

AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S SUPREME WAY TO KNOW GOD

The present article aims at expounding al-Ghazālī's supreme way to know God, His qualities and His acts. According to him, these three elements are the highest objects of man's knowledge. Some scholars have held that al-Ghazālī preferred the mystical experience as the best way to know God,⁽¹⁾ while others maintained that he regarded intellectual endeavors as the most effective.⁽²⁾ Watt has combined the two ways, the mystical and the intellectual, asserting that al-Ghazālī believed in both simultaneously or at different times.⁽³⁾ In my opinion, al-Ghazālī's best means to reach the knowledge of God is intellectual, whether occurring gradually or immediately. This means is firmly connected with his conception of man's goal in life and his greatest pleasure in the world to come. It is only a special type of persons that possess this capacity.

(1) See D. B. Macdonald, "Al-Ghazzālī", *ET*, Vol. II, p. 147. A. J. Wensinck, "Ghazālī's *Mishkāt al-anwār*", *Semitische Studien*, Leiden 1941, p. 212. C. R. Upper, "Al-Ghazālī's Thought Concerning the Nature of Man and Union with God", *MW* 42 (1952), pp. 23-32.

(2) See D. Z. Baneth, "Rabbi Jehuda Halevi and al-Ghazālī" (in Hebrew), *Kneset* 7 (1942), p. 324 f, and especially p. 325, n. 3. J. Obermann, *Der Philosophische und Religiöse Subjektivismus Ghazālī's*, Wien 1921, pp. 96 ff.

(3) See W. M. Watt, "The Authenticity of the works ascribed to al-Ghazālī", *JRAS* (1952), pp. 24-28. Idem, *Muslim Intellectual*, Edinburgh 1963, pp. 164-167. For a criticism of Watt's system of establishing the chronology of some of al-Ghazālī's works according to the criterion of *dhawq*, *ilm* and *īmān* see G. F. Hourani, "The Chronology of al-Ghazālī's Writings", *JAOS* 79 (1959), pp. 225-233.

There is no doubt now that *Iljām al-‘awāmm ‘an ‘ilm al-kalām* is al-Ghazālī's last work.⁽⁴⁾ Therefore, the views he expresses in it may reflect either the ultimate development of his thought, if we accept the supposition that his conception underwent essential changes in the course of his lifetime, or, if not, then it may represent al-Ghazālī's basic ideas to which he always adhered, with slight modifications.⁽⁵⁾ An examination of the text of *Iljām* proves that al-Ghazālī believes in the superiority of philosophical reasoning as the best means to attain belief in God, which is equal to the knowledge of God, even if he admits that this way pertains only to the elect. Let us examine al-Ghazālī's theory in detail.

Adhering to his conviction, al-Ghazālī does not permit a wise person to reveal subtle issues to a common one (*‘āmmī*)⁽⁶⁾ which the latter cannot understand. About this point al-Ghazālī is asked as follows: "If a common person is prevented from pursuing inquiry and reflection (*al-baḥṭh wa'l-naẓar*), he will not know the proof (*dalīl*), and whoever does not know the proof will not know the thing proved (*madlūl* i.e. God), whereas God orders all human beings to know Him."⁽⁷⁾ According to al-Ghazālī, man's knowledge of God includes four parts: a. belief in God (*īmān*) and acceptance of His existence as true (*taṣdīq*)⁽⁸⁾; b. declaration of God to be far removed (*taqdīs*) from signs of created beings (*simāl al-ḥawādith*) and from likeness to others; c. knowledge of His unity; d. knowledge of His qualities, namely, His Omniscience (*‘ilm*), His Omnipotence (*qudra*) and other qualities.⁽⁹⁾ All these components of knowledge are not attained by necessary knowledge,⁽¹⁰⁾

(4) See *Bouyges*, pp. 80-82. An exception is Watt. See "The Authenticity", p. 31.

(5) Obermann (*op. cit.*) and Jabre (*La Notion*) hold the view that there is an essential unity in al-Ghazālī's works, whereas Baneth (*op. cit.* p. 313) and Watt ("The Study of al-Gazālī", *Oriens* 13/14 [1961], pp. 121-137) reject this view.

(6) For the term *‘āmmī*, see Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies*, pp. 352-357 and index.

(7) See *Iljām*, p. 73.

(8) For another translation and understanding of *īmān* and *taṣdīq*, see W.C. Smith, "Faith as *Taṣdīq*", in *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, ed. P. Morewedge, New York 1975, pp. 96-119. R.M. Frank criticizes Smith's view in *JAOS* 106 (1986), pp. 316-318. On this term, see also H.A. Wolfson, *MW* 33 (1943) p. 114 and S. Afnan, *Oriens* 10 (1957), pp. 71-76.

(9) See *Ihyā'*, Vol. I, pp. 39, 105-114.

(10) *Wa-hādhihi al-umūr laysat qarūriyya*. Al-Ghazālī understands the word *qarūri* to mean *‘ilm qarūri*, a necessary knowledge. This knowledge is defined as knowledge that reaches man without the latter's doing anything to attain it and without his being able to prevent it from reaching him. Its opposite is acquired knowledge (*‘ilm mukṭasab*), i.e., knowledge which is attained through an intellec-

rather they must be sought⁽¹¹⁾ by man through premises, proofs and conclusions, that is, a process of reasoning. Even the acceptance of Muḥammad as true prophet and the distinction between him and impostors involves reflection.⁽¹²⁾ Thus the question just posed to the effect that there is a contradiction between preventing man from reflection and obliging him to know God becomes all the more accentuated.

Al-Ghazālī answers this question stating that the belief in these elements of the knowledge of God is obligatory on all human beings. This belief means absolute acceptance of these elements as true. It is reached in six ways, graded by al-Ghazālī from the highest rank to the lowest one. The highest rank is attained through demonstrative proof (*burhān*) based on certain conditions (*shurūṭ*), which are well exhausted, and principles (*uṣūl*) and premises (*muqaddimāt*) which are gradually built. This whole process aims at preventing confusion and errors. It is the utmost objective (*al-ghāya al-quṣwā*), but only few people reach it, one or two in each generation, and sometimes a generation may lack such a person altogether.⁽¹³⁾ Al-Ghazālī concludes this section by saying that if salvation (*najāt*) were confined to this knowledge, then only few people would attain it. (This notion will be dealt with in detail below.) What does al-Ghazālī speak about in the first stage? Both the application of the terms *burhān* and *muqaddimāt* and the fact that the whole process of reasoning is built gradually so as to prevent errors and doubts prove that what al-Ghazālī means by this process is philosophical reasoning. It should be noted that al-Ghazālī composed some works on logic in which he regards logic as a mere tool of knowledge, not committed to any philosophical view or doctrine.⁽¹⁴⁾

tual effort. See M. Schwarz, "Some notes on the notion of *iljā'* (constraint) in Mu'tazilite Kalam", *IOS* 2 (1972), p. 420, n. 29. J. R. T. M. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, Leiden 1976, pp. 53-57.

(11) The word *maḥlūb* used here by al-Ghazālī is equivalent to *mukhtasab* which is defined in note 10 above.

(12) See *Iljām*, p. 73.

(13) In Stoic tradition the wise person is rare. See S. van den Bergh, *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*, London 1954, Vol. II, p. 206, n. 363. Raḥman, *Prophecy*, p. 36. Cf. *Babylonian Talmud*, tractate *Sukka*, fol. 45b.

(14) See M. E. Marmura, "Ghazālī and Demonstrative Science", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 3 (1965), pp. 183, 189. Idem, "Ghazālī's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic", in *Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science*, ed. G. F. Hourani, New York 1975, p. 102f.

Belief in the second stage is achieved through using Kalam presumptive proofs (*adilla wahmiyya kalāmiyya*) built on premises which people accept as true on account of their being widespread among great scholars. This third way to achieve absolute belief is through proofs which one usually applies in discussions and speeches (*al-muḥāwarāt wa'l-mukhāṭabāt*). Most of the proofs found in the Qur'ān are of this sort, one of the most famous being *dalīl al-tamānu'*.⁽¹⁵⁾ Belief can also be reached through accepting the views of one who is praised by people such as a man's father or teacher. This kind is known as *taqlīd*.⁽¹⁶⁾ The fifth kind speaks of quick acceptance of things as true because of a combination of circumstances and indications which seem to tell a true fact. For instance, one hears from many persons that the head of the city is ill, then he hears crying and shouting from the latter's house and his servant tells him that the head of the city has died. The 'āmmī tends to hold this story as true without taking into consideration that the crying and shouting may have another reason. The sixth kind, the lowest rank, is reached through man's hearing of something suitable to his character and qualities. For instance, one quickly accepts a slight rumour about his enemy's death as true, but refuses to accept a rumour concerning his friend's death as true. This way, according to al-Ghazālī, is the weakest, for the five preceding ones are based on certain proofs (or indications), even though some of them are sometimes weak, whereas the sixth way depends solely on one's predilections. Concerning the 'āmmī, says al-Ghazālī, the highest rank is the third, namely, the proofs of the Qur'ān. Most people, however, attain their belief through following their parents and teachers (*taqlīd al-ābā' wa'l-mu'allimīn*)⁽¹⁷⁾.

Finally, al-Ghazālī states that the important thing is to attain the truth, no matter how, be it through rational proof or any other way. Every person is summoned to the truth through the way suitable for him; some are called to belief through philosophy (*ḥikma*) others through good admonition (*maw'iza ḥasana*) and others through disputation (*mujādala*). All these ways, says al-

(15) *Dalīl al-tamānu'* means the argument from hypothetical mutual prevention through which one can prove God's unity. See al-Ash'arī, *K. al-luma'*, ed. R. J. McCarthy, Beirut 1953, p. 8, 11.3-12 of the Arabic text. Al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād*, p. 38. For a criticism of this argument see Ibn Rushd, *al-Kaṣf 'an manāḥij al-adilla fī 'aqā'id al-milla*, ed. Maḥmud Qāsim, Cairo 1969, p. 156 f.

(16) On *taqlīd*, see Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies*, p. 488-502.

(17) See *Iljām*, pp. 74-78.

Ghazālī, we have counted in *al-Qisṭās al-mustaqīm*.⁽¹⁸⁾ Yet he explicitly asserts that the knower's (*ʿārif*) rank is above the *muqallid's*, although they are both believers.⁽¹⁹⁾ Philosophical reasoning, then, is the best way to achieve belief in God. It is worth noting that al-Ghazālī says nothing about mystical experience or prophetic vision as a means of achieving knowledge of God. Is it possible that prophecy and mystical experience are included in the first stage? We shall try to answer this question later.

Al-Ghazālī's preference of philosophical reasoning as a means of attaining knowledge of God over other means is also emphasized in *Qisṭās*. In this work he shows that the three Aristotelian figures of syllogism and the two Stoic conjunctive and disjunctive syllogisms are found in the Qurʾān,⁽²⁰⁾ and that philosophical ways of proving stand higher than the system of Kalam.⁽²¹⁾ The various ways of syllogism enable man to reach the knowledge of God.⁽²²⁾ Elsewhere al-Ghazālī states that the everlasting spiritual world (*ʿālam al-malakūt*) is hidden in the intellect (*bāḥin fī'l-ʿuqūl*).⁽²³⁾ It is to be noted that al-Ghazālī's view as to the superiority of the intellect over other devices to reach the knowledge of God does not contradict his stand in *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*. In this work he condemns the philosophers because they do not apply correctly the systems of logic in their discussion of metaphysical issues.⁽²⁴⁾

The three ways leading to the knowledge of God (= belief) which al-Ghazālī refers to in *Iljām*—the way of philosophy, the way of admonition and the way of disputation—are also found, in a some-

(18) The Muslim philosophers, especially al-Fārābī, differentiate between the Sages (*ḥukamāʾ*) who rationally perceive the truth, and the Believers who believe in the truth in figurative, not conceptual terms. See Raḥman, *Prophecy*, p. 40 f.

(19) See *Iljām*, p. 80. *Qisṭās*, pp. 84-91. According to both al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rush, the theory of the three ways is based on sura 16, v. 125: "Call to the way of your Lord through wisdom and good admonition, and dispute with them through the better way..." *Hikma* means philosophical wisdom, "admonition" is equivalent to oratory and rhetoric and "disputation" to dialectic. See D. P. Brewster, *The Just Balance*, Lahore 1978, p. 3, n. 10. Cf. G. F. Hourani, *Averroes On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*, London 1961, p. 59, p. 92, n. 59.

(20) Al-Ghazālī holds that even all the sciences are found in the Qurʾān potentially (*bi'l-quwwa*), not actually, since in it there exist the ways of syllogism through which "the gates of wisdom are opened". See *Qisṭās*, p. 91.

(21) See *ibid.*, p. 99. On al-Ghazālī's attitude towards the Kalam see Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies*, pp. 373-378.

(22) See *Qisṭās*, p. 63.

(23) See *Imlāʾ*, p. 39, l. 2.

(24) See the editor's introduction in *Qisṭās*, p. 27.

what different manner, in *Mizān al-ʿamal*.⁽²⁵⁾ Al-Ghazālī details three systems (*madhāhib*) in answering the criticism that some of his statements in the book agree with the system of the Sufis and others with the system of the Ashʿarites and other dogmatic theologians (*mulakallimūn*).⁽²⁶⁾ The first system is the system of debate, that is, what man learns from his parents, teachers and fellow-citizens and adheres to and boasts of stubbornly. This way corresponds to the way of disputation in *Iljām*.⁽²⁷⁾ The second system is what man says privately when he guides and instructs someone who seeks knowledge and direction. This way is adapted to the seeker: each one according to his ability and understanding.⁽²⁸⁾ It corresponds to the way of admonition in *Iljām*. Here I must remark that I have not dealt with the differences between the first two ways in *Qisṭās*, *Iljām* and *Mizān*, for my aim is to concentrate on the highest way, concerning which there is no difference in these three works.

The third system is "what man believes in his heart, that is, what is disclosed to him through reflection" (*mā yaʿlaquduhu al-insān fī nafsihi mimmā ʾnkaṣṣa lahu min al-naẓariyyāt*).⁽²⁹⁾ Watt translates this sentence as follows: "What in his heart he believes on speculative questions as a result of his personal experience."⁽³⁰⁾ He understands the *min* in *mimmā* as a particle denoting result, not *min al-bayān*, and translates *mā ʾnkaṣṣa lahu* as "personal experience". Watt's understanding of the third system seems correct, but the context and the words al-Ghazālī uses suggest a different meaning of this system. Al-Ghazālī goes on to elucidate the third system: "The third system is what man believes secretly between himself and God. Only God knows it (*lā yaḷ-ṭaliʿu ʾalayhi illā allah*). He speaks of it only to his fellow who shares his knowledge (*sharikuhu fī l-iṭṭilāʿ ʾalā mā iṭṭalaʿa*) or has reached a stage in which he can assent to and understand this knowledge. That will be the case when the inquirer is wise (*dhakī*) and an inherited creed (*iʿliqad mawrūth*), on which he grew up and to which he adheres obdurately, has not taken firm root in him ..." ⁽³¹⁾ Again, Watt inserts the word experience (*iṭṭilāʿ*) into

(25) On the time of its writing, see *Bouyges*, pp. 28-30.

(26) See *Mizān*, p. 405.

(27) Cf. *Qisṭās*, p. 90.

(28) See *Mizān*, p. 405, ll. 6-7. Cf. *Qisṭās*, p. 85.

(29) See *Mizān*, *ibid.*, ll. 8-9.

(30) See Watt, "A Forgery", p. 18.

(31) See *Mizān*, p. 408, ll. 1-3. Al-Ghazālī's statement "what man believes

his translation: "He speaks of it only to his fellow (*sharīk*) who has had a similar experience." Yet, to the best of my knowledge, this word has the meaning (and also connotations) of knowledge and cognition.⁽³²⁾ Watt concludes from these two passages quoted that "the third *madhhab* is what man knows as a result of his mystical experience, whereas the second comprises what he knows intellectually".⁽³³⁾ In my opinion, Watt also fails to consider the context of the third system. Al-Ghazālī speaks of one who is wise and who has no creed to which he is committed, that is, he is not a *muqallid*. In *Qisṭās*, those who have insight and the elite who have wisdom (*ahl al-baṣīra wa-khawāṣṣ ak-dhakā'*) share three characteristics: a. inborn quality of intelligence (*fiṭra*); b. absence of *taqlid*; c. belief in their teacher's knowledge of syllogisms.⁽³⁴⁾ The first two characteristics correspond to what is required from the seeker of knowledge in *Mizān*, namely, wisdom and non-commitment to a certain creed. In *Mizān*, al-Ghazālī further depicts whoever is not a *muqallid*: he must be independent in his opinions and ask the truth through reflection (*naẓar*). Moreover, since doubts lead to the truth, whoever does not doubt does not reflect (*fa-man lam yashukka lam yanzur*).⁽³⁵⁾ We may conclude now that al-Ghazālī regards the third system as the system of the sages or the philosophers, which, according to him, is the highest way to achieve the truth. It is pursued through reflection by a wise person who is not committed to any early dogma.

There is a difference of quality between *Mizān*'s second and third systems, but not between an intellectual system (the second) and a mystical one (the third) as Watt argues. The intellectual system is the third as is proved from the context and the comparison to *Qisṭās*. What is most perplexing is the fact that al-Ghazālī considers neither the Ṣūfis' way nor the Mutakallimūn's way the

secretly between himself and God. Only God knows it" reminds one of Ibn Sīnā's saying concerning the prayer: "The matter is in the hands of the Creator and my Creator knows my matter and no one except me knows it" (*fa-inna al-amr ma'a al-khāliq wa-khāliqī ya'lamu amrī wa-lā ya'rīfuhu ḡayrī*). See *Risāla fī māhiyyat al-ṣalāt*, ed. A. F. Mehren, p. 34. It is worth noting that according to Ibn Sīnā the real meaning of prayer (*ḥaḳīqat al-ṣalāt*), or any other devotional work, is the knowledge of God. See *ibid.*, p. 35.

(32) See E. W. Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, London 1863-1865, p. 1868 f. Cf. *Ihyā'*, Vol. IV, p. 308.

(33) See Watt, "A Forgery", p. 20, ll. 3-5.

(34) See *Qisṭās*, p. 85, ll. 5-10. On the term *dhakā'* see p. 188 below.

(35) See *Mizān*, p. 409.

best way to attain the truth, even though he is asked what his preference is between Ṣufism and Kalam. He puts forward another possibility while giving the impression—it is no more than that—that he prefers mystical experience. In this way, he conceals his true opinion from the common people. Elsewhere, I have proved that al-Ghazālī uses the same method of concealing when he deals with the problem of causality.⁽³⁶⁾ One should also bear in mind that *Iljām*, *Qisṭās* and *Mizān* are works which al-Ghazālī wrote in different periods: *Mizān* were written during al-Ghazālī's stay in Baghdad (1091-1095), *Qisṭās* during al-Ghazālī's period of retirement (1095-1106) and *Iljām* were completed in al-Ghazālī's last days. Thus al-Ghazālī, throughout his lifetime, did not change his basic perception of the best way for man to attain the truth.

Our next step is to examine al-Ghazālī's perception of knowledge and its owners as occur in his greatest work *Iḥyā'* and in its summary *K. al-arba'in*. In *K. al-arba'in* al-Ghazālī points out that beyond the stage of external belief (*i.e.* a stage in which man believes without knowing the proofs of his belief) there are two stages: a. "the knowledge of the proofs [leading] to the external belief (*ma'rifat adillat hādhihi al-'aqida al-zāhira*) without embarrassing on its secrets (*asrār*)". b. "the knowledge of the secrets of belief (*ma'rifat asrārihā*) and of the innermost part of its meanings (*lubāb ma'ānihā*) and of the real meaning of its external parts (*ḥaqīqat zawāhiriḥā*)".⁽³⁷⁾ These three stages correspond to the three stages mentioned in *Iljām*, *Qisṭās* and *Mizān*. The way in which man adheres to his parents' or teachers' belief (the way of disputation) is analogous to the stage of external belief which occurs here, the way of admonition is analogous to the second stage, while the third way, that of *ḥikma*, is identical to the third stage.

In the following an attempt will be made to prove that the third stage in *K. al-arba'in* is an intellectual stage. According to al-Ghazālī, the common people are not obliged to deal with these last two stages. Their salvation from torment (*al-khalāṣ min al-'adhāb = najāt*) and their achieving of basic felicity (*aṣl al-na'im*) are not dependent on carrying out these two stages. The perfection of happiness (*kamāl al-sa'āda*), however, depends on fulfilling

(36) See "Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Causality", *Studia Islamica* 67 (1988), pp. 75-98.

(37) See *K. al-arba'in*, p. 21.

both stages. For al-Ghazālī happiness means attaining the utmost degree of felicity (*ghāyat al-na'im*). He brings a parable to illustrate his view; when a ruler conquers a city its inhabitants may be graded according to three conditions which correspond to the three types of persons mentioned above (the common people, the knowers of the proofs and the knowers of the secrets): a. those who escape killing and torment. They are saved although the ruler removes them from the city. b. those whom the ruler gives the possibility of remaining in the city. c. those whom the ruler gives a share in his rule.⁽³⁸⁾ What is of utmost importance is the place al-Ghazālī ascribes to knowledge. Whoever reaches the utmost and perfect happiness is the knower, not the common man. This notion of al-Ghazālī comes close to that of the Arab philosophers.⁽³⁹⁾

In *K. sharḥ 'ajā'ib al-qalb* in *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī states that knowledge is man's goal and a special attribute for which he was created (*wa'l-'ilm huwa maqṣūd al-insān wa-khāṣṣiyyatuhu allatī li-qjlihi khuliqa*).⁽⁴⁰⁾ Man is distinguished from animals by his knowledge of things as they are (*ma'rifat al-ashyā' 'alā mā hiya 'alayhi*).⁽⁴¹⁾ The maker of things is God. Therefore, whoever does not know God, even though he knows everything, it is as if he knows nothing.⁽⁴²⁾ Thus the best knowledge is the knowledge of God, His qualities and His acts.⁽⁴³⁾ In this knowledge lies man's perfection (*sa'āda*) and the perfection of his happiness (*kamāl sa'ādatihi*).⁽⁴⁴⁾

(38) See *ibid.*, p. 21 f. Cf. Maimonides, *The Guide*, III, ch. 51.

(39) See al-Fārābī, *Mabādī'*, p. 410 f.

(40) See *Iḥyā'*, Vol. III, p. 9, l. 14.

(41) According to Maimonides, unbelief means to conceive a thing not as it is (*wa-a'nī bī'l-kufr i'tiqād al-shay' 'alā khilāf mā huwa 'alyhi*). See *The Guide* (Joel), I, ch. 36, p. 56, l. 15.

(42) See *Iḥyā'*, *ibid.*, p. 63, ll. 2-3.

(43) See *Iḥyā'*, Vol. III, p. 9, l. 13. Cf. *Jawāhir al-qur'ān*, p. 42. *Iḥyā'*, Vol. IV, pp. 307-310. Ibn Taymiyya condemns al-Ghazālī for regarding the knowledge of God, His attributes and His acts as man's goal instead of *'ibāda*. This is "pure philosophy", says Ibn Taymiyya, and it "is worse than the beliefs of the idolatrous Arabs, let alone of Jews and Christians". See Raḥman, *Prophecy*, p. 101 f. Ibn Taymiyya, *K. al-nubuwwāt*, Cairo 1346 H, p. 79, l. 6-p. 82, l. 2. Ibn Taymiyya bases his opinion of al-Ghazālī on *K. al-maḍnūn bihi 'alā ghayr ahlīhi*, which is suspected of being spurious (*Bouyges*, pp. 51-53), but we see that there is a basis for this condemnation in al-Ghazālī's authentic works as well.

(44) See *Iḥyā'*, Vol. III, p. 9, l. 13. Cf. al-Fārābī, *Mabādī'*, p. 442 f.

Al-Ghazālī counts five obstacles which prevent man from achieving this knowledge: a. the imperfection of man's essence, such as the imperfection of the child's intellect. b. submission to lusts which causes the commission of evil deeds. c. man's deviating from the direction of the truth which is to be sought (*jihat al-haqīqa al-maḥlūba*). Even though, says al-Ghazālī, man's heart (= intellect) is pure, the truth does not appear in it, since he does not direct his intellect towards the truth. Frequently he is very concerned about fulfilling the minute parts of the bodily precepts (*al-ṭā'āt al-badaniyya*) or preparing means of subsistence, so that he turns away from thinking about the Godship's presence (*al-ḥaḍra al-rubūbiyya*) and the hidden divine truths. Consequently, what is disclosed to him is what he is thinking about, namely, the minute defects of acts (*daqā'iq āfāt al-a'māl*), the hidden imperfections of the soul (*khafāya 'uyūb al-nafs*) or the means of subsistence.⁽⁴⁵⁾ d. an opinion to which man adheres by means of *taqlīd*. Such an opinion is a barrier (*ḥijāb*) between him and the truth. e. man's ignorance of the direction in which the aim can be attained. Man can obtain knowledge only by means of syllogisms. That is, each piece of knowledge (*'ilm*) can be attained through two previous pieces of knowledge which are connected according to a certain aspect. Whoever does not know the roots (*uṣūl*) of syllogism and the way in which they are connected cannot achieve knowledge.⁽⁴⁶⁾ In sum, a sane person must deviate from evil deeds and perform the precepts in order to be able to think and reflect about God. He must also turn his intellect to the right direction, namely God, abandon opinions which were attained through *taqlīd* and obtain knowledge through the syllogistic device.

Al-Ghazālī does not ignore the question which one would immediately raise, namely, what is the place of mystical experience as a means of attaining the highest knowledge. He differentiates between the way of the mystics to discover the truth and the way of those who contemplate (*nuzḡār*). According to al-Ghazālī, the mystics hold that man must subdue his passions, eliminate his blameworthy qualities, practice ascetism and turn himself absolutely towards God. If he performs all these actions, his heart (= intellect) becomes pure and ready to receive directly the highest

(45) Cf. Maimonides, *The Guide*, I, ch. 34.

(46) See *Iḥyā'*, Vol. III, p. 13 f.

knowledge from God.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Now he only expects God's mercy, that is that God will reveal to him the secret of the everlasting spiritual world.⁽⁴⁸⁾ As for those who contemplate, they, as understood by al-Ghazālī, do not deny the existence and possibility of the mystics' way. They do admit it, because this is the state of the prophets and saints. But they assert that it rarely leads to the objective. Their main criticism is that even if the mystic attains the highest stage of knowledge, it is only for a short time, for a slight evil motive⁽⁴⁹⁾ may confuse his heart. Moreover, man's fight against his passions may cause damage to his intellect. And also, the fact that the mystic does not learn the sciences may cause false imaginations, which the mystic considers truths, to be fixed in the soul for a long time.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Had the mystic begun his way to God by study, a false imagination would not have confused his mind. For study (*tarīq al-tā'allum*) is the safest (*awṭhaqu*) and nearest way to achieve the aim (*wa-aqrab ilā al-gharad*). The proponents of reflection state that first one should study, after which there is nothing objectionable in expecting what has not been revealed to most sages; may be it will be revealed through abstinence (*mujāhada*).⁽⁵¹⁾ The possibility, then, of knowing the highest truth through mystical experience is doubted even after studying the sciences. Before studying, knowledge of the highest truth through mystical experience is almost impossible. A comparison to a relevant passage in *Mizān* proves that the last notion is al-Ghazālī's own view. Answering the question concerning the relative preferability of the mystical or the intellectual way, al-Ghazālī states that it is suitable for most people to study in order to know

(47) The notion that man's heart is like a mirror which one has to polish in order to receive light (knowledge) was frequently used in philosophical and mystical writings. Its origin is Neoplatonic. See Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies*, pp. 312-320. Cf. A. Altman, "Ibn Bājja on Man's Ultimate Felicity", in *H. A. Wolfson Jubilee Volume*, Jerusalem 1965, p. 63, n. 45.

(48) See *Ihyā'*, Vol. III, p. 19 f.

(49) According to al-Ghazālī, there are two motives (*khāṭir* pl. *khawāṭir*) in man's heart which cause his volition; the first which motivates man to do good is called *ilhām* (lit. inspiration) and the second which motivates man to do evil is called *waswās* (lit. devilish temptation). It is very difficult for man, says al-Ghazālī, to free himself from the evil motive. See *Ihyā'*, *ibid.*, pp. 27-28, 31, 45. Cf. H. A. Wolfson, "The *Ḥatirānī* in the *Kalam* and Ghazālī as Inner Motive Powers of Human Actions", in *Studies in Mysticism and Religion presented to G. G. Scholem*, Jerusalem 1967, pp. 363-379.

(50) Cf. *Mizān*, p. 223. *Munqidh*, p. 39, l. 1.

(51) See *Ihyā'*, *ibid.*, p. 20.

how to carry out devotional acts according to the Şufic system. Only an intelligent person (*dhakī*) who was aware of his intellectual ability in his youth and was taught by a wise person who was not committed to any opinion is ready to exercise both ways. After studying all the demonstrative sciences (*al-'ulūm al-burhāniyya*) it is unobjectionable that such a person withdraw from the community and become an ascetic and then expect that through this way (of abstinence), what was confused to other followers of this way (the Şufis) may be revealed to him.⁽⁵²⁾ Thus the supreme way to know God is a blend of wisdom or philosophical reasoning and ascetism. Abstinence alone as a means of obtaining the truth is rejected.

Four points are stated here by al-Ghazālī with respect to the person who may receive revelation: a. He must have an extraordinary intellectual power (*dhakā'*). [In Ibn Sīnā's epistemology *dhakā'* means the faculty of *ḥads*, that is, the power of perceiving the middle term. See Raḥman, *Avicenna's*, p. 249] b. He must learn the sciences but not in *taqlīd* way. c. He must practice ascetism. d. The fulfillment of these three conditions may cause revelation to occur. Two of these points, a and b, remind one of al-Fārābī's notion of intellectual revelation. Al-Fārābī says that the prophet has an extraordinary intellectual gift, that previous to revelation his intellect passes the stages of actualization and that at the end of this process the prophetic intellect receives revelation from the Active Intelligence. Indeed, al-Ghazālī does not use philosophical terms here, except for *dhakī*, but the resemblance in the main features of the theory cannot be overlooked. In the following we shall show the influence Ibn Sīnā exercises on al-Ghazālī.

Al-Ghazālī's four points do not coincide with the following passages in which he puts forward what seems to be the mystical way. The two parables which illustrate the difference between attaining knowledge through man's efforts and attaining it through the mystical way and a long passage dealing with pieces of evidence from tradition, which demonstrate the correctness of the mystical way as a means of reaching the knowledge of God,⁽⁵³⁾ may show the superiority of this way. Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī does not recede from his criticism of the mystical way. Is it possible to argue that al-Ghazālī speaks here only of the second stage (i.e. the mystical one) which comes only after the pursuit of study

(52) See *Mizān*, pp. 221-228 and especially p. 228.

(53) See *Ihyā'*, *ibid.*, pp. 20-22.

and inquiry? On the other hand, the abundance of material advocating the mystical experience could lead us to the conclusion that al-Ghazālī prefers it to the intellectual way, or that he regards the two ways as equal.⁽⁵⁴⁾ Could it be that al-Ghazālī wants his common reader to think that he prefers the mystical way, whereas his real intention is to strengthen the intellectual foundation of man's search for the highest knowledge. We have already seen that he uses a device of concealing in *Mīzān*.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Later, I shall try to show how al-Ghazālī connects these two ways.

Al-Ghazālī admits the existence of secret knowledge in religion.⁽⁵⁶⁾ This fact still does not necessarily indicate that al-Ghazālī himself had esoteric doctrines. But some facts suggest that he had an esoteric doctrine which he thought it would be too dangerous to express openly.⁽⁵⁷⁾ These are: a. He states that he has some books which must be kept from unsuitable persons.⁽⁵⁸⁾ b. He vacillates between revealing secrets and concealing them. c. He contradicts himself on crucial points in the same book and sometimes even in the same paragraph.⁽⁵⁹⁾

Following the mention of the two stages of knowledge (the knowledge of proofs leading to external belief and the knowledge of the secrets of belief. (See p. 184 above), al-Ghazālī says which of his books he devotes to the explanation of the first stage and which to the explanation of the second stage. The works dealing with the first stage are: 1. *K. qawā'id al-'aqā'id* in *Iḥyā'*. 2. *K. al-istiṣād* in which one can found belief (*i'tiqād*) but not knowledge (*ma'rifa*). The elucidation of the second stage is found in two sources divided according to the measure of their revealing of the *ma'rifa*. A small quantity of this knowledge is set forth in several books of *Iḥyā'*: *K. al-ṣabr wa'l-shukr* and *K. al-maḥabba* and the chapter on *taḥwīd* in *K. al-tawakkul*. A sound amount of material on this subject which enables one to knock at the door of *ma'rifa* occurs in *al-Maqṣad al-asnā*. But if one wants "the manifest knowledge of the real meanings of this belief without obscurity

(54) At any rate, statements such as "Al-Ghazālī steadily rates the faculty of revelation higher than that of intellect in his various scales" (C. R. Upper, "Al-Ghazālī's Thought" p. 32) cannot be accepted.

(55) See above p. 184.

(56) See *Iḥyā'*, Vol. I, pp. 99-103.

(57) See W. H. T. Gairdner, "Al-Ghazālī's *Mishkāt al-Anwār* and the Ghazālī-Problem", *Der Islam* 5 (1914), p. 147.

(58) See below p. 190.

(59) See below p. 193.

and control, he will find it in some of our books which are to be kept from those unfit to deal with them" (*al-maḍnūn bihā 'alā ghayr ahlihā*).⁽⁶⁰⁾ We know two works ascribed to al-Ghazālī which bear the title *K. al-maḍnūn* (*al-Maḍnūn al-kabīr* and *al-Maḍnūn al-ṣaḡhīr*), but these two works are suspected as being unauthentic.⁽⁶¹⁾ Alternatively, even if we accept their genuineness, it is clear that neither of these books treats the notion of the supreme way to know God. Another problem arises when al-Ghazālī fixes *al-Maqṣad* above *Ihyā'* in the graduation of the notion of *ma'rifa* according to the criterion of the author's disclosure of secrets. This hierarchic arrangement, however, loses its reliability when one reads in *al-Maqṣad* the following statement: "Whoever perceives the real meaning of God's unity in His action and knows that He who is alone in action in the corporeal as well as in the everlasting spiritual world is one, perceives this (*i.e.* that all comes from God). We have alluded to this point at the beginning of *K. al-tawakkul* in *Ihyā'*; thus, one must look for it there, since this book cannot bear it".⁽⁶²⁾ We may, therefore, conclude that *al-Maqṣad*, which was written after *Ihyā'*, is below the rank of *Ihyā'* with regard to revelation of secrets. Thus, we have to examine al-Ghazālī's view about the real meaning of *ma'rifa* in *Ihyā'*. [It is possible that al-Ghazālī intended to compose secret books, but finally decided to withdraw from this plan and to content himself with his books which were written in a way which reveals little and conceals twice as much. Probably, he thought that if he had revealed all the secrets, the common people would not have understood him and as a result would have accused him of unbelief. Therefore, he might have chosen the intermediate device of revealing and concealing at the same time. It would be very instructive to compare between al-Ghazālī's stand and Maimonides' concerning the treating of the innermost part of religion.⁽⁶³⁾]

A passage in *K. al-maḥabba* in *Ihyā'* further confirms al-Ghazālī's view in *K. al-araba'in*, to the effect that only the knowers can attain the perfect happiness in the world to come. The way to obtain the knowledge of which al-Ghazālī speaks is not mystical

(60) Maimonides uses a similar expression: *maḍnūn bihā 'alā al-jumhur*. See *The Guide* (Joel), I, ch. 35, p. 54, l. 4.

(61) See *Bouyges*, pp. 51-55.

(62) *Lā yaḥtamiluhu* means it cannot bear something because of its being a secret. See *Maqṣad*, p. 143. *Ihyā'*. Vol. IV, p. 247. *Mishkāt*, p. 91.

(63) See *The Guide* (Joel), Introduction, pp. 5-13.

but intellectual. It is well known that according to Muslim dogma the best reward which the believers will receive in the hereafter is seeing God (*ru'ya't allah*).⁽⁶⁴⁾ The real meaning of this seeing has been much disputed by Islamic dogmatic schools.⁽⁶⁵⁾ While al-Ash'arī and his followers held that God will be seen in the world to come, most of the Mu'tazilites interpreted this vision to mean knowledge.⁽⁶⁶⁾ Al-Ghazālī seems to adopt the Mu'tazilite view (or Ibn Sīnā's? see note 72 below) and interweave it into the framework of his own ideas. He begins his discussion of this issue with the statement that things perceived (*mudrakāt*) are divided into two kinds: a. those which are perceived by imagination, such as bodies of any sort, and b. those which are not perceived by imagination, such as God's essence and everything which is not a body as knowledge, power, will, etc. The difference between imagining things and seeing them is merely that in seeing there is more clarity and disclosure than in imagining, for the form seen is consistent with the form imagined. Seeing (*ru'ya*) is called thus because it is the utmost disclosure, not because it is fixed in the eyes.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The things known (*ma'lūmāt*) are also of two sorts: a. the first things which are known (*al-ma'lūmāt al-'ulā*), and b. things known which complement man's knowledge (*istikmāl lahā*). The difference between the two sorts of *ma'lūmā* is like the difference between a thing imagined and a thing seen; that is, the things known in the second stage (the complementary) are more clear and disclosed. Furthermore, as in the first dichotomy, the second type is called seeing in relation to the first type, for seeing is the utmost disclosure. Al-Ghazālī goes on in this comparison to say that just as one cannot see when the eyelids are shut, and in such a case one's perception means only imagination, so too do corporeal obstacles (e.g. desires) prevent one from perfect knowledge of things. These obstacles will be removed in the world to come and man will see God not in the meaning of physical vision, which God is above, but in the meaning of real and perfect know-

(64) See *Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr*, Beirut 1970, to sūra 10, v. 26 (Vol. III, p. 497 f) and to sūra 75, vv. 22-23 (Vol. VII, p. 171).

(65) See A. K. Tuft, *The Origins and Development of the Controversy Over "Ru'ya" in Medieval Islam and its Relation to Contemporary Visual Theory*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California 1979, University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor 1982.

(66) See 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, ed. 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uthmān, Cairo 1965, p. 270 f.

(67) See *Ihyā'*, Vol. IV, p. 312, ll. 1-10.

ledge.⁽⁶⁸⁾ What is most important is the following statement of al-Ghazālī: "The knowledge which is attained in this world, this knowledge itself, is to be complemented, reach the perfect disclosure and clarity and become perfect perception, or intellectual seeing (*mushāhada*). There will be no difference between the perfect perception in the hereafter and the things which man knows in this world but with regard to additional disclosure and clarity".⁽⁶⁹⁾ There can be no doubt that when al-Ghazālī speaks of first knowledge and complementary knowledge he refers to knowledge obtained through intellectual endeavors, not through mystical experience.⁽⁷⁰⁾ Al-Ghazālī draws the inevitable conclusion that only the knowers in this world will achieve the highest stage in the world to come, namely, *ru'ya*; whoever does not know God in this world, will not see (= know) him in the world to come. What does not accompany man from this world, will not recommence in the hereafter.⁽⁷¹⁾ Consequently, inasmuch as the measure of the knowledge of God, His qualities and His acts increases in this world, so the pleasure in the hereafter increases.⁽⁷²⁾

Al-Gazālī concludes his treatment of *ru'ya* by answering the unavoidable question about his stand on this issue, which seems to

(68) See *ibid.*, p. 312, l. 11 - p. 313, l. 9. Cf. Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla fī māhiyyat al-ṣalāt*, ed. M. A. F. Mehren (*Traité des Mystiques*, Leiden 1899) p. 38. Maimonides, *The Guide* (Joel), I, ch. 5, pp. 19-21.

(69) See *Ihyā'*, *ibid.*, p. 313, ll. 10-12. Man's knowledge is not erased when he dies. See *Ihyā'*, Vol. III, p. 22. *Mishkāt*, p. 47 f.

(70) The verb *dhāqa* and its infinitive *dhawq* mentioned in *Ihyā'*, *ibid.*, p. 309 f, are not understood to mean mystical experience, but the pleasure of whoever pursues the process of reasoning. For another meaning of *dhawq* see p. 201 f. below.

(71) See *Ihyā'*, *ibid.*, p. 313, l. 29 - p. 314, l. 2.

(72) See *ibid.*, p. 315, ll. 5-7. Abrahama, "Ibn Sīnā's, p. 14 f. The notion that seeing God means knowing Him also appears in *Ma'ārij al-quḍs fī madārij ma'rifat al-naḥs*, Cairo n.d. (pub. al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā), p. 135 f. This work is not al-Ghazālī's, since much of it is by Ibn Sīnā at first or second hand. See A. S. Tritton, "Ma'ārij al-Quds", *BSOAS* 22 (1969), p. 353. G. Vajda, "Le Ma'ārij al-quḍs fī madārij ma'rifat al-naḥs attribué à al-Gazālī et les écrits d'Ibn Sīnā", *IOS*, 2 (1972), pp. 470-473. If we accept that this treatise is Ibn Sīnā's, then al-Ghazālī's theory of *ru'ya* can be traced back to him. The notion that man sees His God with intellectual seeing (*mushāhada 'aqliyya*) occurs in *Risāla fī māhiyyat al-ṣalāt*, p. 38. Another possibility of Ibn Sīnā's influence on al-Ghazālī will be shown in the following (See below p. 201).

The question of whether al-Ghazālī, when he speaks of this theory, is alluding to the philosophical idea that the soul, after death, has a life of its own merits further study. Cf. Rahman, *Prophecy*, p. 23, n. 8.

contradict the orthodox one. Al-Ghazālī's subtle and intricate answer runs as follows: "If you say: 'Where is the place (*maḥall*) of this seeing in the world to come, is it in the heart or in the eye?' know that people have disputed this question, whereas the wise do not pay attention to this dispute or reflect on it; the intelligent person eats vegetables without asking whence they come. Whoever desires to see his lover, his love diverts him from paying attention to [the question of] whether his seeing is created in his eye or in his forehead. He aims at the seeing and its pleasure, be it in the eye or in another place. For the eye is a place (*maḥall wa-ṣarf*) which no one directs attention to and expresses an opinion on."⁽⁷³⁾ The truth concerning this matter is that the eternal power is huge; thus, we should not judge that it is unable to [do] each of the two (i.e. to fix seeing in the eye or in any other place). This (fixing) is possible (*fi ḥukm al-jawāz*). As regards [the question of] which of the two possible things will actually happen in the world to come, this is to be perceived by tradition (*al-sam'*). The truth is the pieces of evidence of Revelation, which are manifest to the orthodox (*ahl al-sunna wa'l-jamā'a*), to the effect that this seeing is created in the eye so that the word "seeing" (*ru'ya*) and the word "looking" (*naẓar*) and all the other expressions occurring in Revelation will be interpreted according to their literal meaning (*ẓāhir*). For it is inadmissible to cancel the literal meaning [of an expression], except on account of necessity (*ḍarūra*). And God, may He be exalted, knows best".⁽⁷⁴⁾

Al-Ghazālī seems to adopt the orthodox stand, when he says that one should adhere to the literal meaning of the text, which means to understand *ru'yā* as physical seeing. But he already deviates from the orthodox view through interpreting *ru'ya* as complementary knowledge. Again we see that while making the impression that he follows the Tradition, al-Ghazālī constructs his own theory which opposes the Tradition as understood by the majority of the Muslim doctors.⁽⁷⁵⁾ It is noteworthy that al-Ghazālī expresses the same notion in *K. al-iqtisād fī'l-i'tiqād*, which was written before his leaving of Baghdad.⁽⁷⁶⁾ This fact proves

(73) Cf. *al-Iqtisād*, p. 32, ll. 20-23.

(74) See *Iḥyā'*, *ibid.*, p. 315, ll. 18-24.

(75) Cf. *Iḥyā'*, *ibid.*, p. 500-502 (the paragraph dealing with the issue of '*adhāb al-qabr*'). Abrahamov, "Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Causality", *SI* 67 (1988), n. 55.

(76) See *Bouyges*, p. 33 f.

once more that al-Ghazālī has not changed his views concerning the basic issues of Muslim dogma during his lifetime.

Let us now examine the section dealing with God's unity in *K. al-tawakkul* in *Ihyā'*. The notion of attaining knowledge through intellectual efforts is also expressed in this section. According to al-Ghazālī, the acceptance of God's unity (*tawḥīd*) is known through four stages. The first stage is one's uttering the statement "there is no god except God" without being aware of the content of this statement or while in fact denying it. The second stage is one's acceptance of the phrase "God's unity" as true, as most Muslims accept it. This is the belief of the common people (*i'liqād al-'awāmm*) which corresponds to the belief of the Muta-kallimun. In the third stage, one sees many things, but nevertheless considers (*yarā*) them as originating (*ṣādira*) from one agent, God. This kind of persons know the truth as it is. The knowledge of things as they are is the act of the intellect which is exempt from imaginations.⁽⁷⁷⁾ In the fourth stage, one observes in the world only God and does not see even oneself. This stage, al-Ghazālī says, is the one which the Ṣufis call passing away from one's consciousness because of being immersed in God's unity (*al-fanā' fī'l-tawḥīd*). Since one does not see anyone except the One, he does not see himself.⁽⁷⁸⁾

Here and elsewhere⁽⁷⁹⁾ al-Ghazālī uses the formula "the Ṣufis express or call it...". The use of the word "Ṣufis" in the third person seems to connote al-Ghazālī's disapproval of their understanding of the term under discussion; otherwise he would say "this stage is called..." without mention of the Ṣufis. Probably al-Ghazālī considers the fourth way of *tawḥīd* a stage obtained through intellectual efforts, a continuation of the third stage, not a mystical experience. That the third and the fourth stage derive from reflection is also proved by the use of the verb *yarā* (lit. he sees or will see) in the meaning of "he considers" or "he thinks it to be" or "he observes". In the third stage al-Ghazālī says: "He (the *muwaḥḥid*) really observes only one agent"⁽⁸⁰⁾ and in the fourth stage he says: "He does not consider the whole as many but as one".⁽⁸¹⁾

(77) See *Mishkāt*, p. 47, ll. 16-17 and note 41 above.

(78) See *Ihyā'*, Vol. IV, p. 245.

(79) See *ibid.*, p. 86, l. 16.

(80) See *ibid.*, p. 246, l. 5.

(81) See *ibid.*, l. 8. Cf. *Imlā'*, p. 31.

Al-Ghazālī refuses to answer the question of how the “many” is “one”, claiming that this question deals with the utmost knowledge of revelation (*ghāyat ‘ulūm al-mukāshafāt*) and that it is forbidden to write the secrets of this knowledge in books, since “the disclosure of the secret of Godship is unbelief” (*ifshā’ sirr al-rubūbiyya kufr*). Al-Ghazālī, however, is inclined, as usual, to divulge a clue to this secret. A thing may be “many” from one perspective (*i’tibār*) and “one” from another, as man is “many” because he consists of many parts, and “one” in relation to another man. The same applies with regard to existence (*wujūd*) which includes the Creator and the created things. According to a certain consideration, the whole existence is “one”, and according to other considerations it is “many”.⁽⁸²⁾ Thus al-Ghazālī does not refer to a spiritual state of the knower, to mystical experience, but rather to a kind of criterion employed by man’s reflection according to which existence is one.

The notion that, from one point of view, all of existence is one is further elucidated in *al-Maqṣad al-asnā*.⁽⁸³⁾ The following passage combines the two stages (the third and the fourth) of the way to attain God’s unity which occur in *K. al-tawakkul*. “In existence there is none but God, may He be extolled and exalted, and His acts. If one observes God’s acts as such (*min haythu hiya af’āluhu*), confining himself to this observation, or does not see them (*lam yaraha*) as heaven, earth and trees (*i.e.* as particulars), but as God’s making (*min haythu annahā ṣan’uhu*), since his knowledge cannot reach (lit. exceed) the Godship’s presence,⁽⁸⁴⁾ it is possible for him to say: ‘I know only God and see only God.’ If a person conceives [that] he sees only the sun and its light spreading out in the horizon, it is right for him to say: ‘I see only the sun’, since the light which emanates from it (*al-fā’id minhā*) is a part of its totality and is included in it. Everything in existence is a light of the lights of the eternal power (*al-qudra al-azaliyya*) and an effect of its effects. Just as the sun is the source of light (*yanbū’ al-nūr*)⁽⁸⁵⁾ which emanates on every lighted thing, so the essence (*al-ma’nā*) which no expression can be given about and which is

(82) See *ibid.*, p. 243, l. 23-p. 244, l. 1.

(83) Al-Ghazālī wrote this book before *Jawāhir al-qur’ān* and after *Ihyā’*. See Bouyges, p. 46 f.

(84) By this statement al-Ghazālī means that man cannot know God’s essence (*dhāt*), but only His attributes and actions.

(85) The text of the Cairo edition has *shī’ā’ al-nūr* which does not fit the context. There are other mistakes in this edition.

designated as the eternal power is the source of existence which emanates on every existent thing. Consequently, in existence there is only God, may He be extolled and exalted. Therefore it is admissible for the knower (*al-ʿarīf*) to say: 'I know only God'.⁽⁸⁶⁾ As usual al-Ghazālī does not want to go any further in this secret subject with which, he says, he has dealt only incidentally!⁽⁸⁷⁾ Thus from the comparison between *K. al-lawakull* and *al-Maqṣad al-asnā*, we may draw the conclusion that the knowledge of God's unity is reached through man's intellectual efforts.

The last passages of the third section of *Mishkāt* (the "veils" section)⁽⁸⁸⁾ also prove that the process of attaining God's true unity and transcendence is intellectual. The attainers of God's true unity reach the conclusion that God is absolutely free from (*munazzah*) any attribute previously ascribed to him.⁽⁸⁹⁾ As a result of their perception they attain the states of *fanā'* or *fanā' al-fanā'*⁽⁹⁰⁾. Al-Ghazālī adds that some attain the knowledge of God's absolute transcendence by stages, while others attain it all at

(86) See *al-Maqṣad*, p. 58, l. 9 - p. 59, l. 2.

(87) See *ibid.*, p. 59, ll. 9-12. It is to be noted that some Neoplatonic elements appear in this passage: a. the use of the parable of the sun. Cf. Wensinck, "Ghazālī's *Mishkāt al-Anwār*", p. 198. b. the application of the verb *fāda* (emanate). c. The essence which confers existence on all things is not God directly, but His eternal power. That is, the relationship between God, the One, and the world, the many, which originates from Him is not a relationship between one and many, since the world derives indirectly from God through the eternal power. Cf. my "Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Causality" *SI* 67 (1988), n. 96. Yet it is not the only passage in *al-Maqṣad* which contains Neoplatonic notions. Towards the end of this work, al-Ghazālī devotes a chapter to explaining the views of the Mu'tazilites and the philosophers on how God's qualities derive from one essence (*dhāt wāhida*). He notes that this chapter is not suitable to the book and not important to it. Whoever does not want to include it in the book, may refrain from doing so. This statement should attract one's attention, since, as we have seen, statements of this type are the forerunners of esoteric teaching. According to the philosophers, the seven qualities (life, knowledge, power, will, hearing, seeing and speaking) derive from God's knowledge, which in turn derive from His essence. His hearing, for instance, expresses His perfect knowledge which refers to voices. As for His knowledge, it is a creative power; His knowledge of a thing is a cause of the existence of this thing. See *al-Maqṣad*, p. 176. The notion that God's knowledge is creative is Neoplatonic. See S. van den Bergh, *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*, Vol. I, p. xx. Now, al-Ghazālī when dealing with God's name *'alim* (the Omniscient) says that God's knowledge precedes things and is the cause of them (*'ilm allah bi'l-ashyā' sābiq 'alayhā wa-sabab lahā*). See *al-Maqṣad*, p. 93, ll. 8-9.

(88) In the introduction to his edition of *Mishkāt* (p. 30f), Afifi proves the genuineness of this work contrary to Watt's view in "A Forgery".

(89) See *Mishkāt*, p. 92, ll. 1-4.

(90) See *ibid.*, ll. 5-13.

one time. In both cases the state of *fanā'* comes after knowledge. That is, *fanā'* is not that which makes man know God, but rather it is the outcome of man's knowledge. In the second case it reads as follows: "The [true knowledge] was revealed to them all at one time (*wa-hājama 'alayhim al-tajallī daf'alan*) and then the sublimity of God's countenance consumed all that is perceived by the senses and the intellect" (*fa-aḥraqat subuhāl wajhihi jamī' mā yumkinu an yudrikahu baṣar ḥissī wa-baṣīra 'aqliyya*).⁽⁹¹⁾ The last sentence is a usual expression of *fanā'*.

Ibrāhīm (*al-khalīl*) serves as an example of the first type of attainers and Muḥammad as an example of the second type. According to al-Ghazālī, Ibrāhīm used two figures of syllogism recorded by the Qur'ān, *al-mizān al-akbar* and *al-mizān al-awsaṭ*,⁽⁹²⁾ by which he learned of God's existence and unity. As has been stated above, al-Ghazālī regards the syllogism as the best way to attain knowledge of God. He repeats this notion in *K. al-tafakkur* (*The book of reflection*) in *Ihyā'*: "Know that the mea-

(91) See *ibid.*, p. 92, l. 17 - p. 93, l. 1. In *Mishkāl* (p. 57, ll. 2-4), al-Ghazālī differentiates between two sorts of states of the knowers, saying: "The knowers, after they ascended to the heaven of truth (*i.e.* the utmost truth) (*ba'da al-'urūj ilā samā' al-ḥaqīqa*) agreed that they did not see in existence but the true One (*illafaqu 'alā annahum lam yaraw fī'l-wujūd illā wāḥid al-ḥaqq*). Among them, however, there are some whose state (after attaining the truth) was a state of intellectual experience (*man kāna lahu ḥādhihi al-ḥāl 'irfānan 'ilmīyyan*) and other whose state was a state of mystical experience (*dhawq*)". Gairdner (*Mishkāl al-anwār*, tr. rep. of London ed. 1924, Lahore 1952, p. 106) understands the word *ḥāl* (state) as denoting the process of attaining the truth. Accordingly he translates: "Some of them, however, arrived at this scientifically, and others experimentally and subjectively". Gairdner seems to be mistaken, since the word *ḥāl* does not mean a process. Consequently, the words *ḥādhihi al-ḥāl* do not refer to *'urūj*, which is a process, but undoubtedly refer to the seeing of God as the One Real, and this seeing, not the process of attaining the knowledge of God, constitutes the summit of the knower's endeavors. Immediately following these lines, al-Ghazālī depicts the state of the knowers which culminates in the ecstatic expressions such as *anā al-ḥaqq* (I am the Truth = My "I" is God) uttered by al-Ḥallāj (d. 922) and *subḥānī mā ajallanī* (Glory be to me, How great is My Glory) uttered by Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī (d. 875). See L. Massignon, *The Passion of al-Ḥallāj*, tr. into English by H. Mason, Princeton 1982, Vol. I, pp. 126-134 and index. Finally al-Ghazālī says: "This state (*ḥādhihi al-ḥāla*), when it increases, is called, in relation to its possessor, *fanā'*." See *Mishkāl*, p. 57, l. 1. It seems to me that al-Ghazālī's term "intellectual experience" (*'irfān 'ilmī*) refers to the philosophical doctrine that the knower becomes the known object in the sense that it becomes like it. According to Aristotle, when man knows God he temporarily lives and shares Divine life. See Raḥman, *Prophecy*, p. 26 f, n. 27.

(92) See *Qistās*, pp. 49, 55.

ning of discursive knowledge (lit. reflection) is to bring two pieces of knowledge into the heart in order to derive from both a third piece of knowledge" (*i'lam anna ma'nā al-fikr huwa iḥdār ma'rifa-tayn fī'l-qalb li-yustathmara minhumā ma'rifa thālitha*).⁽⁹³⁾ Thus every piece of knowledge brings about another piece of knowledge, and this process may continue infinitely.⁽⁹⁴⁾ Two obstacles, however, prevent most people from increasing their knowledge: a. They do not have pieces of knowledge. b. Even if they have, they do not know to how use them according to the method of syllogism.⁽⁹⁵⁾ What is most important is al-Ghazālī's statement that the way of using syllogism is obtained either by a divine light in the heart, which is an inborn quality *nūr ilāhi fī'l-qalb yaḥṣulu bi'l-ḥiṣra* and which is the case with all the prophets, or by learning and exercising, which is the case with most people.⁽⁹⁶⁾ The notion that the prophet knows God gradually through the syllogistic device equals the way of Ibrāhīm, just mentioned, to attain the truth.⁽⁹⁷⁾ Thus al-Ghazālī considers prophets not only as persons who receive complete knowledge from God in one stroke (the case of Muḥammad in *Mishkāl*), but also as persons who have the inborn quality to use syllogisms, which enable them by stages to reach the rank of prophets.⁽⁹⁸⁾ The question which arises is why al-Ghazālī says that all the prophets have this inborn quality? Why should a prophet who receives all knowledge all at one time need such a quality?

Al-Ghazālī might have answered that each prophet had the inborn quality of using syllogisms. Some used it to gradually reach the truth (the case of Ibrāhīm) and others understood by this quality what was revealed to them in one stroke (the case of Muḥammad). Therefore both types of prophets need this quality. Another solution is suggested in consequence of the examination of the section dealing with the five faculties or spirits of the human soul in *Mishkāl*.⁽⁹⁹⁾ The first of these is the sensitive spirit

(93) See *Iḥyā'*, Vol. IV, pp. 425, ll. 25-30.

(94) See *ibid.*, p. 426, ll. 10-13.

(95) See *ibid.*, ll. 13-16.

(96) See *ibid.*, ll. 17-18. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 27, ll. 17-19. Also Ibn Sīnā uses the term *ḥiṣra* to denote the power to perceive the middle term. See Marmura, "Ghazālī's Attitude", p. 110, n. 20.

(97) Cf. Rāḥman, *Prophecy*, p. 30 and p. 66, n. 3.

(98) On a prophet's having an ability to use syllogism, see Ibn Sīnā, *K. al-nubuwwāt*, ed. M. E. Marmura, p. xiv f.

(99) In my opinion, *Mishkāl* does not deviate from al-Ghazālī's other works on

(*al-rūḥ al-ḥassās*) which receives the information obtained by the senses. The second is the imaginative spirit (*al-rūḥ al-khayālī*) which records the information received by the senses and keeps it ready for the use of the third spirit. The third spirit, the intellectual spirit (*al-rūḥ al-ʿaqlī*), perceives notions which cannot be perceived by the senses or by the imagination. The objects of the perception of the intellectual spirit are necessary and universal pieces of knowledge.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ The fourth is the discursive spirit (*al-rūḥ al-fikrī*) which uses syllogisms in treating pieces of knowledge. We have seen al-Ghazālī's attitude toward this important device of learning in *Qisṭās* and *Iḥyāʾ*. The fifth is the sacred prophetic spirit (*al-rūḥ al-qudsī al-nabawī*) which pertains to prophets and some saints. Through this faculty the unseen tables (?), the laws of the world to come, some knowledge of the Celestial and Terrestrial Realms and divine knowledge, which the intellectual spirit and the discursive spirit cannot perceive, are revealed.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ According to al-Ghazālī, it is not impossible that beyond the intellect (*ʿaql*) there should be another stage through which what does not come out through the intellect comes out. This stage, the sacred prophetic spirit, al-Ghazālī also calls *dhawq* and *wijdān*.⁽¹⁰²⁾ The fact that the fifth spirit is beyond the intellect, and the use of the words *dhawq* and *wijdān* may lead us immediately to the conclusion that al-Ghazālī regards the last spirit as mystical experience, which has no connection to other spirits.

But the essence of the fifth faculty seems to be different when examining al-Ghazālī's explanation of the components of the parable of the "light verse".⁽¹⁰³⁾ The symbol for the sensitive spirit is the niche for a lamp, for the imaginative spirit the glass, for the intellectual spirit the lamp, for the discursive spirit the tree (because it branches out as the result of the process of syllogism)

the issue of man's cognition.

The following discussion concerning the light verse (see below note 103) appeared in Abrahamov, "Ibn Sinā's", pp. 8-11.

(100) See *Mishkāṭ*, pp. 43-48.

(101) See *ibid.*, p. 76 f.

(102) See *ibid.*, p. 77, l. 13 - p. 78, l. -3.

(103) See sura 24, v. 35: "God is the Light of the heavens and the earth; the likeness of His Light is as a niche wherein is a lamp (the lamp in a glass, the glass as it were a glittering star) kindled from a Blessed Tree, an olive that is neither of the East nor of the West whose oil well nigh would shine, even if no fire touched it; Light upon Light; (God guides to His Light whom He will.) (And God strikes similitudes for men, and God has knowledge of everything.) See A. J. Arberry's tr. in *The Koran Interpreted*, Oxford 1983, p. 356 f.

and for the sacred prophetic spirit the oil.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ I would now like to quote the passage dealing with the symbol for the fifth spirit, on account of its importance to the understanding of this spirit. "As for the fifth, it is the sacred prophetic spirit attributed to the saints, if it is absolutely pure and luminous."⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ For the discursive spirit (*al-rūḥ al-mufakkira*)⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ is divided into that which requires instruction, stimulation and assistance from the outside so that it may continue [to deal with various] types of knowledge, and that which is absolutely pure as if it were stimulated by itself without assistance from the outside. Therefore it is appropriate to express the pure and the intensely ready (to act) faculty in [the words]: 'whose oil almost would illuminate, even if no fire touched it'. For there are saints whose light almost shines that they almost could dispense with the prophets' assistance, and there are prophets who almost could dispense with the angels' assistance. This parable fits this part (*i.e.* the fifth spirit)."⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Now, according to this passage the discursive spirit is divided into two parts. The first needs help from the outside and therefore is not entirely pure. Actually it is the fourth spirit called by al-Ghazālī *al-rūḥ al-fikrī*. This conclusion is proved by a comparison to the passage, just mentioned, in *K. al-tafakkur* in *Iḥyā'* (see above p. 197 f.). As we have seen, there are two ways to know how to use syllogisms; the first is through divine light, which is an inborn quality, and the second is through learning. This second way equals the fourth spirit, and the first equals the fifth spirit which is the faculty of the prophets, as is stated in *K. al-tafakkur*. Thus the difference between the way of the prophets and saints to reach the utmost truth, on the one hand, and the way of the wise or the philosophers, on the other hand, is not an essential, since both parties obtain knowledge through the same device; that is, the discursive spirit. It is only a difference of degree. The discursive spirit, in its pure form, namely, the sacred prophetic spirit, enables prophets and saints to perceive immediately what others would perceive in a long time if ever. Thus al-Ghazālī believes in intel-

(104) See *Mishkāṭ*, pp. 79-81.

(105) The next has *fī ghāyat al-ṣafā' wa'l-sharaf*. *Al-sharaf* does not make any sense. Very probably it is a scribal error and the original word may have been *al-sharq*.

(106) Gairdner (p. 153) translates this term as "the thought-spirit", while, through the context, it is very clear that al-Ghazālī speaks here of the fifth spirit, namely, the discursive spirit.

(107) See *Mishkāṭ*, p. 81, ll. 4-11.

lectual revelation caused by illuminated intuition. This notion may have been taken from Ibn Sīnā.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

Whereas al-Fārābī conceives of the prophetic revelation as occurring at the end of noetic development, a process advocated also by al-Ghazālī (see above p. 198), Ibn Sīnā regards revelation as something happening in one stroke. He states that people differ in their power of intuition (i.e. perception of a truth without consciously using syllogism). There are people who possess this power and others who do not. Among those who have it, there are some who have a great measure of it and others who have a little measure. Thus there may be a person endowed with such a great measure of this power that he intuits all things in one stroke.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ This faculty Ibn Sīnā calls the sacred spirit (*al-rūḥ al-quḍsiyya*)⁽¹¹⁰⁾ or sacred faculty (*al-quwwa al-quḍsiyya*).⁽¹¹¹⁾ Moreover, knowledge obtained through the syllogistic device is denominated discursive knowledge (*al-'ilm al-fikrī*).⁽¹¹²⁾ Thus al-Ghazālī was influenced by Ibn Sīnā to such a degree that he used his terminology. Al-Fārābī's influence on al-Ghazālī can be discerned even in this doctrine. As we have pointed out al-Fārābī believes in an intellectual process at the end of which revelation emerges. Al-Ghazālī may have taken the Farabian notion of the noetic development along with Ibn Sīnā's notion of attaining the truth through the syllogistic device, when, in *Mishkāt*, he speaks of Ibrāhīm who attained the truth by stages. The idea that saints and prophets can dispense with outside aid had already been put forward by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.⁽¹¹³⁾ It should also be noted that al-Ghazālī connects the fourth and the fifth spirit stating that man must strive to become one of the people who possess *dhawq* through something of this spirit.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Thus man is capable of attaining the highest stage through his endeavors which cannot be but intellectual.

There are two problems to be solved: a. Why al-Ghazālī states that the fifth spirit is a stage beyond the intellect (*'aql*) whereas we see that the fifth spirit is also based on reason? b. Does not the

(108) See Rahman, *Prophecy*, p. 31 and the notes to this page. *Mishkāt*, 'Afīfī's introduction, p. 21 f.

(109) See Rahman, *Prophecy*, *ibid.*

(110) See Rahman, *Avicenna's*, p. 249, l. 1.

(111) See *ibid.*, p. 250.

(112) See *ibid.*, p. 243, l. 7.

(113) See Rahman, *Prophecy*, p. 31.

(114) See *Mishkāt*, p. 78, l. 13.

fact that al-Ghazālī calls the fifth faculty *dhawq* and *wijdān*—both terms denote mystical experience—contradict the conclusion that the fifth faculty is also intellectual? When al-Ghazālī speaks of the intellect he means the intellectual spirit, just as when he speaks of *ihsās* (sense perception) he means the sensitive spirit. Just as the intellectual spirit is a stage higher than the sensitive spirit, so the sacred prophetic spirit is higher than the intellectual spirit.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ *Dhawq*, or its equivalent *wijdān*, as understood here by al-Ghazālī, means intuition, that is, the faculty of immediate perception. The important point is that al-Ghazālī deems this faculty a pure and elevated form of the fourth faculty, the discursive one, and not that he denominates it by a Ṣufic term. *Dhawq* in this context is not mystical experience, since the latter is a state, whereas the former is a faculty of the soul. The fact that *dhawq* occurs as a Ṣufic way in *al-Munqidh*⁽¹¹⁶⁾ should not contradict what al-Ghazālī states in *Mishkāt*. For what one must search for, to use al-Ghazālī's notion, is not words or terms but their real meaning.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ And the real meaning of *dhawq* is the best intellectual faculty of the soul which enables man to perceive what could not be perceived by other faculties of the soul.⁽¹¹⁸⁾

Concluding remarks: In several writings representing different periods in his lifetime, al-Ghazālī held the idea that philosophical reasoning is the best way to attain knowledge of God. This way is expressed through different terms which sometimes refer to the faculty of reasoning (*al-rūḥ al-fikrī*, *al-rūḥ al-qudsī al-nabawī* or *dhawq*) and sometimes to the action of this faculty (*fikr*, *tafakkur*).⁽¹¹⁹⁾ The fact that there is no essential difference between the fourth and fifth spirit in *Mishkāt* enables us to answer the question, posed at the beginning of the article, of why prophets and saints are not mentioned in the highest stage in *Iljām*. Since attaining the knowledge of God through syllogisms is the way of

(115) See *ibid.*, p. 77, l. -2 - p. 78, l. 1. Cf. *Munqidh*, p. 42, p. 51, l. 2.

(116) See *ibid.*, ch. 6-8, *passim*.

(117) See Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies*, p. 295.

(118) It would be very instructive to compare between al-Ghazālī's stand and Ibn Sīnā's on this issue.

(119) Al-Ghazālī regards the syllogistic device, which he calls *fikr* or *tafakkur* (See *Iḥyā'*, Vol. IV, p. 425) as the best means for attaining the truth. Its fruit is knowledge which changes the state of the heart, which in turn changes the actions of the organs. *Fikr*, therefore, is better than any action, since it is the principle on which every good action is based. See *ibid.*, p. 426f. Cf. L.S. Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, pp. 78-94.

prophets and saints, be it a gradual process (the fourth spirit; the case of Ibrāhīm) or immediate intuited perception (the fifth spirit; the case of Muḥammad), al-Ghazālī, according to his system, need not mention them. In this way one may explain the appearance of philosophical reasoning in *Qisṭās* and *Mizān* and also the way of the saints in *Sharḥ 'ajā'ib al-qalb* which corresponds to the fifth faculty in *Mishkāṭ*.

The influence of al-Fārābī's and Ibn Sīnā's philosophy on al-Ghazālī with respect to the subject matter of this article is undoubtable. Al-Ghazālī's view that man's utmost goal in life is to know God and that only the knower will attain the highest felicity in the world to come seems also to have been derived from the writings of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.⁽¹²⁰⁾

Al-Ghazālī's supreme way to know God is not Ṣūfī, although he gives the impression that it is so. It is a philosophical system which sometimes appears in Ṣūfī disguise.

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(120) See al-Fārābī, *Mabādī*, p. 410. Idem, *Rasā'il*, ed. F. Dieterici, Leiden 1890, p. 53, ll. 13-16.

ABBREVIATIONS

- Abrahamov, "Ibn Sīnā's", B. Abrahamov, "Ibn Sīnā's Influence on al-Ghazālī's Non-Philosophical Works", *Abr-Nahrain* 29 (1991), pp. 1-17.
- Bouyges, M. Bouyges, *Essai de Chronologie des Œuvres de al-Ghazālī*, ed. M. Allard, Beirut 1959.
- Al-Fārābī, *Mabādī' Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State. Abu Naṣr al-Fārābī's Mabādī' Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, ed. and tr. R. Walzer, Oxford 1985.
- Ihyā'*, al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, Cairo (al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā) n.d.
- Iljām*, al-Ghazālī, *Iljām al-awāmm 'an 'ilm al-kalām*, in the margins of 'Abd al-Karīm al-Jilānī's *al-Insān al-kāmil fī ma'rīfat al-awākhir wa'l-awā'il*, Cairo n.d.
- Imlā'*, al-Ghazālī, *K. al-implā' fī ishkālāt al-ihyā'*, in *Mulḥaq ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* in the edition of *Ihyā'* mentioned above.

- al-Iqtiṣād*, al-Ghazālī, *K. al-iqtiṣād fī l-i'liqād*, Cairo (Maktabat al-Ḥusain al-Tijā-riyya) n.d.
- Jabre, *La Notion*, F. Jabre, *La Notion de la Ma'rifa chez al-Ghazālī*, Beirut 1958.
- Jawāhir al-qur'ān*, al-Ghazālī, *Jawāhir al-qur'ān*, ed. Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā al-Qabbānī, Beirut 1985.
- K. al-arba'in*, al-Ghazālī, *K. al-arba'in fī uṣūl al-dīn*, Cairo (Maktabat al-Jundī) n.d.
- Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies*, H. Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies in al-Ghazzālī*, Jerusalem 1975.
- Maimonides, *The Guide* (Joel), Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, ed. S. Munk, Paris 1856-66, I. Joel, Jerusalem 1930.
- al-Maqṣad*, al-Ghazālī, *al-Maqṣad al-asnā sharḥ asmā' allah al-ḥusnā*, Cairo 1968.
- Mishkāl*, al-Ghazālī, *Mishkāl al-anwār*, ed. Abū al-'Alā 'Afīfī, Cairo 1964.
- Mizān*, al-Ghazālī, *Mizān al-'amal*, ed. S. Dunya, Cairo 1964.
- Munqidh*, al-Ghazālī, *al-Munqidh min al-dalāl wa'l-mūṣil ilā dhī al-'izza wa'l-jalāl*, in F. Jabre's tr. into French, Beirut 1969.
- Qisṭās*, al-Ghazālī, *al-Qisṭās al-mustaqīm*, ed. V. Shelhot, Beirut 1959.
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- Raḥman, *Prophecy*, F. Raḥman, *Prophecy in Islam Philosophy and Orthodoxy*, London 1958.
- Watt, "A Forgery", W. M. Watt, "A Forgery in al-Ghazālī's Mishkāt?", *JRAS* 1949, pp. 5-22.