

draft practices may be helpful exercises. Each draft exercise can be practiced on a single topic, on different topics, or on topics that are encountered in reading the phenomenological literature and other human science or fictional literary texts. These draft exercises are not a linear practice; rather, they should be seen as an increasingly layered set of practices of reflective and writerly abilities.

The following are some of the draft writing exercises that I have practiced with students in my courses and workshops, and that may be helpful in conducting a phenomenological study. Many research papers (see, for example, van Manen, 2001) and dissertations have grown from these writing exercises. Each form of writing practice involves a kind of questioning and a guiding concern. For example, the first draft involves heuristic writing, and it focuses on the nature of the phenomenological question that aims to instill in the reader a sense of wonder about the question. Even though the following exercises are seven distinguishable drafts, this does not mean that there are seven consecutive stages or steps. First, these are not steps, and, second, it is possible to distinguish different or additional writing exercises. Rather the intent of these exercises is that each draft keeps circulating in increasingly complex layers and directions. Every draft engages the style and intent of the other drafts. This is not so much a hermeneutic circle as it is a kind of constant circulating in all relevant directions that a phenomenological question may entice the author to extend him- or herself. Still, it speaks for itself that it may be helpful to start a phenomenological research-writing project with an attempt to draft a wondering set of paragraphs.

- Heuristic writing: what question? (instilling wonder)
- Experiential writing: what experience? (pushing off theory)
- Thematic writing: what aspects of meaning? (phenomenological thematizing)
- Insight cultivating writing: what scholarly thoughts and texts? (insighting)
- Vocative writing: what vocative words, phrases, examples? (voking)
- Interpretive writing: what inceptual meanings? (deeper sensibilities)

Heuristic Draft Writing

Heuristic draft writing is challenging because it is difficult to evoke wonder in the reader through the writing of a single or a few small paragraphs. Even the researcher who is doing the writing may not yet have internalized the true enigmatic and depthful nature of the phenomenological question that he or she is pursuing. As well, the irony is that a common topic may seem very ordinary and shallow, and yet almost any topic hides a depthful question that can make us truly wonder about the meaning of human existence. Each subsequent draft must keep the questioning wonder of the first draft alive. The wondering tone of heuristic questioning lingers and echoes throughout an increasingly full-fledged phenomenological text.

Experiential Draft Writing

Experiential draft writing means being attentive to inserting lived experience material into the text. Initially it may be helpful to focus on preliminary anecdotes, examples, fragments, images, and stories that seem to be the concrete embodiments of the phenomenon being investigated. Gradually this experiential material should be expanded and edited for its relevance. The experiential examples need to be recognizable and compelling.

Thematic Draft Writing

Thematic draft writing goes hand in hand with experiential writing. Themes are succinct phrases that are discerned in the activity of theme analysis of the concrete or experiential material. These phrases correspond to the variant and invariant themes of the reduction. Theme statements are generally converted into narrative passages. Increasingly, the writing needs to focus on essential and possibly original thematic insights of the reduction. Invariant and distinct eidetic aspects of meaning need to be rationally and sensitively expanded in the writing process. Eidetic phrases that appear to get at the heart or essence of the phenomenon may function as headings, side headings, and leading lines.

Insight Cultivating Draft Writing

Insight cultivating draft writing is enabled by reflections on sources that draw on other scholarly phenomenological and related texts. Cultivating insights may be gleaned by reading relevant literature metaphorically, as it were. For example, it is likely that Dreyfus and Dreyfus drew on Kohlberg's stages of moral development (from rule bound to principled reasoning) to develop their phenomenology of skill development from novice (who is rule guided) to expert (who uses intuition). Marion likely drew on the interpretation of the Orpheus gaze by Blanchot, for the phenomenology of writing, to develop his own interpretation of the Orphean myth for the phenomenology of the invisible in painting.

Vocative Draft Writing

Vocative draft writing consists of the tactful attentiveness to the vocative nature of language. Vocativity is part of the entire phenomenological reflective writing process. Poetic elements of the writing process may help to bring to language nonintentional meanings that are difficult to capture in the more conceptual and rational discourses of the text. Phenomenologically powerful anecdotes, examples, fragments, selective material from literature, art, and mythology may be tactfully and eloquently integrated and sifted into the text. Vocative writing strives for the text to be addressive and speak to our whole embodied being.

Inceptual Draft Writing

Inceptual draft writing articulates deeper, perhaps speculative, and sometimes surprising insights about the human condition and the meaning of life. For example, Sartre's phenomenology of responsibility and freedom led him to the hermeneutic conclusion that all humans are "condemned to freedom." In his *Psychology of the Sickbed*, van den Berg raises the question of who is more ill: the person who is in bed or the so-called healthy person. It is worth quoting this paragraph from his book:

Who misses more of life, the healthy person, when he throws himself into the avalanche of ever more respect, with an ever more wonderful house, an ever more expensive car and ever further reaching holiday trips, and consequently a frantic drive for money; when he throws himself into this avalanche which bears the dazzling name of "career"? Or the sick person who makes her room, her window sill, her window and her view a world full of significant and breathtaking events? Who—now in a completely different sense—is more ill? The illness of the body can be the condition for a soundness of mind which the healthy person misses easily. An existence devoid of sickness lacks the stimulus to live, just as an existence devoid of mental problems degenerates into complete insignificance. Probably there is no better guarantee for a really unhealthy life than perfect health. (van den Berg, 1966, p. 73)

In my own experience, of assisting graduate students in the practice of phenomenological writing, these various components of draft writing may require a certain order: for example, it is helpful to first attempt a short draft of a few paragraphs that seduce the reader to develop a wondering orientation toward the phenomenon that is the topic of the phenomenological study. But, this sense of wonder needs to be sustained throughout the phenomenological text that emerges in the research process of the study. Again draft writing is not a mechanical process—it requires a creative sense of logic and a developing textual tact.

Excursion: Draft Writing: What Is It Like for Students to Experience Their Name?

1. In this first paragraph, the draft attempts to seduce the reader into a sense of wonder about student name experiences:

In everyday life, in schools and classrooms, teachers call on students; address students by their names; pronounce, mispronounce, or confuse their names; and sometimes forget student names altogether. As adults we may have had many experiences with naming, misnaming, or name forgetting. We may have heard the story of how we came to be named as we are. The name was chosen before we were born, or parents waited until they saw us and then decided on a name. Or, the girls in the family take the mother's name and the boys take the father's name, or perhaps we didn't receive a permanent name until a ritual

The first few times that I meet my classes I remind myself to look over the class list to make sure I know all the names of the students. As I quickly rehearse the names I try to connect these names with the persons to whom these names belong. Soon some of these students I will know so well that I no longer have to remember them. I will simply know them. I will have trouble remembering the names of other students for quite some time.

For example, in my grade nine class I have a boy who looks very much like his older brother who was in my class last year. During the first few weeks of school I kept confusing and calling Tim by his brother's name Don. One day, when this happened again, I could see that Tim was clearly annoyed even though he did not say anything. So, spontaneously I made a public apology to him. Of course, I felt embarrassed having to do this and my confession was somewhat like self-punishment. But I knew it important to let Tim know that he mattered to me. I told him how sorry I was that I kept confusing his brother's name and how I appreciated him for who he was. (JA, grade 9 teacher)

At this point we should note that these student naming experiences are told by the teacher. But how do students themselves describe these experiences? If we were to ask individual students questions regarding their name experiences, they may say things such as, "It is important that the teacher knows who you are." "The science teacher still did not know my name after three months!" "I don't like it when a teacher calls me by my last name." Teacher comments such as the above suggest that name experiences are important to students and that they need to tap into these experiences if only we give them the opportunity to do so.

But it is important to distinguish between what teachers recall about their name experiences and how students describe their name experiences. A phenomenological inquiry requires experiential accounts as data for reflection. To this end, students were prompted to describe their experiential moments themselves:

- Can you recall a name experience? Think of a specific time when a teacher called you by your name or by an incorrect name—or possibly when a teacher seemed to avoid calling you by any name.
- Tell what happened without explaining or giving opinions about it. Just describe the experience as you lived through it.
- Recall what was said by the teacher, by you, and by others.
- How did the teacher act, talk, and use gestures? What was the tone or feeling of the interaction? What did you say, think, feel, do?
- (This event may have happened recently or several years ago. Do not use real names of teachers or students.)

From the researcher's point of view, students writing their experiences as they lived through them gives the researcher access to the subjectivity of classroom life. Lived experience descriptions (such as the anecdotes in this text) are written experiences that the researcher borrows in order to examine what meanings may inhere in them with respect to a particular phenomenon such as the name

experience. The researcher can then reflect on the experiential accounts or anecdotes, looking for what, at first reading, might be unseen, probing for deeper understandings of the situation and of the meanings the incident held for the students.

While, in the last story, the teacher may never have reflected on the phenomenological significance of the student's experience of being named (in this case by a wrong name), the teacher does seem to realize that this is not an unimportant matter. The teacher senses how misnaming the student by his brother's name somehow affects or damages his sense of self and self-identity—for who he is in his own right. Still, we should not assume that we know how a particular student experiences the event of being confused with a sibling's name. Here is a student's description of an experience of being connected to a sibling by name.

"Tim Tibburn?" "Here." The first day of school has finally arrived. Mrs. Larson is taking attendance. My older brother, Ben, attended this school for three years. He set the reputation for me. Let's just say he wasn't exactly the teachers' favorite student. The benches in the hallway saw a lot of Ben throughout his school years. Every teacher I meet and talk to on this crisp September morning makes this connection to Ben. When I confess my name is Tim Tibburn, I can see the glimmer of hope in their eyes. Hope that I am not like my brother, "Tibburn, as in Ben Tibburn?" "Yes," I respond. "Oh . . . I see," Mrs. Larson's voice lowers, no doubt remembering the times she had with Ben a couple years back. Everyone's eyes turn to me. The whole class realizes what type of student Ben must have been, just because of the disapproving look on Mrs. Larson's face and the awkwardness it creates. I glance at her. It seems as though she has no problem remembering who Ben was. Trying to lower my head, I can only imagine what the next few years of school will be like. (TT)

How does Mrs. Larsen's association of Ben's name with Tim's influence the possibilities for the relationship between teacher and student? When other students in the class see Mrs. Larsen's disapproving look and then turn their gaze to Tim, what are the possibilities for Tim's relationship with his classmates? When a teacher doesn't use a student's name correctly, then the student may experience immediate and intense feelings and thoughts.

Our discussion here is not to be critical of teachers when they fail to properly name a student, but to call attention to students' experiences and to what it is like for a student to have an experience. Even university students may feel sensitive to name confusions in their relations with their teachers.

Last term I took philosophy from Professor Santos, who I really liked. And he seemed to like me because he often called on me and would say things like, "Frieda really makes an excellent point" or "Frieda, what do you think of this issue?" and so on. Some of my friends would laugh when Professor Santos called me by the name Frieda. But I did not mind so much because he really seemed to respect me. At the end of the term, after writing the test, I went up to him and said: "I really liked your philosophy classes. However, I want you to know that I am not Frieda. My name is Jane."

Professor Santos had been smiling as I thanked him but then looked shocked: "Oh, no, I am so sorry!" But I said, "Never mind—you had it partially right. My name is Jane Friedman." (JF)

So what we are learning (coming to understand?) about any experience, and the experience of recognition and naming in particular, is that we need to realize that even by naming an experience we already shape the prereflective nature of experience as we live it from moment to moment. And yet, we must try to do the impossible and reflect on the possible meanings of the experiences that we live.

My Chinese name, Huixia Ling Ho, is difficult to pronounce for Canadians. In one of my classes I was impressed by the teacher's ability to motivate students' participation in class discussions. The teacher had learned everyone's name very quickly despite the large class size. He always called students by their first name. However, he never mentioned my name. I thought that I did not mind it that much. But one day, when he discussed each group project, calling each student's name as if he appreciated every member's effort, I found myself waiting for my name to be mentioned. At last it was our turn. There were four in our group.

I concentrated on the teacher. He looked at us and quickly mentioned the names of the first two individuals in our group. Then, I saw him hesitate for a moment and almost unnoticeably skip my name to the fourth member. I was unrecognized. I was a bit surprised at myself, my own reaction.

I did not expect that I would be so disappointed. I was embarrassed. I was painfully aware of my Chinese name, which makes me who I am. I realize that I have become nameless, a nobody in this class. (HLH)

3. Thematic draft writing is done by reflecting on the experiential descriptions:

We should not trivialize that in school life (as well as in everyday life) the experience of confusing, misusing, or forgetting someone's name easily remains a source of embarrassment, hurt, and pain. While the embarrassment itself may not be so important, it does alert us to the question of what is at stake in the encounter when a student's name is misused or forgotten. In trying to determine what are some (variant and invariant) themes of the experience of naming, it is helpful to look at every experiential description as a whole and line by line and ask: what does this say about the experience of naming? We may come up with themes like these:

- Our name provides identity.
- Naming connects, creates relation, familiarity, closeness.
- Using someone's proper name draws one into a sphere of intimacy, belonging.
- Not being remembered may be experienced as a denied/refused/lost relation.
- The encounter now has a quality of distance (nonbelonging) rather than closeness.

- There are many ways for covering up not knowing someone's name.
- One way to compensate for the failing memory is to demonstrate behavior that is overly friendly, familiar, and "close."
- Literally when we can't re-call the name: we can no longer "call" the person.
- Being remembered means one's identity being validated, recognized.
- If someone has forgotten my name, I may feel not worth being remembered.

These themes are only abstractions and need to be woven into the texture of the text.

In the last story, Huixia, who is a secondary school student, shows remarkable insight into her experience. But we should realize that this awareness is only possible because she has expressed her experience in language (here in written form). She seems to realize that, at the collective level, her Chinese name gives her a certain identity, but she also realizes that at the personal level her name refers to her singularity, her uniqueness. On the one hand, it is her uniqueness that is denied by the teacher's not including her by her name. By the teacher's forgetting or skipping her name, she cannot feel recognized and seen—she feels nameless. On the other hand, her cultural identity is also at stake in the teacher's name-forgetting. Huixia seems to experience hurt that is associated with the withholding of recognition at two levels of subjectivity: her universal subjectivity (being Chinese) and her singular subjectivity (being her own unique self).

When we look carefully (line by line) at the stories of Jane and Huixia, then we may become aware of a paradox: we don't really know a person if we don't know his or her name. Both Jane and Huixia seem to hesitate drawing the teacher's attention for the misnaming and the name-forgetting. Perhaps they know intuitively that it can be embarrassing for a person to forget someone's name. And, of course, there is the practical challenge that it is not easy to remember all names of people we meet. When someone calls us by our name (especially when this someone is a significant person), then we feel addressed in our singularity. Calling a person by his or her first name tends to create a sense of intimacy and trust. Teachers tend to realize that naming is a crucial aspect of the relation they maintain with students. Many teachers try to memorize their students' names early in the new school term; they realize that it is important to be able to recognize and call their students by their proper names.

4. Insight cultivating draft writing looks for sources to help with the identification of thematic and essential insights that lie at the heart of the phenomenon:

Gusdorf suggests that "to name is to call into existence" (1965, p. 38). Naming is recognition: to be seen and noticed. We are able to recognize aspects of our world by naming them. Not only do we make things noticeable by naming them,

but also we make them real somehow. And just as we call things into being by naming them, so we ourselves need to be named to exist for others and for ourselves. Things that fall outside of our linguistic reach may stay more indeterminate. And this is also true for proper names of people. The strange thing is that people, even those we think we know, do to some extent remain indeterminate until we remember their names. Somehow, by being able to call them by their names, we seem to be able to reach them, and stand in a meaningful relation to them. When, as teachers, we call students by name, we point to the singularity of a specific student, and we may take for granted that calling the name calls the student into relation with us.

To be called by my name is to receive recognition and to receive recognition; it literally means to be known. Someone who recognizes me thereby acknowledges my existence, my very being. This is not the same as fleetingly noticing people whom one passes in a busy street. To cognize means to know, but to re-cognize is to know again in the sense of becoming part of people's memory. When I recognize someone, I revive my cognitive experience: this person has become part of my experience, my life history. He or she exists for me; this person is now memorable. It is not surprising, therefore, that naming and recognition play such a critical role in people's lives. One's very existence depends on being named and recognized—to be known by others. To paraphrase Descartes: "I am recognized, therefore I exist." The experience of recognition is inextricably intertwined with selfhood, identity, and one's sense of personal being.

It has been long known that proper names are more easily forgotten than other words. An interesting example is the Baker-baker paradox, an often-cited experiment by McWeeny, Young, Hay, and Ellis (1987). In the experiment people were shown a face where sometimes the name Baker was given as proper name and other times the word baker was used to indicate that this face belonged to someone whose occupation was a baker. The occupation baker was more easily recalled upon seeing the face than the name Baker. So it appears, that remembering that someone's name is Mr. Baker is more difficult than remembering that someone is a baker. The reason may have something to do with recognition, and the fact that proper names tend to be experienced as more arbitrary and meaningless; as well, proper names are virtually detached from other semantic networks. This does not make things easier for teachers to recognize their students by their names. And yet, these are experiences that are important for students. We should take student experiences seriously but often do not seem to know how to do this.

Experiences seem to arise from the living flow of everyday existence. In recent years, there has been a resumption of interest in the notion of experience. David Wood argues that there is a "return of experience" in philosophy and the human sciences (2002, pp. 21–36). Scholars such as David Wood and Martin Jay (2005) are resurrecting the focus on the meaning and significance of experience in contemporary inquiry. They argue that lived experience forms the starting point for inquiry, reflection, and interpretation, from Hegel through Heidegger

to Foucault and Derrida. This thought is also expressed in the well-known line from Merleau-Ponty: "The world is not what I think, but what I live through.... If one wants to study the world as lived through, one has to start with a direct description of our experience as it is" (1962, pp. xvi-xvii).

The "contents" of experiences are recognizable in the sense that we can name and describe them, or perhaps they come into being as experiences as we name and describe them. No doubt we could distinguish many more such experiences in the above student accounts. For example, in Tim's and Jane's descriptions we could distinguish the experience of waiting, the experience of embarrassment, the experience of the teacher's look, the experience of hearing one's name spoken in a certain tone of voice, and so forth. Every nameable experience seems to acquire an identity that makes it potentially distinguishable from other experiences. We could single out any of these moments that we just named and ask, "What is the phenomenological meaning of that experience?"

Indeed, phenomenology always asks those sorts of questions: "What is the nature and meaning of this or that experience-as-we-live-through-it?" "How does this phenomenon present itself as a distinguishable experience?" It is often baffling how the meanings of experiences are so much more difficult to determine than the meaning of concepts, which can be studied by examining their use in language. Gadamer explains that all lived experience has a certain immediacy that eludes every determination of its ultimate meaning. Why? Because when we try to recover the contents of our experiences through memory or reflection, we are in some sense always too late. We can never recover experience as it happened in the instant of the moment. Moreover, says Gadamer, everything that is experienced "is experienced by oneself, and part of its meaning is that it belongs to the unity of this self and thus contains an unmistakable and irreplaceable relation to the whole of this one life" (1975, p. 67). Indeed, what belongs to a certain experience cannot be exhausted in what can be said of it or in what can be grasped as its meaning.

5. Vocative draft writing is never really a separate activity but must be attempted throughout the phenomenological writing whenever the elusive meaning of a phenomenon needs a certain form or degree of evocation:

The phenomenological interest is focused on the phenomenon as an aspect of our existence. It tries to grasp the living sense of the moment before we have lifted it up into cognitive, conceptual, or intentional determination or clarity. Indeed this conceptual or theoretical clarity would be misleading or at least full of assumptions. We, therefore, try to come to an understanding of a phenomenon by constantly investigating and questioning these (psychological, personal, cultural, theoretical) assumptions. We ask, "What is experienced in that moment before we reflect on it, before we conceptualize it, and before we even name and

interpret it?" Only through this type of questioning can we come to discern the complex and subtle nature of experience when we speak of student experience.

We need to acknowledge that even in naming a student experience, we have already lifted it up, so to speak, from the raw reality of human existence. That is why we have to constantly remind ourselves that we are trying to understand not some named concept, but the prereflective existent—that raw moment or aspect of existence that we lift up and bring into focus with language. Is experience ultimately a linguistic phenomenon? And how is the body involved in our experience as we live it from moment to moment? Does experience already have meaning before we are consciously aware of it? Or are these experiences more primal phenomena? And how is this prereflective moment already part of our lived experience? The point for us is not that we should try to develop philosophical answers to these questions, but that we must remain aware of their openness and reach. We could push the problem further, beyond the cognitive toward the noncognitive: the unnameable, the pathic dimensions of life. In order to explore the living relations we maintain with the world we might need to unname things. In the short story "She Unnames Them" the science fiction author Ursula LeGuin (1987) hints at what happens in unname with a wonderfully evocative text that makes us pathically sense what it might be like if we could unname ourselves and thus experience the deeper significance of the enigmatic question of what it is that names name.

LeGuin tells the tale of woman who asks Adam to take back the name he had given her just as he had given names to all the animals that the Creator had brought before him. She had already persuaded the animals and the birds and the insects and the fishes to accept namelessness. They had agreed and decided to give back their names. For most of them the act of unname had been very easy since the names given to them had left them utterly indifferent.

The insects parted with their names in vast clouds and swarms of ephemeral syllables buzzing and stinging and humming and flitting and crawling and tunneling away.

As for the fish of the sea, their names dispersed from them in silence throughout the oceans like faint, dark blurs of cuttlefish ink, and drifted off on the currents without a trace. (1987, p. 195)

She must have suspected that for humans the effect of unname might be quite dramatic. The effect she had been after, of becoming more attached to the world, was even more powerful than she had anticipated. After the unname she had discovered with surprise how close she felt to the creatures around her.

None were left now to unname, and yet how close I felt to them when I saw one of them swim or fly or trot or crawl across my way or over my skin, or stalk me in the night, or go along beside me for a while in the day. They seemed far closer than when their names had stood between myself and them like a clear barrier: so close that my fear of them and their fear of me became one and the same fear. And the attraction that many of us felt, the desire to smell one another's smells, feel or rub or caress one

another's scales or skin or feathers or fur, taste one another's blood or flesh, keep one another warm—that attraction was now all one with the fear, and the hunter could not be told from the hunted, nor the eater from the food. (p. 195)

The effect of unnamings was much more powerful than she had expected. She decided that she could make no exception and she too needed to give back the name that had been given to her. So she went up to him and said:

"You and your father lent me this—gave it to me, actually. It's been really useful, but it does not exactly seem to fit very well lately. But thanks very much! It's really been very useful." (p. 196)

She found that it was not that easy to return a gift without creating the impression of being ungrateful. But Adam seemed preoccupied.

He was not paying much attention, as it happened, and said only, "Put it down over there, OK?" and went on with what he was doing. (p. 196)

After some hesitation she said at last to him, "Well, goodbye, dear. I hope the garden key turns up."

With this simple dialogue Ursula LeGuin produces a scene that is no less startling than the philosophical reflections of Derrida on the meaning of name. When things get unnamed we can no longer ignore the hidden contours of the phenomena that words tend to hide like blankets of snow. For Adam language was only a tool to gain dominion over the earth and its inhabitants.

He was fitting parts together, and said without looking around, "OK, fine dear. When's dinner?"

"I'm not sure," I said. "I'm going now. With the —" I hesitated, and finally said, "With them, you know," and went on. In fact, I had only just then realized how hard it would have been to explain myself. I could not chatter away as I used to do, taking it all for granted. My words now must be as slow, as single, as tentative as the steps I took going down the path away from the house, between the darkbranched, tall dancers motionless against the winter shining. (p. 196)

Reflecting on words and names helps us to realize how closely related language is to thinking and to our ways of being in the world. But what occurs when we unname things is a question that is rarely asked. Can we truly erase the names we give to the things that are important to us? How would we unname pain, lover, child, healing, or teaching? We do not live in that science fiction world of LeGuin. We cannot unname things, perhaps not even one thing. But unnamings does not have to mean that we completely discard the words. By putting them aside or by making them transparent we can orient to our world as if we were removing "a clear barrier" that stands between us and our lived experiences. Certainly we would not be able to take things for granted as we usually do.

We need to know our students' names so that we can know them and recognize them. But their names can also be taken for granted and turned into

mere labels. Students may feel sometimes that their names are just treated as numbers.

6. Inceptual draft writing aims at bringing forward the "deeper" meaning of a phenomenon:

Even though, as researchers, we seem to be speculating about Tim's, Jane's, and Huixia's inner lives, it needs to be pointed out that this is not really the intention. As researchers, we are not the teachers of these students, and we are not really able to "know" them as unique individuals. Our subject is not this or that student; our subject is the phenomenon (the student experience) of naming. Huixia's description of a naming incident is an example of this human phenomenon (what it is like to be named, misnamed, unnamed, forgotten, and so on). And so are all other experiences we borrow from students. Once we borrow these experiential descriptions they should be regarded, for all intents and purposes, as epistemologically fictitious. We are trying to construct a qualitative text that makes the student experience of naming recognizable to readers. In this recognition lies the possibility of becoming more pedagogically sensitive to the experiences of individual students such as Tim, Jane, and Huixia. A teacher practitioner has a broader interest than we do in this text: the teacher must be interested in his or her students' individual experiences as well as in the phenomenon of the naming experience. In concrete classroom situations, the phenomenological and the personal understandings merge into a fuller pedagogical understanding.

From the perspective of educational practitioners, there are always two pedagogical aspects to a phenomenological interest such as the student experience of naming: on the one hand, there is the experience of naming as a human phenomenon, and, on the other hand, in actual teaching-learning situations there is the inner psychological experience of this or that particular student. Of course, phenomenology, as a philosophical methodology, cannot help us understand the psychological lives of particular students. As researchers we can only focus on phenomenological understanding. And yet, there is always the larger picture of the actual lifeworld where teachers must deal with the psychological lives of real children. At the general level, teachers can increase their thoughtfulness by reflecting on the phenomenological meaning and significance of naming, and at the level of everyday thinking and acting the teacher also needs to know psychologically, as adequately as possible, how a particular student experiences a specific learning moment or specific classroom incident. In concrete and practical pedagogical relations and situations, these two types of understanding (phenomenology and psychology) cannot really be separated. They are grasped together and enacted, as pedagogical thoughtfulness and tact, in the present instant of each teaching moment (van Manen, 1991).

Calling the other person by his or her name means that we allow ourselves to be addressed by the uniqueness of this person. Indeed the name that has been

given to the other to "bear" through life also gives expression to a fundamental vulnerability.

Where is the other more naked than in his name—a name that he does not possess, but has received; a name that he does not coincide with, but which can neither leave him indifferent; a name that summons him to life, but that also will survive him? (Visker, 1998, p. 203)

So, on the one hand, it is important to be able to remember a person's name since that is how we recognize each other and stand in reciprocal relation to each other. The uniqueness of proper names reflects the uniqueness of each relation and unsubstitutability of each person in this relation. Forgetting someone's name seems to say that there is no reason for the other person to be worth remembering. Even the social practice of snubbing is in some sense an acknowledgment of the Hegelian notion of recognition—the person who snubs the other says: "I see you but I have no reason to acknowledge you. You are not worth recognizing." And, indeed, sometimes it may appear as if forgetting someone's name lies unfortunately close to a snub.

On the other hand, it is important to be able to see beyond a person's name since that is how we can truly orient to the other person as "other" in the sense of Levinas, without reducing the other to our own priorities (the self) or to an "it" in the sense that a name can make us into an object when the name just becomes a label. A name is something to which the other can never be reduced, and yet without the name there would be no particular other. It is a paradox that precisely when we do not have to remember the other person's name, that we may be able to experience both the greatest distance and the greatest closeness. In a strange sense, we need to remember and forget the name of the other in order to understand him or her as other. To understand we would need to listen and speak in a manner that is attentive to his or her true otherness that is ultimately unnameable.

The Research Is the Writing

After the attention in the last two chapters to phenomenological writing, one may still wonder: is there a difference between phenomenological research and writing? The main point I have made in this book is that the research *is* the writing. Even the activities of phenomenological interviewing, gathering experiential material, thematic reflection involved in the epoché and the reduction, and the philology of the vocative are textually-sensitive practices. So, I think it is critical to insist on the inseparability of phenomenological inquiry or research from phenomenological writing or textual reflection. And, of course, phenomena-logical reflection may involve the visual and auditory languages of images, art, cinema, or music.

I want to reiterate that there are many creative ways to express the meaning of phenomena through reflective phenomenological research-writing. Some

phenomenological research texts are written by the systematic exploration of placing the phenomenon in the context of existentials such as temporality, corporeality, relationality, spatiality, and materiality. Other phenomenological research texts are written as ever-deepening penetrations into the ways that a phenomenon is experienced. It is good practice to start with the most ordinary, down-to-earth and common experiential aspects of a phenomenon, and then increasingly move to more inceptual insights. Again, other phenomenological research texts are written in ever more complex layers of meaning that spiral in the direction of fundamental insights. Often one starts writing from the experiential perspective of the self, but then increasingly folds these personal experiences into the intersubjective realm of the phenomenological universal. Still other research writings are composed as fragmentary texts. Textual paragraphs or sections are written in a fragmentary manner that underscore the multiple meaning aspects of a phenomenon from multiple and variant perspectives. A fragmentary approach is sensitive to the realization that, first, our experiences are never the same, and second, phenomenal meaning is plural in its singularity.

It is true that reading is very much like writing. And when we read a text, then we are interpreting it in our particular way and therefore, to read a text is to (re)write it, as it were. Every text that is rich can be read interpretively. But in a more important respect, the responsibility of the author of a phenomenological text is not to write for multiple interpretations but only for one interpretation. The author tries to make the reader "see" something specific: for example, this phenomenon or event of having a conversation, or falling asleep, or being ill, or forgetting someone's name, or falling for someone. Even so, as readers we always see in a personal manner. Thus, the author writes for one interpretation while the reader interprets variously.

The phenomenologist does not present the reader with a conclusive argument or with a determinate set of ideas, a list of themes, a selection of essences or insights. Instead, the phenomenologist aims to be allusive by orienting the reader reflectively to that region of lived experience where the phenomenon dwells in recognizable form. Put more strongly, the reader must become possessed by the allusive power of text—the reader must be taken, touched, overcome by the phenomenological effect of a reflective engagement with lived experience. And I would urge that in this sense, the writer must become a reader of his or her own texts too.

Phenomenological research and writing tries to make intelligible the experiences that we explore in a "feelingly understanding" manner. In phenomenologically-composed texts, the human being recognizes, creates, and imagines forms of being, significations of humanness. This means that phenomenology does not only describe what something is, it also explores what this phenomenon can mean by offering possible interpretations. Certainly, phenomenological research and writing involves the analysis of concepts and how words are being used in everyday life. But conceptual theoretical language by itself falls short of

the phenomenological project. The atomistic tendencies of conceptual language demand abstractions for generalization, reasons for fixation, criteria for designation, and measures for referentiality.

To reiterate: the language of semantic and mantic, designative and expressive meaning does not entail an either/or distinction. Phenomenological discourse depends on the philosophic rationality of the epoché and the reduction—on cognitive meaning: argument, logic, conceptual, intellectual, and moral intelligibility. And I have aimed to show in this book that the reduction proper is complemented by the broader rationalities of vocative and philological methods and poetic sensibilities. Phenomenological text must appeal to our cognitive and noncognitive modes of knowing—to immanent and transcendent meaning. The challenge of phenomenological research and writing lies in these distinctions. The human science researcher is not just a writer, someone who writes up the research report. Rather, the researcher is an author who writes from the midst of life experience where meanings resonate and reverberate with reflective being. Sensitive phenomenological texts reflect on life while reflecting life.

