

that Schneersohn himself was to be revealed as the messiah. Habad's messianic fervor, combined with its populist and open approach, brought the movement into conflict with other Haredi circles. Rabbi E. M. M. Shach, the leader of Lithuanian Orthodoxy, led the opposition to Habad. Schneersohn's death in 1994 brought a debate between those who accepted his death and those who clung to a messianic faith that he would return.

The Zionist-Religious Gush Emunim followed the doctrine of Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook, Rabbi A. I. Kook's son, and interpreted Israel's victory in the Six-Day War as realization of his father's messianic expectations. Opposing concession of the territories occupied in the war, Gush Emunim built new settlements in the controversial areas of Judea and Samaria and exerted political influence, pushing Religious-Zionist Orthodoxy to the right on the Israeli political map. Today Gush Emunim, as an organized body, has actually ceased to exist, but other bodies, much less inspired by messianic theology, carry out its political program.

The third group, of utmost significance, that has started to play a role since the eighties is Sepharadic Haredi Judaism, politically represented by the Shas party. Shas was created to improve the status of Sephardim within Haredi society, heretofore dominated by Ashkenazim. While, when founded, Shas received the blessings of both the Ashkenazic and Sepharadic leading rabbis, a dispute between the two was only a matter of time, leaving Shas to turn away from the Ashkenazic Rabbi Shach to prefer the spiritual guidance of the Sepharadic halakhic genius, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef (b. 1920). This move tore Shas away from the Haredi Ashkenazic world but enabled it to earn unprecedented popular support as an ethnic-traditionalist movement. In the nineties, apart from the growth of its parliamentary power, Shas has become a major factor in the growing process of *hitkavut* (approximately: gradual return) to religion among Sepharadic Israelis.

The fluctuations in Israeli society affected some of the developments in both Orthodox camps, including the relationship between the two. The traumatic Yom Kippur War (1973) caused a change in the Israelis' self-image and cooled the ideological passion of secular Zionism. This, as well as the economic growth, made Israeli society adopt many of the "normal" goals it perceived in its western counterparts. The Israel-Egypt peace treaty (1978), in which Israel undertook to evacuate and rip down settlements in the Sinai, the opposition to the Lebanon War (1982), and the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo talks initiated by the Rabin government in 1992, in which Israel agreed to withdraw from great parts of Judea and Samaria, increased Religious-Zionists' disappointment with secular Zionism. Their bitter ideological wing interpreted the change as a betrayal of a common "holy" cause, and has begun a revision of several sections of its ideology. The messianic rhetoric of its founders was mitigated, and the objection to withdrawal was now defended through pragmatic arguments of national security. The debate escalated in 1995, when a Zionist-Religious university student assassinated Prime Minister Rabin, an unprecedented event in Israeli history. Despite overall Orthodox condemnation of the act, it caused a strong anti-Orthodox wave in Israeli secular society.

The new generation of the Haredim, on the other hand, was already born into a situation in which the Zionist state is not only an existing fact, but a place of thriving Haredi religious life and education. Many of them could no longer be indifferent to Israel's fate, and felt a part of it in their hearts if not in their official ideology. The feelings of solidarity were strengthened as the Haredim entered the government coalition (1977), after two and a half decades of refraining from such a step. These moves have begun to cause a tendency of relative openness in the Haredi camp, but the growing tensions between them and secular Israelis have kept them constantly on the defensive, which has balanced this tendency. The secularists' accusations have focused mainly on the fact that most of the Haredi men are not drafted to the army and do not take an active part in the national workforce, while accepting state handouts for their educational institutions, thus increasing the Israeli taxpayer's burden. The Haredim, on their part, argue that their Torah learning guarantees Jewish continuity no less, and even more, than the secularists' corporeal activities, and therefore the secularists also benefit from it, even if they don't recognize its importance (see below). Taking active part in these corporeal activities, most of the Zionist-Religious share the secular criticism.

The deterioration in the relationship between religious and secular Jews in Israel was a defeat for the Zionist-Religious way and shook their self-confidence. The Haredim, on the other hand, lacking any messianic expectations of the state of Israel and harboring no illusions about a partnership with the secular Israelis, strengthened their self-confidence. Another fact contributed to these feelings. The Zionist Orthodoxy values its ability to function as a bridge between religious and secular Israelis. Their openness to secular society had a cost, as many Zionist-Religious young people abandoned religious observance. Conversely, the Haredim could proudly note that they almost totally blocked such losses, even as they attracted *Ba'dei Teshuva* (= "repentants") to their ranks. Haredim have always mocked Zionist Orthodoxy's self-definition, and often quote the sarcastic remark misattributed to the Hazon Ish and actually stated by rabbi E. B. Wassermann: "A real bridge is used both for those who come back and those who go forth. Yet this one [= the Zionist-Religious] serves only those who go forth" (a pun in Hebrew: come back = repent; go forth = transgress, sin).

The relative moderation in the Haredi camp and the embracing of stricter standards of halakhic observance and Torah scholarship in the Zionist-Religious camp could pave the road for reunification of the two. Actually, a very limited rapprochement has been felt in recent years, most of it during the Rabin government period, when the Zionist-Religious Israelis' disappointment with secular Zionism was at its peak. However, in spite of crises, the Religious-Zionists are deeply involved with the secular Israeli society, from which the Haredim so incisively isolated themselves, and the two camps' common commitment to halakhah does not seem to be a sufficient platform on which the cultural and religious gaps could be bridged, not to mention that this very commitment has never been equal in the two camps. Today Haredi and Zionist-Religious Jews view each other with growing respect, and in both camps there are some who

wish to strengthen the ties, but the voices of those who oppose the alliance seem to be stronger. The relationship between the two is, therefore, unstable, and a full unification remains remote.

While most Orthodox Jews live in either Israel or America, every large Jewish center in the world today includes a sizeable Orthodox contingent. Although there are no hard statistics on Orthodox numbers in the worldwide Jewish population, recent (1999) assessments based on surveys from the early 1990s place the number of American Orthodox Jews above 400,000 of a total Jewish population of about 5,800,000. Of the approximately 4,600,000 Jews living in Israel, more than 20 percent identify as Orthodox, a third of them Haredim. Yet, these numbers are unreliable, as many Jews fall between the conventional categories of religious identity. The recent emergence of Shas in particular has clouded the boundaries between "traditional," religious, and Haredi Israelis. An additional 500,000 Orthodox Jews live dispersed around the world in Jewish centers such as France, Britain, Belgium, and Australia.

The flight from Orthodoxy to a more secular life-style, which devastated the movement in the first half of the century, has been checked and in some cases reversed. As the birth rate among Orthodox Jews (especially Haredim) is significantly higher than among other sectors of the Jewish population, and as non-Orthodox Jewish populations are diminished by assimilation, the percentage of Jews who identify as Orthodox is assumed to be growing.

Halakhah and Religious Practice

The observance of religious law, the halakhah, has generally been the main indicator of Orthodox identity. Although Orthodoxy has produced a rich literature in several religious fields (theology and biblical commentary, religious ethics, etc.), the study of halakhah (including talmudic novellae) has remained the field on which the Orthodox religious elite focuses most of its intellectual resources.

The fundamental Orthodox tenet sees the halakhah as eternally valid and forever unchanging. This commitment notwithstanding, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Orthodoxy initiated several changes in the interpretation of the law. It is noteworthy that interest in questions of civil law (*Hoshen Mishpat*) declined over the years and was addressed mainly in theoretical discussions. Instead, questions regarding daily ritual (*Orah Hayyim*) dominated Jewish legal discussion.

Orthodoxy has reshuffled its priorities regarding halakhic decision making. Preserving the legal system's stability has become a primary component of Rabbinic rulings, pushing aside almost any competing value. In the Hungarian Orthodox halakhic tradition, the struggle for the very survival of the halakhic system has led to far-reaching *humras* ("stringent rulings"), while in the German tradition of Neo-Orthodoxy (in which prominent halakhists were few), the same

concern has had an opposite effect, resulting in significant *kulas* ("lenient rulings"). Prewar eastern European halakhic tradition – definitely the richest and most impressive in Orthodoxy – succeeded in preserving both trends, side by side. The formation of the new Haredism in the third stage of Orthodox history emphatically advanced the tendency towards stringency, especially due to the Hazon Ish's strong influence. He wrote explicitly that in any case of doubt, one should prefer the *Humra*.

The question of the status of custom (*minhag*) as a source of law provides an illuminating example of the different approaches to halakhah within Orthodoxy. Custom has always functioned as one of the law's recognized normative sources ("Minhag Israel Torah," that is, "the custom of Israel is law"), but, over the generations, halakhic masters have disagreed regarding the significance of *minhag* in relation to other normative sources of law. Neo-Orthodox halakhah expressed willingness to abandon some customs not firmly anchored in the halakhic literature, if these hindered Jewish participation in modern social and economic life. Even Neo-Orthodox rabbis, though, firmly defended customs that had been attacked by Reform movements. Hungarian Orthodox halakhah, on the other hand, treated customs – insofar as they embodied *humras* – as a foremost halakhic source. Lithuanian halakhists evaluated each custom individually. In principle, the view of *minhag* was favorable, but since many popular conventions ceased to reflect an *opinio juris* of religious observance, only customs anchored in the legal literature and expressing an authorized rabbinical opinion were accepted as normatively binding.

Zionist settlement activity raised new halakhic problems for Orthodoxy, and the response to individual questions often reflected the attitude of a specific halakhic master to the Zionist enterprise as a whole. The question of halakhic authority – largely a moot question in the diaspora, as each community adopted its own authority without state intervention – thus rose to the forefront of halakhic dispute. Immediately after the establishment of the Palestine Chief Rabbinate in 1921, Zionist-Religious Jews hailed the chief rabbis as the supreme Jewish religious authority in the land. Members of the Old Yishuv, however, perceived it as an "Official Rabbinate" and refused to obey the new body; no few Haredi immigrants to Palestine followed the same path.

Another contested halakhic issue concerned the laws of the Sabbatical year, the principle that every seventh year the land must be left uncultivated (Lev. 25:1–7; Deut. 15:1–6). The prohibition, if observed, could have caused the economic collapse of religious settlements. Rabbi A. I. Kook, chief rabbi of Palestine and the paramount pro-Zionist halakhic thinker in the first decades of the twentieth century, accepted a halakhic construction known as *Heter ha-Mekhirah* ("Permission to Sell"). In cases of necessity, Kook suggested, Jews could formally "sell" their land to non-Jews (while continuing to work it themselves), thus avoiding the Sabbatical restrictions, which apply to Jewish-owned land alone. Haredi rabbis, later headed by the Hazon Ish, attacked this as a transparent and unacceptable legal fiction. The controversy continues today, each seven years, as the chief rabbinate extends the permissive ruling. Haredi

Jews buy agricultural goods from Jewish farmers only if they were grown in areas outside the territory of (ancient) Israel. Similar disputes arose regarding the prohibition of milking cows on the Sabbath (where Rabbi Kook took a surprisingly stringent stand) and other agricultural issues.

Haredi and Zionist-Religious rabbis clashed over the halakhic authority of the state, its laws and institutions. Although the Talmud affirms that *Dina de-Malkhuta Dina* ("the law of the kingdom is law"), extremist Haredi rabbis, such as the rebbe of Satmar, vehemently objected to the application of this principle to "the Kingdom of Heresy." More moderate Haredi rabbis acknowledged partial authority of the State, not so much in recognition of the halakhic status of the "Kingdom" but because some of Israel's laws attained the status of "custom." Zionist-Religious rabbis, on the other hand, apply the Talmudic injunction almost indiscriminately. Attempts made by Zionist-Religious rabbis, such as Chief Rabbis Yitzhak Isaac Herzog (1889–1959) and Ben-Zion M.H. Uziel (1880–1953), to legislate new halakhic regulations (*Takkanot*) and reconcile the halakhah with the State's laws were firmly rejected by the Hazon Ish and other conservative halakhists.

Whatever their original intent, in both Modern and Haredi Orthodoxy, certain fragments of western legal doctrine penetrated the halakhah. In ancient halakhah, for example, there were no legal persons other than human beings. When modern company law recognized corporations as legal persons, rabbis had to determine whether these are also recognized by the halakhah. Most of the rabbis responded negatively, perceiving an incorporeal legal body as a means for frauds and deceptions, but some did recognize it to a limited extent and for specific purposes. The question as a whole has not yet been conclusively determined.

The question of military service also presented religious thinkers with several controversial halakhic issues. Regarding women, almost all halakhic masters agreed that the State's attempt to draft them into military service contradicts the halakhah. Some Haredi rabbis (including the Hazon Ish) went so far as to rule that such a law, if accepted, would constitute a *Gzeirat Shmad* ("an ordinance of forceful transgression"), in response to which the halakhah commands: "One should be killed rather than transgress." Zionist-Religious politicians suggested a compromise, that Orthodox women be drafted into a non-military "national service." While some Zionist-Religious rabbis accepted the arrangement, the Haredim insisted that all Orthodox women be fully exempted from any form of service. Similarly, with almost no precedent in the classic halakhic literature, the military service of men raised halakhic questions. On the whole, the Zionist-Religious camp has adopted a creative, sometimes impressive, approach. In particular, Rabbi Shlomo Goren (1917–95), Chief Rabbi of the military and later of Israel, adopted a systematic approach to solving such purely modern halakhic questions, while involving unconventional texts in his rulings as accessory halakhic sources. Haredi rabbis, by contrast, have virtually ignored these issues, in part due to their ideological opposition to the State, and, in part, because the issues rarely arise within their community, as most of the Haredim are exempted from draft.

Orthodox rabbis of both movements (Haredim even more than their Modern Orthodox counterparts) have written authoritative responsa on issues of modern technology, especially in the field of medicine, regarding such matters as artificial insemination, limb transplants, and euthanasia. Some, like Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, have exhibited a consistent willingness to accept the advantages of technology. Among the Sephardic halakhic masters, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef's rulings also are conspicuously lenient in everyday-life questions. However, when problems raise social and value-ridden issues, most Haredi rabbis rule stringently, casting themselves as guardians against fissures in the wall of resistance to modernity. Deep differences broke out, for instance, regarding the halakhic status of the secular Jew. Most Orthodox rabbis identify non-observant Jews as *Tinok she-Nishba* ("a captured infant"), that is, as Jews uprooted from Judaism since early childhood, who cannot be held fully responsible for transgressing the precepts. Haredi halakhists, however, still tend to deprive secular Jews of certain halakhic rights, while Zionist-Religious rabbis try to treat them with more equality.

The changing status of women in the western world has affected Orthodox Jews of almost all circles. In Zionist-Religious society, many women no longer focus exclusively on the household and child-rearing but pursue university education and professional careers. Even Haredi women join the workforce, but, while Zionist-Religious rabbis sometimes champion the recent changes in the status of women, Haredi rabbis merely tolerate them given the circumstances.

In light of the changes, not only secular spheres, but also religious ones, have become open to women. The most important is Torah-learning. In recent decades, the medieval halakhic prohibition against women's studying Torah has been abrogated. In Haredi institutions, women study primarily theological, ethical, and practical texts, avoiding thorough Talmudic discussions, while, in the Zionist-Religious community, an increasing number of institutions have attained rabbinical approval to teach women Talmud.

In summary, although they accept the same basic texts and principles for the halakhic process, in many fields, Haredi and Modern Orthodox rabbis arrive at different conclusions. In matters of ritual observance, Haredi rabbis often adopt a stricter line than their Zionist-Religious counterparts, and in issues of social or ideological concern the views in the two camps often contradict one another. It is noteworthy that the Haredi world seems to have produced the bulk of the great halakhic masters of the recent decades, but this appraisal is not quite fair, since many impressive Zionist-religious halakhists gain appreciation from neither their own camp, where halakhic greatness is often underestimated, nor from the Haredim, who do not recognize such greatness outside their own camp. Consequently, Zionist-Religious rabbis make great use of halakhic material from the Haredi camp, while Haredi rabbis generally refrain from halakhic works of the Zionist-Religious camp. The ideological differences between the wings of Orthodoxy thus also leave their marks on halakhic decision making. The main question that has concerned Orthodox leaders since the late eighteenth century – where to locate the limits of resistance to modern values – continues to be the dividing line between the camps today.

Theology and Religious Worldview

While all Orthodox groups agree on the central importance of the study of halakhah, disagreement remains over the need for similar systematic discussions of faith and theology. Hungarian Orthodoxy is traditionally suspicious of theological discussions, and the Hatam Sofer once implied that anyone who neglected Talmud and halakhah for theology should be suspected of reformist tendencies and shunned. Nevertheless, Hungarian Orthodox rabbis address questions of theology in Sabbath and holiday sermons as well as in their biblical interpretation. While, generally speaking, very little innovative theological work has emerged from these sources, a notable exception is a disciple of the Hatam Sofer, Rabbi Moshe (Maharam) Schick (1807–79), whose sermons and interpretations of both Torah and Pirke Abot provide an eloquent, though not systematic, expression of traditional beliefs, sometimes in confrontation with those of modernity.

In German Neo-Orthodoxy, theological creativity occupies a place of honor within the hierarchy of Jewish values. Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, the preeminent representative of German Neo-Orthodoxy, made extensive efforts to demonstrate that Judaism not only complies with modern humanistic values (especially those of German romanticism), but embodies them. According to Hirsch, Judaism aims to produce an ideal human type, the *Mensch-Israel* ("Israelite Man"). He understood emancipation as an opportunity for Jews to realize this ideal and present it to the gentiles. His assumptions about Judaism's higher goals encouraged him to discuss the rationale behind individual precepts (*Ta'amei ha-Mitzvot*), a field that many generations of Jewish thinkers perceived as dangerous.

Since the doctrines of Neo-Orthodox thinkers were primarily apologetic, some scholars question the movement's lasting value and see its main achievement in the field of education rather than theology. An important exception is Rabbi Hirsch's grandson, Dr. Isaac Breuer (1883–1946). With both a Talmudic and university education, Breuer created an impressive and original doctrine on which he based a political theology. He accepts the idea of Jewish nationalism but rejects Zionism. Jewish national identity is not based on territory, language, culture, and race (as according to Zionism) but on law. It was its law, the Torah, that created it, formed its nationhood, and preserved it throughout the generations. The Jewish people is, therefore, "the Nation of the Torah," and any new basis of identity creates a new, different nation. In contrast to Herzl's secular *Judenstaat* ("State of the Jews"), Breuer aspired to establish the Jewish state as the "State of the Torah," a task he failed to convince his Haredi colleagues in Agudat Israel to undertake.

The most impressive Orthodox theological achievement in the second half of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth is that of the Lithuanian Musar Movement. Commencing with Rabbi Israel Salanter, Musar thinkers, who saw themselves more as educators than theologians, focused their discussions on man, the powers acting within him, and his stance before God. Like other nineteenth-century philosophical and scientific trends, many Musar

thinkers sought to expose the dark side of man and the unconscious factors that motivate him. They emphasized the power of drives and instincts in human activity and exhorted action according to Reason. The way of Reason, they believed, is the way of Torah and Musar.

Different Musar thinkers interpreted the core premise in very different ways. The radical Novardok school stressed the "savage" nature of man and the strength of his instincts. Novardok postulated the "annihilation of Will" as a way to impose Reason (namely, the Torah) on man's behavior. The Slobodka school, on the other hand, stressed the "loftiness of Man" (or "Greatness of Man") and his quasi-divine supremacy. It portrayed the Evil Drive as an element essentially alien to man's true nature, which was created only to enable him to reveal his free choice (which is, of course, a part of his loftiness). Slobodka Musar instructs man to overcome his drives through a sober and rational consciousness of his own greatness, bringing this capacity into action. Most Musar thinkers came from a third school. The Kelm Musar adopted a position stressing the variety of man's mental forces, and advocated a strict discipline to keep them in order. Some integrated Kabbalistic concepts, transforming mystical senses into psychological ones. The Musar movement's view of man has had an overriding influence on postwar Haredi thinkers.

Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Hasidic thought gradually neutralized the mystical elements of early Hasidism. Rebbe continued to use the essential terminology of early Hasidic doctrine but neutralized their original dimension of mystical experience and rendered them traditional, "harmless" denotations. A similar transformation occurred in the bodies of Hasidic theology, as the strong monistic emphasis of early Hasidism has given way to more dualistic metaphysical models, in which the notion of the world's absolute unity in God is less emphasized. The very influential theology of the second rebbe of Gur, Yehuda Leib Alter (1847–1905), known as the Sfat-Emet, is a typical example of this trend. Actually, most of the Hasidic rebbe rejected theological discussion altogether and preached the ideal of *Emuna Tmima* (approximately: "Simple Faith"), which became the leading ideal of Haredi doctrine in the second and third stages.

Influenced by early Hasidic thought, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook's thought is immersed in mystical and monistic elements. He was convinced that the Supreme Holiness, identified with the Perfect Good, cannot be fully grasped by human beings and therefore descends to our reality as an only partial appearance of the Good. One of the places we can witness this is in the aspirations of social movements. Each movement seeks to attain another "partial" good, and, as the movements clash with one another, they sharpen, discern, and expose the good hidden within them. The resulting synthesis brings them all closer to the Perfect Good. Thus, according to Kook, everyone, including secularists, is actually aspiring to Supreme Holiness. Positive religion is only one, partial search for this, though the highest one. Rabbi Kook identifies attainment of the Perfect Good with redemption, the ideal of Judaism. The whole course of history is nothing but the gradual ascent of humanity towards this achievement. Kook maintains, however, that the main thing is not the objective but the process.

This philosophy adopts the modern idea of progress and contradicts the traditional concept of *Yeridat ha-Dorot* ("the Degradation of the Generations"), which Haredi thinkers have developed into a predominant theology of history. Rabbi Kook's theology supported his tolerant approach to both secular Zionism and Haredi opponents (including the extremists of the Old Yishuv), enabling him to interpret the struggles between them as a stage in the self-emendation of diaspora Judaism and its preparation for its messianic goal.

The thought of Rabbi Joseph Baer Soloveitchik, the most prominent post-Holocaust Zionist-Religious thinker, evolves from different premises. His basic point of view is not metaphysical but existential. In his early essay "The Halakhic Man," he portrays two human "types" with fundamentally different approaches to the world: Scientific Man strives for a formal and generalized explanation of reality, while the *Homo Religiosus* seeks to enrich his world with a direct experience of the divine. Each of these types misses something of reality. Science misses the touch with the transcendent, while religious experience is subjective and elusive. Soloveitchik's ideal, the Halakhic Man, reaches the two goals. The halakhah, he claims, is the "objectification" of religious consciousness. Halakhic Man aspires to the divine but is aware that the chasm separating the creator and the created cannot be bridged. His desire to come closer to God is satisfied through his analysis of the Lord's commandments, the halakhah, with the same logical accuracy with which the scientist approaches nature. Soloveitchik basically refers to an analytic-conceptual method of Torah study, such as the one developed by his renowned grandfather, Rabbi Hayyim Soloveitchik of Brisk. The halakhah, he asserts, provides a system of *a priori* categories, through which the Halakhic Man perceives reality.

In his later essay "The Lonely Man of Faith," Rabbi Soloveitchik offers a similar typology, though this time not in the intellectual sphere but, rather, the social one. Majestic Man wishes to imitate God: he wishes to be active, creative, to rule the world. The Man of Faith, conversely, seeks complete submission to God. The former lives and works in a community, while the latter stands alone before God, contemplating his own self. Both paths are problematic: The Majestic Man is afflicted with "anxiety and neurotic complexes," a result of the machinery he has built, while the Man of Faith feels loneliness and lack of confidence. Consequently, the Man of Faith grasps that he, too, must act in a community, but, unlike the Majestic Community based on ambition, his community, the Covenant Community, is based on obligation. The common experience of its members enables them to continue the dialogue with God, himself a "member" of the Community, through common prayer and observance of the law. Saved from his loneliness, the Man of Faith turns to dialogue with the Majestic Man. This dialogue, especially in the modern age, might make him feel again the desire to withdraw to his loneliness, but this, says Soloveitchik, is the challenge of the modern Man of Faith: to return to the community, act within it, and influence it, as a believing man. It seems that this view shaped Soloveitchik's attitude to Zionism. The establishment of the State and the following events are God's call to reaffirm the covenant. Believing Jews must accept the call by active involvement in the entire society's efforts, but as believing Jews.

Another Orthodox thinker, eccentric in many respects, is Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1903–94), who based his doctrine on the distinction between facts and values. Facts are discovered through cognitive capacities. Once a fact is discovered, it is imposed on one's mind. Conversely, values are chosen to guide practical behavior. Judaism, according to Leibowitz, demands that we choose as a supreme value the worship of God *lishmah* ("for its own sake"). This choice expresses itself in the fulfillment of the practical precepts of halakhah without seeking any reward or utility. Therefore, Leibowitz asserts, any attempt to read the Torah as a source of facts – whether metaphysical (such as the world-to-come, the messiah, and the resurrection), historical (such as the creation or the revelation), or scientific – is an abuse of the divine text. The Torah must not serve as a human tool but as a source for divine imperatives. Leibowitz did not accept much of Judaism's traditional dogma and argued that Judaism never demanded – and could not demand – belief. At most, he concedes, Judaism could recognize dogmatic belief as a compromise for those who could not meet the ideal of worship of God *lishmah*. In this, Leibowitz sees the difference between Judaism, a religion that poses demands to its believers, and Christianity, a religion that promises to endow them.

Leibowitz's distinction also provides him with a solution to the conflict between religion and science (the problem that, apparently, generated the whole doctrine): Science gives us information, it serves us; religion (Judaism) elaborates our duties – the norms of halakhah – and demands submission. The two cannot, therefore, contradict. Leibowitz offers a similar description of the relationship between religion and state: state norms are made to tend human needs and interests, while religion's precepts demand that we transcend them. Therefore, any attempt to incorporate religious norms into the state's laws (as desired by many Orthodox Israelis) degrades religion. This is why Leibowitz, especially in his later years, keenly opposed conceptions that attributed a religious value to the state of Israel, demanding instead separation between religion and the State.

Haredi Judaism's approach to theological discussions resembles that of nineteenth-century Hungarian Orthodoxy. Haredi thinkers shy from doctrinal creativity and deny the existence of "Haredi thought." Nevertheless, Haredi theology does exist. Forced into existence by the confrontation with modernity, it has yielded an insightful critique of its values and achievements. It disputes the ideals of freedom, equality, and nationality; the idea of progress, so dominant in early modern thinking; modern ideologies such as communism and nationalism, but also liberalism and democracy; and modern technology, which gave ideologies the power to reach their destructive goals. A disciple of the Musar school of Kelm, Rabbi Eliahu Eliezer Dessler (1891–1954), one of the most influential thinkers of postwar Haredi society, built his critique of modernity on the premises of Musar theology, coping with novel ideological problems through the use of traditional concepts. It seems that the critique of modernity and its ramifications is Haredi thought's main contribution to contemporary Jewish theology. Its discussions on classical questions – such as providence and free will, nature and miracles, reason and revelation – contains but modest innovations.

Unlike Rabbis Kook and Soloveitchik, who seek to learn the divine will from historical processes, some Haredi thinkers believe that we are unable to read

God's will from history. It is expressed first and foremost in the Torah and only through the Torah can one decipher the meaning of events. Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum of Satmar, for instance, could never accept the argument that the successes of the Zionist state reflect divine support for its existence. According to his interpretation of a famous passage at B. Ket. 111a, founding an independent Jewish state before the coming of the messiah constitutes an open revolt against the sovereignty of God; it is a breach of the "Three Oaths" the Lord imposed on the Israelites. Creation of the State thus invited a horrendous punishment, which he finds in the Holocaust. All the successes of the State, further, are only divine tests of the faithfulness of the Lord's few worshipers in the last hour before the true redemption.

Some Haredi personalities, such as Rabbi E. M. M. Shach (greatly influenced by Rabbi E. B. Wassermann) and Rabbi Y. Y. Halberstamm of Zans-Klausenburg, adopted a more moderate position on these questions. Their point of view is clearly historical. Both describe the premodern world as more or less stable, being based on a fixed tradition that passed the test of time. The modern era, they argue, is characterized by chaos. People began to believe in their own understanding and presumed to take God's place. They created new societies, based on new values. For these utopias' sake, millions lost their lives, other millions were outraged, and the outcome was but disappointment and agony. Not only the suffering cries out, but the absurdity does as well, for the move to elevate humankind ultimately lowered people more than ever. According to these thinkers, Zionism is one with the rest of the twentieth century's ideologies, even if it seems unusually successful. A state is *in adjecto* a transient thing, and the Jewish state is no different. Neither a political institution nor military forces saved the Jewish people in exile: the power of the Torah alone preserved Jewish identity. The role of Haredi Judaism, these leaders argue, is to refrain by all means from entering the wild game of the twentieth century and to focus on the growth and fortification of the Torah world (i.e., *Yeshivot* and *kollelim*) as the best guarantee for Jewish continuity.

Rabbi Shach's doctrine underlies the basic nature of Haredi Orthodoxy, which differentiates it so much from Modern Orthodoxy: Zionist-Religious thinkers wish to create a versatile Jewish existence, risking exposure to the dangers and challenges of modern civilization. As part of this enterprise, they incorporate into their doctrines western ideas and modes of thinking. Haredi thinkers, by contrast, reject any such involvement with modern civilization. They seek to present their followers a pure, uncompromising Judaism that rejects the tempting glamor of modernity.

It seems that, unlike accusations sometimes heard from its critics, the wells of Orthodoxy have not dried up. Whether it chooses or not, Orthodox Judaism faces the challenges it meets and, consequently, new dilemmas arise and an alert inward discourse develops upon them. This discourse might sometimes be estranged to external observers but, for those who can understand it, Orthodoxy today presents an interesting and colorful rainbow of ideas, a variety of social groups, and an impressive display of religious creativity.