Connecting the Dots
Tracking Two Identified Terrorists
by Valdis Krebs
Social Network Analysis [SNA] is a mathematical method for
'connecting the dots'. SNA allows us to map and measure complex, and
sometimes covert, human groups and organizations.
Early in 2000, the CIA was informed of two terrorist suspects
linked to al-Qaeda. Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were
photographed attending a meeting of known terrorists in Malaysia.
After the meeting they returned to Los Angeles, where they had
already set up residence in late 1999.
What do you do with these suspects? Arrest or deport them
immediately? No, we need to use them to discover more of the
al-Qaeda network. Once suspects have been discovered, we can use
their daily activities to uncloak their network. Just like they used
our technology against us, we can use their planning process against
them. Watch them, and listen to their conversations to see...
- who they call / email
- who visits with them locally and in other cities
- where their money comes from
The structure of their extended network begins to emerge as data
is discovered via surveillance. A suspect being monitored may have
many contacts -- both accidental and intentional. We must always be
wary of 'guilt by association'. Accidental contacts, like the mail
delivery person, the grocery store clerk, and neighbor may not be
viewed with investigative interest. Intentional contacts are like
the late afternoon visitor, whose car license plate is traced back
to a rental company at the airport, where we discover he arrived
from Toronto (got to notify the Canadians) and his name matches a
cell phone number (with a Buffalo, NY area code) that our suspect
calls regularly. This intentional contact is added to our map and we
start tracking his interactions -- where do they lead? As data comes
in, a picture of the terrorist organization slowly comes into
focus.
How do investigators know whether they are on to something big?
Often they don't. Yet in this case there was another strong clue
that Alhazmi and Almihdhar were up to no good -- the attack on the
USS Cole in October of 2000. One of the chief suspects in the Cole
bombing [Khallad] was also present [along with Alhazmi and
Almihdhar] at the terrorist meeting in Malaysia in January 2000.
Figure 2 shows the two suspects and their immediate ties. All
direct ties of these two hijackers are colored green, and link
thickness indicates the strength of connection.
Once we have their direct links, the next step is to find their
indirect ties -- the 'connections of their connections'. Discovering
the nodes and links within two steps of the suspects usually starts
to reveal much about their network. Key individuals in the local
network begin to stand out. In viewing the network map in Figure 2,
most of us will focus on Mohammed Atta because we now know his
history. The investigator uncloaking this network would not be aware
of Atta's eventual importance. At this point he is just another node
to be investigated.
Figure 3 shows the direct connections of the original suspects as
green links, and their indirect connections as grey links. We now
have enough data for two key conclusions:
- All 19 hijackers were within 2 steps of the two
original suspects uncovered in 2000!
- Social network metrics reveal Mohammed Atta emerging
as the local leader
With hindsight, we have now mapped enough of the 9-11 conspiracy
to stop it. Again, the investigators are never sure they have
uncovered enough information while they are in the process of
uncloaking the covert organization. They also have to contend with
superfluous data. This data was gathered after the event, so the
investigators knew exactly what to look for. Before an event it is
not so easy.
As the network structure emerges, a key dynamic that needs to be
closely monitored is the activity within the network. Network
activity spikes when a planned event approaches. Is there an
increase of flow across known links? Are new links rapidly emerging
between known nodes? Are money flows suddenly going in the opposite
direction? When activity reaches a certain pattern and threshold, it
is time to stop monitoring the network, and time to start removing
nodes.
IMHO this bottom-up approach of uncloaking a network is more
effective than a top down search for the terrorist needle in the
public haystack -- and it is less invasive of the general
population, resulting in far fewer "false positives".
All data for this analysis is 'open source' and was gathered
from public sources on the WWW in late 2001 and early 2002. A more
complete network map of the hijackers and reported others is available. I want to
thank all those who provided constructive feedback on earlier
versions of this document. This white paper was written under the
assumption that all surveillance data is gathered via legal means
and that it will stand up in a court of law.
Update 2005
In August 2005, U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon revealed a similar
network map of 9-11-2001 terrorists that was created in 2000, also
from open source information. The "Able Danger" secret US
intelligence unit supposedly created that network maps. This project
remained controversial throughout 2005. Here is an overview of "Able Danger" -- including blurred
pictures of Able Danger maps.
In December 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush revealed that he
authorized the National Security Agency [NSA] to monitor phone calls
and Internet traffic of US-based people with "terrorist links". My
guess is that once the NSA gathers the data, it is assembled and
analyzed in a fashion very similar to the above scenario.
Update 2006
It appears that the Canadian terror cell that was arrested in
June 2006 was tracked and unraveled in method very similar to what I
describe above. The Toronto Star reported that initially the
suspects were spotted on web sites spewing anti-Western sentiments
and the desire to attack in North America. This gave the Canadian
intelligence community an entry point into the network. Then,
starting at this entry point, they were able to discover others in
the network using normal surveillance methods and linking them
together.
The Baltimore Sun reported that the surveillance received
prior approval:
"Martin Rudner, director of the Canadian Centre of
Intelligence and Security Studies at Carleton University, said the
surveillance of the Toronto cell shows that it is possible to
detect terrorist cells using a system that requires the equivalent
of a search warrant.
Canadian officials had to obtain
permission from a threat-review committee before investigating
Canadian citizens, he said. As a result, he said, all the
information collected should be usable in court."
In August 2006, a large terror plot -- to blow up U.S. passenger
planes crossing the Atlantic Ocean -- was disrupted in England.
The Scotsman reports the following:
Based on the information from Pakistan, MI5 began its watching
operation last year. The BBC last night reported the operation
began in July, but The Scotsman understands it started several
months earlier.
In the initial stages, counter-terrorism
officers watched from a distance. By sifting telephone records,
e-mails and bank records, the MI5 officers built up what insiders
call "concentric circles" of information, gradually connecting
each suspect to others and building up a detailed picture of the
conspiracy.
Concentric circles of 1 and 2 steps? Looks like they followed the
recipe above.
It appears that this terror network was not disrupted by
data mining of massive phone & financial records -- Big Brother
was not involved. An entry point was found into the network,
allowing the activity of the network to reveal the structure of the
network -- all without bothering the other 60,000,000+ UK residents.
Update 2007
Jeff Jonas -- the genius behind NORA
[Non-Obvious Relationship Awareness] -- comments on the congressional debate on data
mining of massive phone-call data:
And for the record, in my opinion, at least in relation to
programs designed to target specific people, predicting which
people should be targeted for additional scrutiny or action should
not be based on machine-discovered patterns when so little
historical training data exists. However, this method does become
useful when first starting with qualified predicates (e.g.,
subjects who attended terrorist training camps). This can
materially assist organizations/governments focus their finite
investigatory resources.
I am so glad when the really smart people came to the same
conclusions that I did! ... ;-)
Software
and Training in social network analysis are available from the
author.
Copyright © 2002-2007, Valdis
Krebs
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