

CHAPTER 10

Two Poles and Perpetual Crisis, 1950–1964

In October 1962, U.S. president John F. Kennedy was presented with evidence that the ongoing struggle of words and wills between the United States and the USSR for international domination had taken a terrifying turn. U.S. military intelligence services had proved that missile silos suitable for launching nuclear warheads had been constructed in Cuba, ninety miles from the coast of the USA. The silos had been built by the USSR, which might be in the process of loading them. The president and his advisers soberly discussed the chances that the Soviet Union would actually use nuclear weapons if the United States should demand that the silos be destroyed and prevent more Soviet ships from reaching Cuba. Nobody knew the answer.

The president called former president Dwight D. Eisenhower to ask his advice. The older man calmly assessed the possibilities, then said that Soviet intentions were unfathomable. But at bottom he thought that no man would actually be able to bring himself to launch the missiles and initiate a nuclear war. Kennedy chuckled grimly, “Yeah. Well, we’ll hang on tight.” Eisenhower also chuckled, and said, “Yes, sir!” Turning to his advisers and officials, Kennedy announced that the United States would demand destruction of the silos and would hope that what was regarded as improbable was actually impossible.¹

¹Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 146.

Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy represented two phases in the management of the postwar world. When Eisenhower was the American president from 1953 to 1961, the emphasis in both the United States and the USSR was on building up nuclear weapons capabilities and intelligence technology so that a direct confrontation between the superpowers became unthinkable. The absolute destructive power of nuclear weapons, combined with rapid advances in technological surveillance, meant that neither of the two great rivals could attack the other without being destroyed itself. The arms race severely taxed the economies and the cultures of both societies, but by the end of the 1950s it had rendered the possibility of nuclear war abstract. Thereafter, the superpowers engage in "Cold War" rivalry, competing for allies and resources without directly fighting each other.

The Cuban missile crisis, however, demonstrated that new leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union could still see the use of nuclear weapons as possible. The crisis was an example of the dangers of the constant brinksmanship between the superpowers—each trying to see how far it could push the other before the threat of nuclear war caused one side or the other to back down. Each side knew that one day there could be a miscalculation, and the other side might refuse to back down even if it meant a nuclear conflict. Moreover, within only a few years of the crisis in Cuba, the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world began, bringing with it new dangers that "limited nuclear war," very hot wars, could become a reality.

Crisis and Compromise in the Management of the Postwar World

After the Second World War, the emergence of new nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America represented many sorts of challenges to the two world powers. Stalin had made it clear to the American and British leaders that he intended to spread communism to as many nations as possible. U.S. leaders and their foreign allies considered every part of the world lost to capitalism to be a diminution of their own access to natural resources and markets. In theory, the leaders of the capitalist world agreed with Stalin: Capitalism and communism were fatally opposed, and they could not coexist. But that was in theory. In practice, they would have to coexist for some indefinite period. Indeed, when Stalin died in 1953, his successor Khrushchev announced that his own foreign policy would be based on "peaceful coexistence" with the United States and its allies.

The New Supremacy of "Security"

An ultimate conflict between the superpowers would be pointless unless one side or the other gained a decisive advantage in self-protection. In both the United States and the Soviet Union, organizations that collected information about the opposition, prevented the opposition from collecting its own information, and

detected ways in which the opposition might be encouraging domestic troubles were all reorganized and enlarged. The development of surveillance technologies became a high priority. Strategies for finding the best placement of listening posts and analytical centers became part of the global calculation behind new alliances and the protection of emerging states.

In the Soviet Union, organizations for state security were already well prepared for their duties in the era of the Cold War. Through the Second World War, intelligence organizations were an important part of the Soviet defense efforts. These organizations were separate from, but worked together with, the Comintern. While the Comintern sponsored the Communist education and political advancement of activists from Europe, Asia, and Africa, the secret police organizations picked certain foreign activists for training as intelligence officers. After Stalin's death in 1953, the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev created the KGB (from the Russian words for "Committee of State Security") from the older organizations. The feared Stalin intelligence chief Lavrentyi Beria was arrested on Khrushchev's orders and his intelligence organizations dismantled and replaced by the KGB.

In the postwar era, and particularly after 1950, the entire political pattern of the globe was determined by the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States were the only nuclear powers, and that they were challenged by no other nations. As we saw in Chapter 9, the Soviet Union, as Germany's enemy after 1940, felt pressured to make headway in atomic research, but it did not have the resources to complete its projects. It had to depend on espionage. The final bit of information enabling the creation of a Soviet bomb was provided after the war, probably by a spy network that included several Los Alamos scientists. Soviet scientists, led by I. V. Kurchatov, quickly interpreted and applied the information. To prevent infiltration by American spies, Soviet scientists were removed to special compounds (*sharashka*), where they lived comfortably but without contact with the outside world while they worked secretly on projects relating to weapons and aviation. There was no official acknowledgment that the *sharashkas* existed, and they had military-style security that permitted trespassers to be shot.

Before the Second World War, the United States did not have well-developed organizations for gathering intelligence, whether military or scientific. Spying and surveillance tended to be focused on an individual's actions, not on his or her thoughts or opinions. During World War II, the American government created several military intelligence organizations. These were reorganized during 1946 and 1947 under American president Harry S. Truman as the Central Intelligence Agency. By law the CIA was supposed to mount operations only outside the United States, and to leave all domestic intelligence work to the FBI. Beginning in the 1950s, the FBI—still under its founder, J. Edgar Hoover—began to investigate unions and universities where it thought communist sympathizers might be residing. Files were opened on most major American intellectuals; these included copies of their publications and, in fewer cases, data from direct surveillance of their personal lives. These methods were used to indict and convict Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed for espionage in 1953. This division of labor between the CIA and the FBI was usually observed through the 1950s,



GLOBAL Technologies

Long-Distance Weapons

As any boxer knows, superior “reach” is an important advantage in a fight. Since antiquity soldiers have looked for ways to land punches on adversaries while standing beyond their range. In the First World War, admirals valued dreadnoughts for their capacity to deliver shells to targets twenty miles distant. In the Second World War they used aircraft carriers capable of striking targets two and three hundred miles away. The race for greater range also drove competition on land, first in

artillery and later in aircraft. The infamous German siege gun of the First World War, Big Bertha, could lob shells sixty-five miles; by the end of the Second World War, American B-29 bombers flew fifteen hundred miles to incinerate Japanese cities. The U.S., dealing with the vast expanses of the Pacific, explored ways to build bombers with even greater range than the B-29. Germany, after developing the V-2 rocket that could fly a one ton warhead from Holland to London, planned a successor that might span the Atlantic to strike cities in North America. The Soviet Union built replicas of the American B-29 and undertook its own research on long-range rockets.

During the 1950s and 1960s both the USSR and the US drew upon captured German rockets and rocket scientists to build intercontinental strike forces.

although incidents such as the communist spying at Los Alamos created gray areas in which the CIA could operate inside the United States.

Though the CIA did not open its own research departments until 1962, from its creation the agency concentrated on certain areas of scientific research that had special importance—drugs that would be useful for the interrogation of spies (“truth serums”); photography and mapmaking; high-altitude aircraft; radio, radar, and sonar surveillance; missiles; and nuclear weapons. Like the KGB, the CIA was especially concerned with keeping track of new candidates for the “nuclear club,” and during the 1950s both organizations were especially observant of the progress made by France.

The New Reach toward Space and Sea

Both the Soviet Union and the United States realized that surveillance satellites would provide a powerful intersection of new technologies in jet propulsion, radio navigation, and precision photography. The CIA knew that Russian ICMBs (see Tech Box) could be used not only as weapons but also to launch satellites. The United States planned to launch a similar device in 1958, but in October 1957 the Soviet Union leaped ahead of schedule, using its R-7 rocket to launch its first satellite, *Sputnik*. The CIA knew that the USSR planned to launch as many as thirteen more. These would be primarily surveillance platforms, permitting

Bombers such as the American B-36 and B-52 and the Soviet TU-95 (Bear) achieved sufficient range to carry nuclear bombs across polar routes. Missile research produced projectiles with ever longer ranges, greater payloads, and faster launch times. The Soviets built and tested the first ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), the R-7, in 1957. Spurious reports of large-scale deployment of these missiles sparked fears in the US about a 'missile gap,' although by 1959 the US was beginning production of its own Atlas and Titan ICBMs. These first-generation missiles were unreliable. Fueled with volatile liquids, they took hours to prepare for launch; once in the air, their mechanical guidance systems offered little more accuracy than those the V-2s and so were suitable for use only against targets as large as cities. These limitations dissolved in the 1960s as engineers and scientists on

both sides developed even-burning solid fuels and on-board electronic digital computers for guidance.

By the 1970s, the missile and bomber forces of the US and USSR were so large as to ensure mutual destruction in the event of war, and both parties were seeking to reduce extravagant spending on new strategic weapons. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the US and Soviet Union led to agreements that essentially froze the size and technical capacities of the superpowers' long-range weapons. Later, in the early 1990s, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) resulted in the partial dismantlement of the massive Cold War arsenals of the United States and the USSR. But other nations, such as China, India, North Korea and Pakistan, continued development of their long-range capabilities.

high-resolution photographing of American military installations around the world, as well as of all of the United States itself.

Sputnik represented a scientific achievement that both stunned and delighted many around the world. Americans felt the humiliation and many criticized President Eisenhower for being indifferent to the scientific competition with the Soviet Union. Many people misunderstood *Sputnik's* capabilities, thinking that it could fire death rays at Americans or drop nuclear bombs from space. It did not help that in the same week in which *Sputnik* was launched, Soviet premier Khrushchev had banged his shoe on a table at the United Nations and threatened to "bury" the United States.

More than any other single event of the 1950s, the *Sputnik* launch created a cultural and political revolution in the United States. The political witch-hunts of the McCarthy era, which had banished or imprisoned many American scientists, were never to return. Government funding for science education rose very sharply, and for the first time women were recruited eagerly into graduate programs of science and technology. Military and commercial development of missile and satellite technology was streamlined, coordinated, and when necessary bolstered by new government grants. Abroad, American diplomats worked to recoup some of the losses. The strategic partnership with Britain, which had weakened somewhat since the end of the war, was revived. U.S. participation in NATO became more consistent. Equally

dramatic, U.S. government leaders who had previously dismissed outer space as of no strategic importance publicly realigned themselves with the new policy of an all-out drive to develop propulsion science and satellite technology.

In fact, an American program to launch a satellite similar to *Sputnik* was already well under way. But there were public relations complications because the most promising candidate for a rocket to carry America's first satellite into space was designed by Wernher von Braun, a German scientist who had designed Hitler's V-2 rocket, and then been protected from war crimes prosecution by the American government. An alternative project to launch America's first satellite burned on the launch pad in December 1957, deepening the government's embarrassment and the American public's anxiety. Eisenhower gave von Braun the signal to proceed, and on January 31, 1958, the United States evened the new "space race" with the Soviet Union by launching *Explorer I*.

At the same time, the United States was pursuing a remarkable program to position revolutionary cameras in space, and this was secretly achieved in August of 1960 with the launch of the CORONA satellite. By means of the new observation device—the existence of which was not declassified or known publicly until 1995—the United States not only closely monitored the size and placement of Soviet nuclear devices throughout the world but also created a method for recovering film from space that would be important in learning to safely return human astronauts to earth in the 1960s.

Observation from satellites was only one part of the new systems of security and surveillance. In the late 1940s, the U.S. Navy had begun to develop extremely sensitive underwater listening devices that could detect submarines at five hundred miles. In 1954 the United States launched the first nuclear-powered submarine, the *Nautilus*. This was the culmination of eight years of collaboration between Navy engineers and nuclear researchers at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The new submarine was so fast that it could outrun conventional torpedoes. More important, its nuclear power plant allowed it to stay submerged and nearly undetectable for unprecedented periods of time.

The U.S. Navy immediately began experimenting with launching von Braun's V-2 rockets from submarines, and by late 1965 had developed a long-distance sea-launchable missile, *Polaris*, with a range of twelve hundred miles. Feeling intensely pressured by the U.S. deployment of nuclear naval technologies, the Soviet Union rushed ahead to implement stolen but not completely understood American designs. By 1958 the Soviet navy had two-dozen nuclear submarines patrolling the seas. It is thought, however, that the hurry to get them into action resulted in many Soviet sailors and technicians dying of radiation poisoning.

The Road to Confrontation

Because the United States and the Soviet Union were each able to destroy the other with nuclear weapons, they competed for power through client states in regional wars. Many of these new participants in the international chess game

were former colonies of Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal. The official U.S. policy was to encourage European countries to surrender their last colonies. Many in the U.S. government considered colonialism to be historically obsolete, and all agreed that the persistence of European colonialism only disposed aspiring nationalists throughout the developing world to sympathize with the Soviet Union's "anti-imperialist" stance. Along with decolonization, the United States also advocated that the Allied occupation of Germany be ended (as the United States was ending its own occupation of Japan in 1954). The end of the Allied occupation of Germany, of course, would mean reunification of the country and an end to the agreement under which the Soviet Union had gained control of East Germany.

The Soviet Union was uneasy with the American position on Germany. Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe appeared tenuous for a time in the spring of 1956 when the Hungarians attempted to throw off Soviet control. The United States had encouraged the Hungarians to revolt, but did not intervene on their side when the Soviet Union violently suppressed the uprising. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union mounted over the fate of the former German capital, Berlin. Though it was located in East Germany, the western part of Berlin was maintained as an American and British zone and was heavily fortified.

Soviet intelligence networks constantly warned that the West German government (then based in Bonn) was attempting to subvert East Germany by smuggling in Western European goods (and political influence) and inviting out East German workers—over two million of whom had escaped, attracted by the wages of the West. The only real hope of retaining East Germany was to insist that it be completely cut off from contact with West Germany. In November 1958, Khrushchev demanded that the United States and Britain give up their control of West Berlin, and that all of Berlin eventually be governed by East Germany. For a time there was consternation in the governments of the United States, Britain, and France. As 1960 approached, Khrushchev decided to wait out both the chancellor of West Germany (who was coming up for reelection) and U.S. President Eisenhower (who would have to end his term in office in January 1961).

Kennedy and Castro

In the 1960 election, John Fitzgerald Kennedy defeated Eisenhower's former vice president, Richard Milhous Nixon. Kennedy had campaigned on an aggressive platform criticizing the Eisenhower administration for dithering over a solution to the Berlin problem. Kennedy belabored the notion of a "missile gap" between the Soviet Union and the United States, claiming the Soviet Union had the advantage (the facts were the opposite). He also claimed that Eisenhower had neglected to prevent the rise to power of Fidel Castro in Cuba.

For half a century before this, Cuba had been under U.S. domination. Part of it was (and still is) a U.S. military base at Guantánamo Bay. The Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar had done little for the local population during his various periods in power since 1933, but he was an effective guardian of American economic interests in Cuba, most of which were connected to sugar

and gambling. Batista was frequently opposed by peasant leaders and guerrilla fighters, among them Fidel Castro. With his allies from both the intellectuals and the peasants, Castro attempted several uprisings against Batista. He finally succeeded in 1959 and forced the dictator to flee to the Dominican Republic. At first, officials of the Eisenhower administration thought that Castro would come under the influence of the United States. They knew that the Cuban economy depended on U.S. tourism and on selling agricultural goods in U.S. markets. The head of the CIA advised that Cuba should be pressured with tariffs on its sugar sales in the United States until it would agree to become a U.S. ally.

Within months of his accession to power, Castro declared himself a Communist and began to court economic aid from the Soviet Union. The United States was startled to have a Communist republic so close to its own shores. It sought ways to warn the Soviet Union off the Western Hemisphere while continuing attempts to intimidate Castro or to work with right-wing anti-Castro Cubans to overthrow him. After his election in 1960, Kennedy was informed by the CIA that a plan to finance and organize an invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro Cuban exiles was already in progress. Kennedy said both privately and publicly that the campaign must have no direct American involvement. When the invasion of Cuba by the anti-Castro forces occurred at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, the invaders were turned back (though the losses were greater on Castro's side than on theirs). Kennedy enacted the long-threatened trade embargo against Cuba, depriving it of income from the sugar sales to North America.

The Berlin–Cuba Crisis

In the last months of Eisenhower's administration, the Berlin crisis had worsened, as the Soviet Union had shot down an American spy plane over its territory and then had walked out of the ongoing negotiations over Berlin, claiming to be shocked and outraged by this brazen American act of espionage. This meant that Kennedy now faced a Berlin problem that had no prospect of solution, with the complications of an American intelligence pilot in Soviet custody and the simmering problems in Cuba coming to a boil.

For his part, Khrushchev also faced serious problems with his own government because he had not driven the Allies out of Berlin. Unlike Stalin before him, Khrushchev could not simply mark his rivals for elimination. If he lost the confidence of the Soviet Union's governing council, he could be deposed or imprisoned. The last time Khrushchev had been near to losing the support of the government, he had banged his shoe on the podium at the United Nations and publicly threatened the United States. Now he decided on something much more dramatic: He ordered that a barrier of barbed wire be built across Berlin on the night of August 12–13, 1961. East Germans trying to escape to West Germany would be apprehended or shot. Access to East German contacts by British and American spies would be eliminated. In the following weeks, the barrier was made more elaborate, becoming a high and thick brick wall surmounted by barbed wire and broken glass.



Ken Kesel/Hulton Archive/Getty Images

For the sake of public appearance, John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev concluded a stormy meeting in Vienna with a warm handshake. In fact their differences over the government of Berlin and the strategic situation in Cuba were not resolved, and shortly afterward led to a series of crises that deeply alarmed both the leaders and the publics of the United States and the USSR.

The population of Berlin was in panic. Families had been separated and stranded; travel lines were broken; food supplies were uncertain. In Berlin, the Allies, with their plans for a possible nuclear confrontation in Europe completed, drew their tanks into a zone on the western side of the wall that the Soviet Union had declared a no-trespassing area. The Soviet and Allied tanks, only a few feet from each other on either side of the wall, stood ready for a solid day to open fire. The next day, the Soviet tanks backed off. The Allied tanks did likewise. Both sides claimed victory.


Though nuclear weapons had not been used at Berlin, both sides had threatened more or less explicitly to do so, and both sides believed that actual use of

nuclear weapons by the other side was a real possibility. By now Kennedy knew that apart from some temporary leads in missile technology, the Soviet Union was not equal in strength to the United States. Outside of Europe, the United States had stored nuclear bombs in Canada, Greenland, Morocco, Okinawa, the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, and Puerto Rico. They were available if American submarines or airplanes should have to be armed or to replenish their supplies of nuclear warheads. U.S. missiles loaded with nuclear bombs had been in Italy since 1957, ready to be used if the Soviet Union should become aggressive in Europe.

Europe itself was becoming a nuclear arsenal. In all, the number of nuclear weapons in Western Europe had risen from about 3000 warheads in 1959 to about 4500 in 1961, of which 80 percent belonged to the United States. By the time of the construction of the Berlin Wall, the European countries keeping nuclear weapons for possible use against the Soviet Union included Britain, West Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, and Spain. The total of U.S. weapons for all of Asia and the Pacific was about a third that of Europe (see Map 10.1). And these were only the weapons kept on land. The number of nuclear bombs that the United States kept at sea, whether on ships or on submarines, exceeded the total number kept on land, and may have peaked at over 30,000 in the 1960s. The number of bombs distributed by the Soviet Union is unknown, because, unlike the U.S. government, the Russian government has not declassified this information. But the numbers were certainly much, much lower than the American reserves, and their distribution was limited to Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Central Asia, and Northeast Asia (including North Korea).

The most provocative U.S. placement of weapons was in Turkey in February 1959. During the Second World War, Turkey had worked out an effective neutrality by signing nonaggression pacts with all the warring parties. However, in 1945 Turkey declared war on Germany just as the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Turkey was awarded a place at the negotiations ending the war and became a founding member of the United Nations. During the Korean War, Turkey fought on the side of the United States and the United Nations, and in 1952 it became a permanent member of NATO. In its postwar role as a consistent ally of the United States, Turkey agreed in 1959 to host U.S. missiles aimed at the Soviet Union. These missiles were virtually on the Soviet border and were accompanied by U.S. listening posts in both Iran and Turkey, tracking the movement of Soviet planes and, of course, any missile launches from the Balkans or from Central Asia.

The discovery of the missiles in Turkey was yet another blow to Khrushchev's shaky standing with his colleagues on the Soviet governing council. He had failed to make the United States back down in Europe, and now he was allowing the Soviet Union to have missiles pointed at its heart. The pressure on Khrushchev to do something that would demonstrate the Soviet Union's strength and determination mounted. With his military advisers, he hit on the plan of placing missiles in Cuba—the closest strategic parallel to the placement of U.S. missiles in Turkey.



MAP 10.1 Mutual Missile Threats.

During the 1950s and the early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union competed to place nuclear missiles and weapons stocks at strategic points around the world. At the time, most of the long-range ICBMs were in fixed silos, aimed across the North Pole at the other superpower. The intermediate-range missiles placed in Turkey by the United States in 1957 were close enough to threaten the USSR and became a motivation for the Soviet attempt to place large numbers of armed missiles in Cuba.

In October 1962, U.S. surveillance planes flying over Cuba photographed the construction of silos for the launching of medium-range intercontinental ballistic missiles. The photographs revealed that the technology could only be Soviet. When the U.S. government found out what was going on, so did the American public. The Kennedy government showed the photographs to the United Nations and announced a naval blockade of any Soviet shipping to or from Cuba. Television news carried images of Soviet ships moving toward the Caribbean, presumably loaded with nuclear weapons mounted on missiles to be placed in the completed silos.

To both Kennedy and Khrushchev, it was clear that these repeated threats would themselves eventually force one power or the other into a corner from which it might well lash out with the ultimate weapon. Publicly, Kennedy demanded unconditionally that the Soviet ships turn around and the silos be decommissioned. Privately, Attorney General Robert Kennedy was dispatched to negotiate with the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrinin, and the younger Kennedy promised that the American missiles in Turkey would be secretly withdrawn. The Russian ships turned away from Cuba and headed home. The crisis was over in less than two weeks.

After the combined crises of Berlin and Cuba, both sides lost their taste for brinkmanship. In the 1950s the superpowers had pushed each other toward the limit, assuming that outright nuclear war was unthinkable. By the time of the Cuban missile crisis, nuclear war not only had become thinkable but had been planned several times. Each side was hatching schemes to allow some portion of its population to survive a nuclear strike and refining means of attempting "limited" nuclear war. They now realized that they had crossed into territory that had put huge numbers of people at immediate risk.

Khrushchev, the older of the two rivals, was left without political capital after the crisis, and resigned his position as premier in 1964. Kennedy enjoyed great popularity in the United States for his fortitude in the crisis, but to his close advisers he made it clear that he regretted the riskiness of some of his decisions and was resolved to focus on more local, militarily conventional, politically limited points of contention in the future. The president who had so relied on his youthful image to inspire the country toward greater optimism now saw himself returning to the more cautious, more compromising style of his predecessor. The next year, on November 22, 1963, Kennedy was assassinated.

Resource Anxieties and the Challenge of Secular Nationalism: The Middle East and North Africa

For both the Soviet Union and the United States, the lingering memory of oil shortages in World War II inspired a determination to control as much of the world's oil production and distribution as possible. Each of the superpowers was patrolling new territories gained in the settlement of the war, and each now had a

set of allies to supply with new weapons. In addition, domestic recovery, particularly in the United States and Europe, was intimately connected to the automobile. President Dwight Eisenhower considered the construction of a national system of highways a major step toward both military effectiveness (since troops and weapons could be moved rapidly over the roads and evacuation plans could depend on them) and economic vitality. Highways also began to appear in Europe and in American-occupied Japan. Postwar development took the automobile and its associated phenomena as the centerpiece of all modernization. Fresh concepts of suburban living, with each family having its own yard, gardens, and garage, were dependent upon using the automobile to disperse human living spaces. But cities, too, were now thought of as hearts that depended on high-capacity traffic arteries. At the 1964 World's Fair in New York City, Robert Moses's sweeping plans for great flyovers intersecting the city and long entry and exit roads surrounded by scenic parks were as surprising and as popular as exhibits showing a future full of robots and computers.

Together with the rapid development of the plastics industries, highways and increased use of the automobile sharply increased the demand for petroleum derivatives. While the search for oil across the world increased in intensity, so did the search for energy alternatives. Nuclear power had showed its potential to contribute to energy supplies. Both Britain and the United States had made distinct strides by the middle 1950s. But in 1957 a reactor fire at a British nuclear plant polluted a great stretch of Western Europe and deeply unsettled a public that was still shocked by the images of human damage and long-term disease resulting from the American nuclear bombings in Japan. For at least a half century after the end of World War II, oil remained the most critical energy resource.

The cheapest oil sources were located in large quantities relatively close to the surface. Continental American supplies of such oil had been diminished long before the Second World War. The use of seismic equipment to test the structure of the rock strata deep beneath the soil had come into use before the war and had revealed deep but large deposits in California and in Texas. Soviet oil supplies were in the Caucasus, in Siberia, and along the Pacific coast. These deposits had been known and partly developed in the nineteenth century, but they were far from the population centers, making transportation very difficult. Both nations therefore had to look abroad for their oil supplies. The greatest concentrations of accessible crude oil were known to be in the Middle East, Central Asia (including the region of the Caspian Sea), and North Africa. These regions became areas of intense competition between the superpowers, and this translated into violent struggles in three hot spots: Israel, Iran, and Egypt.

Strategic Alignments in the Middle East

In 1948 the former British territory of the Mandate of Palestine was divided into the Kingdom of Transjordan (soon to be Jordan) and the State of Israel.

The connection of Israel to European history, culture, and political interests remained very strong. The history of the Holocaust convinced Jews all over the world, and many non-Jews too, that there must be a safe haven for those who might become the victims of new waves of anti-Semitism. European governments and the United States supported the creation of a strong, independent Israel not only because of the lessons of the Holocaust and the wishes of some of their Jewish citizens to return to Israel for religious reasons, but also because of the emerging strategic patterns in the Middle East. Israel would be a critical listening post for detecting Soviet attempts at expansion into Iran, the Middle East, and parts of Central Asia. It might also be an important client, should competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for oil and preeminence in the region turn hot.

But the creation of Israel meant the displacement of Arabs living in Palestine. This process had begun with the creation of the British mandate in 1917, and by the time of the creation of Israel perhaps as many as 750,000 Arabs had been driven out of the land. From having been the majority population of Palestine, Arabs were reduced to a minority. They were concentrated in the marginal territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, while others migrated en masse, with no resources, to the holding camps that were created in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Arabs who resisted the removal were subjected to terrible violence, sometimes by the new settlers and sometimes by the authorities managing the transition to the Israeli state. The most famous incidence of Palestinian deaths in the removal was that at Deir Yasin in 1948, in which members of the Israeli paramilitary group Irgun killed hundreds of villagers.

Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon were outraged by the forced displacement of Arabs and the construction of the state of Israel. In 1948 Jordan attacked and occupied the West Bank, to which many residents of the former Palestine had fled. It also seized a portion of the city of Jerusalem. Israel won its survival in this skirmish, but the disputed city of Jerusalem was divided, with one part under Israel's control and the other under Jordan's (eventually to come under international jurisdiction).

For a decade afterward Israel remained locked in battle against its Arab neighbors, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula. Because the Arabs in Palestine had inhabited and worked the land under the traditional collective institution of the Islamic trust (*waqf*), the new Israeli legal authorities declared the land ownerless and appropriated it for redistribution to Israeli farmers or military installations. Until the later 1950s, Israel depended for its survival largely upon the zeal of its farming population, its crack intelligence service, and occasional military and financial support from Europe. In the later 1950s, the United States became interested in supporting Israel financially. This was done primarily through a "Food for Peace" program of the early 1950s. Military assistance did not begin until 1959, but it quickly blossomed to large proportions. This was inspired in part by two large shifts in the power balance, first in Iran and then in Egypt.



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In 1948 Golda Mabovitz, later known as Golda Meir, signed the Israeli declaration of independence from British rule. Born in Russia, Meir had lived in Palestine since 1921 and been active in the movement for local rule by Jewish immigrants. After independence she would serve as foreign minister, and finally in 1969, as prime minister—the third woman prime minister of the twentieth century after Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka and Indira Gandhi of India, and the first to lead a nation aligned with the West.

Struggles for Self-Direction: Guatemala, Iran, Egypt, and Algeria

As we shall see, many nations made attempts to negotiate a middle path between the superpowers in the 1950s. They depended on ideas of nationalism, self-determination, and, when possible, self-reliance. One of the first episodes in the history of the aspiring nonaligned nations took place in Guatemala. In 1951 Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was elected president of Guatemala, and he promised land reform as the central program of his new government. Arbenz's policies were intended to bring stability to a country that had been governed by dictators for decades. Under the previous government system, the United Fruit Company, an American corporation once based on banana sales but now controlling many aspects of the Central American economy, had been permitted to dictate wage and landholding conditions in Guatemala. The result was a situation in which barely more than 2 percent of the population owned 70 percent of the land.

Most working men were agricultural laborers; many had been rounded up by Guatemalan army troops and sent to jungle or mountain regions to work as slaves. Guatemala circa 1952 has given us our phrase “banana republic.”

When UFC saw that it could not continue its previous practices in Guatemala under the Arbenz government, it lobbied the Eisenhower administration in the United States to declare that Arbenz “tolerated communists.” The U.S. government then pursued a multifaceted strategy that was to become a model for eliminating troublesome governments in the future. First, it worked to brand the Guatemalan government as being not “democratic” but “communist” and to isolate it in the region. Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, and eventually Mexico all became helpers of the United States in the anti-Guatemala campaigns, some of them acting as staging grounds for the planned military invasion. Next, leaders of the Guatemalan army (and Arbenz himself) were offered rewards to change their loyalties. Arbenz refused, but many of his army officers accepted. In the meantime, the United States disrupted the shipment of agricultural goods out of Guatemala and oil supplies into the country. The economy crashed. Finally, the CIA oversaw continual aerial bombardments of Guatemala, attempting to destroy its fields and its cities. In June 1954, the Guatemalan army demanded Arbenz’s resignation. He left the country to live in Mexico City. After his departure, a military dictatorship that was friendly to both the United Fruit Company and the United States was established.

This model of ideological stigmatization and regional isolation, economic destruction, and finally invasion by U.S.-trained troops was used elsewhere even while it was being deployed in Guatemala. One target had been Iran, and the purpose was to preserve U.S. access to oil. Iran, which was a monarchy under the control of the *shah* (king), Reza Pahlavi, had been contested by the United States and the Soviet Union before the end of World War II. In the agreements among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union that followed the conclusion of the war, Stalin withdrew from the parts of Iran that he had occupied. British companies, which had dominated Iran’s oil industry before the war, regained control of their facilities. At the same time, the United States and Britain won a very important listening post for monitoring the movement of Soviet armaments and industries throughout the Caspian region and Central Asia.

Soon, however, the United States and its allies were shocked at the turn of local political events. Iran and its neighbor Iraq were undergoing many transformations in the years after the war and after the ending of European colonialism. Nationalist enthusiasms were high, and labor movements, particularly among oil workers and dockworkers, were becoming strong. Many of the unions were socialist in orientation, and the United States had feared for years that the Soviet Union would exploit labor unrest in order to preach communism. In 1951 Mohammad Mosadegh was elected prime minister. He declared Iran’s oil resources and industries to be national assets and demanded the abdication of the *shah*. Mosadegh argued that Iran should be a nonaligned nation instead of a client state of Britain and the United States.

Though Mosadegh's ideas appeared very radical to the British and Americans, they were actually in the tradition of Kemal Atatürk (see Chapter 4), the founder of the Turkish republic, because they stressed not only nationalism but also secularism—the idea that Islamic law and culture should not control the society but that the more religious and less religious should live under a government that fostered individual rights and privacy. But Britain was unwilling to lose a lucrative industrial base and the United States found the prospect of losing control over Iran strategically intolerable. In 1953 the CIA led a plot to convince the Iranian public that Mosadegh intended to end the Iranian monarchy and seize dictatorial powers. They funded an opposition leader who forcibly deposed Mosadegh. British ownership over the oil companies was restored, and after the *shah* returned to power he was encouraged to rely less on democratic legitimacy and more on surveillance and force. This was the second time that foreign intervention had put the *shah*, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, on the throne—the first was in 1941 when Nazi Germany had installed him as *shah* in place of his father. A secularist who advocated industrialization, modern education, women's voting, and close cooperation with the United States and Britain, Pahlavi tended over time to favor authoritarian symbols and repressive policies. His secret police, SAVAK, became renowned worldwide for terrorizing the population.

The sabotage of the Mosadegh government left the United States and Britain even more deeply invested in Middle Eastern affairs. By the middle 1950s, Egypt attracted American and British attention as a direct threat to their interests. Along with Morocco, Liberia, and Ethiopia, Egypt had emerged from colonial rule, and it sat close to the newly discovered oil deposits in North Africa. Gamal Abdel Nasser, a young military officer of very humble origins, was a key figure in a series of remarkable events in Egypt that, between 1952 and 1954, both ended the Egyptian monarchy and ended the British military presence in the country.

Like Atatürk and Mosadegh, Nasser was a nationalist first and a Muslim second; he thought that a civil regime should be able to accommodate many religious or even nonreligious attitudes. Nasser was also a bitter enemy of Israel, he traded arms with Czechoslovakia (a client state of the Soviet Union), and he recognized the government of the People's Republic of China, all actions that annoyed the United States. Nevertheless, he was bold enough to ask Britain to help finance his plans for a huge dam on the Nile, to supply water for city residents in Cairo as well as farmers in southern Egypt.

When Britain refused to help finance the project, Nasser seized the equipment and assets of the private British company that ran the Suez Canal, by which oil and other goods were shipped from the Persian Gulf to Europe. In October 1956 Israel invaded Egypt with the military support of Britain and France. The intention was clearly not only to regain control of the Suez Canal but to depose Nasser himself. As it happened, the invaders were stymied by the basic dynamics of bipolar brinksmanship. The United States and the leaders of the United Nations, fearful that the Soviet Union would enter the fight on the side of Nasser, refused to endorse the invasion. In 1957 the Israeli, British, and French forces all withdrew from Egypt, and Nasser enjoyed a reputation at home and abroad that put him in

a category with Castro—a brash young nationalist who could stand up to the aging, corrupt colonial powers as well as the two imposing superpowers.

The echoes of Nasser's achievement were felt very strongly in Algeria, where France was attempting to perpetuate its colonial rule. Algeria, like other parts of North Africa and the Middle East, had a vigorous movement for secular nationalism developing among its younger generation. But there was also a large population of native-born descendants of the French colonial settlers, who were called *pièds-noirs* ("black feet"). This group, like the descendants of British colonialists in Ireland and Rhodesia and of the Dutch settlers in South Africa, feared that any lessening of imperial power in the colony would leave them destitute, or perhaps even place their lives in danger. The *pièds-noir* were long-standing opponents of granting any powers to Muslim Algerians, and they threatened civil war if France should abandon colonialism in Algeria.

For its part, the French public seemed equally determined to hold Algeria. Vietnam had been surrendered in a political agreement with the United States in 1954, and this had been followed by France's humiliation by Nasser. To many in France, Algeria was the last symbol of French imperial greatness. When Algerian nationalists, who had been active since the late 1930s, rose in open rebellion in 1954, it was regarded as a national crisis in France. By 1958 suppression of the Algerian guerrillas had reached a high point of violence, incarceration, and torture of prisoners, but the independence movement had not been crushed. The political right wing in France called on Charles de Gaulle to come out of retirement and assume the presidency. France's Fourth Republic ended, and a new regime was founded. De Gaulle swore to the *pièds-noir* that he would end the Algerian uprising, and thereafter a savage campaign to strangle Algerian independence began. In 1962 de Gaulle and the National Liberation Front in Algeria reached an agreement to cease fire and hold a referendum on independence in Algeria. When the Algerians voted overwhelmingly for independence, France was forced to grant it in 1962.

As many in both France and Algeria feared, the withdrawal of the colonial government did not bring peace to Algeria. Violence between the *pièds-noir* and Algerian Muslims persisted for years. The triumvirate that assumed control of Algeria after the French withdrawal fell out among themselves, and Ahmed Ben Bella soon emerged as the most powerful. By this time Algeria was a shambles. Nearly a million people had died in the fighting first against the French and then among themselves, twice that many were homeless, and 70 percent of the normally working population was unemployed. Ben Bella attempted to institute a sort of "Algerian socialism," founded on land reform, universal health care, and centralized education. These hopes were not realized, mostly because of constant challenges to Ben Bella's authority that eventually descended into a new civil war.

Continuation of Cold War in Vietnam

When Japan had invaded and occupied Vietnam in 1943, the Communist activist Ho Chi Minh became a leader of the guerrilla resistance, supported by American


advisors and supplies. But when Japan was defeated, the Vietnamese nationalists were not given control of the country. The United States, fearing Soviet expansion after the war, was chilled by Ho's history as a Communist. It supported a restoration of French rule in Vietnam, and in fact it paid the majority of the expenses of the French colonial regime in its efforts to reassert rule. Between 1946 and 1954, Vietnam was an early proxy theater in the Cold War, with France as the U.S. client and Ho Chi Minh as the Soviet client.

In 1954 France decided to withdraw from Vietnam after suffering heavy losses at the battle of Dien Bien Phu. An international conference at Geneva determined that Vietnam would be provisionally divided into north and south. The north was to come under the governance of Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh party, while the United States would stand in for France as the protector of southern Vietnam. The agreement provided for free elections in the south, but the United States decided to ignore this and to install Ngo Dinh Diem as president. When Kennedy inherited this situation in 1960, he realized that Diem could not make himself popularly accepted, but he saw no alternative to giving him military support.

In early November 1963, however, Diem's own officers assassinated him and established a new government. Kennedy was murdered only weeks later, and President Lyndon Johnson, who succeeded Kennedy, decided to aggressively prop up the government of South Vietnam. His advisers at the time, notably Robert McNamara and George Kennan, believed that containment of the Soviet Union and its "Communist bloc" required vigorous opposition to every Communist or socialist movement. If the local representative of anti-Communist interests was incompetent, he might be replaced. If he was unpopular, there must be a propaganda campaign to make him lovable. If his military resources were inadequate, they must be improved by supplying him with increasing quantities of deadlier weapons, including tanks, planes, assault rifles, grenades, and land mines. The Communist movement should be fought in "hearts and minds" (in the culture and the politics of the society) as well as on the battlefields, because in the view of these strategists, a single loss of territory to the Communists would strengthen all Communist movements in the world.

"Third" Forces and the Changing Structure of Power

Just as President Johnson was preparing to invest a massive American military presence and large amounts of foreign aid in his advisers' idea that the "Communist bloc" would expand and increase its power unless Communists everywhere were defeated, parts of the Communist bloc were falling apart. Signs of the fracture were evident in the later 1950s when Yugoslavia became quite independent under its leader, Josip Broz Tito, and the 1956 rebellion in Hungary had to be crushed by Soviet troops. The troubles in Eastern Europe and the Balkans had inspired the Albanian Communist leader Enver Hoxha to declare in 1956 that he felt much more closely allied to the People's Republic of China than to the Soviet Union. For its part, China was becoming more and more distant from



MAP 10.2 New Power Alignments.

Asia was one of many venues in which nations emerging from colonialism were pressured either to become allies of the United States or the Soviet Union, or to become part of the "Third World," or non-aligned nations, who first gathered at Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. Of the nations seen here, North Korea and North Vietnam were allies of the Soviet Union while South Korea and South Vietnam were allies of the U.S.; Burma (Myanmar) was neutral for some years but eventually became an ally of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China; Cambodia and Laos attempted to remain neutral but were gradually overwhelmed by Communist insurgencies; Sri Lanka pursued an independent path; the Philippines remained closely connected to the U.S. after independence; India and Indonesia became leaders of the Third World.

the Soviet Union, and Mao was promoting himself internationally as a truer successor to Stalin than Khrushchev was.

The place of China in a “Communist bloc” had always been problematic. The Chinese Communist Party had been founded in 1921 with Soviet encouragement, and with the exception of Mao Zedong the CCP’s early leaders had all been trained in Moscow and acknowledged by the Comintern, the Leninist organization for the international promotion of communism. Mao’s theories of rural revolution (instead of Marxist revolution based on an urban proletariat) were regarded by the Comintern-educated Communist elites as ignorant, and Mao never had a position of real power in the party until the Soviet-controlled CCP leaders were driven out of the Chinese cities between 1927 and 1931. They had to drag themselves in humiliation to Mao’s remote base in the countryside and join his “People’s Liberation Army” in fighting both the Japanese and the Nationalist government of China. After Japan surrendered in 1945, the Communists and Nationalists turned against each other in a civil war that concluded with a Communist victory in 1949 (see Chapter 9).

After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, relations with the Soviet Union worsened almost immediately. Mao felt that the Soviet Union did not provide suitable support to China in its war against the United States in Korea between 1950 and 1953. At the end of the war, Mao denounced the accession of Khrushchev to leadership of the Soviet Union as a betrayal of Stalin’s legacy. Through the middle 1950s, Mao constantly criticized Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the United States, a Communist victory in China in 1949 had necessarily meant an increase in the power and influence of the Soviet Union. There were fears of Chinese intervention in Vietnam, or threats to Taiwan, which some countries in the world still recognized as the home of the official Chinese government. The American intention was to isolate the PRC internationally, deprive it of foreign aid, and keep it under constant military pressure from South Korea and from Taiwan itself (where U.S. nuclear weapons were stockpiled).

Both Mao Zedong in China and Kim Il Sung in North Korea initiated radical programs of “self-reliance.” Their idea was that a fundamental decentralization of agriculture and industry, along with suppression of foreign trade and forcing each individual to focus on work basic to survival, would insulate their societies from a nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. In both countries, these extreme programs were accompanied by severe policies suppressing dissent and imprisoning large numbers of intellectuals, farmers, and industrial workers who might resist.

In 1957 Mao Zedong initiated an “anti-rightist movement” in China to flush out and silence critics of his radical decentralization plan—not coincidentally including those Soviet-connected party functionaries who had always annoyed him. With the “rightists” out of the way, Mao proceeded to reorganize agriculture, moving all farmers into massive “communes,” where they were to run their own factories, hospitals, schools, storage facilities, and garages. In some areas there was resistance and violence, particularly in northwest China where Muslim

nomads hoped to keep their pastures and religious buildings from being absorbed. In 1959 Tibet came under direct military occupation because of its resistance to agricultural reorganization and cultural suppression.

The immediate effects of the policies at the end of Mao's first radical transformation, the "Great Leap Forward" (1959-1961) were, we now know, disastrous. Perhaps as many as thirty million to forty-five million people died as a result of agricultural failures, inability to move food where it was needed, or violence as troops and villagers fought over the little food that was available. Mao was unimpressed by this human cost, considering it part of the process of socialist transformation. Criticism of Mao within the CCP was intense by 1959. But moderate party leaders failed to convince their colleagues to abandon Mao's course and replace him as party secretary. In 1960 relations with the Soviet Union broke down completely. After decades of rancor and mutual suspicion, the supposed "Communist bloc" had formally split.

Part of Mao's program for China was assumption of leadership in the global "Third World" movement for freedom from domination by the two superpowers. Mao had laid the groundwork for this in 1955 when his officials attended a conference of the leaders of twenty-nine developing nations at Bandung, Indonesia. These countries shared problems of agricultural development, public health, and industrialization, and they all feared becoming embroiled in the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union; American novelist Richard Wright described them, sympathetically, as "the underdogs of the human race." As a group they represented the majority of the world population. The Chinese representatives portrayed themselves as the champions of these nations struggling for independence. India, itself ambitious to lead the Third World movement, was indignant. In 1957 China engaged in a brief border skirmish with India, and the Soviet Union took the Indian side.

When the full extent of the human disaster caused by the agricultural radicalization of 1958 to 1961 was realized by the CCP, Mao finally had to appear to share power with his moderate rivals. But by 1962 he was plotting to return to full power, with a stronger base than ever. His new push, when it came in 1966 as the "Cultural Revolution," would be both domestic and international. Domestically, it would be based on an appeal to youth, a demand that the national revolutionary spirit be renewed, and a call for China to make new efforts toward Mao's own ideal, self-reliance. Internationally, it would build on the Third World leadership that China had established at Bandung, but with an important new element: China became the world's fifth nuclear power (after the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France) when it tested a device in 1964.

This breakthrough was not a complete surprise, but it was nevertheless an unlikely achievement in many ways. Mao's China had been in the midst of a radical move away from the centralized planning of agriculture, and also from all centralization and hierarchy in industry and education. Mao appeared to be going the opposite way from the superpowers, which were moving toward more centralization and more rationalization in the development of communications, education, and research. But Mao had been careful to protect the extremely secret

centers for nuclear research and other military weapons research in the country. The research was led by the physicist Qian Xuesen (H.S. Tsien), who had been educated in the U.S. and had been serving in American rocketry development before being driven out of the country by false claims of being a communist and forced to return to China in 1955. Their research facility, on the nearly unpopulated frontier between Tibet and Qinghai province, was completely isolated, relatively safe from the prying eyes of Soviet and U.S. surveillance, and certainly out of the way of China's ideological enforcers.

The United States and the Soviet Union both realized that although the Chinese nuclear device was no direct threat to them, Mao was very likely to use it to intimidate his Asian neighbors, and that the bomb would become a symbol of Chinese preeminence in the Third World. They sought a local champion that could create a modest "balance of terror" in Asia. Their choice was India.

The parallels between China and India were remarkable, but the differences were also striking. India's population rivaled China's, and India—like China—could lay claim to the cultural prestige of thousands of years of civilization. It used land reform and Lenin-style "five-year plans" to develop the economy and redistribute wealth. Like China, India had determinedly steered a course between the superpowers. Again like China, India had been led through the turbulent period of the 1950s by a single leader: Jawaharlal Nehru, who became India's first prime minister after independence in 1948 and continued in that position until his death in 1964.

There were, however, very vivid differences between the two countries. Though many people criticized Nehru's patrician attitudes and authoritarian style, India was a democracy. Nehru had been educated as a lawyer and in his youth had been a follower of Gandhi. He was a prolific writer in English, and his publications helped to create international sympathy for India in the postwar world. Secure as he was in his communications with both the United States and the Soviet Union, Nehru was often frank with the two powers, demanding respect for India's neutrality.

Nehru's plan for India was extremely ambitious, going far beyond mere agricultural self-sufficiency to full-scale industrialization. The country had the advantages of high literacy rates and several outstanding educational institutions. There were certain formidable obstacles, however. Nehru did not reform India's rigid caste system, and so he did not create maximum opportunity for talented people to enter the educational stream. Agricultural reforms were successful in some areas, but in other areas the climate was too poor or natural disasters occurred.

Most devastating was the deepening divide between Hindus and Muslims. Nehru had wished to avoid the partition of South Asia between predominantly Hindu India and predominantly Muslim Pakistan. But the British had insisted on the partition, and Nehru—a native of Kashmir, which was beset by religious troubles from the time of independence—struggled to deal with the complex regional tensions in addition to continuing conflicts within India itself. In the middle and late 1960s, both the Soviet Union and the United States avoided China and grew closer to India. They lavished foreign aid and good press on

the country, and they actively encouraged it to pursue a program of nuclear development. Though India did not develop a nuclear bomb immediately, it became an important potential partner to both the superpowers, and a political and educational model for many of the developing, nonaligned nations. The foundation was laid for another great power to emerge in Asia.

CONCLUSION

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union based their relationship with each other on their shared monopoly of nuclear weapons and the constant search for the point at which the other party would back down rather than risk unlimited destruction. Both parties realized in 1962 that they had gone too far, and had risked too much over the fates of Germany and Cuba. They tended thereafter to seek ways of containing their own rivalry within limited, conventional theaters of conflict, and they also attempted to limit their need to invest in further development and production, manufacture, and maintenance of nuclear weapons. Increasingly through the late 1950s and 1960s the superpowers transferred their rivalry to their client states, fighting each other through proxy wars.

By this time, however, the science of nuclear weaponry was no longer completely under the control of these two powers. Most significant of the new nuclear powers was China, which after 1960 was an unfriendly rival of both the Soviet Union and the United States. China now competed with the two superpowers for influence over the nations of Africa and Asia that were emerging from colonialism. It relied on the ideology of Third World hopes for agricultural success, accessible industrialization, military independence, and national dignity. The Cold War was not over, but by the mid-1960s it was no longer the primary determining factor in the distribution of world weapons and resources.

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