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Conclusion

At the end of this necessarily short and incomplete survey of the irresistible movement which, in less than two decades, has transformed the world map and the political relationship between the continents, some facts stand out.

The decolonization process was not the result of chance or circumstances, though the latter undeniably were favourable to its development. Just as colonization, at the end of the nineteenth century, had found its roots in the upsurge of nationalist fever which had affected Europe, the decolonization process originated in the growth of colonial nationalism which was often bred in Western thinking. The distortion between the ideas of freedom, equality and justice proclaimed as the foundations of political morality and ordinary conduct gave rise, among the élites, to a desire for change.

First colonial nationalism was essentially nourished by the idea of inequality and the wish to put an end to it. 'The most besotted and the basest of drunkards was (in white colonial society) superior to the most distinguished of men to be found among the subjugated races, in the field of science, culture and industry' (Carlo Romulo). Access to equality seemed to be linked above all to severing the links of dependence:

I saw [wrote Nkrumah] that the only solution to this problem lay in political freedom for our people, because it is only when a people is politically free that the other races show it the respect it deserves. It is impossible to talk about equality in any other terms. No people without its own government can deal with sovereign peoples on an equal footing. A race, a people, a nation cannot exist freely, or be respected either at home or abroad, without political independence.

In order to prolong their rule, the Europeans relied on the slow pace of progress among the native masses: peoples devoid of any political awareness could not be allowed to rule themselves, it was argued. Yet this awareness developed at a surprising speed, under the influence of the élites who directed it towards fulfilling the aspirations of freedom. The argument was put forward that, in a world where interdependence tended to predominate, nationalism was out of place and the pursuit of national sovereignty a dangerous anachronism. The French Socialist party put

forward as their own the doctrine of 'individual liberation of each man, each woman; an economic and social liberation which would free them from poverty and free them politically by putting them in a situation where they could express their opinions freely' (speech by G. Mollet in New York, 28 February 1957). The colonial peoples were the less satisfied with all these good intentions in that the Western powers seemed reluctant to abandon their sovereignty; moreover the colonial peoples discovered that they were faced with an attitude which was expressed baldly, to say the least, by a leading French journalist:

Nowadays [wrote R. Cartier] the European living in Africa uses all his skill in justifying his presence. He describes himself as a trustee whose mission will end when the peoples he rules come of age. . . . The remedy against this is to declare calmly that the white man is in Africa to stay because his interest urges him to be there and to stay there. The benefits which colonization brought to primitive African civilizations are incalculable but they are not the main reason for colonization and they have far too often been used as a smokescreen or a justification. Without Africa, Europe is only a small overpopulated and dependent peninsula; it is a clear and sufficient reason not to get rid of Africa even if it means fighting to keep her. (Special Report, *Paris-Match*, October-November-December 1953.)

The colonial leaders knew that independence was not a magic panacea which would cure all the ills of their countries; they also knew that independence would not by itself give them the means to build a modern economy capable of quickly raising their standards of living. But they preferred 'poverty in freedom to wealth in slavery' (Sekou Touré). For them, however, prosperity was not a condition of autonomy but, on the other hand, the development of their prosperity depended on their autonomy.

Colonial nationalism was the driving force in the 'acceleration of history'. Not only did it provoke the rapid disappearance of the old type of imperialism, it also gave to these territorial units autonomous political life, for which role nothing seemed to have prepared them. From the moment the emancipation movement achieved some importance, the objections about the political and economic maturity which for many years the colonial powers had used as an argument, disappeared. 'The New Zealand government,' noted *The Economist* (6 January 1962), not without humour, 'has accepted the demand for independence of Western Samoa on a vote of its inhabitants (113,000); few Samoans had any idea what the written constitution was all about, and although most of them wanted independence some time, they do not feel that their leaders are yet ready for it; but there was no opportunity to express this point of view on the voting paper. Thus the average Samoan simply felt that since he did not want to be a slave, he had better vote Yes to both questions.'

Nationalism based itself on the historical past of the peoples, if they possessed one; the absence of a written history did not harm the nationalist cause. 'Perhaps there are no African nations as such in history. But then nations are not always a heritage or a resurrection; they grow

and develop as much on the future as on the past.' (A. Charton, *Le Pluralisme ethnique et culturel en AOF*.) Those Africans, and they were the majority, who did not have the memory of a sovereign state in their past history, settled within the 'colonial plots' which the Europeans had arbitrarily cut out when they came to Africa. For them, colonialism was the cradle of nationalism by giving it a geographical framework which, without the intervention of colonialism, would probably have taken a long time to establish itself. Nationalism would no doubt have grown within limits more in accordance with geographical and, above all, ethnic realities, but certainly at the price of prolonged conflicts. The confines of tribes and groups has been superseded; the regrouping took place in relation to the problems and the interests of the territory in particular. The struggle for independence engendered a genuine form of patriotism:

Certainly [wrote A. Charton in 1957] some Africans will continue to call themselves Ouolof or Baoule, Fon or Malinke, but they do so in a way a Frenchman calls himself Périgourdin, Basque or Catalan. Other categories, other denominations are offering him other types of association. First the territory, a creation of the French administration; the native from Senegal is now aware of being Senegalese; there is constant and continual talk about the inhabitants of the Ivory Coast, the Eburneans, who thereby show how conscious they are of belonging to their community....*

Having accepted this, there is no need whatever to recall common historical memories to form a nation.

The severance of the links of bondage, however important this may have been, was only one stage in the decolonization process; the easiest stage according to some. Political independence, if it is not to be a vain ideal, must be based on solid economic foundations. Yet many states which were formerly colonized must rebuild their economy on new foundations, because until then it was geared according to the needs and the profits of the colonizer. To tackle this enormous problem falls outside the scope of our survey. We agree, however, with the following English author when he writes: 'The colonial empires will cease to exist only on the day when all the peoples of the world, in all walks of life, relate to each other on equal terms.' (E. A. Walker, *The Colonies; Past and Future*.)

*Many African leaders do not share the opinion which was very widely held in Europe until recently, whereby the peoples of the black continent have no national history. Recent studies by African or European writers already confirm that this apparent vacuum was in fact only an unexplored field.

Postscript

Since this book was first published the movement of political decolonization has practically ended; nearly all the territories who desired independence, at least the former English and French possessions, have achieved it. In 1975, the Commonwealth had ten more members than in 1965: the three protectorates of South Africa have become states: namely Botswana, Lesotho (Basutoland) in 1966, and Ngwame (Swaziland) in 1968. Great Britain, no longer desiring responsibility east of Suez, retired from the Emir States of the Persian gulf at the end of 1971, leaving behind three independent states; the Abu-Dhabi — Dubai federation, Bahrein and Qatar. The only case of conflict is Rhodesia which claimed unilateral independence in 1965, a step considered of no legal value by London.

The emancipation of Africa is in its final stages, with the decolonization of the Portuguese territories of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique. The process towards freedom of the oldest European colonial empire in Africa began roughly about 1960. From then, the voice of the colonized masses began to be heard in Europe via a few 'advanced' militants from Angola and Guinea. On the spot, all the 'subversive actions' were crushed with extreme rigour by the Portuguese army and colonists: the Luanda bloodbath (4 February 1961) led to the intervention of the UN Security Council in the form of an enquiry commission. The Salazar government showed its determination to retain its domination by promulgating the organic Law of 24 June 1963, which affirmed: 'The overseas provinces, as integral parts of the State of Portugal, are bound to each other and to the parent state.'

Repression slowed the nationalist movement but did not stop it. Resistance movements formed 'maquis'; but the organization and the growth of these clandestine groups were hampered by the lack of Africans capable of assuming their leadership. The 'assimilated', aptest men to undertake it, having some rights because they could read and write, and 'lived a Christian life', were thrown into jail as soon as they evinced any taste for freedom; most of them preferred expatriation. Lastly, even more so than in the rest of Africa, these nationalist groups were divided.

And yet these 'forgotten ones' advanced, helped by neighbouring countries (Zambia, Tanzania), by the USSR, by China, and by the action of the UN. On 21 November 1968 the Commission for Non-autonomous

Territories invited Portugal to grant, 'without delay', the right to self-determination to the peoples of its African territories; the Commission condemned the collaboration between Portugal and Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia, and South Africa; it asked all states to cease giving Portugal any aid in pursuing its 'colonial war'. The Lisbon government held strong to its basic position, although admitting that the nationalists controlled certain areas of the territory and were beginning to set up a political infrastructure (proclamation of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau by the African Party for the Independence of the Guinea and Cape Verde Islands - PALGC). By using a sham concession, the Portuguese altered the names of their possessions, which instead of being called 'provinces' became 'states'; a pretence of internal autonomy was granted to Guinea (Organic Law of 23 June 1972), but in reality the Portuguese held full power and more than 40 per cent of the national budget was devoted to their war effort.

Public opinion in Portugal, and foremost the army, was growing weary. Spínola's book, *Portugal and her Future* (February 1974) proclaimed aloud the secret thoughts of many people on the impossibility of a military solution. The weariness led to the overthrow (25 April 1974) of a regime which was moreover discredited by its bigoted conservative nature and repressive police system. Caetano's plan for the African territories was a road towards self-government whose rhythm would be subject to inside or outside circumstances, but which in any case would maintain 'white power' under cover of 'multiracial rule'. The aims of Spínola, who wanted to preserve the interests of big Portuguese and multinational firms, were not very different from Caetano's. The Armed Forces Movement chose to negotiate with the nationalist parties for rapid emancipation. After Guinea in 1974, Mozambique was to become independent in June 1975 and Angola in November 1975.

This emancipation is not taking place in good conditions and is likely to cause problems in Portugal and the colonial 'states'. For the former the question is what to do with the 300,000 Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola? Will they be able to stay in Africa? If they return to Portugal, how will they be integrated into a parent country with an underdeveloped economy and excess labour at its disposal? What will be their attitude towards an army they reproach with having abandoned the colonies to their new masters too easily? In these territories, especially in Angola, bloody rivalries between nationalist movements, encouraged covertly by outside forces, are creating an explosive situation. Economic development is threatened by a catastrophic drop in foreign investments, deterred by the insecurity of the past years.

Considering the field of observation furnished by the past decade, if we try to sum up the consequences of decolonization, it is clear that the end of colonial empires form a break: it denotes the end of centuries of a sort of imperialism; the end of the hegemony of the old Western European nations on the Asian and African continents. But the influences brought about by colonization have not disappeared with it. Prolonged contact with the parent state has left a deep mark in the mental, cultural and economic structures of countries formerly under its rule. Thrown off

course, so to speak, by foreign influence, they must 'at the same time reinvent a culture and a character, and a passage from one to the other'. (J. Berque, *La Dépossession du monde* Paris, Seuil, 1965.) In this concise formula the chief problems dominating relations henceforth between partners of yesterday, nations and individuals, can be incorporated. These problems, whose solution will to a great extent affect the future face of the world, have already given rise to a great many studies. We shall briefly mention some of the most important.

1 Human relationships

First, the political change has profoundly altered the population trends which had been set up during the colonial period: the settling of Europeans in newly independent states has come to an end. Only Britons continue to emigrate towards the white-peopled states of the former Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand, Canada). The converse flow was far more important. In some instances, independence was grasped by means of violent struggle, and provoked the simultaneous departure of nearly all the Europeans: in Algeria this exodus became dramatic, because it was hastened, and the people to be repatriated were numerous, but also it was a hard uprooting for families who had been settled in the country for several generations. Most of the time, the political and economic circumstances which arose in the new states dictated the pace of return.

One of the most unexpected results of decolonization has been the flow of former subjects, Asian, African and West Indian, towards the mother country. This phenomenon reached its greatest proportions in Great Britain. These populations are driven towards Europe primarily by their inability to find regular employment in their own country, especially for men and women whose occupation had no links with farming. Moreover countries ready to receive immigrants were growing more and more scarce: the McCarran Law (1951) forbade entry to the USA to immigrants from the Caribbean; the East African states not only rejected new arrivals from India and Pakistan, but rid themselves of those who had settled there when the British ruled. This is the reason why after having followed a sort of self-regulation dictated by the economic situation, by 1960 the immigration of the Commonwealth citizens largely increased. The 1961 census revealed that 530,000 coloured people were living in the United Kingdom, that is, an increase of 40 per cent over the ten-year period. This influx, although in keeping with the traditional policy of freedom of movement for Commonwealth citizens, caused a certain amount of anxiety in different sectors of British public opinion and induced the government to impose controls and restraint on any mass immigration of coloured UK passport-holders. Many people believe that Britain no longer needs to bring in labour as it did at the end of the 1950s and that there is a widening acceptance that the population of the country must be restricted if it is still to be worth living in. Restrictions directed against certain coloured overseas British passport-holders have brought to the

forefront of the national debate the matter of colour. For about 2,500,000 coloured people of the UK, either immigrants or in many cases born there, this is a matter of concern.

2 Cultural and mental reactions of decolonized peoples

Apart from technology, emancipated peoples are extremely suspicious towards anything brought by their former masters. From the cultural viewpoint, they have to establish a very fine balance between the outside heritage with which they are more or less imbued and their ancestral legacy more or less genuinely restored. Their first task is to decide on a national language, which is a means of recovering their personality once it is installed for official use. This is relatively easy for peoples who already had one before colonization, whether it was their own or that of the ethnic group they belonged to, for example Arabic; but it is a far more delicate task for nations which are the historical and political product of European dominion, as was often the case in black Africa.

Colonization has raised another problem by widening the gap between the élite and the masses, urban and rural areas, creating thus a scarcely favourable situation to social stability. A British anthropologist remarked:

In Africa the gulf is real and deep. The top people are those who had been educated in schools giving instruction in the language of the metropolitan power. . . . From them come the politicians, the professionals, the civil servants, the technicians, . . . The difficulty of adequately staffing the public services and industry without recourse to the 'expatriates' is everywhere considerable. The new élites are the people whose mode of life is thoroughly Westernized. (Lucy Maier, 'Social Changes in Africa', *International Affairs*, October 1960.)

This state of affairs, she added, was a cause of weakness for new states, for the political regimes set up by élites (even with 99 per cent plebiscites) are not founded in the eyes of some people on the same legitimacy as those who held the reins of power in the old society.

A good educational system could perhaps attenuate the effects of elitism as a factor of social inequality. But, if we refer to Pearson's Report (*Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development*, New York, 1969), this system remains to be created: 'In too many instances, children who finish primary schools in rural areas seem rather less fit to become creative and constructive members of their own community than if they had never been at school,' he writes. And he lays the responsibility for this set-back on the 'inadequacy of the curricula and system inherited from colonial days'.

On the other hand, the revolt against colonialism has destroyed the inferiority complex of black peoples towards Europeans; it has removed the vision of Africans as peoples without culture and history, which colonial policy has proclaimed far and wide to justify its 'civilizing mission'. A black man need no longer appear as 'white as possible' in cultural and life-style to achieve equality with a white man. Independence

has put an end to this 'dispossession' of Africans of their personality and their culture, and has sounded the bell for a renewal, a reaffirmation and a study of African values.

The impact of events has even spread beyond the frontiers of the black continent. W. G. DuBois had long since declared that 'the problem of the colour bar was international in scope and was a guiding force behind the movement for Pan-African unity; Garveyism had driven Africans to rebel against' the dispossession they had been subject to. In its turn the successful revolt against colonialism has created in many American black militants a heightened sense of the international character of racial conflict, and has stimulated a re-examination of the nature of the American racial situation. The links between subordination in Africa and in the USA openly appeared. As Le Roi Jones has put it:

The kind of unity I would like to see among black Americans is a unity that would permit most of them to understand that the murder of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and the murder of Medgar Evers were conducted by the same people. (Le Roi Jones, *Home*, New York, Morrow, 1966.)

Jones's analysis means that the situation of black people on the whole has been determined by European expansion. By defining non-whites in their belief as inferior, wherever they were found, white domination laid the groundwork for the current international consciousness of common interest among blacks.

Lastly, we may wonder if rejection of multi-party parliamentary institutions and their replacement by authoritative systems in which the army has a dominant role in many emancipated countries, does not correspond to the desire to expel an institution brought in by their former masters, inadequate and unfit for the traditions to which these countries are faithful.

3 Unequal economic relations

Generally relations between countries born of decolonization and others follow the normal rule of those between sovereign states; but, in economic affairs, these relationships are those of 'developing countries' with industrialized countries. The former not only lag far behind, but they must also raise up their infrastructure, conceived by the colonizer for his own interest, which is not necessarily that of the new states. They have neither the ability nor the means to build up rapidly the means of transformation and they must acquire them from abroad. The most difficult problems are equipment and industrialization, but these are not the only problems; the shortage of skilled industrial workers is a serious obstacle to economic expansion; the battle of the parent states against handicrafts in certain colonies had forced overwhelming numbers of the population towards agriculture (a very primitive form of agriculture): in India, the farming population went from 60 per cent to 84 per cent between 1893 and 1947; in this way any possibility of progressing from an artisan state to industry was

compromised — an evolution which Great Britain herself had undergone.

Since then economic relations, based on apparently well-balanced contracts and sufficiently sophisticated to seem equal, are a cover-up for unequal relations and often penalize the weaker partner. They run on two principles: (1) The rule of supply and demand in trade. Now this rule, considered to be a normal basis for economic relations, is a law of the jungle in which the poor always find themselves the loser. (2) Aid programmes, generously offered, have doubtless been of great use in order to support new countries in their task of organizing and setting up administrative, educational and economic structures; but they were rarely offered without any mental reservation and political or economic aim. And notwithstanding the commitments involved, this help has always been insufficient and is tending to become more and more so. It is true to say that 'The structural dependence of disadvantaged countries towards those who hold economic power has dramatic and inevitable consequences. This dependence today seems one of the most serious problems: probably the most serious.' (Paul Bringuier, preface to *Pays industriels et pays sous-développés* by R. H. Strahm.)

A basic condition to completing liberation is the creation of an independent economy. This is a task which requires a whole series of measures: to take the resources and enterprises into national hands; to establish basic industrialization and state control of trade; to carry through a fundamental land reform which introduces diversification and the modernization of agriculture.

Unfortunately, in most new countries the natural resources are rather weak. The most fortunate are those rich in natural sources of energy, especially oil. The sale of these products, which the industrialized countries cannot do without, may give them hope for a rapid takeoff.

1975

Appendix

Chronology

1918	8 January	The 14 points of President Wilson
1919	28 June	Creation of the Mandates by the Covenant of the League of Nations
1920	April	Distribution of the Mandates at the San Remo Conference
1922	28 February	Independence of Egypt (British declaration)
1930		Anglo-Iraqi treaty; end of the mandate in Iraq
1936	26 August	Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance: end of the military occupation in Egypt (except the canal zone)
	9 September	Franco-Syrian treaty
	13 November	Franco-Lebanese treaty
1941	14 August	Atlantic Charter
1942	8 November	Anglo-American landing in North Africa
1944	30 January — 8 February	Brazzaville Conference
1945	June	End of the mandate in Syria and Lebanon
		San Francisco Charter
1946		Creation of the Kingdom of Transjordan
	6 March	Preliminary agreement Leclerc-Ho Chi Minh
1947	15 August	Independence of India and Pakistan
	15 December	Independence of Ceylon
1948	4 January	Independence of Burma (Anglo-Burmese agreement of 17 October 1947)
	5 June	Along Bay agreements: independence of Vietnam
1949	8 March	Auriol-Bao Dai Agreements (confirming the preceding agreements)
1950		Transjordan becomes Jordan
	19 July	Laos becomes an independent associate state
	8 November	Cambodia becomes an independent associate state
	27 December	Independence of Indonesia
1951	14 December	Independence of Libya
1952	15 September	Eritrea is federated with Ethiopia
1953	February	Independence of the Sudan (Anglo-Egyptian treaty)
	22 August	Franco-Laotian agreement

1954	21 July	Geneva agreements: end of the war in Indochina
		Independence of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
	20 August	Self-government for Tunisia
	1 November	Algerian uprising
1955	April	Bandung Conference
1956	1 January	Independence of Sudan
	2 March	Independence of Morocco
	20 March	Independence of Tunisia
		Franco-Indian treaty and transfer of the French possessions to India
1957	6 March	Independence of Ghana
	31 August	Independence of Malaya
1958	3 June	Independence of Singapore
	2 October	Independence of French Guinea (referendum of 28 Sept)
1960	1 January	Independence of Cameroon
	27 April	Independence of Togo
	26 June	Independence of Madagascar
	30 June	Independence of the Belgian Congo
	1 July	Independence of Somaliland
	12 July	Independence of the Congo (Brazzaville), of the Central African Republic, of Chad, of Gabon (for these four countries the proclamation of independence took place respectively on 15, 14, 11 and 17 August)
	1 August	Independence of Dahomey and Niger
	5 August	Independence of Upper Volta
	7 August	Independence of Ivory Coast
	11 September	Independence of Senegal
	23 September	Independence of Mali
	1 October	Independence of Nigeria
	28 November	Independence of Mauretania
1961	27 April	Independence of Sierra Leone
	9 December	Independence of Tanganyika
1962	1 January	Independence of Western Samoa
	1 July	Independence of Ruanda and Burundi
	3 July	Independence of Algeria
	6 August	Independence of Jamaica
	31 August	Independence of Trinidad-Tobago
	19 October	Independence of Uganda
1963	March	Irian (Western New Guinea) is transferred to Indonesia by the Netherlands
	31 August	Creation of Malaysia, consisting of the territories of North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak
	12 December	Independence of Kenya and Zanzibar
1964	1 July	Independence of Nyasaland (Malawi)
	23 October	Independence of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)

List of Commonwealth members (as of 1 January 1965)

Australia	Jamaica	Pakistan
Canada	Kenya	Sierra Leone
Ceylon	Malawi	Tanzania
Cyprus	Malaysia	Trinidad
Gambia	Malta	Uganda
Ghana	New Zealand	United Kingdom
India	Nigeria	Zambia

Biographies

Ferhat Abbas

Born in October 1899 in Taher (Algeria), the son of a local civil servant. He went to the primary school of Djidjelli and continued his education at the lycée of Constantine and the university of Algiers where he took a degree in pharmacy. Besides his studies he was attracted by politics (he was president of the Algerian Muslim Student Union) and literature and started to edit the *Jeune Algérien*.

Having set up as a practising pharmacist in Sétif in 1933, he subsequently became a town councillor, general adviser and adviser to the 'délégations financières'.* In 1933 he founded *L'Entente* which published his famous profession of faith in 1936. During the Second World War he joined the army as a volunteer and was deeply affected by France's defeat.

In November 1942 he met President Roosevelt's special envoy, R. Murphy, and became acquainted with the details of the Atlantic Charter, which awakened in him the hope of possible reforms for Algeria. He drafted the People's Manifesto (22 December 1942) and presented it to the French authorities on behalf of a group of distinguished Muslim citizens of moderate opinions. The organization he founded for the purpose of achieving internal autonomy for Algeria, 'Les amis du manifeste et de la liberté', was dissolved after the riots in Sétif (May 1945). 'L'Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA), which was founded thereafter, played an important role in the second constituent assembly (eleven representatives) but lost all its influence as from 1947. Ferhat Abbas, who was opposed to violence, did not at first approve of the rebellion of November 1954; he gave his blessing to the FLN's aims only in April 1956, when all hope of a peaceful solution was abandoned.

*From 1898 to 1945, Algeria possessed a non-political assembly called the Financial Delegations. These Delegations were based on the principle of 'representation of interests', a concept long held to be particularly well-suited to a country where material interests were of paramount importance and where the inhabitants, belonging to separate communities, could not easily be welded together into a single electorate. Each of the three delegations comprising the assembly – farmers, non-farmers, and natives – was composed of twenty-four members elected for six years. The members of the native delegation – seventeen Arabs and seven Kabyles – were nominated by the governor-general and elected by a small electoral college. The assembly's essential task was to vote the budget. (M.K. Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, Praeger, New York, 1959, p. 45.)

Nnamdi Azikiwe. 'Zik'

Born in Lagos in 1904, son of a local railway clerk. He was first educated at the mission school; he later went to the US where he experienced poverty, working in turn as a laundry-man, boxer, miner and finally enrolling as a student at Lincoln University and Columbia University. After obtaining his MA degree he returned to Africa to work in journalism and founded in the Gold Coast a chain of newspapers, among them the *West African Pilot*. His business acumen enabled him to increase his fortune rapidly and to branch out into many commercial enterprises.

On his return to Nigeria he founded the Nigeria Reconstruction Group (1944) the first stage of the future NCNC. As leader of the latter he showed great skill in increasing his public image, making people believe that his life was being threatened because of his nationalist activities and presenting himself as the 'African St George fighting the imperialist dragon'. As wily in politics as in business, Zik adopted varying positions regarding the future of Nigeria: he was in turn extremist and conciliatory towards the British; he was Pan-Nigerian or regionalist according to the circumstances. Neither his political career nor his prestige with the masses, especially in the east, were jeopardized by rumours of his embezzling public funds for private interests (the African Continental Bank case). Despite temporary setbacks, he remained the dominant personality of the Nigerian political scene and became the first governor-general of independent Nigeria on 16 November 1960.

Mohandas Gandhi (1869-1948)

Born in 1869 in Porbandar (north-west of Bombay) into the Bania caste which traditionally provides the small state of Kathiawar with its ministers. He married at the age of thirteen. In 1888 he was sent to London to study law and became acquainted with Western civilization without, however, adopting its philosophy or its customs.

After his return to Bombay he soon abandoned the law, being disillusioned with its sharp practices and in 1893 he left for South Africa where he remained until 1914. There he became the protector of the Indian community against the discrimination it was suffering and practised successfully the method of non-violent resistance (*satyagraha*) which aims at persuading the oppressor rather than fighting against him.

The campaign in favour of Indian emancipation, to which Gandhi devoted his entire life, began in 1919 when the British abolished individual freedom (Rowlatt Act). Despising both political success and popularity (he was furious at being called Mahatma - Great Soul), he refused to be a party leader. Although behind many Congress decisions, when he always counselled moderation, he preferred to devote himself to educating the masses and to achieving unity between Hindus and Muslims, by going constantly from one village to another and sharing the existence of the poor.

Fanatically opposed to any violence, he was the most disconcerting and the most efficient adversary with which the British authorities had to deal. He was rightly held responsible for the non-violent civil disobedience movements and was imprisoned on several occasions but always freed

with an enhanced prestige.

He owed his prestige to his attitude of mind, which was open to the most diverse influences (the pacifist message of Christianity, the humanitarianism of Ruskin, the evangelism of Tolstoy); to his passionate attachment to justice; to the disregard he showed for his own life which he ultimately sacrificed in the cause for which he stood.

'He represents', wrote Nehru, 'the peasant masses of India; he is the quintessence of the conscious and subconscious will of those millions of poor people. . . . A man of the keenest intellect, of fine feeling and good taste, wide vision; very human and yet essentially the ascetic who has suppressed his passions and emotions, sublimated them and directed them in spiritual channels; a tremendous personality, drawing people to himself like a magnet and calling out fierce loyalties and attachments.' (J. Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1958, pp. 189-90.)

Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948)

The son of a Karachi merchant, he studied law in London from 1892 to 1896 and practised as a barrister in Bombay.

Soon he became a member of the Congress party and was active among the group of moderate nationalists under the leadership of Gokhale. In 1911 he became the Muslim representative in the Central Legislative Council where he remained until 1930. He thought it desirable to strengthen united action between Hindus and Muslims in order to obtain autonomy for India. To this end, and as president of the Muslim League (which he joined in 1913), he was one of the promoters of the Lucknow pact (1916).

The inter-community conflicts which followed the 1919 reforms made Jinnah fear that, within an autonomous India, the rights of minorities would not be respected by the Hindu majority. He disapproved of Gandhi's non-co-operation campaign (1919-22) and severed his connections with Congress. His 'Fourteen-point declaration' in 1928 showed that from then onwards he had embraced the idea of a federal constitution, with political and social guarantees for the Muslims.

His position continued to diverge from the unitary conceptions of the Congress party. When, after some years spent in retirement, he resumed his activities in the Muslim League (1935), he turned the latter into a militant party, organized on Western lines, and becoming in 1937 its 'Qaid-i-Azam' (Supreme Leader). With the independence of India likely to become a reality, he worked with a single aim in view: partition followed by the formation of a Muslim state (Pakistan).

Jomo Kenyatta

Born in 1893 in Mituvu near Fort Hall; orphaned at an early age, he was brought up in a Scottish mission of Kikuyus. First working as a kitchen hand and later employed by the Water Board in Nairobi, he campaigned against the working conditions imposed on natives; in 1922 he joined the Kikuyu Central Association and became its president. He left his country in 1929 returning only in 1946. He protested in London in 1932 against the land distribution carried out by the Carter Commission. After a period of

study at the London School of Economics, he frequented various other European universities (including Moscow) publishing in 1938 a book on ethnography: *Facing Mount Kenya*.

He played an active part in the Pan-African Congress in Manchester (1945) and on his return to Kenya became principal of the Githunguri teachers' training college. He asked the governor for permission to found a legal political party, the Kenya African Union (1947) which soon acquired a membership of 100,000. With this party Kenyatta wanted to campaign in favour of giving Africans freedom of cultivation (they were restricted to tea, coffee, sisal), equal pay and self-government. The success of his party disquieted the British authorities who banned it in 1952 and imprisoned its leader for his complicity with the Mau Mau.

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1963)

Born in 1889 in Allahabad. His family belonged to the high caste of Kashmiri Brahmans; his family was extremely Europeanized and anglophile and in 1905 sent the young boy to be educated in England. He studied natural science at Harrow, then at Trinity College, Cambridge. He then read law at the Inner Temple in London. At the same time he acquired a wide knowledge of European literature and history.

On his return to India in 1912, he was called to the bar; he was also a member of the Indian National Congress together with his father, Motilal Nehru, who was a very prominent Congress personality.

After the events of 1919, he abandoned his career as a barrister in order to devote his energies to politics. He took part in Gandhi's civil disobedience campaigns and, like him, was imprisoned, for the first time in 1922. Although he had a friendly relationship with the Mahatma, he did not share the latter's conservative and traditionalist views: as an aristocrat who had embraced a form of Socialism, he believed in the need to carry out an agrarian reform and to improve the life of the masses by initiating a powerful industrial drive. He was basically a pacifist but did not always rule out the use of force; although thoroughly anglicized he believed (in 1928) that there could be 'no independence for India as long as there remained any ties with Britain'.

Appointed president of Congress in 1929, he became a powerful force in the nationalist struggle and was imprisoned several times until, in 1946, the British authorities asked him to form a provisional government. He did not hesitate then to make such concessions as he considered to be realistic: the partition of India and Pakistan and agreement that India would remain within the Commonwealth.

Kwame Nkrumah (1909–72)

Born in 1909 in Nkroful in the western part of Gold Coast; was first educated in a Catholic mission school and later at Accra College. He qualified as a teacher in 1930 and became headmaster of the Catholic primary school in Axim.

In 1935 he arrived in the USA and enrolled at the black university of Lincoln (Penns.); for eight years he studied history, philosophy, political economy and journalism. After graduating in 1943, he was appointed

lecturer in political sciences at Lincoln University. By then he had already embraced the nationalist and Pan-African cause as a result of reading the works of M. Garvey, and abandoned his Catholic religion.

To complete his PhD thesis he went to London in May 1945. But during his two years' residence in London he was chiefly engaged in politics. As vice-president of the West African Students Union, he was appointed secretary of the fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester where the plans were drawn up for Africa's independence struggle through the use of 'mass organizations'. Soon afterwards, he became a member of the 'West African Secretariat', which was responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the African nationalist movements. He also engaged in journalism, wrote pamphlets, met other African leaders (Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny). In December 1947, he was recalled to the Gold Coast to take over the general secretariat of the UGCC.

Julius Nyerere

Born in 1921 in the small Zanaki tribe (north province). He was educated at University College of Makerere (Uganda) to become a teacher and was head of a Catholic mission school in Tabora. In 1949 he was the first student from Tanganyika to enrol at a British university (Edinburgh). On returning home he went into politics and became in 1953 president of the TAA; later he founded the TANU on 7 July 1954. His efforts to establish and build up the party throughout the country made him suspect in the eyes of the colonial administration but popular with the Africans. Moderate and conciliatory by nature, he was always opposed to violence and strove to unite all inhabitants of Tanganyika into one body of equal citizens, without any distinction of race. 'The colour of one's skin is not a sin in Tanganyika,' he said.

His qualities of integrity and intelligence, his organizing talents, his ability to translate his idealism into practical terms, were the main reasons for his success.

Sukarno (1902–70)

Born in 1901 in Surabaya (Eastern Java). His father, a schoolmaster, strove to give him a Western-type education. At fourteen years of age he was accepted at a high school in Surabaya and lived with the family of Tjokroaminoto (the founder of Sarekat Islam) where he was converted to nationalism. He started his political activities by forming an association of young nationalists.

He was admitted into the Institute of Technology in Bandung to study engineering (1920) and became friendly with certain political leaders, including Douwes Dekker.

The year 1926 was really the beginning of his political campaign directed towards the unification of the Dutch East Indies and the achievement of independence. In 1927 he founded the National Indonesian Party (PNI); in 1928 he succeeded in forming a federation of various nationalist groups (PPPKI – Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia – Union of Indonesian Political Associations) of which he became president.

As a result of his activities he was arrested in December 1929 and accused of fomenting rebellion. He took advantage of his trial to launch his appeal 'Indonesia accuses', which was a virulent attack on the abuses of Dutch rule.

After two years in prison, he applied himself to the reconstruction of his party which had disintegrated during his absence, and published his book *Towards Independence for Indonesia*. Certain passages having been considered 'detrimental to the interests of the Dutch colonial power', he was again arrested and exiled to Flores Island 'as a threat to peace and public order'.