is also specifically the “I” of suffering and being in the world, the “I” of certain forms of sentience: pleasure and desire, pain and revulsion. The śāstric critiques only scratch the surface of this much more complex notion of self.

### 3. Suspicions of a Self

The following text contains further variations of the two common logia I have been discussing so far. As already noted, these are traditionally identified as part of the Second Sermon delivered by the Buddha after his enlightenment, presumably after the Sermon on the Four Noble Truths and also at the Deer Park in Benares. This version raises interesting issues regarding what some Buddhists may have considered to be the characteristics of “self.”<sup>16</sup>

The setting was in Benares, at the Deer Park.<sup>17</sup> At that time, the Blessed One addressed the group of the five monks. He said this:<sup>18</sup> “The body, monks, is not self.<sup>19</sup> If the body, monks, were self, it would not bring pain, and one would be able to will, with respect to the body, ‘let my body be like this, let my body not be like this.’ But since the body, monks, is not self, therefore, it brings pain, and one is not able to will, with respect to the body, ‘let my body be like this, let my body not be like this.’”<sup>20</sup>

As can be easily predicted, the text then proceeds to make exactly the same claims regarding the other four aggregates (skandhas): sensations, thoughts and conceptions, habitual tendencies, and consciousness.<sup>21</sup> All of these are not self.

The passage implies a close connection between self on the one hand, and will and absence of pain on the other. By implication there is also a necessary connection between that which is not self, and pain and lack of control. Thus, one can say that anything that one could identify as self or part of self “is not self,” and this is why “it brings pain, and one is not able to will, with respect to [it], ‘let [it] be like this, let [it] not be like this.’”

The text continues with the chain of arguments mentioned above in the outline or summary presentations of the Second Sermon:

“Now, what do you think, monks? Is the body permanent or impermanent?”<sup>22</sup>

“It is impermanent, Venerable one.”

“And what is impermanent, is that happiness or is it suffering?”

“Suffering, Venerable One.”

“What is impermanent, suffering, unstable by nature, is it fitting to regard it thus: ‘this is mine, I am this, this is my self?’”<sup>23</sup>

“Surely it is not, Venerable One.”

“So also it is with sensations, thoughts and conceptions, habitual tendencies, and consciousness.”<sup>24</sup>

“Therefore, monks, whatever is body, be it past, future or present, internal or external, obvious or subtle, base or refined, far or near, it all should be perceived with right discernment, as it really is: namely, ‘this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’”<sup>25</sup>

Again predictably, the text then applies the same argument to “sensations, thoughts and conceptions, habitual tendencies, and consciousness.”<sup>26</sup> For all of the skandhas, absence of control is tantamount to absence of self. But control is not

achieved by restoring some notion of self, rather it is established by the practice of the Path (*mārga*):

“Seeing in this manner, monks, the learned noble disciple turns away from body, turns away from sensations, turns away from thoughts and conceptions, turns away from habitual tendencies, turns away from consciousness. As he turns away he becomes dispassionate; when he becomes dispassionate, he becomes free; and when he is free, he knows ‘I am free.’ And thus he discerns clearly: destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived fully, the task has been accomplished, in this state there is no hereafter.”<sup>27</sup>

In this manner did the Blessed One speak. The five monks were elated,<sup>28</sup> and they applauded the words of the Blessed One.

And, as this sermon was being delivered the minds of the five monks grasped no more at existence and became free from any growth in future karma.<sup>29</sup>

Unless this passage hides a subtle notion of self, we must assume that control and agency are therefore possible even if there is no self to be found anywhere. We must also assume that complete control is only possible in the Path. One can easily see why some may have been led to assume a Buddhist belief in a higher self: the Path and its practice bring about everything that has been declared to be absent from that which is not self. The similarities between a self and the Path and its goal are in a few simple claims: that the Path is agency and control, that it is the only sphere of existence in which the will corresponds to a realistic goal, and that it leads to felicity and freedom from suffering.

#### 4. Agency and Freedom

The last paragraphs of the above sutta can be ignored as so much filling, or they can be read as witnesses to an important context of the no-self debate. Although it is possible (and arguably legitimate) to separate the skeleton argument from its religious context, it is also true that it usually occurs embedded in a particular form of religious discourse. It is not the rhetoric of selflessness (in the contemporary English sense), but the rhetoric of self-cultivation. Hence the paradox: no-self (absence of the presumed unchanging agent) is very much about self (agency, freedom, felicity).

We have already seen that no-self is about self control. But it is also about awareness, knowledge, and purity. This is seen in numerous passages, but is espe-

cially clear in the use of stock phrases in a classical formulation of the so-called three signs of the Buddha Dharma (they happen to be four in many of the variant versions). These occur (as four) in the *Udānavarga*, for instance. One Central Asian manuscript of this text presents an interconnected argument that is reminiscent of the canonical account of the Second Sermon.<sup>30</sup> This variant reads as follows:<sup>31</sup>

- XII.5. When one sees with discernment  
that all compounded things are impermanent,  
then one becomes free from suffering.<sup>32</sup>  
This is the path to purification.
- XII.6. When one sees with discernment  
that everything impermanent leads to suffering,  
then one becomes free from suffering.  
This is the path to purification.
- XII.7. . . .<sup>33</sup>
- XII.8. When one sees with discernment  
that everything that is suffering is without a self,  
then one becomes free from suffering.  
This is the path to purification.

The passage parallels the reasoning expressed in the Second Sermon. But it also reinforces the doctrinal frames seen elsewhere by using stock phrases from other contexts. For instance, “sees with discernment” may be construed as a metrical variant of “by means of true discernment.” The phrase “then one becomes free from suffering” is a variant of “when he becomes dispassionate, he becomes free”—especially given the ambiguity of the Sanskrit expression. “This the path to purification” reminds us not only of the centrality of path, but also of the fact that no-self and self have much to do with ascetic self-cultivation, renunciation, and sainthood.

But one should note that in this passage two things change in the location and structuring of the argument. First, the argument is not exactly the same as the argument presented earlier,<sup>34</sup> and second the frame tends to be more repetitive than in other locations. It is as if self, suffering, and impermanence (and, of course, emptiness), were direct links to impurity, and the opposite of right awareness. The passage suggests an interconnection between impermanence, suffering, and self, and their close links within a network that includes purity/impurity, freedom/bondage, and knowledge/ignorance (or unawareness). This is a net of meanings that can be instantiated in almost any canonical passage. This is done masterfully in the following passage from the Chinese version of the *Samyukta Āgama* [*Taishō*, ii, #99(262), 66b-c]. This sūtra represents a different version or transmission of the

doctrine expressed in the preceding selections; it corresponds to the Channa-sutta of *Samyutta Nikāya, III*, 132-135.<sup>35</sup> Like its Pāli parallel, this sūtra represents several voices. First, there is Channa, the seeker. Second, we meet the monks who first instruct him (presented as if they represent the surface meaning of the Second Sermon). Third are the two intermediaries: Ānanda (who would be the spokesperson for the Buddha himself), and Katvāyana (who appears both as intermediary, and perhaps as pretext to introduce the logion that is being used here as scriptural commentary).<sup>36</sup> Finally, the sutta refers to, or is in part directed at a non-Buddhist world that grasps at systems and views of existence.<sup>37</sup>

Thus have I heard. At one time a large congregation of elder monks were staying in the Deer Park at Rṣivadana in the kingdom of Benares. The Buddha had already attained his parinirvāṇa. At that time the elder Channa early in the morning dressed himself in his robe, picked up his bowl, and went begging for alms food in the city of Benares. After he had his meal, he returned, put away his [upper] robe and his bowl, and washed his feet. Then he took his door key and went from hermitage to hermitage, and from cell to cell, and to every place where monks were doing their aftermeal walking meditation. And to every monk [he encountered] he pleaded and asked: "Please instruct me. Please teach me the Dharma. Please let me know and see the Dharma, that I may know according to the Dharma, that I may perceive according to the Dharma."

Then every monk told Channa: "The body is impermanent. Sensations, thoughts and conceptions, habitual tendencies, and consciousness are impermanent. All compounded things are impermanent. All dharma are without a self. Nirvana is peace."<sup>38</sup>

Channa replied to each one of these monks: "I already know this, that the body is impermanent, that sensations, thoughts and conceptions, habitual tendencies, and consciousness are impermanent, that all compounded things are impermanent, that all dharma are without a self, that nirvana is peace." But Channa also said, "Still I find no joy in hearing this, that all compounded things are empty, and at peace. I am unable to attain the extinction of craving, the abandonment of desire, nirvana. In this state, how will I know or see so that I can say 'In this way I know, in this way I see'?"

This statement is crucial. Channa is not satisfied with a pat answer. He is not satisfied by a repetition of a doctrine he has heard before, because this doctrine has not had the expected transforming effect. He therefore challenges the authority of his teachers and asks for a competent teacher:

A second and a third time he asked this question. Channa then asked, "Who has the capacity here to teach me the Dharma so that I may know the Dharma and see the Dharma?"

And he then thought, "The venerable Ānanda is now staying in the Kingdom of Kauśambī, in the park at Ghosilāra[ma]."<sup>39</sup> He venerated the World Honored one and loved him faithfully. He was one praised by the Buddha and respected by all those who lead the holy life. He most certainly will be able to teach me the Dharma, so that I may know the Dharma, so that I may see the Dharma."

In this manner Channa decides to seek Ānanda. He gathers his things and travels to Kauśambī. There he meets Ānanda and tells him of his quest and his disappointment.

"[E]very monk told me, '... All compounded things are impermanent. All dharmas are without a self. Nirvana is peace.' And to each one of them I replied, 'I already know this,...' But I also said, 'Still I find no joy in hearing this, that all compounded things are empty, and at peace. I am unable to attain the extinction of craving, the abandonment of desire, nirvana. In this state, how will I know or see so that I can say 'In this way I know, in this way I see'? ... Indeed it would be good, venerable Ānanda, if you instructed me and taught me the Dharma so that I may know the Dharma and see the Dharma."

And then the venerable Ānanda said to Channa: "Wonderful, Channa. I am greatly pleased. I rejoice that a man of benevolence [speaks] so frankly in front of those who lead the holy life of the monk, [thus] defeating falsehood and deceit. Channa, it is the foolish common man who is not able to understand that the body is impermanent, that sensations, thoughts and conceptions, habitual tendencies, and consciousness are impermanent, that all compounded things are impermanent, that all dharmas are without a self, that nirvana is peace. You are now fit to grasp the supreme and subtle Dharma. Now listen attentively. I will explain it to you."

Then it occurred to Channa, "I am now overjoyed that I will obtain the supreme and subtle Dharma. My heart leaps with joy for I am now fit to grasp the supreme and subtle Dharma."

Then Ānanda spoke thus to Channa: "This I heard directly from the Buddha, as he explained it to Mahā-Katyāyana."<sup>40</sup> 'People of the world are confused and upset because they rely on two extremes—being and nonbeing. People of the world grasp at all the sense fields, and their mind hankers after

them, becomes attached to them. Katyāyana, if one does not hold on to an ‘I,’ does not grasp at an ‘I,’ does not dwell in it, and does not hanker after it, then [one knows] it is [only] sorrow that arises when [sorrow] arises and ceases when it ceases. Katyāyana, [one who knows this] has no doubt or hesitation about this; relying on no one else, this person is able to know by himself. This is called seeing correctly what the Tathagata has taught.”

In first parts of the sūtra the text weaves many of the themes already noted elsewhere in the Pāli *Samyutta Nikāya*. The last paragraph weaves in a new theme: not grasping at any idea of an “I.” Now one last loose end remains: the connection between “self” and world. This is explained with another classical formula:

“Why is this so? Katyāyana, if one sees correctly, as things truly are, the coming to be of the world, then one does not give rise to the view of the non-existence of the world. If one sees correctly, as things truly are, the coming to be of the world, then one does not give rise to the view of the existence of the world. Katyāyana, the Tathagata, abandoning both extremes, teaches a Middle Way, namely, ‘When that cause exists, this arises; when that is born, this is born. That is to say, by depending on [the arising of] ignorance karmic conditioning arises, and so forth down to the arising of birth, old age, illness, and death—of the whole mass of grasping, affliction, and sorrow. And also, that when that cause does not exist, this does not arise; when that ceases, this ceases. That is to say, if ignorance ceases, karmic conditioning ceases, and so forth down to the cessation of birth, old age, illness, and death—of the whole mass of grasping, affliction, and sorrow.’ ”

This is, in a nutshell, the “ontological Middle Way”: neither being nor non-being, but causal connection. This classical statement does not need much commentary, except to note that here it is supposed to expand or complete two other canonical formulae. It completes first canonical statements encapsulated in the three (or four) marks: impermanent, painful, no-self, at peace in nirvana. And it completes the canonical statements about not holding on to any idea of an “I”.

## 5. Towards a Conclusion

The narrative context of the passage should not be taken lightly. It is no mere pre-text—rather, it is a statement of the religious motivations or meanings of the elusive self-less-ness that seems to confuse us so much. The typical “stock phrases” that conclude the story are also, in my opinion, central to the way in which this text

locates “being without a self.” It is therefore worthwhile ending with the final sections of the *sūtra*, the part that one is most likely to ignore if one assumes that such statements are merely ornaments.

First we are told that Channa has “attained the Dharma”:

When the venerable Ānanda had explained the Dharma in this manner, Channa the monk left behind the impurity of the world and abandoned the dust of the world, and he was able to purify the eye of Dharma.

Then at that time Channa the monk saw the Dharma, attained the Dharma, knew the Dharma, gave rise to the Dharma. He surpassed all doubts. Without relying on another, he gained the fearlessness of a great teacher who teaches the Dharma.

Naturally, this is not simply an internal event, a philosophical understanding, but a personal transformation that prompts both a deep gratitude towards the teacher, and a sense of personal joy in which both teacher and disciple share:

And he paid his respects to the Venerable Ānanda with joined palms, and addressed him, saying, “Indeed it is as you say. Such is [your] wisdom and [your] practice of the holy life. [You are] a benevolent virtuous friend teaching, imparting instruction, and preaching the Dharma. I have now heard from the venerable Ānanda the Dharma with respect to all compounded things—that they are all empty, at rest and unattainable. Grasping has been extinguished, passion has been abandoned, brought to rest and extinguished in nirvana. [My] mind rejoices, and dwells correctly in liberation. There is [for me] no more returning to the cycle [of rebirth]. I no longer see an ‘I.’ I only see the true Dharma.”

Then Ānanda said to Channa: “You now have obtained the greatest good. With respect to the most profound Dharma of the Buddha you have obtained the holy wisdom eye.”

Then the two masters displayed great joy. They arose from their seats and each returned to his dwelling place.

This all-too-common frame is easily missed precisely because it is so common. But it is an integral part of the wider context of no-self notions and practices upon which the philosophical debates are often (although admittedly not always) projected. This broader context includes parallel and opposing themes of selfhood and non-selfhood, and of selfhood defined as the absence of certain specific notions of self. Such themes include ascetic motifs of renunciation and self-effacement, ab-

stention and self-sacrifice, affective models or ideals that result in paradigms for human attitudes and public manifestations of emotion, and ways of viewing the world and the self. These dimensions of self and no-self are spread along a broad range of issues that may be termed the contextual semiotics of self: what self signifies in specific contexts.

What each of these dimensions of no-self might mean, and the many variants they may have, are topics in need of further explorations. Also in need of further reflection is the question of whether or not any of these models can be realized in practice. These are all issues that intertwine with the philosophical question of what the self or no-self might be, or with the philosophical question of what it would mean to “have no self.” However, the latter questions cannot be answered satisfactorily without a better understanding than the one we now possess of the contextual semiotics of no-self.

## Appendix

### Anatta-suttas

1. Anatta-sutta. SN, III.196. In the definitional genre illustrated above (“No-self, no-self,” it is said. What sort of thing is “no-self?”). Preceded by three other short suttas on, respectively, impermanent, by nature impermanent, and suffering.
2. Anatta-sutta. SN, III.199. This is in fact two short suttas: that which is not self must be abandoned, and that which is by nature not self (*anatta-dhamma*) must be abandoned. Preceded by two pairs of similar short suttas on, respectively, impermanent, and suffering.
3. Anatta-sutta. SN, III.201. The same as number 2.
4. Anatta-sutta. SN, V.133. On the cultivation of the mental representation of no-self (*anattasaññā*). [In some redactions this sutta is known as *Dukkhe anatta-sutta*. In the Sinhala BJT it is presented in six variant versions.]
5. Anatta-sutta. SN, III.78. One should abandon desire for that which is not self (which is no-self). Preceded by two similar short suttas on, respectively, impermanent, and suffering. [Number 5 is not recognized by Malalasekera.]

6. Anattaniya-sutta. SN, III.78. One should abandon desire for that which “does not belong to self.”<sup>41</sup>
- 7a. Anattalakkhaṇa-sutta. Vin, I.13-14. This is the sutta recognized by the commentaries as “the Second Sermon,” and the Anattalakkhaṇa-sutta proper. [Malalasekera counts this and the following as a single text, although they are not identical.]
- 7b. Pañca-sutta. SN, III.66-67. A variant of 7a, with a different frame, and lacking part of the argument of 7a.
7. Anattā-sutta. SN, III.21. As in the Udānavarga, no-self is seen as implying something that must be avoided or something that must cause revulsion leading to dispassion, and by dispassion to liberation. Preceded by two similar short suttas on, respectively, impermanent, and suffering. In all three, the topic is the five skandhas.
8. Anattā-sutta. SN, III.77. Similar to number 5 above.
9. Anattā-sutta. SN, IV.2,4,6. Actually four separate suttas representing three variants of two stock phrases: the syllogistic chain of the Second Sermon and the formula of dispassion. The three variants consist in the application of these formulas to the sense organs, the sense objects, the sense organs in the past and the future, and the sense objects in the past and the future.
10. Anattā-sutta. SN, IV.28. “All” is no-self, and “all” means all the dhātus.
11. Anattena-sutta. SN, III.178. Actually three short variants of a single stock phrase recommending the abandonment of desire, passion, and both desire and passion towards that which is no-self. Preceded by two sets of similar short suttas on, respectively, that which is impermanent, and that which is painful (suffering).

### Notes

1. Saṃyutta Nikāya (henceforth SN), IV.54. All references within the main body of the text and in the notes are to the standard title of classical works or, in the case of contemporary works of scholarship, to the last name of the author fol-

lowed by the publication date as listed in the Bibliography at the end of this article. Abbreviations are noted on their first occurrence and are also listed at the end of the article. All translations of Pāli texts are from the Pāli Text Society edition. In this passage, and in similarly structured passages below, constructions of the type "Reverend Master, I have heard it said again and again 'the world is empty, the world is empty.'" are free renderings of the Indian structure: "Reverend Master, it is said, 'the world is empty, the world is empty.'"

2. Much of this literature has been reviewed and justly criticized by Collins (1982). The most recent advocates of the Buddhist self (or qualified self) have been Bhattacharya (1973) and Pérez Remon (1980). The problem may be more complicated than a simple choice between self and no-self. The question is of course what sort of self? And this question needs to be answered in a manner that is something more than a consideration of metaphysical propositions. For a movement in this direction, see Collins (1994), and the papers in Carrithers, Collins, & Lukes (1985). Of course, we still don't know for sure whether or not at least some of the early Buddhist critiques of ātman were directed at the advocates of Upaniṣadic doctrines.
3. In spite of its focus on one body of literature, the reader will detect the instability of the concepts of self and no-self. As philosophical extensions of a pronoun with a wide range of discourse functions, "self" and "no-self" are fluid concepts. Their fluidity will become obvious from their changing position in the passages that follow, as well as from the uncertainty of the English translations ("myself," "my self," "no-self," "non-self," "not self," etc.).
4. The word "śāstric" is my neologism for that category of Indian Buddhist writings and arguments that were traditionally classified under the rubric of Sanskrit *śāstra*. It is meant to avoid the limitations of "philosophical" and "scholastic."
5. Pāli and Sanskrit words are only italicized on their first occurrence.
6. A rough sense of the redactional issues can be had by comparing the passages considered in the present article with a list of *Samyutta Nikāya* suttas whose titles begin with the words *anatta* and *anattā*. Such a list is presented in the Appendix and is in part based on Malalasekera's (1937) *Dictionary of proper names*. Although the list is somewhat arbitrary (the present article already demonstrates that a list of titles is no guide to the thematic content of the texts), it serves to illustrate the ways in which the pericopes analyzed here were used by the redactors of this *Nikāya*.
7. Literally: "Sūtra on the Summarized Dharma."

8. The text, which recurs repeatedly, especially in *Samyutta Nikāya*, reads: Taṃ kiṃ maññasi ānanda, cakkhuṃ niccaṃ vā aniccaṃ vāti? Aniccaṃ bhante. Yaṃ pañāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vāti? Dukkhaṃ bhante. Yaṃ pañāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ: “etaṃ mama, eso ‘haṃ asmi, eso me attā” ti? No he taṃ bhante. (SN, IV.54)
9. The established translation for the term *anicca* (*anitya*) is misleading. The issue is not permanence, if by “permanent” one understands that which is “never ending.” Rather, the question is whether that which we call “I” is something that abides or endures without change, hence, whether or not it is immutable. Furthermore, the notion of mutability is connected to the notion of rootedness (*ni-tya*), and by extension to metaphors of centeredness and foundationalism.
10. The terms “pericope” and “logion” (logia) are borrowed, naturally, from Biblical criticism. However, they are not meant to imply that I believe the logia are actual words of the Buddha. This is not an enterprise of the type pursued by scholars like those of “The Jesus Seminar.” Rather, the words are borrowed to describe formal and contextual characteristics that suggest something about the materials used by the transmitters and redactors of *Nikāya* and *Āgama* material. Fragments and formulae that are used in a cut-and-paste fashion are called pericopes. Segments of discourse that are treated as self-contained units and as utterances of the Buddha are called logia. The distinction, of course, is often impossible to make.
11. The last clause like the rest of the passage matches the “standard” formula of the “Second Sermon” in the *Mahāvagga*, *Vinaya*, I.13-14: netaṃ mama, neso ‘haṃ asmi, na me so attā. In this section of the *Mahāvagga*, a number of the pericopes that appear scattered and repeated in the *Samyutta Nikāya* are woven into a single sermon that is similar to, but not identical with the *Pañca-sutta* of SN, III.66-67.
12. As already noted, Pāli and Sanskrit words are only italicized on their first occurrence.
13. One should note, parenthetically, that the accusation of “reductionism” is not an argument against theories of no-self, unless one assumes there is a self. Since the self is not an empirical fact, the very notion of “reduction” is problematic in this context. Needless to say, reduction and reductionism are not synonymous. The classical canonical passage suggesting that the self can be “reduced” to the *skandhas* is SN, III.46: “Monk, those *samanas* and *brahmanas* who thoroughly examine and reflect on the self in all its many forms every one of them [only] examines and reflects on the five groups of grasping or one of the components of these [five groups].” Ye hi keci bhikkhave, samapā vā

brahmaṇā vā anekavihiṭaṃ attānaṃ samanupassamānā samanupassanti, sabbe te pañcupādānakkhandhe samanupassanti, etesaṃ vā aññataraṃ. Cp. SN, III.42, and DN, II.66-68.

14. The term *ajjhata* (Sanskrit *adhyātman*) means here “internal,” that is, referring to human consciousness, not to the external or bodily behavior that can be observed by other persons.
15. The subgenre I would describe as a type of catechetic or abhidharmic recitation of questions and answers. This particular form is concentrated in the Fourth Book of the *Samyutta Nikāya*.
16. The translation is from the Pāli version in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, III, 66-68 (i.2.1.7). The sermon appears with some variants in a number of other locations in the canonical collections, for instance in the Pāli Vinaya (Mahāvagga, *Vinaya*, I, 12-13) and in the *Catuṣpariṣat-sūtra* of the Mūla-Sarvāstivādin. The common title for the second sermon, *Anattalakkhaṇa-sutta* (“The Sūtra on the Signs of No-self”), is not found in the Pāli Text Society versions of the *lo-gia*, but it occurs in the Nālandā edition, where its presence may be due to editorial license. The title in the Sri Lanka Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series electronic version (BJT) and in the Pāli Text Society edition is *Pañcavaggiya* and *Pañca*, “The Group of Five,” and “The Five,” referring to the five ascetics who were Buddha’s first companions and disciples.
17. The present translation is from the Pāli Text Society edition, which may have taken this fascinating lead sentence from its base manuscript – the Burmese manuscript at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. The Nālandā edition, which prefers Singhalese recensions, has the more conventional opening found in the Sri Lanka Buddha Jayanti edition (BJT): “At one time the Blessed One was staying in Benares, in the Deer Park at Isipatana.”
18. Instead of “He said this,” the Nālandā and Sri Lanka Buddha Jayanti editions have the following exchange: “Monks,” he said. “Venerable one,” replied the monks to the Blessed One. The Blessed One said: “The body, monks,...”
19. Naturally, the word *rūpa* is more than just the body. It is all perceivable form or material phenomena.
20. This pericope presents a variant on the syllogistic argument discussed in the previous section. Self is that over which we have perfect control.
21. Manuscripts, redactions, and editions adopt different conventions to abbreviate the stock phrases that are often repeated within a single sūtra (repetition or duplication occurring outside the boundaries of a single sūtra is seldom acknowledged). Modern editions frequently follow these conventions. But the Pāli Text Society edition is generally inconsistent (as perhaps are some of its sources), and sometimes abbreviates with sentence fragments or single words.

The Nālandā edition sometimes omits important phrases that appear in the Pāli Text Society edition. In the present case, the expansion of the argument to include all of the skandhas is abbreviated in all extant redactions.

22. This sentence begins a dialogue that appears as an independent pericope in a variety of contexts – e.g., *Samyutta Nikāya*, 2, 244-246.
23. The expression in quotation marks in the English rendering is “*eso me attā*” can be rendered as “this is my self,” but may have been a shorter way of saying “this I am myself.” See the note to the negative form of the expression below note 25.
24. This abbreviated repetition is not found in the Nālandā edition. The Pāli Text Society edition repeats the whole set of stock phrases only with respect to consciousness.
25. The expression “*na me so attā*” (found in all versions of this sutta) can be rendered with a literal English equivalent (“this is not my self”), but bolder and more free renderings are possible (e.g., “I don’t have this self”).
26. Again, the abbreviated repetition is not found in the same form in the various redactions. The Nālandā edition omits the abbreviated text altogether. The Pāli Text Society edition repeats the whole set of stock phrases only with respect to consciousness. The Sri Lanka Buddha Jayanti electronic version repeats the passage for each one of the other four skandhas.
27. The phrase “holy life” is a free rendering of *brahmacaryā*. Here, as in a few other, but crucial contexts, associations with the concepts of brahman and Brahman are vague references to that which is holy, very much like the use of terms of class and ethnic nobility (e.g., *ārya*) are metaphors for moral nobility. The term *brahmacaryā*, as one of the stages in the life of a brahmin, refers to stage of spiritual discipleship, before marriage, and hence to a life of celibacy. In Buddhist contexts the term retains these connotations, so that the *brahmacaryā* is usually the life of the celibate ascetic – monk or wanderer.
28. Literally: “group of five was elated.”
29. A free rendering for the technical term *āsrava* (Pāli: *āsava*), which is especially problematic. Etymologically, it appears to be from the root *ā-su-* (Sanskrit *ā-sru-*), “to flow toward,” most likely, “to flow in,” as would be the case of water lead through a canal to a reservoir. In Jain usage it refers to the flow of karma (conceived as some sort of fluid) into the acting agent. The flow adds karmic weight to the person’s soul. In Buddhism, the term has lost almost all connection to its metaphoric origins, and is used abstractly as a technical term for the factors contributing to an increase or a maintenance of the flow of karma – traditionally these are the thirst for sense pleasures, thirst for rebirth, and thirst for extinction. The noun *āsava* (*āsrava*) has been understood tradi-

tionally to mean an “outflow,” and the older metaphor has been replaced by that of an open sore or “canker” from which oozes some sort of polluting substance. With such a complicated history, the term defies translation. My translation is a poor compromise, but a compromise that reflects the fact that by the time the term was used in canonical works it was probably already an abstract technical term. See Fumiō Enomoto (1979).

30. This manuscript, collated by Chakravarti (1930) is unique in its presentation of the passages. All other versions, including the Chinese (see, e.g., *Taishō iv*, 212, 682b-682a), present these four “signs” as a list, either predicating each “sign” of all the conditioned dharmas (*samskāra*) or predicating the first three of conditioned dharmas, and the last sign (no-self) of all dharmas. These, more standard readings are analyzed thoroughly by Bernhard (1965).
31. The germ of the argument here is clearly the pericope at SN, IV. 1, which was discussed above.
32. Here, as I would also do in *Dhammapada* 277-279, I translate the verb *nir-vid* in its Vedic sense of “getting rid of,” and not in the Classical sense of “being disgusted by.” The latter translation is a common contemporary reading in Theravāda settings. I follow Fausböll’s interpretation. Like *virāga* and *nirvāṇa*, with which the word is often paired as a near synonym, *nirveda* refers to a state of perfect detachment and freedom.
33. In Chakravarti’s manuscript, the variant portion of stanza 7 is seriously damaged. A conjectural reading would be “that everything that is suffering is empty.”
34. This would be especially true if we compared the *Udānavarga* variants with the readings of other Dharmapadas. For this, consult Bernhard (1965) and Roth (1980).
35. The *Samyuktāgama* has other short sutras on this same topic. Some of these sutras, with their correspondences, in Pāli or elsewhere in the canonical collections, are: (a) *Taishō ii*, #99(80), 20a25-b27 = as an independent text titled Āryadharma-mudrā-sūtra (*Taishō ii*, #103, 500ab) or Dharmamudrā-sūtra (*Taishō ii*, #104, 500bc); (b) *Taishō ii*, #99(81), 20b28-21a24 = Mahāli, *Samyutta Nikāya*, 3, 68-72; and (c) *Taishō ii*, #99(82), 20a25-b13 = no known parallels.
36. Perhaps this is the same Katyāyana appearing elsewhere in the *Samyutta Nikāya* as the disciple who explains the Middle Way as a doctrine that neither affirms nor denies existence. He appears later in this anthology. The story of Katyāyana receiving the teaching on the Middle Way is perhaps only second to the story of the First and Second Sermons in canonical importance for all of “background” Buddhism.

37. Several persons with the name of Channa appear in the canon, including the faithful charioteer who drove the young prince Siddhartha when the latter came face to face with disease, old age, and death. If the Channa of the present sutra is the same who appears later in a second Channa Sutta (at *Samyutta Nikāya*, 4, 55-59), the desperation in Channa's behavior and language in the present selection may be a reflection of the author's knowledge of Channa's illness and death by suicide in the second sūtra. The story of the suicide also occurs in the Channovāda Sutta of *Majjhima Nikāya*, 3, 263-266.
38. This paragraph, the first major pericope in the sūtra, is possibly a logion. Note that the statement "nirvana is peace" is a definition, and hence almost tautological, unless one assumes that it refers to a specific formulation of what is nirvana and how it is attained. In these selections I have left the word nirvana untranslated, precisely because it can have so many different meanings in various Indian contexts, within Buddhist literature, and even within a single Buddhist text.
39. This refers to the cloister and gardens donated by Ghosila (Pāli: Ghosita), a lay supporter from Kauśambī (Pāli: Kosambī). Many important sermons and incidents in the history of the order took place in this locality – the most tragic of which was the first schism in the Sangha.
40. The pericope corresponds almost verbatim to *Samyutta Nikāya*, 2, 15-17 (xii.2.15).
41. This usage illustrates well the fragility or linguistic opaqueness of the concepts of self and no-self. What does not belong to myself is not synonymous with that which does not belong to the self, or with that which does not belong to self.

### *Bibliography*

- ABENHEIMER, Karl M. (Karl Markus). (1991). *Narcissism, nihilism, simplicity and self*, [Aberdeen, Scotland]: Aberdeen University Press.
- AMES, Roger T. & DISSANAYAKE, Wimal. (Eds.) (1996). *Self and deception: A cross-cultural philosophical enquiry*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- BASU, Ananyo. (1997). Reducing concern with self: Parfit and the ancient Buddhist schools. In Douglas Allen, ed., *Culture and self: Philosophical and re-*

*ligious perspectives, East and West* (Boulder, CO, USA: Westview Press), pp. 97-109.

BAUMEISTER, Roy F. (1997). Identity, self-concept, and self-esteem: The self lost and found. In Robert Hogan, ed., *Handbook of personality psychology* (San Diego, CA: Academic Press), pp. 681-710.

BEAUVOIR, Simone de. (1949). *Pyrrhus et Cineas*. [Paris]: Gallimard, [1949], 6th edition. First ed. 1945.

BERNHARD, Franz. (Ed.). (1965). *Udānavarga*. 2 vols. Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden 10, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, philologisch-historische Klasse, dritte Folge, Nr. 54. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Band I, Einleitung, Beschreibung der Handschriften, Textausgabe, Bibliographie; Band II, Indices, Konkordanzen, Synoptische Tabellen.

BHATTACHARYA, Kamaleswar. (1973). *L'atman-brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien*. Publications de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient, v. 90. Paris: École française d'Extrême-Orient.

BOUSFIELD, Paul. (1923). *The omnipotent self: A study in self-deception and self cure*. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner.

BRAARVIG, Jens. (1986). Development of mental complexity as suffering in Sāṃkhya and Buddhism. In Eivind Kahrs, ed., *Kalyāṇamitrārāgaṇam: Essays in honour of Nils Simonsson* (Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, Oslo, Serie B-Skrifter, 70. Oslo: Norwegian University Press & Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture; Distributed by Oxford University Press, c1986), pp. 49-56.

BREAKWELL, Glynis M. (1986). *Coping with threatened identities*. London: Methuen.

BRUNER, E.M. (Ed.). (1983). *Text, play, and story: The construction and reconstruction of self and society*. (Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society). Washington, DC: American Ethnological Society.

- CARRITHERS, Michael, COLLINS, Steven, & LUKES, Steven. (1985). *The Category of the person: Anthropology, philosophy, history*. Cambridge <Cambridgeshire> ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- CHAKRAVARTI, N.P. (1930). *L'udānavarga sanscrit*. Tome premier (Chapitres I à XXI). Mission Pelliot en Asie centrale, Série petit in-octavo, tome IV. Paris: Mission Pelliot.
- CHINCHORE, Mangala R. (1995). *Anatta/Anatmata, an analysis of Buddhist anti-substantialist crusade*. Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica, no. 158. Delhi, India: Sri Satguru Publications.
- COLLINS, Steven. (1982). *Selfless persons: Imagery and thought in Theravāda Buddhism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- COLLINS, Steven. (1994). What are Buddhists doing when they deny the self? In Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, eds., *Religion and practical reason: New essays in the comparative philosophy of religions*. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, Chapter 2), pp. 59-86.
- COLVIN, C.R. & BLOCK, J. (1994). Do positive illusions foster mental health? An examination of the Taylor and Brown formulation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 116(1), 3-20.
- COWARD, Harold & FOSHAY, Toby. (Eds.). (1992). *Derrida and negative theology*, with a conclusion by Jacques Derrida. Albany: SUNY Press.
- CROSS, Susan E., & MADSON, Laura. (1997). Models of the self: Self-construals and gender. *Psychological Bulletin*, 122(1), 5-37.
- DE SILVA, P. (1984). Buddhism and behaviour modification. *Behaviour Research and Therapy*, 22(6), 661-678.
- DE SILVA, P. (1985). Early Buddhist and modern behavioural strategies for the control of unwanted intrusive cognitions. *The Psychological Record*, 35(4), 437-443.
- DE SILVA, P. (1990). Buddhist psychology: A review of theory and practice. *Current Psychology: Research & Reviews*, 9(3), 236-254.

- DENNETT, Daniel Clement. (1991). *Consciousness explained*. Illustrated by Paul Weiner. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- DONNELLY, Margaret E. (Ed.). (1992). *Reinterpreting the legacy of William James*. 1st ed. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- DUERLINGER, J. (1993). Reductionist and nonreductionist theories of persons in Indian Buddhist philosophy. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 21, 79-101.
- EIMER, Helmut. (1976). *Skizzen des Erlosungsweges in Buddhistischen Begriffsreihen: Eine Untersuchung*. Arbeitsmaterialien zur Religionsgeschichte (ed. Hans-Joachim Klimkeit), 1. Bonn: Religionswissenschaftliches Seminar der Universität Bonn.
- ELSTER, John. (Ed.). (1985). *The Multiple self: Studies in rationality and social change*. Cambridge, [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press; Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1986, Maison des sciences de l'homme (Paris, France): "Published in collaboration with Maison des sciences de l'homme."
- ENOMOTO, Fumiō. (1979). Āsava (rō) no seiritsu ni tsuite – omo ni jaina kosō-kyōten ni okeru. *Bukkyō Shigaku Kenkyū*, 22(1), 17-42.
- FINGARETTE, Herbert. (1969). *Self-deception. Studies in philosophical psychology*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Repr. New York: Humanities Press, 1972.
- FOUCAULT, Michel. (1984). *Le souci de soi*. Paris: Éditions Gallimard.
- FOUCAULT, Michel. (1988). Technologies of the self. In Martin, et al., 1988, pp. 16-49.
- FRAUWALLNER, Erich. (Ed./trs.). (1956). *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*. Philosophische Studientexte, Texte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. 2. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. [The 3rd ed., rev., 1969, was not available to this reviewer.]

- FRONDIZI, Risieri. (1953). *The nature of the self: A functional interpretation*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1953.
- GARRETT, Brian. (1998). *Personal identity and self-consciousness*. International library of philosophy. London & New York: Routledge.
- GOFFMAN, Erving. (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- GÓMEZ, Luis O. (1973). Emptiness and moral perfection. *Philosophy East and West*, 23(3), 361-373.
- GÓMEZ, Luis O. (1994). Presentations of self: Personal dimensions of ritualized speech. In P. Granoff and K. Shinohara, eds., *Other selves: Autobiography and biography in cross-cultural perspective* (Oakville, Ontario, and Buffalo, NY: Mosaic Press), pp. 114-131.
- HUME, David. (1978). *A treatise of human nature*. 2d ed. With text rev, and variant readings by P.H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.
- JACOBSON, Nolan Pliny. (1966). *Buddhism: The religion of analysis*. New York: Humanities Press, 1965 <i.e.1966>.
- KALANSURIYA, A.D.P. (1987). *A philosophical analysis of Buddhist notions: The Buddha and Wittgenstein*. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
- KAPFERER, B. (1986). Performance and the structuring of meaning and experience. In Turner & Bruner, eds., pp. 188-203.
- KAPSTEIN, Matthew. (1986). Review of Parfit 1984 and Collins 1982. *Philosophy East and West*, 36(3), 289-298.
- KITAYAMA, Shinobu, & MARKUS, Hazel R. (Eds.). (1994). *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

- KRISTEVA, Julia. (1987/1989). *Soleil noir: Dépression et mélancholie*. Paris: Éditions Gallimard. English trans.: *Black sun: Depression and melancholia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.
- KRISTEVA, Julia. (1992). Psychoanalysis and the imaginary. In George Levine, ed., *Constructions of the self* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press), pp. 285-297.
- LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Louis de. (Ed.). (1914). *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā. Prajñākaramati's commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva*. Ed. with introduction by Louis de La Vallée Poussin. 7 fascicles: Bibliotheca Indica Sanskrit series, vol.150, fascicles 983, 1031, 1090, 1126, 1139, 1305, 1399. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1901-1914. [Sanskrit edition of the *Pañjikā*].
- LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Louis de, & THOMAS, E.J. (1925). Mysticism (Buddhist). In James Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908-1927, Repr. 1955), vol. 9, pp. 85-87.
- LEVINE, George [Lewis]. (Ed.). (1992). *Constructions of the self*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- LOCKARD, Joan S., & PAULLUS, Delroy L. (Eds.). (1988). *Self-deception: An adaptive mechanism?* Century psychology series. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- LOPEZ, Donald S., Jr. (1996). *Elaborations on emptiness: Uses of the Heart Sūtra*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- MALHOTRA, Ashok, K. (1997). Sartre and Samkhya-Yoga on the self. In Douglas Allen, ed., *Culture and self: Philosophical and religious perspectives, East and West* (Boulder, CO. USA: Westview Press), pp. 111-128.
- MALALASEKERA, G.P. (Gunapala Piyasena). (1937). *Dictionary of Pāli proper names*. 2 vols. The Indian texts series. London: John Murray. Repr. 1st Indian ed. New Delhi: Oriental Reprint. Exclusively distributed by Manoharlal, 1983.
- MARKUS, Hazel, & CROSS, Susan. (1990). The interpersonal self. In Lawrence A. Pervin, ed., *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (New York: Guilford Press), pp. 576-608.

- MARKUS, Hazel Rose, & KITAYAMA, Shinobu. (1998). The cultural psychology of personality. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology: Special Issue: Personality and its measurement in cross-cultural perspective*, 29(1), 63-87.
- MARKUS, H., & NURIUS, P. (1986). Possible selves. *American Psychologist*, 41(9), 954-969.
- MARKUS, H., & NURIUS, P. (1987). Possible selves: *The interface between motivation and the self-concept*. In K. Yardley & T. Honess (Eds.), *Self-identity: Psychosocial perspectives* (pp. 157-172). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- MARKUS, Hazel Rose, MULLALLY, Patricia R., & KITAYAMA, Shinobu. (1997). Selfways: Diversity in modes of cultural participation. In Ulric Neisser, ed., *The conceptual self in context: Culture, experience, self-understanding* (The Emory symposia in cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 13-61.
- MARTIN, Luther H. (1988). Technologies of the self and self-knowledge in the Syrian Thomas tradition. In Martin, et al., eds., 1988, pp. 50-63.
- MARTIN, Luther H., GUTMAN, Huck, & HUTTON, Patrick H. (Eds.). (1988). *Technologies of the self: A seminar with Michel Foucault*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- MARTIN, Mike W. (Ed.). (1976). *Self-deception and self understanding: New essays in philosophy and psychology*. Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas.
- MAUSS, Marcel. (1921). L'expression obligatoire des sentiments (Rituels oraux funéraires Australiens). *Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique*, 18, 425-434.
- MAUSS, Marcel. (1936/1973). Techniques of the body. *Economy and Society*, 2(1), Feb. 1973, 70-88. Repr. in B. Brewster, 1979, 95-123. Originally published in *Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique*, 32(3-4), 271-293.

- McADAMS, Dan P. (1989). The development of narrative identity. In D.M. Buss and N. Cantor, eds., *Personality psychology: Recent trends and emerging directions* (New York: Springer-Verlag), pp. 160-176.
- McLAUGHLIN, Brian P., & RORTY, Amélie Oksenberg. (Eds.). (1988). *Perspectives on self-deception*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
- MÉLE, Alfred R. (1987). *Irrationality: An essay on akrasia, self-deception, and self-control*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MILLER, Mara. (1997). Views of Japanese selfhood: Japanese and Western perspectives. In Douglas Allen, ed., *Culture and self: Philosophical and religious perspectives, East and West* (Boulder, CO. USA: Westview Press), pp. 145-162.
- MUS, Paul. (1962). The problematic of the self—West and East and the maṇḍala pattern. In Charles A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy and culture East and West: East-West philosophy in practical perspective* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), pp. 594-610.
- OETKE, Claus. (1988). *"Ich" und das Ich: Analytische Untersuchungen zur buddhistisch-brahmanischen Atmankontroverse*. Alt- und neu-indische Studien, 33. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH.
- PARFIT, Derek (1984). *Reasons and persons*. Oxford <Oxfordshire>: Clarendon Press.
- PEREZ REMON, Joaquin. (1980). *Self and non-self in early Buddhism*. The Hague & New York: Mouton. Originally presented as the author's doctoral thesis at the University of Bombay under the title: *The Anattavada in the Suttapitaka*.
- RORTY, Amélie Oksenberg. (Ed.). (1976). *The identities of persons*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
- ROSENBERG, Howard B. Kaplan. (Ed.). (1982). *Social psychology of the self-concept*. Arlington Heights, IL: H. Davidson.

- ROSS, M. (1989). Relation of implicit theories to the construction of personal histories. *Psychological Review*, 96(2), 341-357.
- ROTH, Gustav (1980). Particular features of the language of the Ārya-Mahāsaṅghika-Lokottara-vādins and their importance for early Buddhist Tradition. In Heinz Bechert, ed., *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung / The language of the earliest Buddhist tradition* (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung, II). Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr. 117, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 78-135. Especially valuable for its two appendices, "Supplement: 1. Notes on the Patna Dharmapada, 2. Text of the Patna Dharmapada" (pp. 93-96 and 97-135, respectively).
- SARTRE, Jean Paul (1966). *La transcendance de l'ego: Esquisse d'une description phénoménologique*. Introduction, notes et appendices, par Sylvie Le Bon. Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques. Paris, J. Vrin. English: *The transcendence of the ego: An existentialist theory of consciousness*. Translated and annotated with an introd. by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. New York, Noonday Press <1957>.
- SHWEDER, Richard A (1982). Beyond self-constructed knowledge: The study of culture and morality. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly*, 28(1), 41-69.
- SHWEDER, Richard A. (1980). Rethinking culture and personality theory: III. From genesis and typology to hermeneutics and dynamics. *Ethos*, 8(1). 60-94.
- SHWEDER, Richard A., & SULLIVAN, Maria A. (1990). USA The semiotic subject of cultural psychology. Lawrence A. Pervin, ed., *Handbook of personality: Theory and research*. (New York: Guilford Press), pp. 399-416.
- SLOAN, Tod Stratton. (1982). *Self-deception and false consciousness in mayor life decisions: A critical-interpretive inquiry*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
- SPENCE, Donald P. (1982). *Narrative truth and historical truth: Meaning and interpretation in psychoanalysis*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- TAYLOR, Charles. (1989). *Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- TAYLOR, Charles (1992). *The ethics of authenticity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992, c1991.
- TAYLOR, S.E., & BROWN, J.D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. *Psychological Bulletin*, 103(2), 193-210.
- TAYLOR, S.E., & BROWN, J.D. (1994). Positive illusions and well-being revisited: Separating fact from fiction. *Psychological Bulletin*, 116(1), 21-27.
- TAYLOR, Shelley E. (1989). *Positive illusions: Creative self-deception and the healthy mind*. New York: Basic Books.
- TILLEMANS, Tom J.F. (1996). What would it be like to be selfless? Hīnayānist versions, Mahāyānist versions and Derek Parfit. *Asiatische Studien / Études asiatiques*, 50(4), 835-852.
- TURNER, V.W. (1974). *Dramas, fields, metaphors: Symbolic action in human society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- TURNER, V.W. & BRUNER, E.M. (Eds.) (1986). *The anthropology of experience*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- WENTWORTH, William M., & WENTWORTH, Carlene M. (1997). The social construction of culture and its implications for the therapeutic mind-self. In Thomas Sexton, ed., *Constructivist thinking in counseling practice, research, and training* (Counseling and development series, No. 3. New York: Teachers College Press), pp. 41-57.