

## CHAPTER 12

# The Many Dialects of Rebellion, 1960–1975

In early April 1968, the civil rights leader Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. and his staff arrived in Memphis, Tennessee, to support a strike by garbage collectors. Like Gandhi (whom King admired), King stressed not only nonviolence but the importance of combining economic self-sufficiency and commercial influence with political assertiveness. He was concerned about the convergence of racial prejudice, labor oppression, economic dependency, and poverty. Injustice, he believed, was corrupting for both the victims and the perpetrators. Resistance to injustice was the greatest good.

By the time of his appearance in Memphis, King had attracted the enmity of racists, anti-labor forces, local governments, and even his own rivals for leadership in the civil rights movement, many of whom despised his nonviolent strategies. In Memphis he acknowledged that his life was at risk, but he asserted that he would have chosen no different time to live, and that if he must die, he would know that he had not died in vain:

If I were standing at the beginning of time, with the possibility of a general and panoramic view of the whole human history up to now, and the Almighty said to me, “Martin Luther King, which age would you like to live in?” ...I would turn to the Almighty, and say, “If you allow me to live just a few years in the second half of the twentieth century, I will be happy.” Now that’s a strange statement to make, because the world is all messed up. The nation is sick. Trouble is in the land. Confusion all around. That’s a strange statement. But I know, somehow, that only when it is dark enough, can you see the stars. And I see God working in this period of the twentieth century in a way that men, in some strange way,

are responding—something is happening in our world. The masses of people are rising up. And wherever they are assembled today, whether they are in Johannesburg, South Africa; Nairobi, Kenya; Accra, Ghana; New York City; Atlanta, Georgia; Jackson, Mississippi; or Memphis, Tennessee—the cry is always the same—“We want to be free.”<sup>1</sup>

King was murdered the next day, at the age of thirty-nine.

The troubled world to which King referred was obvious to everyone at the time. The United States was in social and political turmoil over its role in the Vietnam conflict, which together with problems of racial strife and economic dislocation created a series of urban crises. Labor issues combined with ethnic tensions in the campaigns of César Chavez for better working conditions for migrant workers in North America. Everywhere it seemed that liberal societies, authoritarian societies, and even some Communist countries were being swept up in massive dissidence. In some regions, farmers and workers were engaging in civil disobedience and violence. Guerrilla movements were gaining momentum and attracting greater followings.

Nevertheless, there was a structural logic to much of what was happening throughout the world. The bipolar system that had emerged from World War II, based on the monopoly of nuclear power by the United States and the Soviet Union, was weakening. After decades of tense sparring, the two superpowers had learned that the idea of using nuclear power was so horrible—and therefore so unthinkable—that the threat of doing so was meaningless. They concentrated on more conventional conflicts in more contained regions. In the process, they empowered many more countries as their partners, and in time they lost their monopoly on nuclear weapons. By 1964, five countries, including the People’s Republic of China, had demonstrated that they could construct nuclear weapons, and by the middle 1970s Israel and India joined the group. The hostility between China and the Soviet Union also made international relations very complex, as China joined the competition to gain influence, military bases, and commercial advantages in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In this more fluid international environment, improving communications and the coalescing of a global popular culture permitted the growth of new connections that crossed national lines, as described in the previous chapter. Ironically, though nationalists such as Patrice Lumumba and Nelson Mandela were important icons of resistance and protest, their nationalist message was sublimated to a greater movement for international connection and the improvement of the lives

<sup>1</sup>Reprinted by arrangement with The Heirs to the Estate of Martin Luther King Jr., c/o Writers House as agent for the proprietor New York, NY. Copyright 1968 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr; copyright renewed 1996 Coretta Scott King.

of a majority of people on earth. Some of these connections created new political dynamics, particularly those that were related to the international “nongovernment organizations” (NGOs), foremost of which was the United Nations. Others stirred new cultural connections, promoting apparent solidarity across regions. Pan-Africanism, pan-Asianism, pan-Celticism, and pan-Arabism were now cultural as well as political themes. They permeated the popular media, but they also had very strong effects on academic curricula, international publishing, and tourism.

At important points, subnational and supranational concerns could mesh. Days before the 1968 Summer Olympics began in Mexico City, government troops had fired on student demonstrators, killing hundreds and wounding as many as a thousand. When the U.S. runners Tommie Smith and John Carlos won their events and stood for the playing of the American national anthem, they raised their right hands in black gloves, the “black power” salute—for which they were expelled from the competition. In the circumstances, it was not merely a gesture of support for their own movement but also a gesture of solidarity with Mexicans who were demanding land and labor rights. Incidents such as the Mexico City drama suggest the structural changes that were fundamental to a series of civil disorders around the world in 1968-1970 that marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War.

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## National Independence in the Weakening Bipolar System

In the 1960s, a pantheon of “Third World” (see Chapter 10) revolutionary heroes were celebrated around the globe. They included conventional nationalists such as Patrice Lumumba (who was killed in 1961), but also radical, revolutionary figures such as Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara (killed in 1967), and the leaders of an emerging black revolutionary movement in the United States, the Black Panthers. Guevara himself had acknowledged that the greatest influence on him after Marx was the leader of the Chinese Communist revolution, Mao Zedong, who appeared to have been the most successful at translating resistance to the superpowers into a national identity of self-reliance and social equality.

### *New Patterns of Competition and Control in Africa*


As of 1960, Africa was still experiencing the lingering hold of the old European colonialist powers. Only five African nations were regarded as independent in 1945, but in 1970 there were 42 African countries represented in the UN. The 1960s in particular had seen a dramatic rise in the number of newly independent nations. Ghana had recently become independent, the Congo gained its independence in June 1960, Nigeria and Sierra Leone became independent later

in the same year, Kenya and Uganda became independent in 1963, Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in 1964, and Gambia in 1965. Some of these transitions, like that in Kenya, had followed years of bloody fighting between nationalist activists and colonial loyalists. Portugal attempted to retain its colonial influence, creating new complications in Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and Mozambique in the early 1960s.

The leading independence hero in Africa in 1960 was Patrice Lumumba. A Christian and former bureaucrat from the city of Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) in what was then Belgian Congo, Lumumba had had little interest in political activism before being imprisoned in 1958. He served a sentence of a year and emerged as an advocate for Congo's independence, as well as becoming active in the pan-African movements for political independence from either the United States or the Soviet Union, for economic development, and for greater access to education. Though Belgium had already agreed to eventually make Congo free, the movement in which Lumumba participated, and which sometimes involved violence, convinced Belgium to permit the creation of a national government in Congo in 1960, years ahead of the proposed schedule. The transition became confused, however, when elements in the Congo military attempted to seize control of one of the country's provinces, and the new civilian government requested outside help from Belgium, the United Nations, and the Soviet Union. Only Belgium and the Soviet Union responded, but the help was too little and too late. Lumumba was abducted and executed by the militarist (Joseph) Mobutu Sese Seko, who subsequently assumed and kept control of Congo.

The murder of Lumumba sent shock waves around the world. European leaders and the UN strongly denounced Mobutu's actions but left him in power. Many noted that Lumumba's campaign recalled that of Muhammad Mosadegh in Iran in 1953 and Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954 (see Chapter 10). Like Mosadegh and Arbenz, Lumumba was elected on political promises of land reform, full or partial nationalization of natural resources, and political independence from the superpowers. In the aftermath of Lumumba's death, many aspiring nationalists in Africa and elsewhere abandoned hopes of perpetuating his ideologically nonaligned style. It appeared that radicalism and militancy were the only options, and many American activists considered the African-American and African movements to be one.

In southern Africa, particularly in South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), white minorities tenaciously clung to rule over the majority, using military force, secret police, and legal racial segregation (apartheid) to enforce their superiority. The new trend toward African nationalism and demands for local land rights produced increasing violence in many parts of Africa in the 1960s. Nigeria's civil war had claimed as many as five hundred thousand lives by the late 1960s. By the middle 1970s, the situation had become somewhat less violent. A new military junta that had come into power in Portugal in 1974 had no choice but to grant all the remaining colonies their independence. South Africa attempted to ameliorate its race problems and its international image by creating special zones of black



**MAP 12.1 Africa after World War II.**

Decolonization in Africa produced the emergence of many new nations and many regional reconstructions of power between 1950 and 1995. Dark and striped areas show the extent of Cuban intervention, most of it led by Che Guevara (see below), in the 1960s. In 2011, Sudan south of the Abyei Region became the Republic of South Sudan.

“home rule” (as in Nyasaland and Zambia). The limited political rights and miserable living conditions of these regions quickly exposed them as a sham.

In this period, Nelson Mandela became the international figure who symbolized the struggle for majority rule and national justice in Africa. Mandela had been born to a prominent family in South Africa, and in the early 1940s he had become interested in politics while studying law at Johannesburg. He joined the African National Conference, a movement advocating majority political participation. After becoming a lawyer, Mandela continued his political activism, always working within the context of the courts and of peaceful protest. Nevertheless, he was a critic of the older leaders of the ANC, who he thought prized lawfulness too highly and were too timid in challenging white rule in the country. He was a strong opponent of the “homelands” policies used in South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s to remove and isolate African majorities in undesirable territories.

In 1960, the ANC was outlawed. Mandela was arrested, but in 1961 his trial for treason was abandoned as South Africa began to revise its constitution from a British “dominion” to a republic. Mandela demanded that the black majority participate in the creation of the constitution. The government responded with military patrols to keep the majority quiet and peaceful while the minority completed the constitution. Mandela became a fugitive, and also changed his feelings on the practicality of nonviolence in the African situation: “At the beginning of June 1961, after long and anxious assessment of the South African situation, I and some colleagues came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be wrong and unrealistic for African leaders to continue preaching peace and nonviolence at a time when the government met our peaceful demands with force. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle. ... The Government had left us no other choice.”<sup>2</sup>

Mandela traveled to other parts of Africa, advocating a “Pan African Freedom Movement,” but on his return to South Africa he was arrested for traveling abroad illegally and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. He was subsequently charged with sabotage and sentenced to life in prison at the notorious facility on Robben Island. Mandela became an international cause, with some regarding him as a principled hero of nationalism, justice, and democracy, and others regarding him as a dangerous subversive. Like Che Guevara, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, and Fidel Castro, he was a figure onto which people projected their understanding of the great trends and great issues of their time.

Africa was rich in some resources that were very important in the postwar world, particularly oil in Nigeria, diamonds in Sierra Leone, uranium and cobalt in Congo, and gold, silver, and copper in South Africa. These resources, combined with the number of new nations that could be won as supporters or clients, attracted the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and Cuba. Most of the new countries were in need of immediate financial aid to develop agriculture and

<sup>2</sup>Nelson R. Mandela, “Statement During the Rivonia Trial,” April 20, 1964.

education. China contributed not only money, as the superpowers did, but also manpower, which it had in abundance. Chinese engineers and workers helped create major railroads and mining installations throughout Africa in the 1960s, and in the 1970s China reaped some political rewards as the new African nations all signed agreements recognizing the PRC as the government of China and either ignoring Taiwan or calling it merely a province of the PRC.

By the end of the 1970s, however, many African nations experienced a decline of foreign interest and support. Continuing political instability prevented the effective development of new industries and often disrupted supplies of oil. More immediately devastating, a drought in the middle 1970s enlarged the Sahara, driving refugee populations both into North Africa and southward into Ghana and Nigeria. The marginal agricultural development of many regions was incapable of supporting the influx. Hundreds of thousands died in refugee compounds, and in other regions new violence resulted from competition for land and water. By the late 1970s, Africa was generally regarded by the competing international powers as a lost cause. China maintained a substantial relationship with oil-rich Nigeria but otherwise followed the pattern of the other leading nations and stepped back from Africa.

### ***Black Activism in the United States and the Pan-African Movement***

In the United States, Martin Luther King was seen as a model for the struggle against the limitations imposed by race, class, or national circumstances. He led marches in which blacks and whites, northerners and southerners, elites and working people came together to protest racial segregation, attempts to prevent African Americans from exercising their voting rights, and local anti-labor policies. As King became more prominent, his public speeches tended more and more to stress the value of all individuals rising above racial distinctions and the necessity for the law to become colorblind.

This message had a strong impact on a large segment of the U.S. public, but it was troubling to some young black intellectuals and activists. Some of them criticized King for being interested in calming the anxieties of American whites and for promoting an unrealistic image of the United States as a society in which race had no significance. For this group, race was an indelible element of the identity of all Americans; equality of the races could not be gained through charm or uplifting spiritual messages, but only through struggle that would either win blacks respect through their actions or make white society pay a price; and blackness was not something to be transcended, but something to be celebrated, reinforced, and brought to its highest potential. A small number in this group saw the only hope for change as being violent confrontation between black forces and the U.S. government. Until his murder in 1965, Malcolm X (Malcolm Little, Malik el-Shabazz), a former convict who joined the Nation of Islam and became an uncompromising advocate of justice for African-Americans, was himself ambivalent about the degree to which violence should be part of the struggle. After his death,

violence and radicalism became more prominent in some sectors of the “Black Liberation” movement.

An important transitional figure in black activism in the United States was Muhammad Ali, born Cassius Marcellus Clay Jr. in 1942 in Louisville, Kentucky. On the night he won the world boxing championship in 1962, he announced his conversion to Islam and his new name, Muhammad Ali. When he was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1967 to serve in Vietnam, Ali refused to serve. He was stripped of his world championship title, his license to continue boxing was revoked, he was tried for draft evasion and sentenced to five years in prison. In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that Ali had the right to conscientiously object to the war and also had the right to continue boxing (under his restored title of world champion). For Ali, the factors compelling poor blacks to do military service and kill in the service of white elites were similar in the United States and in Africa. On visits to Africa, he was hailed as a hero of the struggle for African dignity and independence. Ali combined civil disobedience, a rejection of violence, and Islamic religion in a new style of Pan African identity.

### ***Che Guevara and Trans-National Revolution***

An evolving international culture embraced athletes, musicians, actors, and writers as celebrities who had chosen to add heroic political activism to their primary achievements. But increasingly political activists were also being hailed as heroes who were also celebrities. The French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, himself an international celebrity and admirer of Muhammad Ali, said of one of these activists: “In his life and in his story one sees the complete man of this age.” Sartre was referring to Che Guevara.

Born Ernesto Guevara de la Serna Lynch in 1928, Guevara came from an upper-class Argentinean family. He was educated as a physician but had strong interests in philosophy, reading Karl Marx at the socialist end of the spectrum and Sartre (his later admirer) at the existentialist end. After his graduation in 1952, Guevara rode a motorcycle throughout Latin America. From his diaries, we know that he was profoundly impressed by the poverty and misery of agricultural workers employed by international agricultural companies—mostly American and British—that sucked out great profits and left nothing behind but broken workers and damaged environments. He went to Central America to work among the very poor farmers there and soon became involved not only in political activism but also in guerrilla warfare. He was in Guatemala at the time of the overthrow of Arbenz (see Chapter 10). The lesson, he later wrote and taught, was that democracy in itself and civil political action would never be sufficient to overthrow what he saw as the undeniable collaboration of international corporations and the U.S. military.

In the late 1950s, Guevara went to Cuba to help overthrow the Batista regime, and he became a very high-ranking lieutenant of Fidel Castro. The combination of Guevara’s influence on Castro and Castro’s rejection by U.S. policymakers resulted both in Castro’s public declaration in 1960 that he was a Communist

and that Cuba was a socialist state. After the U.S. defeat at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Cuba began its own international revolutionary campaign, supporting guerrilla fighters in Guatemala, Mexico, and Bolivia. Castro also decided to support guerrillas in Congo, Guinea, Mozambique and other African colonies fighting the last remnants of European imperialism. In all these campaigns, Guevara was sent by Castro to be the main adviser, strategist, and ambassador.

Guevara was admired for his determination to aid countries that were not his own. But his actions were sometimes contradictory. With great tenderness he cared for enemy soldiers who had been taken prisoner. But when the Castro regime was newly victorious and was struggling to consolidate its hold over Cuba, he accepted personal responsibility for executing Batista military commanders without trial. He was a committed Marxist in the sense that he understood and was convinced by the ideas of Marx himself. Nevertheless, he did not approve



AP Photo/José Luis Magaña

Alberto Diaz Gutierrez (professional name Korda) edited his casual photo of Che Guevara in 1960 into a portrait that captured the attention and imagination of the world. In various forms the image became one of the best known and most enduring in the world, used not only to promote social reform and revolutionary causes but also to serve commercial ends. Korda died in 2001 without ever having received any payment for the image—primarily because the laws of Cuba do not protect intellectual property.

of many so-called Communist governments in his own time, and he despised self-styled revolutionaries who mindlessly adhered to the dictates of foreign regimes. He was brave and ruthless in combat, but between 1961 and 1965 he served as a Cuban bureaucrat, and he hoped that in his retirement he would have time for writings on history and philosophy.

In Bolivia, Guevara hoped to organize peasants to resist new encroachments by American-based companies. However, the peasants failed to rally to his cause and let him fall into the hands of CIA-trained Bolivian forces. He was shot in October 1967. To prove that they had killed Guevara, the Bolivian soldiers photographed his corpse and removed his hands to take with them before burying the body. His grave was left unmarked to prevent it from becoming a site of pilgrimage (the bones were discovered and identified thirty years later).

## Anti-colonialism and Self-reliance in Asia

After Guevara was killed in 1967, he was internationally celebrated as a martyr to Third World struggles against injustices perpetrated by the United States and Britain and their intelligence agencies. Guevara himself had acknowledged that the greatest influence on him after Marx was the leader of the Chinese Communist revolution, Mao Zedong, who had been the most successful at translating resistance to the superpowers into a national identity of self-reliance and social equality.

### *Mao Struggles Against Revolutionary Success*

As we saw in Chapter 10, Mao's plan for decentralization of China was opposed by a faction within the Chinese Communist Party who had been partly educated in the Soviet Union and adhered to the Soviet model of professionalization and centralization in the military, in science, and in education. Particularly in the late 1950s, this group felt that China should be emphasizing centers of research and training, along with specialization in the military and in the medical and scientific professions. In Mao's eyes, his opponents were threatening to use the success of the revolution to create a new elite of cadres who would soon become as corrupt and self-centered as the old landlord classes had been. In 1962, following the stupendous disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the break with the Soviet Union (see Chapter 10), Mao was weakened at home but still commanded great prestige abroad, where the facts of his disasters were unknown. Those who had lost earlier debates about centralization, specialized advanced education, and military professionalization were expected to move into the top positions in the PRC government.

But in 1962 Mao began a new political campaign that would culminate in the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976). This began as a student movement (instigated by Mao) that was opposed to supposedly archaic methods of teaching. Mao believed that intellectuals should not have a distinct place in society but should be merged with the mass of workers, all of whom would be both highly

educated and fit for hard manual labor. There should not be a choice between being a devoted Communist and being a highly trained professional—one should be “both red and expert.” But Mao claimed that the “counterrevolutionary” mentality of teachers and other intellectuals was preventing this cultural transformation from occurring.

Mao encouraged students to identify counterrevolutionaries personally, beginning with their teachers and parents but spreading out to anyone who appeared to be an opponent of socialist transformation. In public demonstrations, identified enemies were paraded before crowds and humiliated, then taken to huge public meetings where they were expected to confess their sins and beg forgiveness, usually by requesting to be made manual laborers. These scenes frequently degenerated into violence. Supposed counterrevolutionaries were beaten, sometimes to death. They were tossed out of windows, strangled, or deprived of food and water until they expired. Gangs of students soon began to vie with one another for local power. The government suppressed this kind of disorder in 1969, and many of the students were subsequently condemned as counterrevolutionaries. But the political campaigns of the Cultural Revolution continued, and Chinese lived in terror of having a neighbor, a family member, or a rival report them for having said counterrevolutionary things. The economy degenerated as the urban centers were dismantled and their professional elites dispersed. A social and economic chill gripped China until Mao's death in 1976.

Mao's campaigns for socialist transformation were accompanied by a phenomenal international publicity campaign that overlapped in time with the internationalization of other revolutionary heroes and placed Mao in the company of Ho Chi Minh and Guevara. The PRC ran an enormous printing and communications enterprise in Shanghai. With the aid of many foreign translators, Mao's words were available in virtually every language. More important, the fantasy of vigorously productive farms, active and modern factories, and happy, healthy, educated workers was supported by the beautiful photographs (most of them heavily retouched) in magazines such as *China Reconstructs*, which was available in all languages and was supplied free or at little cost to every country. Very effective “documentary” films also showed China as a model of agricultural modernization, with beautiful, abundant crops springing from the rich soil.

To viewers in the developing countries, where agricultural production and water supplies were constant worries, China seemed a shining beacon of what could be accomplished through self-reliance. To viewers in the developed countries who were weary of Cold War rhetoric and fears of the “military-industrial complex,” China was a refreshing hope for the possibilities of honest, humble government. The uniting of a dream of national self-reliance with one of economic abundance resonated strongly with the plight of Vietnam, which under U.S. bombardment enjoyed neither. The image of China in the 1960s was one of the best managed, most ubiquitous, and most appealing publicity campaigns of all time. In fact, the period of the Cultural Revolution produced no economic gains, and it left a death toll of perhaps five hundred thousand to a million, in addition to the losses of the Great Leap Forward. But it achieved its goals of

reestablishing the aging Mao at the pinnacle of power and of providing the primary imagery for people's revolutionary, agrarian, communitarian, guerrilla movements during the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

### ***Guerrilla Ethics in Post-War North Korea***

In North Korea, the new president, Kim Il Sung, had a parallel career to Mao's in many ways. Kim had begun his political life as a resistance fighter against the Japanese colonial authorities. While he had been put in power in the north (that is, in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and was sustained there by his ally the Soviet Union after the war, Kim nevertheless claimed that South Korea was still under colonial occupation by the United States. A patriotic war of national reunification must, in his view, be prosecuted to end colonialism in Korea for good. Kim's tactics in that war (see Chapter 9) were basically those of a guerrilla fighter. The people had to forgo modern conveniences supplied them by the imperialists to wean themselves from the patronage of the colonizers. They must be self-sufficient in food production, in managing their health care, and in creating their own industries and weapons.

Kim wrote up his thoughts on self-reliance (in Korean, *ju che*) and demanded that they become the basis for student indoctrination. They were later translated into English and had wide distribution throughout Asia and Africa. *Ju che*, rather than outright military confrontation, was the first line of resistance and defense. After that, guerrilla tactics would maximize the strengths of the liberation forces and diminish the strengths of the forces of oppression. Success would go to those who had the greatest determination, the greatest courage, and the greatest capacity to survive without conveniences. The final stage of victory would be the creation of a socialist economic system, in which it would be impossible to revive the exploitative relationships between the elites and the majority that had been the hallmark of imperialism.

Though Kim's ideas were an authentic reflection of his years as a nationalist fighter against Japanese colonialism, they were not particularly original. The same complex of ideas had been important to Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and Patrice Lumumba (although they had been democratic nationalists and not guerrilla fighters), as well as to Sukarno in Indonesia (another resistance fighter against Japanese imperialism who assumed control of his country after the Second World War), Mao Zedong in China, and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. By the middle 1960s, it was Ho and Mao who represented these ideals in the global consciousness more vividly than any others. These two relatively old men (Ho was seventy-five in 1965 and Mao was seventy-two) came to be intensely admired by young people all over the world because of their exemplification of self-reliance and national independence.

### ***"People's War" and New Models of Justice***

When the United States assumed France's role in Vietnam in 1954, Ho Chi Minh immediately received more weapons and advisers from the Soviet Union



**MAP 12.2 The War in Vietnam.**

Since the division of Vietnam between the North and the South in 1954, North Vietnamese campaigns to reunify the country depended upon the so-called "Ho Chi Minh Trail," which actually ran through Laos. Attempts by U.S. forces to disrupt the North's lines of travel and transport eventually extended to bombing Laos and Cambodia, which provoked widespread popular protests in 1970 and pressured the American government to move to end the war. American and South Vietnamese positions were gradually overwhelmed in a roughly north-to-south progression, with Saigon falling in 1975.

(where he had spent some time as a student and had signed on as an activist for the international Communist revolution). But in general Ho realized that the struggle against the United States in southern Vietnam would require protracted guerrilla warfare. The society of the north must be organized both to put the largest possible workforce into the fields and to put the largest possible workforce into the military struggle. That meant rebuilding society to erase the distinctions between soldiers and farmers, as well as between male and female roles. To Ho, this was the "people's war," the only way that poorer countries could resist domination and exploitation by the richer and more heavily armed superpowers. To U.S. military planners, a "people's war" meant that every civilian was a potential guerrilla fighter and a potential spy. The distinction between combatants and noncombatants, which had been weakened but had survived the Second World War, began to crumble completely.

Ho and his generation of Vietnamese military leaders proved brilliant at maintaining the morale of their organizations and making the most of the nationalistic enthusiasm that years of French colonialism had instilled in the Vietnamese. Though they certainly could not have expected to win the war without help from the Soviet Union or China, the basic contribution came from the Vietnamese people and their leaders. Ho himself had a fellow champion of "people's war" in Mao Zedong of China. Both men made their nations symbols of the serious, protracted war of self-sufficient but less industrializing societies against the previously industrialized, predatory superpowers.



## GLOBAL Technologies

### Assault Rifles and the Global Arms Trade

In the Second World War, German armies first explored the design of medium-range rifles that could be switched between select and automatic firing, and were small enough and light enough to fit the needs of moving, and sometimes crowded, troops. To power the magazine supplying the continuous flow of bullets, the gun captured its own explosive gases produced by the firing of the bullets in the first place. Many machine guns worked by a similar method, and hand-held versions of automatic rifles were developed in several countries during and after the First World War. The infamous Thompson submachine gun, for example, is familiar to all viewers of 1930s gangster films. Expensive, inaccurate, and prone to mechanical failures, these weapons found little use in professional armies after the Second World War. Soviet armorers used the German idea of powering by recycled gases to develop the AK-47. Its name stood for its type (*Avtomat* or Automatic),

its principal designer (Mikhail Kalashnikov), and the year of its development (1947). The gun sacrificed accuracy and range for light weight, reliability and simplicity, making it easy for untrained shooters to use. It is the ancestor of what is now called an assault rifle.

The AK-47 became the weapon supplied by Soviet Union to its allies and clients in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and many ongoing conflicts in Africa. No one knows exactly how many copies of the original rifle and its many derivatives and knock-offs came off production lines, but a hundred million is a plausible estimate—a number far exceeding the military needs of the USSR and its allies. By the 1970s, the guns were being traded for political influence or simply for hard cash; by the 1980s they had become ubiquitous wherever state authority was weak and political tensions were high. They were sufficiently rugged to be reliable in the dusty hill country of Lebanon or Afghanistan and the humid jungles of Columbia or Mindanao, sufficiently simple even for child soldiers to maintain, and sufficiently destructive to make poorly trained insurgents dangerous to well-trained soldiers. AK-47s (bought with U.S. and Saudi funds) became great equalizers in the war between Afghan tribesmen and Soviet troops during the 1980s and between Taliban fighters and NATO

### *“Vietnam” and the Peak of International Awareness*

The central development in the global uprisings of 1968 and 1970 was U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam, which is often referred to in shorthand as “Vietnam.” After the accession to office of President Lyndon Johnson in 1963,

troops in the 2000s. Today, at least 26 countries, most with some connection to the former Soviet Union or to China, manufacture their own variants and upgrades of the AK-47, for their own use and for the international arms market.

For centuries, governments have often put weapons in the hands of potential allies, including groups engaged in irregular or civil warfare. China, for instance, was supplied with machine guns by Britain and the United States in the nineteenth century for suppression of internal rebellions; by the early twentieth century, China in the age of the warlords purchased perhaps as much as fifteen percent of the world's arms. German submarines landed handguns and ammunition in Ireland before the 1916 Easter Rebellion; in the 1930s, Italy, Germany, and Soviet Union supplied their allies with weapons during the Spanish Civil War. Nonetheless, the international arms trade of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is unprecedented both in volume and destructiveness. Inexpensive, plentiful, and lethal weapons like the AK-47 shift power from police forces and standing armies to insurgents, militias, and even criminal gangs.

It is difficult to be precise about the quantity of manufactured and traded weapons, because a small portion of the parties involved work illegally and

make no reports. But globally the value of the trade is believed to have risen from about \$45 billion in 1998 to \$51 billion in 2007, accounting for about three percent of all global trade. The United States exports about 30% of all weapons, followed by Russia, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The largest importer of weapons is believed to be India (at about nine percent) followed by China, South Korea, Pakistan, and Greece.



MAGNUM/Steve McCurry

the United States sharply increased the number of soldiers and the amount of expenditure it was putting into the campaign to defeat North Vietnamese guerilla fighters. In early August 1964, operatives of the U.S. government claimed that Vietnamese boats had attacked a U.S. ship that was on a routine patrol in the Tonkin Gulf and that two days later, without provocation, Vietnamese boats

had torpedoed U.S. Navy vessels in the same waters. The reports were featured in news articles on the front pages of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* on August 5. Historians have now established that the incident was knowingly falsified by the U.S. government. The first U.S. ship attacked in the Tonkin Gulf was not on routine maneuvers but was supporting an assault by South Vietnamese forces against the North that had been going on for six months with covert American assistance. The second attack on the U.S. fleet never happened at all. The report of it was apparently inspired by a nervous sonar operator who might not have understood his readings, followed by firings from his ship that disturbed and confused other U.S. ships in the area. President Johnson himself said of the second attack that the U.S. ships might have been Navy ships “shooting at whales.” Nevertheless, the next day Johnson demanded that Congress grant him extraordinary powers to pursue a war in Vietnam based on North Vietnam’s purported aggression against the U.S. Navy. Without adequate investigation of what had happened in the Tonkin Gulf, Congress acquiesced.

Within a year, two hundred thousand U.S. troops were in Vietnam. Bombing campaigns eventually reduced North Vietnam and much of South Vietnam to a wasteland. In 1968, as Johnson considered running again for the presidency, the pace of the war was intensified. Escalation resulted from North Vietnam’s “Tet Offensive” (because it occurred at the lunar New Year) of 1968, in which a change from guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare was attempted with simultaneous assaults on various cities held by the American or South Vietnamese forces, particularly the capital of Saigon. Massive casualties on both sides resulted before the assault subsided without gaining control of any new cities. But continuous and rising levels of exposure of the violence in the American press raised American and European awareness of the extraordinary costs of the stalemate in Vietnam. Demonstrations in the United States protested the continuation of the war—and particularly of the draft. Johnson’s credibility was so badly damaged that he withdrew from the presidential race, and by the end of 1968, Richard Nixon, a Republican, had been elected president.

During 1968, political demonstrations became well established as a global phenomenon. Demonstrations against racism, for gay liberation, for women’s equality, for better labor conditions, and for prison reform had taken place all around the world. The single most widespread inspiration for the demonstrations in 1968 and 1969, however, was opposition to the American prosecution of the war against North Vietnam. Nixon hoped to quiet public wrath in the United States by withdrawing ground troops gradually from South Vietnam. He and his advisers intended to pursue the war with bombing campaigns, assuming that an air war would mean fewer American casualties and that American fear of the draft would calm. In 1969, the bombings were extended to Cambodia and Laos without notifying Congress or making any public announcement. But Nixon had miscalculated. In May 1970, news of the bombings broke, along with the revelation that U.S. ground troops were in Cambodia.

Popular reaction in the United States was instant and widespread. Spontaneous public outrage at the news of the Cambodia bombings combined with the general

acceptance of demonstrations to bring many thousands of participants to the colleges and universities, and also to public squares and parks. On many university campuses, authorities called in the local police to prevent students from vandalizing property or obstructing traffic. In some states, governors mobilized the National Guard to dispel demonstrations at state universities. This led to tragedy at Kent State University in Ohio, where the National Guard opened fire on students and killed four, two of whom were not involved in the protest. Shock and outrage at this event fueled even greater and more vigorous demonstrations on campuses, where students now occupied buildings, using the upper stories as grandstands from which to give speeches against the war and against the suppression of dissent in the United States. In New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles, street fighting broke out as groups of construction workers or motorcycle gangs set upon demonstrators. On May 9, 1970, tens of thousands of protesters gathered at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., where Nixon himself put in an appearance, hoping to mollify the crowds.

As in 1968, urban tensions combined with immediate political passions to sustain a general movement against "the system": capitalism, racism, the CIA, the military-industrial complex, and ecological devastation, all of which were now characterized by dissidents as mutually reinforcing elements of the bipolar system of global dominance. On May 14, 1970, students protesting the war and local racism at Jackson State College in Jackson, Mississippi, skirmished with police, with the result that two students were shot dead at close range and twelve others were wounded by scattered gunfire. By the end of May, nearly four hundred fifty campuses had been disrupted, some of them shut down completely. The general upheaval of college campuses and urban centers in May 1970 was followed by a marked shift in the political culture of the United States.

In the 1960s, protest against traditional values, against segregation and racism, and against the war had been associated with young people and, increasingly, with African Americans. But the steady stream of demoralizing news coverage from the war, the increasing casualties, the revelations in 1969 of the 1968 massacre of civilians in the village of My Lai, and the intense experiences of May 1970 produced a decline in the glamour of violence and extremism. The damage to campuses and city centers from fires, fire bombings, and occasional gunplay had produced enough rubble and repair bills that popular patience with mayhem had evaporated. Radical leaders who had promoted or permitted violence in their movements, whether white "Yippies" or commanders in the Black Panthers, were being indicted and imprisoned, and were increasingly being treated in the popular media as criminals. Violent factions such as the Weathermen (or Weather Underground, a reference to a Bob Dylan song) and the Symbionese Liberation Army were on the run, sought by the FBI and not supported by a sympathetic public. The public was weary of self-styled revolutionaries and undisciplined public displays, but it was also indignant at the brutality of the repression of the students in Ohio and in Mississippi. Skepticism about not only the war but the Nixon administration was widespread.

During 1970 and 1971, U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and his adviser, Henry Kissinger, came up with the apparently extraordinary idea of going to

China to talk directly with Mao Zedong about helping to end the Vietnam War. The plan was a confused one. China was a supporter of the North Vietnamese guerrillas, but it was not as important in that role as the Soviet Union. Whatever help the Chinese could provide to the United States in ending the war would be marginal. Nevertheless, official communications with China would be unexpected news in the United States and would possibly divert attention from the U.S. war in Vietnam and the Nixon administration's deepening political troubles. It would certainly discomfit the Soviet Union. China would undoubtedly demand something in return for this help, and that demand was expected to be that the United States reverse its entire China policy.

Up to that time, the United States had recognized the Republic of China government in Taiwan as legitimate and had claimed that the People's Republic of China (PRC) government was an illegitimate illusion. Not surprisingly, Mao and China's premier Zhou Enlai welcomed the idea of the U.S. president coming to Beijing and in practice recognizing the PRC as real. They were always eager to gain leverage against the Soviet Union, and the prestige of having the American leader coming to pay homage to Mao was overwhelming. Moreover, since Mao claimed that only the U.S. government and not the American people was an enemy, there would be a way for him to reconcile his reception of Nixon with his ideology by recognizing him as a representative of the American people. In the end, the public relations advantages for both sides of having the meeting were irresistible, regardless of whether real political change resulted. In 1972 Nixon and Mao met in Beijing and agreed to the "Shanghai Communiqué." It stated that there was "one China" and that U.S. policy would always recognize only one China.

The political meaning of the Shanghai Communiqué was nil, but the effects for the rest of the 1970s were dramatic. Ping-pong matches between Chinese and American players promoted travel exchanges and extensive media coverage. The giant pandas Hsing-hsing and Ling-ling were presented by China to the National Zoo in Washington, D.C., and became international media stars. Britain and Canada recognized the PRC as the government of China within a short time after Nixon's visit, and the groundwork was laid for the eventual recognition of the PRC by the United States under President Carter in 1979. For Taiwan, of course, the effects of the Nixon visit were initially devastating. In anticipation of PRC recognition, Taiwan lost its seat as China in the UN and its place in the Olympic games. By the end of the 1970s, the dictatorial government of Taiwan had a credibility crisis of its own, with a rising movement among the Taiwanese for political independence and overthrow of the immigrant militarists of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party who had seized power in 1947.

To understand the importance of the change in U.S.-PRC relations in the 1970s, the role that the PRC had played in the international cultural politics of the 1960s must be examined. Although China had positioned itself in the 1950s as champion of the Third World, it was only during its aggressively pursued and aggressively publicized economic reorganization campaigns of the late 1950s that it began to play the role of a model for nations pursuing self-reliance. Beginning

in the late 1950s, Mao had argued that the best defense against a possible nuclear strike from one of the two superpowers was total decentralization. If every agricultural commune had its own fields, factories, hospitals, and schools, the destruction of the major urban centers would not bring the country to a standstill. Mao also promoted high birthrates, claiming that a developing economy could accommodate an unlimited number of workers, and that a dense but evenly distributed population would best survive a new world war. Finally, he argued for complete exploitation of the environment. To seek the best life, the people must be ready to mine every mineral, use every tree, draw all the water, and if necessary pollute the air in order to advance. Nature, Mao felt, was limitless.

Nixon went to China in 1972 to encounter the fantasy, and to co-opt it if he could. His visit certainly achieved a warming of all China's international relations and opened the path to a far more realistic way for the United States to deal with China in the future. It also meant that the Third World countries were not merely nations where the United States and the Soviet Union competed for influence and privileges, but were themselves competitors with the superpowers for influence in other nonaligned nations. As we saw in Chapter 11, India had enjoyed steady success since 1948 in improving agriculture and living conditions, as well as in managing stable democratic institutions. But with no enormous publicity machine working on its behalf, and with the glamour of the Green Revolution wearing thin, Asia's other giant was put in the shade of the Cultural Revolution's energetic publicity campaign. Indeed, global knowledge of and fascination with China's Cultural Revolution was so strong that the youth-oriented upheavals that marked North America, Europe, and Japan all identified themselves with the rhetoric of China's Cultural Revolution.

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## Flexing of the American Pole

So long as the Vietnam War continued, international abhorrence of the destruction of Vietnam's natural environment, the shattering of its economy, and the mass killing of millions of its people were held against the American government, and particularly against Richard Nixon and his adviser, Henry Kissinger. During the 1960s and 1970s, the willingness of Americans to disparage, satirize, peacefully and violently protest, and finally force the resignation of the president created an international withdrawal from the anti-Americanism of the 1950s and late 1960s. Though the bipolar system would survive for years, U.S. rigidity was seen by foreign editorial writers and diplomats to dissolve into a more complex and flexible structure during the rest of the 1970s.

### *Nixon and Kissinger Seek a Conclusion*

The mainstreaming of opposition to the war was not less threatening to Nixon, but more threatening. His opponents were now not radical pacifists and violent anarchists but the great mass of the American middle class, the "silent majority"

that he had previously claimed as his loyal supporters but whose support he now felt to be wavering. From the time he began to campaign for the presidency in 1968, Nixon had intended to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam. But he believed that this had to be done gradually, and he blamed Johnson's lack of political realism for the former president's unpopularity. Soon after his election, Nixon appointed Kissinger as national security adviser and had him engage in secret negotiations with representatives of the North Vietnamese government. The talks would buy time in which the United States could attempt to solidify the government of South Vietnam and to eradicate the last vestiges of Communist infiltration of the South.

The talks did not go well. Between 1969 and 1971, Kissinger was often in Paris meeting with his counterpart, Le Duc Tho, but the talks were complicated by many factors, including the refusal of South Vietnam president Thieu to cooperate. As time wore on and the 1972 elections approached, Nixon and Kissinger turned to tactics that were both more ruthless militarily and more flexible diplomatically. In 1972, Kissinger and Le reached an agreement assuring the sovereignty and independence of both North and South Vietnam. The agreement was publicized, Nixon won reelection in 1972, and Kissinger and Le were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. But the bloody work of ending the war was still in the future. In December, the United States conducted its most destructive bombing campaigns ever against the North, seeking to force the North Vietnam government to enact the final peace provisions. American troops were withdrawn (and Thieu immigrated to the United States) just before Congress ended funding of the war on August 15. An invasion of the South by the North followed the American troop withdrawal.

### ***Watergate and the Final Collapse***

Before a conclusion was reached in Vietnam, Nixon confronted a political impasse at home that forced him to become the only U.S. president to resign his office under threat of impeachment. The origins of the drama probably lay in the increasing exposure, after 1968, of illegal decision making regarding the conduct of the war in Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger suspected that leaking of the unflattering information came from some kind of conspiracy among the press, the Democratic Party, certain members of the State Department, and even members of the military. They were driven to act in 1971 when the *New York Times* published classified Pentagon documents—the “Pentagon Papers.” The documents revealed that in the Johnson administration, and continuing in the Nixon years, Congress and the public had been repeatedly and deliberately misled about the reasons for the war, the amount invested in it, and the actual theaters of engagement. The Nixon administration attempted to prevent the newspaper from continuing to publish the documents, but it lost its case in the Supreme Court.

Thereafter Nixon decided that since they had no legal means of preventing such material from being published, they would have to find the individuals

who were leaking the information and persuade them, by either bribery or blackmail, to cease. In the hunt for the leaks, his staff employed espionage mercenaries to burgle, bug, and bully those whom they suspected. In time their operatives were arrested (some at the Watergate Hotel in Washington), and new means had to be found to keep them quiet. Congress, already alarmed by the popular opposition to the war, turned on Nixon when the misdeeds of the "Watergate" scandal were gradually revealed. On August 9, 1974, Nixon resigned rather than face impeachment and probable conviction. He was succeeded by Congressman Gerald T. Ford. It was under President Ford that U.S. forces evacuated the South Vietnamese capital, Saigon, in 1975. Vietnam was finally reunified.

The cost for Vietnam was about two million deaths, a generation of massively wounded young, an environment that had been devastated by the effects of bombs and the defoliant chemical Agent Orange (used to destroy hiding places for the guerrillas), the great cities of Hanoi and Saigon reduced to rubble, and the countryside littered with unexploded land mines that would continue to maim for generations. For U.S. society, the cost had been very high too. Billions had been spent on the war, and 58,000 Americans had died in the conflict. One president had withdrawn from candidacy, another had been driven from office by the indirect effects of attempts to silence war critics, a generation of young men and their families had been affected by the trauma of war service (or imprisonment or exile for refusing to serve), the economy was distorted by the effects of inflation, and the populace was disgusted with government deception. To many around the world, the differences between domestic politics and international affairs had been exposed as illusory. Whether for a superpower or for a small nation struggling for economic and political independence, the global effects of interconnection could not be avoided.

### ***International Dislocations and the Dependence on American Policies***

Between 1968 and 1973, the idea that an international communist conspiracy to control the world must be opposed at every location, lest nations would fall like "dominoes" into Communist hands, had no credibility in a world that was ideologically and politically diverse. There was no longer a bipolar situation in which countries were in either the communist or the capitalist camp. On the contrary, the nationalist movements in the Third World were promoting independence and self-sufficiency, without being in the shadow of either of the superpowers.

By the early 1970s, U.S. isolation had become as serious a problem as it had been in the early 1950s. In Europe, France had led the way to a repudiation of U.S. policy in Asia, recognizing the People's Republic of China in 1964. Popular opinion in Western as well as Eastern Europe, especially among students and young workers, ran heavily against the American intervention in Vietnam. In the crisis year of 1968, demonstrations, riots, and bombings in Paris were heavily focused on opposition to the United States, as well as on labor rights and government education policies. The French government, still under de Gaulle, was able

to use the anti-American sentiments in France and Germany to propel a plan for a European Economic Community that would finally move Europe out of the American sphere and onto a path of local commercial power and shared political interests.

In Japan, too, U.S. prestige and credibility had been seriously damaged by the involvement in Vietnam. Though the occupation had ended in 1954 and Japan had entered the UN in 1956, it still played the role of helper in U.S. foreign policy and in the U.S. military presence in East Asia. Japan was also an important listening post for American intelligence, being only five miles from Soviet territory in the Kurile Islands, 150 miles from Korea, and 400 miles from China. In various ways, this was all a boon to Japan's economy, but Japanese born after World War II also regarded it as a serious wound to their national pride. Public protests against U.S. policy in Asia began as early as 1960 when students and workers demonstrated against the new security treaty, ANPO, that made Japan a staging area for American military action throughout East and Southeast Asia. In May 1968, and again in 1970, there were massive student demonstrations in Tokyo and other large cities, protesting extension of the American bombings. Like their European counterparts, Japanese political leaders wished to avoid a situation in which they would be forced to choose between remaining viable at home and supporting United States policies in Asia.

While facing the protests over its relations with the United States, the government of Japan had dealt with what was becoming an increasing and very threatening phenomenon: domestic political violence. Unlike most of the developed countries, Japan had had an intense experience of right-wing violence in the 1930s, part of its disastrous movement toward the Second World War. In the 1960s and 1970s, Japan was still not free of right-wing violence. In fact, the growing American influence on Japanese popular culture was as deeply resented by the Japanese right wing as the military occupation had been. This was shockingly demonstrated in 1970 when the internationally acclaimed writer Yukio Mishima led a small army of followers in an attack on a military office, then publicly committed suicide by self-disembowelment while a follower cut off his head.

This amazing but brief episode did not prevent Japanese political leaders from realizing that the greatest continuing threat was from left-wing violence. This was centered in the Red Army Faction, which had been known in the earlier 1960s but demonstrated its dedication to international terrorism at the Tel Aviv airport in Israel in 1972, machine-gunning twenty-six people to death and wounding eighty more. All over the world, democracies were dealing with outbreaks of relatively organized, very violent groups. The Red Brigade, which was active in Italy and Germany, was involved in bombings, kidnappings, and murder. Britain was vulnerable to attack by bombs and guns from the Irish Republican Army and its offshoots. Peru was troubled by a Maoist guerrilla group, the Shining Path. In the United States, the Weathermen periodically planted bombs to attempt to destabilize the U.S. government.

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## CONCLUSION

In the late 1960s and 1970s, a variety of factors contributed to major changes in popular culture and political attitudes in the United States, Europe, and Japan. By 1968, some of these changes had found expression in massive civil demonstrations, mostly but not exclusively involving university students protesting against American involvement in the war in Vietnam, against racism, and against what were regarded as the repressive intelligence policies of the United States and its international allies. In the United States, Britain, and France, these movements came to be deeply skeptical about government relationships with industry and finance, and about the use of the CIA to enforce the interests of multinational corporations. The political activism of 1968 progressed in the context of horrifying events: the bloody Tet Offensive in Vietnam in the spring of 1968, the murder of Martin Luther King Jr. in April, and the murder of Robert F. Kennedy in August.

Throughout the developed and developing world, an enthusiasm for casting off the cultural and social patterns of the Cold War was evident. Much of the rhetoric and imagery for this came from the richly tumultuous group of societies of the Third World. The great theme of their leaders—self-reliance—struck a chord with young people in many parts of North America and Europe. Self-supporting communes in which residents grew their own food, made their own clothes, and educated their own children became popular, at least as an experiment. Many idealized the Indian *ashram*, the traditional self-reliant communities that Gandhi (see Chapter 4) had championed as a means to Indian independence. Images of revolutionary self-reliance were glamorized, and revolutionary heroes became international cultural icons.

As we saw in Chapters 10 and 11, the early 1960s was both a period in which a new meaning of youth came to the fore and a time when global media permitted the rapid dissemination and standardization of youth culture. The emphasis on youth was in part a result of the postwar baby boom, which produced an unprecedented number of young people in the early 1960s. In addition, as the older generation of World War II leaders retired or died, younger people assumed positions of real power. However, large sectors of American and European society regarded politicians and vote casting as ineffectual or hypocritical. And for most of the world outside of the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe, genuine transformation of the political and social systems could be achieved only through radical and perhaps even violent action. What distinguished them from the rebel heroes of the 1950s was that they were praised for taking public action against oppressive or constraining institutions.

Outside of the industrialized societies, politics in these times was also tumultuous and also strongly featured youthful activists, but the concerns and the assumptions were quite different. American, European, and Japanese youth were profoundly cynical about government in general. Their emphasis was on a search for idealistic “alternative”s—new choices in religion, in medical thinking, in

social organization, in morality, and in politics. But in China, India, Chile, Nigeria, and many other parts of the developing world, suspicion was directed toward interference in local affairs by the government of the United States or the Soviet Union and their intelligence agencies, while people retained a great hope that honest nationalist governments could bring empowerment and economic development.

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