



UNIVERSITY of
HAWAI'I
PRESS

The Problem of the Self in the Analects

Author(s): Herbert Fingarette

Source: *Philosophy East and West*, Apr., 1979, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), pp. 129-140

Published by: University of Hawai'i Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1398552>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Philosophy East and West*

The general topic of this series of symposia is “the problem of the self”; my specific topic is “the problem of the self in the *Analects*.” Now “the problem of the self” is a phrase that, of course, can have various connotations. The phrase can allude to logical analysis of the concept of the self, or to psychological theories about the self, or to moral or religious prescriptions of what the ideal self would be like. The “problem of the self” may also be taken to amount to the quest to identify some specially central element of personhood—the soul, or (beneath the facade) the “true” or “real” self. The “problem of self” may refer not to an intellectual question but to a task for the person: the task of actualizing one’s “true self” and so achieving fulfillment. Or, by contrast, the phrase may refer to the task of losing or surrendering the self, and so achieving liberation from a delusion that is the seat and source of our deepest suffering.

I mention only a few possibilities, and only roughly describe them. Even so, one sees readily that the different “problems” of the “self” that I have mentioned are not unrelated. Understanding one may bring better understanding of others. However in my remarks here I shall specifically concern myself with the last of the “problems of the self” that I mentioned: the task of becoming selfless. And I do so specifically in connection with the *Analects*.¹ Nevertheless, though the *Analects* is my focus, the intended larger context is that of Asian thought in some of its major variants.

Asian thought (if I may risk a truly enormous generalization about so global a notion as “Asian thought”) is perfused—not entirely, but very widely—with the teaching that the individual self or ego is the source and the seat of delusion and suffering, of frustration and bondage. Our great task is to let go of the self. The specific doctrines, differing as they do, nevertheless are significantly akin in their use of bywords, which, whatever their ultimate meaning, are at least on their face predominantly negative and passive: “*neti-neti*,”² “emptiness,”³ “non-ego,”⁴ “nonaction.”⁵ The literature of orthodoxy in India, of Buddhism, and of Taoism is as we know replete with such language regarding the individual self.

There is one major seeming exception—the thought whose source is Confucius. Confucius seems to be a yea-sayer. His language and his imagery are generally positive, affirmative, active. To read the *Analects* is inevitably to become aware how central is the concern on Confucius’ part that each of us dedicate ourselves with utmost vigor and unqualified commitment to making something of ourselves personally. We must vastly develop our learning and our skills,⁶ cultivate proper demeanor,⁷ develop appropriate attitudes and motives,⁸ and strive to act always on right principles.⁹ Effort, commitment, determination, persistence, diligence¹⁰—these are key necessities if one is to become a truly noble person, a *chun tzu*^a. There is a reasonable sense in which

one may say that for Confucius the great task is self-cultivation, and not self-loss.

It is true that the phrase “cultivate oneself” (*hsiu chi*^b) is used explicitly in the *Analects*: it is found in only one passage in the *Analects*, though it is there repeated three times in a formula-istic way.¹¹ The idea of self-cultivation does become a key tenet, a technical term of importance, in later Confucian thinking. An early and important example is the *Great Learning*, where we are told that “the root is self-cultivation,” expressed as *hsiu shen wei pen*^c.¹² But I am interested here in the *Analects* and not in the meanings the phrase takes on in later Confucian thought. In the passage in the *Analects* where it does appear, the word “cultivate” in “cultivate oneself” does not really seem to have “one-self” as the object, but has instead a more specific aim such as “one’s capacity to pacify the people.” Waley’s translation is suggestive of this: “Cultivate in himself the capacity to ease the lot of other people^d.”¹³ Moreover, the fact that the formula occurs in only one passage is evidence that we do not have to do here with a self-conscious, crystallized idea of portentous significance, an idea around which Confucius himself centered his own thought. What he himself teaches us explicitly to value and to cultivate are certain *specific* traits, aims, principles, and skills.

It is the *commentator*, rather than Confucius, who is tempted to generalize these teachings by focusing on the “self” as an overarching or basic rubric, and summing it all up in terms of “self-cultivation.” But of course there is more than one way to generalize from, or to characterize as a whole, a collection of particulars. Would Confucius himself have generalized on his own teachings, or summarized them, by taking the consummately cultivated self as his focal concept? The fact is, of course, that he did not. Why not? He surely had no antipathy to highly general concepts, for he explicitly used a number of general concepts as central. Why did not “self-cultivation” constitute one of these? My answer is that he did not say it because he did not mean it. And yet one cannot read the *Analects* without having the impression that for Confucius there is surely something focally important, in a constructive way, about the role of the individual in bringing himself to be as he should be, and thereafter in living as such, as a man of true humanity (*jen*^e), a truly noble man (*chun tzu*). Is this not self-cultivation? So here we have a puzzle.

Turning to the larger Asian context, there is another way of seeing the question I want to raise. It would be agreed generally that Confucius was teaching an unselfish, unegoistic way of life, as did his principal disciples and followers. Why, then, does the Confucius of the *Analects*, in his tone as well as his language, evoke an impression that so strongly contrasts with the immediate impression produced by the *neti-neti*, the emptiness, the nonaction, and the analogous ideas and images so suggestive of self-negation and passivity that permeate major non-Confucian lines of thought in Asia? To what extent, if any, and wherein, precisely, is there really a shared approval of selflessness, and wherein lies the

contrast? It is the nature of the agreement, and the nature of the contrast, that I want to track down.

There have been many discussions of these interrelations—comparisons of Confucians with each other, and with teachers in such other schools as Taoism and Buddhism. These comparisons are very often conducted within the frame of the terminologies and distinctive larger doctrines found in the texts that are being compared, and the terms of reference are therefore in the traditions of those texts. But, in varying ways and degrees, recent studies move more independently. I propose here to try a more independent approach to identifying the respects in which Confucius is radically affirmative as to the self and its role, and the respects in which he teaches a radical selflessness. I propose to do this by inquiring particularly into the role of the will in the *Analects* by showing how there are different dimensions to willing in Confucius' usage, and how, depending on which dimension we take as our standpoint, we get a different view of the individual self and its significance.

I will lay the foundation for my own theses by examining in some detail four terms that are used with frequency in the *Analects* that seem explicitly to refer to self and to willing: *chi*^f, *shen*^g, *yu*^h, and *chih*ⁱ. Of course there are passages where these terms do not occur, but where the sense of the passage presupposes such ideas. However, for brevity, and also to avoid premature interpretation, I will restrict my analysis to actual uses of these frequently used terms.

The terms in the *Analects* referring to what in English we would appropriately render as "self" are: *shen* and *chi*. *Shen* is used some seventeen times;¹⁴ *chi* is used some twenty-five times.¹⁵ The term *tsu*^j is used to mean "self" far less¹⁶ than are *chi* and *shen*, and its use in this sense introduces nothing significantly different from what we will learn by examining *chi* and *shen*. Therefore I do not discuss it further.

Chi is used as a term for self-reference, often emphatic. The emphatic reference may be to oneself as *subject*: "himself wishing to be established, establishes others. . . ." ¹⁷ The reference may be to oneself as *object*—"I do not care that none know *me*." ¹⁸ Or the reference may be to oneself as *agent*—"I conduct myself humbly," "to cultivate oneself so as to be respectful." ¹⁹ There is a certain reflexiveness here—the person is self-observing and self-regulating, rather than merely being, or merely doing, in an unselfconscious way. It is the difference between "I am opening the door," and "I myself am opening the door." That is, the more ordinary personal pronoun, such as *wu*^k or *wo*^l, distinguishes me as subject, or agent, or possessor, or object; but it does so in an unemphatic way, an unself-conscious, unreflexive way. ²⁰

Chi is used repeatedly as an emphatic contrast with others (*jen*^m). The suggestion is that oneself, *chi*, may have interests or aims conflicting with, or in some way contrasting with, the interests of the *other*. ²¹ But there is also the equally plain suggestion that the interests of oneself *ought* ideally to harmonize with those of others, or even perhaps to defer to them. And finally there is also

the suggestion that if there *is* due respect for others, it is the self, *chi*, that is in some crucial way the source of this.²²

Turning now to the character *shen*—though not ceasing to take into account *chi*—we can find the following major uses in the *Analects*. It seems to embody a reference to the self more as objective phenomenon than as subject. This is consistent with the use of *shen* to mean “body.” The capacity for self-observation is again manifest: Master Tseng says, “I examine my self (*wu shen*)” daily as to whether I have shown loyalty, good faith, and diligence in my dealings.”²³ One should not allow what is not *jen* to affect or impinge on one’s self.²⁴ One should not allow one’s self to become tainted.²⁵ And *shen* is used to refer to self-regulation, self-government—“govern the self rightly (*cheng ch’i shen*).”²⁶ One’s *shen* is one’s “life”—that is, one’s self viewed as having a limited extension through space and time. So in this sense one can “devote” one’s life, or one can “disregard” one’s life.²⁷ Here “one’s life” is one’s total potential as the individual existent self that one is. Or we say, “all my life” (*chung shen*^P), meaning “during all that period in which I as a person exist.”²⁸ The truly human person will even sacrifice the self (*shen*) to bring what is truly human (*jen*) to perfection.²⁹

Shen adds a bit, then, to what we learned from *chi*; and it also confirms much. The main addition is that we have here an explicit conception of the self as associated with body and temporal existence. Beyond that, we have usage in which what is explicit, as with *chi*, are the self-observing and self-regulating powers of the self.

Regarding the notion of “will” in the *Analects*, I shall focus attention on two terms in particular: *chih* and *yu*. Since *yu* is both less interesting and more easy to discuss, I will take it up first.

Yu is translatable into English as “wish” or “desire.” It is used quite frequently in the *Analects*³⁰—about forty times—and seems to serve as the most common, generic term for indicating one’s preference, as is done in English by use of such words as “wish,” “want,” and “desire.” Though it can take on specific nuances or connotations, *yu*, in itself, as used in the *Analects*, need convey no special implication as to whether we have to do with bodily appetite, or spiritual need, or social ambition; nor need it connote anything special as to intensity, source, or aim. It is available as a term that can be neutral regarding the kind or quality or intensity of the wish or desire.³¹

The word “*yu*” merely commits one to what is perhaps as truistic—and so, as basic—as anything can be about the concept of the person. Persons are conceived as beings of whom it can characteristically be said that they want this or that; every actual wanting being ascribed to some individual person as subject.

The character *chih* presents somewhat more interesting information. *Chih*, used about seventeen times in the *Analects*,³² is often translated specifically as “will.”³³ Among the other English words or phrases used by translators are

“bent,”³⁴ “wish,”³⁵ “set on,”³⁶ “determined,”³⁷ “aim.”³⁸ It is plain from the contexts that the sense of the term does lie somewhere within the range of such English words, and perhaps of others such as “purpose,” “intention,”³⁹ “resolve.”⁴⁰ But, whereas the intensity and persistence of *yu* may be entirely unspecified, *chih* seems to be used in contexts where strong and persistent purpose is at issue.⁴¹ As with *yu*, the *chih* is always the *chih* of a particular person. Indeed it is inseparable from the person—no one can take away the *chih* of even the meanest man.⁴² Regarding the scope of the conduct, the ground or reason of it, or its specific aim—*chih* seems as indefinite as *yu*.

Chih is intimately related to action. *Chih* can motor and direct action,⁴³ yet it is not in itself action. In itself it can even be contrasted with overt behavior. For example, Confucius contrasts it with *hsing*⁴⁴; and he remarks that the *chih* can be, and perhaps in its clearest form must be, discovered in retirement (rather than in action).⁴⁵

I feel I should add at this point that Confucius’ usage reveals no explicit doctrines of a metaphysical or psychological kind about the details of structure of will, or the processes internal to the individual’s control of the will. There is, for example, no reification of a Faculty of Will, no inner machinery or equilibrium of psychic forces, no inner theater in which an inner drama takes place, no inner community with ruler and ruled. This absence of an elaborated doctrine of an “inner psychic life” is consistent with theses that I have argued elsewhere. But I mention it here more particularly to emphasize that, in focusing on Confucius’ use of “willing” and “wanting,” I am not proposing any special philosophical or psychological doctrine of “the will.” My point is simply that Confucius does often explicitly characterize persons as willing and wanting. His usage, when taken in its context in the *Analects*, is internally consistent and allows one to draw certain general conclusions about Confucius’ views of human nature, real and ideal.

Let me summarize, then, the conclusions I would draw up to this point and then develop their implications.

We have the concept of the self as a self-observing and self-regulating individual, a self sharply distinct from Others, a self with interests that may in fact conflict with those of Others but that ought ideally to be brought into accord with or even yield to the interests of Others. From this self there arises a kind of directed dynamism—wanting, willing—that characteristically is what mediates the orientation of the self and the actual conduct of the self. This intermediary dynamic may take various degrees of intensity and persistence, and various directions, and may arise on various occasions. All these variations are contingent. But what is necessary is that, in each instance, this dynamic is generated and controlled by the self; its locus is the particular self, as distinct from all other selves.

In this summary characterization of the self as having will, there is nothing new or startling to the Western mind; but there *is* something important to our

inquiry. What is important is that on the basis of this portrait we can see quite specific respects in which Confucius is affirmative, rather than negative, about the role of personal will and of the self it expresses. Specifically, Confucius appeals to us to activate our will—something only we as individuals can do—as a prime means of realizing the ideal life. As we know, he repeatedly and emphatically emphasizes that we should commit ourselves unflaggingly to learning and then following the Way (*tao*),⁴⁷ that is, to such specific commitments as learning and abiding by *li*,⁴⁸ clinging to *jen*,⁴⁹ following the principles of *chung*¹ and *shu*^u ⁵⁰—all this adding up to the will to become and then the will to remain a *chun tzu*. As Creel has said, “Confucius demanded the utmost zeal of his followers.”⁵¹

Now, when it comes to control over activating the will, regulating its intensity and persistence, and selecting its direction, everything depends upon the *use* of powers uniquely and distinctively controlled by the self. So in achieving the ideal life, it is the self whose zealousness of will must be relied upon, and that unceasingly plays a crucial role. Confucius, as I mentioned at the outset, is the great yea-sayer when it comes to the affirmation of oneself, as an individual self, through one’s own will. His conception of human nature, real and ideal, is rooted in such affirmation.

Another way in which I would like to express this is by saying that, in the respect just mentioned, our will is inherently a *personal* will. In saying this I mean that in these respects the concept of a particular will makes necessary reference to a particular person. I mean that will can only be identified and described in those respects by identifying the individual self whose will it is. What is *personal* to me, then, in the sense at issue, is what makes essential reference to me as the unique individual I am. The will, in regard to its locus, its generative source, and control over its arousal, intensity, and direction, and thus in turn its power over conduct, is personal. This way of putting the issue presents us with a more specific integration of what is implicit in saying that Confucius is “affirmative” in his attitude to the self. He is insisting that in the respects in which the will is inherently personal it is for us, to affirm that will, to exercise it, assert it—and in so doing, of course, to affirm, to assert our self as individual, as unique.

We can now in this context identify with more precision the negative aspects, the respects in which Confucius teaches, as central to his Way, that we must have *no* self and *not* impose our personal will. We can begin to see this by recalling Confucius’ emphatic rejection of certain kinds of motives and goals. He tells us that we ought to abjure the quest for personal profit,⁵² personal fame,⁵³ or personal gratification of the senses.⁵⁴ It is not that there is anything intrinsically wrong with fame, wealth, honor, or even sensual pleasure—if such things arise as incidental effects of a will directed to the Way (*tao*) for its own sake. But better to have poor food and shabby clothes and be unknown, and to will the *tao*, than to depart from the *tao* even for a moment.⁵⁵

This contrast of motives brings to our attention dimensions of will that may be but that are not inevitably and distinctively *personal*. It will be recalled that my will, in respect to its generative source, control over its arousal, intensity, and direction, and its power in turn over conduct, is inherently personal. For in all these respects *my* will can only be identified and described by identifying me personally.

But the *ground* for willing a certain act is distinguishable from any of these, and it need not be personal. It is true that I and only I can will *my* will, but it may be that *what* I will is what is called for by the *li*, or by *jen*, or *chung*, or *shu*, or *i*^v,⁵⁶ or—to put it most generally—by the *tao*, and that my reason for so willing is precisely that this *is* what the *tao* calls for.

In respect to the ground of my will in such cases, my will is *not* personal. For neither *tao* nor its subsidiary aspects are defined by reference to me uniquely. The *li*, for example, is expressible in terms of guidelines for conduct of persons of certain kinds of status and role—the emperor, the father, the minister, the son, the friend⁵⁷—finding themselves in certain kinds of situations, and having to deal with other persons identified by reference to their own kinds of status and role. The *tao* says that *any* person in my present position should do thus and so—my proper name is not built into the *tao*, or the *li*. In all aspects of the *tao* there is an inherent generality, an absence of essential reference to a unique individual. My personal existence is contingent; not so the *tao*. The *tao* is not only intelligible independently of such reference, its moral authority is surely independent of reference to me as the unique existent that I am. So, while the will that I direct to the *tao* *is* personal regarding its initial locus of energy, and control over the arousal, intensity, direction, and persistence, when it comes to the *ground* on which I choose and justify the direction for my will, and on which I elect to maintain that will vigorously and wholeheartedly, that ground—the *tao*—is in no way one that has reference to me personally.

Egoists are those who have their will rooted in themselves personally as ground. The egoist wants to be famous or wealthy—and here the wealth or fame must be this person's *only*, uniquely, or it is not an adequate ground of will for the egoist. To look at the ground of an egoist's will is thus necessarily to look at that ego; whereas to look at the ground of a *chun tzu*'s will is to look not at the person but at the *tao*. If one seeks to understand deeply the content of an egoistic will, one must necessarily understand that particular person, the motives, anxieties, hopes, and other personal data that go to make intelligible the conduct of that person. But the more deeply one explores the *chun tzu*'s will, the more the personal dimensions are revealed as purely formal—the individual is the unique space-time bodily locus of that will; it is *that which* controls, but it is nonsignificant regarding why, specifically, or in what specific direction, the control shall be exercised. To understand the content of the *chun tzu*'s will is to understand the *tao*, not the *chun tzu* as a particular person. The ego is present in the egoist's will. The *tao* is present in the *chun tzu*'s will.

The egoist's will *imposes* the egoist on affairs. The *chun tzu's* will imposes nothing, but it manifests or actualizes the *tao*. I say the *chun tzu's* will does not *impose* itself, because I mean to emphasize that the *te*^w,⁵⁸ the peculiar power of the *tao*, is *not* itself *willpower*. The will is directed to *li*, to being *jen*; and this means that the *chun tzu* intends no one to respond to him by virtue of his affirming his personal will as such. The reason people are to do as they do is because this *is* the *li* of human affairs, and ideally all participate *of* their own will, but in spontaneously harmonious ways regarding each other. The egoist, by contrast, intends that *his* will shall govern: the fact that *he* has willed thus and so is to be *my* decisive reason for action. Thus, the egoist orders or commands me how to act. Not so the *chun tzu*. The *chun tzu* accomplishes by "yielding^x"—he yields his will to the *tao*, and never imposes by means of will on others; as Confucius tells us, the *chun tzu* gives no orders.⁵⁹

It is out of this total exclusion of the imposition of personal will that is generated the atmosphere that pervades and distinguishes the *Analects*—the atmosphere of an ideal community in which there is no coercion or imposition of one persons' will upon another. Indeed, from the standpoint of the ground of the will, there is no imposition of personal will at all, whether by physical, psychological, legal, or political means. Instead, all cooperate spontaneously in a mutually respectful harmony defined by the *tao*.

Since the *chun tzu's* will is thus ideally the medium by which, and through which, the *tao* is allowed and enabled to work and to be actualized, the "I" of the *chun tzu*, as purely personal, has become, as it were, transparent. It is a generative space-time locus of will without personal content. This way of looking at matters is reminiscent of things Lao Tzu says, as for example, that the sage has no heart of his own,⁶⁰ that he does not put himself forward,⁶¹ that he does not seek to dominate,⁶² that people do not know him,⁶³ that he is dark,⁶⁴ and simply rides the *tao*.⁶⁵ One gets still another perspective on this view of the *chun tzu* by recollecting teachings in the Baghavad Gita, teachings to the effect that *I* am not the actor,⁶⁶ that Krishna or Brahman is the true ground of all.⁶⁷ The *chun tzu's* will, grounded in the *tao*, is a will that in an important way is unconcerned—unconcerned *personally*—for the "fruits of action."⁶⁸ Where he acts, it is the space-time power of will unique to him that acts, but he personally is not the *ground* of the action.⁶⁹ Is this not "inaction by action?"⁷⁰ And where consequences have no *personal* relevance to will, can *karman* any longer have significance for that person? The idea at issue here is more culturally catholic yet—for it is a way of expressing, less pregnantly but in one respect more precisely, the spirit of the phrase, "Not my will, but Thine be done."

I must now qualify my formulation by pointing out that there is an important level at which the unique personality can and must have its play. Confucius loved music, and gave it a very high place in the hierarchy of the forms of self-cultivation.⁷¹ To cover much ground briefly in these last few words of

mine, I will resort to a single extended image, that of the musical performance.

Consider a fine violinist's presentation of the Bach Chaconne, or consider *Chih*, the Chief Musician, and his performance of the "Ospreys."⁷² Plainly what governs—especially when this is an artistic performance and not an excuse for mere showmanship—is the musical conception brought forth by Bach, the poetic-musical conception of the "Ospreys." It is this musical concept, corresponding to the *tao*, that transcends the individual will, and that constitutes the ground of the will for each ideal performer. The essential conception is *encoded* in the musical score, or in the *Book of Songs*; but the musical concept itself is embodied, actualized, in the developing structure of sound, or word-in-sound, through time. Ideally, the performer's willed conduct is the medium *through* which the musical concept gets embodied, becomes actual.

Yet we know that there are legitimate personal aspects of the musical performance, aspects that are irreducible and valuable. Without the whole-hearted and unwaveringly diligent will to follow-through properly, there is *no* performance, or it simply breaks down. Beyond this, the personal dimensions of style, temperament, and interpretation shine in and through the embodied Chaconne. *Chih's* performance is singled out by Confucius for its special brilliance. Yet, although style and interpretation may be unique to the performer, that is, personal, it remains basic that the true artist's style *serves* the work; the personal interpretation is a genuine interpretation *of* the work. Style and interpretation must not dominate, obscure, or distort the concept of the Chaconne or the "Ospreys." Confucius remarks that though the musicians in ancient times were given a certain liberty, the tone remained harmonious, brilliant, consistent, right to the end.⁷³

Unique personality has a role because, no more than any concept, even that of the *tao*—the musical concept cannot resolve unambiguously *every* aspect of the concrete reality to be actualized. No concept embraces the fullness of the reality. And so the performer, the one who makes *actual*, cannot be denied the office of creating a reality that is denser and richer than any concept, and that therefore is necessarily personal in important ways—even though the personal only serves and enhances the governing and pervading concept, which is nonpersonal.

It would be enlightening to explore the ways in which this conception of Confucius' significantly differs from conceptions of selflessness peculiar to other streams of Asian thought. Obviously there are differences of importance. But if we keep in view his teaching as centered, specifically, on the *tao* as ground of the will, and on the implications of this grounding, we see clearly a fundamental respect in which he shares in the pan-Asian ideal of selflessness as crucial to salvation.

NOTES

1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein are to the *Analects*, and will be given by chapter and paragraph number without further identification.

2. See, for example, *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, II 3.6; III 9.26; IV 2.4; and *Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa*, III 2.22.

3. Examples of the doctrine of *śūnyatā* in Chinese Buddhism can be found in Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), Chapters 22–26. For examples from Indian Buddhism, see Edward Conze, *Buddhist Texts through the Ages* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), especially selections 149–156. The *Heart Sūtra* exemplifies this notion as found in the Prajñāpāramita literature (see: *Buddhist Wisdom Books*, trans. Edward Conze [London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1958]).

4. The doctrine of *anatta* (no-self) is distinctive of much Buddhist teaching. See, for example, the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, trans. D. T. Suzuki (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932), secs. 44–45, and the *Diamond Sūtra*, in *Buddhist Wisdom Books*, *supra* note 2. For an example of a Hīnayāna text with this idea, see selection 66 in *Buddhist Text through the Ages*, *supra* note 2.

5. The teaching of *wu wei*⁷ appears early in Chinese thought as a central idea in the *Tao Te Ching* and Chuang-Tzu texts. The idea of “inaction in action” plays a key role in the great Indian text, *Bhagavadgītā*.

6. For example, 1:1, 6:25, 7:8, 7:19, 7:33.

7. For example, 7:36, 13:26, 15:21.

8. For example, 2:10, 2:14, 6:3, 8:2.

9. For example, 4:5, 4:6; 4:10, 12:4, 14:1, 15:17.

10. For example, 4:16, 7:8, 8:13, 15:23.

11. 14:45.

12. *The Great Learning* (*Ta Hsueh*), Chapter 6. See also Ch. 4.

13. 14:45 (trans. A. Waley [Random House, 1938]). Note, too, that the term for “self” used by Confucius (*chi*) is not the one usually used in the later texts (*shen*).

14. *Shen* will be found at least once in each of the following passages: 1:4, 1:7, 4:6, 9:26, 12:21, 13:6, 13:13, 15:8, 15:23, 17:7, 18:7, 18:8.

15. *Chi* will be found at least once in each of the following passages: 1:8, 1:16, 4:14, 5:15, 6:28, 7:28, 8:7, 9:24, 12:1, 12:2, 13:20, 14:25, 14:32, 14:42, 14:43, 14:45; 15:4; 15:18, 15:20, 15:23, 19:10.

16. *Tsu* is used in the sense of “self” in the following passages: 4:27, 5:26, 12:23, 14:18, 14:30, 16:14, 19:17, 19:24.

17. 6:28. See also 12:23, 15:23.

18. 14:32. See also, for example, 1:16, 12:1, 14:42, 15:18.

19. 5:15, 14:45. See also 7:28, 13:20.

20. For example, “At fifteen I [*wu*] was bent on learning . . .” (and in the remainder of this well-known sequence the personal pronoun is omitted entirely) [2:4]. In 4:6 *wo* is used as nonemphatic subject. In 5:11 one finds *wo* used as subject and as object; followed immediately by *wu* used as subject. Thus, in general, though *wu* is used more frequently than *wo*, they can be interchanged in various uses, and they take various grammatical roles. But consistently they remain used to unambiguously identify the person referred to in the sentence as the speaker, but to do so without throwing the emphasis in a reflexive way on the person. However Waley says that *wo* as nominative is more emphatic than *wu* (*supra*, note 13, p. 103, n.2).

21. 1:8, 6:28, 9:24, 12:2, 14:25, 15:20, 15:23, 19:10.

22. 12:1, 15:20.

23. 1:4.

24. 4:6.

25. 18.

26. 13:6, 13:13.

27. 1:7, 12:21.

28. 9:26, 15:23.

29. 15:8.

30. *Yu* is used at least once in each of the following passages: 2-4, 3:10, 3:17, 4:5(1), 4:24, 5:11, 6:4, 6:28, 7:29, 9:10, 9:19, 9:13, 11:10, 12:2, 12:10, 12:18, 12:19, 13:17; 14:2, 14:13, 14:26, 14:47, 15:9, 15:23, 16:1, 17:1, 17:5, 17:19, 17:20, 18:5, 18:7, 19:24, 20:2.

31. The term seems to be used in a "neutral" way, for example, in the various versions of the golden rule to be found in the text, for example, at 5:11, 12:2, and 15:23.

32. *Chih* is used at least once in the following passages: 1:11, 2:4, 4:4, 4:9, 4:18, 5:25, 7:6, 9:25, 11:25, 14:38, 15:8, 16:11, 18:8, 19:6.

33. Legge, for example, translates this way in *Chinese Classics*, volume 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), 7:6, 9:25, and 18:8.

34. For example, Legge uses "bent" in 2:4.

35. For example, Legge uses "wish" in 5:25.

36. For example, Legge combines "will" and "set on" in 4:4.

37. For example, Legge uses "determined" in 15:8.

38. For example, Legge uses "aim" in 19:6.

39. Waley (*supra* note 13) uses "intention" in 1:11.

40. Waley uses "high resolve" in 18:8.

41. For example, 4:4, 4:18, 15:18, 18:18(2), 19:6. There are a few cases where a weaker purposiveness can be read into the passage, but where a strong purpose is also consistent with the text. Thus, in 9:25 Waley uses "opinion," but Legge uses "will." In 4:18, Waley uses "opinion" and Legge uses, as the effective verb, "incline"; but on the other hand Leslie uses stronger language here (*ne l'écoutent pas et ne changent point. . .*) (Daniel Leslie, *Confucius*, Editions Seghers, 1962).

42. 9:25.

43. 2:4, 4:9, 7:6(1), 19:6.

44. 1:11. See also 5:25, 11:25, 16:11.

45. 16:11(2).

46. Herbert Fingarette, *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), especially chapter 3.

47. For example, 8:13.

48. For example, 12:1.

49. For example, 4:5.

50. For a full discussion of Confucius' emphasis on these two principles as the 'one thread' that runs through his teaching, see Herbert Fingarette, "Following the 'One Thread' of the *Analects*," (forth-coming in *Proceedings of the Ancient Chinese Philosophy Conference* Boston, Mass.: Harvard University, 1976)].

51. H. G. Creel, *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Mentor, 1953), p. 36.

52. For example, 4:5, 4:16, 14:1, 15:31.

53. For example, 1:1, 4:5, 4:14, 8:13, 14:32, 15:18.

54. For example, 4:9, 9:17.

55. For example, 8:13, 14:13.

56. For passages and comment on *li*, *jen*, *chung*, and *shu*, see notes 48, 49, and 50 *supra*. For reference to *i*, see, for example, 4:10, 4:16, 15:17, 17:23.

57. 12:11.

58. 2:1; and see 15:4. Full discussion will be found in Fingarette, note 46 *supra*, chapter 1.

59. 4:13, 12:19, 13:16.

60. *Tao Te Ching*, chapter 49.

61. *Ibid.*, chapter 7.

62. *Ibid.*, chapter 22, 34.

63. *Ibid.*, chapter 17.

64. *Ibid.*, chapter 20.

65. *Ibid.*, chapter 14.

66. *Bhagavadgītā*, 5:8.

67. *Ibid.*, 5:10.

68. *Ibid.*, 4:18-20, 18:23, 18:45-47.

69. *Ibid.*, 4:16-21.

70. *Ibid.*, 4:18–20.

71. See: 3:3, 3:20, 8:8, 8:15, 11:1, 14:13, 16:5.

72. 8:15.

73. 3:23.

^a 君子	ⁿ 吾身
^b 脩己	^o 正其身
^c 脩身爲本	^p 終身
^d 脩己以安人	^q 行
^e 仁	^r 道
^f 己	^s 禮
^g 身	^t 忠
^h 欲	^u 恕
ⁱ 志	^v 義
^j 自	^w 德
^k 吾	^x 讓
^l 我	^y 無爲
^m 人	