

# An Important Reader of al-Ghazālī: Ibn Taymiyya

**Yahya M. Michot**

*Hartford Seminary*

Many of the simplistic images of the Damascene theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) circulating nowadays are grave distortions of his ideas, alike in the domain of politics as in Islamic thought generally, particularly in regard to Sufism and *falsafa*. Much time will probably be needed for these images to be corrected, especially among certain Islamist groups and mediocre neo-Orientalists. Several recent studies nevertheless have already paved the way towards a more accurate understanding of his ideas.<sup>1</sup> Also, works like his magisterial *Dar' al-ta'arud*<sup>2</sup> have begun to receive the attention they deserve as first-hand sources for the history of intellectual, religious and spiritual debates during the classical period of Islam.

In earlier articles, I have presented a number of Taymiyyan texts relating to, or commenting on, al-Ḥallāj, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', Avicenna, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.<sup>3</sup> What

<sup>1</sup> See Y. MICHOT, *Ibn Taymiyya: Against Extremisms*. Texts translated, annotated and introduced. With a foreword by Bruce B. LAWRENCE (Beirut-Paris : Albouraq, 2012); *Muslims under Non-Muslim Rule. Ibn Taymiyya on fleeing from sin, kinds of emigration, the status of Mardin (domain of peace/war, domain composite), the conditions for challenging power*. Texts translated, annotated and presented in relation to six modern readings of the *Mardin fatwa*. Foreword by J. PISCATORI (Oxford - London: Interface Publications, 2006); *Ibn Taymiyya's "New Mardin Fatwa". Is genetically modified Islam (GMI) carcinogenic?*, in *The Muslim World*, 101/2 (Hartford, April 2011), p. 130–181; *L'autorité, l'individu et la communauté face à la Shari'a : quelques pensées d'Ibn Taymiyya*, in *Mélanges de l'Université Saint Joseph* (Beirut, 2011), forthcoming; Y. RAPOPORT & S. AHMED (eds), *Ibn Taymiyya and his Times* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010); C. BORI, *Théologie politique et Islam à propos d'Ibn Taymiyya (m. 728/1328) et du sultanat mamelouk*, in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, 224/1 (Paris, 2007), p. 5–46; J. R. HOOVER, *Ibn Taymiyya's Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, "Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 73", 2007).

<sup>2</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *Dar' ta'arud al-'aql wa l-naql aw muwāfaqa ṣaḥīḥ al-manqūl li-ṣarīḥ al-ma'qūl*, ed. M. R. SĀLIM, 11 vols (Riyāḍ: Dār al-Kunūz al-Adabiyya, [1399/1979]). See Y. MICHOT, *Vanités intellectuelles. L'impasse des rationalismes selon le Rejet de la contradiction d'Ibn Taymiyya*, in *Oriente Moderno*, 19 (80), n. s. (Rome, 2000), p. 597–617.

<sup>3</sup> See Y. MICHOT, *Ibn Taymiyya's Commentary on the Creed of al-Ḥallāj*, in A. SHIHADDEH (ed.), *Sufism and Theology* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 123–136; *Misled and Misleading . . . Yet Central in their Influence: Ibn Taymiyya's Views on the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'*, in N. EL-BIZRI (ed.), *The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' and their Rasā'il. An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 139–179 —

about Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī? According to Frank Griffel, “Ibn Taymiyya was probably one of the best-informed critics of rationalism in Islam, and his opinion deserves to be taken seriously. He was certainly right about Avicenna’s strong influence on al-Ghazālī”.<sup>4</sup> In point of fact, Ibn Taymiyya does far more on al-Ghazālī than recognize in him a disciple of the Shaykh al-Ra’īs. A first striking fact is his remarkably extensive knowledge of the Ghazālīan *corpus*. The titles that he quotes, as surveyed by R. Y. al-Shāmī,<sup>5</sup> exceed two dozen:

|                                  |                                            |                                  |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| - <i>Ihyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn</i>      | - <i>Qānūn al-ta’wīl</i>                   | - <i>Mi’rāj al-sālikīn</i>       |
| - <i>Iljām al-‘Awāmm</i>         | - <i>al-Qistās al-mustaqīm</i>             | - <i>Mi’yār al-‘ilm</i>          |
| - <i>Bidāyat al-Hidāya</i>       | - <i>Kitāb al-thaghrīyya</i>               | - <i>Maqāṣid al-falāsifa</i>     |
| - <i>Tabāfut al-falāsifa</i>     | - <i>Kīmīyā’ al-sa’āda</i>                 | - <i>al-Mankhūl</i>              |
| - <i>Jawābir al-Qur’ān</i>       | - <i>Masā’il al-naḥk wa l-taswīya</i>      | - <i>al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl</i> |
| - <i>Sbarḥ al-asmā’ al-ḥusnā</i> | - <i>al-Mustasfā</i>                       | - <i>Mizān al-‘amal</i>          |
| - <i>al-‘Aqīdat al-quḍsiyya</i>  | - <i>Mishkāt al-anwār</i>                  | - <i>al-Wasīt</i>                |
| - <i>Faḍā’il al-Bāṭiniyya</i>    | - <i>al-Maḍnūn bi-bi’alā ghayr abli-bi</i> |                                  |
| - <i>Fayṣal al-tafrīqa</i>       | - <i>al-Maḍnūn al-ṣaghīr</i>               |                                  |

Impressive as this list appears, on its own it does not indicate fully the depth of Ibn Taymiyya’s engagement with the works of his predecessor. Al-Shāmī very helpfully provides references to the texts in which Ibn Taymiyya mentions these titles, but his survey is unfortunately not exhaustive. Moreover, it does not reveal that the Damascene theologian sometimes quotes verbatim lengthy excerpts from a number of al-Ghazālī’s works and comments on them in various ways. This is the case in, for example, his *Bughyat al-murtād*,<sup>6</sup> where several pages of the *Mi’yār*, *Tafrīqa*, *Mishkāt* and *Jawābir* are reproduced and discussed, in relation to the *Fuṣūṣ al-hikam* of Ibn ‘Arabī and the *Risālat al-Alwāḥ* of Ibn Sab’īn.

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Corrected version on [www.muslimphilosophy.com](http://www.muslimphilosophy.com); *A Mamlūk Theologian’s Commentary on Avicenna’s Risāla Aḥwāwiyya: Being a Translation of a Part of the Dar’ al-Ta’arūf of Ibn Taymiyya*, with Introduction, Annotation, and Appendices, in *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Part I, 14/2 (Oxford, May 2003), p. 149–203; Part II, 14/3 (Sept. 2003), p. 309–363; *Vizir «hérétique» mais philosophe d’entre les plus éminents : al-Ṭūsī vu par Ibn Taymiyya*, in *Farhang*, 15–16, nos 44–45 (Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Winter-Spring 2003), p. 195–227.

<sup>4</sup> F. GRIFFEL, *Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 283. On Avicenna’s influence on al-Ghazālī, see also J. JANSSENS, *Al-Ġazzālī and His Use of Avicennian Texts*, in M. MARÓTH (ed.), *Problems in Arabic Philosophy* (Piscataway: The Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003), p. 37–49. — Reprinted in his *Ibn Sīnā and his influence on the Arabic and Latin World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, “Variorum Collected Studies Series, CS843”, 2006), section XI.

<sup>5</sup> Rizq Yūsuf AL-SHĀMĪ, *Ibn Taymiyya: Maṣādiru-hu wa manbajū-hu fī taḥlīlī-bā*, in *Journal of the Institute of Arabic Manuscripts*, v. 38 (Cairo, 1415/1994), p. 183–269, at p. 244–246.

<sup>6</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *Bughyat al-murtād fī l-radd ‘alā l-mutafalsifa wa l-qarāmiṭa wa l-bāṭiniyya abl al-ilḥād min al-qā’ilīn bi-l-ḥulūl wa l-itihād*, ed. M. b. S. AL-DUWAYSH (n.p.: Maktabat al-‘Ulūm wa l-Ḥikam, 1408/1988). See Y. MICHOT, *Al-Ghazālī’s Esotericism According to Ibn Taymiyya’s Bughyat al-Murtād*, in G. TAMER (ed.), *Proceedings of the Ghazālī Conference, Ohio State University, November 10–12, 2011* (forthcoming).

One thing can thus be affirmed straightaway, without risk of error: Ibn Taymiyya's information about, and grasp of, Abū Ḥāmid's corpus is far better than that of the latter's most famous challengers among the *falāsifa*, Ibn Ṭufayl and Averroes. It is accordingly the more astonishing that Ibn Taymiyya has not been more often taken into consideration in Ghazālian studies.<sup>7</sup> The present study will hopefully contribute to correcting this bias. As in other publications, I have preferred to let Ibn Taymiyya speak for himself. The first texts that I have translated relate to four prominent books of al-Ghazālī, the *Mustasfā*, *Iḥyā'*, *Tabāfut*, and *Maḍnūn*. The two last translations offer evaluations of his thought as a whole, and discuss its sources and influence.<sup>8</sup>

I. AL-MUSTAṢFĀ AND GREEK LOGIC.<sup>9</sup> — The use of the [way of the logicians] has become frequent since the time of Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī]. He included an introduction concerning Greek logic in the beginning of his book *The Choice Essentials* (*al-Mustasfā*)<sup>10</sup> and claimed that the knowledge of no one is to be trusted unless he knows this logic.<sup>11</sup> He composed about it *The Standard of Knowledge* (*Mi'yār al-'ilm*)<sup>12</sup> and *The Touchstone of Study* (*Miḥakk al-naẓar*). He also composed a book which he titled *The Straight Balance* (*al-Qistās al-mustaqīm*) and in which he spoke of five "scales" (*mizān*): the three categorical (*ḥamlī*) [syllogisms], the conditional conjunctive (*sharṭī muttaṣil*), and the conditional disjunctive (*sharṭī*

<sup>7</sup> For example, there is very little use of Ibn Taymiyya in E. L. ORMSBY, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought. The Dispute over al-Ghazālī's "Best of All Possible Worlds"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and, more recently, K. GARDEN, *Al-Ghazālī's Contested Revival: Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn and Its Critics in Khorasan and the Maghrib*. Unpublished PhD dissertation (University of Chicago, 2005). Fortunately, however, things are improving.

<sup>8</sup> Many imprecisions surround the chronology of Ibn Taymiyya's writings and the few texts selected here have to be read for what they are: samples from an enormous corpus still in want of a systematic exploration.

<sup>9</sup> These titles are added by the translator. This Text I is also translated by W. B. HALLAQ, *Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians*. Translated with an Introduction and Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993; hereafter, **H**), p. 111–112. Our version is partly inspired by his. In the *apparatus criticus* notes, the edition used for the translations is always referred to as **E**.

<sup>10</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Kitāb al-Mustasfā min 'ilm al-uṣūl*, 2 vols (Būlāq: al-Maṭba'at al-Amīriyya, 1322/1904), vol. I, p. 10–55.

<sup>11</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Mustasfā*, vol. I, p. 10: "In this introduction, we will speak of the matters perceived by the intellects and mention that they are reducible to the definition and the demonstration (*burhān*). We will speak of the condition[s to be filled by] the true definition, of the condition[s to be filled by] the true demonstration, and of the divisions of both of them, in a manner (*minbāji*) more succinct than what we have mentioned in the book of *The Touchstone of Study* (*Miḥakk al-naẓar*) and the book of *The Standard of Knowledge* (*Mi'yār al-'ilm*). This introduction is not part of the science of the fundamentals (*'ilm al-uṣūl*) as a whole, nor among the introductions particular to it. Rather, it is the introduction to all the sciences and someone who does not comprehend (*aḥāṭa bi-*) it is fundamentally not to be trusted in his sciences." See also below, Text VIII.

<sup>12</sup> See J. JANSSENS, *Al-Ghazzālī's Mi'yār al-'ilm fī fann al-manṭiq: sources avicenniennes et farabiennes*, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge*, 69 (Paris, 2002), p. 39–66. — Reprinted in his *Ibn Sīnā*, section IX; *Al-Ghazālī: the Introduction of Peripatetic Syllogistic in Islamic Law (and Kalām)*, in *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales*, 28 (Cairo, 2010), p. 219–233.

*munfaṣil*).<sup>13</sup> He exchanged their terminology for similes (*mithāl*) drawn from the words of the Muslims and mentioned that he was addressing thereby some of the Ta'limites (*abl al-ta'līm*, "adepts of teaching").<sup>14</sup> He also composed a book on their objectives (*maqāṣid*),<sup>15</sup> and another<sup>16</sup> on their incoherence (*tabāfut*).<sup>17</sup> He made their unbelief clear, because of [their views on] the question of the eternity of the world, their denial of the [divine] knowledge of particulars, and their denial of the [future] return. In his last books, he made clear that their road (*ṭarīq*) is corrupted, does not enable one to arrive to certainty, and blamed it more than he blamed the road (*ṭarīqa*) of the *Kalām* theologians.

At the beginning, he had mentioned in his books many of their words, either in their terminology, or in another terminology. Thereafter, at the end of his life, he went to great lengths to blame them. He made clear that their road contains, as far as ignorance and unbelief are concerned, things that make it necessary to blame it and to consider it corrupted, even more seriously so than the road of the *Kalām* theologians. He died while preoccupying himself with al-Bukhārī and Muslim.<sup>18</sup>

Logic, about which he had said what he had said, had thus not enabled him to reach his objective; nor had it put an end in him to the doubt and perplexity in which he had found himself. For him, logic had been to no avail.

However, because of what had been produced by him during his life and also for other reasons, many thinkers (*nāẓir*) began incorporating Greek logic in their sciences; so much so that those of the later [scholars] who took the road of these [people] became of the opinion that there is no other road than this [Greek logic] and that what they had maintained concerning definition and demonstration was something sound, to be admitted by intelligent people. These later scholars did not know that the intelligent and eminent people, among the Muslims and others, had not ceased inculcating that [logic] and contesting it. Muslim thinkers have indeed composed numerous works about that and the majority of Muslims inculcate it categorically because of what they see of its [harmful] effects and

<sup>13</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *al-Qistās al-mustaqīm*, in M. M. ABŪ L-'ALĀ' (ed.), *al-Quṣūr al-'awālī min rasā'il al-imām al-Ghazālī*, 4 vols (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jandī, 1390/1970), vol. I, p. 9–80, at p. 18–55; *The Correct Balance*, in R. J. MCCARTHY, *Deliverance from Error. An Annotated Translation of al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazālī* (Louisville: Fons Vitae, n.d.), p. 245–283, at p. 249–264.

<sup>14</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Qistās*, p. 9, trans. MCCARTHY, *Balance*, p. 245.

<sup>15</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Muqaddima Tabāfut al-falāsifa al-musammāh Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, ed. S. DUNYĀ (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, "Dhakhā'ir al-'Arab, 29", 1379/1960).

<sup>16</sup> maqāṣidi-him wa kitāban fī + **H** : fī **E**

<sup>17</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Tabāfut al-falāsifa*, ed. & trans. M. E. MARMURA, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2000).

<sup>18</sup> For K. GARDEN (*Revival*, p. 23, n. 26), "stories in some of his [i.e. al-Ghazālī's] biographies of his beginning to study the science of *Hadith* in the days immediately before his death, or that he died with the *hadith* collection of Muslim on his chest, have the ring of fictions designed to apologize for this weakness in his scholarship."

necessary concomitants, which show what the adepts of [logic accept] in the matter of things contradicting knowledge and faith, a situation that leads them to all sorts of ignorance, unbelief and erring.<sup>19</sup>

One century before Ibn Khaldūn and long before modern scholarship,<sup>20</sup> Ibn Taymiyya thus gives to al-Ghazālī a pivotal role in the dissemination of Greek logic into the religious sciences of Islam. He knows how important logic was for Abū Ḥāmid and notes the titles of various works which he devoted to it. He explains their success by the cosmetic changes which he introduced in the original terminology of logic in order to islamize it. He also underlines a paradox: as a result of the well-known spiritual evolution that took him away from philosophy and *Kalām* theology toward skepticism and, during his last days, the study of Prophetic traditions, al-Ghazālī finally realized how useless logic had been to him; because of the irresponsible manner in which he had persistently promoted it in several of his books and for other reasons as well, later Muslim scholars nevertheless adopted it uncritically, without paying any attention to the refutations which many eminent thinkers had devoted to it.

Manifest in this first text is Ibn Taymiyya's familiarity with the Ghazālīan *corpus*. His understanding of Abū Ḥāmid's ideological evolution as eventually leading to indecision and *tauba*, or return to the religion, obviously serves his own reformist agenda<sup>21</sup> and he does not question the spontaneity and sincerity of Abū Ḥāmid's autobiographical narrative in his *Munqidh min al-Dalāl*.<sup>22</sup> This notwithstanding, the interest which he shows, not only in al-Ghazālī himself but in the influence of his writings on subsequent Islamic thought, particularly in logic, indicates the approach and concerns of a true historian of ideas.

<sup>19</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *Majmū' al-fatāwā* [MF]. Ed. 'A. R. b. M. IBN QĀSIM, 37 vols (Rabat: Maktabat al-Ma'arif, 1401/1981), vol. IX, p. 184–185. This text is an excerpt from an abridgement, by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), of the *Refutation of the Logicians* (*al-Radd 'alā l-mantiqīyyīn*) which Ibn Taymiyya wrote in Alexandria in 709/1309–1310; see W. B. HALLAQ, *Ibn Taymiyya*, p. liii–lviii, 4. It is published in MF, vol. IX, p. 82–254 under the title *Abridgement of the Sincere Advice to the People of Faith concerning the Refutation of the Logic of the Greeks* (*Mukhtaṣar naṣīḥat ahl al-imān fī l-radd 'alā mantiq al-Yunān*).

<sup>20</sup> See for example M. AFIḤ AL-AKITI, *The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Falsafa: Al-Ghazālī's Maḍnūn, Tahāfut, and Maqāṣid, with Particular Attention to their Falsafī Treatments of God's Knowledge of Temporal Events*, in Y. TZVI LANGERMANN (ed.) *Avicenna and his Legacy. A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), p. 51–100, at p. 94.

<sup>21</sup> On this agenda, see Y. MICHOT, *Vanités*, p. 601. For other Taymiyyan assessments of al-Ghazālī's evolution, see the texts translated in Y. MICHOT, *Vanités*, p. 610–612; A. DALLAL, *Ghazālī and the Perils of Interpretation*, in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 122/4 (2002), p. 773–787, at p. 774.

<sup>22</sup> On the demythologization of the *Munqidh*'s narrative in recent studies, see F. GRIFFEL, *Theology*, p. 19–59; K. GARDEN, *Coming down from the Mountaintop: Al-Ghazālī's Autobiographical Writings in Context*, in *The Muslim World*, 101/4 (Hartford, October 2011), p. 581–596. Like al-Ghazālī, Avicenna is now having his "official" autobiography questioned by scholars; see for example Y. MICHOT, *IBN SĪNĀ. Lettre au vizir Abū Sa'd. Editio princeps d'après le manuscrit de Bursa*, traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et lexique (Paris: Albouraq, "Sagesses Musulmanes, 4", 1421/2000), p. 7\*–130\*. In both cases, history appears far more fascinating than the myth.

The next text is an undated fatwa about the *magnum opus* of al-Ghazālī.

II. AL-IHYĀ' AND PHILOSOPHY. — [Ibn Taymiyya] was asked about *The Revival of the Sciences of the Religion* (*Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*), *The Food of the Hearts* (*Qūt al-qulūb*) [of Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī],<sup>23</sup> etc.

— The *Book of the Revival*, he answered, follows the *Book of the Food of the Hearts* in what it mentions concerning the actions of the hearts: patience and gratefulness for example, love, trust, realization of the divine oneness, etc.<sup>24</sup> Abū Ṭālib is more knowledgeable of the *ḥadīth*, the traditions (*athbar*) and the words of the people possessing the sciences of the hearts — the Sufis and others — than Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. What he says is more correct (*asadd*) and better, as far as realizing [the truth] (*taḥqīq*) is concerned, and further from innovation. In *The Food of the Hearts*, there are nevertheless weak and fabricated *ḥadīths*, as well as many things that are to be rejected.

Most of the words found in *The Revival* concerning what makes one perish (*al-mublikāt*)<sup>25</sup> — the words concerning pride for example, conceit and ostentation, envy, etc. — are copied (*manqūl*) from the words of al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī in *The Observance* (*al-Ri'āya*).<sup>26</sup> Some of these words are acceptable, others are to be rejected, and about still others there are controversies.

*The Revival* is of many benefits (*fā'ida*) but it also includes blameworthy materials (*māddāt*). Corrupted materials are indeed found therein: sayings of the philosophers relating to the divine oneness, prophethood and the [future] return. When Abū Ḥāmid speaks of the things known (*ma'ārif*) by the Sufis, he is the equivalent of someone taking an enemy of the Muslims and dressing him up (*albasa*) in the garments of the Muslims. The imāms of the religion have criticized Abū Ḥāmid for [including] that in his books. “His disease is *The Healing*” (*maradu-hu al-shifā'*), they said, i.e. [*The Book of*] *the Healing* [composed] by Avicenna in philosophy.

<sup>23</sup> Abū Ṭālib Muḥammad b. 'Alī l-Ḥārithī l-Makkī (d. in Baghdād, 386/996), author of one of the greatest treatises of Sufism: *Qūt al-qulūb - The Food of the Hearts*; see *Die Nabrung der Herzen, Abū Ṭālib al-Makkīs Qūt al-Qulūb*. Eingeleitet, uebers. und kommentiert von Richard GRAMLICH, 4 vols (Stuttgart: Steiner, “Freiburger Islamstudien, 16”, 1992–1995).

<sup>24</sup> For the correspondences between the *Ihyā'* and al-Makkī's *Qūt al-Qulūb*, see M. HOGGA, *Orthodoxie, subversion et réforme en Islam. Ġazālī et les Seljūqides*. Suivi de *Textes politiques de Ġazālī*. Préface de J. JOLIVET (Paris: J. Vrin, “Études musulmanes, XXXIV”, 1993), p. 191, n. 3, 203. M. Hogga makes no mention of Ibn Taymiyya's awareness of such correspondences. See also K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 29, n. 37, p. 67–68.

<sup>25</sup> The third of the four parts of the *Ihyā'* (Books XXI–XXX); see AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, 4 vols (Cairo: Dār Ihyā' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, n.d.).

<sup>26</sup> Al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. in Baghdād, 243/857), Sufi author of the *K. al-Ri'āya li-ḥuqūq Allāb - The Observance of the Rights of God* (ed. by 'A. Ḥ MAḤMŪD, Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1984). For the influence of al-Muḥāsibī's *Ri'āya* on the *Ihyā'*, see M. SMITH, *The Forerunner of al-Ghazālī*, in *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1 (1936), p. 65–78. M. Smith makes no mention of Ibn Taymiyya's awareness of such an influence. See also K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 68.

In [*The Revival*], there are weak *ḥadīths* and traditions (*atbar*); many are even fabricated.<sup>27</sup> Therein one also finds some of the captious questions (*aghālīṭ*) of the Sufis and of their hoaxes (*turrahāt*).

This being so, in [*The Revival*] there are also, by way of words of the Sufi shaykhs who, concerning the actions of the hearts, are knowing (*ʿarīf*) and are on the straight path, things that are in agreement with the Book and the *Sunna*.<sup>28</sup> Concerning the acts of worship and good manners (*adab*), one also finds therein things that are in agreement with the Book and the *Sunna*. These things are more numerous than the ones that are to be rejected and this is why people have come up with (*ijtihād*) divergent views about this book and disputed with each other about it.<sup>29</sup>

Asked about the worth of the *Iḥyāʾ*, Ibn Taymiyya offers an answer combining textual archaeology and comparative spirituality. He sees in al-Ghazālī's *summa* an hybrid of mysticism borrowed from al-Makkī and al-Muḥāsibī — and thus worth what the writings of these two Sufi masters are worth —, Avicennan *falsafa*, questionable traditions and Sufi stories of an even worse nature. He does not speak of the controversies concerning the philosophizing character of the *Iḥyāʾ* that erupted during the lifetime of its author<sup>30</sup> but utters a strong condemnation in three points: Abū Ḥāmid's treatment of Sufism in that book is a travesty benefiting the enemies of Islam; it has been criticized by the "imāms of the religion"; it is the work of a sick person infected by Avicenna.

Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa does not end on such a negative note. Al-Ghazālī's views on theology, prophetology and eschatology might be corrupted in the *Iḥyāʾ* but the book remains "of many benefits" and contains more praiseworthy elements than things to be rejected. This is particularly true of practical elements of the religion like the actions of the hearts, the acts of worship and *adab*. The heterogeneous nature of the *Iḥyāʾ* explains why it was the object of divergent reviews and passionate

<sup>27</sup> On al-Ghazālī and *Ḥadīth*, see K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 22–23. K. Garden notably writes that "Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 771/1369) [. . .] devoted slightly over half of the lengthy entry in his biographical dictionary on al-Ghazālī to the hadith in the *Iḥyāʾ* for which he found no *isnād*, or validating chain of transmission; his list filled more than 100 pages."

<sup>28</sup> For the *Iḥyāʾ*'s borrowings from several earlier authors other than al-Makkī and al-Muḥāsibī — al-Rāghib al-Isfahānī, al-Qushayrī, *et alii* —, see the references given by K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 15, n. 12. K. Garden makes no mention of Ibn Taymiyya's knowledge of such borrowings.

<sup>29</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *MF*, vol. X, p. 551–552. French translation in Y. MICHOT, *Musique et danse selon Ibn Taymiyya. Le Livre du Samāʾ et de la danse (Kitāb al-samāʾ wa l-raqs) compilé par le Shaykh Muḥammad al-Manbijī*. Traduction de l'arabe, présentation, notes et lexique (Paris: Vrin, "Études musulmanes, XXXIII", 1991), p. 191–192.

<sup>30</sup> A serious controversy about the philosophizing of the *Iḥyāʾ* erupted after al-Ghazālī's return to teaching in Naysābūr, in 499/1106 according to K. Garden, 501/1108 according to F. Griffel; see K. GARDEN, *Coming down*. He defends himself in his *al-ʾImlāʾ fī ishkālāt al-Iḥyāʾ*.

debates. The critical sharpness of the theologian does not prevent him from pondering pros and cons and being able to conclude with a balanced judgement.<sup>31</sup>

In Texts I and II, Ibn Taymiyya does not go into philosophical or theological intricacies and his assessments of the *Mustasfā* and the *Iḥyā'* remain obviously general. Things are different in the following passage concerning the *Tabāfut*.

III. THE TAHĀFUT AND CAUSALITY. — It habitually happens (*al-'āda jāriya*) that man eats and is sated, drinks and has his thirst quenched, strikes with a sword and cuts. The [Ash'arites] used to say that it is solely the eternal [divine] power (*qudra*) which makes satiety, quenching, cutting, etc., occur (*muḥdith*), with (*'inda*) these things that are connected (*muqāran*) to them, not through (*bi-*) them, and that there isn't here a faculty (*quwwa*), nor a nature, nor an action, having in any respect an influence (*ta'thīr*) on such occurring things (*ḥādith*). This being so, what they therefore say about the miracles is more powerful and evident.<sup>32</sup>

In the book of *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* (*Tabāfut al-falāsifa*), Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī put this question among the fundamentals about which he disputed with the philosophers.<sup>33</sup> This is why, in *The Incoherence of the Incoherence* (*Tabāfut al-tabāfut*), Ibn Rushd strongly criticized him.<sup>34</sup> He made this one of the topics about which he arrogantly attacked Abū Ḥamid, seizing this opportunity to refute him and to help the philosophers to become victorious.<sup>35</sup>

The criticism of secondary causality developed in the seventeenth discussion of the *Tabāfut* is one of the most famous chapters of the book and remains the object of fierce debates among specialists.<sup>36</sup> In this passage, Ibn Taymiyya sees al-Ghazālī as a traditional Ash'arite occasionalist theologian proclaiming the exclusive power of God and correlatively denying any real efficacy of the apparent natural causes, faculties and actions on their assumed effects. It is therefore no surprise that Averroes so fiercely attacked him.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Ibn Taymiyya is sometimes more severe: "Indeed al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā'* is rendered superfluous (*yugħnī 'an-hu*) by the *Kitāb al-rī'āya* of al-Muḥāsibī and *Qūt al-qulūb* of Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī" (indirect quote, without Taymiyyan reference, in K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 68).

<sup>32</sup> More powerful and evident in that God's omnipotence is not limited by a system of natural efficient causes.

<sup>33</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Tabāfut al-falāsifa*, Discussion XVII, trans. MARMURA, *Incoherence*, p. 166–177.

<sup>34</sup> See IBN RUSHD, *Tabāfut al-tabāfut*, ed. S. DUNYĀ, 2 vols (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1969–1971), vol. II, p. 777–812.

<sup>35</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *Kitāb al-Ṣafadiyya*. Ed. M. R. SĀLIM, 2 vols (Mansoura: Dār al-Hady al-Nabawī - Riyāḍ: Dār al-Faḍīla, 1421/2000), vol. I, p. 148–149. M. R. Sālim dates this book to the years 713/1313–717/1317; see the introduction to his edition, p. 7–13.

<sup>36</sup> See F. GRIFFEL, *Theology*, p. 147–173.

<sup>37</sup> "[Averroes] refuted Abū Ḥamid [al-Ghazālī] in the *Tabāfut al-tabāfut* with a refutation in which he made abundant mistakes, the correct opinion being that of Abū Ḥamid. Part of [his refutation] he drew from the words of Avicenna, not from the words of his ancestors, and he found [the *Tabāfut*] mistaken from Avicenna's viewpoint]. In [another] part of his [refutation], he became presumptuous toward Abū Ḥamid and accused him of want of equity (*qillat al-inṣāf*), as he based this [part of his

Interestingly enough, the Damascene theologian notes elsewhere that al-Ghazālī is not always an Ashʿarite occasionalist but adopts, on the question of secondary causality, a position closer to the requirements of both reason and the religion, notably in the *Ihyāʾ*:

IV. CAUSALITY IN THE *IHYĀʾ*. — Some rejecters [ . . . ] have rejected what God Most High has set as causes (*sabab*), so much so that they exited [the realms of] the Law and Reason [by doing so]. God, they said, makes satiety and quenching occur with (*inda*) the existence of food and drink, not through (*bi-*) them. He likewise makes the plant occur with the coming down of the rain, not through it, etc. This conflicts with what the Book and the *Sunna* have taught [ . . . ] The rejection, about created matters, that these causes are causes is similar to the rejection, by some groups of Sufis and their like, of the actions of the hearts and other affairs prescribed by the Law which they are commanded [to do], by consideration of the [divine] decree (*qadar*) and under the pretense of reliance [upon God], as we have amply explained elsewhere.

This is why people who have examined these two deviations, like Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī], Abū l-Faraj b. al-Jawzī,<sup>38</sup> and others, have said, [as] in [al-Ghazālī's] *Book of Reliance* (*Kitāb al-tawakkul*):<sup>39</sup> “Know that to pay attention to (*iltifāt ilā*) the causes is associationism, as far as the proclamation of God's oneness is concerned. To obliterate (*maḥw*) the causes [by denying] that they are causes is changing the bearing (*taghyīr fī wajh*) of reason. To turn totally away from the causes is to reproach the Law (*qadh fī l-sharʿ*).”

The ancients (*salaf*) and the imāms were in agreement about the establishment of [the existence of] these faculties. The faculties whereby one reasons are like the faculties whereby one sees. God Most High is the Creator of all this just as the servant does (*faʿala*) that through his power (*qudra*) — there is not dispute among

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refutation] on corrupt principles of *Kalām*, for example the [idea] that the Lord does nothing for a cause, nor for a wise purpose, and the [idea] that the Omnipotent, Who chooses, gives preponderance to one of the two objects of His power (*maqdūr*) over the other without anything making it preponderant (*murajjih*). In [still another] part of his refutation, he became totally confused due to the unclear nature of [Ghazālī's] position” (IBN TAYMIYYA, *Minhāj al-sunnat al-nabawiyya fī naqd kalām al-Shīʿa wa l-Qadariyya*, ed. M. R. SĀLIM, 9 vols (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1409/1989), vol. I, p. 356). On Averroes' criticism of al-Ghazālī, see also F. GRIFFEL, *The Relationship between Averroes and al-Ghazālī as it Presents itself in Averroes' Early Writings, Especially in his Commentary on al-Ghazālī's al-Mustaṣfā*, in J. INGLIS (ed.), *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism and Christianity* (Richmond, 2002), p. 51–63; A. AKASOY, *The al-Ghazālī Conspiracy. Reflections on the Inter-Mediterranean Dimension of Islamic Intellectual History*, in Y. TZVI LANGERMANN (ed.), *Avicenna*, p. 117–142, at p. 128–129.

<sup>38</sup> Abū l-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī b. al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200), Ḥanbalite ulema. On Ibn al-Jawzī's criticism of al-Ghazālī, see E. L. ORMSBY, *Theodicy*, p. 98.

<sup>39</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Ihyāʾ*, Book XXXV, vol. IV, p. 238–286; AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence* (Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa l-Tawakkul). *Book XXXV of The Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn)*. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by David B. BURRELL (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2001).

them about that. God Most High is its Creator and the Creator of his power and there is no might and no strength but in God!<sup>40</sup>

What al-Ghazālī writes in the *Book of Reliance* is slightly different from Ibn Taymiyya's quote: "To consider (*mulāḥaẓa*) the causes and to rely on (*i'timād 'alā*) them is associationism, as far as the proclamation of God's oneness is concerned. Not to bother at all about (*tathāqul 'an*) them is defaming (*ta'n fī*) the *Sunna* and reproaching the Law (*qadh fī l-sbar'*). To rely on the causes without seeing them as causes is changing the bearing (*taghyīr fī wajh*) of reason and becoming immersed in the flood of ignorance."<sup>41</sup> The theologian nevertheless correctly understands Abū Ḥāmid's turn of phrase and, by inverting its second and third parts, effectively makes his reasoning clearer. Metaphysically, the problem of secondary causality leads to an aporia: if it is affirmed, it entails giving partners to God; if it is denied, it is irrational. This being so, an efficient secondary causation is needed for prophethood and the Law to make sense and operate. Something on which no decision can be reached in metaphysics is thus reintroduced into the debate and validated as a requirement of the religion, or ethics. Such a refoundation of secondary causality through ethics, beyond the limitations of metaphysics, has a very modern aspect.

Also fascinating is the parallelism which Ibn Taymiyya draws between an occasionalism of the Ash'arite type and the antinomianism of predeterminist Sufis. The consequences of an excessive exaltation of the omnipotence of God through the denial of secondary causes are even more grave in practical matters than in theological debates. Such a wrong *tauhīd* indeed undermines the whole edifice of religious practice by depriving it of real efficacy and thereby making it pointless. Hence the affirmation of secondary causality as a requirement of ethics.

But let's come back to al-Ghazālī. As understood by Ibn Taymiyya, his view of secondary causality in the *Ihyā'* is closer to the position of the philosophers which he refutes in the *Tabāfut* than to the Ash'arite occasionalism which he deploys there to attack them. For F. Griffel, "al-Ghazālī was ultimately undecided whether God governs over every element of His creation immediately and as the only cause, or whether His creative activity is mediated by other beings, who are themselves His creations. In some places al-Ghazālī puts forward an occasionalist model of divine creation, but in others he endorses a model that allows for the existence of secondary causes which mediate the divine creative activity."<sup>42</sup> In fact, the purely theoretical nature of the discussions in the

<sup>40</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *Bughya*, p. 261–263. According to its editor, Mūsā al-Duwaysh, Ibn Taymiyya wrote the *Bughya* during his stay in Alexandria in 709/1309–1310; see the introduction to his edition, p. 47–52.

<sup>41</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Ihyā'*, vol. IV, p. 238. D. B. BURRELL (*Faith*, p. 4) translates *taghyīr fī wajh al-'aql* by "diverts reason from its goal".

<sup>42</sup> F. GRIFFEL, *Al-Ghazālī's Cosmology in the Veil Section of his Mishkāt al-Anwār*, in Y. TZVI LANGERMANN (ed.), *Avicenna*, p. 27–49, at p. 31.

*Tabāfut* allows for an occasionalist *tawhīd* which its author would find far more difficult to stick to when, in the spirituality of the *Iḥyāʾ*, he is pursuing practical ends. Might it be that, rather than being undecided, Abū Ḥāmid could be occasionalist or not, depending on a theoretical or practical context?

Whatever the answer to this question, Ibn Taymiyya must have been all the more content with al-Ghazālī's stand about secondary causes in the *Book of Reliance* as this is very much his own view on the matter, as evident in his *Epistle on the Intermediaries between the Creatures and the Real* (*Risālat al-wāsiṭa bayna l-khalq wa l-Ḥaqq*)<sup>43</sup> — and it does not matter that, in this instance, it is a view convergent with ideas already expressed by Avicenna and which can partly be traced back to him.<sup>44</sup>

The last important Ghazālīan book about which we want to hear Ibn Taymiyya's opinion is *al-Maḍnūn bi-hi 'alā gḥayr abli-hi* — *The Book to Be Withheld from Those Who are not Worthy of It*. The three texts translated next relate to it.

V. THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE MAḌNŪN. — As for *The Book to Be Withheld from Those Who are not Worthy of It* (*al-Kitāb al-maḍnūn bi-hi 'alā gḥayr abli-hi*),<sup>45</sup> another group of scholars deny its authenticity. However, the specialists in [al-Ghazālī] and in his circumstances (*ḥāl*) know that these are all his words as they know the matters he speaks about and their similarity one to another. He and his like, as said earlier, were confused (*muḍṭarib*) and did not adhere to one firm saying.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>43</sup> “Every invoker and intercessor who invokes God, Praised and Most High is He, and intercedes [with Him], his invocation and his intercession do not exist but by the decision (*qadāʾ*) of God, His power, and His will. Now, He is the One Who answers the invocation and accepts the intercession. He is thus the One Who creates the cause (*sabab*) and the [thing] caused (*musabbab*). The invocation is among the sum of causes that God has decreed, Praised and Most High is He. This being so, to pay attention to the causes is associationism, as far as the proclamation of God's oneness is concerned. To obliterate the causes [by denying] that they are causes is a deficiency (*naqs*), as far as reason is concerned. To turn totally away from the causes is reproaching the Law (*qadh fī l-sharʿ*)” (IBN TAYMIYYA, *MF*, vol. I, p. 121–136, at p. 131; French translation in Y. MICHOT, *IBN TAYMIYYA. Les intermédiaires entre Dieu et l'homme* (*Risālat al-wāsiṭa bayna l-khalq wa l-Ḥaqq*). Traduction française suivie de *Le Shaykh de l'Islam Ibn Taymiyya : chronique d'une vie de théologien militant* (Paris: A.E.I.F. Éditions, “Fetwas du Shaykh de l'Islam Ibn Taymiyya, I”, 1417/1996), p. 8. See also IBN TAYMIYYA, *MF*, vol. X, p. 35, trans. MICHOT, *Intermédiaires*, p. 8, n. 12; *Minhāj*, vol. V, p. 366.

<sup>44</sup> See the Avicennan texts translated and analyzed in Y. MICHOT, *La destinée de l'homme selon Avicenne. Le retour à Dieu (maʿād) et l'imagination* (Louvain: Peeters, 1986), p. 61–63; *Intermédiaires*, p. 6–7, n. 15. Ibn Taymiyya somehow combines his post-metaphysical ethical re-validation of causality with Avicenna's theology of the *musabbib al-asbāb*, the latter's Ashʿarizing monism of divine action and his distinction of two approaches to every human process of causation: what it is metaphorically (*bi-l-majāz*), “from some viewpoint” (*bi-wajh mā*) — i.e. an action of the creature concerned —, and what it is in reality (*fī l-ḥaqīqa*) — i.e. a divine act.

<sup>45</sup> AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *al-Maḍnūn bi-hi 'alā gḥayr abli-hi*, in M. M. ABŪ L-ʿALĀʾ (ed.), *al-Quṣūr al-ʿawālī min rasāʾil al-imām al-Ghazālī*, 4 vols (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jandī, 1390/1970), vol. III, p. 124–169.

<sup>46</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *MF*, vol. IV, p. 65. This is a passage from Ibn Taymiyya's *Book concerning the Details of the Creed* (*Kitāb muḥaṣṣal al-iʿtiqād*) published in *MF*, vol. IV, p. 1–190.

Recent research insists on the primordial importance of the *Maḍnūn*. For M. Afifi al-Akiti, it “sits at the top of al-Ghazālī’s theological curriculum and represents the most sophisticated expression of this theological project.”<sup>47</sup> The question of the Ghazālīan authorship of the *Maḍnūn* is thus settled. As for its exact textual content, things are less clear and the same scholar prefers to speak of a “*Maḍnūn* corpus”.<sup>48</sup> Ibn Taymiyya sometimes refers to it in the plural — *The Books to Be Withheld from Those Who are not Worthy of Them* (*al-Kutub al-maḍnūn bi-hā ‘alā ghayr ahli-hā*)<sup>49</sup> — and it would be worth enquiring which version he had access to. As for its authorship, the theologian is aware of the controversy but has no doubt that it is a work by al-Ghazālī.

VI. *INTERCESSION IN THE MAḌNŪN*. — The meaning of “intercession” (*shafā’a*), for [these philosophers], is not to invoke God and His Messenger as it is [in] the doctrine of the Muslims. Intercession, according to them, is rather that the heart is attached to [some] means, so much so that there flows (*fāḍa*) upon it, by the intermediary (*bi-wāṣiṭa*) of these means, something from which it benefits, just as the rays of the sun flow upon a wall by the intermediary of their flowing on a mirror. Now, this is an intercession of the kind that the associators establish [the existence of] and it is the one which God has rejected in His Book.

Things have got into what Abū Ḥamid [al-Ghazālī] says in *The Book to Be Withheld from Those Who are not Worthy of it*, and in others of his books, that are of the kind of what those [philosophers] say about intercession, about prophethood, etc. — he even fixes [the number of] properties of the Prophet at three,<sup>50</sup> as mentioned before, and [adopts] other things which they say.

The critique (*nakīr*) of these words by the scholars of Islam was strong, and they said about Abū Ḥamid and his like things that are well known. The companions of Abū l-Ma’ālī [l-Juwaynī],<sup>51</sup> such as Abū l-Ḥasan al-Marghīnānī<sup>52</sup> and others, spoke

<sup>47</sup> M. AFIFI AL-AKITI, *The Good*, p. 55.

<sup>48</sup> SEE Y. MICHOT, *A Mamlūk Theologian*, part I, p. 153, n. 16; M. AFIFI AL-AKITI, *The Good*, p. 52.

<sup>49</sup> See below, end of the Text IX.

<sup>50</sup> See M. AFIFI AL-AKITI, *The Three Properties of Prophethood in Certain Works of Avicenna and al-Ghazālī*, in J. MCGINNIS (ed., with the assistance of D. REISMAN), *Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group* (Leiden - Boston: Brill, “Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, LVI”, 2004), p. 189–212; F. GRIFFEL, *Al-Ghazālī’s Concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into Aṣarite Theology*, in *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, 14 (2004), p. 101–144.

<sup>51</sup> Abū l-Ma’ālī ‘Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn (Bushtanikān, near Naysābūr, 419/1028–478/1085), Shāfi’ite jurist and Ash’arite theologian, professor of Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī.

<sup>52</sup> This al-Marghīnānī is also called “Abū l-Ḥasan” in IBN TAYMIYYA, *Bughya*, vol. I, p. 281. Elsewhere, Ibn Taymiyya calls him “the companion (*rafiq*) of Abū Ḥamid, *Abū Naṣr* al-Marghīnānī” (IBN TAYMIYYA, *Kitāb al-Nubuwwāt* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), p. 82), and “his companion (*rafiq*), *Abū Ishāq* al-Marghīnānī” (IBN TAYMIYYA, *Sharḥ al-‘Aqīdat al-Isfahāniyya*. Ed. Ḥ. M. MAKHLŪF (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, n.d.), p. 132; see below, Text VIII). He cannot be identified with the later Ḥanafite jurist Abū l-Ḥasan Burhān al-Dīn ‘Alī b. Abi Bakr b. ‘Abd al-Jalīl al-Farghānī al-Marghīnānī (d. 593/1197) as proposed by M. R. SĀLIM in his edition of *Ṣafadiyya*, vol. I, p. 210, n. 2, and M. b. S. AL-DUWAYSH in his edition of *Bughya*, p. 281, n. 1. A better candidate is Ṣahīr al-Dīn ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Razzāq Abū Naṣr

likewise about him. The members of the house of al-Qushayrī<sup>53</sup> and his followers spoke likewise about him; and also the shaykh Abū l-Bayān,<sup>54</sup> Abū l-Ḥasan b. Shukr,<sup>55</sup> Abū ‘Amr b. al-Ṣalāh<sup>56</sup> and Abū Zakariyyā.<sup>57</sup> Abū Bakr al-Ṭurṭūshī,<sup>58</sup> Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Māzarī<sup>59</sup> and Ibn Ḥamdīn al-Qurṭubī<sup>60</sup> spoke likewise about him. Abū Bakr b. al-‘Arabī,<sup>61</sup> his disciple, wrote something about that and even said: “Our shaykh Abū Ḥamid entered into the belly of the philosophers; he then wanted to come out from among them but was not able [to do so].”<sup>62</sup> Abū l-Wafā’

al-Marghīnānī (d. 506/1112), a Ḥanafite ulema from Khurāsān and disciple of al-Ghazālī; see M. Y. SALĀMA (ed.), *IBN TAYMIYYA. Thubūt al-nubuwwāt ‘aqṣan wa naqlan wa l-mu’jizāt wa l-karamāt* (Cairo: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1427/2006), p. 310, n. 3.

<sup>53</sup> In *Bughya*, p. 281, Ibn Taymiyya speaks of “the sons of al-Qushayrī”. The two sons of ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Hawāzin Abū l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1073), the author of *The Epistle (al-Risāla)*, are: 1) Abū Naṣr ‘Abd al-Raḥīm b. ‘Abd al-Karīm, preacher in Baghdad (d. 514/1120); 2) Abū l-Faṭḥ ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Karīm (d. 521/1127). In *Nubuwwāt*, p. 82, Ibn Taymiyya quotes anti-Ghazālī verses of Abū Naṣr al-Qushayrī (see below, Text IX).

<sup>54</sup> Naba’ b. Muḥammad Abū l-Bayān al-Qurshī, known as Ibn al-Ḥawrānī, Shāfi’ite Sufi of Damascus (d. 551/1156).

<sup>55</sup> Abū l-Ḥasan Aḥmad b. ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. Shukr al-Andalusī (d. in Fayyūm, 640/1242).

<sup>56</sup> Taqī l-Dīn Abū ‘Amr ‘Uthmān b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kurdī l-Shahrazūrī, known as Ibn al-Ṣalāh (d. in Damascus, 643/1245). On his criticism of al-Ghazālī, see E. L. ORMSBY, *Theodicy*, p. 103, and below, Text VIII.

<sup>57</sup> Muḥyī l-Dīn Abū Zakariyyā’ Yaḥyā b. Sharaf al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277), Shāfi’ite jurist and important traditionist.

<sup>58</sup> Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Walīd al-Fihri l-Ṭurṭūshī (d. in Alexandria, 520/1126), Andalusian Mālikite jurist, who criticized al-Ghazālī in two works: a *Risāla ilā ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Muẓaffar* and a *Kitāb al-asrār wa l-‘ibar*; see M. FIERRO, *Opposition to Sufism in al-Andalus*, in F. DE JONG & B. RADTKE (eds), *Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics* (Leiden - Boston - Köln, Brill, 1999), p. 174–206, at p. 191; E. L. ORMSBY, *Theodicy*, p. 98–101; K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 179–182; A. AKASOY, *Conspiracy*, p. 117–118.

<sup>59</sup> Two scholars opposed to al-Ghazālī are known as al-Māzarī. One is Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Abī l-Faraj al-Māzarī, known as al-Dhakī (d. in Iṣfahān, 510/1116); see K. GARDEN, *Al-Māzarī al-Dhakī: Al-Ghazālī’s Maghribi Adversary in Nishapur*, in *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 21/1 (Oxford, 2010), p. 89–107. The other is Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Tamīmī l-Māzarī, known as al-Imām (d. in Mahdiyya, 536/1141), a Sicilian Mālikite traditionist and jurist, author of a refutation of the *Iḥyā’ al-Kashf wa l-inbā’ ‘alā l-mutarjam bi-l-Iḥyā’*; see M. ASIN-PALACIOS, *Un faqīh siciliano, contradictor de al Ḡazzālī (Abū ‘Abd Allāh de Māzara)*, in *Centenario della nascita di Michele Amari*, 2 vols (Palermo: Virzì, 1910), vol. I, p. 216–244; E. L. ORMSBY, *Theodicy*, p. 98–101; F. GRIFFEL, *Theology*, p. 303, n. 232. Ibn Taymiyya refers here to al-Imām but is also aware of al-Dhakī: in *Dar’ al-ta’arūf*, vol. VI, p. 240, he mentions the names of both. I am most grateful to K. Garden for this last reference.

<sup>60</sup> Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Ḥamdīn al-Qurṭubī (d. 508/1114), Almoravid jurist and Mālikite qāḍī of Cordoba, who wrote a refutation of the *Iḥyā’* and ordered its burning in 503/1109; see K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 155–179.

<sup>61</sup> Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. al-‘Arabī l-Ma’fīrī (d. 543/1148), Mālikite great qāḍī of Sevilla and one of the major ulema under the Almoravids; see E. L. ORMSBY, *Theodicy*, p. 101–102; K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 184; F. GRIFFEL, *Theology*, p. 62–71; ‘A. ṬĀLIBĪ, *Arā’ Abī Bakr ibn al-‘Arabī al-kalāmīyya*, 2 vols (Algiers, 1974).

<sup>62</sup> On this quote, see E. L. ORMSBY, *Theodicy*, p. 102; K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 183.

b. al-'Aqīl,<sup>63</sup> Abū l-Faraj b. al-Jawzī, Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī<sup>64</sup> and others spoke likewise about him. Al-Kardārī<sup>65</sup> and others among the companions of Abū Ḥanīfa spoke likewise about him.

Among the gravest things because of which the imāms of the realizers [of the truth] (*muḥaqqiq*) spoke about him is that about which he was in agreement with those philosophizing Ṣābeans. Thereafter, he nevertheless refuted the philosophers and expounded their incoherence (*tabāfut*) and unbelief. He also expounded that their road (*ṭarīqa*) does not enable [one] to arrive to the truth. Moreover, he also refuted the *Kalām* theologians and gave his preference to the road of devotion (*riyāda*) and Sufism. Then, when he did not obtain, by these roads, what he was in search of, he remained among the people of suspension (*waqf*) and leaned towards the road of the adepts of *ḥadīth*. He died while preoccupying himself with al-Bukhārī and Muslim.<sup>66</sup>

Before proceeding further, a note on this list of ulema. Ibn Taymiyya is interested, not in the scholars who admired al-Ghazālī and were inspired by him,<sup>67</sup> but in his opponents.<sup>68</sup> The names that he mentions in this Text V and the order in which he lists them are not chosen randomly but follow a precise agenda: to show the consensual nature of the opposition against Abū Ḥāmid, which comes not only from his own Shāfi'ite school of jurisprudence but also from scholars of the three other schools. One will moreover notice that the representatives of each of these schools are generally listed according to the chronological order of their passing away. Once again, our theologian is approaching matters as an historian:

|                                       |                                                               |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                       | JUWAYNITES                                                    |
| Abū l-Ḥasan al-Marghīnānī             | Abū l-Ḥasan [Ishāq/Naṣr] al-Marghīnānī (d. 506/1112)          |
|                                       | SHĀFĪ'ITES                                                    |
| The sons and followers of al-Qushayrī | The sons and followers of al-Qushayrī [Abū Naṣr, d. 514/1120] |
| Abū l-Bayān                           | Abū l-Bayān (d. 551/1156)                                     |
| Abū l-Ḥasan b. Shukr                  | Abū l-Ḥasan b. Shukr (d. 640/1242)                            |
| Abū 'Amr b. al-Ṣalāḥ                  | Abū 'Amr b. al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245)                            |
| Abū Zakariyyā' [al-Nawawī]            | Abū Zakariyyā' [al-Nawawī] (d. 676/1277)                      |

<sup>63</sup> Abū l-Wafā' 'Alī b. 'Aqīl b. Muḥammad b. 'Aqīl al-Baghdādī (d. 512/1119), Ḥanbalite jurist; see G. MAKDISI, *Ibn 'Aqīl: Religion and Culture in Classical Islam* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).

<sup>64</sup> Taqī l-Dīn Abū Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Maqdisī (d. 600/1203), Ḥanbalite ulema and traditionist.

<sup>65</sup> Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Sattār b. Muḥammad, Shams al-a'imma, al-Kardārī (d. 642/1244), Ḥanafite jurist. Al-Kardārī wrote a refutation of the passages of al-Ghazālī's early work, *al-Mankhūl min ta'līq al-uṣūl - The Sifted among the Notes on the Methods of Jurisprudence*, in which the latter went so far, in his criticism of Abū Ḥanīfa, as to refuse him the title *muṭtabid*; see K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 108.

<sup>66</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *Ṣafadiyya*, vol. I, p. 209–212.

<sup>67</sup> On them, see H. LAOUST, *La survie de Ghazālī d'après Subkī*, in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, XXV (Damas: Institut Français de Damas, 1973), p. 153–172.

<sup>68</sup> On opponents of al-Ghazālī, see K. GARDEN, *Revival*.

MĀLIKITES

|                                    |                                                                |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| Abū Bakr al-Ṭurṭuṣhī               | Abū Bakr al-Ṭurṭuṣhī (d. 520/1126)                             |
| Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Māzarī           | Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Māzarī (d. 536/1141)                         |
| Ibn Ḥamdīn al-Qurṭubī              | Ibn Ḥamdīn al-Qurṭubī (d. 508/1114)                            |
| Abū Bakr b. al-'Arabī [l-Ma'āfirī] | Abū Bakr b. al-'Arabī [l-Ma'āfirī] (d. 543/1148) <sup>69</sup> |

ḤANBALITES

|                         |                                       |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Abū l-Wafā' b. al-'Aqīl | Abū l-Wafā' b. al-'Aqīl (d. 512/1119) |
| Abū l-Faraj b. al-Jawzī | Abū l-Faraj b. al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) |
| Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī | Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī (d. 600/1203) |

ḤANAFITES

|            |                          |
|------------|--------------------------|
| Al-Kardarī | Al-Kardarī (d. 642/1244) |
|------------|--------------------------|

VII. *PROPHETHOOD IN THE MAḌNŪN*. — [Those philosophizers] are of the opinion that when, in a man, there is preparedness for the perfection of his soul's purification and for its reformation (*islāḥ*), sciences therefore flow (*fāda*) upon it from the agent intellect just as the rays flow on a polished mirror when it is cleansed<sup>70</sup> and the sun is faced by it.<sup>71</sup> [They also think] that the arriving (*ḥuṣūl*) of prophethood is not something that God makes occur (*aḥdatba*) by His will and His power but is only the arriving of this flux (*fayḍ*) on this prepared [soul], similarly to the arriving of the rays on that polished body. Many of them thus began seeking prophethood, as is related about a group of ancient Greeks, and as this also happens to a group of people under Islam.<sup>72</sup>

This is why people seriously criticized the author of *The Alchemy of Happiness* (*Kīmīyā' al-sa'āda*) and the author of *The Book to Be Withheld from Those Who are not Worthy of It* and *The Niche of Lights* (*Mishkāṭ al-anwār*). There are indeed, in what he says, things that are of the kind of what is said by those heretics (*mulḥid*). He expressed them in Islamic terminologies (*'ibāra*) and Sufi pointers (*ishāra*) and, for that reason, the author of *The Taking Off of the Two Sandals* (*Khal' al-na'layn*),<sup>73</sup>

<sup>69</sup> For a list of other Mālikite Maghribī opponents of al-Ghazālī, unmentioned by Ibn Taymiyya, see D. SERRANO RUANO, *Why Did the Scholars of al-Andalus Distrust al-Ghazālī? Ibn Rusbd al-Jadd's Fatwā on Awwliya' Allāh*, in *Der Islam*, 83 (2006), p. 137–156, at p. 137–138.

<sup>70</sup> *juliyat : julliyat* E

<sup>71</sup> Allusion to the kind of explanation of the process of revelation proposed by Avicenna; see IBN TAYMIYYA, *MF*, trans. MICHOT, *Musique*, p. 193; *Destinée*, p. 127–128. On the assimilation of the soul to a mirror in al-Ghazālī, see H. LAZARUS-YAFEH, *Studies in al-Ghazzali* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1975), p. 312–320; more generally, see D. DE SMET, M. SEBTI, G. DE CALLATAÏ (eds), *Miroir et Savoir : La transmission d'un thème platonicien des Alexandrins à la philosophie arabo-musulmane* (Leuven: Peeters, 2008).

<sup>72</sup> See for example what Ibn Taymiyya writes about al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), Ibn Sab'īn and Ibn 'Arabī in *MF*, trans. MICHOT, *Mamlūk Theologian*, part I, p. 183–184. According to Ibn Kathīr (*al-Bidāya wa l-nihāya*, 14 vols (Beirut: Maktabat al-Ma'ārif, 1977), vol. XIII, p. 261), Ibn Sab'īn believed that prophethood could be acquired and “was a flux flowing on the intellect when it becomes pure”.

<sup>73</sup> *Khal' al-na'layn fī l-wuṣūl ilā ḥaḍrat al-jam'ayn* is the work of Abū l-Qāsim Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn Ibn Qasī (d. 546/1151), Andalusian Sufi and leader of a revolt against the Almoravids (538/1144). It was commented on by Ibn 'Arabī. See D. R. GOODRICH, *A “Sufi” Revolt in Portugal: Ibn Qasī and his Kitāb Khal' al-na'layn*. Unpublished PhD dissertation (New York: Columbia University, 1978); K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 2, 191–192, 214–216.

Ibn Sabʿīn,<sup>74</sup> Ibn ʿArabī<sup>75</sup> and their like among those who built [their thinking] upon this corrupt foundation, were misled (*ighhtarra*).

On the contrary, for prophethood, there must unavoidably be a divine revelation by which God specially distinguishes whomever He specially distinguishes thereby among His servants, by His will and His power. He, praised is He, knows this Prophet and what, in the matter of revelation, He reveals to him. By His power, He specially distinguishes him by what, of his miracles (*karāma*), He specially distinguishes him by.<sup>76</sup>

In these Texts VI and VII as in Text I, Ibn Taymiyya mentions a number of Ghazālīan writings, alludes briefly to Abū Ḥāmid's spiritual evolution, and investigates the influence that he had on later thinkers. Though Text VI starts with a discussion of the meaning of intercession and Text VII with a discussion of the philosophers' prophetology, in both the real question is once again the efficiency of secondary causes in al-Ghazālī's thought. And this time, according to Ibn Taymiyya, it would seem that Abū Ḥāmid has gone from one extreme to its opposite.

Indeed, rather than being illusory agents, secondary causes are now recognized by al-Ghazālī the efficiency of a natural process independent of God and in which the connection between cause and effect is automatic, just as when the rays of the sun reflected in a mirror fall on a wall, or can effectively appear in this mirror because it has been cleansed and polished. Without this preparation of the mirror, the rays of the sun would not appear in it, and without the mirror acting as an intermediary, they would not reach the wall. This is, according to Ibn Taymiyya, the physical model which the author of the *Maḍnūn* borrows from the philosophers in order to explain the concept of intercession and the receiving of revelation. In both cases, an efficiency is attributed to "means" — an intercessor or a purified soul — and is so real that it compels God to act accordingly — that is, to forgive or to send down a prophetic revelation.

About intercession, al-Ghazālī writes in the *Maḍnūn*: "As for the intercession (*shafāʿa*) of the Prophets, prayer and peace be over them, and of the Friends [of God] (*walī*), intercession is a term meaning (*ʿibāra*) a light which shines from the Divine Presence upon the substance (*jawhar*) of prophethood and is diffused therefrom towards every substance whose correspondence to the substance of prophethood is strengthened due to the intensity of love, the great perseverance in [following the Prophetic] traditions (*sunna*) and the frequent remembrance [of God] through prayer

<sup>74</sup> Quṭb al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. Sabʿīn, philosopher and mystic (Murcia, 613/1217 – Makka, 668/1269). On Ibn Sabʿīn, see A. AKASOY, *Philosophie und Mystik in der späten Almohadenzeit: "Die Sizilianischen fragen" des Ibn Sabʿīn* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); *The Muḥaqqiq as Maḥdī? Ibn Sabʿīn and Maḥdism among Andalusian Mystics in the 12th/13th Centuries*, in W. BRANDES & F. SCHMIEDER (eds), *Endzeiten: Eschatologie in den monotheistischen Weltreligionen* (Berlin, 2008), p. 313–337.

<sup>75</sup> Muḥyī l-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. al-ʿArabī, theosophist and mystic (Murcia, 560/1165 – Damascus, 638/1240).

<sup>76</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *Ṣafadiyya*, vol. I, p. 229–230.

upon the [Prophet], God pray over him and grant him peace! A simile (*mithbāl*) for it is the light of the sun when it falls upon water and is reflected therefrom towards a particular point on a wall, not towards all its points. That point is only a particular one because of the correspondence between it and the water, as far as the point [in the water where the reflection takes place] is concerned. Now, such a correspondence is inexistent for the rest of the parts of the wall. That point is the one from which a line comes out, [extends] towards the point [reached by] the light in the water, and as a result of which an angle is obtained relative to the ground equal to the angle obtained from the line coming out from the water [and extending] towards the disk of the sun [relatively to the ground].”<sup>77</sup>

About the preparedness to receive the divine flux, one reads in al-Ghazālī’s Persian synopsis of the *Ihyā’*, *The Alchemy of Happiness*: “Every disciple who is sharp and fluent in the beginning and then weakens supposes that God had had a care and inclination towards him but has now changed. To consider that change as being in God Most High is unbelief. Indeed, he must understand that God is not affected by change, for He is the Changer and is not subject to change. He must understand that his own character changes until that sublime reality which had been open [to him] becomes veiled. It is like the sun, whose light is lavished generously [upon one], unless he goes behind a wall and thereby becomes hidden from it. The change is in him, not in the sun [ . . . ] He should attribute the veil to his own misfortune and an error he has committed, not to God Most High.”<sup>78</sup> In the *Maḍnūn*, al-Ghazālī explains: “Someone who is so overwhelmed by monotheism (*tawḥīd*) that his correspondence to the Divine Presence is firm, the light shines upon him without intermediary.”<sup>79</sup> In the *Mishkāt*, he writes: “God Most High is manifesting Himself (*mutajallī*) in His essence by His essence, and the veil inevitably relates to the veiled [subject].” “The clouds are the bad beliefs, the lying opinions and the corrupt imaginations that become a veil between the unbelievers and faith, knowledge of the Real and enlightenment by the light of the sun of the Qur’ān and reason. The characteristic of clouds is that they veil the shining of the light of the sun.”<sup>80</sup>

One could probably argue with Ibn Taymiyya that when al-Ghazālī writes these texts, like Avicenna before him, he knows two things very well. First, that intercessors

<sup>77</sup> AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Maḍnūn*, p. 151.

<sup>78</sup> AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Kīmīyā’ al-sa’āda*, translated from the Persian by Jay R. CROOK, *Al-Ghazzali. Alchemy of Happiness*. Introduction by L. BAKHTIAR, 2 vols (Chicago: Kazi Publications, “Great Books of the Islamic World”, 2008), vol. I, p. 404. See also AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Kitāb sharḥ ‘ajā’ib al-qalb - The Marvels of the Heart, Book 21 of the Ihyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn - The Revival of the Religious Sciences*. Translated from the Arabic with an Introduction and Notes by W. J. SKELLIE with a Foreword by T. J. WINTER (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2010), p. 36–41, the five reasons why the mirror of the heart does not reflect the truths which it is essentially ready to reflect if not altered; A. DALLAL, *Ghazālī*, p. 778–779.

<sup>79</sup> AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Maḍnūn*, p. 151.

<sup>80</sup> AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Mishkāt al-anwār*, ed. A. ‘A. ‘AFĪFĪ (Cairo: al-Dār al-Qawmiyya li-l-Ṭibā’a wa l-Nashr, 1964/1383), p. 84, 82–83.

and processes of purification only have an impact on our reception of the divine creative flux, not on God's acting *per se*. Two, that the causal power of such mediations and preparations is metaphorical since it is itself created by the *musabbib al-asbāb*, the God Who makes the causes be causes. That said, the truth remains that the way al-Ghazālī expresses his views in these passages, and for which Ibn Taymiyya blames him, dispenses with the ideas of divine exclusive power and discretion, supposedly central in Ash'arism. A full empowerment of the intermediaries — *iqrār wa taqwīyat al-wasā'it*? — has replaced their eclipse (*isqāṭ al-wasā'it*). The necessitarianism of an automatic mechanism has superseded occasionalism. Theology is subordinated to the geometry of optics. It does not come as a surprise that people misled by such premises began claiming that prophethood could be acquired through spiritual exercises, and started seeking it. As for al-Ghazālī himself, it is no wonder if his critics considered that, rather than striking the final blow to the philosophers in the *Tabāfut*, and whatever his eventual conversion (*tauba*) might have meant, he became involved in *falsafa* to the point of never being able really to recover from it.<sup>81</sup>

Many more pages of Ibn Taymiyya could be examined that would confirm the depth and relevance of his analyses of various Ghazālīan doctrines. The scope of this study only allows for two more translations. Despite its general character and its repeating things which we have already read in the preceding texts, Text VIII is of great interest as it provides a good illustration of how Ibn Taymiyya deploys earlier critics of al-Ghazālī and positions himself in relation to them. In this case, his main source is a section of *The Classes of Shāfi'ite Jurists* by Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ al-Shahrazūrī (d. 643/1245) reporting criticisms made by a professor of the Baghdād Nizāmiyya school, Yūsuf al-Dimashqī, and by the famous Sicilian Mālikite scholar al-Māzarī (d. 536/1141) — the former of Ghazālī's uncritical commendation of Greek logic in the *Mustasfā*, the latter of his philosophizing and other oddities in the *Iḥyā'*.

VIII. OLD AND NEW CRITIQUES. — In what Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] says there is a refutation of the philosophers, an anathematization (*takfīr*) of the latter, an exaltation (*ta'zīm*) of prophethood, etc. There are also, in his [words], things [that are] sound (*ṣaḥīḥ*), excellent (*ḥasan*) or, even, of great value (*'aẓīm al-qadr*), useful (*nāfi'*). Despite all this, there is also, in some of his words, a philosophical material, and things which have been ascribed to him, that agree with the corrupted fundamentals (*aṣl*) of the philosophers which conflict with prophethood or, even, conflict with clear reason (*ṣarīḥ al-'aql*). So much is this so that groups of ulema of Khurāsān, 'Irāq and Maghrib spoke about him, like his companion Abū Ishāq al-Marghīnānī, Abū l-Wafā' b. 'Aqīl, al-Qushayrī, al-Ṭurṭūshī, Ibn Rushd,

<sup>81</sup> One generation after al-Ghazālī, Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī provides a good example of such a criticism; see Y. MICHOT, *La pandémie avicennienne au VIe/XIIe siècle. Présentation, editio princeps et traduction de l'introduction du Livre de l'advenue du monde - Kitāb ḥudūth al-'ālam d'Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī*, in *Arabica*, XL/3 (Nov. 1993), p. 287–344.

al-Māzarī, as well as groups of the first [scholars of Islam]. This was thus mentioned by the shaykh Abū 'Amr b. al-Ṣalāḥ in what he collected concerning the classes of companions of al-Shāfi'ī<sup>82</sup> and what was edited by the shaykh Abū Zakariyyā' al-Nawawī.<sup>83</sup>

In this book,<sup>84</sup> [Abū 'Amr b. al-Ṣalāḥ] said: "SECTION EXPOUNDING IMPORTANT THINGS THAT WERE REPROACHED IN THE IMĀM AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S WRITINGS, AS WELL AS ABNORMAL THINGS WHICH THE PEOPLE OF HIS SCHOOL (*MADHḤAB*) AND OTHERS WERE NOT PLEASED WITH<sup>85</sup> IN HIS UNDERTAKINGS. There is notably what he says in introducing logic at the beginning of *The Choice Essentials* (*al-Mustasfā*): 'This [logic] is the introduction to all the sciences and someone who does not comprehend it is fundamentally not to be trusted in his sciences.'<sup>86</sup>

"I have heard," the shaykh Abū 'Amr [b. al-Ṣalāḥ] said, "the shaykh al-ʿImād b. Yūnus reporting about Yūsuf al-Dimashqī,<sup>87</sup> the professor at the Nizāmiyya [school] of Baghdād, who was one of the renowned thinkers, that he criticized these words and said: 'And Abū Bakr, and ʿUmar [b. al-Khaṭṭāb], and so and so?' He meant that the shares of serenity<sup>88</sup> and certainty that those [early] masters possessed were great although they had not comprehended this introduction and similar things."<sup>89</sup>

"I was reminded thereby," the shaykh Abū 'Amr said, "of this anecdote told by the author of the book *al-Imtā' wa l-mu'ānasa* — i.e. Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī<sup>90</sup> —: "the assembly (*majlis*) of the vizier Ibn al-Furāt<sup>91</sup> in Baghdād used to welcome [all] sorts of eminent personages — *Kalām* theologians and others.<sup>92</sup> Mattā,<sup>93</sup> the Nazarene philosopher, was once in this assembly and the vizier said: 'I want one of you to devote himself to disputing with Mattā about his saying that there is no way to recognize the real from the vain, the proof from the sophism, doubt from certainty, except by means of what we comprehend of logic and of what we learn from its founder, gradually.' Abū Sa'īd al-Sīrāfi<sup>94</sup> devoted himself,

<sup>82</sup> See IBN AL-ṢALĀḤ, *Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqabā' al-Shāfi'iyya*. Version corrected by Abū Zakariyyā' al-Nawawī. Ed. M. D. 'A. NAJIB, 2 vols (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā'ir al-Islāmiyya, 1413/1992), vol. I, p. 252–264 (T).

<sup>83</sup> Muḥyī l-Dīn Abū Zakariyyā' al-Nawawī (see above, Text VI) edited Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ's *Ṭabaqāt*.

<sup>84</sup> I.e. *Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqabā' al-Shāfi'iyya*. Ibn Taymiyya quotes p. 252–259 of M. D. 'A. Najib's edition.

<sup>85</sup> yartaḍī-hā T : yartaḍī-hā E

<sup>86</sup> See above, Text I.

<sup>87</sup> Yūsuf b. 'Abd Allāh b. Bandār al-Dimashqī (d. 563/1168), Shāfi'ite jurist.

<sup>88</sup> al-balj T : al-thalj E

<sup>89</sup> ashbāhi-hā T : asbābi-hā E *its causes*

<sup>90</sup> 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. al-'Abbās Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023), man of letters and philosopher.

<sup>91</sup> Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. Furāt al-'Āqūlī (d. 312/924), Shī'ite politician and man of letters, three times vizier of the 'Abbāsīd caliph al-Muqtadir.

<sup>92</sup> wa ghayri-him E : wa fi-him al-Ash'arī raḥmat Allāh 'alay-hi + T . . . *others, amongst whom al-Ash'arī, the mercy of God be upon him*

<sup>93</sup> Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus al-Qunnā'i, Christian logician (d. 328/940).

<sup>94</sup> Al-Ḥasan b. 'Abd Allāh b. al-Marzubān al-Sīrāfi (d. 328/940), grammarian.

who was eminent in [various] other sciences besides grammar.<sup>95</sup> He spoke about this to [Mattā] until he silenced him with his arguments and shamed him.”<sup>96</sup>

“This is not the place,” Abū Muḥammad said, “to speak longer about it.”

“Before the founder of logic, Aristotle, and after him,” the shaykh Abū ‘Amr said, “the intellectuals and the scholars were not afraid, with their abundant knowledge, to be able to do without learning logic. For them, logic was only, as they used to say, a regulatory,<sup>97</sup> technical tool (*ālā qānūniyya šinā’iyya*) that protects the mind from error. Now, every person with a sound mind is logical by nature.”

“How,” [the shaykh Abū ‘Amr also] said, “did al-Ghazālī disregard the [intellectual] state of his shaykh, the Imām of the Two Sanctuaries, [al-Juwaynī], and of every imām who had lived before him, preceded him [in knowledge] and whose place, in the realization of the realities, was elevated and exalted, although none of them had paid any attention to logic, nor built upon it any foundation in any of their undertakings? By blending logic with the fundamentals of jurisprudence, he perpetrated an innovation whose calamitous character was considered grave by the jurists; all the more so as, thereafter, philosophizers became numerous among the [jurists]. And God is the One Whose help is sought!”

“Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Māzarī,”<sup>98</sup> [the shaykh Abū ‘Amr also] said, “the jurist, the *Kalām* theologian, the specialist in the fundamentals [of the faith], was an imām, a realizer [of the truth] (*muḥaqqiq*), outstanding in the two schools (*madhhab*) of Mālik [b. Anas] and al-Ash‘arī. He composed [several] works in [various] disciplines, among which<sup>99</sup> an *Epistle* commenting on *The Guidance* (*al-Irshād*) and *The Demonstration* (*al-Burhān*) of the Imām of the Two Sanctuaries, [al-Juwaynī]. In it, he speaks of the situation (*ḥāl*) of al-Ghazālī and of the situation of his book *The Revival* (*al-Iḥyā’*). He published it, concerning the deviationist state (*ḥāl ḥayda*) of al-Ghazālī,<sup>100</sup> as an answer to what had been written to him from the West and the East querying that, when people differed in opinion thereon.

In this [epistle, al-Māzarī] had mentioned things that can be summarized as follows: al-Ghazālī had plunged into [various] sciences, composed works about them and become so famous as an imām in his clime<sup>101</sup> that he had very few rivals. He had delved (*istabḥara*) in jurisprudence and the fundamentals of jurisprudence but he was more knowledgeable of jurisprudence. As for the fundamentals of the

<sup>95</sup> al-naḥw **T** : al-nujūm **E** *astrology*

<sup>96</sup> See A. Ḥ. AL-TAWḤĪDĪ, *K. al-Imtā’ wa l-mu’ānasa*, ed. A. AMĪN & A. AL-ZAYN, 2 vols (Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt, n.d.), vol. I, p. 107 sq.

<sup>97</sup> qānūniyya **E** : – **T** *a technical tool*

<sup>98</sup> Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Māzarī al-Imām; see M. ASIN-PALACIOS, *Faqīh*; K. GARDEN, *Al-Māzarī*, p. 104–107. K. Garden (*Al-Māzarī*, p. 106) mistakenly says that Ibn Taymiyya writes that he took this long text by al-Māzarī from the latter himself. The theologian has made very clear above that his source was Ibn al-Ṣalāh’s *Ṭabaqāt*.

<sup>99</sup> fī + **T** : min-hā **E**

<sup>100</sup> ḥāl ḥayda **E** : ḥayāt **T**, *during the lifetime of*

<sup>101</sup> iqlīmi-hi **E** : wa barā’a + **T** . . . *them, become famous as an imām in his clime, and excelled so much*

religion, he had not delved into them. His reading in the sciences of philosophy had distracted him from that. Reading philosophy had also made him acquire a conceptual audacity (*jarā'a 'alā l-ma'ānī*) and coolness (*tashīl*) in [his] attacks against the realities. Philosophy<sup>102</sup> indeed proceeds along ideas crossing the mind (*khāṭir*), has no Law (*shar'*) restraining it<sup>103</sup> and is not afraid of getting into conflict with the imāms whom it follows. This is why a sort of conceptual libertinism (*idllāl 'alā l-ma'ānī*) possessed (*khāmara*) [al-Ghazālī]. He therefore let himself go, concerning [concepts], in the manner of one who does not care about other than himself."

"One of [al-Ghazālī's] companions," [al-Māzarī] said, "has informed me that he was addicted (*'ukūf 'alā*) to reading the *Epistles* of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'.<sup>104</sup> There are fifty-one of these *Epistles*, each of them being an independent epistle. Many opinions have circulated about their author. In sum, he" — he means, the one who composed the *Epistles* — "was a man, a philosopher, who plunged into the sciences of the Law (*shar'*), formed some mixture between the two sciences<sup>105</sup> and embellished philosophy in the hearts of the adepts of the Law by means of [Qur'ānic] verses and *ḥadīths* that he quoted to them. Then, in this later period, there was a philosopher known as Avicenna who filled the world with writings concerning the sciences of philosophy, quoted the Law as his authority and adorned himself with the ornaments of the Muslims. His strength in the science of philosophy led him<sup>106</sup> subtly to make every effort in order to reduce the fundamentals of the creeds to the science of philosophy<sup>107</sup> and he achieved, regarding this, things that were not achieved by the other philosophers."<sup>108</sup>

"I found", [al-Māzarī] said, "that this al-Ghazālī relies on [Avicenna] in most of what he alludes to concerning the sciences of philosophy; so much so that, at some moments, he textually quotes his words, without change, whereas, at other moments, he changes them and links them<sup>109</sup> more to questions pertaining to the Law than Avicenna had done,<sup>110</sup> as he is more knowledgeable of the secrets of the Law than him."

"Al-Ghazālī relied on Avicenna and the author of the *Epistles* of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' concerning the science of philosophy."

"As for the doctrine<sup>111</sup> of the Sufis", [al-Māzarī] said, "I don't know who he relies on concerning them, nor who he relates himself to in order to know it."

<sup>102</sup> al-falsafa : al-falāsifa **E** **T**

<sup>103</sup> yaza 'u-hā **E** : yarda 'u-hā **T** *binding*

<sup>104</sup> On the philosophical society of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' (4th/10th c.) according to Ibn Taymiyya, see Y. MICHOT, *Misled*.

<sup>105</sup> I.e. Law and philosophy.

<sup>106</sup> addat-hu : addāt-hu **E** addā-hu **T**

<sup>107</sup> al-falsafa **E** : al-falāsifa **T** *the philosophers*

<sup>108</sup> On Avicenna's fame in the Maghreb, see A. Akasoy, *Ibn Sīnā and the Arab West: the Testimony of an Andalusian Sufi*, in *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale*, 21 (2010), p. 287–312.

<sup>109</sup> wa yanqulu-hu **E** : bi-naqli-hi **T** . . . *them by linking them*

<sup>110</sup> mim-mā naqala **E** : min naql **T**

<sup>111</sup> madhhab **E** : madhāhib **T** *doctrines*

"I think", [al-Māzarī] said, "that it is Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī the Sufi whom he relies on for<sup>112</sup> the doctrines of the Sufis. I know<sup>113</sup> that this Abū Ḥayyān compiled an important divan on this discipline but nothing of it has reached us."

Thereafter, [al-Māzarī] mentioned that, in *The Revival (al-Iḥyā')*, there are fatwas based on things that have no truth. There is for example the fact that [al-Ghazālī] considers good, when paring nails, to start with the index finger because of the preeminence it has above the rest of the fingers, as it is the one which praises [God], then with the middle one because it is on the right side, then with the little one[s], in a circular way. It is as if the fingers, for him, were a circle. When he looks at his fingers, he goes round them in a circular way<sup>114</sup> ending with the thumb of the right hand.<sup>115</sup> "This is what I have been told about [that] book by somebody I trust."

"Look at this!"<sup>116</sup> [al-Māzarī] said, "how reading<sup>117</sup> about geometry and the science of circles and their rules benefited him so much that he linked it to the Law and made it into a fatwa for the Muslims!"

[Al-Māzarī] also said: "Some of my friends brought me the first part of this work<sup>118</sup> and I found that [al-Ghazālī] mentions in it that someone who dies after his puberty and does not know that the Creator is eternal dies as a Muslim, according to the consensus (*māta muslim<sup>an</sup> ijma<sup>an</sup>*).<sup>119</sup> Someone who is careless in reporting a consensus on such<sup>120</sup> a matter about which the most likely is that the consensus concerning it is the opposite of what he says, it is proper not to trust everything which he relates and to think that he does not care about reporting something whose truth is not established for him."

"Al-Māzarī," [Abū 'Amr b. al-Ṣalāḥ] said, "then spoke at length about the good qualities of *The Revival* and its blameworthy aspects, its benefits and its harmfulness, and concluded this: 'Somebody who does not possess a knowledge wide enough for him to find in it a shelter against the dangers (*ghā'ila*) of this book, to read it is not permitted to him, even if there are in it things from which one would

<sup>112</sup> fī Ṭ : 'alā E

<sup>113</sup> 'alimtu E : u limtu Ṭ I have been informed

<sup>114</sup> thumma E : ḥattā Ṭ until he ends with

<sup>115</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Iḥyā'*, Book III, vol. I, p. 140–141, trans. N. A. FARIS, *The Mysteries of Purity: being a translation with notes of the Kitāb Asrār al-Ṭahārah of Al-Ghazzālī's Iḥyā'* Ulūm al-Dīn (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1966), p. 62; *Kīmīyā'*, trans. CROOK, *Alchemy*, vol. I, p. 126.

<sup>116</sup> ḥādhā E : khubāṭ + Ṭ . . . this insanity!

<sup>117</sup> qirā'a Ṭ : qirā' E

<sup>118</sup> min E : ḥīna Ṭ . . . part while I was dictating this and. "This work", that is, the *Iḥyā'*.

<sup>119</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Iḥyā'*, Book I, vol. I, p. 16; trans. N. A. FARIS, *The Book of Knowledge: being a translation with notes of the Kitāb al-Ilm of Al-Ghazzālī's Iḥyā'* Ulūm al-Dīn (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1974), p. 34. Ghazālī's affirmation is in fact not about the eternity of God but about the eternity of the Qur'ān: "If such an [idea] did not pass through [someone's] mind and he dies before he believes that the word (*kalām*) of God — glorified is He! — is eternal, that He is visible and that He is not a locus of indwelling for things happening (*maḥall li-l-ḥawādith*), as well as other matters mentioned among the things to believe, he dies in Islam, according to the consensus (*māta 'alā l-islām, ijma<sup>an</sup>*)."

<sup>120</sup> mithl Ṭ : mithli-hi E

benefit. As for someone who possesses enough knowledge to ensure his own protection against the dangers of this book and knows what it contains of symbolic allusions (*ramz*), he shall keep away from what is entailed by their apparent meanings and entrust the case (*amr*) of their author to God Most High even if they are all susceptible of interpretation. For him, reading this [book] is thus allowed. One will benefit from it — my God! — unless the one reading it is one of those who would take it as a guidance and be misled by it. To such an individual, it shall be prohibited to read it, to commend it and to praise it.”

Al-Māzarī also said: “If we did not know that this message that we are dictating will only be read by the elite and someone who possesses a knowledge that ensures his own protection, we would not review and praise the good qualities of this book; nor would we venture to mention them. However, we feel safe from misleading [anyone]. Moreover, [we do not want] that a fanatic partisan (*man ta’aṣṣaba li-*) of the man<sup>121</sup> be of the opinion that we have evaded speaking equitably about his book, nor [do we want] the fact that he might believe that about us to be a reason for him not to accept our advice.”<sup>122</sup>

The shaykh Abū ‘Amr [b. al-Ṣalāh] said: “This is the end of what we have copied from al-Māzarī.”

What al-Māzarī has said about al-Ghazālī’s material concerning the Sufis, I<sup>123</sup> say, is [indeed] as al-Māzarī said it about himself: he didn’t know who he<sup>124</sup> relied on about it. Al-Māzarī indeed did not devote to the books of the Sufis, their stories and their doctrines, the attention which he devoted to the road of *Kalām* theology and what follows it — philosophy, etc. This is why he didn’t know that.

Al-Ghazālī’s material [concerning the Sufis] did not come from the words of Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī alone. Or, rather, most of what he says does not come from him. In Abū Ḥayyān, rhetoric and eloquence predominate, i.e. a composite of literary, philosophical and *Kalām* theology disciplines, etc. More than one even testified against him that he was a free-thinker (*zandaqa*) and linked him to Ibn al-Rāwandī,<sup>125</sup> as mentioned by Ibn ‘Aqīl and others.

Most of Abū Ḥamid’s borrowing (*istimdād*) is only from the book of Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī which he called *The Food of the Hearts* (*Qūt al-qulūb*), from the books of al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī and others, from *The Epistle* of al-Qushayrī,<sup>126</sup> and from various pieces of prose (*manthūrāt*) that reached him from the words of the shaykhs. What he copies in *The Revival* from the imāms to blame *Kalām* theology,

<sup>121</sup> I.e. al-Ghazālī.

<sup>122</sup> naṣīḥata-nā **E** : wa Llāh a lam + **T** . . . *advice, and God knows better!*

<sup>123</sup> I.e. Ibn Taymiyya.

<sup>124</sup> I.e. al-Ghazālī.

<sup>125</sup> Abū I-Ḥusayn Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Ishāq b. al-Rāwandī (3rd/9th c.), Mu’tazilite and heretic, denier of prophethood.

<sup>126</sup> See AL-QUSHAYRĪ, *The Risālah*, translated by R. HARRIS, *Abū-l-Qāsim ‘Abd-al-Karīm bin Hawāzin al-Qushayrī: Principles of Sufism*. Edited by L. BAKHTIAR (Chicago: Kazi Publications, “Great Books of the Islamic World”, 2002).

he copies from the book of Abū 'Umar<sup>127</sup> b. 'Abd al-Barr concerning the eminence of knowledge and its people. What he copies in it in the matter of invocations and formulas of remembrance of God (*dhikr*), he copies from *The Book of Remembrance* (*Kitāb al-dhikr*) by Ibn Khuzayma.<sup>128</sup> This is why the *ḥadīths* of this section are excellent. He sat in the company of whomever of the shaykhs of the [mystical] roads he had the chance [to meet]. However, from the words of the Sufis, he mostly drew things relating to the actions and morals (*khalq*), asceticism, devotion (*riyāḍa*) and worship — i.e. the things which he calls “the sciences of behaviour” (*mu'āmalā*).

As for the things which he calls the “sciences of uncovering” (*mukāshafa*)<sup>129</sup> and to which he makes symbolic allusions in *The Revival* and other [works], he borrows about them from the words of the philosophizers and others, as is [the case] in *The Niche of Lights* (*Mishkāt al-anwār*)<sup>130</sup> and *The [Book] to Be Withheld from Those Who are not Worthy of It*, etc.

Because he blended Sufism with philosophy as he blended the fundamentals (*aṣl*) [of the faith] with philosophy, some people began laying claim to Sufism, who themselves were not in agreement with the well-accepted shaykhs who are [acknowledged] in the community as having a truthful tongue, God Most High be pleased with them, or, even, were in disaccord with them about the fundamentals of the faith, like faith in the divine oneness (*tauhīd*), messengership, and the last Day, and were considering these [ideas of theirs] as the doctrines of the Sufis. Such things are notably mentioned by Ibn al-Ṭufayl,<sup>131</sup> the author of the epistle *Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān*, Abū l-Walīd b. Rushd — the grandson —, the author of *The Taking Off of the Two Sandals* (*Khal' al-na'layn*), Ibn al-'Arabī, the author of *The Openings* (*al-Futūḥāt*) and of *The Bezels of Wisdom* (*Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*), Ibn Sab'īn, and the like of those.

Such people make out (*taẓāhara*) as if they share the doctrines of the shaykhs of the Sufis and the people of the road (*ahl al-tarīq*), whereas, in reality, they are

<sup>127</sup> ibn : wa ibn E. Abū 'Umar Yūsuf b. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abd al-Barr al-Namarī (d. in Jativa, 463/1070), Andalusian traditionist and jurist, author of a *Jamī' bayān al-'ilm wa fadli-bi wa mā yanbaghī fī riwāyati-bi wa ḥamli-bi* - *Comprehensive Exposition of Knowledge, of its Eminence and of what is Appropriate to Transmit it and to Carry it*.

<sup>128</sup> Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Ishāq b. Khuzayma (d. 311/923), Shāfi'ite traditionist and jurist of Naysābūr.

<sup>129</sup> The sciences of behaviour (*mu'āmalā*) and the sciences of uncovering (*mukāshafa*) are the two main divisions of the sciences of the hereafter in the *Ihyā'*; see AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Ihyā'*, trans. N. A. FARIS, *Knowledge*, p. 6.

<sup>130</sup> “[Al-Ghazālī] divided the book [titled *The Niche of Lights - Mishkāt al-Anwār*] into three chapters. The first chapter expounds that the real light is God — Exalted is He! — and that, for others than Him, the word “light” is purely metaphorical, without reality. His words go back to [the idea] that “light” has the meaning of “existence”. Before him, Avicenna proceeded similarly to that, by making a synthesis between the Law and philosophy — and likewise did the Ismā'īlī esotericists proceed in their book called “the *Epistles* of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’”. After him, Averroes also did so. And likewise for the unionists (*ittihādī*): they make His appearance and His epiphany in the forms have the meaning of His existing in [these forms]” (IBN TAYMIYYA, *Bughya*, p. 199).

<sup>131</sup> Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Malik b. Ṭufayl al-Qaysī (d. in Marrākush, 581/1185), Andalusian philosopher.

hypocrites, free-thinkers, who end up affirming the [divine] indwelling [in creatures] (*ḥulūl*) and the union [of the Creator and the created] (*ittiḥād*), and following the Qarmāṭs,<sup>132</sup> the adepts of heresy, as well as the doctrine of the antinomians (*ibāḥiyya*) who reject the command and prohibition, the promise and the threat. They [only] pay attention to the reality of the [divine] decree (*qadar*) in relation to which no difference is made between [on the one hand] the Prophets and the Envoys, and [on the other] every mighty, obstinate [ruler]. Moreover, they affirm various kinds of innovated realities, neither recognizing the religious, Law-related realities, nor traveling the path (*maslak*) of the Friends of God who are the best creatures after the Prophets. At the end of their [process of] realization (*taḥqīq*), they thus let lapse the command and prohibition, obedience and worship, while opposing the Messenger and following something else than the way (*sabīl*) of the believers. They separate themselves from the way of the pious Friends of God so as to tread the way of the friends of the Satans. Thereafter, they affirm the [divine] indwelling [in creatures] (*ḥulūl*) and the union [of the Creator and the created] (*ittiḥād*), which is the utmost degree of unbelief and the final stage of heresy.

In the words of the shaykhs who know (*ʿārif*), like Abū l-Qāsim al-Junayd<sup>133</sup> and his like, it is made clear that proclaiming the divine oneness (*tawḥīd*) consists in the singling out (*ifrād*) of origination (*ḥudūth*) from pre-eternality (*qidam*), etc. Also made clear there is the obligation to follow the command and prohibition and to persist in worshipping until death. By all this is made clear that those well-guided masters called to caution against the road of those heretics. This is why we notice that these [people], like Ibn ʿArabī, Ibn Sabʿīn and their like, rebuke the like of al-Junayd and similar imāms of the shaykhs, and claim to have attained, in the realization [of the truth], the final stage of deep-rootedness (*rusūkh*). They [however] have only attained to being real heretics and entering into [the heresies] of indwelling and union. The shaykhs of the Sufis, the believers, have not ceased calling to caution against the like of those people who travesty things (*mulabbis*), just as the imāms of the jurists have called to caution against the way of the adepts of innovation and hypocrisy among the adepts of philosophy, *Kalām*, etc.<sup>134</sup>

The 4th/10th century man of letters Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī is given an unexpected pre-eminence in the anti-Ghazālīan prose of both Yūsuf al-Dimashqī and al-Māzarī. Ibn Taymiyya is not impressed and contests al-Māzarī's view that he influenced al-Ghazālī's spirituality in the *Iḥyāʾ*. After briefly sharing his own appraisal of al-Tawḥīdī's personality, he develops an alternative approach to the *Iḥyāʾ*, in two parts.

First, he offers a textual archaeology as he does in Text II but with more detail. In the *Iḥyāʾ*, he now sees borrowings not only from Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī and al-Muḥāsibī but

<sup>132</sup> One of the Ismāʿīlī sects.

<sup>133</sup> Abū l-Qāsim b. al-Junayd (d. 298/910), moderate Sufi of Baghdād, disciple of al-Sarī l-Saqatī and teacher of al-Ḥallāj.

<sup>134</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *Sharḥ al-ʿAqīdat al-Isfahāniyya*. Ed. Ḥ. M. MAKHLŪF (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, n.d.), p. 132–136. Ibn Taymiyya wrote this *Commentary on the Creed of Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Isfahānī* in Egypt in 712/1312; see his introduction, p. 3.

also from al-Qushayrī, Abū 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Barr and Ibn Khuzayma, plus miscellaneous Sufi words relating mainly to practical spirituality. As for ecstatic matters, he considers the *Iḥyā'* marked by the same philosophizing as the *Mishkāt*, the *Maḍnūn*, etc., and addresses this matter rather than attacking Abū Ḥāmid for petty issues like the way he says one should pare one's nails.

Instead of succinctly alluding to al-Ghazālī's influence on Ibn Qasī, Ibn Sab'īn and Ibn 'Arabī as he does in Text VII, Ibn Taymiyya then affirms that his blending Sufism with philosophy caused a substantial mutation in Islamic spirituality. The result was the appearance of a new Sufism, philosophizing and deleterious, leaning towards the doctrines of the divine indwelling in creatures (*ḥulūl*) and the union of the Creator and the created (*ittiḥād*), predeterminism and antinomianism. For Ibn Taymiyya, representatives of this new Sufism initiated by Abū Ḥāmid include Ibn Ṭufayl and Averroes as well as Ibn Qasī, Ibn 'Arabī and Ibn Sab'īn. He does not underline the fact that they are all westerners, i.e. Muslims from the Maghreb and Andalusia, but firmly asserts that they have very little left in common with the good old Sufism of al-Junayd and his like.<sup>135</sup>

The theologian does not explain here the philosophical and theological mechanisms through which al-Ghazālī's heterogeneous spirituality triggered the mutation of Sufism that he deplores.<sup>136</sup> By contrast, and most interestingly, by writing that Abū Ḥāmid "blended Sufism with philosophy *as he blended the fundamentals [of the faith] with philosophy*" Ibn Taymiyya takes us back to the passage of Text I in which he accuses al-Ghazālī of having triggered another mutation of Islamic thought, this time by encouraging and normalizing the use of Greek logic in the religious sciences of Islam. For M. Afifi al-Akiti, "by relying on the scientific and philosophical community, he [i.e. al-Ghazālī] has constructed a unified theological system giving a reasoned explanation of the world, but expressing his ideas in traditional terms."<sup>137</sup> For K. Garden, "far from being a meek expression of an orthodox Sufism, al-Ghazālī's greatest work [that is, the *Iḥyā'*] is a bold, polemical attack on the leading sciences of his day and an assertion of the primacy of Sufism described in terms that could be read as tinged with philosophy."<sup>138</sup> Considering the fundamental nature of the mutations that Abū Ḥāmid's philosophizing, as properly noticed by Ibn Taymiyya, triggered in both the dogmatic and spiritual dimensions of Islam, it should perhaps be more adequate to speak of a genetic re-engineering of the religion.

<sup>135</sup> On Ibn Taymiyya's criticism of Andalusian "philosophical Sufism", see A. AKASOY, *Conspiracy*, p. 130–142.

<sup>136</sup> One could imagine that, for him, what took place was an apparently paradoxical process where the blurring of the boundary between the divine and the created realms resulted from both an occasionalist monism of divine action and the idea of the automatic acquirability of prophethood, or extinction of the self (*fanā'*) through contemplation, by the appropriate means of purification. To explore this further would require studying several other Taymiyyan texts.

<sup>137</sup> M. AFIFI AL-AKITI, *The Good*, p. 55; see also p. 94.

<sup>138</sup> K. GARDEN, *Revival*, p. 75.

The mutations that he initiated al-Ghazālī already experienced in his own career of scholarship and teaching. But how do you pin down and label a mutant? According to our last translation — Text IX —, observers were puzzled and neither the ulema of the old school — the “Muslims” in Ibn Taymiyya’s terminology —, nor the new, ideologically evolved, ones — the “Philosophers” —, recognized him as being totally one of them. For some, Abū Ḥāmid became a sort of chameleon whereas others blamed a lethal disease. Whatever the historical truth, he paved the way towards a de-rigidified formulation of the core Islamic beliefs, deeply understood by him as Avicennan philosophical truths but modulatable into a diversity of creeds according to audiences. He had a number of followers.

IX. THE THREE CREEDS OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ, BETWEEN ISLAM AND PHILOSOPHY. — Those who walked behind Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] or imitated (*dābā*) him in treading the way, such as Ibn Sabʿīn and Ibn ʿArabī, explained openly the reality of that which they arrived at, i.e. that existence is one.<sup>139</sup> They knew that Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] did not agree with them about that.<sup>140</sup> They therefore deemed him weak and accused him of having been restricted (*muqayyad*) [in his thinking] by the Law and the intellect.

Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] is [stuck] between the ulema of the Muslims and the ulema of the philosophers. The ulema of the Muslims blame him for things going against the religion of Islam in which he is the associate of the philosophers. The philosophers scorn him for what remains with him of Islam and for not having disentangled himself (*insalakha*) totally from it in favour of the sayings of the philosophers. This is why Ibn Rushd, the grandson, recited about him:<sup>141</sup>

<sup>139</sup> See for example Ibn Sabʿīn’s description of the highest ecstatic state in his *Budd al-ʿarīf*, ed. G. KATTŪRA (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus - Dār al-Kindī, 1978), p. 94–95: “It is as if you are yourself — and you are inexistence —, and as if you are Him — and He is the existence”. See also IBN ʿARABĪ, “Whoso Knoweth Himself . . .” from the *Treatise on Being (Risālet-ul-wujūdīyyab)*. Trans. by T. H. WEIR (Abingdon: Beshara Publications, 1976), p. 10: “But none attains to union except he see his own attributes to be the attributes of God (Whose name he exalted), and his own essence to be the essence of God (Whose name he exalted), without his attributes or essence entering into God or proceeding forth from Him at all, or ceasing from God or remaining in Him. And he sees himself as never having been, not as having been and then having ceased to be. For there is no soul save His soul, and there is no existence save His existence.”

<sup>140</sup> In various texts, al-Ghazālī for example criticizes al-Ḥallāj and Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī for encouraging a Sufism of the [divine] indwelling [in creatures] (*ḥulūl*) and the union [of the Creator and the created] (*ittiḥād*) reminiscent of Christian incarnationism (see for example, *Mishkāṭ*, p. 57, trans. W. H. T. GAIRDNER, *Al-Ghazzālī’s Mishkāṭ Al-Anwār (“The Niche for Lights”)*. A translation with introduction (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1952), p. 106–108). He prefers a “mirror christology” where God does not indwell or unite with Christ, but is only mirrored in Christ’s heart as light is reflected in a polished mirror; see A. TREIGER, *Al-Ghazālī’s “Mirror Christology” and Its Possible East-Syriac Sources*, in *The Muslim World*, 101/4 (Hartford, October 2011), p. 698–713. For Ibn Sabʿīn’s criticisms of al-Ghazālī, see his *Budd*, p. 144; A. AKASOY, *Conspiracy*, p. 128–129.

<sup>141</sup> See IBN RUSHD, *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, ed. M. ʿĀ. AL-JĀBIRĪ (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdat al-ʿArabīyya, “Silsilat al-turāth al-falsafī l-ʿarabī. Muʿallafāt Ibn Rushd, 1”, 1997), p. 113; trans. G. F. HOURANI, *Averroes: On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy* (London: Luzac & Co., 1976), p. 62.

*One day, when you come to someone from Arabia Felix, Yamān.  
And, if you meet a Ma'addite,<sup>142</sup> 'Adnān.<sup>143</sup>*

Abū Naṣr al-Qushayrī<sup>144</sup> and others blamed him for being a philosopher and recited about him well known verses in which they say:

*We disavow, in regard to God, a group of people stricken  
With disease by the Book of the Healing.<sup>145</sup>  
How often I said to them: "O people, you are  
On the edge of an abyss<sup>146</sup> from which there is no healing!"<sup>147</sup>  
As they were making light of our teaching,  
We came back to God. He suffices us.  
They died in the religion of Aristotle  
And we lived according to the Sunna of the Elected.<sup>148</sup>*

This is why they were saying that *The Healing* had made Abū Hāmid sick.<sup>149</sup>

Similarly, al-Ṭurtūshī, al-Māzarī, Ibn 'Aqīl, Abū l-Bayān, Ibn Ḥamdīn, Abū Naṣr al-Marghīnānī, the companion of Abū Hāmid, and the like of those have said many things to blame him for what, in the matter of philosophy, he had entered into.

The scholars of Andalusia have [written] about this a great number [of texts]; and this, while Ibn 'Arabī and Ibn Sab'īn were walking behind him.

In the *Book of the Aim*<sup>150</sup> [of the Knower] (*al-Budd*) and in others, [Ibn Sab'īn] considers the "one brought near [God]" (*muqarrab*) the ultimate end (*ghāya*) — it is the equivalent of the "one brought near [God]" in the words of Abū Hāmid [al-Ghazālī] — and he fixes the number of ranks at five. The lowest one is the *fiqh* doctor, then the *Kalām* theologian, then the philosopher, then the Sufi philosopher — i.e. the traveler (*sālik*) —, then the realizer (*muḥaqqiq*).<sup>151</sup>

As for Ibn 'Arabī, he has four creeds (*aqīda*).<sup>152</sup> The first one is the creed of Abū l-Ma'ālī [l-Juwaynī] and of his followers, devoid of proof (*ḥujja*). The second one

<sup>142</sup> I.e. a northern Arab, of the progeny of Ma'add, son of 'Adnān.

<sup>143</sup> Verse of Imrān b. Ḥittān al-Khārījī; see G. F. HOURANI, *Harmony*, p. 107, n. 145.

<sup>144</sup> Abū Naṣr 'Abd al-Raḥīm b. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d. 514/1120), Shāfi'ite jurist and Ash'arite theologian, son of the author of the famous *Epistle (al-Risāla)*.

<sup>145</sup> *Kitāb al-Shifā'*, Avicenna's major philosophical *summa*.

<sup>146</sup> ḥufra : jufra **E** *pit*. See Q. 3: 103.

<sup>147</sup> Or: "which has no edge".

<sup>148</sup> *Al-Muṣṭafā'*, i.e. Muḥammad. Verses attributed to the Persian Sufi Abū Sa'īd b. Abī l-Khayr (d. 440/1049); see M. Y. SALĀMA (ed.), *Thubūt*, p. 309, n. 1.

<sup>149</sup> See above, Text II.

<sup>150</sup> *al-budd* : *al-yad* **E**

<sup>151</sup> See IBN SAB'ĪN, *Budd*, p. 94–95. Ibn Sab'īn speaks of "the Ash'arites" (*al-Ash'ariyya*), not of "*Kalām* theologians".

<sup>152</sup> See IBN 'ARABĪ, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, 4 vols (Būlāq — Anastatic reedition: Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.), vol. I, p. 34–47. In *Ṣafadiyya*, vol. I, p. 267–268, Ibn Taymiyya attributes three creeds to Ibn 'Arabī: "In the beginning of *The Openings (al-Futūḥāt)*, Ibn 'Arabī speaks of three creeds: a creed summarized from the *Irshād* of Abū l-Ma'ālī [al-Juwaynī], with its *Kalām* theology proofs; then a philosophical creed seeming to have been drawn from Avicenna and his like; he then alludes to his esoteric belief which

is that creed demonstrated with its *Kalām* theology proofs. The third one is the creed of the philosophers — Avicenna and his like — who make a distinction between the necessary and the possible. The fourth one is the realization (*taḥqīq*) [of the truth] to which he arrived, i.e. that existence is one.

Those took the path (*maslak*) of the philosophers which Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] refers to in *The Scale of Action* (*Mīzān al-ʿamal*),<sup>153</sup> and which [consists in saying] that somebody eminent (*fāḍil*) has three creeds: one creed with the commonalty, according to which he lives in this world, like *fiqh* e.g.; one creed with students, which he teaches them, like *Kalām* theology; and a third one about which he informs nobody but the elite. This is why he composed *The Books to Be Withheld from Those Who are not Worthy of Them* (*al-Kutub al-maḍnūn bi-bāʿ alā ḡbayr abli-bā*). Their [content] is pure philosophy, for which he took Avicenna's path. This is why he considers the Preserved Tablet<sup>154</sup> to be the soul of the [Heavenly] sphere,<sup>155</sup> and other matters which I have explained elsewhere.<sup>156</sup>

Three creeds mentioned in al-Ghazālī's *Mīzān al-ʿamal*, four creeds distinguished by Ibn ʿArabī, five religious ranks in Ibn Sabʿīn's *Budd al-ʿArif*. . . Abū Ḥāmid really initiated an inflationary process of dilution of Islamic orthodoxy correlatively to a hierarchical division of society, while the truth of *tawḥīd* ended up being identified with *waḥdat al-wujūd*, a post-Avicennan doctrine of oneness of existence only accessible to the elite. For sure, the great theologian was not always original in his criticisms of Abū Ḥāmid. He was able to rely on the rich anti-Ghazālīan literature of the 6th/12th–7th/13th centuries — some even going as far back as Abū Ḥāmid's lifetime — and he used it effectively. He nevertheless contributed his own, often bright, analyses, as an historian of ideas and virtuoso comparativist of the various currents of Islamic thought. Like other philosophers, theologians or Sufis, al-Ghazālī did not interest him for himself but as a key ideological player in the increasing distantiation of Islamic societies not only from

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he has explained openly in *The Bezels of Wisdom* (*Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*), i.e. the oneness of existence. He said: 'As for the creed of the quintessential elite, it will be expounded in detail in this book.'

<sup>153</sup> See AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Mīzān al-ʿamal* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿa Kurdistān al-Ilmiyya, 1328/1910), p. 212–215. In the *Iḥyāʾ*, al-Ghazālī distinguishes three degrees of illumination and faith: blind imitation (*taqlīd*) for the masses; an imperfect use of logical reasoning with the *Kalām* theologians; "seeing [clearly] with the light of certainty" for the knowers (*ʿarif*); see AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Kitāb sharḥ ʿajāib al-qalb*, trans. SKELLIE, *Marvels*, p. 41. On the influence of Avicenna, notably his *Risāla fī aḥwāl al-naḥs*, on the *Mīzān al-ʿamal*, see J. JANSSENS, *Al-Ghazālī's Mīzān al-ʿamal: An Ethical Summa based on Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāghib al-Isfahānī*, in A. AKASOY and W. RAVEN (eds), *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages: Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber* (Leiden - Boston: Brill, "Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 75", 2008), p. 123–137.

<sup>154</sup> See Q. 85: 22.

<sup>155</sup> See A. J. WENSINCK, *On the relation between Ghazālī's Cosmology and his Mysticism* (Amsterdam, Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers-Maatschappij, "Mededelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeeling Letterkunde, Deel 75, Serie A, N° 6", 1933), p. 183–209, at p. 187, 197–198.

<sup>156</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *Nubuwwāt*, p. 81–82. This book is posterior to the *Commentary on al-Isfahānī's Creed* (712/1312), to which it refers, p. 154.

the canonical sources of Islam but from clear reason (*ṣarīḥ al-ʿaql*). Ibn Taymiyya was ready to give Abū Ḥāmid the praise that he deserved, as manifest at the beginning of Text VIII. He moreover admitted that writings and ideas had been attributed to him of which he was innocent. He was nevertheless convinced of his enormous responsibility in the mutation of the religion through philosophy. From this viewpoint, Abū Ḥāmid was the Muslim counterpart of that other follower of Avicenna, Maimonides (d. 1204), mixing in Judaism “the Prophetic sayings with philosophical ones and interpreting them accordingly”.<sup>157</sup> Had he been like this other Jew, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. in Baghdād, after 560/1164), and like him trodden “on the way of rational examination (*ṭarīq al-naẓar al-ʿaqlī*), without being a blind follower” (*bi-lā taqlīd*) of the Shaykh al-Raʾīs, he would surely have fared better.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> IBN TAYMIYYA, *Darʿ*, vol. I, p. 131–132.

<sup>158</sup> “The words of Aristotle on *divinalia* are extremely few and there are many mistakes in them. Avicenna and his like expanded them and spoke about *divinalia*, prophethood, the secrets of the [divine] signs, the stations of the knowers and, even, the return of spirits, in words that are not found with those [Aristotelians]. What is correct in their words, [it is so because] they followed, about it, the path of the Prophets. That which is mistaken therein, they based it on the corrupted fundamentals of their ancestors. This is why Averroes and his like among the philosophizers say that what Avicenna mentioned about revelation, dreams, the causes of the knowledge [that some have] of future events, etc., is something which he said by himself and had not been said, before him, by the Peripateticians, his ancestors. As for Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, the author of *al-Muʿtabar*, and his like, because they were not blindly following these, because they were treading on the way of rational examination without being blind followers, and because they were enlightened by the lights of prophecy, they say more valid things on this subject than these and those” (IBN TAYMIYYA, *Minbāj*, vol. I, p. 348).