



Maslow: – learners needs.

Deck clearing-any issues to resolve?

The trainer should provide warning at this stage that this can be an emotive lesson. Part of the lesson will discuss atrocities that has affected large parts of the population and Police.

Gestalt - verbal outline of aims and objectives.

Aim:

To provide students a broad understanding of Counter terrorism and their place in front line policing to combat terrorism and protect our communities.

Objectives:

At the end of this lesson, students should be able to:

1. **State** key counter terrorism terminology/concepts
2. **Identify** key legislation relevant to counter-terrorism policing
3. **Understand** the function of key counter-terrorism operations that impact on front-line policing
4. **Explain** the role of front-line local policing in gathering intelligence that can combat terrorism
5. **Describe** the role of front-line policing in identifying vulnerabilities in a counter-terrorism context and taking appropriate action for safeguarding

6. Identify appropriate actions to maintain vigilance & personal safety

NB. *Knowledge Check – Counter Terrorism Year 1, V1* **to be used to consolidate learning**

Handouts:

HO - Contest 2018 – V1

HO - PREVENT Referral Stat Bulletin 2017 - V1

HO - CT Threshold Matrix - V1

HO - CT Threshold Matrix Definitions - V1

HO - STAY SAFE Aide-Memoire - V1

Videos

Slide 11 has two videos available:

[Work with those at risk](#) (Push & Pull)

[Channel Panel](#) (Channel)

These can be found in the All Wales PEQF Drive

Slide 30 & 33 have embedded videos

Slide 57 you tube linked video

Contest Strategy

UK Government Strategy to deal with terrorism within the UK and for UK interests abroad.



QTS

Q. What is Counter Terrorism? (Plenary discussion)

A. Tactics, techniques, and strategy that Government, Military, Law Enforcement, Business, and Intelligence agencies use to combat or prevent terrorism.

QTS

Q. What is the CONTEST Strategy?

The National Government Strategy to deal with Terrorism is called CONTEST. The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism. If you use a search engine and type in CONTEST you will be able to view the government strategy in detail. This is via a hyperlink to the document itself.

(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf)

Essentially the CONTEST document is made up of 4 P's. Do not discuss this into much detail as this will be covered in next slide.

- **Pursue** focuses on the investigation/prosecution side - evidence gathering. Example – just think about all the terrorists which have been in the media over the last 12 months)
- **Protect** looks at crowded buildings / iconic places in relation to building / personal security. (Example – Airports no longer allow pick up/drop off immediately outside terminal. Glasgow

airport attack 2008)

- **Prepare** is all about testing and exercising both internally and externally with the public. (Example – Trafford Shopping Centre Manchester, testing of an active shooter and the police/military response.)
- **Prevent** with its main purpose to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. This will be covered in more detail throughout this presentation.

We will look into PREVENT at the end of this section in much more detail as Police have a huge role in this section. We need to understand our role as front-line officers, so that we can identify vulnerabilities in a counter-terrorism context and take appropriate action for safeguarding.

HO - Contest 2018 – V1

What are the four P's?

P

Protect

To strengthen the protection against terrorist attack in the UK to reduce our vulnerability to attack.

P

Prepare

To mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack which can not be stopped, to enable a speedy recovery in the aftermath.

P

Prevent

To stop people becoming terrorists in the first instance, to implement diversion and deradicalisation programmes.

P

Pursue

To disrupt, detect and prosecute those engaged in terrorist activity.



QTS.

Q. Trainer to ask students what each one is and ask for a brief example of how each section works.

Trainer to give examples of how Protect, Prepare, Prevent and Pursue have become implemented....

Protect – e.g. Bollards fitted on Westminster Bridge in June 2017 just 24 hours after a terrorist attack to protect the public.

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-40165169>

Example:– Airports no longer allow pick up / drop off immediately outside terminal. For example Glasgow airport attack 2008

Prepare – e.g. Training exercises to allow business to check their response plans

<https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/mock-terror-training-exercise-manchester-16145963>

Example: Trafford Shopping Centre Manchester, testing of an active shooter and the police / military response

Prevent – e.g. Safeguarding in schools, Community members working with the police

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/05/uk-mentors-steer-youth-away-from->

radicalisation

We will go into this in much more detail in the coming slides.

Pursue – e.g. Arresting Terrorists

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-51926162>

Example: just think about all the terrorists which have been in the media over the last few years

PREVENT Awareness



"The aim of the Prevent strategy is to reduce the threat to the UK from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism".



PREVENT, is an important arm of the 4 P's and one that Front Line Officers have a key role in, in their day to day lives and duties.

What is Prevent? That is the question you may be asking.

Prevent is the initial Counter Terrorism (CT) concern stage which is there to safeguard individuals. As you can see from the board Prevent is about reducing the threat to the UK by stopping those people from becoming Terrorists or supporting Terrorism .

PREVENT Awareness

Rehabilitation


Provide support to those already engaged to disengage and rehabilitate

Early Intervention

Using safeguarding principles provides tailored multi-agency support to those identified as most at risk to radicalisation

Tackling Causes of Radicalisation

Working online and offline to empower communities and individuals



Since the Prevent Strategy was introduced in 2006 the **UK Police Service has played a vital role in stopping people getting drawn into terrorism and violent extremism**. This unique contribution has been essential in boosting the UK's ability to counter the threat posed by terrorists, whilst at the same time helping build stronger and safer neighbourhoods. Whilst the CTSA 2015 is the primary piece of legislation we use, in 2018 an update was provided.

TACKLING CAUSES OF RADICALISATION

Working online and offline to empower communities and individuals. This includes using our CEU (Community Engagement Unit) colleagues who work to achieve this goal.


EARLY INTERVENTION

Using safeguarding principles provides tailored multi-agency support to those identified as most at risk to radicalisation. This is where Prevent's main workload sits. Early intervention trying to provide support at the earliest point.

REHABILITATION

Provide support to those already engaged to disengage and rehabilitate. Prevent also has a key role here.

PREVENT Awareness



Working together Prevent and Pursue.

The shift in the nature of the terrorist threat has led to a deeper consideration of the links and touch-points between the four 'P' work strands of CONTEST. We recognise our capabilities and resources need to be increasingly interconnected, working across the 'P' work strands to ensure we are generating the maximum impact to help prevent, detect and disrupt terrorist attacks, and where attacks do get through, to limit the impact and recover swiftly. The links between the Prevent and Pursue work strands are particularly important and can be seen clearly in our approaches to managing the risks from terrorist travellers and prisoners, and to multi-agency working. As shown in the diagram, our Prevent work to rehabilitate and reintegrate those who have already engaged in terrorism complements Pursue work to stop terrorist attacks happening in the UK and overseas.

Prevent and Pursue have much in common and compliment each other both seeking to stop acts of terrorism through intervention or disruption of the individuals or networks (5 mins) It is important however to recognise that Prevent is the early intervention program to stop people going into Pursue.

Prevent looks at the 3 I's and has a responsibility to look to rehabilitate individuals:

IDEOLOGICAL

Prevent Challenges corrosive Ideology's (an ideology is a set of opinions or beliefs of a group or an individual) – those who promote an Ideological challenge through a political context or religious one. Prevent looks to counter that Ideological narrative and challenge it.

INSTITUTIONS

The other I is Institutions where places are used as platform to help Individuals and the Ideology. As the name suggests this is all about Prevention. Community cohesion is paramount.

INDIVIDUALS

Prevents main workload however deals with Individuals. The core aim is to support the individual from being drawn into terrorism.

The Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) (Sec 129 - Contest 4.0)

Put simply the DDP program focuses on those individuals who have committed terrorist offences and helping these individuals be rehabilitated.

Key Terms



Refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups.



Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.



C.T. interventions may take a variety of approaches. CT policing makes use of many overt and covert methods to intervene in a persons path to extremist activity.



Group Activity 1

Before showing this slide, trainer to split students into 3 groups. Each group to be given one term:

Radicalisation

Extremism

Interventions

Each group to define their term, come up with an example(s) and report back to the group.

Students in groups will research each term and define it with examples. At the end of the allocated time students are to report back their findings to the rest of the class.

Use slide to debrief

Extremism emanates from a wide spectrum of causes; international, regional and domestic.

The term Domestic Extremism has been discontinued (April 2020) together with the terms Extreme Left and Extreme Right Wing terrorism and has been replaced with;

- Left, Anarchist, Single Issue Terrorism - LASIT
- Right Wing Terrorism

We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.

Interventions are designed to prevent something, especially a system, event or process, from continuing as expected.

Areas of Interventions could be:

- Lifestyle
- Behaviour
- Vehicles
- Travel
- Business
- Crime

Physical Interventions could include:

- Referral to Prevent
- Seize and forfeiture of money
- Arrest or process for non CT related matters
- Removal of an asset which facilitates the activity i.e. having a vehicle impounded by Roads Policing Officers where offences using that vehicle have been committed
- Removal of travel documents
- Arrest for C.T. offences and remanded into custody.
- Using a combination of tactics to disrupt a single or multiple elements of the targets lifestyle.
- Engagement with the full range of agencies and partners who are supporting the disruption
- Using each disruption as an opportunity for further intelligence gathering and refreshing the plan
- The co-ordination and timing in the use of the tactics

Please see menu of disruptions document for additional information, this document accompanies this presentation and lesson plan.

Link this topic to the lesson which follows = 5 Identifying Vulnerabilities – We will be exploring some themes relating to vulnerabilities in that lesson.



Trainer to engage with group for this slide and ask on each click if the image is known to them and why?

Click 1 - Anders Behring Breivik - A terrorist who murdered 77 young people in Norway, who had produced a 1500 page manifest detailing his vision to rid the world of Islam. He dressed as a cop and casually massacred those young people. He continues to believe it was his human right to murder those people. He follows the ideology of someone from the far right which is referred to in the UK as Cultural Nationalism

Click 2 - Anjam Choudrey - a British Islamist social and political Activist convicted of inviting support for terrorist organizations (DAESH – AKA ISIS). Choudrey is a clever man training as a Solicitor. He would very often challenge anyone who thought Prevent was a safeguarding process, stating that it targeted Muslims. A complete fabrication of what Prevent is about. He for many years walked very close to the illegal line of supporting a proscribed organization an offence under the terrorism Act 2000. He used his knowledge of the law and knew how far he could go and get away with making outlandish comments that boarded on inciting violence. He was convicted on 6th September 2016 for 5.5 years for supporting a Terrorist Organization. Also in the back ground Michael Adebolajo one of the 2 killers of Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013. As you can see Michael was present at some of the rallies Choudrey ran. Michael is convicted of Murder not terrorism offences but is he was ever to leave prison he would be monitored.

Click 3 - The group Britain First a Cultural Nationalist group. This group involves several generations within families carrying on the narrative.

Click 4 - ALF – Animal Liberation Front. Using Violence to promote their cause. Several individuals have used explosives to blow up animal testing centers and tried to murder scientists in the UK. This group would be defined as extreme Left wing group. Other groups would be those protecting badgers, foxes also those campaigns against Nuclear power.

Click 5 - The KKK – Believe it or not, there are groups in the UK who align themselves to this Group. Highly racist and offensive, support for a group that would hang black people, unbelievable. In modern day Britain we have people that think like this.

Click 6 - Alex Davies one of the founding members of NATIONAL ACTION. A group that was banned in DEC 2016. This group follow a Nazi theme, securing the white race, White Supremacist group. NA are different in that they target Young intelligent students. They use messaging boards to recruit their followers. When individuals hit 25 they are asked not to attend demos, but to financially support, be supporters. They don't have a rank structure like other groups they have managers, who help run the group. This group use University and College messaging boards to influence young people and advertise through these mediums as well as leafleting in cities around the country. They used many forms of social interaction online, such as open source mediums that me or you could easily access via our search engines, Google, Firefox Bing etc.

Click 7 – Tommy Mair - In 16 June 2016, Jo Cox, the British Labour Party Member of Parliament for Batley and Spen, died after being shot and stabbed multiple times in Birstall, West Yorkshire, England, shortly before she was due to hold a constituency surgery. A 52-year-old local man named Thomas Mair was arrested in connection with Cox's death. On 23 November 2016, Mair was found guilty of murder and other offences connected to the killing. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a whole life order.

Mair was a frequent user of his local library's computers, where he researched subjects such as the BNP, white supremacist, Nazism, the KKK, Waffen SS, Israel, public shooting, serial killers and matricide, as well as the Wikipedia pages of Ian Gow and William Hague. Mair was particularly fascinated by Norwegian far-right terrorist Anders Breivik, and kept newspaper clippings from the Daily Mail about the case. Although he had links with the National Front in the 1990s, and was recently seen at an EDL rally, both anti-fascists and supporters of various far-right organisations deny that Mair had ever "crossed their radar". Despite the presence of several fringe far-right groups in West Yorkshire and identification with extremist political figures, Mair appeared to have made little effort to make contact or involvement with local individuals or groups of a like mind

Click 8 – Khalid Masood - On 22 March 2017 a terrorist attack in London began on Westminster Bridge, and continued into Parliament Square and the grounds of the Palace of Westminster. The attacker, identified as 52-year-old Briton Khalid Masood (born Adrian Russell Elms), drove a car into pedestrians on the pavement along the south side of Westminster Bridge and Bridge Street, resulting in more than 50 people being injured, four of them fatally. After the car crashed into the perimeter fence of the Palace grounds, he abandoned it and ran into New Palace Yard where he fatally stabbed an unarmed police officer (PC Keith Palmer). Masood was then shot by an armed police officer and died of his injuries at the scene. The whole attack lasted 82 seconds.

Click 9 – Samantha Lewthwaite – wife of 7/7 bomber Jermaine Lindsay – suspected of being involved in Westgate attack – 'White widow'. Rumoured to be a radicaliser and recruiter.

Click 10 – Salman Ramadan Abedi On 22 May 2017, 22-year-old British Muslim detonated a shrapnel-laden homemade bomb at the exit of Manchester Arena in Manchester, England, following a concert by American singer Ariana Grande.

22 Victims died and hundreds injured. Abedi brother has also been convicted of the killings.

Click 11 - Khuram Shazad Butt / Rachid Redouane / Youssef Zaghba - On 3 June 2017, an attack took place in the Southwark district of London, England, when a van mounted the pavement of London Bridge and was driven into pedestrians. The van crashed, and the three male occupants ran to the nearby Borough Market pub and restaurant area, where they stabbed people with long knives. Eight people were killed and 48 were injured, including four unarmed police officers who attempted to stop the assailants. The three attackers, who wore fake explosive vests, were all shot dead by police.

Click 12 – Darren Osborne - On 19 June 2017, a suspected terrorist named Darren Osborne drove a van into pedestrians in Finsbury Park, London, injuring at least ten people. This occurred near the Muslim Welfare House, 100 yards (90 m) from Finsbury Park Mosque. A man who had earlier collapsed and was receiving first aid died at the scene. The incident was investigated by counter-terrorism police as a suspected terrorist attack. On 23 June 2017, Darren Osborne of Cardiff was charged with terrorism-related murder and attempted murder. Victim = 51 year old Makram Ali.

Click 13 – European/World Groups – Groups within Europe and indeed the world all influence the UK in very positive ways, but like every other element of life, there are fractions of a population that hold unsavoury ideas. Many groups from across the World seamlessly enhance the UK's Culture, but some hold extremist mind-sets. Within Prevent we look to challenge such groups whose purpose is to undermine our societal norms and disrupt their activity too.

Click 14 – Ahmed Hassan – Parsons Green Bomber. His Mother and Father was reportedly killed in airstrikes whilst in Baghdad in Iraq and had no parents from the age of 6. Hassan hated the UK and sent his tutor messages asking why this(UK) country continued to bomb Iraq. More than 50 injured no deaths. Sentenced to a min of 34 years in jail. Hassan represents a significant case for Prevent as he was in Channel, something we cover later. However this case has changed UK Prevent Strategies significantly.

Click 15 – All female Terror plot – Safaa Boular/ Rizlowne Boular/ Mina Dich / - First all female terror plot in UK. Safaa at the age of 16 met a ISIS fighter online and tried to go to Syria to Join ISIS to join him. He was reportedly killed in a airstrike and this intensified her desire to attack the UK. Safaa was arrested but passed on the mission to her sister Rizlowne. Their mother Mina fully supported her girls who planned to attack either a museum in London or attack near to the houses of parliament.

Click 16 - Andrew Dymock, 22, of Weymouth Street, Bath, was arrested on Wednesday morning by counter-terrorism officers. In all, Mr Dymock faces 15 charges: Five counts of encouraging terrorism, Four of disseminating terrorist publications, Two of terrorist fundraising, One of possessing material of use to a terrorist and Three of stirring up racial hatred.

It is alleged that he used the System Resistance Network (SRN) website - which later became a site for the Sonnenkrieg Division - to upload articles that directly encouraged terrorist violence, with one post said to call for the extermination of Jewish people.

Click 17 – Usman Khan – London attacker – Fishmongers – On rehabilitation programme and killed Jack and Sakia who were mentors helping turn people's lives around. Khan was convicted in 2012 for plotting to commit a terrorist attack. Khan received an indeterminate sentence in 2012 with a minimum term of eight years. At sentencing, the judge said that Khan and his Stoke-on-Trent associates were "more serious jihadis" who operated "at a higher level of efficacy and

commitment than the rest" —the other six convicts

Additional Info

Terms Left Wing and Ring Wing Extremism were replaced with

LASIT – Left Wing, Anarchist, Single Issue Terrorism.

Right Wing Terrorism Changes:

Cultural Nationalism: is a belief that “Western Culture” is under threat from mass migration into Europe and the lack of integration by certain ethnic and cultural groups.

White Nationalism: is a belief that mass migration from the “non-white” world, and demographic change, poses an existential threat to the “White race” and “Western Culture”. Advocates a “White Homeland”.

White Supremacism: is a belief that the “White Race” has certain physical and mental characteristics that makes it superior to other races. This can also include the belief in the spiritual superiority of the “White Race”.

Also of note that any evidence of individuals being engaged in or support for Irish Related Terrorism are routed through Prevent in the same way as any other form of terrorism.

PREVENT Referral Process

- Schools
- College
- Universities
- Doctors / Nurses
- Health Visitors
- Carers
- Social Workers
- Prison Officers
- Probation Officers
- Community Members
- Family
- Police

Anyone!



QTS

Q. Who can refer people to PREVENT?

Results displayed are the main people who refer into Prevent

Explain that anyone can make a referral.

****SWP & GWENT OFFICERS Complete the same form via:****

<https://digitalservices.south-wales.police.uk/en/all-wales-prevent-partners-referral-form-english/>

HO - PREVENT Referral Stat Bulletin 2017 - V1

PREVENT Referral Process

What happens once a referral reaches Prevent?

Closure / Re-Direct

Multi Agency Led

Police Led



Any new referral into Prevent will go through an initial triage assessment which must be completed in 5 days.

Closure / Re-Direct

The referral could be as it could be malicious or misinformed or it could be re-directed to another department/partner agency who are better placed to deal with the issues raised

Multi Agency Led

CHANNEL is a confidential, voluntary multi-agency safeguarding programme that supports people who are vulnerable to radicalisation.

It is run in every local authority in England and Wales and addresses all types of extremism including the extreme-right and Islamist-related. It is about early intervention to protect vulnerable children and adults who might be susceptible to being radicalised, which, if left unsupported, could lead to involvement in terrorist-related activity.

Anyone can make a referral if they are concerned about someone being radicalised. Referrals from the general public can be made to the local authority or the local police. The Channel panel – which is chaired by the local authority - and made up of representatives from different safeguarding areas including health, education, and the police– will meet to discuss the nature and extent of the potential vulnerability of the individual.

All referrals are carefully assessed. Sometimes the person doesn't need any help at all, and the

referral is closed. In other cases, the panel will offer the individual an appropriate support package tailored to their needs.

Support could include assistance with education or employment, health support, and ideological mentoring to provide vulnerable individuals with the skills to protect themselves from being drawn into committing terrorist-related activity or supporting terrorism.

Remember this multi agency approach requires consent, should consent not be granted then it will need to be managed in the Police led space.

Police Led

This process is for those who don't give consent or for those who following assessment would not meet the criteria for Multi Agency. Partner agencies will also be involved and work with the police. Various multi agency meetings can be held but this wont be under the guise of Channel.

What do PREVENT do?

- Prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism
- [Work with those at risk](#)
- Work with Partner Agencies
- [Channel Panel](#)
- Intervention Providers
- Ongoing support



****Videos if time allows****

[Work with those at risk](#) (Push & Pull)

[Channel Panel](#) (Channel)

These can be found in the All Wales PEQF Drive

Reiterate the Prevent strap line.....Prevent prevents people becoming terrorists or those supporting terrorism.

Prevent works with those who are vulnerable and are at risk of radicalisation and where concerns have been identified. These concerns arrive in the form of a referral such as emails, phone calls from colleagues, partners and members of the public. The key here is to have the information.

Use the hyperlink to show a short 3 minute video which explains the 'push and pull' factors of how someone can be radicalised as explained by Chris Dean who is a Chartered Psychologist. (Chris describes this in a very simple manner.)

Prevent as discussed earlier works at the initial concern stage, where no Terrorism offences have been committed this is a safeguarding process. Partner agency work is key, Prevent officers cannot work alone and partner agencies are heavily involved in dealing with Safeguarding concerns. This includes information from the British Security Services (MI5 and MI6)

If concerns around the individual require further work then partners are called on to help provide a safeguarding team around that person. This meeting is called a Channel Panel meeting. The meeting is multi Agency with lots of relevant partners. Use the hyperlink to play the Channel video (approx. 7 mins in length.) This process is a Voluntary one.

Once a meeting takes place and the Channel Chair (Local Authority rep) has decided to accept the case as a Channel case, then one tactical option could be to use a intervention provider. These are specially trained individuals who have specific knowledge in that persons views i.e. a right wing specialist or an Islamist specialist. These people are subject matter experts who help provide a counter narrative to the ideology presented. Prevent officers look to match Intervention providers to the subject to give the best chance of success and diverting that person away from an extremist path.

When individuals have left the program, their risks reduced or dealt /managed with, they are then provided with ongoing support which can be with other partners. They are also followed up 6 and 12 months down the line.

Additional Info

Prevent is a voluntary process, its working with individuals, not forcing this process on them. If they don't want to be part of Channel then officers may look at other options to deal with the individuals if concerns exist, such as disruption techniques or ask partners to monitor.

Identifying Vulnerabilities which give Cause for Concern

Emotional Changes

Crying, Withdrawn,
Angry, Depressed

Verbal Changes

Scripted speech, Argumentative,
Inappropriate Language

Physical and Circumstantial Changes

Change of clothing, Tattoos, New Friends,
Increased Internet use, Isolation, Facial Hair



Activity 2 – Board blast

Trainer to show sub-heading on the slide:
Emotional Changes, Verbal Changes, Physical Changes.

Trainer to ask the group questions around these to involve interaction and get the students to write possible indicators to help spot vulnerabilities. **Students** to come up to the white board / interactive TV and write possible indicators to spot vulnerabilities under each of the subheadings.

There should be endless responses however some of the most common are displayed on the slide when clicked.

Other triggers are shown on slide 13.

****Facial Hair - If 'Growing of beard' topic is mentioned, presenter to keep this subject until the end****

Run through each heading drawing out concerns.

****When talking about beard concern, it is important to explain that someone growing a beard may not be a concern, but this issue does come up and can lead to stereotypes being made and enforced, this must be avoided at all costs. ****

Now a word of caution, these changes, emotional, verbal, physical and circumstantial could be just the normal changes we all experience at times. The prevent team are not looking at people with these normal changes. It's about highlighting those changes that are not in context of that person, and something just doesn't feel quite right. You may get challenged on these vulnerabilities and someone may say that their son / daughter / close friend could be described as the person noted on the board. If they do, use this example.

Example:

A young girl has changed her appearance and become a Goth; she has changed her friends and has a new boyfriend. She also has a number of new body piercings. She is very emotional one minute and then incredibly happy the next. Verbally she is very argumentative, disagreeing with her parents regularly.

In this case this is an example of a teenager who is still trying to find her place in society and understand where she fits in relation to her peers. The reason why she is very emotional and argumentative is because of her exams.

The point of this is that Prevent does not deal with the everyday changes that may occur in individuals, but those changes that when in context are of concern and unusual.

Other Triggers.....



Prifysgol Cymru
Y Drindod Dewi Sant
University of Wales
Trinity Saint David

Real Example

- Referral made by Police Schools Officer
- 15 year old school boy made comments about how easy it was to make a bomb
- Collaboration with partner agencies (Channel)
- 3 sessions with an Intervention Provider
- Male regretted the comments he made admitting he was trying to impress friends
- Subject signposted to school who will continue to monitor



This is a real example:

Additional Info:

Referral came from Police Schools Officer. They had been made aware by Head Teacher one of their 15 year old male pupils was making regular comments about how he could make a bomb. He also openly showed support to the Columbine Massacre.

Following the referral into Prevent, Prevent staff visited male at his home address. He spoke openly and proudly about his Right Wing views and also showed various material on his laptop which the visiting officers described as 'alarming'. Subsequently he was moved into CHANNEL where a collaborative approach was formed between Prevent, Safer School, School, Subjects Parents and the Local Authority. It was agreed the subject would receive support from an Intervention Provider (IP).

The IP (during 3 sessions) was able to establish the individuals mind-set and therefore challenged his ideologies – therefore mitigating the risk.

The male himself regretted the comments he made, admitting he was just trying to impress his friends. The male has been signposted back to the school for them to monitor. The police involvement has ceased as the terrorism element has been mitigated.

Real Example



- Referred in by Neighbourhood Policing
- Adult male with severe learning disability, living independently but thought of as extremely 'suggestible'
- Acting as a Flag bearer for a prominent right wing protest group
- This male's vulnerability is further heightened by the fact that the group are using him as he is of Black African ethnicity



This is a real example

Prevent referral as on screen. Presenter to read through.

Additional Info:

This male was referred into Prevent and was assessed as Vulnerable and with having a CT element (Right Wing group – EDL). He was accepted into Channel and a mental health assessment was organised. The male was said to be of sound mind, however the dangers of his being associated with this right wing group were pointed out to him due to his ethnicity. The male met the Mental Health nurse on several occasions and decided that being a flag bearer for this group was probably not a great idea. This male was safeguarded. This is an example of Prevent and potentially without any intervention could have led to a very different outcome.




NOTICE : We want Officers and Staff to firstly notice the concern, this could be through what's being said, what's being seen etc.

SHARE : Once the concern is Noticed and then Checked, then we want Officers and Staff to share there concerns. This is vitally important. If the sharing does not take place then the risk potentially stays with the person who has the information.

HO - CT Threshold Matrix - V1
HO - CT Threshold Matrix Definitions - V1

History of CT Legislation



Click one

January to June 1939 there were 127 bombings in which one person was killed and fifty-five injured. These were perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

In August a bicycle bomb in Coventry killed five and injured eighty. The Coventry bombing occurred weeks before the outbreak of WWII and as a result was quickly forgotten about. However, throughout the duration of WWII the IRA undertook a number of active operations in England.

QTS:

Trainer to pose the question to what the group believe would be the government response?

Answer:

The Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provision) Act of 1939.

The Act was intended to last for two years, but it was reviewed yearly until 1954

The Act gave wide powers of search to the Police. The power of detention for five days (previously unheard of). Power of immediate deportation by the Home Secretary suspected IRA sympathisers could be required to register with the Police

As a result of these powers hundreds of Irishmen were deported to Ireland where the majority were immediately interned. Many were jailed in England. Two, Peter Barnes and Frank McCormick, were hanged for the Coventry Street bombings

Click 2

British mainland subjected to a prolonged and substantial IRA campaign of terrorist attacks. Such as:

- M62 coach bomb resulted in the death of nine soldiers and three civilians.

Birmingham Pub Bombings - 20:15hrs on Thursday 21st Nov 1974 two IRA bombs exploded at pubs in Birmingham, the Mulberry Tree and the Tavern in the Town. A few minutes earlier a man with an Irish accent had telephoned a warning to the local newspaper, the Birmingham Post. However, it was far too late...

The explosions resulted in the death of nineteen people and injury to one hundred and eighty two...

The nation was shocked at the carnage and the way in which the war in NI was being brought to the mainland...

Whilst the IRA intended taking the 'troubles' to the British public they undoubtedly did not intend the disaster of Birmingham.

The bombs were planted on the orders of the local IRA commander as a revenge attack. He believed that the city had gloated over the death of James McDade, an IRA bomber who had blown himself up exactly one week before while planting a bomb at Coventry Telephone exchange.

The bombing in Birmingham is still have an impact to this day as the enquiry into the Birmingham Pub Bombings and the police investigation continues.

QTS:

What was the Governments Response?

Answer:

Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974

Each time a disaster occurred such as:

- Harrods Bombing - **Click 3**
- Lord Mountbatten Murdered by IRA – **Click 4**
- Hyde Park Bombing – **Click 5**
- Brighton Hotel Bombing (Concervatory Party Conference) - **Click 6**

The act updated:

- Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976
- Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984
- Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989

The 1989 act was in force for 12 years, and was very much focused on countering Irish Related Terrorism (IRT) activity, until the introduction of The Terrorism Act 2000 on the 19th February 2001.

The legislation throughout had a common theme – it was a temporary provision and as such had to be renewed on a regular basis.

Current Legislation

Terrorism Act 2006 (previously 2000)
Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008
Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010
Terrorism Prevention & Investigation Measures Act 2011
Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime & Policing Act 2014
Counter-Terrorism & Security Act 2015
Counter-Terrorism & Border Security Act 2019



One of the ideas regarding the introduction of the 2000 Act was to bring terrorism legislation under one Act, making it simpler to use. Came into force on 19/02/2001

Places terrorism legislation on a permanent basis

Subject to annual review and report to Parliament,

However, history repeats its self and after the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) was rushed through Parliament and came into force in November of that year. At first glance the ATCSA 2001 is an amendment to possibly three Acts rolled into one.

The Anti-Terrorism section amends some of 2000 Act, in particular the extended powers of stop and search within Schedule 7, of the 2000 Act to include internal flights.

Immediately this came into force it watered down the initial concept of having simplified the terrorism legislation and things became more complicated with the introduction of The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. This legislation created control orders – effectively a house arrest for suspected terrorists. This was repealed and replaced with the Terrorism Prevention & Investigation Measures Act 2011.

Yet it did not stop there, we now have The Terrorism Act 2006 which has introduced some 9 new terrorism offences and amends some of the 2000 Act powers.

And was likely to continue in this vain for some time to come, it was envisaged that sometime in 2007 a consolidation was to take place of all terrorism legislation to come under one Act – As you can see this never happened!

The CT Act 2008, introduced 'Part IV' notifications – A requirement for persons convicted under CT legislation to be registered. Similar to Registered Sex Offenders, for example the need for them to live at approved premises, have their photographs taken and regularly updated, to report to a police station under certain circumstances.

The Terrorist Asset freezing etc. Act 2010 has little or no bearing on Police work and was introduced to allow the treasury to freeze bank accounts of suspected terrorists. However, it is anti-terrorism legislation.

Terrorist Prevention & Investigation Measures Act 2011 – the replacement for the Prevention Of Terrorism ACT 2005 – TPIMs replaced control orders. Persons who can not be charged and brought before a court may be subject to a TPIM measure i.e. relocate to a certain part of the country, restriction on association, restriction on mobile phones, restriction on bank accounts, restriction on computer use, restrictions on travel.

Anti-Social behaviour, Crime & Policing Act 2014 – Although not obviously terrorism related, this piece of legislation had a massive impact upon Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act and it created the accredited role of accredited Examining Officer and Review Officer in the Ports environment – as well as other CT Ports policing changes. Also made changes to retention of CT suspect bio-data.

CT & Security Act 2015 – this legislation made amendments to parts of the terrorism Act 2000 and Aviation Security Act 1982 to deal with travellers. Most importantly it brought in a lot of PREVENT directives to Higher Education & Further Education organisations.

Also Schedule 1 – Ports power to temporarily prevent persons suspected of terrorism related activity (taking place outside of the UK) from travelling by seizing their travel documents
Schedule 2 – Power to impose a temporary exclusion order on persons considered of risk from entering the country.

CT and Border Security Act 2019 – the main elements designed to give enhanced powers at ports have yet to be enacted (February 2020) as parliament are waiting for time and opportunity to enact it.



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Trainer to split class into 3 groups. Each group be given one of the following questions:

What is a Terrorist?

What is S41(1) of TACT?

Students in groups will research the question given to them and define it. At the end of the allocated time students are to report back their findings to the rest of the class.

Groups to report back. Trainer to use slides 19 to 25 to debrief.



S1 of the Terrorism Act - 2000

In this Act “terrorism” means
the use or threat of “action”

Serious violence
Serious damage
Endangers
Serious risk
Serious electronic

to

Influence or
Intimidate

a

Political
Racial
Religious
Ideological

unless

firearms or explosives are used, then it is terrorism
whether or not PRRI is Influence / Intimidated



Trainer to explain definition

- (a) involves serious violence against a person,
- (b) involves serious damage to property,
- (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,
- (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
- (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public,

for the purpose of advancing

A Political, Racial, Religious or Ideological (PRRI) Cause.

If the use or threat involves firearms or explosives to further a P.R.R.I Cause, then there is no requirement to either influence or intimidate.

Section 1 of the Terrorism act 2000 merely creates the definition of what terrorism is, it does not create an offence per se.

However Terrorism is treated differently to other offences and not everything that fits this will be considered as terrorism – Animal Rights activity is a good example. Animal Rights activity currently is considered to be extremism and is generally covered by crime policing powers i.e. criminal damage, offences against the person etc.



S40 of the Terrorism Act - 2000

A terrorist means a person who:

Has committed an offence under any of sections:

11, 12, 15 - 18, 54 and 56-63

OR

Is or has been concerned in the Commission, Preparation or Instigation of acts of TERRORISM



Trainer to highlight

40(1)(a) HAS committed specific offences,
or IS or HAS

been concerned in Commission Preparation or Instigation (CPI) of acts of TERRORISM.

QTS:

What does this mean?

Get Students to try and define this

KEY POINTS

They could not have kept it simple, there are two separate elements to this definition, Section 40 subsection (1)(a) and section 40 subsection (1)(b). Either equate to the person being a terrorist and if you suspect the person of being a terrorist, Section 41 gives you the power to arrest them.

Both require limited disclosure to the detained person on the grounds and reasons for the arrest. It is quite possible that the arresting officer does not know anything about the circumstances behind the decision to arrest, and what information is about may have come from a sensitive source.

Notice it only states a person who has committed an offence, in the past tense, not is about to or is committing.

Highlight-

S40(1)(a) is for specific offences, which are offences per se (see below a list of these offences). You can also be charged with these offences; all these offences require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) before a charge can be laid before the person affected. It is recommended that the relevant Sch 5 TACT 2000 search warrant is sort in every case.

Section 40(1)(b). C.P.I. A far wider reaching part of the definition, not a specific offence requires suspicion. Cannot be charged with CPI therefore it is not an offence per se.

You only need to tell the person arrested that they have been arrested on suspicion of being a terrorist. BUT be cautious, a person must be informed in simple terms why they are being detained.

List of offences referred to in Section 40(1)(a)

S11 membership of proscribed organisation

S12 supporting for proscribed organisation

S15 fundraising for terrorism purposes

S16 uses or possesses money or other property for purpose of terrorism

S17 makes a funding arrangement for the purposes of terrorism

S18 conducts money laundering for the purposes of terrorism

S54 provides or receives weapons training for the purposes of terrorism

S56 directs a terrorist organisation

S57 possess an article for a terrorist purpose

S58 collects information for a terrorist purpose

S59 – S61 inciting terrorism overseas

S62 terrorist bombing - Jurisdiction – a person commits an offence in the UK if committing an act of terrorism out of the UK which would have been an offence within the UK

S63 terrorist financing - Jurisdiction – a person commits an offence in the UK if committing an act of terrorism out of the UK which would have been an offence within the UK



S41(1) of the Terrorism Act - 2000

Power of Arrest

A Constable may arrest without warrant a person whom they **REASONABLY SUSPECT** to be a **TERRORIST.**



KEY POINTS

Trainer to explain that Terrorism Act has its own power of arrest and is outside of Section 24 PACE.

A Constable – Constable ONLY.

Obviously can be any rank including Chief Constable.

Reasonably Suspects

Has to be very good reason for arresting. The usual test for reasonably can be applied here.

A Terrorist.

Therefore, if you reasonably suspect a person is a terrorist, you can arrest them. Its that simple. Or is it?

The power allows an officer to arrest a person under S41 anywhere in the United Kingdom, including Scotland and Northern Ireland but be aware of the limited search powers post arrest in Scotland.

We will discuss a bit about Sch 8 in the next few slides....

To arrest for this you must have good grounds to 'REASONABLY SUSPECT' not just in wrong place at wrong time.

Now that you know that the power of arrest is different and is not for an offence. You will now

see that once a person is arrested for being a terrorist, their detention is treated differently to any other prisoner.

Schedule 8 of TACT 2000 - Detention

- Schedule 8 TACT / PACE Code H
- Designated detention places
- Code G Necessity may not apply – arresting Officer authorises detention
- Handwritten Custody Records (best practice in forensic arrest)
- Relevant Time & No stopping of clock (41(3))

- Reviews
- No PACE S18 or S32 – Only Schedule 5 TACT Warrant
- Fingerprints (Constable only) & Samples (Para 10)
- Additional Identification powers (Para 2)
- Video recording of interviews only (Video CoP).



- Where a person is arrested using TACT powers then Schedule 8 of the TACT 2000 governs that detention and is covered by Code H (PACE) not Code C. Trainer to explain that the law relating to conditions of detention lies in the Terrorism Act, but the practical application and tactical delivery lies within the code of practice i.e. Code H.
- There are five TACT Custody Centres in UK – This is where prisoner(s) will end up. These centres are designed to comfortably hold/process TACT prisoners with secure VTC to Westminster Magistrates Court. (Designation of custody facilities is in Schedule 8 Part 1, 1(1))
- PACE Code G relates to the statutory power of arrest under section 24 PACE 1984 and contains the necessity test for arrest. It does not apply to arrests under the TACT. There must be some reasonable grounds for arrest for arrest under the TACT and objective grounds for suspicion.
- Custody records are handwritten – partly to prevent ‘hacking’ of the record, plus the level of detail recorded on these records far exceed the drop-down boxes in electronic custody records. The main reason for handwritten records is in forensic arrests to prevent cross contamination.
- Relevant time is the time of arrest or commencement of an examination at a port. Also, once arrested the custody clock does not stop counting down - unlike PACE custody clock than will stop during hospital visits etc. (amendment to this will follow once the Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 becomes enacted in full)
- Reviews are conducted either by an Inspector or a Supt up to 48hrs. At this point, prisoner is either charged, released or subject to a Warrant of Further Detention (WoFD).

Where a WoFD has been granted it is accepted that the review has been conducted by the court and no further reviewing is required, although to demonstrate transparency and appropriate detention reviews are conducted in the 'spirit of PACE'

- Fingerprints and certain samples must only be taken by a Constable (any police officer). TACT fingerprints are wet prints (with ink and paper) and are very detailed and can take a long time to obtain. Each print is reviewed at the time of them being taken by a fingerprint expert who is present and advises if they are to the required standard or should be taken again.

Schedule 8 of TACT 2000 - Detention

- Counter Terrorism Legislation Advisor (best practice)
- FMT's – Not CSI's (best practice)
- Monitored Consultations (Para 9, Schedule 8)
- No Bail
- TACT Independent Custody Visitors

- Home Secretary
- 48hrs & Extensions of detention (Schedule Part III)
- 7 days / 14 days – If longer required then legislated
- Judiciary for WOFD – Westminster Mags only
- Security issues.



- Counter Terrorism Legislation Advisers (CTLA) will need information from Custody and other sources to complete the Warrant of Further Detention (WoFD).
- All forensic recovery from TACT scenes (including prisoner) will be obtained by specially trained Forensic Management Team Officers. Force CSI Officers are not used, as the processes differ considerably.
- Monitored Consultations – If there concerns that a legal adviser is in league with the prisoner, a Chief Officer of police can authorise an Inspector to sit in the prisoners legal consultation. Very extreme.
- There is no provision for either 47/3 bail or bail after charging.
- There are TACT trained Independent Custody Visitors (ICV) who are informed about every TACT arrest and may attend the custody unit. ICV Code of Practice (CoP) refers
- The NTAD (National Terrorist Arrest Database) will be informed of all TACT arrests – NTAD brief the Home Secretary.
- Prisoners detained beyond 48hrs (and most are) will need held by a WoFD. A 2nd WoFD will need to be obtained to detain TACT prisoner(s) from 7days to 14 days.
- The only Court in UK designated to deal with WoFD and other CT related matters is Westminster Magistrates Court.

I arrest for a CT Offence, but it's not a specified offence?



Arrest are made under Section 24 PACE when not arresting under Section 41 TACT and therefore PACE Code C applies.



If an offence is committed which is contained in the terrorism act but is **NOT** one of the specified offences i.e.

S11 membership of proscribed organisation

S12 supporting for proscribed organisation

S15 fundraising for terrorism purposes

S16 uses or possesses money or other property for purpose of terrorism

S17 makes a funding arrangement for the purposes of terrorism

S18 conducts money laundering for the purposes of terrorism

S54 provides or receives weapons training for the purposes of terrorism

S56 directs a terrorist organisation

S57 possess an article for a terrorist purpose

S58 collects information for a terrorist purpose

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S62 terrorist bombing - Jurisdiction – a person commits an offence in the UK if committing an act of terrorism out of the UK which would have been an offence within the UK

S63 terrorist financing - Jurisdiction – a person commits an offence in the UK if committing an act of terrorism out of the UK which would have been an offence within the UK

or you **do NOT** suspect the person to be engaged in the Commission Preparation or Instigation of

an act of terrorism then you would use PACE detention conditions.

i.e. a Terrorist cordon is in place and a person refuses to obey the directions of the constable – refuses to leave that cordon area. An offence under the terrorism act has been committed but it is not an offence that falls within the definition of a terrorist under section 40(1). The power of arrest under section 24 PACE would then be relevant and the provisions for detention in PACE Code C would apply.



S43 & S43A of TACT - 2000

Police Constable Power of Search

Allows for stop search
of both Individuals &
Vehicles

AND

Provides power to
search person post
arrest

As amended by Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 to include the vehicle.



QTS:

Q. Can you search someone who you suspect of terrorism?

A. Students may not know this but based on previous lessons they should respond, yes

Q. What Powers would you use?.

A. Students have touched on this in Stop & Search Lesson. The answer expected is powers under TACT. S43, 43A & 47.

Sect 43 now allows the search of a person who is reasonably suspected of terrorism and their vehicle. Up until 2012, we could only stop and search a person under this power – we had not power to stop & search the vehicle.

43A added a new power to stop vehicles that are reasonably suspected of being used for terrorist purposes – this vehicle can be searched and so can anyone has found within. May be useful for Op Lightning vehicles, i.e., those engaged in hostile recon.

S47 is a search power that allows officers to search with no suspicion. Only a ACC or Commander may authorise, in relation to a specified area or place, if the officer—

- (a) reasonably suspects that an act of terrorism will take place; and
- (b) considers that—

- (i) the authorisation is necessary to prevent such an act;
- (ii) the specified area or place is no greater than is necessary to prevent such an act; and
- (iii) the duration of the authorisation is no longer than is necessary to prevent such an act

Notes for S47:

- Constable in uniform
- Stop and search
- Vehicle (and driver, passengers, anything in or on vehicle or carried by driver/passenger), or
Pedestrian (and anything carried)
- For articles used in terrorism
- No suspicion required
- Cannot remove clothing in public except: **Jacket, Outer Coat, Gloves (JOG) & Headgear, footwear.**

THE POWERS ONLY APPLY FOR THE SPECIFIED AREA OR PLACE AS DESIGNATED BY THE AUTHORISING OFFICER.

- Can be enacted for 14 days duration
- We must Inform Secretary of State as soon as practicable (who must confirm within 48hrs)
- **And have due regard to Code of Practice**

Op Lightning is the national standing operation within the CT network to record those believed to be engaged in hostile reconnaissance, persons, vehicle, and circumstances are recorded as an Op Lightning Report, stored collated and disseminated to all the CT Network as intelligence.

Cordons, S33 - 36 of TACT - 2000

- **S33** – Defines a Cordon
- **S34** – Powers to Designate
- **S35** – Duration of Cordon
- **S36** – Police Powers



No other type of investigation has legislation that defines and introduces Cordons. Not only can you have a legally imposed cordon during a Tact investigation, but it comes with its own, in emergencies a search power and prosecutable offences for persons not complying with a constable's command within the boundaries of a cordon.

- **Terrorism Act 2000, Sect 33**
Defines the designation of a Cordon.
- **Terrorism Act 2000, Sect 34**
Power to designate – person of the rank of Superintendent or in case of urgency, a Constable – ensuring that a Superintendent is informed asap.
- **Terrorism Act 2000, Sect 35**
Duration of cordon – 14 days extended to 28
- **Terrorism Act 2000, Sect 36**
Police Powers – Regarding removal of persons/vehicles and/or restricting access.
Offences of failing to comply.



We will now look at three (*time depending, trainer must go through minimum of one*) modern counter-terrorism operations that have impacted on front-line policing.

****HEALTH WARNING**** The next few slides are recent events and includes pictures. This topic may illicit emotional responses from students, especially if friends or families were amongst victims. Trainer to be aware and warn students of this. ****HEALTH WARNING****

Three operations will be examined (mini summaries below):

- Operation Overt. 2006, plot to blow up transatlantic airplanes
- Operation Aggrace. 2017, plot to attack police officers
- London and Manchester 2017.

Op Overt – some incredible changes were immediately implemented once this plot was revealed i.e., liquids were limited to 100ml at all airports.

This continues to this day re our air travel and the restrictions now placed upon each traveller. Some countries insisting on prior registration before entry that country is allowed. In addition, further offences and policies have been created to bolster up powers at ports and borders.

Op Aggrace – this and some other operations about the same time highlighted the change in terrorism targeting in that the police became ‘fair game’ for a random attack, this was legitimised and promoted in ISIS doctrine where calls to attack wherever and whenever the terrorist could.

Attacks against the police have been seen across the world; Chechnya, Indonesia, France, Russia, Canada and UK a number of them fatal.

Attacks in 2017 – the scale and frequency of the attacks of 2017 brought about changes within the CT Network. Front line policing became the actual target for terrorist attacks, and it was seen on a number of occasions that hostile reconnaissance had been conducted against police targets.

Operational names are used by the police to differentiate between one operation and another, therefore keeping the policing activity separate and distinct. The names are given by centralised departments in police forces or specialist departments, these names being chosen at random from a constructed list within these forces and departments. In Counter Terrorism Policing the names are always one word. Colours, animals, and places are not used for operational names.

Operation OVERT

- August 2006, 24 men arrested for planning to board aeroplanes and blow them up using home made explosives
- Immediate changes to passenger rules
- Still current to this day – limited liquids on aeroplanes
- Passenger manifests forwarded to Borders officers
- Further offences at ports compelling people to comply or become arrested

The Legacy of this enquiry for us all

- Increased restriction on international travel – e.g. USA pre registration for all visitors
- Further offences provided



Q. What can you tell me about Operation OVERT (August 2006 plan to board planes in UK?)

The following is abstracted from Wikipedia – March 2020.

On 9 August 2006, British police arrested 24 people for questioning. The arrests were made in London, Birmingham, and High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, in an overnight operation. Two of the arrests were made in the Birmingham area and five were made in High Wycombe; The key suspects were British-born Muslims, some of Pakistani descent. Three of the suspects were recent converts to Islam.

Eight of the suspects were later charged with conspiracy to murder and commit acts of terrorism a further three with failing to disclose information about acts of terrorism and one youth with possession of articles related to a terrorist act. Others were released without charge.

Police said they had been observing the plot evolve for months, and that the "investigation reached a critical point" on the night of 9 August 2006. when the decision was made to take

urgent action in order to disrupt what was believed was being planned.

A total of 69 searches of residences, businesses, vehicles and open spaces were carried out, which netted possible bomb-making equipment and chemicals including hydrogen peroxide, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke said on 21 August 2006. "As well as the bomb-making equipment, we have found more than 400 computers, 200 mobile telephones and 8,000 items of removable storage media such as memory sticks, CDs and DVDs," he said. "So far, from the computers alone, we have removed some 6,000 gigabytes of data." It will take "many months" for investigators to analyse all of the data, he said.

Police said they found a list of flights on a memory stick belonging to one of those arrested. The memory stick listed scheduled flights from three carriers – American Airlines, United Airlines and Air Canada.


The plotters planned to use peroxide-based liquid explosives; the Metropolitan Police said that the plot involved acetone peroxide, (TATP), which is sensitive to heat, shock, and friction, and can be initiated with fire or an electrical charge and can also be used to produce improvised detonators.

During the trial of the conspirators, the prosecution stated that each bomber would board a plane with the "necessary ingredients and equipment". They would then construct the devices mid-flight and detonate them. The hydrogen peroxide would be placed in 500 ml plastic bottles of the Oasis and Lucozade soft drinks.

A sugary drink powder, Tang, would be mixed with the hydrogen peroxide to colour it to resemble a normal soft drink. Hydrogen peroxide is widely available for use as hair bleach and along with the other ingredients can become explosive if mixed to a specific strength. The mixture would be injected into the bottles with a syringe. The bottle's cap would not have been removed and the hole would have been resealed, thereby allowing the device to resemble a normal, unopened drink bottle when screened by airport security. The use of liquid explosives with dissolved powder is similar to the composition used in the 21 July 2005 London bombings, using hydrogen peroxide and chapati flour, activated by a detonator.

A second substance, a type of high explosive, would be hidden within an AA battery casing; this small explosive charge would detonate the main bomb. The charge would be detonated by linking the bottle of explosives to a light bulb and a disposable camera. The charge from the camera's flash unit would trigger the explosion.

Operation OVERT



The mechanism planned?

The Result?



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This is a recreation of what the prosecution believed was to be the manner in which the bomb makers were to construct and use the devices on the airplanes.

Click on the image to run the clip.

Operation OVERT

The eight men accused of the plot to blow up transatlantic aircraft in a suicide attack.

(top row, from the left) Waheed Zaman, Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Waheed Khan and Umar Islam

(bottom row, from the left) Tanvir Hussain, Donald Stewart-Whyte, Abdulla Ahmed Ali and Assad Sarwar



As a result of the actions of the bomb plotters, air travel throughout the world changed. Countries are now required to impose much stricter guidelines upon air travellers. No one who has taken a flight since 2006 will not have become impacted upon by this.

Operation AGGRACE

- Khalid Ali planning to mount an attack in Whitehall, London in April 2017
- Somali/Ethiopian decent, living in London since 1992
- Travelled with aid convoys to Al Qaeda training camps, had made and detonated bombs in Afghanistan
- Performed hostile reconnaissance in central London – Downing Street, New Scotland Yard and the MI6 building at Vauxhall Cross.


- 26th April he bought a set of knives, later that evening he disposed of the packaging into a neighbours bin. At this time his mother found the knives and hid them in different parts of the house fearing his intentions. An argument ensued and police were called. Ali then left the house and did not return.
- 27th April he rearmed himself, travelled to Westminster and it was feared was about to mount an attack upon police officers.



QTS:

Q. What can you tell me about Operation AGGRACE? (Planned Whitehall attack London 2017)

Operation AGGRACE



Khalid Ali seen in March 2017 performing hostile reconnaissance in Whitehall at Downing street and talking to police officers. Consider if he was already armed with those knives at this point? How vulnerable are patrolling officers in these situations, consider what personal protective equipment (PPE) you make use of, consider your training to protect yourself.

****Click on the BBC CLIP to Play****

A BBC clip showing the arrest of Khalid Ali and some background to his offending.

Following this operation and a number of other similar plots across the UK all police staff are now advised – and the advice is still current (March 2020) not to travel in uniform to and from work, to ensure you do not openly make it known where you work, how you travel to and fro. Police officers and staff must ensure their social media ‘footprint’ is sufficiently masked to provide the same level of security for the individual.

London & Manchester 2017

- Westminster Bridge, Khalid MASOOD March 2017
 - 5 fatalities including PC Keith PALMER, dozens injured
- Manchester Arena, Salman ABEDI May 2017
 - 22 fatalities, hundreds injured
- London Bridge, Khuram BUTT, Rachid REDOUANNE, Youssef ZAGHBA June 2017
 - 8 fatalities, dozens injured




The most devastating year on British soil since the 7/7 attacks of 2005 (52 fatalities, 700 injured)

2017 saw the return of the use of a bomb to attack the British public – Manchester arena, it also saw the low sophisticated attack of making use of a vehicle as a weapon and then conducted a knife attack.

The London Bridge attack saw also the use of fake suicide vests worn by the three attackers who remained at the attack site clearly waiting for the police to arrive and to be confronted by armed officers.

Westminster Bridge, London - March 2017



The first photo shows the direction of travel of the vehicle – orange arrow, the direction of travel of the attacker on foot – yellow arrow, the aftermath of the attack and the attending 1st responders.

Photo depicts the scene on Westminster Bridge immediately following the attack. Police and Ambulance resources respond to assist the dying and wounded.

Westminster Bridge, London - March 2017

- Mass witnesses
- Language barriers re witnesses
- Iconic Target
- Police Officer fatally wounded
- Other fatalities being reported
- Palace of Westminster evacuated



100's of witnesses either came forward at the time of the incident or were spoken to at the location in the aftermath of the incident.

Many of those witnesses were tourists to the UK and could not provide lucid accounts in English.

Due to the fact that the Palace of Westminster was the target, hundreds of people were in that area

PC Keith Palmer confronted the attacker within the ground of parliament and suffered fatal injuries

As the accounts of what had happened continued to come in, so did the reports of more and more fatalities

Due to the uncertainty of the actual attack the Palace of Westminster was cleared, all MP's and staff and all other witnesses were ushered into Westminster Abbey where a triage of those witnesses then took place.

Following the attacks bollards are now places along bridges crossing the River Thames plus other iconic places as vehicle mitigation barriers. This is an example of the work of the Protect Prepare officers of CT Policing.

Manchester Arena - May 2017



22nd May 2017 at 10.31pm Salman Abedi detonated a person borne improvised explosive device (PBIED) within the foyer of the Manchester Arena during a concert.

22 people died as a result of the explosion, 139 wounded (half of which were children), hundreds more suffered psychological effects and trauma.

Salman Abedi was a local man, born in Manchester of Libyan ancestry, he acted with his brother Hashem Abedi to carry out the attack. Following extensive enquiries Hashem Abedi was returned to the UK from Libya to stand trial. He was convicted in March 2020 of his part in the murder of these 22 who had died.

Manchester Arena - May 2017



All the images of police officers dealing with the aftermath of the bombing were response or initial responders. The first response to a terrorist incident is nearly always a response officer or a first responder.


The actions on first arrival at the scene of a terrorist incident will be explored further in Lesson 7 – Provide a First Response to Potential Terrorist Incidents.

Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu (Head of Counter Terrorism Policing UK) has stated that it is his desire that every officer across the UK becomes a CT officer. The CT Network (some 8000+ in strength) can not tackle terrorism within the UK alone, it will take every officer thinking and considering whether what they are facing is potentially terrorist activity, terrorist planning or someone on the path of radicalisation. By acting together we can defeat terrorism – think Action Counters Terrorism (ACT campaign)

A link to the website re ACT is here <https://act.campaign.gov.uk/>

Manchester Arena - May 2017

Mass Casualties
Mass Witnesses
Country Wide Response
Person Borne IED




Hundreds of casualties to deal with immediately
14,200 in attendance at the concert, all of whom are witnesses in some manner or other
Greater Manchester Police requested assisted from neighbouring forces, then nationwide to respond to the investigation.

Statistics:

17,678 exhibits seized in the investigation of which 847 were used at the trial of Hesham Abedi
20,996 documents of which 1021 statements were used at the trial of Hesham Abedi
1,274,800 finger print comparisons have been made
+1500 days worth of CCTV reviewed
721 digital exhibits seized (laptops, mobile phones, storage devices)
15TB worth of data

London Bridge, June 2017



- Mass Casualties
- Mass Witnesses
- Potential unexploded devices
- 'petrol bombs' found in the vehicle
- Other attacks nearby – related/unrelated



London Bridge 21.58hrs on 3rd June 2017. Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouanne, Youssef Zaghba together in a hired Renault van drove over London Bridge deliberately driving at and over people before crashing the van. Then on foot walked towards and through Borough Market stabbing people indiscriminately.

All three were confronted by armed police officers. They were shot dead.

8 fatalities, dozens injured including four unarmed police officers who had confronted the attackers.

Mass casualties across a wide area i.e., the bridge, Borough Market and streets nearby.

A chaotic scene with people fleeing the scene, many witnesses left the area and were unable to be traced. One individual was apparently spared by Rachid Redouanne, this individual has never been traced and therefore we do not know what the interaction was between the attacker and potential victim.

All three attackers wore items which were intended to look like suicide vests, the responding officers would not know if these were in fact real or fake, therefore a full EOD process had to be carried out by the military and police EOD officers to render them safe.

Glass wine bottles, filled with fuel with rags stuffed into them were found inside the rear of the van used by the attackers, these were never used and had been discarded by them. Should they have chosen to use the petrol bombs in the attack, the effects could have been even more devastating than they were.

At 23.45hrs that same evening a stabbing took place at Vauxhall Station, it was not known whether this was connected and was this to be a pattern of other attackers? It turned out to be unrelated and was dealt with separately, however the police command had to keep an open mind of further enduring threats or even copycat attacks that might follow, triggered by this attack.

London Bridge, June 2017



The images clearly depict first responders arriving at the scene.

The attackers having driven over people on the bridge, then walked and ran through Borough Market (a very busy part of that area of London having bars, shops and stalls open till late at night with people visiting the market enjoying the summer evening), stabbing and slashing at the people with ceramic and kitchen knives which they had taped to their hands.

Each attacker wore a fake suicide vest. It is unknown what the intention was in having these fake suicide vests, it might have been to cause greater fear and panic, or it might have been to encourage the police to back off, or even to shoot thereby created a 'suicide by cop' situation.

The bottom right pictures show the armed police having dealt with the attackers, on the body of this attacker can be seen the fake suicide vests worn by them.

What did we learn?

Who is on the front line?

Who are the targets?

Mass Witness Triage

Working together as one network, one service

Every Officer is a CT Officer

Run, Hide, Tell

See, Tell, Act (unarmed police advice)



QTS:

Q. What did we learn?

Q. What is Run Hide, Tell?

Q. What is See, Tell, Act?

Who is on the frontline? Response officers/first responders have been shown to be the intended targets of terrorist attacks or will be the first people onto the scene following an attack.

Much has been learnt re the handling of mass witness triage, the obtaining of initial accounts particularly from those witnesses thought to be tier 1 witnesses (significant witnesses)

The introduction of the Major Incident Police reporting platform MIPP, (see here for a link to that site <https://mipp.police.uk/>) has changed the manner in which the public can report into the police. Should a major incident be declared forces will open up a new 'tile' on the MIPP and will encourage the public to report into that site.

Officers attending the incident and dealing with the public will also make use of the MIPP by downloading a document known as the Investigative Triage Form (ITF) or by completing the ITF online as part of the MIPP.

Once recorded the data being received can be analysed immediately and officers directed to the

witnesses providing the most relevant information/evidence.

There have been many examples of close cooperation of police forces in the response to terrorist attacks in recent years, the successful response is one which is coordinated, targeted to achieve our common goals of – preservation of life, protection of property and the bringing of offenders to justice. Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, charges us all to become CT officers, i.e. to have Counter Terrorism in mind when dealing with seemingly non CT incidents

Run, Hide, Tell – this is a campaign which was delivered by the UK government following the London Bridge attack and is intended to inform the public what to do should they find themselves in a marauding attack situation. More info can be seen here

<https://www.npcc.police.uk/StaySafeAssets/FINAL%20MPS168715%20Run%20Tell%20Hide%20A5%20Lft%20Blk%20Eng%20v3.pdf>

See, Tell, Act (unarmed police advice) – West Midlands Police March 2020.

See

Maintain observations of the overall incident from a position of cover

Seek opportunities to re-locate in order to maintain and develop observations and situational awareness

Work in pairs where possible to maintain a 360 degree awareness of the developing incident

Identify other opportunities for observation such as localised CCTV control rooms or CCTV cameras

Tell

Inform and communicate with the Force Control Centre and update them with your observations

Speak to the public who have evacuated an area in order to gain information on the last sighting and direction of travel of subjects, and share this with Force Control Centre

Act

Identify potential escape routes and utilise cover to enable an immediate evacuation of the observation points if required

Give positive directions to the public to leave the area and prevent disorientated or unaware members of the public inadvertently accessing the areas of threat

Identify safe access routes and a rendezvous point for armed officers in order to give a 'face to face' situational awareness briefing prior to their deployment forward

Support the developing emergency service response within the Warm and Cold Zones



CRITICAL
An attack is expected imminently

SEVERE
An attack is highly likely

SUBSTANTIAL
An attack is a strong possibility

MODERATE
An attack is possible but not likely

LOW
An attack is unlikely

Threat Levels

- What would they mean to you and your daily routine?
- Take 10 mins to consider the various threat levels and the likely response by your organisation to them.




Group Activity 4

Trainer to split the class into groups and ask them what does each level mean to them? And what does it mean to their daily routine. Students then to report back.

Students will be divided into groups where they will discuss what the 5 threat levels mean and what it means to them.

They will then discuss their findings in open forum in class.

*****Trainer to check what the threat level is at the actual time of the delivery of this lesson and what that means to public, policing, and other security structures. *****

The UK threat level is produced by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. JTAC analyses and assesses all intelligence relating to international terrorism, at home and overseas. It sets threat levels and issues warnings of threats and other terrorist-related subjects for customers from a wide range of government departments and agencies, as well as producing more in-depth reports on trends, terrorist networks and capabilities.

JTAC brings together counter-terrorist expertise from the police, and government departments and agencies so information is analysed and processed on a shared basis.

The five threat levels and the meanings –

Critical (an attack is expected imminently)

Severe (an attack is highly likely)

Substantial (an attack is a strong possibility)

Moderate (an attack is possible but not likely)

Low (an attack is unlikely)

The threat level has only been raised to the highest level of ‘Critical’ once in the recent past – post the Manchester bombing in 2017. this was reduced to Severe within a couple of weeks.

QTS: (Split Students into groups to report back)

What do the threat levels mean to you and your daily routine?

Take 10 mins to consider the various threat levels and the likely response by your organisation to them.

Critical - An attack is expected imminently.

The response is classed as exceptional and therefore - ‘Maximum protective security measures to meet specific threats and to minimise vulnerability and risk. Critical may also be used if a nuclear attack is expected’

Expect to see armed police and military guarding the UK strategic and tactically important infrastructure, government buildings, police stations, electrical power stations etc, also increased patrols in vulnerable areas, increased military presence to support policing, potential restriction on movement.

Severe - An attack is highly likely

& Substantial - An attack is a strong possibility.

The response is classed as Heightened and therefore – ‘Additional and sustainable protective security measures reflecting the broad nature of the threat combined with specific business and geographical vulnerabilities and judgements on acceptable risk’

Expect to see an increased police and security presence at UK strategic locations, more visible police patrols.

Moderate - An attack is possible, but not likely

& Low - An attack is unlikely.

Routine protective security measures appropriate to the business concerned.

Expect, usual operating procedures, restriction on access to certain locations or access via security checks. Business as usual routines.



Prifysgol Cymru
Y Drindod Dewi Sant
University of Wales
Trinity Saint David



COUNTER TERRORISM POLICING

Intelligence Front Line

Importance of Local Policing
in gathering intelligence
that can combat terrorism

QTS:

Q. What are the main 5 Policing purposes? (Answers on next slide)

A. Protecting Life and Limb, Preserving Order, Preventing the commission of offences, Brining offenders to justice, Any duty or responsibility arising from common or statue law.

Policing Purpose - Recap

The Police collect information that is required for policing purposes. Policing purposes provide the legal basis for the collection, recording, evaluation, sharing and retention of information and may include one, or a combination, of the following;

Protecting Life and
Property

Preserving Order

Preventing the
Commission of
Offences

Bringing Offenders
to Justice

Any Duty or
Responsibility arising
from Common or
Statute law



Policing Purpose – Recap if required

The police collect information that is required for policing purposes. Policing purposes provide the legal basis for the collection, recording, evaluation, sharing and retention of information and may include one, or a combination, of the following:

Protecting life and property

Preserving order

Preventing the commission of offences

Bringing offenders to justice


Any duty or responsibility arising from common or statute law.

Information Collection

Information can be collected in one or a combination of three ways;

Think of an example for each method!

We need families, friends, colleagues and communities to recognise early intervention is not ruining someone's life but saving it, and potentially that of others, too."
MetPol Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu



Information is collected in one of three ways:

QTS.

Q. What are these three ways?

A. Routine, Tasked, Volunteered

Q. Name some data sources that we use in the collection of information?

A.

Routine collection

A by-product of general duties. ACT Campaign – Officers need to be more alert to other threats and risk outside their normal remit.

Tasked information

Is the prioritised collection of information, for example, information concerned with problems and subjects (suspect or victim) identified in the Intelligence Requirement.

Tasked information may be accessed from many sources including:

internal and external databases

CCTV systems

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS)

automatic number plate recognition systems

Volunteered information.

Possibly via crime stoppers, CHIS or a general meeting with a member of the public.


“We need families, friends, colleagues and communities to recognise early intervention is not ruining someone’s life but saving it, and potentially that of others, too.” **MetPol Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu**

How approachable are you?

Good co-operation with the community and other Policing agencies is important.

Intelligence Cycle – A Recap

The collection, development and dissemination of intelligence allow decisions to be made about priorities and tactical options;



The Intelligence Cycle – Recap if required

Text: The collection, development and dissemination of intelligence allow decisions to be made about priorities and tactical options;

Trainer Note: The collection, development and dissemination of intelligence allow decisions to be made about priorities and tactical options. Intelligence collection is a continuous process and there may be specific requirements for its recording and use.

Click to reveal:

DIRECTION
COLLECTION
PROCESS
DISSEMINATION

Click to reveal speech bubbles x 4

Publish the Intelligence Product

The Intel Cycle – Intel Requirements

Intelligence Requirements (IRs) and collection can be focused on a variety of data sources;



QTS: What data sources can you think of?

Click to reveal the list:

Intelligence Requirements (IRs) can be focused on a variety of data sources, including;

- Community Intelligence.
- Open Source.
- Communications data.
- HUMINT (CHIS).
- Financial Intelligence.
- PREVENT/CHANNEL.
- Operational Coverage.

Notes: A collection plan could be built (Spreadsheet) to hold the Intelligence Requirements (IRs) and the sources identified to answer them assigned the task.

Front Line Policing – Intel Issues

“Community support is essential if the danger is to be reduced. Communities defeat terrorism, and public information and action, including being vigilant, saves lives,”

MetPol Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu



Potential Issues:

Developing and understanding the intelligence picture around emerging threats, Subjects of Interest (SOIs), managed location or Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) can be exposed to challenges such as;

- Limited CT awareness not identifying CT relevant information.
- Remoteness (Solo Working) likely to reduce Officer Briefing opportunities.
- Lack of suitable briefing material to aid the collection and reporting effort.

“Community support is essential if the danger is to be reduced. Communities defeat terrorism, and public information and action, including being vigilant, saves lives,” MetPol Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu


- Lack of clear direction can make the Intelligence cycle less effective.
- Silo working likely to increase duplication of effort and missed opportunities to corroborate information.

- A more 'joined up' approach required with clear direction and common Priority Intelligence Requirements identified and agreed.

MetPol Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu said the scale of the challenge meant that officers needed the public's help to stop future attacks. 5 Feb 20

Recognising CT Policing Relevance

Recognising issues relevant to CT Policing could be the difference between an atrocity occurring here in the UK or a young person being steered away from radicalisation through early intervention.



Report Suspicious Activity

The Current ACT Campaign aims to raise the CT awareness issue with everyone



Every Police Officer and Staff member is encouraged to be alert to the threat and risk posed by potential acts of Terrorism..

<https://act.campaign.gov.uk/>

Prevention is better than the cure!!

Recognising CT Policing Relevance

- Within Force, Specific Intel Units are collectively responsible for ensuring the Force has access to intelligence assessments and support for specific activities, especially where there is high threat, risk and harm.
- Forces have specific Intelligence Liaison Officers (ILOs) that are geographically based and there to assist with intelligence gathering.
- The Intelligence Management System (IMS) is where you submit Information. It is then assessed and graded by Intelligence staff to help identify threat and risk.



The purpose of the IMS (Intelligence Management System) is to receive and store information, to inform patrol strategies, hotspots, offending behaviour, criminal links and associations, it informs an intelligence picture, ensuring that your NPU provides a safe and effectively patrolled environment for its communities

As well as informing current and potential future situations IMS provides an intelligence storage area that is easily interrogated and capable of retrieval at any given point

Information that you submit goes into a IMS queue to be reviewed. **(C7 – CTU)**. It is then assessed and graded by Intelligence. On occasion (as in the case of an ongoing operation) this assessment is done by a dedicated intelligence professional.


Not all intelligence is developed at this stage, and the decision to develop immediately is based on whether there is anything time critical, high risk, or the opportunity to intervene. Other intelligence is researched at a later time, and sometimes is used to corroborate other intelligence sources.

Information/Intel of CT or **National Security** relevance could be channelled via IMS on the C7 Queue or potentially via the Force Confidential Unit.

Furtherance of a Legitimate Aim - National Security

Legitimate aims that may be pursued by CTP when interfering with an individual's Article 8 rights include action:

- a) for the prevention of disorder or crime;
- b) in the interests of **National Security**;
- d) in the interests of the economic well-being of the country;
- e) for the protection of health or morals; or
- f) for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.



The following policy outline relating to national security as a legitimate aim is provided on a non-exhaustive basis. Where practitioners consider that they may be acting to safeguard national security but in a way that falls outside of the description, they should seek specific legal advice.

Whilst threats to national security evolve and develop over time, its key tenets can be more readily identified. In the context of safeguarding national security, as a legitimate aim being pursued by CTP through the use of NSIM, this includes acting to promote and protect:

The UK system of government – including protecting it from espionage, terrorism, sabotage, hostile activity by foreign states and activities intended to overthrow or undermine the system of parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.

People, their rights and freedoms – including taking such steps as are necessary for the protection of life and property, upholding human rights and the prevention, detection and prosecution of criminal activity as well as countering those who, through their actions, pose a risk to the UK and its way of life.


Economic wellbeing – including action to protect the economy and economic activity from threats such as espionage and hostile state activity as well as ensuring the effectiveness of the markets, industries and supply chains on which the UK depends.

Infrastructure and assets – including the protection and exploitation of both physical and non-physical assets and information as well as facilitating the defence and security of the UK and its critical national infrastructure.

International co-operation, defence and security capabilities – including the mutual sharing of information and working with partners and allies. This includes occasions where unilateral action or wider reciprocal co-operation between the UK and others is capable of promoting the UK's law enforcement, defence, foreign policy and/or security objectives.

CTP Intel Flow

A report that may come into the Fixed Intelligence Management Unit (FIMU) could have originated from **YOU!**



QTS.

Q. How do you think CT-Policing use information and intelligence you gather?

A report that may come into the Fixed Intelligence Management Unit (FIMU) could have originated from any Officer.

That report would have been created on receipt of information volunteered by a member of the public or other source. A report was created using IMS and received by Force Intel. On checking relevance and threat and risk, the content was deemed to be of interest to CT Policing and so was transferred to the CT Queue for the attention of the CTP FIMU. The Force Confidential Unit might also play a part in ensuring material of CTP and National Security concern reaches the Counter Terrorism Unit.



Group Activity 5 - Board Blast


Students to come up to the board and write what actions they would take when they first respond to a CT incident.

Students to write on board actions they would take when responding to a CT incident. Actions will be varied but will be based on normal investigations such as:

Golden Hour, METHANE, Cordons, Safe distances, First Aid, SEE – TELL – ACT

Trainer to debrief by using next slide, putting images on the board and discussing each one. The last Image it must be pointed out this is for Public advise only and Officers must: See | Tell | Act.

Actions of First Responders



Click 1 – GOLDEN HOUR

It can not be underestimated how important the actions of our first responders are at all incidents. There is a principal of 'the Golden Hour' when investigating Serious Crime including Terrorism.

Actions taken early in an investigation have the potential to be extremely beneficial to an investigation. Likewise things that are missed or not followed through have the potential to be detrimental.

Click 2 – METHANE – RECAP

Major Incident

Exact Location

Type of Incident

Hazards

Access

Number, type, severity of casualties

Emergency Services required

Click 3 – CORDONS

On arrival at an incident it might be considered necessary to put into place a cordon, these can be for a variety of reasons:

- Scene preservation

- Preservation of evidence

- Public safety

Ensure privacy (i.e. casualties)
Consider powers and necessity.

For the purposes of a terrorist investigation a cordon may be placed and authorised... See the below Sections from the **Terrorism Act 2000**

Section 33 Cordoned areas | Section 34 Power to designate | Section 35 Duration | Section 36 Police powers

Click 4 – Distances

For suspicious items the distances that must be left surrounding the item are a minimum of:

- Small rucksack or briefcase 100 metres
- Small vehicle 200 metres
- Van or HGV 400 metres

Click 5 – Run, Hide Tell

This is for civilians only..... Police must See, Tell, Act.... See next slide

See, Tell, Act

See

- Maintain observations of the overall incident from a position of cover
- Seek opportunities to relocate in order to maintain and develop observations and situational awareness
- Work in pairs where possible to maintain a 360 degree awareness of the developing incident
- Identify other opportunities for observation such as localised CCTV control rooms or CCTV cameras

Tell

- Inform and communicate with the Force Control Centre and update them with your observations
- Speak to the public who have evacuated an area in order to gain information on the last sighting and direction of travel of subjects, and share this with Force Control Centre

Act

- Identify potential escape routes and utilise cover to enable an immediate evacuation of the observation points if required
- Give positive directions to the public to leave the area and prevent disorientated or unaware members of the public inadvertently accessing the areas of threat
- Identify safe access routes and a rendezvous point for armed officers in order to give a 'face to face' situational awareness briefing prior to their deployment forward
- Support the developing emergency service response within the Warm and Cold Zones



Trainer to put the words SEE | TELL | ACT on the screen and put it to the class what does each word mean. Using slide to debrief.

See

- Maintain observations of the overall incident from a position of cover
- Seek opportunities to re-locate in order to maintain and develop observations and situational awareness
- Work in pairs where possible to maintain a 360 degree awareness of the developing incident
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Activity

The class to consider arriving at the scene of a reported marauding attack in a shopping centre, they can hear gun fire and people screaming inside the shopping centre. People are fleeing and running at them. Take 10 mins to consider how to apply the See, Tell, Act principles in such circumstances.

Notes

Zones –

Hot = the area of the hostile activity. Armed and suitable trained officers may work in this area

Warm = the area immediately adjacent to that hostile activity and where suitable protected and trained officers may work

Cold = the area outside of the warm zone which is relatively safe in the given circumstances.

NOTE – the zone may change rapidly from cold to warm to hot dependant on the hostile activity taking place

Personal Safety & Maintaining Vigilance



Trainer to start this section with no other information other than the students need to watch the following film.

<https://youtu.be/PaKUg3lc5K0>

Trainer to play film and then invite comment from students.

This will set the tone for the session. Students will identify that they make both themselves and the organisation vulnerable to either criminal (including terrorist group members) or foreign State security agencies either from deliberate actions or from poor security measures.

Operational Security

- Access to buildings
 - Check tailgaters
 - Check ID passes
- Use your own log on, do not allow others to share
- Careful use of telephones – do you know who you are calling?
- Use the call back procedure before giving out information
- MOBILE PHONES not used for operational activity
- Who's listening to your Airwave terminal?




Group Activity 6

Students to be put into groups and to discuss how they would operate in a secure environment. Create a list of the important things they have considered then report back.

Students in their groups to discuss and create lists of how they would operate in a safe environment. Students will then have to be prepared to show their lists and discuss / defend them in open forum.

Fact or Fiction?

A CHIS (Covert Human Intelligence Source) notebook is lost?




This is true. Full details are withheld to protect individuals and the organisation. The notebook was lost in Manchester and the consequences were relocation of Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS), protection of witnesses, additional security to the potential cost to the organisation of £4 million.

The individual involved raised the alarm immediately and through his honesty, measures were put in place to protect those involved.

Fact or Fiction?

Top Secret Documents left on a Train?




Again this one is true.

A "serious" security breach was reported after a civil servant lost top-secret documents containing the latest intelligence on al-Qaeda. The Cabinet Office employee breached strict security rules when he left the papers on the seat of a train.

A fellow passenger spotted the envelope containing the files and gave it to the BBC, who handed them to the police. The official was later suspended from his job, the Cabinet Office announced.

However, compared to the previous example, this individual failed to report this loss.

The purpose of these examples is to make students aware that mistakes do happen but in the counter terrorist environment these can have serious national security consequences. Emphasise for students to 'own up' if they are ever in this situation.



Mistakes
can
happen to
senior
officers
too!



Ask students if they are familiar with the image?

On 8 April 2009, when Assistant Commissioner Bob Quick arrived at a briefing at 10 Downing Street he inadvertently exposed a document marked Secret, this was a briefing document re "Operation Pathway" this was seen by photographers and which compromised the counter-terrorist operation which the document concerned. This forced the police in the North West of England to strike sooner than planned, making twelve arrests within hours. He resigned the following day.

The above images are from the internet and clearly show the contents of the document Mr Quick was carrying. This mistake very publically cost him his job.

Consequences for the Organisation

- Potential threat to employees or public
- Threat to operation
- Reduction in capability
- Integrity of unit
- Loss of professional standing



QTS:

Q. What are the consequences for our organisation from the previous examples?

A. Potential threat to employees or public | Threat to operation | Reduction in capability
Integrity of unit | Loss of professional standing

All the bullet points speak for themselves.

Consequences for you?


- Formal investigation
- Chief Constable briefed
- Head of Professional Standards Department consults Independent Office for Police Conduct re: supervised enquiry
- CPS engagement
- Personal impact
- Vetting removed
- A term of Imprisonment!



Q. What are the potential consequences for you if you were one of the officers in the previous examples?

A. Formal investigation | PSD consults IOPC | CPS engagement | Personal impact | Vetting removed | Imprisonment

Personal Security



QTS.

Q. Do you think social media is misused by police officers and staff deliberately or inadvertently

Trainer to discuss the three articles.

Article 1 – August 2014

Hundreds of police officers have been investigated for breaching social media guidelines, research has revealed.

Freedom of Information requests by the Press Association found officers made racist comments online and asked crime victims to become Facebook friends

Article 2 – September 2016

Dozens of police officers and staff have been investigated for misusing social media.

Avon and Somerset Police revealed 58 of its staff had been reported over the past four years, with one of them being sacked and six others resigning or retiring.

The allegations made against officers included 'inappropriate contact, undermining public confidence in the police, homophobic comments and derogatory comments'.

'Inappropriate' videos or pictures were also posted.

Article 3 – March 2017

Six Northern Ireland police officers have been disciplined for making "unprofessional" and "inappropriate" comments on social media in the last three years.

One officer was found to have posted homophobic comments about a colleague on Facebook,

while another shared details of a threat briefing.

Trainer could also use the examples of famous people/celebrities who have posted comments on social media platforms and have then had to issue retractions/apologies due to the nature of the item posted – some have been adjudged to be insensitive, offensive, racist, incorrect etc

Social Media



The volume of data available held on the internet on individuals is staggering. Even those of us who try to be 'secure'. But how secure is your information?

Trainer to ensure that those present read their respective force policy on the use of Social media.

Facebook – 2.37billion accounts (info as at February 2020)

Cyber malware attacks:

2015 8.19billion

2016 7.87billion

2017 8.62billion

2018 10.52billion

300% increase in cyber attacks since 2015 (Feb 2020)

Social Media



I need a coffee



Why am I drinking coffee?



I had a coffee



Watch me drinking coffee



This is where I
have coffee



Look at how good I am at
drinking coffee!



This slide will emphasise some of the social media sites **routinely** being used and how individuals share their daily lives with their network of friends. For many social media users these regular daily updates are the norm and sometimes the sharing of operational information is completed inadvertently. e.g. Bored at a crime scene cordon and clicking on 'location' setting before posting.

Legal firms and Insurance companies are expanding their intelligence departments using techniques like this to build profiles on individuals who put in fraudulent claims or claims they are concerned about. For those who wish to exploit you they could adopt the same principles. By entering very basic simple search engines like Pipl you can trace details of people. Pipl works by searching against email addresses, names and usernames, and from these searches you can find things like facebook pages linked to an individual and other sites.

Encourage students to try this next time they are on media device. Just type in 'Pipl' into google and then enter their name or email address etc.

EMPHASISE for all students with social media accounts to look at how much information is attached to their profiles, what pictures they are posting and ensure the security features within any of the applications are set at the appropriate level.

What makes you a target?

- Fixated or deliberate targeting of officers/staff
- Part Uniform– how do you travel to work
- Where is your car parked, would it identify you?
- Social media, friends, photos, comments
- Daily routine
- The Whole picture
- ‘Gimme Three Rings’.



Group Activity 7

Trainer to put students into groups and ask them to consider what makes them easily identifiable as a Police Officer? What makes them a target? Then report back.

Students in groups to discuss what makes them easily identifiable as a Police Officer, what makes them a target. Report back their thoughts via pictures they can project onto the screen.

- Fixated or deliberate targeting of officers/staff – **operations have existed where patrolling police officers are the actual target for attack**
- Part Uniform – **how do you travel to work – what identifies you – CHECK LOCAL POLICY, emphasise problems occur due to complacency i.e. people adhere for a few weeks then let the standard drop off.**
- Where is your car parked, would it identify you? – **what is your car reg number, some officers like to have ‘999’**
- Social media, friends, photos, comments – **what have you posted on your social media, pictures of work, comments on what sort of day you’re having, your location etc? do you tag people in photos, thus creating links across accounts making easier for hackers to gain even more information about you/your friends?**
- Daily routine – **do you always travel the same route to work, the same train/bus, do you always park in the same place?**
- The Whole picture – **take a step back and look at yourself from a terrorists point of view, from your online presence, your routine, your vehicle or your dress, what would they be able to learn about you.**

- **'Gimme Three Rings' - have you shared your phone number with the team/team leader, can they get hold of you if they need to? – when necessary agree a protocol of calling a friend when you have safely arrived at a location – consider the use of a codeword**



Closure

Ensure that the students are okay as this was an emotive subject.

Recap of the objectives and aim from start of the lesson and ask if any questions.

Aim:

To provide students a broad understanding of Counter terrorism and their place in front line policing to combat terrorism and protect our communities.

Objectives:

At the end of this lesson, students should be able to:

1. **State** key counter terrorism terminology/concepts
2. **Identify** key legislation relevant to counter-terrorism policing
3. **Understand** the function of key counter-terrorism operations that impact on front-line policing
4. **Explain** the role of front-line local policing in gathering intelligence that can combat terrorism
5. **Describe** the role of front-line policing in identifying vulnerabilities in a counter-terrorism context and taking appropriate action for safeguarding
6. **Identify** appropriate actions to maintain vigilance & personal safety

NB. Knowledge Check – Counter Terrorism Year 1, V1 to be used to consolidate learning

Confirm again with students if everyone is ok and advise if students need to talk to speak to trainer after class.

Before allowing students to leave trainer to ask each student the following question.

QTS:

Q. What will you take away with you from this lesson?