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Ethnography

Relating the part to the whole

Isabelle Baszanger and Nicolas Dodier

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the anthropological tradition, primarily through the influential work of Bronislaw Malinowski, Edward Evans-Pritchard and Margaret Mead, had conferred an abiding legitimacy on field observations integrated into a 'cultural whole'. The subsequent crisis in this model corresponds to two lines of questioning. First, ethnomethodological studies undermined the conventional view by revealing the interpretations and negotiations needed to decontextualize observation situations at all junctures of fieldwork. Whether that work is ethnographic or statistical, it involves invisible operations that do not generally appear in social science texts. Second, analysis of how field notes are constructed forced a revision of the traditional views of the anthropologist in the field and served as a basis for a very critical reassessment of the authority of the ethnographer.

In parallel, within the field of sociology, greater emphasis was being placed on ethnographic approaches, primarily in terms of the importance given to direct, *in situ* observation of concrete sequences of activities. This was encouraged by new developments in the theory of action including extensions of the interactionist tradition, the many studies focusing on scientific activity, and work carried out in French pragmatic sociology looking at different regimes of action.

Since that time, new conceptions of ethnography have emerged. They reassert the value of fieldwork, but focus more on demonstrating the relationship between forms of heterogeneous action rather than trying to identify a culture as a whole. This chapter will take stock of these new developments in ethnography, the underlying conception of the field and the way in which they deal with the fact of human plurality (Arendt, 1995).

We will start with the question of the totalization of ethnographic data, i.e. how to integrate the series of data collected in the field into a single whole? We suggest distinguishing between three kinds of ethnography:

- 1 *Integrative ethnography*: following the anthropological tradition, this constructs units of collective belonging for individuals.
- 2 *Narrative ethnography*: by contrast, this offers readers a first-person narrative of events for each different field.
- 3 *Combinative ethnography*: by working simultaneously in different fields, this brings together a casebook that can be used to identify the different forms of action in which people may engage, along with the possible combinations between them.

As the above list suggests, totalization has a methodological dimension. This involves an examination of the operations whereby a totality is built up in the course of an ethnographic study, into which each concrete item is then, finally, fitted. These operations are both external (note taking, building up a series of observations, codings, etc.) and internal (the transformation, during the work, of the researcher's own way of apprehending the world). At the same time, it is also a theoretical question, since the relationship between individual cases and a totality directly involves the status ascribed to the references to the latter (e.g. collective belonging, individual stories, forms of action) in interpreting individual behaviour or actions.

In this chapter, we show how combinative ethnography has helped find a way out of the crisis of totalization in its 'integrative' version, and also how the question of the anchoring of the wholes thus constituted is brought into new focus by initiating reflection around the mode of otherness in which persons appear in each of the three forms of ethnography listed above.

AN INITIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH

Ethnographic studies are carried out to satisfy three simultaneous requirements associated with the study of human activities:

- 1 the need for an empirical approach;
- 2 the need to remain open to elements that cannot be codified at the time of the study;
- 3 a concern for grounding the phenomena observed in the field.

Each requirement is briefly discussed below.

The need for an empirical approach

This first need is dictated by the fact that the phenomena studied cannot be deduced but require empirical observation. This is undoubtedly what Durkheim really meant by his well-known injunction to 'treat social facts

as things', meaning not so the same lines as the natural philosophy and the intro approach.¹ In the current understand the world and between the social sciences phenomenology and her

The need to remain open

Beyond any methodological open in order to discover that people mobilize in with the world. By marking expectations, but are displayed in contact 1995; Thévenot, 1994). To new data (*in situ* studied according to items and rules (*a priori* incapable of revealing progresses. In method it allows each subject to not influenced by the s

There are many real compliance with the study for recourse to ethnography be understood in the light the contingency of co tradition) and observational situation (ethnomethodology)

This principle of openness in the basic tension between openness conflicts with in the conduct of the both the fieldworker and study. This duality is fieldworker.

The tension is primarily of the people observed has governed the 'reproduction' or 'reproduction' requirement of science none the less, to control human activities appear seek to conform as

as things', meaning not so much that sociology should be conducted along the same lines as the natural sciences, but as a way of distinguishing it from philosophy and the introspection that takes place upstream of an empirical approach.¹ In the current debate over the resources people mobilize to understand the world and to make reference to it, this is the major difference between the social sciences, on the one hand, and the philosophy of language, phenomenology and hermeneutics, on the other.

The need to remain open

Beyond any methodical planning of observations, the fieldworker must remain open in order to discover the elements making up the markers and the tools that people mobilize in their interactions with others and, more generally, with the world. By markers, we mean representations of the world, or normative expectations, but also the linguistic and para-linguistic resources that are displayed in contact with the environment (Bessy and Chateauraynaud, 1995; Thévenot, 1994). The objective here is to distinguish between openness to new data (*in situ studies*) and its opposite, as when individual activities are studied according to strict schedules and on the basis of previously defined items and rules (*a priori codified studies*). This second approach is intrinsically incapable of revealing the unexpected elements that come to light as a study progresses. In methodological terms, a study can be described as *in situ* if it allows each subject to behave in an endogenous manner: that is, one that is not influenced by the study arrangements.

There are many reasons for not 'aligning' the subjects of a study in compliance with the study arrangements, just as there are many theories calling for recourse to ethnographic studies: discovery of other cultures that cannot be understood in the light of pre-existing knowledge (anthropological tradition), the contingency of continually negotiated human activities (interactionist tradition) and observation of how people handle the contingencies of a given situation (ethnomethodology), and so on.

This principle of openness to what cannot *a priori* be pre-codified results in the basic tension underlying *in situ* studies. The flexibility required by this openness conflicts with the need to maintain at least a minimum of method in the conduct of the study; that is, a certain guide for the behaviour of both the fieldworker and the people observed, depending on the plan of the study. This duality is an implicit part of the general situation of the *in situ* fieldworker.

The tension is primarily epistemological. The principle of non-alignment of the people observed does not sit easily with the principle of planning that has governed the experimental sciences since the idea of scientific 'reproduction' or 'reproducibility' was elevated to the rank of a major, normative requirement of scientific research (Licoppe, 1996). Social scientists who wish, none the less, to continue openly to observe the endogenous development of human activities approach this problem in a number of different ways. Some seek to conform as closely as possible to the requirements of experimental

reproducibility. Even if they allow open activity sequences to take place, they try as much as possible to standardize the time intervals of these sequences and record this activity by automatic means (tape recorder or VCR used in conversation analysis – see Parts V and VI of this volume).

Others oppose this requirement of alignment and even the whole idea of observation corresponding to the current canons of science. They insist on an approach that is opposed to any type of planning, leaving the study completely open to the uncertainties of the field. Still others recognize the need for some sort of compromise between method and openness to situations, and see ethnographic tensions as a more extreme but, ultimately, a quite banal example of the sort of negotiation that is omnipresent in science (e.g. scientists' negotiation between the need to follow standard rules, which in any case always demand local interpretations and adjustments, and the concrete course of any scientific endeavour).²

It is worth noting that this duality underlying the ethnographer's work also has moral implications beyond the epistemological dimension. To satisfy this principle of openness, which is deliberately taken quite far, the ethnographer must graft his/her study onto pre-existing systems of activity. As opposed to the researcher, who channels subject matter into the laboratory, the ethnographer leaves the laboratory and tries to make his/her data gathering compatible with the study population's other commitments. By definition, ethnographic study design is a hybrid approach in which the fieldworker is present in two agencies, as data gatherer and as a person involved in activities directed towards other objectives.³

Grounding observed phenomena in the field

A study becomes ethnographic when the fieldworker is careful to connect the facts that s/he observes with the specific features of the *backdrop* against which these facts occur, which are linked to historical and cultural contingencies. Not all *in situ* studies are field studies.

Distinctions can be made between different sorts of empirical study carried out in the social sciences. Some attempt to universalize, i.e. are formal in nature, while others, resolutely grounded in a specific context, can be considered as ethnographic – or field – studies. Formal studies dissociate collected data from any context in order to access a universal, human level from the outset. This is the approach characteristic of the philosophy of language, of Austin's pragmatics, of phenomenological analyses or ordinary language analysis based on analysis of conversations.

It is also characteristic of the 'nomothetical' approach that uses empirical observation to demonstrate consistencies between facts and to formulate general laws. Nevertheless, the ethnographic study is not only empirical or only 'open'. It is, like history, embedded in a field that is limited in time and space (Ricoeur, 1984–1988). Returning to a concept that Darbo-Peschanski (1987) applies to the studies of Herodotus, it is a 'science of the particular' and describes itself as such.

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INTEGRATIVE ETHNOG

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newly arrived fieldworker. As Clifford noted, a professional anthropologist is supposed successfully to 'infiltrate the expressional universe of the other' (1983: 100). By understanding the other through an empathetic relationship, the fieldworker would be able to reconstruct this other's point of view, and therefore culture (or the contents of this other's collective consciousness).

The assumption of empathy as the process through which the point of view of the other becomes transparent to the fieldworker is vulnerable to criticisms arising from hermeneutic interpretation of texts and actions (Gadamer, 1975; Ricoeur, 1991). The act of gaining access to the point of view of the other always implies an initial period of questioning, which is itself embedded in a certain tradition, that of the interpreter – s/he is always caught in the 'hermeneutic circle' of the initial questioning of the text (or action), and of its transformation, in return, as a result of this encounter.

Although certain relationships or certain moments can be better qualified as empathetic, in the sense of a type of harmony between persons, we cannot therefore conclude that the point of view of the other will be conveyed in total transparency or that it can be expressed in words. Any interpretive act is influenced, consciously or not, by the tradition to which the interpreter belongs. Lévi-Strauss (1963) proposes a variation on this process by considering the moment the experience is integrated into a whole not as a moment of access to the point of view of the other, but as a moment when the entire set of results experienced and memorized by the fieldworker crystallizes into a single, unified experience. That event takes place at the conclusion of the fieldworker's ethnographic apprenticeship in the society studied. The ethnographer's field experience 'represents a crucial moment in his/her education, prior to which he may have accumulated dissociated knowledge that might never integrate into a holistic experience; only after this moment will this knowledge "take definitive form" and suddenly acquire a meaning that it previously lacked' (Lévi-Strauss, 1963). In other words, what we are dealing with here is a genuine 'internal revolution' (Lévi-Strauss, 1963).

By treating participant observation as a method rather than 'a clinical talent' resulting from an empathetic stance,⁵ a number of authors have helped to provide a new explanation for the position of the ethnographer, which becomes one of his/her own methodological tools. Just like the ethnographer in remote societies, the observer has to accept a separation from his/her familiar universe, not only in order to be physically present in the new environment, but also in order to achieve personal proximity.⁶

The observer has to enter into the group and find the right distance between him/herself and the group. There is a close relationship here between the observer's presentation of him/herself (to enter the field and throughout the study), and the place accorded to the observer by the other.

While it is paramount for a fieldworker to be attentive to the expectations and role projections of the people being observed,⁷ this is less in order to achieve an empathetic attitude than because the interrelations themselves and, ultimately, the fieldworker and the work done on his/her experience are the preferential instruments of observation.

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There is nothing romantic or intuitive here (Piette, 1996: 68–72). This is conscious work on the part of the observer, who has to control his/her emotional reaction to what is observed and also develop a finely tuned introspection to understand fully the process of transformation which s/he undergoes by being constantly present in the field. Hence, understanding a cultural whole is achieved through this reciprocating motion of the observer and the phenomena that s/he is observing, or, as Fox puts it, the process 'by which a participant observer gradually makes organized sense out of what he sees, hears and becomes a part of it' (1974: 230).

The observer establishes a sort of parallel between what s/he feels and what the people observed feel, or the phases they pass through. S/he uses a form of introspection to reveal how s/he develops new attitudes or borrows new roles and what that 'does for him/her'. In this way, the observer has fleeting insights into the possible functions and meanings for the people observed, which s/he then tries to verify in the field, at which point s/he either recognizes their validity or rejects them.⁸

The duration of the observation enables the fieldworker in a sense to immerse him/herself in the subject being observed, but this is closer to a process of socialization than a direct access to the point of view of the other. In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of a group, the fieldworker has to work his/her way through the dense fabric of the culture observed, in order to arrive later at an objective understanding and, hence, a monographic totalization.⁹ This brings us back to a slightly modified form of Lévi-Strauss's position.

Geertz (1973) also distances himself from the empathetic schema and re-integrates the concept of culture in a hermeneutic process: activities can be read like texts, as far as both the actors themselves and the fieldworker are concerned; the concept of 'culture' is also a tool for the actors, who use it to interpret their reciprocal behaviour. It is the discovery of the hermeneutic role of the concept of culture for all individuals in their daily relationships – based not on a representation of lived experience or on their point of view, but on a description of their oral or written production – that allows us to relate a sequence of specific scenes to a culture. In any case (empathy, the integrative experience of the ethnographer, the participant observation of the sociologist, the hermeneutic approach), access to the major features of the culture being studied, as can be seen in all ethnography manuals, implies using methods to go beyond a disparate set of ethnographic observations and discover an integrated culture which is different from other cultures.¹⁰

Because of its capacity to satisfy the need for concrete facts in the study and at the same time produce a discourse taking in collective wholes, this approach has for a long time exerted a great deal of fascination over the social sciences. However, it does not stand up very well to two criticisms. First, it is only valid if we are dealing with so-called 'mechanical' solidarity between individuals (Durkheim): that is, a society or group in which people are assumed to share the same elements of the collective consciousness. Difficulties arise if the coordination between human activities conforms to other types

of logic. In contemporary worlds, one now has to take into account the fact that several possible references can coexist despite their contradictions, sometimes within the same person, and that they can slot into the normative guidelines for action depending on the constraints of the actual situation (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991).

The very notion of society becomes problematical when solidarity between people is established along socio-technical networks in which individuals coordinate their activities step by step according to functional objectives and without reference to a single common framework (Dodier, 1995a). Moreover, at the methodological level, the moment at which data are integrated into a whole occurs at an unknown, almost mysterious point of the process.

Some ethnographers cultivate this sense of mystery by affirming their lack of interest in any account of methods. But others take a more ambiguous stand: monographic totalization may conceal implicit statistical totalization performed, as it were, behind the scenes. We see this particularly in the rhetoric of cultural ethnographic studies, which very easily use frequency markers when describing behaviour (often, sometimes, from time to time, always, etc.) without making more than a token attempt to justify them. These problems have been taken very seriously by some historians of ethnography and by certain ethnographers, to the point of casting doubt on the tradition of totalization presented more or less as a foregone conclusion in ethnology and field sociology.

NARRATIVE INTEGRATION

An attentive reading of ethnographers' field notes, particularly the famous example of Malinowski's notebook (1967), has led some authors to hark back to the question of the status that should be accorded to the process of monographic totalization (Marcus and Cushman, 1982). The very personal nature of the act of totalization, perceived in an almost ritual form by anthropologists, has been revealed as an experience associated with solitude.

For a long time, this experience in the field was perceived as a necessary moment of immersion in a culture for which the anthropologist could then become the legitimate representative. An analysis of field notes shows that the switch from this experience in the field to the ethnographic text is more complicated than had been thought. The role of the actual individual history of the ethnographer in his/her manner of identifying the culture became more apparent, as did the influence of the actual work of writing on the identification of cultural types, based on much vaguer and more varied encounters than might be imagined from the simple accounts given in the published texts. Once this observation was acknowledged, several channels were explored.

The first consists of claiming that the writing work itself is an essential part of ethnography. The ethnographic text is deliberately considered to be a work of fiction, stylizing people and events as a way of emphasizing their cultural

traits. The ethnographer is seen as the profoundly personal

Another characteristic of the face of ethnography is the material of the ethnographic or a society revealed, in which, finally, the ethnographer is confronting the ethnographic seen as integrated into a dimension and contrasted, in fact, with the opposite, in fact, with the

Such narratives call for a hyper-reflexive approach on the operation of the concepts such as the encounter between the initiated and the uninitiated between the wholes. The conclusion is not to try so much to establish a tradition that is established (Favret-Saada, 1979).

Finally, the narrative analysis (Favret-Saada) is described as a narrative ethnographer. The narrative of the fieldwork

Alternatively, the narrative dimension of the narrative discourse with analyses of the case, the framework of the ethnographic because it does not particularly if it also avoids limiting at least suggests provides information with the world a purely singular of the 'I', which is not limited to a retrospective of events which what place s/h (Favret-Saada, 1979). Here, with

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traits. The ethnographer is seen as an author and due emphasis is given to the profoundly personal nature of his/her account (Clifford and Marcus, 1986).

Another channel consists of seeing the fieldwork itself not as the hidden face of ethnography, perhaps reported in a personal diary, but as the actual material of the ethnographic text. This text is no longer the 'picture' of a culture or a society revealed to the ethnographer at the end of a learning process by which, finally, s/he is able to see it as a whole, but the 'account' of events confronting the ethnographer as the enquiry progresses. The narrative is now seen as integrating these events (Ricoeur, 1991); it preserves their temporal dimension and does not banish the ethnographer from his/her text – quite the opposite, in fact.

Such narrative ethnography can take the form of an approach that we might call hyper-reflexive, more preoccupied in fact with questioning and reporting on the operations performed by the ethnographer in his/her attempt, through concepts such as 'culture' or 'society', to confer some meaning on activities, than really acknowledging the existence of the other (Moerman, 1972). The encounter between ethnologist and study population is viewed as a dialogue initiated between individuals who themselves belong to different collective wholes. The concept of 'culture' is not abandoned, but the ethnographer does not try so much to acknowledge an 'other culture' as to reveal the dialogue that is established between different cultures during the fieldwork (Dwyer, 1979).

Finally, the narrative approach in ethnography is influenced by psychoanalysis (Favret-Saada, 1980; Favret-Saada and Contreras, 1981).¹¹ The study is described as a process profoundly linked to the individual history of the ethnographer. The text may be a history of the events occurring in the course of the fieldwork, i.e. the field notes (Favret-Saada and Contreras, 1981).

Alternatively, in an approach that is closer to the anthropological tradition, the narrative dimensions of the ethnological study are fitted into or alternate with analyses giving a representation of the logic of the relationships (in this case, the framework surrounding enunciations about sorcery) encountered by the ethnographer (Favret-Saada, 1980). This form of narrative is interesting because it does not unfairly remove the ethnographer from his/her text, particularly if s/he is closely involved in the activities described therein. It also avoids limiting the enquiry to the trajectory of a specific person, without at least suggesting why this experience is exemplary and in what way it provides information about the type of relationship the people studied have with the world. Hence, this form of text transcends the alternative between a purely singular 'I', characteristic of narrative ethnography, and the absence of the 'I', which is typical of classic ethnography. The work of reflexivity is not limited to narratives in the first person. Through the study itself, and in a retrospective vision, the author becomes capable of describing, in the series of events which s/he is reporting, in what capacity s/he was present or what place s/he occupied in these events (and, notably, in the case of Jeanne Favret-Saada, the place of her work in the framework surrounding enunciations). Here, we are dealing, in the field of the social sciences, with texts that

have the same force as 'evidence'. Often, these texts also suggest what part of this evidence is representative of a more general condition, by using all the possibilities of first-person narration and by identifying the role played by the author.¹²

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC CASEBOOK

There is another way of looking at the aggregation of specific events collected in an ethnographic study. The context of the events observed is considered neither as a 'whole' to be discovered (integrative ethnography) nor as a grounding point for an individual history (narrative ethnography), but as a disparate collection of resources between which individuals have to navigate. Unlike the cultural approach, we do not presume here that the resources mobilized by people in their behaviour can be linked up to a coherent whole. Unlike narrative ethnography, we leave behind the first-person account, the aim being to generalize from the study. This approach could be described as *combinative ethnography*. It takes several different forms in ethnographic work. In point of fact, it is present from the very beginning of the interactionist tradition.

Compared with the anthropological tradition, the originality of the early Chicago School was that it did not necessarily integrate the data collected around a collective whole in terms of a common culture, but in terms of territory, of geographic space.¹³ The problem with which these sociologists were concerned was based on human ecology: the interactions of human groups with the natural environment and a given geographical milieu. Their key concept, the unit of reference, so to speak, was the biotic community, with its notion of territory.¹⁴ The main point here was to make an inventory of a space by studying the different communities and activities of which it is composed.

This kind of ethnography sought to identify certain cases (and notably life histories) as examples of more general phenomena,¹⁵ but with quite a high degree of freedom to move between different levels of generalization.¹⁶ Here the ethnographer's participation in daily activities was seen as much, if not more, as a way of collecting facts as of gaining access to the meaning of situations for the subjects being studied. In this respect, we are still some distance away from the movement that was to become participant observation in the 1950s (cf. Platt, 1983) and the position of integrative ethnography.¹⁷

In the theory of action proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) as well as in its methodological implications, the method known as 'constant comparison' does not necessarily concern collective entities, but rather situations or types of activity, classified by the sociologist and studied in their relationships to each other, with a view to revealing their compatibility or the contrasts between them. Individuals can switch from one line of activity to another and the aim of the sociological study is to demonstrate the combinations – whether harmonious or conflictual – between these multiple commitments.

This methodological approach is part of new developments in the field of 'sociological pragmatism' in different 'regimes of truth' and work for these situations, but that tensions or contradictions exist (Boltanski and Thévenaz, 1999). The work of a doctor or a teacher, for example, involves 'framings' of his/her actions (Boltanski, 1987). From this view, the search for references is not a goal in itself. It aims to take stock of the resources of individuals within a situation, are related to the situation, framing the action and its distribution in space, type of schema, which is shared from the outside, at the intersection of the situation examined in their existence.

A common characteristic of the Chicago tradition, the sociological pragmatism, is the study method of analysing them as coexisting not only in individuals or during

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This methodological orientation has also emerged within the framework of new developments of the sociological theory of action. Here, in the context of 'sociological pragmatics', it is considered that individuals can be involved in different 'regimes of action', that the arrangements that provide a framework for these situations direct people towards certain forms of commitment, but that tensions or combinations can emerge between these regimes of action (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991; Dodier, 1993, 1995a). For example, the actual work of a doctor could be studied as the articulation between different 'framings' of his/her patient (Baszanger, 1998b; Dodier, 1994; Silverman, 1987). From this viewpoint, ethnography is no longer concerned with the search for references shared by the actors, as in the integrative approach. It aims to take stock of the dynamic relationship between the real activities of individuals within the framework of complex, normative references, which are related to the situation and are not unified. Although the arrangements framing the action are assumed to have a historical origin and a particular distribution in space, they are not automatically assigned to a culture. This type of schema, which breaks with the concept of a collective consciousness shared from the outset, assumes that individuals, and their actions, are located at the intersection of a non-harmonized plurality of references, which are examined in their existential commitment.

A common characteristic of these three types of ethnographic study (the Chicago tradition, the form of interactionism inspired by Anselm Strauss, sociological pragmatics) is to *distinguish between generalization and totalization*. The study method consists of accumulating a series of individual cases and of analysing them as a combination between different logics of action that coexist not only in the field under consideration, but even within these individuals or during their encounters.

Accumulation and processing of these cases can be likened to an *ethnographic casebook*, which is gradually enriched by new examples displaying new forms of activity and patterns of articulation. The research aims at producing a combinative inventory of possible situations. The researcher has not chosen an integrated field constituting a central point from which s/he will reconstitute a collective whole. Instead, s/he circulates between several sites, depending on which dimensions appear relevant in the analysis of each case. Although the researcher sometimes seeks a field that will allow him/her to study a regime of action or a form of activity in greater depth, s/he is not surprised if this field proves to be more disparate than anticipated, a factor that forces him/her to take into consideration the way in which it is related to other forms of action. As a result, the material collected often appears as a rather vast corpus of textual data coming from very disparate sources, in terms of situations and the media used.¹⁸

FORMS OF TOTALIZATION AND FORMS OF OTHERNESS

In ethnography, several responses have been proposed to the question of how we aggregate our observations. Integrative ethnography suggests that it is possible, thanks to monographic totalizations, to gain access to the collective wholes that govern behaviour. Narrative ethnography has quite radically challenged any pretension to totalization on the part of the social sciences – it integrates itself in a vaster movement of critiques of totalization in the social sciences,¹⁹ and focuses on the production of highly individualized accounts gathered in the course of the study. Finally, various ethnographic practices have sought to implement forms of generalization, which, starting from work on series of cases, aim not so much at the totalization of data as the revelation of a combinative mechanism between disparate or even contradictory forms of action within a given society.

Methodologically speaking, these last-mentioned works refer back to a non-cultural concept of the field which was already present in the Chicago tradition. However, here there is a greater concern for theoretical clarification concerning the concept of action and the methods for gathering and processing data.²⁰ This avoids both the mysteries of monographic totalization and the excesses of focusing on the person of the fieldworker evident in some narrative ethnographic works, or the escape back towards hyper-reflexivity.

What is the aim of each of these forms of ethnography? In this chapter, we will look at this question from the perspective of otherness: how do they represent the fact of human plurality? We suggest that these forms of ethnography propose what we might call different modes of otherness, i.e. different ways of showing the reader how the people present and acting in the texts are both similar to and different from him/her.

The relationship of individuals to the wholes or aggregates of integrative ethnography is one of belongingness. These aggregates are all tools for distinguishing among individuals between those that 'belong', so to speak, and those that do not. Hence, they are social identification markers, within the meaning given by Goffman (1961). The aggregates of classical ethnography, as noted by Piette (1996), correspond to objects supposedly 'shared' by people. These are shared only by the people presented in the ethnographic text, and not by its readers, who are, on the contrary, invited to see in ethnography faithful images of what happens 'over there', and not 'here' (Geertz, 1988). Moreover, these shared objects are only recognized as such by the ethnographer because the ethnographer him/herself does not share them.

The whole process of assembling observations, up to and including closure of the study, is based on the fact that what is shared is shared only by a circumscribed group of individuals which includes neither the ethnographer nor, in most cases, the people who read ethnography. Whether one identifies the recording of this aggregate in an integrative experience (Lévi-Strauss), in a hermeneutics of indigenous interpretations (Geertz) or in a successful socialization (Fox), the very fact that closure can be reached reflects the dual

nature of this global whole, what we ourselves call wholes. Whether it is unimportant – with an otherness

Narrative ethnography and the ethnographer are producing a complete case, a biography of a fieldworker, who is of the configurational sense by Ricoeur, as so many individuals of self, caught up

Closure occurs at a given moment, or Closure does not. Later reflection becomes which might be is faced with the contacts. At the forms of identity from the Latin plural singular person, to categories of two forms of identity to the narrative

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nature of this global reference. It is shared by the others, and distinct from what we ourselves are supposed to share given that we belong to other wholes. Whether or not these other wholes are explicitly mentioned in the text is unimportant – it is their implicit presence that counts. Here, we are dealing with an otherness of belonging.

Narrative ethnography is built on recording encounters between the ethnographer and the study population within an individual story, establishing a completely different relationship to the relevant whole: in this case, a biographical sequence. This sequence is built up gradually by the fieldworker, who is revealed to him/herself in the field in the narrative work of the configuration of self, according to a schema defended in a more general sense by Ricoeur (1990). The other individuals are perceived in the same way: as so many individual beings also involved in the process of the construction of self, caught up in the same tangled web of stories in the field.

Closure occurs when the ethnographer deems that s/he is capable, at a given moment, of giving his/her experience the shaping form of the narrative. Closure does not rule out further developments that might spring from later reflection by the fieldworker about him/herself, or further applications which might be directed to him/her by contacts in the field. Here the reader is faced with the otherness of the ethnographer as much as that of his/her contacts. At the centre of this otherness we find the interplay between two forms of identity proposed by Ricoeur, 'ipseity' and sameness. Ipseity comes from the Latin pronoun *ipse* and defines a form of identity referring to the singular person, which is distinct from 'sameness', a form of identity referring to categories of belongingness of the person. The interplay between these two forms of identity as a characteristic of the narrative leads, as he suggests, to the narrative identity.

Integrative ethnography proposed that the ethnographer disappear to reveal better to the reader an otherness of belonging (that of the natives). Conversely, in narrative ethnography, the presence of the ethnographer confronts the reader with a narrative otherness, grounded in the 'ipseity' of the ethnographer but none the less – thanks to the very dynamic of the narrative – offering possible avenues towards generalization beyond the individual case.

The question of belonging, which is central to integrative ethnography, and that of individual biographies, central to narrative ethnography, is replaced in combinative ethnography by the question of action. The initial point of entry into the field is generally an enquiry into a form of activity, explored in different places: disputes, judgement, scientific activity, medical activity, production, etc. In this case, the ethnographic text is very similar to a kind of inventory. It is generally presented as a list of possible operations: the resources available to people to act while taking into account situational constraints.

Nevertheless, despite the basically disparate or even conflicting nature of the forms of action envisaged, these inventories do not contradict the idea that the people involved act with reference to 'shared objects'.²¹ However,

these objects do not have the same status as in integrative ethnography. The resources mobilized are presented very specifically in the form of a relative availability. They are available to people because they belong to a common fund of skills, shared by all those appearing in the text.

This availability is relative since mobilization of these resources implies a cost, unless they become available owing to some unexpected opportunity or development. These resources, which are potentially available to individuals, do not, as in integrative ethnography, 'absorb' these individuals, to use the concept developed by Piette. They are too disparate or even mutually contradictory for that.

In combinative ethnography, the coherence of resources is lost, but not the existence of a shared aggregate of dispositions for understanding the world. This aggregate is presented as a common fund of possible actualizable operations. The origin and contours of this common fund vary according to the forms of activity studied and the underlying frameworks.

So we find studies referring to a common fund shared by all (or virtually all) human beings. These studies, while showing disparate forms of action, none the less relate them to a global reference as a source of shared objects. But it is a very general reference, not particularized as in the case of integrative ethnography.

Ethnomethodology refers to the skills of 'members' as shown in their mastery of natural language. Through this mastery, people are capable of demonstrating, *in situ*, the accountability of their activities. The work of Sebastian McEvoy on 'defensive invention' (1995) attributes this very general skill in handling language in a given situation to people involved in sequences of accusation and defence and in the myriad possible ramifications of the language in which disputes may be expressed. Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot refer explicitly to the existence of a very general skill in people's commitment to multiple forms of action directed towards a concern with justice, renewing both for philosophy and history, the question of the genesis of these skills.

In other studies, the status of this common fund is more flexible. Erving Goffman, for instance, refers to interactional skills which are shared by all individuals in their daily lives, and skills available to people under more specific conditions. One of the attractions of his work lies in the connections he creates between very different places, even in work which, in other respects, as in *Asylums* (Goffman, 1961), presents a monographic-type unity of time and place. The contours of the common fund of resources tend to be more strictly demarcated in the interactionist tradition inherited from Anselm Strauss, notably in the sense that concepts such as 'social world' (Strauss, 1978) tend to refer to circumscribed groups of people brought together around a shared horizon of action.

Hence it is possible to build up a theory that occupies an intermediate position between combinative and integrative ethnography, oscillating between the study of a common fund of interactional skills in our societies and a demonstration of the existence of varied funds of knowledge distributed

between different groups, that they depend on a particular person, social distinction, singularity once again, work on scientific instruments, their narratives produce the chain of socio-technical of the human beings, again, common, but keep in operation the

This dual language status ascribed to the casebooks are assumed as relative, responds to a saturation of operations that take organized in different (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

In the work of Boltanski and Thévenot, are, to some extent, are assumed to make the list of figures in the 'common world' not rule out the histories already exist, and in Chateauraynaud's work with Christian Besse (1995), is characterized by endless deployment into a given form of propose.

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between different groups of people. Here, at the extreme, skills are so plastic that they depend completely on the eminently local context surrounding the person, social distinctions between individuals on the basis of their belongingness once again becoming meaningless. This is shown in the follow-up work on scientific innovation carried out by Michel Callon and Bruno Latour:²² their narratives propose a vision of a world in which constant movement in the chain of socio-technical networks is echoed by transformation of the skills of the human beings engaged in these networks. The skills referred to are, once again, common, but in the very general sense of a capacity to maintain and keep in operation the networks of sciences and techniques.

This dual language of 'common' skills and 'possible' acts reflects the new status ascribed to closure of the ethnographic field. Here, inventories and casebooks are associated with the principle of a closure that is always envisaged as relative. In Glaser and Strauss's 'grounded theory', closure corresponds to a saturation of data within the framework of gradual sampling operations that take into account unexpected developments in a collection organized in different places, which are then compared with each other (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

In the work of Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), the forms of possible actions are, to some extent, closed off by the enumeration of 'cities' to which actors are assumed to make reference when addressing the concept of justice, but the list of figures inside the model increases as observations in the field feed the 'common worlds' concretely linked to the cities. Moreover, the model does not rule out the historical emergence of new cities supplementing those that already exist, and interfering with them in unexpected combinations.²³ Francis Chateauraynaud's work on professional mistakes (1991) and, in association with Christian Bessy, on the expertise of objects (Bessy and Chateauraynaud, 1995), is characterized by an epistemology that resolutely emphasizes the endless deployment of figures that can be demonstrated from interrogation into a given form of activity, consistent with the inventions that people may propose.

The relativity of closure of an inventory of possible actions is exacerbated, in the ethnography of regimes of action, by the fact that each observed 'case' is itself considered to be open. Once we accept that each protagonist has possible resources to attempt to change the temporal outcome of the action, there is nothing (apart from the constraints specific to empirical enquiry itself) to justify closing off at any particular point following the dynamics of stories that might continue to be played out in the field and elsewhere, even in the most unexpected configurations.

Here we can see where combinative ethnography differs from the preceding forms of ethnography in terms of the mode of otherness proposed to readers. Otherness is not seen in the same way as in integrative ethnography, i.e. in terms of belongingness. No distinction is made between people as such; that is, in terms of their acquisition of dispositions differentiating them in a sufficiently stable manner inside shared, albeit circumscribed, wholes. In the case of those ethnographic works which take the most radical line, we are, as readers, authors

and the people encountered in the field, assumed to share a common fund of skills, and it is this fund revealed by the analysis which is deployed alongside the other entities present in the world: artefacts, natural entities. Or, as is the case in work which allows a wider margin for distinguishing between people in terms of a flexible belongingness, the contours of common funds and their inscription within groups are not clearly specified.

This reference to a common fund of resources does not necessarily imply that we cannot differentiate between the positions taken by people, but that they are first and foremost action related. This means that they are defined by the respective positions occupied by people at the time of their encounter rather than by their belongingness to a given group or aggregate: such as victims/benefactors/spectators; care workers/patients; judges/prisoners/counsel for the defence, and so on.

Uneven distribution of skills between people is envisaged in terms of these respective positions, rather than as a function of what each party has acquired through belonging to distinct aggregates. Here, ethnography seeks to build a sociology of encounters²⁴ between persons occupying different action-related positions with respect to an 'anthropological' problem (i.e. linked to a general human condition). People are seen to be in possession of a fund of skills offering various possibilities of commitment in the encounter, while remaining within the constraints fixed by the arrangements created by the initial situational context.

MEASURING WHAT IS POSSIBLE

This suggests the emergence of a new mode of otherness which we might call pragmatic otherness. It proceeds from the fact that the reader is brought into contact, through the text, with individuals who share with the reader and between themselves a common fund of heterogeneous resources and who may, depending on the case, occupy varied action-related positions. From the reader's viewpoint, and despite all the myriad ethnographic details provided, the text does not present people that are 'different', either in terms of their acquired skills as in integrative ethnography, or in terms of their individual stories, as in narrative ethnography. Indeed, the criticism of 'disembodiedness' frequently levelled at the most radical texts of combinative ethnography reflects their failure to satisfy this implicit expectation of integration of observations in persons distinguished from one another.

Whereas successful integrative ethnography offers its readers an encounter with appreciably different individuals, combinative ethnography offers an explication of what is in fact present in all of us, albeit not necessarily activated owing to the limited opportunities afforded us by our situated commitments. It pictures a world of common or indeed plastic capacities, with the potential for indefinite modelling in reaction to the sudden appearance of the non-human objects with which we are confronted owing to the incessant transformations of socio-technical networks.

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Ultimately, combinative ethnography presents itself as a vast inventory of possibilities or potentialities regarding situated actions. Each new study observes new scenes and hence helps enlarge the spectrum of skills, arrangements and forms of action explored by earlier studies. The discourse of possibilities characteristic of these works springs from taking into account two simultaneous properties of action: individuals have to deal with situational constraints; but they always have the possibility of dealing with them by redefining the situation. However, these possibilities impose a cost for the people using them. Such costs can involve internal tensions, linked to the individual's confrontation with heterogeneous forms of activity, with the work of adjustment required to move from one form to the other, or to harmonize one with the other in the course of the action. All the cases show the efforts made by the individual to reorganize around him/herself the other people and arrangements engaged in the same situation.²⁵

This brings us to the question of creating an equivalence between these costs: how do we measure possibilities and establish a comparison between them? Crucial to the different forms of combinative ethnography is the representation of fundamental possibilities or potentialities. Even if they have not hitherto been actualized, the skills referred to here are considered as being potentially in people, who draw on them primarily as a function of situational opportunities. The paramount factor in whether they deploy these potentialities is whether they have or have not yet encountered the arrangements or action-related positions allowing them to do so. The characteristics of people who have acquired distinct sets of capacities through past experience is not systematically investigated.

This does not mean that combinative ethnography is not interested in the question of acquisition of skills. Indeed, a number of researchers have reflected on the comparison between distinct processes of acquisition, linked to distinct forms of action.²⁶ However, in these works, differentiation between persons in terms of what they have actually mobilized is of secondary importance. This assessment of potentialities tends to compare the different situations with which a generic person might be confronted.

This manner of looking at individuals reflects a theoretical choice: the primary aim is to construct a theory of potential skills, actualized depending on the encounters of each individual with other people, with arrangements and with action-related positions, rather than a theory of differentiated acquisition of skills. However, it also highlights the limitations of combinative ethnography as a study method. Integrative ethnography proposed a simple and attractive schema, marrying close observation of behaviour with a recording of the differences between people. Measuring possible actions was comparatively clear: the society or the unit of belongingness defined for each person the range of appropriate possibilities, those of their society or group, and excluded other possibilities as so many reactions incompatible with this belongingness.

Looked at from the perspective of heterogeneous worlds, the skills acquired by people emerge less clearly. Here, we need to 'follow' individuals, and

observe the very complex way in which the effects of successive commitment is related to a genuine in composite situations are embedded in these people. There is nothing at the moment of the to prevent an ethnographer undertaking this follow-up of individuals and the common space of indeed this is the process found in case histories centring on a given person forms of capital and whose trajectory is recounted in the light of salient moments observed by the assessment of possibilities by the ethnographer.²⁷ Nevertheless, a genuine comparative analysis of possibilities to be already resolved linked to the differentiated positions acquired by individuals presupposes the to light in the study. establishment of a common space within which the facts relating to their behaviour would be systematically recorded.

This work is not incompatible with ethnography, but it does require some **ETHNOGRAPHY IN** additional investment at a given moment in tools capable of representing One contribution made to readers the skills in a single item (a diagram of connections, a statistical table, etc.) the often objects of reflection. I quite large numbers of people concerned in terms of the kinds of activity that both by situational constituted the point of entry into the study. Only in this way can we hope the close observation skills that are not a to visualize the degree to which the positions occupied by individuals are activities. In particular the texture of the act similar or different and compare the possibilities available to individuals perform in order to structured in a distinct manner within a single space of coexistence.²⁸

Within such a space, individuals emerge according to a new form of otherness: the otherness of acquired skills. The reader is introduced to people who over time have acquired distinct sets of potentialities. This form of otherness provides a key for reflecting on acquired skills in heterogeneous worlds, beyond the schema of belongingness proposed, for other contexts, by integrative ethnography.

Representation of a common space of coexistence necessarily implies selecting a few fairly simple traits characteristic of the actions of the study population, given the complexity of the operations revealed by ethnography of action. The degree to which this activity is simplified depends on the resources which the fieldworker is able to invest and the limitations, at any given time, of the processing tools available to deal with complex bodies of data.²⁹ In addition, the different forms of commitment coincide more or less exactly with the representational arrangements required to visualize these common spaces. Certain forms of action can hardly be recorded (Dodier, 1990) and other forms can only be recorded in very specific forms of writing as Boltanski showed in his study of love as *agape* (1990).

Here we can measure the very reductionist effect on the pragmatic condition of individuals of ethnographic observations aimed at illustrating work which tries to represent systematically the differentiated positions acquired by individuals in a given society – notably in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Indeed, in these observations, the concept of pragmatic otherness disappears, practically speaking, when all the skills of commitment in situations are related, as a matter of principle, to so-called social positions.

Ethnographic observations then exist, first and foremost, as a means of exemplifying phenomena objectified elsewhere, using other methods, mainly statistical ones. The lucidity required to unmask in each situation what is related to social positions monopolizes the interpretive effort. There is no longer any possibility to reflect on what in the relationship with the other

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ETHNOGRAPHY IN THE PUBLIC SPACE OF ITS READERS

One contribution made by combinative ethnography is its capacity to explain to readers the skills for acting with which they themselves are unfamiliar as objects of reflection. Every person can see him/herself as potentially concerned both by situational constraints and by possibilities for acting. Moreover, the close observation of activities which ethnography allows here possesses a capacity to bring to light, from a critical point of view and in a public space, skills that are not acknowledged by the usual arrangements for recording activities. In particular, close observation of individual behaviour uncovers the texture of the activity by revealing the multiple operations that individuals perform in order to act in a complex universe.

Indeed, one aim of this work of combinative ethnography is to bring into the public space the elements constituting the (often hidden) pragmatic condition of individuals. This type of ethnography renders visible to an audience a whole complex web of activity which otherwise would be apparent only to those engaged in the situation, at the time and in that place, generally without leaving any durable and transportable trace of their commitment.³⁰

Integrative ethnography brought into close perspective the fabric of the life of individuals belonging to other societies. Combinative ethnography shows us what we all mobilize in the course of action, or what we might be brought to mobilize if confronted with a given set of arrangements or a given action-related position. Its real aim is to bring to light what generally remains invisible in official accounts, both by revealing the work of adjustment and by acknowledging skills for acting that are typically underestimated.

The critical compass of ethnography is very sensitive, for instance, to what ethnomethodology and laboratory-based ethnographies reveal concerning the local adjustments of scientific practice which escape the remote observation formerly allotted to it by epistemology. What is true of skills is also true of the pragmatic tensions experienced by people in a heterogeneous universe. These tensions are only revealed by close observation of behaviour which force us to look beneath the smooth surface that some actors ascribe to their organizations when they undervalue, consciously or not, their costs for concrete activities.

Hence this work involves explaining concrete conditions for acting, openness to new capacities and a critique of what is ordinarily hidden in official accounts. This critique proceeds not so much by elucidating the real

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8. The way in which Renée Fox describes her understanding (discovery) of the meaning and function of black humour for sick people nicely illustrates this phenomenon: 'At a non-hospital gathering one evening, I *caught myself* in the act of making a macabre joke, and I can remember speculating on the source of my unlikely new talent. The next morning, as I moved to [the ward], for the first time I *noticed* how much of the ward's conversation was phrased in the language of the grim joke and how often I responded in kind. Without realizing it, I had learned to speak to the men of [the ward] in the same way that they talked to each other. Long before this insight occurred, my field notes contained many samples of ward humor. But it was only by virtue of *self-observation* that I became sufficiently *aware* of its prevalence to regard it as a phenomenon central to my study' (1974: 231; emphasis added).
9. This point appears clearly in the relationship between the initial field notes, which, in many ways, already contain 'everything', and the final analysis which came months later: 'From the very start . . . my notes contained almost all the components of the ward picture I was ultimately to assemble. However, at the time that I recorded this observation, I was not yet aware of the patterned interconnections between them. At what point did I begin to see the ward in a coherently structured way? In the sense of month and day, I cannot really answer that question. But I do know that the so-called "understanding" of [the ward] which I eventually attained was not simply the result of coming to know more about the ward in a cognitive sense. It also involved a process of attitude learning (very much akin to what social scientists mean when they refer to the process of "socialization")' (Fox, 1974: 217-18).
10. We can, for example, refer to the classical manuals of Griaule (1957), Maquet (1962) or Mauss (1947).
11. See also Certeau (1987) concerning the relationship between history and narrative.
12. Evidence about working-class lifestyles are remarkable in this respect in their capacity to combine accounts of individual histories anchored in very specific contexts and preservation of a general framework of discussion (Linhart, 1978; Navel, 1945; Weil, 1951).
13. The sociological objective of this tradition was an attempt to understand the new urban space emerging as a result of industrialization and the double phenomenon of immigration that accompanied it (from the south and rural zones towards the north and the dawning metropolises, on the one hand, and from the European continent with its multiple ethnic components, on the other). Chicago, with its mosaic of ethnic groups and its different socio-ethnic neighbourhoods, was emblematic of this phenomenon. The aim was to analyse the ways in which this space in which different groups confronted each other and mixed together was structured and to study their reactions to these totally new living conditions.
14. For example, Thrasher (1927) started from the question of the geographical localization of juvenile delinquency: some sectors are more affected than others; how can this be explained?
15. The preferred approach is the study of natural history followed by a study of the community (understood here in the sense of a biotic community with its notion of territory): a town, a neighbourhood, an ethnic community located in a given geographical space (the ghettos). The central method used is the case study, which is based essentially on a life history and, to a lesser extent, on non-structured interviews using the actual words of the subject and all sorts of personal documents (personal letters, evidence collected in community notebooks, etc.).

16. The important point was to gather intensive data – for example, for *The Hobo*, Anderson (1923) collected sixty life histories, and made a preliminary study of 400 tramps, one use of which was to establish a list of the apparent physical defects of hobos and to identify both individual and more general traits. Alongside these life histories, the facts were collected via a study of administrative statistics, archives, local newspapers and the case files of social workers.
17. The fieldworker's position is different from the empathetic position of the participant-observer and is closer to that of the stranger, if we refer to Sombart and especially to Simmel. In a text written during his 1927 survey and published in 1983, Cressey shows how he attempted to build up a position as stranger in his ethnographic relationships to study the environment, the world of taxi dance halls. Referring to Sombart's analysis of 'the cultural stranger', he distinguishes between two 'stranger positions' which he used in his research. The 'sociological stranger' is a stranger with a particular status as commonly used by lawyers, doctors, social workers, public school counsellors, etc. The second, which he used much more often, is that of the 'anonymous stranger'. This is an ordinary relationship in big cities where isolated people meet up in transient relationships and with free time on their hands. For the researcher: 'it provides an opportunity for exploring aspects of human nature not ordinarily revealed' and has the effect of a 'catharsis'. This ethnographic relationship allows the fieldworker to access revelations that Cressey calls 'impersonal confessions'.
18. The work of processing these data can benefit from the development of automated techniques designed to facilitate constant two-way communication between the encoding of the material and ethnographic concentration on its special features (Chateauraynaud, 2003).
19. On the critique of statistical totalization and its limitations, see Dodier (1996).
20. See, for example, the enumerations made in Becker et al. (1961), and, in a more general sense, for the relationships between qualitative and quantitative data in theoretical elaboration, see Glaser and Strauss (1967: Chap. 8).
21. For developments on this point, and more particularly concerning interactionism and ethnomethodology, and taking a critical approach to this referring back to shared objects, see Piette (1996).
22. See for instance Callon (1998) and Latour (1987).
23. It is worth pointing out that in a recent work Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) analyse the emergence of a new city 'the city of projects' (*la Cité 'par projets'*), linked to the latest developments of capitalism.
24. The encounter is characterised by the fact that the people involved are in each other's horizon of action, whether directly or indirectly through objects of communication. At the very least, these people are in each other's horizon without this necessarily being reciprocal, as in the scene analysed by Boltanski (1999) based on an action-related schema, of the television viewer faced with the sight of another person's suffering. Encounter-driven relations can be distinguished from relations of interdependence, which includes all those situations where the action of one person has consequences for another, without one being necessarily present in the horizon of the other (see Corcuff, 1995).
25. See for instance the work of Goffman (1974) on shifts in 'framing', the analyses of Strauss et al. (1985: 151–90) on the 'work of articulation', or the revelation of the cost of moving between different 'common worlds' in Boltanski and Thévenot's model (1991).
26. We might note the observations of Thévenot (1994) on the constitution of familiarity

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in the relationship to objects, and the way in which Bessy and Chateauraynaud (1995) use the concept of 'hold' to describe the embedding, in both persons and things, of moments when the body is engaged at a level that does not mobilize exercise of judgement.

27. A good example is Strauss et al.'s development (1985: 161–81) of the case of Mrs Price in the framework of an analysis of the trajectories of cumulative mess in the hospital environment.
28. This space may bring together contemporaries who live at the same point in history. It may also aim to grasp the effects of history on the internal structuring of individuals, notably to situate observations relative to the present in an historical perspective (Baszanger, 1998b; Young, 1995).
29. These limitations are fortunately tending to recede thanks to the recent development of automated techniques allowing a continuous movement back and forth between encoding of material and an ethnographic attention to its particularities (Chateauraynaud, 2003).
30. We might think here of the way in which Anselm Strauss's focus on the different dimensions of medical work and above all the difficulty of harmonizing the different lines of work allowed him to see and bring to light the work done by the patient, in all its different dimensions (Baszanger, 1998a). For an argument supporting the need for close observation in order to apprehend the intensity of the web of judgements of ability between operators responsible for ensuring the operation of technical systems, see Dodier (1995b).

Recommended reading

Adele Clarke (2004) *Grounded theory after the postmodern turn: situational maps and analyses*. London: Sage.

Clarke revisits grounded theory and offers new provocative developments, in particular ways of doing 'situational analyses'.

Paul Atkinson, Amanda Coffey, Sara Delamont, John Lofland and Lyn Lofland (eds) (2001) *Handbook of ethnography*. London: Sage.

This handbook offers a rich and stimulating vision of the range of ethnographical questions today, paralleling some of the points made in this chapter.

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- This chapter extends research by considering different approaches to macro- and micro-sociology, the microsociology of Foucault (1984; Mehan and McLean-Parks (Atkinson and Heritage 1987; Sacks, 1992; Heritage 1992) emphasis of Foucault (Foucault, 1972, 1981) and the parallels between the two and similarities in the use of each methodology. The features of each approach are used to show how aspects of the themes with ethnography

We use the bridge land formations, not opening new opportunities for the formations or bridges are also built. The same can be two or more analyses, while also each perspective. The complementarity of strategies.

This goal may involve using several realities (Denzin, 1990).