

Theories of Fate among Present-day Astrologers

Bernadette Brady

Master of Arts, Culture Astronomy and Astrology
Bath Spa University College, 2005

Submitted in partial fulfilment for the award of PhD

Conducted under the auspices of
University of Wales Trinity Saint David

School of Archaeology, History and Anthropology

12 December, 2011

Director of Studies – Dr Nicholas Campion
Second supervisor – Prof. David Cockburn



Candidate's Surname / Family Name: **Brady**

Candidate's Forenames: **Bernadette**

Student Number: **29001462**

Candidate for the Degree of: **PhD**

Full title of thesis: **Theories of Fate among Present-day Astrologers**

Abstract:

The accepted view of the secondary 'outsider' literature on present-day astrology tends to argue that astrology's appeal is based on its determinism and the individual's surrender of personal responsibility to a larger external force. In contradiction to this is the primary, 'insider' literature which propounds the theory that astrology's appeal is based on its advocacy of personal responsibility, even if within a broader deterministic framework. This thesis examines this dichotomy through an investigation into the beliefs held by astrologers regarding the order that astrology is assumed to impose on their lives.

The thesis establishes different classical theories of fate, from the early Greek literature of Homer through to the fate discussed by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. These theories of fate consist of a collection of beliefs concerning the nature, source, and purpose of fate, and its role in human life. However, these theories of fate have, since the seventeenth century and the development of scientific rationalisation, been marginalised and the notion of fate itself has been replaced with the doctrine of universal determinism. This replacement of fate with determinism has resulted in a subsequent shift in philosophical debates, which having rejected fate are now focused on arguments

concerning the influence of determinism on free will. The thesis also considers the modern arguments of René Descartes, Baruch de Spinoza, David Hume and Arthur Schopenhauer in their views on determinism, and then uses these views combined with the classical concepts of fate to investigate the nature of the 'determinism' adopted by astrologers. The field work reveals that, almost unanimously, astrologers have rejected determinism, and indicates that part of the appeal of astrology is that it provides a vehicle for the individual to adopt a life-style choice that embraces different versions of classical theories of fate and which encourages reflective knowledge of the self and personal responsibility.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introducing the Research Project.....	1
What is determinism?.....	3
Dualism and monism: two approaches to the question of free will	6
What are theories of fate?	8
What is astrology?	9
The horoscope – the astrologer’s map	13
The horoscope’s features and construction	14
The horoscope as a medieval symbolic map.....	15
How astrologers read horoscopes	19
Astrology and its association with fate or determinism	21
The astrologer’s taboo.....	26
Astrologers and fate	27
Definitions of terms used in this thesis	28
Other studies of astrology in contemporary society.....	30
Current investigations into beliefs about determinism and free will	34
Broader implications of this project.....	36
Reflexive considerations	37
The design of the research project	39
The target group	41
Primary data sources and analysis.....	43
Overview of the chapters	43
Chapter summary	46
 Chapter 2 Theories of Fate and Cosmic order	 47
Introduction	47
Fate.....	48
Plato and the divine cosmos.....	53
Plato’s dualist theory of fate	56
Plotinus, astrology and Plato’s theory of fate	60
Calcidius and the idea of human agency.....	64

Aristotle: issues of causality and <i>telos</i>	68
The Stoics: a monist theory of fate	73
Fatalism – a discussion	79
A sympathetic cosmos.....	80
Saint Augustine: providence and theological fatalism.....	81
Saint Thomas Aquinas	84
Chapter summary	87
Chapter 3 Modern approaches to the free will dilemma.....	89
Introduction	89
René Descartes —free will as true	90
Baruch de Spinoza — the chains that bind us.....	93
David Hume — Freedom as our illusion	100
Arthur Schopenhauer — an irrational world with free will as illusion.....	105
Moral responsibility —other contemporary compatibilists' arguments	110
Questioning the nature of determinism	111
Challenging determinism's universality	111
Emergentism, self-organising systems.....	113
Teleology as a causal agent.....	114
Challenging antecedent linear causality	117
Chapter summary	118
Chapter 4 Astrological Literature Review Part 1, Dualism.....	121
Introduction	122
The dualist arguments	122
Alan Leo – the union of Theosophy with astrology.....	123
Dane Rudhyar – the union of emergentism with astrology.....	128
Sepharial and McWhirter – Cartesian dualism	134
Linda Goodman – the popular voice of astrology.....	139
Summary of the dualist astrologers.....	141
Chapter 5 Astrological Literature Review Part 2, Monism	143
Introduction	143
Claudius Ptolemy – comminglings and Stoic sympathies	144

Reinhold Ebertin – a twentieth century reformer of astrology	149
C.C. Zain – adding agency to Ptolemy's sympathetic cosmos	151
Edward Johndro – astrology as science	153
Time and place as carriers of fate	154
Horary astrology – the fate of the 'right' time	157
Jim Lewis - the fate of place	159
Chapter summary	161
Chapter 6 Astrological Literature Review Part 3, Monism	164
Introduction	164
Charles E.O. Carter – voicing the free will dilemma in astrology	164
Margaret Hone – Plotinus' 'compatibilist' solution to living with fate	166
Liz Greene — establishing Carl Jung's psychology in astrology	170
Michael Meyer – humanistic astrology, a return to Aristotle' <i>telos</i>	174
Chapter summary	176
Chapter 7 Surveying the Astrological Community.....	178
Introduction	178
The survey's design process.....	179
Strategy to encourage response to the survey	180
Survey distribution and target group.....	181
Sample size.....	183
Strength and weakness of the survey	184
Ethical considerations: anonymity of participants	184
The questions	185
Attributes.....	185
Investigating the consistency of the belief	187
Astrological vignettes.....	188
Belief in natural hard incompatibilism reduces with increase of emotional content	190
Astrologers and Adorno's authoritarianism	193
Belief in fate and/or determinism as true over time	194
Prediction and <i>kairos</i> time	196

Evidence of living in a sympathetic cosmos, the participatory life-style	199
Fate as pattern and telos	201
Secular or non-secular astrology	204
Do astrologers consider astrology as a spiritual subject?.....	204
Overview of belief in astrology's association with the divine	205
Source and purpose of fate	207
Most supported source of fate and purpose of astrology	209
Dualism as the central theme to the theory of fate	210
Monist theories of fate	210
Examining for evidence of a belief in the inevitability of the horoscope - natural hard incompatibilism.....	211
Saint Augustine or Science	212
Summary of the survey	212
Chapter 8 The notes from the astrological practitioners	215
Method of collecting the material	215
Anthropological considerations	216
Reflections of theories of fate	218
Homer's necessity	218
Astrologers and 'fate as an illusion'	220
Stoicism and Spinozian thought — fate and acceptance	222
Time — cycles and <i>kairos</i> time	224
Plato — natural libertarianism	227
Suggestions of Calcidius' theory of fate	228
The self seen through a Spinozian lens of detachment, the horoscope.....	229
Living as an astrologer in a sympathetic cosmos.....	232
The astrologer's taboo.....	236
Astrology and culture.....	238
Chapter summary	241
Chapter 9 The interviews with professional astrologers	243
Methodology	243
Ethical considerations	244
The interviewees	244

Fate as the order of the world.....	246
Fate and the soul.....	250
Fate, soul and the horoscope	255
Fate, time and the horoscope.....	259
Fate and reason.....	262
Fate and the astrologer's clients	264
Living with fate	266
Summary of the Interviews	274
Chapter 10 Conclusion	277
An overview of the research findings	279
Fate and Determinism	279
Astrology's fatalism – <i>kairos</i> time.....	280
Astrologers and moral responsibility	281
Astrologers and modern theories of fate	283
The features of a theory of fate	283
Cicero's assumption and Aquinas' solution.....	288
The horoscope and detachment.....	289
Astrology as neither secular nor non-secular	289
Astrology and the notion of a diverse community	290
Final thoughts.....	291
Appendices.....	293
Appendix 1 – Survey.....	294
The Questionnaire	294
Example of report sent to each participant.....	301
Data Entry	306
Survey results.....	307
Investigating the consistency of the belief in fate.	307
The authors considered to be most influential on the respondent's astrology	307
Example: The column labelled 2.5.....	308
A note on Adorno's authoritarian issues	309
Belief in fate as true over time	310

Beliefs about time	311
Belief that astrology is an expression of a divine cosmos	312
Fate and God/gods	312
The astrologer's personal matrix.....	313
Appendix 2 - The Interviews	315
The interviewees	315
Brian Clark.....	315
Faye Cossar	315
Darby Costello	315
Barbara Dunn	315
Dr Ben Dykes.....	316
Carolyn Egan.....	316
Demetra George	316
Roy Gillet.....	316
Dr Dorian Greenbaum.....	317
Dr Liz Greene.....	317
Karen Hamaker-Zondag.....	317
Robert Hand	317
Gillian Helfgott	318
Stephanie Johnson.....	318
Claire Martin	318
Alan Oken	318
Melanie Reinhardt.....	319
Christeen Skinner	319
Rod Suskin	319
Sue Tompkins	319
Sue Ward.....	320
Interview Release Form	321
Bibliography	322

Chapter 1

Introducing the Research Project

The aim of this research project is to investigate beliefs concerning determinism and/or fate within the contemporary astrological community. In order to discuss the nature of this research project, the relationship between the modern notion of determinism and the classical concept of fate need to be first addressed.

Susanne Bobzien points out that in the classical period the term fate was used to name a set of shifting beliefs regarding a perceived pressure or limiting force on human action.¹ She argues that although up until the third century C.E. fate was 'often the centre of a discussion... in virtually every sect or school' now, however, it is perceived as a 'fossilized view, or receives a mere nominal mention as the representative of universal causal determinism.'² Carl Hoefer argues that, since the seventeenth century, the notion of fate within philosophy has been abandoned as it is considered to be associated with mystical or religious concepts and not part of the philosophical discourse proper.³ Robert Solomon states that, 'Until recently, the concepts of fate and fatalism were both very widely accepted and taken quite seriously. Today, both concepts tend to be the target of widespread philosophical disdain.'⁴

This shift referred to by Bobzien, Hoefer and Solomon occurred, according to Richard Olson, with the rise of mechanical philosophy, defined as the acceptance that the

¹ Susanne Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1998] 2005), p.6.

² Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*: p.5.

³ Carl Hoefer, "Causal Determinism," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2010), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/determinism-causal/>. 18 June 2011.

⁴ Robert Solomon, "On Fate and Fatalism," *Philosophy East and West* Vol. 53, no. 4 (2003): p.435.

mechanical laws of physics governed all matter, including life, and thus human beings.⁵ Although not concerned with the notions of fate, Stephen Hawking talks of this dominance of the laws of physics, which has led to them dictating the very meaning of the term 'determinism' in both philosophy and science, thus making it synonymous with universal scientific determinism.⁶

This abandonment of the notion of fate together with the hegemony of the laws of physics has led to a lack of clarity. As Bobzien points out, in reference to the Stoic view on fate, a 'very different ontological framework lurks'.⁷ A failure to acknowledge this different ontological framework can lead to lack of distinction between the concept of fate on the one hand, and the determinism of the laws of physics on the other. Later in this chapter these distinctions will be discussed. However, an example of the lack of appreciation of the possible nature of fate and its different ontological framework is evident in the branch of contemporary philosophy known as experimental philosophy. This is a recent branch of philosophy and, to quote the Yale University Experimental Philosophy (*X-Phi*) Lab website, which collects and represents a wide selection of papers in this field, its focus is to research:

...the fundamental cognitive processes underlying people's intuition about matters of traditional philosophical concern. So the lab's research is concerned with the sorts of questions that have been traditionally associated with philosophy (morality, freewill etc.) but it approaches these questions using the sorts of methods characteristic of contemporary cognitive science (experimental studies, statistical analysis etc.).⁸

Using the methods of experimental philosophy, Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe conducted research into people's beliefs around matters to do with determinism and found that, 'Again and again, these investigations have challenged familiar assumptions, showing that people do not actually think about these issues in anything like the way philosophers

⁵ Richard Olson, *Science Deified and Science Defied* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp.33-36.

⁶ Stephen Hawking, "Does God Play Dice?," <http://www.hawking.org.uk/lectures/dice.html>. ; Hoefer, "Causal Determinism".

⁷ Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*: p.1.

⁸ "Experimental Philosophy Lab," Yale University, <http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jk762/lab/Lab.html>. 1 June 2011.

had assumed.⁹ These assumptions were that an individual would be consistent in their beliefs, for if a philosopher adopted an argument on free will and determinism then, according to Nichols and Knobe, they maintained that argument in all circumstances. However, their research found that non-philosophers did not display this same consistency. The findings of Nichols and Knobe suggest that views on determinism may not be the best description of people's natural beliefs. They may instead be intuitive notions of fate rather than an intellectual philosophical position on determinism.

This research project seeks to find what present-day astrologers think about issues to do with determinism and/or fate in their lives. It will consider whether these beliefs are based in determinism as defined within contemporary philosophy, or as suggested by the findings of Nichols and Knobe, whether they have a relationship to other ideas. Additionally it will investigate the 'natural' set of philosophies about determinism and/or fate in a manner similar to David Hume's concept of 'natural religion' whereby he sought to establish empirically the beliefs held concerning the nature of God.¹⁰

My investigation will therefore address three points:

- i. It will look for the presence of determinism and/or fate within the beliefs of present-day astrologers.
- ii. It can provide insight into astrology's role in western society by understanding the nature of the belief in fate or use of determinism within the subject.
- iii. It will address the question of whether the assumptions of many of astrology's critics, who associate a belief in a fated heaven with an acceptance of determinism reflected in the heavens, are correct.

What is determinism?

William James (1842–1910) offered a definition of determinism in 1896 as follows:

It professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb: the part we call the present is compatible with only one

⁹ Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, *Experimental Philosophy*, (Oxford, London, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.3.

¹⁰ David Hume, *Dialogues on Natural Religion* ed. Ed. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), Part X.

totality. Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible.¹¹

James defined determinism as based in causation and the laws of physics — demonstrated in the equation, $f \text{ (force)} = m \text{ (mass)} \times a \text{ (acceleration)}$ — and accepted it as universal in that it is considered valid for all organic and inorganic matter.¹² James then defined the philosophical position which adopted this style of determinism, as 'hard determinism'. This is now replaced by the term 'hard incompatibilism' which, as Derk Pereboom states, carries the meaning that determinism is true and, continuing his argument, suggests that its presence in human actions denies the existence of free will.¹³ The paradox concerning the existence of free will in the presence of the universal nature of determinism is contained in a comment by R.J. Lucas who in 1970 wrote:

...determinism is based on there being physical laws of nature, ... together with the claim that all other features of the world are dependent on physical factors. Given a complete description of the world at any one time, we can calculate its complete physical description at any other time, and then given the complete physical description at that other time we can calculate also what all its other, non-physical, features must be. Hence on the basis of the physical factors at one time, which because they are physical exclude all personal factors, we can, at one remove, calculate what a person's future actions must, infallibly, be. And so again we have a threat to freedom.¹⁴

Debates within philosophy on how to maintain the existence of free will or whether one can justify it in the presence of determinism are defined as the free will problem or debate.¹⁵ Robert Kane points out that in the last thirty to forty years this debate has attracted a rebirth of interest in philosophy relating to:

issues about (1) moral agency and responsibility, dignity, desert, accountability and blameworthiness in ethics, (2) nature and limits to human freedom, autonomy, coercion, and control in social and political theory; issues about (3) compulsion, addiction, self-control, self-deception and weakness of will in philosophical

¹¹ William James, *The Will to Believe. Essays in Popular Philosophy* (London, New York: Longmans, Green and co, 1912), p.150.

¹² Nancy Cartwright, *The dappled world: a study of the boundaries of science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.3 and pp.43-46.

¹³ Derk Pereboom, "Hard Incompatibilism," in *Four Views on Free Will* ed. John Martin Fischer (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p.85.

¹⁴ J.R Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), p.66.

¹⁵ Robert Kane, *A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.2.

psychology; (4) criminal liability, responsibility, and punishment in legal theory; (5) the relations of the mind to body, consciousness, the nature of action and personhood in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive and neurosciences; (6) the nature of rationality and rational choice in philosophy and social theory; (7) questions about divine foreknowledge, predestination, evil, and human freedom in theology and philosophy of religion; and (8) general metaphysical issues about necessity and possibility, determinism, time and chance, quantum reality, laws of nature, causation, and explanation in philosophy and the sciences.¹⁶

Given the scope of these issues, philosophical acceptance of hard incompatibilism is only one position on the subject. James also defined the counterpoint to determinism as indeterminism: 'Indeterminism, on the contrary, says that the parts have a certain amount of loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does not necessarily determine what the others shall be.'¹⁷ In contemporary philosophy James' concept of indeterminism would now be located within 'incompatibilism'. Incompatibilism is the view that determinism and free will are mutually exclusive concepts. If one accepts the incompatibilist argument as well as the truth of free will, one is then denying the existence of determinism; or, if one accepts the truth of determinism, then one denies the existence of free will.¹⁸ Kane comments that the form of incompatibility which accepts the truth of free will is now defined as 'libertarianism'.¹⁹ Thus within the incompatibilist argument one can either follow Pereboom's position and preclude free will — a form of hard incompatibilism — or take up Kane's position to exclude determinism — libertarianism. In contrast to these two incompatibilist positions are those arguments which support 'compatibilism', where free will is seen to exist alongside determinism. John Fischer writes of compatibilism that, 'One of the main virtues of compatibilism [is] that our deepest and most basic views about our agency — our freedom and moral responsibility — are not held hostage to views in physics'.²⁰ David Hodgson argues, however, that the views of physics cannot be lightly put to one side as 'The only alternative to compatibilism, if sense is to be made of free will, would be to postulate that the laws of physics do not have universal application and that human free will can cause things to happen contrary to those

¹⁶ Robert Kane, *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.3-4.

¹⁷ James, *The Will to Believe. Essays in Popular Philosophy*: p.150.

¹⁸ John Martin Fischer et al., *Four Views on Free Will* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p.3.

¹⁹ Robert Kane, *The Significance of Free Will* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.9.

²⁰ John Martin Fischer, "Compatibilism," in *Four Views on Free Will*, ed. John Martin Fischer (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p.81.

laws.'²¹ Thus compatibilism requires the holder to somehow locate free will within the confines of determinism or to change the nature of determinism, which would open the way to styles of libertarianism.

These terms of hard incompatibilism, libertarianism and compatibilism will be used throughout the thesis. However, when used to talk about fate, they will be distinguished from their normal philosophical use by the Humean rider of 'natural'. Thus an astrologer who accepts fate within their astrology rather than determinism may be described as a natural hard incompatibilist, or a natural libertarian or a natural compatibilist.

Dualism and monism: two approaches to the question of free will

The free will debates are, as Kane noted earlier, also contained by the mind-body debates within philosophy. These debates fall into two themes, those of 'dualism' or 'monism'. Howard Robinson states, 'In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical — or mind and body or mind and brain — are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing.'²² W.D. Hart comments that, central to the debate around dualism and monism is:

... the question how the mind is attached to the body. The materialist answer is that because the mind is the body, ... each person's mind is necessarily embodied. In contrast, the dualist answer, as its name suggests, is that each person's mind is at least not identical with his body, so these are two different things.²³

Hart continues his discussion on dualism by citing the thinking of René Descartes (1596-1650) as an example of a dualist philosopher and uses Descartes to expand his definition by stating that 'the dualist means that he (his mind, the person or self he is) could exist even if his body did not'.²⁴ Descartes wrote:

²¹ David Hodgson, "Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will " in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.86.

²² Howard Robinson, "Dualism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 2011(2007), <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/>. 15 April 2011.

²³ W.D Hart, "Dualism," in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p.265.

²⁴ Hart, "Dualism," p.265.

I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that "I," that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is.²⁵

In short, this form of dualism 'is a claim that you could be disembodied.'²⁶

There are other forms of dualism, notably Plato's dualism, which will be discussed in chapter 2. The monist argument however is summarised by Samuel Guttenplan who defines it thus:

Monism is the view that there is only one kind of substance underlying all objects, changes and processes. It is generally used in contrast to dualism though one can also think of it as denying what might be called "pluralism" a view often associated with Aristotle which claims that there are a number of substances.²⁷

However, Jonathon Schaffer points out that, 'There are many monisms. What they have in common is that they attribute oneness. Where they differ is in what they attribute oneness to (*the target*), and how they count (*the unit*).'²⁸ Timothy O'Connor revealed these variations between substance and property in dualism and monism when he argued that:

It may be enough, though, that one supposes that agent causal power [free will] and its allied properties are ontologically emergent, while still being powers and properties of the biological organism. That is, one might embrace a strong form of property dualism, consistent with substance monism.²⁹

Independent of these philosophical variations on dualism and monism, within the free will-determinism question Robert Kane argues that libertarianism, the belief that the causal chain begins with the action of the individual who is 'the prime mover unmoved', can only exist in a dualist schema as within the monist position one is always subject to

²⁵ René Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, trans. John Veitch (New York: Cosimo Inc, [1924] 2008), Part IV, p.31.

²⁶ Hart, "Dualism," p.265.

²⁷ Samuel Guttenplan, "Monism," in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p.122.

²⁸ Jonathan Schaffer, "Monism," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall Edition)*(2008), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/monism/>. 12 January 2011.

²⁹ Timothy O'Connor, "Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent Causal Theories," in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.342.

coercions, even if these are only of genetics and culture.³⁰ Daniel Dennett dismisses dualism by stating, 'Dualism, the idea that minds (unlike brains) are composed of stuff that is exempt from the laws of physical nature, is a desperate vision which richly deserves its current disfavour.'³¹ J. R. Lucas also uses this form of argument to distinguish between different solutions to the free will–determinism problem. He argues against the commonly accepted dualism — seeing one's free choices made outside the laws of physics — by pointing out the consequences of this belief and he writes, '... we believe that as free agents we can introduce an arbitrary disturbance into the universe and thus destroy any pre-arranged harmony.'³²

These categories of dualism and monism can also be applied to the attitudes held by astrologers towards their horoscopes and their relationship to fate or determinism in their lives. This will be a theme developed later in this chapter.

What are theories of fate?

An acceptance of fate will also be embedded in other personal beliefs that support the expression of fate in the person's life. Bobzien addressed this by labelling such belief systems as theories of fate.³³ Fate as a belief system is evident in Sophie Botros' comments about the role of fate, which she defines as fatalism, in the life of the early Stoic:

Moreover, these passages suggest that the Stoic's fatalism was an expression of his feeling of powerlessness as he contemplated the immensity of this Whole of which he was only a minute part - a feeling nevertheless mitigated by the identification of his personal ends with those of the Whole.³⁴

Later in chapter 2 I will distinguish 'fate' from 'fatalism'. However, Botros sees fate for the Stoic as providing a personal meaning and a reason for life. Bobzien points out that the early Stoics only had the concept of personal fate and lacked a notion of universal

³⁰ Kane, *A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will* p.47.

³¹ Daniel C. Dennett, *Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), p.28.

³² Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will*: p.63.

³³ Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*: p.5.

³⁴ Sophie Botros, "Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy," *Phronesis* 30, no. 3 (1985): p.280.

determinism.³⁵ Michael Frede adds that, for the individual, a theory of fate, no matter how incomplete or contradictory, was required to address the location and influence of the individual's free will.³⁶ A theory of fate, could consists of personal beliefs about the source/s, if any, of limitations upon one, the nature and purpose of these limitations (or the lack of them) and the level of freedom one had in the face of these limitations.

Looking for the presence of any such personal theories of fate held by astrologers or in contrast the acceptance of the idea of the inevitability of a horoscope — the acceptance of determinism — is the focus of the literature reviews, survey and interviews.

Chapter 2 discusses classical thinking on fate. However, there are a few contemporary definitions of the term. Solomon argues that fate has an 'otherness' to it. He suggests that, 'Fate provides something by way of "hands" in which we can place ourselves whether or not we have confidence in their goodness.'³⁷ Sarah Broadie writes that the experience of fate is as '...an agency concerning which all we know is that it has a certain purpose... and is clever and foreknowing and powerful enough to carry out this intention no matter what.'³⁸ In this regard the modern use of the term fate tends to describe the encountering of a pattern which appears to have no causal agent and exists in a future which is being 'aimed for' regardless of our actions.³⁹ For the sake of clarity, therefore, in this thesis the term 'fate' will be employed when the user is suggesting a semi-compelling or a compelling force in their life which has intent or purpose. The term 'determinism' will be employed when the user refers to a non-personal compelling inevitable force. There are other terms that will also require clarity and these will be discussed later in this chapter.

What is astrology?

Definitions of astrology vary considerably, depending on the personal views of their authors. Many definitions contain assumptions that astrology seeks to be one of the

³⁵ Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*: p.55.

³⁶ Michael Frede, *A Free Will - Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), pp.176-177.

³⁷ Solomon, "On Fate and Fatalism," p.442; For a similar argument also see Botros, "Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy," p.279.

³⁸ Sarah Broadie, "From Necessity to Fate: A Fallacy?," *The Journal of Ethics* 5, no. 1 (2001): p.28.

³⁹ Broadie, "From Necessity to Fate: A Fallacy?," p.27.

sciences. Philippa Waring's definition captures this concept when she states: 'Astrology and fortune telling overlap the fields of superstition . . . What began with a natural veneration for the heavenly bodies primitive man saw above him, today has become a flourishing science [astronomy] — but the basic belief that their movements can affect people's lives remains unchanged.'⁴⁰ So, while she defines astrology as a natural veneration of the heavens, which belongs to the primitive and hence superstitious chapter of the human story, she acknowledges the historical union of astrology and astronomy but considers this has been dismissed by science. Similarly a definition of astrology in *Philips' Astronomy Dictionary* actually defines astrology in the context of science, stating that astrology is: 'A pseudo-science professing to assess people's personality traits and to predict events in their lives and future trends in general from aspects of the heavens, in particular the positions of the planets. Astrology is based on ideas which are scientifically unsound and which the great majority of rational people dismiss.'⁴¹ Martin Ince, in the *Dictionary of Astronomy*, follows this line of thinking and defines astrology as:

The ancient but still popular superstition for attempting to predict the future from celestial portents. Mocked by most (but not all) modern scientists, astrology separated from respectable astronomy in the 17th century as knowledge of the solar system grew, weakening the argument that the positions of the planets could affect our fortunes. Astrology is apparently immune to extinction despite scientific advance and the spread of education.⁴²

Ince's definition, like Waring's and that of the *Philips' Astronomy Dictionary*, seek to understand astrology by likening it with science and consequently considers astrology's robustness in popular culture as attributable to the failure of science to educate people.

Morris Jastrow, in *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* of 1910, took a different approach. He defined astrology as, ' . . . the ancient art or science of divining the fate and future of human beings from indications given by the positions of the stars (sun, moon and planets)'.⁴³

⁴⁰ Philippa Waring, *The Dictionary of Omens and Superstitions* (London Treasure Press, 1978), p.20.

⁴¹ John Woodroff, Neil Bone, and Storm Dunlop, *Philips' Astronomy Dictionary* (London George Philip Ltd, 1995), p.20.

⁴² Martin Ince, *Dictionary of Astronomy* (Teddington, Middlesex: Peter Collins Publishing, 1997), p.12.

⁴³ Morris Jastrow, "Astrology," in *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), p.795.

Jastrow's definition accepted that astrology may not be a science and acknowledged the role of fate within the subject, although he did not attempt to define the word fate. Also moving away from any association with science is David Pingree's pragmatic definition of astrology as, '...the study of the impact of the celestial bodies — Moon, Sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, the fixed stars and sometimes the lunar nodes — upon the sublunar world.'⁴⁴ Although Pingree's definition did not link astrology to science, his use of the word 'impact' to describe the believed association between the celestial bodies and humanity invokes the language of science and determinism. Other scholars define astrology in the classical period as a form of divination. David Potter remarked that, 'Pride of place among the various forms of inductive divination available in the Roman world must go to astrology.'⁴⁵ Sarah Johnston also linked astrology to divination but she grouped it with lecanomancy and haruspicy — scrying and interpreting animal entrails — for the reason that they were all practices that 'work by methods that are empirically unverifiable.'⁴⁶ However, a definition of astrology as divination or a pseudo-science imposes restrictions upon any investigation of fate and/or determinism within astrology, the latter requiring that astrology contains determinism while the former imposes the need for a non-secular astrology based on the workings of the gods.

In turning to definitions from astrologers, Claudius Ptolemy (c.90–c.168), the first century Greek reformer of astrology, clarified the distinction between what are now defined as astronomy and astrology when he wrote:

The studies preliminary to the astronomical prognostication, O Syrus! are two: the one, first alike in order and in power, leads to the knowledge of the figurations of the Sun, the Moon, and the stars; and of their relative aspects to each other, and to the earth: the other takes into consideration the changes which their aspects create, by means of their natural properties, in objects under their influence.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ David Pingree, "Astrology," in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, ed. Philip P Weiner (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p.118.

⁴⁵ David Potter, *Prophets and Emperors: Human and Divine Authority from Augustus to Theodosius* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p.17.

⁴⁶ Sarah Iles Johnston and Peter T Struck, eds., *Mantikê: Studies in Ancient Divination* (Leiden: Brill 2005), p.7.

⁴⁷ Claudius Ptolemy, *The Tetrabiblos*, trans. Ashmand. J. M. (Mokelumne Hill, USA: Health Research, 1969), Book I.I.

For Ptolemy, astrology and astronomy were two stages of a single practice. While for the English astrologer William Lilly (1602–1681) defined astrology as a divine force. He wrote of, '... this heavenly knowledge of the Stars, wherein the great and admirable works of the invisible and all-glorious God are so manifestly apparent'.⁴⁸ For Lilly astrology was a gift from God.

In the twentieth century, definitions of astrology are just as diverse. The US astrologer and software developer Robert Hand sees astrology as a system of knowledge and defines it as follows:

Dane Rudhyar called astrology the algebra of life but I suggest it's much more like a taxonomy of life than an algebra. A taxonomy is a classification system. It classifies animals as reptiles or mammals, or humans as Aries or Taurus. If we could actually convert astrology into a symbolic algebra, into an algebra of quality, we would really have made a major advance in thought.⁴⁹

Hand, with his background in computing, defines astrology in a similar way to Ptolemy in that he sees it as an expression of the natural world, using a zoological metaphor, and suggesting it is an algebra of quality. In contrast to Hand is the definition of Michael Mayer who, in the book based on his PhD thesis on psychology and personality, wrote of astrology as, 'One of the most intricate metaphoric/symbolic systems ever developed to speak of human personality ... Here a language exists which transforms aspects of the universe into symbols to speak of personality.'⁵⁰ For Mayer, astrology is the language of the psyche while, for Hand, it is an algebra that can bring greater understanding of a world that is already perceived.

A different approach comes with defining astrology as magic. Lawrence Jerome defines astrology in this way and links its late twentieth century popularity to what he describes as

⁴⁸ William Lilly, *Christian Astrology*, 3rd ed. (London: Regulus Publishing, [1647] 1985), From 'To the Student of Astrology' p.B.

⁴⁹ Robert Hand, "The Proper Relationship of Astrology and Science," *Astrological Journal* 31, no. 6 (1989): p.316.

⁵⁰ Michael Mayer, *The Mystery of Personal Identity* (San Diego, USA: ACS Publications, 1984), p.44.

a general rise of interest in occultism.⁵¹ George Hansen also associates astrology with non-scientific discourses and sees it as belonging to the paranormal, arguing that, while non-rational discourses are marginalised, they are nevertheless still present within society.⁵²

The differing definitions of astrology varying from a form of science, a divine order, a style of algebra, the language of the psyche, divination or magic can lead to confusion. Consequently when astrology is discussed, whether in a sceptical, esoteric or ethnographic light, or by those who describe themselves as astrologers, one needs to pay close attention to what a given individual thinks astrology actually is. Patrick Curry, a UK academic, embraced this diversity of understanding in his recent definition of astrology within a wholly cultural framework. He defines astrology as '... the practice of relating the heavenly bodies to lives and events on earth, and the tradition that has thus been generated.'⁵³

The Horoscope – the astrologer's map

In the face of the diversity of definitions of astrology, there are, however, two recurring themes within the practice of astrology. One of these themes is the prime subject of my research, that of the perceived link between the order of the nature of celestial mechanics and the fate or determinism within life. The second theme is that the astrologer will use a map, a horoscope, to provide them with a unique view of the individual in time and space. Indeed it is this map, based on the Newtonian mechanics of the solar system, which is for astrologers the actual instrument of fate or determinism. For as the astrologer accepts his or her natal horoscope, so they also accept, in some way, the mechanical and mathematical rigour of the order it places into their lives.

⁵¹ Lawrence E. Jerome, "Astrology and Modern Science: A Critical Analysis," *Leonardo* 6, no. 2 (1973): p.121.

⁵² George P. Hansen, "Rationalization, Secularization, and the Paranormal: on the "Elimination" of Magic from the World," in *Academy of Spirituality and Paranormal Studies, Inc. Annual Conference* (Kutztown University, Pennsylvania. June 3-6 2010), pp.117-119.

⁵³ Patrick Curry, "Astrology," in *The Encyclopaedia of Historians and Historical Writing 2 Vols*, ed. Kelly Boyd (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1999), Vol 1 p.55.

The horoscope's features and construction

A natal horoscope is constructed for the place and time of an individual's birth in order to create a map of the orientation of the planets and zodiac to the local horizon. The zodiac used is generally not associated with the actual physical constellations but instead is mathematically derived. For example, one of the major zodiacs used is known as the tropical zodiac and is based on twelve equal divisions of the band of the ecliptic (the sun's apparent path through the sky) starting from the point on the equator of the location of the sun at the spring equinox (usually 21st March).⁵⁴ The planets are located in the map by their position in this mathematical zodiac at the time of the person's birth. In this way the horoscope displays both the mathematical zodiac and the planets' orientation to the individual who is located in the centre of the map with the eastern horizon aligned on the left (see *figure 1*). Additional notation is generally added, such as the planets' angular relationships to each other, known as aspects. The 360⁰ of space around the individual is also divided into twelve sections which are known as the houses. Each of these houses represent an area of the individual's life and are numbered 1 to 12 commencing from below the eastern horizon and moving in an anti-clockwise direction.⁵⁵

Since the horoscope is constructed for an exact time and location, and reflects the resulting complexities of planets, aspects and houses, any given horoscope is generally held to be unique for an individual. In this way the horoscope provides the astrologer with a distinctive map which establishes that person's originality in the world.

⁵⁴ Fred Gettings, *Dictionary of Astrology* (London, UK Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), pp.107,294,341.

⁵⁵ Margaret E. Hone, *The Modern Text-Book of Astrology*, 5th ed. (London: L N Fowler & Co. Ltd, [1951] 1973), pp. 99-143.




Figure 1- The astrologer's horoscope. This is a circular horoscope using a tropical zodiac and is constructed for 1st January 2000 for New York, New York, at noon and thus the sun (☉) is at the culminating position above and to the south of the individual. As with the astrolabe, the individual is located standing on the horizon line in the centre of the horoscope. East is to the left of the individual and in this northern hemisphere horoscope south is at the top of the map.

The horoscope as a medieval symbolic map

Francesca Rochberg notes that the first horoscopes came from Mesopotamia and they were list maps, a text-based description of the sky, with the earliest known being dated from 410 B.C.E.⁵⁶ Johannes Thomann points out that the tradition of the horoscope as a written list perpetuated well into the Hellenistic period.⁵⁷ He suggests, however, that the horoscope as a diagram or representation in a map format rather than text remained scarce in the West until Arabic influences reached the west in the twelfth century. His argument is that the horoscope as a drawn diagram, which was originally square rather than circular, was of Chinese origin and moved into the Islamic world and hence to the West via the trade routes

⁵⁶ Francesca Rochberg, *Babylonian Horoscopes* (Philadelphia, USA: American Philosophical Society 1998), p.3.

⁵⁷ J Thomann, "Square horoscope diagrams in Middle Eastern astrology and Chinese cosmological diagrams: were these designs transmitted through the Silk Road?," in *The journey of maps and images on the silk road*, ed. P; Kaplony A Leiden Forêt (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p.98.

of the Silk Road.⁵⁸ Robert Hand commented that the horoscope drifted into its circular format by the seventeenth century, as evidenced in the work of William Lilly, cited earlier in this chapter, but was firmly established in the nineteenth century by the English astrologer Zadkiel, the pseudonym of Richard James Morrison (1795–1874).⁵⁹ Nevertheless once the horoscope as a map or diagram was established by the twelfth century within the astrological tradition, whether it was represented as a square diagram or in its later nineteenth-century circular version, it has maintained its central position within the practice of astrology.

Throughout its long history the horoscope has sustained the same sky orientation as the astrolabe, the scientific instrument 'which has been in the hands of scholars since antiquity'.⁶⁰ As Sara Schechner Genuth comments seldom were astronomers pictured without an astrolabe, making it a 'badge of the profession'.⁶¹ The astrolabe placed the user visually at its centre, facing south with east on their left. This is a rational orientation for the northern hemisphere: if one's place of location is north of 23° of northern latitude, the ecliptic is located to the south of the observer, so this orientation where east is to one's left allows for the culminating planets, in the south, to be shown high on the astrolabe. The heavens are thus seen to move from left (east) to right (west) in the movement that is now defined as clockwise motion.

This similarity of orientation between the astrologer's horoscope and the astrolabe was probably due to their close association, for the astrolabe, a time-finder, was used to construct horoscopes, a time-marker.⁶² Additionally, the link between the horoscope viewed as a map and the astrolabe, used to help plot the sky, was strengthened by fact that

⁵⁸ Thomann, "Square horoscope diagrams in Middle Eastern astrology and Chinese cosmological diagrams: were these designs transmitted through the Silk Road?," pp.107-113.

⁵⁹ Robert Hand in reply to my question at his lecture at the 'Astrologies' conference, Bath, UK, 24–25 July 2010.

⁶⁰ Roderick S. Webster, Marjorie Webster, and Sara Schechner Genuth, *Western astrolabes* (Chicago, Ill. ; [Great Britain]: Adler Planetarium & Astronomy Museum, 1998), p.2.

⁶¹ Webster, Webster, and Schechner Genuth, *Western astrolabes*: p.2.

⁶² Silke Ackermann, "The Astrological Scales on the National Maritime Museum Astrolabes," in *Astrolabes at Greenwich*, ed. Kristen Lippincott (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 2005), p.73.

both were introduced into Europe at the same time.⁶³ Such close rapport between the instrument for examining at the sky and the horoscope suggested a view of the horoscope as a simplified map of the heavens and therefore open to be read with the same factual veracity of its kindred instrument, the astrolabe. This supposition has opened contemporary astrologers to accusations of ignorance as their horoscopes do not reflect the modern knowledge of the heliocentric solar system. Richard Dawkins made this assumption about the horoscope when he wrote in the *Independent on Sunday* on 31 December 1995:

My birthday (26 March) is listed in the papers as Aries but this is the sun sign which somebody with my birthday would have had when Ptolemy codified all that stuff. Because of the processional shift...my sun sign is in fact (if you can call it that) Pisces. If astrologers were doing something that had any connection with reality, this presumably ought to make a difference. Since they aren't, it doesn't...⁶⁴

Dawkins has assumed that astrologers are seeking perfection in modern celestial cartography. If this was the case then he would be justified in his accusation of ignorance. However, the notion that the veracity of a map should be measured by its factual representation is in fact an eighteenth-century construct. As Matthew Edney states, 'The later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries constitute a period of profound significance for modern Western cartography. From this period dates the widespread acceptance that cartography is an empirical, objective and unproblematic science concerned only with the presentation of geographic information.'⁶⁵ Gunner Broberg points out that in this way the idea of the map became the bedrock of science, a symbol of unchangeable and fixed truth, a rock on which to stand, that which was fixed and known about the world.⁶⁶ David Woodward comments that when nineteenth century scholars turned their attention to medieval maps they completely misunderstood these older maps. With their anachronistic approach they considered that the medieval knowledge of the world was simplistic as it

⁶³ Koenraad van Cleempoel, "Representations of Astrolabes in Western Art," in *Astrolabes at Greenwich*, ed. Kristen Lippincott (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 2005), p.99.

⁶⁴ Richard Dawkins, "The Real Romance in the Stars," *The Independent on Sunday*, 31 December 1995, p.2.

⁶⁵ Matthew Edney, "Mathematical Cosmography and the Social Ideology of British Cartography, 1780-1820," *Imago Mundi* 46 (1994): p.101.

⁶⁶ Gunnar Broberg, "The Broken Circle " in *The Quantifying spirit in the 18th century*, ed. J. L. Heilbron Tore Frängsmyr, Robin E. Rider (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), p.55.

appeared ill-informed, believing in a flat world and assuming that Jerusalem was located in the centre.⁶⁷

The horoscope is also a medieval map. Evidence of its minimal connection to celestial cartography can be found in the events of the late eighteenth — and early nineteenth — century when European astrologers began to cast horoscopes for southern hemisphere locations. By this time the astrolabe had been overtaken by the clock and had fallen into disuse, thus astrologers relied on sets of printed tables to orientate the zodiac around an individual. However, to create a horoscope for a birth in the southern hemisphere, a different methodology was required, for not only did the final result need to be reversed but the astrologer needed to add an extra twelve hours to the calculations in order to correctly use the tables.⁶⁸ Nevertheless even though astrologers made these adjustments to compensate for their southern latitudes, they ignored the inverted nature of the southern hemisphere sky — the sun moving in an anti-clockwise direction and culminating in the north. In spite of these obvious differences the astrologers continued to place east to the left of their horoscopes and the point of culmination of the planets (which was now north) above the head of the individual. Thus they ignored the conventions of the four compass points and the normal orientation of maps. This disregard for the actual sky challenges the very idea that the horoscope is intended to be a factual piece of celestial cartography and supports instead the idea that the astrologer was more concerned with representing in their horoscopes a symbolic relationship between the individual and the heavens.

The idea of a map as a symbolic diagram was, as previously cited, a feature of many medieval maps. A medieval map could be concerned as much with philosophy and theology as with geography, and represent all of these positions within a single diagram. Woodward argues that the *mappaemundi* of the medieval period were 'primarily to provide a visual narrative of Christian history cast in a geographical framework'.⁶⁹ In discussing the philosophy of map-making from the medieval period Evelyn Edson states '... world

⁶⁷ David Woodward, "Reality, Symbolism, Time and Space in Medieval World Maps," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* Vol. 75, no. No. 4 (1985): p.510.

⁶⁸ See Alan Leo, *Casting the Horoscope* (London: Modern Astrology, 1908), p.41.

⁶⁹ Woodward, "Reality, Symbolism, Time and Space in Medieval World Maps," p.519.

maps were philosophical rather than practical, providing a cosmic overview rather than information for some mundane journey.⁷⁰ She points out that these maps were a mixture of metaphor, history, spiritual realms, and physical places arranged in a manner to help the individual undertake a lifelong spiritual pilgrimage physically or mentally.⁷¹ Given that the basic components of the horoscope and its diagrammatic structure has not changed since it was first introduced into Europe in the twelfth century, and continues to maintain its apparent disregard for a true representation of the sky, it is logical to conclude that the horoscope has more in common with the spiritual and metaphorical themes to which Edson referred than the accuracy of contemporary cartography assumed by Dawkins. Indeed Patrick Curry argues for the idea of the horoscope as a symbolic map when discussing how astrologers read horoscopes, and comments that 'surely a horoscope is a symbolic map of someone's psyche a soul-map...'⁷²

How astrologers read horoscopes

An astrologer, as cited by Claudius Ptolemy in the first century, will read an individual's horoscope by analysing the combinations of planet, house, zodiac sign and aspects and endeavours to make the implications of these combinations relevant for the individual's life.⁷³ This aim has changed little since the time of Ptolemy. However, the nature of the information the astrologer pursues when reading a horoscope is subject to the astrologer's personal expectations of a horoscope, as well as their own views on fate, and/or determinism. Such information can include any of the following: information about past lives; their spiritual life and soul journey; their mundane daily life; psychological complexes; personality and/or character issues; or life-style choices and health.⁷⁴

Additionally astrologers may also use the horoscope to clarify knowledge of the future,

⁷⁰ Evelyn Edson and Emilie Savage-Smith, "An Astrologer's Map: a Relic of Late Antiquity," *Imago Mundi* 52(2000): p.21.

⁷¹ Evelyn Edson, *The World Map 1300 - 1492, the Persistence of Tradition and Transformation* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2007), pp.14-15.

⁷² Roy Willis and Patrick Curry, *Astrology Science and Culture, Pulling down the moon* (New York Berg, 2004), p.62.

⁷³ Ptolemy, *The Tetrabiblos*: p.6.

⁷⁴ See Nicholas Campion, "Prophecy, Cosmology and the New Age Movement. The Extent and Nature of Contemporary Belief in Astrology" (Bath Spa University College, 2004), p.12. Also see the appendix for the list of specialist areas within astrology represented by the astrologers interviewed as part of my field work.

using it to construct a personal calendar of future encounters with events or symbols. Based on the geometry of the horoscope the astrologer will apply mathematical techniques to either move the natal planets forward through time or to move the zodiac in its orientation to the individual, working with real time or with symbolic time.⁷⁵ This is one of the deterministic features of a horoscope and as such will eventually produce a fixed list of dates which the astrologer considers to be inevitable and non-negotiable. The astrologer's beliefs and attitude to this personal life calendar and their idea of time which emerges out of the mechanical but potentially symbolic horoscope are questions that will be explored in my research. Shoshanah Feher noted, however, that some astrologers will use the horoscope in this way while others do not consider that the horoscope can be used to foretell a future event.⁷⁶

An astrologer will read a horoscope with varying levels of skill based jointly in their knowledge of astrological technique and their ability to untangle the possible different themes implied by Curry's notion of 'soul-map' cited early. Darrelyn Gunzburg also makes this point when she states that for the astrologer 'reading a chart is more than reading each planetary algorithm as a reductionist exercise. It consists of seeing what the astrologers believe are the alternate possibilities contained within the horoscope.'⁷⁷ It is the need to find a pathway through these 'alternative possibilities' that has led some astrologers to believe that the act of reading a horoscope is a ritual act. In 2006 John Wadsworth conducted a study of astrologers who practiced in Glastonbury, UK, and he asked whether the act of reading a horoscope placed the astrologer into 'a liminal ritual space, which might allow for a "different perspective",' to be seen.⁷⁸ He points out that his results were unclear primarily due to the difficulties he encountered in attempting to define

⁷⁵ Martin Gansten, *Primary Directions, Astrology's Old Master Technique* (Bournemouth, UK: Wessex Astrologer, 2009), pp.1-2; Sepharial, *Directional Astrology* (London: William Rider & Son, Limited, [1915] 1921), pp.115-116.

⁷⁶ Shoshanah Feher, "Who Holds the Cards? Women and New Age Astrology," in *Perspectives on the New Age*, ed. James R Lewis and Gordon Melton (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p.180.

⁷⁷ Darrelyn Gunzburg, "How Do Astrologers Read Charts," in *Astrologies, Plurality and Diversity*, ed. Nicholas Campion and Liz Greene (University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter, UK: Sophia Centre Press, 2011), p.197.

⁷⁸ John Wadsworth, "The Astrological Ritual: A Phenomenological Study of Astrological Practice in Glastonbury," *Correlation* 24, no. 2 (2007): p.37.

what astrologers considered constituted was a ritual. However, he did find that all the astrologers engaged in a '*non-astrological*, [act] insofar as being beyond any consensual hermeneutic approach', and that this was described by different astrologers as intuition, participation with the 'muse of astrology', clairvoyance, or simply the feeling of 'connection' with something larger than the self.⁷⁹ Gunzburg, independently investigating a similar question, used a global collection of professional astrologers. She also discovered a 'non-astrological' act connected with reading a horoscope. However, Gunzburg equated this act not with ritual but with creativity. She drew comparisons between what astrologers experienced in reading a horoscope and those of an artist in the creative act. Gunzburg argues that astrologers undertook what G.A. Kelly labelled 'loose construing', the mental state which allowed the artist to withhold judgement while being flooded with options and possibilities which then slowly emerged into one particular theme or pattern.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, independent of whether astrologers conduct rituals or move into a state of loose construing when reading a horoscope, the findings of Wadsworth and later Gunzburg show that for contemporary astrologers the horoscope was not a factual map which produces one single option. Indeed what an astrologer seeks to read from a horoscope will, as already stated, depend on the different attributes they assign to a horoscope. These attributes tend to reflect the astrologer's thinking on the question of free will and fate and/or determinism and are discussed in the literature reviews of chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Astrology and its association with fate or determinism

One of the earliest written commentaries on astrology and fate was produced by the Roman philosopher and statesman, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 – 43 B.C.E.). He defined fate as, 'Now by Fate I mean ... an orderly succession of causes, wherein cause is linked to causes and each cause of itself produces an effect.'⁸¹ Cicero then expanded this definition to describe how fate operated in the ordered cosmos: 'Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable: it creates

⁷⁹ Wadsworth, "The Astrological Ritual: A Phenomenological Study of Astrological Practice in Glastonbury," p.50.

⁸⁰ Gunzburg, "How Do Astrologers Read Charts," p.186.

⁸¹ Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Divinatione*, trans. W.A. Falconer, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge Massachusetts, London England: Harvard University Press, 1923 Reprinted 2001), I lv.125.

nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order.'⁸² For Cicero, fate was similar to the modern concept of determinism as defined by James and Lucas, cited earlier in this chapter, that determinism is causally based with the future embedded into only one path. However, Cicero's definition of fate did not contain universality, as he believed that such a fate did not apply to humanity. He thus criticised astrologers for considering that this fate was a part of human life. He asked the following questions concerning the viability of predictions based on the stars:

On what law of nature do such prophecies depend? ... [if prophecies] are controlled by some natural and immutable law such as regulates the movements of the stars, pray, can we conceive of anything happening by accident, or chance? Surely nothing is so at variance with reason and stability as chance. Hence it seems to me that it is not in the power even of God himself to know what event is going to happen accidentally and by chance.⁸³

He then challenged the viability of astrology by stating, 'And, again, the fact that men who were born at the very same instant, are unlike in character, career, and in destiny, makes it very clear that the time of birth has nothing to do in determining man's course in life.'⁸⁴ Cicero was identifying the astrological belief that the natal horoscope, was an external image of the 'character' or self and that it revealed the life story of the individual. He then criticised astrologers pointing out that the horoscope, the image of his version of fate, could only produce one 'character' and one life story. For Cicero, linking fate, seen by him like an 'unwinding cable', to the horoscope could only produce an inevitable horoscope. The horoscope could only indicate one future path and one single 'character'. This is Cicero's assumption. In my research the term 'Cicero's assumption' and the notion of an 'inevitable horoscope' will be used interchangeably.

Four hundred years later, Saint Augustine (354 – 430) used a similar argument when he observed that the different lives of exact time-twins were sufficient to show the fallacy of

⁸² Cicero, *De Divinatione*: I lvi 127.

⁸³ Cicero, *De Divinatione*: II vii 18.

⁸⁴ Cicero, *De Divinatione*: II xlv 95.

astrology.⁸⁵ Tim Hegedus noted that this was the 'argument of different destinies' and he claims that it was a common feature of anti-astrology polemics of this period.⁸⁶ However, Theodore Otto Wedel and Lynn Thorndike both point out that the 'argument of different destinies' was recycled and reused for centuries.⁸⁷ Augustine also considered that astrology was an affront to God's ability to intervene in human lives, as well as tainting God with the potential evil-doings of the stars. Augustine's arguments on the demonic nature of astrology are invoked to this day when astrologers are warned by some Christians of the potential damnation of their souls.⁸⁸

Hegedus also points out another argument which was the 'argument of common destinies'.⁸⁹ This is the argument that two people may have the same events happen in their lives even though they have very different horoscopes. Such examples come from the evidence that many soldiers, all with different horoscopes, can die at the same time in a battle, or sailors drown at the same time with the sinking of their vessel. This 'common destinies' argument was put forward by the third century theologian Hippolytus (170 – 235) in *Refutation* and by Saint Gregory of Nyssa (c.335 – after 394) in his *Poemata Arcana*.⁹⁰ Both these arguments, of the 'different destinies' and of the 'common destinies', are grounded in the assumption that there can be only one possible life per horoscope —the inevitable horoscope argument. Whether these arguments were or were not a valid criticism of fourth century astrology is not pertinent to this thesis. What is relevant, however, is that these arguments, based on Cicero's definition of fate, have been maintained within the culture of the anti-astrology polemics from generation to generation up to the present day.

⁸⁵ St Augustine, *St. Augustine Confessions* trans. Pine-Coffin R.S. (London Penguin, 1961), pp.140.

⁸⁶ Tim Hegedus, *Early Christianity and Ancient Astrology* (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), p.43.

⁸⁷ Theodore Otto Wedel, *The Mediaeval Attitude Toward Astrology, Particularly in England* (Oxford University Press, 1920), p.6; Lynn Thorndike, *History of Magic and Experimental Science Part 1* (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1923), p.514.

⁸⁸ Nick Goggin, "Astrology, is it harmless fun or a gateway into the occult?," Watchmen Bible Study Group, <http://www.biblestudysite.com/astrol.htm#3>. 23 June 2011.

⁸⁹ Hegedus, *Early Christianity and Ancient Astrology*: pp. 85-87.

⁹⁰ See: Hippolytus, "The Refutation of All Heresies ", http://www.valentino-salvato.com/Astrology/pdf/The_Refutation_of_All_Heresies.pdf. 9 June 2011; C. Moreschini, ed. *St Gregory of Nazianzus, Poemata Arcana* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.22-23.

One contemporary example of these anti-astrology arguments was put forward by the German philosopher Theodore Adorno (1903–1969) who produced a polemic against astrology in the 1950s. Adorno was concerned with the acceptance of the philosophy of Nazism by the German population before and during WWII (1939–1945) and he developed a scale to measure what he defined as an authoritarian personality. Such a personality, he argued, fostered fascism. As he outlined it, this schema, later known as the 'F' scale, revealed low scorers as people who succumbed to authoritarians and high scorers as those who sought authoritarian status: for Adorno, the two components of the authoritarian syndrome.⁹¹ Through his research Adorno linked superstition, belief in astrology and marginalization to the potential for the emergence of fascism within the individual and thus within a culture.⁹² He continued this work into the early 1950s by conducting research using an astrological column written by Carroll Righter in the *Los Angeles Times*. He assessed this material over several years before extrapolating from it to conclude that astrological sun sign columns removed their readers' personal responsibility from their daily lives.⁹³ In his introduction to Adorno's work, Stephen Cook argues that, apart from the removal of free will, Adorno considered astrology was a promoter of authoritarian irrationalism within contemporary culture.⁹⁴ Adorno appeared to accept that astrologers and their followers lived by the dictates of the inevitable nature of their horoscopes for he wrote that a person who used astrology was '...somewhat relieved of his responsibility'⁹⁵ and thus moved into a state of believing that, '...he has to obey some highly systematized orders without, however, any manifest interconnection between the system and himself.'⁹⁶

For Adorno the astrological column was a form of brain washing, whereby its readers gradually accepted what Adorno considered must have been a contradiction between their

⁹¹ John Levi Martin, ""The Authoritarian Personality," 50 Years Later: What Lessons Are There for Political Psychology?," *Political Psychology* 22, no. 1 (2001): pp.2-3.

⁹² See: Theodor W. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York Harper & Brothers, 1950).

⁹³ Theodor Adorno, W, "The Stars Down to Earth: the Los Angeles Times Astrology Column," in *The stars down to earth and other essays on the irrational in culture*, ed. Stephen Crook (London: Routledge, 1994), p.38.

⁹⁴ Stephen Cook in the introduction of Adorno, "The Stars Down to Earth: the Los Angeles Times Astrology Column," pp.16-17.

⁹⁵ Adorno, "The Stars Down to Earth: the Los Angeles Times Astrology Column," p.54.

⁹⁶ Adorno, "The Stars Down to Earth: the Los Angeles Times Astrology Column," p.64.

own daily lives and that forecast in the column. Such acceptance, he argued, led eventually to the adoption of what he termed irrational authoritarianism.⁹⁷ Such behaviour scored low on the 'F' scale, indicating the person could slip into accepting fascism. Adorno's view of astrology was its intrinsic acceptance of determinism — Cicero's assumption — and implied for him that users of astrology had a compulsive neurosis to follow orders:

It is intrinsic to the astrological pattern itself: one believes he has to obey some highly systematized orders without, however, any manifest interconnection between the system and himself. In astrology as in compulsive neurosis, one has to keep very strictly to some rule command or advice without ever being able to say why. It is just this 'blindness' of obedience which seems to be fused with the overwhelming and frightening power of the command. In as much as the stars as viewed in astrology form an intricate system of do's and don'ts, this system seems to be the projection of a compulsive system itself.⁹⁸

Adorno's criticism of astrology was founded on two premises: the assumption of the inevitability of the horoscope as argued by Cicero; and his own personal attempt to understand the reasons for the acceptance of Nazism by Germans. From this blending, he defined astrologers or astrological consumers as marginalised individuals who suffered from an authoritarian personality disorder. Adorno's 'F' scale, as Ray argues, is now discredited.⁹⁹ Although Adorno's anti-astrology arguments, proposing a link between astrology and fascism, have faded, his claims that astrology is associated with issues of marginalization and maladjusted personality disorders based on the premise that its users accept the authoritarianism implications of the horoscope — the inevitable horoscope argument — still influence critics and researchers today. For example, in 1995 Richard Dawkins also focused on the idea that astrology supports the acceptance of an inevitable horoscope, and concluded that astrology necessarily removes personal responsibility. Echoing Adorno's themes, Dawkins suggested that consumers of astrology are marginalised people who are preyed upon by maladjusted individuals; he writes of people who use astrology, for example to look for a partner as:

⁹⁷ Adorno, "The Stars Down to Earth: the Los Angeles Times Astrology Column," pp.16-17.

⁹⁸ Adorno, "The Stars Down to Earth: the Los Angeles Times Astrology Column," p.64.

⁹⁹ See: John J. Ray, "Why the F Scale Predicts Racism: A Critical Review," *Political Psychology* 9, no. 4 (1988): pp.676 -677.

Lonely people, whose life might be transformed by a longed for compatible friendship, are deliberately encouraged, by their reading of astrological quacks in the newspapers, wantonly and pointlessly to throw away 11/12th of the available populations. This is not just silly, it is damaging, and the quacks concerned deserve our censure as strongly as their deluded victims deserve our pity.¹⁰⁰

Geoffrey Dean, Ivan Kelly and Arthur Mather agree with Dawkins; they also carry Adorno's arguments forward when they consider that people who use astrology have a psychological weakness in that they appear to give up the control of their lives.¹⁰¹

This anti-astrology literature raises the following questions:

- i. What is the actual nature of belief concerning human life and determinism and/or fate held by followers of astrology?
- ii. Does this belief of astrologers within present-day astrology really lead to the loss of free will, nihilism and lack of moral responsibility?
- iii. Is the notion of fate in astrology the same as determinism? And if so would this still deny moral responsibility?

The astrologer's taboo

In contradiction to the assumptions of Adorno and later Dawkins, who accept astrology as a life ruled by an inevitable fate, is the evidence of the codes of ethics of many astrological organisations. For this notion of fate in connection with astrology is actually an institutionalised taboo. Such a taboo can be seen in the Code of Ethics of ISAR, the International Society for Astrological Research, a major astrological organisation based in the USA. In section D.3. of their code of ethics, they state that members are not allowed to claim infallibility in prediction, and that independent of this restriction, members are also not allowed to make predictions, 'of calamitous events or other negative outcomes without balancing the interpretation with more positive possibilities.'¹⁰² Similarly in the UK, the APAI, Association of Professional Astrologers International in their opening statement of

¹⁰⁰ Dawkins, "The Real Romance in the Stars."

¹⁰¹ See Geoffrey Dean, Ivan Kelly, and Arthur Mather, "Astrology" in *The Encyclopaedia of the Paranormal*, ed. Gordon Stein (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996), pp. 47-99.

¹⁰² ISAR, "Code of Ethics," <http://www.isarastrology.com/home/92?task=view&start=5> 23 June 2009.

their code of ethics, state that their members must '... respect the dignity and worth of every human being and their right to self-determination.'¹⁰³ However, they do not define what they mean by 'self-determination'. Different organisations vary in their exact stand on the role of fate within astrology. Thus there is common agreement amongst the astrological community that believing that one can predict accurately from a horoscope, is seen as a blight upon the standing of astrology within larger society, and should not be tolerated.

Astrologers and fate

However, astrology is associated with fate. This fate is derived from an assumed link between the astrologer and the heavens and is represented for them in their natal horoscope. In the first century C.E., Claudius Ptolemy wrote:

In the next place, it must not be imagined that all things happen to mankind, as though every individual circumstance were ordained by divine decree and some indissoluble supernal cause; nor is it to be thought that all events are shown to proceed from one single inevitable fate, without being influenced by the interposition of any other agency.¹⁰⁴

Thus Ptolemy's fate was unlike Cicero's as it was not inevitable. Nine hundred years later, Rabbi Avraham ibn Ezra (1092 – 1167) spoke of fate existing in eight levels: the first level of fate comes from the nation in which one is born, then comes one's genetics, followed by a series of further levels such as family and the leader of the nation and, finally, 'The eighth way is [judged] from the influence of the soul and its power [which] is wisdom.'¹⁰⁵ Ibn Ezra pointed out that knowledge of a forthcoming event revealed by astrology could be used to avoid that event. For Ibn Ezra fate was negotiable, not inevitable.

In the seventeenth century William Lilly advised students of astrology to handle their knowledge of a person's fate with care, suggesting that they '... be humane, courteous, familiar to all, ease of access, afflict not the Miserable with terror of a harsh Judgment, in

¹⁰³ APAI, "Code of Ethics," <http://www.professionalastrologers.co.uk/ethics.htm> 30 January 2011.

¹⁰⁴ Ptolemy, *The Tetrabiblos*: Book I.III.

¹⁰⁵ Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra, *The Book of Nativities and Revolutions*, trans. Meira B. Epstein (ARHAT Publications, 2008), pp.1-3.

such cases, let them know their hard fate by degrees.'¹⁰⁶ In the twentieth century Reinhold Ebertin also acknowledged fate within astrology but considered it in a different light, writing: 'The stars are not dictators of human destiny, the stars are rather celestial signs showing possibilities and bounds, time and tendency, man himself is the controller of his fate.'¹⁰⁷ Thus he allocated to humanity a fate that embraced human agency and free will. The US astrologer Nancy Hastings' views on fate were different to Ebertin's, as she wrote in 1984: 'I have never believed that we're pawns of the universe, pulled here and there willy-nilly by an unseen force of fate.'¹⁰⁸ Hastings associated fate with Cicero's inevitability and thus, supporting the taboo, rejected the notion that fate was a part of astrology. She did not see humans as creators of their fate but rather immune to or separate from it. Hastings was not alone in this assumption. James Lewis who defined fate in his 1994 *Astrology Encyclopedia*, also accepted Cicero's version and defined fate as leading to the notion of an inevitable horoscope: 'Fate (destiny or predestination) is the belief that events — and, especially, human lives — follow an irrevocable script: What we are experiencing at this moment was inevitable and could not have possibly been different'.¹⁰⁹

Conversely the US astrologer Demetra George accepts fate, writing in 2008 that 'Although astrology can clearly describe your character, fate, and fortune, in its highest expression, it is a window into your soul that helps you live a life that expresses your authentic self for the great good.'¹¹⁰ For George fate is somehow linked to soul, which she associates with the 'authentic self'.

Definitions of terms used in this thesis

With these preliminary introductions to astrology, the horoscope, fate and determinism completed a few terms can be now be established.

¹⁰⁶ Lilly, *Christian Astrology*: in his letter, 'To the Student in Astrology' p.B.

¹⁰⁷ Reinhold Ebertin, *Directions, Co-Determinants of Fate* (Tempe, USA AFA, 1976), p.9.

¹⁰⁸ Nancy Anne Hastings, *Secondary Progressions, Time to Remember* (York Beach, Maine: Samuel Weisers, 1984), p.xvii.

¹⁰⁹ James R Lewis, *Astrology Encyclopedia* (Detroit, Washington, D.C., London: Visible Ink, 1994), p.201.

¹¹⁰ Demetra George, *Astrology and the Authentic Self* (Lake Worth, FL: Ibis Press, 2008), p.11.

In this thesis, if an astrologer views the horoscope as an incomplete image of the self and their life story, they will be categorised as a dualist — seeing the determinism or fate in their life as influencing only part of their life. These astrologers may also accept a form of transcendence to another mode of existence. If the astrologer views the horoscope as a complete image of the self and their life story, they will be categorised as monist — accepting the influence of determinism or fate throughout their entire life. Monist astrologers may have spiritual values but they still see the horoscope as an image of their complete self in their physical life. These two distinctions will be developed in later chapters.

The term 'secular astrology' is used to define the practice of an astrology which does not require a divine presence in the universe. The term 'non-secular astrology' will be used to define the practice of an astrology which is considered an expression, in some manner, of a divine presence in the universe.

Another problematical term is 'character'. Marvin Berkowitz and Melinda Bier define character as '...complex, multifaceted, and psychological and that it comprises the moral side of a person' and is developed slowly through family and schooling.¹¹¹ Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) considered character was set by the forces of determinism and already fixed by the time of birth and remained unalterable: 'Since character, so far as we understand its nature, is above and beyond time, it cannot undergo any change under the influence of life.'¹¹²

Independent of whether character is fixed or changeable is the question of whether the human will is also contained in character, and if so, then is character subject to determinism? If the will is not part of character, then where does it lie? Consequently when Cicero stated that astrologers see 'character' (*naturas*) in a horoscope, it is not clear if he also included the will. As a result of this ambiguity, when the word 'character' is used I will explain its context. The terms 'fate' and 'fatalism' need to be considered later in the

¹¹¹ Marvin W. Berkowitz and Melinda C. Bier, "Research-Based Character Education," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 591(2004): p.73.

¹¹² Arthur Schopenhauer, *On Human Nature* (Cosimo, Incorporated, 2010), p.64.

context of the classical literature review discussed in chapter 2.

Other studies of astrology in contemporary society

Astrology in contemporary western society has been the focus of academic research seeking to understand why people hold astrological beliefs. Robert Wuthnow (1976) in the USA, based his research on the assumption that astrology offered an alternative authoritarian system to religion. He asked the question, 'If it appeals to those whom modern society has left on the fringe, it may offer an alternative source of authority and reward, of comfort, just as churchly religion has been known to offer to socially marginal parishioners.'¹¹³ He concluded, like Adorno, that people who used astrology were marginalised. However, his definition of marginalisation was the '...more poorly educated, the unemployed, non-whites, females, the unmarried, the overweight, the ill, and the lonely...'¹¹⁴ Similarly G. A. Tyson (1982) in South Africa, conducting research into the nature of people who consulted an astrologer, looked for the following variables:

The independent variables used in the present study were all with one exception, ones which had previously been found to correlate with belief in astrology: viz. sex, age, marital status, education, religious affiliation, importance of religion, locus of control and a measure of maladjustment.¹¹⁵

Tyson's one exception was stress, and he concluded that those who consulted astrologers were predominately women and thus astrology appealed to gullible people who were looking for a higher level of control to be imposed on their lives.¹¹⁶ US academics Cary J. Nederman, a historian of science, and James Wray Goulding, a sociologist, adopted a similar position. In 1981 they wrote a paper commenting on Adorno's research and criticised the supposed beliefs that astrologers have in fate by stating:

Take things as they are, since you are fated for them anyway... . The importance of fate is not to be underestimated It is our star-determined fate, rather than our

¹¹³ Robert Wuthnow, "Astrology and Marginality," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 15, no. 2 (1976): p.157.

¹¹⁴ Wuthnow, "Astrology and Marginality," p.167.

¹¹⁵ G.A. Tyson, "People Who Consult Astrologers: A profile," *Personality and Individual Differences* Vol. 3 (1982): pp.119-120.

¹¹⁶ Tyson, "People Who Consult Astrologers: A profile," p.123.

socio-economic status, which sets the pattern of our lives. Of course, in order to cloud any possible connection between the "heavens" and the "earth," fate is interpreted as a cosmic throw of the dice. It is always the element of risk that determines one's fate.¹¹⁷

However, they did not define what they meant by the term 'fate', nor did they investigate how astrologers defined it. In 1997 John Bauer and Martin Durant, both academics based in London, conducted research as to why people accepted astrological premises. Their work was based on the analysis of a British survey of 2009 people. They concluded that there was insufficient support for Adorno's hypothesis that astrologers sought an external locus of control; however, their research indicated that people who felt that they did not have control over their lives were drawn to astrology. They concluded, therefore, that, '...the fatalism element [in astrology] was confirmed.'¹¹⁸ Like Nederman and Goulding they, too, did not offer definitions of fate or fatalism. In 2004 Michael Dambrun conducted research amongst French university students concerning their views about Arabs living in France. Following Adorno's lead of looking for fascist-like tendencies, Dambrun drew a correlation between a belief in astrology and prejudice towards Arabs, overweight people and women suggesting that '...beliefs in astrology bias our perceptions and have some damaging consequences with regard to intergroup relations.'¹¹⁹ Whether there could have been other social issues within the lives of the university students which contributed to these results or indeed whether the vehicle of a scale-based survey was sufficiently refined to justify these conclusions are concerns left unanswered.

Not seeking to support Adorno's hypothesis but still accepting Cicero's inevitable horoscope argument, Terry Brink from Notre Dame, CA, in 1978 conducted a study of the religious attitudes of 227 junior and senior students at a Catholic girls' high school to see if they believed in astrology, Catholicism or reincarnation. Brink assumed these three beliefs

¹¹⁷ Cary J. Nederman and James Wray Goulding, "Popular Occultism and Critical Social Theory: Exploring Some Themes in Adorno's Critique of Astrology and the Occult," *Sociological Analysis* 42, no. 4 (1981): p.327.

¹¹⁸ John Bauer and Martin Durant, " British Public Perceptions of Astrology: An Approach from the Sociology of Knowledge," *Culture and Cosmos* Vol 1, no. 1 (1997): p.66.

¹¹⁹ Michael Dambrun, "Belief in Paranormal Determinism as a source of prejudice towards disadvantaged groups: 'The Dark Side of Stars'," *Social Behavior and Personality* Vol 32, no. 7 (2004): p.634.

to be mutually exclusive. For Brink the omnipotence of God and the free will of man were views held to be inconsistent with a belief that fate was produced by the planets. Brink also assumed that '...astrology's fatalism is based upon blind impersonal forces [the solar system] and is substantially different to whatever fatalism reincarnationists attribute to the workings of karma.'¹²⁰ His results were inconclusive and he commented that his research did not support Adorno's and Wuthnow's marginalization hypothesis.¹²¹ However, when further considering his results, which did show a correlation between belief in astrology and belief in reincarnation, he concluded that his young research group were simply muddled in their thinking.¹²² For, as cited earlier, he had assumed that the fate within astrology was quite different to the fate contained within a belief in karma. If Brink had read some contemporary astrological literature he would have noted that reincarnation had been a strong theme within astrology since the early twentieth century. This is considered in the work of Alan Leo discussed in chapter 4.

In 1992 the American academic Shoshanah Feher published her research into believers of astrology. In 1989 she surveyed 383 people attending an astrology conference in the USA and concluded that astrologers fell into two groups based on whether they considered astrology to be a spiritual practice or not. She defined these groups as New Age astrologers (non-secular) and non-New Age astrologers (secular) and indicated that the secular astrologers were distinguished by their use of astrology as a predictive tool, while the non-secular astrologers used it for their personal and spiritual growth.¹²³ The raw numbers in her reported results show that 42.3% of her sampled astrologers were secular and 57.7% were non-secular.¹²⁴ Thus, although she did not point this out, the distinction between the two groups was based on individual astrologers' beliefs about the influence of determinism and/or fate in their lives as represented by their horoscopes. Feher's spiritual astrologers considered the influence of fate to be weaker or different in some manner as it could not be

¹²⁰ T. L. Brink, "Inconsistency of Belief among Roman Catholic Girls: Concerning Religion, Astrology, Reincarnation," *Review of Religious Research* 20, no. 1 (1978): p.82.

¹²¹ Brink, "Inconsistency of Belief among Roman Catholic Girls: Concerning Religion, Astrology, Reincarnation," p.84.

¹²² Brink, "Inconsistency of Belief among Roman Catholic Girls: Concerning Religion, Astrology, Reincarnation," p.85.

¹²³ Feher, "Who Holds the Cards? Women and New Age Astrology," p.180.

¹²⁴ Feher, "Who Holds the Cards? Women and New Age Astrology," p.188.

used, or should not be used to predict a future event, while her non-New Age astrologers held different views on fate and did attempt to use it to make predictions. Feher's results, although not the focus of her research, usefully demonstrate that there are different views held by contemporary astrologers about the role of determinism and/or fate in their lives. In 1994 the US astrological community conducted Project Focus and received 657 responses.¹²⁵ This community consisted of astrologers who belonged to different astrological associations. The survey was primarily focused on the education of astrologers and the legal position of the subject within the different states of the USA. However, of the 70 questions asked in the survey, two were associated with the role of determinism and/or fate in informants' lives. Of the 657 respondents, 74% stated that they used horoscopes to delineate personality, showing the astrologers' belief in a link between the ordered heavens and an individual's life; 52% also stated that they sought to make predictions using astrology. However, the survey also revealed that 24% of astrologers did not think that their lives contained any determinism and/or fate. Such a result reveals an element of ambiguity regarding understanding, agreement or attitude towards determinism and/or fate within the community of US astrologers.

Another survey, conducted by Nicholas Campion for his doctoral research in 1999, questioned 159 astrologers at a UK conference and a further 152 at a US conference in 2002, making a total of 311 practitioners. His survey focused primarily on exploring astrology as a New Age phenomenon, and also included several questions exploring the prevalence of determinism and/or fate in the belief structure of astrologers. Of his 311 respondents, 66% agreed that astrology could make accurate predictions, and 87% agreed that while the birth horoscope contains indicators of one's potential, how it is used is up to the individual.¹²⁶ Like the Project Focus survey, Campion's results reveal a high level of ambiguity regarding understanding, agreement or attitude towards determinism and/or fate within the UK and US astrological communities.

¹²⁵ A conference paper sent directly to me from the organisers of the survey. Focus Project, "First Light - Preliminary Findings from the Astrologer's Survey Questionnaire in the United States," in *U.A.C. '95* (Monterey, California 1995).

¹²⁶ Campion, "Prophecy, Cosmology and the New Age Movement. The Extent and Nature of Contemporary Belief in Astrology," p.243 and p.248.

There has been further doctoral research conducted into the question of the role or place of astrology in contemporary society, but these have not focused on the role of determinism and/or fate as perceived by astrologers. Alison Bird's research in 2006 was focused on how astrologers learned astrology and she stated that, 'Astrology is the thinking woman's divination system of choice'.¹²⁷ Bird accepts that astrology is a form of divination. In the same year Bridget McKenney Costello considered the practice of astrology and how astrologers actually used astrology, concluding that it was a moral discourse against the hegemony of science.¹²⁸

Adorno, Wuthnow, Dambrun, Nederman and Goulding, Brink, Bauer and Durant all accepted Cicero's assumption about astrology — the inevitable horoscope argument. In Brink's case his assumption led to confusion in his results. Campion's makes no such assumption and his results, although not focused on determinism and/or fate, reveal, like Feher's and the Project Focus survey, the ambiguity about determinism and/or fate that prevails within astrological beliefs. Feher's results also highlight the presence of a secular astrology (43.7% of her responses). Bird assumes that astrology is a form of divination, suggesting that astrology is a non-secular subject. Costello's argument is that astrology in contemporary society is a reaction against science.

Current investigations into beliefs about determinism and free will

Cited earlier in this chapter, the new field of experimental philosophy explores the free will debate. Nichols, in 2006, defined this new field as a way of collecting 'folk' ideas about philosophical issues: 'When we try to determine the nature of philosophically important concepts used by the folk, we are basically doing a kind of cognitive anthropology.'¹²⁹ Using this approach of cognitive anthropology he endeavoured to discover what he termed 'folk intuition' on matters to do with free will. He found that people had shifting opinions around issues of determinism and their ability to freely choose their actions. To examine these beliefs Nichols used psychological duplicates as his method. He used a thought

¹²⁷ Alison Bird, "Astrology in Education: An Ethnography" (University of Sussex, 2006), p.94.

¹²⁸ Bridget McKenney Costello, "Astrology in action: Culture and status in unsettled lives" (University of Pennsylvania, 2006), p.ii.

¹²⁹ Shaun Nichols, "Folk Intuitions on Free Will," <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctyho/dfwNichols.html>. 7 August 2006.

experiment which asks a person to imagine that they have an identical twin who lives in another world, who has an identical history; then he asks them to consider whether, if their twin takes a certain action, would they take the same action? Nichols found that most people agreed that they would take the same action and he thus concluded that this revealed an acceptance of a hard-incompatibilist position.

However, when his research subjects were faced with moral content, he found shifting attitudes in their responses. If the twin committed a violent act such as stabbing another person, many of those people who indicated that they adopted a hard incompatibilist position shifted to a compatibilist position. Thus people tended to accept their own ability to take independent actions, use their free will, when faced with following the actions of their psychological duplicate who had just committed a violent deed. Nichols concluded that people's attitude to determinism varied depending on issues of moral responsibility. This apparent mismatch of the assumptions of modern philosophy and people's actual beliefs concerning determinism was again demonstrated in 2007 when Nichols and Joshua Knobe conducted a similar piece of qualitative research into people's beliefs about determinism, and they concluded their research paper with the comment:

Philosophers who have discussed lay intuitions in this area tend to say either that folk intuitions conform to compatibilism or that they conform to incompatibilism. Our actual findings were considerably more complex and perhaps more interesting. It appears that people have both compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions. ... clearly far more remains to be done.¹³⁰

Nichols' first research project, and his later additional work with Knobe, indicate that the greater the emotional or moral content the greater is the tendency of a person to believe they have the ability to use their free will.¹³¹ I have replicated Nichols' and Knobe's work in my own research and this is covered in chapter 7.

¹³⁰ Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe, "Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions," *Nous* 41(2007): Web format: pp.29-30.

¹³¹ Nichols and Knobe, "Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions," pp.664-665.

Moving away from determinism and researching notions of fate, Jeremy Burrus and Neil Roese also found an inconsistency in the way people thought about fate and free will. They defined fate as inevitable teleology: 'Fate means that an event was meant to be, that is, predetermined by prior unseen forces.'¹³² They asked University of Illinois undergraduate students to tell them about their beliefs in this version of fate and found, 'Most (75%) did indeed believe in fate, but ... 85% further believed it possible for events to be decided jointly by both fate and individual action.'¹³³ Gillian Bennett researched belief in predestined events. In 1994, she interviewed 120 people who were visiting a podiatry clinic. Her research topic was an exploration of people's beliefs about knowing the future and she found that, 'Running like a thread through many of my informants' conversations was the concept of predestination with its passive-compliant corollary, complete acceptance...'¹³⁴

Nichols, Knobe, Burrus and Roese, and Bennett were not concerned with astrology and the beliefs of astrologers. However, their separate research does suggest that most people do accept, in varying ways, some defining order or pattern to their lives.

Broader implications of this project

In 1986 the philosopher Galen Strawson put forward the idea that people intuitively adopt a hard incompatibilist position.¹³⁵ Strawson's argument was supported by Kane who, in 1999, expressed a similar opinion.¹³⁶ However, Nichols' work, cited earlier, challenges both Strawson and Kane by showing that an individual could shift their philosophical position from hard incompatibilism to libertarianism depending on the situation in which

¹³² Jeremy Burrus and Neal J. Roese, "Long Ago It Was Meant to Be: The Interplay Between Time, Construal, and Fate Beliefs," *Personality Social Psychological Bulletin* 32, no. 8 (2006): p.1050.

¹³³ Burrus and Roese, "Long Ago It Was Meant to Be: The Interplay Between Time, Construal, and Fate Beliefs," p.1050.

¹³⁴ Gillian Bennett, "'If I knew you were coming I'd Have Baked you a Cake'. The Folklore of Foreknowledge in a Neighborhood Group.," in *Out of the Ordinary: Folklore and the Supernatural*, ed. Barbara Walker (Logan, Utah: Utah University Press, 1995), p.135.

¹³⁵ Galen Strawson, *Freedom and Belief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.30.

¹³⁶ Robert Kane, "Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism," *Journal of Philosophy* Vol.96 (1999): p. 218.

they found themselves. Additionally, in 2005, the philosophers Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer and Turner also challenged the commonly accepted ideas of philosophy concerning what people actually believed about determinism and concluded in their paper:

Furthermore, we hope this paper will motivate philosophers in the free will debate to do two things. First, we think philosophers should be more explicit about how they think their theories of free will and moral responsibility align with – and diverge from – people's actual intuitions and practices. And second, to the extent that they claim their theories do align closely with these intuitions and practices, they should be more explicit and careful about their reasons for believing such alignment exists.¹³⁷

My research project into the beliefs about determinism and/or fate held by astrologers can potentially contribute to these debates within experimental philosophy, as astrologers represent a group in the community who live according to an as-yet-undefined or unexplored natural determinism or fate.

Reflexive considerations

I come to this research project from a position of embeddedness in the western astrological community. Since 1980 I have been a full time practising astrologer and in that capacity I have been a consulting astrologer and a teacher of astrology, travelling and lecturing to the global western astrological community, and organising national and international astrological conferences. I am also the author of four astrology books, and have designed two commercial software applications addressing the needs of the astrological community.

I have always been interested in the nature of fate within astrology and, in 1992, in my textbook on predictive astrology I wrote:

If we can read the dynamic patterns of a birth chart to give the timing and descriptions of future events, then we must not only acknowledge some “master plan” to which the individual is subject but also realise it is the very raw material with which we are working. For as astrologers we work with fate, just as a cobbler works with leather and a blacksmith works with metals.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ E. Nahmias et al., "Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility " *Philosophical Psychology* 18 no. 5 (2005): p.578.

¹³⁸ Bernadette Brady, *The Eagle and the Lark – a Textbook of Predictive Astrology* (Maine, USA: Samuel Weisers, 1992), p.xv.

In this astrological work I then urged the student to think about what they meant by the word fate as it would alter how they would use astrology. In 2002 I broadened my focus and entered into the academic exploration of astrology and culture, and in 2005 obtained an MA in Cultural Astronomy and Astrology from Bath Spa University, UK. Since 2008 I have been a tutor at the University of Wales Trinity Saint David, Lampeter, for the MA in Cultural Astronomy and Astrology.

Consequently I have had access to many levels of the astrological community, both for the gathering of data through surveys and for in-depth interviews with the leading astrological thinkers of this period. Hence, in this research project, I am more what Kenneth Pike would define as an 'emic' (insider) in contrast to an 'etic' (outsider). According to Pike the 'etic' researcher is one '...whose relevance is external to the system being studied... the emic system requires the inclusion of criteria relevant to the internal functioning of the system itself.'¹³⁹ In this way, having knowledge of the community, its structure, differences, literature and history, I can approach the project with an awareness of the potential diversity that the research may reveal. Pike further argued that holding such an 'emic' position could produce a lack of external relevance thus condemning the insider to relevance only to the closed circle of their community. However, to balance this 'emic' orientation I also hold an 'etic' position in that the role of being a qualitative researcher places me outside the astrological community. This 'etic' position is also enhanced by my academic work which ensures knowledge of the diversity of views and cultural issues surrounding opinions about astrology. These factors, taken together, contribute to providing both knowledge of my research community while at the same time providing some separation from the researched community.

However, the monitoring and awareness of this shifting boundary line between 'emic', with its potential lack of external relevance, and 'etic', with its potential imprimatur of acceptable external relevance, is enhanced by my awareness of Clifford Geertz's

¹³⁹ Kenneth L Pike, "Etic and Emic Standpoints for the Description of Behavior," in *Language and Thought*, ed. D.C. Hildum (Princeton NJ: D.van Norstrand Company, 1967), p.29.

development of Heinz Kohut's concepts of 'experience-near' and 'experience-distant'.¹⁴⁰ Geertz pointed out that researchers positioning themselves in an 'experience-near' position can share feelings, thoughts, imaginings and expectations and be readily understood by others. In contrast, 'experience-distant' researchers define themselves as taking an observational position. The exclusive adoption of the former position will, Geertz argues, leave the researcher, '...awash in immediacies, as well as entangled in vernacular...' while the pure confinement to the latter — 'experience-distant' — position leaves the researcher in '...abstractions and smothered in jargon.'¹⁴¹ My awareness of the advantages of combining 'emic' and 'etic' views, of balancing the shifting needs of the near and the far researcher, constituted an ever-present process as I conducted my fieldwork.

The design of the research project

This project adopts a general qualitative methodology as recommended by John McLeod, who argues that, instead of adopting a set methodology which can impose a restriction on the project, one selects one's research tools as required.¹⁴² McLeod's argument is that the real impact on the results of qualitative research is the attitude the researcher brings to their decisions about the nature of data collection, memo and journal keeping. He recommends adoption of what Clifford Geertz would define as the 'experience-near' position regardless of one's 'etic' or 'emic' qualifications and, from this perspective, making the research decisions that appear to suit the project as it emerges.¹⁴³ However, some design elements needed to be in place from the onset so, mindful of McLeod's argument of being open, I also accepted the suggestion of Mathew Miles and Michael Huberman which was to seek as broad a base as possible for the research.¹⁴⁴ Thus, with the question of determinism and/or fate in mind, I collected my raw data from as broad a range as possible but within a well-defined target group. I also drew on the arguments of Alan Bryman for combining

¹⁴⁰ Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge* (London: Fontana Press, 1993), p.57.

¹⁴¹ Clifford Geertz, "On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," in *The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion: a Reader*, ed. Russell McCutcheon (London: Cassell, 1999), pp.50-53.

¹⁴² John McLeod, *Qualitative Research in Counselling and Psychotherapy* (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), pp.130-137.

¹⁴³ McLeod, *Qualitative Research in Counselling and Psychotherapy*: p.160.

¹⁴⁴ Matthew B Miles and Michael A Huberman, *An Expanded Sourcebook, Qualitative Data Analysis* (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1994), p.17.

both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies; these allow for distinctive methods of data collection but also allow for an overlap of information.¹⁴⁵ Robert Thomas supports a similar approach, recommending an encompassing focus on the different data which can be collected both quantitatively and qualitatively, and suggests that these two sets of data can be used to inform each other.¹⁴⁶ This approach was particularly useful at the time of the early drafts of the survey for, by conducting interviews and discussion groups with astrologers, each method of qualitative data collection could inform the other.

I also wished to incorporate quantitative data into the research. As David Silverman writes, in support of quantitative data, 'Instead of taking the researcher's word for it, the reader has a chance to gain a sense of the flavour of the data as a whole... [and] removing nagging doubts about the accuracy of their impressions about the data.'¹⁴⁷ In consideration of the potential diversity of opinions which could be found concerning the nature and role of determinism and/or fate within the astrological community, I considered that a body of quantitative data was essential for the project. In this I have taken as a guideline Jennifer Mason's arguments on the combination of quantitative and qualitative data, in particular her suggestion that, '... the two parts of the study were not designed to validate each other. They are data of a different order so that the relationship between them may or may not be one of confirmation or even contradiction, although they may contain themes which are similar or distinct.'¹⁴⁸ Thus, as will be discussed later, the survey's quantitative data, although overlapping with the qualitative data of the interviews, has nonetheless allowed to contribute its own unique findings.

¹⁴⁵ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), p.125.

¹⁴⁶ R. Murray Thomas, *Blending Qualitative & Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations* (Thousand Oaks, California: Corwin Press, Inc, 2003), p.7.

¹⁴⁷ David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data*, 2nd Edition ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2002), p.35.

¹⁴⁸ Jennifer Mason, "Linking qualitative and quantitative data analysis," in *Analyzing Qualitative Data*, ed. Alan Bryman and Robert G. Burgess (London: Routledge, 1994), p.109.

The target group

Matthew Miles and Michael Huberman stress that the first consideration of any research project is to 'bound the territory' of the research.¹⁴⁹ The target group thus focused on people who practised astrology. To the outsider the followers of astrology can appear to be one single group. However, this is not the case. When discussing astrology in eighteenth century England, Patrick Curry addressed this question by defining three groups in society who engaged in activities deriving from astrological belief. He labelled these 'higher, middling and lower'. He defined the 'middling group' as, '...a kind of middle-brow astrology, midway between popular and philosophical.'¹⁵⁰ The 'middling group' were those who calculated and interpreted horoscopes while the popular or 'lower group' was defined as consisting of rural or semi-literate labourers, and/or those belonging to the working classes, who partook of almanacs and celestial folklore.¹⁵¹ Curry defined philosophical or 'higher group' astrologers – for example John Worsdale (1766-c.1828), an astrologer in eighteenth century England - as those who strove to restore or recreate astrology from its believed or actual philosophical roots.¹⁵²

In the tenth century, Muslim scholar 'Abd al-'Azîz ibn Uthmân al-Qābīsī also divided astrologers into different groups. He compiled an astrological examination to distinguish the credentials of any astrologer presenting himself to the court, and defined four groups. Al- Qābīsī's groups consisted of the 'complete astrologer', one who could work directly with the sky and make the tables which the second group, the 'craft astrologers', could use. The third group, the 'blind astrologers', described uneducated individuals who knew a little but were not capable of working as astrologers. The fourth group was the astronomers.¹⁵³ Such groupings are still applicable today. Curry's lower or popular group is reflective of the consumer of astrological products: those people whose sole contact with astrology is to read sun-sign columns, buy astrological jewellery or other such items, and use web sites in

¹⁴⁹ Miles and Huberman, *An Expanded Sourcebook, Qualitative Data Analysis*: pp.25-26.

¹⁵⁰ Patrick Curry, *Prophecy and Power: Astrology in Early Modern England* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), p.118.

¹⁵¹ Curry, *Prophecy and Power: Astrology in Early Modern England*: p.96.

¹⁵² Curry, *Prophecy and Power: Astrology in Early Modern England*: p.132.

¹⁵³ Charles Burnett, Keiji Yamamoto, and Michio Yano, *Al-Qabīsī (Alcabitius): The Introduction to Astrology*, vol. 2. (London, Turin: The Warburg Institute, 2004), pp.2-6.

the hope of finding out more about their own lives. Curry's middling group is similar to Al- Qābīsī's craft astrologers and, in contemporary terms, this group would more accurately be said to comprise astrological practitioners. These are the individuals who partake of astrological classes, join astrological clubs or associations, attend astrological educational events such as workshops or conferences, and do horoscopes for their families, friends and clients. They may also be consumers of astrological products. Al- Qābīsī's 'complete astrologers', whom Curry would align with his higher or philosophical astrologers, might today describe the astrological theorists who contribute to and disseminate astrology by way of books, software, lectures and teaching which the astrological practitioners study. Astrological theorists are thus practitioners who have become shapers of astrological thought for other practitioners. Astrological theorists may also be consumers but consumers are not astrological theorists.

The research and/or writings of Adorno, Wuthnow, Dambrun, Nederman and Goulding, Brink and Bauer and Durant, all cited earlier, investigated people at the consumer level of astrology and, although their findings may be generalised across groups of consumers of astrological products, they are not applicable beyond the boundaries of that group. The projects undertaken by Feher, Campion, Bird and Costello, cited earlier, focus rather on the practitioners and theorists and their findings belong within the boundaries of these groups. Ignoring such distinctions has led, I would argue, to the conflicting results in which astrologers are found, on the one hand by Wuthnow and others investigating the consumer group, to be semi-literate and marginalised and, on the other hand, to be highly educated and well established in society, as found by Feher and Bird, working with the practitioners and theorists.¹⁵⁴

Thus, following the recommendations of Miles and Huberman regarding the need to clearly define the territory of the research, this project is focused on investigating the beliefs and thinking of the practitioners and theorists of astrology on the nature of the

¹⁵⁴ Wuthnow, "Astrology and Marginality," p.167 ; Shoshanah Feher, "Who Looks to the Stars? Astrology and its Constituency," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 31, no. 1 (1992): p.89; Bird, "Astrology in Education: An Ethnography," p.94.

determinism and/or fate which astrology brings to their lives; its focus will not extend to researching the beliefs of the consumer group.

Primary data sources and analysis

There were three areas of primary data for this research: literature reviews, in-depth interviews, and survey work.

The research required three literature reviews: the first explored the different theories of fate as defined within classical literature; the second considered the opinions of four philosophers from the post-seventeenth century regarding determinism; and the third reviewed the astrological literature of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to ascertain the presence of determinism or fate expressed within the astrological corpus.

There were 22 interviews with astrologers considered to be theorist, of 60 to 90 minutes' duration, conducted in person or by Skype. These interviews have been transcribed and discussed in chapter 9.

The practitioners of astrology were sampled through the use of a survey. Following Thomas' suggestion, this survey was designed as largely inventory-like in its approach.¹⁵⁵ This was necessary, as the survey was aimed at the collection of feelings and beliefs about determinism and/or fate. The details of the design as well as the results are reported and discussed in chapter 7. The survey also allowed for astrologers to add their own comments concerning determinism and/or fate. 902 comments were received comprising more than 77,000 words of written comments. These are discussed in chapter 8.

Overview of the chapters

In addition to this introductory chapter the thesis consists of:

Chapter 2 –Theories of Fate and Cosmic Order

This chapter considers the classical theories of fate of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics and

¹⁵⁵ Thomas, *Blending Qualitative & Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations*; p.70.

their influence on other classical authors so that these theories of fate can be used in comparison with the findings of the field work. The chapter introduces their varying theories of fate and the nature of their links to the idea of a divine ordered cosmos. Additionally this chapter discusses the influence of the work of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas as an extension of these theories of fate beyond the classical period.

Chapter 3 – Modern approaches to the free will dilemma

This chapter focuses on the work of René Descartes (1596-1650) and his version of dualism which leads to libertarianism; Baruch de Spinoza (1632–1677) and his contemplations on living with hard incompatibilism; David Hume (1711–1776) and his naturalism providing a form of compatibilism; and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) whose hard incompatibilist version of pessimistic dualism had a profound influence on literature, poetry and art. The chapter also considers some of the more contemporary solutions which challenge the universality of determinism, and the nature of causality.

Chapter 4 – Literature Review of Astrologers, Part 1, Dualism

This chapter begins the review of the astrological literature of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries for evidence of beliefs regarding the influence of determinism and/or fate in human action. It focuses on the literature of astrologers who support a dualist view where the horoscope is considered an incomplete image of the self and the life story. Thus the fate or determinism of the horoscope is not applicable to the entire being, for a part of it, the will, soul and/or spirit, is insulated from the horoscope. The chapter's main focus is a discussion on the dualism of the astrologers Alan Leo (1860–1917) and, Dane Rudhyar (1895–1985) as well as considered the influence of Linda Goodman (1925–1995) and her popular sun sign book.

Chapter 5 — Literature Review of Astrologers, Part 2, Monism

The aim of this chapter is to continue the review of the literature. It focuses on those astrologers who adopt a monist approach to astrology through seeing the horoscope as mirroring the whole individual, mind and body, where both are subject to determinism, or fate. These astrologers view the role of astrology informing them primarily about the nature of a person and the external world. The chapter begins with the first century author

Claudius Ptolemy and defines his monism and discusses his influence on present day astrological thought. It considers the twentieth century astrologers, the reformer Reinhold Ebertin (1901–1988), the naturalist C.C. Zain (December, 1882–1951) and the attempt by Edward Johndro (January, 1882–1951) to bring astrology under the umbrella of science. It also considers fate in the context of horary and relocation astrology both defined within this chapter.

Chapter 6 — Literature Review of Astrologers, Part 3, another form of monism

This chapter completes the review of the literature. It focuses on the astrologers who, like those in chapter 5, also adopt a monist approach to astrology by considering that the horoscope reflects the whole individual, mind and body. However, these astrologers see the role of astrology as informing them primarily about the nature of a person's psychological make-up. The chapter begins with Charles O.E. Carter (1887–1968) who attempted to find free will within a horoscope, and then presents the solution found by the British astrologer Margaret Hone (1892–1969). It then considers the work of two contemporary astrologers, Liz Greene, who embedded Jungian symbolism into astrology, and a student of Dane Rudhyar, Michael Meyer, promoted what is known as humanistic astrology.

Chapter 7 — The Survey on Determinism and/or Fate within Astrology

The aim of this chapter is to present the results of the survey (n1062), conducted from September 2007 to November 2008, which investigated the acceptance of determinism or the beliefs about fate by members of the astrological community.

Chapter 8 — Email Interviews with the Surveyed Astrologers

This chapter discusses the 902 emails received from the astrologers concerning their personal opinions about determinism or their thinking on the role, nature or source of fate in their lives. These were non-structured, freely given thoughts attached to the end of the completed surveys. These are like snippets of conversations that pile up and slowly reveal the nature of the beliefs on fate or determinism within the research community.

Chapter 9 — Interviews with the Astrological Theorists

This chapter reports and discusses the findings of the in-depth interviews with the authors, teachers, lecturers and those astrologers who are shaping the nature of contemporary astrology, the astrological theorists. It focuses on their beliefs concerning the link between the heavenly bodies and their life on earth. This chapter therefore takes a step beyond the material discussed in chapter 8, from the surveyed astrologers and allows for a more thorough consideration of the astrological beliefs concerning fate or determinism.

Chapter 10 — Discussion and Summary of the Research Project

This chapter draws together the project's arguments, and presents a discussion of the results and conclusions of the research project.

Chapter summary

This chapter focused on defining my research project, which is to investigate the attitudes and beliefs concerning determinism and/or fate within present-day astrological communities. The chapter introduced a typography of determinism and defined the terms 'monism' and 'dualism' as used in the philosophy of the mind/free will debate. It then explored different definitions of astrology and its association with fate. Cicero's anti-astrology arguments were considered through his definition of fate and the consequences when applied to human life and astrology, thus producing the inevitable nature of a horoscope. This concept was defined as 'Cicero's assumption'. The chapter also provided an overview of the nature of the horoscope and how contemporary astrologers viewed this map. The work of Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe within experimental philosophy regarding 'folk intuition' and the relationship between free will and determinism was also considered. Their findings on people's beliefs and how these beliefs can alter do not support the expectations of contemporary philosophy and imply that people hold alternative beliefs about determinism. The chapter then defined the parameters and methodology of my research project. In chapter 2 I will explore the influence of perceptions of cosmic order on the formation of the different classical theories of fate.