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Author(s): John R. Short

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Yuppies, yuffies and the new urban order

JOHN R. SHORT

Lecturer in Geography, Department of Geography, Reading University, Reading RG6 2AB

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ABSTRACT

The paper examines changes in social relations which are causing a bifurcation in life chances and employment opportunities. The effects on spatial relations are noted, in particular the extension of commercial spaces and transformation of residential quarters. These new built forms embody the emerging tensions of the new urban order.

KEY WORDS: Restructuring, Yuppies, Yuffies, London Docklands

INTRODUCTION

A new geography of capital accumulation has emerged in the last twenty years. Lash and Bagguley (1988) refer to these changes as the rise of *disorganized capitalism* including, amongst other things, deregulation of markets and new sociologies of production. Scott (1988) provides a good general summary of these latter changes and empirical studies of specific countries, regions and cities respectively include Cooke (1988), Morris (1987) and Soja (1986).

In this paper I will consider some of the effects of these changes on the central areas of world cities, i.e., big cities in the capitalist core, in the belief that we can only fully understand disorganized capitalism when we understand its urban implications while any analysis of contemporary urbanism is incomplete without a consideration of capitalism, disorganized and organized. The essay is addressed to the British case and, in particular, London, but the general remarks apply to other world cities.

CHANGING SOCIAL RELATIONS

World cities are losing their status as manufacturing centres and are becoming centres for the tertiary and quaternary sectors of the economy. Since the mid-1960s a new international division of labour has emerged in which world cities have lost much of their manufacturing employment through closure, mechanization, suburbanization of industry, more efficient work practices and what Peter Dicken (1986) refers to as the global shift of industrial employment from the

core to the semi-periphery and peripheral countries of the world economy. New employment growth in world cities is dominated by service employment especially in the producer services category (Marshall, 1988). The biggest and fastest growth has occurred in financial services. The measurement, monitoring, moving and management of money is now a major growth industry. The changes have not been uniform across space. Selected countries in the semi-periphery, especially that subset known as newly industrializing countries including Brazil, Mexico and South Korea, have captured most of the industrial growth while in the core some countries fared worse than others. Britain because of its poor competitiveness, lack of investment and a financial structure which easily allowed foreign investment, showed some of the biggest losses of industrial employment. British capital found it easy and more profitable to invest in manufacturing abroad (Short, 1984).

The decline in Britain was greatest in the big cities. Between 1971 and 1981 1.8 million manufacturing jobs, over one-third of all manufacturing employment were lost in the conurbations of Britain; in London alone 200 000 manufacturing jobs have been lost every five years since 1961 (see Martin and Rowthorn, 1986). The net result was a form of deindustrialization with specific implications for gender and class relations. An examination of the figures in *Employment Gazette* reveals that between 1971 and 1981, the number of jobs done by men fell by 1.7 million: in contrast, female employment has increased; over the period between 1961 and 1981

TABLE I. *Employment in the UK 1971–86*

	millions	
	1971	1986
Manufacturing	8.06	5.23
Services	11.62	14.49
banking, finance, insurance & business services	1.33	2.20
All industries & services	22.13	21.59
Unemployed	0.75	3.28

Source: Social Trends, 1988, Table 4.9 and 4.19

the number of women in paid jobs increased from 7 million to 8.5 million, from 35 per cent of the total workforce to 45 per cent. The increase in part-time employment by one million jobs in the past 15 years has been almost entirely female labour. While cultural images of work and popular representatives of employment may still make a distinction between male workers and female housewives the new realities are very different. A majority of adult women have either part-time or full-time employment in addition to their domestic chores. While the male working class saw the closure of traditional avenues of employment, female members of the working class saw increased employment opportunities albeit in routine jobs. Labour organizations have traditionally been forged from the experience of male working class. Deindustrialization has meant a decline in the social and political power of the male working class.

Table I shows the general pattern of a decline in manufacturing employment over the period 1971 to 1986 and the absolute and relative increase in service employment. The Table also reveals that over 30 per cent of this increase came from the financial services category. In this sector employment is bifurcated between a high paid managerial section, predominantly although not completely male, and mostly female workers in the routine office work. Both manufacturing loss and financial services gain have been urban-based. The predominant centre is London accounting for 60 per cent of all financial and producer service employment although Leyshon *et al.* (1988) point to the more recent rise of provincial financial centres. Within London there is a concentration of very highly paid workers, a fact which has important regional multiplier effects (Thrift *et al.*, 1987).

In summary, there has been a loss of manufacturing employment and an increase in service employment all against a background of rising unemployment. The social effects have been a reduction in the power of the traditional male working class, an increase in female employment and the emergence of a new middle class. These trends have been given popular recognition in the terms *yuppie* and *yuffie*, themselves part of a plethora of new words coined in the 1980s including *buppies*, *swells* and (my favourite) *lombards*. A yuppie is a young upwardly mobile person though the u can also denote urban. Yuffies are young urban failures. If the yuppies are the successful new middle class, yuffies are the stranded and blocked working class. The other terms? Buppie is the yuppie's black equivalent, swell is single women earning lots in London, a term which summarizes the rise of the female executive and perhaps the beginnings of the end for the monopoly of the male domination of senior and responsible positions. Lombard is lots of money but a right dickhead, a term of abuse whose real quality is only recognized if you know that one of the main streets in the City of London is Lombard Street.

There is always a problem in using very contemporary words. Nothing dates so much as the latest fashion. To use yuppies and yuffies in the title of an academic paper may be the equivalent of sporting bell-bottom trousers and a kipper tie to a 1970s end of term party. Trendy at the time but if pictures are taken a source of embarrassment for the years ahead. The terms may have a very short shelf-life but they ultimately refer to perennial questions of money, power and class and allow us an entry into the dynamics of social relations. To consider the background to these terms is to grasp the tensions between the circumstances of social history and the agents of social geography.

There is another problem in using the terms, they defy simple empirical analysis. We do not know how many yuppies there are or the changing proportion of yuffies. They are as much myth as fact, points of popular debate as much as empirical realities. They are important as figures of contemporary urban folktales. Yuppie has become a term of abuse for profound reasons. Britain became the first industrialized economy but never became an industrial society. Wealth carried social obligations and status was always as important as conspicuous consumption. The Thatcherite achievement has been to introduce the bourgeois revolution Britain never had. But there has been popular resistance to this attempted

rejection of the moral economy and its total replacement with a money economy. The critical use of the term yuppie is part of this distaste. The term yuffie, not so popular but becoming more so, expresses recognition of an underclass, a group of youths denied access to the fruits of economic growth. If the yuppies are the success story of Thatcher's Britain, then the yuffies are the failure, one the dream the other the nightmare. In the rest of this paper I will use the terms in the double sense of empirical fact and urban myth; a use which straddles the ambiguity of cultural expression and social process, fact and fancy, myth and reality.

As myths yuppies have become a powerful model, a peg for advertising campaigns and dedicated followers of fashion. Some developers are also building for the yuppies, parts of cities are being yuppified. This has both an empirical and a symbolic element. Empirical in the sense that changes can be seen in the form of new housing stock, leisure facilities etc. and symbolic in the sense that the meaning of particular places is being transformed. As fact yuppies are an emerging social group with particular forms of employment and consumption. Their existence is due to the rise of non-manual and especially managerial and professional categories of employment. Yuppies are the higher paid members in the technical and management levels of the control centres of international corporations, the expanding financial services sector, producer services and the media industry. They are particularly found in London where these sectors are concentrated. The term yuppie is a loose one, it is suggestive of a new social group, not so much a class more a constellation of groups whose emergence has been noted but not fully identified. The term is useful as a shorthand, a generalization which stands in contrast to that other social grouping of contemporary society, the yuffie.

Yuffies are young urban failures. The 'failure' is their inability to get a job. It does not imply personal failing or irresponsibility. The main problem of the yuffie is that they were born at the wrong time. Life chances of any social group vary through time, we know this from our experience as academics. Born in 1935 you managed to avoid serving in the war and if you followed an academic career you were at your most marketable when the higher education sector experienced its biggest expansion. Born in 1965 your chances of an academic career are severely limited by the financial restrictions on universities and colleges. Same occupation, contrasting opportunities for different cohorts. The same with broad social categories.

A semi-skilled worker in Britain had more opportunities when looking for a job in 1968 than in 1988. The yuffies are the unlucky cohort.

As a slump hit the world economy in the 1970s firms responded by either going out of business or by shedding labour. Labour was either sacked, or 'lost' through natural wastage. By not employing new labour, young people coming into the job market for the first time bore the brunt of the recession. Their problems were exacerbated by the response of the British State from the mid 1970s to redirect public expenditure. The public sector was thus not able to soak up the unemployment produced by deindustrialization. The net effect was an increase in unemployment in the UK. In 1988 over 3 million were out of work, almost one million of whom were under 25 (see Social Trends, 1988, Table 4.23). In London a third of the population are aged under 26 and of these one in eight are unemployed.

The young unemployed do not necessarily become yuffies. Inability to gain formal employment does not necessarily mean a complete reliance on government income support. Opportunities are available in the twilight world of the informal economy. Research in this area is difficult but the results we do have suggest that the amount of informal work done by the unemployed is very slight. The work of Ray Pahl (1984) suggests that either those in employment or newly made redundant make greater use of the black economy because they have easier access to potential customers, materials and networks of social communication. Young people with no, or limited, work experience are thus in a more difficult position than most. There is a distinction between individuals and households. A young person may be unemployed but not necessarily poor if they are in a household with a worker in paid employment (see Pahl, 1988). Yuffies are not simply the young unemployed, they are the alienated young unemployed. They are the people who rioted in 1980 and 1981. These disturbances were not so much race riots as youth riots. They were, in the words of Lord Justice Scarman (1981) a 'burst of anger'. They indicated the street power of the yuffies.

Yuffies pose a problem for the State. Governments in liberal democracies have the problem of providing an income support which is not too low to cause social unrest but not too high so that recipients are discouraged from looking for work. Yuffies also pose a threat in the mythologies which circulate in town and cities. They are perceived as the main source of crime, they threaten people and property, they are

the muggers and burglars, the leading roles in the law and order script which reads as follows: there was once a golden age where cities had less crime, now it is not safe to walk the streets as these young hooligans threaten life and property. The nostalgic reference to the past and the calling for more policing is not new. Geoffrey Pearson (1983) has shown it to be a recurring theme of urban Britain at least from the Victorian period, an enduring fear which always fastens on to the young male 'lower orders'. The latest folk devil is the young black unemployed male now a popular symbol of criminal intent, social disorder and moral disruption. Yuppies are the id of the urban imagination.

The yuppie/yuffie theme has captured a significant space in popular culture. In film there is now an identifiable genre of 'yuppie in crisis'; in 1988 BBC radio introduced a London-based serial *Citizens* which provides a rich contrast to the long running, rural world of the *Archers*; and the stable working class community of *Coronation Street* now has to compete with *Eastenders*. *Citizens* and *Eastenders* take the yuppie/yuffie items as key points in their storylines. The making of City money in London was also the theme of the successful 1987 West End play of the year, *Serious Money*. There have also been adaptations of the work of Dickens including the RSC's highly acclaimed *Nicholas Nickleby* and the 1987 movie *Little Dorrit*. The revival of interest in Dickens is not accidental. Dickens was concerned with London, its social contrasts, the pace of social change, the gaining and losing of money, property and position in society. Dickens provides an imaginative encompassing of rapid change in a world city. His rich and poor characters, dramatic light and shade are the Victorian equivalent of our yuppies and yuffies. The historical parallels are not accidental. The opening scene of Caryl Churchill's *Serious Money* is a quote from *The Stockjobbers*, a play by Thomas Shadwell first performed in 1692. This reference and the revival of Dickens are reminders that wealth and poverty have always been the primary division of British society. The yuppie/yuffie dichotomy may appear unusual from the perspective of 1958 and 1968 when economic growth was more equally shared and growing State intervention was increasing the quality of life for the majority. From 1698 or 1888 it will come as no surprise.

There is a basis of social experience for these cultural expressions. In Britain there is a growing bifurcation of life chances. For those in employment, income tax has been reduced. Since the Conservatives

TABLE II. *Share of total income after tax in the UK 1975-76, 1984-85*

	1975-76		1984-85	
	% share	average income (£)	% share	average income (£)
Top 1%	3.9	9010	4.9	31 060
Next 9%	19.2	4910	21.6	15 240
Next 40%	50.3	2900	48.6	7 640
Lowest 50%	26.6	1230	24.9	3 160

Source: Social Trends, 1988, Table 5.14

came to power in 1979 the basic rate of income tax has been reduced from 33 per cent to 25 per cent while the maximum rate has been slashed from 83 per cent to 40 per cent. The wealthiest have benefitted most from these changes. The corollary is that those in low income employment face high marginal rates of taxation while the unemployed are facing reductions on benefits. From April 1988 the Social Security Act of 1986 came into effect in which young people were to receive no benefits if they refused a place or a youth training scheme. Under this new poor law arrangement a young single unemployed person aged under 25 would receive £23.55 per week compared to £31.35 under the previous system. By contrast, the average weekly take home pay of an accountant in the City of London in April of the same year was £350. The net result is a growing gap between rich and poor (see Table II). The richest 10 per cent of the population now have more income than the bottom 50 per cent. This is a reversal of a 50 year trend towards greater equality of income. Not only is there greater inequality but it is becoming more visible. The term young in yuppie is not only a function of age but a position in the great divide in attitudes to credit. The deferred gratification of the old middle-class reared on ideas of sacrifice, saving and waiting has given way to the conspicuous consumption of the new middle-class emerging in an era of credit cards, buy-now-pay-later slogans and a banking system which is encouraging personal indebtedness.

There is also a split in the labour market. It used to be assumed that high levels of unemployment would depress wages. This did occur in the 1970s and early 1980s but since then those in middle-to upper-income employment have experienced real increases in disposable income not just through income tax changes but also through real increases in wages. The mechanism which links unemployment and wages seems to

be through the rate of increase of unemployment rather than the absolute level of unemployment. When people are losing their jobs this acts as a break on wage claims. Labour is disciplined by the fear of unemployment. But when the rate of increase tails off, even at a high absolute level, as in the mid 1980s, then the fear of unemployment for those with jobs begins to lessen and wage claims begin to make their appearance. The large pool of the unemployed does not form a reserve army of labour, their existence depressing the wages of the employed, rather there is a growing split between the incomes and life chances of those in and those out of employment, between those in low-income employment and those in middle- and upper-income employment (Hakin, 1987). But while there may be a bifurcation in the command over resources both groups continue to live in the same cities. Cities are shared spaces. In contemporary world cities there is a spatial as well as a social restructuring and yuppies and yuffies are now living in the same social spaces.

RESTRUCTURING SPATIAL RELATIONS

A major cause of the spatial restructuring in world cities is the growth of the financial service industries which is causing a demand for office space. The mid to late 1980s has seen a commercial office boom in the world cities similar to the early 1980s (Short, 1988). Where the pressure cannot be met by intensification of existing spaces there is pressure for the extension of commercial space. The tight clustering of such industries means that the extensions cannot be too far away; firms renting space too distant lose credibility and vital contacts. In London the pressure has built up around the edges of the City.

Pressure has also come from new housing demands. The new middle class are more than end points of structural changes. As E P Thompson (1968) reminds us in the title and the text of his most famous work, classes make themselves. As part fact, part myth yuppies make themselves in their lifestyles especially in attitudes to time and space. The *filofax* is the yuppie icon. It indicates the problem of time yet its successful management. It suggests a life full of work, commitments, movement and meetings. It represents a full life. The problem with the unemployed, in contrast, is how to fill time. The cruel paradox of modern life is those with more resources have less time while those with most time have least resources. The attitude to time is matched by an assessment of space. Yuppies are inner city-dwellers. Their jobs are

in the central areas. Not for them the trek to the suburbs made by their parents and dreamed of by their grandparents. A central location saves time in journey to work, entertainment and contact with friends and influences. It is also symbolic of wider attitudes. The suburbs are, in essence, places for children, they indicate the willingness of people to lead their lives 'for the children'. Suburbs are places of sacrifice, sites for the reproduction of the family. The garden, the lower density and the search for better schools are the essential ingredients of the suburban choice. Yuppie households, if they have children, are concerned as much with the wants of the adults as the perceived needs of the children. The emergence of the yuppies is signalled by new forms of housing consumption. On the one hand there is gentrification as middle class groups move into low-income neighbourhoods close to the city centre (see Smith and Williams 1986). On the other hand there are the new-build schemes. Aware of the market possibilities developers are now consciously meeting the demand for centrally-located dwellings for young middle- and upper-income households with a mix of dwelling size designed to interest non-child and single-person households; Figure 1 shows one such scheme.

This spatial restructuring involving the extension of commercial space and new forms of residential space is not just a demand-led phenomenon. It is also a result of the growing power and influence of financial institutions seeking long term investment. It is as much investment as demand-led. Much of urban research in the last two decades has been concerned with the relationship between the mode of production and urban structure (e.g., Harvey, 1985). Too little attention has been paid to the importance of the mode of investment. Finance capital has had an enormous impact on the landscape and life of cities. Financial institutions, including insurance companies and pension funds, have been the recipients of the growth of personal savings. Money has flooded as incomes have increased, the number of people in occupational pension schemes has quadrupled in 30 years and more recently in Britain there has been the move towards privatization of old age pensions whereby individuals have been encouraged to invest in a financial institution rather than the State pension scheme. The result has been a huge increase in investing institutions (Plender, 1982). Urban property is an attractive investment for these institutions:

- (1) it takes up big chunks of money, a handy characteristic for hard-pressed investment managers seeking to make as few decisions as possible;



FIGURE 1. New forms of residential space are being constructed in inner city areas. This scheme in Reading was built on the banks of the Kennet–Avon canal. From proto-industrial to post-industrial

- (2) it is a long-term investment which can be used to balance shorter term investments in gilts, stocks and shares;
- (3) its scarcity is assured by the nature of absolute space; in the urban context this is often re-inforced by planning controls.

Favoured investments have been commercial properties. Figure 2 shows what every investment manager wants—an office block in a thriving commercial centre. There is nothing an investment-fund manager likes more than a tall office block on a prestige site in a favoured location. Increasing asset value is assured. In the world cities property investment has been attracted to the commercial core and surrounding areas, particularly along the fault lines along the edge of CBD. Here the conversion of residential use to commercial users and low-income housing to high-income housing provides the greatest returns. But while individual speculative ventures may give high returns, as in the case of one company obtaining permission for an office block in an adjacent residential area, such deals are risky and time-consuming. Pension fund managers are risk averters rather than risk takers. They seek high returns but on a very secure

basis as in the more orderly, organized extension of commercial space and residential renewal such as the construction of Battery Park city on the southern tip of Manhattan the commercialization of the Rocks area of Sydney and the biggest of them all, the transformation of London Docklands.

London Docklands

Located just east of the capital's financial centre, the 16sq miles of Docklands was the commercial water frontage of London (see Fig. 3). It was also the home of working-class communities, almost 40 000 initially based on dock-working. By the 1960s the docks were being closed because they were unable to cope with the bigger container ships. The port functions moved east to Tilbury and, in Docklands, registered dock employment fell from 25 000 to 4100 between 1960 and 1981. Church (1988a) provides a good review of the transformation of Docklands.

London Docklands was well placed for spatial restructuring. Recent years have seen employment growth in London's City (see Thrift, *et al.*, 1987). Close to the City it gave opportunities to developers



FIGURE 2. An investment manager's dream. A new office block in Reading

for the recommodification of derelict land into offices and residences. There was an alignment of investment-rich institutions, a demand from a buoyant City for office property and new housing requirements of the growing new middle-class which all led to the recommodification and yuppification of the area. The successful prosecution of these aims required three things:

- (1) incentives to private capital;
- (2) political power;
- (3) central organization.

(1) In the 1980 Budget the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the creation of enterprise zones to promote private redevelopment of inner city areas. Under this scheme incentives were provided over the period 1981–91 which included exemption from rates and land taxes on site disposal, tax allowance for building construction and relaxation of planning controls. Eleven zones were designated, one of them, the Isle of Dogs, in Docklands (see Fig. 3). This has been

one of the most successful. For example, many newspaper offices have relocated from their traditional home in Fleet Street and now *The Sun*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Guardian* and *The Observer* are now located in the zone. Incidentally, their move was part of a restructuring of labour relations involving a reduction of the labour force and the introduction of new technology.

(2) The commercial transformation of large areas will favour lucky landowners and astute developers but it will not directly benefit the local people. Any truly democratic local representation will thus tend to resist such changes. For the developments to take place, power must be taken out of local hands. This is the rationale behind the creation of London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC). The LDDC was established by a Conservative government in 1981. It replaced the Docklands Joint Committee established in 1974 and is made up of representative of five dockland boroughs. That Committee was concerned with the needs of local residents. The non-elected, government appointed LDDC has no need to court local political support. Its aim has been to 'develop' Dockland for the private sector.

(3) Individual companies are unwilling and unable to undertake such large and speculative ventures. The LDDC has acted as central organizer of the project—assembling land, making environmental improvements and providing the vital, initial infrastructure investment. The LDDC spent £130 million between 1981 and 1985, almost £200 million from 1985 to 1987 including £35 million on a light railway system which links the area to the City, London's financial centre, and has asked for £531 million for the period 1988 to 1993. The area is now an attractive location for office users, it is now 'closer' to the City and all of central London, yet rents are only quarter of what they are in the City.

The LDDC has been successful in raising awareness of the commercial opportunities of Docklands. A barrage of publicity has changed the mental map of London. Previously the Docklands was 'unknown' to the majority of middle-class Londoners. It was a spatially and socially self-contained segment of the capital. The LDDC campaign has given Docklands a higher profile and more 'positive' image. Publicity photographs are carefully taken to show only the glitzy areas and colour enhancement changes the murky Thames into a sunkissed, bright blue river, pollution free, just waiting for you to windsurf.

In their own terms the LDDC has been successful (Church, 1988a,b). Almost £2200 million of private




FIGURE 3. London Docklands



FIGURE 4. The reconstruction of London Docklands. Note the NatWest tower on the horizon indicating the proximity of the City


investment has been attracted. The whole area has been transformed and major developments are planned or in the process of construction (see Figs. 4, 5 and 6). Almost 500 000 square metres of office development is completed or under construction. By the year 2000, it is estimated that 2 million square metres will be constructed. At Canary Wharf is planned the biggest single development, a £3000 million complex of office and shopping space which eventually will employ 72 000 people. In London Docklands there are the equivalent of fifteen Canary Wharf size developments under construction. Between now and the end of the century office development in Docklands will increase London's commercial office space by 50 per cent.

Housing has also been built. Thirteen thousand dwellings were completed or under construction by 1987 (see Figs. 7 and 8). The LDDC plan is to complete 25 000 dwellings by the end of the century. Selling points have been the water frontages and the relative cheapness considering the easy access to the City. Developments on this scale do more than just meet a demand. Giddens (1973) has suggested that an important influence on class formation is residential


segregation. The residential element of Docklands development will create the environmental context for the new middle class being as much a class 'for itself' as 'in itself'.

In effect there has been a transformation of the landscape of Docklands. Figures 4–8 show the new buildings while a comparison of Figures 9 and 10 shows the before and after. The industrial buildings of the past are being recycled. Both in terms of use and meaning. The Docklands as Victorian economic resource is giving way to Docklands as postmodern landscape of offices, from old working-class to new middle-class. Docklands has become a spectacle for the display of post-industrial employment and the presentation of housing forms for the new middle-class. The transformation of the Docklands is not only a change in use but a change of meaning.


Most of the architecture is postmodern (see Figs. 5, 6 and 8). A great deal has now been written about such architecture (e.g., Harvey, 1987; Mills, 1988). Here I want to make only one point, postmodernism is an architecture which explicitly references the past. The interesting thing is not so much postmodernism because architects have been 'citing' past styles for



FIGURES 5 and 6. Commercial spaces in London Docklands have the postmodernist look



FIGURES 7 and 8. Residential development in London Docklands



FIGURES 9 and 10. The recommodification of London Docklands. The disused nineteenth-century industrial buildings of London Docklands (above) are being recycled. St Catherine's dock (below) is now a shopping and entertainment centre



FIGURE 11. An example of the contemporary urban enclosure movement



FIGURE 12. A bunker architecture separates public and private spaces

over three hundred years but the rise and more recent collapse of modernism. Modernist architecture arose from an emancipatory view of architecture as the built form of a brave new world. But in trying to build Utopia they mostly succeeded in constructing jerry-built nowheres. Postmodernism marks the demise of the modernist enterprise.

A NEW URBAN ORDER?

A new urban order is emerging from the contestation for political power and social meaning in world cities. Commercial pressure for central locations, the growing power of the mode of investment and the emergence of new social groupings are taking place at the same time as deindustrialization, pressure on the poor and the emergence of an underclass marginalized by economic change. Returning to Docklands again, Church and Ainley (1987) show how local unemployment especially amongst the young continues to persist despite the boom of Docklands. I use my words precisely. *Taking place* is exactly what is happening as

the two social forces are meeting in the same social spaces. Yuppification involves the destruction of an existing community and its replacement by a new one with consequent changes in the meaning and use of space. There is local resistance. The press releases of the Isle of Dogs Neighbourhood Committee, for example, provide an antidote to the publicity machine of the LDDC. They point out that few of the jobs created have gone to local residents. When the average local income was £8500 per household the average price of a 2 bedroomed property in the area was £185 000. More radical has been the attitude of *Class War*. The East End has reached a point of no return; according to them, its either resist or die. In their newspaper *Class War* and billposters they urge local people to mug a yuppie, scratch BMW cars and make life as unpleasant as possible for the affluent incomers. Members of the TV soap *Eastenders* have been attacked, *Class War* accused them of being show-business sellouts; estate agents regularly have their hoardings daubed with graffiti and 10th September 1988 was declared national

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You'll be in the fashionable Docklands where property is in great demand.

You'll be minutes from the City. Take the new Rapid Transit Train from right outside your door, and you'll be at Bank in less than half an hour.


You can move straight in to a beautifully built, brand new home. Take your pick, 1 or 2 bedroom flats, or a 3 bedroom house, and prices from £81,000 to £116,000.

You'll have a fitted kitchen, tiled bathroom, wardrobe in the main bedroom, independent central heating, double glazing, a balcony or even a garden and space to park your car.

You'll be making a wise investment in a home that's part of a select development.

riverside residences

Prices from £475,000



Duke Shore Wharf, Narrow Street: Wapping flats in the £185-350,000 price range.

WATERSIDE · LIFESTYLE

Studios, one and two bedroom apartments and exceptionally large maisonettes. Prices from

£99,500-£229,500

RIVERSIDE HOMES OF EXCELLEN

Just a short walk from the city and Tower Bridge, the exclusive new 3 and 4 bed freehold homes at Sir Thomas More Court on the banks of the tree lined canal have fully fitted kitchens, with oven, hob and extractor, luxury carpets, stylish bathrooms, integral garages and a sophisticated security system.

The most distinguished address in Wapping.

On the edge of the Thames and the City.

resident-only
swimming pool and fitness centre

A SUPERB INVESTMENT IN A UNIQUE ENVIRONMENT

New Crane Wharf offers a choice of the best in studio, 1, 2 and 3 bedroom apartments. Designed by architects Conran Roche to combine traditional craftsmanship with the very finest in modern sign and style.

And offer a way of life which provides exclusivity, cachet and a unique lifestyle.

- 143 apartments ● A choice of elegantly appointed bathrooms
- Superb fitted kitchens ● Secure underground parking
- Riverside restaurant ● 24 hour security ● Health club ● Select range of shops.

With its fine riverside location and cobbled courtyard echoing its past, New Crane Wharf sets new standards for quality and finish. Yet only minutes from the very heart of the City and the West End.

family homes within 10 minutes of the city.

3 bedroom houses with garden and garage from £119,500

2 bedroom house with garage £115,000

1 bedroom apartment with garage £79,950

Superb listed (Grade II) warehouse conversion boasting exceptionally spacious 3 and 4 bed apartments with south-facing views over the River Thames.

The facilities include a Leisure Centre, Shopping Piazza and landscaped gardens.

A premier location with easy access to the City. Probably the finest and most innovative of all Docklands developments, set around a landscaped courtyard and providing private covered parking and sophisticated security.

What could crown your success more than a prestigious home in the heart of renaissance dockland? Quay West is a unique development of delightful mews, squares and courts with a choice

MINUTES FROM THE CITY AND CLOSE TO PERFECTION.

Audio-visual
security

mews development only minutes from the City

FIGURE 13. A collage of newspaper advertisements for Docklands dwellings. The adverts stress security, location, investment potential and lifestyle

Source: Taken from newspapers in the period April–August 1988

Anti-Yuppie Day. *Class War* has 1000 members and a political philosophy. According to one spokesman:

At first people thought we were just into violence. But we have our own political theory. We do not call ourselves anarchists any longer. Yes, we want to overthrow capitalism and if that has to be violent then so be it. We are interested in community politics for the working class to stick up for itself (Lashmar and Harris, 1988).

The threat is taken seriously by Scotland Yard who have assigned six officers full time to monitor *Class War*.

Class War is unusual, perhaps the best (and only?) example of an urban social movement condensing the yuppie/yuffie bifurcation: more common are the unorganized random acts of resistance/vandalism. As a correspondent of the *East London Advertiser* wrote:

I was delighted the other day when sitting with my younger sister on the Isle of Dogs and saw some youngsters ripping up newly planted trees and using them to attack yuppie homes. Hopefully some young people locally will still have some fight in them and will repel these new Eastenders by making life unbearable for them (Kane 1987).

As the letter suggests, young people constitute a point of resistance. They have energy, anger and have not yet learnt to accept their fate. In Docklands, however, it looks as if this resistance will ultimately fail. It is the deathroes of a community undergoing marginalization and eventual disintegration. The organized yuffies of *Class War* constitute a nuisance and a threat but not a permanent block to the changes. The power of finance capital in alliance with a central government committed to private enterprise and big business is too big an opponent for a small working-class community with few political friends and limited resources.

But the yuffies still have power. Their very existence in the collective urban imagination has produced effects. First, there is the fear of crime; 'colonization' of space involves the invasion of someone's place. In the imperial past overseas colonization was underwritten by the British Army and Navy. Now it is the police who defend the urban colonizers. It is not that crime is any more prevalent in gentrified areas although the contrast between rich and poor does provide greater opportunities. It is more a case of the new middle-classes having the right language and the necessary confidence to demand better policing. Demands for more effective

policing are greatest in areas undergoing gentrification. Secondly, the fear of the yuffies is apparent in the new built forms. There is a contemporary urban enclosure movement which is blocking off and minimizing public open space (see Fig. 11). Riverside frontages are being alienated, walls are being constructed and barriers being created all in order to keep out the urban folk devils (see Figs. 12 and 13). The security arrangements of residential blocks are a major selling point while commercial properties are so designed that their frontages ward off rather than invite. The attraction of water frontages is only partly the scenic views, for on one side, at least, they can be easily defended against the yuffies. This bunker architecture is concerned more with security than display, personal safety more than show and the exclusion of indigenous communities rather than their incorporation.

The fear of the underclass has always been a major element in the life of London as in all world cities. In the past this has been managed by segregation, people knowing and keeping (in) their place. When different groups are in the same places the emphasis switches to the architectural design of the buildings, the location of buildings and the construction of defensible spaces. In London Docklands and selected areas of other world cities economic restructuring is causing a change of use, a change of meaning and a contestation for the social control of urban spaces. The new urban order of disorganized capitalism will arise from this struggle; its eventual shape a function of conflict and compromise, its final form a mark of victory. And of defeat.

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