

YŪSUF AL-QARAḌĀWĪ AND THE NEW ISLAMIC TV

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This chapter will discuss the connection between the communicative strategies of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī and the function of the media in constructing public spheres, identities and communities. I will argue that Qaraḍāwī differs from many other present-day Muslim TV preachers by his religious authority, by his use of new Islamic TV combined with other new media, and by his way of reasoning. The main focus is therefore the communicative methods and strategies of Qaraḍāwī with the use of new Islamic TV as the focal point. The term Islamic TV refers to a growing phenomenon of channels and programmes defined as Islamic, meaning that the programmes—which may be of all conventional sorts, such as children’s programmes, cartoons, quiz programmes, debate programmes, and documentaries—are defined by having an Islamic perspective based on Islamic values.¹

On 5 November 2006 the satellite TV channel al-Jazeera celebrated the tenth anniversary of the programme *al-Sharī‘a wa ’l-Ḥayāt* (*Sharia and Life*). As usual the guest in the studio was Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī.² Topics of specific programmes, different programme hosts and different scholars appearing in place of Qaraḍāwī were remembered and reflected upon. But most of all, the programme was about Qaraḍāwī. He was the first one to comment on and analyse the meaning and perspectives of the programme, which he himself defined more as his

own than a programme of al-Jazeera. At the same time, the model of letting viewers call in to comment or ask questions was partly maintained, as small recorded interviews with former studio hosts were shown, and scholars from abroad commented on the importance of Qaradāwī.

The celebration of *Sharia and Life* and Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī was part of a general celebration of the birth of al-Jazeera ten years earlier. And this was quite appropriate. During its ten years the programme has become one of the most famous of al-Jazeera's programmes, with a high number of viewers and popularity both in Muslim countries and among Muslims living in Western countries.³ Together, Qaradāwī and al-Jazeera have succeeded in combining new transnational media with Islamic thinking in a modern framework. Ever since al-Jazeera has become the most influential Arab satellite-channel,⁴ academics have been interested in its pivotal role in the construction of a transnational Arabic public sphere.⁵ It is relevant to discuss the contribution of Qaradāwī from this perspective, as a powerful constituent of the Islamic dimension of this public sphere. Not only has *Sharia and Life* for many years been the only religious programme at al-Jazeera, the programme has also become a model to imitate for other new Arab satellite channels. There is no doubt that Qaradāwī uses the media with high skills but also with clear goals, one of which is the wish to unite the Muslim peoples, the *umma*, a key topic in his analyses and comments. One could argue that, with his focus on the Muslim *umma*, Qaradāwī takes part in a redefinition of a Muslim public sphere.

As mentioned in the introduction to this volume, Qaradāwī is seen by some as a moderate conservative Muslim thinker, whereas he is seen by others as a radical Islamist. The focus in the following is not the question of classifying Qaradāwī as more or less radical. What I am going to discuss is how he uses the new media, what kind of Muslim public he could be seen to promote in his programmes, and what consequences the use of new media has for the presentation of Qaradāwī and his position.

Qaradāwī and the concept of religious TV

Qaradāwī has a history with TV, which goes much further back than the ten years at al-Jazeera. Since 1970 he has hosted his own programme on the national TV of Qatar. Entitled *Hadī 'l-Islām* (Guidance of Islam), this is a weekly programme, though in some periods programmes from earlier years are being screened. According to his autobiography, it was Qaradāwī himself who suggested that the programme should receive questions from the viewers about Islamic matters (social, religious, political etc.).⁶ Initially the programme only lasted 20 minutes, but soon it was extended to 30 minutes and later to 50 minutes, to get time to answer all the questions received from the viewers. The concept used has been called a *fatwa*-programme. The programme had its ordinary viewers among people from Qatar and the Gulf States, especially Bahrain and the eastern part of Saudi Arabia. As soon as the national TV of Qatar also was broadcast via satellite in 1993,⁷ viewers from outside the Gulf, especially from North Africa, started to send in questions to the programme. With the introduction of *Sharia and Life* on al-Jazeera, *Hadī 'l-Islām* lost some of its attraction.

Sharia and Life was broadcast for the first time on 3 November 1996 with Aḥmad al-Shaykh as presenter and Qaradāwī as the guest of the programme. According to the anniversary programme the title of the first programme was "the meaning of Sharia and its role in the organisation of human life".⁸

As with *Hadī 'l-Islām*, the concept of *Sharia and Life* is that of a *fatwa* programme. It is a concept developed from that of an older Egyptian programme which was broadcast on Egyptian national television from 1960 to 1977 with more than 850 episodes, and again from 2000 till summer 2006. The programme was called *Nūr 'alā Nūr* (Light upon Light) and was hosted by Aḥmad Farraj.⁹ A mufti or a scholar, a Muslim, a non-Muslim, an Arab or non-Arab Orientalist, was invited into the studio with a live audience, where the scholar gave his interpretation concerning a specific question on the basis of the Qur'an. It can therefore be defined as a *tafsīr* programme, but the interpretations given by the scholars in the programmes were often

taken by the people as instructions on how to live as Muslims, and this can be said to have been developed further in the *fatwa* programmes. In the summer of 1974, while Qaraḍāwī was visiting Egypt, he went for the first time on Egyptian television to record three episodes of *Nūr 'alā Nūr* with Aḥmad Farraj. The episodes dealt with the question of *zakāt* (binding alms) because of Qaraḍāwī's new book *Fiqh al-zakāt*.¹⁰ By attending *Nūr 'alā Nūr*, Qaraḍāwī joined other prominent Islamic scholars such as Sha'rāwī, Abū Zahra, Khafif, Madanī, and Sanhūrī, who all have been guests of the programme.¹¹

As *fatwa* programmes *Hadī 'l-Islām* and *Sharia and Life* initiated a programme genre which since then has become a widespread and popular format on Arabic satellite channels. The programmes offer differing interpretations, depending not least on the scholar invited, but inspired by the same model, where religious authority is left in the hands of a religious scholar. The task of the guest is to interpret what is *ḥalāl* (allowed) and what is *ḥarām* (forbidden), in accordance with the Islamic thinking of the scholar at hand. In this way the media transmit traditional discourses of Islam, where questions about the right Islamic practice can be put to a scholar trained in giving *fatwas*. The new media seem to go very well together with this practice and have developed recently in unprecedented variations, where Muslims can order and pay for a *fatwa* from certain private enterprises.

Beside the two *fatwa* programmes on Qatar TV and al-Jazeera respectively, which could most correctly be labelled Qaraḍāwī's programmes, he has been a guest on several other programmes on the national TV of Qatar. For instance, during the month of Ramadan he has taken part in programmes with the title *Fī riḥāb al-Qur'ān* (In the vastness of the Qur'an) and *Min mishkāt al-Nubuwwa* (From the lantern of the prophecy).¹² And more than ten years after his first appearance on Egyptian TV, Qaraḍāwī was invited again. Three episodes of a programme with the woman presenter Karimān Ḥamza were recorded in 1984, with the moderate or middle way (*wasatiyya*) of Islam as the common subject. Two of the programmes were broadcast, while the third was rejected for security reasons, Qaraḍāwī was told. And together with other Muslim thinkers and activists, Qaraḍāwī

was denied appearance on the Egyptian national TV, and they were even denied access to the TV building for reasons linked to their Islamist conviction.¹³ In 1986, he was again allowed to appear on Egyptian Radio, where he was part of a long debate programme in two episodes called “Witness to a decade”, about the Islamic revival and present issues. Later, he was interviewed several times on the Egyptian Qur’an Radio.¹⁴

Thus Qaradāwī’s appearance on TV has from an early start been politically controversial, and still is. It started during the reign of President Nasser, when Qaradāwī had trouble with the security police in Egypt because of his affiliation with the Muslim Brothers. After periods of imprisonment in Egypt he settled in Qatar in 1961.¹⁵ In July 1970 he was encouraged by Qatari TV to make *Hadī ’l-Islām*, and the first six episodes were shot in Beirut, where he spent his holiday. Today he is not only controversial for the Egyptian state; he is also controversial among some other Muslim scholars and leaders, who find him either too moderate or too radical. Despite the criticism, his TV appearances have contributed to his popularity among ordinary people and to his authority in the Muslim world in general.

Qaradāwī himself seems to have a clear goal in using the TV as a medium to diffuse knowledge about Islam. He does not want to categorise a programme like *Sharia and Life* as a religious programme. In the anniversary programme he tells how at the beginning of the programme the title was discussed.¹⁶ Proposals were *Religion and Life* or *Islam and Life*, and they ended up with *Sharia and Life*, because they wanted Islam to be introduced as a direction in *life*, and not only as theological or abstract belief. In Qaradāwī’s perspective Sharia should direct the practice of human life, the life of the individual, of the family, the society, the nation, the country and international relations. His programmes and appearances on TV should therefore not be seen as a limited religious contribution. In his view the programme should be seen as Islamic and not religious TV, since Islam embraces every aspect of life.¹⁷ As we will see in the following, characteristics of his two *fatwa* programmes show how he understands Islamic TV, but also how it has changed because of new transnational development.

*Two fatwa programmes: Hadī 'l-Islām
and al-Sharī'a wa 'l-Hayāt*

At first glance the two programmes *Hadī 'l-Islām* and *al-Sharī'a wa 'l-Hayāt* seem very similar in framework and aim, one of the main reasons being Qaraḍāwī as a key figure in both programmes. But on closer inspection the two programmes reflect the change from national public service TV to transnational TV, a change in framework which also affects Qaraḍāwī's message and role.

The key figure in both programmes since their introduction, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī is invariably dressed in his traditional dress of a Muslim scholar (*ʿālim*) and placed behind a desk. In *Hadī 'l-Islām* he is the only person in the studio, facing and talking directly to the viewer, while in *Sharia and Life* he is placed opposite the host of the programme, who is dressed in a suit.¹⁸ Both programmes are in classical Arabic. In *Hadī 'l-Islām* Qaraḍāwī talks almost exclusively in the classical language, while in *Sharia and Life* he once in a while gives examples in Egyptian dialect; for instance he quotes a proverb in Egyptian. The set design of the two programmes also differs. The interior of the studio of *Hadī 'l-Islām* reflects an Islamic timelessness common to many Islamic religious programmes, with oriental woodwork as decoration and an introduction with Arab classical instrumental background music, while the camera focuses on Qaraḍāwī.

The set design of *Sharia and Life* has changed over the time. In its first years the visual frame of the programme signalled an obvious connection between Islam and present time. The introduction visualised the hot spots in the world, accompanied by dramatic background music, and seen through the Arab letters for Sharia, functioning as a prism through which one has to see and interpret the present development.¹⁹ In 2006 the difference between *Hadī 'l-Islām* and *Sharia and Life* in studio design has diminished. But still the thematic structure differs. At *Hadī 'l-Islām* Qaraḍāwī may as an introduction present a current case, followed by answers to questions from people sent in by letter, the questions may differ in topic and scope, which makes the programme jump from one subject to another. In *Sharia and Life* the individual episode is centred around one topic, which is introduced by

the host, and later analysed and expanded by Qaraḍāwī. Thereafter people can call in and ask questions in relation to the specific topic of the programme.

Even though the answers and the world view of Qaraḍāwī may be the same in both programmes and Qaraḍāwī defines himself in the same way, the set design, visual framework, and thematic and media context are not irrelevant for TV-transmitted Islam. It reflects a change in media on several levels. Most importantly, there is a significant change from public service TV to a more agenda setting TV.

By letting Qaraḍāwī face the viewer directly at *Hadī 'l-Islām*, he is positioned as the authority, who talks to the viewer but does not expect him or her to answer back. This is the univocal dialogue used on public service TV with the aim to inform and educate the mass audience. This is national TV and as such a representative of national public institutions. The viewers can raise the question by post and get an authorised answer by Qaraḍāwī. Al-Jazeera, for its part, gives an important role to the host or presenter. The host is tasked with asking the questions that ordinary viewers may ask. He complements the calls and emails by putting controversial and relevant questions to Qaraḍāwī. The style of the various presenters has differed over time. A person like Aḥmad Maṣṣūr has a confronting and polemical style, and Anne-Sofie Roald has argued that his questions were more critical than those of his successor, Māhir 'Abd Allāh.²⁰ But all the hosts have had the position of the voice of the people, confronting the univocal direction of the public service TV. The hosts are the guarantee that the programme becomes what Eickelman and Anderson see as characteristic for the new media, "*discursive, performative, and participative, and not confined to formal institutions recognized by state authorities*".²¹

Hence the authority and discourse of Qaraḍāwī have not only to do with his personal knowledge. Rather, the context of the media is crucial. It is not unimportant that the viewers have the possibility to call in by phone, which gives the viewer the possibility to participate in a much more direct way. Also, the set design with the talk show setting, two men communicating on an intimate basis, is an important change from the public service setting, where Qaraḍāwī faces the audience. The intimate and performative setting gives the viewer the

possibility to identify with the actors in the dialogue. The viewer could potentially have been the one sitting together with Qaradāwī asking the same questions as the host does. In this way, the programme stresses the relevance and importance of the people's problems of today. In contrast to the more traditionalist scholar presented on Arab satellite television, who avoids questions when they relate to a reality of today in conflict with traditional interpretation, Qaradāwī welcomes such questions. The "traditional scholar" is in the habit, according to Anne-Sofie Roald, of answering controversial questions with rhetorical counter-questions or talking in abstract terms.²²

Still, one could argue that Qaradāwī does raise the same kind of people's questions in *Hadī 'l-Islām* also, despite the different design set. And at the same time, the change of the classical public service media setting could go much further than in *al-Sharī'a wa 'l-Hayāt*. The intimate atmosphere is limited by the desk by which the two participants are placed, and the programme seems to keep up this formal interior setting, contrary to other competing *fatwa* programmes which have taken up a new model placing the shaykh as well as the programme host on a sofa as in an imagined living room, strengthening the feeling of intimacy and the possibility for the viewer to identify.²³

According to Skovgaard-Petersen, Qaradāwī's way of reasoning in *Sharia and Life* is a rational form of argumentation often seen as typical of public service TV. It is men sitting and discussing serious matters for hours, only interrupted by news—a typical example of the old modernistic intellectual. Qaradāwī still has the main aim of educating and informing, Skovgaard-Petersen argues.²⁴ Nevertheless, I find there is a change from the Qatar national TV to al-Jazeera, which is reflected in *Sharia and Life*. The main change is the function of *Sharia and Life* and Qaradāwī as *setting an agenda* through facing the problems of the Muslims in small as well as large matters. This much stronger role in setting an agenda has something to do with Qaradāwī, but certainly also with the media context, including the role of al-Jazeera.

A main difference between terrestrial and satellite TV is the potential audience. By addressing the national audience and the audience of Arab Gulf countries *Hadī 'l-Islām* has a more conservative and nationally defined Islamic audience by comparison with *Sharia and*

Life, which might reach a very heterogeneous and differentiated audience in relation to Islamic interpretation, nationality and political environment. The al-Jazeera audience could be said to have high expectations of relevance and critical perspectives in the programmes transmitted.

The role of al-Jazeera

Al-Jazeera has become a controversial channel because of its potential for democracy, critical media coverage and the construction of a new Arab public. Not least since 9/11 2001, al-Jazeera has been accused of promoting a political *Muslim* Arab public, defined as in opposition to Western values.²⁵ Others rather see al-Jazeera as a positive instrument, as representative of a liberalisation of the media, which will weaken the Islamic fundamentalism and renew Islam in a progressive sense.²⁶ This approach is supported by arguments saying that al-Jazeera is a necessary alternative to the national TV channels in the Gulf, which broadcast a lot of boring, uninteresting and reactionary religious programmes that underestimate the intelligence of the people.²⁷

So why is al-Jazeera broadcasting the programme *Sharia and Life*, which at first sight seems very similar to *Hadī 'l-Islām* on Qatar TV? And how come that a channel like al-Jazeera, presenting itself as a secular, critical and independent channel focusing on news coverage, chooses to produce a programme of this kind? It is the only specifically religious programme at al-Jazeera, even though religion of course often becomes a subject included in other programmes. But al-Jazeera, for instance, does not transmit the Friday prayer. The answers to these questions seem to lie in the agenda setting of *Sharia and Life* in agreement with the scope of al-Jazeera.

From the very beginning, al-Jazeera has defined itself as an alternative to the state controlled and nationally oriented TV channels. In spite of the economic and political support from the Emir in Qatar, it has been launched as an independent channel, promoting critical journalism and addressing a wider Arab speaking audience. The type of programme is the same kind that can be found at the BBC, which has also been interpreted as the ideal of al-Jazeera. Al-Jazeera broad-

casts news, documentary, and not least different kinds of talk shows, famous for taking up controversial issues and inviting well known personalities without restraining critical cross-questioning. As such, it has echoes of public service TV, wanting to inform and educate, which the BBC is famous for. But more crucial is, again, the aim of setting the agenda. Al-Jazeera wants to raise the questions which the national television of Arab countries did not raise; it wants to define the important issues of the Muslim Arab world.²⁸ The motto of al-Jazeera defines the aim: *al-ra'y wa 'l-ra'y al-ākhr* (the opinion and the counter opinion).

Qaraḍāwī shares with al-Jazeera an interest in the present political problems of the Arab-Muslim societies. And neither is afraid to raise the controversial issues; they have a common assignment. Compared to the set design of *Hadī 'l-Islām, Sharia and Life* speaks the language of al-Jazeera. The introduction to the programme in the beginning, with pictures from recent dramatic events in the world, is just one example. Another common feature is the ambition, made possible through the technological development of satellite TV, not only to reach physically a transnational audience of predominantly Muslim Arabs living inside and outside the Arab countries, but also to reach a world-wide Arab audience mentally with content, form and approach.²⁹ In the tenth anniversary programme, Qaraḍāwī explained that they chose to broadcast the programme on Sunday evening at 22:05 (Mecca Time), equivalent to 19:05 (Greenwich Time), because the programme also speaks to Muslim in the Western countries, where Sunday is the holiday and people are off work; this is also the case in some Arab and Muslim countries, he argued.³⁰ The point is that al-Jazeera and Qaraḍāwī want to set an agenda transnationally, and not only regionally.

The third aspect where al-Jazeera and Qaraḍāwī have the same approach relates to the most important issues of the Muslim world at the moment. The major issues are about political global conflicts where Muslims are the victims, not least the Palestinian issue, and the state of democracy and development in the Arab world. Qaraḍāwī emphasised in the anniversary programme that he was tired of talking about all the small issues, too narrowly related to private daily life.

“We have discussed the small things long enough,” he said, giving examples like questions about ablution, birth, menstruation and ritual purity. Instead, the programme needed to raise the important issues, the questions of Islamic life, meaning the issues of Muslim society. Qaradāwī continued by mentioning what he called the burning issues, such as Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the war in Lebanon.³¹ Not everyone at al-Jazeera might agree with Qaradāwī about the role that Islam should play in the world of today; but they do seem to agree that this question is absolutely necessary and crucial for the future of Arab societies. As such they have a common agenda: an agenda which through opinion formation creates what media researchers have called an opinion based community.³² But what kind of community is promoted by Qaradāwī and *Sharia and Life*, and how does it correspond with other Islamic media’s construction of a public?

The emergence of the new Islamic media

Qaradāwī is very well aware that he is part of a new phenomenon, the Islamic media. He once finished answering a question from a viewer in *Sharia and Life* by saying with a laugh that he knew that if the viewer did not get the answer he wanted, he would just phone the next shaykh in another *fatwa* programme. Therefore his position and role in *Sharia and Life* must also be seen in the context of new Islamic media in general. The Islamic public he is promoting is in competition with other kinds of Islamic programmes.

First, the change from national TV to transnational and thereby more liberal media is decisive for the development of new Islamic TV. As Lila Abu-Lughod has argued in her studies of specifically Egyptian TV, Arab TV has had the objective to construct a national public, using what she calls national pedagogy to educate and construct the people as national citizens.³³ At the same time national TV has been censored and harshly controlled by the state authorities. With transnational TV, not only the censorship but also the (unbalanced) national ideology has been challenged. The new transnational religious Arab channels—such as *Iqrā’*, *al-Majd*, *al-Risāla*, and *al-Fajr*—can be seen

as instruments in what the American Middle East researcher Jon Alterman argues could be the development of a new and transnational Muslim public. He identifies a double potential in the new transnational media. First, they could be an instrument in the development of a civic public; in this way the transnational media can be seen as potentially supporting a process of democratisation in the Arab world. Secondly, the transnational media have the potential to support the development of an Arab and/or Muslim public, which might be defined in opposition to the Western countries and the Western liberal values.³⁴

During the years under national hegemony Islamic coverage was primarily limited to broadcasting of Friday prayer, Friday sermons, Qur'an readings and the pilgrimage (*ḥajj*). Even before the first Arab satellite station, Arabsat, started in 1985, Saudi Arabia had begun transmitting the Friday prayer from Mecca and the annual *ḥajj* via the satellite Intelsat. But not all Arab countries have transmitted Friday prayer, which reflects the fact that some Arab nation-states, such as Syria, have had an ideological identity where Islam has been played down. When it comes to transnational Arab TV channels, it is mostly the religious Arab satellite channels which broadcast the Friday prayer. It is therefore possible to see the Friday prayer both as part of a public service obligation of national TV and as an element in the construction of the national identity, including the religious identity, of the state. On the other hand, broadcasting of Friday prayers and other religious rituals on transnational TV is part of a media-created religious space of quite a different kind from the one promoted by national TV.

Qaraḍāwī's move from Qatar TV to al-Jazeera is therefore not insignificant. Even though he maintains the traditional role as Friday preacher on Qatar TV and still appears giving a Friday sermon, even this has reached another degree of influence because of the new Islamic media. Qaraḍāwī has cleverly made use of the media development and a more liberal space. He does not just give the sermon and let Qatar TV transmit it. He also broadcasts his sermons via a transcript on the internet. He has his own very comprehensive website, www.qaradawi.net, and is a central figure behind the online-portal www.islamonline.net. IslamOnline.net has its headquarters in Doha, and Qaraḍāwī is

the head of a committee, made up of the major scholars throughout the Islamic world, whose role is to ensure that nothing on this site violates the fixed principles of Islamic law.³⁵ While this position may be largely honorary, it still testifies to QaraḌāwī's interest in harnessing new media to spread his message to Muslims and non-Muslims all over the world.

New media like TV, satellite TV, radio, fax machines, audio- and videocassettes, the telephone and the internet have been useful tools in an open challenge to the *authoritative* use of the symbolic language of Islam. The fact that different opposition groups as well as ordinary people have gained access to new media has changed the asymmetrical position of the early mass media and created a new Muslim public. Eickelman and Anderson define this Muslim public as the existence of a large number of Muslims who in public explain their goals in life in a terminology borrowed from the normative language of Islam, even though the individual participant in this discourse may be motivated by other numerous and quite different models of belonging, like ethnic, national, kinship, and occupational belonging. One can talk about a new kind of Muslim identity policy and a new Muslim discourse.³⁶ Researchers in transnational media in general agree about the potential of the new media to challenge all kinds of conventional authorities. From this perspective, the relevant question is how QaraḌāwī, as a rather conventional religious authority, has succeeded in upholding his authority and even strengthened it through the new media.

The question of authority

The authority of QaraḌāwī has indeed been challenged, and these challenges are certainly closely related to new media. On the one hand, by addressing a wider audience, he has opened the way for a range of ideological criticism from both more conservative and radical Muslims, as well as from Western observers. On the internet there are websites dedicated to the criticism of QaraḌāwī, such as the Salafi website against QaraḌāwī³⁷ and others more selectively critical, such as "Some mistakes of Yusuf al-Qaradawi".³⁸ This type of website criticises what it perceives as his lenient attitude towards infidels, art and

entertainment, and his very defensive interpretation of *jihād*. On the other hand there are institutions which find Qaraḍāwī too radical, such as the pro-Israeli Media Research Institute MEMRI with its website www.memri.org, which selects and translates transcripts from Middle Eastern media and among these gives examples of what Qaraḍāwī has said about the relationship between Muslims and Jews, between Muslim countries and Israel, focusing only on the confrontational statements. Another example is a website that was created as a response to what it calls “Mayor Ken Livingstone’s public embrace of Sheikh Qaraḍāwī” in 2004.³⁹ This website seeks to “explain the fears and dismay felt by representatives of community and faith-based groups in London”.⁴⁰ The website includes a document referring to and criticising some of Qaraḍāwī’s statements and *fatwas* in relation to terror, minorities and women rights.

The point is that being part of the new Islamic media means taking part in a process of globalisation, where weakening of the traditions of society has provided a breeding ground for declarations of community identity, such as religious, ethnic and sub-cultural identity. This process gives room for new intellectuals and new authorities, which are promoted by the media, while the old traditional authority is placed in a weakened position. Qaraḍāwī is very aware of this challenge, and despite his humorous acknowledgment that some people might shop around for the *fatwa* they want, he meets the challenge by distinguishing between a true and traditional authority, such as himself, and the new missionaries who are, in his eyes, merely self-appointed. As far as he is concerned, the solution to the fragmentation of authority is to strengthen the role of traditional scholars in the Muslim world. In his opinion only the *ulama* have the intellectual knowledge and training to guide the Muslim society.

His alliance with al-Jazeera seems to have been crucial in this perspective. The seriousness of al-Jazeera has reflected the seriousness of Qaraḍāwī, and vice versa. Both use the rational, logical way of reasoning and in general highlight a balanced view of the world. At the same time Qaraḍāwī emphasises his authority through his formal theological education at al-Azhar, his confinement to tradition, and the fact that his authority to give *fatwas* is never questioned in *Sharia and Life*. The

situation in the Muslim world and the practice of Muslims might be questioned by the host, but seldom the specific interpretation by Qaradāwī. His academic background in Islamic religious studies is presented as an unavoidable qualification and precondition for his authority, an authority which has given him the legitimate status to issue *fatwas*. He finds that the qualifications of the new missionaries are insufficient. He argues that they lack the education in theology, which should both include the science of the Qur'an, *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*, as well as knowledge about other religions; they lack linguistic and literary intellect, and knowledge about historical culture.⁴¹

In the media context his attempts to dismiss the new authorities are relevant, because it seems that some are very successful in attracting viewers. New Muslim media stars like Amr Khalid, and rising stars like Moez Masoud, compete with the traditional authority through new ways of using the media in an experience-based and entertaining manner. It is no longer the rationality of the message that has to convince the audience, it is the semantics of Islam, the intensity of the belief and the possibility of identification, that become the purpose of the programmes. The Qur'an goes from being the source of rules to being a book of signs symbolising Muslim feelings, community and identity. It is not the *interpretation* of the text that is important; it is rather the *effect* of the text on the audience.⁴² It reflects what Eickelman and Anderson call the change from a law-based to an experience-based way of reasoning, is the latter being dominant in the new Muslim public.⁴³ Qaradāwī's two dominant programmes can therefore be seen as two models, which both are challenged by a third and post-modern kind, where signs and symbols replace the educational and informational aim of *Hadī 'l-Islām* and the agenda setting aim of *Sharia and Life*.

Until now, I have almost solely analysed the setting and the outward circumstances connected to the media. To understand the success of Qaradāwī, it is necessary to go further into how he might take part in the construction of a Muslim public and how this is connected to his media use. The question is, how does he construct a Muslim public discursively and why is it met with sympathy among Muslims all over the world?

	<i>Target group</i>	<i>Form</i>	<i>Aim</i>	<i>Discourse</i>
<i>Hadī 'l-islām</i>	National and regional	One way message. Non-questioned authority. Timelessness.	Information and education.	Universal Islam, outside and above context.
<i>Sharia and Life</i>	Transnational and global	Two way dialogue. Strong authority, but performative questioned. Time and context bounded.	Agenda setting, by means of discourse, performance and participation.	Universal Islam, but dependent of context.

Qaradāwī's Muslim public

It is obvious that the transnational Muslim public is rather fragmented and oppositional, and the media take part in the construction of a Muslim public through communication of an Islamic discourse. Seen in the perspective of Qaradāwī's media use, his discourse is not isolated from other present discourses about society. On the contrary he stresses the importance of starting with the real problems of the people, and the real problems cover very different parts of life. Four overall objectives pass through all his teachings, often repeated in his autobiography, in the anniversary programme and in the presentation of goals and objectives at IslamOnline.net.

First, the realistic approach of Qaradāwī is central. He wants to relate to *real* problems, and he wants to relate to the problems in a *realistic* way. As mentioned before, the real problems are in his view not the formalistic discussions on how to wash one's hands, but what *really* affects the life of Muslims today. Second, he sees *all* kinds of problems as relevant in an Islamic perspective; thus Islam is *universal*. In the anniversary programme he says that the programme includes culture, upbringing, mission, economy, politics, social issues and the

family. Third, Qaradāwī makes a virtue of approaching Muslims all over the world. The Muslim public is *transnational* or *global* in his discourse, without ignoring the local, as he says in the anniversary programme. Fourth, the way to approach the questions is through what Qaradāwī several times has defined as the *middle way* (see Gräf in this volume). The four approaches together create a discourse defining Islam as universal, global, realistic and tolerant, meaning that its applicability in all places and times is a key point.⁴⁴ But how does Qaradāwī substantialise this discourse? Which discursive strategies does he use? And what does intertextuality mean for the construction of his discourse?

Looking through the themes of the episodes of *Sharia and Life* in the new millennium, it is possible to identify four main categories of subjects. First, there are the political challenges facing Muslims all over the world (political issues); second, subjects concerning how to practice religious duties and understand Islamic dogma in a changing world (religious aspects); third, topics regarding how to organise Muslim society in a world influenced by new political thinking, modernisation and globalisation (civic aspects); and fourth, social, family and community matters. As it might appear, it is a general perspective that discusses even the most dogmatic questions in relation to the current changes in the world.

As already mentioned, the question about the current political situation involving Muslim countries or citizens is a returning topic. Examples of programmes in this category are “Islam five years after 9/11”,⁴⁵ “Kidnapping and killing of hostages in Iraq”,⁴⁶ “Consequences of the ban against *ḥijāb* in France”,⁴⁷ and “Statements of the Pope towards Islam”.⁴⁸ Questions on religious practice are raised in relation to the duties of the Muslim, such as prayer and *zakāt*. They are discussed in relation to changes in society, for instance, where the financial structure has changed the private economy or living in a non-Muslim society might bring forward new kind of obstacles in relation to daily prayers. Examples of programmes in this category are “Philosophy of worship in Islam”,⁴⁹ “The duty of *zakāt* in the life of Muslims”,⁵⁰ “Contemporary practise of *zakāt*”,⁵¹ and “Belief in the day of judgment”.⁵² These questions overlap with the third category of topics,

focusing on modernisation and globalisation. Qaraḍāwī seems to find it important to discuss seriously on a principal and general level what new political thinking, modernisation and globalisation mean to Muslim societies and Muslims. Programmes in this category include “Human rights in Islam”,⁵³ “The permission to have a constitution and vote for it”,⁵⁴ “The contemporary Islamic political *fiqh*”,⁵⁵ “The Islamic discourse in a globalised age”,⁵⁶ and “Political and civil freedom”.⁵⁷ Often the topics are related; for example, the question on having a constitution raises a wider discussion about the relationship between Islamic law and the law of national states, but also becomes an urgent question because of preparations for a constitution in Iraq in 2005. The programme with the constitution topic was broadcast around a month and half before the Iraqi referendum was going to take place on 15 October 2005. The fourth category includes programmes focusing on social responsibility and on principles how to organise relationships between Muslims. Examples of such programmes are “The role of women in life”,⁵⁸ “Islam and problems of poverty and hunger”,⁵⁹ “Understanding of the family in Islam”,⁶⁰ and “The Islamic-Christian dialogue”.⁶¹ In the following we will have a deeper look into the four subjects and we will be able to crystallise four discourses.

The political issues

The use of different media complementing each other is central in the communication strategies of Qaraḍāwī. He would give a heated sermon at the Friday prayer broadcast live on Qatar TV, after which he would give a *fatwa* supporting the point of the sermon in more rational language on *Sharia and Life*, distributing it further on his personal website or IslamOnline.net. Some of his most controversial *fatwas* are related to political issues, such as the *fatwa* which defends the legitimacy of Palestinian suicide killings. When and where confrontations between Muslim and non-Muslim countries are at their height, Qaraḍāwī talks in a uncompromising discourse of “us” and “them”, for instance in an episode of *Ḥaḍī’l-Islām*, where he talks about fighting the Jews because they have taken Muslim land and stresses that all Muslims as individuals have the duty to fight in the name of Islam to

defend Muslim land. The distinction between Jews and Muslims is in this case absolute.

In the perspective of construction of a Muslim public this discourse—which Qaradāwī has been employing for years—can be seen as the building of a distinct political community different from “the Other”, which is seen as the enemy of Islam and the Muslim world. In contrast to the attitude of many Salafi groups, the “Other” is not the infidel Muslims.⁶² Qaradāwī does not construct other Muslim groups as infidels or non-believers, but uses the current political issues to construct a strong feeling of Muslim solidarity.

Some of his Friday sermons and *fatwas* reflect this discourse. On 4 January 2000 he gave a sermon with the title: “Why are they enemies of Islam?” He began with a rhetorical question by “one of our brothers”, as he put it. By referring to the question as being raised by “one of us”, Qaradāwī made the topic relevant and meaningful for “us”, who are Muslims in general, which became evident when Qaradāwī continued by raising rhetorical questions referring to current areas of conflict where Muslims were involved, such as: “Why do the Western Christians define the Eastern Muslims as their enemy? What are the reasons to the violent offensive or rather the bloodthirsty war, which is both direct and indirect? Why is the war directed at the Islamic *umma*, its revival, and the Islamic movement? What did we do against these nations, since they declare war against us all over the world: in Palestine, Lebanon, Kashmir, Chechnya, Sudan, the Philippines, and many other countries? What did we do which makes them declare the devastating war against us? There is no reason. We did not commit any evil deeds against others.”⁶³

These introductory questions construct a clear-cut opposition between “them” and “us”, between Muslims and the Western world. They are categorical dualisms and oppositions useful in creating a strong sense of belonging to a community.⁶⁴ Qaradāwī did not try to differentiate or tone down the dualism, instead he answered the rhetorical question with reference to God’s law: “The law of God has created oppositions in the universe and among his creations. It is a fight between the good and the evil, justice and injustice, the right way and the wrong way, belief and non-belief, Adam and Iblis, Abraham

and Nimrod, Moses and Pharaoh, Muhammad and Aba-Jahel and Aba-Lahab and people like them.”⁶⁵ Later in his lecture he continued these categorical oppositions, defining in turn Western imperialism, the Russians, the Zionists and the Americans as the main enemies of the Muslims. The discourse is obviously directed at mobilising the audience, not necessarily to war or violence, but to mobilise solidarity, union, and belief in Islam. The Muslims are encouraged in the sermon to keep hold of the message and get support from their civilisation, tradition and community: “We need to be one community (*al-umma*), as God has ordered us to be”, Qaraḍāwī stated.⁶⁶

The intertextuality with an Islamist discourse is obvious in the rhetorical distinction between Muslims and the imperial powers. This is not surprising, as far as Qaraḍāwī himself in his memoirs defines his book *The Imported Solutions and How they Ruined our umma* as a continuation of Sayyid Quṭb’s book *Khaṣā’is al-taṣawwur al-islāmī wa-muqāwamatuhu* (The Characteristics and Values of Islamic Conduct) from 1960. Even though Qaraḍāwī finds that Sayyid Quṭb only focuses at one side of Islam, while he himself includes several sides of Islam, Qaraḍāwī acknowledges the usefulness of some of Quṭb’s key concepts.⁶⁷

At the same time it is necessary to see the different *fatwas*, sermons, and talks on recent political issues as deeply related to the concrete political context. The sermon on 4 January 2000, “Why are they enemies of Islam?” came shortly after the Russian attack on Chechnya on 18 December 1999, which resulted in a violent escalation of the conflict, followed by the beginning of Putin’s presidency on 1 January 2000; Putin did not show any tolerance towards the Chechens. Qaraḍāwī’s sermon cannot be analysed without awareness of this political reality.

In relation to the Muslim public, it is obvious that as a Muslim one has to feel solidarity with other Muslims regardless of ethnicity, nationality or language. Qaraḍāwī stressed this directly in a sermon “Muslims are one *umma*” on 9 April 1999. Islam is the principal idea of the Muslim community, but this idea is supported by other ideas such as “the historical logic, the geographical logic, the logic of interest, our modern logic or with the logic of the enemies of Islam—with any

logic..."⁶⁸ In this way he defined the logic of a Muslim community as of the same kind as the modern national discourse; thus he envisages an "imagined community" in Benedict Anderson's sense.

It is possible to find *fatwas*, sermons and talks of similar kinds, where the distinction between Muslim countries and non-Muslims as hostile countries is prevalent. But it is not sufficient to understand the political thoughts of Qaradāwī by referring only to this nationalist discourse. A motive in many of his lectures related to current situations is justice, or rather the demand for justice. The discourse of justice is not limited to a Muslim society, but is part of a more general and basic discussion.⁶⁹

Civic aspects

The principal discussions on how to organise political and civil life, globally and in Muslim societies, seem to be more pluralistic and inclusive than the strongly political discourse on the basis of a distinction between friends and enemies. In *Sharia and Life* on 11 December 2005, Qaradāwī discussed the participation of Muslims in political life. He argued that Muslims are under a theological obligation to take part in political elections actively. He found that Islam recognises precisely the same freedom as in a secular law, regarding the rights of the population in a society. Islam, he said, had blossomed and been strengthened during times of freedom and had become backward in times without freedom. Therefore the Muslim Brothers, for example, wanted freedom and wanted to change the Egyptian constitution to gain freedom for everyone. During the programme, the host raised all the questions which throw suspicion on the motive of Islamists and what they might do if they achieve power. Qaradāwī retorted that they should be the first to defend freedom, as they themselves have experienced what it means to be suppressed.⁷⁰ For the same reason he encouraged the Iraqis to participate in the elections.⁷¹ If they did not, he argued, they would surrender power to the occupiers. It was therefore, in Qaradāwī's view, the duty of the Iraqis to go and vote and decide for themselves, before others did it for them.⁷²

On 13 November 2005 the topic in *Sharia and Life* was “Human Rights in Islam”.⁷³ The programme was broadcast a few days after a suicide attack in Jordan, where many civilians were killed. Without going into the motives behind the attack, Qaraḍāwī used the incident to explain the meaning of human rights, in this case the individual’s right to life. According to Qaraḍāwī, the focus in the West is on one’s rights, and not on one’s duties. In Islam the duty comes first, including the duty to fight for one’s rights: the rulers are obliged to give the population its freedom, and the population is obliged to fight for its rights in relation to the powerful, such as the father, the employer, the rich and so on; if everyone felt committed to practicing these duties and rights, society would be vastly better off.

Whenever Qaraḍāwī raises these important discussions on how to organise society in a modern and global age, he constructs Muslims through global discourses on democracy, human rights and equality. He might challenge the conceptualisation of key nodes of the discourse, but he is not challenging the discourse. Roald sees some of the same tendencies, arguing that Qaraḍāwī uses a theological discourse which includes universal and modern discourses such as a human rights and a feminist discourse.⁷⁴

Religious aspects

On 10 October 2006 Qaraḍāwī discussed the modern practice of *zakāt*. He explained the meaning of *zakāt*, its purpose in Islam and the difference between *zakāt* and any other charity. He defined who has the right to receive and who has the duty to give *zakāt*, detailing how one can settle the amount of *zakāt*, and what to do if one wants to pay *zakāt* not paid in earlier years.⁷⁵ Once in a while *Sharia and Life* discusses such central concepts and dogmatic elements of Islam, but always, as in the programme about *zakāt*, in an attempt to include a practical perspective—for instance, how to relate to *zakāt* in a society where you may pay taxes covering some of the expenditure *zakāt* originally was meant for, or how to settle the amount in relation to an income system with a monthly salary but yearly income taxes, and so on. Qaraḍāwī seems not to be content with just interpreting the dog-

matic in an abstract, timeless and non-contextual way, he insists on making the point relevant for the life of Muslims today, not only in the Muslim countries, but all over the world. The combination of realism, global perspective and *wasatīyya* is in this respect very obvious. But at the same time he demonstrates that there are Islamic answers to all the questions, and thereby constructs Islam as a universal practice. Despite his realistic approach and focus on the context, Qaradāwī highlights universalism in regard to religious practice and traditions. He uses religious practices to construct a Muslim community; hence the religious practice is not only a model *for* the organisation of the community, but it is also a symbol *of* the community.

In a Friday sermon in 1999 Qaradāwī said, “All Muslims behave in the same way. They all eat with their right hand, they mention the name of God before eating and thank God when they finish eating. When they meet a Muslim, they greet him with the greeting *al-salām ‘alaykum*, and then he answers back with *wa ‘alaykum al-salām wa-rahmat Allāh*, regardless of his mother tongue. If you say to him ‘God bless you’, he will answer back in the same way. These things are a common Islamic behaviour.” And he continued: “Regardless of where a Muslim is in the world, he prays in the same and only direction, he has only one behaviour, he has only one way, as long as he loves his religion”.⁷⁶ The religious practice here is not a question of moral conduct, but a symbol of the community. “That we pray is a sign that we are one *umma*”, he says.⁷⁷

Social and community aspects

The question of the practice of the *umma* is a recurring subject of the programmes of Qaradāwī. The issue of social responsibility, and the principles that organise relationships among Muslims, is close to the heart of Qaradāwī. Again he finds the guiding principles in the Sharia, relating the issue to the modern development of social organisation and adding a global perspective.

One session of *Sharia and Life* was devoted to the attitude of Islam towards poverty and hunger.⁷⁸ Qaradāwī pointed to the consequences of poverty and hunger on human beings, and how poverty ruins the

individual and the world. He talked about the optimum way of using the resources of the world, about the causes of poverty and hunger, about how they can be opposed, and finally about the effect of a growing birth rate on poverty and hunger. The wrong distribution of resources on a global level is obvious, and Qaraḍāwī blamed the old colonial powers for still exploiting the poor countries. But by including the discussion on birth control, he was not exclusively blaming factors from outside. And he stated that it is not right just to wait for things to happen, rather one needs to make a difference on one's own. Addressing the issue of birth control, in spite of Muslim unease about the subject, can be seen as an example of Qaraḍāwī's realism. He said that it is not allowed to talk about restriction of birth, but it is allowed to talk about how to organise birth rates. "We live in another society now", Qaraḍāwī said, and continued to point to the consequences of **having too many children.**⁷⁹

To sum up, Qaraḍāwī combines several discourses to construct a Muslim public. One could argue that the approach of *Sharia and Life* actually reflects central components of globalisation as defined by Roland Robertson. Robertson argues that globalisation has to be seen as a simultaneous process of homogenisation and heterogenisation, universalism and particularism, globalism and localism. He identifies four common processes for all societies and cultures in a global world of today: processes of global internationalisation, global socialisation, global individualisation, and global humanisation. Besides being part of international processes of economics and politics, human beings are globally developing common discourses on the principles of how to organise communities in nations, how to conceptualise identity and integrity of the individual human being and, last but not least, how to see all human beings, regardless of religion, as part of humankind.⁸⁰

By using the human rights discourse at the same time as distinguishing the Western and Muslim interpretation of human rights, Qaraḍāwī constructs Muslims as equal members of a global community and of global discourses, while at the same time constructing a Muslim public guided by distinct values. The same thing happens in the religious and social discourse, as Qaraḍāwī constructs a Muslim public as naturally connected through common religious symbols, at the same time as he

is negotiating the religious practices of Muslims in relation to modern changes. And despite the non-negotiable distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim countries, he stands for a respectful and positive interaction with reference to the common humankind which Robertson accentuates. "We are all human beings," Qaraḍāwī says on many occasions. Exactly these apparent contradictions are the ones used by his critics. But in Robertson's perspective, the simultaneous discourse of difference and unity or exclusiveness and inclusiveness is a consequence of globalisation. There is a common global discourse saying that human beings and societies need a distinct and unique identity, which necessarily results in processes of exclusion and inclusion.⁸¹

Conclusion

This article has analysed the way Qaraḍāwī uses the media, and, secondly, how through the media he discursively constructs a Muslim public. I have argued that with the change from Qatar national TV to al-Jazeera, Qaraḍāwī also gained a new role: from primarily being an educator and informer, Qaraḍāwī became an agenda setter, and as such took part in a development of the media in general. He is still reluctant to identify with a newer trend in media, where the mediation of symbols and signs is more important than content and agenda, which might place him as a modernist rather than a post-modernist. His popularity might be explained by his cleverness in combining several discourses in his construction of a Muslim public, discourses that reflect a global development in the understanding of society and identity. What could become a weak spot is the lesser attention to the individual. His Muslim public and use of global discourses are first and foremost dominated by consideration of the community, the group, the family, and so on. The rights of individuals are present in his discourse, but are always secondary. New Muslim missionaries might comply better with the expectations of the individual through the experience-based discourse, taking individual religious experiences into consideration. The discourse of individualisation is a strong global discourse, as Robertson emphasises, and hence the Muslim discourses of new missionaries and even of Salafis do seem to include the individual more than Qaraḍāwī does.⁸²

The last question I will touch upon is how media and media-created discourses construct and frame the discourse of a media-prominent figure like Qaraḍāwī. Through media attention Qaraḍāwī has become more than just an Islamic preacher. He has become a media personality and as such the media have been a space to create and contest the personality of the figure Qaraḍāwī. This becomes obvious when looking at all the Qaraḍāwī-critical fora on the web, or when reading media-spread dialogues framed as attacks and defences of Qaraḍāwī. Qaraḍāwī can be used to prove treason to Islam by anti-Islamic activists, just as much as to argue for moderate interpretation of Islam by his supporters. Authority will be questioned from within and from outside, thus effectively limiting authority to a specific group or virtual community, rather than to society or community at large, as in a more traditional setting. The new and at least less controllable media offer the audience very different positions or identities, and thereby expose continuous processes of inclusion and exclusion. It seems that the new media, with their transnational reach and their individualising potential, open the way for a discussion on Islam that might have very little to do with Qaraḍāwī and very much to do with individual and institutional participants in the mediatised discourse on Islam. Or to put it differently, one could say that Qaraḍāwī has got his own life as a media-personality, partly detached from what he says and believes in. That, truly, makes him a phenomenon of our age.

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NOTES

1. A popular example is the channel *Iqrā'*, which was launched by ART (Arab Radio and Television) on 21 October 1998. The main owner of ART is the Saudi Salih Kamel. The focus of the programme is, according to Salih Kamel, Islamic values. *Iqrā'* was launched with the specific goals 1) to sup-

port the values of the Arab-Islamic community, stressing the Islamic moderate identity, 2) to stress the basics of Qur'an and Sunna (the example of the prophet Muhammad), 3) to protect the Arab-Islamic community against imported non-Islamic cultures, 4) to support the relations between the different Arabic countries, and 5) to produce quality entertainment programmes for the Arab family. Under www.iqraatv.com, on 15 September 2005.

2. *Sharia and Life*, 5 Nov. 2006.
3. The global popularity can be seen through the viewers calling from all over the world during the programme to raise questions or give comments.
4. According to *al-Ḥayāt* of 12 January 2002, al-Jazeera had 35 million viewers in 2002: Galal, 2005, p. 63. In relation to international conflicts it is the most quoted Arab channel in Western media, despite its controversial role as seen by the Americans, due to its critical stance towards the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
5. See for instance Alterman, 1998, Galal, 2002, Eickelman and Anderson, 1999.
6. Qaraḍāwī, 2006, p. 240.
7. Qatar's national TV started broadcasting in 1970, and from 1993 the national channel was broadcast by satellite and thereby gained a potentially much larger audience, Galal, 2005, p. 73.
8. *Sharia and Life*, 5 Nov. 2006.
9. See for instance Abdel-Tawab, 2005. Aḥmad Farraj died on 9 May 2006 at 75 years.
10. Qaraḍāwī, 2006, p. 308.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 240.
13. Ibid., p. 304.
14. Ibid., p. 310.
15. Qaraḍāwī, 2004, p. 328.
16. *Sharia and Life*, 5 Nov. 2006.
17. Ibid.
18. Except for a short period of time in the end of 2003, when Khadīja b. Qanā was the host of the programme, all hosts have been men.
19. Skovgaard-Petersen, 2003.
20. Roald, 2001, pp. 38–9.
21. Eickelman and Anderson, 1999, p. 2.
22. Roald, 2001.
23. About the set design of the Talk Show and its meaning, see Bruun, 1999.
24. Skovgaard-Petersen, 2003.
25. Ajami, 2002.
26. al-Shimmārī, 1999.
27. al-Hail, 2000. Al-Hail writes that in the Gulf States around 40–50% (up to 60% in Saudi Arabia) of the daily programmes on national television are oriented towards Islam. The percentage increases during Ramadan (al-Hail, 2000).

28. Galal, 2002; Sakr, 2001.
29. Al-Jazeera launched an English language channel on Wednesday 15 Nov. 2006.
30. *Sharia and Life*, 5 Nov. 2006.
31. Ibid.
32. Andersen, 2006.
33. Abu-Lughod, 2005.
34. Alterman, 1998.
35. Under www.islamonline.net.
36. Eickelman and Anderson, 1999, p. 2.
37. www.allaahuakbar.net/jamaat-e-islammi/Qaradawism/reading_in_Qaradawism.htm
38. <http://islamicweb.com/beliefs/misguided/Qaradawi.htm>
39. www.londoncommunitycoalition.org/
40. www.londoncommunitycoalition.org/, on 23 Nov. 2006.
41. Qaradāwī, 2006, p. 404.
42. Galal, 2003.
43. Eickelman and Anderson, 1999.
44. See also the description of the goals of IslamOnline.net, which stresses similar objectives (www.islamonline.net).
45. *Sharia and Life*, 10 Sep. 2006.
46. *Sharia and Life*, 19 Sep. 2004.
47. *Sharia and Life*, 21 Dec. 2003.
48. *Sharia and Life*, 17 Sep. 2006.
49. *Sharia and Life*, 10 Nov. 2002.
50. *Sharia and Life*, 10 Jan. 1999.
51. *Sharia and Life*, 24 Oct. 2004.
52. *Sharia and Life*, 15 Feb. 2004.
53. *Sharia and Life*, 13 Nov. 2005.
54. *Sharia and Life*, 4 Sep. 2005.
55. *Sharia and Life*, 11 Oct. 1998.
56. *Sharia and Life*, 22 Dec. 2002.
57. *Sharia and Life*, 6 Feb. 2005.
58. *Sharia and Life*, 6 June 1999.
59. *Sharia and Life*, 23 June 2002.
60. *Sharia and Life*, 28 Nov. 2004.
61. *Sharia and Life*, 20 June 2004.
62. On one of the websites mentioned earlier, one finds on the first page a list of different Muslim movements and personalities which are all defined as infidels. As infidels are mentioned among others the Shi'a Muslims, Sufism, the Aḥmadiyya, Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr and many others, see under: www.allaahuakbar.net/jamaat-e-islammi/index.htm.
63. Qaradāwī, 2000, p. 2.
64. Gaffney, 1994, p. 241.
65. Qaradāwī, 2000, p. 2.
66. Ibid., p. 8.
67. Qaradāwī, 2006, p. 408. For more details about Qaradāwī and Quṭb, see al-Khateeb in this volume.
68. Qaradāwī, 1999, p. 2.
69. Cf. Krämer, 2007.
70. *Sharia and Life*, 11 Dec. 2005.

71. Ibid. Qaraḍāwī stressed the same point in relation to the Iraqi constitution, in *Sharia and Life* 4 September 2005.
72. *Sharia and Life*, 11 Dec. 2005.
73. *Sharia and Life*, 13 Nov. 2005.
74. Roald, 2001, p. 49.
75. *Sharia and Life*, 10 Oct. 2006.
76. Qaraḍāwī, 1999.
77. Ibid.
78. *Sharia and Life*, 23 June 2002.
79. *Sharia and Life*, 17 April 2005.
80. Robertson, 1992, p. 283.
81. Robertson, 1991, pp. 283–4.
82. Olivier Roy argues that current Salafi groups are characterised by radical individualism, cf. Roy, 2004.

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