



Formula One's new urban economies

Sylvain Lefebvre^a, Romain Roult^{b,*}

^a Department of Geography, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), Montreal, Canada

^b Department of Urban and Touristic Studies, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), Montreal, Canada

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ABSTRACT

The Formula One (F1) industry has become a true microcosm of the world economy, as new business opportunities surface in emerging countries. Until the beginning of the twenty-first century, this sport was mostly relevant to traditional western urban elites, but since then, the F1 calendar has been largely altered to the benefit of 'dominant-emerging cities' and to the detriment of more traditional destinations. This article focuses on this urban question through a historical analysis of the F1 circuit's expansion phases as well as through a study of the current Grand Prix's estimate sanction fee.

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Introduction

The Formula One (F1) industry has become a true microcosm of the world economy, as emerging countries offering new business opportunities are ready to pay millions to guarantee they will host a Grand Prix that will last for a little less than a decade. This new outcome overturns the F1 world, which capitalizes on the bidding war between cities fighting for certain races. This outbidding was generated by a monopolistic situation and provoked a major reconfiguration of the main races' locations. This change in policy also means that certain cities are compelled to stay in the margin of the world circuit. These new cities pay more than 400 million dollars each year to obtain franchise rights from the F1 authorities. This has contributed to turning franchise rights into the first economic income for the F1 organisation, surpassing television rights (\$380 million in 2007). This change, which was partly initiated by Bernie Ecclestone – the main financier of the F1 – in the middle of the 1990s, was reinforced throughout the last few years. Today, we could even speak of an F1 revolution. Indeed, before the early 2000s, this sport's audience was mostly comprised of a western urban elite. A few emblematic urban destinations symbolized the entire sport, such as the Monte Carlo or the Monza Grand Prix. However, since the beginning of the new millennium, the F1 cul-

ture has changed drastically. There was a complete revision of the F1 calendar and 'dominant-emerging cities' are now clearly on the rise, competing strongly with more traditional destinations.

Several Grands Prix disappeared from the 2009 calendar (Indianapolis, Montreal, Magny and more recently Hockenheim). This situation seems to confirm the great transformation highlighted earlier, and suggests that the F1 is entering in a new era where prosperity and notoriety are no longer exclusive to European or North American territories, but are now found in the Middle-East and Asia as well. Formula One has become a revealing sign of a transition that is taking place in the entire sport and entertainment industry. Worldwide, dominant and emblematic cities are progressively giving way to new ones, thereby strongly supporting the observation that a major change is taking place in the world of contemporary sports. This article aims to answer several fundamental questions on this matter. First, from an historical point of view, how did the urban and economic transition unfold since the creation of the industry in the 1950s? Second, can we locate different development phases and how should we proceed to identify them? Third, what are the urban characteristics of these new markets? Fourth, why are the 'dominant-emerging cities' aspiring to turn into hosting cities for these international mega-events? Finally, from a theoretical point of view, how can we define these new urban sport territories? In other words, are these festive spaces defined in scientific literature, or should we see them as hybrid cities in need of a new definition? Since this transformation of the F1 industry raises numerous questions, we will try to propose a series of answers as well as new ways of approaching this global issue.

* Corresponding author. Address: Département de Géographie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), C.P. 8888 Succursale Centre-Ville (Bureau A-4140), Montréal (Québec), Canada H3C 3P8. Tel.: +1 514 987 3000x6251; fax: +1 514 987 6784.

E-mail address: roult.romain@courrier.uqam.ca (R. Roult).

Conceptual and methodological aspects and definition of the 'dominant-emerging city' concept

Classical perspective

To define these new F1 urban territories does not only mean to consider the classic urban concepts that are related to globalization, but also to integrate them into the complex problems of emerging countries. Just like the Olympic Games or the FIFA, it has become obvious that this industry is now based in a system of urban hierarchy, as well as territorial affirmation. As Sassen (2001, 2006) and others have put it, the concept of 'global cities' is an excellent starting point to define these urban spaces. Sassen pointed out the importance of cities' centrality within the process of global economy. However, Derudder and Witlox (2008) made a point of saying that Sassen's work principally helped us to understand that "through their transnational, city-centered spatial strategies, producer service firms have created worldwide office networks covering major cities in most or all world regions, and it is exactly the myriad connections between these service complexes that gives way [...] to the formation of transnational urban systems" (2008, p. 14). However, despite some secondary considerations (national standing, location of state and cultural functions), this notion only refers to economic criteria of evaluation that cannot be easily transposed into the F1 context. As a matter of fact, financial variables are not sufficient to fully explain it. So far, the creation and the methodological structure of this concept, especially for Beaverstock, Smith, and Taylor (1999), do not seem to suit these new F1 cities because cultural and political criteria are not sufficiently taken into account. Regarding Beaverstock's work, Jenks, Kozak, and Takkanon (2008) mention that "there are inevitably dangers in this approach. What is possible to measure and include, also opens up the debate about what is excluded. Many aspects may be difficult to measure, many may have problematic data sources" (2008, p. 354).

According to Derudder and Witlox (2008), this concept also limits our understanding since it does not take the strong relationship between the city center and the larger metropolitan area into consideration. While considering these issues, one should also be mindful of the 'global city-regions' concept, as Petrella (1995), Veltz (1996) and Scott (2001) use it in their work. However, this concept's definition also remains limited since these 'global city-regions' are mainly defined as "production nexuses in a global economy dominated by a post-Fordist accumulation regime" (Derudder & Witlox, 2008, p. 17). On the other hand, the term 'world city' or 'semi-peripheral cities' could also be used (Clark, 1996; Eade, 1996). These concepts, which appeared during the 1980s in Friedmann's work (1986, 1982), allowed the construction of analytical models defining these new political and economic centers. However, since its materialization during the 1990s and at the start of the 2000s, this concept is now often confused with the concept of 'global city' or only refers to demographic criteria and does not include functional analysis. Finally, the concept of the 'international city' is mostly used for territories that play major roles within the regional changes but are not very relevant in the global economy (Berry-Chikhaoui, Deboulet, & Roulleau-Berger, 2007). It is also important to note that these different terms were defined and interpreted within a western context that is very far from the economic, political and cultural realities of emerging countries (Robinson, 2002).

Finer spatial analysis of 'dominant-emerging cities'

Michael Pacione (2009) uses the notion of the 'third world city' to define these emerging countries' urban territories as distinct

from the western ones, referring to their history (colonialism and post-colonialism) and their socioeconomic development (economic growth, important social gaps, etc.). However, although this notion appears to be global, it is divided into multiple elements, which depend on each regional bloc's economic, social and political characteristics (Latin American cities, African cities, South-eastern Asian cities, etc.). It is also important to underline that the 'third world city' does not automatically refer to urban globalization, but that it comprises many urban categories (small cities, medium agglomerations and great metropolises). Although this notion encompasses various characteristics, it remains difficult to use it in the case of the F1 urban territories since it takes little consideration of cultural, touristic and recreational aspects of the globalized context. Marcuse (2008) refers to 'mega-cities' when talking about tentacular metropolises such as Mexico, Sao Paulo, Nairobi or Mumbai. According to him, these 'mega-cities' are "the products of their own specific historical developments coupled with the strong influence of their positions within the world of globalization, with its threads of colonization, uneven development, competition, division of labor, and exploitation" (2008, p. 29). Marcuse indicates that these 'mega-cities' are often developing around a similar internal urban structure. Most of all, he underlines a reinforcement of security measures, segregation and urban exclusion, which is spatially symbolized by 'skyscrapers and skyscraper clusters', 'gentrified neighbourhoods', 'citadels', 'ghettoes', 'ethnic enclaves' and 'exclusionary enclaves'. According to Marcuse, from the perspective of urban form, 'soft locations' are actually what makes these 'mega-cities' more similar to western metropolises. He characterizes these 'soft locations' as the effects of globalization on these cities. The emergence and renovation of 'central business districts', 'waterfronts', 'brownfield sites', 'historic buildings and sites' as well as 'public spaces' actually transform them into landmarks and symbols of the globalized urban form that the emerging cities are seeking. As such, these urban spaces seem to follow what western cities did in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the 'mega-cities' concept is too closely connected to demographic and urban form's aspects. It does not depict all the nuances of other political, economic and cultural strategies used for the enhancement of the city.

According to Jenks et al. (2008), these different concepts are useful to expose the diversity of these globalized urban territories. At the same time, they "are subject to many meanings and interpretations" (2008, p. 4). They assert that the analytical and methodological classification of these globalized cities, especially Beaverstock's, "provide a solid foundation for research and comparison" (2008, p. 4) but they do not consider the subjective and qualitative characteristics of these territories. This is especially the case when considering cultural or festive manifestations. Derudder and Witlox (2008) tried to synthesize these different concepts into the sole concept of 'world class city'. According to them, this term "refers to the aspiration to join the league of major cities in a globalized economy. [...] Empirically, the term invokes the presence of assets that are deemed necessary to be taken seriously in this global gold rush: being a world class city at least entails the presence of well-connected international airports, major hotel chains, and a climate that is somehow conducive to inviting and redirecting globalized capital" (2008, p. 11). However, Derudder and Witlox, just as Ooi and Yuen (2010), formulate two main arguments against this definition. Firstly, it only portrays one perception of the city ('urban entrepreneurialism') and fails to consider other variables, such as social planning, into account. Secondly, it is only based on a few empirical examples of the well-established western world, such as New York, London or Tokyo. Therefore, it only offers a partial perspective on these urban forms and developments. However, Derudder and Witlox (2008) indicate that this concept of 'world class city' is a good starting

point for analysis. Then again, they insist it should be supported empirically through more cases and refined with a richer conceptual system.

Analytical reflections on the conceptual connections linking 'dominant-emerging' metropolises to mega-events

To this strictly urban conceptualisation, it is also crucial to add the analytical aspects that are related to the notions of the 'mega-event' and the 'major sporting event', which are holding together the definition of these new sports urban territories. Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and many more became the world economy's new champions and part of the sport elites. They are aiming to reinforce their international image as well as joining the relatively select circle of sport franchise cities, which remained relatively exclusive to the European and Anglo-Saxon cities' until the 2000s. Like the Olympic Games or the FIFA, the F1 offers these cities the opportunity to show their ability to invest and especially to attract investors in the organisation of such mega-events (Westerbeek, 2003). These 'mega-events' are key occasions that emerging metropolises are looking for in order to set up their economic and political domination at the local level and especially at the international level (Roche, 2000; Xu, 2006). Within the entertainment domains, these 'major sporting events' are developing into important identity markers for these cities. Because of their prestige and notoriety, these events offer a reinforced or even renewed identity to these spaces, but also give them a chance to stand out in comparison to other metropolises (Sterken, 2006). The world metropolises are now using these urban and cultural landmarks as 'business cards' in order to attract investors and capital to their territory. They are becoming emblematic of an attractive and conquering urbanity, preferred by public and private actors, who fear their disappearance, since it acts as a sign of decline. To climb the global urban hierarchy is now conditional to hosting a few 'major sporting and cultural events' of which Formula One is a perfect example.

Black and Van der Westhuizen (2004) agree with this when they point out that urban arguments and territorial marketing "may have particular resonance in semi-peripheral jurisdictions-urban, regional, and national-seeking heightened visibility and prestige in the context of globalisation" (2004, pp. 1195–1196). In their opinion, emerging cities consider and use 'major sporting events' as a way to attract "a CNN presence and, concomitantly, tourism, capital, students and similar multiplier effects" (2004, p. 1204). From a conceptual point of view, Black and Van der Westhuizen (2004) as well as Carmona and Burgess (2001) prefer to use the term 'marketing territorial' instead of 'branding territorial'. In their opinion, this concept better reflects the global marketing processes, the different promotion strategies, as well as the planning of these urban territories; it is not linked only to the creation and the presentation of a 'brand'. However, based on the existing literature in this field, Matheson and Baade (2004) suggest three principal motives that put the benefits of these 'major sporting events' in perspective: "First, the increase in direct spending attributable to the games may be a 'gross' as opposed to a 'net' measure. Most economic impact studies estimate direct spending by simply summing all receipts associated with the event. [...] A second reason that economic impact may be exaggerated is the 'crowding out' effect. Event tourists may simply supplant other travelers who would normally visit the host venues. [...] A final reason economic impact may be exaggerated relates to the multiplier, the notion that direct spending increases induce additional rounds of spending." (2004, pp. 1090–1091).

Moreover, in terms of public finances, the relatively opaque political context in which some of these emerging cities evolve allows them to inject many millions from the public funds without

any public consultations. These financial aspects put them in a fairly different position than the traditional western markets. The 2002 FIFA in South Korea and Japan as well as the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing are examples supporting this logic, which was followed and repeated during the organisation of the Malaysian, Chinese or Abu Dhabi Grand Prix. According to Black and Van der Westhuizen, "the quest for positive publicity and marketing power associated with major games may backfire if what is highlighted by the international media (over which organisers have minimal control) is the competency deficit of the organising city and country. Given the high stakes of such events, the incentive for semi-peripheral countries in particular to spare no expense to secure an unqualified success in the eyes of the world is equally high" (2004, p. 1209). The authors also support their analysis by demonstrating that these 'major sporting events' became tools to assert these emerging territories' aims for globalized economies. In fact, these cities' local political elites use mega-events in order to "shore up political legitimacy, reinforce a sense of national identity and placate those constituencies adversely affected by the growing internationalisation of domestic issue-areas" (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004, p. 1204).

Beyond these 'emerging cities' visibility quest, this new urban competition for the organisation of international sporting events is pressuring the major leagues and other professional sports associations, such as the F1, to increase their acquisition rights and franchise renewals. These associations are then benefiting from the 'no limits' financial politics, allowing them to speculate, create an overbid and pressure the traditional western fields. These same associations also upgrade their contributions while nourishing the beliefs of delocalization (Sandy, Sloane, & Rosentraub, 2004). In fact, the latest Grand Prix additions, added to Formula One calendar since 1999, have had to pay extremely high franchise prices, which increased by 130% comparatively to contracts that were negotiated in the 1990s for traditional races (see Fig. 1). However, these same western circuits are forced to renegotiate their franchises accordingly (a raise of approximately 70%) in order to keep their Grand Prix (Sylv & Reid, 2006). This is, therefore, challenging the western cities' monopoly on the F1 races, and this situation is clearly more beneficial for the F1 organizers. These leagues have permitted and maintained this tremendous sport's renewal towards new markets in order to upscale their visibility in other territories and to upgrade their revenues in terms of television and publicity rights.

An attempt to define the concept of 'dominant-emerging city'

This case study on the urban and economic evolution of the F1 industry allowed us to better conceptualise this new type of city. These urban territories aspire to become new global cities. They do not hesitate to use important public funds as means to support their 'festive ambitions'. They use the new principles of urban development (urban marketing, city branding, flagship development, etc.). They put their stakes on the exclusive and ephemeral aspects of mega-events in order to compete with western metropolises. These territorial and financial games actually help them ascend in the global urban hierarchy, even though they might never become global cities such as New York, London or Tokyo. As a result, in order to define these new F1 urban spaces, it is appropriate to use the urban concept of 'dominant-emerging cities', which we define below.

*The 'dominant-emerging city'*¹ refers to eastern millionaire metropolises that were partially generated during the oil and economic booms

¹ Note that this concept of 'dominant-emerging city' is exploratory and should be refined, as it would benefit from future research.

Traditional Race	Estimate Sanction Fee (\$ million)
Australian Grand Prix	27.0
Spanish Grand Prix	17.25
Monaco Grand Prix	15.0
British Grand Prix	17.25
German Grand Prix	21.5
Hungarian Grand Prix	18.75
Italian Grand Prix	4.25
Belgian Grand Prix	23.75
Japanese Grand Prix	38.5
Brazilian Grand Prix	20.25
New Race	
Malaysian Grand Prix	41.5
Bahrain Grand Prix	28.0
Turkish Grand Prix	26.75
Chinese Grand Prix	33.25
European Grand Prix	35.0
Singapore Grand Prix	40.0
Abu Dhabi Grand Prix	45.0
Old Race	
San Marino Grand Prix	12.0
European Grand Prix (Hockenheim)	13.0
Canadian Grand Prix	15.0
United States Grand Prix	15.0
French Grand Prix	13.0
Future Race	
Korean Grand Prix (2010)	45.0
Indian Grand Prix (2010)	35.0
British Grand Prix (Donington, 2010)	25.0

Source: Authors Compilation, 2009

Fig. 1. Formula One's estimate sanction fees.

of the 1990s, established on growing liberal markets, and within which public and politic administration keep a central role. These metropolises are the knots of their regions' economic system and aim to develop at an international level through financial incentives that are susceptible to attract multinationals which are mostly involved in high-level service industries (finance, insurance, property business, etc.) to their territories. In regards to events, these cities are interested in prestigious cultural and sporting events, the 'jet set' and corporations with a strong media visibility that are able to increase their public image. In order to do so, these metropolises use sufficiently virulent politics to attract events and profit from the urban competition that exist within sports leagues. They also invest, with no hesitation, hundreds of millions from public funds with no guaranteed returns.

Methodological design

From a methodological point of view, this research is based on an exploratory and qualitative approach that includes both induction and interpretation. In this context, we used documentary analysis as well as secondary data analysis (Robson, 2002). This approach follows the methodological indications of Gratton and Jones (2004) in their publication on research within sports studies. More specifically, it follows the section concerning documentary analysis for a case study. According to Gratton and Jones, "a case study research involves the intensive study of a specific case. A case refers to a specific instance, for example you could undertake case study research on: [-] an organisation, [-] a sports team, [-] a school, [-] an individual. The use of a case study is based on the argument that understanding human activity requires analysis of both its development over time, and the environment and context within which the activity occurs. Case study designs are used to gain this holistic understanding of a set of issues, and how they relate to a particular group, organisation, sports team, or even a single individual" (Gratton & Jones, 2004, p. 97). Therefore, this paper

covers a historical case study of the F1 world, which is based on the consultation of archives as well as economic and statistical reports concerning the event, mainly published by the official authorities of the F1 industry (The Federation Internationale de l'Automobile, Formula One Management, etc.). In order to triangulate data, we also used different monographic sources and other scientific articles as well as many independent reports concerning this sport. These last documents helped us in covering the contemporary section of our case study. They allowed us to better distinguish the actual urban and economic stakes of the F1.

Consequently, this article is formulated as an historical study of the F1 world, based on archive consultations, economic and statistical reports as well as different monographic sources and articles that analyse these sports' phenomena. Thus, a relatively exhaustive press file on the principal cases presented in this study (Montreal, Indianapolis and Abu Dhabi) was completed in order to assess and understand the motivations and attitudes of different local actors as well as the perception held by different populations on these sports and economic questions. In the case of Montreal and in order to better define the particular context of the North-American F1 establishment, we conducted seven semi-directed interviews with former and actual promoters of this Grand Prix. These interviews allowed us to develop our analysis based on the case of Montreal as well as to understand the spatial, economic and cultural particularities of the F1 North-American industry. It is interesting to note that most of the existing economic and urban studies about the F1 are essentially grounded on secondary data analysis. Moreover, these analytical data are fairly rarely accompanied by interviews with the stakeholders of these sport and economic environments. We therefore decided to follow this methodological structure in order to reinforce our analysis and to compare some of our statistical and financial data with our interviewees' point of views and arguments. The documentary analysis followed the different methodological prerequisites of this data collection technique (Yin, 2009). We also analysed many international electronic




Fig. 2. The evolution and locations of the Grand Prix from 1950 to 2009.

databases (Sport Discus, Scopus, ASSIA, Sociological Abstracts, Pro Quest, Eureka, etc.) via the targeting of different key words as well as through social sciences' meta-analysis processes (Littell, et Corcoran, & Pillai, 2008). The documents we inventoried were then analysed via Nvivo in order to bring out the documentary occurrences within our research. We then proceeded to the categorisation and the grouping of the data we collected. Our decision to choose a flexible design allowed us to use grounded theory to construct part of our data analysis phase. It also allowed us to test and modify, if and when needed, the concepts that were presented in our conceptual framework. We mainly used secondary data analysis techniques to treat our economic statistical tables in order to calculate bias, averages, percentages and scaling. We will be presenting our statistical data throughout this article. It mainly allowed us to highlight the economic and spatial evolution of the F1 industry. It was also mostly formulated through a crossing analysis of our variables and secondary data.

From a Western F1 world to worldwide logics

Since its creation in 1950, Formula One has developed according to a market logic identical to that of all multinationals. In 2009, the F1 calendar went from its 1950's initial seven Grand Prix (six in Europe and one in the USA) to 17 races of which a little less than 50% were in Europe (Sylv & Reid, 2008) (see Fig. 2). This development strategy can be analysed by phases, in order to underline F1's different evolution periods, its impact on these urban territories, and most importantly the global turn of this industry towards 'dominant-emerging' destinations. If we examine the spatial distribution of the Grand Prix since 1950, it is possible to consider four principal expansion phases, which follow particular economic and

urban logics and which explain this global reconfiguration (1950–1961; 1962–1980; 1981–1998 and 1999–2009). The consultation of research reports and other databases retracing the history of this discipline allowed us to come to this conclusion concerning the F1 industry.

The first phase, from 1950 to 1961, corresponds to the creation period of the sport. Its financial and media setting, in this case Europe, was then reinforced and exacerbated. Almost 80% of the Grand Prix were organised in Europe in 15 cities. In parallel, it is interesting to note that if the F1 was developing outside Europe, it was only within markets that were related to European culture and economy, such as the USA and the city of Buenos Aires (important European immigration), the only exception being the 1958 Moroccan Grand Prix and the 1958 Libya Grand Prix. Moreover, these races were, for the most part, organised in medium and small cities (50,000–500,000 inhabitants) for which the only organisational necessities were the presence of a well-designed circuit and an existing culture of the sport in the local population. This sport industry was at its beginnings, and no logic of global expansion was considered during this period. It does not highlight important impacts on the urban form of these hosting territories either.

The European races (almost 70% of the Grand Prix) are still dominant during the second period, from 1962 to 1980, but we can already observe the beginning of an F1 expansion to the emerging metropolises of South America (Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo), Japan and the Commonwealth countries (Canada and South Africa). This is in line with an affirmation of these countries' economy at an international level. During this period, other than certain traditional Grand Prix, such as Monaco, Monza or Silverstone, the F1 world was relatively open and its management was trying to impose new emblematic races to its calendar by testing different circuits (more than 30 cities hosted a race). However,

except for a few great agglomerations, the F1 calendar remains exclusive to small and medium cities, since the sport's authorities are not yet aiming for a market development linked to metropolises' logics. Since the media and publicity appeal of this sportive discipline were not as polished as they are now, hosting requirements (such as hotels, transportations, and the city's entertainment attractiveness) were still barely considered by the F1 industry. The industry was preoccupied by the quality of the circuit and the paddock rather than by urban qualities or the related festive characteristics. In the first phase (1950–1961) as much as in the second phase, the F1 is popular because of the pilots' feats or of the mechanical characteristics of the nominated cars (the research and development of constructors in mechanical engineering are important). In these two phases, the F1 should therefore be understood as a true mechanical sport, which did not attract the kind of media attention and economic concerns it does today.

The 1981–1998 phase truly reveals the start of the F1 expansion towards new urban economies. As Brazil, Japan and Canada became inevitable races on the F1 calendar, they were intertwined with the Australian ones (Adelaide and Melbourne), which appear during the same period. These new destinations were amongst the first to see the F1 as an engine for their urban, touristic and festive economies. This openness can be related to the first global logics of the industry. In fact, this phase actually coincides with the increasing development of the commercial characteristics as well as the television rights of this industry, which is mainly brought about by Bernie Ecclestone, head, at the time, of the Formula One Constructors Association (FOCA), the economic agency of F1. The FOCA sees in these new Grand Prix a way to increase its media fallouts, its clientele basin as well as a way to increase the franchise costs by amplifying the competition between the hosting cities and the ones hoping to become hosts. It is also interesting to note that during this period the American continent hosted more races than ever (five cities). This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the F1 authorities were looking for a circuit, within an urban environment, that would be favorable to the development of the sport for an American clientele, which is also coveted by NASCAR type races.² The Long Beach (California), Las Vegas and Watkins Glen (Detroit) circuits are the most representative of these commercial strategies initiated within the F1 industry. These three circuits are closely related to North American automobile history, and are situated within the traditional basins of mechanical sports amateurs. Therefore, they are important to the F1 industry, which constantly looks for new clientele on the American continent and also tries to detach itself from its European 'label'. European races remain the majority but their predominance is diminishing (about 65% of the races), which is related to the number of cities hosting a Grand Prix (21 city races). Moreover, we can observe that, in order to keep the faithful European clientele, the F1 authorities are also trying to add new emblematic European circuits to their calendar, such as Barcelona, Imola, Spa Francorchamps, Nurburgring, Hockenheim or the Hungaroring in Budapest. On this matter, it is interesting to note that these Grand Prix will be the first to get important recreational and touristic amenities in and around the circuits (design of luxurious corporative lodges; restaurants and bars developments; and organisation of commercial and festive activities). Therefore, we should note that it is mainly during this period (1981–1998) that the F1 enters the globalization era with a major reorganisation of its revenues

and franchises. In addition, our documentary analysis highlighted that these strategies also appeared during this period, suggesting that these sport events would accelerate urban mutations and attract new investors. However, it is important to remember that the amounts given to these projects were already made to the detriment of an increase of the national debt.

Finally, the most recent period, from 1999 to 2009, presents a globalized portrait of the F1 industry. Whereas Europe remains in the majority on the calendar (a little more than 55% of the races), its predominance is largely diminishing to the profit of Asian and Middle-Eastern destinations (more than 40% of the 2009 calendar), which are much more lucrative for the F1 authorities, especially in terms of the amount given for the obtainment of these new franchises (see Fig. 2). In parallel, the F1 world is setting emblematic races that are media and advertising friendly in order to reach a larger public. In order to do so, they do not hesitate to relocate traditional circuits to 'dominant-emerging cities' (such as the 2009 Canada Grand Prix that was relocated to Abu-Dhabi). These media and the economic actors therefore become the true managers of this industry. It is their actions that should be analysed as a means to fully understand the internal evolution of the F1. They seem to play a major role in terms of the timelines, the schedules and the organisation of the Grands Prix. They also decide the shape of the circuits as well as the desired clientele. The urban attractiveness, the originality and the architectural audacity of some circuits as well as the metropolises' corporative aspects and 'jet set' are now scrutinized by the F1 authorities as they become considerable reasons to maintain or relocate a Grand Prix. The infrastructure itself (circuit and paddocks) is no longer sufficient to draw the hosting of an F1 race; the urban surroundings have become a variable just as important as the financial details of these races. With a 74% increase in the average estimate sanction fee since 2004, the F1 industry attempts to guarantee its revenues by motivating public actors to invest in its projects. Their main argument is that the F1 will provide dynamic and positive impacts to these urban territories (Sylvé & Reid, 2008). In some cases, these new circuits become true team (theme?) parks, mixing sportive, cultural and touristic structures and activities into commercial, business residential, or even university³ spaces. The F1 is used as a pretext to plan and design even greater territories under the authority of new elitist territorial signatures. For the 'dominant-emerging cities', these developments are therefore considered to stand for recognition and international influence. As Van Der Westhuizen and Swart put it, "no matter how optimistic the projections by management consultants of an event's potential employment, tourism and international media exposure spinoffs, academic literature on the economic effects of mega-events articulates disillusionment with the returns an event's proponents proclaim. Given that it is exceptional for mega-events to generate the kind of benefits state and other elites hope for, the compulsion for these elites – in both the developing and advanced industrial world – to continually vie to host them needs to be read in relation to the event's perceived capacity to generate symbolic rather than just material capital." (2011, p. 177) (Van der Westhuizen, & Swart, 2011). Globalization, which touches the F1 as much as all other economic sectors, is therefore highlighting these new financial strategies and it is easy to believe that, in the near future, more than 80% of the Grand Prix will take place outside of the western markets. The recent additions of the South Korean (calendar 2010) and Indian (calendar 2011) Grand Prix as well as the Russian and South-African projects presently underway confirm these prospective considerations. As such, any western races' safety and salvation can only come from eventual megaprojects that would integrate the circuits within a unique

² National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) is an American sport league organising the most important North-American car races generally taking place on an oval circuit. Its principal difference with F1 racing, other than the shape of the track, is the motorization of the cars. In NASCAR racing, the vehicles are all tourism automobiles that were transformed for competition and have, in theory, the same characteristics, which makes them all equal. In comparison, in F1 racing, each team possesses their own motors as well as their own development centres.

³ As in the cases of Yas Marina circuit in Abu-Dhabi as well as Sepang in Malaysia.

urban territory with exquisite architecture and image (for example, the project of a Parisian circuit in and around Euro-Disney, the project of New York within Manhattan's streets and the project of Las Vegas by night in the streets of the city).

When the F1 decides to move from Montreal⁴ to Abu Dhabi in 2009

This globalized F1 industry has started to overtake traditional investors since the early 2000s, but we can observe the principal changes related to commercial strategies more acutely since 2005. The disappearance of the prestigious Imola, Hockenheim, Magny-cours, Indianapolis and Montreal Grand Prix from the 2009 calendar sounded the end of the traditional F1 to the profit of relocations toward 'dominant-emerging cities'. If we closely scrutinize the case of the Canadian Grand Prix, which migrated to Abu Dhabi in 2009, it is interesting to notice that the information given by the F1 authorities to justify this franchise migration are in fact only dictated by financial and image considerations.

Montreal, which hosted the Grand Prix since 1978, became an emblematic circuit as well as an inevitable race for the North-American F1. Other than its urban and cultural characteristics, closely connected to its bilingualism, Montreal offered considerable visibility to the F1 on its continent, with 25 million admirers (Canada and USA), as well as a global television audience that was amongst the highest of the calendar (in 2005, it was the third most popular race amongst television's audience, with more than 300 million cumulated viewers). These extremely flattering numbers were tied to an assistance level that was equally high. Proportional to its hosting capacity, the Canadian Grand Prix was considered to be one of the three most attractive races (334,000 spectators within three race days in 2005) (Sylt & Reid, 2006). Additionally, there were considerable economic impacts at the local level; Montreal's percentage of tourists increased by more than 250% during the race weekend and customers in its downtown shops, hotels, restaurants and bars also increased by more than 25%, with a global economic impact of about \$100 million dollars (Lefebvre, 1997, 1998; Lefebvre and Binhas, 1998, 1999, 2000). As a result, this urban circuit provided the F1 authorities and its hosting city with all the amenities and positive effects of such an event, as well as the estimate sanction fee, which from the F1 perspective needed to be renegotiated since 2003–2004 so the Grand Prix could remain in Montreal. According to the interviews we conducted with these stakeholders, its private investors had to pay an annual \$15 million sanction fee although there were practically no benefits to it. This was partly due to the organizational demand as well as to prohibitive operational costs (Tremblay, 2008). Within the 2008 context of contract renewal, the private promoter as well as the different governmental authorities supporting the financing of the Montreal Grand Prix (20% of its sum was financed through public funds) chose to let go of this event that had stopped to be feasible or beneficial from a financial point of view (Domenjoz, 2008). In fact, the F1 authorities were asking these investors for more than \$25 million per year in order to keep the Grand Prix in Montreal. The disappearance of this race and its migration to

Abu Dhabi was then partly due to a financial overbid that was void of sportive considerations.

The premature departure of the Montreal F1 clearly depicts that this industry entered a fully speculative development logic in which, from a strictly financial point of view, the organisation of a Grand Prix is no longer profitable. This also explains why private investors are not entering the F1 adventure without the public sector's financial support anymore. Moreover, our interviews as well as our documentary research allowed us to observe that although the city of Montreal significantly gained from this event, the F1 mainly remained the privilege of local economic and political elites. In fact, the financial dividends of the event were only slightly redirected to local population and the related employments remained precarious and seasonal. As a result, it seems very relevant to question whether the public funds directed towards the F1, as it is largely the case in Montreal, should not be submitted to the process of public consultation. As Garcia (2004) reminds us, "inward investment is good as long as it protects the interests and rights of the community, which requires a careful balance between corporate competitiveness and the survival of public provisions. Also, the creation of jobs is positive, but only sustainable if it involves a degree of skill development and improved access to future employment." (2004, p. 116).

Since the mid-2000s, with the inauguration of the Bahrain circuit in 2004, Abu Dhabi's Yas Marina circuit, which replaced the Canadian race on the 2009 F1 calendar, became a coveted market. Consequently, Abu Dhabi is becoming a prime example of the F1 reconfiguration towards these 'dominant-emerging' markets, which can invest many millions in order to host an elitist sport and be part of the selective F1 club. The Abu Dhabi circuit, which is more than 200 hectares, with a 50,000 hosting capacity, a luxurious hotel with more than 500 rooms overhanging the track, a marina for yachts next to the circuit as well as a business, residential and recreational park, was built on Yas Island by the project Director Philippe Gurdjian and the star architect Hermann Tilke, and took part in a property market project (Abu Dhabi Motorsports Management, 2008) worth roughly \$5 billion dollars. In addition, the F1 authorities also require an annual \$45 million estimate sanction fee until 2016 (90% of which comes from public financing). This urban project, which is comparable to the construction of an international airport or to the planning of a business district, is a first in the F1 world. This underlines the 'overly-ambitious aspirations of the F1 authorities, which seem more concerned with the image of the sport than with the sportsmanship of such events. However, if we consider Bahrain's experience, the expected attendance and television audience for this event are far less attractive than Montreal's. The expected audience for a 3-days race competition is nearly 70% (85,000 spectators) of Montreal's, with a local market of 5 million F1 admirers and an international television audience of only 90 million viewers, if we consider that the time slot organisation is favorable to European audiences (Sylt & Reid, 2006). In view of these estimates, the global economic impact per race is to be inferior to the Canadian one by \$20 million (\$80 million vs. \$100 million).

These numbers clearly show that the F1 has decided to develop itself according to speculative global logics that are detached from its traditional concerns. To reinforce this assertion, the 2009 Turkey Grand Prix in Istanbul attracted only 32,000 admirers at the track, joined by a television audience of only 85 million spectators (Fioriti, 2009). This preoccupying situation for the F1 authorities can partly be explained by an increase of the admission ticket costs in comparison to 2008, by an unfavorable economic conjuncture for the assertion of this event within the Turkish public, and more globally by F1 decision makers' incorrect evaluation of the market (Fioriti, 2009). The cases of Abu Dhabi and Turkey lead us to a debate on the real urban benefits behind the construction of these

⁴ It is important to note that the Montreal Formula One Grand Prix is back into the 2010 calendar, under a \$75 million yearly contract, 70% of which is financed by public funds, identical to the contract that was put into place before the 2008 renegotiations. This turnover from the F1's side can be explained by the moroseness present in the international economic context following the 2008 financial crises. In fact, the F1 authorities could not continue to increase their franchise costs, as they did not receive enough demands. Therefore, they had to accept signing less lucrative contracts so that the 2010 calendar could be perpetuated. Moreover, under the pressure of car manufacturers participating in the F1 circuit and threatening to leave the organization, Bernie Ecclestone decided to go back to the North-American market by choosing Montreal's race, for which he had no better option for short or middle term.

hosting structures. Indeed, although the debate on the beneficial legacy and equipments of these mega-events tend to indicate that these structures can be the lever of urbanisation, as they allow ulterior social usage, the question of the future design of these equipments remains unresolved. Since they were built through important publicity campaigns, which were designed to stimulate the urban patriotism and to praise their sustainable utility, these equipments represent a colossal management goal and lead to considerable costs.

As a result, the F1 reconfiguration mainly profits those countries and cities that are capable of meeting nearly 90% of its costs via public financing, which is both logical and troublesome (Nauright & Schimmel, 2005). Considering the event itself, it has not been profitable to host an F1 race for a little less than a decade. At the same time, it is not solely accessible for speculative interests but also for actors and metropolises that seek international visibility or aim to develop into new global cities. On this matter, Horne (2007) reminds us that such mega-events, particularly when it goes to emergent countries, “are a significant part of the experience of modernity, but they cannot be seen as a panacea for its social and economic problem. [...] Proper social impact assessments and full public consultation before submitting bids is required if mega-events, as megaprojects, are to regain public support and become more democratically accountable achievements. Otherwise they remain based on dubious, unethical and possibly illegal practices.” (2007, p. 92). Indeed, we should question whether the F1 is not only a mirage within the economic and touristic landscape of these ‘dominant-emerging’ cities. As it bears many symbols of development, the F1 ultimately reveals that local elites entertain the myth that this “luxurious object” will be profitable to society. As such, it is legitimate to question whether these mega-events truly improve the urban landscape in the perspective of a spatial democratisation, or if they are empowering machines for urban entrepreneurs to the detriment of the population, which was convinced by the “urban patriotism” discourse usually promoted during these mega-events.

North America, a continent abandoned by the F1?

Nonetheless, this globalized F1 was absent from North America during the 2009 season, which was a first in F1 history; an absence that is especially surprising since this territory represents the most important economic market for the automobile manufacturers involved in the event. Aside from the Montreal Canadian Grand Prix, the F1 always had problems asserting itself in the USA, from an image and economic point of view. This was partly due to its direct competition with NASCAR, which has been considered, since 2004, the fourth major American sport. By using the renowned history and the image of a mythical place, the Indianapolis Grand Prix, which in a globalization context was the F1's most important entry into the USA market since its creation and especially since 2000, reached traditional American automobile sports' admirers. This marketing strategy worked out relatively well from 2000 to 2005, with a spin-off income reaching more than \$170 million per year, which made the Indianapolis Grand Prix the fifth most important economic event in the USA. Despite these very attractive financial results, it had one of the lowest television audience rates, with 70 million international spectators (Sylt & Reid, 2006). The well-known 2005 Michelin embarrassment added to this problem when, for technical reasons, all the stables equipped with Michelin tires could not take part in the race. This led to the organisation of a Grand Prix with only seven drivers and marked the beginning of a negotiation process between the F1 authorities and the promoters of the event for the redesigning of the circuit. Starting in 2005, the F1 requirements for this Grand Prix became fairly strict, especially

regarding the alteration of the track, which needed to follow the standards (design of the ring for the F1), and the revamping of the hosting site so it could make up for the weak appeal of Indianapolis city. These new operational conditions progressively stopped the promoters of this Grand Prix from renewing their franchise contract, which was also conditional upon an increase of over \$10 million (from \$15 to \$27 million per year).

Since the Indianapolis Grand Prix disappeared in 2007, the USA did not host any Grand Prix. This absence was largely criticised by the automobile constructors as well as the sponsors of the discipline. As a result of internal pressures, as well as clear statements of many American public and private stakeholders, in May 2010, the F1 authorities decided to grant a 10 years contract (2012–2021) to the city of Austin under the condition that they build a new circuit. In order to obtain this F1 franchise, the municipal and provincial authorities accepted to pay close to 30 millions per year (Cutler, 2010). This important public financial agreement was supported and encouraged by the Republican administration, particularly in Texas, since the mid-2000s and the first disappointments of the Indianapolis Grand Prix. For these public stakeholders, the F1 is to be seen as part of a global plan for the reinforcement of touristic and festive attractions in Texas' capital city. Indeed, Austin is one of the few American cities with more than 800,000 inhabitants that does not possess a professional sport franchise. The F1 would therefore allow the city to partly fill this gap, to increase its international visibility and, most of all, to compete with its urban neighbors, such as Houston, Dallas or San Antonio, by increasing its tourist appeal. For the F1, Austin and Texas represent an extraordinary opportunity to get a new clientele, largely interested in mechanical sports. That way, it will be able to compete with NASCAR on its own territory. In order to achieve this project, the F1 is supported by private investors who entertain close relationships with sport professionals. For example, Tavo Hellmund, former automobile pilot, is now an important promoter of this F1 Grand Prix. These private stakeholder accepted to invest close to \$300 millions in order to build a new circuit, which will be located about 15 km away from Austin's International Airport. That way, for these public and private powers, the F1 appears to be a new economic ‘manna’ within a festive market that is very competitive. The most optimistic economic provisions anticipate more than \$200 millions of annual fallouts for Austin and Texas and more than 30 millions from the admission rights (Dirr, 2010). These numbers, which seem exaggerated, do not truly reflect the actual economic reality of the F1. However, they reveal how public and private elites maintain the illusion that the F1 can be prolific from a strictly financial point of view as well as for the community.

Our documentary analysis, as well as our interviews with industry stakeholders, allowed us to think that the long-term presence of the F1 in the North-American market seems to depend on an emblematic race that Las Vegas might be able to undertake. There is no doubt that the F1 speculative changes observed over the 2000s would favor such a ‘glamorous’ race as Las Vegas’, which hosted the 1981 and 1982 USA Grand Prix and could come back to this sport as one of its masterpieces with a redesigned urban circuit for night races, similar to Singapore's. This urban project is part of the F1 medium-term development plan, but it was mostly revitalized when the Indianapolis Grand Prix disappeared in 2007. The F1 authorities consider this new Eldorado as a way to reinforce their glamorous image, to increase their offshoot income through the presence of very important investors, and to reach a new American public as well as international tourists that are fond of this type of elite events (Sylt & Reid, 2006). Through this globalized development, the F1 is no longer under any obligation to organize multiple races in America; it prefers to focus on the most prolific territories in regard to media and finances, such as Las Vegas and New York, or Paris and London for the European context.

That way, these urban logics raise the question of the true benefits of public investments put into public–private partnerships. As different studies clearly demonstrate, it is both difficult to measure the efficiency and to justify such projects and partnerships. Following the local authorities' desires, The F1 is supposed to resolve the eventual shortcomings of local equipments by attracting the greatest number of national and international tourists as well as through the mobilisation of inhabitants and locals. But will these projects really allow them to supplant short-termed human mobilisations and often-fleeting political and financial projects? This analysis also raises the question of the utilisation and appropriation of the spaces built for these mega-events. Will these events encourage the qualification or re-qualification of urban spaces for tourists, for locals, or for both? It is therefore essential that urban professionals, together with elected officials and administrative authorities, take responsibility of these projects in a way to guarantee their economic and social durability and, that way, to avoid the appearance that they are only a great publicity for the city (Charles, 2010).

Conclusion

The exuberance of the Malaysian, Abu Dhabi, Singaporean or Bahraini circuits, which now represent an investment potential of \$5 billion (construction of the circuit, infrastructures, etc.) and an exponential increase of the F1 organisational costs, which almost quadrupled since 2000, is symptomatic of an F1 revolution where it is almost impossible for the simple private promoter to gain benefits from the event. Consequently, the F1 profits from the global corporate elite, a very well targeted high society and cosmopolitan clientele, while cities are kept under the illusion that the event will insure them the prestige and notoriety necessary to achieve future economic success (Beech, 2004). Just as the other sportive mega-events, the Grand Prix has acquired new significations as well as new dynamics. They now occupy a very precious space in the contemporary metropolises' agenda, perfectly featuring Guy Debord's society of spectacle, which was thought in the 1960s and is now under the hegemony of globalization. These sportive mega-events contributed to new discussions about cities that announce some convergences of public and private interests, which claim to be beneficial to the cities. The conceptual model of the urbanisation of the 'global-city', followed by cities hosting sport and cultural mega-events, takes its roots within eastern entrepreneurial urban planning. However, it has now moved to 'dominant-emerging cities' and was largely broadcast towards local and national urban decision makers. But is this urban way of thinking truly beneficial to these developing territories? This inquiry allows us to better understand how these urban coalitions are formed between entrepreneurs, governments and some sectors of the civil society for the construction of a necessary consensus around the idea of an economic and building industry's growth, as well as a necessary objective to the survival of cities in a context of international economic competition.

While there are financial restrictions within public politics as well as an increasing possibility for private funding from financial institutions, these events are the perfect occasions to associate private marketing with urban marketing and to allow governments to lead projects and investments. This is also allegedly influential in electoral turnouts. However, reality seems to follow different logics. Governments are not drawing from private sector's finances, but the private sector actually benefits from heavy public investments. It is also important to note that most of the time, these decisions are not debated publicly. Even if the projects are conducted by local private coalitions, associated with the local politics in power, local or national public institutions guarantee increasing

costs. This problem becomes even more complex in the case of emerging or developing countries, because they lack basic infrastructures and the localisation of these urban investments often result in misguided decision-making. Moreover, these countries make decisions according to the logic of hegemonic actors' economic interests (international federations, sport leagues, local authorities, etc.). This situation can also have severe consequences on the local population (destruction of habitations, displaced population, space privatisation, gentrification effects, etc.).

The migration of these sportive mega-events towards the south has its risks. It could exacerbate urban social antagonisms, which is the exact opposite of what is actually announced in official discourses. In fact, the stake is to fulfil the myth of growth and development, to answer to the very uncertain results concerning the democratisation of cities that are extremely unequal, results that are very beneficial for the local elites who share the benefits with global actors. A few years ago, great southern metropolises, such as Sao Paulo, aimed to attain the 'global city' status, but the results of their numerous efforts were never very conclusive (Ferreira, 2004). This certainly exemplifies our observations. From a strictly structural point of view, these mega-events establish priorities for the construction of infrastructures that will only fulfil the needs of the sportive logistics. However, these infrastructures do not correspond to the real need of the city itself. Therefore, the city planning, as well as its priorities, is more and more subordinated to these games' logics. In the context of emerging cities, the land overvaluation provoked by these new facilities lead to a gentrification phenomenon. Indeed, this is even more apparent in cities where infrastructures are already insufficient. The conflicts about land in these emerging countries are still frequently violent and they cannot count on legislative urban control instruments, as in developed countries.

If it is true to say that this international visibility is highly developed throughout the industry of Formula One spectacle, the price to pay for such a race have, however, increased radically in the last years. Our documentary analysis and interviews allowed us to highlight a tendency to overestimate the economic and urban local development perspectives, especially when it comes to 'dominant-emerging cities'. To this can be added the difficulty of measuring these impacts because of the reversal of the financial priorities and the cancelation of investments in other sectors (such as health or education) for which the impact of these mega-events are rarely taken into account. Also, it is to the detriment of F1 history and identity, related to its traditional destinations as well as the loss of automobile race admirers and the usually important local economic revenues, that the redeployment of circuits' locations is enforcing itself. The new domination of the F1 world by these 'dominant-emerging' metropolitan economies does not necessarily suggest the complete disappearance of this sport in the Occident, but we can say without any doubts that only the strongest traditional symbols of this industry – Monaco being the perfect example – will survive. For the others, their continued existence will be conditional upon their capacity to reach the financial requirements of the F1 via public funds. Accordingly, it is obvious that this F1 revolution will not rise from traditional metropolises but from 'dominant-emerging cities' that are actually reframing the global urban landscape.

These new destinations redefine the underlying hierarchies of upcoming races, such as those in Russia or South Africa, which could reinforce this sport-spectacle's reconfiguration within a context of globalization (Lefebvre, 2003). At the same level as the Olympics or the FIFA, the evolution of the F1 industry is revealing economic, politic and urban upheavals affecting professional sports. The emerging cities are of interest to these sport industries, especially since the end of the 1990s. Many factors are favorable for these 'dominant-emerging' metropolises: the saturation of

some traditional western markets, the commercial requirements and the profitability of many of these sportive leagues' shareholders and sponsors, the post-industrial blossoming of different southern economies, and the contribution of important public funds by these new markets in order to attract these industries on their territories. As any other globalized sport organisation, the F1 will not completely disappear from western territories, but their part in the global economy of this sport will no longer be dominant. The future and the logics of these sport industries' logics are not based on the western world anymore, but on these 'dominant-emerging cities' and territories that are more dynamic and attractive at financial and media levels.

These 'dominant-emerging cities' are now trying to seduce with the same zeal some western cities had in the 1980s and the 1990s in regard to the recreational and touristic sectors. Plus, these cities do not hesitate to spend colossal sums in order to be the most aggressive in urban sport markets. The 2008 economic crisis may have slowed some down, but it did not stop this change, which actually transforms the professional sport. This urban sport's hierarchy is therefore completely convoluted and the virulence of many African, South American and Asian countries is highlighting their desire to welcome new F1 races. As such, the fact that these 'dominant-emerging' territories call the western monopoly into question is only a premise to further investigations. Therefore, this exploratory research and this first definition of the 'dominant-emerging cities' concept should be refined and deepened via the analysis of the new F1 cases (such as South Korea and India). But it should also be compared to other 'major sporting events' (such as the Olympic Games, the FIFA, the Tennis Master Series, etc.). Moreover, it is our point of view that a specific analysis of the North American context would be extremely pertinent to better understand the urban, economic and cultural characteristics of these new territories within this new global sport organisation. The targeting of these characteristics would allow us to better highlight the ongoing stakes and, at the same time, the strategic orientations and developing sports logics that should be prioritized for these North American spaces.

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