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
QUO

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Edited

Paul R

Penguin




QUO

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ment. But they were also revolts against model
ers, isolation, the medical or educational ser-
revolts whose aims were merely material? Or
its: against the obsolete, but also against com-
orders, but also against the psychiatrists? In
ements—and the innumerable discourses that
n rise to since the early nineteenth century—
he body and material things. What has sus-
urses, these memories and invectives, are in-
naterial details. One may, if one is so disposed,
e than blind demands or suspect the existence
ien strategies. In fact, they were revolts, at
ly, against the very body of the prison. What
not whether the prison environment was too
ic, too primitive or too efficient, but its very
strument and vector of power; it is this whole
er over the body that the technology of the
e educationalists, psychologists, and psychi-
to conceal or to compensate, for the simple
e of its tools. I would like to write the history
all the political investments of the body that
in its closed architecture. Why? Simply be-
ted in the past? No, if one means by that
the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one
history of the present.³

Notes

give no notion by references or quotations what
les Deleuze and the work he is undertaking with
ould also have quoted a number of pages from
ysme and say how much I am indebted to Pierre

rie, *Contrepoint* (Paris, 1973) and 'L'Histoire im-
y-June 1974).

th of the prison only in the French penal system.
cal developments and institutions would make a
examination too burdensome and any attempt to
non as a whole too schematic.

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Docile Bodies

(FROM *Discipline and Punish*)

Let us take the ideal figure of the soldier as it was still seen in the early seventeenth century. To begin with, the soldier was someone who could be recognized from afar; he bore certain signs: the natural signs of his strength and his courage, the marks, too, of his pride; his body was the blazon of his strength and valor; and although it is true that he had to learn the profession of arms little by little—generally in actual fighting—movements like marching and attitudes like the bearing of the head belonged for the most part to a bodily rhetoric of honor; "The signs for recognizing those most suited to this profession are a lively, alert manner, an erect head, a taut stomach, broad shoulders, long arms, strong fingers, a small belly, thick thighs, slender legs and dry feet, because a man of such a figure could not fail to be agile and strong"; when he becomes a pike-bearer, the soldier "will have to march in step in order to have as much grace and gravity as possible, for the pike is an honorable weapon, worthy to be borne with gravity and boldness."¹ By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inert body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit; in short, one has "got rid of the peasant" and given him "the air of a soldier." Recruits become accustomed to "holding their heads high and erect; to standing upright, without bending the back, to sticking out the belly, throwing out the chest and throwing back the shoulders; and, to help them acquire the habit, they are given this position while standing against a wall in such a way that the heels, the thighs,

the waist, and the shoulders touch it, as also do the backs of the hands, as one turns the arms outwards, without moving them away from the body. . . . Likewise, they will be taught never to fix their eyes on the ground, but to look straight at those they pass . . . to remain motionless until the order is given, without moving the head, the hands, or the feet . . . lastly to march with a bold step, with knee and ham taut, on the points of the feet, which should face outwards."²

The classical age discovered the body as object and target of power. It is easy enough to find signs of the attention then paid to the body—to the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained; which obeys, responds, becomes skillful, and increases its forces. The great book of Man-the-Machine was written simultaneously on two registers: the anatomico-metaphysical register, of which Descartes wrote the first pages and which the physicians and philosophers continued, and the technico-political register, which was constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school, and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the body. These two registers are quite distinct, since it was a question, on the one hand, of submission and use and, on the other, of functioning and explanation: there was a useful body and an intelligible body. And yet there are points of overlap from one to the other. La Mettrie's *L'Homme-machine* is both a materialist reduction of the soul and a general theory of *dressage*, at the center of which reigns the notion of "docility," which joins the analyzable body to the manipulable body. A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved. The celebrated automata, on the other hand, were not only a way of illustrating an organism; they were also political puppets, small-scale models of power: Frederick II, the meticulous king of small machines, well-trained regiments, and long exercises, was obsessed with them.

What was so new in those projects of docility that interested the eighteenth century so much? It was certainly not the first time that the body had become the object of such imperious and pressing investments; in every society, the body was in the grip of very strict powers, which imposed on it constraints, prohibitions, or obligations. However, there were several new things

in these techniques. To begin with, there was the scale of the control: it was a question not of treating the body *en masse*, "wholesale," as if it were an indissociable unity, but of working it "retail," individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself—movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body. Then there was the object of the control: it was not or was no longer the signifying elements of behavior or the language of the body, but the economy, the efficiency of movements, their internal organization; constraint bears on the forces rather than on the signs; the only truly important ceremony is that of exercise. Lastly, there is the modality: it implies an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its result, and it is exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement. These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed on them a relation of docility-utility, might be called "disciplines." Many disciplinary methods had long been in existence—in monasteries, armies, workshops. But, in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the disciplines became general formulas of domination. They were different from slavery because they were not based on a relation of appropriation of bodies; indeed, the elegance of the discipline lay in the fact that it could dispense with this costly and violent relation by obtaining effects of utility at least as great. They were different, too, from "service," which was a constant, total, massive, nonanalytical, unlimited relation of domination, established in the form of the individual will of the master, his "caprice." They were different from vassalage, which was a highly coded, but distant relation of submission, which bore less on the operations of the body than on the products of labor and the ritual marks of allegiance. Again, they were different from asceticism and from "disciplines" of a monastic type, whose function was to obtain renunciations rather than increases of utility and which, although they involved obedience to others, had as their principal aim an increase of the mastery of each individual over his own body. The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the

human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, or at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down, and rearranges it. A "political anatomy," which was also a "mechanics of power," was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed, and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, "docile" bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an "aptitude," a "capacity," which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection. If economic exploitation separates the force and the product of labor, let us say that disciplinary coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination.

The "invention" of this new political anatomy must not be seen as a sudden discovery. It is, rather, a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another, support one another, distinguish themselves from one another according to their domain of application, converge, and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method. They were at work in secondary education at a very early date, later in primary schools; they slowly invested the space of the hospital; and, in a few decades, they restructured the military organization. They sometimes circulated very rapidly from one point to another (between the army and the technical schools or secondary schools), sometimes slowly and discreetly (the insidious militarization of the large workshops). On almost every occasion, they were adopted in response to particular needs: an industrial innovation, a re-

newed outbreak of certain epidemic diseases, the invention of the rifle, or the victories of Prussia. This did not prevent them from being totally inscribed in general and essential transformations, which we must now try to delineate.

There can be no question here of writing the history of the different disciplinary institutions, with all their individual differences. I simply intend to map, on a series of examples, some of the essential techniques that most easily spread from one to another. These were always meticulous, often minute, techniques, but they had their importance: because they defined a certain mode of detailed political investment of the body, a "new microphysics" of power; and because, since the seventeenth century, they had constantly reached out to ever-broader domains, as if they tended to cover the entire social body. Small acts of cunning endowed with a great power of diffusion; subtle arrangements, apparently innocent, but profoundly suspicious; mechanisms that obeyed economies too shameful to be acknowledged, or pursued petty forms of coercion—it was nevertheless they that brought about the mutation of the punitive system, at the threshold of the contemporary period. Describing them will require great attention to detail: beneath every set of figures, we must seek not a meaning, but a precaution; we must situate them not only in the inextricability of a functioning, but in the coherence of a tactic. They are the acts of cunning, not so much of the greater reason that works even in its sleep and gives meaning to the insignificant, as of the attentive "malevolence" that turns everything to account. Discipline is a political anatomy of detail.

Before we lose patience we would do well to recall the words of Marshal de Saxe: "Although those who concern themselves with details are regarded as folk of limited intelligence, it seems to me that this part is essential, because it is the foundation, and it is impossible to erect any building or establish any method without understanding its principles. It is not enough to have a liking for architecture. One must also know stone-cutting." There is a whole history to be written about such "stone-cutting"—a history of the utilitarian rationalization of detail in moral accountability and political control. The classical age did not initiate it; rather, it accelerated it, changed its scale, gave it pre-

truments, and perhaps found some echoes for it in the ion of the infinitely small or in the description of the -tailed characteristics of natural beings. In any case, "de- d long been a category of theology and asceticism: every important since, in the sight of God, no immensity is than a detail, nor is anything so small that it was not y one of his individual wishes. In this great tradition nence of detail, all the minutiae of Christian education, astic or military pedagogy, all forms of "training" found ace easily enough. For the disciplined man, as for the ever, no detail is unimportant, but not so much for the ; that it conceals within it as for the hold it provides for ver that wishes to seize it. Characteristic is the great the "little things" and to their eternal importance, sung Baptiste de La Salle in his *Traité sur les obligations des Écoles chrétiennes*. The mystique of the everyday is ere with the discipline of the minute. "How dangerous eglect little things. It is a very consoling reflection for ke mine, little disposed to great actions, to think that o little things may, by an imperceptible progress, raise e most eminent sanctity: because little things lead to . . . Little things; it will be said, alas, my God, what o that is great for you, weak and mortal creatures that Little things; if great things presented themselves would orm them? Would we not think them beyond our ? Little things; and if God accepts them and wishes to hem as great things? Little things; has one ever felt es one judge according to experience? Little things; rtainly guilty, therefore, if seeing them as such, one nem? Little things; yet it is they that in the end have at saints! Yes, little things; but great motives, great great fervor, great ardor, and consequently great mer- treasures, great rewards." ⁴ The meticulousness of the as, the fussiness of the inspections, the supervision of est fragment of life and of the body will soon provide, ntext of the school, the barracks, the hospital, or the), a laicized content, an economic or technical rational- s mystical calculus of the infinitesimal and the infinite. story of Detail in the eighteenth century, presided over

re de La Salle, touching on Leibniz and Buffon, I, covering pedagogy, medicine, military tactics, , should bring us, at the end of the century, to ream of being another Newton, not the Newton ties of the heavens and the planetary masses, but small bodies," small movements, small actions; o replied to Monge's remark, "there was only one ver": "What do I hear? But the world of details, dreamt of that other world, what of that world? d in it ever since I was fifteen. I was concerned nd this memory lives within me, as an obsession andoned. . . . That other world is the most im- at I flatter myself I have discovered: when I think aches" (these words are attributed to Bonaparte ction to Saint-Hilaire's *Notions synthétiques et his- sophie naturelle*). Napoleon did not discover this now that he set out to organize it; and he wished nd him a mechanism of power that would enable smalles event that occurred in the state he gov- ded, by means of the rigorous discipline that he mbrace the whole of this vast machine without ail escaping his attention." ⁵ ous observation of detail and, at the same time, a ness of these small things, for the control and use e through the classical age, bearing with them a chniques, a whole corpus of methods and knowl- ons, plans, and data. And from such trifles, no n of modern humanism was born. ⁶

that war as strategy is a continuation of politics. t be forgotten that "politics" has been conceived on, if not exactly and directly of war, at least of odel as a fundamental means of preventing civil ics, as a technique of internal peace and order, ement the mechanism of the perfect army, of the ss, of the docile, useful troop, of the regiment in he field, on maneuvers and on exercises. In the h-century states, the army guaranteed civil peace

no doubt because it was a real force, an ever-threatening sword, but also because it was a technique and a body of knowledge that could project their schema over the social body. If there is a politics-war series that passes through strategy, there is an army-politics series that passes through tactics. It is strategy that makes it possible to understand warfare as a way of conducting politics between states; it is tactics that makes it possible to understand the army as a principle for maintaining the absence of warfare in civil society. The classical age saw the birth of the great political and military strategy by which nations confronted each other's economic and demographic forces; but it also saw the birth of meticulous military and political tactics by which the control of bodies and individual forces was exercised within states. The "*militaire*"—the military institution, military science, the *militaire* himself, so different from what was formerly characterized by the term *homme de guerre*—was specified, during this period, at the point of junction between war and the noise of battle, on the one hand, and order and silence, subservient to peace, on the other.

Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century; but there was also a military dream of society; its fundamental reference was not to the state of nature but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility.

"Discipline must be made national," said Guibert. "The state that I depict will have a simple, reliable, easily controlled administration. It will resemble those huge machines, which by quite uncomplicated means produce great effects; the strength of this state will spring from its own strength, its prosperity from its own prosperity. Time, which destroys all, will increase its power. It will disprove that vulgar prejudice by which we are made to imagine that empires are subjected to an imperious law of decline and ruin."⁷ The Napoleonic regime was not far off and with it the form of state that was to survive it and, we must not forget, the foundations of which were laid not only by jurists but also by soldiers, not only councilors of state but also

junior officers, not only the men of the courts but also the men of the camps. The Roman reference that accompanied this formation certainly bears with it this double index: citizens and legionaries, law and maneuvers. While jurists or philosophers were seeking in the pact a primal model for the construction or reconstruction of the social body, the soldiers and with them the technicians of discipline were elaborating procedures for the individual and collective coercion of bodies.

Notes

¹ J. de Montgommery, *La Milice française* (1636 ed.), pp. 6-7.

² Ordinance of 20 March 1764.

³ Maréchal de Saxe, *Les Réveries* (1756), p. 5.

⁴ J.-B. de La Salle, *Traité sur les obligations des frères des Écoles chrétiennes* (1783 ed.), pp. 238-9.

⁵ J. B. Treilhard, *Motifs du code d'instruction criminelle* (1808), p. 14.

⁶ I shall choose examples from military, medical, educational, and industrial institutions. Other examples might have been taken from colonization, slavery, and child-rearing.

⁷ J. A. de Guibert, "Discours préliminaire," *Essai général de tactique*, I (1772), pp. xxiii-xxiv. Cf. what Marx says about the army and forms of bourgeois society in his letter to Engels of September 25, 1857.