

CHAPTER 8 WARFARE AND THE STATE

VINCENT GABRIELSEN

1. INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTS AND APPROACH

'States make war and war makes states.' Charles Tilly's dictum represents a view widely shared by political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists. 'State' and 'war' are not self-explanatory or uncomplicated concepts.¹ Max Weber's immensely influential definition posited that the state encapsulated a human community, a definite territory and a monopoly of legitimate physical force (*Gewaltsamkeit*).² That force is usually understood to have two functions: an internal one, consisting of the enforcement of legal order by a police force; and an external one, consisting of the defence of the state's territorial sovereignty by the army and navy. Guided largely by this thinking, several scholars classify ancient Greek communities, particularly the *polis*, as stateless societies: legal order was not ensured by a police force but through the custom of self-help practised by the community members themselves, and with rare exceptions there were no standing armies.³ In short, in most places legitimate violence had not yet become the monopoly of a central political authority.

Recently, however, Mogens Hansen has pointed out that Weber's criterion of a monopoly of legitimate violence was not met even by major European states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; while it was often posited as an ideal, this monopoly seems never to have been realized in full.⁴ Such a partial emancipation from Weberian influence is a great leap forward. The present chapter argues that the concept of state is perfectly compatible also with polities in which legitimate force exists within an *oligopolistic* rather than a monopolistic system.

In his seminal *War in the Ancient World: A Social History*, Yvon Garlan distinguishes between, on the one hand, war proper or a 'true state of

¹ Tilly (1975b) 73–6, (1992) 20–8; cf. Hansen (2002) 39, '*poleis* make war and war makes *poleis*'. See Fried (1967) 204–5; Carneiro (1970) 734–6, (1994); Gellner (1983) 3; Gallie (1991) 31; Held (1995) 48; Pierson (1996) 7; Ferguson (1999) 417–18.

² Weber (1972) 822. Contrast the unconscious use of the terms 'state' and 'war' by e.g. Delbrück (1962); Pritchett (1971–91).

³ Berent (1996), (2000). On self-help: Lintott (1982); Fisher (1998); Hunter (1994).

⁴ Hansen (1998) 96, 118, 120, (2002) esp. 38–9. Cf. Mann (1986) 11.

war', as it had emerged through a process of legal formalization in the world of the classical Greek city-states, and on the other hand its precursor, a pre-judicial (or pre-state) phase of war characteristic of earlier, primitive communities. Concretely, the distinction is one between two forms of organized violence: (1) communally organized armed conflict, which in principle involved a polity's entire fighting population; and (2) privately organized predatory enterprises, smaller in scale, whose primary objective was the acquisition of material gain, that is brigandage and piracy. For Garlan the latter were 'anti-wars' lacking the validation of law and ultimate victory. The evolutionary scenario is explained as follows: 'before conflicts could emerge from their pre-legal framework the political structure of the communities . . . had to develop internally'.⁵ Resistance to that transformation is seen as a sure sign of cultural backwardness and atrophied statehood. A process of 'legal formalization' – the establishment of rules, conventions, battle protocols and, above all, the very concept of 'legitimate' warfare – is indeed a well-documented phenomenon.⁶ But fairly well-documented, too, are blatant manipulation of the concept of legitimacy and frequent transgression of these rules, not least by states which prided themselves on having long passed the threshold of primitiveness.⁷ Such distinct and chronic lapses into (to use Garlan's terminology) primitive, *pre-droit* conditions are enough to make the following remark by St Augustine applicable to the whole period treated here: 'For what are states but large bandit bands, and what are bandit bands but small states?' (*De civ. D.* 4.4).

In the classical period and beyond, the question of what did or did not constitute war, especially legitimate war, was itself a bone of contention and a frequently used weapon in the ideological fight among polities over the issue of who was civilized and central and who was primitive and peripheral. Certainly, as will become clear, there were profound changes, particularly from c. 500 onwards, in both the nature and scale of organized violence. In principle, the distinction drawn by Garlan and others between private raids and public military campaigns is valid. Yet no simple evolutionary scenario of 'war reaching its civilized, adulthood stage within the developed state' seems credible today. From the ranks of anthropologists, furthermore, dissenting voices now insist that 'the venerable distinction of "primitive" from "civilized" war obscures a fundamental similarity. War is war.'⁸ And so it is. In archaic and classical Greece (just as other regions in different periods) several violence-producing agencies, each generating its particular product in the form of raids and community-wide campaigns, existed side-by-side.

⁵ Garlan (1975) 77, with 23–4, 31, 37. ⁶ Ober (1996b); Hanson (1989).

⁷ See Krentz (2000). ⁸ Ferguson (1999) 429, cf. (1984a) 26.

II. THE PRODUCERS OF VIOLENCE AND THE PROFITS OF WAR

Thinkers of the classical period occasionally reminded their contemporaries that the appropriation of wealth in connection with armed conflict was a normal and perfectly justified act. Xenophon, for instance, held this to be a timeless and universally accepted convention: 'for it is a law established for all time (*nomos aidios*) among all men that, when a city is taken in war, the persons and the property of the inhabitants thereof belong to the captors'.⁹ Such seizures may be denounced as 'theft' (*harpagē*) but to the victors they constitute the legitimate acquisition of 'booty' (*leia*).¹⁰ The very concept of booty unites in itself the two most central ingredients of warfare: wealth and military power. 'In the ancient world power and wealth were not independent notions: each fed on the other . . . power was used to seize wealth . . . wealth was seized in order to enhance power.'¹¹ That was as true of Alexander's campaign of conquest, 'a booty raid on an epic scale', as it was of Homer's Trojan expedition, an epic raid that yielded booty on an immense scale.¹² For all the tactical and technical innovations of the centuries separating Homer and Alexander, one element remained remarkably constant throughout: war brought profits.¹³

Booty was both a *raison d'être* and an indispensable means of warfare; this, it will be argued in the following section, proved to be particularly true of the monopolistic type of state. Yet the fruits of war seldom feature among the causes of war.¹⁴ The reason appears to be that those who acquired booty were placed into two separate compartments. The private raider retained throughout a name directly associating him to his trade, 'booty-chaser' (Homeric: *leistēr*; later: *leistēs*), but his public counterpart shook off this association completely: the terms for warrior, soldier, hoplite and so forth, and for the collectivity to which they belonged, the army (*strateia*, *strateuma*), all flagged the notion that communal interests superseded purely personal interests. An individual's contribution to the collective endeavour was defined as a cardinal duty – indeed, a hallmark of citizenship.¹⁵ A set of special terms (*xenos*, *epikouros*, *misthophoros*) singled out those who put their skills at the service of a community other than their own.

Thus the two kinds of violence producers were set apart. At one end stood the 'booty-chaser' (*leistēs*), often a socially prominent figure in command of the necessary material and human resources, represented by Homer's Odysseus (e.g. *Od.* 17.424–33) and his historical successor, the Phocaeen Dionysius (Hdt. 6.17). At the other end stood the fighting potential of an entire community, mustered and fielded by the central political authority.

⁹ Xen. *Cyr.* 7.4.73; cf. 3.3.45, 4.2.26. ¹⁰ For the terminology, see Pritchett (1971–91) v.77–86.

¹¹ Garland (1975) 183. ¹² Austin (1986) 454; cf. Nowag (1983); van Wees (1992) esp. 299–310.

¹³ Aymard (1957); Garland (1977); Finley (1985) ch. 5, esp. 76–7.

¹⁴ On which see Momigliano (1966a). ¹⁵ Manville (1990); Raaflaub (1997).




Figure 8.1 Fighting around a beached warship, on a late eighth-century Attic vase. On the left two men fighting with swords, and trying to grab each other's hair; in the centre two spearmen attacking and an archer defending the ship; on the right a line of soldiers each armed with a so-called Dipylon shield (an early, single-grip, version of the Boeotian shield; see fig. 5.2), a pair of spears and a sword.

Its activation was *formally* justified by the need to preserve collective liberty and pride, demand respect from potential rivals and retaliate for rectifying an injustice committed against itself or against a valuable ally – the usual assortment of causes of war. None the less, the material proceeds of organized violence constituted just as strong and lasting a concern for this kind of producer of violence as they did for his private counterpart.

In the early Greek world, as elsewhere, however, neither these two agencies of violence nor their respective spheres of activity were yet completely separated.¹⁶ The borderline between them remained rather fluid for at least three reasons. First, because in most archaic communities – Sparta after the occupation of Messenia may have been a notable exception – private and public producers of violence enjoyed a symbiotic relationship which constitutes the defining characteristic of the oligopolistic type of state. Their political regimes possessed legal mechanisms capable of accommodating the private *opérateur* – if not because he himself was a prominent figure in their power-structure, then because the universal principle of mobilization and funding, a reliance on 'those able to arm themselves' (*hoi (ta) hopla parechomenoi*), rendered his personal abilities and resources indispensable when an all-out effort was called for. Second, because such all-out military enterprises invariably demanded that communal forces be placed under a single command structure, all early states tended to behave in a monopolistic fashion during short spells of 'national' hostilities, only to revert to their original status as soon as fighting or campaigning was over. And third, because in this area private action often had public repercussions. Owing to the time-honoured and pervasive custom of reprisals (*sylê*, *rhysia agein*), privately organized, small-scale predation was likely to instigate a full-blown clash between the armed forces of the communities of the perpetrator and the retaliating victim.¹⁷

¹⁶ See Raaflaub (1997) 51–3. On archaic Rome, see Rawlings (1999).

¹⁷ E.g. Nestor's story in Hom. *Il.* 11.670–761. See Bravo (1980); Pritchett (1971–91) v.68–132.

When the complete separation of the two kinds of violence producer did occur, it had the historic effect of creating two diametrically opposed notions of state. It meant the fully fledged emergence of the monopolistic type, which gradually became a fierce ideological rival of its older counterpart, the oligopolistic state, because the latter continued to embrace an element which the former considered inimical to its very existence. The oligopolistic type of state, in sharp contrast to its counterpart, was inherently unable to enforce the observance of widely accepted conventions of warfare, an inability with often disastrous consequences for those who abided by such conventions. The private *opérateur*, showing little respect for those most basic protocols which limited armed conflict spatially, temporally and in terms of personnel, was wont to hit at random anyone, in any place and at any time. Hence the conceptual segregation of his *modus operandi* – the ‘raid’ – from ‘war’. For the monopolistic state, the raid was (and still is) demographically and economically destructive; besides, it strongly challenged the central political authority’s ability to meet its primary obligation of protecting those under its control.

Although this was fundamentally an ideological opposition, spokesmen for the monopolistic state tended to express it in cultural terms by situating their rival either in an uncivilized past or among the ‘primitive’ remnants of a civilized present. In the second half of the fifth century Thucydides gave the following account of the situation:

In earlier times both the Greeks and the barbarians who dwelled on the mainland near the sea, as well as those on the islands . . . turned to *leisteia*, under the lead of their most powerful men, whose motive was their private gain and the sustenance of their weaker followers, and falling upon cities which were unprotected by walls and indeed consisted of only scattered settlements, they plundered them and gained their livelihood from that source. At this time such a profession, so far from being regarded as disgraceful, was considered quite honorable. It is an attitude that can be illustrated even today by some of the inhabitants of the mainland, among whom success in the performance of this act [sc. *leisteia*] is regarded as something to be proud of . . . and even up to the present day much of Greece still follows the old way of life – among the Ozolian Locrians, for instance, and the Aetolians and the Acarnanians and the others who live on the mainland in that area.

(Thuc. 1.5.1–3; Loeb edn, adapted)

Thucydides also points to the circumstances that conditioned the emergence of the most pre-eminent classical Greek example of the monopolistic state and establishes the approximate date of this momentous event. Prior to the Persian wars, he explains:

there was no war by land from which any considerable accession of power resulted; all those wars that did occur were border wars between neighbours, and foreign

expeditions far from their own country for the conquest of others were not undertaken by the Greeks. For they had not yet been brought into union as subjects of the greatest states, nor, on the other hand, did they carry out common expeditions as equals; it was rather against one another that the neighbouring peoples severally made war.

(1.15.2; Loeb edn, adapted)

Here, as also in the analysis he offers in the archaeology-section of his work (esp. 1.11–17), Thucydides highlights two principal preconditions for large-scale power expansion, both of which have recently been rediscovered by historical sociologists and anthropologists: (1) current military technology and infrastructure must be able to meet the logistical challenges posed by such a project; and (2) a single polity must be able to mobilize and organize under its leadership a wide-ranging military potential.¹⁸ The one Greek state to succeed where all others had failed is of course classical Athens. What ensured that success was partly possession of two major violence-related institutions – sea-power and hegemony – and partly a determined effort to achieve a high degree of financial independence. These are the themes on which the rest of this chapter will focus.

III. WARFARE AND THE STATE: THE HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

However spectacular and costly a project, the enlargement by 480 of Athens’ fleet to 200 war vessels of the most powerful type, the trireme, in itself was a mere precondition to power accretion. Absolutely essential for turning the new acquisition into an effective war machine with which to amass *and* to sustain power was the build-up of a naval organization. That was a vastly more demanding, complex and long-term project, since it involved a series of crucial, even daring, political decisions with profound and far-reaching consequences – political, economic and social. The distinctive organization which early fifth-century Athens chose to erect ushered her squarely into monopolistic statehood and made her the exemplar of such a polity in the classical Greek world – matched only later on by Macedon. Conversely, a lack or limited development of such an organization remained the principal structural weakness impeding a number of other *poleis*, notably Sparta. The main components of the Athenian naval organization from its inception in the early fifth century to 323/2 and the relationship of these components to the remaining, land-based, military apparatus therefore deserve close scrutiny.

¹⁸ Mann (1986) esp. 7–10; Reyna (1994) (‘hegemonic domination’ and the concept of ‘war’).

1. Centralization

One vital component of Athenian naval organization was a long process of centralization, already adumbrated in the Peisistratid step to bring war finance into the public sector,¹⁹ and set in motion by the decision that new accretions to the existing fleet – primarily the purchase of twenty ships from Corinth in 491 BC and the large-scale shipbuilding programme of 483/2²⁰ – should be entirely paid from public funds and thus become *Athenian* property.

By 478 that decision had brought about two major changes. One was of political import: the principal authorities of democratic Athens, that is the council and the assembly, had now assumed complete control over the existing naval resources and hence a monopoly over the exertion of armed violence at sea. Later, in 423, Athens tried formally to externalize that prerogative by trying to restrict the use of warships by her adversaries (Thuc. 4.118.5). How jealously that prerogative was thereafter guarded is indicated by the fits of political hysteria that swept Athens any time some of her citizens deployed public war vessels for unauthorized purposes (*Hell. Oxy.* A1, 1–27 Chambers), particularly for conducting private plundering raids ([Dem.] 51.13–14), or even when some citizen went off to operate as a privateer on a trireme he himself had purchased (Isae. 11.48). That monopoly almost instantly set the naval branch apart from the remaining military organization: for all other branches the general rule continued to apply that the citizen-infantryman, whether heavy- or light-armed, fought with his own equipment and the cavalryman (for yet some time) on his own mount.²¹

The other change had social consequences. Not only was the private *opérateur* deprived of his freedom to act of his own accord and to partake in communally organized exploits, but in addition his person was now viewed as an outlaw and his kind of violence as illegitimate. Henceforward, the independent aristocratic raider – the erstwhile main naval contributor within the 'oligopolistic' state – could only engage in his time-honoured pursuits as a civic outcast branded with the dishonourable label of a mere 'booty-chaser'. Unless of course he chose, as most representatives of this class of people did, to let his personal energies, abilities and resources be harnessed to communal decisions and actions.

An illustration of that dramatic expansion of the public sphere at the expense of the private one is offered by the activities, under Peisistratid rule and under the democracy, of two members of a single aristocratic family. The principality which the elder Miltiades, son of Cypselus, carved out in

¹⁹ Thuc. 6.54.5: financing of warfare out of a 5 per cent tax, cf. Lewis (1990) 246.

²⁰ Hdt. 6.89, 7.144.1–2; Thuc. 1.14.1–2; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.7.

²¹ Infantry: *ML* 14.8–12. Cavalry: Bugh (1988) 37.

the Thracian Chersonese c. 550 can hardly be called *Athenian* in any real sense; Miltiades, styling himself *oikistês* and tyrant, commanded adequate local manpower and military resource, including ships, to lead independent military campaigns.²² However, by the time of his nephew, Miltiades, son of Cimon, who in 493 possessed five triremes,²³ things had begun to change. Shortly before 493, Miltiades conducted in private a raid against Lemnos, captured the island and then 'handed it over to the Athenians' – private conquest was thus turned into public property.²⁴ The next and decisive step is evidenced by the story about Miltiades' expedition against Paros in 489, which is characterized by Herodotus (6.132–3) as a raid undertaken out of personal motives. This time Miltiades could deploy the force of seventy ships as well as the appropriate amount of funds and manpower only after the Athenian assembly had authorized the expedition, and only after Miltiades had assured his home authorities that his personal venture would enrich *all the Athenians* with an abundance of gold – publicly owned means were now to be used exclusively for hauling home publicly owned profits (Hdt. 6.132.1–2).

In stark contrast to this, politics adhering to oligopolistic statehood continued to allow the principle 'war is a natural method of acquisition' (Arist. *Pol.* 1256b23–6) to be operative for private individuals as well, except in special circumstances and always for the benefit of a particular group or community.²⁵ 'Booty-chasing' remained in Thucydides' times a national habit in 'many parts of Greece' (cf. Thuc. 1.5.3, quoted p. 252). Some two centuries later it could still boast its resistance to reform; in 230, the Illyrian queen Teuta answered a Roman complaint about her peoples' raids against Italian shipping with the words: 'as far as private activities are concerned it [is] not customary for Illyrian rulers to preclude their subjects from increasing their fortunes at sea'.²⁶

In fifth-century democratic Athens the raid had been entirely deprivatized to become the sole prerogative of the state. As a result, the proceeds of armed violence, whether at sea or on land, were by law regarded as state property, a principle that was enforced rigorously throughout the fourth century.²⁷ Determined and creative individuals might of course still try, with greater or lesser success, to evade that rule. Thucydides (6.15.2) more than implies that Alcibiades warmly supported the expedition to Sicily in 415 because he intended to use his commandership as a means of private enrichment.²⁸ Again, in 355, two publicly appointed captains commanding

²² Hdt. 6.34–6, 37.1; Paus. 6.19.6 (dedication at Olympia); cf. Figueira (1991) 133–7, 260–2.

²³ Hdt. 6.41.1–2, with Lewis (1988) 298. ²⁴ Hdt. 1.136.2–3; cf. Figueira (1991) 138, 253–6.

²⁵ See e.g. the agreement of c. 450 between two Locrian communities: Tod 1 no. 34.

²⁶ Polyb. 2.8.8, with Davies (1984) 287.

²⁷ Pritchett (1971–91) v.398–438, esp. 416–25; Gabrielsen (2001a) 78–9.

²⁸ On generals profiting from war booty, see Davies (1981) 66–7.

an Athenian trireme looted, on the high seas, the cargo of a merchantman from Naucratis worth 57,000 drachmas; their profiteering venture, though, was spoiled when the assembly confirmed the legitimacy of the act but considered the loot to be state property (Dem. 24.11–14).

2. Finance

Another vital component of Athens' naval organization was a tightly controlled and efficient fiscal system which for the first time made it possible to transfer to the public sphere financial responsibility for the running of the entire machinery. To understand fully the character of this system one must appreciate the unprecedented pressure on resources, especially cash, which had to be met from the late 480s onwards, and consider the alternative modes of finance available.

First, the pressures. One set of these emanated from the amount and value of the materials needed for the building and maintenance of the ships. Above all, the procurement of high-quality ship-timber, a commodity whose monetary and strategic worth was fully recognized by those in power at the source of supply (e.g. Hdt. 5.23.2), required hard currency and adept diplomatic footwork. Evidence from the second part of the fifth century onwards attests to Athens' cultivation of political relations with a main supplier, Macedon,²⁹ and her use of imperial muscle to extract the materials she needed: 'If some city is rich in ship-timber', Pseudo-Xenophon (*Atl. Pol.* 2.11–12) wrote, 'where will it distribute it without the consent of the leading power at sea? And if some city is rich in iron, copper or flax, where will it distribute it without the consent of the leading sea-power? In all these things, however, I see the very materials of which also my [sc. Athens'] ships are built.' Very few places were as blessed with possession of both timber and revenue as were, for instance, Thasos and its mainland territories, Amphipolis or south Italy and Sicily³⁰ – and those which were fell prey, at one point or another, to a naval power coveting their riches.

Expenditure on a grand scale, furthermore, was a requisite for the development and upkeep of spacious harbours equipped with ship sheds, storage buildings and other facilities, all manned with an appropriate workforce and administrative personnel. The vast project that resulted in the transformation of Piraeus' three natural harbours, Zea, Munichia and Cantharus, into fortified naval bases proper – the headquarters of the Athenian fleet – had

²⁹ Contacts with Macedon: *IG* 1³, 89, 117; Andoc. 2.11; for the fourth-century: Tod n. no. 111; Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11. *SEG* xxxvii.573 records Alexander's temporary prohibition, in 335 BC, to sell timber from Mt Dyonon, cf. Demosthenes' complaint (17.28) that timber was difficult to acquire. Cf. Meiggs (1982) 116–53; Borza (1987).

³⁰ Thasos: Hdt. 6.46–7; Thuc. 1.103.3. Amphipolis: Thuc. 1.98.1, 4.102.3–4, 108.1. Syracuse: Thuc. 6.90.3, 7.25.2; Diod. Sic. 14.41.1–6, cf. Meiggs (1982) 117, 119, 124.

been initiated by Themistocles already in 494 and represented a distinct contribution to the centralization process.³¹

Considerably greater were the pressures arising from operating the fleet. With a complement of 200 men on each trireme, the manpower requirements posed by 200 ships amounted to some 40,000 men; manning even half that force with citizen crews was a demographic impossibility for any single *polis*, Athens included. To the need for sheer muscle should be added the need for skill, since the combat effectiveness of this particular type of war vessel depended heavily upon the expertise of its ratings and oarsmen.³²

These factors rendered it necessary to supplement the pool of locally based manpower with often very large numbers of mercenary naval labour: what was said of Athens in 431 BC – that her navy relied on 'purchased rather than home-grown' manpower (Thuc. 1.121.3) – almost certainly applied also to the preceding period as it did throughout the fourth century. The large-scale employment of outsiders to crew fleets therefore spearheaded a pivotal military development: the increasing use of mercenary soldiers.³³

Probably, it was also within the naval sphere that the organization of an effective commissariat and the supply of pay (*misthos*) were for the first time defined as responsibilities predominantly, if not entirely, falling on the state,³⁴ a novelty that almost certainly affected directly the coinage-issuing policies of several *poleis* which possessed fleets.³⁵ Already between 525 and 500 Eretria saw the need to institutionalize, by law, the provision of *misthos* to oarsmen who were sent on distant campaigns, that is beyond Euboean waters.³⁶ With armies, on the other hand, private expenditure seems to have held a prominent place for a longer time. Even in the mid-fifth century, when the establishment of an army commissariat is in evidence,³⁷ the switch to public funding in this area was not complete, and it never really became so: our earliest surviving document securely attesting *misthos* for hoplite service, a decree of Lindos that may date as early as 440, distinguishes between soldiers paid from public funds and those paid by private individuals.³⁸ Again, part of the 200 talents spent on the campaign to Thermopylae in 352 (5,000 hoplites and 400 cavalry) was made up of

³¹ Thuc. 1.90–3; Ar. *Eq.* 815; Diod. Sic. 11.39–40; Plut. *Them.* 19. Cf. Frost (1980) 175–7; Kallet-Marx (1994).

³² Gabrielsen (1994) 121–3. ³³ Parke (1933); Marinovic (1988); Baker (1999).

³⁴ Main evidence: Pritchett (1971–91) 1.3–52. Cf. Gabrielsen (1994) 110–14; contra Eddy (1968) (i.e. naval pay was introduced after the Peace of Callias or even after 445).

³⁵ Pritchett (1971–91) 1.13–14, quoting Selman (1955) 108–9.

³⁶ *SEG* xli.725, with Cairns (1991); contra Pritchett (1971–91) v.378 n. 541.

³⁷ Pritchett (1971–91) 1.30–41, esp. 32–3; Anderson (1970) 43–66; Hammond (1983a).

³⁸ *IK* 38 no. 251 (of 440–420), providing that those who set out from Lindos on an expedition either *damosiai* or *idiai* shall pay to the war god Enyalios one-sixtieth of their pay. I agree with Pritchett (1971–91) 111.325–6 (cf. v.168 n. 228) that the contrast is not between citizens and mercenaries, but between at public and private expense. However, since *idiai* in the inscription is used of soldiers who received *misthos*, Pritchett's view that 'private' refers to volunteers who paid their own expenses cannot

the money paid by the soldiers themselves from their own means (Dem. 19.84).

As fleets grew larger and more numerous, pay became a prominent factor in the attempts to attract swarms of men to perform hard and hazardous work. This was the means, for instance, to which the Corinthians resorted when in 434/3 they swept the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece to find rowing labour for their newly enlarged navy (Thuc. 1.31.1). Keeping such huge numbers of men adequately fed and paid constituted one of the most formidable financial challenges facing a naval state. Adequate pay meant wages at rates high enough to pre-empt mutiny or to induce crews to stay through often lengthy and distant campaigns. For post-480 Athens, of course, these challenges were of enormous proportions. Because of the high demand for skilled manpower, naval pay developed into a tactical device: the offer of higher rates was used to paralyse an enemy fleet by enticing its crews to defect to one's own side (e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4). As a counter-measure part of the sailors' pay could be withheld until disembarkation (Thuc. 8.45.2), though that meant no relief at all for naval budgets, which in certain circumstances were further burdened by payments of extra bonuses to especially important teams of crewmen.³⁹

The cumulative impact of these pressures on naval budgets remains an elusive question, mainly because of the interplay of two factors. One is that we lack even the most basic of the relevant figures. For instance, even though a widely held view sets the cost of a trireme at one talent (6,000 dr.), our sources are practically silent on that matter.⁴⁰ Moreover, recurrent outlays on ship maintenance, a far from negligible item of expenditure, are virtually unretrievable. We are no better off with the operational costs, of which naval pay – at the rates of 3 obols or, perhaps more usually, 1 drachma per day – constituted only one part. The costs of naval operations usually reached exceedingly high and incalculable levels. 'War', an orator reportedly said, 'is not fed by fixed contributions'.⁴¹

The second factor rendering naval budgets quantitatively intractable was the constant need to deal with unforeseeable outlay instantly and on the spot. In 351, anticipating an escalation of Athens' conflict with Philip of Macedon, Demosthenes tried to introduce some improvements in this area by proposing a scheme that was intended to make the operational costs of a standing force amenable to budgetary planning. Yet even that scheme (which did not win support) had to make allowance for a fleet's resort to

be right: see Thuc. 8.100.3 and Lys. 16.14, to be contrasted with instances in which the soldiers, in part or wholly, served at their own expenses, e.g. Dem. 19.84.

³⁹ Thuc. 6.31.3. Cf. Gabrielsen (1994) 122–4.

⁴⁰ Gabrielsen (1994) 139–45 (hulls), 152–3 (equipment); *contra* Amir (1965) 16–18.

⁴¹ Plut. *Dem.* 17.4, quoting Theophrastus, who quoted Crobylus (= the orator Hegesippus of Sounion).

self-help and improvisation in order to find supplementary sources of funding (Dem. 4.16–29). Fleets of triremes afloat swallowed up huge amounts of money; in theory, their resource demands were infinite; a point made by a fourth-century orator when he described the triremes as 'devouring' (Lys. fr. 39 Thalheim). Due appreciation of the same phenomenon informed Thucydides' decision to base his account of fifth-century Athenian naval power on four key concepts: naval preparedness (*paraskeuē*), expenditure (*dapanē*), revenue (*prosodos*) and surplus of money (*periousia chrematōn*).⁴² Essentially, none of this was new by 480. What did constitute a novelty, however, was the unparalleled scale on which funds were needed by a single state, Athens.

Next, the alternative modes of naval finance available. One consisted of regularizing and upgrading to state level the customary *ad hoc* 'fund-raising' expeditions, that is plundering raids and extortion. The assaults by a Samian force on wealthy Siphnos and by Themistocles on Aegean Medizers right after Salamis are just two examples (Hdt. 3.57–8, 8.111–12). Alternatively, one might lay hands on temple treasure: either by force, as Histiaeus of Miletus advised the commanders of the rebelling Ionian fleet to do if they wanted to prevail over the Persians at sea in 499;⁴³ or by contracting loans, as the Corinthians proposed that Sparta and her Peloponnesian League should do from Olympia and Delphi (Thuc. 1.121.3). A final means of raising money was to get a cash-rich foreign power, Greek or non-Greek, to assume the role of paymaster, as Sparta was compelled to do with Persia from 412 onwards.⁴⁴ The flaws of all these methods, chiefly their inadequacy in ensuring a sufficiently steady and substantial flow of money, are fairly obvious. Besides, loans had to be repaid,⁴⁵ forceful acquisition of sacred funds was likely to meet with general hostility,⁴⁶ and the services of a foreign paymaster had to be repaid dearly in political currency, that is the partial surrender by the recipient of his right to independent action – exit hegemony. Athens chose not to rely on any of these, but opted instead for a system that rerouted domestic, private wealth towards public utility. A new fiscal device took shape.

Its core was the old ethic that publicly oriented toil and largesse (*leitourgia*) deserve public acclaim, which was now applied to personal responsibility for captaining a warship (*trierarchia*).⁴⁷ To each state-owned trireme there was assigned a rich man, the trierarch, who from his private wealth

⁴² Kallet-Marx (1993) 1–20.

⁴³ Hdt. 5.36.2–4. On the proposal of the Mantineans in 363, the Arcadian Confederation stopped using the treasure of Zeus at Olympia for war purposes: Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.33–4.

⁴⁴ Pritchett (1971–91) 1.47–8 (principal evidence); David (1979–80); Lewis (1989) (discussion).

⁴⁵ Migotte (1984).

⁴⁶ E.g. Thuc. 4.118.3, with Parker (1983) 170–5; Davies (2001b) 125.

⁴⁷ Gabrielsen (1994) 7, 19–39.

had to assist the public treasury; as we shall see below (p. 266), a comparable arrangement was introduced about mid-fifth century in the cavalry. This device bore the clear imprint of Athenian democratic law and ideology, in that it imposed a potentially onerous public obligation on a specific social class: wealthy citizens were legally required, for one year at a time, to captain a warship and at the same time to become financially responsible for both the ship itself and part of its running expenses. Thus the independent raider came to be supplanted by a state appointee whose primary, but not sole, qualification was the size of his purse. Virtually all other Greek naval states too had their ships captained by trierarchs.⁴⁸ What gave the Athenian institution its special style, however, was its being the work of a particular political regime.

Concentration on domestic, private wealth, then, offered itself as a solution to a major problem of war finance. But at the same time it created a new one: how to keep the volume and frequency of fiscal exactions at levels which, on the one hand, met on-going military demands and, on the other hand, did not overcharge or even exhaust the economic potential of the social stratum afflicted by these exactions. Maintaining a balance between these two concerns clashed directly with the pre-eminent 'national' objective of pursuing sea-power. At a later date, Thucydides made Pericles stress the limitless character of that objective by saying that mastery of the sea consists not only of Athens' 'present hold' (i.e. the empire) but 'any extension you [sc. the Athenians] may wish for, because of your current naval preparedness [*paraskeuê*]' (2.62.2). So, additional, preferably non-domestic, mechanisms were needed to absorb the financial shocks of a constant increase of military activity.

3. Imperial revenue

The expansion of power and the acquisition of the wealth were made to feed each other by the creation of the Delian League, which from 478/7 onwards enriched the domestic fiscal system with a massive external branch. The proposition that the Delian League became yet another component of Athens' naval organization does not require a stand on the issue of when one can appropriately describe it as an 'empire'. This is not the place to rehearse the league's history; nor is it immediately relevant to decide whether the main motive for its formation was revenge against the barbarian, which Thucydides (1.96.1) calls 'a pretext', or pure and simple gain (*kerdos*),⁴⁹ which would make Athens' hegemonic league look like a

⁴⁸ E.g. Hdt. 6.14.2 (Samos); Thuc. 4.11.4 (Sparta).

⁴⁹ Thuc. 1.8.3, with Kallet-Marx (1993) 53–4. See also Sealey (1966) 253, *contra* Jackson (1969); Raflaub (1979).

grander and more sophisticated version of such *ad hoc* corporate bodies as 'those sailing away for booty' of Solonian times (*Dig.* 47.22.4). What matters here is the effect of three long-term trends: the gradual conversion of league funds to a purely Athenian resource; the increasing monetization of that resource, that is a priority of coin (*chremata*) over all else; and the piecemeal centralization, physical and administrative, of financial potential into a few easily supervised depositories. All three trends intersected and even coalesced at several points. They helped put hegemony and monopolistic statehood on a much firmer footing.

Foremost amongst the effects of the *resource-conversion* process stands the momentous expansion of Athens' own naval capacity. One part of this growth was secured by the confiscation of whole league fleets, either after the suppression of a revolt, or after the compulsory inclusion into the league of a new member. Suppliers of the first kind include Thasos in 465, Samos in 440, Mytilene in 427 and probably also Naxos in the early 460s. To those of the second kind belong perhaps Carystus, the first *polis* to be coerced into joining the league, and definitely Aegina, which with her entrance into the league in 457 surrendered the part of her navy that had not already fallen into Athenian hands. For each take-over of a fleet we can confidently assume a corresponding seizure from the *polis* concerned of its land-based naval infrastructure, ship sheds and all.⁵⁰

A presumably bigger number of ships was secured by captures. The considerable haul of Phoenician triremes after Eurymedon in the 460s,⁵¹ a league exploit that surely resulted in tangible Athenian gains,⁵² prefigured what was to become a habitual and appreciable source of supply of naval matériel.⁵³ The prize from a single naval victory alone, that over Aegina in 459, amounted to no less than seventy ships (Thuc. 1.105.2), a number of which are reported to have been brand-new (Diod. Sic. 11.78.4). We have neither the full list of confiscations and captures nor the number of vessels involved in each case. But what we do know so far is sufficient both to render it likely that, in aggregate, such gains more than counterbalanced running losses – including those suffered in Egypt in 454 (Thuc. 1.101.4), the most severe in the pre-413 record – and to explain the absence of trustworthy, contemporary evidence about large-scale shipbuilding programmes before the disaster in Sicily in 413.⁵⁴ The exact impact of these accretions on Athens' naval strength remains beyond calculation.

⁵⁰ Thuc. 1.101.3 (Thasos), 1.116.1, 117.3 (Samos), 3.50.2 (Mytilene), 1.98.1 (Naxos), 1.98.3; cf. Hdt. 8.66.2 (Carystus); Thuc. 1.108.4 (Aegina). See Meiggs (1972) 63 n. 2, 70; Hornblower (1991–6) 1.151 (on Thuc. 1.98.4), *contra* Schuller (1974) 104–7.

⁵¹ Thuc. 1.100.1: a total of 200 Phoenician triremes were seized and destroyed.

⁵² For a parallel: Hdt. 9.119–21 (siege of Sestos, 479), with Kallet-Marx (1993) 52–3.

⁵³ E.g. *IG* II², 1604–7; Dem. 20.77.

⁵⁴ Several such programmes have been postulated: Wade-Gery and Meritt (1957) 183, 187–8; Blackman (1969) 208, 211–12; Jordan (1975) 25–30.

Some figures do become available with Thucydides' enumeration of the resources possessed by Athens when at the peak of her power, but these figures seem to give two mutually inconsistent pictures. On the one hand, it is said that just prior to the war of 431 there were '300 seaworthy triremes' (Thuc. 2.13.8; cf. Ar. *Ach.* 545); and Thucydides mentions a resolution that '100 of the best triremes' be set aside every year for use in dire emergency only, specifically in the event that Attica was threatened by a seaborne invasion (Thuc. 2.24.2). Thus Athens appears to have had an effective force of only 200 triremes. But on the other hand, Thucydides also registers naval activity by a larger fleet in 428, when 250 triremes were simultaneously in commission (Thuc. 3.17.2); another contemporary author, moreover, refers to 400 trierarchs being appointed annually during the Archidamian War ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.4). On this evidence, then, Athens' effective force numbered over 200 triremes, while her total came up to 400 triremes.

Modern scholarship has generally upheld the figure of 300 triremes and tried in various ways to explain away the 'problematic' figures.⁵⁵ Yet the size of fleets in commission, whether in 428 or any other year, is an unreliable guide to total naval strength, and Thucydides' '300 seaworthy triremes' (*triēreis ploimous*) is simply a reference to those ships only that were currently fitted out for immediate deployment, as opposed to additional hulls that were not – but, if necessary, could be – fitted out for action.⁵⁶ Since the recently enhanced carrying capacity of the three naval bases at Piraeus (c. 434/3: *IG* I³. 52 = ML 58) still remained well below 372 ships, the total reached through a much later expansion (330 BC: *IG* II². 1627.398–405), Thucydides' figure of 300 plus ships probably strictly pertains to what the bases of Piraeus were capable of housing in about 431 – the residue being stationed at overseas bases.⁵⁷ Finally, there are no compelling reasons why we should doubt that the net number of Athenian trierarchs appointed every year was indeed 400. The view that imperial Athens had a core fleet of 400 ships thus fits with the main figures and can better accommodate

⁵⁵ One suggestion is that the resolution about the 100-ship reserve was not maintained: Hornblower (1991–6) 1.280; Andrewes in Gomme et al. (1945–81) v.6 (on Thuc. 8.1.2). If the Athenians used the reserve in 428 (Thuc. 3.15.2–2, 16.2), then they acted in accord with the pertinent decree, not contrary to it. Another idea is that the passage about 250 active ships is not authentic: see Gomme in Gomme et al. (1945–81) II.272–7; Hornblower (1991–6) 1.401; and Kallet-Marx (1993) 130–4, 150–1, for the earlier views; their own view is that the passage should retain its place but be read as relating to 430. It has also been argued that fifty new ships were built in winter 431/30 (Gomme in Gomme et al. (1945–81) II.276) and that only 300 of 400 trierarchs were actually appointed: Davies (1981) 16; Gabrielsen (1994) 74–5, 176–7.

⁵⁶ When used of warships, *ploimos* usually has a technical meaning, cf. Thuc. 1.29.3: the Corcyraeans 'fitted out their old ships with *hypozeugmata* in order to make them seaworthy (*ploimous*)'. At Thuc. 1.50.4, *ploimoi nees* are contrasted with those disabled in combat (Hornblower 1991–6: 1 ad loc.). On the *hypozeugmata*, see *IG* I³. 153.6–11, with Morrison et al. (2000) 169–71, 196–9, 220–1.

⁵⁷ A practice that continued in the fourth century, e.g. the use of Oeniadae as a naval base: Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.14, with Kolonas (1989–90) with pls. 9, 10, 14 and fig. 5.

the significant gains from confiscations and captures. Its implication that there were actually even more ships than there were Athenian trierarchs is not really an obstacle, if the 'loan' of a naval squadron to Samos in 405 is seen as typifying a particular way of favouring loyal allies (*IG* I³. 127 = ML 94.25–33). In 392/1, Andocides (3.38) said that it was a matter of imperial policy 'that such *poleis* as possessed no triremes should be supplied with them by us'.

Even more important were the effects of the other two processes, monetization and centralization. The veritable *chremato*-mania which they unleashed⁵⁸ was solidly grounded in current military wisdom: 'War is not a matter of weapons, but of money which gives weapons their usefulness.'⁵⁹ Some of the most conspicuous and familiar signposts of these two processes are: (1) the establishment of a league treasury, based on Delos and starting off with an annual total of 460 talents paid by non-ship-contributing league members;⁶⁰ (2) the removal in 454 of that treasury to Athens and the high-handed rerouting – either via the portion dedicated to Athena (*aparchē*) or otherwise – of its contents to Athenian treasuries; (3) the conversion of allied ship contributions to cash payments, through which 'the Athenian fleet grew strong' (Thuc. 1.99.3);⁶¹ (4) the blatant squeezing of allied financial potential,⁶² most clearly exemplified by the assessment of 425 (which boosted the number of tribute-paying cities to some 400 and the annual yield to slightly less than 1,500 (or, alternatively, 1,000) talents, as compared to 175 cities and 400 talents in 433/2;⁶³ and (5) the creation of an all-Athenian, tribute-managing bureaucracy (*Hellenotamiai*, assessors, collectors, auditors, etc.), placed under the supervision of the council.

Less conspicuous, but still contributing to the cash-stockpiling process, are the fines for late payment (*epiphorai*), the war indemnities, and also such innovative steps as the creation in the 420s of a new type of tribute-payer (Cythera and six Thracian cities) who were not also 'allies'.⁶⁴ Financially inseparable from all of the above are the setting up of a fund from the 10-per-cent-tax, possibly levied on shipping passing through the Hellespont; the

⁵⁸ One that continued in the fourth century: Lewis (1954) 49; Davies (2001b) 126, referring to the material cited by Ferguson (1932) 85–95, 111–27.

⁵⁹ Thuc. 1.83.2–3, trans. Hornblower (1991–6) 1.128. The use of money as a weapon is a theme that reappears in the King's Peace of 387/6: king Artaxerxes promises to fight those who do not accept the peace 'both by land and by sea, with ships and with money': Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.30–1.

⁶⁰ Aristides' assessment of 478/7: Thuc. 1.96.2.

⁶¹ See Hdt. 3.19: the Persians refrained from using force on the Phoenicians because their naval strength relied on them. On allied ship contributions, see Blackman (1969).

⁶² Cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 656–60. Imperial income other than tribute: Kallet-Marx (1993) 100–1, 141–9, 167, 176, 199; Hornblower (1991–6) II.97. Part of tribute spent locally: Unz (1985).

⁶³ Thudippus decree: *IG* I³. 71 (= ML 69); Kallet-Marx (1993) 270, rightly stresses the psychological and symbolic value of the 425 assessment, but cf. Hornblower (1991–6) II.95–6.

⁶⁴ Indemnities: e.g. Samos: Thuc. 1.117.3; Hornblower and Greenstock (1986) 125, Cythera: Thuc. 4.57.4. Thrace: Thuc. 5.18.5; Kallet-Marx (1993) 160, 181–2; Hornblower (1991–6) II.476.

concentration of almost all the sacred treasuries of Attica on the Acropolis, accompanied with an order to use their funds for paying what was owed to the gods and to apply the residue to 'the dockyards and the walls';⁶⁵ and last but not least, the establishment, in 431, of the 'iron reserve' of 1,000 talents – which remained untouched until 412 (Thuc. 2.24.1, 8.15.1).

Monetization and centralization were thus made to work in tandem towards the amassing of revenue from which the Athenians were 'feeding their navy' (Thuc. 1.81.4) – primarily thanks to their command, for a remarkably long period of time, over an expansive external fiscal base. It was only natural, then, that the destruction of that base would become a principal strategic goal for Athens' adversaries (Thuc. 1.81.4, 122.1, cf. 2.13.2). Yet, for as long as it lasted, imperial revenue helped also to attenuate an unsettling incongruity that resided in the double function of the Athenian propertied class as both a tax-paying entity and as a managerial elite who provided the skills required for running the empire; the lesser their burdens in the former area, the greater their enthusiasm to perform in the latter. In the long run, therefore, the non-domestic branch of the fiscal system contributed substantially to maintaining a balance between the financial demands of the 'national' objective of sea-power (*thalassokratia*) and the strain on domestic, private wealth.

4. War and state in Athens, 431–322

The balance was disrupted soon after 431, when warfare moved into a much higher gear, and even more so after 404, with the loss of the empire and the revenue derived from it. In response, naval organization and the entire system of war finance underwent a series of fundamental adjustments. Ironically, the cracks in the system become visible in one of the most signal expressions of Athenian self-confidence on record, Pericles' stocktaking of Athens' financial power just before the Great War (Thuc. 2.13.2–5). His listing of not only the annual tribute of 600 talents and the accumulated surplus of 6,000 talents but also the 500 talents of uncoined gold and silver on the Acropolis, unspecified but considerable amounts of money in other temples, and finally the gold plating on Athena's statue, 40 talents of pure gold, is an implicit admission that the revenue from the empire might ultimately fail to support an escalated and sustained war effort. And so it proved.

First, there was a serious discrepancy between the annual amount of tribute payable by the allies and the sum actually reaching Athens. A handful of decrees, most of them from the early 420s, attest not only to widespread

⁶⁵ For both of these measures, see the first Callias Decree (IG I³. 52 = ML 58), usually dated to 434/3, but Kallet-Marx (1989) argues for 431 BC.

defaulting in payment, but also to systematic administrative malfeasance. Problems in tribute collection, probably going back to the early 440s, seem to have persisted despite repeated attempts to impose tighter control over the process.⁶⁶ Such evidence discloses the unreliability of tribute as the chief source of imperial revenue,⁶⁷ not because there was an overall decline in the amount of allied obligations nor because outstanding payments were ultimately given up, but because one could not count on the year's revenue to be at hand precisely when it was needed: for massive, short-term war expenditure.

Second, from 431 onwards just that kind of expenditure became the norm even more than before. Hard figures are in short supply. Expenditure of slightly over 1,400 talents is registered for the ten-month siege of Samos in 440–439.⁶⁸ Payments probably adding up to 76 talents were made to the two squadrons of ten and twenty ships respectively sent to assist Corcyra in 433⁶⁹ – and each of these amounts relates only to what came from the treasury of Athena, so that further outlay cannot be excluded. A 'real' total is the 2,000 talents reported by Thucydides (2.70.2) to have been spent on the two-and-a-half years' siege of Potidaea, an enterprise which in conjunction with intense naval activity in 428 put a severe strain on Athens' financial resources (Thuc. 3.17.3–4). Heavy, mostly war-oriented borrowing from sacred treasuries in the years 433/2–423/2 (heaviest from 432/1 to 430/29 and totalling nearly 6,000 talents) indicates that imperial revenue, even if impressive on paper, was unable to follow the pace at which fleet operations swallowed up cash.⁷⁰

Third, land warfare added considerably to the overall pressures. Sheer manpower requirements constituted one major determinant. The turn-out of a full muster (*pandemei, panstratia*) for the first of a series of twice-yearly invasions of the Megarid in 431 produced 'the largest army of Athenians [and metics] that had ever assembled in one body', 13,000 men (Thuc. 2.31.1–2, with 4.66.1 and 2.13.6). Considerable, too, were the contingents of light-armed skirmishers. Such mass armies were by now being paid and provisioned predominantly from the public coffers.⁷¹ Other funds had to be earmarked for Athens' incipient employment of land-fighting mercenaries: 1,000 Thracians in 423; 'as many Thracians as possible' in 422; again, 1,300

⁶⁶ IG I³. 34 (= ML 46), of 447 BC (? or the early 420s, see ML pp. 120–1); IG I³. 60, of c. 430 BC; IG I³. 68 (= ML 68), of 426 BC; IG I³. 71 (= ML 69), of 425 BC, lines 44–8.

⁶⁷ Kallet-Marx (1993) 190–4.

⁶⁸ IG I³. 363 (= ML 55); cf. Thuc. 1.116.1; Isoc. 15.111; Nep. *Timoth.* 1; Diod. Sic. 12.28. For the amount, see Fornara (1979).

⁶⁹ IG I³. 364 (= ML 61); cf. Thuc. 1.45, 50–1.

⁷⁰ IG I³. 369 (= ML 72; commentary 216–17). Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 194–8, (1989) 102–3: such borrowing was quite normal financial practice and constitutes no evidence that Athens' resources were depleted.

⁷¹ [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.2; Cf. Pritchett (1971–91) 1.7–14, 23–4, 30–52.

Thracians, each paid 1 drachma a day, in 413.⁷² Such instances presaged the transformation of extraneously recruited, light-armed combatants into a tactical asset in the fourth century (particularly, Iphicrates' peltasts)⁷³ and the heavy expense incurred thereby – 1,000 talents on mercenary pay during the Social War (357–355) alone (Isoc. 7.9).

Further demands issued from the Athenian cavalry. A higher degree of public financial concern with that branch is reflected in the *katastasis*, a state loan that enabled the newly enrolled cavalryman to purchase his mount, and which had to be repaid in full upon retirement from service; the *sitos*, a fodder grant received in coin, presumably throughout the year; and the daily *misthos* given to the cavalryman while in active service.⁷⁴ Regardless of whether all three arrangements originated with the reform of c. 445 that raised the number of horsemen from 300 to 1,200,⁷⁵ they certainly brought this branch, much more than before, into the purview (and so under the control) of the state.⁷⁶ In the fourth century public expenditure on the cavalry (presumably the cost of the fodder allowance only) amounted to 40 talents a year;⁷⁷ surely, the corresponding figure in the fifth century would have been at least of the same order.

A closer interaction between army, cavalry and navy turned most naval expeditions into amphibious affairs.⁷⁸ Warships especially constructed as troop and horse carriers (*stratiotides*/*hoplitagogoi* and *hippagogoi*) greatly enhanced the mobility of land forces by transporting them *en masse* to distant fields of operations.⁷⁹ Tactics thus made the land forces into yet another component of Athens' naval organization and expenditure. Thucydides registers the point at which their aggregate cost reached heights that rendered it mandatory to restructure the entire range of sources of revenue: 'For the siege of Mytilene' in 428/7, he writes, 'the Athenians needed funds over and above those provided by their regular sources' (3.19.1). From that moment on, down to 323/2, alternative forms of revenue, previously discarded or given low priority, came with shifting intensity and duration to play a new role: the foreign paymaster, allied contributions and the almost

⁷² Thuc. 4.129.2 (423 BC), 5.6.2 (422 BC), 7.27.1, 29.1 (413 BC).

⁷³ Best (1969); Pritchett (1971–91) II.117–25.

⁷⁴ *Katastasis*, evaluation, inspection: Lys. 16.6–7; [Arist.] *Arth. Pol.* 49.1, with Rhodes (1981) 565; Kroll (1977) esp. 97–9. *Sitos*: IG I³, 375 (= ML 84, 410/9 BC), 4, 8, 9, 11–12; Xen. *Eq. mag.* 1.19. *Misthos*: Tod 1 no. 72 (= IG I³, 83); Thuc. 5.47.6 (quadruple alliance of 420 BC), both of which term the 1 Aiginetan drachma for each cavalryman *sitos*; but cf. Lys. fr. 6 Budé: 1 dr. daily *misthos* at least until 403/2, when a reduction of pay from 1 dr. to 2 ob. was proposed for 1,000 *hippeis* and a raise from 2 to 8 ob. a day for 200 mounted archers (*hippotoxotai*). Demosthenes (4.28) calculated with 1 dr. per day. On all this, see Bugh (1988) 52–62, who assumes that the state provided horses for the *hippotoxotai* (135, 156–8).

⁷⁵ So Bugh (1988) 39–78, esp. 53, 60–1. ⁷⁶ Keil (1902) 142.

⁷⁷ Xen. *Eq. mag.* 1.19. Cf. Bugh (1988) 60. ⁷⁸ See Hanson (1991b) 369–75.

⁷⁹ *Stratiotides*/*hoplitagogoi*: Thuc. 6.31.3, 8.62.2; cf. IG I³, 60. *Hippagogoi*: Thuc. 2.56.2, 6.25.2, 31.3, 43; Ar. *Eq.* 595–610; IG II², 1627.241; cf. Morrison et al. (2000) 94, 157.

inseparable trio 'plunder, extortion and sale of protection' constituted one set; fiscal mechanisms at home made up another.

Inevitably, the stress on external sources persisted. Persian gold exercised a greater attraction for needy Sparta, but eventually Athens, too, was forced by post-404 financial exigency to get on the King's payroll as a recipient of the aid given to the anti-Spartan coalition in 393–388 and of a special donation with which to rebuild the Long Walls at home.⁸⁰ Strictly, these instances must be distinguished from the few occasions on which Athens secured satrapal (not royal) cash through 'leasing out' commanders and their forces (e.g. Chares, who in 356 took service under Artabazus 'in order to relieve the Athenian finances' and who used the satrap's generous pay to feed his men).⁸¹ On the whole, money from the King himself – a cash-rich but niggardly paymaster (*Hell. Oxy.* D16, 537–44 Chambers; Isoc. 4.142) – was received in unimpressive quantities and for short spells of time. Yet far more telling than what the Athenians actually got is what they *wished* to have: serious flirting with the idea of financing their warfare with Persian gold is attested already in the 'optimistic' years, 431 and 424,⁸² while the possibility of using that source continued to be aired as late as in 340.⁸³

Better exploited was the option of securing allied financial support that was legally and terminologically dissociated from the imperial tribute (*phoros*) system. Early specimens include the *ad hoc* contributions (some of over 50 talents) made by Sicilian allies probably in 427/6,⁸⁴ and the sixty talents of uncoined silver given by Segesta as a month's pay for sixty Athenian ships in 415 (Thuc. 6.8). Then, with the formation of the Second Athenian League in 378/7, a larger and more permanent arrangement was formally established, one based on the consent of the membership to fund league expeditions through regular money contributions, for which the term *syntaxeis* (not *phoros*) was judiciously applied.⁸⁵

Our evidence about that arrangement is too patchy to yield a coherent picture: Aeschines (2.71) reports that Chabrias *annually* collected 60 talents from the islanders; Demosthenes (18.234) sets a single year's total in the early 340s at 45 talents; individual assessments are only known for two cities, Oreos and Eretria, each of which paid 5 talents (Aeschin. 3.94, 100).⁸⁶ However, two things are reasonably clear. First, from 378/7 to 338/7 Athens did, indeed, avail herself again of an external fiscal base, though payers now

⁸⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.2, 4.8.8–10, 12; Diod. Sic. 14.84.5. For Conon and naval petty-officers (*hyperesiai*), see *Hell. Oxy.* A1, 28–30 Chambers. In 388, Lysias (33.5) called the King 'paymaster' (*tamias*) of the Greeks and 'possessor of many ships'.

⁸¹ Diod. Sic. 16.22.1–2; Dem. 4.24. Remaining examples: Pritchett (1971–91) 159–116.

⁸² Thuc. 2.7.1, 4.50.3; Ar. *Ach.* Cf. Lewis (1989) 230. ⁸³ Dem. 10.31; cf. Dem. 11.5–6; Isoc. 12.159.

⁸⁴ IG I³, 291. For the date, see Ampolo (1987). ⁸⁵ IG II², 43.23, cf. Theopomp. *FGH* 115 F98.

⁸⁶ See generally Cargill (1981); Brun (1983) 74–142.

handed their contributions directly to Athenian commanders and only after two separate authorizations – one by the league council, the other by the Athenian assembly – had been issued to that effect.⁸⁷ Second, despite such differences, this new system inherited almost all the defects of the old one: recalcitrance among payers; use of force against contributors by Athenian commanders of underfunded expeditionary forces;⁸⁸ defection of allies, resulting in increased war expenditure and the diminution of the group of *syntaxeis*-payers (Dem. 18.234). On top of all of this, the Athenians refused to let their fleet commanders use the *syntaxeis*, which caused Demosthenes to exclaim: 'For where else do you suppose that he [sc. a commander] looks for the maintenance of his troops, if he gets nothing from you and has no private fortune to furnish their pay? To the sky?' (8.26, cf. 21). In the face of such failings, which are attested both when the public treasury suffered from abject poverty and when it experienced a relative recovery,⁸⁹ one other option gained considerably in appeal: the disreputable trio plunder, extortion and the sale of protection.

As financial expedients, plunder and extortion had been operative in the fifth century. In 428, to obtain additional funds for the siege of Mytilene (Thuc. 3.19.1; cf. p. 266), a squadron was sent on a 'money-collecting' mission, *argyrologia*, an innocent-sounding label for what in fact was a forceful exaction from allies of money other than tribute.⁹⁰ With a single known precedent in 430/29, that procedure was repeated in 425/4 and again in 424.⁹¹ Incidentally, the Spartans resorted to the same methods: in 413, *argyrologia* was used to finance their fleet, while in 399 booty fed their armies throughout the Peloponnese.⁹² Plunder made its own contribution to Athenian war expenditure in 415, when the expeditionary force to Sicily raided Hyccara in the north-west of the island and captured all its inhabitants, whom the admiral Nicias then sold for 120 talents (Thuc. 6.62.3–4). These occurrences, however, count for little in comparison with those from the period after 411, during which plunder and extortion became two of the financial props of naval campaigns. The relevant evidence is too copious to be cited in full here,⁹³ but documents the incontrovertible fact of a major hegemonial power 'going raider'.

The heavy hand of Athenian fleet commanders was felt in 411 by Cyzicus, Halicarnassus and Meropis in Cos, the latter plundered by Alcibiades in order to pay his fleet at Samos; by the Hellespontine area and Thasos

⁸⁷ IG 11², 123 (= Tod 11 no. 156); [Dem.] 49.49; [Dem.] 50.53; Plut. *Phoc.* 7.1–2.

⁸⁸ On both of these: Isoc. 8.36, 29, 15.123; IG 11², 111.12–14.

⁸⁹ Pritchett (1971–91) v.459–61, for the public treasury before and after 346.

⁹⁰ Kaller-Marx (1993) 136–8, 160–4, 200–1; cf. Meiggs (1972) 254; Hornblower (1991–6) 11.94–5.

⁹¹ Thuc. 2.69.1, 4.50.1, 4.75.1; cf. Cleon's connection with *argyrologia* in Ar. *Eq.* 1070–1.

⁹² Thuc. 8.3.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26. For contributions to the 'Spartan War Fund', see the document treated by Loomis (1992) esp. 75–6 (suggested date c. 427).

⁹³ Much of the material is in Pritchett (1971–91) v esp. 381, 385–7. Cf. de Ste Croix (1953) 50–1.

in 411/10; by Cyzicus again, Selymbria and Lydia in 410; by Bithynia, the Hellespontine cities and the Thracian Chersonese in 408, in which year Alcibiades, besides collecting 100 talents from Caria, also plundered Cos and Rhodes to maintain his troops.⁹⁴ Thrasybulus' and Ergocles' 'fund-raising' enterprises in 389–388 – that is, plunder in the Hellespont and extortion (*argyrologia*) in Pamphylia – typify almost every naval expedition in the fourth century.⁹⁵ The booty brought by Chabrias to Athens after the battle off Naxos consisted of 3,000 captives and more than 110 talents. Operating with seventy ships in 373–372, Iphicrates sold captives for 60 talents with which he fed his crews and exacted money from Cephalenia. Having received no money from Athens for his ten-months campaign against Samos in 366, Timotheus paid his men (8,000 light-armed troops and thirty triremes) from booty. In 360 Chares plundered Corcyra and in 353 Sestos. Exactly the same methods were used by Diopeithes during his operations in the north Aegean, 343–340.⁹⁶ Xenophon (*Eq. mag.* 7.7) recommended the use of cavalry as raiders (*leistai*). Predatory activity, or rather its product (*leia*), had become an essential part of the naval organization. Yet the label *leistês* was invariably reserved for the enemy – for example, Alexander of Pherae, *leistês* on land and at sea, or Philip of Macedon, 'the plunderer of the Greeks'.⁹⁷

A lucrative target of state-licensed predation was commercial traffic at sea. Whenever opportune, Athenian fleet commanders raised funds by seizing merchantmen (e.g. Dem. 2.28, 8.9, 28, 24.11–14; Aeschin. 2.71). This had two intimately connected consequences. First, it brought the state-sponsored predator into sharp competition with the private *opérateur*, whose activities Athens therefore endeavoured to curb by extending her hegemony: a resolution from shortly after 344, formally motivated by the wish to protect merchants against raiders, forbade all Athenian allies to receive 'booty-chasers' into their harbours. In 342/1 the Melians were fined 50 talents for having breached that ban ([Dem.] 58.53–6); at that time, Athens' protection monopoly in the Aegean was being seriously challenged by Philip of Macedon.⁹⁸

Second, the predatory activities of both the public and the private *opérateur* raised the demand for – and hence also the value of – protection as a commodity perennially on offer by a maritime power. According

⁹⁴ Thuc. 8.107.1, 108.2; Diod. Sic. 13.40.6, 42.2–3, 69.5; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.8, 12, 20–2, 1.2.41, 1.3.3, 8, 1.4.8; Plut. *Alc.* 30.3, 35.4.

⁹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25–30; Lys. 28.2, 5ff. Pritchett (1971–91) 1.50–1, 11.101–2.

⁹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.61, 6.2.33, 35–6, 38; Diod. Sic. 15.34.3–35.2, 47.7, 95.3, 16.34, 57.2–3; Isoc. 15.111; [Dem.] 12.3; Dem. 8.21–9, 20.77; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 3.9.55, 3.10.9.

⁹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35; Dem. 10.34; see de Souza (1999) 33–4, 36–9, 241.

⁹⁸ See [Dem.] 7.14–15; de Souza (1999) 38–9; Gabrielsen (2001b) 232.

to Demosthenes (8.24–5), Athenian generals routinely received payments (euphemistically called 'benevolences', *eunoiai*) from merchants and their cities in return for protection against pirates. In 340 Chares convoyed no less than 230 corn-ships of various nationalities from south Russia.⁹⁹ A key area for this kind of business was the Hellespont (e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22, 36). Operating there with a fleet in 388, Diotimus collected a substantial sum from shippers and merchants, though he failed to observe the law and hand all of it to his home treasury; the sum he kept to himself allegedly amounted to 40 talents (Lys. 19.50). In the late 340s Diopithes was exploiting the potential of organized violence to the limit by both seizing merchantmen (Dem. 8.9, 28) and receiving money to protect them (ibid. 24–5). On the whole, then, the 'disreputable trio' was gaining ground already in the fifth century, while in the next century it tended to outdo in profitability all other external sources of revenue. Yet, its inherent hazards and unpredictability still required the presence of a complementary system, which, at least in theory, would be a dependable safety mechanism by raising revenue from domestic wealth.

The relevant institutions were the irregularly levied war tax (*eisphora*) and the annually imposed trierarchies. They cannot be discussed in detail here,¹⁰⁰ but what does need to be noted is that the monetary exactions made through these institutions began to increase in size and frequency in the 420s (for the trierarchy, cf. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.13). Simultaneously with the *argyrologia* of 428/7 through which extra funds were to be raised for the Mytilene campaign, the Athenians levied for the first time an *eisphora* of 200 talents (Thuc. 3.19.1). Here, the expression 'for the first time' most likely means 'the first time an amount as high as 200 talents was raised by means of the war-tax', rather than 'this was the first ever *eisphora*'.¹⁰¹ In the period to follow, Athens' propertied class was all the more often required to make its wealth available for war-expenditure through payment of *eisphorai* and performance of trierarchies.¹⁰²

Both systems underwent a series of reforms or simply adjustments that aimed at enhancing their efficiency, primarily by means of introducing better collection procedures and more rigorous controls against evasion. Just as with the allied contributions, the amounts paid in *eisphora* became part of a central fund, the Military Fund (*stratiotika*, instituted by 373), which in time of war was by law also to receive surplus money from the other public

⁹⁹ *Didymus Papyrus* (Theopomp. *FGH* 115 F292, and Philoch. *FGH* 328 F162). See, in addition, [Dem.] 50.17–21; Dem. 21.167; *IG* 11², 408, 1623.276–80, 1628.37–42.

¹⁰⁰ See further, on *eisphora*: de Ste Croix (1953); Thomsen (1964), (1977); Brun (1983) 3–73; on the trierarchy: Cawkwell (1984); Gabrielsen (1994) 173–217.

¹⁰¹ Griffith (1977), followed by Hornblower (1991–6) 1404, *contra* Kallet-Marx (1993) 134–6, (1989); cf. *IG* 1³, 52 (= ML 58 B), lines 17, 19, a document usually dated to 434.

¹⁰² E.g. *Ar. Eq.* 924; Lys. 21.3. Cf. Brun (1983) 24–5.

treasuries.¹⁰³ From 378/7, the *proeisphora* (i.e. advance payment of the entire *eisphora*-levy by the 300 richest citizens, who then had to recoup their money from a larger group of taxpayers) was used to ensure the timely collection of the whole amount voted for a campaign;¹⁰⁴ from 347/6, an *eisphora* of 10 talents was imposed each year, though extra levies could be voted.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, those liable to pay were arranged into groups, the symmories (one set for the *eisphora*, another for the trierarchy), chiefly for the purpose of affording better control over the payers themselves and the flow of their contributions. Finally, the *syntrierarchy* (i.e. permission for two or more men to share between them a single trierarchy) and the sub-division of symmory-members into groups of naval *synteleis* ('joint contributors'), were intended to spread the financial burdens and to distribute them more equitably. Public awards of honours promoted voluntarism. And constantly lurking in the background was the dreaded *antidosis*, the mechanism rendering it compulsory for members of the propertied class to uncover dodgers among their number.¹⁰⁶

All these measures contributed to a more effective mobilization of domestic wealth for war purposes. Almost certainly, those liable to these obligations, especially the onerous trierarchy, were forced to expand or intensify their economic operations in order to generate the surplus capital needed to meet them.¹⁰⁷ However, success was limited. None of the reforms of the trierarchy produced an entirely satisfactory system, primarily because the Athenians abstained from applying further coercion because they wished to preserve the goodwill of their naval financiers.¹⁰⁸ With the *eisphora*, the main problems were unwillingness to vote levies,¹⁰⁹ unwillingness to pay those that were voted¹¹⁰ and inadequacy of the amounts collected to finance campaigns ([Dem.] 50.8, 15). To this should be added the tendency after the Social War to starve the Military Fund for the benefit of the Theoric Fund.¹¹¹ Athenian democracy had indeed managed to transform the aristocratic warrior into an honourable taxpayer. Less honourably, however, he sometimes was apt to lament his pecuniary plight as a naval financier ([Dem.] 50.59–61), while at other times he had to flee over the rooftops not to be caught by over-zealous war tax-collectors (Dem. 22.50, 53).

¹⁰³ On the Military Fund, see e.g. Dem. 1.19. Instituted by 373; [Dem.] 49.12, 16. Its administration: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 43.1, with Rhodes (1981) 513–16. *Eisphorai* going into the Fund: [Dem.] 50.8, 10. The law about surpluses: [Dem.] 59.4. Cf. Brun (1983) 170–6.

¹⁰⁴ [Dem.] 50.8–9, 42.25. ¹⁰⁵ *IG* 11², 244.12–13 and 505.14–17; Din. 1.69. Cf. Brun (1983) 54–5.

¹⁰⁶ Gabrielsen (1994) 91–5. ¹⁰⁷ Osborne (1991), stressing an increase in agricultural production.

¹⁰⁸ Gabrielsen (1994) 182–213, esp. 212. ¹⁰⁹ Dem. 8.21–3, and *Ex.* 41.2.

¹¹⁰ Dem. 2.24, 27, 31, 3.20, 4.7, 22.42–5; Lys. 29.9. Puzzlingly, in the period 378/7–356/5, 14 talents were owed in arrears from levies totalling 300 talents, despite the existence of the *proeisphora*: Dem. 22.44–5.

¹¹¹ Dem. 1.19–20 with *hyp.* 4–5, 3.10–13, 31, 19.291; [Dem.] 59.4–6; Philoch. *FGH* 328 F56a. Cf. Buchanan (1962); Cawkwell (1963); Hansen (1976).

Symptomatic of the deep-seated weaknesses of the existing fiscal devices is the increasing use of 'extra-fiscal' schemes for mobilizing private wealth, notably by means of canvassing voluntary contributions, *epidoseis*.¹¹²

In the end, of the several options available to achieve an adequate degree of financial independence, plunder and extortion proved indispensable: to ensure its survival the truly hegemonial state had to give high priority to the time-honoured craft of predatory acquisition. An ancient author twice explained the decision of Athenian commanders to conduct plundering raids with their wish 'to relieve the Athenian *demos* of the *eisphora*' (Diod. Sic. 13.47.6–7, 64.4). After 338, however, the pursuit of financial independence began to lose its justification. Athens' status as a hegemonial power practically vanished with Chaeronea. Sea-power continued for a little longer, but it, too, evanesced in 323/2. By that time, another state, Macedon, was emerging as the quintessential monopolistic state. But the particular trajectory she followed is a different story.

¹¹² Migotte (1992) 10–21 nos. 1–8; Gabrielsen (1994) 199–206.

War was a holiday for the Spartans, a relief from the rigours of military training to which they dedicated their lives, according to Plutarch (*Lyc.* 22.1–2). The Spartan reputation for discipline, professionalism and even militarism was – and is – second to none in the ancient world. But if the Spartans stood out, it was more because military standards in the rest of Greece were remarkably low than because their dedication was extreme in comparison with, say, a modern soldier's. The other Greeks hardly engaged in any military training at all and showed *no* true dedication to warfare, as Xenophon was always keen to point out.¹ For all the accounts and images of war in art and literature, for all the temples littered with dedications of booty and victory monuments, the impact of war on Greek society was rather limited. The demands of war usually did not dictate the daily routine of citizens, or shape social and political structures, or dominate economic activity. On the contrary, in archaic and classical Greece it was the demands of social, political and economic life which shaped warfare.²

1. WAR AND THE LEISURE CLASS

A defining feature of Greek society was the distinction between those who could afford to live off the labour of others – 'the rich' (*plousioi*) or leisured classes – and those who had to earn a livelihood – 'the poor' (*penetes*) or working classes. How best to spend one's leisure was a much-debated moral issue from the seventh century onwards, with poets and philosophers warning against idle displays of luxury and increasingly urging that a man's leisure should be spent actively participating in civic life, above all in politics and warfare. Conversely, it was commonly held that only men of leisure and wealth were able to play their political, military and other civic roles effectively: 'a community which is to have a fine political system must enjoy

¹ Xen. *Lac.* 13.5; *Hell.* 6.1.5; *Mem.* 3.5.15, 21, 3.12.5; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1338b25–39; Thuc. 2.39.1, 4.

² For the exaggerated prominence of war in our sources, see ch. 2 in this volume, and Shipley (1993). The following draws and builds on ideas developed in more detail in van Wees (2004).