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The Archaeology of Colonization and the Colonization of Archaeology

Theoretical Challenges from an Ancient Mediterranean Colonial Encounter

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“Let each man be a Greek in his way! But let him be one,” implored Goethe at the dawn of the nineteenth century. A couple of generations later, the prolific British man-of-letters John Addington Symonds insisted that “All civilized nations, in all that concerns the activity of the intellect, are colonies of Hellas” (1880:401). Similarly, in the mid twentieth century, at the twilight of the British Empire, the classicist Gilbert Murray wistfully asserted that “The continent of Europe has been our modern Hellas....And surely we may without self-flattery claim that in the high civilisation which Europe has inherited and passed on to her kindred across the oceans, is a Hellenism which the barbarian rejects but still longs to understand and assimilate” (1953:52–53). These quotations, which were chosen from hundreds of other possible examples echoing identical sentiments, serve admirably to introduce a paradox in the investigation of ancient colonial situations: undertaking an archaeology of colonization requires first understanding the colonization of archaeology. This problem is particularly acute in the study of the ancient Mediterranean, the region of my own research. However, the implications of this issue are by no means limited to this situation,

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but reverberate throughout the archaeology of colonies, colonization, and colonialism in general. Later discussion will make clearer the basis of this claim, as well as suggesting a few possibilities for dealing with some of the problems that inhere from this predicament.

But first things first. Let me begin by explaining what I mean by the “colonization of archaeology.” This intentionally provocative trope encapsulates an extremely complex historical process explored in greater detail elsewhere (Dietler n.d.). However, in brief, I am arguing, first, that the discursive foundations of modern European identity and colonialist ideology and practices were largely grounded in selective interpretations and interpolations of the texts of two *ancient* colonial powers: Greece and Rome. This curious appropriation produced a limited and doubly inflected representation of the ancient encounters engendered by Greco-Roman expansion. But what is more, because of the European etiological mythology of Greco-Roman cultural ancestry that developed out of the Renaissance and the resulting structures of “cultural capital” (Bourdieu 1984; 1990) that developed within the academy and European society in general, such perceptions have become part of the doxic, implicit foundations of Euro-American culture. This, of course, includes the academic discursive framework within which archaeology was constituted as a professional discipline. Hence, without a critical awareness of the complex referential loops involved in this process, archaeologists attempting to study ancient Greek and Roman colonialism (or, indeed, ancient colonialism in general) risk unconsciously imposing the attitudes and assumptions of ancient colonists, filtered and reconstituted through a modern interpolating prism of colonial ideology and experience and absorbed as part of the Western intellectual habitus, back onto the ancient situation. Ironically, this would constitute a kind of second colonization of the non-Greco-Roman peoples of the ancient Mediterranean, but one even more pervasive than the first in that all access to indigenous experience of the encounter would have been finally suppressed under a hegemonic interpretive discourse.

Consequently, this chapter first attempts to demonstrate and disentangle the complex recursive interrelationship that has developed between the prolonged colonial encounter initiated by Greeks and Romans in the ancient western Mediterranean and modern European

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culture and colonialism. In particular, it shows both how this *ancient* Mediterranean colonial situation came to exert such a profound influence in the construction of cultural capital and colonial ideologies in *modern* Europe and America, and how those features have had a pervasive reciprocal influence in structuring the teleological discourse of modern scholars engaged in the archaeological exploration of these (and many other) ancient colonial encounters. This analysis indicates that, given its role as the symbolic reservoir for modern colonial ideology, there is an especially pronounced need for critical analytical scrutiny of ancient Greek and Roman colonialism by archaeologists. However, it also suggests that it is impossible to evaluate and improve upon current understandings of this particular ancient colonial encounter (or others treated in this volume) without situating our approaches to the archaeology of colonialism within a simultaneous critical sociohistorical examination of the role that the ancient encounter played in both the development of modern European culture and the institutional context in which the discipline of archaeology has been formed. Circumventing the structural determinisms and naturalized teleological assumptions arising from this recursive relationship is by no means easy. However, the chapter also suggests how a focus on consumption, theoretically grounded in the anthropological literature of colonial and postcolonial studies, may provide a means for restoring agency and contingency to the archaeological analysis of colonialism and reasserting the fundamental historicity of the phenomena clustered under this rubric. Due to limitations of space, I have excluded all but a passing mention of the archaeological case in southern France that generated the largely theoretical discussion presented here and that illustrates its utility. Hence, those seeking further clarification must look elsewhere (see Dietler 1990b; 1997; 1998; 2004; n.d.).

RECURSIVE COLONIZATIONS, ANCIENT AND MODERN

Perhaps the most intriguing and consequential case of “invented traditions” in European history involved a sweeping “colonization” of modern consciousness by the ancient Greco-Roman world. This process was launched several centuries ago, and its evolving manifestations have been a pervasive feature of European culture ever since. The

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passages cited at the beginning of the chapter are illustrative of this curious cultural conquest of the present by the past, although many other examples easily could have been substituted to make this point (see Dietler 1995; n.d.). More important in the present context, however, is to examine the nature of, and reasons for, the historical development of this referential and reverential engagement with the ancient “classical” world and, especially, to reveal its connection to the intimate and problematic relationship between ancient and modern colonialisms that I posited above.

This issue is of particular concern in dealing, as my own research does, with the colonial encounter in the western Mediterranean during the Early Iron Age. That is because this encounter constitutes the seminal episode in the colonial process through which the indigenous peoples of the territories that would eventually spawn the dominant colonial powers of the modern world—France, England, Spain, Portugal, and Germany—first became entangled with the Greco-Roman world that would later come to play such an obsessional role in the collective ancestral imagination of these imperial nations. Hence, it is a moment of pregnant significance for modern discourses of imperialism and anti-imperialism. This feature also indicates both why there is such a pressing need for a critical archaeological reanalysis of this encounter and why situating that analysis from a position that attempts to dislodge the encounter from its discursively embedded context is simultaneously so desirable and difficult.

This modern infatuation with ancient Greece and Rome stems from a particular moment in European history, the so-called Renaissance of the fifteenth century, when a new myth of European cultural ancestry was constructed. Not coincidentally, this was a period that also witnessed the first phase of modern European colonization beyond the Mediterranean (Mignolo 1995; Quinn 1976).

Here, I am principally concerned to do several things. First, I examine the ways in which the development and embellishment of this ancestral myth was linked to the production of both a field of “cultural capital” (Bourdieu 1984; 1990) marshaled in processes of class differentiation within European societies and an imperialist discourse providing an ideological engine for European colonialism abroad. I then show how both of these closely interrelated features subtly have conditioned and constrained the interpretive perspectives of archae-

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ologists engaged in the study of ancient Mediterranean colonialism and explain why it is so critical to “decolonize” our intellectual habitus, to the extent that this is possible. Finally, I briefly suggest an approach that points the way toward circumventing some of these vexing problems.

The Renaissance was not so much a “rebirth” as an invention, a self-conscious attempt to link the present directly to a long-dead and poorly understood period of the past by negating a millennium of intervening history and a wide variety of other cultural influences. As the movement began in Italy, it is not surprising that ancient Rome provided the initial ancestral “golden age” and that Roman culture was the first focus of adulation and emulation. The imperial legacy of Rome was not the least of its attractions that inspired imitation, and this movement rapidly spread to other parts of Europe as well, including especially France, Spain, and, eventually, England (Pagden 1995; Quinn 1976). Liberally reinterpreted visions of Roman culture inspired facsimiles and established the canons of taste in everything from architecture to literature, art, political philosophy, furniture and clothing styles, and gardens (for example, see Auslander 1996; Haskell and Penny 1981; Kostof 1995; Mukerji 1997). Some of these borrowings were deliberately historicist, while others were based upon supposed timeless, universal aesthetic principles that the classical world was believed to have distilled and codified. Latin was expanded and transformed from its monastic role as the language of the church to attain an even more elevated status as the universal language of secular rational intellectual discourse; and the works of Roman poets, orators, and historians were studied as stylistic models and sources of moral and philosophical inspiration. The lingering aura of prestige that Latin acquired during this time is reflected in the fact that most universities in the United States, thousands of years and miles away from any connection to ancient Rome, have Latin mottoes on their crests.

A widespread fascination with the ancient Greeks did not develop until several centuries after the debut of the Renaissance. It was not until the eighteenth century that the Greeks began their sudden rise from obscurity to the level of a pan-European cultural obsession and were retrieved from relegation to the decadent “Orient” to be rehabilitated as the quintessential ancestor of “the West.” This dramatic transformation stemmed largely from a romantic humanist vision developed in Germany during the eighteenth century and especially popularized

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by a scholar named Johann Joachim Winckelmann (Butler 1935; Marchand 1996; Wohlleben 1992). This romantic aesthetic fixation on the Greeks originated partly as a reaction against the rationalist Enlightenment tradition of “Augustan” neoclassicism that had become particularly associated with France. Although Winckelmann never actually visited Greece, he became convinced through his reading and observation of art that “Good taste...had its origin under the skies of Greece “ (1987:3) and that ancient Greek culture represented the pinnacle of human development in the quest for universal standards of absolute beauty and truth. For Winckelmann, emulation of Greek culture, or what he rather imperfectly understood it to be, was almost a moral obligation. This version of passionate philhellenism, which Wohlleben (1992) has aptly labeled “Graecolatry” and “Graecomania,” was adopted by Goethe, Schiller, Schlegel, and other influential German writers and intellectuals who came to believe that becoming Hellenized was the only possible path for someone seeking personal development (*Bildung*). Hence Goethe’s dictum, “Let each man be a Greek in his way! But let him be one.” This virulent strain of Graecomania soon infected France, England, and other countries as well (Webb 1982; Zuber 1992), leading to Shelley’s famous battle cry of Romantic Hellenism in its waning days, “We are all Greeks” (Shelley 1822).

By the nineteenth century, the Greek colonization of modern European (and Euro-American) culture was at its apogee. Political philosophy, art, architecture, and education were permeated by appeals to the ancient Greeks (Grafton 1992; Jenkyns 1980; Marchand 1996; F. M. Turner 1981). Would-be Greek temples such as La Madeleine in Paris, the Altes Museum in Berlin, the British Museum in London, the Field Museum in Chicago, or the “Parthenon” in Nashville are impressive architectural testaments to the ideal of a monument thought to be uniquely expressive of “high culture” on both sides of the Atlantic during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, the kind of Hellenism that informed European life after the early nineteenth century was quite different from the Romantic Hellenism of Winckelmann and Shelley. As Marchand has noted for Germany, the earlier Graecophiles

borrowed their ideals—self-cultivation, disinterested contemplation of the beautiful, good and true, admiration of

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the ancients—from aristocratic models; but the incorporation of nineteenth-century philhellenism into the founding of Prussia's new research universities, secondary schools, museums, and art academies after 1810 universalized these values and in effect imposed them on generations of middle-class Germans.... As the century progressed, philhellenism became more and more the conventionalized predilection of the educated middle class (*Bildungsbürgertum*), inextricably linked to the academy and state bureaucracy. (1996:xviii–xix)

Rome by no means disappeared as a cultural ancestor in the face of this rampant Graecolatry. It still remained a powerful source of inspiration in terms of legal, institutional, and architectural models, and the legacy of its imperial conquests continued to provide a standard of reference and ambition for modern European nations (Koebner and Schmidt 1964; Vance 1997). But the relationship between the Greek and Roman legacies was the subject of a broad range of complex, and often contradictory, interpretations. The characteristics of the two civilizations were often contrasted, with the Greeks dominating a clear hierarchy of cultural superiority and the Romans getting the nod for military and administrative prowess. However, the best aspects of Rome itself were often considered to be a product of its own Hellenization. As Murray succinctly summarized this view, "Roman civilization, as it became more perfect, became more Hellenic" (1953:13). Given that Rome (or at least its ruling elite) had been heavily influenced by Greek art, architecture, philosophy, and science, it was often seen to have been actually carrying out a historic mission as a middleman in bringing the superior moral and intellectual enlightenment of Greek civilization to the "barbarians" it incorporated into its empire. Hence, the European myth of cultural ancestry in the nineteenth century enshrined both Greece and Rome as hallowed progenitors with complementary characteristics and roles.

The same processes of institutional embedding that Marchand noted for nineteenth century Germany were in operation in England and France as well, albeit with variations appropriate to the different political histories and educational systems of these nations. In all three nations, a knowledge of, and a cultivated appreciation for, the "classics"

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became a powerful form of “cultural capital,” in the sense of Bourdieu (1984; 1990), by which members of the ruling class (now essentially the wealthy bourgeoisie) were able to embody and symbolically assert their cultural and moral superiority. Access to this specialized cultural competence was acquired in the universities and the institutions of secondary education that were available only to the privileged and that formed the elite class of each country: the English “public school” and the tellingly named German “*Gymnasium*” and French “*lycée*.” The curricula of these schools tended to be heavily dominated by the study of Greek and Latin language, literature, and history, as contact with these idolized ancient civilizations was thought to have powerful transformative effects in the development of character and taste (Ringer 1979; 1992). As Gerard (1982:357) has remarked, the lycée student of the late nineteenth century was “a little citizen of the ancient classical world” who learned the history of his own country only as a brief episode in the history of Rome.

Likewise, as Bowen (1989) noted for England, the public schools were designed to fashion an elite ruling class that included both a remnant of the traditional aristocracy and a wealthy and powerful segment of the bourgeoisie. Their mission was to impart the traits of aristocracy to those who had not inherited them and to enhance the patina of superiority for those who had. “In the nineteenth century that had been the task of Hellenism; its content provided the appropriate ideology, while its vehicle, the Greek language, served an essential mystifying function, since the express purpose of arcane learning is to exercise domination over the uninitiated” (1989:183). Moreover, for the Victorian public school boy, in training for his role in ruling an empire, “Intelligence mattered less than the acquisition of ‘character’, and intellectual activity was largely restricted to otiose and repetitive exercises in the languages of two former imperial powers, Greece and Rome” (James 1994:206–7). The public schools took their lead in this obsessive focus on classical education from Oxford and Cambridge, the prestige universities of Victorian England, which the public schools were designed to service. The classics dominated the curricula of these universities, and admission to them depended upon having acquired the proper training in Greek and Latin.

To a certain extent, the hierarchical vision of the relationship

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between Greek and Roman culture noted earlier also came to reflect and reinforce finer class distinctions within the English bourgeoisie. At least a smattering of Latin was diffused more widely through the middle class via the grammar schools, whereas Greek continued to be the preserve of “expensively and extensively educated males” of the public schools (Vance 1997:15; see also Grafton 1992). In brief, knowledge of Greek was a prime source of cultural capital in the cultivation of diacritical “distinction” of the kind analyzed by Bourdieu (1984). The fashionable practice of the “grand tour” visit to the Mediterranean became, from the eighteenth century on, another important element in developing the cultural capital of classical cultivation, one that was available only to those wealthy enough to undertake such an expensive voyage to see the landscape and statuary of their classical “ancestors” (Constantine 1984; Fox 1978). As even that archtypically insular Englishman, Dr. Johnson, noted, “A man who has not been to Italy is always conscious of an inferiority” (quoted in Fox 1978:45).

The barriers to social mobility for those who were not in a position to acquire this cultural competence (that is, to become Romanized and, especially, Hellenized) were more than simply social conventions. They were also increasingly institutional. In France, Germany, and England during the nineteenth century, a knowledge of Greek and Latin was not only necessary to enter university, but the entrance examinations for the civil service all began to require a strong competence in these ancient languages (Bowen 1989; W. B. Cohen 1971; Marchand 1996). This feature also assured that politicians and upper-level administrators of the empires controlled by these countries all had in common the feature of having been steeped in the classics. From Bismarck to Gladstone, Napoléon III, and the graduates of the *École Coloniale*, they shared an exclusive common bond of tastes, values, and implicit cultural references lodged in esoteric access to an idolized and idealized ancient culture. The British prime minister, William Gladstone, for example, who wrote an influential book on Homeric Greece (Gladstone 1858), expressed a sentiment common to his class in stating, “The state of Athens at its climax, that is of human nature at its climax...” (quoted in Livingstone 1935:43).

Even if many elite schoolboys managed to acquire only a veneer of classical learning, their education provided them with (1) a conviction

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that the cultural ancestry of their own country lay in ancient Greece and Rome; (2) a belief in the inherent attractiveness and superiority of Greek “civilization” in an absolute, universal hierarchy of cultures; and (3) an assurance that the personal cultivation of Hellenized tastes that their schooling imparted was a sign of their own superiority and an appropriate diacritical mark of their class and its destiny to lead others. However, the legacy of the classics was not simply one of *Bildung*, of personal cultivation and the pursuit of beauty (and the embodiment of class distinction). From Athens to Alexander, Caesar, and Augustus, it was also a legacy of colonization and colonialism. This legacy was interpreted by each of the modern European states that saw itself as the legitimate heir to Greco-Roman civilization as a mandate to continue an inherited mission to “civilize” the “barbarian” world and as an ideological model for its own imperial practices.

An institutionalized infatuation with the ancient “classical” world was by no means confined to the European powers; it also had an influential role in those colonies that were settled by large, dominant European populations, such as the United States (Macarthur 1943; I. Morris 1994). Even a cursory reflection on the monumental architecture of the nation’s capital city and the capitol buildings of most state governments, not to mention countless museums, courthouses, banks, and other major institutions, should be sufficient to appreciate the impact of Greco-Roman models in America. This pervasive phenomenon is to a large extent the result of a self-conscious attempt by the “classical class” of the former colonies, including especially Thomas Jefferson, to fashion an independent national taste that would express and inspire a sense of historical destiny for the new republic. Jefferson quite explicitly saw the newly independent United States as a new Greece developing in the wilderness of America, and he turned directly to ancient Athens and, especially, the Roman Republic for appropriate architectural models (Kostof 1995:624). Moreover, the rigidly geometric land demarcation system imposed on the newly acquired territory west of the Appalachian Mountains bears an uncanny resemblance to the cadastration practices imperial Rome used to restructure the landscape of its colonies.

As this last example suggests, the multifarious roles that Greco-Roman colonialism played in the development of the discourse of modern imperialism and the practices of modern colonialism are

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difficult to overestimate. At the most basic level, it involved an axiomatic absorption of the fundamental Greco-Roman hierarchical dichotomization of the world into “civilized” societies and “barbarians,” a perspective that would have far-reaching effects in the development of modern imperialism (and, as we shall see, in archaeological interpretive models). But the specific manifestations of the ideological relationship between ancient and modern colonialisms were both varied and pervasive.

Initially, from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries, Rome was the nearly exclusive source of imperial models. As Pagden has noted, “It was, above all, Rome which provided the ideologues of the colonial systems of Spain, Britain and France with the language and political models they required, for the *Imperium romanum* has always had a unique place in the political imagination of western Europe” (1995:11). Of course, the Italians also shared in this discursive project: Machiavelli’s influential writings, for example, are permeated by advocacy of colonization on Roman models. In fact, ultimately, all the European empires made continual symbolic and discursive reference to the Roman Empire (Brunt 1965; Mattingly 1996; Pagden 1995; Quinn 1976; Seed 1995; Tulard 1997). However, this Roman legacy, known mostly through the ancient texts of writers such as Cicero, Polybius, Strabo, Caesar, Livy, Virgil, and Sallust, and the remnants of its monuments, was interpreted in an astonishing variety of ways. For example, Seed (1995) has demonstrated that, from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries, the major European colonial powers all based their “ceremonies of possession” in the New World, by which they claimed sovereignty over land and peoples, explicitly upon their understandings of ancient Roman practices, although these understandings were radically different in character from one another.

Greek colonization and imperial politics were also gradually incorporated into imperialist discourse and became particularly influential in Victorian England and Prussia: seeing themselves more as enlightened modern Athenians than Romans, the Athenian Empire of the fifth century B.C. became the analogy of choice (Jenkyns 1980; Marchand 1996:24). But the Romans also retained a very powerful role in imperialist discourse. This was especially true in France (for example, Napoléon III 1866), although the numerous books comparing the British and Roman Empires (for example, Bryce 1901; Cromer 1910;

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Lucas 1912) attest to the allure of this legacy in England as well. Roman precedents and analogies also permeated debates in the British Parliament and in newspaper editorials (Brunt 1965; Vance 1997). Moreover, Rome also provided a source of models for the practices and vocabulary of colonialism. Such “investigative modalities” and technologies of control as the Roman colonial census, taxation, and cadastral land restructuration practices, as well as ethnographic surveys, all had their derivatives in, for example, British India (Cohn 1996). Greek and Roman colonial models were, in fact, both contrasted and combined in a variety of complex ways. Murray’s opinion that “at home England is Greek, in the Empire she is Roman” (quoted in Jenkins 1980:337) exemplifies some of these analogical complexities and paradoxes.

Whatever the relative Greek/Roman emphasis, what is strikingly clear is that ancient Greek and Roman versions of colonialism were seen as axiomatic points of reference for modern situations. As Livingstone noted, “These ages, with which we have spiritual affinities and which have anticipated our problems, have a special interest and instructiveness for us. They are our *Doppelgänger*. We recognize our faces in theirs” (1935:117–18). This was no less true in the matter of colonialism than in other aspects of life. Examples illustrating the pervasive and symbolically powerful operation of such analogies are innumerable, beginning most obviously with the adapted term of supreme rulership for the new “empires”—“*Empéreur*” for the Napoléons, “*Kaiser*” (Caesar) for the Prussian Wilhelm, “*Empress of India*” for Victoria, and *Czar* (Caesar) for the Russian court.

In France, modern imitations of triumphal arches built by the Romans to celebrate victories in their wars of conquest are found in cities ranging from Paris to Lyon and Marseille; and these were erected by governments as diverse as those of Louis XIV and Napoléon I to the Third Republic. Indeed, the recently constructed *Grande Arche de la Defense* in Paris is a modernist interpretation of this same tradition. According to Hautecoeur, Napoléon I insisted that public monuments “ought always to be in the style of the Romans. His empire ought to be the continuation of that Empire which spread from Egypt to the British Isles” (quoted in Ridley 1992). To further this project of symbolic association, Napoléon had himself portrayed in Roman garb as a bronze

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statue atop a monumental column in the center of the Place Vendôme, imitating precisely the Roman Emperor Trajan's Column at Rome.

A major aspect of this invocation of ancient empires was the representation of modern colonialism as the continuation of a civilizing mission that had been inherited from one's cultural ancestors. Colonization could thus be portrayed almost as an unavoidable altruistic duty imposed by history. This idea was often quite explicitly articulated, as in the French colonial doctrine of the *mission civilisatrice*. The English equivalent was Kipling's famous "white man's burden," which the classicist Gilbert Murray would refer to half a century later as "the fine work of the better colonial governments in performing their 'sacred trust'" (1953:59). This hierarchical classification of cultures was, of course, frequently undergirded by racist ideology, a prime example being Sir Francis Galton's (1869) scientific scalar classification of the natural intellectual ability of various regional, national, and racial groups, in which "the negro" ranked several grades below the Englishman and ancient Athenians topped even the English.

I manifestly do not mean to imply in this brief and necessarily schematic discussion that the invocation of the classical past was a homogeneous phenomenon: on the contrary, it was richly riddled with complexities, contradictions, and controversies. As I suggested earlier, the character of the Greek and Roman legacy evolved considerably from its manifestations in the early Renaissance, through the Enlightenment, to the Romantic humanism of the eighteenth century and its bourgeois bureaucratic incarnation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, within each of these periods, Greek and Roman precedents were selectively marshaled to argue all sides of a given philosophical or political issue. They were invoked both as a self-satisfied endorsement of the status quo and as a critical appeal for reform (as, for example, in the famous debate between the "Ancients and Moderns" in France: Perrault 1979). Nor can the invocation of the Greco-Roman past be reduced simply to a cynical manipulation to rationalize imperial ambition and greed. In fact, Roman and Greek antecedents were often invoked to criticize current imperial policies and practices as much as to justify them (for example, Hobson 1902). But what was common to all sides of these debates was a fundamental implicit acceptance of the direct relevance of ancient Greco-Roman

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colonialism to modern cases, and the assumption of a common “Western” cultural heritage in the civilizations of ancient Greece and Rome. There was, in other words, a shared discourse that implicitly defined the terms of discussion by shaping the boundary between the taken for granted and the unthinkable.

The overtly hegemonic grip of the classics on European culture has gradually diminished in the wake of the sundering of the Victorian world produced by the catastrophic trauma of the First World War. Indeed, it has been said that Hellenism died on the battlefields of Flanders (Bowen 1989:183). Rather, I would suggest that, although it was perhaps mortally wounded, this death has been a long and slow affair. It is true that “classics” departments now occupy more the intellectual periphery than the center of European and American universities; but they still vastly outnumber those dedicated to the study of any other ancient culture; and, indeed, no university feels complete without one (contrast this situation with, for example, departments of Celtic studies). Moreover, the privileged status of classical scholarship within academia persisted even more strongly in some countries than it did in the anglophone world—the prime examples being Germany and France (Marchand 1996; Ringer 1979). But even in the anglophone academic world, our common operational vocabulary and specialist jargons are still permeated by terms (colloquium, symposium, syllabus, anthropology, archaeology, and so on,...) that derive from and subtly reinforce an implicit hierarchy of valuation in which terms of Greek or Roman origin (preferably hybrids of the two for neologisms) have greater symbolic capital than their Anglo-Saxon analogs. Interestingly, this phenomenon seems to be at least as characteristic (if not more so) of postcolonial scholars, whose manifest political project involves challenging the hegemony of the classical cannon, as it is of defenders of the centrality of “Western civilization.”

What is more, although the field has been changing rapidly, within classics departments generally there are still deeply entrenched conservative Hellenist perspectives (involving hierarchical assumptions about ancient cultures) and disciplinary practices that have influenced and constrained the exploration of the classical past in subtle and not-so-subtle ways (Dyson 1989; Hingley 1994; Marchand 1996; I Morris 1994; Shanks 1995; van Dommelen 1998). Finally, although it is clear that

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cultural capital within the academy and in society at large no longer is linked to an ability to read Greek, nevertheless the myth of cultural ancestry created in the Renaissance and the hierarchies of cultural superiority engendered by this tradition have persisted as a profoundly embedded, implicit part of popular consciousness. Although an overt concern with the classics is now the preoccupation of only a relatively small body of academic specialists, many of the tenets of the Renaissance, Enlightenment, Romantic, and Victorian engagements with the Romans and Greeks have been absorbed subtly, as implicit unarticulated attitudes, into the consciousness of people who know and care little about ancient history. They have become a taken-for-granted part of a popular habitus that operates at the level of unquestioned assumptions about the “natural” order of things, a kind of discursive landscape of the axiomatic in which we live.

Goudineau’s (admittedly informal) recent survey shows, for example, how persistent the ideology of the civilizing mission of colonization and the cultural hierarchy of “civilization” and “barbarians” that informed Napoléon III’s interpretation of the Roman conquest of Gaul (see Dietler 1994) have been, even among well-educated French people in the post-colonial era. Over 85 percent of those he interviewed considered the Roman conquest of Gaul to have been “beneficial,” and almost 60 percent thought of it as “a model to reproduce.” Almost 70 percent of those who considered it positively did so because it was responsible for bringing “civilization” (Goudineau 1990:17–18).

I would suggest that this subterranean groundwater of Graecolatry and Romanophilia is what lies behind the angst and heated conservative resistance to multiculturalist challenges to the central place of courses on the “foundations of Western civilization” (understood essentially as the heritage of Greeks and Romans rather than, for example, the equally plausible Celts, Iberians, Germans, Phoenicians, and so on) in the curricula of American universities. The recent book by Hanson and Heath (1998), which combines a nostalgic call for a kind of neo-Bildung Hellenism with a bilious harangue against those recent scholars who have dared to view the Greeks as simply another interesting ancient society worthy of critical analysis rather than as the deified Western ancestor, emphatically underscores the emotional weight that this assumption of cultural superiority still carries in many quarters.

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TOWARD A REFLEXIVE ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE COLONIAL

Given this deeply embedded “colonization” of modern European consciousness by the classical world, what implications does it have for the central problem addressed in this volume—the archaeology of colonization and colonialism—and, most particularly, for my own research investigating the colonial encounter in Iron Age France? The answer is both complex and subtle, and it can best be at least suggestively revealed in the following critique of interpretive models that have guided research on this latter colonial situation. But one of the most obvious points that can be made at this stage is that archaeologists, and the discipline of archaeology, have also been formed within this broader discursive field. Indeed, archaeology (particularly the archaeology that deals with this episode of colonialism) developed as a professional discipline largely as a result of the antiquarian desire stimulated by this infatuation with the ancient classical world, and it has been frequently implicated in the concomitant process of modern colonialism (Marchand 1996; I. Morris 1994; Schnapp 1996). The museums of northern Europe and North America are now filled with treasures of Greek and Roman sculpture, architecture, bronzework, and ceramics as a result of the acquisitive urge that motivated the development of archaeology as a means of bringing back the tangible relics of an ancestral past; and the archaeology of Rome, for example, was born of Napoléon’s conquest of Italy and his obsession with its colonial legacy (Ridley 1992). These objects, in turn, have formed the basis for the development of connoisseurship, one of the forms of “distinction” (Bourdieu 1984) that became an important element of the cultural capital of cultivated tastes. It is also clear that archaeology, as a European invention exported to the colonies, frequently served as one of the cultural techniques of domination by which the pasts of colonized societies were defined, systematized, and controlled (Anderson 1991; Cohn 1987; 1996; Guha 1997; Said 1978). Hence, ultimately, we need to think not only about the archaeology of colonization and the colonization of archaeology, but also about archaeology as colonialism. That, however, is a dimension that space demands be left to other venues (for example, see Abu El-Haj 1998; 2001, Dietler n.d.; Holl 1990; Trigger 1984) in order to return to the main theme of this chapter.

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It is important to emphasize that the previous discussion is decidedly not intended as an indictment of classicists, nor to imply that archaeologists are unreflective products of a single, uniform hegemonic discourse, or that archaeology as a discipline has been a static instrument of such a discourse in any simple, straightforward way. Rather, what I wished to indicate is that an understanding of the practice of archaeology requires that it be clearly situated within the evolving cultural history of its institutional landscape and practices.

In the current context, I have suggested that the intimate entanglement of ancient and modern colonial situations presents some severe challenges to archaeologists attempting the crucial work of reexamining and understanding ancient cases. Fusions of vocabulary, for example, have sometimes led to the unconscious imposition of anachronistic motivations and structures stemming from modern colonialism onto the past, as in the treatment of trade in the ancient Mediterranean in terms that derive from the competitive nationalist colonial projects of the nineteenth century (for example, Dunbabin 1948) or, as I will argue later, in the application of world-systems models. What is crucial is the constant questioning of our implicit assumptions and their discursive bases, because these have a great influence in conditioning research goals, interpretation, and evaluation of knowledge claims. Such assumptions may, for example, preclude the asking of certain questions, and they may create uneven standards of plausibility for interpretations. I am not advocating that this be carried to the level of “epistemological hypochondria” that was common in much recent postmodern criticism, but the dangers evident in the palimpsest of colonialisms revealed earlier should require a high degree of vigilance, especially in the case of Greek and Roman colonialism.

Having explained at some length why I feel the archaeology of colonial encounters in the ancient Mediterranean (my own field) is both necessary and difficult, it is also important to say a few words about the value and feasibility of an “archaeology of colonialism” more generally. Why is such an obviously difficult project a worthwhile endeavor at all? And what can archaeology contribute to the broader anthropological and historical investigation of colonialism? The answer to the first question is, I think, fairly easy. Colonialism has been implicated frequently as one of the most significant forces in world

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history. It has been estimated that, by the early decades of this century, one-half of the surface of the earth's continents was under some form of colonial domination, and about two-fifths of the population of the world (more than 600 million people) were living under colonial rule (Girault 1921, cited in Osterhammel 1997:25). Few scholars would seriously contend that it is possible to understand the state of the current "post-colonial" world, as well as its various forms of cultural and economic "neocolonialism," without reference to this historical legacy of colonialism. Most would also agree that such understanding requires a comparative exploration of the enormous range of strategies and practices employed in the effort to exert control over other societies around the world and the myriad repercussions of those practices, including forms of resistance.

The discipline of archaeology can contribute to this project in several ways. In the first place, it can aid in understanding the expansion of the Euro-American capitalist "world system" that, from the sixteenth century on, was responsible for the most extensive implementation of colonialism in world history (Braudel 1984; Ferro 1997; Wallerstein 1974; Wolf 1982). It can do this by furnishing kinds of evidence that are qualitatively different from and independent of the colonial texts that constitute the vast bulk of evidence available to historians. Because most colonial powers were literate and most subjects of colonial domination were not (at least originally), the textual evidence for such encounters tends to be highly partial, in both senses of the term. What archaeology offers is access to the *material dimension* of the encounter and to the processes of daily life through which the colonial situation was experienced and worked out by ordinary people. This is by no means a straightforward or unmediated window of access to an indigenous perception of the colonial situation: archaeologists practice an interpretive discipline that has many serious problems with data and epistemology that limit the range and quality of the information they can generate. However, even within cultural anthropology and history, a new appreciation of the significance of material culture in colonial processes has been growing recently (for example, see Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; 1997, Howes 1996; N. Thomas 1991; Turgeon 1998; Turgeon, Delâge, and Ouellet 1996), and this promises new possibilities for fruitful synergistic collaboration with archaeologists in the investigation of colonial history.

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Perhaps an even more important contribution of archaeology to the study of colonialism derives from the fact that it is the primary conduit to ancient, precapitalist colonial encounters, for which relevant contemporary texts are far more limited or absent. As noted earlier, understanding colonialism in the encounters generated by the historically recent development of Euro-American capitalist expansion requires that they be set in comparative perspective through examination of the historical dynamics of many different contexts. It is especially necessary to examine the many colonial situations that predate Euro-American colonialism in order to ascertain both the singular and more widely shared features of this already diverse set of recent phenomena that has generated most of our anthropological theory on colonial interaction, as well as to understand its genesis. Without recourse to archaeological data, such fundamental issues could only be subject to speculative surmises.

Archaeological studies of colonialism should also serve to counter an occasional tendency toward temporal myopia among cultural anthropologists and historians for whom modern Euro-American colonialism sometimes seems the only game in town. Although the huge geographical extent of capitalist expansion is undeniable, it is well to recall that, for example, the Roman Empire lasted far longer than any modern empire and, in many ways, its colonial practices had even more profound cultural and social consequences than more recent examples (for instance, in terms of linguistic replacement). Moreover, one frequently cringes to hear certain technologies of control or aspects of colonial practice naively attributed to a unique origin in the logic of capitalism, when they were, in fact, a feature of much earlier colonial systems. As should be clear from the earlier discussion, most of the nineteenth century European colonial administrators who were responsible for devising and implementing these practices were far more intimately familiar with the history of Greek and Roman colonialism than are many current scholars of colonialism and postcoloniality, and they were acutely aware of the prior origin of the practices they were trying to replicate or adapt. In this vein, it is also relevant to note that the late twentieth century is by no means the first experience of a post-colonial moment in world history. The ancient world had many such episodes (ironically, for reasons that should now be obvious, these have often been referred to as “dark ages”).

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COLONIZATION, COLONIALISM, IMPERIALISM

At this point, it is also necessary to introduce a brief parenthetical discussion of terminology. Specifically, I want to make clear the senses in which I employ the intersecting terms “colonization,” “colonialism,” and “imperialism.” I raise this issue not out of a pedantic concern to establish a semantic orthodoxy, nor to indulge the kind of typological fetishism for which archaeologists are renowned. Rather, the issue is of concern for two reasons. First, these are all terms about which there is general consensus regarding their importance, yet little agreement about their precise definition. A perusal of even a small sample of the extensive relevant literature (for example, Bartel 1985; D’Altroy 1992; Ferro 1997; Fieldhouse 1981; Finley 1976; Garnsey and Whittaker 1978; Hovarth 1972; Klor de Alva 1995; Koebner and Schmidt 1964; T. Mitchell 1988; Osterhammel 1997; Said 1993; Schreiber 1992; van Dommelen 1998; R. J. C. Young 2001) reveals a wide variety of often contradictory ways in which the terms are used and in the ways their meanings are seen to intersect or overlap (see Dietler n.d.). Secondly, this issue of terminology serves as a striking initial example of the subtle complexities of the problematic relationship between ancient and modern colonial situations noted earlier. This is because, in fact, most of our modern analytical vocabulary for treating such phenomena derives precisely from this ancient Mediterranean colonial encounter (as did a good part of the operational vocabulary of modern colonialism). For example, the terms “colonization,” “colonialism,” “colonial,” and “colony” all derive from the Latin word *colonia*, and “imperialism” and “empire” stem from the Latin *imperium*. However, the meanings of these words have been significantly transformed as they have been applied over the centuries to a variety of modern contexts and processes (see Finley 1976; Koebner and Schmidt 1964; Pagden 1995). Reapplying them uncritically to the seminal ancient context poses the danger of importing modern meanings back to the past and implicitly rendering the ancient cases simply as variants, or prototypes, of the modern. As should be clear from the earlier discussion, this was precisely the ideology responsible for the original application of these words to modern situations. But Roman “colonies” were not the same thing as nineteenth century French or British colonies, and it is an analytically crucial move to recognize and make explicit that what has been terminologically constructed as metonymy is actually metaphor.

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As postcolonial critics have been especially instrumental in emphasizing, this is not a trivial problem. R. J. C. Young, for example, has noted that “all perspectives on colonialism share and have to deal with a common discursive medium which was also that of colonialism itself: the language used to enact, enforce, describe or analyse colonialism is not transparent, innocent, ahistorical or simply instrumental” (1995:163). As he further emphasized, a failure to challenge the way that colonialism has involved (in addition to its military and economic instruments of control) a permeation of knowledge, risks attempting to understand colonialism through its own discursive products.

Overcoming the problems posed by this terminological palimpsest is not easy, but it is quite important. The strategy frequently employed by cultural anthropologists to signal cultural and historical distinctiveness—that is, using indigenous terms in place of translating them into subsuming “etic” analytical categories—has, by and large, been precluded in the current case precisely because those terms have already been coopted and integrated into our analytical discourse with interpolated semantic content. Moreover, the idea of linguistic reform—of inventing and imposing upon the reader a new analytic vocabulary to deal with ancient cases that avoids all Greco-Roman terms already incorporated into modern discourse—seems a cumbersome and quixotic endeavor at best: the intellectual equivalent of spitting into the wind. Rather, I would suggest that, although we are condemned to pragmatically continue to employ the terms current in the discourse of colonial analysis, we must maintain a self-conscious wariness of the traps of implicit fusion and the dangers of anachronism. Whatever imperfect vocabulary one ultimately decides to employ, vigilant attention must be paid to differences as well as similarities in the colonial contexts and processes that are clustered semantically.

In the face of the terminological disaccord noted earlier, my own pragmatic preference is to reserve the word “imperialism” to indicate an ideology or discourse that motivates and legitimizes practices of expansionary domination by one society over another (what might equally be called “colonial discourse”). The term “colonization” is problematic because it is frequently used to mean the act of establishing “colonies,” but in (at least) two very different senses that correspond to two historically different meanings of the word “colony”: that is, either a settlement of foreigners established in the territory of others

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or a subject province ruled by an alien power. Among various potential solutions to this confusion, I choose to use “colonization” to indicate the act of imposing political domination over foreign territory and people, and “founding colonies” to denote the act of establishing new settlements in alien lands. This also implies that I use the word “colony” in a sense that is both narrower than its nineteenth and twentieth century usage and broader than its original Latin meaning. “Colony,” as used here, encompasses the Greek term *apoikia* and the Latin *colonia* (both originally implied the founding of a settlement in foreign territory, but with quite different relations of dependency within different structurations of the political economy: see A. J. Graham 1964). I use “colonial province” to designate a subject territory that is the product of colonization.

Finally, by “colonialism” I mean the projects and practices of control marshaled in interactions between societies linked in asymmetrical relations of power, and the processes of social and cultural transformation resulting from those practices. Hence, colonization is, ultimately, solidified or maintained through colonialism; but colonialism can also operate without the formal political subjugation of foreign territories that colonization implies. Or it may precede an eventual colonization. The nature and effectiveness of such practices defined as colonialism, and their potential permutations, may be extremely variable from one context to another, ranging from such things as trade, to missionary activities, warfare and raiding, political administration, and education. Similarly, the processes of transformation are highly variable, and they always entail a host of unintended consequences for both indigenous peoples and alien colonists. Both parties eventually become something other than they were because of these processes of entanglement and their unintended consequences.

These definitions of colonization and colonialism are sufficiently broad ones that they cannot be considered analytically precise categorical tools used to demarcate a uniform process or a reified transhistorical phenomenon explicable within a single “theory of colonialism.” Indeed, I am in agreement with the growing body of scholars who voice skepticism that such a project is possible (for example, J. L. Comaroff 1997; Cooper and Stoler 1997; Dirks 1992; N. Thomas 1994). Rather, in the sense used here, these terms are pragmatically general (and inher-

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ently plural) rubrics employed to focus critical attention and facilitate the comparative discussion and analysis of a range of practices and strategies by which peoples try to make subjects of other peoples in a variety of disparate historical situations, and the complex transformations occasioned by those practices, in the effort to better understand both the similarities and differences in these processes through history.

HELLENIZATION AND WORLD SYSTEMS: SHARED INADEQUACIES

To illustrate some of the ramifications of the previous discussion, let me briefly turn to an examination of two interpretive perspectives that have tended to dominate archaeological investigation in the area of my own research: the colonial encounter in Early Iron Age France. This was an encounter initiated in the late seventh century B.C. by Etruscan merchants trading along the Mediterranean coast of the lower Rhône basin. At the beginning of the sixth century B.C., Greeks from the city of Phocaea in the eastern Mediterranean established the first colonial settlement in the region, the city of Massalia (modern Marseille). Another Phocaean colony was established within a couple of decades at Emporion (modern Ampurias) on the coast of Catalonia. Massalia eventually grew to become the largest settlement in the entire region (at about 50 hectares) and, over several centuries, established a number of very small subcolonies along the coast of southern France. However, unlike the later situation of Roman imperial expansion (Woolf 1998), Massalia was never powerful enough to engage in major colonization. For several centuries, its relations with the surrounding indigenous peoples were primarily characterized by trade and cross-cultural consumption—a form of social and cultural entanglement that I have characterized as “consuming colonialism” (see Dietler n.d.).

The assumption that this encounter had important cultural and sociopolitical consequences for the indigenous societies of western Europe has been firmly entrenched in the archaeological literature for a very long time. In general, two major interpretive perspectives have tended to dominate analysis of the situation. The first, which I will call the “Hellenization perspective,” has been an enduring theme since the first discoveries of Greek imports more than a century ago and is still a powerful influence (compare Benoit 1965; Bouloumié 1981;

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Jacobsthal and Neuffer 1933; Kimmig 1983). The second approach, which has become increasingly popular in recent years among Anglo-American and some French scholars, consists of various versions of “world systems” models.

The Hellenization perspective is simply a particularly overt and naive expression of the colonization of modern Western consciousness that I discussed earlier. It is a tautological re-presentation of the past in terms of assumptions about the civilizing mission of modern colonialism and the inherent attractiveness and superiority of Western culture that were constructed precisely on appeals to this ancient encounter. Hence, it hardly seems necessary to dwell at length on its increasingly obvious inadequacies as a way of understanding the past (see Dietler 1990a; 1995; Morel 1983; Whitehouse and Wilkins 1989). Suffice it to say that this rather vague concept has been used to simultaneously describe and explain what was seen as the absorption or imitation of Greek culture (or that of other Mediterranean civilizations) by indigenous “barbarian” societies. This unidirectional process was accepted axiomatically as an inevitable outcome of mere contact between “barbarians” and the “civilized” Greeks and was considered to be self-explanatory. The desire for all things Greek was assumed to be as natural as gravity (or as the analogically assumed desire for modern Euro-American goods by colonial Others): like water, high culture flows downhill. Moreover, the impetus for historical change was seen to lie always among the dynamic Greeks rather than among the passively receptive “barbarians.” For scholars steeped in the tradition of “Hellenophilia” described earlier, the superiority and attractiveness of Greek culture were inherently self-evident. It is hardly surprising that archaeologists formed in this tradition have tended to approach the colonial encounter with a heavy baggage of Hellenocentric preconceptions or that scholars who were themselves so actively striving to become Hellenized would have had difficulty understanding a lack of similar desire on the part of the “barbarians” they were studying. Hence, ultimately, the concept of Hellenization says a good deal more about the aspirations and dispositions of modern scholars than it does about the natives of Iron Age France. It is important to recognize that the desires of the latter are not something transparent and inevitable, but rather something that must be explored and defined empirically

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and explained theoretically. Hellenization is simply a descriptive concept laden with a host of implicit ethnocentric assumptions. Explaining cross-cultural consumption requires a more complex and subtle consideration of the social forces and cultural structures that govern tastes and desires.

What is more, there are empirical difficulties with this concept. The archaeological evidence shows something very different from a general emulation of Greek culture. Rather, one sees a regionally distinctive, highly selective, and consistent demand for a very limited range of goods for several centuries: essentially wine and drinking gear (Dietler 1990b; 2004). It is striking, for example, that in the lower Rhône basin, despite the immediate and avid thirst for wine, such fundamental Greek cultural practices and goods as writing, coinage, olive oil, clothing, weapons, and religious practices were ignored or rejected for hundreds of years (Bats 1988; Dietler 1997). Moreover, when one looks closely, it is clear that patterns of demand for imported Mediterranean goods and their historical paths of consumption differ considerably from region to region. The differences between the Rhône basin (with its generalized consumption of imported wine amphorae and ceramic drinking cups on nearly all settlements) and the more northerly Hallstatt context (in Burgundy and southwestern Germany, with its spectacular imported bronze wine-serving vessels and drinking ceramics limited to a small number of ostentatious graves, and its notable paucity of wine amphorae) are particularly glaring. But equally striking differences are evident in Western Languedoc or Catalonia (see Dietler 1990b; 1997; 1998; 2004; n.d).

Growing unease with the idea of Hellenization has provoked a number of scholars to explore alternative approaches. Perhaps the most popular theoretically explicit alternative has been the proliferation of “world systems” models. This is, in part, a reflection of the growing popularity of world-systems models in the archaeology of colonialism in general, although early formulations of this perspective in the Hallstatt/Massalia case have had a seminal influence within archaeology as a whole, especially the pioneering article of Frankenstein and Rowlands (1978). It has been followed more recently by the analyses of Brun (1987; 1992), Cunliffe (1988), Frank (1993), Kristiansen (1994), Sherratt (1993), and others. These approaches differ in many details

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(including the explicitness of their derivation from the different theoretical visions of Braudel, Wallerstein, and Frank); but they all share the use of macroscale models of structural dependency that emphasize counterflows of raw materials and manufactured prestige goods articulating a regional division of labor. They situate Hallstatt political relations within a broad Mediterranean-centered world system in which Hallstatt chiefs expanded their power by monopolizing a role as intermediaries in a huge Mediterranean-oriented system geared toward draining raw materials (primarily tin and slaves) from temperate Europe. The apparent collapse of the Hallstatt political structure in the mid-fifth century B.C. is held to be the result of shifts in this system resulting in changes in control of access to Mediterranean prestige goods.

The use of world-systems models in archaeology has already been subjected to a substantial recent critique (see Dietler 1989; 1995; 1998; 1999a; Kohl 1987; Stein 1998; 1999b; Woolf 1990), and I will not undertake a detailed rehearsal of these arguments here. Instead, a few comments are offered outlining problems that are more directly related to the gist of the discussion that introduced this chapter. Suffice it to say that, aside from the issue of anachronism, these models tend to suffer from a magnification of all the problems identified with the original versions of world-systems theory that inspired them. Essentially, world-systems models exhibit a tendency toward mechanistically reductionist, structurally overdetermined, functionalist explanations and an emphasis on core determination of process on the periphery. They are unable to accommodate culture or local agency and, in their uniformity, they deny the fundamental historicity of colonialism (see Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Dietler 1989; 1995; 1998; Dirks 1992; Roseberry 1989; Sahlins 1985; 1994; Stein 1999b; N. Thomas 1991; Wolf 1982). There is considerable irony in the fact that, despite the radically different Marxist roots of the world-systems perspective, archaeological applications of these models replicate Hellenization's denial of agency outside "core" societies (as well as the axiomatic identification of Greeks as the "core"): both approaches assume the inevitability of native demand on the "periphery" (and, ultimately, reinforce a highly Eurocentric vision of historical determinism). At best, world-systems models have sometimes incorporated a generic concept of functional utility for imports in indigenous societies employing a very generalized model of "pres-

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tige goods” and their redistribution; but this perspective is incapable of explaining why particular indigenous societies began exchanges with Mediterranean traders at all, and why those exchanges centered on particular objects and practices. Yet these are crucial issues if, as in this case, we seek to understand the inception and early development of the colonial encounter.

What is even more to the point of this chapter, the very use of the analytical concepts of “center” and “periphery” poses some alarming dangers in that it all too easily melds the physical and the metaphysical into a reified landscape of hierarchical binary difference. In other words, it risks reproducing a set of linkages among binary oppositions (center/periphery; civilization/barbarism; dynamic/static; modern/premodern) that were fundamental to colonialist ideology and then smuggling them into a stable geography of power that cartographically inscribes and naturalizes these metaphysical constructs. As a number of postcolonial theorists have pointed out (for example, Chakrabarty 2000), the unintended consequence of the very process of applying a center/periphery model to recent history is that it serves to reproduce and perpetuate a hegemonic project in which Europe was able to define itself as the center, as the cultural and economic engine of world history. The subsequent uncritical projection of this concept into the distant past serves to further naturalize this image by validating the etiological and teleological mythology of European ancestry. The truly radical move that is necessary to break out of this trap is to deconstruct the very idea of a center and to dismantle the entrenched binary categories that undergird the center/periphery concept.

This warning is even more urgent in the archaeological cases where center-periphery models have been applied to ancient situations—and most particularly in the ancient Mediterranean (for reasons that should be abundantly clear by now). One must ask, for example, on what basis the precarious colonial city of Massalia is defined as the center (or part of the center) during the Early Iron Age and the indigenous societies of Gaul as the periphery? In fact, there is precious little evidence to indicate that this fits any of the economic or political criteria that characterize the center in a modern world-systems model. Once again, it is not unreasonable to suggest that this definition hinges upon the various other linked hierarchical binarisms that furnish the

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implicit subtext of the model—the same set of binarisms that informed the recursive relationship between ancient and modern colonial ideologies. In other words, Massalia is the center because it was “Greek” (whatever that might mean in the sixth century B.C.) and the indigenous peoples of the region were “barbarians” (the Greek Other)—by definition the denizens of the periphery of the Greek world view. Hence, one can assume that Massalia served roughly the same core structural role as modern Europe and thus correspondingly assume the economic evidence that does not exist.

Along with this tacit assumption of an inherent geography of power, the world-systems approach seems to stimulate a predilection for maps with arrows indicating flows of trade goods across Europe (for example, see Brun 1987; Cunliffe 1988). Yet, a critical look at the archaeological evidence indicates good reason to doubt the plausibility of these arrows. Indeed, when treated as an explicit empirical question rather than a premise, the interconnected set of world-systems assumptions about a significant trade between Massalia and the Hallstatt zone, the existence of relations of dependency and regional division of labor at this early date, and the meaning and function of imports in native contexts appears remarkably dubious (see Bintliff 1984; Dietler 1989; 1990b; 1995; 1999b; Gosden 1985; Pare 1991).

Impressive as some of the individual objects are, the quantity of Mediterranean imports found in the Hallstatt area is exceedingly small in comparison with contemporary imports in southern France. There is little to indicate a steady flow of such imports into the region or to show that their redistribution could have played a systemic role in sustaining the Hallstatt political structure or creating dependency, as the world-systems models assume. Indeed, unlike the case with indigenous Hallstatt prestige goods, there is little to indicate that they were redistributed at all. How this handful of objects could have formed the basis for regional systemic dependency is never adequately explained (and this is, after all, the *sine qua non* of a world system). Additionally, the invocation of counterflows of tin and slaves to the Mediterranean is based not on any evidence, but rather on anachronistic extrapolations from much later periods when the structure of colonial relations had changed dramatically. In brief, a claim of systemic dependency should require, at a minimum, evidence of at least the moderate duration of a

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relationship, quantitative significance of the goods exchanged, and a functionally crucial role in the political economy for the objects consumed—none of which has been demonstrated in the Hallstatt case.

What is more, this easy invocation of world-systems mechanisms for the Early Iron Age constitutes a peculiar form of Whig (pre-)history that threatens to impede historical understanding of the development of the colonial situation and to preclude perception of indigenous agency and experience of the process. As Nicholas Thomas has warned for recent historical colonial contexts, “Although the ultimately exploitative character of the global economy can hardly be overlooked, an analysis which makes dominance and extraction central to intersocietal exchange from its beginnings will frequently misconstrue power relations which did not, in fact, initially entail the subordination of native people” (1991:84). As with many other colonial situations, in the case of Iron Age France it is a serious analytical error to assume that asymmetrical relations or structures of power that ultimately appeared in later periods were necessarily a feature of the first stages of the encounter rather than a product of a subsequent complex history of interaction and entanglement.

CONSUMPTION, AGENCY, AND COLONIALISM

Examination of this initial phase of the colonial encounter in Iron Age France is important precisely because it holds the promise of revealing the specific historical processes that resulted in the entanglement of indigenous and colonial societies and how the early experience of interaction established the cultural and social conditions from which other, often unanticipated, kinds of colonial relationships developed. As Dirks has argued for modern colonialism, “It is tempting but wrong to ascribe either intentionality or systematicity to a congeries of activities and a conjunction of outcomes that, though related and at times coordinated, were usually diffuse, disorganized, and even contradictory” (1992:7). This caveat is all the more apt in the context of the Archaic Western Mediterranean in which the systems of communication and the technologies of control were far less developed. To understand how structures of colonial dependency and domination were gradually created, often in the absence of coercive instruments of power, we must seek to understand the historical complexities of the

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“colonization of consciousness” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:235–63) and the role of material objects in this process. This means that we must first understand how and why some practices and goods were absorbed into the everyday lives of people, while others were ignored, rejected, or turned into arenas of contest, and how those objects or practices triggered processes of cultural entanglement and transformation.

Developing the theoretical tools to accomplish this goal, and to enable a productive archaeology of colonialism, will require coming to grips with the issue of agency in indigenous societies and abandoning teleological assumptions of inevitability that have underlain previous approaches. Given the confusion surrounding the increasingly popular concept of agency in the current archaeological literature, I should perhaps clarify my use of the term in this context. I am decidedly not talking about an attempt to operationalize a notion of Cartesian individualism in archaeology. Rather, I am aiming at a more nuanced, relational understanding of human subjectivity and consciousness in which the conditions for consequential action, and its motivation, are displaced from transhistorical metastructures (particularly crudely economic ones) to socially situated positions and culturally constructed dispositions. My perspective on this version of what might be called situated agency is informed by insights from both theorists of colonial subjectivity (for example, Amselle 1998; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Guha 1997; Stoler 1992) and by practice theory, particularly as developed by Bourdieu (for example, 1990). In other words, I wish to avoid both the Scylla of individual autonomy and the Charybdis of what Sahlins has called “a physics of the world-historical forces” (in Kirch and Sahlins 1992, 1:2), that is, forms of reductionist historical determinism in which agency is attributed solely to economic macrostructures of power and the mechanistic articulation of modes of production.

Whatever their heuristic novelty at a prior moment in time, models of colonial relations in which history is determined at the “core” while the “peripheries” simply react in predetermined ways have surely been rendered obsolete by the past quarter-century of anthropological research and postcolonial analysis. Progress in understanding the colonial experience and its unfolding consequences in specific contexts requires recognizing that intercultural adoption of objects or practices,

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the process that instigated the initial entanglement of the colonial encounter, is not a phenomenon that takes place at the level of cultures or abstract structures. It is an active process of creative appropriation, manipulation, and transformation played out by individuals and social groups with a variety of competing interests and strategies of action embedded in local political relations, cultural perceptions, and cosmologies. People use alien contacts for their own political agendas, and they give new meanings to borrowed cultural elements according to their own cosmologies and schemes of value. Foreign objects must be understood not only for what they represent in the society of origin, but for their culturally specific meaning and perceived utility in the context of consumption. Hence, the colonial encounter must be contextualized in the conjuncture of the different social and cultural logics of interaction and demand of the different parties involved.

It is important to emphasize again that I am not arguing for a romanticized vision of autonomous action, but rather for a balanced consideration of agency and structure as mutually constituting historical forces. Local history and agency must be situated within the larger political economy, but in a way that allows for motivated and consequential human action. One of the main points of my own research in France has been precisely to understand how indigenous and colonizing societies, through the socially situated, and often contradictory, desires of their own members, were drawn into larger fields of economic and political power relations and were transformed in the process.

It is, of course, easier to advocate such a program in the abstract than to carry it out effectively in the analysis of empirical cases. This is especially true for archaeologists, given our peculiar problems with data and epistemology. Nevertheless, I believe we do have the potential to yield significant new insights and substantially improve understanding of colonial situations, providing we strive to develop appropriate theoretical tools and analytical strategies. The chapters in this book demonstrate a variety of productive attempts to move analysis in new directions, each appropriate to particular kinds of colonial situations.

In my own work, I have found that a focus on the process of consumption can provide a particularly useful and sensitive means for penetrating indigenous agency and experience in a wide variety of colonial

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encounters. This is because, in the first place, patterns of consumption of a very revealing kind are potentially accessible in the archaeological record, given the development of an appropriate analytical strategy (see, for example, Dietler 1990a; 1990b; n.d.; Rogers 1990; this volume). Moreover, consumption is a domain of practice that is increasingly being recognized by anthropologists and historians as fundamental to the operation of colonialism. The literature of the anthropology of consumption (for example, Appadurai 1986; 1996; Baudrillard 1968; Bourdieu 1984; Dietler 1990a; 1990b; Dietler and Hayden 2001; Douglas and Isherwood 1979; Howes 1996; McCracken 1988; Miller 1987) makes it clear that demand is never an automatic response to the availability of goods, and especially not in colonial situations. It must be understood as an aspect of the cultural economy of societies that follows the political logic of consumption in specific historical circumstances. Hence, the evolution of tastes and desires in the realm of consumption is a powerful, although by no means simple, indicator of local experience of more global colonial processes.

But, in order to exploit the analysis of the relationship between consumption and colonialism, one must first appreciate the fact that the phenomena assembled under the rubric of culture are not static or rigid. In fact, not only is consumption structured by cultural categories and dispositions, but, reciprocally, "culture is constructed through consumption" (J. Comaroff 1996:20). This implies two things. In the first place, objects "materialize" cultural order—they render abstract cultural categories visible and durable, they aid the negotiation of social interaction in various ways, and they structure perception of the social world (Baudrillard 1968; Bourdieu 1984; Douglas and Isherwood 1978). The "systems of objects" (Baudrillard 1968) that people construct through consumption serve both to inculcate personal identity and to enable people to locate others within social fields through the perception of embodied tastes and various indexical forms of symbolic capital (Baudrillard 1968; Bourdieu 1984). But more than simply reproducing static systems of cultural categories, consumption constructs culture in a more dynamic sense; and this is especially relevant to the issue of cross-cultural consumption and colonialism (Howes 1996). In effect, consumption is a process of structured improvisation that continually materializes cultural order by also dealing with alien

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objects and practices through either transformative appropriation and assimilation or rejection. Hence, culture must be understood not only as something inherited from the past, but as a continual creative project: it is a way of thinking, of perceiving, and of solving problems, including the ever-present problems of dealing with alien peoples, goods, and practices (for example, see Sahlins 1985; 1994; 1995). Societies have never existed in a state of isolation and people must always negotiate their lives in relation to external conditions. This is what Amselle (1998:x)—following Ricoeur's (1992) observation that "selfhood" is constructed in a permanent relation with alterity—means in talking about "originary syncretism." Cultures are inherently relational in nature: they have always been both products of *métissage* and in a ceaseless process of construction through *métissage*. The distinctive feature of colonial contexts is that the particular configurations of colonial relations of power have a marked influence on the nature and structure of the process. Moreover, precisely because of the significance of consumption to the construction of culture, material culture has repeatedly served as an instrument of colonialism.

Given the importance of consumption in constructing culture and social relationships, it should not be surprising that goods have not only been appropriated and indigenized, they have also been used by both parties in exchanges to attempt to control the other—"making subjects by means of objects" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997:218). This has involved not only attempts to create novel desires for new goods, but also attempts to get people to use imported objects in particular ways, as well as the (usually mistaken) belief that the use of particular objects or technologies would inherently induce certain kinds of desired behavior. For example, it is clear that clothing played a very important instrumental role in the strategies of European missionaries to "colonize the consciousness" of indigenous peoples in various parts of the world. Among the Tswana in South Africa, both clothing and architecture served as vehicles for attempts by missionaries to inculcate European concepts of domesticity and bodily discipline; and they became sites of struggle as the Tswana used these new material forms as an expressive language to structure identity in new ways and contest colonial categories and aesthetics (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997). As this case suggests, such strategies to use material objects as vectors of

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control always have unintended consequences for all the parties concerned.

Returning to the issue of the cultural and social logic of desire for cross-cultural consumption of goods, historical accounts of colonial encounters in various parts of the world during the period of European expansion demonstrate that European goods were by no means inherently irresistible to indigenous societies. Usually these peoples exhibited highly selective preferences in both the goods they were willing to accept and to give in exchanges with colonial agents, and they sometimes refused to interact at all (see Sahlins 1985; 1992; 1994; N. Thomas 1991). As has been suggested, indigenous demand in Early Iron Age western Europe was equally specific and selective. In the regions discussed in this chapter, for a period of at least two centuries it was largely confined to a desire for wine and drinking paraphernalia, while other objects and practices were ignored or rejected. Although an appetite for importing alcohol might appear straightforwardly “natural” and self-evident, closer analysis shows that this is not the case (Dietler 1990a; 2001). Moreover, a probing analytical focus on such a deceptively transparent consumption pattern can prove to be extremely revealing of both local agency and the structure of linkages in the broader colonial political economy.

The exploitation of such insights in the archaeological investigation of colonial encounters requires careful attention to identifying specific local patterns of consumption and demand. This involves analyzing simultaneously, on both a regional and site-specific scale, the dynamic relationships among several features: (1) *the contexts of consumption* (that is, the range of the kinds of sites on which objects are found versus those where they are not found, the kinds of specific contexts where objects are found within those sites, the nature of their presence and treatment within those contexts, and so on); (2) *the patterns of association* of imported goods (that is, what kinds of objects are found associated in what kinds of contexts); (3) *their relative quantitative representation* (both in specific contexts and regionally); and (4) *their spatial distribution* (both within sites and regionally). It is also crucial to examine the *specific properties of the objects* imported and consumed, rather than treating them as generic exotic imports, or “prestige goods,” as has often been done previously. This requires using a com-

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parative ethnographic and historical perspective to derive plausible models of the range of their potential social roles, of the significance of demand, and of the social consequences entailed by their consumption; and evaluating the relative plausibility of those models against the patterns outlined above in a dialectical process of contrast and comparison. Finally, this kind of analysis is most effective when one examines patterns in both their temporal and spatial dimensions—that is, when there is both a focus on historical process and an attempt to compare and contrast local patterns with those of adjacent regions or other societies within and outside a particular system (lacking the space for an empirical demonstration of this approach here, readers are referred to Dietler 1990b; 1998; 2004; n.d.).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the intention of this chapter was to suggest both the importance and the possibility of an archaeological contribution to the understanding of colonies, colonization, and colonialism. It was concerned first to establish that such a contribution depends crucially upon a reflexive sociohistorical understanding of the cultural framework of implicit assumptions that underlies our disciplinary discourse. Moreover, it was particularly concerned to show why the colonial encounter in the ancient Mediterranean has played such a pivotal role in the recursive entanglement of modern and ancient colonialism, and why it requires of analysts an especially high degree of self-conscious vigilance. Modern imperialism and the practices of modern colonialism were grounded in a reverential and referential engagement with ancient Greco-Roman cultures and their colonial legacy. That engagement was based upon a heavily interpolated incorporation of a very partial understanding of that ancient context rooted in colonial texts, and the resulting discourse has continued to inform the interpretative dispositions of archaeologists in subtle and not so subtle ways. The chapter was also concerned to suggest (given that limits of space preclude a genuine demonstration) how a strategic focus on the process of consumption offers possibilities for circumventing some of the problems posed by this interpretative conundrum for the development of a viable archaeology of colonial phenomena. A consumption-oriented approach, focused upon the social and cultural logic of desire for alien

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goods, the relationship between objects and objectives in colonial interactions, and the unintended entangling consequences of consumption, offers the potential of restoring access to indigenous agency and the fundamental historicity of the colonial situation.

Our challenge is to find ways of making the histories of such colonial situations intelligible without making them seem ineluctable. History is not made at the center of a world system, nor can it be reduced to teleological mechanics of global structures of power. Archaeologists interested in contributing to the anthropological understanding of colonial encounters must push beyond reductionist macro-models and find new, more subtle ways of exploring the relationship between local and “global” processes: we must develop methods for coming to grips with local agency, culture, and history in the material record of the past. We must also strive to remain vigilantly self-conscious of our own situation in the history of colonialism and of the discursive fields that structure our intellectual landscape of implicit tenets and teleologies.

Acknowledgments

I owe a double debt of gratitude to the School of American Research: first, for hosting the Advanced Seminar at which this paper was presented in 2000, and then, for providing me with a delightful sabbatical as a Weatherhead Resident Scholar in 2002–2003, during which I was able to (nearly) finish the long overdue book from which this chapter was derived. My thanks also to all the seminar participants for stimulating discussion.