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HPPH7010

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Assignment Mark

1st Marker's Provisional mark

54

2nd Marker's/Moderator's provisional mark

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Final Mark

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Annotated Bibliography

K.A. Higgins

Topic chosen: Is there any point in trying to define 'knowledge'? Which of the various definitions you have come across do you find most cogent?

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Catherin Osborne, 'Heraclitus', in *From the Beginning to Plato, Routledge History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, ed. CCW Taylor (London and New York: Routledge, 1997)

This section will be subdivided for easier consumption and personal organization.

(page 90)

Gr
Summary: Osborne speaks to the mythological side of the Greeks in the age of the Pre-Socratics and, further, how atheism, too, was present. She also explains that the tendency to use mythological thought - the role of the gods and other celestial/deific beings' will, temper, et cetera - as explanation for environmental changes, and almost everything else that went on around them that they couldn't see an immediate cause for, was being questioned. The early thinkers and philosophers wanted to begin to formulate a theory that could explain the underlying principles of the world. Even with some philosophers' desire to keep the gods within said theory, they strive for discerning how to find order despite having a larger mover (the gods and other deific characters) above them. Osborne asserts that the Pre-Socratics believed that even the gods must be ruled and understood rationally.

Evaluation: To believe that even the gods - the highest powers of the universe - were ruled by rationality brought them to the necessary conclusion that the underlying principle must be rational as well. That being said, the hunt for concrete knowledge begins. Rationality (or in other words, order) go hand in hand with knowledge, since order and the knowledge that one can deduce from it, can be categorically logged and utilized for future use, e.g astronomy, and the cycle of the stars and planets; the cycle of the tides; the seasons, and how to prepare for each. Without these bits of cataloged examples, there would be no sense of stability or order. In that vein, chaos produces no knowledge of the present or future (as predication in this case would have no significant backing), but just of the past (which one can argue is only memory and not knowledge at all). To summarize, Osborne brings to the table an argument *for* the defining of knowledge by describing that the Pre-Socratics believed that even the highest of powers were ruled and understood by it, and thus, it was an unshakable tenet of the universe. This will add to my own pro-argument because it will not only provide a solid base for the necessity and undeniability of both reason and, therefore, knowledge, but will also allow me to segue into why *defining* those things would be not only beneficial for unlocking deeper knowledge (though that seems a bit redundant) but also necessary for philosophers to do their job and give an explanation on the truths of the universe, since understanding the basic tenets is a compulsory task before one can delve deeper into the specifics, such as the who, what, where, and why, of the world, rather than the how.

How
are the
two
connected
Are
they
really
inter-
changed
terms?

(page 97)

Summary: Osborne speaks of a particular theory of Heraclitus, which introduces a term 'logos' - translated as an account of reason. As a Pre-Socratic who strives to identify rationality as the

Or is it that our faculties enable us to grasp *logos*?
ruling principle of the world, Heraclitus zeroes in on the idea of '*logos*', and that said idea is a faculty that allows us to answer or explain what is happening around us rationally. Osborne believes that Heraclitus informally defines '*logos*' as an objective truth. Something that is universally concrete, something that will not change regardless of who is viewing and/or trying to understand the explanation of an event. Even so, Osborne notes that Heraclitus (expounded upon by Sextus Empiricus) states that while this truth can be theoretically gained by anyone, many fail to grasp it, and instead live life in a dream-like state, as if they were sleeping.

It is...

Evaluation: It seems to me that Heraclitus' '*logos*' is the vehicle for which knowledge comes to us, which is a crucial part of the puzzle of actually *defining* knowledge. Furthermore, it seems as though Heraclitus' view of *logos* and gaining knowledge is that it is a secret (for lack of a more precise word) that is reserved for a select few. Those who are not amongst said select few live life as if they are asleep, which speaks to the conclusion that those sleepers are not living life to the fullest extent. One could even go so far as to say those who *do* understand the *logos* are extraordinary (and those who do not are simply ordinary). On this thought, it seems as though Heraclitus is suggesting that the mass majority of the population (the layfolk, ordinary) will never understand *logos* or the absolute truths of the world, and that it is only reserved for the extraordinary, or superior. This can add to my pro-argument by explaining the difficulty and - in the end - the reward of understanding and defining knowledge through the pre-defined (thanks to Heraclitus) vehicle for which we get to knowledge: *logos*.

Nickolas Pappas, *Plato and the Republic* (London: Routledge, 1995) ch.7, 'Metaphysics and Epistemology'. (Available online as an e-book via LCR electronic sources)

Summary: Pappas quite neatly explains Plato's overarching theme - his response to the Pre-Socratic search for knowledge - as well as how the philosopher adds on to this, the necessity of 'the nature of *being*' (his ontology). To pull directly from the text, "Plato interweaves questions of reality with questions of knowledge, on the grounds that each kind of object in the world corresponds with a different kind of human perception of it" (cited above). Pappas states that Plato is unifying multiple philosophical problems and inquiries under one overarching theory - Plato's Theory of Forms. This theory will cover defining and laying out conditions for his definition of knowledge. *provides insight on what Plato believed to be the necessary conditions...*

Evaluation: This piece by Pappas will serve as a perfect introduction to Plato's *Republic* and his Theory of Forms, serving as a succinct thesis statement for Plato. 'A theory [Theory of Forms] *plato's theory of forms is...* which is essentially a systematic account of what is real and what we can know. How to distinguish knowledge and reason from belief and faith. In my essay this will serve as a segue into Plato's *The Republic*, Book V-VII

Plato, 'The Republic' Bks. 5-7 in *Plato Complete Works*, with notes by G.M.A Grube, Rev. C.D.C Reeve (Hackett Publishing Company, 1997)

This section will be subdivided for easier consumption and personal organization

(Book V, 479-480)

Summary: Plato, through the character of Socrates, introduces the idea of the philosopher king, stating that 'an ideal society' can only develop under the rule of a philosopher in power. He then goes on to define 'philosopher', which he describes as those who desire *all* knowledge - the *whole* of it, not simply part. Further, he states they are those who love to see the truth.

Evaluation: This may seem like a sidebar, but I added it specifically to bring light to the similarity in thought between Plato and his predecessor, Heraclitus. Noted above, Heraclitus believes only a certain few can obtain the understanding of *logos*. My interpretation of this is that the 'few' he is referring to are philosophers. Should we accept this premise (for the purpose of my essay, I will be doing just that), we can make the assumption that Heraclitus believes that philosophers are both different and superior to the laypeople - the ordinary. This would both compliment and support Plato's claim that philosophers - the superior minds - should be ruling and actually have the ability to create an 'ideal' society for others.

(Book VI, 484 c-d)

Summary: In this section, we are introduced to the difference between reality and what Plato writes as 'unreality', and how they affect the ability 'to know'. Through the character Socrates, Plato asserts that things that fully 'are' are knowable, and things that are not fully 'are [or is, in his words]' cannot be knowable. Therefore if one has knowledge, then that knowledge must be a knowledge of what *is*. On the contrary, ignorance is in relation to what 'is not'. Lastly, he claims

that what lies between reality and unreality, or knowledge and ignorance, is belief and/or opinion.

Evaluation: In this section, Socrates - through Plato - gives us an account of what can be known. While it isn't a definition, we are at least given parameters to work with while trying to discern the exact definition of knowledge. It also gives us a definition of 'belief' and which is important to note and keep track of while we delve deeper. This particular caveat of Plato's introduction to the Forms will aid in arguing that there not only is a point in defining knowledge, but further, that we can know for certain what it is (on Plato's account, of course).

✓ okay -
Should you
mention
that just-
fication &
belief
here

(Book VI, 484 c-d)

Summary: In this section, Plato delves deeper into the caveats of belief versus knowledge in action rather than in theory. This takes us back a bit, to the lay people versus the philosophers. Plato states that the people who witness a particular form of a universal (say justice) and look no further than to think 'this is a just action' or 'this is an unjust action', merely have a belief of justice. On the other hand, those who witness a particular form of a universal (utilizing justice, as before) and think 'this seems to be a just action - so what about it makes it that way?' can gain knowledge over opinion or belief. These people - referred to as philosophers - concern themselves with not only observing, but *contemplating* the universal form of the particular that they witnessed.

Evaluation: This section gives us the condition that one must *contemplate* the forms in order to gain any knowledge from them. Plato leaves this act to the philosophers, who, he says, are 'those whose hearts are fixed on the true being of each thing' (cited above). Belief is reliant on the particular, while knowledge is based on the universal. In this section, Plato gives us his definition of what knowledge is. But for this essay, it will not be enough to define, but also to consider if this definition is accurate, effective, and useful. This will be discussed further in the actual essay.

On the objects
to knowledge

(Book VI, 484d - 485c)

Summary: Once Socrates and Glaucon, through Plato, decide what a philosopher is and how to differentiate them from non-philosophers, they discuss the job of the philosopher. Pulling from the text, "the latter [non-philosophers] have no clear model in their souls" (cited above). This line is referring to forms. Using the example of 'good', the non-philosopher has no model (the true form, or the universal) of good, so they can not establish which of the particulars would also be considered good. Socrates (henceforth, I will not be making reference to Plato as the writer, though note that it is he and not Socrates who is forming these ideas) uses the example of an artist. How could a painter ever paint a picture of a proper tree (particular) without a model in mind (the universal)? Furthermore, Socrates presses the importance of philosophers and their job of the preservation of knowledge (of the universal forms) because if such is lost or forgotten, then we would no longer have knowledge on what is good, what is beautiful, what is just, and we will simply be opining with no reference.

Evaluation: This section of *The Republic* offers a strong response to the question 'Is there a point in defining knowledge?'. According to Plato (and Socrates), it is not only preferable, but *necessary* to define knowledge, because without it - without a reference to the universal forms of good, just, beauty, love - we would be doing no better than guessing without proper justification. To put it succinctly, we must have a definition of knowledge, so knowledge can be gained, for, without knowledge (which is only available to us when we have a proper definition) we will lose all connection to the forms. In my reading of this source, I pull from Plato this (subjective) conclusion - knowledge offers us order, whereas lack of knowledge (ignorance) will bring us to chaos. In a world with no definition or condition of knowledge, not only do we lose any reference to, in essence, everything, but, if Heraclitus is correct in the assumption that the world must be understood through rationality, then we no longer have the faculties to understand the world - which would throw us back into the realm of relying on mythological explanations. Essentially, having no definition of knowledge would literally throw us back into the dark ages. (Again, please note that this is the conclusion I draw from this reading).

(Book VI, 485d - 486c)

Summary: Socrates adds onto what is already compiled, another caveat of knowledge and how to gain it. He brings up the idea of 'the nature' of a person. In this example, he uses the descriptions 'slavish' and 'cowardly' versus the nature of a true philosopher, which would elementally be the exact opposite, or, in his words, 'orderly'. He makes the claim that slavish and cowardly people, who are obsessed with life and gaining as much material pleasures in their mortal lives, could have no part in true philosophy, because rather than being guided by a desire for knowledge, they

There is no need to say this, as you have made this clear in your signposting

are guided by a desire for worldly things that can offer no hints of the Forms by themselves. To make the distinction between the slavish and the true philosophers, Socrates ponders the fear of death. In the dialogue, he and Glaucon use the example of love. His logic follows as so: if a man is inclined, by nature, to love his partner, he will certainly love everything that encompasses his lover. Likewise, if a man, by nature, is inclined to a philosophical path, he will love not only wisdom, but everything which encompasses wisdom - which must invariably involve death. In this vein, Socrates wonders if, then, a philosopher ought to love all that is life (which, indeed, involves death), would he then be afraid of death? Glaucon's answer is an astounding 'no', which brings both to the conclusion that true philosophers would have no fear of death.

Well put.

Evaluation: I quite like this passage. The nature of one's soul - which, in my opinion - is predetermined before birth, is in complete control over whether or not you will become truly philosophical and, therefore, eligible to gain the knowledge of the universe. When put plainly that way, it seems to be in the vein of defeatism a bit, for those who are enslaved to being slavish and cowardly. Of course, it would only seem defeatist to those knowledgeable enough to discern slavish from philosophical, so in a way, those who are slavish are ignorant to the fact that they are born into defeatism. Ignorance is bliss, to the fullest extent. Still, this claim that Plato gives us outlines a grim but logically valid (because perhaps soundness can never be discovered for it) criterion for the discovery of knowledge. A criterion we have no control over. To pull from his logically built argument, I believe I can safely pull yet another criterion. Taking from the lover example: if a man loves his partner by nature, he will certainly love *everything* about the partner. This will be premise one. Socrates then states: if man loves his partner by nature, he cannot also love the absence of his partner (using a philosopher cannot both love wisdom and falsehood

Me, too!

Could you draw your analysis from the text instead? Reference the text.

This is a bit confusing, go back to the text

But P himself outlines the education needed

simultaneously). This will be premise two. Premise three would be that man does indeed love partner, which would bring us to this conclusion: Man cannot love the absence of his partner. Translating from 'love of partner' to 'love of wisdom', we can deduce that a philosophical nature cannot love, and in fact, will *fear*, ignorance (which we know is the absence of wisdom). Thus, fear of ignorance would be yet another criterion, though not explicitly stated (though touched upon in 490b). *for P - yes - ignorance - dangerous*

(Book VI, 507e - 510)

Summary: Socrates and Glaucon, in this section, are using similes to discuss the Form of Good. Socrates is using the simile 'sun' to represent 'universal Good'. The elements of this simile are the light from the sun, the eye, and the sight that the combination of both offer us. Without the light of the sun (or the sun itself), we cannot have sight. Likewise, without eyes, we cannot have sight. Eyes, however, is a particular and a vessel. The sun is a universal, and the cause. If we had just eyes, we would still have no sight because of lack of light. The sun is necessary, and its light can only be viewed through the eyes - what Socrates describes as 'the most sunlike of the senses'. Socrates says, "and it [the eye] receives from the sun the power it has, just like an influx from an overflowing treasury" (cited above). He further describes the power of the sun in this simile. He states that the sun is not only responsible for granting the eye the power to see the visible, but is also responsible for the growth, nourishment, and 'coming to be', of the eye. Though this is the case, however, the sun itself is not 'coming to be' because the sun is already in a state of superiority and perfection. Translating this to the Form 'Good', Socrates claims that not only do knowledgeable things owe their existence to the Good, but they also are nourished

and grow by the nurturing of the Good. And like the sun, the Good is already in a state of superiority and perfection - it does not have to grow or 'come to be', as the Good is not actively 'being'.

Evaluation: In this section, Socrates and Glaucon have a discussion over what is Good and how one would describe or understand it. Furthermore, this section also tells us how one can theoretically find the forms. And obviously, as my essay will argue for Plato's theory of knowledge, this section will be beneficial in laying out the structure of the universal forms and how (even if they are not fully conceivable, one can still draw from them the stepping stones that can bring them closer to Truth and knowledge.

Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy, Vol I: Greece and Rome* (London: Burns Oates And Washbourne, 1946) ch.XIX, 'Theory of Knowledge'. (See scanned text.)

Summary: Copleston gives a summary of Plato's cumulative journey with knowledge and his epistemology. He prefaces that Plato treats ontology and epistemology as equal and dependent (though he specifically uses the Latin *pari passu*, which I believe is relevant). He brings us through the dialogue *Theaetetus*, first, which chronologically comes after *The Republic*, though Copleston does this on purpose, as he says that there are presuppositions in the former that Plato uses to supplement that latter. In this, Copleston claims that Plato uses Heraclitean ontology of *arche* (and therefore, monism) and Protagorean epistemology of relativism and the theory that everyone is always correct in discerning what is true as a 'theory of knowledge' and if

Rephrase: P. critiques relativism

knowledge is attained through said theory, what is attained is not necessarily True knowledge.]

To put it bluntly, Plato says knowledge is ^{by definition} infallible and what *is*, and sense-perception of humans cannot be either of those things. Copleston says that when Theaetetus enters the conversation, Socrates asks him what knowledge is. In this discussion, Socrates leans more in the epistemological realm, as he does not want to know what knowledge is contained of, but what knowledge *itself* is. Copleston points out that on the surface, it may seem solely epistemological, however, one must remember that for Plato, ontology and epistemology go hand in hand necessarily, so while they are discussing the latter, the former must be kept in mind. After further discussion, Copleston says it is agreed upon that knowledge cannot be perception if the world is always in flux, since knowing A at one moment, and then knowing it will be changing, cannot know A in the future, we cannot truly know A. Thus, sense-perception by itself, cannot be the whole of knowledge. In order to be complete, sense-perception must be joined by intellectual reflection. Copleston clarifies by claiming Plato, who is firm in his belief that the knowable (and The Forms) are infallible and unchanging, takes from that belief that sense-objects - those things that we see and perceive through our senses, therefore, cannot possibly offer insight on True knowledge alone, since said objects are, by nature, fallible and in constant flux. Through process of elimination, the philosophers discover that to have true knowledge of something, it must fully be encompassed, possessing nothing beyond the definition of the object, otherwise, said definition would not be the true definition. Finally, Copleston leads us to Socrates' conclusion of the Universal Forms, which is unchanging, whether or not the particular object is in flux or not. He uses the example of the Athenian Constitution. He says perhaps today it is good, but tomorrow new laws are added and it is no longer good but bad. The particular - the constitution -

has been in flux and has changed, but the Universal Form it used to encompass (Good) does not change, because in its change the constitution lost said characteristic in favor of 'bad'.

Evaluation: Copleston's interpretation of Plato's dialogue in *Theaetetus* will serve in my essay as the counterargument and then the defense. First off, noting Copleston's claim that ontology and epistemology for Plato, is *pari passu*, suggesting that the former and the latter are both of great significance and the study of being and the study of knowledge must be determined together and will not stand without the help of one another. This is backed by Plato's conviction that an object *must* 'be', or 'be real', in order to gain True knowledge of it. Without realness, we cannot have knowledge (two sides of the same coin, one could say. With the help of *Theaetetus*, Socrates effectively disproves Heraclitus' ontological theory and Protagoras' epistemological theory when they stand alone, which Copleston believes is a necessary presupposition in order to make sense of *The Republic* and the further study of knowledge and the Universal Forms. Copleston finally gives Socrates' final thoughts in a concise fashion, using the latter's example of the Athenian Constitution. I quite like this example for its simplicity, but also for its validity. The way I make sense of it is this: say there is a seesaw. One side of the seesaw is positive, and the other side is negative. For this example, I'll replace 'positive' with 'good' and negative with 'bad' (thought the choice of Form is interchangeable by the nature of the example). We then add to this mix a sensible object. I will use the Athenian Constitution, and it will start in the middle of the seesaw, in neutral. As is, it follows the example and thus has the characteristics of Good, therefore, said sensible object will move closer to the Good side of the seesaw, the closer it comes to perfection, the more Good will dip with its weight. But, like Socrates poses, what if laws are ^{changeable} changed and suddenly ^{s can} the constitution begins to lack the qualities of Good, which make

the object move back to the center of the seesaw and then, if the new laws are deemed to have
Bad qualities or characteristics, it will begin to slide closer to the Bad side, lifting Good back up
and making Bad dip. In this example, Good (or what would make the Form Good) dip, does not
change. Not only that, but the measure of the weight of Good characteristics is not only available
to the constitution, but to every sensible object. But then, adding another layer, just because a
sensible object has weight in the Form Good, does not mean it cannot simultaneously have
weight in other Forms, such as Beauty and Justice. My interpretation of Plato's Forms through
the elucidation given by Copleston, is that each universal Form is perfection and each particular
is on a sliding scale of said Forms. Form on one side and anti-Form of the other, with the idea
that if the Form side should ever dip low enough to touch the ground, the particular that is
weighing it down is also perfect. Of course, that can never be, but theoretically, I believe the
example is accurate.