



Beyond the securitisation of development: The limits of intervention, developmentisation of security and repositioning of purpose in the UK Coalition Government's policy agenda

Jonathan Pugh^a, Clive Gabay^b, Alison J. Williams^{a,*}

^a School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK

^b School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of London, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK

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ABSTRACT

Through reviewing the UK Coalition Government's reconfiguration of the security–development nexus, this paper tracks a move away from the 'securitisation of development', toward the 'developmentisation of security'. It demonstrates how discourses of capacity building from the bottom-up have replaced the assertions of global cosmopolitanism of the Blair years. We argue that the Coalition is attempting to portray this as a 'post-interventionist' approach, in an attempt to resolve the crisis of faith in legal accountability, moral responsibility and political responsibility inherited from the previous administration, and respond to their legacy of international interventions. Rather than emphasise the agency of liberators, the UK Coalition therefore now cultivates the image of a chaotic world, populated by vulnerable subjects in need of empowerment, where instrumental interventions are less certain. Thus, reconfiguring the intervention/non-intervention binary, more recent engagements in Libya, Afghanistan and the Arab Spring have been framed by and retreated into facilitating the resilience of non-Western subjects.

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1. Introduction

Within weeks of coming to power in May 2010, the UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition had put in place wide ranging reviews of both its defence and development provision and future requirements (Department for International Development (DfID, 2011a, 2011b)). The first documents to be published, in October 2010, were the National Security Strategy (HM Government, 2010a) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (HM Government, 2010b). Six months later the reports on the DfID's reviews into the UK's bilateral and multilateral aid provisions were produced (DfID, 2011c, 2011d). Underpinning all these were the so-called 'austerity' measures set out in the Government's Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), also published in October 2010 (HM Treasury, 2010). Such documents detail a new set of policy parameters. In this paper we document how they represent a reconfiguration of the security–development nexus. With its retreat into resilience, local empowerment and capacity building discourses, the Coalition is seeking to disassociate itself from the global cosmopolitanism discourse that characterised the previous UK Government. Documenting how this represents the limits of previous interventions, we seek to move

beyond the 'securitisation of development' that dominates contemporary literature (Duffield, 2001; Gregory, 2004; Dodds and Elden, 2008; Elden, 2009; Jeffrey, 2009), emphasising instead a shift toward the 'developmentisation of security'.

In this paper we explain what this means in the following way. We argue that in place of the assertion of Western agency and responsibility, new human security framings now seek to release the agency of the vulnerable non-Western subject. Intervention still takes place, but whereas under the last UK Government this undermined the sovereignty of the non Western state, today, what we call following Chandler (2012) a more 'post-interventionist' approach has emerged. While this still constitutes non-Western subjects as frequently incapable of governing their own countries, it now seeks to enable and empower them as agents of their own security and development. As Chandler (2012, p. 225) says, since "the 1990s, the trend has been one of a shift from Western responsibility for securing the other to enabling the other to secure itself." Rather than taking on the burden of regime change associated with Blair and Bush, below we explain how the Coalition has accelerated the implementation of such capacity building discourses from the bottom up. This framing of human security and development through self-improvement attempts to bypass the intervention/non-intervention binary associated with sovereign territories. And it has facilitated intervention practices under the Coalition, particularly those of the military in Libya and Afghanistan, which were previously heavily critiqued. Thus, post-interventionism

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: jonathan.pugh@newcastle.ac.uk (J. Pugh), c.gabay@qmul.ac.uk (C. Gabay), alison.williams1@ncl.ac.uk (A.J. Williams).

and new human security paradigms are an attempt to resolve the crisis of faith in legal accountability, moral responsibility and political responsibility inherited from previous administrations and the legacy of recent international interventions.

The structure of the paper is as follows. First we engage with previous research by tracing how development has been securitised by successive UK governments. Drawing upon the work of Chandler (2007, 2009, 2012), we highlight some tensions in the wider literature between the power of biopolitical interventions and what others more simply characterise as the knee-jerk and ill thought out reactions of the UK Government to world events. Second, turning to recent UK Coalition documents, we analyse how the increasing developmentisation of security seeks to meet threats through 'softer' stabilisation-centred interventions at source. This illustrates a shift in the security–development nexus. The subject of intervention is no longer the passive victim of the Blair–Bush years and Iraq, but the vulnerable subject of Cameron's Libya or the Arab Spring, in need of enabling agency to become resilient. The agency of liberated rather than liberator has become the focus of attention. Here the UK Government seeks to establish new 'Coalitions of the willing' (including NGOs) that emphasise bottom-up self-improvement. To some extent, this approach reverses that of the previous administration. While the non-Western state is still constituted as incapable, the burden of responsibility stops at its boundaries. Thus, the two key parts to our argument converge upon how this developmentisation of security represents a reconfiguring of the security–development nexus. While this deflects the limits of traditional interventionism, it is equally not a retreat from interventionism; instead we contend (following Chandler, 2012) that this is a move towards a post-interventionist stance. Through its sweeping reviews of the security–development nexus, the UK Coalition has continued to facilitate intervention practices, particularly those of the military, by reemphasising discourses of empowerment.

Methodologically, the paper utilises a discourse analysis approach, interrogating key Coalition defence and development documents, as well as relevant policy material from the previous Labour administration (Ritchie, 2011; Noxolo, 2012). We have also undertaken discourse analysis of reports produced by key NGOs in the wake of, and relating to, these documents. Johnstone (2002, p. xii) outlines how discourse analysis "is an open-ended heuristic, a research method consisting of a set of topics to consider in connection with any instance of discourse". In the paper we identify what discourse analysts refer to as a set of "specific markers" (Johnstone, 2002, p. 4; Lees, 2004) associated with the 'developmentisation of security'. This discourse is marked by the key themes of empowering vulnerable, non-Western subjects, in what is increasingly portrayed as a chaotic and fragmented world. Recombining those themes in new ways, the UK Coalition now places less emphasis upon discourses of regime change and global cosmopolitanism. Non-Western subjects are still frequently constituted as incapable. But below we identify how a new post-interventionist approach, built upon the foundations of discourses of empowerment, capacity building and risk management has now emerged as part of the developmentisation of security discourse. Before turning to this in detail, it is necessary to review a more well-trodden path in the social science literature; the securitisation of development, in order to provide context for the arguments that follow.

2. The securitisation of development

The dominant discourse surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 contends that these events brought the relative peace and stability of the post-Cold War period to a jarring halt. In the intervening decade, the so-called 'War on Terror', or

the 'Long War' as Bergen (2011) famously named it, has practically and discursively affected how states have perceived their role on the international stage and where their foreign policy priorities lie. Work by Dodds and Elden (2008), Elden (2009), and Jeffrey (2009) are illustrative of a number of critical geographical engagements with how the UK has sought to discursively and practically position itself after 9/11. A key theme identified is how the war-fighting aspects of the Long War have been accompanied by a rhetoric and foreign policy discourse, primarily driven by the George W. Bush administration in the United States, but also reiterated within the UK.

In this regard, in his book *the Colonial Present* Derek Gregory (2004, p. xiv) argues that Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine "confirm Orientalism is still abroad: emboldened and aggressively exorbitant". Gregory (2004, p. xv) retains the word 'colonial' in his title because he wants to maintain the idea that constellations of power, knowledge and geography "continue to colonize lives all over the world". This takes a contemporary form in Manichean ideas about 'good' and 'evil'. As such, concepts such as 'homeland security', the 'axis of evil' and the notion of meeting 'threats at their source', became the dominant tropes of the Bush and Blair regimes (Bergen, 2011). In turn, analysing the interpenetration of global geopolitics and micro-politics at the city and neighbourhood levels, Graham's (2010) book *Cities Under Siege* examines how pervasive the securitisation of everyday life has become. City-dwellers are continually tracked, scanned and targeted through Western military technology. In his groundbreaking work, Graham examines the use of security concerns to suppress democratic dissent and the enacting of legislation suspending normal civilian law. Such works show concern for the securitisation of everyday life, and feed through into the 'securitisation of development' theme that presently dominates geographical literature.

Although our paper makes a quite specific argument about the developmentisation of security, it can thus be situated within a wider literature. Like Gregory (2004), the political sociologist Mark Duffield (2006) has also considered a continuation of colonial discourse which initially sought to justify Western interventionism by deeming the West as civilised and the non-West as barbaric. Now, non-Western states are divided along a line of effectiveness (rather than civility), with those deemed ineffective at securing their citizens considered legitimate for Western humanitarian and developmentised intervention (Duffield, 2006). Duffield thus argues that the post-9/11 security–development nexus represents a project of nation-making which continues the colonial attempt by Western powers to extend their sovereign frontier (see also Barnett, 2004).

Successive UK Governments' preoccupation with 'failing states' illustrates this blurring of the lines between security, development and national purpose. In the final Defence White Paper of the last Labour Government, entitled *Delivering Security in a Changing World* (Ministry of Defence, 2003), then Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon identified that the existence of 'failing states' posed a significant risk to wider global security. The central tenet of that Government's policy for facing these threats was to focus upon the UK Armed Forces' ability to deploy for "peace support and counter-terrorist operations where the focus w[ould] be on conflict prevention and stabilisation" (Ministry of Defence, 2003, p. 11). Hoon noted that "the successful management of international security problems w[ould] require even more integrated planning of military, diplomatic and economic instruments" (Ministry of Defence, 2003, p. 1), specifically pointing to the need to better co-ordinate the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the DfID (DfID). And so the Conflict Pool was created; a group uniting MOD, FCO, and DfID officials. The Conflict Pool's *raison d'être* was to provide multi-agency level assistance and planning targeted at specific states

that were identified as requiring conflict prevention, stabilisation and peacekeeping activities. This also linked with the dominant US ideology (of Bush, then Obama) of meeting threats at source to protect the homeland from as far away as possible (Simon, 1993; Ruggie, 1994; Brinkley, 1997; Barry and Keith, 1999; Kuus, 2007; Duffield and Waddell, 2006; Elden and Bialasiewicz, 2006; Chandler, 2007; Bergen, 2011).

Such concerns should also be seen against the backdrop of a broader point made by many commentators in recent years; that the new millennium is merely the continuation of a deeper desire to re-assert what is meant by the national interest after the Cold War (Duffield, 2001, 2003; Harrison, 2001, 2004; Craig and Porter, 2004; Abrahamsen, 2004, 2005; Chandler, 2007). The general line of reasoning is that world leaders, like Bush and Blair, were not quite correct in saying that ‘everything changed’ after 9/11. It instead provided a new node around which countries could rearticulate foreign policy positions in response to a new and credible threat, something that had been missing since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thus, policy frameworks evoked the need for a ‘global war’ promoting human security approaches, the doctrine of sovereignty as responsibility and humanitarian intervention (Chandler, 2009). The globalisation of security agenda converged on the basis that Western security is at stake in a multitude of security and development policy interventions in regions previously lacking geostrategic importance.

As Chandler (2009) points out, rather than question this assumption, critical theorists like Agamben (1998, 2005) and Hardt and Negri (2001) have instead reinforced this understanding of the globalisation of security. They contend we are witnessing “a general global state of war”, which is eroding the distinction between the domestic and international (quoted in Chandler, 2009, p. 246). Reading Foucault into international relations, such post-structuralist critique foregrounds an unending war against governmental biopolitics. Chandler makes an interesting point in this regard. This is that both policy-makers and critical detractors alike tend to converge on this idea of a global war “as the exercise of global aspirations for control” (Chandler, 2009, p. 248). While critics like Hardt and Negri may not like this exercise and aspiration, like many others, their analysis only serves to reinforce and reify its presence. Chandler however takes this line of thinking in a different direction from other commentators. He sees the responses to 9/11 as part of a much broader attempt by Western nation-states to establish a sense of purpose after the end of the Cold War. Here Chandler (2007, p. 363) says

“that the dynamic behind the security–development nexus is not based so much on the desire of leading Western states, such as the United States, to regulate and control peripheral non-Western states but rather the desire to use the international sphere as an arena for grand policy statements of mission and purpose – from the ‘Global War on Terror’ to the desire to ‘Make Poverty History’ – while simultaneously disengaging from serious policy-making in these regions and passing responsibility to other actors, particularly non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international institutions.”

Although in some ways complementary, Chandler provides a distinct perspective from Gregory and Duffield. All agree that after the seismic events of 1989 the meaning of ‘national interest’ became less clear. The expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, the emergence of an embryonic EU security discourse, and the proliferation of new security threats rendered, certainly at least in Europe, the national interest less fixed. But while a significant portion of the literature tends to say that western nation states are continuing the colonial project (in modified form), others, like Chandler (2007), Devji (2005), Pupavac (2004) and Laïdi (1998) see military

intervention under the last UK Government as a desperate attempt to reinsert a purpose into international relations. Rather than emphasise Foucauldian biopower as disciplinary force, they draw attention to the lack of strategic purpose. Here Chandler (2009, p. 250) says that critical theory “flatters policy actors” because rather than presenting Iraq, Afghanistan and Bosnia as the ad hoc, knee-jerk reactions of states, “interventions can be rewritten as morally and strategically well designed, merely coming unstuck on their overestimation of the capacity of the target populations” (Chandler, 2009, p. 250).

Thus, it is often assumed that contemporary concerns around global security are merely an extension of more traditional struggles of control around discourses of colonialism, modernity and development. However, like Chandler we are less confident about ‘scaling-up’ Foucault’s conception of biopolitical power as an overarching explanatory framework (as in Hardt and Negri or Agamben). Here we agree with Foucault (2007) himself, that biopower cannot be translated into a *general* theory. As Foucault (2007, p. 1) says, biopower is “not in any way a general theory of what power is. It is not a part or even the start of such a theory”. We are not then denying that the stakes can be biopolitical. Indeed, Vrsti (2012) interestingly argues that a bio-political analytic allows us to examine the multiple ways in which neoliberal governmentality, through over-ambition or under-applicability, fails to construct sites and subjects in its image. Neoliberalism may thus fail to be truly global, but still remain universal in its pretensions (Vrsti, 2012, p. 3). This is a discussion we return to from a particular perspective later in the paper, when we engage with work of Schmitt (2003). Thus, what we are interested in is the changing stakes associated with the security–development nexus (Chandler, 2010; Kiersey et al., 2010; Selby, 2007; Jospehs, 2010). In particular, we demonstrate how a shift in this nexus reveals a fundamental insecurity at the heart of government foreign policy (see the next section) which speaks to universalist pretensions to shape a global order based on the self-regulation of weak and fragile states, even as the events emerging from these very places illustrate the failure of that strategy.

3. Battered Britain

The Coalition’s development policy turns away from the previous administration’s emphasis upon the moral imperative of development, for and of itself. One of the first actions of the New Labour Government of 1997 was to separate out DfID from the Foreign Office, foregrounding what could perhaps be seen as the ‘purity’ of development aid because it would not be contaminated by other departments’ interests. Blair’s Ministers, such as Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and Head of DfID, Clare Short, famously sought to usher in an era of ethical foreign policy. Blair’s in particular was a vision of a new global cosmopolitanism. Leading political scientists at the time, like Archibugi et al. (1998), also encouraged a move away “from the national to the cosmopolitan public sphere”, claiming that we were witnessing “the formation of a global polity” (Köhler, 1998, p. 231). However, times have changed. Post-Iraq, Arab spring and the economic crisis of 2008, ‘global polity’ rhetoric has become less prevalent. Under the Coalition Government the central problematic in international relations can now more easily be grasped as one of withdrawal from the international sphere rather than intervention.

Post-interventionism is emerging in a particular way under the Coalition. Aid given to the non-Western world is increasingly defined in terms of ‘rapid responses’ to threats that may suddenly appear anywhere, at any time. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is dominated by the need to be “flexible and adaptable, to respond to unexpected threats and rapid changes in adversaries’ behaviour” (HM Government, 2010a, p. 18). It thus

calls for the establishment of such things as the “High Readiness Force” (HM Government, 2010a, p. 19) and

“...new Stabilisation Response Teams. These joint teams, with expertise tailored to the operational environment, will be brought together when needed to deploy at short notice anywhere in the world where an integrated UK response is needed” (HM Government, 2010a, p. 46).

Whilst at first sight this may appear reminiscent of Bush's conceit that you are either ‘with us or against us’, we want instead to stress the ‘chaotic’ imaginary at play in the above quotes. The security–development nexus of the Coalition is now centred around the notion of stabilising and securing the nation state against the battering elements of an uncertain world.

The Conservative Party has been cultivating this particular perspective of what we call ‘Battered Britain’ since before entering office in 2010. In government, the Coalition's three main slogans have been ‘We are all in this together’, ‘Broken Britain’ and ‘The Big Society’. As discussed earlier with reference to Graham's (2010) insightful work, security has come to pervade everyday life through fear – from rioting looters, to broken families and the threats of mass migration and contagious economies. This increasingly comprehensive narrative of fear, built layer upon layer of argument, was further reinforced by Prime Minister David Cameron's contentious comments, in February 2011, on the supposed failure of multiculturalism within the UK (Wintour, 2011). In short, an image is being portrayed of a UK being attacked on all fronts.

As noted earlier, in 2010 the new Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition Government published the National Security Strategy (NSS) (HM Government, 2010b) and the SDSR (HM Government, 2010a). The NSS was the first document that the new Government published in support of the securitisation of development agenda. This coincided with the creation of a new National Security Council (NSC) whose role is to “coordinate responses to the dangers we face, integrating at the highest level the world of the foreign, defence, home, energy and international development departments, and all other arms of Government contributing to national security” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2010). This image of Battered Britain – where defence and development now need to be seamlessly incorporated in one overarching strategy – is further demonstrated in the title of the SDSR: *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty* (HM Government, 2010a). Talk of the need to create a global cosmopolitanism based upon moral reasoning is less relevant.

This is perhaps most starkly illustrated in the Coalition's shifting mantra, that aid from Britain is also aid for Britain. In March 2011, Andrew Mitchell, Conservative Secretary of State for International Development, said that the results of aid are

“not only delivered from the British people; they are also for the British people. They contribute to building a safer, more stable and prosperous world which, in turn, helps keep our country safe from instability, infectious disease and organised crime.” (Mitchell, 2011)

What is interesting here is that threats are not overtly constituted as between one country and another, or in terms of making ‘them’ like ‘us’, as we find in traditional critical renditions of the security–development nexus (see Duffield, 2006). Rather, the Coalition Government emphasises the dangers of new chaotic forces, where cyber warfare, diseases, migration, volatile capitalism and terrorism, reveal the limits of traditional intervention.

Before we turn to the repercussions for the developmentisation of security, this illustrates something fundamental about the contemporary nature of international relations that the work of Schmitt (2003) can shed light upon (Chandler, 2009; Elden, 2010;

Legg, 2011). Distinguishing two forms of international relations, Schmitt contrasts territorialised or *telluric* partisan struggles, with irrational, ad hoc, and non-instrumental partisan struggles. In the latter, problems are no longer grasped strategically, but in terms of an uncontained, unlimited and endless ‘war’ against deterritorialised powers. This is where we situate the Coalition's configuration of the security–development nexus. We align it with what Schmitt (2003) calls the *abstract* character of global liberalism, where there is no clear ‘friend/enemy’ territorial distinction. Rather, as Schmitt (2003) further points out, the lack of objectivity between territorial struggles makes violence more indiscriminate and less predictable – a point which, as documented in this section of the paper, present UK Coalition Government policy makes clear.

4. The developmentisation of security: reconfiguring international relations

The bombing of Libya in 2011 was different from the interventions in Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan (Chandler, 2011). It did not seek to undermine the sovereignty of the state or the agency of the people. Rather, the no fly zone sought to facilitate and empower the Libyans to act for themselves. Intervention sought to establish the conditions where local agency could be released. Although the Libyan bombing lasted longer than the war in Kosovo, the conceptual framework was therefore different and received in a more positive light by critical commentators. As Chandler (2012) points out, without the transformative promise of Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan, western powers were strengthened both morally and politically. There was no internationalist baggage. Liberal internationalism was rejected in favour of empowerment, good governance and capacity building discourses. The Libyan intervention was not therefore grasped in terms of a clash of legal and political rights around sovereign claims. Rather, it is illustrative of a further reconfiguration of the security–development nexus under the UK Coalition that we now seek to highlight.

Post-Iraq in particular there is deep anxiety across Western societies over whether ‘harder’ military engagement is either moral or effective (Collier, 2008; Short, 2009; Ritchie, 2011). Short (2009) says that her personal experience of military intervention suggests it tends to exacerbate problems in fragile states, rather than ameliorate them. Commenting on US foreign policy, she says that “the military power of the biggest economy on earth, the Rome of our era, has been shown to be vulnerable” by over-focusing on military intervention as a way of solving problems (Short, 2009, p. 62). Short (2009, p. 62) also points to how the USA “has been unable to defeat the resistance in Iraq. NATO is in considerable difficulty in Afghanistan and Hezbollah has shown that it cannot be controlled by the military power of Israel, the USA's major ally and greatest armed power in the Middle East”. Frank Ledwidge, in his 2011 book *Losing Small Wars*, similarly says that initial UK Government celebrations over the ‘success’ of small wars in Malaya and Northern Ireland, despite expectations at the time, could not be carried through into countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. The now widely recognised ineffectiveness of military intervention has led many, including prominent people in the field like Short (2009) and Chitiyo (2011), but also now the UK Coalition, to turn to the development side of the security–development nexus for answers.

Although the term can only be found in a small number of papers (for examples, see Haddad, 2005; Harriss-White, 2007; Koponen, 2010; Anderson and Williams, 2011), the origins of the ‘developmentisation of security’ concept can be traced back to the early 1990s. Then the United Nations was increasingly saying that “[w]ithout peace, there may be no development. But without

development, peace is threatened” (1994, p. iii). By the early part of the millennium, Duffield (2001, p. 159) also began to identify an emerging trend in policy literature which saw “underdevelopment as dangerous”. In 2005, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) produced a series of recommendations that fed into the 2008 OECD/DAC’s *Handbook on Security System Reform*. These suggested that a wide range of actors should be involved in development, from the armed and police services, to customs and local security units, financial management bodies, civil society organisations, judiciary and prosecution services, human rights commissions, even liberation and guerrilla armies. When it comes to UK Government policy, in the mid 2000s Edmunds (2007, p. 1070) further identified a blurring of the line between war-fighting and peacekeeping activities that included “rebuilding key infrastructural capacities such as roads, power stations or water supply networks”. Today, Chitiyo (2011, p. 26) makes the claim more explicit, stating that the “developmentalisation of security is already becoming the ‘new wave’ in the security–development nexus.”

A consensus on a definition for the ‘developmentalisation of security’ has yet to emerge. Thus, building upon previous sections of this paper, here we seek to elucidate what one could look like through analysis of current UK Government policies. Perhaps the key document here is the Coalition’s ‘Building Stability Overseas Strategy’ (BSOS) published in July 2011 (DfID, 2011e). This document; a joint DfID, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Ministry of Defence publication, clearly articulates how the Government plans to utilise its armed forces in non-war-fighting activities through development to enable security (for both the host state and the UK); particularly through empowerment and capacity building. As the then Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, stated at the launch of BSOS, the “MOD has an important role to play in helping to build stability overseas as our strong reputation and global reach allows us to achieve preferred outcomes” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2011). Speaking at the same time the International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, explained how this strategy reinforced the development agenda. He stated that

“The Building Stability Overseas Strategy will help the UK to work more effectively to tackle instability upstream, helping to prevent conflict and the suffering it causes. This goes to the heart of the drive to achieve better targeted, more effective, aid [which is] cost effective and beneficial for the security of the UK” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2011).

At the core of the BSOS are the Stabilisation Response Teams noted earlier (DfID, 2011f). These teams are “drawn from across government including military, policy or civil servant and other experts” (DfID, 2011e, 22). The first of them was deployed to Libya in May 2011 to help in the regime change and transition to a new stable government in that country. Central to their operation was building the resilience and capacity of local populations. This was done by a combination of NATO surveillance forces and mentoring of anti-Qadhafi forces (see DfID, 2011f).

This turn toward vulnerable subjects therefore dominates the UK Coalition’s approach to the security–development nexus. To ascribe vulnerability suggests a lack of capability for resilience. Whereas the previous Government stressed the importance of the internationalist paradigm and emphasised the agency of external interveners, this demonstrates a different approach. It illustrates a more general trend noted in counter-terrorism studies in recent years, where we find, for example, Bachmann’s (2011) work on Kenya unearthing the evolution in donor discourses from counter-terrorism to population-centred ‘peace and security’ strategies. Employing a discourse of empowerment of Kenya’s Muslim

communities, donors have displaced the risks of counter-terrorism onto the target populations. As Chandler (2007, p. 378) says:

“Where the security–development nexus starts out with bold declarations of transforming the security and development situation for people in non-Western states, it ends by turning the transformation of material circumstances into a matter of psychological analysis open to therapeutic interventions at the level of the non-Western state and society” (see also Pupavac, 2004).

Illustrating the extent to which the Coalition is pushing through with a re-focusing of its security provision, in February 2012 the UK Government announced the moving forward of its deadline for the handover of security control in Afghanistan to the Afghan National Army to 2013. This will result in USA, UK and other ISAF forces remaining in Afghanistan only in a training and support role (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012). Despite reconstruction halting in some parts of Helmand in June 2006 (partly due to governors in the province, partly because military presence provoked the Taliban) UK Government policy documents nevertheless paint the UK’s military presence in Afghanistan as a force for good. This is because they now more explicitly focus on how foreign governments and NGOs can provide the educational and health needs of civilian Afghans. The impression is given of a military undertaking less contentious, development-oriented work (see Ledwidge, 2011). As Chandler (2012, p. 225) says:

“Calls for the empowerment of the vulnerable through discourses of inculcating resilience have enabled a rearticulation of the dominant agendas and framings of Western intervention. The crisis of liberal interventionism, clear in the undermining of the authority and standing of the UN at the end of the 1990s and fears over the future of international law, seems to have been resolved through the reinsertion of Western policy concerns within the human security paradigm of resilience and post-intervention.”

Bearing in mind our previous analysis of Short’s (2009) essay on the limitations of military intervention, it is important to note here that the MoD has to continue to find a rationale for deploying troops in Afghanistan. Over 400 British service personnel have died during Operation Herrick in Helmand, while thousands of British troops have been maimed or traumatised. Against the backdrop of such failures, it is necessary to demonstrate that military intervention can be effective in other ways. Here another example of how the UK military is becoming increasingly involved in stabilisation and development activities is the Female Engagement Teams. These military-staffed units are currently being operated in Afghanistan by the UK military and seek to “strengthen Afghan women’s civil society organisations to strengthen the influence of Afghan women in public life” (DfID, 2011e, 26). As Lieutenant Colonel Mark Bower, British Army, explained

“Effective female engagement across Helmand, at the tactical level, will enable engagement of a large percentage of the Afghan population who themselves can influence the decision makers and ultimately take an active role in improvement of life at the district, provincial and national level” (Stabilisation Unit, 2011).

Here again we can see evidence of the British armed forces being trained and deployed to carry out stabilisation through “improvement of life” activities across Afghanistan, taking up some of the qualitative aspects previously covered by the development side of the security–development nexus. The following are some further illustrations, this time from the BSOS:

"In Nepal we will help re-integrate 3,000 former combatants into civilian life by 2015... In Ethiopia we will increase by 50% the number of women with improved access to security and justice as a result of UK funding. In Sierra Leone we will help give 50% of remote communities access to mediation services by 2015... By 2015 UK aid will help create 45,000 jobs in Somalia, and build, upgrade, maintain or rehabilitate over 500 kilometres of roads in Nepal" (2011:25).

We can now summarise our key argument in this paper so far. The UK Coalition's approach to the security–development nexus draws attention to the anxiety surrounding the previous Government's approach to liberal intervention and regime change. This draws attention to the limits of that intervention, which ascribes agency and places the responsibility and onus upon the liberator. For example, Blair (and his detractors) emphasised the moral imperative to intervene in Iraq by overthrowing the regime. Today, the UK Coalition seeks to bypass the intervention/non-intervention binary that caused so much trouble for Blair, by instead focusing upon the theme of capacity building from the bottom up. Although of course it still has many detractors, this leaves it less open to accusations of an imperialist imagination and assertions of a single global cosmopolitanism. So that today, rather than emphasise the power of the intervener, the Government cultivates the image of a chaotic, constantly changing and deterritorialised world, populated by vulnerable subjects in need of empowerment. As the next section explains, we cannot document this reconfiguration of the security–development nexus unless we further consider two other major forces at work shaping the Coalition's agenda: the post-2008 economic crisis and the response of the wider development community.

5. How austerity measures and NGOs are influencing the developmentisation of security

We cannot fully understand how the Coalition has put this particular stamp on the security–development nexus without paying attention to its sweeping austerity measures and the response of NGOs in particular. On 20th October 2010 the Government announced the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) (*HM Treasury, 2010*). Despite the severity of the cuts, it has made much out of its commitment to increase development aid and technical assistance. The aim is to meet the United Nations target of spending 0.7% of national income on aid within 3 years. It is proposed that DfID's resource budget will be increased by 37% in real terms to £9.4 billion by 2014/2015. This is the largest rise of any Government department. DfID's capital budget will grow by 20% to £2 billion. The Chancellor, George Osborne, stated that "[t]his Coalition Government will be the first British Government in history, and the first major country in the world, to honour the United Nations commitment on international aid" (*The Independent, 2010*). On one level, the central reason for this commitment is to meet obligations to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Significantly, however, the CSR also announced that 30% of the ring-fenced aid budget will be diverted to fragile states by 2014–2015, with particular reference to Afghanistan and Pakistan (*HM Treasury, 2010*). We have found that this only represents a 10% increase from 20% under the last Government, but consists of a third of the total projected increase to DfID's 2014/2015 budget (which will rise from £8.4 billion in 2010 to £12.6 billion in 2014 (*HM Treasury, 2010*)). This is over a billion pounds more than it would have been under the previous Government's plans.

The impact of the CSR for development (initially outlined in a Conservative 2010 Green Paper, *Noxolo, 2012*) was demonstrated in the first major policy speech delivered by Andrew Mitchell, in his role as UK International Development Secretary, in June 2010, in which he stated that,

"We can't escape the fact that today's fiscal landscape is radically different from what has gone before. There is a massive deficit, which it is our number one priority to tackle" (*DfID, 2010*).

In order to facilitate this Mitchell announced the establishment of an independent aid watchdog to provide "verified evidence that it [aid] is being well spent" (*DfID, 2010*). As Mitchell made clear,

"Your [British taxpayers] contribution to our life-saving UK aid budget imposes a deep responsibility on this Government, and on me as Secretary of State for International Development, to deliver and demonstrate value for money in aid" (*DfID, 2010*).

He continued that his "aim is to spend every penny of every pound of your money wisely and well. We want to squeeze every last ounce of value from it" (*DfID, 2010*). To this end, DfID's multi-lateral and bilateral aid reviews were announced with the intention to "identify projects that should be stopped and savings that should be made so that we can increase aid spending in poor countries more quickly" (*DfID, 2010*).

This idea of better 'value for money' is of course subjective. Given the widespread backlash against the previous Government's approach to the security–development nexus, it is therefore interesting to analyse the response of the NGO and development community to the above statements; to ask how they evaluate 'value for money'. This is important, because it will explain the extent of the consensus that is emerging around the reconfiguration of the security–development nexus.

Today, 75% of donor aid globally is directed toward conflict zones, many of which are implicated in the 'War on Terror' (*BBC World Service, 2011*). Of the 27 countries continuing to receive DfID support most are constituted as fragile states. And as the SDSR states,

"We must focus on those fragile and conflict-affected countries where the risks are high, our interests are most at stake and where we know we can have an impact. To help bring enduring stability to such countries, we will increase significantly our support to conflict prevention and poverty reduction. We will deliver this support through an integrated approach that brings together our diplomatic, development, defence and intelligence resources." (*HM Government, 2010a, p. 44*)

What is important to emphasise here is that in the aftermath of the reviews a number of development NGOs and leading experts issued a range of support for the UK Coalition's approach; from the qualified, to the outwardly exuberant (Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, (*CAFOD, 2011, Haddad, 2011*). As the former head of the Royal United Services Institute Africa Programme, Knox Chitiyo, states "security forces can, and should on occasion, contribute directly or indirectly to development." (*Chitiyo, 2011, p. 26*).

Perhaps more noticeably, a number of key NGOs also seem reasonably satisfied that a developmentisation of security (and not securitisation of development) is now taking place under the UK Coalition. For instance, a detailed analysis by the *CAFOD (2011)* of the spending announced in the bilateral review, found that there was no evidence to support the contention that money for development was to be spent upon security concerns. This is based on the fact that the per-capita aid spend in countries deemed by the Government to be high terror risks stands at £9.43, as compared to all other countries, where the per-capita spend stands at £16.43 (*CAFOD, 2011, p. 1*). This appears to rebut accusations of the securitisation of development quite starkly, although as the *CAFOD* report notes, these figures are partly the result of DfID's withdrawal from Iraq, Niger and Indonesia, all Government high terror risk states, which allows higher levels of money to be spent in fewer high terror risk states (*CAFOD, 2011, 7*). Nevertheless, the

CAFOD report concludes that “[l]ooking at the overall patterns, there does not seem to be evidence of a shift towards giving aid to countries with greater security interests to Britain” (CAFOD, 2011, 10)

Lawrence Haddad, Director of the Institute for Development Studies, President of the UK Development Studies Association, and adviser to the DfID bilateral review says:

“For sure, the countries with the largest % increases (Somalia, Nigeria, Pakistan, DRC, Yemen) are fragile and conflict affected, but the percent of the bilateral spend going to MDG priorities such as health, education, water and sanitation and poverty and under-nutrition increased significantly and totals 65%. Is a large increase in spending on girls’ schooling in Pakistan a “securitisation of aid” or simply a large increase in spending on girls’ education?” (Haddad, 2011)

Haddad’s final question is particularly apposite. Taken out of the context of the shifts taking place in UK security strategy, increased spending on MDG targets in high terror risk states appears to be a reaffirmation of the cosmopolitan ideals of the previous Labour administration. However, we argue that this is merely further evidence of what the ‘developmentisation of security’ means in practice. The support of NGOs and Government alike illustrates how human security frameworks are no longer marginal, but dominate the international agenda. They work by ostensibly evading problems of state sovereignty, legal accountability and moral legitimacy, precisely because dominant conceptual frameworks now converge upon the empowering idea that people can capacity build their way out of problems from the bottom up. Seen in this light, and to answer Haddad’s question, a large increase in spending on girls’ schooling in Pakistan is not necessarily a securitisation of aid, but neither is it “simply a large increase in spending on girls’ education” (Haddad, 2011). Rather, it illustrates the underlying shifting ground of the security–development nexus, bypassing the state by going straight to the people. There has not been a significant backlash to the Coalition’s approach by NGOs because the Afghan, Libyan or African subject is no longer the passive victim of the Blair–Bush years, but the vulnerable subject in need of enabling agency to become resilient. Rather than securing power on behalf of the powerless by overthrowing the state, the Coalition’s approach works in reverse. While the state is still constituted as incapable, responsibility stops at its boundaries. The power to secure is decentralised and dispersed back into society. This is undertaken by what could now be called new ‘coalitions of the willing’ (including NGOs, local parties and agencies). The Western Government is thus relinquished of responsibility, and blame, because there is ostensibly no clash of rights between sovereignty and intervention.

6. Conclusions

This paper has documented a shift in UK Government policy surrounding the security–development nexus. It has done so through reviewing the key literature produced by the UK Con-Lib Coalition elected in 2010. We have identified how this now operates through a new register, by emphasising the vulnerability of subjects and collapsing the binary of intervention/non-intervention. As illustrated in Libya, intervention now depends upon the critique of liberal discourses of intervention posed in terms of sovereignty and rights (Chandler, 2012). Whereas in the Blair years there was a clearer assertion of global cosmopolitan purpose, emphasis is now less controversially placed upon building the capacity and resilience of people from the bottom up. There has been a move away from the intervention privileged in the 1990s and invasion of Iraq, toward emphasising empowerment, prevention and the agency of

post-conflict and post-colonial subjects. This has become the new conceptual justification for intervention under the UK Coalition.

In making this main argument in our paper we have documented how the Coalition’s National Security Council, Strategic Defence and Security Review, and Building Stability Overseas Strategy, among other key reports, have now shifted the security–development nexus in a particular direction. Whereas previously the onus was upon the agency of the intervener (US and UK in particular) to make the change; today the intervened become the focus of attention and responsibility. This has perhaps unsurprisingly gained qualified support from a growing number of NGOs. Non-Western Governments are still often constituted as incapable, but they are not to be overthrown, and their people are to be made more resilient. As revealed in the less contentious responses to Western interventions in the Arab Spring, the binary of intervention/non-intervention has become less problematic for many commentators. Through our review of responses to key UK Government literature, we have thus identified a certain convergence between non-governmental and governmental agencies around the conceptual framework of capacity building. This was further illustrated when drawing attention to how the ‘value for money’ development agenda of this post-economic crisis UK Government has received support from many sections of the wider development community. This is mainly because many NGOs find the extended developmentisation of security more appealing than previous approaches.

The ‘securitisation of development’ dominates contemporary literature (Duffield, 2001; Gregory, 2004; Dodds and Elden, 2008; Elden, 2009; Jeffrey, 2009). For example, the 2012 Royal Geographical Society/Institute of British Geographers Annual Conference key theme was the ‘Security of geography/geography of security’. In this paper we have now also argued that increasing attention should be given to the ‘developmentisation of security’. What we have called the emergence of this ‘post-interventionist’ approach is reframing human security paradigms around the vulnerability of non-Western subjects, seeking to enable and empower them as agents of their own security and development. This therefore raises questions for future research; not only in the fields of geopolitics and international relations, but also political philosophy. For example, how does the developmentisation of security reflect new understandings of ‘political subjectivity’? Such questions cannot of course be answered here, but they do suggest potentially fruitful avenues for future research.

Tracking the post-2010 UK Coalition Government’s approach to the security–development nexus is not a straightforward task. With the continuing crises in the Middle East, the re-election of Putin in Russia, global economic uncertainty, the rise of the BRIC countries, and problems with the European Union, we anticipate it will become no less dynamic in future years. For our part this creates the imperative to go beyond our initial policy analysis of UK Coalition policy presented in this paper, to further track other forces shaping the agenda. We have identified how a reconfiguration of the security–development nexus is taking place around the themes of anxiety over interventionism; collapsing of intervention/non-intervention binaries through the less contentious discourse of capacity building; austerity measures, and a growing groundswell of support from NGOs for security concerns to focus more on development. Although far from unqualified in their support, and while of course some NGOs are more resistant than others, for the moment a general pattern is being solidified by the UK Coalition around the developmentisation of security.

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