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ordained goal, Muslim nations must support liberation movements wherever they occur, whether or not they are Islamically inspired.⁸⁹

The ire of many of the *ulama*, and indeed many Muslims, across the Islamic world was particularly aroused by Qaddafi's methodology and interpretations of Islam. He challenged the status and role of the *ulama* by emphasizing that all Muslims had a right to interpret Islam and by interpreting Islam himself in a rather sweeping style whose innovations broke with traditional belief and practice. Raising his *Green Book* to the status of the Sharia, interpreting Islam for state and society, encouraging others to do so—all these actions flew in the face of the traditional role of the *ulama*. Qaddafi also encouraged Muslims to break with the centuries-long Islamic practice of dating the Muslim calendar from the emigration (*hijra*) of Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina. Instead he introduced a new Muslim calendar, which begins with the death of the Prophet. For many, the proof of Qaddafi's hubris and unorthodoxy was his position regarding the authenticity and binding nature of the corpus of Prophetic traditions, the *hadith*. Like some Muslim scholars and much of Western scholarship, Qaddafi questioned the authenticity of the traditions of the Prophet, given alterations, interpolations, and fabrication. He concluded that due to this lack of certitude regarding the Sunna of the Prophet, only the Quran should be regarded as binding and as an infallible guide. Many of his critics charged that Qaddafi was merely clearing the way for the authority of his own statements and teachings. Indeed, Qaddafi rejected the binding nature of the Sunna, the schools of Islamic law (which he regarded as sectarian movements), and the traditional religious establishment. Moreover, in a direct assault upon the authority of the *ulama*, he had encouraged his youthful followers to take over the mosques.

In addition to those alienated in the international political arena, Muammar Qaddafi's radical reinterpretation of traditional Islam and Arab socialism earned the opposition of the religious establishment and many Islamic activists at home and abroad. Thus, among those opposition leaders whom he has executed have been members of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. Mixing populist rhetoric with political, social, and economic experimentation, Qaddafi attempted to implement an ideological revolution in Libya and to export it internationally. His use of *The Green Book* to displace the Sharia's governance of the political and social order substantially reinterpreted Islam. In the final analysis, Qaddafi devised an ideology and system of government based less on revelation than his own guidance and dictates.

Iran

For many in the West, Islam and events in the Muslim world have been viewed primarily through the prism of the Iranian revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran: the fall of the Shah, long regarded by the Western media as an enlightened, modernizing monarch and a staunch ally of the United States; the wrenching spectacle of the seizure of the American embassy in Teheran and of "America Held Hostage" by Islamic militants, shown nightly on television and in the press shouting "Death to America"; the kidnapping of Americans and bombings of American embassies and Marines in Lebanon, attributed to Iranian-inspired and supported Islamic radicals; Salman Rushdie's condemnation to death for blaspheming in his novel *The Satanic Verses*. The Iranian experience exemplifies a publicly proclaimed "Islamic" revolution and government as well as the clash of interpretations of Islam that accompany the politicization of Shii Islam.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah of Iran's White Revolution had attempted to implement a wide-ranging modernization program. Despite noteworthy gains, the real impact and advantages of modernization had primarily benefited urban areas and a new modern middle class of technocrats and professionals. Most important, modernization had not included significant political reform. Many sectors of Iranian society had become increasingly critical of the Shah's growing autocratic rule and the rapid, uncritical pace of modernization, which posed a threat to Iranian national autonomy, identity, and culture.

In the face of the regime's refusal to grant broader political participation and its suppression of dissent, an alliance evolved between the traditional, religiously oriented classes (religious leaders, merchants, and artisans), who felt many of the Shah's modern reforms to be an assault on both their religion and livelihood, and many modern, Western-educated intellectuals and professionals. Both shared common concerns about political freedom, the dangers of military and economic dependence on the United States, and the threat of cultural alienation due to the Westernization of Iranian education and society—what one secular intellectual termed "Westoxification" or "Weststruckness," that is, indiscriminate borrowing from and dependence upon the West. Although all shared the goals of overthrowing the Shah and creating a more indigenously rooted government and society, their religious and political outlooks and agendas were in reality quite diverse. For many, the Islamic alternative meant a return to Islam, the establishment of an Islamic state and society. Others wished to restore national pride and identity through a conscious preservation and incorporation of

Iran's Persian/Shii identity and cultural heritage. Their differences would emerge once the Shah was overthrown and Iran's new leaders moved from opposition to a common foe to the implementation of an Islamic republic.

As opposition to the Shah mounted, the reinterpretation and politicization of Shii Islam emerged as the most viable and effective vehicle for articulating national concerns, for legitimating demands for reforms, and for gaining popular support. Islam provided an indigenous, non-Western alternative—a sense of identity, a common set of religious-cultural symbols and values and thus an ideological framework within which a variety of factions could co-exist. The ideological worldview of Shii Islam, in particular its religious history, gave meaning and legitimacy to a mushrooming opposition movement. Indeed, early Shii religious history and belief lent itself to the interpretation of Shiism as a religion of protest and revolution: the disinheritation of Ali, Husayn, and the early Imams by Sunni caliphs; Shii revolts against Umayyad and Abbasid Sunni rulers; and especially the martyrdom of the Imam Husayn at Karbala. All these events offered inspirational examples and symbols for the ensuing battle against oppression and injustice, and the legitimacy of protest, martyrdom, and, if necessary, revolution.

Modern Iranian history had also provided selective examples or precedents for the use of Islam in protest movements to preserve Iranian independence and national interests. In the Tobacco Protest (1891–92) to prevent the selling of tobacco concessions to Europeans and the Constitutional Revolt (1905–11), which set some limits on the Shah's power by instituting liberal reforms, a modern constitution, and parliamentary form of government, local religious leaders (mullahs) were pressed into service, joining with other sectors of society in the protests. In both cases, religious leaders and institutions were part of broad-based movements to safeguard Iranian identity and autonomy and check an autocratic Shah. Similarly, during the 1970s the mullah-mosque network offered a ready-made system of organization and mobilization. The imprisonment of many key secular leaders and the imposition of martial law accentuated the more independent status and role of religious leaders, who represented a vast reservoir of grass roots leadership. Their mosques, situated throughout Iran's cities, towns, and villages, became centers for political organization and agitation. Government regulations could not restrict the functioning of mosques, the economic support which religious leaders received from wealthy merchants and others who paid their Islamic tithes or taxes (the annual tithe on wealth for the poor, *zakat*, and the Shii religious tax on income, *khums*, which is paid directly to religious authorities), or the

sermons at Friday community prayer which drew upon Shii religious history to excoriate the evils of imperial oppression. The battlefield at Karbala in the seventh century became the streets of Teheran and other Iranian cities in the twentieth century; the confrontation between the armies of Caliph Yazid and the martyred Husayn was transformed into the contemporary confrontation between the Shah (the new Yazid) and the modern-day forces of Husayn, the Iranian people. Thus, the classic Shii myth of good and evil, the army of God versus that of Satan, with its lessons of sacrifice and martyrdom, had its modern-day meanings and application. Similarly, traditional Shii belief in the return of the hidden Twelfth Imam, its promise of ultimate victory and a reign of perfect social justice, could be drawn upon to inspire and motivate.

The Islamic component in Iran's revolution had many sources, drawing on a variety of Islamically oriented leaders and their ideological interpretations of Islam. Among the more prominent and influential were Mehdi Bazargan, Dr. Ali Shariati, and the Ayatollah Khomeini. Bazargan (1907-96), who would become the provisional prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, was a French-trained engineer and Islamically inspired political activist who had been a long-time critic of the Shah and had been imprisoned for his beliefs. In 1961, he and the Ayatollah Taleqani (1910-78) established the Liberation Movement of Iran, which sought to bridge the gap between religious and secularly oriented Iranians to create a more Islamic state and society. Bazargan was particularly effective because he combined a traditional religious outlook and vocabulary with modern concerns, and was thus able to speak to the *ulama* as well as modern, educated students and professionals. Using the doctrine of God's unity or oneness and citing as examples Muhammad's joint role as prophet-statesman and the status and activities of the Imams as religiopolitical leaders, Bazargan argued for a process of Iranian reform based on the integral relationship of Islam to politics and society.

Ali Shariati (1933-77), the son of a preacher-scholar, was a Sorbonne-educated intellectual and teacher. As a young man, he and his father had belonged to the Movement of God-Worshipping Socialists, which tried to combine Shii Islam with European socialism. He had been active in Bazargan's Liberation Movement of Iran in the 1960s and influenced by the example of the Algerian and Cuban revolutions. Shariati combined the Islamic reformist spirit of Bazargan and Taleqani, the ideas of sociologists such as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, and the revolutionary Third World socialist ideals of Franz Fanon and Che Guevara. He synthesized Shii Islam and Western social

scientific language to develop a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of traditional Islam, a kind of liberation theology. He denounced "world imperialism, including multinational corporations and cultural imperialism, racism, class exploitation, class oppression, class inequality, and *gharbzadegi* [Weststruckness]." ⁹⁰ His goal was to reverse what he regarded as the retrogressive state of Shii Islam and to construct a revolutionary Islamic ideology for sociopolitical reform. For Shariati, Shii Islam provided the symbols for a much-needed social and cultural revolution. Nowhere was this more evident than in his reinterpretation of Shii belief in the hidden Imam's return. Shariati believed that the real meaning and significance of this doctrine had been distorted into a political quietism, with believers passively awaiting the return of the Imam, the future coming of a messianic Mahdi or rightly guided leader. In the interim, a depoliticized Shiism accepted the legitimacy of temporal rulers during the absence of the Imam. Instead, he believed the period of expectation or awaiting should be marked by active striving to usher in the age of social justice and equity because, as he noted, this messianic doctrine included promise of ultimate victory:

Contrary to what Beckett says in *Waiting for Godot*, *intizar* [expectation or waiting for the return of the Imam] is not a futile idea. . . . Oppression, crime, injustice, all are unfinished stories and events in human history. . . . The story shall end with Justice and Truth triumphing over oppression and corruption. . . . Belief in the final Saviour, in the Shii Imams and the Twelfth Imam, means that this universal Revolution and final victory is the conclusion of the one great continual justice seeking movement of revolt against oppression. ⁹¹

Shariati's teachings disturbed both the political and the religious establishments. The Shah regarded Shariati as an Islamic Marxist and revolutionary, while many of the *ulama* condemned his innovative reinterpretation of traditional Shii beliefs, which was critical of the *ulama's* role in Iranian history. Shariati distinguished between original Islam (the Islam of Ali and his early followers)—which he claimed was dynamic, progressive, scientific, and revolutionary—and the scholastic, institutionalized, bureaucratic Islam (Safavid Islam) of the *ulama*, who had been co-opted by the Safavid rulers. The *ulama* produced a rigid, passive and retrogressive religion of the establishment. For Shariati, both Western imperialism and a retrogressive religious leadership were responsible for the decline of Muslim society. The *ulama* had too often become government advisers or fallen into quietism rather than asserting their true role as protectors of Islam against oppressive governments. Thus Shariati believed that reform must come primarily from

lay intelligentsia rather than from the traditional religious leaders. His dynamic revolutionary Islam, which preached a more indigenous ideology—Iranian/Islamic rather than Western/imperialist—proved very effective among many of Iran's modern, educated professionals and students. More than 100,000 copies of his lectures were published and distributed, and thousands flocked regularly to hear him speak. For them, Shariati demonstrated the relevance of Shii Islam to modern life and to serve as the basis for a much-needed social revolution.

In sharp contrast to Shariati stands the champion of clerical rule, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989). If Shariati was the ideologue of the Iranian revolution, Khomeini was its living symbol and guide. An early, outspoken critic of the Shah, he had been forced to live in exile from the 1960s until his triumphant return from France in 1979. The freedom and independence he enjoyed in exile enabled him to remain vociferous in his call for reform and to cultivate his image and role as the symbol of opposition to the Shah, the outspoken voice and conscience of Islam and the Iranian people. From exile, he continued to guide his followers in Iran; his speeches and writings were smuggled into Iran on audiocassettes and pamphlets and widely distributed through the mullah-mosque network.

Khomeini, like many others in Iran and throughout the Islamic world, condemned Western imperialism, the Westernization of Muslim societies with its threat to Islamic identity and culture, and Israel, which he regarded as an outpost of American neocolonialism:

The foul claws of imperialism have clutched at the heart of the lands of the people of the Quran, with our national wealth and resources being devoured by imperialism . . . with the poisonous culture of imperialism penetrating to the depths of towns and villages throughout the Muslim world, displacing the culture of the Quran. The sinister influence of imperialism is especially evident in Iran. Israel, the universally recognized enemy of Islam and the Muslims, at war with the Muslim peoples for years, has, with the assistance of the despicable government of Iran, penetrated the economic, political, and military affairs of the country; it must be said that Iran has become a military base for Israel which means, by extension, for America.⁹²

In contrast to Bazargan and Shariati, Khomeini remained religiously conservative in his education, vocation, worldview, and lifestyle. While all three shared common national and religious concerns—the experience of government repression, opposition to the Shah, rejection of political quietism, and the struggle for Islamically oriented sociopolitical reforms—Khomeini's outlook was shaped by his clerical background and interests. For Khomeini, the comprehensiveness of Islam

and its integral relationship to society were inseparably linked to clerical dominance:

Islam has a system and a program for all the different affairs of society: the form of government and administration, the regulation of people's dealings with each other, the relations of state and people, relations with foreign states and all other political and economic matters. . . . The mosque has always been the center of leadership and command, of examination and analysis of social problems.⁹³

However, religious traditionalism did not preclude change and development in his interpretation of Islam. His qualified acceptance of monarchy during the 1940s was replaced in the 1970s by his unequivocal declaration that Islam is fundamentally opposed to monarchy. Khomeini's lectures in 1970 on Islamic government not only reiterated the inseparability of Islam and politics and clerical involvement in politics, as advocated by Bazargan and a number of Shii ayatollahs, but also argued that in the absence of the Imam, the clergy should not only advise the government on Islamic matters but rule directly. His doctrine of jurist rule asserted that since an Islamic government is one based upon Islamic law, the most qualified to rule would be an expert (*faqih*) or group of experts in Islamic law. However, Khomeini's opinions would have remained academic if the political situation had not deteriorated so badly in the mid-1970s. The increasingly repressive measures of the Shah transformed an opposition movement demanding reform into a resistance movement, organized under the umbrella of Islam, calling for a new political and social order. This movement comprised diverse groups in the Iranian political and ideological spectrum: from secularists to Islamic activists, from liberal democrats to Marxists. In 1970, the Ayatollah had spoken of an Islamic revolution that might take centuries; he could not foresee that events in 1979 would lead to his triumphant return to Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

While the Shah provided a common foe and Islam a unifying symbol, the sharp differences among revolutionary factions came to the surface shortly after the downfall of the Pahlavi dynasty. The rupture occurred as Iran's new leaders turned to the task of implementing its Islamic identity and ideology—establishing the Islamic republic and drafting its first constitution. A sharp division existed over the role of the clergy and the implementation of Islamic law. Liberal constitution-
alists, among whom were secularists, Islamic modernists like Mehdi Bazargan, and religious authorities like the Ayatollah Shariatmadari, believed that the clergy should have an indirect role in government as

members of a committee who could veto any law judged contrary to Islam. The second camp, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini and supported by a majority of the mullahs, advocated direct rule by religious leaders and the full implementation of traditional Islamic law.

After an initial struggle, Khomeini and his clerical followers prevailed. They consolidated their power and dominated Iran's government, parliament, judiciary, military, Revolutionary Guards, the press, and media. Censorship of news and publishing, ideological control of university curricula and professors, prohibitions on alcohol, gambling, drug use, and sexual offenses were all enforced in the name of Islam. Islamic courts and judges sentenced and punished those convicted of offenses ranging from drug smuggling and homosexuality to political dissent. Dissent, both Islamic and secular, was silenced. Competing interpretations of Islam were often no longer tolerated but eclipsed or displaced by a doctrinaire ideology which left little place for the followers of Islamically oriented laity like Shariati and Bazargan or for dissenting clerics. Many were driven out of office, fled the country, imprisoned, or executed. The Ayatollah Shariatmadari was defrocked and other clerics silenced.

During the first decade of the Islamic Republic of Iran's existence, Khomeini and his clerical cohorts defined the nature and limits of Iran's Islamic identity and ideology and oversaw its implementation. Even then, sharp differences in Islamic domestic and foreign policy often existed. Postrevolutionary attempts to articulate and implement an Islamic alternative to the Shah's modernization program revealed deep divisions between those who advocated private sector freedom and those who favor radical socioeconomic reforms through state control of the economy. The clerically dominated Council of Guardians, influenced by merchants (*bazaaris*) who had been the financial backbone of the *ulama* and the revolution, consistently vetoed reform legislation as contrary to Islamic law.

Strong differences of interpretation have also occurred over the meaning of export of the revolution, which is rooted in the Quranic mandate to realize and propagate God's message. This principle is embodied in the first constitution of the Islamic Republic's commitment "to perpetuate the revolution both at home and abroad." Khomeini's espousal of a nonsectarian, universalist Islam, transcending Sunni-Shii differences, informed Iran's advocacy of a universal Islamic revolution to liberate all the oppressed and justified Khomeini's outspoken leadership on Islamic issues internationally. This doctrine was used to justify the incitement of revolts in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iraq; to support the Moro in the southern Philippines; to legitimate Iranian in-

tervention in Lebanon; and to justify Khomeini's condemnation of Salman Rushdie.

Debate over the interpretation and application of Islam has continued throughout the existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Contending factions, sometimes referred to as the realists/pragmatists vs. militant revolutionaries, have vied for power over issues ranging from the place and power of the clergy in politics, land reform, the veiling of women and their roles in society, relations with the West, the nature of Iran's export of its revolution (should it be through example or by violent overthrow of regimes), and tolerance of political and religious dissent.

Lebanon

The dominant reality of Lebanon during the late 1970s and the 1980s was its civil war. Lebanon also offers the second major example of militant Shii politics. Ironically, the two Middle Eastern countries most torn by violence and civil strife, Iran and Lebanon, were once regarded as the most stable, modern, and Western-oriented. It was not uncommon for Lebanon to be referred to as the Switzerland of the Middle East or for Beirut to be described as the Paris of the Middle East (reflecting the influence of French culture and fashions). Moreover, Beirut's banks, shops, boutiques, cinemas, and leading universities (the French Jesuit Université St. Joseph and the American University of Beirut) reflected Western influence and offered the best that was available in the United States and Europe.

Shii organizations such as AMAL, Hizbullah, and al-Jihad, which mobilized Shii Muslims in protest and revolutionary activities, were major actors in the Lebanese civil war. Since the late 1970s, a Shii community, long a distant third in political and economic power in a state dominated by Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims, has become a formidable force. Domestic political developments in Lebanon reflect a situation in which one could conclude that:

Without question, the most important development in Lebanon during the 1980's has been the emergence of an assertive, politicized, but riven Shiite community.⁹⁴

The Shii of Lebanon existed in a confessional or sectarian state whose government was based on the balancing of several major religiopolitical communities or confessional groups' interests.

Historically, with the division of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Lebanon had been placed under French rule, known as the French Mandate. The French subsequently oversaw the creation of modern Leb-

anon, whose government was based on an informal agreement, the National Pact of 1943, designed to assure the dominance of France's Christian Lebanese allies. A sectarian system of government, based on the census of 1932 which identified the Maronite Christians as the largest community, institutionalized the relative population strengths of Lebanon's major religious communities: Maronites, Sunni Muslims, Shii Muslims, and Druze. Thus, the president was to be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the chamber of deputies a Shii. Key positions in the government, cabinet, parliament, ministries, and military were apportioned along confessional, or sectarian, lines. Within this system, the Shii minority were a distant third to the more numerous and prosperous Christian and Sunni Muslim communities. However, Shii prominence in political affairs increased in the 1970s, and a major catalyst for this turn of events was an Iranian-born and -educated Shii cleric, Imam Musa Sadr. As the Ayatollah Khomeini had come to symbolize the hopes and aspirations of Iran's dispossessed, so too the charismatic Musa Sadr came to represent the reinvigorated and mobilized Lebanese Shii community.

Musa Sadr had come from Iran to Lebanon in 1959. The Lebanese Shii were primarily rural, poor, and disorganized. By the early 1970s, he had become the leading Shii cleric in Lebanon, a major force in organizing a weak, disparate community. Musa Sadr appealed to Shii identity and community solidarity to sustain a populist movement for social and political reform, and in 1974 he organized the Movement of the Disinherited. Musa Sadr reinterpreted Shii religious history and belief. Early Shii suffering at the hands of Sunni rulers was likened to the tyranny, discrimination, and exploitation suffered under the Christian-dominated Lebanese political system. He identified AMAL ("Hope": the militia which had evolved from this movement) with the liberation of Lebanon's oppressed and disinherited. Demonstrations and strikes were utilized to press the government to modify the Lebanese political system to better reflect the new social realities of a Lebanon in which Muslims, not Christians, were now the dominant population. AMAL organized the Shii and led rallies and marches to protest socioeconomic injustice and the Israeli military threat in south Lebanon. Although he had initially rejected force and insisted on nonviolent means to protest social injustices, the political realities of Lebanon led him to alter his position. In a land of militias and escalating sectarian warfare, AMAL, originally organized to provide the Shii community with protection, to defend the rights of a community who had now grown in numbers to become Lebanon's largest confessional group, became radicalized.

Five events precipitated a radicalization of Shii politics: the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, the disappearance of Musa Sadr in 1978, the Iranian revolution of 1978–79, and the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. The failure of Lebanon's Christian-dominated government to acknowledge the changed demographics (no census was taken after 1932!) and redistribute power more equitably to reflect a Muslim (Sunni and Shii combined) majority and of the Christian and Sunni Muslim leadership to respond to the needs of a Shii community that had grown from 18 percent in 1968 to 30 percent, or approximately one million, of the population, plus the presence of significant numbers of Palestinians in the south had exacerbated an already fragile and volatile political situation.

The mysterious disappearance of Musa Sadr while visiting Muammar Qaddafi in Libya in 1978 transformed Musa Sadr from a symbol of Shii protest to a cult hero and breathed new life into AMAL. Like the Ayatollah Khomeini, Musa Sadr had cultivated his religious persona, often identifying himself with the early Imams, in particular Ali and the martyred Husayn. Also like Khomeini, he did not try to prevent his followers from calling him Imam. Indeed, many came to call him "Imam of the Disinherited." Musa Sadr's disappearance fit nicely into the Shii paradigm of martyrdom and the occultation of the Hidden Twelfth Imam. He was transformed into a religious hero, a worthy descendant of Husayn. Many maintained that Imam Musa Sadr had not died; he had merely disappeared and would return.

The Iranian revolution and the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 significantly contributed to the further deterioration of Lebanon's war-torn politics and the radicalization of the Shii. The impact of the Iranian revolution, with its heightened sense of Shii pride and identity, testified to the power of Shii faith and ideology and verified the politicized Shii model of resistance and its promise of ultimate triumph. However, by 1982, AMAL, under Musa Sadr's lay successor, Nabih Berri, had increasingly pursued a moderate, pragmatic policy, maintaining relations with Lebanon's Christian-dominated government and Western powers. Its leadership, rhetoric, and agenda were less Islamic and more that of a nationalist organization, pursuing full Shii political and socioeconomic parity within Lebanon's pluralistic, multiconfessional state. AMAL did not call for a Shii-dominated state, an Islamic state, or the introduction of Islamic law. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the massacres at Shatilla and Sabra in 1982, attributed to a Christian militia, discredited Berri in the eyes of more alienated and radicalized Shii youth and Iranian-influenced militants. They rejected AMAL's accommodationist attitude, charging that Berri had collabo-

rated with the Christian government, Israel, and the United States, which has long been regarded as an ally and sponsor of both the Lebanese and Israeli governments.

With the assistance of Iran, radical Islamic organizations like Islamic AMAL, Hizbullah, and Islamic Jihad emerged in Baalbek, a Shii center in the Beqaa Valley. Calling for an "Islamic revolution," Iran offered a more militant, confrontational, and explicitly Islamic alternative to the Shii of Lebanon. Like Islamic AMAL, which broke with Berri and opted for a more explicit Islamic identification, all rejected AMAL's secular nationalism and, influenced by the example of Iran, called for an Islamic republic for Lebanon and the implementation of a more Islamic way of life. The groundwork had been well prepared. Politically, many Shiites had come to perceive or experience a seemingly endless deterioration of their position and the failure of moderation to achieve a more equitable situation. Ideologically, like the Ayatollah Khomeini, Lebanese Shii religious leaders such as Musa Sadr and Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (Hizbullah's ideologue and adviser) had been engaged in a powerful reinterpretation of Shii Islam which supported a populist, militant, political activist movement of resistance and protest.

Hizbullah, the Party of God, had sprung up in the wake of the Iranian revolution with the support of Iranian Revolutionary Guards ostensibly sent to Lebanon to fight Israel. Its motto ("the Party of God will surely be the victors") was taken from Quran (58:22), for they perceived their battle as that of the Party of God against the Party of Satan (Quran 58:19-20)—whether Christian militias, Israeli forces, Western imperialism, or even AMAL. Members of Hizbullah regarded the Iranian revolution as tangible proof of God's guidance and assistance in the battle against tyranny and injustice. Thus, Iran and Khomeini provided a model to be emulated. Posters of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who was often referred to as leader of the faith, adorned the houses and streets of Shii areas; his words were often reported and quoted. Indeed, Khomeini's politicized interpretation of Islam, emphasis on the special role of the clergy as the elite vanguard for reform, and condemnation of foreign imperialists, especially the United States, are essential principles of Hizbullah's ideological worldview. Quoting Khomeini, Hizbullah ideologues maintained that "the original objective of the imperialist countries is to destroy the Holy Koran and to obliterate it, and to destroy Islam and the Muslim ulama (leadership) . . . and their plan is to keep [Islamic countries] backward, and in the name of encouraging education . . . they have suppressed religious schools."⁹⁵

Pro-Iranian Shii clerics provided leadership and guidance for Hizbul-

lah. Their mosques became centers for recruitment, training, and mobilization. The clerics attracted students and young professionals, who regarded their situation as so desperate as to justify armed struggle (jihad) in their defense against political oppression, imperialism, and social injustice. Iran provided training, arms, and substantial financial aid to Hizbullah, supported its military operations as well as such religious activities as the building of mosques and the reconstruction of war-torn homes, hospitals, clinics, schools, and farms.

Throughout the 1980s Hizbullah grew to be an umbrella group with which a variety of smaller groups, such as the shadowy Islamic Jihad, allied themselves. Within the shifting alliances of Lebanon's civil war, the various groups have fought Christian militias, Israeli and Syrian troops, and AMAL, and engaged in kidnappings, hijackings, and bombings such as those of the American and French embassies as well as the barracks of multinational forces in Beirut in 1983.

With the end of civil war in 1990 and return to parliamentary government, both AMAL and Hizbollah remained significant, though differing, Shii voices in Lebanese society. In contrast to AMAL, Hizbollah initially opposed implementation of the Syrian-backed Taif Accord of 1989 and its establishment of a government based on Christian-Muslim parity. Instead it advocated a referendum on the creation of an Islamic state in which Christians would be "protected" people. However, in the 1990s, both AMAL and Hizbollah participated in parliamentary elections. AMAL's leader Nabih Berri became Speaker of the Parliament. Both AMAL and Hizbollah joined with Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Druze in rebuilding Lebanon and participated in institutes, conferences, and projects to improve interreligious understanding and cooperation. However, while Hizbollah participated in politics and society in the north, at the same time, it kept up its substantial military resistance to Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon.

Despite Iranian influence among the Shii, Islamic movements in Lebanon are Lebanese in leadership, ideology, politics, and direction. They are run by Lebanese and possess agendas which reflect their constituency and are tailored to the Lebanese reality. In present-day Lebanon, as in Northern Ireland or Israel, membership in a (religious) communal group or organization may simply designate political affiliation or identification and have little to say about whether a person is a practicing Muslim, Christian, or Druze. The motivations and ideological orientations of individuals and organizations vary widely, and the resurgence of the Shii community encompasses a diversity of religious viewpoints. Thus, AMAL and Hizbullah have represented quite different applications of Shii identity and belief in Lebanon. Although in-

spired by the memory of an Iranian-born charismatic cleric, AMAL has stood for a more pluralistic, multiconfessional state and lay-dominated organization and has carefully eschewed a primarily Islamic path for Lebanon. Hizbullah and its associated groups have more rigorously espoused an Islamic identity, ideology, clerical leadership, and goal.

Saudi Arabia

A visitor to Saudi Arabia is initially struck by a host of images that seem to confirm the Islamic character of the state—a seemingly endless number of mosques, a society that seems to stop at prayer time as shops close and the faithful, wherever they are, face Mecca to pray; prohibition of alcohol; women veiled and segregated in public life. Saudi Arabia provides a striking and at times paradoxical example of a traditional yet modern self-styled Islamic state. The Saudis proudly proclaim their Islamic heritage and traditions. Religion is the basis of Saudi Arabia's national identity, society, law, and politics. The House of Saud has relied on Islam to unite and rule its tribal society, to legitimate its authority and institutions, and to assert its leadership in the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia encompasses an area that is the original birthplace of Muhammad and the homeland of Islam. The Saudis are the keepers of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and guardians of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

Although the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially established as a nation-state in 1932, its roots date back to the eighteenth-century Islamic revivalist Wahhabi movement, with the alliance of religion and political power under Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud. The Saudi flag, which combines the Muslim confession of faith ("There is no god but the God . . .") and the crossed swords of the House of Saud and ibn Abd al-Wahhab, reflects this union of faith and politics. The Wahhabi spirit and strict interpretation of Islam have remained a prominent force in Saudi politics and society.

Islam provides the ideological basis for Saudi rule. The Quran is its constitution, and the state is governed by Islamic law, applied by a Shari'a court system whose judges and legal advisers are *ulama*. The House of Saud has been careful to cultivate its relationship with the *ulama*, the guardians of Islamic law, through intermarriage and state patronage. The monarchy itself has been justified or rationalized by maintaining that the king himself is subject to the Shari'a, God's law. For example, the removal of an inept ruler, King Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz, in 1964, and the transfer of power to his brother, King Faisal, were