

to say that the Tung-lin and their allies were unconcerned with policy, but only that they made little progress in the study and reform of political institutions—a shortcoming which is perhaps explainable by their almost frenzied concern over China's immediate military plight and the flagrant corruption in public life, as well as by the inescapable fact that no change in policy could be effected without first discrediting and displacing those in power. But whatever the reason, the most notable characteristic of Tung-lin political utterance is its righteous indignation rather than its penetration of political problems. It remained for the next generation to produce men like Huang Tsung-hsi and Ku Yen-wu, who, less directly involved themselves in political contention, were able to approach political questions in the broad light of history and in the most general terms Confucianism allowed.

HUANG TSUNG-HSI'S CRITIQUE OF CHINESE DESPOTISM

Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695) was the son of a high Ming official affiliated with the Tung-lin party who died in prison at the hands of the eunuchs. At the age of eighteen, after the fall of the chief eunuch, Wei Chung-hsien, Huang avenged his father's death by bringing to justice or personally attacking those responsible for it. Thereafter he devoted himself to study, took part in a flurry of political agitation at Nanking just before the fall of the Ming dynasty, and then engaged in prolonged, but unsuccessful, guerrilla operations against the Manchus in southeast China. There is evidence that he even took part in a mission to Japan, hoping to obtain aid. After finally giving up the struggle, Huang settled down to a career as an independent scholar and teacher, refusing all offers of employment from the Manchu regime.

Warfare being less total and intensive in those days, Huang was probably not forced to neglect his intellectual interests altogether during those unsettled years. Nevertheless it is remarkable that his most productive years should have come so late in life. His first important work, *A Plan for the Prince* (*Ming-i tai-fang lu*), was written at the age of fifty-two. Thereafter he worked on a massive anthology of Ming dynasty prose and the broad survey of Ming thought, *Ming-ju hsiieh-an*, which is the

first notable attempt in China at systematic and critical intellectual history. At his death he was compiling a similar survey for the Sung and Yuan dynasties. Huang's range of interests included mathematics, calendrical science, geography, and the critical study of the Classics, as well as literature and philosophy. In most of these fields, however, his approach is that of an historian, whose underlying bent is reflected further in the fact that his most outstanding disciples and followers in the Manchu period also distinguished themselves in historical studies. Huang was an independent and creative scholar, who re-examined some of the age-old prejudices of the Confucian literati and came to his own conclusions (as, for instance, to the role of Law). Nevertheless, he felt no urge to break with Confucian tradition as a whole; for him it provided the basic principles for the reform of existing evils. Therefore it is not so much as a strikingly original thinker that Huang holds a high place in Chinese intellectual history, but as one who combined the broad scholarship characteristic of the Chu Hsi school with the active interest in contemporary affairs shown by the best of the Wang Yang-ming school. Though a competent classical scholar, he gave more attention to the study of the recent past than did most others of his time, whose interests were increasingly antiquarian. In this sense, *A Plan for the Prince*, which analyzes the political and economic weaknesses of seventeenth-century China in the light of Huang's extensive historical researches, is truly representative of his best work.

HUANG TSUNG-HSI

A Plan for the Prince

A Plan for the Prince (*Ming-i tai-fang lu*)¹ is probably the most systematic and concise critique of Chinese imperial institutions ever attempted from the Confucian point of view. Besides dealing with the theory and structure of government, it takes up the problems of education, civil service examinations, land reform, taxation, currency, military organization, and eunuchs—all of them closely related to the problem of government or affected by the activities of the state. Huang's views on only a few of these can be set forth here. Though not representative of any sustained or effective movement in Chinese political thinking at the time, Huang's views were not untypical of Confucian scholarly

¹ The Chinese title is not susceptible of literal translation; we give the general sense of it as indicated by Huang's preface to the work.

opinion outside the official class; the great Ku Yen-wu, for instance, expressed himself as in agreement with "sixty or seventy percent of it."

[From *Ming-i tai-fang lu*, 1b-3b]

ON THE PRINCE

In the beginning of human life each man lived for himself and sought to benefit himself. There was such a thing as the common benefit, yet apparently no one promoted it; and there was common loss, yet apparently no one eliminated it. Then a man appeared who did not think of benefit in terms of his own personal gain, but sought to benefit all under Heaven; and who did not think of loss in terms of his own personal disadvantage, but sought to spare all under Heaven of loss. Thus his labors were thousands of times greater than the labors of ordinary men. But to work a thousand or ten thousand times harder without benefiting oneself is certainly not something which human desires seek after. Therefore in those early times some men, considering what was involved in it, refused to become princes—Hsü Yu and Wu Kuang² were such. Others undertook it, and then quit—Yao and Shun, for instance. Still others, like Yü, became princes against their own will and later were unable to quit. How could they have felt differently? Indeed, to love ease and hate strenuous labor has always been the natural inclination of man.

However, with those who later became princes it was different. They believed that since they held the power over benefit and loss, there was nothing wrong at all in taking for themselves all the benefits and leaving to others all the loss. They made it so that no man dared to live for himself or seek to benefit himself. Thus the prince made his own private interests the common end of all. At first the prince felt some qualms about it, but his conscience eased with time. He looked upon the world as an enormous estate to be handed on down to his descendants, for their perpetual pleasure and well-being. Of Han Kao-ti it is said that he asked: "Considering the estate I have acquired, which of us, Brother Chung, or myself, has done better for himself?"³ In these words he betrayed his overweening selfishness. The reason for [these contrasting attitudes] is this: In ancient times the people were considered hosts and the prince was the guest. All of his life the prince spent working for the sake of

²Legendary Taoist heroes who refused the throne when it was offered them.

³The founder of the Han dynasty, after his conquest of China, asked this question of his father, who had always thought his older brother the more capable of the two.

the people. Now the prince is host and the people are guests. Because of the prince people can find peace and happiness nowhere. In order to achieve his ends, people must be harmed and killed and their families broken up—all for the aggrandizement of one man's fortune. Without feeling the least pity for mankind, the prince says: "I want only to establish this estate for the sake of my descendants." Yet when he has established it, the prince still wrings every drop of blood and marrow from the people and takes away their sons and daughters to serve his excessive pleasures. It seems entirely proper to him. It is, he says, the interest on his estate. Thus the greatest enemy of mankind is the prince and nothing but the prince.

If there had been no rulers, each man would have lived for himself and secured what was to his own benefit. Could it be that the institution of rulership was meant to work out like this? In ancient times men loved their prince, thought of him as a father, likened him to God; and truly this was no more than just. Now men hate their prince, think of him as a mortal foe, call him an "outcast"; and this is perfectly natural. . . .

If it were possible for the latter-day princes to preserve such an estate and hand it down in perpetuity, this selfishness would not be hard to understand. But once the world comes to be looked upon as a personal estate, who in the world does not desire it as much as the prince? Even if the prince could tie his fortune down and lock it up tight, still the watchfulness of one man is no match for the greed of all. At most it can be kept in the family for a few generations, and sometimes it is lost in a lifetime. Sooner or later the spilling of blood and loss of life fall upon his own descendants. . . .

Therefore when the function of the prince is understood, as in the time of T'ang and Yü, everyone would just as soon pass the job on to someone else, and men like Hsü Yu and Wu Kuang are not unique. When the function of the prince is not clearly understood, every man in the market place covets the position. It is for this reason that throughout all subsequent time no one has heard of another Hsü Yu or Wu Kuang.

It is not easy to make plain the function of the prince, but any fool can see that a brief moment of excessive pleasure is not worth an eternity of sorrows.

Here Huang sets forth his conception of the true function and status of state officials. [Elsewhere he argues especially for a strong prime ministership. The office of prime minister had been abolished by the founder of the Ming, for fear that it concentrated too much power in the hands of a potential usurper.

[From *Ming-i tai-fang lu*, 4a-5b]

The reason for ministership lies in the fact that the world is too big for one man to govern and that it is necessary to share the work with others. Therefore, when I come forth to serve, it is for the whole world and not for the prince; it is for all men and not for one family. . . .

But those who act as ministers today do not understand this concept. They say that a minister is created for the prince, that he rules only because the prince shares part of the world with him and delegates to him some leadership over the people. They look upon the world and its people as personal property in the prince's pouch. . . .

Whether there is peace or disorder in the world does not depend on the rise and fall of dynasties, but upon the happiness or distress of the people. That is why the fall of Chieh and Chou were occasions for peace and order; why, too, the rise of the Ch'in and Mongol dynasties were nevertheless occasions for disorder; and why the rise and fall of Chin, Sung, Ch'i, and Liang had no effect whatever on the stability or instability of the times.

If a minister ignores the plight of the people, then even if he succeeds in assisting his prince's rise to power or follows him to final ruin, it still can never be said that he has followed the [True] Way of the Minister. The governing of the world is like the hauling of great logs. The men in front call out, "Heave!" those behind, "Ho!" The prince and his ministers are log-haulers working together. If some of them, instead of holding tight to the ropes with feet firmly set on the ground, amuse themselves by cavorting around in front, the others behind will think it the thing to do and the business of hauling logs will be neglected. Alas, the insolent princes of later times indulge themselves [in the same way] and do not tend to the business of the world and its people. From among the men of the country they seek out only such as will be servile errand-boys. And if from the country those alone respond who are of the servile

errand-boy type, then when they are protected from cold and hunger for a while, they feel eternally grateful for his majesty's kindness. Such men will not care whether they are treated by the prince with due respect, and will think it no more than proper to be relegated to a servant's status. In the first years of the Wan-li period [1573-1619] Chang Chü-cheng was treated by Shen-tsung with more respect than most ministers are shown, but it was not one-hundredth of what was shown to the counselors of ancient times. At the time people were shocked because Chü-cheng's acquiescence in these honors seemed unbecoming to a subject. His fault, on the contrary, lay in being unable to maintain his self-respect as a counsellor so that he had to take orders from servant people. Yet he was blamed for exactly the opposite. Why so? Because people's minds had been contaminated for so long by degenerate notions about what a minister was, taking it as the accepted standard. How could they be expected to know that princes and ministers differ in name only, and are in fact the same? . . .

The terms "prince" and "minister" derive their significance from service to mankind. If I have no sense of duty to mankind I am an alien to the prince. If I come to serve him without any consideration for the welfare of mankind, then I am merely the prince's menial servant. If, on the other hand, I have the people's interest at heart, then I am the prince's mentor and colleague. Only then may I really be called a minister.

ON LAW

Huang was rare among Confucianists in the importance which he attached to the form or system of government, rather than simply to the character of the men administering it. Whereas Confucianists had traditionally been hostile to "law," associating with it the concepts of the hated Legalists of old, Huang refused to accept this definition of the term and insisted that "law" could represent something more than the arbitrary and oppressive dictates of despotic regimes.

[From *Ming-i tai-fang lu*, 6a-7b]

Until the end of the Three Dynasties there was law. Since the Three Dynasties there has been no law. Why do I say so? Because the Two Emperors and Three Kings knew that mankind could not do without sustenance and therefore gave men fields to cultivate. They knew that men could not do without clothes and therefore gave them land on

which to grow mulberry and hemp. They knew also that men could not go untaught, so they set up schools, established the marriage ceremony to guard against promiscuity, and instituted military service to guard against disorders. This constituted law⁴ until the end of the Three Dynasties. It was never laid down for the benefit of one man alone.

Later rulers, once they had won the world, feared only that their dynasty might not last long and that their descendants would be unable to preserve their empire. To prevent what they feared from happening, they resorted to laws. Consequently, what they called "law" was simply instituted for the sake of one family and not for the sake of all mankind.

Thus the Ch'in abolished feudal fiefs and set up commanderies (*chün*) and prefectures (*hsien*) thinking that this system would better serve their own interests. The Han gave domains to members of the royal house, so as to have them stand guard for the dynasty throughout the empire. The Sung abolished the military commanderies because they caused the dynasty some uneasiness. Such being their laws, how could we expect to find in them the slightest trace of consideration for the general welfare? Indeed, could we call them "law" at all?

The law of the Three Dynasties safeguarded the world for the people. The prince did not monopolize all the wealth of the land nor did he jealously keep the right to punish and reward out of the people's hands. Position at court was not particularly considered an honor; to live an obscure life in the country was not particularly a disgrace. Later this kind of law was criticized for its looseness, but at that time the people were not envious of those in high place, nor did they despise humble status. The looser the law was, the fewer the disturbances which arose. It was what we might call "law without laws." The laws of later times safeguard the world as if it were something in the [prince's] treasure chest. It is not desired that anything beneficial should be left to the lowly, but rather that all blessings be reserved for the one on high. If the prince employs a man, he is immediately afraid that the man will act in his own interest, and so another man is employed to keep a check on the first one. If one measure is adopted, there are immediate fears of its be-

⁴ The Chinese term *fa* means "system" as well as legal regulation, and is applied here to the political and social institutions of ancient times, which for Huang represented a kind of basic constitution.

ing abused or evaded, and so another measure must be adopted to guard against abuses or evasions. All men know where the treasure chest lies, and the prince is constantly fretting and fidgeting out of anxiety for the security of the treasure. Consequently, the laws have to be made more comprehensive and detailed, and as they become more detailed, they become the very source of disorder. These are what we might call "unlawful laws."

Some say that each dynasty has its own laws and that succeeding generations of the royal house have a filial duty to follow the ancestral laws. Now the "unlawful laws" were originally instituted because the first prince of a line was unable to curb his own selfishness. Later princes, out of the same inability to curb their own selfishness, may in some cases have broken down these laws. The breaking down of the laws was admittedly a cause for suffering among the people, yet this does not mean that the original enactment of the laws never caused the people to suffer. And still some insist that we get involved in this kind of legalistic muck just to gain a little reputation for upholding the dynastic laws—all of which talk is just the secondhand drivel of petty literocrats.

It might be argued that order and disorder in the world are unrelated to the maintenance or absence of law. Now as to this there has been a great change from the past to the present: one complete upheaval which came with the Ch'in dynasty, and another with the Yüan [Mongol] dynasty. Following these two upheavals nothing at all survived of the sympathetic, benevolent, and constructive government of the early kings. So, unless we take a long-range view and look deep into the heart of the matter, changing everything thoroughly until the original order is restored with its land system, feudal system, school and military system, then even though some minor changes are made there will never be an end to the misery of the common man.

If it should be said that there are only men who govern well, not laws which govern well, my reply is that only if there are laws which govern well, will there later be men who govern well. Since "unlawful laws" fetter men hand and foot, even a man capable of governing well cannot overcome the handicaps of senseless restraint and suspicion. When there is something to be done, he does no more than his share, and since he contents himself with trifling accomplishments, there can be no outstanding achievements. If the law of the early kings were restored, there would

be a spirit among men which went beyond the letter of the law. If men were of the right kind, the full intent of the law would be fulfilled; and even if they were of the wrong kind, it would be impossible for them to govern tyrannically and make the people suffer. Therefore I say we must first have laws which govern well and later we shall have men who govern well.

THE SELECTION OF OFFICIALS

For Huang, as for earlier reformers, the operation of the civil service was of crucial importance. Here only his basic principles are set forth, but in the original work he gives a detailed analysis of existing forms of recruitment, examination, and employment, as well as detailed recommendations for their improvement.

[From *Ming-i tai-fang lu*, 172-18b]

In ancient times the selection of officials was liberal, but the employment of them was strict. Today the selection of officials is strict, but the employment of them is liberal. Under the old system of "state recommendation and village selection," a man of ability did not have to fear that he would go unrecognized. Later on, in the T'ang and Sung, several types of examination were instituted, and if a man did not succeed in one, he could turn around and take another. Thus the system of selection was liberal. . . .

But today this is not so. There is only one way to become an official: through the examination system. Even if there were scholars like the great men of old, such as Ch'ü Yüan, Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Ssu-ma Hsiang-jü, Tung Chung-shu, and Yang Hsiung, they would have no other way than this to get chosen for office. Would not this system of selection be called too strict? However, should candidates one day succeed, the top-most are placed among the imperial attendants and the lowest given posts in the prefectures and districts. Even those who fail [the metropolitan examinations] and yet have been sent up from the provinces are given official posts without having to take examinations again the rest of their lives. Would not this system of employment be called too liberal? Because the system of selection is too confined, many great men live to old age and die in obscurity. Because the system of employment is too liberal, frequently the right man cannot be found among the many holding official rank.

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The common man, seeing only that in the past two hundred years a few men of character and achievement have appeared among those chosen, concludes that the examination system is good enough and there is no need to look elsewhere. He does not realize that among the hundreds and thousands taken in by the examination system, some men of character and achievement would inevitably find their way in. This means that men of character and achievement may find their way through the examination system, but the examination system does not find them. If we had scholars draw lots and chose them according to the length of the lot drawn, in the course of several hundred years men of character and achievement would naturally appear among those so chosen. But would we call this a good way to choose officials?

After all, the men of today who have character and ability are a far cry from those of the Han and T'ang dynasties. Today we have only mediocre and shallow men cluttering up the world. But it is surely not because Heaven has ceased to produce men of talent, is it? The system of selection is wrong.

Therefore, I would broaden the system for selecting officials, and choose men [not only] through the regular examinations [but also] through special recommendations, through the Imperial Academy, through the appointment of high officials' sons, through [a merit system for] junior officials in prefectures and districts, through special appointments, through [the recognition of] unique scholarship, and through the presentation of [outstanding] memorials.

LAND SYSTEM

In the following pages Huang gives his views on land reform, which echo the ancient ideal of the well-fields and earlier proposals for land redistribution. The greater part of Huang's discussion of the land problem, however, is a lengthy historical analysis of tax systems (not reproduced here), reflecting his belief that the chief evil was oppressive taxation by the state. Unless this were corrected, even the redistribution of land would not help the peasant. A significant feature of Huang's essay is his discussion of the land problem on the basis of statistical evidence, not just in the abstract. The official statistics available were none too accurate, but at least there were the beginnings here of social science, had Huang's line of inquiry been pursued and more accurate evidence compiled.

[From *Ming-i tai-fang lu*, 26a-27b]

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After the abolition of the well-fields, Tung Chung-shu proposed a limitation on the amount of land a man could hold.⁵ In accordance with this principle Shih Tan and K'ung Kuang decreed that no one could hold more than thirty *ch'ing* [about 340 acres], and that after a grace period of three years the land of those who violated this decree was to be confiscated.⁶ Their intentions were good, but whereas in ancient times the wise ruler distributed land so as to provide for the people, today people own their own land and if an attempt is made to deprive them of it by legal means—if, far from distributing land, the government expropriates it—it is [what Mencius] called "doing an act of unrighteousness" and should not be done.

Some people may say: "If we try to restore the well-field system by seizing the land of the rich, disorders will result. We can restore the well-fields only by taking advantage of strife and bloodshed, when the population is small in relation to the vastness of the land. What a pity, therefore, that it was not done when it might have been: when Han Kao-tsu destroyed the Ch'in dynasty [206 B.C.] or Kuang-wu assumed the throne of Han [A.D. 25]!"⁷

Now the early kings instituted the well-fields in order to provide for the livelihood of the people, in order to make them prosper and multiply. And yet such persons seem to regard the massacre of the people as something fortunate, because this makes it possible for them to advance their own projects. Could it be that they would regard it as a misfortune if, after turning the land into well-fields, the people should thrive and multiply and thus make it difficult for them to carry out their proposed reforms?

Among the scholars of later times, none presented so fully as did Su Hsün⁸ the reasons why well-fields could not possibly be restored, and none so cogently as did Hu Han and Fang Hsiao-ju⁹ the reasons why the well-fields should be restored. Su Hsün believed that without several hundred years of exhausting labor, it would be impossible to establish a system of rivers and highways, canals and roads, waterways and roadways, ditches and lanes, and trenches and pathways.¹⁰ Now if we

actually distributed land to the people, all routes would be kept open for traffic and all irrigation works could be kept in repair. So why need we get bogged down in the secondary details of the system? All the things that Su Hsün worried about were in no way vital to the well-field system.

Hu Han and Fang Hsiao-ju said well-fields should be restored, but were unable to elaborate an effective method for restoring them. Through a consideration of the military farms,¹¹ however, I have learned how the well-fields may be restored—in just the same way as the military farms were set up. These days scholars admit, when it comes to military farms, that to operate them is quite feasible, but when it is a question of well-fields, they say it cannot be done. They don't even know that two fives make ten!

Each soldier was allotted fifty *mu* which is equivalent to one hundred *mu* in ancient times.¹² Is it not, then, just the same as the hundred *mu* allotted to each man [under the well-field system] in Chou times? The regular grain tax on fifty *mu* of land was twelve piculs which the soldier-cultivator was permitted to use for his own needs; an additional tax of twelve piculs went to the officers and men of the local garrison for pay and supplies. Thus, actually the tax was just twelve piculs, and this amounts to two pecks (*tou*), four pints (*sheng*) per *mu*, just the same as under the tribute system used in the inner and outer districts during the Chou dynasty.

The total area of military farm land at present is 64,424,300 *mu*.¹³ In the sixth year of Wan-i [1578], the total land actually under cultivation was 701,397,628 *mu*. If we find the ratio between them, military farm land is seen to occupy one-tenth of the total. [Since all military farm land is government land distributed to cultivators] that part of the total in which land distribution has not been effected is only nine-tenths. To apply to these nine-tenths of the land what is already true of one-tenth would not seem a difficult thing to do.

All land is either government-owned or private. Government land cannot be bought and owned by an individual. Within the area organ-

⁵ See pp. 216-18.

⁷ See pp. 406-8.

⁸ At the end of the Former Han dynasty.

⁹ Early Ming (late fourteenth century) scholars.

¹⁰ As the system was described in the *Rites of Chou*.

¹¹ Farmlands set aside for the support of military households in the Ming dynasty.

¹² Because the unit of measurement was thought to have doubled in the meantime.

¹³ Actually Huang's figures are not current but come from the 1587 edition of *The Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty* (*Ming hui-tien*).

ized into districts and prefectures, government land occupies three-tenths of the total. Now if we take the total land under cultivation and average it out, with a total of 10,621,436 households in the land, each household would receive fifty *mu* and there would still be 170,325,828 *mu* left over. If the rich were allowed to occupy the remainder, no one need feel that he did not have enough. So why must there be any fuss over property limitations and equalization of land, or this needless to-do about causing the rich to suffer?

WANG FU-CHIH

Wang Fu-chih (Wang Ch'uan-shan, 1619-1692) was born of a scholarly family at the end of the Ming and had already received his first degree when Peking fell to the Manchus. Personally committed to the old dynasty, he raised an armed force and made attempts to support the remnants of Ming rule. When he realized at last the hopelessness of such efforts, he retired to his native place and spent the remainder of his life in seclusion, refusing to have anything to do with the new regime. He wrote and compiled numerous works on the classics, history, philosophy, and literature, employing historical and philological methods of research and at the same time expounding his own political ideas. Because of his isolation and hostility toward Manchu rule, he was little known in his own time. His works were not published until about two centuries after his death when, with the growth and development of anti-Manchu sentiment at the turn of the nineteenth century, they achieved great popularity and influence.

A philosopher of considerable depth and power, Wang Fu-chih reacted strongly against the idealism and subjectivism of the Wang Yang-ming school and turned back to the Sung master, Chang T'ai, for his basic ideas. He attacked the concept of metaphysical categories or principles as existing above or prior to material forms. According to Wang, function alone determines the form of a thing (not abstract principle) and the two can never be considered apart from one another. As applied to his political philosophy, for instance, this meant that the cardinal Confucian virtues of humanity and righteousness had to be conceived functionally as the means by which the ruler "lovingly cared for his own

people" and "regulated his own human relationships" (i.e., performed his obligations to his own kindred).

Having, for a Confucianist, an uncommonly strong sense of racial consciousness, and regarding the preservation of the Chinese people and their culture as the ultimate end of government, Wang insisted that humanity and righteousness were not worth talking about unless they served the preservation of the race. Applying the same principle to political institutions, Wang asserted that there was no ideal system of political, economic, or military organization apart from the geographical conditions or historical circumstances in which they had to function. The institutions appropriate to each age differ, and therefore it is useless to talk of restoring the feudal system or the other institutions described in the Classics, as so many Confucian idealists had urged. Thus despite Wang's realistic attitude in regard to the need for adjusting to changed circumstances, he may be considered a reformer only in a limited sense, since he insisted equally upon the need for reconciling oneself to existing institutions, however defective in certain respects, which had arisen in response to historical changes. Wang, indeed, tended more toward a cyclical or pulsatory view of history than a progressive or evolutionary one. Nevertheless, among reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, his intense nationalism and theory of adaptation to changed circumstances were hailed as anticipating the needs of modern China.

WANG FU-CHIH

Dynastic Rule and the Preservation of the Race

In the following excerpts from the opening portion of his *Yellow Book* (*Huang shu*), Wang argues that the differentiation of species and races is a fundamental principle of nature, and that self-preservation of the people and their culture is the primary duty of the ruler. Because he rejected the Manchus as barbarians and challenged the legitimacy of their rule, great danger attached to the expression of his views. Whether for this reason or for his own idiosyncrasies of literary style, the text is full of cryptic expressions and recondite allusions, as well as censored passages. Because of difficulties in interpretation and reconstruction, the following translation is quite tentative and at some points represents only a rough paraphrase of the original.

[From *Ch'uan-shan i-shu*, *Huang shu*, 1a-2b]