



By the end of the lesson learners will be able to:

1. **Explain** what is meant by a critical incident.
2. **Recognise** types of critical incidents.
3. **Describe** the police response to critical & major incidents which impact on communities/victims.
4. **Explain** what is meant by 'a major incident'
5. **Explain** the initial response to critical & major incidents
6. **Identify** the meaning of METHANE
7. **Describe** the use of METHANE

First Responder

As a first responder when dealing with an incident (including call handlers & first attending officers), you should continually ask yourself these questions :-

What am I dealing with?



What might it develop into?



What impact might this incident have?



QTS – as a first responder to the scene of any incident what should you be thinking in relation to the impact it may have?

Any incident can escalate into a critical incident whilst other incidents are often clearly significant in their early phases

Anyone can declare a major incident including first officer on the scene.

A major incident may be declared by one or more emergency services, if any of the criteria outlined previously has been satisfied. In certain circumstances, such as flooding, the local authority may declare a major incident.

What is a 'critical incident'?

Any incident where the **effectiveness** of the police response is likely to have a **significant impact** on the **confidence of the victim, their family &/or the community**



QTS – thinking back to the types of incident we go to as police, what do you think a 'critical incident' is?

Critical incident management (CIM) is intended to provide a response which satisfies the needs of the victim, their family and the community, but also provides an effective and proportionate outcome to an incident.

The definition is deliberately broad and should ensure that incidents which are likely to escalate into a CI are not missed. It recognises the fundamental importance of community confidence and trust in the police response to CIs, and applies equally to serious, less serious and internal incidents.

Although high-profile and/or large-scale incidents are more likely to develop into or contain multiple CIs, less serious incidents and internal incidents can, and do, escalate. A CI may appear to come from nowhere, but usually there are warning signs.

A wide range of incidents or operations have the capability to become a critical incident, including anti-social behaviour or hate crime, pre-planned events or internal incidents.

The tradition of policing by consent is most successful when it is based on active and voluntary participation of the community. This participation helps build a safe, just and tolerant society, thereby increasing feelings of security and reducing the fear of crime.

Where crimes occur and they are believed to be the result of police failure to act or discrimination against particular communities, the whole basis of policing with the consent of the community is undermined. In addition, where the failings are because of police incompetence or indifference, trust and confidence within the wider community will be lost. This situation can be illustrated by the Stephen Lawrence case.

The [public inquiry \(Macpherson, W. \(1999\) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry\)](#) following the investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 resulted in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) acknowledging that some incidents, even if managed properly, can have a significant negative impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and the community. The inquiry also found that institutional racism was apparent in several aspects of the investigation. To address this and other shortcomings the MPS developed guidance to help officers deal with similar cases, which they termed 'critical incidents'. They adopted the definition used today.

Guidance has been developed to assist police officers dealing with similar cases,

Discuss with the class the Keywords and draw out their interpretation:

- **Effectiveness** – this is a measure of the professionalism, competence and integrity evident in the police response to an incident.
- **Significant impact** – significant should be interpreted as being particular to each incident but critically relates to the impact on the individual, family or community.
- **Confidence** – this is a reference to the long-term confidence of victims, families and communities in policing.
- **Likely** – all incidents that the police deal with could have a significant impact on confidence, but are they likely to?

Have the class identify what type of incidents have the potential of being a critical incident and further provide examples of cases that fit within the broad definition of critical incident - discuss

Who can declare a 'critical incident'?

Anyone can bring a potential critical incident to the attention of a senior officer, but only a **designated senior officer**. E.g. the duty Inspector can declare an incident as critical



This acts as a **quality assurance** mechanism to avoid inappropriate mechanisms



Declaring a critical incident

Declaring a CI needs to be done when information is sparse, but there is pressure to make the right decision quickly. To do this, declaring officers should ensure that they have access to all sources of information available at the time. This may include:

- decision logs and case files
- briefings
- family liaison officers
- current situation awareness.

Each incident should be assessed on its own merits. Chief officers will want to ensure that CIs are declared only when it is necessary and appropriate to do so, and that the response is proportionate to the scale of the incident.

Declaration is a means of supporting a competent and well-managed police response in line with standard policies and procedures. National and local policies and procedures are intended to ensure that there is a consistent and effective police response to a wide range of incidents. They incorporate key legislation and good practice, where this has been identified.

However, there are times when deviating from recognised policy and

procedure can be the appropriate thing to do. Officers should clearly record their decision for this and the rationale behind it where this occurs.

Where an incident is declared critical, the response should quickly identify the cause.

Management plans should be implemented to ensure or restore the quality of the police response and maintain or rebuild confidence. A prompt and well-coordinated response enables the police to reassure the victim, their family and the community, and restore public confidence in the police service.

Types of Critical Incident



Types of critical incidents

The cases used in the review could suggest that critical incidents are usually high profile, serious or related to homicide. It is important to remember that this is not always the case and some involve incidents such as missing persons or bullying.

Anti-social behaviour

The deaths of Fiona Pilkington and her daughter Francecca in October 2007 and the death of David Askeu in March 2010 demonstrate that critical incidents are still occurring and that they can have their origins in a wide range of incidents. These cases were both linked to repeated and persistent anti-social behaviour (ASB).

Case study – Fiona Pilkington

The Fiona Pilkington case had its origins in harassment and ASB. Fiona and her daughter suffered frequent and sustained local disorder, often directed at their home, over a period of several years. This was reported to the police, but 'incidents were too often dealt with by police officers in isolation and with an unstructured approach' (IPCC, 2011). This and other factors, such as not identifying the family as vulnerable, and not recognising the ASB and harassment as targeted hate crime, caused frustration. Fiona eventually took her own life and that of her disabled daughter, Francecca.

Case study – David Askew

David Askew collapsed and died after an incident in which youths were reportedly causing a nuisance at his home in Hattersley. Greater Manchester Police had been in contact with Mr Askew and his relatives over a number of years in relation to repeated allegations of ASB. An [IPCC investigation](#) was subsequently undertaken and the findings published 21 March 2011.


Hate crime

Other incidents, eg, racism on Channel Four's *Big Brother*, which may not involve violence or threats of violence, can also develop into a critical incident if not managed appropriately.

Case study – *Big Brother*

During the Channel Four television show *Big Brother*, Shilpa Shetty was subjected to racist comments from other housemates. The national and international media profile of this programme meant that Hertfordshire Constabulary were under intense pressure to act quickly and effectively. A failure to react quickly enough exposed the force to criticism, and undermined public confidence that the police were taking such behaviour seriously

Internal Critical Incident



Internal incidents

Police officers and staff who work together may also be recognised as a community in their own right. A team may consider themselves to be a family (but at the same time also contain, or be part of, a number of other separate and distinct communities, eg, special interest groups, federation or union groups).

Certain incidents may have a significant impact on the confidence of these internal communities. These are known as internal critical incidents and can include bullying, discrimination, corruption or other inappropriate behaviour, as well as the death or serious injury of a colleague. Extensive organisational upheavals, such as force restructuring or a review of pay and conditions, may also be considered as critical incidents.

Irrespective of who the victim or the community is, the police response to the critical incident should always be the same (see [managing critical incidents](#)).

Case study examples

The following case studies provide recent examples of internal critical incidents which have had a significant impact both internally and externally. In addition to these high-profile cases, there are many which do not come to public attention, eg, professional conduct or disciplinary matters, but which also have an impact on police officers and staff during their careers.

Case study 1

In July 2009 two police dogs were left in a car during a heat wave and died. This incident not only had an impact on those immediately affected within the organisation, but also on the national police community who, until this point, had a positive reputation for animal welfare issues. It also had an effect on the wider local community who, the previous year, had been involved in an appeal for puppies to be trained for police work.

Case study 2

In January 2011 an undercover officer Mark Kennedy offered to give evidence on behalf of the defence during a case against environmental activists. The publicity this case received not only raised concerns that the officer had 'gone native', but also that the police were carrying out unnecessary undercover operations. The officer had infiltrated the group, had been an active member of it for seven years and been involved in protests such as the G8 protest in Gleneagles in 2005. This case raised a number of questions internally and externally which undermined public and ministerial confidence in police undercover activities, their deployment, purpose and effectiveness. It also had a direct impact on officers and their families, who need to have confidence in the police service to appropriately deploy and manage such officers.

Case study 3

In January 2011 former police officer, Stephen Mitchell, was sentenced to life imprisonment after being found guilty of two counts of rape, three indecent assaults and six counts of abuse of public office. Between 1999 and 2007, the former police officer from Northumbria had committed sexual offences against vulnerable women he had come into contact with during the course of his duties. This case not only undermined the confidence of victims, their families and the local community, but also that of officers and staff in the police recruitment processes (which missed the fact that Mitchell had a history of sexual offending). Officers and staff need to have confidence in the integrity of the colleagues they work with. This case also generated widespread public concern because of the high-profile media response the case received.

Case Study 4

On the evening of 3 March 2021, **Sarah Everard**, a 33-year-old [marketing executive](#), was kidnapped in [South London](#), England, as she was walking home to the [Brixton Hill](#) area from a friend's house near [Clapham Common](#). [Metropolitan Police](#) officer **Wayne Couzens** falsely arrested her under the pretence of having breached [COVID-19](#) regulations and drove her to near [Dover](#) where he [raped](#) and [strangled](#) her, before burning her body and disposing of her remains in a nearby pond.

On 8 June 2021, Couzens pleaded guilty to Everard's kidnap and rape, and admitted responsibility for her death, and on 9 July he pleaded guilty to her murder. He was sentenced by [Lord Justice Fulford](#) to a [whole life order](#) on 30 September 2021.

On 27 October it was reported that Couzens was applying to appeal his sentence. Any decision by the court of appeal whether to hear the case was not expected for months.

The case sparked debate surrounding the role of [police in UK society](#) and [police violence](#).^{[66][67][68]} The police were criticised both for their crackdown on vigils for Everard during the COVID-19 lockdown and for their failure to have prevented the murder – not only did Kent Police not take any action after an alleged incident of [indecent exposure](#) in 2015,^[56] but Couzens had faced at least two other accusations of indecent exposure that had not been properly investigated, he had been involved in an incident in 2002 that was missed in his vetting.^[69] In early October, it was reported that Couzens's colleagues had once been forced to call him back to the station from patrol after a prostitute had showed up at the station demanding money from him.^[70] In mid-October, it was reported that police were investigating claims that Couzens had sexually assaulted a [drag queen](#) at a pub in Deal in 2018.^[71] Radio presenter [Emma B](#) also came forward to say that she had attempted to report Couzens in 2008, after he flashed her in an alley in Greenwich, but that the police had laughed at her.^[72]

Police culture in the UK also came under criticism. An officer who had been a part of the search for Everard was suspended from duties after sharing an inappropriate graphic on social media, five officers were placed under investigation for sharing grossly offensive material with Couzens before he committed the murder, and several officers gave character references supportive of Couzens during the hearings for his sentencing.^{[73][74][75]} Several female officers told the press that they did not feel as if they could report concerning behaviour by male colleagues.

On 4 October 2021, Dick announced that the Met will launch a review of professional standards and internal culture, writing, "I hope to announce a high-profile figure will be appointed to lead a review of our professional standards and internal culture. They will look at our training, leadership, processes, systems and standards of behaviour, and examine cases where officers have let the public down. This person will also work alongside me, challenging my senior team and our leadership on standards, corruption, sexual misconduct and how the Met responds when things go wrong."^[96] On 3 October, Prime Minister [Boris Johnson](#) stated that the government would not undertake an immediate [public inquiry](#) into the case;^[97] Patel later announced that an inquiry would investigate the "systematic failures" in allowing Couzens to continue working as a police officer following the incidents of reported indecent exposure.^[98] The police force announced [Baroness Casey of Blackstock](#) will lead an independent enquiry in which the Metropolitan Police's recruitment, training, and vetting will be examined. A second enquiry will investigate cases where allegations of sexual misconduct or domestic abuse were made against police officers or members of staff, who still work in the force

A Proactive Response



QTS – so how can the police response to an incident prevent it from potentially escalating into a critical one?

A proactive response

Where there is a likelihood of a case escalating into a critical incident, early intervention has been shown to help prevent a significant loss of confidence. For example, the police response to the murder of Damilola Taylor in London in 2000 was identified by the subsequent [MPS review](#) as an example of a proactive and preventive approach. Early recognition of this case as a critical incident led to several senior officers overseeing the investigation from the outset. This timely intervention was commended by the review

More recently, the investigations into the deaths of Mary Fox in Bodmin in November 2009. The death of Mary Fox on Bonfire Night horrified the entire community in the Cornish town of Bodmin.

The fire which claimed her life was deliberately started by three youths who pushed a lit firework through the letterbox of her home in the Berryfield's estate in a bid to frighten her.

Aamir Siddiqi in Cardiff in April 2010. Aamir, who was due to study law at

Cardiff University in September, was killed in front of his parents Sheikh and Parveen Ahmad, 68 and 55, on Sunday afternoon after two masked men burst into the home they shared in Roath Park, Cardiff.

Both provide examples of proactive approaches to critical incident management and community engagement.

Sporting and Pre-planned Events



Pre-planned events

Sporting events or other public order operations are likely to develop one or more critical incidents if the effectiveness of the police response falls short of that required by the event, or does not take account of the needs of the community.

The potential for a pre-planned event, particularly where emotions are high, to develop into disorder or violence cannot be underestimated. If this happens, the quality of the police response will have a significant impact on public confidence.

This was the case when violent disorder broke out during student protests in London's Milbank area in November 2010. The response to events such as this may heighten community concerns and undermine confidence in the ability of the police to prevent disorder.

Factors to consider

The Critical Incident Manager should be included in the planning for such events, particularly where:

- there may be a history of tension between the local community and visitors, eg, the Appleby Horse Fair in Cumbria (see [situation awareness](#))
- there is [intelligence](#) which suggests disorder may be likely, eg, prior to the

English Defence League marches during the summer of 2010.

- The size of an event may also increase the likelihood that disorder, even in small pockets, will occur, eg, at music festivals.

The Phases of Critical Incident Management



An incident which has the likelihood to escalate into a critical incident should be addressed promptly and efficiently. Reassuring and maintaining confidence is fundamental to managing a CI, as is restoring confidence where it has been lost.

A three-phased approach is set out in this module

1 Preparing for critical incidents

This requires chief officers to consider current management structures ensuring, where possible, that:

- staff are trained effectively
- resources are available
- the overall quality of the police response reflects a competent and accountable standard of incident management.


2 Managing critical incidents

This considers how to identify critical incidents early on. It includes processes to ensure incidents are notified to the most appropriate person, and that they are managed effectively.

3 Restoring public confidence

This considers incidents that have had a significant impact on public confidence but were not identified when the incident was live, and how confidence may be rebuilt through community engagement, resolution or a public inquiry.

Management of Critical Incidents



Management of a critical incident (CI) should start with early identification and notification. It is particularly important that small-scale CIs are identified early, as even these can have a long-term impact on community confidence if left unchecked. Processes should be in place to manage issues that may affect the quality of the police response before they can impact on public confidence.

Particular attention should be paid to the needs of the victim, their family and the community.

Media and communication strategies should be based on openness and transparency, keeping in mind the particular needs of the investigation or operation.

Ongoing monitoring of CIs ensures that resources are used effectively and appropriately. Post-incident evaluation realises positive learning outcomes for the future.

The impact of an incident

It is not always possible to predict the impact that an incident might have on an individual, or why. It is likely, however, that the greater the impact an incident has on those closely affected by it, the greater their expectations will be about the quality of the police response. There will also be an assumption

that what is important to those affected will be equally important to the police. The impact that an incident may have on an individual is influenced by:
the circumstances of the incident
the emotional, mental or physical impact of the incident (including the effect of trauma or bereavement)
general feelings of security and/or vulnerability.


Tension and vulnerability

It is possible, however, to gauge general feelings of tension and vulnerability in a community (situation awareness) and to predict criticality factors which are likely to have an effect on how the victim, their family or the community may react to an incident, irrespective of the quality of the police response. These, along with the effective use of [intelligence](#), will help forces to identify incidents which may escalate. Early recognition of a poor police response and a prompt apology to those affected may prevent further escalation.

Restoring public confidence

During a live critical incident (CI), it should be possible to identify the reason why public confidence has been lost and to implement a management plan to recover it. Once an incident has closed the opportunity to do so diminishes. Restoring public confidence involves dealing with the issues raised and being seen to deal with them in a prompt, equitable and transparent manner by those people most closely affected. The police service needs to learn from its mistakes and take positive steps to prevent them from happening again. Failure to respond competently and diplomatically to complaints may compound the situation and cause another CI.

Characteristics of Critical Incidents



Thousands of incidents happen every year. Many are dealt with well but some are not. In the [2010–11 British Crime Survey](#), 70% of victims were 'very' or 'fairly satisfied' with the response they received. Although this is an improvement on previous years, 30% of victims were less than 'fairly satisfied'.

Police response

An incident can escalate to a CI when the police response to crime, disorder or anti-social behaviour (ASB) fails to meet the expectations of the victim, their family and/or the community.

Community impact

A CI may have a significant and potentially long-term impact on community engagement and neighbourhood policing. It may also generate insecurity among vulnerable members of the community and increase fear of crime and disorder. There is an additional risk that by failing to provide an effective response, the police may cause repeat victimisation.

Review of critical incidents

A [review](#) in 2007 looked at a number of cases which, although not labelled as



critical at the time displayed characteristics that mean they would now be declared a CI.

These characteristics can be divided into five broad areas. They usually develop because of several factors which separately may have little or no impact, but have a significant impact when compounded.

Decision making

The findings of that review are still applicable today. Crucially, in all cases, the review found that the central theme to preventing or managing a critical incident is effective decision making in difficult situations (see the [National Decision Model](#)). This includes acknowledging decisions, errors and avoiding decisions.

In the event of a multi-agency response partners will also refer to the [Joint Decision Model](#) (JDM).

Decisions, errors and avoiding decisions

There is a growing body of research which focuses on police decision making during critical incident management. This suggests that cognitive bias (a person's pre-determined and unconscious thought process) affects decision making. It tries to shed light on how people might make mistakes when assessing difficult situations, and how this can lead incident commanders to pursue a course of action that might hinder the successful management of an incident.

In addition, there is fresh understanding about why some commanders might excessively delay or avoid making a decision even when it is clear, both at the time and later, that a decision was needed.

Incorporating learning

Chief officers need to be aware of the findings of this research and ensure that their critical incident commanders at operational, tactical and strategic levels understand the factors involved in effective decision making. An experienced commander who is aware of these factors can be alert to them during the response to an incident (in themselves or in others) and can take steps to limit their negative impact.

Improving accountability

Understanding the factors affecting decision making will help officers to account more clearly for the decisions they make, and to identify what was done to mitigate common errors. This will reduce the fear of excessive accountability, which may prevent officers from making a decision at all.

What is a 'Major Incident'?



A major incident is **any emergency** that requires the implementation of special arrangements by **one or more of the emergency services**



and generally includes the involvement either directly or indirectly of **large numbers of people**



QTS – what do you think a 'major incident' is?

Trainer to expand on the definition (as given in the ACPO guidance), that a major incident may also involve other agencies and organisations including the National Health Service, local authorities, the Environment Agency, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, utility companies, transport companies, private companies and the voluntary sector.

A major incident is an event or situation requiring the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services. Typically, a Major Incident involves one or more of the following:

- Involvement, either directly or indirectly, of large numbers of people;
- The rescue and transportation of a potentially large number of casualties;
- The large scale combined resources of Police, Fire Brigade and Ambulance Service;
- The mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and support services, for example: local authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people; and transport operators actively managing the road and rail networks to support emergency response;

- The handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the news media - usually made to the police.

Major incidents may require

Initial treatment, rescue & transport of a large number of casualties

Handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated from both the public & news media

Large-scale combined resources of two or more of the emergency services

Mobilisation & organization of the emergency services & partner organisations, e.g. local authority to cater for threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people



- Done in conjunction with other emergency services
- Casualty Bureau / HOLMES (Home Office large major enquiry system) – The Casualty Bureau (CB) Incident Room is the central point to receive, collate & assess all information in relation to an incidents. This includes information about people believed to be involved in the incident.
- Hospitals
- Documentation Teams at Survivors Reception Centre (SuRC). This key action of establishing this centre would be completed during the rescue phase. A SuRC may be established near the site of the incident by the Police to provide a secure area for survivors who do not require acute medical treatment. A SuRC can provide first aid and immediate shelter and should also signpost survivors to further support. The LA, supported by other trained volunteers as appropriate, should ensure welfare support and follow-up advice is provided for those at the SuRC. The voluntary sector may support the Local Authority with the provision of welfare on behalf of the police, including first aid. They may also be able to provide practical support to survivors such as refreshments, mobility aids or spare clothing.
- Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC) – This would be established during the relief phase of the major incident. FFRCs are also set up by the

Police and supported by the LA. They are a focal point for relatives and friends of individuals affected by an emergency. The LA, supported by other trained volunteers as appropriate, will need to ensure emotional support is available to those at the centre. Family and friends should be provided with information about their loved one by the most appropriate agency as soon as it is available and in a sensitive way (for example notification that a person is deceased will be through police family liaison officers). The FFRC may also provide information about other support services available.

Examples of Major Incidents



QTS – can you name some major incidents that have happened over the years?

Trainer to boardblast responses

Some History of Major incidents and types of incidents Jesip would be implemented.

1985 Bradford Fire – The Bradford City stadium fire occurred during an English League Third Division match between Bradford City and Lincoln City on Saturday, 11 May 1985, killing 56 and injuring at least 265.

1987 Kings Cross Fire – 31 dead-The fire began at around 7.30pm in a machine room under the escalator on November 18 1987.

This escalator connected the Piccadilly line with the mainland station.

More than 150 firefighters would be called to tackle the blaze.

But when they first arrived, the fire was described as the size of a "cardboard box".

Minutes later a "flashover" jet of flames shot up the escalator into the packed ticket hall filling it with intense heat and smoke

1988 Lockerbie Disaster – 280 dead (PANAM flight 103 Killed - 243 passengers, 16 crew and 11 on the ground) **1988: Jumbo jet crashes onto Lockerbie**

A Pan Am jumbo jet with 258 passengers on board has crashed on to the town of Lockerbie near the Scottish borders. Initial reports indicate it crashed into a petrol station in the centre of the town, between Carlisle and Dumfries, and burst into a 300-foot fireball.

Hundreds are feared dead as airline officials said flight 103 was about two-thirds full with 255 adults and three children on board

1996 Dunblane – 16 Dead-The Dunblane school massacre took place at [Dunblane Primary School](#) near [Stirling](#), [Stirlingshire](#), Scotland, on 13 March 1996, when Thomas Hamilton shot 16 children and one teacher dead before killing himself. It remains the deadliest [mass shooting](#) in British history.

2004 Morecombe Bay Cocklers – 23 dead -The Morecambe Bay cockling disaster (Chinese: 拾貝慘案 Shí bèi cǎn'àn, "cockle-picking tragedy") occurred on the evening of 5 February **2004** at Morecambe Bay in North West England, when at least 21 Chinese illegal immigrant labourers were drowned by an incoming tide after picking cockles off the Lancashire/Cumbrian coast.

2005 & 2017



2005 7/7 London bombings – 53 dead

London Bridge attack - On 3 June 2017, a terrorist [vehicle-ramming](#) and [stabbing](#) took place in [London](#). A van was deliberately driven into pedestrians on [London Bridge](#), and then crashed on the south bank of the [River Thames](#). Its three occupants then ran to the nearby [Borough Market](#) area and began stabbing people in and around restaurants and pubs.^[8] They were shot dead by [City of London Police](#) officers, and were found to be wearing fake [explosive vests](#).^[9] Eight people were killed and 48 were injured, including members of the public and four unarmed police officers who attempted to stop the assailants.

2011 London Riots – 5 dead




The **2011 England riots**, more widely known as the **London Riots**, were a series of [riots](#) between 6 and 11 August 2011. Thousands of people rioted in cities and towns across [England](#), which saw [looting](#), [arson](#), as well as mass deployment of police and the deaths of five people.

The protests started in [Tottenham Hale](#), [London](#), following the [death of Mark Duggan](#), a local man who was shot dead by police on 4 August.^[10] Several violent clashes with police followed Duggan's death, along with the destruction of police vehicles, a [double-decker bus](#) and many homes and businesses, which rapidly gained the attention of the media. Overnight, looting took place in [Tottenham Hale](#) retail park and in nearby [Wood Green](#). The following days saw similar scenes in other parts of London, with the worst rioting taking place in [Hackney](#), [Brixton](#), [Walthamstow](#), [Peckham](#), [Enfield](#), [Battersea](#), [Croydon](#), [Ealing](#), [Barking](#), [Woolwich](#), [Lewisham](#) and [East Ham](#).

From August 8 to 11, other towns and cities in England (including [Birmingham](#), [Bristol](#), [Coventry](#), [Derby](#), [Leicester](#), [Liverpool](#), [Manchester](#), [Nottingham](#), [West Bromwich](#), and [Wolverhampton](#)) saw what was described by the media as "copycat violence", with [social media](#) playing a role. By 10 August, more than 3,003 arrests had been made across England, with more than 1,984 people issued with criminal charges for various offences related to the riots. Initially, courts sat for extended hours. There were a total of 3,443 crimes across London that were

linked to the disorder. Along with the five deaths, at least 16 others were injured as a direct result of related violent acts. An estimated £200 million worth of property damage was incurred, and local economic activity – which in many cases was already struggling due to [the recession](#) – was significantly compromised. The riots generated significant debate among political, social, and academic figures about their causes and context. Attributions for the rioters' behaviour included social factors such as racial tension, class tension, economic decline, and the unemployment that decline had brought

Manchester Arena Bombing 2017



On 22 May 2017, an Islamist extremist suicide bomber detonated a shrapnel-laden homemade bomb as people were leaving the Manchester Arena following a concert by US singer Ariana Grande.

Twenty-three people died, including the attacker, and 139 were wounded, more than half of them children. Several hundred more suffered psychological trauma. The bomber was Salman Ramadan Abedi, a 22-year-old local man of Libyan ancestry. After initial suspicions of a terrorist network, police later said they believed Abedi had largely acted alone but that others had been aware of his plans. In March 2020, the bomber's brother, Hashem Abedi, was found guilty of 22 counts of murder in relation to the attack.

The incident was the deadliest terrorist attack and the first suicide bombing in the United Kingdom since the 7 July 2005 London bombings.

Casualties

The explosion killed the attacker and 22 concert-goers and parents who were in the entrance waiting to pick up their children following the show; 119 people were initially reported as injured. This number was revised by police to 250 on 22 June, with the addition of severe psychological trauma and minor injuries. In May 2018,

the number of injured was revised to 800. The dead included ten people aged under 20; the youngest victim was an eight-year-old girl and the oldest was a 51-year-old woman. Of the 22 victims, twenty were Britons and two were British-based Polish nationals.

North West Ambulance Service reported that 60 of its ambulances attended the scene, carried 59 people to local hospitals, and treated walking wounded on site. Of those hospitalised, 12 were children under the age of 16. In total, 112 people were hospitalized for their injuries, and 27 were treated for injuries that did not require hospitalisation. Out of this total of 139, 79 were children.[34]

Examples of Major Incidents



2011 Chevron Oil Refinery explosion, 4 dead



February 2020, RCT floods, 0 dead



2011 Chevron Refinery Explosion - The HSE's report details how on June 2, 2011, an atmospheric storage tank within the amine regeneration unit at the Chevron Pembroke Refinery exploded. The force of the explosion ejected the five-tonne steel tank roof over 55 metres through the air. After narrowly missing a multi-fuel pipe track, the roof crashed onto a pressurised storage sphere containing extremely flammable butane. Good fortune prevented the airborne roof from puncturing the butane storage vessel, which would have led to an uncontrolled release of liquified petroleum gas (LPG).

The explosion was caused by the unintended ignition of a flammable atmosphere within the tank (17T302), during what should have been a routine cleaning operation conducted in preparation for maintenance. The investigation revealed a longstanding and widespread failure to understand and control risks posed by the flammable atmosphere inside the tank. The explosion and the resulting fatalities were therefore avoidable. The incident was not merely the consequence of errors by individual employees, but because of the failure of safety management systems to ensure a safe place and safe systems of work.

Rhondda Cynon Taff Floods - The rainfall across parts of Wales in February 2020 as a

result of Storms Ciara, Dennis and Jorge was remarkable, both in terms of scale and severity.

Record breaking rainfall and river flows across the UK over the space of four weeks would see February 2020 written into the record books as the wettest February on record. It was also the fifth wettest month and the fifth wettest winter on record for the UK as a whole since records began in 1862

Each period of heavy rain was delivered in quick succession, resulting in the flooding of **3,130** properties in Wales and some of the most significant flooding the nation has seen since the [floods of December 1979](#).

Other examples

1997 – Train derailment near Taunton. Carrying 700 tonnes of highly flammable fluids from the Gulf Refinery in Milford Haven. No injuries, but tanks had split and a subsequent fire burned for 24 hours needing fire-fighters from 5 counties to tackle and deal. Cause of derailment was due to axle failure; the train had travelled approx. 60miles through our force area!

16/8/2013 – Collision between crane and road petrol tanker, Merlins Bridge Haverfordwest. No injuries but 7000litres diesel escaped. Fortunately the front compartment of the tanker containing more flammable unleaded petrol remained intact. Multi-organisation and agency incident and because of the potential this incident declared a MI

Charter for Families Bereaved Through Public Tragedy

'Policing has profoundly failed those bereaved by the Hillsborough disaster over many years and we are sorry that the service got it so wrong. Police failures were the main cause of the tragedy and have continued to blight the lives of family members ever since.

Hillsborough is a touchstone for long-lasting change in policing and there is a commitment from the leadership in policing to create a modern, dynamic police service which acts without fear or favour, and with integrity and empathy. The changes include all police forces in England and Wales signing up to a charter agreeing to acknowledge when mistakes have been made and not seek to defend the indefensible.'

CC Andy Marsh, College of Policing CEO



Prifysgol Cymru
Y Drindod Dewi Sant
University of Wales
Trinity Saint David

Hillsborough disaster – background information

The **Hillsborough disaster** was a fatal human crush during a football match at Hillsborough Stadium in Sheffield, South Yorkshire, England, on 15 April 1989. It occurred during an FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest in the two standing-only central pens in the Leppings Lane stand allocated to Liverpool supporters. Shortly before kick-off, in an attempt to ease overcrowding outside the entrance turnstiles, the police match commander, David Duckenfield, ordered exit gate C to be opened, leading to an influx of supporters entering the pens. This resulted in overcrowding of those pens and the crush. With 97 deaths and 766 injuries, it has the highest death toll in British sporting history. Ninety-four people died on the day; another person died in hospital days later, and another victim died in 1993 (after suffering severe and irreversible brain damage on the day)

In the following days and weeks, South Yorkshire Police (SYP) fed the press false stories suggesting that football hooliganism and drunkenness by Liverpool supporters had caused the disaster. Blaming Liverpool fans persisted even after the Taylor Report of 1990, which found that the main cause was a failure of crowd control by SYP.

The first coroner's inquests into the Hillsborough disaster, completed in 1991, concluded with verdicts of “accidental death” in respect of all the deceased. Families disputed the findings, and fought to have the case re-opened

The second coroner's inquests were held from 1 April 2014 to 26 April 2016. They ruled that the supporters were unlawfully killed owing to grossly negligent failures by police and ambulance services to fulfil their duty of care. The inquests also found that the design of the stadium contributed to the crush, and that supporters were not to blame for the dangerous conditions. Public anger over the actions of their force during the second inquests led to the suspension of the SYP chief constable, David Crompton, following the verdict. In June 2017, six people were charged with offences including manslaughter by gross negligence, misconduct in public office and perverting the course of justice for their actions during and after the disaster.

The police service in England and Wales has committed to ensure families bereaved through public tragedy are treated with compassion, sensitivity and respect and that forces are open to public scrutiny

As a result.....

The COP have signed the ‘[Charter for families bereaved through public tragedy](#)’ – a key recommendation of the 2017 review of the Hillsborough families’ experiences by The Right Reverend James Jones.


The police service in England and Wales has committed to ensure families bereaved through public tragedy are treated with compassion, sensitivity and respect and that forces are open to public scrutiny.

The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) has also signed the charter on behalf of all 43 police forces in England and Wales and has written to all police forces and chief constables to ensure that the principles set out in the charter are being implemented locally.

By signing the charter, policing is making a public commitment to learn the lessons of the Hillsborough disaster and its aftermath. This includes ensuring the perspective of bereaved families is not lost during the response of public organisations to major incidents and that families are treated with care and compassion at all times.

Policing is also making a pledge to improve the way the service responds to disasters by being more open and transparent and by placing public interest above all other priorities.

The Initial Responder's Role



QTS – what do you think the role and responsibilities of the initial responder are?

The initial responder role is to:

- Take interim charge of scene until relieved by supervisor
- Identify safe and suitable RV points
- Not to get personally involved in any rescue work
- Establish forward command post

At a major incident officers will be faced with a lot of challenges; you could have lots of people seriously injured, have lots of people dying, emergency services attending, chaos, what is expected though is that the first responders stand still and make an assessment and get that information back to the control room.


The actions of a first police officer on scene are crucial to the proper and managed outcome of the incident and relying on instinct is not sufficient in

such situations.

A police officer needs to follow proper procedures, and to think and act rationally and calmly in order to:

Assess the situation and work out what is going on, communicate as quickly as possible and prioritise actions.

Cordons



A Major Incident should be treated as a crime scene until proven otherwise. It is probable that any officer might be the initial investigator of a major crime, although such crimes will be subject of further investigation.

The objectives of any police officer at the scene of major crimes are to:

- Preserve Life
- Deal with victim(s) and locate other victims (and witnesses)
- Arrest the offender
- Preserve the crime scene

Trainer to discuss the importance of:

Responding to the needs of victims/witnesses and at CI/MI how this might be achieved

Scene preservation and how this is achieved

Scene preservation/protection must be initiated and maintained:

- For safety - of those working on the scene and also to prevent anyone from approaching which may be a danger to them
- To protect evidence - Protection from removal of items which may have souvenir value to bystanders but could be vital to investigation. Also

looting.

- To control access/egress - Keep a log of who enters and leaves scene (refer to Brighton bomb & detonator found embedded in boot of a fire officer)
- To keep out sightseers/press - Could be huge numbers of people arriving, relatives and press included; there will be a point of contact set up where these will be referred to

Cordons

The police are responsible for designating and maintaining any cordons required. In respect of an inner cordon during the Rescue Phase, this responsibility must be undertaken in conjunction with the Fire and Rescue Service. The implementation of traffic management arrangements in response to an emergency or major incident also lies with the police.

- Inner – provides immediate security to incident
- Outer – all access routes should be covered by officers
- Extent of cordons varies according to incident (and personnel available) – guidelines in place for explosive devices.
- Tape, signing, barriers may be used to reinforce cordons
- Inform public when cordons have been changed or removed

Initial Response to a CBRN incident (CRESS)

C	R	E	S	S
• Consciousness	• Respiration	• Eyes	• Secretions	• Skin



CRESS is simple & systematic assessment tool based on 5 parameters to assess an individual in order to identify an associated Toxidrome. Toxic syndrome or toxidrome is a constellation of toxic effects comprising a set of clinical fingerprints that is caused by a dangerous level of toxins in the body created by chemical agents or biological toxins. They are also useful in identifying other life threatening conditions.

Put in simple terms, it enables the user to have a good look at an individual and assess if there is anything odd going on.

By recognising certain unusual signs and symptoms you will be able to inform your response to the situation and manage it more effectively.

The elements of the CRESS mnemonic are:

Consciousness – What is their level of consciousness? Do they open their eyes when spoken to or when touched?
Are they drowsy? On edge? Completely unresponsive? Fitting? Confused? Behaving strangely?

Respiration – What is their respiratory rate? How many times a minute are they breathing? Are they struggling to breathe or having to exert themselves to breathe?

Over 12 years incl. adults - 12 -20 per minute

5-12 years – 20 - 25 times per minute

2-5 years – 25- 30 times per minute

1-2 years – 25 – 35 times per minute

<1 year – 30-40 times per minute

Anyone displaying rates above or below these ranges is considered abnormal. However, please remember that a number of external factors can affect respiratory rate such as anxiety, exertion or environmental factors.

Eyes – Examination of Pupils and reaction

You will obviously not be compromising your safety to get close enough to certain subjects to assess their pupillary response. However, You may notice constricted pinpoint pupils or dilated pupils from a reasonable distance away.

Secretions – Are there increased or decreased secretions?

Secretions may be in the form of saliva, tears, sweat, bile or mucus.


Conversely the subject may have decreased secretions such as a dry mouth or dry skin.

Involuntary urination/ defecation?

Skin – Examination of colour and other signs such as sweating.

Does the subject(s) skin appear a different colour from normal, it may be pink, blue, flushed, dry or pale.

Other – Have you noticed anything else unusual about the subject? Was the onset of symptoms sudden or delayed? Are they vomiting? Is there more than one person suffering symptoms



QTS - Why do you think we use CRESS as a tool?

This slide is intended to emphasise the benefits of being aware of the CRESS mnemonic.

Safety – Identifying a potential contamination event or the presence of harmful agents early will promote safety of the responding officers, subjects, additional responders, members of the public and health care professionals. It is vitally important that frontline responders feel comfortable in raising concerns through the appropriate channels.

Simple to use – When responders become familiar with using this tool it will become second nature.


Early recognition – the earlier a potential contamination event is recognised the sooner that mitigation measures can be implemented. This will be potentially life-saving and will reduce the impact of the incident in line with generic strategic objectives.

Scene Assessment – Utilising the tool will inform the assessment of the scene. For example, How many people does the symptomology appear in?

Shared situational awareness – Passing accurate information to other responding agencies through the appropriate channels will lead to an improved situational awareness and therefore a more efficient and timely response, this is in line with JESIP.

Generic Tool – This tool was developed by the National Ambulance Resilience Unit (NARU) and will be commonly used across UK Ambulance Trusts. The National CBRN Centre will be utilising this tool to assist in scene assessment at all levels of response and Command at a multi-agency level. CRESS can be used by any staff member from any agency to help formulate the joint understanding of risk, therefore, as this tool becomes embedded it will be commonly understood and recognised.

More specific – Following the CRESS tool will help in focussing on the potential identifiers of a contamination incident. This will also assist in the information passing process.



Trainer to write METHANE on the board.

QTS – what does each letter stand for?

The role of the police at MI:

Trainer could list keywords on flip chart and expand, or explain in plenary
The first priority for the Police is to work with the other emergency services to save life and also to prevent (further) loss of life.
Then other considerations need to come into effect; the Police need to look at establishing cordons and thinking about the health and safety of not only themselves but other responders as well as the public.

As well, the Police need to think about the fact that the scene could actually be a scene of crime. There could well be a major investigation as a result of this incident, so we need to make sure that the scene is preserved and evidence is preserved.

Another key consideration is that the Police usually co-ordinate the work of all the emergency services and other responding agencies at the scene and nearby.

The primary areas of police responsibility at a major incident are:

- The saving of life together with the other emergency services;
- The co-ordination of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations acting in support at the scene of the incident;
- To secure, protect and preserve the scene and to control sightseers and traffic through the use of cordons;
- The investigation of the incident and obtaining and securing of evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable;
- The collection and distribution of casualty information;
- The identification of the dead on behalf of Her Majesty's (HM) Coroner;
- The prevention of crime;
- Family liaison; and
- Short-term measures to restore normality after all necessary actions have been taken

JESIP



JESIP (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles)

Improving the way the Police, Fire & Rescue and Ambulance services work together when responding to major multi-agency incidents.



The incident may be part of a wider multi-agency response and have far reaching consequences, in which case partners will follow the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles. Further information can be found at **JESIP**

Initially JESIP (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles) was a two year programme which ran from 2012-2014. It was primarily about improving the way the Police, Fire & Rescue and Ambulance services work together when responding to major multi-agency incidents.

What JESIP produced was much needed practical guidance to help improve multi-agency response. The *Joint Doctrine: the interoperability framework* sets out a standard approach to multi-agency working, along with training and awareness products for organisations to train their staff.

Whilst the initial focus was on improving the response to major incidents, JESIP is scalable. The five joint working principles and models can be applied to **any type** of multi-agency incident and in fact could be utilised in a multitude of environments where organisations need to work together more effectively.

The programme initiated the largest and most successful joint training initiative across the emergency services. Now JESIP is about all services integrating the JESIP ways of working and models into all policies, procedures until staff use JESIP as a matter of course.

5 Principles of JESIP

1. Co-locate

Co-locate with commanders as soon as practicably possible at a single, safe and easily identified location near to the scene.

2. Communicate

Communicate clearly using plain English

3. Co-ordinate

Co-ordinate by agreeing the lead service. Identify priorities, resources and capabilities for an effective response, including the timing of further meetings

4. Jointly understand risk

Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards to agree potential control measures

5. Shared Situational Awareness

Shared Situational Awareness established by using METHANE and the Joint Decision Model

If the principles are followed then the result should be a jointly agreed working strategy where all parties understand what is going to happen when and by who, this strategy should include:

What are the aims and objectives to be achieved?

Who by – police, fire, ambulance and partner organisations?

When – timescales, deadlines and milestones

Where – what locations?

Why – what is the rationale? Is this consistent with the overall strategic aims and objectives?

How are these tasks going to be achieved?

Why do we need JESIP?

The UK's emergency services are admired and respected all around the world for the excellent service they provide. They each provide a different service. They work to keep our country safe and secure as well protecting the public.

However, in our ever changing world they have to adapt to the demands placed upon them. This means they are working together, responding to emergencies on an ever increasing basis.

Drivers for Change

The findings from a number of reviews of major national emergencies and disasters made clear that the emergency services carry out their individual

roles efficiently and professionally.

However, there were some common themes relating to joint working where improvement was needed - JESIP was established to address these issues:

Challenges with initial command, control and coordination activities on arrival at scene (sometimes called the "Golden Hour")

A requirement for common joint operational and command procedures

Role of others, especially specialist resources and the reasons for their deployment, not well understood between services

Challenges in the identification of those in charge at the scene leading to delays in planning response activity

Misunderstandings when sharing incident information and differing risk thresholds not understood

We need to ensure that our initial multi-agency response to all incidents is more organised, structured and practiced. The emergency services need to ensure they constantly update their working practices and learn from events of the past... together... and not just in isolation. JESIP aims to help them do that.

Major Incident Public Portal MIPP & Investigative Triage Form (ITF)

Welcome to the UK Police Major Incident Public Reporting Site.
If life is in danger or a crime is in progress call 999.



How can you help?

If you have any information that may assist the Police in one of these investigations please click on the relevant photograph for further information and instructions.



QTS – Has anyone ever heard of the Major Incident Public Portal?

The Major Incident Public Portal (MIPP) is a website that will give the public access to various forms in the event of a terror attack, major disaster or a high profile incident such as a murder.

It allows people to send information, reports, images and video footage directly to the police casualty bureau and major incident teams.

The portal is a quick and easy way for the public to submit information that could be vital in a major incident.

It can also be used if there's an incident that involves mass casualties and you want to report a person missing who you believe is involved.


This website can be used by the public to directly report information. It can also be used by police and other partner agencies to report people involved using the Investigative Triage Form (ITF), which is password-protected and predefined by the Casualty Bureau Manager.

A Casualty Bureau Incident Room is likely to be activated when there is a significant demand from the public for information that exceeds normal force call-handling capabilities. It may also be activated by the SIM to receive a significant volume of information from the public (using the ITF).

All police regions are required to have a CB Incident Room capability. All police forces can provide additional CB call-handling resources to support any other CB Incident Room upon a mutual aid request. All information received via the CB Incident Room telephone numbers and online via MIPP is recorded into a secure incident cloud-based account. This ensures that all information is collated in the same place.

When the CB Incident Room is activated for a mass fatality incident, it manages all information in relation to the recovery, reconciliation, identification and repatriation of victims, as well as criminal investigation.

Command Structure



There is a standard command sequence in use in all police forces across the UK. The levels refer to the function of command level and not necessarily to the rank of the officers concerned.


Gold – strategic command usually at police headquarters or a designated police command centre

Silver – Tactical police command at a forward point closer to the scene of the immediate crisis

Bronze – Operational local response at the crisis point itself

This is the same command structure when dealing with large scale public order incidents.

Four Stages to a Major Incident



Most major incidents can be considered to have four stages:

- The initial response :-

Will see a scalable response from all or any of the emergency responder agencies dependent on the incident and the response initially required. Any member of an emergency responder agency can declare a major incident. In practice, a joint decision is often made between the initial attending emergency services. All or any of the emergency services and other responder agencies will respond depending on the needs of the incident. This may for example include the local authority, transport operators, utility companies.

- The consolidation phase:-

The consolidation phase will normally involve all of the emergency services in attendance as they progress the initial response phase. Other responder agencies may also be invited to the operational or tactical coordination meetings to advise or respond based on their specific expertise and response capabilities (e.g. local authority structural engineers in the event of damaged buildings). Transition from initial response phase with activation of additional agencies as required by the needs



of the incident. Additional communications with the control room or relevant incident coordination functions of all relevant emergency responder agencies.

- The recovery phase :-


Recovery is an integral part of the emergency management process. It is defined in HM Government 'Emergency Response and Recovery' guidance as: 'The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency'. The recovery process usually begins during the response phase, which can be defined as the actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency. As the incident progresses towards the recovery phase, the emergency services will need to undertake a formal handover to the local authority in order to facilitate the local authority's lead role in the recovery process. Transition of lead responder agency, normally from the police service to the local authority.

- The restoration of normality :-

A continuation of the initial recovery phase into longer-term restoration activity with continued communications between all relevant responder agencies.

Trainer to give out generic process map handout

The Importance of Effective De-briefing



The sudden discovery of the scene of a serious crime can be traumatic. Even experienced officers have, on occasions forgotten the simplest rules when taken off-balance by the stress of totally unforeseen violence, calamity or unpleasant & unnerving scenes



The purpose of debriefing is to identify good practice and areas for improvement, which could include organisational learning. The gold, silver or bronze commander should establish, at an early stage, the debriefing arrangements required and identify who should be responsible for compiling and assessing any debriefing material generated.

Pressure on operational staff can lead to debriefing being overlooked. This should not be allowed to happen as effective debriefing will ultimately minimise bureaucracy, streamline current procedures and reduce demands on operational staff.

Staff debriefing is likely to be one of the most productive areas for capturing information. A debriefing must be tailored to the needs of the team in question, but the structure, purpose and focus of the debriefing should be consistent. Although a debriefing should ideally occur at the end of a shift, this may not always be possible. A hot debrief should always be conducted at the end of a police operation.

Debriefings need to be structured and must follow a set agenda. They should be a standard phase of every operation, and the information obtained should be used to benefit future operations.



