

Chapter 3

Modern approaches to the free will dilemma

This chapter considers some key modern approaches to the free will dilemma. In order to capture the diversity of arguments and the implications of these arguments for human life I have focused on the work of the following philosophers: the French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes (1596-1650), representing the birth of the modern era and following in Plato's tradition supporting a style of dualism;³⁷⁹ the Dutch philosopher Baruch de Spinoza (1632–1677), representing a version of Stoicism and hard incompatibilism with its implications on daily life, bringing Stoic thinking into the modern philosophy;³⁸⁰ the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) representing a form of Aristotelian naturalism and its implications for natural beliefs and a compatibilist position;³⁸¹ and the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) whose reversal of Plato's divine cosmos into a pessimistic view produced a form of dualism within hard incompatibilism which had a profound influence on literature, poetry and art is considered.³⁸² The chapter will also consider some of the more contemporary solutions which include challenging the universality of determinism, and the nature of causality. Chapter 2 considered the classical arguments on theories of fate. This chapter will present modern arguments around free will and determinism.

Introduction

From the period of the seventeenth century, philosophers have been clarifying their definitions regarding the free will dilemma. The classical concepts of necessity, contingency, chance and fortune, discussed in chapter 2, are no longer used in

³⁷⁹ John Cottingham, "Descartes," in *The Great Philosophers, from Socrates to Turing*, ed. Ray Monk and Frederic Raphael (London: Phoenix Paperback, 2000), p.95.

³⁸⁰ Dilman, *Free will: an historical and philosophical introduction*: p.132.

³⁸¹ H.O. Mounce, *Hume's naturalism* (Routledge, 1999), p.2; See also Norman Kemp Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume (I) " *Mind* (1905): p.151.

³⁸² Roger Caldwell, "Schopenhauer," *Philosophy Now*, no. 86 (2011): p.13.

contemporary philosophical debates. Necessity was eventually replaced with determinism where the source of causality was no longer divinely motivated and filled with purpose but was, instead, inanimate and defined by the laws of physics. The ambiguous concepts of contingency, chance and fortune which were random and unpredictable in nature are now understood by mathematics and probability.³⁸³ Fatalism, however, has been retained and, as defined in the previous chapter, is the concept of inevitable teleology. The classical term fate, with its theories of interrelated beliefs cited in the previous chapter is now, according to Robert Solomon, held in philosophical disdain.³⁸⁴

The idea of a classical sympathetic cosmos with fate providing a personal element was rejected, as it represented non-causal physics. It was replaced with a non-divine universal cause, determinism, which left little or no room for the concept of the freedom of the will, and even the meaning of life as it was based on the laws of physics widely accepted as universal and applicable to all organic and inorganic objects.³⁸⁵ Philosophers were thus challenged to produce arguments concerning the very nature and existence of free will which could allow for a belief in a purposeful life.

René Descartes —free will as true

According to John Cottingham, the work of the French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes (1596–1650) was synonymous with the birth of the modern era in both science as well as philosophy.³⁸⁶ Considered a revolutionary in science for his development of the reductionist approach to the natural world, Descartes wrote: 'I recognise no matter in corporeal things apart from that which the geometers call quantity, and take as the object of their demonstrations, i.e. that to which every kind of *division, shape and motion* is applicable.'³⁸⁷ However, having argued that all of nature could be reduced to the concept of quantity he then added a crucial caveat to his definition of nature:

³⁸³ Pier Luigi Luisi, "Contingency and Determinism," *Philosophical Transactions: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences* 361, no. 1807 (2003): p.1142.

³⁸⁴ Solomon, "On Fate and Fatalism," p.435.

³⁸⁵ Cartwright, *The dappled world: a study of the boundaries of science*: p.3, pp.43-46.

³⁸⁶ Cottingham, "Descartes," p.95.

³⁸⁷ René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, trans. Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller (New York: Springer, [1644]1984), Pt. II, art. 64.

In short there is nothing in the whole of nature, nothing, that is, which should be referred to purely corporeal causes, i.e. those devoid of thought and mind, which is incapable of being explained on the basis of these self-same principles.³⁸⁸

For Descartes, the realm of thought and mind were not included in the corporeal world. The world, for Descartes, was made of two distinct substances; the first was *res extensa*, the world of matter subject to the reductionism that he was advocating, while the second was *res cogitans*, the world of thought, not subject to the laws of physics and existed in every conscious mind.³⁸⁹

Descartes' view of the world as two distinct substances announced his dualist credentials.³⁹⁰ Plato, discussed in chapter 2, had advanced a body–soul duality where the immortal soul was insulated from being totally consumed by the world of matter.³⁹¹ It can be argued that Descartes' concepts extended Plato's ideas; for Descartes equated the soul with a substance, a substance that was not of the body. Broadie claims that there were fundamental differences between the dualism of Plato and that of Descartes. She argues that this difference was 'Plato's acceptance and Descartes' rejection of the assumption that the soul (= intellect) is identical with what animates the body.'³⁹² She expands this point by arguing that for Plato the body was an instrument for the soul which had 'a sort of limited omnipotence' and required the use of a body to aid its return to the divine.³⁹³ Broadie also points out that for Descartes the mind — and in the example she is discussing she equates it with the soul — did not actually require the body; the 'mind and body are ontologically separable' with the mind able to exist independently.³⁹⁴ She argues that Descartes saw a 'universal separability' between mind and body.³⁹⁵ For Descartes the mind consisting of a substance whose whole essence was to think.³⁹⁶ This universal separability, where the mind did not require membership to the material world grew in popularity. Albert Blaz

³⁸⁸ Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*: Pt. IV, art. 187.

³⁸⁹ Stent, "Epistemic Dualism of Mind and Body," p.579.

³⁹⁰ C.E. Jarrett, *Spinoza: a guide for the perplexed* (Continuum, 2007), p.62.

³⁹¹ Plato, *Phaedo*: see 78b - 84c. Quote - 80a.

³⁹² Broadie, "Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes," p.295.

³⁹³ Broadie, "Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes," p.305.

³⁹⁴ Broadie, "Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes," p.299.

³⁹⁵ Broadie, "Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes," p.299.

³⁹⁶ Jarrett, *Spinoza: a guide for the perplexed*: p.62.

comments on the popularity of the idea by writing, 'the Cartesian isolation of the soul from nature, and its definition as substance, undergoes a remarkable increase in importance. The mind-body dualism was advanced by Cartesians as an irresistible truth.'³⁹⁷

This universal separability informed Descartes' notion of the body, or the natural world, which he saw thus as a machine consisting simply of physical elements:

I should like you to consider ... all the functions I have ascribed to this machine such as the digestion of food, the beating of the heart and the arteries, the nourishment and growth of the limbs, respiration ... I should like you to consider that these functions follow from the mere arrangements of the machine's organs every bit as naturally as the movements of a clock or other automaton follow from the arrangements of its counterweights and wheels.³⁹⁸

Into this view of nature as a machine Descartes then placed God's will. David Cunning notes that for Descartes God's will was immutable and God himself was indifferent and separate to the world.³⁹⁹ For Descartes wrote of God as 'completely indifferent with respect to all things' and in talking of God's actions: 'although his actions were completely indifferent, they were also completely necessary.'⁴⁰⁰ In addition to this deism Descartes considered that God preordained all things from eternity. However, for him this preordination of all events did not challenge human freedom. As Mo Weimin and Wang Wei state, freedom for Descartes 'belongs exclusively to the human soul.'⁴⁰¹ In this way the human will remained totally free and, as argued by Robert Rethy, was to be used to resemble God in action and thought.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁷ Albert G. A. Balz, "Cartesian Refutations of Spinoza," *The Philosophical Review* 46, no. 5 (1937): p.479.

³⁹⁸ René Descartes, "Treatise on Man," in *The Nature of Life: Classical and Contemporary Perspective from Philosophy and Science*, ed. Mark A. Bedau and Carol E. Cleland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.20. AT 11:202 CSM 1:108

³⁹⁹ David Cunning, "Descartes on the Immutability of the Divine Will," *Religious Studies* 39, no. 1 (2003): p.80.

⁴⁰⁰ René Descartes, "Conversation with Burman," in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, 12 vols ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1996), 5.166; Requoted from: Cunning, "Descartes on the Immutability of the Divine Will," p.80.

⁴⁰¹ Weimin Mo and Wang Wei, "Cogito: From Descartes to Sartre," *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* 2, no. 2 (2007): p.256.

⁴⁰² Robert Rethy, "The Teaching of Nature and the Nature of Man in Descartes' "Passions de l'Ame", " *The Review of Metaphysics* 53, no. 3 (2000): pp.682-683.

Michael Norwitz comments that Descartes' dualism was a form of libertarian retreat from the idea of determinism in human life.⁴⁰³ Additionally, Daniel Dennett, in 1984, saw Descartes' dualist philosophy, when applied to the nature of free will, as having lead philosophy on an interesting but nevertheless '...wild goose chase...' for the last three centuries.⁴⁰⁴ Notwithstanding some of the philosophical disdain about using dualism as a solution for the free will dilemma, Manuel Vargas argues that dualist arguments have been reinforced by Western culture and Christianity for centuries so that now, he believes, they are the dominant western philosophical belief amongst non-philosophers.⁴⁰⁵

Consequently my research may well find dualist beliefs within the astrological communities I have studied. If so, this dualism could exist in two forms. Firstly it may be aligned with Plato's dualism, argued in chapter 2, which is a partnership of body with soul, at times strained but always necessary for the soul's relationship with the divine. Secondly it may be aligned with Descartes' dualism where there was an inherent isolation: a physical body which was only a machine separate to the mind, or soul, which held all the freedom and sought, what Arthur Lovejoy labelled, an 'otherworldliness', a desire for the better place beyond the natural world.⁴⁰⁶

The points in Descartes' thinking which are significant for my investigation of astrologers' beliefs are:

- i. The will of God, a deist model, is eternal, unchanging and preordains all things.
- ii. Free will exists in the mind which is separate and independent from the body.
- iii. The mind has a form of omnipotence and should resemble God in its activities – human sovereignty over nature.

Baruch de Spinoza — the chains that bind us

According to Steven Barbone, the Dutch philosopher Baruch de Spinoza (1632–1677) was dissatisfied with Cartesian physics and intentionally broke with the Cartesian definition of

⁴⁰³ Michael Norwitz, "Free Will and Determinism," *Philosophy Now*, no. 1 (1991): p.11.

⁴⁰⁴ Dennett, *Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting*: p.18.

⁴⁰⁵ Manuel Vargas, "Revisionism," in *Four Views on Free Will* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p.139.

⁴⁰⁶ Arthur. O Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1936), p.25.

a will that was free.⁴⁰⁷ With this rejection of freedom of the will Vargas notes that Spinoza accepted the reality of hard incompatibilism, defined in chapter 1.⁴⁰⁸ Spinoza expressed this when he wrote, '...from a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect to follow.'⁴⁰⁹ Dilman notes this argument led Spinoza to develop a different approach to the nature of the human will. He writes that, 'self-control, for Spinoza, is not a matter of willing or the exercise of one's free will — as Descartes held. For in Spinoza the will is itself subject to causality; it is not a 'free cause.'⁴¹⁰ Joel Friedman points out that Spinoza's arguments show that he rejected the Descartes dualist position.⁴¹¹ Indeed Spinoza's thinking was actually in contrast to the dualist arguments of Descartes as well as those of Plato, Plotinus and Aquinas, cited in the previous chapter, all of whom considered in different ways that the human will existed *outside* the realm of fate or necessity; for Spinoza the will was embedded *within* determinism. Jarrett argues that Spinoza can be considered as either supporting neutral monism, where something is inherently neither mental nor physical, or supporting a dual aspect theory, where the mind and body are two aspects of the one thing. However, he notes that this version of dual aspectism is ascribed to Spinoza and Spinoza alone.⁴¹² Steven Smith, however, accepting Spinoza's monism credentials, argues that Spinoza represented a 'revival of Stoicism in early modern moral philosophy.'⁴¹³ Smith points to Spinoza naturalism and comments that Spinoza's acceptance that humanity did not control nature but was instead dependant and embedded within it revealed, in him, a Stoic immanent world view.⁴¹⁴

⁴⁰⁷ B de Spinoza et al., [*Renati Des Cartes Principia: Philosophiae. English*]. *the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy* (Hackett Pub., 1998), See Steven Barbone's Introduction to this work pp. xxvii - xxix.

⁴⁰⁸ Manuel Vargas, "The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility," *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 125, no. 3 (2005): p.408.

⁴⁰⁹ Baruch de Spinoza, *The Ethics*, trans. R.H.M. Elwes (Forgotten Books, [1883] 2008), A.3.

⁴¹⁰ Dilman, *Free will: an historical and philosophical introduction*: p.132.

⁴¹¹ Joel I. Friedman, "An Overview of Spinoza's 'Ethics'," *Synthese* 37, no. 1 (1978): p.80; Based on Spinoza, *The Ethics*: Part 2. Prop 21.

⁴¹² Jarrett, *Spinoza: a guide for the perplexed*: p.64.

⁴¹³ Steven B. Smith, "What Kind of Democrat Was Spinoza?," *Political Theory* 33, no. 1 (2005): p.8.

⁴¹⁴ Smith, "What Kind of Democrat Was Spinoza?," p.8; Also see: Susan James, "Spinoza the Stoic," in *The Rise of Modern Philosophy: The Tension between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz*, ed. Tom Sorell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

This immanent world view was reflected in Spinoza's belief that the universe was made of one substance, but that this substance had an infinite number of modes; we were, however, only aware of two of them, one being thought (mind) and the other being extensions (matter).⁴¹⁵ Spinoza considered that this idea was replicated through the whole of nature. All physical objects also had a mental correlate, thus, as Scruton points out an inorganic object like a stone could think.⁴¹⁶ In this way all things in the world were subject to determinism — mind and body. Thus Spinoza concluded that a person's perception of the freedom of their will was an illusion of ignorance:

Men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; and this opinion depends on this alone, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This, therefore, is their idea of liberty, that they should know no causes of their actions...⁴¹⁷

This concept of ignorance reflected Homer's necessity, *ananke*, which Nikolopoulou, in chapter 2, argued as operating '...on instinct, and because instinct is governed completely by necessity, the animal creature does not recognize necessity as alien to it, and thus remains unconscious of negation, limits, and ultimately, death.'⁴¹⁸ Spinoza labelled this notion of freedom as a 'fictitious idea' which led to the construction of absurdities in philosophy 'which are not worthy of rational refutation.'⁴¹⁹

Freedom for Spinoza, according to Firmin DeBrabander, consisted of autonomy:

I may also be considered autonomous since my mind spawns a sequence of ideas that is wholly distinct from the order of imaginations, that medium where I am acquainted with things through external determination. I am autonomous in another respect in that I am the cause of my emotional states, since my understanding

⁴¹⁵ Spinoza, *The Ethics*: Part 2. Prop 21. Note.

⁴¹⁶ Roger Scruton, "Spinoza," in *The Great Philosophers, from Socrates to Turing*, ed. Ray Monk and Frederic Raphael (London: Phoenix Paperback, 2000), pp.147-150; Drawing on for example, Spinoza, *The Ethics*: Part 3. Prop.2 and Part 4. Prop 32, Note.

⁴¹⁷ Spinoza, *The Ethics*: Part 2. Prop. 35. Note.

⁴¹⁸ Nikolopoulou, "Feet, Fate, and Finitude: On Standing and Inertia in the *Iliad*," p.180.

⁴¹⁹ Baruch de Spinoza, *On the Improvement of the Understanding*, trans. R.H.M. Elwes (MobileReference.com, 2008), Paragraph 60.Points 1-8.

produces its own rational emotions. Taken together, these aspects constitute Spinozistic freedom.⁴²⁰

Thus understanding and acceptance of the continual influence of emotions in one's self, was the only the freedom offered to humanity by Spinoza.⁴²¹ He argued that a person who purely reacted to an emotion of hurt or anger actually lacked freedom and that their will was simply a response to the deterministic forces around them. Dilman expands this point stating that if a person has:

'...only been a party to a transaction in which his role has been purely reactive and, therefore, passive, his reaction is the expression of a necessity that worked through him. In this respect he is like a puppet on a string. While he so reacts he is not himself.'⁴²²

This type of reaction, or rather action of being passive in the face of necessity, is what Weil suggested was at the heart of Homer's *Iliad*, discussed in chapter 2 – the blind reaction to situations only amplified a deterministic momentum. Weil's assessment of the *Iliad* can be considered Spinozan as Spinoza saw that it was the illusion of free will that actually created our bondage. We believed in the contingency of things, the unexpected nature of events, only when our mind was passive — for Spinoza this was simply reacting to external events rather than responding.⁴²³ Spinoza's position, therefore, was opposite to that of Calcidius, cited in chapter 2. Calcidius argued that the formation of contingent events was partly the result of the freely taken actions of individuals. To ensure this he defined these contingent events as separate to God's providence. However, for Spinoza such a claim would be considered an illusion.

Scruton points out that for Spinoza the human mind and body were one and the same and both were subject to determinism.⁴²⁴ He argues that this led to the notion of mental determinism where individuals were subject to internal 'chains that bind us', and he adds

⁴²⁰ Firmin DeBrabander, *Spinoza and the Stoics, Power Politics and the Passions* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007), p.32.

⁴²¹ DeBrabander, *Spinoza and the Stoics, Power Politics and the Passions*: p.36.

⁴²² Dilman, *Free will: an historical and philosophical introduction*: p.128.

⁴²³ Dilman, *Free will: an historical and philosophical introduction*: p.132.

⁴²⁴ Scruton, "Spinoza," p.156; See Spinoza, *The Ethics*.Part 2 Prop.35

that Spinoza believed that by 'gathering our chains into ourselves, and becoming conscious of their binding force, we also rid ourselves of them, and obtain the only freedom that we can or should desire'.⁴²⁵ Thus one could gain a form of freedom by being aware of one's reactions to the events of the external world. However, this form of freedom was not a force of the will but rather an expression of a form of consciousness. Spinoza defined his version of *conatus* as this sense of self, the body as a form of mind. Smith comments on Spinoza's version of *conatus* by stating:

Our *conatus* may indeed grow out of a biological desire for self-preservation, but it contains the presence of an urge, however poorly understood, to live rationally or intelligently. We desire not just to live but to enjoy the fullness or plenitude of life. Spinoza regards this desire as the foundation of all the virtues.⁴²⁶

Friedman comments that for Spinoza *conatus* flowed from our desire for wellness of being and he points out that, 'According to Spinoza, the mind habitually imagines well-being in the body.'⁴²⁷ Hasana Sharp talks of the importance of *conatus* for Spinoza as the power for a being to '...preserves its integrity amidst infinitely many other beings...'⁴²⁸ This Spinozan integrity can be seen as the acceptance of the determinism of one's mind and body while maintaining a sense of individual self by seeking to understand and develop the self, *conatus*, to the fullest degree. For Spinoza a person is self-determined when his actions are allowed to follow his own nature, his own *conatus*. Thus if a person is unaware of their nature, their *conatus*, then they are unaware of their actions and are not self-determined; they have failed to understand their will.

Spinoza considered that within each individual there was a true self, an inner nature — *conatus* — which can be allowed to produce one's responses only if it can understand the determinism in which it is embedded. This is similar to the concept of Plotinus' authentic self which was cloaked in a garment of planetary fate-bestowing influences as it descended to earth. For Plotinus one needed to learn to free the soul by releasing it from the cloak of

⁴²⁵ Scruton, "Spinoza," p.156.

⁴²⁶ Smith, "What Kind of Democrat Was Spinoza?," p.15.

⁴²⁷ Friedman, "An Overview of Spinoza's 'Ethics'," p.94.

⁴²⁸ Hasana Sharp, "The Force of Ideas in Spinoza," *Political Theory* 35, no. 6 (2007): p.740.

planetary fate.⁴²⁹ However, unlike Plotinus, Spinoza did not consider that the individual or the soul could actually free itself from determinism. Spinoza's notion of virtue was also reminiscence of Stoic thinking discussed in chapter 2. Friedman claims that Spinoza saw happiness as the acceptance that one could *only* be self-determined in regard to one's inner responses.⁴³⁰ Such inner harmony was Spinoza's concept of virtue.⁴³¹ Drawing on Stoic moral theory, DeBrabander argues that Spinoza provided a form of ethical individualism which 'eschews external authority in ethical matters' and removes the human being from a privileged position within the world view.⁴³² In this regard *conatus* for Spinoza was the idea of an inner self based on internal reflection, rather than any external loci of control.

Spinoza considered there were two ways an individual could overcome their ignorance which produced the internal chains that bound them. The first, reminiscent of Plato discussed in chapter 2, was by use of reason. Spinoza claimed that reason saw the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, without reference to time. He wrote, 'In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.'⁴³³ He defended this by pointing out that reason was affected just as much from things in the past as those in the present and future, so personal history and memories all existed in the present, timeless. Martin Lin notes that in this idea Spinoza does not mean eternity, time without end, but rather he is referring to a form of 'atemporal timelessness'.⁴³⁴ To this timelessness of reason Spinoza also argued that our emotions and desires exist in the world of *specie durationis* — linear time— since our emotions and desires are subject to the flow of events, internal or external.⁴³⁵ Scruton comments that Spinoza considered that, '...freedom is not the release from necessity but the *consciousness* of necessity that comes when we manage to see the world *sub specie aeternitatis* — in a timelessness mode — and ourselves as bound by its immutable

⁴²⁹ Plotinus, *The Enneads*: I.6.9.

⁴³⁰ Friedman, "An Overview of Spinoza's 'Ethics'," pp.96-97.

⁴³¹ Spinoza, *The Ethics*: See Part 5. Prop 10. Note.

⁴³² DeBrabander, *Spinoza and the Stoics, Power Politics and the Passions*: p.7.

⁴³³ Spinoza, *The Ethics*: Part 4. Prop. 62 also expanded in Part 62.Prop.44. Corollary 62.

⁴³⁴ Martin Lin, "Teleology and Human Action in Spinoza," *The Philosophical Review* 115, no. 3 (2006): p.340-341.

⁴³⁵ Scruton, "Spinoza," p.164.

laws.⁴³⁶ Jarrett draws parallels between Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Spinoza and states that 'His [Spinoza's] primary concern, like theirs, is with how it is best to live and his answer, in outline, is the same: "in accordance with reason".⁴³⁷

Spinoza's second concept to help the release from ignorance was to use an instrument of *sub specie aeternitatis* which allowed for a level of detachment.⁴³⁸ Dilman argues that this detachment is not the same as indifference, as the ego needs a way to avoid reacting to the internal question of 'why has this happened to me?'.⁴³⁹ The individual thus requires a way to cultivate detachment in order to release their ego from the basic reactions of anger, blame, or feelings of rejection which can be catalysed by the necessitated external events. Scruton comments that, for Spinoza, the more we understand causality the more we increase our understanding of it and so the more we are self-determined.⁴⁴⁰

Spinoza's contribution to my investigation is that he contemplated not only a lifestyle of living with determinism, in a manner similar to the Stoics, but he also suggested a method by which this could be achieved. The key points in his thinking which are relevant to my research are:

- i. Body and mind/soul were of the same substance, thus body and the human will were both *within* the influence of determinism.
- ii. Lack of awareness of determinism led to an illusion of free will which was based in an ignorance of the antecedent causes.
- iii. Emotionally reacting to external events was simply responding to determinism and showed a lack of what Spinoza considered was the only freedom we could have.
- iv. By accepting the consequences of determinism one could begin to release oneself from reacting to the determinism of the mind. This task could be aided by using the method of:
 - a. Stepping out of time to enable clarity of thinking – the notion of *sub specie aeternitatis*.

⁴³⁶ Scruton, "Spinoza," p.164.

⁴³⁷ Jarrett, *Spinoza: a guide for the perplexed*: p.146.

⁴³⁸ Spinoza, *The Ethics*: Part 2, Prop. 44, corollary 42 and Part 45, Prop 42 and 44.

⁴³⁹ Dilman, *Free will: an historical and philosophical introduction*: p.134.

⁴⁴⁰ Scruton, "Spinoza," p.168.

- b. Defining one's self — *conatus*— by an inner authority.
- c. Using an instrument of detachment.

In astrology, as discussed in chapter 1, the instrument of determinism or fate is generally the horoscope which may act as an antecedent cause where its geometry ultimately imposes the timing of the events of life.⁴⁴¹ But the horoscope is also, according to Costello, an instrument which provides a level of detachment from emotional issues.⁴⁴² The horoscope, therefore, can potentially offer the astrologer a Spinozan instrument of *sub specie aeternitatis* as it can provide detachment and through this detachment also a sense of self and autonomy from not reacting externally or internally to the determined forces around one. This notion will be explored in later chapters.

David Hume — Freedom as our illusion

The Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) offered another approach to freedom and determinism. In his discussion on the naturalism of David Hume, Norman Kemp Smith in 1905 introduced the term 'natural beliefs'. This was a way of defining Hume's notion that beliefs are instinctive and, as a product of determinism, tends to also be irresistible.⁴⁴³ Smith expanded this Humean concept and added that these natural beliefs arise from 'the particular fabric and constitution of the human species.'⁴⁴⁴ Louis Loeb comments that Smith's 'naturalistic interpretation has been the dominant force in the Hume literature ever since.'⁴⁴⁵ Don Garrett notes that the term naturalism varies depending on the different views of 'what is meant to be excluded from the scope of the term "nature".'⁴⁴⁶ With this in mind the label of naturalism when used to describe Hume's argument is referring to the notion that human beliefs were not formed by reason but rather by nature.

⁴⁴¹ For an example of this thinking see Alan Leo, *The Complete Dictionary of Astrology* (c 1900), ed. Vivian Robson (Rochester Vermont: Destiny Books, 1989), p.8.

⁴⁴² Costello, "Astrology in action: Culture and status in unsettled lives," p.77.

⁴⁴³ Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume (I) " p.151.

⁴⁴⁴ Norman Kemp Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume (II)," *Mind* (1905): p.343.

⁴⁴⁵ Louis E. Loeb, "The Naturalisms of Hume and Reid," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 81, no. 2 (2007): p.65.

⁴⁴⁶ Don Garrett, "Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical Project," *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 132, no. 1 (2007): p.3.

For Hume all questions of philosophy and belief needed to be explained within human experience. Hume wrote, 'Nature by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel...' ⁴⁴⁷ Garrett notes that Hume's focus on naturalism meant that he could not and would not, 'make sweeping pronouncements about matters that lie far beyond "common life" and experience...' ⁴⁴⁸

John Bowlin makes a case for linking Hume's ideas to the naturalism of Aquinas, citing Aquinas' belief that virtue and justice are features of human life because they are useful to us in the world and have stemmed from or are shaped by the necessity of the world. ⁴⁴⁹ However, Bowlin points out that Aquinas was not committed to naturalism as was Hume, for Aquinas also embraced the notion of divine life and its influence, a dualist argument. ⁴⁵⁰ In contrast Hume considered that even a belief in the divine was a product of nature or determinism. Garrett notes that Hume rejected the notion of God or supernatural beings, dismissed any arguments of dualism and recognised no miracles or even undetermined acts of free will, 'endorsing instead a universal determinism requiring uniform laws that extend even to human belief and action.' ⁴⁵¹

For Hume, '...all our reasoning concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures.' ⁴⁵² In this way Hume considered the human mind as 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement.' ⁴⁵³ For Hume the mind and reason were simply products of determinism and thus so too the notion of human reflection. According

⁴⁴⁷ David Hume, *A treatise of human nature* (New York: Dover Philosophical Classics, 2003), IV. p.131.

⁴⁴⁸ Garrett, "Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical Project," p.3.

⁴⁴⁹ John R. Bowlin, "Sieges, Shipwrecks, and Sensible Knaves: Justice and Utility in Butler and Hume," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 28, no. 2 (2000): p.274.

⁴⁵⁰ Bowlin, "Sieges, Shipwrecks, and Sensible Knaves: Justice and Utility in Butler and Hume," p.275.

⁴⁵¹ Garrett, "Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical Project," p.3.

⁴⁵² Hume, *A treatise of human nature*: IV.p.131.

⁴⁵³ Hume, *A treatise of human nature*: VI p.180.

to Ainslie's interpretation of Hume, it was these reflections and perceptions that were the building blocks of personal identity, not reason.⁴⁵⁴ Differing from Platonic and Stoic thought, Hume dismissed 'reason' as the vehicle for finding free will or self, and thus as Shaun Gallagher comments, Hume reduced the human soul, the supposed holder of reason, to romantic fiction, something that was 'written by the imagination.'⁴⁵⁵ Gallagher continues that for Hume the mind was always in a 'temporal flow or succession of perceptions (impressions and ideas) which perpetually and spontaneously glide away.'⁴⁵⁶ The thoughts of the mind, Hume considered, were the result of determinism and thus consisted of shifting and inconsistent beliefs formed partly by our history and partly by current circumstances. It was in his work *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* that Hume extended his thinking and argued that with all of the features of humanity contained within the determinism of nature, we lived a 'mixed kind of life'.⁴⁵⁷ Scott Yenor points out that by this argument Hume considered 'that the modern world is the home of the virtues most attuned to our complex and mixed nature.'⁴⁵⁸ Hume thus saw the human mind in a state of flux, shifting in perception and thoughts as events occurred.

Such mixed and varying thoughts are revealed in the field work of Nichols and Knobe, cited in chapter 1. Their findings, that people held varying beliefs concerning the nature of determinism, support Hume's naturalistic argument.⁴⁵⁹ Nichols and Knobe found that these beliefs varied, even within a given individual, between hard incompatibilism through to libertarianism depending on the external circumstances. Nichols called this phenomena 'folk intuition' but in taking a Humean position, as Smith did in 1905, they could be more aptly named 'natural beliefs'.

⁴⁵⁴ Donald C. Ainslie, "Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62, no. 3 (2001): pp.560-561.

⁴⁵⁵ Shaun Gallagher, "The Theater of Personal Identity: From Hume to Derrida," *The Personalist Forum* 8, no. 1 (1992): p.22.

⁴⁵⁶ Gallagher, "The Theater of Personal Identity: From Hume to Derrida," p.21.

⁴⁵⁷ David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Eric Steinberg (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977; reprint, 2nd), p.3.

⁴⁵⁸ Scott Yenor, "Between Rationalism and Postmodernism: Hume's Political Science of Our "Mixed Kind of Life", " *Political Research Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (2002): p.329.

⁴⁵⁹ Knobe and Nichols, *Experimental Philosophy*: p.3.

Hume's arguments challenge the very autonomy of the human mind. However, by maintaining his naturalistic orientation, he argued that humanity may not have free will but still retained moral responsibility:

... no human actions, where it [liberty] is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the objects either of approbation or dislike. For as actions are objects of our moral sentiment, so far only as they are indications of the internal character, passions and affections it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from these principles, but are derived altogether from external violence.⁴⁶⁰

Hume thus argued that if the world was *not* governed by determinism then all events would be random and thus one's actions must also be random. Consequently one's actions could not be determined by personal desires, preferences, or values. But if one's actions were not determined by these things, then a person could not be held responsible for the random events they performed. Thus within Hume's naturalistic arguments moral responsibility requires determinism. Hume is considered a classical compatibilist or a naturalistic compatibilist and can be considered to have set the tone of compatibilist arguments for the next two centuries.⁴⁶¹

Spinoza considered that most people's concept of freedom was based in ignorance or illusion of the influence of determinism on their minds. Hume, however, considered that we do have freedom, found in the very ignorance pointed out by Spinoza. Hume saw that an individual could have the illusion of freedom, particularly when unaware of any coercion. He called this the 'liberty of indifference'.⁴⁶² This was the liberty based in illusion of autonomy.⁴⁶³ To think one is free to choose to do otherwise while free of any known coercion; to freely choose to stir one's tea clockwise or anticlockwise is a simplistic example of Hume's liberty of indifference. Kane defined Hume's 'liberty of indifference' as only dealing with 'surface freedom', freedom based in the illusion of being free of

⁴⁶⁰ Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*: p. 66.

⁴⁶¹ Gary Watson, "Free Action and Free Will," *Mind* 96, no. 382 (1987): p.150; Helen Beebe and Alfred Mele, "Humean Compatibilism," *Mind* 111, no. 442 (2002): p.201.

⁴⁶² Hume, *A treatise of human nature*: pp.407-408.

⁴⁶³ Watson, "Free Action and Free Will," p.145.

causal agents.⁴⁶⁴ Yet within Hume's naturalistic position, as argued, this is the only freedom that one can actually gain. Kane appears to concur with Hume as he points out that in our everyday life we are all products of our upbringing and social conditioning and thus the pursuit of a deeper freedom, free from *any* coercion, may be unrealistic.⁴⁶⁵ Kane argues that to experience deep freedom, one has to invoke a dualist argument.⁴⁶⁶ Kane appears to agree with Hume, by asking the question, 'Why sacrifice the everyday freedoms that really matter to us, freedoms from coercion, punishment, constraint, oppression, and the like, for an illusory freedom of the will that we cannot have anyway?'⁴⁶⁷ Hume also accepted that the will could never be freed but for Hume, as previously argued, such freedom was not required for moral responsibility, which for Hume was the greater prize. Hume defined free will, therefore, like that for the soul cited earlier, as a product of our imagination, but an important product of our imagination.

Hume also focused on the nature of human identity:

But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time.... For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.⁴⁶⁸

Barry Stroud argues that Hume considered identity as fictitious based only on our temporal reflections and illusions.⁴⁶⁹ Donald Ainslie suggests that, for Hume, identity was founded in reflective secondary ideas and memory, not so much as being engaged in an action but reflecting back one's engagement with that action.

In summary, therefore, Hume considered that our personal values and beliefs emerged in our minds as a result of the actions of nature — actions shaped by the necessity of our lives

⁴⁶⁴ Kane, *A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will*: p.2-3.

⁴⁶⁵ Kane, *A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will*: pp. 2-3.

⁴⁶⁶ Kane, *A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will*: p.39.

⁴⁶⁷ Kane, *A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will*: p.4.

⁴⁶⁸ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp.251-252.

⁴⁶⁹ Barry Stroud, "The Constraints of Hume's Naturalism," *Synthese* 152, no. 3 (2006): p.346.

and the utilitarian re-enforcement of justice and goodness by the actions of society.

Personal moral responsibility came out of nature and determinism rather than notions of free will. Freedom itself was an illusion but an illusion which facilitated the development of moral responsibility and virtue.

The key points in his thinking which are relevant to my research are:

- i. For Hume freedom only existed as an illusion. We experience the illusion of free will when our awareness of coercion is at a minimum.
- ii. Hume argued, however, that in a similar manner to Aquinas, that moral responsibility and thus virtue was a product of the natural world.
- iii. Hume used a naturalistic approach to human beliefs. He considered that all our beliefs, which included beliefs about freedom and determinism, were subject to the personal history and current events, all of which were also subject to determinism. In this way, for most people, their beliefs were varied, complex and often inconsistent — natural beliefs.
- iv. Personal identity, which for Hume was mutable, was enhanced by self-reflection (memory and personal history) of our actions and decisions.

In this way for an astrologer the use of the natal horoscope with its basis in natural celestial cycles could be seen as a Humean naturalistic object of reflection, on their personal history, to build self-identity. As the British astrologer Margaret Hone wrote in 1951:

Inasmuch as a man identifies himself with his physical self and the physical world about him, so he is indissolubly part of it and subject to its changing pattern as formed by the planets in their orbits.⁴⁷⁰

Arthur Schopenhauer — an irrational world with free will as illusion

The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) had a profound influence on music, literature, poetry and art and thus in many ways his views have had a wide impact

⁴⁷⁰ Hone, *The Modern Text-Book of Astrology*: p.17.

on society well beyond the confines of philosophy.⁴⁷¹ He saw character as central to his views on humanity, and spoke of character in the following manner:

Since *a man does not alter*, and his moral character remains absolutely the same all through his life; since he must play out the part which he has received, without the least deviation from the character; since neither experience, nor philosophy, nor religion can effect any improvement in him, the question arises, What is the meaning of life at all? To what purpose is it played, this farce in which everything that is essential is irrevocably fixed and determined?⁴⁷² [Schopenhauer's italics]

Character for Schopenhauer was not the state of flux as argued by Hume, but was instead a fixed, shaped by the causality of determinism, and present from the moment of birth.

Schopenhauer wrote:

Since character, so far as we understand its nature, is above and beyond time, it cannot undergo any change under the influence of life. But although it must necessarily remain the same always, it requires time to unfold itself and show the very diverse aspects which it may possess.⁴⁷³

Thus for Schopenhauer a man's actions '...proceed from his innate and unalterable character and they are more immediately and particularly determined by motives. A man's conduct, therefore, is the necessary product of both character and motive.'⁴⁷⁴ This character formed by determinism was the result of what Schopenhauer labelled as the 'World as Will' and the 'Will' was in all things.⁴⁷⁵

Roger Caldwell writes of Schopenhauer's approach to the notion of will by stating, 'For Schopenhauer, "Will" is the fundamental driving force of the universe: in galaxies, rocks (through gravity), in plants, animals and humans alike.'⁴⁷⁶ Schopenhauer saw will existing in parallel with the idea of 'mind'. Stjepan G. Meštrović notes the dualist feature of these arguments, for Schopenhauer saw the world as consisting of both the 'Will', which at times

⁴⁷¹ Caldwell, "Schopenhauer," p.13.

⁴⁷² Arthur Schopenhauer, "Character," in *The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer; On Human Nature*, ed. T.Bailey Saunders (Teddington: The Echo Library 2006), p.40.

⁴⁷³ Schopenhauer, *On Human Nature*: p.64.

⁴⁷⁴ Arthur Schopenhauer, ed. *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p.23.

⁴⁷⁵ Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea* (New York: Dover Press, [1818] 1969), p.23.

⁴⁷⁶ Caldwell, "Schopenhauer," p.14.

he called the 'heart', as well as the notion of 'mind', also known as the 'representation' or idea.⁴⁷⁷ But for Schopenhauer the relationship between the will and the mind was, as Meštrović points out, 'an antagonistic relationship...'.⁴⁷⁸

Schopenhauer's arguments have parallels with Plato's views, discussed in chapter 2, for Plato also considered that character was fixed; he located it within the soul and as a consequence it was immortal, and polished by its actions and choices both in the material world and the spiritual afterlife.⁴⁷⁹ Additionally Zain Imtiaz Ali argues that Schopenhauer's, 'concept of freeing the Will is akin to Plato's desire to purify the soul.'⁴⁸⁰ Plato also considered that the relationship of the body to the soul could be seen as one of tension.⁴⁸¹ However, Plato argued that the notion of a World Soul filled with divine reason 'overruled Necessity by persuading her to guide the greatest part of the things that become towards what is best, and the result of this subjugation of Necessity to wise persuasion was the initial formation of this universe.'⁴⁸² Some thousand years later Calcidius extended this to suggest that the World Soul was in essence fate.⁴⁸³ Schopenhauer disagreed. Henri Ellenberger makes this point when he wrote that:

Schopenhauer's will had the dynamic character of blind, driving forces, which not only reigned over the universe, but also conducted man. Thus, man is an irrational being guided by internal forces, which are unknown to him and of which he is scarcely aware.⁴⁸⁴

Caldwell also focuses on the irrational or a lack of purpose to Schopenhauer's will by arguing that, 'Taken as a whole the 'World as Will' is endless, utterly meaningless, and blindly striving towards nowhere in particular.'⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁷⁷ Stjepan G. Meštrović, "Rethinking the Will and Idea of Sociology in the Light of Schopenhauer's Philosophy," *The British Journal of Sociology* 40, no. 2 (1989): pp.273-274.

⁴⁷⁸ Meštrović, "Rethinking the Will and Idea of Sociology in the Light of Schopenhauer's Philosophy," pp.273-274.

⁴⁷⁹ See Plato, *Timaeus*: 42c.

⁴⁸⁰ Zain Imtiaz Ali, "Ai-Ghazālī and Schopenhauer on Knowledge and Suffering," *Philosophy East and West* 57, no. 4 (2007): p.413.

⁴⁸¹ For an example of this see Plato, *Phaedo*: 66a-b.

⁴⁸² Plato, *Timaeus*: 48a.

⁴⁸³ den Boeft, *Calcidius on Fate*: Paragraph 143b.

⁴⁸⁴ Henri Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconsciousness* (New York: Basic Books 1970), p.208.

⁴⁸⁵ Caldwell, "Schopenhauer," p.14.

Schopenhauer actually reversed the traditional dualist arguments. He saw the will as the dominant force in the world and the mind or reason a secondary concept. This dominant will not only shaped the unconscious but was experienced as emotional, instinctual and passion driven. Georg Simmel points out, 'All philosophers prior to Schopenhauer conceived of man as a rational being,[but] Schopenhauer challenged the dogma that rationality is the deep-seated and basic essence of man that lies beneath the other ripples of life.'⁴⁸⁶ For Schopenhauer humanity was dominated by an irrational force, the will. Schopenhauer saw the relationship between the will and the mind like a 'strong blind man carrying the sighted lame man [the mind] on his shoulders'⁴⁸⁷ R. K. Gupta also stressed that Schopenhauer's will was not rational but rather irrational, a blind and involuntary force.⁴⁸⁸ Meštrović concludes that, 'In essence, Schopenhauer turned the Enlightenment understanding of human nature in which the mind is ultimately granted a superior position in relation to the heart upside down.'⁴⁸⁹

For Schopenhauer the human mind or consciousness was not in control of the individual. He defended this argument by citing examples of an individual unable to prevent themselves from undertaking certain unwanted actions.⁴⁹⁰ In popular language this may be expressed as a person having a weak will or a lack of will power, as well as, perhaps, a lack of awareness of why they may be self-destructive.

Faced with the concept of humanity living in an antagonistic relationship with the irrational will which not only shaped the individual's unconscious but also dictated all external events, Schopenhauer answered his own question, cited earlier, on the meaning of life. For him life was a farce however the personal meaning of life was so that:

⁴⁸⁶ Georg Simmel, *Schopenhauer and Nietzsche* (Amherst University of Massachusetts Press, [1907] 1986), pp.27-28.

⁴⁸⁷ Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea* p.209.

⁴⁸⁸ R. K. Gupta, "Freud and Schopenhauer," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36, no. 4 (1975): p.722.

⁴⁸⁹ Meštrović, "Rethinking the Will and Idea of Sociology in the Light of Schopenhauer's Philosophy," p.274.

⁴⁹⁰ Schopenhauer, *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will* p.35.

... a man may come to understand himself, that he may see what it is that he seeks and has sought to be; what he wants, and what, therefore, he is. *This is a knowledge which must be imparted to him from without.*⁴⁹¹

Not all agreed with Schopenhauer's view of life. William James (1842–1910) expressed his distaste for Schopenhauer's philosophy when he defined Schopenhauer's notion of an 'incurably vicious Will-substance' which dominated the mind as 'a pessimistic principle.'⁴⁹² Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) also rejected the irrational nature of Schopenhauer's will and wrote of Schopenhauer's notion of will as, 'the blind World-Will that it is so strong that a man could slay his brother merely to grease his boots with his brother's fat.'⁴⁹³

Dilman notes that repugnant as Schopenhauer's reversal of the classical concept of dualism was to some philosophers, Schopenhauer did, however, have a strong influence on the development of psychoanalysis, which functions on the premise that the individual may need to be freed from the bondage of his or her unconscious.⁴⁹⁴ Gupta argues that there were strong similarities between Schopenhauer's view of will and Sigmund Freud's (1856–1939) concept of *id*.⁴⁹⁵ Gupta continues by noting that, 'Both Schopenhauer and Freud reacted against the prevailing overvaluation of reason and intellect in man, and saw the real driving force behind his action in the dark depths of the unconscious.'⁴⁹⁶ Similarly with the emphasis that Schopenhauer placed on the will as an unconscious irrational dominating force, Gupta argues that Jung was also influenced by Schopenhauer's thinking.⁴⁹⁷ It should be noted, however, that, as cited earlier, Jung rejected the irrational foundation of Schopenhauer's notion of will. However, in influencing Freud, and thus Jung, Schopenhauer's thinking forms the foundation of psychological astrology, discussed in chapter 6, through the work of Margaret Hone and Liz Greene.

⁴⁹¹ Schopenhauer, "Character," p.40.

⁴⁹² James, *The Will to Believe. Essays in Popular Philosophy*: p.82.

⁴⁹³ C.G Jung, "The Oedipus Complex," *Freud and Psychoanalysis*, vol. Vol IV, The Collected Works of C. G. Jung (1961), p.156.

⁴⁹⁴ Dilman, *Free will: an historical and philosophical introduction*: p.179.

⁴⁹⁵ Gupta, "Freud and Schopenhauer," p.721.

⁴⁹⁶ Gupta, "Freud and Schopenhauer," p.721.

⁴⁹⁷ Gupta, "Freud and Schopenhauer," p.724.

The features of Schopenhauer's philosophy which contribute to this work are as follows:

- i. Character was the immutable product of determinism and could not be altered by the individual's experiences, philosophies, or religious beliefs.
- ii. The world was governed by Will: Indeed Schopenhauer saw the World as Will.
- iii. The Will was irrational, thus the character of an individual was formed in an irrational manner: it was not the product of a benign deity with a sense of harmony and balance to its motives, it was formed by the state of the Will at the time of birth.

Moral responsibility —other contemporary compatibilists' arguments

The question of free will is also a question of moral responsibility. Hume's arguments for determinism, cited earlier, can be viewed as arguments on how naturalism can create moral responsibility, the sense of what is good and what is not good.⁴⁹⁸ The resulting model of free will which emerged from Hume's naturalism was a 'liberty of indifference'. In more recent times Harry Frankfurt focused on the link between moral responsibility and freedom.⁴⁹⁹ Frankfurt sees the will as being based in desires and considers different levels of human desire. He argues that humanity has '...the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.'⁵⁰⁰ It is these second-order desires which are not our impulses or cravings but our rational decisions and which are, for Frankfurt, the location of moral responsibility, our ability to override a desire. However, in commenting on Frankfurt's arguments, David Cockburn points out that there are different combinations of freedom and moral responsibility: they are not a pair of single concepts.⁵⁰¹

Another argument, put forward by Susan Wolf, is that the debates on determinism and its conflict with free will are not relevant. She suggests instead that moral responsibility and

⁴⁹⁸ Garrett, "Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical Project," p.15.

⁴⁹⁹ Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," *The Journal of Philosophy* 66, no. 23 (1969): p.831.

⁵⁰⁰ Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," *The Journal of Philosophy* 68, no. 1 (1971): p.7, pp.19-20.

⁵⁰¹ David Cockburn, "Reviews: *The Non-Reality of Free Will* by Richard Double and, *Freedom Within Reason* by Susan Wolf," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 42, no. 168 (1992): p.386.

one's depth of autonomy should be the centre of the argument, not freedom and determinism.⁵⁰² Applying Wolf's arguments to Stoicism, for example, it could be argued that, in choosing to act for the good, without reward or punishment, praise or blame, and with no immediate consequences in this life or the next, Stoic thinking genuinely displayed the true nature of human freedom. When talking of this style of freedom Wolfe states 'Only this kind of freedom will be neither too much nor too little. For then the agent is not so free as to be free from moral reasons, nor so unfree as to make these reasons ineffective.'⁵⁰³ Cockburn adds to Wolf's argument by suggesting that this question should not be about fitting moral responsibility into determinism but rather one should see if '...there is room for determinism (and indeterminism) in the gaps left by responsibility.'⁵⁰⁴

Placing moral responsibility in the centre of the argument and allocating a secondary role to questions of free will and determinism may be a motivation for some astrologers. They may use their horoscope as a guide to live what for them is a morally correct life, regardless of the implications or demands that astrology makes on their personal ideas of free will.

Questioning the nature of determinism

Spinoza, Hume and Schopenhauer focused on living with determinism, a determinism defined by the laws of physics. By accepting the constraints of the universal nature of determinism their only option was to redefine the nature of free will. However, a different approach to the free will dilemma is not to look to make free will fit into universal determinism but rather to challenge the nature of determinism.

Challenging determinism's universality

The belief in the universality of determinism has been the dominant philosophical position since the seventeenth century and the acceptance of its universality from that period is reflected in the scorn of François-Marie Aroue, known as Voltaire (1694–1778), when he

⁵⁰² Susan Wolf, *Freedom within Reason* (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.44-45.

⁵⁰³ Susan Wolf, "Asymmetrical Freedom," *The Journal of Philosophy* 77, no. 3 (1980): p.166.

⁵⁰⁴ David Cockburn, "Responsibility and Necessity," *Philosophy* 70, no. 273 (1995): p.427.

stated, 'It would be very singular that all nature, all planets, should obey eternal laws, and that there should be a little animal, five feet high, who, in contempt of those laws, could act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice.'⁵⁰⁵ Nevertheless in the face of this hegemony, Mark Balaguer argues that by challenging universal determinism one can effectively insulate free will from determinism.⁵⁰⁶

The universality of determinism, discussed in chapter 1, states that the organic and the inorganic worlds are equally affected by the laws of physics, laws that have no moral content, following only mathematics and the laws of thermodynamics. Determinism makes no comment on the experience of human life. It is silent on matters of quality of life, matters of fortune, misfortune, good or evil and, as David Hodgson states, it, '...has no place and role for consciousness.'⁵⁰⁷ Due to the consequences of this universality there are contemporary arguments that dispute this claim.

Nancy Cartwright challenges the universality of determinism and considers this feature of determinism to be a 'fundamentalism of physics', '...there is a tendency to believe that all facts must belong to one grand scheme and moreover that this is a scheme in which the facts ... have a special and privileged status.'⁵⁰⁸ Cartwright also points to the self-organizing emergentism of biology and its resistance to reductionism — a feature of determinism — suggesting this is an indication of an error in the assumption of the universality of determinism.⁵⁰⁹ She suggests instead metaphysical nomological pluralism, which is the doctrine '...that nature is governed in different domains by different systems of laws not necessarily related to each other in any systematic or uniform way; by a patchwork of laws.'⁵¹⁰ She argues that the laws of physics are theoretical generalizations

⁵⁰⁵ Voltaire, "The Ignorant Philosopher," in *In The Best Known Works of Voltaire*. London (London: Blue Ribbon Books, 1932), p.439.

⁵⁰⁶ See Chapter 4 of: Balaguer, *Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem*: particular section 4.4.2.

⁵⁰⁷ Hodgson, "Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will " p.106.

⁵⁰⁸ Cartwright, *The dappled world: a study of the boundaries of science*: p.25.

⁵⁰⁹ Cartwright, *The dappled world: a study of the boundaries of science*: pp.32-33.

⁵¹⁰ Cartwright, *The dappled world: a study of the boundaries of science*: p.31.

based on what should be the phenomenological laws of nature and that by this generalization they produce distortions.⁵¹¹

Carl Hoefer also lists a range of arguments against the universality of determinism, one of which is the twentieth century assumption that the laws of physics actually *create* nature rather than simply *explain* nature.⁵¹² He argues, in a similar way to Cartwright, for a determinism of parts, '...each part bears a determining—or partial-determining—relation to other parts, but in which no particular part [antecedent space or times] has a special, stronger determining role than any other.'⁵¹³

Emergentism, self-organising systems

Determinism's universality is also challenged by self-organising systems. Christian Fuchs *et al* points out that these systems appear to be governed by '...less than strict determinism... [as] a touch of indeterminism enters causal relationships that involve self-organizing systems, for the systems themselves select one of the several possible ways to react.'⁵¹⁴ Klaus Brunner comments that, within a system undergoing self-organisation, 'Different inputs may lead to the same output, and the same input may lead to different outputs. So causes and effects are not coupled unambiguously.'⁵¹⁵ These 'less than strict' deterministic situations contain the potential for a system to emerge into a pattern whose final form is not inevitable. Commenting on this type of pattern-forming behaviour Brian Goodwin writes, 'Such unexpected, orderly patterns from disorderly elements are known as emergent properties. In general they cannot be predicted from a knowledge of how individuals behave and how they interact.'⁵¹⁶ Furthermore such emergent systems are common. They occur in mathematics when fractals are formed by certain types of equations undergoing iterations. 'Iteration' is when the results of the equation are fed back

⁵¹¹ Nancy Cartwright, *How the Laws of Physics Lie* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), Introduction.

⁵¹² Hoefer, "Causal Determinism".

⁵¹³ Hoefer, "Causal Determinism".

⁵¹⁴ Christian Fuchs, Wolfgang Hofkirchner, and Bert Klauninger, "The Dialectic of Bottom-up and Top-down Emergence in Social Systems " (paper presented at the Problems of Individual Emergence, Amsterdam, 2001).

⁵¹⁵ Klaus A Bruner, "What's Emergent in Emergent Computing?,"(2002), <http://www.self-organization.org/results/papers/pdf/hsicpaper1.pdf>. 15 June 2011.

⁵¹⁶ Brian Goodwin, *Nature's Due, Healing Our Fragmented Culture* (London: Floris Books, 2007), p.35.

into the next application of that equation.⁵¹⁷ They also occur in living systems: social, political, cultural and even the lives of individuals.⁵¹⁸ Thus an emergent system is not fully described, nor can its behaviour be predicted by using the properties of determinism, with its universal antecedent causality. According to Goodwin, the features of an emergent self-organising system are cyclic where feedback within the system produces new order in a manner which is similar but not the same as the previous order.⁵¹⁹ The resulting order from this repetition, or cyclic nature, was defined by the mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot (1924-2010) as self-similarity.⁵²⁰ An emergent system therefore appears to challenge determinism's universal claims as it moves forward through time in a cyclic manner producing order by returning to its earlier variation and each new phase of order produced is similar but not identical to the previous expression.⁵²¹

Part of the field work of my research has been to explore astrologer's beliefs for an emergent style of fate. This is reported on in chapter 7.

Teleology as a causal agent

Emergentism with its self-organising systems can lead to questions around teleology. F. J. K. Soontjens notes that Aristotle, discussed in chapter 2, accentuated an 'internal teleology, in which final causes are active in nature itself: things strive to the actualization of their own form.'⁵²² Soontjens points out that Aristotle's internal teleology became converted to external teleology in the Christian period:

Under the influence of Christian theology, this Aristotelian concept of 'internal teleology' was radically transformed. Nature came to be viewed as the result of

⁵¹⁷ John van Eenwyk, *Archetypes and Strange Attractors, The Chaotic World of Symbols* (Toronto, Canada: Inner City Books, 1997), p.52.

⁵¹⁸ Stuart Kauffman, *At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.15, p.186; Michael Butz, *Chaos and Complexity – Implications for Psychological Theory and Practice* (Washington, DC: Taylor and Francis, 1997), p.18.

⁵¹⁹ Goodwin, *Nature's Due, Healing Our Fragmented Culture*: pp.38-39.

⁵²⁰ Benoit Mandelbrot, *Fractals: Form, chance, and dimensions* (San Francisco W.H. Freeman, 1977), pp.16-17; For the terms use in living systems see Butz, *Chaos and Complexity – Implications for Psychological Theory and Practice*: p.17.

⁵²¹ Goodwin, *Nature's Due, Healing Our Fragmented Culture*: pp.38-39.

⁵²² Soontjens, "Evolution: Teleology or Chance?," p.137.

'external teleology': all natural order and all natural processes were the outcome of God's plan and purpose.⁵²³

Soontiëns argues that there is now a general and incorrect assumption that teleology implies a purely external teleology linked with the 'purposes of God' and 'anthropomorphism'.⁵²⁴

Teleology was also a causal agent within the cosmological view of Alfred Whitehead (1861–1947). He suggested, in a way reminiscent of Stoic doctrine, that the cosmos was only immanent and he wrote:

The mutual independence of contemporary occasions [an event or entity] lies strictly within the sphere of their teleological self-creation. The occasions originate from a common past and their objective immortality operates within a common future. Thus indirectly, via the immanence of the past and the immanence of the future, the occasions are connected. But the immediate activity of self-creation is separate and private, so far as contemporaries are concerned.⁵²⁵

In this way Whitehead considered all things to be dependent on each other but not causally linked to each other. Each 'occasion', which he defined as a person, an idea, a nation state, or a landscape was self-creative and influenced by its individual history and by its internal need to move, in a creative manner, forward through time rather than reaching for an Aristotelian potentially inevitable view of an idea of perfection.

Paul Cilliers, arguing from the discipline of process philosophy and complexity science, suggests that this behaviour described by Whitehead is emergent but that it happens blindly or randomly.⁵²⁶ Nicholas Rescher comments on both Cillier's and Whitehead's arguments. He labels Cilliers' argument as a naturalistic wing of process philosophy which is '...nature's processuality as a matter of an inner push or nusus to something new and

⁵²³ Soontiëns, "Evolution: Teleology or Chance?," p.137.

⁵²⁴ Soontiëns, "Evolution: Teleology or Chance?," p.138.

⁵²⁵ Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of ideas* (Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican Books, 1933, 1942), p.190.

⁵²⁶ Paul Cilliers, *Complexity and Postmodernism, Understanding complex systems* (London, New York: Routledge, 1998, 2005), p.92.

different.⁵²⁷ He then labels Whitehead's argument as the teleological wing defined as a belief in '...nature's processuality as a matter of teleological directness towards a positive destination.'⁵²⁸ A middle position was suggested by the cultural historian and ecotheologian Thomas Berry (1914–2009). Instead of the blind emergence of Cilliers he supported Whitehead's form of teleology and argued that order was immanent and emergent but not as inevitable *telos* but rather non-inevitable *telos* that is moving forward in time in a creative manner maintaining a loyalty but not exactness to a pattern.⁵²⁹ Whitehead's and Berry's ideas are in fact another form of sympathetic cosmology, emergent and held together by a desire for order but creative with regard to that order. Klaus Brunner sees such a view of teleology as, '...establishing a middle ground between the extremes of mechanism [scientific determinism] ... and vitalism, introducing a degree of indeterminism while remaining a fully naturalistic philosophy by rejecting supernatural influence.'⁵³⁰ Brunner was discussing emergent computing but saw his work as applicable to all complex systems organic or non-organic.

However, Ernst Mayr argues against the existence of teleology and points out that, since the work of Charles Darwin and the development of the concept of evolution, teleology is no longer required to understand the world. He suggests that evolution '...provides a satisfactory explanation for the course of organic evolution and makes an invoking of supernatural teleological forces unnecessary.'⁵³¹ F. Soontiëns, however, puts forward the idea that the human is a teleological being with current actions being directed by future ambitions. In this way he argues that humanity could not be the product of an a-teleological world, for he states that, 'If nature and evolution are a-teleological, than we are either obliged to conclude that human teleology stems from a non- (extra-, super-) natural source, or we are obliged to conclude that human teleology is only an illusion.'⁵³² Potentially astrologers may support Soontiëns argument and accept teleology as a form of

⁵²⁷ Nicholas Rescher, *Process Metaphysics, an introduction to process philosophy* (New York: State University of New York, 1996), p.99.

⁵²⁸ Rescher, *Process Metaphysics, an introduction to process philosophy*: p.99.

⁵²⁹ Thomas Berry, *The Great Work, our way into the future* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1999), p.31.

⁵³⁰ Bruner, "What's Emergent in Emergent Computing?".

⁵³¹ Mayr, "The Idea of Teleology," pp.118-120 and this quote from p.135.

⁵³² Soontiëns, "Evolution: Teleology or Chance?," p.140.

fate. For this reason questions around patterns and teleology were included in the survey discussed in chapter 7.

Challenging antecedent linear causality

Whitehead, Cilliers, Berry, and Brunner all challenged the theory of antecedent linear causation, replacing it with different versions of emergence and/or teleology. This challenge was not without precedent. Menno Hulwit argues, '...contrary to what is generally supposed, causation is not a univocal conception It is an ambiguous conception, with at least two (or three) different meanings, each of which requires a critical analysis on its own.'⁵³³ David Sapire also comments that science and philosophy 'still lack a satisfactory general theory of causation — a theory that captures in a unified way the acceptable aspects of both traditional and contemporary causal concepts.'⁵³⁴ Any shifts in the meanings of causation as referred to by Hulwit and inferred by Sapire has implications for definitions of determinism suggesting that determinism may not be adequately described as the universal application of a law of physics concerning force, mass and acceleration.

Such debates on causality were also present in the classical period. Plotinus, cited in chapter 2, was guarded around issues of causation when he suggested, 'Cause might conceivably underlie all the entities in both orders [spirit and material] or none in either. It might underlie some, only, in each order, the others being causeless.'⁵³⁵ In contrast to Plotinus' ideas of causation, the Stoic causal theory underpinned the Stoics' entire philosophy and was, as Bobzien states, a single cause.⁵³⁶ This single Stoic cause, according to Long and Sedley, was only antecedent in that '...a cause is a thing which, by its activity, brings about an effect.'⁵³⁷ Additionally Bobzien argues that this single Stoic cause was unlike the modern view of causation in that all causes needed to have motion rather than

⁵³³ Hulwit, "From Cause to Causation. A Peircean Perspective".

⁵³⁴ Sapire, "General Causation," p.321.

⁵³⁵ Plotinus, *The Enneads*: III.1.1.

⁵³⁶ Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*: p.302.

⁵³⁷ Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic philosophers*, 1: p.340; also see Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*: p.18.

just effect, and indeed cause and effect were seen as two separate concepts.⁵³⁸ Thus, for the Stoic, any object in motion was a cause in itself, be that a moving planet or any form of life, including an individual human being. Each object moved within its own individual nature, influencing and/or restricting other objects. Bobzien points out that by this movement, and a belief that such movement complied with universal reason, the order of the world slowly emerged and the 'moving' god was created.⁵³⁹

Thus both the nature of causality and the claim of determinism to be universal have been challenged. Within the philosophical debates on free will and moral responsibility it is being considered that determinism may not be universal; it may not apply equally at all times to all objects. The causal agent contained within determinism may be emergent and have teleological characteristic rather than being solely antecedent. Awareness of these points needs to be maintained when considering any present-day theories of fate which may be found within the beliefs of astrologers. Astrologers may have what Smith defined as 'natural beliefs' and these natural beliefs may not only contain Platonic, Stoic and/or Aristotelian themes discussed in the previous chapter or post-seventeenth century philosophical themes as discussed in this chapter. Present-day astrologers may also hold intuitive beliefs which do not accept the universal nature of determinism driven by antecedent causality.

Chapter summary

This chapter has examined different modern approaches that have been argued as solutions to the free will dilemma. The chapter focused on the solutions advocated by René Descartes, Baruch de Spinoza, David Hume, and Arthur Schopenhauer. Descartes argued for a dualism which allocated freedom to the human will which existed in consciousness, a form of libertarianism based in universal separatism. Spinoza postulated that what people considered freedom was an illusion; his arguments were aimed towards the notion of removing the ignorance of the 'chains that bind us'. He posited a therapeutic approach to

⁵³⁸ Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*: pp.18-27.

⁵³⁹ Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*: p.32.

living with determinism by implementing a timeless mode and adopting a level of detachment to enable reason to grow in understanding of the deterministic nature of the mind. Hume's work drew on naturalism and saw all beliefs as derived from nature. In this way he considered that free will was an illusion but an illusion that provided for moral responsibility. Schopenhauer took a dualist position but reversed the classical position of divine reason that dominated the world of matter. Schopenhauer saw character as fixed at birth and defined by the will, an irrational expression of determinism which controlled the individual through the influence of emotions and instincts emerging from the unconscious. Schopenhauer thus placed humanity into an irrational world where the immutable character created by the force of determinism was only revealed through the actions and life of the individual.

The chapter then considered some of the more contemporary solutions to the free will dilemma which focused on moral responsibility through the arguments of Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolf, who in different ways, argued that moral responsibility should be the focus of the debate and not the tension between the notion of free will and the notion of universal determinism. The chapter also discussed solutions to the free will dilemma which challenged the universality of determinism and the nature of causality. Nancy Cartwright's arguments for the non-universality of determinism were considered as well as different causal models such as the concept of emergentism and its cyclic self-similar producing nature. Additionally teleology was discussed, both internal and external, producing the concept of inevitable as well as non-inevitable teleology.

The questions that can now be asked of the astrological community are as follows: Do they support some or all of these modern solutions to the free will dilemma? Have astrologers followed suit with philosophical modern thinking and rejected the existence of a sympathetic cosmology filled with theories of fate? If not, then what is the nature of the theories of fate within present-day astrology? Furthermore, independent of the astrologer's choice between fate and determinism, do present-day astrologers accept Aquinas' solution and embrace dualism, either Cartesian or Platonist? Are they following the naturalism of Aristotle and later Hume and thus instinctively accepting Hume's argument for a natural compatibilism? Do they intuitively follow Spinoza's concept based in Stoicism and see

their horoscopes as a detached expression of themselves? Or does the pessimism of Schopenhauer's dualism produce a therapeutic — psychological— form of astrology? Is there one single solution to the free will dilemma that astrologers adopt, if they adopt one at all, or are there many different solutions?

The next three chapters begin to answer some of these questions through the literature of the twentieth- and twenty-first century astrological literature while subsequent chapters take these questions into the field.