

Systems Group project Safety Report

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Introduction

This report details the safety design process solution used by TruePath Safety, based on the safety framework established by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). These processes will then be applied to research and development activities to ensure and maintain operational safety, including hazard identification, risk assessment, and the implementation of the concept of the hierarchy of control.

Key Definitions

- Reasonably Practicable: Balancing the level of risk against the measures needed to control the real risk in terms of money, time or trouble. [1]
- Suitable and Sufficient: Good enough to protect people from any harm that you can predict [2]
- Hazard: Anything with the potential to cause harm [3]
- Risks: The likelihood that a specified undesired event will occur due to the realisation of a hazard by, or during work activities or by the products and services created by work activities. [3]
- Control Measures: Any measure designed to reduce the risk of hazard occurring. [3]

Literature Review

The QFD Method is believed to have been developed by Japanese engineers with the aim of a systematic process to make design decisions by balancing the functional requirements and the means of archiving the requirements and subsequent trade-offs made during a products development, while still maintaining the required functionality.

The QFD Method Uses 4 matrixes to fulfil its aim where it relates:

- Customer Requirements to Functionality
- Required functionality to the means performing the function
- Design features to specifications for the feature (e.g. Parts)
- The specifications of the features to manufacturing processes

Different variations of the QFD process exist, however, the core principles of the process stay the same, with the voice of the customer driving requirements and all subsequent processes required to meet these requirements being related (verification and validation), through the use of the QFD matrixes, back to the original customer requirements.

[4,5]




Figure 1 QFD Process

[6]

1 Understanding Safety Requirements

The TruePath safety team collaborated closely with all roles leads to get a comprehensive understanding of the safety requirements required for each process.

In this report the main areas covered will be as follows;

- The safety process design solution toolset
- The safety process design applied to Research and Development

1.1 Safety Design solution

To understand the safety requirements of each of the sections covered within this report. The author collaborated closely with each area lead to gain insight into the processes and operations involved within their field.

A Safety Design solution toolset, derived from the HSE, would be used to illustrate a fundamental framework of the safety and regulatory environment for each selected area, these being;

- Identification of an area's key hazards (HAZID)
- Conduction of Hazard analysis (risk assessment)
- Hazard Mitigation and controls
- Identification of legal safety deliverables

1.1.1 Risk assessment

As required by law all employers must conduct risk assessments that are “suitable and sufficient” per the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 [7] To illustrate compliance with the legislation, employers must identify what could cause injury or illness within their operations (Hazards), the Likelihood of harm occurring and the severity of harm that could be sustained from the identified hazards (Risk).

Once these processes have been completed, employers must implement the Hierarchy of Controls. Where if hazards cannot be eliminated or substituted, appropriate controls and mitigation measures must be implemented to ensure the associated risks are reduced to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Within this process, controls are preventative measures intended to reduce the likelihood of a hazardous event occurring, while mitigations are reactive measures intended to reduce the severity of the consequences should the event occur.

1.1.2 Hazard identification

As outlined by the HSE the hazards associated with an employer's operations must be captured and understood, A common technique used for this process is known as HazID or Hazard identification where hazards are first identified and categorised by:

- The people it might affect
- The controls that may already be in place
- Any further action that is required to control the risk
- The Trigger event
- The impact of the event occurring

Different variations of HazID exist. However, the one used by the TruePath Safety team is derived from the guidance provided by the HSE.[8]

Table 1 HazID Template

Area Undergoing HazID			
Hazard	Who Might be harmed	Trigger Event	Potential Impact

1.1.3 Risk rating

With the Hazards identified, a means of deterring its associated risk is. The method used by the TruePath safety team is known as a risk matrix.

A risk matrix is a tool that provides a numerical value to a hazards

- Likelihood of occurring
- Impact from the hazardous event

The TruePath Safety team used a 5X5 risk matrix to provide a standardised method for calculating risk. The likelihood score is multiplied by the impact score to produce an overall risk rating for the hazard. Following the implementation of the Hierarchy of Controls, the assessment can be repeated to determine whether the revised risk level is tolerable and ALARP. [2] [9]

Table 2 Shows the Risk matrix used by TruePath safety

Table 2 Risk Matrix

		Impact (I)				
		Minor 1	Moderate 2	Major 3	Severe 4	Critical 5
Likelihood (L)	Highly probable 5	Moderate 5	High 10	Extreme 15	Extreme 20	Extreme 25
	Probable 4	Moderate 4	High 8	High 12	Extreme 16	Extreme 20
	Possible 3	Low 3	Moderate 6	High 9	High 12	Extreme 15
	Unlikely 2	Low 2	Moderate 4	Moderate 6	High 8	High 10
	Rare 1	Low 1	Low 2	Low 3	Moderate 4	Moderate 5

1.1.4 Hierarchy of controls and Mitigations

The purpose of the Hierarchy of Controls is to reduce the likelihood of hazardous events occurring through the control methods illustrated in Figure 2. Eliminating the hazard is considered best practice and the most effective control measure, while personal protective equipment (PPE) is considered the least effective. [10] [11]




Figure 2 Hierarchy of controls

[12]

In addition to the hierarchy of controls, the TruePath Safety team understands that when dealing with high hazardous materials, such as explosives, the primary function of an explosive device is the reason it is hazardous. As a result, the team also considers measures that mitigate the impact (reduce the effect) of hazardous events in order to reduce risk.

1.1.5 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

The TruePath safety team implemented Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) tools to analyse systems containing hazards and to identify how system failure modes could lead to hazardous events. The use of FMEA tools allows the team to identify areas requiring controls and mitigations that can act as barriers to reduce the likelihood and or the impact of a hazard occurring.

Figure 3 shows an example of a FMEA fault tree where 3 Subsystems are required to have a live shaped charge. Each subsystem is itself a system made up of components, these components contribute to the creation of the live shaped charge. Within the fault tree, a potential failure mode can be identified involving the detonator's explosive TATP. TATP, the primary explosive used in this example, is highly sensitive to friction and could detonate during the assembly of the detonation cord and detonator [13]. Creating the hazard of Premature detonation.

Using the hierarchy of controls, a substitution control could be implemented by replacing TATP with lead styphnate. Substituting the explosive reduces the likelihood of premature detonation occurring. However, this introduces a new potential failure mode that being an inconsistent explosive train, this is because Lead Styphnate may not produce a sufficient shock wave required to reliably detonate the TNT (Shock to detonation transition). To control for this, a booster charge could be introduced to improve reliability in turn reducing the likelihood of failure.

The FMEA process can also assist in identifying mitigations related to the effects of failure modes. For example, an inconsistent explosive train could result in unexploded ordnance remaining live and untrained personnel not knowing what to do. This risk could be mitigated through operator training, ensuring personnel understand the correct procedures for identifying and handling unexploded ordnance safely. Without appropriate training, personal may not know that unexploded ordnance could later detonate, potentially causing fatalities. [14] [15]

By Using FMEA tools the TruePath team could naturally Identify hazards, identify the likelihood and impact and even consider controls and mitigations that could be put in place to reduce the risk associated with the hazards in the system.




Figure 3 Fault Tree Example

1.1.6 Legal and Regulatory Deliverables

Controls and mitigations are also influenced by the regulatory and legal environment, where required deliverable also known as acceptable means of compliance must be shown in order to comply with the Legal/regulatory requirements.

The TruePath project is bound to comply with an extensive list of legal and regulatory safety standards, and Governing Body's These giving bodies such as the defence safety authority (DSA) and the Health and Safety Executive exist to ensure compliance with the relevant safety standards. Examples of this can be seen below:

Humanitarian Standards

- IMAS 04.10 – Safety & Occupational Health
- IMAS 07.30 – Marking of hazards
- IMAS 09.40 – EOD procedures

UK Defence Standards

- DEF STAN 00-56 – Safety Management Requirements for Defence Systems
- DEF STAN 00-970 – Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft
- DEF STAN 07-85 – Design Requirements for Weapons and Associated Systems
- JSP 520 – Defence Ordnance, Munitions and Explosives Safety and Environmental Management Policy

UK Health and safety legislation and regulations

- Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 -Primary legalisation for safety
- The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999- Manages and controls risk
- Workplace Health, Safety and Welfare Regulations 1992- Controls for work environment condition
- Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 – Ensures staff are trained on and have equipment this is safe and suitable

NATO STANAGs

- STANAG 4671 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airworthiness Requirements (USAR)
- STANAG 4170 – Principles and Methodology for the Qualification of Explosive Materials
- STANAG 2036 – Land Mine Laying, Marking, Recording, and Reporting Procedures
- STANAG 2897 – Explosive Ordnance Equipment Requirements and Equipment

1.2 Research and Development example process

Within this R&D Risk assessment the applied processes taken by the author, a representative of TruePath, can be shown.

TruePath safety collaborated alongside TruePath's R&D lead to gain an understanding of the requirements and design deliverable derived from the customer. A critical function of R&D is the analysis of design trade off and selection of an appropriate design, TruePath Safety collaborated closely during the function means Selection process, where the means were compared against the required functionality of the system. However, the means selected was guided by the Safety requirements (set by regulators). With the result of a carefully considered means selection that created the design solution of TruePath.

Function	Means											
Deploy system	In pickup truck bed	Towed by pickup truck	Hand-mounted on pickup truck	Self-propelled to location	Man carried	Air dropped	Horzeback	Helicopter				
Detect surface mines	Kimble (Poking or Bumping)	Sonar	Radar	Lidar	Don't	Sniffer dog	Magnetic field	Seismic	Thermal	Visual	Nuclear Quadrupole resonance	
Neutralise mines	Don't	Controlled EOD Detonation	Uncontrolled Detonation (e.g. Rail)	Mechanical Defusal	Electro magnetically defuze	Flood it	Isolate	Controlled delagration	Pirate control signal			
Create cleared lane	Don't	Move mine	Destroy mine									
Mark cleared route	Flags	Digitally	Paint	Grid reference	Human wall	Netting	GPS	rope it off	Painted rock			
Protect personnel	Hardened Armour	Distance	Training	Don't	Sacrificial panels	Autonomous human controlled or not	EPRA					
Operate in air contested environment	Fixed Wings	Rotary Wing	Ground operate (Wheel/track)	Legs	Accept Loss (Pilot/ cargo)							
Comply with regulations	Don't comply	Comply	Partial compliance	Valuer	Limit operationally							
Survive environment	Don't	Dust filters	Heating/Cooling System	Environmental Shielding	Environmental Seals	Suspension	Tracked	Tyres	Unditching Log	Impact Resistant	Vinch	EMFI shielding
Technique for field repair	Spent Parts	Serviceable	Modular	Simple	COTS Items	Poka-yoke	Manual	People training				
Dispose system	Send to Allies	Non-Beropoke Materials	Non-Hazardous Materials	Non-ITAPPEAR	Breakdownable (Screws Not Welds)	Ocean/ bury	Training Target	Leave in Storage	Museum	Sell for Scrap	Burn	Detonate

Figure 4 Function means

1.2.1 Risk assessment conducted Pre controls and mitigation

Table 3 HazID for R&D Processes

HazID for R&D Processes			
Hazard	Who Might be harmed	Possible Trigger Event/ Threats	Potential Impact
Human exposure to TNT vapours, dust, or residue (Toxic ingress)	R&D Team People who encounter R&D Team	Prototyping the shaped charge. Inhalation/ingestion of TNT dust or direct skin contact during lab-scale mixing, melting, or casting of the explosive.	Toxic exposure Causing Deaths Chronic Illnesses
Falling drone	R&D Team Public	In door prototyping drone malfunctions. Motor failure, Battery fault Communication fault Flight controller fault Operator fault	Blunt force Trama Impalement Death Severe injuries
Fragmentation	R&D Team Personnel Public	Small scale live-fire proof-of-concept testing. Detonating a scaled-down prototype.	Deaths Severe injuries Toxic exposure
Unexploded ordnance (DUD/UXO) Shaped Charge	R&D Team Personnel Public EOD	Detonator fault Detcord Fault Broken explosive train/Deflagration to detonation transition	UXO detonates Deaths Severe injuries

Mine Not Neutralised	R&D Team Personnel Public EOD	Shaped charge fires but jet fails to initiate the main fill of the target mine during live fire tests	UXO detonates Deaths Severe injuries
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Table 4 Risk Matrix R&D Pre controls and mitigation

Hazard	Likelihood	Impact	Risk rating
Human exposure to TNT vapour's, dust, or residue (Toxic ingress)	5	5	25
Drone Falling on observers	1	4	4
Fragmentation	5	5	25
Unexploded ordnance (DUD/UXO) Shaped Charge	2	5	10
Mine Does Not Detonate (Low-Order Detonation)	3	5	15

The risk assessment was conducted using the insight gained through the collaborative approach adopted by the TruePath team. By understanding both the project critical functions and the methods used to achieve them, the safety team was able to gain a clear understanding of the R&D workflow. This collaboration enabled the safety team to identify the key hazards associated with the selected R&D approach, assessing likelihood and impact of hazardous events occurring. As a result, TruePath Safety was able to produce an accurate and informed risk assessment.

1.2.2 Controls and mitigations R&D

Risk Scores analysis was conducted to determine whether risks were tolerable.

At first glance, the hazard of a drone falling on observers could be considered tolerable. However adhering to ALARP principles mitigations methods, could be identified, that could reduce the impact of the hazardous event and be easily implemented to further reduce the associated risk score. This could be done by required mandatory use of personal protective equipment (PPE), such as hard hats, to reduce the impact of blunt force trauma sustained from a falling drone. This mitigation could reduce the potential impact from death to a moderate injury, such as a Grade 2 concussion. [16] .

Hazard	Controls	Mitigation	Outcome
Human exposure to TNT vapour's, dust, or residue (Toxic ingress)	Fume hoods, Staff training, PPE, Humidity/climate control	First aid station, Wash station, medical checks	Reduction in Likelihood of toxic ingress. Reduction in deaths, cross contamination, and illnesses
Drone Falling on observers	Safe operating distances, Operator training, Designated and controlled operating areas.	PPE, Reduce payload, when possible, inert testing where possible	Impact reduction to from death to grade 2 concussions
Fragmentation	Safe operating distances, Operator training, Designated and controlled operating areas, simulate before live testing, designed with fragmentation reduction in mind.	Trama response team nearby, Scaled down testing, PPE, Safe operating distances	Reduction in Likelihood of fragmentation hitting individuals. Impact reduction from deaths to Minor injury's
Unexploded ordnance (DUD/UXO) Shaped Charge	Simulate before live testing, Operator training, Designated and controlled operating areas,	EOD Unit nearby, Informing people on site of incident, adoption of best practice misfire procedures.	Reduction in Likelihood of Hazard event occurring . Impact reduction from deaths to death
Mine Does Not Detonate (Low-Order Detonation)	Simulate before live testing, Operator training, Designated and controlled operating areas,	EOD Unit nearby, Informing people on site of incident, adoption of best practice misfire procedures.	Reduction in Likelihood of Hazard event occurring . Impact reduction from deaths to death

Note: PPE (and other risk reduction methods) can be both a Control and or a Mitigation IE Gloves as a barrier reducing the like hood of toxic ingress but hard hat to reduce the impact from the hazardous event.

Hazard	Likelihood	Impact	Risk rating
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Human exposure to TNT vapour's, dust, or residue (Toxic ingress)	2	3	6
Drone Falling on observers	1	3	3
Fragmentation	2	2	4
Unexploded ordnance (DUD/UXO) Shaped Charge	2	4	8
Mine Does Not Detonate (Low- Order Detonation)	2	4	8

1.2.3 Risk assessment

Within the controls and mitigations in place, the risk ratings associated with the selected hazards were significantly reduced. Toxic ingress, drone falling, and fragmentation hazards were deemed tolerable.

However, both unexploded ordnance (UXO) hazards are considered as not tolerable within a civilian role. The primary driver of this assessment is the severity of the potential impact consequences associated with the hazard. Nevertheless, the impact to civilian personnel may be reduced as EOD activities remain outside the scope of their role and responsibilities. In this case, suitably qualified EOD technicians could assume the residual risk associated with the hazard, reducing the risk score for civilian R&D. Confirmation will be sought from the EOD specialists to determine whether this approach could be used.

1.2.4 R&D Legal/ Regulatory safety Deliverables

The legal and regulatory environment in which TruePath operates requires clear evidence of compliance with the standards set by the relevant governing bodies. The employer is therefore responsible for completing the required deliverables and demonstrating that the acceptable means of compliance have been met.

Table 5 R&D Acceptable means of compliance examples

Governing Body	Specific Legislation / Regulation	Legislation / Regulation summary	Required Deliverable / Acceptable means of compliance
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)	Control of Substances Hazardous to Health 2002 (COSHH)	Melting and handling raw TNT exposes R&D engineers to highly toxic dust and vapours (Liver toxicity, Dermatitis).	Produce COSHH Assessments. mandate fume hoods (LEV), specific PPE (Nitrile), and Medical Surveillance (blood tests).
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)	Explosives Regulations 2014 (ER2014)	For R&D, procuring, synthesizing, or storing any amount of TNT or detonators is strictly controlled.	Obtain an Explosives Certificate to legally hold prototype energetics. ensure lab has a licensed, secure storage magazine.

2 Reflection TruePath Safety perspective

2.1 Safety's reliance on communication

TruePath safety team was split into 3 groups

- Safety of Manufacturing
- Safety overview
- The Safety of R&D, T&E, Disposal (Managed by the author of this report)

Responsible for the safety of R&D, T&E and disposal the author was reliant on the direction provided by the relevant role leads to ensure safety requirements for each area. However, with periods where the TruePath teams' communication was limited, the author often found that role leads modified their original direction, forgetting to communicate the changes made. This had the effect of safety work previously completed, by the author, being outdated and no longer relevant, creating inefficiency's that negatively impacted productivity. If these changes were communicated, the author could have pivoted earlier in their process, being more cost effective with their time.

2.2 What went well

Overall TruePath's overall design was a collaborative process with all members contributing with ideas and collaborating using the design QFD process in person and within Teams, with transcripts of these meeting being created to capture the design process and decisions made.

The presentation delivered by the team was well received, with the feedback focusing mainly on cosmetic improvements and the fact that the team exceeded their allotted presentation time. This feedback was taken onboard and will be used to improve future presentations. Overall, the response was positive, with acknowledgement of the team's cohesion. Feedback highlighted how team members consistently referenced and connected each other's sections, demonstrating a strong understanding of how each part of the presentation influenced the others.

The author also received individual constructive feedback regarding the speed at which information was delivered, with recommendations to slow down and refrain from reading directly from the slides, these suggestions will be adopted in future presentations. Positive feedback was also received on areas the audience particularly enjoyed, including the use of Bow-Tie Diagrams to illustrate risk management and the clear familiarity and confidence demonstrated with safety processes.

3 Conclusion

The report demonstrates the safety design process solution used and its application to research and development activities, highlighting its ability to identify and control risks associated with highly hazardous environments, such as conducting R&D involving explosive devices and toxic substances. It outlines how risk assessments are undertaken to evaluate risk tolerability and recommend suitable control and mitigation measures to reduce risks to (ALARP), while posing creative solutions to risks too high for civilian job roles, suggesting the possibility of EOD specialists assuming the risks associated with UXO so that the risk could be deemed tolerable for the civilian R&D personnel.

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Annex Safety application

Breakdown and Disposal

Table 6 Breakdown and Disposal HazID

Breakdown and Disposal HazID			
Hazard	Who Might be harmed	Trigger Event	Potential Impact
Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT)	Disposal Team Nearby People	Burning too much TNT in a single pile or burning it while it is still enclosed in the heavy steel casing. The heat and pressure build up faster than the gas can escape, causing the burning TNT to suddenly detonate.	Unplanned explosion in burn pit Death Severe injuries Secondary hazard of ignition of environment from projectile debris
Failure to Segregate Initiators	Disposal Team Nearby People	Detonator in the burn pit alongside the main TNT charge. Detonators do not burn; they explode when heated.	Unplanned explosion in burn pit Death Severe injuries Secondary hazard of ignition of environment from projectile debris
Toxic Plume Inhalation	Disposal Team Nearby People	Open burning of TNT creates highly toxic smoke plume containing nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide, and unburned vaporized TNT. Wind direction will affect the direction of the toxic gas	Toxic exposure Causing Deaths Chronic Illnesses
Residual Heat / Ash Flare-ups (Burn)	Disposal Team Nearby People	Burn pit is approached while still smouldering, Unburned TNT trapped under the hot ash suddenly ignites.	Deaths Severe injuries (Burns) Toxic exposure
Heavy Metal & Chemical Soil Contamination	Local stake holders of the area, fauna, flora	The melting of the copper liner and the incomplete combustion of the TNT leaves behind heavy metals and toxic chemical salts (DNT, unburned TNT residue) in the burn pit.	Environmental damage (out of scope for this risk assessment)

Table 7 Breakdown and Disposal Risk matrix

Hazard	Likelihood	Impact	Risk rating
Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT)	4	4	16
Failure to Segregate Initiators	2	4	8
Toxic Plume Inhalation	3	4	12
Residual Heat / Ash Flare-ups	3	3	9
Heavy Metal & Chemical Soil Contamination	4	3	12

T&E

Table 8 T&E HazID

T&E HazID			
Hazard	Who Might be harmed	Trigger Event	Potential Impact
Premature Detonation (HERO)	T&E Team Nearby people	HERO (<i>Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance</i>). The detonator is accidentally triggered by the drone's own radar, telemetry transmitters, or stray local radio signals while the drone is still being loaded or taking off near personnel.	Deaths Severe injuries
Autonomous Fly-Away (Loss of Link)	T&E Team Nearby people	Complete loss of the drone's Command and Control link, a GPS failure, or a critical software bug while it is carrying the live shaped charge.	Deaths Severe injuries
Premature Payload Drop	T&E Team Nearby people	Mechanical failure of the drone's gripper/release servo, or unexpected turbulence, causing the drone to drop the heavy shaped charge in the incorrect location	Deaths Severe injuries
Lethal Fragmentation Range Miscalculation	T&E Team Nearby people	Planned, successful detonation of the shaped charge. However, the safety engineers underestimated the maximum fragmentation travel distance.	Deaths Severe injuries
Unexploded Ordnance	T&E Team Nearby people EOD	The drone successfully places the charge and flies away. The RF fire signal is sent, but faulty wiring or a defective receiver fails to trigger the main fill.	Deaths Severe injuries

Table 9 T&E Risk assessment

Hazard	Likelihood	Impact	Risk rating
Premature Detonation (HERO)	1	5	5
Autonomous Fly-Away (Loss of Link)	3	5	15
Premature Payload Drop	2	4	8
Lethal Fragmentation Range Miscalculation	2	5	10
Unexploded Ordnance	2	4	8

FMEA

Table 10 FMEA

Function	Failure Mode	Effect	Cause
Detect mines (Detection drone)	Mine not detected (false negative)	Residual mine left in lane → risk to civilians/convoy	Sensor failure, GPS degradation, environmental dust, low altitude error
Detect mines (Detection drone)	False positive	Unnecessary neutralisation or mission delay	Sensor noise, metallic clutter, EMI interference
Neutralise mine (Neutralisation drone)	Premature or failed initiation	Blast hazard or incomplete neutralisation	Arming logic fault, continuity failure, battery loss
Drone flight control	Loss of control over minefield	Unintentional approach → potential detonation	Power failure, motor fault, GPS spoofing, high winds
Marking cleared lane	Incorrect or missing marking	Convoy enters unsafe area	Human error, poor visibility, marker displacement
Verification sweep	Missed device during re-sweep	Residual hazardous item left behind	Incomplete sweep, operator oversight

Raw transcript example

The screenshot shows a Zoom meeting interface with a dark theme. At the top, the meeting title is 'WBG P Presentation'. Below the title bar, the date and time are '27 February 2026 14:00 - 15:00', and the meeting is divided into three parts, with 'Part 2' currently selected. A message states, 'This part of the meeting was transcribed only.' Below this, there is a 'Shared files' section indicating no files were shared. Navigation tabs for 'Notes', 'AI summary', and 'Transcript' are present, with 'Transcript' being the active tab. A 'Download' button and a search bar are also visible. The transcript itself lists five messages from participants LB and BA, with timestamps and redacted names. The messages discuss the structure of the presentation, mentioning a 45-minute duration and a plan for six participants to speak for 5 minutes each.

WBG P Presentation Chat Shared Recap Q&A Meeting Whiteboard +

27 February 2026 14:00 - 15:00 | Part 1 Part 2 Part 3

This part of the meeting was transcribed only.

Shared files ⓘ
No files were shared.

Notes AI summary Transcript

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LB [redacted] 4:36
We'll just put questions in on that final one.

SJ [redacted] 4:39
Mhm.
Right, if I go to the thing, it says it's gonna be forty-five minutes, the presentation, so...
Are we going to try and have it like broken down like evenly that everyone speaks first even amount or are we going to do it by like a straight up sections?

BA [redacted] 4:59
I think it, sorry.

LB [redacted] 4:59
Uh, put...
Yeah, I know after you, Blake.

BA [redacted] 5:03
I think by the time everybody has their own section because there's what, six of us.
Speaking for 5 minutes each, that's half an hour by itself, and that's without introductions, questions, or anything.

Included to show evidence of a transcript, that was used for design record keeping. Not fully included due to permission concerns.