

CHAPTER 6

EVALUATIVE SELF-AWARENESS

It is time for a lightning review. In the first chapter, after outlining some preliminaries for the proposed framework, we described four facets of well-being. In the second chapter, we defined a broadly Kantian element of this framework, according to which any account of well-being should not instrumentalise the person, and instrumentalising oneself would count against one's well-being. In the third, we explained the non-instrumental value of the activities, experiences and processes that constitute a life in such a way that it can avoid the dilemma of the desire theory vs. objective list theory. In so doing, we indicated what kinds of empirical evidence would be relevant for claims about what is non-instrumentally valuable for a being. The fourth chapter showed how appreciative awareness is relevant to well-being without embracing a monadic view of happiness. We showed how a pleasure theory transforms into a theory of cognitive appreciation that has emotional aspects.

A flourishing life or being well requires appropriate kinds of evaluative self-perception. We introduced the idea of evaluative perception in Chapter 4. The content of our perceptions is defined by a set of descriptions that capture how we see what we perceive. For instance, I see a person's behaviour as friendly, and 'friendly' will be part of the content of the perception.¹ Furthermore, the content can be evaluative. When a person perceives an accident as gruesome then, to describe the content of his perception accurately, one needs to use evaluative words such as 'gruesome' or 'awful'. Her perception has evaluative content. These same points apply to self-perception and self-awareness: our perceptions of ourselves can be and are often richly value-laden.

That they *can* be so should be beyond dispute, but how can our self-perceptions be *appropriately* value-laden? What does *appropriate* mean in this context? And how does this relate to the constitution of well-being? One's life is in part made up of one's almost continuous self-perceptions. It is an ineradicable aspect of a person's life. Therefore, good self-consciousness will be an unavoidable feature of a good or well-lived life. In saying this, we are not asserting that positive self-consciousness causes well-being, even though this is certainly true. We are affirming that a good or appropriate self-awareness is partly constitutive of well-being.

Since one's sense of oneself is a constant companion and all pervasive influence on one's life, this aspect of well-being is important. In the next chapter, we will articulate this importance in relation to the other aspects of well-being, and reserve this one for articulating what this dimension amounts to: How should we define 'good self-consciousness' as relevant to well-being? If good living requires good self-consciousness, what counts as good in this second context?

There are four preliminary points, prior to delving into this key question. First, contemporary writers are prone to think of self-consciousness purely in terms of consciousness of the self. In turn, 'self' is often characterised in terms of identity and narrative (McAdams and McLean 2013). With these two moves, the issue then quickly becomes: how do we construct our identities? How do our narratives construct the self? As an antidote to the hypnotic effect of

this monolithic picture, we can remind ourselves that reflexive self-consciousness almost continuously permeates our lives even in the tiny and fine details. As I drink coffee, I am aware of myself doing this in several different ways, many of them quite commonplace. At the simplest level, I can attend to my activities as mine. For example, as I drink the coffee, I can be aware of my awareness as such. This reflexive self-consciousness can accompany any particular experience (Kant 1999: Transcendental Deduction sections 16-19). I can also be aware of myself as a coffee drinker or as a person who likes to frequent coffee shops. Awareness of oneself, under some description or other, is usually interwoven into the micro-fabric of one's daily life. For instance, it is not only that moods can infect one's experience of one's activities, for such influences can occur without one being conscious of them; it is rather that one can be aware of one's mood and that this awareness of oneself can affect one's experiences. In short, we can contrast global self-perceptions (such as "I am a happy person") with more local ones that transform the felt quality of everyday life. In a rush to understand the more glamorous global, we might overlook the importance of the more mundane local.

Second, the three-fold distinction between activities, awareness of them and awareness of that awareness is an abstraction. In everyday living, they are constantly joined and co-form, even when self-consciousness waxes and wanes. This point helps us to see how local self-conscious perceptions can constitute well-being. As we saw in Chapter 4, one's appreciation of life's activities is appropriate when it tracks the desirable features of the activity. One appreciates what is good about the activity. A similar point applies to self-awareness: it needs to be appropriate to the appreciation. For example, I can be aware of myself enjoying the taste of the coffee. A person who is thinking about his appearance to others, or who is over anxious to impress, will not be able to appreciate properly walking on the beach. He will be too anxious about his hair. Local self-awareness modulates the appreciation of activities. In so doing, it can enhance the appreciation or it can destroy it.

We can take this point further. In Chapter 4, we saw that one's awareness of one's environment and of one's activities inadvertently constructs a phenomenal world that one inhabits or that one is saddled with. If I attend to the beautiful then I will live in a beautiful "world". If I attend to the material wealth of others, then I will inhabit a world that provides affordances for envy and feelings of superiority. A similar point applies to self-awareness: one's local self-consciousness does the same. Through one's awareness of one's phenomenal "world", one inadvertently constructs a sense of oneself: I am the kind of person who lives in this kind of world. This isn't to assert that one constructs oneself (for who would do the constructing?). It is rather to recognise that one builds a complex sense of oneself: oneself as perceived by oneself from moment to moment. This seamless mosaic of local self-perceptions partly constitutes one's well-being. The quality of local self-perception defines the quality of one's inhabited phenomenal "world".

Let us back up a bit. The important theme of narrative identity has tended to dominate discussions of self-consciousness. We have offered a quick antidote to that by illustrating how self-consciousness can be salient to the concept of well-being in local or minute ways.

Third, we need to distinguish self-awareness and self-consciousness. By definition, the latter is conscious. However, it is important to recognise that not all self-awareness is conscious. For example, a person may accept important and damaging assumptions about herself without being conscious that she does so. Indeed, a person can be subject to an emotive self-perception without being aware of it. For instance, people can suffer from insecurity without knowing it. Insecurity is more than a mood because it involves a set of self-perceptions that

the person needn't be conscious of. Thus, evaluative awareness of oneself needn't be self-conscious.

Fourth, in this chapter we are examining ways of being well with oneself. We are investigating well-being at the level of self-awareness and self-consciousness. At this level, negative and positive feedback loops become an important issue. For example, the selectivity of self-consciousness tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. For instance, by noticing and paying attention to one's anxiety, one thereby reinforces the perceptions of oneself as anxious, and one reinforces the feeling that one is living in a world that is full of things to be anxious about. In a similar vein, one of the tragedies of poverty is not only that it limits the range of desirable activities and experiences that a person can live through, but also that it damages the perception a person may have of herself at the local level of self-awareness, especially concerning the future.

These kinds of feedback loops mean that a distinction that we insisted on at the start of our work becomes more complex: the distinction between constituent and cause. Earlier, we said that the two questions 'What causes well-being?' and 'What comprises well-being?' are distinct. Now because of the feedback loops inherent in self-consciousness or the self-fulfilling prophecy feature of self-awareness, this distinction needs to be modulated. We need to introduce the idea of internal causes of well-being as partial constituents. We can do this through the negative principle that if some factor *internally* causes harm to a person's well-being then it cannot be a constituent of well-being. For example, we might want to claim that a person's self-image is part of her well-being. In general, that people have a self-conception is an integral and inescapable aspect of our way of being. Thus, it is appropriate to discuss well-being and ill-being in this context. However, if a person's specific self-image is internally damaging to her life then one cannot count that self-image as a component of the person's well-being. We used the qualification 'internally' for a reason. These feedback loops don't depend directly on external circumstances. When a person perceives herself as free of anxiety, this may cause her to attend less to what would otherwise be considered as anxiety producing factors in her life, and this reinforces her tendency to regard herself as free from anxiety.

Martha's story demonstrates the working of some feedback loops.

In summary, self-awareness is global when it addresses one's life as a whole, or oneself as a whole person. It can take the form of judgments about one's character, for instance in Martha's case, with the judgments "I am a worrier.", or "I am not the kind of person who would do that." It can also take the form of narratives that one would tell oneself and others about one's life and/or bits of it. For example, Martha's narratives seemed to be selected to support her self-description as 'a worrier'. It can also take the form of perception of one's potential or future, such as the uncertainty Martha felt about her future. Then there is also self-consciousness in the present. This variety of judgments partly define one's relationship to oneself.

Martha was in her late 40s when she took part in our research interviews. She introduced herself as a single mother with two daughters aged 17 and 18. For five years, she was studying part-time for an undergraduate degree in environmental sciences.

Martha describes herself as a 'worrier'. It started when she was a child. Born out of wedlock in Ireland, Martha always felt unwanted and disliked by people around her, including her own mother, her stepfather and his family. Her parents ran a family business which got into trouble after ten years, and anxieties about the business brought alcohol, rows, fights, and even violence. So, throughout her teenage years, Martha was anxious and tried to make herself invisible because she would be "too sick with worry" about being identified as the cause of the family's problems.

Martha quit education at 15 to help the family. At 21, she got married. Her husband worked in the Airforce, and soon they moved abroad. It was a comfortable life, and Martha had the opportunity to travel, and to see a great deal of the world. However, beneath all the whirlwind romance and happiness lay Martha's anxiety that her husband was going to find out that she was no good for anything, and that he would soon leave her. She couldn't let herself enjoy the natural beauty of Asia and Africa during their holidays, nor appreciate the arts, history and cultures of the European cities in which they lived. Therefore, it didn't come as a surprise to her when her husband filed for divorce after 7 years of marriage.

Almost immediately, Martha moved in with Tom, with whom she was already acquainted. After 3 years, they had two beautiful daughters. The children took Martha out of her usual anxieties and worries because they were delightful and demanding, and Martha hardly had time to worry. While Martha occupied herself with two babies, however, Tom moved on, and moved in with a new partner. Suddenly Martha found herself once again worried about everything, being a single mother, living abroad, children's health and well-being, housing, money, food, education, work, and more. She was so worried that she literally became physically sick, and as a result, the family of three returned to England and thereafter became subjects of social welfare.

Strangely, for the first time, Martha (and her daughters) had some stability – council housing, local schools, child benefits, and occasional part-time work. Still, Martha embraced life gingerly "as if I was watching it from outside and waiting for something (bad) to happen." While this period of uneventfulness lasted, with support from friends, Martha gathered her courage to return to education. She first took access courses to get qualifications for applying for university courses, and then enrolled onto an undergraduate degree to study environmental sciences – her lifelong passion.

Unfortunately, this move coincided with the beginning of the government's extended period of austerity. Once again, Martha was thrown into the deep pool of anxiety and worries. At the time of this interview, Martha gave a long list of things all to do with money – child benefits, tax credit, student finances, housing benefit, and a host of other related issues.

Learning had been a dream for Martha since 15, and now when it is finally within her reach, all the worries seem to prevent her from fully engaging in it. "I am just not sure if I am ever going to carry on with my studies." Martha concluded.

FORMS OF SELF-AWARENESS

To explain how these global judgments are (partly) constitutive of well-being, we need to look at their relationship to time. Global self-awareness has different functions in defining well-being according to whether it is awareness of oneself in the present, past or future.

a) In the Present

In the immediacy of the present moment, I can be aware of my awareness or conscious of my consciousness. We can call this phenomenon ‘reflexive self-consciousness’ to distinguish it from other forms of self-consciousness or awareness of oneself. One can perceive oneself under many kinds of descriptions. For example, Martha is often aware of herself as a single mother and sometimes as a citizen of the UK. In contrast, a person can be aware of herself under no specific description (or predicate) but simply as ‘I’. This is reflexive self-consciousness. It is an idea that is close to the Stoics and Kant.

This is the simplest form of self-consciousness and is a prerequisite for other forms of self-awareness and for being a person.² Because of this, it is an inescapable part of our way of being: being an I. Being an I includes the idea that one is capable of reflexive self-consciousness. As an inescapable and fundamental aspect of our way of being, being an I is a non-instrumentally valuable state. This follows from the conclusions of Chapter 2 in which we argued that the fundamental bearer of prudential non-instrumental value consists in living as a human person. From this it follows that being an I is non-instrumentally valuable and that appreciation of this is an indispensable aspect of well-being. To put this in plain language, an essential ingredient of well-being is to take pleasure in one’s consciousness. To take pleasure in one’s consciousness is to have appreciative reflexive self-consciousness; that is, it is to feel happy being an I in its simplest and most immediate form. We can call this ‘joy’.

We say ‘simplest form’ because taking pleasure in one’s consciousness is different from for example, taking pleasure or appreciating that one is an engineer (which is different again from taking pleasure in doing engineering). To repeat the point, to appreciate the value of being an I is to take direct pleasure in one’s own consciousness as such. This is different from taking pleasure in seeing oneself under various descriptions, such as being an undergraduate student, being a single mother, being clever. These are more complex forms of self-appreciation, which we will discuss later.

The kind of appreciative self-reflexive consciousness that we have mind is similar to what the Epicureans call ‘passive pleasure’. Their idea is that there is a kind of pleasure that doesn’t come from having one’s desires and ego satisfied, but which consists in a state of serenity or tranquillity. They characterised this as absence of pain (Thomson 2016). We are characterising it as the simple pleasure of being or as the joy that is being aware of one’s awareness.

Despite some differences, the two accounts are similar because, as the Epicureans recognised, pain and other disturbances can distract one from feeling passive pleasure. The blockages to joy are various. We already discussed four kinds of obstacles to appreciation in Chapter 4: we can instrumentalise; we can allow our awareness to be overcome by desires or wants; we can be numbed by habit and our awareness can be coloured by emotions and moods. These also apply to our capacity to feel joy at being alive or conscious. To these, we now add the ways in which one’s perception of oneself can become an obstacle to good immediate self-

consciousness or joy. For instance, when she was younger, Martha was plagued by insecurity and worries about how others perceived her (as the cause of problems in the family); she tended to be extremely cautious about being too self-assertive. Such a person will tend to take insult quickly. This self-perception will drown out the ability to feel the joy of the present moment.

In this list of obstacles, we also need to include the elements of self-awareness discussed later in this chapter. If a person is aware of herself most of the time under predicates related to her past and future (e.g. in the case of Martha), then she will have fewer opportunities to be aware of herself simply as an I in the present moment. Furthermore, if these forms of self-awareness are emotionally laden then they will contribute towards patterns of self-awareness that become an obstacle to the joy of 'I' awareness.

In conclusion, we can describe appreciative self-reflexive consciousness negatively as being free from disturbances or positively as the joyful appreciation of simply being conscious of one's consciousness. If this is correct, then the Epicureans were right to think that damage to one's ability to appreciate this mode of being would count as direct harm to one's well-being.

b) In the Past

It is often claimed that narratives provide unity to the self.³ They unite me as I am now with the 'me' of the past. They are supposed to do this in a way that is meaningful or significant for me now, and that adds potential to the 'me' of the future. In this sense, such narratives have a good claim to be essential aspects of well-being. They add value by unifying the past, and by linking it to one's present experiences and one's plans or possibilities for the future. This claim implies that a person who lacks such integrating narratives will be *ipso facto* deficient in well-being. Such a person would be fragmented or lack integrity. The aim of this section is to evaluate these claims, and to conclude about the role of narrational self-awareness in constituting well-being (concerning self-consciousness of one's past).

Narratives are stories that one tells self-consciously about oneself, to others or to oneself. In this sense, they are essentially about one's past, even if they have a function and importance in terms of present perception of oneself and one's perception of one's future. They are a way to relate meaningfully to one's past (Strawson 2004). However, they may not be the only way because one might remember isolated past events with affection without placing them in the context of a wider narrative. These are claims that lie beyond the scope of this inquiry, which is focused on the importance of narratives insofar as they partly constitute well-being. If they are an essential aspect of our being, then they are essential aspect of our being well. (This, of course, is in addition to their ability to contribute and enhance well-being, or the opposite, to harm.)

There is one consideration that supports the claim that narratives are an essential aspect of our being regarding self-consciousness of one's past. Our lives are embedded in a web of narratives of our own and of others (Taylor 1989) Since people are tellers of stories, it is difficult to imagine it otherwise (MacIntyre 2007). This line of argumentation relies on the assumption that narrative should be conceived first and foremost as a process rather than as a product, and that the power of this process consists in its capacity to extract meanings from what might otherwise appear to be a set of isolated events and random acts. The process enables a person to develop an account of her life. This process can be imbued with creative potential, especially when it offers the narrator an opportunity to articulate what she values and might pursue in her ongoing life. It thus becomes possible for the person to thematise her

life *as if* the process were life-making. As the narrator reorders the events in her life, she perceives her memories and experiences with a new significance. In this way, she is able to make new connections between various of the encounters and happenings in her life.

This does not imply that life was meaningless prior to a narrative-process of self-reflection. Rather it means that such a process may enable a person to understand better her past and, because of this, articulate new meanings, which were previously no more than latent possibilities. Furthermore, this does not entail the conventional claim that people live the stories which they tell (McAdams and McLean 2013). Rather it means that a person might employ the insights developed through narrating her life's processes in deciding or guiding her future.

As an important aside, there is a wealth of literature on narratives and well-being, which we will quickly relate to the main theme of this chapter. The literature tends to characterise three ways in which narrative processes (such as telling one's life as a story to another person) can contribute (causally) to well-being.

First, narrative interpretation can help a person make better sense of who she is, and thereby better articulate a personalised conception of her well-being. The interpretation and resulting analysis can help a person identify why she cares about some things more than others and consider whether these things really matter significantly more. Such self-conscious attention can enable a person to see in what ways their life could be better lived. Through such interrogation, the narrative process can accentuate meaningfulness and inspire growth as a striving for higher levels of purposefulness and richness in life and in one's relationships with the world (Bauer, McAdams & Pals 2008). Such processes have been described as 'narrative growth' (Mansfield 2009).

Secondly, some writers have maintained that narrative-processes enable one to critically examine one's daily life from new angles (Gill 2012). They allow people to encounter something novel and meaningful in the mundane and ordinary. In articulating one's experiences, a certain canonicity of narrative can be uncovered, interrupted and breached, thus making the familiar strange (Bruner 2004). This is why narrative-processes can enable us to question and transcend lived experience on a number of levels, such as the personal, cultural and political. The process of narrative reflection involves developing a personal life-story within overall cultural expectations (McLean, 2008).

As a field of inquiry, narrative can 'pose dilemmas, subvert obvious or canonical "truths" that force incongruities upon our attention' (Bruner 1986: 127). Furthermore, as with phenomenology, it is possible to focus narrative analysis on the social and political through the lenses of lived human experiences as the sites where self-knowledge and critical understanding are generated. For example, through such processes, people can become more aware of how the limitations imposed on them by their circumstances, such as family background, have constricted their lives. Others may see how their character and personal attributes have prevented them from appreciating life more fully.

The third is that, as an interpretative process, narrative allows a person to increase her capacity to understand, resolve and discover a different set of meanings to the traumas and difficulties in her life, and to integrate this set within an overall narrative of one's life; this is sometimes called 'narrative resolution' (Mansfield 2009). Once a traumatic experience is told to an audience, its significance and impact are externalised thus creating an opportunity for

resolving the trauma and healing (Narvaez 2010). In this way, psychotherapy has long integrated narrative healing in its methodologies for helping individuals deal with difficult periods and traumatic experiences in their life.

Finally, bringing all these different aspects of narrative together, writers have maintained that narrative-processes free the person to see life-changes as possible. Whilst narrative tends to highlight the boundedness of our narratives (for instance culturally) at the same time, it can also enable metamorphosis. One can realise that improvements and transformations are possible on a personal level or even on a wider scale. This is possible when narrative processes highlight what we love, care about and value.

These strands within the literature emphasise the potential of narrative-processes to causally facilitate well-being. They do so under the assumption that changing narrational self-consciousness will affect corresponding changes at the other levels of well-being. They leave unanswered a few important questions, especially those concerning the claim that narratives be harmful, and the idea that a person might form misleading or erroneous narratives about herself. However, the question that we face is fundamentally different. It isn't 'Can narrative-processes improve well-being?' It is rather 'Assuming that one's consciousness of one's own past consist in narratives, then in what ways can such narratives in part constitute well-being?' The first is about narrative-processes; the second is about narratives as the content of self-consciousness. The first concerns the causes of well-being; the second what constitutes it.

We shall assume that one's self-consciousness of one's past does inescapably consist in narratives, at least in part. Given this assumption, we need to ask in what ways such narratives can be constitutive of well-being. Before we answer this question, we need some cautionary points.

We need to remind ourselves that not all narratives are global. For instance, there are narratives about events in my life that might be interesting (or boring!) to recount at dinner parties or in family reunions. Such stories, however, are fragments. Thus, they do not qualify as unifying principles of selfhood. The idea is that certain kinds of stories that one might tell about oneself provide a unity of self. These are stories told in very special circumstances when someone asks you: "tell me about yourself..." and one is supposed to answer with the story of your life.

Second, there are an indefinite number of different kinds of narratives that one could tell about oneself. For example, there are those that concern one's relationships to one's parents and other close family members, one's friendships, working life, one's fears and hopes. But there are also more obscure narratives about things that hardly matter to one, such as one's relations to insects or to boats. This indicates the necessary intentionality of self-perception, and hence selectivity of such narratives. This reminds us that a person's life isn't a narrative. The latter is a complex perceiving of the former.⁴

The term 'narrative' includes narratives that don't help one to make sense of one's life, as well as those that do. We shouldn't simply assume that any specific narrative will help a person to make sense of her life and, furthermore, the phrase 'making sense of one's life' isn't yet clear. The general idea is that we selectively interpret our own past, which of course includes one's relations with others, with social groups and with externally defined goals. These interpretations consist in fragments, which are largely about oneself in the extended

sense of including what is one's own.⁵ Such narratives have many psychological functions that come under the umbrella term 'making sense of one's life'. Making sense of one's life includes attempts to explain one's current life situation, to set one's life into a wider context, to understand how one came to be what one is, and to gain deeper comprehension of oneself and one's life. As we have seen, such forms of self-knowledge may function as therapy, but they also can comprise a state of non-instrumental value insofar as they constitute being well with one's life in the past.

Because of the above, we shouldn't assume that there is a single hugely complex narrative of one's life that unites all these different facets into one all-encompassing vision of one's past. Even if such an ideal made sense, it would require a god-like perspective on one's past life, and even if that idea also made sense, one does not have access to it. We can conclude tentatively that there is no such thing as *the* narrative of one's life. In perceiving one's life, one will privilege certain kinds of descriptions over others. But then, one should do so according to what criteria?

Finally, we need to distinguish between the narrative-like content of one's self-perceptions of one's past and a narrative as an artefact, which we can call 'an autobiographical story' (Curry 2010). Such a story is an artefact that is created to be digested or contemplated, perhaps by the person herself. This implies that such a story is a construction shaped by the concerns and interests of the potential readership, even when that potential readership is oneself. It would be a degrading mistake to think of oneself as an object that exists mainly for the sake of pleasing an audience. It is equivalent to thinking of oneself as a film or as a set of images. This is a sophisticated and insidious way of instrumentalising or commodifying oneself.

The failure to distinguish between a person's past life, the content of her self-perceptions of that life and an autobiographical story that represents some of those self-perceptions will imply confusions regarding authorship. If my life were a story, then who is the author? A story could not write itself, and so the view that my life *is* a story requires that there are *at least* two distinct things present: me as the author, and the thing authored, the story. Given this, we cannot identify a person with her story. This supports the conclusion that a story is a linguistic representation of a set of self-perceptions of a life.⁶ Therefore, it is not a life. Furthermore, the relationship between a person and her life is much more intimate than the relationship between an author and a story that she authors. My life is not a *thing* distinct from me in the way that a story about me is distinct from me.

In sum, we need to distinguish the life of a person in its infinite complexity from a selected narrative self-conscious perception that highlights some aspects of this infinite complexity at the expense of others. We are concerned with the second, so long as it is a generally truthful or not misleading perception of the first. We are interested in self-consciousness of one's past. So, a person's well-being is in part constituted by how she selects those narrative contents, given that they are broadly truthful. To cut to the quick, we need to assert that one's well-being is partly constituted by *appropriate* narrative self-awareness of one's past. The problem is to articulate the criteria for 'appropriate' in this context. We can answer this in three steps.

We need to return to the previous two levels of well-being. Whatever 'appropriate' means in the above context, it must include being consonant or in harmony with the two other levels. In other words, a person's conception of her life must be broadly consistent with the idea that the living of a valuable life consists partly in the appreciation of non-instrumentally valuable

aspects of the activities one engages in. Of course, this doesn't mean that the person would articulate it in this way! Nevertheless, her narrative-self conscious perceptions of the past will have that shape. More specifically, the person's conception of herself in the past must express appreciative connection to significant events of her past. So, for example, if a person expresses an attitude of shunning other people in her narrative of the past, when in fact her life was full of friendship then this is likely to be inconsistent with the specifics of the first two levels of well-being. A person's self-awareness must broadly reflect the realities of her life, without self-deception.

There is considerable room for narratives to be self-deceptive. This self-deception can be quickly crystallised into a feature of one's personality and sense of oneself. Sometimes, people perceive themselves in ways that are misleading and damaging. For example, one may sense that one's life has been a tragedy because of a series of events that one hasn't been able to overcome. Sometimes people perceive themselves with flattering narratives. Both forms of exaggeration are self-deceptive. As it stands, the word 'narrative' encompasses self-perceptions that are faithful to one's past as well as those that are deceitful or based on fantasy. Such fictitious narratives don't count towards being-well. Even if a fictitious narrative brings psychological benefits to a person, insofar as it is fictitious, it won't partly constitute being well with oneself. Therefore, appropriate narratives about one's past must be broadly speaking true. Of course, they will still be selective, biased and inaccurate in their details. This is unavoidable. Nevertheless, they can be broadly speaking true rather than being inventions or fabrications.

Second, narratives can vary with respect to their degree of autonomy. Life narratives can be more or less scripted. Not only are we prone to be scripted by the implicit injunctions of our parents, but also we are also susceptible to having the fundamentals of our narratives defined by the society around us and by its history, as well as by peer pressure (Goodson 2018). Specifically, there is a psychological temptation to make one's love of oneself hostage to whether others like us. There is a perceived need to be special or unique, and to unwittingly draft one's narratives around this perceived 'need'. Such are the dreams of fame and of being a hero. Such are the nightmares of individualism.

In each case, these can be fundamental decisions that can warp or ruin a person's life. If one looks at the obsessions that drive us to drink or to work too much or that push us to hurt the people we love or to sabotage ourselves, then there often lies behind these urges a set of stories that we unknowingly have swallowed from elsewhere. In such cases, the person must struggle to become free of such narratives. In this way, we are regularly trying to reframe ourselves, to come to a better understanding of ourselves. For such self-understanding to constitute an improvement, it must be subject to at least three conditions: it must be truthful; it must be towards greater freedom from being scripted; and it must free the person from harm. The very last point isn't simply that such narratives are detrimental to well-being but rather that they constitute a form of ill-being.

To be well with one's past is in part to be freer from the sufferings of the past. When people have had a traumatic or painful experience, or when people have felt humiliated or unloved, or generally hurt by life then many will tend to have unresolved issues regarding their past. The person may be stuck, unable to move on past their past. Such blocks can pervade a person's sense of herself and infuse her life with a rupture and suffering. For example, a person who has been deeply humiliated may easily carry that suffering into their everyday sense of themselves and this will greatly reduce their capacity to appreciate the activities that

they engage in and to enjoy the present moment of being-an-I. Quite apart from their harmful consequences, such states constitute being unwell with one's past. In contrast, to be well with one's past is to be reconciled and happy with it. It is to have accepted deeply the hurts, the limitations and the contingencies of one's life. In this sense, we can characterise it as being at peace with oneself.

c) Towards the Future

What is it for a person to be well or ill in relation to her own future? In theory, the future is an open field of possibilities. In practice, it can't be indefinitely open; it must be circumscribed. The manner of its closure defines 'ill' and 'well' in this context. In short, a person is well in relation to her future when that future is open in appropriate ways. There are ways in which one's future can be appropriately closed. Otherwise, it should be open. Let's consider the story of Gabriela.

Gabriela just survived an operation following the recurrence of breast cancer, and she was eager to take part in our research interview. These conversations took place while she was recovering from radiotherapy. She was 54 years old at the time, happily married, with three adult children.

Growing up in Mexico, Gabriela had a care-free childhood. At 12, two years after the death of her father, Gabriela arrived in the UK with her mother who raised her single-handedly while working as a carer. When Gabriela completed her secondary education, her mother could only suggest two options for her: to look for a job, or look for a husband. With little awareness of what she could do, Gabriela took on jobs such as waitressing and serving in shops simply to avoid staying at home. Within a few years, she met her future husband, a successful electrician immigrated from Portugal. After marriage, they lived a comfortable life. Gabriela became a 'home-maker' and she knew that she was expected to be a devoted wife and a loving mother. As time went on, she learned to 'play' these parts. For instance, she learned to host great dinner parties for her husband's families and friends, and she was the go-to person when other parents needed help with childcare. Gabriela accepted her parts in life and played them well.

However, when she was diagnosed with breast cancer at the age of 43, her entire perspective shifted. Although she responded well to surgery and treatments, Gabriela continued to be acutely aware of her mortality. Questions such as "What have I done in my life?" or "How should I live my life now knowing that I may die?" became constant companions. Following advice from a therapist, she made some dramatic changes to her life, including adopting a vegan diet, practicing yoga and mindfulness, volunteering, and running a half-marathon for charities. She said that these changes were not just for physical health, they helped her feel that her life could be 'bigger'.

The awareness of finitude also urged Gabriela to reflect on herself, such as her interests, her talents, and what she would like to do as work ("not the money-making sort"). She realised that she had seldom thought about these questions, and she was now open and willing to explore. To everyone's surprise, Gabriela found a passion for horticulture, and she enrolled on an organic horticulture course. She further surprised everyone, and herself, not only by completing the highly challenging certificate course, but also by taking the study to the next level – diploma course in organic farming and horticulture. Just before the recurrence of the cancer, Gabriela was working as an assistant tutor in a community college, supporting students on vocational courses.

At the time of the interview, cancer once again brought Gabriela to confront mortality. She said that she was not afraid of death and that she had prepared herself to face it. Gabriela called her cancer "a blessing in disguise" because it inspired her to look at her life in new ways, and to learn about herself in ways that she wouldn't have done otherwise. She concluded her interview by affirming "My well-being is to live my life to the fullest, and nobody could do that for me but myself."

As illustrated in Gabriela's life, there is an interesting relationship between one's sense of one's mortality and one's feeling of responsibility for one's own life (May 2005). The feeling that one has only one life to live and that it is short may bring one to feel that one should try to make the most of it. Such feelings spur the desire for greater self-understanding, which may lead the person towards well-being with respect to her future.

Second, one's future possibilities may be open in ways that are naïve and express a lack of self-understanding. Gabriela took time to reflect on the kinds of activities that suited to her temperamentally, and as she was open, she learned that her horizons did not include a host of activities, even though she could have been interested in them. In short, one can close off one's future for good reasons related to one's abilities and capacities. Of course, the point shouldn't be painted in black and white. It is usually a question of degree.

Third, most people have sets of commitments that structure, delineate and give meaning to their future. These may include a life-plan, a dream, or a mission, even if it is not explicitly articulated. We are not implying that a person must have a life-plan or that greater well-being requires that a person have a life-plan. In some cultures, many people do have something akin to a life-plan or a set of projects, and they explicitly use such concepts or ideas to conceive of their own future. In other cultures, such ideas are quite alien. In any case, if a person does have commitments that close off her future possibilities, then these can be treated as a given but only insofar as these are not themselves harmful. Thus, for example, commitments that narrow our sense of our future unnecessarily will *in this respect* be harmful. Furthermore, life-plans can lead to an instrumentalisation of life, and in that sense, chop off appreciation at the root.

In general, a person's sense of her own future is *ipso facto* better insofar as it is open. For instance, one's future possibilities can be closed prematurely and harmfully by one's own limited sense of oneself. In the case of young Gabriela, she followed her mother to define her future mainly in terms of obtaining a job and getting married. Their vision of Gabriela's future was limited in terms of its material ambition, but also in that it largely consisted of material ambition. In a similar vein, a farmer's son may unconsciously assume that his future is limited to being a farmer. If he becomes aware of this then he may unconsciously limit his future to *not* becoming a farmer (anything but that!). Perhaps, he is well suited to becoming a farmer, or such a life could be full and happy for him. But in which case, his self-conscious decision to follow the path of his father, in the face of knowledge of the alternatives, constitutes a form of being well with his future.

This returns us to the intersection between self-awareness *qua* one's past and *qua* one's future. When one uncritically accepts other persons' or society's version of oneself then one unwittingly denies a sense of one's future possibilities. The extent to which one's sense of oneself with regard to the past is scripted, or defined externally by others, is likely to determine the extent to which and the ways in which one's future horizons are prescribed.

In conclusion, while in general a person's sense of their own future is *ipso facto* better insofar as it is open, nevertheless there are three caveats to this. The first is that self-understanding will naturally tend to close off certain prospects, and this is appropriate. The second is the set of commitments that a person has. The third is that the person's self-awareness concerning the future must include the willingness to come to terms with one's death, and to come to terms with all sorts of changes in one's life. This part of what it means to have a future. We live in contingency.

THE SYNTHESIS OF THE THREE

The unity of the self through present, past and future is one's overall sense of oneself. It consists in the unity of one's awareness of oneself in the present, as someone with a past and who will live in and have a future. Often this is called 'identity.'

However, in a way, the term 'identity' is misleading because strictly speaking one's identity is what one *must be* to be at all. One's identity consists in the necessary conditions for being oneself. To lose one's identity is to no longer be; such a loss would be death. Now, many aspects of oneself that are often called 'one's identity' fail this test. For example, one's nationality, gender, race and profession are sometimes considered part of one's multiple identities, but strictly speaking they are not. A man from New York could have been a woman from Gambia. Let us indulge in some fiction: suppose that his parents inform him that they have been hiding the truth from him: he was born to Gambian parents in Gambia, and that in his infancy he was given a sex change. Ludicrous, but logically possible. But if that had happened, he would not cease to exist. In this sense, being a male from NY is not part of his identity. He would not cease to be even if his real parents were aliens from another planet.

Consequently, when someone affirms that their gender or nationality is part of their identity, there must be some other meaning. Following Appiah, the idea might be that one's identity is how others perceive me and how I perceive myself (Appiah, 2005). However, this cannot be exactly right for two reasons. First, how others perceive me is up to them. Although it may delight, distress or destroy me, it is not *directly* integral to the *constitution* of my well-being. For instance, others thinking less of me may cause me to think less of myself. Even when the first is an important source or cause of ill-being, it isn't constitutive of ill-being. Additionally, claiming that how others perceive me isn't integral to the constitution of well-being doesn't contradict the thesis of the previous chapter that well-being is relational and social. The point under consideration now is different: it is the overall sense of oneself as oneself. We may reserve the word 'identity' for this but, in this sense of the term, it isn't constituted by how others perceive me, although it may well be affected by it.

Second, both in the case of how others perceive me and how I perceive myself, there are many perceptions under descriptions irrelevant to this kind of identity. They may be irrelevant because they are trivial. For instance, consider the numbers of the telephones one has owned. There are countless types of potential self-perceptions that are trivial and unimportant, and which do not constitute part of one's identity. Nevertheless, how one perceives oneself can be integral to one's well-being. We need to specify the relevant kinds of description.

To make progress requires we reframe the word 'identity'. It doesn't consist in a set of essential attributes nor in how one is perceived by others. Rather it consists in what one identifies with. It is better to switch from the noun form of the term 'identity' to the verb form 'to identify'. What does it mean to say that one identifies with a description of oneself in such a way that it constitutes part of one's so-called 'identity'? What is it to identify with some description of oneself? In a sense, it is to take a decision about oneself. A person who identifies herself as a kind person has *ipso facto* decided that she will try to be kind and generous. Likewise, the person who identifies herself as an athlete has decided to judge her life in part in terms of a certain set of values, defined (albeit roughly) as constituting athleticism.

One advantage of this kind of idea is one doesn't have to think of identity solely as a narrative. Often in the literature concerning these issues, writers employ the phrase 'narrative identity' as if the two terms were ineluctably linked. In contrast, we are trying to avoid simply assuming a person must identify solely with a set of narratives about her past. She may do so or may not. She may also identify with aspects of her character more deeply than she does with her past. She may identify with a social grouping perhaps without that being explicitly narrative-based. What a person identifies with is an empirical question that needs to be settled with observation. Likewise, the identifications that a person makes change through her life, and in any case, they may be more or less healthy or constitutive of well-being. These two points give rise to a host of interesting empirical questions.

However, our primary concern is with what constitutes well-being rather than what causes it, even when the two overlap. We are concerned with how different aspects of our being may have the kind of non-instrumental value that constitutes (in part) well-being. The issue is 'what aspects of myself should I identify with?' where the term 'should' is non-moral. It is non-instrumental and prudential, and thus relevant to the constitution of well-being.

As we saw earlier, the life of a person has primary value. For a person's life to be well, she must appreciate that value in the appropriate way: one has to feel and perceive oneself as valuable. This perception is a fundamental form of self-respect or self-love, which ought not depend on what one does or has done.

The conception that a person has of her self-worth is an important component of well-being. Many people have problems with their feeling of self-worth. In large part, perhaps, this is because they make it contingent on something else beyond their control. For example, some people implicitly and emotionally assume that they have to be successful in some way to be or to feel worthy. Others emotionally and implicitly assume that they have to be perceived by other people in certain ways in order to be worthy (or rather to see themselves as worthy). Therefore, they spent much time seeking the approval or deference of others. Such states of being can amount to a form of insecurity. Such states of insecurity may be caused by some past humiliation, but they also result in feelings of humiliation.

In contrast, it is possible for a person to have a sense of self-worth that is not hostage to such contingencies, like the perceptions of others. This possibility can be explained as follows. Persons have a special value status, and one can have a sense of that.⁷ One may also fail to have a sense of that. One can fail to make the appropriate connections in one's case, as well as in the case of others (as we explored in chapter 5).

*(Technical Details: In order to avoid misunderstandings, we need to distance ourselves from some Kantian ways of explaining these points. Kant's argument is roughly that, by having the capacity to choose, persons make values possible. This is because a function of values is to guide choice; without choices to guide, there can be no question of what is valuable. Therefore, persons have a value that is beyond the mere desirable. Kant calls the complex capacity to make choices and to be responsive to reasons for action 'autonomy.' Autonomy in this Kantian sense cannot be taken away from a person, for instance, by putting him in jail. Other people might fail to recognise my autonomy for instance if they enslave me. But they cannot take it away because it defines in part what kind of being I am. Likewise another person cannot give one one's autonomy; he or she can recognise it and respect it (or not) through his or her actions.

In the previous chapter, we argued that a person is essentially relational. Now we seem to be claiming that a person is autonomous. These two claims may seem contradictory because of the assumption that if something is essentially relational then it can't be autonomous. One reply to the objection is to deny that assumption. In this context 'autonomy' doesn't refer to a state of independence; it refers to the capacity to perform actions and choose. Those set of capacities exist in a social setting and are defined as such within a network of social relations. In other words, one's well-being can be (in part) relational without this excluding the idea that one is an agent in a socially relational manner too. Consequently, one's being autonomous in this sense doesn't mean that one is like an atom that can exist unchanged on its own.

However, the idea that persons have a worth, which they can sense and which can constitute self-worth, need not be locked into the specifics of the Kantian conception of autonomy. Kant's notion of autonomy has (or may have) at least five aspects that we don't need to accept.⁸ First, it is tied to the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. Second, it is all or nothing: either you have it or you don't. If one does, then one is a person; if one doesn't then one is equivalent to an object. There are no degrees in between. Thirdly, Kant's notion of autonomy is intertwined with a *sui generis* conception of free-will. Fourthly, Kant's conception of autonomy is essentially tied to reason and rationality. While there may be wildly different readings of what 'reason' means in this kind of context, for the sake of simplicity, we can put these issues into suspension. Fifthly, for all of the above reasons, Kant's notion of autonomy seems to require what one might call 'an absolutist conception of the self.' We need to remove these Kantian assumptions from the table.)

Let us step back. We are trying to explain what it means to be well with regard to one's self-consciousness in a holistic sense that integrates the more specific senses of what it means to be well in relation to one's past, future and present. The key idea is how a person identifies herself. This must be done in a way that is consistent with a person's self-worth as a person. This means that this identification should not be hostage to certain kinds of contingencies. We were trying to explain this idea of the self-worth of a person without handcuffing it to the specifics of certain individualistic interpretations of Kant.

As we saw in Chapter 2, having the right kind of relationship to oneself is not just a moral issue. It constitutes an aspect of being well. And as we have insisted throughout, this does not reduce to the idea that such a relationship is conducive to feelings of happiness, even though the latter may be true.

One can recognise and respect one's own worth, for instance, by recognizing one's responsibility for the course of one's own life or by not blaming others for how one feels ("You *made* me feel sad" apparently fails to acknowledge my responsibility for my feelings). We can fail to respect one's intrinsic worth. As we saw in Chapter 2, we can instrumentalise ourselves by having the wrong relationship to one's own goals and desires, for instance, by treating oneself purely as instrumentally valuable to the attainment of some goal. Likewise, one can be more or less aware of oneself as a person who has this special value-status. This is the idea that one's perception of oneself can be infused with dignity and self-respect. Since being a person is an inescapable mode of being, it must enter well-being. We need to ask the questions: 'How can such a state of being be valuable non-instrumentally in a way that is relevant to well-being?' and 'How can one be appreciative of this state in such a way that is salient as a contributing part of well-being?'

We have already seen the answer to the first question. The value of being a person who makes choices is fundamental, as we saw in Chapter 2. Therefore, if a person identifies with anything she must identify with herself as such. This isn't to argue that one should *only* identify with this mode of being.

To identify oneself as a being of primary intrinsic value is *ipso facto* to not instrumentalise oneself. Insofar as a person instrumentalises herself, she is not identifying herself as such a being. This is because to identify with oneself as a such a being is to regard oneself essentially as a type of being who makes choices and for whom other values exist. To instrumentalise something is to treat something non-instrumental valuable as if it were of purely instrumental value.⁹

To summarise, a person has well-being insofar as she identifies herself as a being that has primary non-instrumental value. This general claim unifies the three types of self-consciousness discussed earlier: to past, future and present. Other identifications that the person makes (or which she treats as her identity) must be compatible with this primary one. For instance, when one views oneself primarily according to the dislikes and likes of other people then this is an especially intimate way of treating oneself as an object. This isn't compatible with the primary idea, as we shall now see.

IN COMMUNITY WITH OTHERS

There is another aspect pertaining to the unity of self-awareness (i.e. to self-awareness as the synthesis of past, present and future). As we saw in Chapters 2 and 4, our activities point inwards and outwards in terms of their meaning or non-instrumental value. Our lives are essentially other-regarding. We amplified this idea in Chapter 5.

This point applies to self-awareness. This may initially sound absurd: how can self-awareness be other-regarding? However, it is not paradoxical. As we have seen, the self is not like an alleged atom that exists independently of its relationships. Therefore, self-understanding and self-awareness is also relational. Therefore, an aspect of good self-awareness will include how one is aware of oneself in relation to others. The nature of our integrated self-understanding must reach to what we might call loosely 'our place in the world.' This is a mode of being that can be well or ill. In relation to this, we shall discuss two ways to be ill.

First, we have just seen that to have an identity is to identify with something. We have also seen that the minimum for well-being with respect to this feature of human life is to identify with oneself as a being who is a primary bearer of intrinsic value. We have also seen that to identify oneself thus is *ipso facto* to not instrumentalise oneself.

This applies to one's relationship to how others view one. Insofar as one identifies oneself with how others view one then one is hostage to their view, such as showed in Gabriela's case. If one were to identify with the view of others and thereby make it part of one's identity, then one would be instrumentalising oneself. Self-consciousness that ranks oneself as an object constitutes a commodification of the self.

This applies to us insofar as we identify ourselves with a self-image formed according to the likes and dislikes of others. Indeed, often a critical factor in a person's life is how he feels

about how others perceive her. People typically hate to be judged negatively or categorised according to prejudices and assumptions. When one feels that one has been judged unfairly, generally it makes one feel upset. Continual negative perception by others can damage one's self-esteem. However, quite apart from these effects, the person who is vulnerable to being slighted by the judgments of others has *ipso facto* made his or her self-worth dependent on the opinion of others, and in this way has instrumentalised himself. In this manner, preoccupation with the opinion of others about oneself constitutes a form of ill-being insofar as it defines one's self-identifications. Indeed, freedom from such preoccupation or anxiety will be not only a cause of well-being, but it will be partly constitutive of well-being.

This doesn't mean that a person shouldn't care about the opinions of others or should be indifferent to their views of oneself (where the 'should' is of the relevant kind). It means that well-being requires that one's should not *identify* oneself in such a way. Of course, to go more deeply into this point would require a clear distinction between caring and identifying oneself.

To return to the main theme: we are looking at the final general aspect of well-being, self-consciousness, and we are examining that with regard to the synthetic unity of the self-consciousness concerning the present, past and future. We defined this feature of well-being in terms of identity. However, we also argued that an aspect of good self-awareness must include how one is aware of oneself in relation to others.

The second way to be ill in this regard is to be self-absorbed to the extent that one is in practice denying that fundamental principle that other people are equally real as oneself is. In this regard, a person has well-being insofar as her conception of herself is consistent with the claim that she is as real as the other people around her (Livingstone Smith 2011: 31-34).

The principle that other people are equally real as oneself is ethical. We take this to be a fundamental egalitarian principle. It is a morally important claim that the life of an Iranian in Tabriz matters equally as the life of a person living in Windsor or Brazzaville and *vice versa*. Intrinsically one cannot claim that the life of the chief executive of the UN is more valuable than the life any person in Lagos, even if one is inclined to say that the life of the Secretary General of the UN matters more instrumentally. This principle means that no individual human life is intrinsically more valuable than any other. Simply stated, the ethical requirement is that one act, perceive and will in ways that are consonant with this principle. Although it is by no means clear what this principle means in detail in practice, nevertheless, it is clear that it requires of us some kind of impartiality.

This fundamental principle stands in conflict with the epistemological asymmetry mentioned in the previous chapter. In our personal lives, we can fall prey to this asymmetry, and also fail to see what others will or desire must be good in some way. Under these psychological conditions, we contradict the fundamental ethical principle of equal reality of all persons. This is because falling prey in these ways amounts to ignoring or discounting the subjectivity of the other person. It amounts to the incapacity or unwillingness to see the situation from the point of view of the other person. In effect, we are succumbing to the childish illusion that I am more real and more important than the other.

This is an ethical principle. How does it relate to well-being? We are *not* asserting that well-being requires one to conform one's actions to this noble but demanding ethical principle. However, we are affirming that one's well-being constitutively requires that we identify

ourselves as a person among others, who are equally real as oneself. Insofar as we do that, our way of being will be well.

In a way, this requirement is simply an extension of the condition argued for in Chapter 5. In the previous chapter we contended that the relational aspect of well-being requires that we relate to others as persons. Now we are extending this requirement to the way in which we are self-conscious. We need to be aware of ourselves as one among many.

Why this is part of well-being? One way to see why is to consider the relevant forms of ill-being. There is a group of illnesses that includes being closed in on oneself, being obsessed with one's own self-importance, not being well connected to the reality of others and not being open to others. Once again, we are considering these states of being as intrinsically bad rather than merely bad instrumentally.

At root, the issue is that a person who is well must be in tune with the fundamental lived realities of human life. The root issue is living harmoniously with how things are for the kind of beings we are. In this context 'how things are' means not only recognizing emotionally that one is the kind of being that has primary intrinsic value, but also appreciating that one is *a* member of a community that includes many other people that have the same status. The meaning of the first implies the second: I am a member of a kind, but *only* one of a kind. In other words, there are others.

Fair enough, but why is this an aspect of well-being? If it isn't obvious, then to answer this question, we need to return briefly to basics. We have argued for a framework of well-being that isn't thin and hedonistic. Among many other things, this means that we must give up the individualistic and hedonist assumption that for something to be part of well-being, the lack of it must feel bad. Once we give up this assumption, we have to find another set of bases for well-being. We found these in the idea that there are structurally constitutive features of any human life in virtue of which we can live well or badly. These are the dimensions of well-being. These are kinds of non-instrumental value. Among these four dimensions is one that includes the relational aspects of well-being. This dimension requires that we relate to others as persons and, in this minimal sense, their value as a person becomes part of our life. If I live *with* others then I must appreciate them as persons. This in turn has implications for my self-awareness: I must be aware of myself as one among many. Hence, we arrive at the conclusion that a requirement of well-being is that one regard oneself as one, but only one, member of a special kind of being.

¹ There is no reason to think that the content of our perception should be captured with a single proposition. Proust teaches us that it may require several pages to describe how someone sees a tree, let alone the behaviour of a person. Our perceptions are phenomenologically rich.

² This doesn't mean that other forms of self-awareness are not also prerequisites for it.

³ Ricoeur claims that narratives provide unity to the self.

⁴ Thus we need at least a four-fold distinction between narrative-processes, the narrational content of self-perception, narratives as artefacts and finally the life of a person.

⁵ Stoic

⁶ Indeed, such a confusion would not make sense because the audience of a story would itself consist only of films or books. Universalise 'I am a film' and the conclusion is everyone is a film, including the audience.

⁷ This doesn't mean that other species are not persons and furthermore, we are ignoring the claim that the difference between persons and non-persons is one of degree.

⁸ Of course, this claim is simplistic and problematic because there are many different interpretations of Kant on these points. There may well be a sophisticated reading of Kant's texts that escapes these quick brush problems.

⁹ We need a term for the opposite error which is to treat something that is only instrumentally valuable as if it were non-instrumentally valuable. These two errors have the same root, which we explored in chapter2.