

8 Inclusion and difference

A phenomenological perspective

As a response to exclusionary educational practices as well as a growing trend towards pluralism in society, inclusion has become a significant factor in education debates, so also in the area of physical education (e.g. Dagkas and Armour, 2013; Goodwin and Watkinson, 2000). The premise of the next two chapters is that physical education – and therefore by implication any pedagogical model for physical education – must deal adequately with the challenges of inclusion.

The issue of inclusion is important to a discussion of movement literacy as a pedagogical model for physical education for several reasons. First of all, physical literacy as developed by Whitehead has from its start emphasized the importance of understanding literacy in relation to each individual's 'endowment'. However, as noted earlier, the physical literacy literature has exhibited some difficulty with the role of endowment, for example when it is assumed that pupils who are labelled obese have lower levels of physical literacy (Gately, 2010). This indicates the need for further work on how literacy in movement contexts can deal with individual differences.

Second, the phenomenological foundation of movement literacy and in particular the phenomenology of the body are often criticized for being essentialist and for being too general and incapable of addressing questions crucial to inclusion, namely, questions of power and how individual experiences are shaped by social contexts. As Shusterman (2012, p. 5) puts it:

The definite article in [philosophy of the body] suggests a dangerous essentialism or uniformity about our embodiment, as if we are dealing with only one single thing – 'the body' – rather than doing justice to the diversity of our bodies (in terms of gender, age, and ethnicity, for example) and the different ways of experiencing them.

Larsson and Quennerstedt (2012) levelled a similar criticism against Whitehead's work, arguing that all phenomenological approaches, including physical literacy, are problematic due to their commitment to monism,¹ and that 'understanding movement as universal leads to the same tendency of decontextualizing movements as do conventional dualist perspectives, like those

underpinning motor development testing' (p. 294). Part of this chapter is devoted to rebutting this assertion by showing that phenomenology is indeed capable of understanding movement and difference, and that it is erroneous to say that all forms of phenomenology decontextualize movements. To the contrary, as I will argue, phenomenology provides theoretical resources that can be extremely useful for analysing movement experiences and inclusion in physical education.

A third reason for connecting movement literacy and inclusion is the concept of capability. Whitehead (2010) invokes this concept with reference to Martha Nussbaum's list of essential capabilities (see Chapter 9). Physical literacy, Whitehead observes, 'does not fit neatly into' Nussbaum's theory, but there are 'a number of key features in [Nussbaum's] description of capabilities that lead to the categorization of physical literacy as a capability' (p. 18). My concern is not so much whether or not physical literacy should be categorized as a capability. Rather, from my perspective, it is how Nussbaum uses her capabilities approach to outline a theory of social justice, that makes it a useful tool for understanding inclusion as an ethical dimension in physical education. Most importantly in this context, her theory can help specify what a pedagogical model, such as one for physical education, must include to be minimally just.

This chapter will deal with the first two of these three reasons. By outlining a phenomenological approach to inclusion and difference, I hope to lay the foundation for a discussion of the normative decisions that teachers must make when they attempt to establish an inclusive physical education curriculum.

Inclusion and difference

As societies, schools and physical education classes become more heterogeneous, the topic of inclusion has become increasingly important. This section will explore the concept of inclusion and its relationship to individual differences in physical education. Establishing a physical education programme that is truly inclusive – both in its curriculum and in everyday pedagogical practice – is an ethical challenge. Ensuring social justice in physical education requires respecting and celebrating individual differences, as well as a fair and equitable distribution of its benefits.

Inclusion: a complex concept

As Kirk (2010) has pointed out, contemporary physical education reproduces rather than challenges social inequalities in areas such as gender, disability, social class and ethnicity. The history of physical education (and schools in general) is replete with exclusionary practices (Reid, 2003). These practices have been documented by many researchers (e.g. Goodwin and Watkinson, 2000; Goodwin and Fitzgerald, 2009; Svendby and Dowling, 2013). With

respect to pupils who experience disability, efforts to counter exclusion have traditionally taken the form of mainstreaming or integration, i.e. placing these pupils in the same school environment as every other child (Reid, 2003). Similarly, girls and boys now participate in physical education classes together, whereas formerly they were taught separately, with different curricula (in some societies, this is still the case) (Penney, 2002).

Over the past two decades, inclusion has emerged as a progressive alternative to integration (Vislie, 2003). Although these two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, the differences in their meaning are particularly significant in the case of special needs education. Integration, as Vislie (2003) points out, is an effort to counter segregation and exclusion. It has three distinct foci: securing the right to education, ensuring that this education takes place in the local school rather than in special facilities, and including special needs pupils in mainstream classes. Inclusion is more comprehensive. As proclaimed in the Salamanca Declaration on Special Needs Education (UNESCO, 1994), inclusion is a process that pertains to all pupils as individuals rather than to individual pupils or specific groups of pupils. Finally, inclusion should be seen as a continuing effort to make curricula and school cultures flexible, open and accepting of difference.

Integration was primarily concerned with efforts to counteract the segregation and exclusion of pupils who experience disability. Inclusion has a broader meaning. As Ainscow and Cesar (2006) have pointed out, the assumption that inclusion is about pupils who experience disability and/or have been assessed as having special needs 'has been questioned, since, in attempting to increase the participation of students, it focuses on a "disabled" or "special needs" part of them and ignores all the other ways in which participation for any student may be impeded or enhanced' (p. 233). Inclusion, in contrast, can be defined as a response to the needs and interests of pupils from a variety of groups who are at risk of being excluded. Although this way of understanding inclusion suggests that some common processes may underlie the experiences of members of different groups who experience exclusion, it perpetuates what we might call 'group thinking', i.e. the idea that any commonalities among individuals who are designated as members of a group constitute their dominant identity. This perspective ignores the differences that surely exist among individuals assigned to any such group. In response, some scholars have advocated understanding inclusion as a comprehensive way of thinking about schools and education for all, which would entail viewing each pupil as an individual rather than as a member of a specific group (Ainscow and Cesar, 2006).

This disagreement is evident in recent literature on physical education and sports. In their book *Inclusion and Exclusion Through Youth Sport*, Macdonald and colleagues (Macdonald et al., 2012, p. 21) warn that thinking about inclusion in terms of groups is problematic: 'those who are not included [...] are positioned as a "problem" [...] this approach serves to reproduce a biologically predetermined group membership where the classification of "the

group" [...] is spurious and potentially limiting'. In other words, 'group thinking' is problematic because it positions individuals in groups that may not be relevant to their lived experiences. In addition, being positioned in a specific group may even have negative consequences for the individual members, for instance due to stigmatization and stereotyping. However, on the very same page the authors note that many chapters in their book 'will outline the experiences of those individuals and groups who have been excluded' (ibid.). At first glance, warning against the problems inherent in categorizing individuals by group and then presenting chapters in which individuals are discussed in terms of their group membership is contradictory. However, I would argue that the authors' approach reflects a paradox in inclusion: Individual differences must always be seen in relation to what they differ from. In the process of identifying either yourself or others as being different, you are also taking on (or ascribing) an identity of being similar to others with the same identity and different from those who do not share it.

Inclusion is thus a complex concept which is under debate, where some see inclusion as a being about responding to groups of pupils who are at risk of being excluded and others who see inclusion as a more radical and transformative approach. As such, there is a potential conflict between inclusion as a general process of relevance to all pupils and the need for additional educational efforts that some pupils may need or benefit from.

Difference and equity

As the previous section indicates, the relationship between inclusion and difference is important and complex. Both terms can be interpreted in different ways, partly depending on the writer's theoretical standpoint. Discussing the implications of difference in physical education, Flintoff and Fitzgerald (2012) observe that 'how differences are conceived and which differences get noted, and why some, and not others, are viewed as significant or relevant, and by whom, are all important questions for those wishing to *make* a difference in education' (p. 16). They go on to identify three theoretical 'waves' commonly applied in analysing difference: categorical, relational and postmodern/post-structural research.

Categorical research identifies categories of difference, such as gender, ethnicity, disability or social class and highlights differences between individuals belonging to different categories. This approach is useful in identifying potential inequalities between different categories (e.g. differences in participation in sports between men and women). Usually, it is not concerned with distinguishing differences within a particular group. In other words, this approach is not particularly well suited to discerning how individuals grouped into a particular category differ from each other.

Relational research examines how differences within and between groups vary historically and culturally. It seeks to 'understand how inequalities are produced and reproduced through everyday practices and institutions across

different contexts' (p. 20). Thus, this theoretical perspective introduces the notion of power and how physical education is linked to structures of inequality in the wider society.

Finally, postmodern/post-structural research asks questions about the very relevance of binary categories (boy/girl, disabled/non-disabled), asserting that such categories are static and not sufficiently capable of explaining how identities and subjectivities are shifting and unstable. This theoretical wave sees individual experiences as shaped by power and socio-cultural resources that are highly complex and shifting. In the field of research on physical education, Flintoff and Fitzgerald note (2012, p. 27), the many versions of 'post-theorizing ... [are] interested in exploring how young people are differently positioned in relation to gender, "race", class, sexuality, disability or religion to benefit from particular truths within PE, sport and health'.

Both theorizing and research on the role of difference in physical education grapple with issues of equity and social justice; how current (and envisioned) practice is (or is not) contributing to a fair distribution of benefits and outcomes of participation and learning. As noted by Penney (2002), equity in physical education means that difference must not be construed as a deficit or a lack of something. Rather, equity demands that differences are not only recognized and respected, they are seen as a resource and an enrichment that can facilitate valuable learning experiences for all pupils (Esser-Noethlich, 2011).

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, phenomenology is often considered to be incapable of dealing with difference and social justice. At least, this seems to be the perception in the physical education literature (e.g. Larsson and Quennerstedt, 2012). In a review of Stolz's (2014) book on the philosophy of physical education, which takes a phenomenological approach, Pringle (2014) argues that

as a critical sociologist, I am not sold on Merleau-Ponty's *phenomenological and seemingly 'asocial' or individualistic approach* [as detailed by Stolz] for understanding how humans construct meaning ... Stolz, in my subjective view, *tends to neglect the influence of the social and the workings of power in understanding how humans negotiate embodied experiences.*

(pp. 280–281, italics added)

Even though Pringle specifies that he is criticizing Stolz's approach to phenomenology, rather than phenomenology *per se*, given the frequency of this type of criticism, it is incumbent upon researchers using a phenomenological approach to explain why this criticism does not apply to their work. In other words, we need to show that phenomenology is indeed capable of working with 'the influence of the social and the workings of power.' This is particularly important in the context of the topics dealt with this chapter, and inspires the following discussion of queer phenomenology.

Queering phenomenology

Recent developments in phenomenology provide ample evidence of its interest in and capacity for understanding how social structures shape embodied experiences. Two excellent examples are the scholars Iris Marion Young – in particular her classic essay, 'Throwing Like a Girl' (Young, 1998a) – and Sara Ahmed, who has produced seminal work on queer phenomenology and inclusion (Ahmed, 2006; Ahmed, 2012).

Throwing like a girl

The essay 'Throwing Like a Girl' was first published in 1980.² In this essay, Young observes that when girls throw, they generally do not make full use of the body's spatial and lateral potential. She points out that this is a general feature of feminine comportment,³ in which movements

have in common first that the whole body is not put into fluid and directed motion, but rather, in swinging and hitting, for example, the motion is concentrated in one body part; and second that the woman's motion tends not to reach, extend, lean, stretch, and follow through in the direction of her intention.

(p. 263)

Referring to Simone de Beauvoir's existential, phenomenological work, Young argues that femininity in movement is not caused by biology, anatomy or physiology, but by 'structures and conditions that delimit the typical situation of being a woman in a particular society' (p. 261).

On the basis of her analysis, Young delineates three modalities of feminine movement, namely ambiguous transcendence, inhibited intentionality and discontinuous unity. In the case of throwing, ambiguous transcendence is represented by the lack of whole-body involvement in the throwing motion. According to Merleau-Ponty, the lived body is characterized by its transcendence, i.e. its capacities for projecting out from the body's immanence toward the world. Young, in contrast, observes that when parts of the body are not engaged in the act of throwing, they remain rooted in immanence, thus making the body's transcendence ambiguous. She also argues that by not making full use of the body's potential for movement, 'feminine bodily existence is an inhibited intentionality, which simultaneously reaches towards a projected end with an "I can," and withholds its full bodily commitment to that end in a self-imposed "I cannot"' (p. 265). As elaborated in Chapter 3, embodied learning consists of the experience of a harmony between what the mover seeks to achieve and her performance.⁴ Inhibited intentionality breaks this intimate relationship between aim and act. In her discussion of discontinuous unity, Young posits two dimensions. One of these dimensions is the discontinuous unity with oneself, in the sense that while some parts of the body

transcend to achieve the aim of the movement, other parts remain immobile and immanent. The other is a discontinuous unity between the body's capacities and the possibilities that exist in the movement environment.

While all three modalities are illustrated by the body's movement, Young also takes care to show the spatial dimensions of these experiences. The ambiguous transcendence of the body simultaneously implies that it does not use all of the space available for movement. In the context of movement literacy's aim of taking full advantage of the body's capacity to read and write the movement environment, Young's approach would suggest that the objective should be to encourage pupils to make fuller use of the space they already inhabit for movement. In other words, physical education should promote a form of critical movement literacy (Wright and Burrows, 2006) that enables pupils to understand the environment which is available to them critically, as well as make to use of it. In addition, they should become capable of expanding their own possibilities by writing (creating) a movement environment that is friendlier and more inclusive of their own movement needs and interests.

Young (1998a) goes on to elaborate on discontinuity:

[A] distinction between space that is 'yonder' and not linked with my own body possibilities and the enclosed space that is 'here,' which I inhabit with my bodily possibilities, is an expression of the discontinuity between aim and capacity to realize the aim that I have articulated.

(p. 268)

In this sense, the experience of discontinuous space is remarkably similar to Toombs' (2001, p. 249) description of the experience of living with a motor disability: 'Locomotion opens up space, allowing one freely to change position and move towards objects in the world. Loss of mobility anchors one in the Here, engendering a heightened sense of distance between oneself and surrounding things.' The parallels between female and disabled movement experiences was also noted by Young (1998a), who asserted that 'women in sexist society are physically handicapped ... physically inhibited, confined, positioned and objectified' (p. 269). Even though we have to take care to avoid conflating analogous experiences, it seems evident that the processes of oppression and exclusion that women and people with disabilities experience in movement contexts have strong structural similarities. In both cases, it can be argued that a lack of opportunities and acquisition of specific habits hinders the full exploitation of one's movement potential.

Although 'Throwing Like a Girl' was informed by Merleau-Ponty's account of embodiment and movement, Young (1998b) notes that he could be criticized for not examining whether and how bodies that are differently gendered express differing subjectivities. In developing her concept of 'gendered modalities of the general categories of body experience and spatiality Merleau-Ponty theorizes' (Young, 1998b, p. 287), she draws on Simone de

Beauvoir's existential, phenomenological framework. This enables her to show how phenomenology can indeed take difference, social structures and power issues into account. Young (2005) goes on to caution that 'after reading Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, Deleuze, Irigaray, and Bourdieu, we cannot be so innocent as to believe that phenomenology can discover a 'pure' embodied experience prior to ideology and science' (p. 8). That noted, she argues that existential phenomenology offers an excellent framework for a theory of embodied subjectivity that can (and should) be sensitive to difference. Such a phenomenology would complement post-structural and postmodern theories, rather than duplicate them.

Several earlier chapters in this book have offered a more or less explicit critique of what I would call total subjectification of the body, i.e. the idea that the body can be understood as a pure subject. For example, although an important and valid critique is often levelled against physical education practices that objectify the body in instrumental ways, this criticism may lead to its opposite: an over-emphasis on the subjective aspects of embodiment. My argument about the necessity of bodily objectifications (Chapters 6 and 7) and the intimate relationship between the body as a knowledge object and the embodied, knowing subject in practical knowledge, is consistent with Young's (1998a) point that 'for feminine existence the body is frequently both subject and object for itself at the same time and in reference to the same act' (p. 266). Although Young's point is slightly different, in the sense that it offers a perspective on bodily objectifications (for instance, how women in movement experience are objects of the gaze of others) that I have not explored so far, her contributions certainly support the argument that phenomenology can be a valuable tool for understanding difference and diversity in physical education. The next part of this section will develop this point further through a discussion of Sara Ahmed's work on queer phenomenology and its relevance to inclusive physical education.

Queer phenomenology and inclusive physical education

Queer phenomenology is a term coined by Sara Ahmed (2006). To understand her argument, we can begin by looking at the meaning of the word queer. Etymologically, it means twisted or crossed, and Ahmed states that one way of using the word is to signify specific non-normative sexual practices 'seen as odd, bent, twisted' (p. 161). The second traditional way that the term queer has been used, according to Ahmed, is to describe what is oblique; in other words, something that deviates from the line. (Interestingly, the same meanings exist in Norwegian: queer as in sexual orientation is commonly denoted as *skeiv*, which is also the word used for an oblique angle. Tellingly, in geometry the oblique angle deviates from the normal line.) One of Ahmed's central points concerning queer phenomenology is that bodies are oriented and straightened by taking up time and space. She makes a connection between the basic phenomenological idea that consciousness is always oriented and the concept of sexual orientation⁵:

The question of orientation becomes, then, a question not only about how we 'find our way, but how we come to feel at home' [...]. Familiarity is shaped by the 'feel' of space or by how spaces 'impress' upon bodies. This familiarity is an effect of inhabitation; we are not simply in the familiar, but rather the familiar is shaped by actions that reach out towards objects that are already within reach.

(p. 7)

For Ahmed, becoming oriented is a process of making the unknown known through the unfolding of bodies in a space. Certain spaces allow some bodies to extend, while other bodies may not be extended in the same way, or at all. This is consistent with Young's point that feminine movement fails to take full advantage of the potentialities of either the body or the space around it.

Ahmed's analysis of 'doing things' is relevant to inclusive physical education. In physical education, we are constantly doing things in the sense that taking part in its actions, activities and practices involves objects that we manipulate and play with. Drawing on Heidegger's concept of equipmentality, Ahmed notes that 'what makes an object "itself" is what it allows us to do, and that "doing" takes the object out of itself and makes it "point" towards something, whether that something is an action or other objects' (p. 46). In other words, the objects used in physical education, such as balls, bean bags, volleyball nets, gymnastics apparatus and so forth, are defined by their use. When they are used in the context of physical education, they become pedagogical objects.

Ahmed argues that the use of objects does not extend to all bodies equally: 'An object tends towards some bodies more than others, depending on the "tendencies" of bodies' (s. 51). And what happens, she asks, when pedagogical objects fail to do the work they were intended to? For instance, when the jump box is too high for some pupils to surmount, the box as a pedagogical object fails to extend those pupils who are not able to jump over it. Ahmed understands these failures to be 'about the loss of capacity to perform an action for which the object was intended' (p. 49), and argues that they are not caused by properties of the object in itself or the subject working with the object. Rather, she asserts, the failure occurs in the relationship or interplay between objects and subjects; it is a failure to extend bodies: 'It would be the failure of subjects and objects to work together. The failure would be the failure of the object to enable the action with which it is identified' (p. 50).

One of the useful concepts that Ahmed develops is the 'straightening device', which I understand as a process of straightening what is queer or oblique so that it follows the 'normal' or straight line. Social expectations are one example of a straightening device, hetero-normativity is another. I would suggest that physical education has incorporated a number of straightening devices. One vivid historical example is Ling gymnastics, which was also known as line gymnastics: Pupils were placed in a straight line and their

bodies were disciplined through following the teacher's instructions precisely, like a chorus line. Similar, contemporary examples include aerobics or other fitness activities in which participants are also lined up and expected to move in sync, again following the instructions of the trainer exactly. Yet another example is sports techniques that specify a (bio-mechanical) movement pattern and correct deviations from the normative ideal. In all these examples, the condition for bodies to be extended in space is that they follow the supposedly correct, straight line. Bodies that fail to, or refuse to, stay in that line are regarded as queer or deviant. Straightening devices in physical education, then, are educational processes based on normative ideas of how a particular movement or activity should be performed. These ideas are put into practice through teaching and the pedagogical use of certain objects. In this sense, straightening devices are potential producers of exclusion.

In discussing colour, Ahmed shows what happens when queer moments arise, for example when coloured bodies are present in rooms filled with whiteness. The presence of such bodies disrupts the line: 'The proximity of such *bodies out of place* can work to make things seem "out of line", and can hence even work to "queer" space; people "blink" and do "double turns" when they encounter such bodies' (s. 161). Queer moments in which bodies of difference are suddenly noticed arise frequently in physical education, as is evident from a large body of research documenting the experiences of girls, pupils who experience disability, pupils from certain ethnic or religious minorities, and pupils who openly express a commitment to queer sexual practices. This research indicates that pupils who experience having a body 'out of place' are either sidelined (excluded) or exposed to straightening devices designed to bring them back to the norm, the straight line. In this context, I believe it is important to note that failure of achieving what one aims for does not necessarily constitute a queer moment. If the notion of a queer moment is going to be meaningful, there must be a certain repetition or habituality in these experiences. Ahmed is not so much concerned about avoiding⁶ such queer moments as she is in inquiring into what happens when queer moments arise and how we should meet queer moments.

Critical movement literacy

Earlier in this chapter, I made a passing reference to the concept of critical movement literacy, citing an article by Jan Wright and Lisette Burrows (2006) in which they discussed Evans' (2004) concept of ability. Wright and Burrows (2006) noted that Whitehead's use of the concept literacy is promising, but added this caveat:

What [physical literacy] doesn't have is any reference to the social and cultural contexts in which we learn and use movement; it does not acknowledge how particular repertoires of being, including movement, are socially constructed in relation to gender, class, race and how

particular forms of movement have relevance for particular social and cultural contexts.

(p. 279)

Wright and Burrows went on to argue that there is need for a *critical* literacy. Using the analogy of reading and writing, they assert that just as people must also be able to recognize the socially structured nature of language and the texts they read and write, a critical movement literacy would require understanding how movements and movement cultures are social products that enable and disable different participants.

Now that I have shown how the phenomenology underpinning movement literacy can meet the criteria that Wright and Burrows set in their critique of Whitehead's work, I will outline what critical movement literacy would involve from a phenomenological perspective. Before doing so, I should caution that my arguments rely on an understanding of the term 'critical' that may differ from the meaning attached to it by critical sociologists/pedagogues. My use of the term is informed by recent work in feminist phenomenology and it highlights the importance of the reconstruction of experience that Dewey (1938) advocated in his educational philosophy.

Sara Ahmed stresses the relationship between inhabitation and difference: In movement contexts, she notes, some bodies have more potential for being extended than others. Their experience is one of inhabitation, of being oriented. Ahmed (2006) discusses this concept in relation to whiteness:

White bodies do not have to face their whiteness; they are not orientated 'toward' it, and this 'not' is what allows whiteness to cohere, as that which bodies are orientated around. By not having to encounter being white as an obstacle, *given that whiteness is 'in line' with what is already given, bodies that pass as white move easily, and this motility is extended by what they move toward.* The white body in this way expands; objects, tools, instruments, and even 'others' allow that body to inhabit space by extending that body and what it can reach. Whiteness becomes habitual in the sense that white bodies extend their reach by incorporating objects that are within reach. To make this point simply: what is 'within reach' also 'extends the reach' of such bodies.

(p. 132, italics added)

It would be possible to substitute 'male', 'heterosexual' or 'non-disabled' for 'white' and Ahmed's argument would still be essentially valid⁷: Norms and expectations allow certain bodies to move with ease, while others have the experience of continuously noticing themselves and how they deviate from these norms and expectations.

The concept of poise, as developed by Samuel Todes (2001), implies that one goal in movement literacy is to enable the moving subject to make the movement environment 'habit-able' (Todes, 2001, p. 65). The contribution of

queer phenomenology is to show that pedagogical practices designed to develop poise must build in attention to difference and, specifically, must structure movement environments so that they are responsive and adaptive to a wide range of movers. I would like to point out that even if physical education were to become a much more inclusive learning environment than it presently appears to be, exclusion and the experience of queer moments will still occur. It is unlikely that there will be such a thing as a barrier-free utopia (Shakespeare, 2006). One of the virtues of critical movement literacy is that it accepts this, and suggests ways of understanding how teachers and pupils should respond to queer moments and make the spaces of physical education habit-able.

This raises the important question: What can (and should) teachers do when queer moments arise? Here, van Manen's (1993) conception of tact as the ability to *see* that a situation calls for sensitivity and an ethically correct *pedagogical response* is instructive. Seeing the situation correctly, it must be noted, is not a neutral process of unbiased observation. Perceptual norms govern what we see and what we miss. Critical movement literacy requires that teachers are alert to queer moments and to how straightening devices produce them. This demands that teachers be sensitive to what Ahmed (2006) refers to as a phenomenology of being stopped: how does it feel to be stopped, in the sense of not being able (habit-able) to express oneself in a specific movement situation? From this perspective, critical movement literacy and, indeed, physical education in general, faces a particular challenge when teachers come from a motor elite, as is often the case, and who have never experienced any problems with movement. Like whiteness, as described above by Ahmed, being *severely able-bodied* may make it difficult for teachers to fully appreciate what pupils experience in being stopped. This is a challenge that physical education teacher education will need to meet as classrooms become more inclusive.

The second part of van Manen's concept – responding with the ethically right pedagogical act – is also a normative issue. In inclusive physical education, the normative guideline would be to choose the pedagogical alternative that is most effective in enabling pupils to experience the environment of movement as habitable. This is a topic that I will return to in the next chapter.

Phenomenological pedagogy could be criticized for placing too much emphasis on the teacher's understanding of pupil experiences. The perspective of critical movement literacy in particular calls for a greater focus on pupils' understanding of their own experiences. This was discussed in Chapter 7, along with suggestions for how pupils' own embodied experience of movement can be elucidated. Here, I will suggest three ways that self-reflection can promote critical movement literacy. First, as Young (1998a) has noted, 'girls and women are not given the opportunity to use their full bodily capacities in free and open engagement with the world, nor are they encouraged as much as boys to develop specific bodily skills' (pp. 269–270). Similarly, Fitzgerald's (2005) research indicates that pupils who experience disability have little opportunity to display and express their abilities because these abilities are

not recognized. Critical movement literacy could respond to this problem by enabling pupils to become fully cognizant of these absences in their experiences and facilitate ways of redeeming this unfortunate situation.

Second, as Young (1998a) notes, girls acquire habits of timidity⁸: their inhabitation is hindered by their adoption of certain forms of movement. In this situation, the role of critical movement literacy should be to help pupils become aware of how what they already know (i.e. their present habits) potentially prevents them from experiencing a freer and more open engagement with their movement environment.

Third, it is important to notice and reflect on the kinds of situations in which pupils' possibilities for inhabitation are limited or prevented by certain normative conventions about how a movement environment should be inhabited. Put differently, this means that pupils should be encouraged to reflect on how straightening devices produce queer moments. In this regard, it's important to recognize that deviating from the straight line is not necessarily a unwanted situation. In a study of the experiences of pupils identifying as lesbians or gays, Walseth and Hæhre (2014) show that some of their participants found positive opportunities in a physical education environment which they experienced as strongly hetero-normative. One opportunity was the potential for queering. That is, by being openly gay and at the same time displaying strength and masculinity, one of the male participants used physical education to contradict stereotypical prejudices of gay men as weak or effeminate. In this case, it is those who harbour stereotypes who might experience the situation as queer. Conversely, a girl in the study who described herself as 'butch' (i.e. having a somewhat masculine identity) used physical education as an opportunity to express herself, rather than conform to normative expectations of how a girl should behave. Thus, the straightening device of hetero-normativity allowed this girl to express her queer identity.

These three points represent experiences that can be a source of learning. They also imply that the pedagogy of Dewey and Shusterman, as outlined in Chapter 7, provides a helpful approach in developing a critical movement literacy. Ultimately, however, to succeed in replacing traditional pedagogies with an approach that is both more inclusive and more effective, critical movement literacy must meet this challenge: It is not sufficient for us to notice our experiences and then critically reflect on how movement and movement contexts are socially constructed in oppressive ways; these reflections must also lead to a new form of doing, to the creation of new habits.

As a final comment, I want to point out how this way of thinking about critical movement literacy relates to inclusion. Ahmed's book *On Being Included* (2012) explores the experiences of diversity workers (i.e. administrators whose task is to promote diversity) at academic institutions. In her conclusion, she reflects on the relationship between knowledge and transformation. Contrasting her views with traditional approaches (e.g. Marx and Freire), Ahmed argues that 'rather than suggesting that knowledge leads (or should lead) to transformation, I offer a reversal that in my view preserves the

point or aim of the argument: transformation, as a form of practical labor, leads to knowledge' (p. 173). In other words, situations in which we confront obstacles that prevent us from advancing in the direction we were going or compel us to stop can generate insight. Becoming aware of queer moments and experiences of exclusion provides both teachers and pupils with opportunities to generate knowledge about inclusion and the processes that might have generated these moments.

Notes

- 1 As noted earlier, although Whitehead identifies herself as a monist, it is manifestly incorrect to assume that this is true of all phenomenologists. Merleau-Ponty, for instance, developed an ontology that was non-dualistic rather than monist.
- 2 In a reflection on 'Throwing Like a Girl' written almost twenty years after its publication, Young (1998b) commented that even though the social contexts in which girls move had changed dramatically, the essay was neither outdated nor irrelevant: '[A]lthough there is something dated about the way the essay expresses its feminist sentiments, [...] many teachers and students have told me that they continue to read the essay and find exciting the discussion it generates' (p. 10).
- 3 'Not only is there a typical style of throwing like a girl, but there is a more or less typical style of running like a girl, climbing like a girl, swinging like a girl, hitting like a girl' (Young, 1998a, p. 263).
- 4 Here, Young quotes Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 167): 'to understand a movement is to experience the harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the performance'.
- 5 At the risk of belaboring this point, it is instructive to see how Ahmed, like Young, sees phenomenology as a useful approach, rather than an obstacle to understanding difference: 'Phenomenology can offer a resource for queer studies as it emphasizes the importance of lived experience, the intentionality of consciousness, the significance of nearness or what is ready-to-hand, and the role of repeated and habitual actions in shaping bodies and worlds' (Ahmed, 2006, p. 2). My contention is that researchers in the field of physical education who claim that phenomenology does not and cannot incorporate an understanding of difference and social forces do not have a thorough understanding of phenomenology's theoretical capacities. My objective is to attempt to trouble those taken for granted viewpoints so that even critical sociologists can think critically about their assumptions concerning phenomenology.
- 6 It might be impossible to avoid the fact that exclusion takes place in society in general and physical education more specifically. Indeed, the whole idea of inclusion would be logically meaningless without the existence of exclusion (Hansen, 2012). This does of course not mean that one should accept exclusion or other processes that assimilate pupils into ethically deplorable practices, but it seems evident that as long as difference is a condition for pedagogical work in physical education, queer moments will arise.
- 7 It becomes more complicated if the white body is also female and disabled. This underscores the importance of considering individual differences rather than group membership.
- 8 E.g. 'subtle habits of feminine bodily comportment – walking like a girl, tilting her head like a girl, standing and sitting like a girl, gesturing like a girl, and so on. The girl learns actively to hamper her movements' (Young, 1998a, p. 270).

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