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The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 marked a defeat for Irish Republicanism. Discuss with particular attention given to the relationships between the main protagonists involved in negotiations.

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The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 marked a defeat for Irish Republicanism. Discuss with particular attention given to the relationships between the main protagonists involved in negotiations.

‘Two households, both alike in dignity, In fair... [Ireland]..., where we lay our scene’.¹ No, it is not *Romeo and Juliet* but a tale of rising sectarianism in a land marked by famine and unrest to which the problematic solution of the *Anglo-Irish Treaty* of 1921 was devised. Having called a truce to the War of Independence, which began in 1919, negotiations between the two nations were unsurprisingly tense.² Initially, the President of *Sinn Féin* and the *Dáil Éirean*, Éamonn De Valera, met with the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, in July 1921 to discuss Anglo-Irish relations. The succeeding delegations saw an absence of De Valera, and in his place Arthur Griffiths, Michael Collins, Robert Barton, Eamonn Duggan, and George Gavin Duffy represented Ireland. The Irish were already at a distinct disadvantage, with far less negotiating experience, compared with the politically shrewd British representatives: Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Lord Birkenhead, Austen Chamberlain, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Sir Hamar Greenwood, and Sir Gordon Hewart.³ Defence and Irish Unity, particularly the semantics of *free* nationhood with the Republicans, marked points of tension in meeting the aims of both sides. Oaths, treaty ports, the ambiguous but infamous *External Association*, question of Irish sovereignty despite a Dominion status, and several other points plagued these individuals for months. Yet, it was Lloyd George’s ability to separate the moderate Republicans, such as Arthur Griffiths and Michael Collins, from the more extreme – to press more heavily in private conversations, and threaten the Republicans with the resumption of war, which contributed to the Treaty being signed at 02:10 on 5th December 1921.⁴ However, this accord did not bring peace to either *Fianna Fáil* (Anti-Treaty) or *Fine Gael* (Pro-Treaty), with some considering the British allowances too great and others not great enough. With mounting hostilities, the 1922-1923 Civil War which followed perhaps seemed inevitable. Yet, with the 1937 declaration of the Irish Free State as a ‘sovereign, independent, democratic state’, being

¹ William Shakespeare, ‘*Romeo and Juliet*: Prologue’, *The Folger Shakespeare*, Available at < <https://shakespeare.folger.edu/shakespeares-works/romeo-and-juliet/prologue/> > [Accessed 11 June 2021].

² History.com Editors, ‘Irish Free State declared’, *HISTORY*, Available at < <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/irish-free-state-declared> > [Accessed 21 June 2021].

³ Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 61 - The Anglo Irish Treaty*, online lecture, YouTube, 18 December 2015, Available at < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXAoRWZvjDA> > [Accessed 5 June 2021].

⁴ Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 62 - The Treaty Debates*, online lecture, YouTube, 18 December 2015, Available at < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDrxPUWcRYs> > [Accessed 15 June 2021].

renamed *Eire*, and later 1949 *Republic of Ireland Act* -⁵ whether losing this battle in 1921 meant that the Republicans lost the war will be determined through this essay.

Irish Republicanism, a fight not just for a national Republic but a Nation's freedom, saw a marked defeat with this Treaty: as Ireland was again denied its independence. Earlier attempts at culling invading rulers were often unsuccessful. Patrick Geoghegan proposes that perhaps the greatest victory – on the battlefield – in Irish history was Brian Boru's, High King of Ireland, in 1014. His uniting of the people against attacking Vikings on Good Friday is raised almost to the heights of a Biblical epic as it's told, and the tale is likely so legendary because of its ending. The 'enduring optimism' and 'spirit that the Irish would overcome' is struck down when Brian was struck dead by a Viking. Geoghegan builds on this notion by implying not just that 'centuries of defeat...followed', but that they culminated in this Treaty.⁶ The long shadow cast by this defeat is felt in Stephen Gwynn's early twentieth century reflection in 'A Song of Defeat':

Eire, love Brian well,
For Brian fought, and he fell:
But Brian fought, and he won:
God! that was long ago!⁷

Using the Gaelic 'Eire' for Ireland indicates an allegiance with the Republicans, as Gwynn attempts to reclaim the country with its native language rather than gunfire. Moreover, the exclamatory punctuation is employed to illustrate the tone of Gwynn's readership, presumably large swathes of Irish nationalists, expressing their frustration with being oppressed by the British and others for such a long period of time. Barbara Tuchman describes the societal instability caused by the destruction and chaos of the past. Although she largely uses fourteenth century case studies, her 'distant mirror' theory – that the uprisings and death of the past mark the future – is applicable in this twentieth century episode.⁸ The legacy of all previous failed rebellions, with deaths harking back to the eighteenth century, permeates into the twentieth.

⁵ History.com Editors, 'Irish Free State declared'

⁶ Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 1, Lecture 1: Ireland in Rebellion An Introduction*, online lecture, YouTube, 2 October 2015, Available at < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tATeLQL-B74> > [Accessed 5 June 2021].

⁷ Stephen Gwynn, 'Classic and Contemporary Poetry: A SONG OF DEFEAT, by STEPHEN LUCIUS GWYNN', *Poetry Explorer*, Available at < <https://www.poetryexplorer.net/poem.php?id=10065153> > [Accessed 18 June 2021].

⁸ David Benson, 'A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century Barbara W Tuchman', *The Spectator*, Book Review (1979).

The 1798 Wolfe Tone revolt, inspired by French and American rebellions, featuring the crude violence of the British with their pitchcapping in response to rising sectarianism; Robert Emmet's rebellion in 1803, again playing on these underlying Catholic/ Protestant conflicts; the 1848 attempt to grab power which saw Republicans again starved of victory as the country was starving of famine; and the 1867 Fenian uprising built on land and tenure issues – all led the revolts of the early twentieth century. As, it is not just failure that links these events, but three shared points of discontent: land, religion, and power imbalance. These points, which entrenched factionalism within the country, stood at the vanguard of the 1916 Easter Rising, and War of Independence;⁹ yet the Treaty attempted to resolve them. In addition, the main protagonists involved in these negotiations formed relationships and more particularly – alliances – in these earlier conflicts. James Connolly, co-founder of the Irish Citizen's Army, a group closely aligned with unionists and central to the Rising of 1916, had Marxist affiliations – reflective of a changing attitude in the populous mid-World War I as people became more aware of working towards a nationalistic effort. His merciless murder in Kilmainham Gaol in 1916 swayed public opinion against the British,¹⁰ which would later help momentum in formulating the Treaty as the British were pushed into a truce, and his experiences in the United States enabled him to gain invaluable negotiation experience teaching the rebels to fight with words, in addition to their fists. Similarly educated in the art of diplomacy in the US, De Valera and *Sinn Féin* saw power shift from Charles Parnell, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, and John Redman, following the debatable collapse of the *Home Rule Act* of 1914,¹¹ as it fell through, but a fourth Act replaced it,¹² to them and he therefore should have been present for negotiations in London in 1921. However, the compromise that the Irish had to make on land settlement likely prevented this duplicitous leader from wanting to be tarnished by it. Ergo, his 'mild rivalry'¹³ with Collins – which began in 1916 – forced this "soldier" to act against "his best Judgement"¹⁴ and go to London in De Valera's place. Collins, head of the more militant Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB or *Fenians*) from 1919 had seen this organisation split from *Sinn Féin* in the Rising and likely still saw this fight over Irish soil being settled in Ireland despite

⁹ Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 1, Lecture 1*.

¹⁰ History.com Editors, 'Easter Rising', *HISTORY*, (2009), Available at < <https://www.history.com/topics/british-history/easter-rising> > [Accessed 22 June 2021].

¹¹ Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 61*.

¹² The fourth Act was the *Government of Ireland Act* in 1920, which saw Ireland split into North and South, from John M. Lynch, 'The Anglo-Irish Problem', *Foreign Affairs*, 50.4 (1972), 601, Available at < www.jstor.org/stable/20037936 > [Accessed 23 June 2021].

¹³ Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 61*.

¹⁴ Michael Collins, from Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 61*.

the focus of sectarian fault lines having moved from Dublin to London - ¹⁵ therefore making him a less appropriate representative in 1921. The seeds of conflict were clearly sown early on in the Irish delegation party, and yet they were unified in their aims.

Herbert Asquith, Prime Minister from 1908-1916, attempted to forget the 'Irish Question' in the Great War but the Rising prevented its overlooking, and John M. Lynch posits that Lloyd George's 1920 *Government of Ireland Act* saw the problem 'shelved' by 'partition', 'but [it] did not solve' it.¹⁶ Ireland's later conflicts and perhaps the inability, of this Treaty, to meet the Republican's core aim betrays the truth of this. Splitting Ireland's counties, with six in the North and twenty-six in the South in 1920, may appear an arbitrary divide but the desire to paint legitimacy over this split, avoiding further conflict, is evident. Through James Craig - the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland - being hurriedly established in office on 7th June 1921,¹⁷ and how the semantics of 'Prime Minister' play on the formal and authorial connotations of a pre-existing position of power in the British hierarchy - it is little surprise that this Act left tensions for the Treaty to resolve. Lloyd George offered Craig a place on their negotiation team, to which Craig declined - this may appear to betray a support of Irish nationalism; however, with the more conservative element represented by Lord Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor from 1919-1922, with clear unionist leanings, supporting Craig's decision: it was a win for Unionists. Moreover, Craig had played into the trappings of Empire when fighting in the Boer war for the British, underlining his loyalty to the Crown by putting his life on the line to defend it: this war piqued religious conflicts in Ireland whilst converting individuals like Sir Roger Casement, a British diplomat in South Africa and America, to become staunch Republicans.¹⁸ Birkenhead, in Craig's stead, then went as far as to give Northern Ireland the opportunity to remain a part of the UK proper in the final terms of the Treaty.¹⁹ With little hope of reunification, this may have been a marked defeat for Republicans; yet, liberal Lloyd George, who had supported Home Rule since 1886, suggested a *Boundary Commission* to determine the topographical split of Ireland mainland which would be 'compatible with economic and geographic conditions' at a later date. Established in Article 12 of the Treaty, these conditions allowed for the potential of a reduction in Northern Irish

¹⁵ John M. Lynch, 'The Anglo-Irish Problem', 602-603.

¹⁶ John M. Lynch, 'The Anglo-Irish Problem', 601.

¹⁷ Scott Edgar, '1st Viscount Craigavon James Craig', *WartimeNI*, Available at < <https://wartimeni.com/person/1st-viscount-craigavon-james-craig/> > [Accessed 23 June 2021].

¹⁸ Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 1, Lecture 1*.

¹⁹ 'The Anglo-Irish Treaty, 6 December 1921', *CAIN Web Service*, Available at < <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/ait1921.htm> > [Accessed 24 June 2021].

territory - with the land passing to the Irish Free State if it became economically unviable to keep. Based off the 1919 Paris Peace Conference discussions, given their flexibility, over boundary revisions for Eastern and Central Europe - the potential for later negotiations and a reunification or the salvaging of more counties from Ulster Unionists left Republicans with hope of their aim being fulfilled at the Commission meeting in 1924-1925.²⁰

A political revolution built on the land, and the Republicans' aim: to see its reunification; this may not have been the outcome of the Treaty, but it did not mark their defeat. Since its conquest in 1144, Ireland's fertile soils have been fed with the blood of 'her children' attempting to free 'her'.²¹ Patrick Pearse, leader of the Rising, mimicked the words of Robert Emmett's proclamation to emphasise the natural progression of every revolutionary attempt to overthrow the British. This feminine personification of Ireland is again employed in the Treaty,²² alluding to this being another attempt; however, this Treaty did not fail - merely compromise. De Valera's earlier July discussions with Lloyd George had revealed the Gaelic omission of 'Republic', merely possessing the Irish translation of the English word - *Poblacht*. A seemingly insignificant game of semantics, but Lloyd George's joke 'the ancient Gaels mustn't have been true Republicans then'²³ and subsequent suggestion of an Irish Free State rather than Republic made it clear that compromise would be required to pass the Treaty. Collins, therefore, despite understanding that he was 'sign[ing] his death warrant', when accepting the Treaty - likely did so in an attempt to avoid more bloodshed after the 1400 killed in the War of Independence.²⁴ Moreover, he, like Griffiths, believed that through the Treaty Ireland was being given the 'freedom', in spite of the compromises made, 'to achieve freedom'.²⁵ Although, knowing that his death would come from being *Fine Gael*, as he was that bit more sympathetic to the British, betraying the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and *Fenians* through compromise - this optimism may have been an attempt to save himself. Late nineteenth century Charles Parnell's creation of the Irish National Land League almost certainly inspired this. This organisation attempted to increase private ownership by Irish tenants and eradicate

²⁰ 'Boundary Commission', *Encyclopedia.com*, Available at < <https://www.encyclopedia.com/international/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/boundary-commission> > [25 June 2021].

²¹ 'POBLACHT NA hÉIREANN', *An Phoblacht*, Available at < <https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/22881> > [Accessed 12 June 2021].

²² In Article 6 of the Treaty, the Irish Free State is allowed to 'undertake *her* own coastal defence', from 'The Anglo-Irish Treaty, 6 December 1921'.

²³ Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 61*.

²⁴ Michael Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence* (Gill & Macmillan, 2002), pp. 201–202.

²⁵ Michael Collins, from Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 61*.

landlordism.²⁶ Parnell proved that in order to enact more radical change, seemingly moderate change needed to be pushed through legally in Parliament. After the Great Famine, which occurred from 1845-1852 and caused the deaths of approximately one million people,²⁷ almost seeing its resurgence,²⁷ and Parnell's influence enabling small peasant proprietors to become the conservative petit bourgeoisie: friction between the British and Irish was compiled with that between the emerging classes. This belligerent view to the ascendancy classes was not helped by Sir Charles Trevelyan, Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, falling into the 'Malthusian trap'²⁸ of seeing the land of Ireland being stymied by war and famine as a deserved outcome of particularly Catholic families having so many children and therefore failing to administer 'relief' to the 'millions of Irish peasants suffering' in the famine.²⁹ The *Fenians*, or members of the IRB, later under Michael Collins, would remember this as the genocide it was under the British - fuelling Irish delegates' bids to take back ownership of the land.

Perhaps it was just Anglo-Irish tensions that remained, as whilst Parnell was working with Michael Davitt, class conflicts were overcome. The rent strikes following Gladstone offering the Land Act in 1881,³⁰ lead figures like Sidney Webb to perceive a pastoral-political link as the unrest aided Parnell's later *Home Rule* campaign. When Lloyd George attempts to be the liberal in the 1921 delegations, he plays on these politics, attempting to bridge *Home Rule*, with his *Boundary Commission*. Yet, the land which unified a people was also its sole cause for their divide. With the creation of *Fianna Fáil* and *Fine Gael*, Ireland's two largest political parties created after the Civil War in the late 1920s/ early 1930s but initially established factions arguing over the Treaty,³¹ it is clear that class divide was not healed by the American influence which encouraged Ireland to move from a backwater to a modern, prosperous country through industrialisation, the establishment of an independent parliament in 1782, and Gratton's creation of the United Irish League in 1898. With *Fine Gael* being tough on paramilitaries -

²⁶ Philip Bull, *Land, politics and nationalism: A study of the Irish Land Question* (Gill & Macmillan, 1996), p.24.

²⁷ C.O. Gràda, 'The Population of Ireland 1700-1900: A Survey', *Annales de Démographie Historique*, (1979), 283, Available at < https://www.persee.fr/doc/adh_0066-2062_1979_num_1979_1_1425 > [Accessed 2 June 2021].

²⁸ Geoffrey Gilbert, 'Introduction', in *Thomas Malthus: An Essay on the Principle of Population*, ed. by Geoffrey Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. viii.

²⁹ Tomás O'Riordan, 'Multitext Project in Irish History: Charles Edward Trevelyan', *University College Cork*, Available from < http://multitext.ucc.ie/d/Charles_Edward_Trevelyan > [Accessed 4 June 2021].

³⁰ Ely M. Janis, *A Greater Ireland: The Land League and Transatlantic Nationalism in Gilded Age America* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), pp. 26-27.

³¹ Mel Farrell, *Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil: 'Civil War' Parties?*, Available at < <http://www.theirishstory.com/2020/05/26/fine-gael-and-fianna-fail-civil-war-parties/> > [Accessed 29 June 2021].

despite their Black and Tans being more unkempt and perhaps brutal than the *Fenians* - and loyal to the British state, therefore largely Protestant and the latter despite rejecting abstentionism, being opposed to the Treaty, aiming to republicanise the Irish Free State from within by forming an economic autarky which appealed to the more working class and Catholic populous.³² This makes Pearse's painting of a unified identity, when discussing the 'right' of 'ownership',³³ even more shocking. However, he merely mimics Davitt's motto 'The land of Ireland for the people of Ireland',³⁴ and Parnell and Davitt's legal attempts at emancipation evidently inspired the Republican's Treaty negotiations. This evolution evidently builds up to the Treaty being the Republicans' most successful attempt at fulfilling the new nationalism proposed by previous episodes: that the people of Ireland be allowed to be patriotic of an Irish Ireland, for it is not that they are unpatriotic, but that the British are asking them to be proud of a land, a *patria* that is not theirs.

The semantics of nationhood appear trivial; however, paired with the loss of vast swathes of land the Treaty's conclusion saw a marked defeat for Republicans. Britain's two central aims were to ensure that Ireland remain a part of the British Empire, with a 'Dominion' status, and keep Britain safe. It was feared that a free Ireland would ally with British enemies, as the Republicans under Pearse had done when planning to use German arms as reinforcement of their own in the Rising,³⁵ and so the British proposed 'treaty' ports as a way of protecting the British Isles' coastline. Although these consternations were evidently well grounded it is more probable that they were being wolves in sheep's clothing, disguising this grab for power and land under concerns for safety. By ceding to the British request and granting them control of three ports: Queenstown, Lough Swilly and Berehaven, the delegates were sacrificing Irish sovereignty, a clear loss for Republicanism. Moreover, the distinction between Republic and Dominion was incredibly significant to De Valera, as it marked the juxtaposition between enslaved and free. The British not only wanted the Irish to be a part of the Empire but possess a Commonwealth status: both aims which were largely met by the Treaty. Despite his absence, De Valera insisted on *External Association* - encouraging Griffiths to reintroduce the proposal on 24th October 1921. This absence was a defeat keenly felt in these negotiations as

³² Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 61*.

³³ 'POBLAUGHT NA hÉIREANN', *An Phoblacht*.

³⁴ Sidney Webb, *The Basis and Policy of Socialism* (London: A. C. Fifield, 1908), p. 72.

³⁵ John Dorney, 'The Weapons of 1916', *Independent.ie*, Available at < <https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/1916/the-rising-explained/the-weapons-of-1916-34505344.html> > [Accessed 8 June 2021].

the *Association* would grant Ireland its Republic status, but little else was clear to anybody besides De Valera as to what the additional terms were. Lloyd George declined and insisted that the status of Dominion was as far as the British were willing to concede. Consequently, a deadlock began, lasting from 14th November to 2nd December.³⁶ Returning to Dublin to consult with De Valera, his resolve in settling for nothing but Irish Unity left the Irish delegates weakened by leashes of no movement to compromise. It is therefore possible that the British were trying to offer them as much freedom as they could, this Treaty did - according to Geoghegan - salvage the reputation of the British from that of brutal oppressors to reasonable negotiators;³⁷ yet this is unlikely. Again, the Republicans saw defeat at the hands of their President. However, it was not a complete defeat as although the Irish Free State did become a Dominion - its citizens first got to swear an oath of loyalty to itself before the crown, and their own Parliament and Army were sanctioned.³⁸

The British only gained so greatly in the delegations through underhanded practices, if they had been more lenient, they perhaps would not have lost so much following the Treaty - ultimately, the Republicans won. The Irish faced no loss of character in the delegations, and it was perhaps their greatest defeat - the point of Ulster - which saw Lloyd George overstep the acceptable, encroaching upon the Republicans' good will too far and perhaps it was that which compelled them to later make the Free State into a Republic, legally.³⁹ By depriving the Irish Delegates of De Valera, the more extreme and unrelenting politician, and current head of the *Dáil*, Collins and Griffiths were almost set up to fail. As WT Cosgrave, President of the Irish Free State from 1922-1932, concurs, it was as if 'they were leaving their ablest player in reserve'.⁴⁰ Although logistical excuses were made, such as the *Dáil* and De Valera being symbols of Republicanism, and the delegates being able to, in fact advised to, return to the President to discuss major issues - giving them a chance to make a plan if discussions broke down: it was likely the minor rivalry with Collins and tarnish that De Valera was attempting to avoid which caused this absence. However, this exposed the inexperienced Griffiths to the 'Welsh Wizard' Lloyd George, whose political cunning enabled him to get Griffiths to promise, in a private

³⁶ Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 62*.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ They achieved this in the 1949 *Republic of Ireland Act*, and it is highly unlikely that the Act would have gone through if not for the legal delegatory attempts of 1921, from History.com Editors, 'Irish Free State declared'.

⁴⁰ WT Cosgrave, from David McCullagh, 'Truce and Treaty: Why did de Valera not lead the delegation sent to London?', *The Irish Times*, Available at < <https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/truce-and-treaty-why-did-de-valera-not-lead-the-delegation-sent-to-london-1.4552357> > [Accessed 29 June 2021].

conversation, not to relent on Ulster if they disagreed at a later point. From this Lloyd George threatened Collins, when he attempted to negotiate on the North, with an immediate resumption of unconditional war with the British. As head of the IRB and an organiser of the IRA, Collins knew that they lacked the armaments, reinforcements and that their soldiers were too tired of fighting to resume the war.⁴¹ This demonstrates Britain's clever outmanoeuvring of the Republicans, as Lloyd George leaned on a weaker member and then used inside intelligence against the Irish to best them, marking their defeat. Lloyd George then explained that he would send one of two letters to Craig, one resuming the fight and the other declaring peace, forcing the men to sign the Treaty. As plenipotentiaries, the men were given the authority to sign, fearing that the phone lines were bugged and with De Valera visiting IRA elements in Galway and Limerick they had no choice but to sign. Such Machiavellian stratagems resulted in an outcome which seemed to favour the British; however, by psephologically examining the Treaty being voted through in the House of Commons on 16th December 1921 at 401 votes for and 58 against, compared with the 64 votes for and 57 against in the *Dáil* on 7th January 1922:⁴² it is clear that the results were too close for peace.

An eighteenth-century Protestant ascendancy fighting a Catholic emancipation movement, emerging classes conflicting with a pre-existing hierarchy, and the ambiguities over Anglo-Irish 'ownership' of the land fed this fight: a battle that the Treaty proves, could only be won with words. De Valera's absence arguably marked the greatest defeat for the Republicans, as his uncompromising stance left Griffiths' inexperience to be exploited and his plenipotentiaries signing an agreement that he did not agree with. Therefore, the Treaty of 1921 led to more violence, a Civil War, which devastated Ireland's people and yet it provided the 'freedom' which Collins promised his people their sacrifice would enable.⁴³ Although the Republicans made far more allowances than the British, this defeat shaped the next decade of conflicts and enabled Republicans to ultimately liberate far more of Ireland than Lloyd George ever would have conceded in this battle of words. Ergo, this Treaty marked a short-term defeat for Republicans, but became a watershed moment in the war of Irish emancipation.

⁴¹ Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 61*.

⁴² History.com Editors, 'Irish Free State declared'.

⁴³ Michael Collins, from Patrick Geoghegan, *Week 13, Lecture 61 - The Anglo Irish Treaty*, online lecture, YouTube, 18 December 2015, Available at < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXAoRWZvjDA> > [Accessed 25 June 2021].

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