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<i>Student Name:</i> Laura Elizabeth Johnson		
<i>Student <u>University</u> Email:</i> 1804618@student.uwtsd.ac.uk		
<i>Module code:</i>	<i>Student ID number:</i> 1804618	<i>Educational support needs:</i> Yes/ No
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How the Third Crusade shaped crusading ideology and royal identity as a political tool during
the Plantagenet-Capetian Rivalry from 1190-1193



By

Laura Elizabeth Johnson

1804618

September 2020

Acknowledgments

This work would remain incomplete without expressing a profound gratitude to my mother, who in all her wisdom, placed in my hands the keys to imagination, adventure, and legends, but also the stories of ages past, shuddering time that winds and unwinds, yet undying and immortalized by memory and words. And in the wake of the pages therein, we find characters, frozen in time as it were, either marred or splendid or otherwise a *mélange* of the two. A gracious thanks to my mother for all the old books of *Robin Hood* legends, history books, *Piers Plowman*, and the antique and crumbling *Beowulf* so skillfully unearthed from library castoffs and rotting shelves. Otherwise, I might have never stumbled into the enchanting and haunting world of Medieval history.

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Abstract

The Third Crusade witnessed a transformation as developing notions of chivalry alongside concepts of ideal kingship fused with and oftentimes overshadowed traditional crusading ideology. Royal participation, particularly the rivaling French and English kings who were already locked in a political vendetta in Europe, colored the crusade with French vs. English sentiments, an overall spirit of disunity, and warring rhetoric. This thesis reassesses the traditional narrative that the Third Crusade failed as a result of the crusade leader's inability to recapture Jerusalem. This study re-examines the Third Crusade as a political tool used by Richard I 'the Lionheart' (r.1189-1199) and Philip II 'Augustus' of France (r.1180-1223) during the Plantagenet-Capetian Rivalry, surveying the years 1190-1193, and how notions of kingship, chivalric ideals, and the appeal of political dominance secularized crusading ideology. The Third Crusade served as an extension of the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry where crusading evolved into a political weapon to justify the retaliatory and self-seeking interests of the competing kings disregarding traditional notions of penitence and pilgrimage. Burdened with societal expectations of forging an honorable reputation, Richard and Philip approached crusading as a game of competition, their respective styles of kingship being compared at every turn by the chroniclers. The disunity borne out of the politicization of the Third Crusade prevented the French and English contingents from cooperating to achieve a workable military strategy and both parties operated independently eventually strangling the endeavor. The two monarchs centered their crusading policy on what was best for their kingdoms and reputations rather than what would benefit Christendom as a whole. Although the Third Crusade failed as a religious undertaking, Philip, and Richard, to the chagrin of the church, achieved limited political successes, establishing a secular crusade aimed at political maneuvering that would take shape in subsequent crusades—The Fourth Crusade and the Albigensian Crusade.

Introduction

Under the leadership of Philip Augustus and Richard I, focusing on the years 1190-1193, the Third Crusade witnessed a transformation in crusading ideology that shifted from the religious ideal to a political weapon of warfare. Colored by the quarrels of the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry and influenced by medieval notions of kingship and chivalry, the Third Crusade was ill-fated from conception. Conceived as a religious undertaking, the Third Crusade failed to recapture Jerusalem and restore the Holy Land to Christendom. However, manipulated as a political tool by the Angevin king and his Capetian overlord, both monarchs achieved success, regardless of how short-lived the political benefits of this warped endeavor were.

Current research assessing the failure of the Third Crusade tends to rely on religious criteria, such as the inability of the crusaders to restore Jerusalem to Christendom.¹ Conversely, the goal of this study is to re-examine the failure of the Third Crusade using non-religious criteria, such as the political motives of Richard I and Philip II, the principal actors in the Third Crusade, and the circumstances in which royal identity shaped their overall actions. The study will also consider the degree to which royal participation and conceptions of royal identity shifted crusading ideology from a religious endeavor to a more politicized one. I hope to validate this argument by examining the conduct and interactions of the rival monarchs during the Third Crusade and their distinctive approach to crusading and subsequent beliefs regarding kingship and their primary obligations to their respective kingdoms placing their duties to the crusade in second place. I hope to demonstrate, utilizing non-religious criteria to assess the overall outcome

¹ For further reading on the failure of the Third Crusade utilizing religious criteria see: Justin Lee Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom: The Failure of the Third Crusade*. (Unpublished PhD thesis, Western Kentucky University, 2011); Michael Markowski, 'Richard Lionheart: bad king, bad crusader?,' *Journal of Medieval History*, 23.4 (1997), 351-365.

of the Third Crusade, that as a secular cause, it met some measure of success in fulfilling the political objectives of the respective royal participants although it failed as a religious one.

Modern scholarship regarding the failure of the Third Crusade generally criticizes Richard's leadership, citing his incompetence and his inability to obey crusading ideology and meet religious expectations successfully. A leading critic of Richard's leadership, Michael Markowski argues 'Richard's failure to take Jerusalem leads to the conclusion that his self-centered, puerile interests in personal adventures destroyed the chance for success of the Third Crusade, and thus prolonged warfare.'² Essentially, Markowski's point is valid; however, he crafts the argument drawing from religious criteria noting that his study 'examines crusade policy and the significance of Richard's decisions to deviate from it' and the 'lack of control which both the Church and normative crusading precedents had over him.'³ However, Markowski's study does not consider Richard's equally valid reasons for deviating from crusade policy, favoring the protection of his kingdom instead. Furthermore, his study does not account for popular notions regarding kingship and royal obligation to protect one's kingdom. Markowski comments 'Philip of France, also having become hostile to Richard, quit the crusade only weeks after Acre fell.'⁴ However, he does not provide a broad enough context to explain Philip's abandoning the crusade, nor does he offer any critical material toward the Capetian king's seemingly dismissive attitude toward the recapture of Jerusalem. Markowski's research does not adequately address Philip's role in the failure of the Third Crusade, the smear campaign Richard faced at home following the assassination of Conrad of Montferrat, the newly elected king of Jerusalem, and the interwoven disunity between the French and English leaders. I hope to

² Michael Markowski, 'Richard Lionheart: bad king, bad crusader?,' *Journal of Medieval History*, 23.4 (1997), 351-365 (p. 351).

³ Markowski, 'Richard Lionheart,' p. 351.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

address these points, specifically Philip's hand in the outcome of the Third Crusade and his political motives, which tend to have less importance in traditional research.

Fortunately, Baldwin's *The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages*⁵ provides invaluable information regarding French notions of kingship at the time of the Third Crusade; however, I hope to build upon his work by extending his study of Philip's political motives to discuss the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry on crusade and at home, while Richard was absent from the continent. Baldwin's study offers convincing justifications for Philip's departure from the Third Crusade, but it lacks an explanation for Philip's involvement in a smear campaign aimed at ruining Richard with assassination allegations. I hope to connect Philip's political motivations on crusade with his actions post-crusade when he was in a position to reshape the Angevin king's reputation. Naus' examination of Philip's political motives in *Constructing Kingship: The Capetian Monarchs of France and the early Crusades* is somewhat lacking, with a tone at times that seems all too dismissive of Philip's role in the restructuring of the Third Crusade as a secular endeavor.⁶ Similar to other studies, it entirely dismisses Philip's involvement in political mudslinging against Richard. However, Naus provides exceptional information regarding perceptions of kingship in Capetian France as well as the political 'successes' Philip acquired from the Third Crusade. *Richard I* by Gillingham⁷ and *Richard I* by Asbridge⁸ also examine the influence of royal reputations on the direction of the Third Crusade.

⁵ John W. Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

⁶ James Naus, *Constructing Kingship: The Capetian Monarchs of France and the early Crusades* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

⁷ John Gillingham, *Richard I* (Great Britain: St. Edmundsbury Press, 1999).

⁸ Thomas Asbridge, *Richard I: 1189-1199* (Penguin Books, 2018).

Justin L. Mathews's paper 'The Great Men of Christendom: The Failure of the Third Crusade' closely examines the political maneuvering between the participating monarchs that plagued the Third Crusade ultimately dooming the endeavor from the beginning. Mathews states 'the actions of the kings, partly as a necessary result of their positions as kings, actually hampered the Third Crusade.'⁹ However, I hope to build upon Mathews's argument that monarchical participation created a shift in crusading ideology toward a more politicized line of thought that minimized religious benefits above personal aspirations and reputation building. Furthermore, I contend with Mathews's argument that the Third Crusade unequivocally failed. In utilizing religious criteria in his assessment, the Third Crusade undeniably failed in recapturing Jerusalem. Conversely, if one assesses the Third Crusade, not as a religious undertaking by two rivals, rather as a secular one with diverse political goals as the aim, it appears Philip Augustus and Richard I enjoyed some limited success.

The focus of this study is the English chronicle *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi* as well as Ambroise's *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*. As a primary source the *Itinerarium* is far from being flawless. Furthermore, the authorship of the text is unknown. Helen Nicholson, providing an excellent translation of the Latin text, maintains the accuracy of the work. Nicholson observes that the work is passionately biased towards Richard, but that Muslim chronicles, such as Bahā' al-Dīn 'usually endorse the *Itinerarium*'s account of events.'¹⁰ Questions concerning the composition date tend to complicate matters. There are two surviving manuscripts of the *Itinerarium* called IP1 (written between 1 August 1191 and 2 September

⁹ Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom*, p. 2.

¹⁰ Helen J. Nicholson *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade* (Aldershot: Ashgate, Publishing, 1997), p. 2.

1192) and IP2 (compiled within the time frame of 1217-1222 perhaps to encourage recruitment in the Fourth and Fifth crusades).¹¹

In her translation of the *Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*, Marianne Ailes notes ‘most of the text is, in fact, recounted in the first person, in both singular and plural forms, and from the perspective of an eyewitness.’¹² However, the author of the *Estoire* also acquired information from other participants in the Crusade. Little is known about the author other than his name, Ambroise. Ailes suggests that ‘the strong moral purpose which runs through the poem’ and ‘the level of language employed’ points to the possibility that Ambroise was a cleric and relatively educated.¹³ The text of the *Estoire* is composed in Old French, utilizing rhyming verses akin to the dramatic style of the *chansons de geste*. The narrative, Ailes observes, reminisces in ‘epic style with heroes and villains, dramatic confrontations and individual deeds of daring, and colorful speeches and imaginary dialogue.’¹⁴ The flowery and romantic style is not to discredit the events recounted in the text, as Ambroise’s audience ‘understood that this was a serious history, authenticated by the teller’s evident status as an eyewitness and participant.’¹⁵ That is not to say that the history is free from bias or that it is without error. Richard is the indisputable hero of this romantic history, the ideal knight and chivalrous warrior-king. The *Estoire* was possibly written in the late twelfth-century, completed either after Richard’s release ‘from captivity in 1194, as this is mentioned in the poem, but before the king’s death in 1199.’¹⁶ The *Estoire* and the *Itinerarium* contain many similarities and are invaluable sources for examining Richard and Philip’s actions in the Levant as well as examples of rivalry and concepts of royal identity.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 10-11.

¹² Marianne Ailes *The History of the Holy War* (Woodbridge, Suffolk England: The Boydell Press, 2003), Introduction, p.1.

¹³ Ibid, Introduction, p.2.

¹⁴ Ibid, p.12.

¹⁵ Ibid, p.12.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

Unfortunately, the French chronicles that provide a less pro-Richard narrative have not been translated for use in this study. Considering this obstacle, the Old French *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)* may prove helpful. One scholar argues that the *Continuation*, 'is unique for its disdain for Richard the Lionheart, providing a different perspective from the English sources.'¹⁷ The *Continuation* was written between 1184 until 1227-1231. The text was translated to French in the early thirteenth century as an extension of Archbishop William of Tyre's Latin history, written during the 1170s and early 1180s. William ended the history in 1184.¹⁸ The authorship of the *Continuation* is indefinite, although some manuscripts suggest that a squire named Ernoul first composed the text. One scholar comments that the *Continuation* was 'completed approximately 50 years after the events it describes.'¹⁹ Edbury warns 'like all narrative accounts of past events, the Lyon *Eracles* version of the Continuation of William of Tyre presents a story that is flawed and distorted' and 'often evidence from other sources provides strong corroboration for the statements it makes, but elsewhere the information is demonstrably false.'²⁰ However, that alone should not discredit the narrative of events that it describes or discourage the use of the text in historical study. The *Continuation* provides unique information regarding the Third Crusade. Edbury reveals 'the Lyon manuscript stops in 1248, but, while the section from 1197 to the end is found elsewhere, that for the years 1184 to 1197 is unique.'²¹ As with the *Itinerarium* and the *Estoire*, the *Continuation* leans somewhat more in favor of Philip. The contradictory sentiments present in all three works is problematic. However,

¹⁷ Adam Aaron, *Constructing the Third Crusade*, p. 10.

¹⁸ Peter W. Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade* (Aldershot, Hampshire England: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), p. 3.

¹⁹ Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom*, p. 5.

²⁰ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 7.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

this study utilizes all three sources to cross-reference and corroborate material to provide the most accurate research on the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry on crusade.²²

This paper contains four sections. The first section explores medieval conceptions of kingship and the development of the chivalric ideal, which informed and influenced the monarchs' actions on crusade, shifting the focus of crusading ideology from the religious benefits to political or secular rewards. I explore the notion that Philip II and Richard I were burdened with societal expectations of imitating or upholding the deeds and reputations exemplified by their ancestors, using John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* as a case study in identifying patterns of kingship and utilizing those patterns to construct an accurate definition of the ideal warrior-king. In the second section, I will examine the chronicles' presentation of Richard and Philip's respective styles of kingship, principally comparing the *Itinerarium*, *Estoire*, and the *Continuation*'s narrative of events and how the presence of the rivaling monarchs and their political motivations in Italy influenced the Third Crusade towards secular objectives. Throughout the paper, I will apply the characteristics of ideal kingship and chivalric patterns proposed in *Policraticus* to assess Richard and Philip's motivations on crusade and how these identities colored their crusading ideology. The third and fourth sections investigate the political objectives of Richard and Philip and how their rivalry forged a spirit of disunity and racial aversion that prevented military cooperation between the French and English contingents, preventing the recapture of Jerusalem, the acclaimed object, and disregarding the pope and churches crusading standards for a policy of political warfare and in-fighting between Christians.

²² Other sources utilized in this study as additional reference material include, but are not limited to, Roger of Howden's *Chronica*, William of Newburgh, Richard of Devizes, Bahā' al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād's *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, and *The History of William Marshal*. For further reading on Howden, Devizes and Newburgh refer to: Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 2-3. For further reading on William Marshal refer to: Nigel Bryant, *The History of William Marshal: the true story of England's greatest knight* (Woodbridge, Suffolk England, The Boydell Press, 2016), Introduction p. 1-24; For further reading on Bahā' al-Dīn see: *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, trans. by D. S. Richards (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2002), p. 1-9.

In doing so, I hope to demonstrate that the Third Crusade evolved into a political weapon, a crusade against two competing kings, directed by the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry away from religious aspirations and towards what would most benefit the French and English kingdoms.

Chapter One: Kingship and Chivalry: The Emergence of a New Crusading Ideology

Henceforth commenced the disastrous Third Crusade, a piece of political mastermind headed by the respective enemies, Philip Augustus and Richard I, who unremittingly engaged in a stratagem of personal revenge and exacerbated policy. Imperative to understanding the secular character endemic to the Third Crusade, both kings respectively had good reason to undertake the seemingly religious obligation. Philip's illustrious grandfather, Louis VI of France 'the Fat,' and Richard's celebrated great-grandfather, Henry Beauclerc, graced the pages of the chroniclers and philosophers in resplendent aura worthy of poets and wordsmiths. For the emulous offspring, a decidedly impossible challenge lay at their feet: the task of duly attaining the same renown purported by their grandfathers and seducing the plumes of the chroniclers in a favorable direction.

Abbot Suger, in his *Vita Ludovici Grossi*, praised Louis VI's kingship with the most laudable vocabulary at hand to create 'a monument more lasting than bronze' in recounting his 'zealous care for the churches of God and his wonderful valor in administering the affairs of the kingdom. May the fortunes of time never succeed in effacing memory of him.'²³ Undoubtedly, Philip was well acquainted with the glorious yarns of his grandfather. In the face of threats stemming from his Angevin opponents, his ability to prove himself as a competent Capetian king must have weighed heavily on his mind. Naus argues that Philip had been the heir of 'several decades of [Dionysian] political theology' and that 'Philip understood crusading to form a core element of his sacred obligation, an essential part of what it meant to be a French king.'²⁴ Richard, too, faced the same societal pressures given his great-grandfather's legacy, Henry I, who

²³Richard Cusimano and John Moorhead, *The Deeds of Louis the Fat* (Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), p. 23.

²⁴ James Naus, *Constructing Kingship: The Capetian Monarchs of France and the early Crusades*, p. 114.

found himself forever enshrined in John of Salisbury's philosophical treatise *Policraticus* as an ideal monarch future princes should endeavor to imitate.²⁵ Salisbury reminisces of 'the illustrious Henry, who is called the Lion of Justice, and who, as is widely known, was feared not only by the cities but also by the castles of Gaul.'²⁶ Charged with the expectation of bringing glory to their domains, Richard and Philip accepted the challenge. To an extent, ironically, religious authorities set a precedent as Salisbury's recollections of Richard's ancestors reveals to us that 'dynastic precedent was something of a two-edged sword' and although it 'added lustre and precedent to the dynasty's name, and inflated the pride of its later members, [it] also imposed a certain burden of emulation.'²⁷ There are a plethora of anecdotes recounting Richard's acts of pettiness and recklessness on crusade, which would not have received the praise of Salisbury's *Policraticus*. However, Richard's deeds, certainly cannot be said of, rather discourteous or gracious, were lost to history.

Collectively, Salisbury and Sugers' works mirror the chivalric ideals that influenced medieval notions of kingship and war, specifically the king's duty to defend the church. This aspect of the warrior-king found an honored place in Salisbury's treatise:

[The prince] ought to have proficiency in law and matters of war [for] knowledge of matters of war nourishes boldness in battle. For indeed a few who are trained in the conflicts of warfare are more prone to victory.²⁸

Given their background in fighting on Angevin soil, Richard and Philip were ripe for crusade warfare and the church, looking for peace at home, gladly persuaded the violent leaders to turn their bloodthirstiness for the defense of Christendom. Roger of Howden echoing Salisbury in his

²⁵ Completed in 1159

²⁶ John of Salisbury, *Policraticus: of the Frivolities of Courtiers and the Footprints of Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). p. 118.

²⁷ Simon Lloyd, 'King Henry III, the Crusade and the Mediterranean,' in *England and Her Neighbours: 1066-1453*, ed. by Michael Jones and Malcolm Vale (London: The Hambledon Press, 1989), pp. 97-119 (p. 102).

²⁸ Salisbury, *Policraticus*, p.110.

Chronica stresses the importance of a king's military skill 'to excel others in feats of arms; being well aware that the science of war, if not practiced beforehand, cannot be gained when it becomes necessary.'²⁹ Aside from the attraction of glory and materialistic rewards, society and ecclesiastical institutions exercised significant influence over monarchical participation. Emerging notions of chivalry had already started to permeate aristocratic culture. So immense was the association between crusading and chivalrous behavior, that several sources, such as the *Itinerarium*, record Richard as the first prince 'north of the Alps' to take the sign of the cross and that 'he preceded everyone in this action, inviting them to follow his example.'³⁰ Such was the pressure to take up arms and march to the Holy Land that the *Itinerarium* reveals 'the enthusiasm for the new pilgrimage was such that it was not a question of who had received the cross but of who had not yet done so.'³¹ The pope's powerful influence, coupled with societal pressures governing popular notions of the honor of knighthood and warrior, king and military leader, would have made it effectively impossible for any able-bodied monarch to disregard the call to arms without a yoke of shame shadowing their legacy. Asbridge notes 'martial prowess, bravery and loyalty were all revered qualities...cowardice [would] bring shame and social reprobation.'³² In addition to religious notions of recapturing Jerusalem and restoring Christendom, a new character crept into old crusading ideology, one in which military capability, political gambits, personal glorification, and material enrichment alluringly marched at the forefront, lending a secular appeal to the endeavor.

²⁹ Roger of Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden Comprising the History of England and of other Countries of Europe*, trans. by Henry T. Riley (London: H. G. Bohn, 1853), p. 490.

³⁰ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 47.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

³² Asbridge, *Richard I: 1189-1199*, p. 27.

Moreover, the Lionheart's deeds were informed and conditioned by emerging notions of chivalry and kingship that pervaded the crusading era. According to Asbridge ecclesiastical authorities may have endorsed this 'holy war as a pathway to spiritual redemption' but among the members of lay society it was promoted 'as a glorious endeavor that could earn participants unparalleled fame—an expedition, akin to the greatest tournament on Earth, in which warriors could prove their worth against [the] Muslim horde.'³³ The Third Crusade was not headed by a throng of passionate peasants, as had once been the case in the First Crusade. Conversely, Europe's secular monarchs responded to the call carrying bag and baggage and various political schemes knocking at the forefront of their mind. Logically, the church turned to the powerful and wealthy monarchs, who, in addition to garnishing the crusade's repute, provided a well-heeled treasury, access to fleets, and the financial means to pay the soldiery handsomely.³⁴ The advantages of a royally-led crusade, however, came at a wicked price. In exchange for a short-lived peace at home and generous funding from the monarchy to ensure the Third Crusade's longevity, the church, perhaps unknowingly, traded religious passion for political intrigue.

For the dueling and unseasoned monarchs, Richard and Philip, the Third Crusade presented far more opportunities as a political platform than a mere penitential pilgrimage. There were reputations to build, territorial aggrandizement to realize, and the political outmaneuvering of one's opponent to bring the other shame and reproach as a warrior, king, and military leader. Even among the clergy, reputation building was not deemed a dishonorable pursuit entirely. In his *Policraticus*, Salisbury wrote 'how many powerful kings have there been of whom there is nowhere a word or a thought?' He concludes in his monologue 'therefore, there is no better counsel to those who seek glory than to be worthy of the greatest of men of letters and of

³³ Asbridge, *Richard I: 1189-1199*, p. 27.

³⁴ Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom*, p. 8.

scribes.³⁵ Regardless of his performance as a king, it is difficult to ignore the reality that Richard became the chivalric hero and model warrior-king in numerous English chronicles. Undoubtedly, Richard took Salisbury's words to heart and undertook the glorious opportunity of setting himself apart from his father as the noblest military commander, leaving behind an indelible legacy on crusading ideology and kingship. Putting religion and chivalric notions aside, petty power politics at large crept into crusading ideology, altering its traditional nature. Lloyd notes that the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry had taken place 'as much over prestige and status as disputed territory and conflicting political goals' and that the kings 'of both dynasties seem to have approached the matter of the crusade with an eye to the potential political capital to be realized.'³⁶ The chroniclers played into Philip and Richards' hands, setting the kings against each other on paper, comparing their styles of leadership and kingship, a mere parallel to the reality. As one source observes 'as much as crusade shaped Richard's kingship, it is certainly clear that kingship was able to shape crusade.'³⁷ Buried within the pages of the chronicles, one may examine the secular nature of the Third Crusade, not as a religious war in the eyes of the monarchs but a political game of strategy, buttressing reputations, and mudslinging.

³⁵ Salisbury, *Policraticus*, p. 3.

³⁶ Lloyd, p. 104.

³⁷ Edward M. Humpert, *Richard I: Securing an Inheritance and Preparing a Crusade, 1189-1191*. (Unpublished PhD thesis, Ohio University, 2010)
<https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=ohiou1275598926&disposition=inline> [10 June 2020].

Chapter Two: The Discourteous Kings: Rivalry in Messina

If ever a crusade started on the wrong foot, it was the Third Crusade. Although the Third Crusade was called as early as 1187, neither Richard nor his Capetian counterpart would leave until the summer of 1190. Delayed by internal politics and distrust towards one another, neither king wished to leave his territory unguarded during an indefinite absence in the Holy Land. At last, following a meeting at Nonancourt in December and at Dreux in March, the two kings departed from Vézelay on 4 July 1190 on crusade.³⁸ Consenting to a joint departure, both kings might rest assured that the other would not remain behind to interfere in regional politics or seize territory. Unfortunately, neither Richard nor his Capetian overlord would leave their political quarrel at home. The Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry colored nearly every aspect of the Third Crusade from military strategy to local politics. The *Itinerarium* lamented:

The dispute between the aforesaid kings revived, and the slightest cause hatched a brood of quarrels. Because of their diabolical principles, each was ashamed to allow himself to be brought low without retaliating, for fear of damaging his honour and reputation.³⁹

These same ‘diabolical principles’ formed a core feature of medieval chivalry of upholding one’s reputation, never bowing the knee to defeat. It was the permeation of these chivalric ideals of honor, fame, character, and military prowess that would divorce the religious from the secular, leaving behind an essentially political crusade. The English, French, and Muslim chroniclers make this apparent by meticulously comparing the two kings at every opportunity, but on that note, this reflects the chroniclers’ biases. The Third Crusade suffered from a disastrous lack of unity: poisoned by the infection of pro-French and pro-English sentiments, it stood apart from the others in that crusading ideology was inherently political, preventing cooperation between

³⁸ Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. xi-xii, 30, 35.; Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 47, 142-3, 147.; Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 92.; Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 70, 136.; William of Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh: The Chronicles of Robert de Monte*, trans. by Rev. Joseph Stevenson, M.A. (Great Britain: Seeleys, 1856), p. 546, 572.

³⁹ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 143.

the respective kingdoms. The chronicles reveal a political undercurrent of ethnic and cultural divisions that dictated the ideology of the Third Crusade. Particularly, a noticeably French versus English mindset plagued the endeavor. One common theme running throughout the English chronicles consist of casting aspersions upon the reputation and military prowess of the French king and his soldiers. The Third Crusade saw an emphasis on independence and nationalism in that each contingent was directed to wear crosses of distinct colors: soldiers under Philip Augustus's leadership wore red, the Angevins donned white, and the Flemish sported green.⁴⁰ Tyerman observes 'this may have made military sense, but it spoke little of any spirit of unity or friendship.'⁴¹ The inherent racial tensions would eventually reach a breaking point, as evidenced by the events that unfolded at Acre.

The quarrel reared its ugly head long before either king arrived in Outremer. One incident in Genoa is worth noting where Richard arrived to find Philip sick. Philip asked Richard for the loan of five galleys, which the English king promptly refused but for a counteroffer of three ships.⁴² Philip, acting in an equally puerile manner, snubbed the offer. Bartlett argues that Richard could easily have found 'two extra ships' but 'he did not make the effort to do so. On the other hand, three galleys were better than none and Philip's response seemed churlish.'⁴³ The event foreshadows an underlying problem that infected the crusade: neither king was willing to bend the knee to his opponent no matter the cost. Other incidents soon followed. Pageantry and outlandish theatrics further deducted from the crusade's religious aura but functioned as symbolic representations of monarchical power:

⁴⁰ Christopher Tyerman, *England and the Crusades: 1095-1588* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 59.

⁴¹ Tyerman, *England and the Crusades: 1095-1588*, p. 60.

⁴² W. B. Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England* (Gloucestershire, Amberley Publishing, 2019), p. 135.; Geoffrey Regan, *Lionhearts: Saladin, Richard I, and the Era of the Third Crusade* (New York: Walker and Company, 1998), p. 136.

⁴³ Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 135.

It is a recognized custom that when a king in particular or the prince of some country is on the march, his progress should be as distinguished and grand and project as much authority as the power which he actually holds. He should not appear less than he is; no, his appearance should match his actual power. The king's splendor should reflect his royal office; his exterior appearance should declare his inner virtue.⁴⁴

The English chroniclers are particularly unkind to Philip, whom they portray as a pauper and delicate king compared to his rival's extravagant display. Richard of Devizes in his *Chronicon* describes Richard's arrival at Messina:

[And] there came to meet the king a multitude of all ages, people without number, wondering and proclaiming with what exceeding glory and magnificence that king had arrived, surpassing the king of France, who with his forces had arrived seven days before.⁴⁵

Likewise, the *Estoire* echoes of the scores of adulant crowds flocking to behold Richard 'on account of his valour' and of his arrival 'with such pomp that the whole sea was covered by galleys' and that 'those who saw the procession said that this was how a king should enter, a king to hold his land well.'⁴⁶ The *Itinerarium* contains an equally glowing report of the English king standing on the prow 'which was higher and more ornate than the rest' so that he 'willingly put himself on show for all to see' before a crowd singing his praises that he was 'certainly worthy of authority! He deserves to be set over peoples and kingdoms. We had heard of his great reputation, but the reality that we see is far greater.'⁴⁷ How could Philip rival the excellence with which Richard arrived, performing his finest role like an actor in an extravagant pageant. The pageantry with which Richard arrived in Messina unmasked the true intentions of the Third Crusade as a politically ideological endeavor as carried out by the monarchy. Indeed, Richard's display mocked Pope Gregory VIII's reverence of crusading '[crusaders] should not travel in precious clothing [or] with others that display ostentation and luxury, but in modest garb and

⁴⁴ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 156.

⁴⁵ Richard of Devizes, *Chronicles of the Crusades Being Contemporary Narratives of the Crusade of Richard Coeur de Lion* (London: J. & H. Cox, 1848), p. 13.

⁴⁶ Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, Introduction, p.39.

⁴⁷ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 157.

demeanor, they should do penance rather than vainglory.’⁴⁸ Ironically, it was the notions of chivalry and military valor lauded by medieval society and the chroniclers that collided and overran the religious nature of crusading.

In every instance, Philip proved far more the expedient companion in reaching the destinations en route to the Holy Land, whereas Richard dawdled behind heaping up honors and assets, a political tactic well-worth investing in. Curiously, the *Continuation* does not include such a contrasting description, but the author comments on the rivalry’s derailment of the crusade. The text reveals ‘I do not know why they went to war, but much harm was done during the conflict between them’ mourning that ‘had their love lasted they would have been honoured for all time, and Christendom would have been exalted.’⁴⁹ However, the author of the

Itinerarium writes that Philip:

was content with only one ship; and as if he was avoiding human gaze, he took himself secretly into the city’s castle harbour. Those waiting on the shore for his arrival accused him of being timid and jeered him, saying that this king could not easily accomplish deeds of valour since he was so wary of human gaze.⁵⁰

The *Estoire* and the *Chronicon* contain similar descriptions, and both the *Itinerarium* and Ambroise’s account emphasizes the contrast between Philip’s preference to one ship and Richard’s menacing galleys. The *Chronicon* contains a jeering remark that ‘the Frenchman, being subject to sickness at sea, marches by land to Sicily; the Englishman, on the contrary, about to proceed by sea, comes to Marseilles to his ships.’⁵¹ Every insult hurled towards Philip diminishes his reputation, honor, authority, and capability as a military leader and ruler. As the masculine commander, Richard poses the ideal chivalric warrior-king, whereas Philip epitomizes

⁴⁸ Bird and others, *Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187-1291*, p. 9.

⁴⁹ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 93.

⁵⁰ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 157.

⁵¹ Devizes, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, p. 11.

the effeminate leader, the sickly king, and incompetent commander. The same chivalric notions of kingship that exalt Richard rip Philip down from his esteemed title.

Naturally, the English chronicles are not the definitive authority on Philip Augustus's character on crusade, given the evident biases. However, lest the mistake be made of dismissing Richard's nobler reputation as a consequence of racial biases, the Muslim chronicles do not reinstate Philip's honor to Richards' height. Bahā' al-Dīn, the Muslim author of the *Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, observed the arrival of the 'king of France, who to them was a great man and respected leader, one of their great kings to whom all present in the army would be obedient' and additionally mentions Philip's possession of 'six busses.'⁵² The English chronicles distort the number of French vessels. Nevertheless, Bahā' al-Dīn provides no further mentions of Philip's character or his ability as a military commander, and although the *Continuation* speaks favorably of Philip, it contains a none-to-surprising pro-French bias. A negative portrayal of Richard as devious and conniving runs throughout the text, though Philip receives little credit for his individual acts of perfidy. His depiction of Richard and Philip's affectionate reception in Messina is unconvincing.⁵³ The Muslim narrative does exceptional damage to Philip as Richard's theoretically powerful overlord 'this king of England was a mighty warrior of great courage and strong in purpose' reiterating his vast experience in fighting and that he was 'intrepid in battle, and yet he was in the eyes below the king of France in royal status, although being richer and more renowned for martial skill and courage' and that 'his coming had a dread and frightening effect on the hearts of Muslims.'⁵⁴ Regardless of the degree of exaggeration

⁵² Bahā' al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, trans. by D. S. Richards (Aldershot, Hampshire England: Ashgate Publishing, 2002), p. 145.

⁵³ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 93.

⁵⁴ Bahā' al-Dīn, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, p. 150.

present in the English chronicles, Richard's arrival made a greater impression upon the Muslims than Philip's unobtrusive entry.

Nevertheless, Richard's ostentatious display of wealth and arms speaks more of the event's secular nature than the religious. The rivaling kings adapted a decidedly political ideology, a game of outdoing and undoing the other, carrying their 'mutual competition off to the Holy Land.'⁵⁵ Richard's conduct only encouraged Philip's later injurious behavior. However, lest one label Richard as an incompetent leader or 'no hero, but a man who merely wanted to fight hand-to-hand forever' as Markowski has⁵⁶, dismissing Philip's role in politicizing the crusade, one might consider Tyerman's words that the 'Anglo-French expedition [came] to be dominated by the personality, followers, and resources of Richard I, whose superiority in men, money, and equipment was acknowledged even by hostile witnesses.'⁵⁷ In the political game of the Third Crusade, it was a bad run of fortune that placed such contrasting leaders together. Neither kings may assume the entirety of the blame alone, for both parties deviated from the religious in favor of secular pursuits and self-aggrandizement.

The second scene of rivalry and political domination surfaces in an anecdote recounting Philip's duplicitous goings-on with the Lombards, the tale largely sustained in the English narratives. Following acts of violence against the crusaders by the Lombards, the local inhabitants of Messina, Richard besieged the city.⁵⁸ According to the *Itinerarium*:

The Lombards went to the king of France, begging and imploring him to aid and defend them. They and theirs would submit to his authority and will; they would even surrender the city to him, if only he would counter the king of England's relentless attack on the city. At once the king of France took up his arms [more] ready to assist the Lombards

⁵⁵ Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, p. 77.

⁵⁶ Markowski, 'Richard Lionheart,' p. 364.

⁵⁷ Tyerman, *England and the Crusades: 1095-1588*, p. 59.

⁵⁸ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 158-9.

than the forces of the king of England, although he had [given] his word that he would give him aid and keep good faith with him everywhere.⁵⁹

The *Continuation* and the *Chronicon* do not contain this report on Philip's disloyalty: on the contrary, the *Estoire* and *Historia* include the anecdote in the narrative of events. Naturally, one must approach the tale with a measure of caution. Perhaps, though, Richard underestimated the cunningness of his French counterpart. Philip, perchance, may have seized the opportunity to capture Messina for himself, remind Richard of his overlordship for his French holdings, or coveted the rare opportunity to demonstrate his martial prowess and improve his reputation as a crusade leader. William of Newburgh writes 'the king of France [considered] the attack upon the city that had sheltered him as an insult towards himself' and accordingly 'conceived an implacable rancor against the king of England, which entered even into the marrow of his bones.'⁶⁰ Baldwin argues that Philip had conspired no great evil against Richard but had 'played the peacemaker' with the Griffons or Greeks.⁶¹ Prior to the capture of Messina, however, Bartlett notes 'French troops were allowed to come and go into and out of the city as they pleased. Richard sensed collusion between Tancred and Philip.'⁶² Given the apparent rivalry and political tension between the two, Philip likely unleashed his bellicose thirst for revenge. Baldwin contends:

The crusade was a frustrating experience for Philip Augustus in particular. At every stage he arrived first, unobtrusively took command, and laid careful plans, only to be upstaged by the later appearance of Richard, whose greater wealth and flamboyant manner generated disturbances and raised rival objectives.⁶³

If so, this provides a possible explanation for Philip's indignation at Richard's flying his banners above the city towers.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 160-1, and Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 40-1, and William of Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 573.

⁶⁰ Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 573.

⁶¹ Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, p. 78.

⁶² Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 140.

⁶³ Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, p. 77.

The English chronicles emphasize the capture of Messina as the decisive moment marking the breakdown of cooperation between the two monarchs. For Philip, it would prove to be a breaking point. The *Itinerarium* recounts that when Philip saw Richard's 'standards and banners on the walls and towers of the city' he 'was so violently shaken by this that he conceived a lifelong hatred for the king of England' that 'he later revealed when he struck at Normandy.'⁶⁴ The English chronicles would have us think Philip a petty sovereign, but his actions are none too surprising: Richard had thwarted Philip's attempt at establishing good relations with the locals. The supercilious Richard had brazenly interfered in the French king's political transactions. Neither king displayed any measure of Christian charity, and Richard's acquisitions of Sicily and Cyprus, both Christian nations, indicate that his mind was preoccupied elsewhere, not on the expedient recapture of Jerusalem. Having sustained injury to his reputation, Philip resolved to put his subordinate in his proper place; after all, Philip was Richard's overlord. Although the English king was a sovereign in his own right, he owed some allegiance to his rival for his holdings in France. The English sources credit Philip's actions to unmitigated jealousy 'he found his noble character unbearable, and regretted having had no part in the glory which the other had won through his own sweat and superior qualities.'⁶⁵ Philip's anger may be justifiable: after all, if the English chronicles are to be believed, the French king had nearly secured the glory for himself with the Lombards promising to submit to his authority.

Political forces continued to pit the rivaling monarchs against each other. Accusations of breaking his oath made at Vézelay further disparaged the French king. In Richard's shadow, Philip's resentment smoldered, feeding his inferiority complex. The French king irreverently tore into his imperious companion for hoisting the banners above the towers of Messina. The *Estoire*

⁶⁴ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 163; Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 42-3.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 163.

observes that Philip and the French contingent were ‘jealous and annoyed [that] Richard had raised his banners there’ and that they ‘sent word to him that his men would lower the banners and they would raise [their] own on the walls of the city.’⁶⁶ In Richard’s defense, however, he conceded to Philip’s demand raising both French and English banners above the walls of Messina, but this did not detract from Philip’s loss of glory and martial dexterity. Any cooperation between the Plantagenet and Capetian rivals was fleeting. The covetous actions committed on both sides had little to do with the crusading ideology purported by Pope Gregory VIII ‘pay attention not to earthly profit and glory, but to the will of God who himself taught us to lay down our souls for our brothers.’⁶⁷ Neither king seemed capable of doing so as insult was added to insult.

The rivalry, alongside the new-found political ideology exercised by Philip and Richard, made its appearance again in the form of Tancred of Lecce, an illegitimate cousin to the late king of Sicily, William II, and the events that ensued. Richard and Philip delayed in Italy tangled in a web of local and personal politics stemming from the English king’s financial motives. Richard locked horns with Tancred demanding that he compensate his sister, Joanna, with ‘an adequate dowry and her share of her husband the king’s treasury’ which Tancred had seized during his succession following the death of King William II, Joanna’s husband.⁶⁸ A noble enterprise assuredly, but one that had little to do with the recapture of Jerusalem and seemed pungently selfish on Richard’s part. The *Continuation* asserts that Richard ‘who was very devious and greedy, never stopped begging his sister to sell her dower.’⁶⁹ Allegedly, the lately widowed

⁶⁶ Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 43.; Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 163.; Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 160.

⁶⁷ Bird and others, *Crusade and Christendom*, p. 8.

⁶⁸ Gillingham, *Richard I*, p. 132-2.

⁶⁹ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 97.

Philip expressed great interest in Joanna. Keeping in line with Richard's general attitude toward the French king, however, he promptly rejected the overture. It was not an unreasonable request as Philip's kingdom would be left without an heir should his only son die. One cannot help but wonder if Richard's obdurate nature contributed to Philip's supposed collusion with Tancred; on the other hand, perhaps the coals were still seething on Philip's head from Richard's insufferable arrogance. Either way, Philip suggested to Tancred that Richard was untrustworthy and persisted in interfering in the sale of Joanna's dowry.⁷⁰ Of course, Philip may have been reacting to Richard's refusal to share the spoils of Messina with him. The *Itinerarium* reiterates on several occasions that Philip was envious of 'Richard's noble character and success' and that 'he began to raise objections over the booty which had been taken when the city was captured, demanding his share under the agreement they had made.'⁷¹ Given the secular direction the crusade was taking, it was a matter of insulting Philip's kingship and reputation. According to Regan, when Philip heard of Richard raising his banners on the walls of Messina, he 'realized that he would have to react strongly or else Richard would have been able to usurp the authority of his feudal overlord.'⁷² Both kings had accused the other of violating the terms of the treaty, Philip, for not defending Richard against the Lombards and Richard for not sharing the spoils of Messina. The English king was legally bound to share the spoils with Philip under oath, save that jealousy or suspicion clouded Richard's judgment. Philip did not maintain exclusive rights to such uncharitable sentiments. The *Continuation* reveals that 'when King Tancred heard that the king of France had arrived in his land, he went to him and received him with great honour' and that

⁷⁰ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 166.; Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 44.; Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 194-6.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 165.

⁷² Regan, *Lionhearts*, p. 140.

‘the king of France was staying in the palace, for King Tancred had vacated it in his honour.’⁷³ Ambroise remarks ‘the kings were at odds with one another, because of jealousy, which always causes discord.’⁷⁴ If the *Continuation* is accurate, perhaps Richard was equally resentful that Philip had received the better lodgings in the royal palace of Tancred ‘while Richard, for all his pomp and show, would have to stay in the house of one of Sicily’s ministers, among the vineyards and outside the city wall.’⁷⁵ Otherwise, it may have burned Richard that his fellow crusader, who had not an inkling of the military renown he had, was put up in the royal palace with a usurper who had imprisoned Richard’s sister.

Howden contains a different narrative with Richard being greeted by Tancred and escorted to the palace upon his arrival, Tancred providing him with a treacherous letter composed by Philip and delivered by the Duke of Burgundy.⁷⁶ Once again, mention is made of violating the terms of the treaty. According to the *Itinerarium*:

It is said that the king of France had sent a letter to king Tancred instructing him not to give way to the king of England’s demands, but to stand firm and protect his rights in everything. He could be absolutely certain that he would be faithful to him and would never fail him for King Richard’s sake. There is one persuasive piece of evidence in favour of the truth of this story: King Tancred loaded the king of France’s messengers with valuable gifts, but he did not even give an egg to those of the king of England.⁷⁷

The *Continuation*, *Historia*, and *Chronicon* do not corroborate the allegations against Philip, but that is not to say they were entirely fabricated. The Third Crusade was plagued by internal quarreling, disunity, racial tensions, suspicions, and deep-rooted jealousy on both sides. Whatever Philip’s reasons for wanting to turn Tancred against Richard, if we are to believe the tale, it only added to the internal quarreling between the two kings. For Howden, the tale justifies

⁷³ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 93.

⁷⁴ Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 44.

⁷⁵ Regan, *Lionhearts*, p. 137.; Gillingham, *Richard I*, p. 141.

⁷⁶ Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 194-5.

⁷⁷ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 166.; Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 45.

both Richard's insidious withdrawal to marry Alice and Philip's undying animosity towards the English king, who should have been a fellow crusader by all rights as a Christian, not the enemy. However, Richard's anger was somewhat hypocritical as he too had conspired behind his opponents back. Bartlett argues that Richard 'believed that Philip had been conspiring to turn Tancred against him; [yet] he was about to publicly reject, and as a result shame, Philip's sister after a ridiculously long betrothal.'⁷⁸ Arguably, Alice's repudiation was to alter the course of the Third Crusade permanently. Politics at home would continually interfere in the progress and unity of the crusade. Richard's withdrawal to marry Alice gave Philip substantial reasons to retaliate to sustain his sister's honor and defend his own damaged reputation. As Gillingham wittily remarks 'Philip's crusade was directed not so much against Saladin as against Richard.'⁷⁹ Neither king seemed capable of putting religious unity before secular discord. According to Howden, upon discovering Tancred's betrayal, Philip accused Richard of inventing the falsehood to discard Alice. Howden details Philip's response at the accusation 'but let him know this for certain, if he does put her aside and marry another woman, I will be the enemy of him [so] long as I live.'⁸⁰ Richard countered with allegations muddying Alice's reputation: she had been the mistress of Richard's father and had a son by him.⁸¹ If the story is true, one cannot blame Philip for his actions post-crusade; being dressed down by one's feudal vassal and having one's sister repudiated and scandalized before a crusading body was not particularly appetizing. However, it is unlikely that, had such a conversation occurred, Philip and Richard would have made it public

⁷⁸ Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 150.

⁷⁹ Gillingham, *Richard I*, p. 145.

⁸⁰ Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 195.

⁸¹ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 10.; Devizes, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, p. 20; Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 195.

for Howden's ears. Nevertheless, the account of Philip's collusion with Tancred and his feelings toward Richard's rejection of Alice is corroborated by several chronicles.

Other disputes followed that threatened the Christian unity of the crusading body. The *Itinerarium* accuses Philip of having a hand in preventing the English army from acquiring food.⁸² The chronicle cuts to the heart of the matter, the inherent problem of the Third Crusade, a religious mission polluted by political warfare, and secular monarchs' personal hostilities. The text reveals:

both of them refused to give way to the other: the king of France felt he would demean himself if he committed himself to the judgement of an inferior, while King Richard thought he would be dishonoured if he submitted to a man whose feats were less impressive than his own.⁸³

In essence, Richard's hauteur and Philip's insecurity dominated the undertaking shifting crusading ideology from religious motivations to political backbiting. For Richard's part, his concern for renown and glory outweighed all other objectives; but this was not irregular or inappropriate given the significance that medieval society attached to kingship and military prowess. For Philip, Richard's seeming generosity only engendered his feelings of disdain. Where Philip played the jealous fool, Richard played the gracious liege. The *Estoire* and the *Itinerarium* describe Richard's generosity at length, bestowing gifts on the widows, soldiers, and the French and dividing the money he received from Tancred equally with Philip. According to the *Itinerarium* 'this brought him glory and approval and wiped out his enemies' envy to some degree' but 'although the king of France was outwardly cloaked with an appearance of affection, the undying rivalry conceived in his heart remained within [jealous] of King Richard's brilliant deeds.'⁸⁴ The nefarious interference of the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry on crusade would not

⁸² Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 166.

⁸³ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 167.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 168-9.

have met with ecclesiastical approval. Indeed, the church hoped that monarchical violence would be directed towards religious endeavors rather than sadistic feuding and vandalization at home in calling a crusade. Gregory VIII lamented:

For we hear from every direction of scandals and conflicts between kings and princes, among cities, so that we lament with the prophet and are able to say: ‘There is no truth, no knowledge of God in the land: lying, murder, and adultery abound, and blood pursues blood.’⁸⁵

To the catholic church and the Pope’s dismay, the two most powerful kings in medieval Europe merely relocated their feud to the Holy Land, coloring and transforming crusading ideology with a secular quality.

Richard’s mind was at work with his own conspiring intentions; only this time, it would be his undoing. He had foolishly played the manipulative trickster in his dealings with Philip’s discarded sister, Alice. During his prolonged conflict with his father, Richard had capitalized on Philip’s offer to marry Alice in order to gain the territory of Gisors and the Norman Vexin.⁸⁶ However, once the acquisitive king whisked Philip away on crusade, ensuring the safety of his kingdom via his ruse to marry Alice, he retracted the marriage proposal. He had fostered the deception long enough to ensure no vengeance was taken against his holdings for disgracing Alice. His hidden motives may explain his insistence on a joint departure. The *Continuation* describes Philip’s surreptitious fury at discovering the ruse, writing that Philip was ‘careful not to betray his feelings or show any sign of outrage’ at Richard who had ‘reneged on the marriage to his sister [but] he showed his outrage clearly when he got back to France.’⁸⁷ The *Chronicon*, too, includes a colorless report on the incident with no mention made of Philip’s indignation toward his counterpart’s pretense. It was dirty politics on Richard’s part, an opprobrium for

⁸⁵Bird and others, *Crusade and Christendom*, p. 7.

⁸⁶Gillingham, *Richard I*, p. 103.

⁸⁷Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 104.

Philip, who had been kept in the dark until far removed from the continent. At every turn, it seemed that Richard found another means of insulting the honor and reputation of his Capetian companion. According to Humpert ‘an insult of this degree meant that Philip had cause for conflict’ as Richard was thoroughly aware that ‘to trounce Alice’s and Capetian honor would be met with a demand for territorial compensation, and the threat of war.’⁸⁸ Richard defended this political subterfuge with allegations that Alice had served as his father, Henry II’s mistress.⁸⁹ Richard had indelibly wounded Philip’s reputation with a scandalous engagement spanning decades. Richard took advantage of the crusade as a secular weapon of warfare, a strategic game to realize his political ambitions; the same may be said of Philip. The Third Crusade acted as a provisional means for Richard to realize his Machiavellian wishes. Perhaps he never intended to cooperate with Philip on crusade or desired his company, but Philip’s presence in Outremer was necessary for a time. Accordingly to repudiate Alice ‘while he and Philip made the crusade journey together, would have seemed a much more judicious decision than repudiating Alice with Philip left in France far from Richard’s influence.’⁹⁰ His marriage to Berengaria was a cold blow to Philip’s sense of honor, but a clever trick that had nothing to do with religious underpinnings. It was an unmistakable case of political outmaneuvering. Perhaps, without the convenient existence of the crusade, Richard may never have pulled it off. Bartlett argues that for Richard, Alice was ‘nothing more than a pawn in a political game’ and that he ‘decided that the game had come to an end, on his own terms and in a way that could only cut Philip to the quick.’⁹¹ The scene was readied for the debilitating actions that ensued, which threatened the crusade. Phillips argues that Richard’s disgracing of Alice by ‘such inflammatory actions were

⁸⁸ Humpert, *Richard I: Securing an Inheritance*, p. 51.

⁸⁹ Regan, *Lionhearts*, p. 145.

⁹⁰ Humpert, *Richard I: Securing an Inheritance*, p. 51.

⁹¹ Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 151.

hardly likely to encourage any sense of co-operation between the two crusading monarchs.’⁹²

One cannot in good conscience, condemn Philip’s rage. The same sense of honor that moved Philip to avenge his discarded sister may be observed in Richard, who displaying equal swiftness, defended his sister Joanna against her deceased husband’s cousin, Tancred. Philip may have been a political mastermind at home on the continent, but in Outremer, he proved a blundering match against Richard’s trickeries. It should not come as a surprise then that Philip would later denounce Richard before Pope Celestine III, but to little effect.

⁹² Jonathan Phillips, *The Crusades, 1095-1204*, 2nd edn. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2014).

Chapter Three: A Near Disaster: Rivalry at Acre and the Aftermath

Returning from Cyprus following an extensive delay, in which he had captured the island and imprisoned the Greek emperor, Isaac Comnenus, Richard arrived at Acre with his familiar grandeur on 8 June, 1191.⁹³ Local political pressures had come to haunt Richard before making landfall at the besieged city. At Acre, Philip was presently supporting the unscrupulous Conrad marquis of Montferrat as the *de facto* king of Jerusalem, a man Bartlett describes as ‘cynical, manipulative, devious, and untrustworthy’ not unlike Philip in temperament.⁹⁴ Madden describes Philip as ‘small, sickly, and nervous’ and that he ‘had a sardonic wit and cynical style that was all the more unattractive when compared with Richard’s hearty and flamboyant personality.’⁹⁵ Perhaps he found a more promising companion in the marquis than he had in Richard. Guy of Lusignan, the extant king of Jerusalem, the failed military leader of the Christian contingent at Hattin, appealed to Richard for support. The *Estoire* recounts Guy’s arrival at Limassol and how he entreated the English king as ‘the king of France wished to do him so much harm that he wanted to the make the marquis [of Montferrat] king.’⁹⁶ Guy may have been a feudatory of Richard’s in the county of Poitou, but as a military leader on crusade, he proved a monumental disaster. Conrad, however, who conveniently happened to be Philip’s cousin, secured his military standing with his exceptional defense of Tyre against Muslim assault from 1187-8. Accordingly, neither Richard nor Philip could objectively approach the situation given the fact that ‘each was entangled in the skeins of western feudal and family relationships.’⁹⁷ Given the circumstances, predictably, it was time once again for the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry to renew itself for yet

⁹³ Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. xiii.

⁹⁴ ⁹⁴ Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 160.

⁹⁵ Thomas F. Madden, *The Concise History of the Crusades*, 3rd edn. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), p. 82.; Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 2nd edn. (York Road London: Continuum, 2005), p. 141.

⁹⁶ Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, Introduction, p.55.

⁹⁷ Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, p. 143.

another qualifying round of political bedlam. The scene of Acre emerges in the narrative as a portent departure from traditional crusading ideology. At Acre, Philip and Richard seem to unequivocally lose sight of the purpose of this religious quest. Instead, as Jonathan Phillips has profoundly observed, ‘thus the deep political divisions of the Levant neatly mirrored those of western Europe.’⁹⁸ The two most powerful European monarchs blindly replaced religious concerns with political rivalry and the obligations of secular kingship and placed both at the heart of their crusading ideology. Phillips argues that ‘religion was not the sole driving force for the crusaders’ and that other ideas such as ‘the lure of land and money, a sense of honour and family tradition, a desire for adventure, and the obligation of service, all sat alongside—and sometimes smothered—religion.’⁹⁹ For Philip and Richard, each of these ideas found a place in their crusading ideology, driving the French and English competitors further off course to the rue of their soldiers. Bartlett argues that Richard was ‘vain, selfish, [and] blind to the opportunities offered by cooperation’ and had in his mind to ‘inevitably do the opposite’ of his French companion.¹⁰⁰ Guy had been an ineffectual king and an incompetent military commander in comparison to the marquis. However, Richard determined it would best suit his political interests in Outremer to support a onetime disorderly feudatory and an advocate for his kingship than to side with Philip’s choice for king, despite Conrad’s better qualifications. The matter was not to be resolved before Philip’s departure, the chroniclers seething at the lack of cooperation and disunity that Conrad fostered between the French and English armies. Incapable of dissevering conflicting politics at home from local dilemmas on crusade, the contending kings colored

⁹⁸ Phillips, *The Crusades*

<https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Crusades_1095_1204/RxyvAwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1> [accessed 30 July 2020].

⁹⁹ Jonathan Phillips, *Holy Warriors* (New York: Random House, 2009), p. xix.

¹⁰⁰ Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 176.

Outremer's politics so that even the kingship of Jerusalem was unable to escape the stranglehold of the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry. The English chronicles do not withhold Richard's anti-French biases. Newburgh writes that Richard was 'more inclined to Guy's party, as he was an Aquitanian, whose whole kindred were in the service of the king of England' and that 'the king of France was much hurt that his sentiments were not approved by the king of England [which] fomented greater strife and hatred.'¹⁰¹ Predictably, Angevin and Capetian politics prevented further cooperation. Mathews notes 'although Conrad's support ran fairly deep among the influential local leaders in Outremer, it seems that the pressures of continental politics persuaded Richard to take Guy's side.'¹⁰² Richard's disapproval of Conrad would later haunt the English king for the remainder of the crusade, particularly upon his return to the European continent.

However, the *Continuation*, sparing any tale that would slander the name of the French king, does not provide a narrative of Philip and Richard's dispute over the kingship of Jerusalem. The opening account of the *Itinerarium* seems to focus more on Richard's manner of kingship and less on religious considerations. The text moves from the clamorous description of Richard's arrival to the Pisans' submission to the English king and the gifts bestowed on the knights by Philip and Richard.¹⁰³ Generosity and gift-giving, medieval notions attached to kingship, permeate the narrative of the Third Crusade. The English chronicles present Richard as a generous monarch prone to share his wealth unspoiledly with both enemies and comrades alike.¹⁰⁴ The Lionheart's meretricious display of wealth, however, did not sit well with his French competitor. Undoubtedly, Richard's ability to outgive Philip not only diminished his authority as a leader but detracted from his appearance as a generous warrior-king, caring for his

¹⁰¹ Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 590-1.

¹⁰² Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom*, p. 45.

¹⁰³ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 203-4.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 168, 170-2, 227.; Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 103.; Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 46.

knights, making him less appealing to the soldiery as a military leader. Generosity held a sacrosanct place in medieval kingship. Salisbury wrote that a king must be ‘affable in speech, generous in support’ striving to preserve ‘the dignity of his authority in matters of moral character. For indeed good speech and a gracious tongue result in a reputation for benevolence.’¹⁰⁵ It was not that Philip was tightfisted; on the contrary, medieval accounts support his generosity,¹⁰⁶ but that Richard drew from a seemingly inexhaustible source of funds as well as lucrative fundraising campaigns. Madden observes that Philip ‘had no war chest to compare with Richard’s, nor did he have the kind of control over his French vassals that Richard enjoyed with his own men.’¹⁰⁷ Curiously, the English chronicles do not attempt to hide Richard’s avidity as the *Continuation* does Philip’s own artifice. The *Itinerarium* boasts that Richard:

learnt that the king of France paid each knight three gold coins a month, and as a result won the favour and gratitude of everyone. King Richard did not wish anyone to seem superior to him or even his equal in dealings of any kind. He ordered a proclamation to be made to the whole army that he would pay a fixed rate of four gold coins a month to each knight who wanted employment, regardless of country of origin.¹⁰⁸

There is little reason to doubt the authenticity of the narrative as the author makes the point most clear: Richard had no desire to have his reputation offended by his French competitor. The English king’s actions, however, ought not to be arbitrarily denounced as ludicrous or an act of perfidiousness. The text of *Policraticus* affords a record of generosity as a critical aspect of medieval kingship. Asbridge concurs ‘martial prowess, bravery, and loyalty were all revered qualities’ that military leaders and knights were expected to demonstrate and that the ideal warrior kings were ‘expected to display a significant degree of generosity, or largesse, to their

¹⁰⁵ Salisbury, *Policraticus*, p.50.

¹⁰⁶ ‘Similarly the king of France also gave generously to his people’ from Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 46.; Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 223.

¹⁰⁷ Madden, *The Concise History of the Crusades*, p. 82-3.

¹⁰⁸ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 204.; Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 95.; Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 109.

followers [for] public display of these virtues could earn an individual honour and renown.’¹⁰⁹

For Philip, the Third Crusade was an imperfect stroke of fortune, one in which he was made to compete with a king who had far greater resources at his disposal than he. William of Newburgh expresses the French king’s dissatisfaction:

[Richard’s] surpassing glory, however, had already begun to vex the king of France, and he could with difficulty conceal the venomous workings of his soul on beholding himself far inferior in strength and resources; while Richard, from the extent of his force and wealth and the celebrity of his successes, was proudly conspicuous above him, and more favorably regarded by the army; and whatever was now to be carried into effect, seemed to be only awaiting his pleasure.¹¹⁰

Whatever small stride Philip made in procuring an honorable reputation among the soldiery,

Richard promptly reversed as evidenced in the English chronicles. Burdened with the responsibility of preserving the legacy of gallantry espoused by his great-grandfather, Richard could not permit another king of less renown and feats to upstage him. Unfortunately, for Philip, he too had the honor of his grandfather, Louis the Fat, to uphold, but at every turn, Richard prevented him from doing so, and the French king had neither the competency nor the funds to compete. Albeit ruthless, the situation speaks to the political ideals subconsciously entrenched within medieval crusading ideology.

The political obligations of secular kingship and status as warrior-king could not be easily divorced from crusading ideology, essentially driving religious duties into obscurity. Continuously, the king had a duty to uphold his honor and enlarge his reputation with feats of valor and munificence. Baldwin contends ‘benefiting from the spoils of Sicily and Cyprus, the English king could outshine his French overlord by offering higher wages to his soldiers.’¹¹¹ Baldwin’s point is well-taken, and Richard pulled a crafty ruse in delaying in Cyprus while

¹⁰⁹ Asbridge, *Richard I*, p. 27.

¹¹⁰ Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 589-90.

¹¹¹ Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, p. 79.

Philip went ahead to Acre. The *Historia* reports ‘for the king of France [demanded] a moiety of the profits of Cyprus [as] belonging to himself by manifest right’ to which Richard responded ‘that as he had gained Cyprus by his own exertions, he ought not to require that, in the acquisition of which he had not expended the slightest degree of labor.’¹¹² Contrary to Richard’s initial reluctance to share the spoils of Messina, he flatly rejects Philip’s exigence. Bartlett states that Richard believed that ‘the deal made at the start of the crusade only applied to gains made in Outremer.’¹¹³ However, he had already contradicted that line of argument in dividing the spoils of Messina with Philip. Perhaps Richard wanted revenge for Philip’s conspiring with Tancred and the Lombards, or he did not wish the unimpressive French king to appear better than he was. Conceivably, Richard genuinely felt that Philip on no account had any right to the spoils given his absence during the conquest. If so, this speaks to the value Richard placed on political acquisitions and his desire to boast a worthier reputation than his competitor. The *Historia* concludes the dispute with Richard refusing ‘the king of France a share of the booty he had taken; while the king of France accused the king of England of violating the treaty, and breaking the covenant.’¹¹⁴ Regardless of the reasoning behind Richard’s decision, it only added to Philip’s jilted sense of honor. For Philip, the small, sickly, less prosperous, and unattractive counterpart, gaining renown would require double the effort exerted by Richard. The rivaling kings made use of the treaty of Vézelay, accusing one another of violating the terms of the political agreement: Richard constantly reminding Philip of his duty to defend the English contingent and Philip’s demand that Richard share the spoils of victory. This preoccupation with outdoing the other, a byproduct of their established rivalry, restructured the objectives of the crusade. For the dueling

¹¹² Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 490.

¹¹³ Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 166.

¹¹⁴ Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 490.

monarchs, the Third Crusade had become a crusade against each other, two Christian kings who had initially pledged to recapture the Holy Land.

Whatever negative qualities Philip Augustus wielded in his character, one thing remains certain: he refused to attack Acre without the presence of Richard, so the chronicles relay. If Richard's reputation brandished as much power over the Muslims as medieval chronicles claim, Philip would have been foolish not to take advantage of such bargaining power. The *Continuation*, which frequently renders a negative portrayal of Richard, contains an enlightening report 'the renown of the king of England and his deeds so terrified them that [the Saracens] despaired of their lives.'¹¹⁵ Although the *Continuation* provides countless affirmative reports concerning Philip's character and kingship, this notion is only expressed toward Richard and echoes Bahā' al-Dīn's description of the Lionheart. Richard had labored ad nauseam to secure so prevenient a reputation. Unfortunately, it was that same character of brashness and arrogance that would drive Philip away and prematurely end the crusade for Richard. Philip had arrived at Acre long before the dawdling Richard having constructed a stone tower and prepared his siege engines 'by placing them in suitable positions' but that he had 'effected nothing with them, as he was waiting the arrival of the king of England, who immediately upon his coming erected his own engines of war.'¹¹⁶ Howden relates that Philip's siege engines were burned by the Muslims following Richard's arrival.¹¹⁷ Richard had already enticed many of Philip's soldiers over to his side with better wages upon arriving in Acre. Bartlett paints a vivid portrayal of Philip's irascibility:

¹¹⁵ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 105.; Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 207.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p. 207.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 207.; Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 210.; Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 96. The tale is excluded from the narrative of the *Continuation*.

[Richard] ordered siege engines to be constructed and great battering rams to be built. It was clear that he planned to energetically prosecute the siege and, before long, that he intended to be the dominant partner amongst the two kings.¹¹⁸ Philip must have experienced significant irritation for two reasons: although Richard's overlord, theoretically, the more powerful of the two, he held a less-authoritative position in conducting the siege and military operations. Secondly, Philip had waited for Richard to arrive before pummeling the walls of Acre only to lose his siege engines as his feudal vassal seized command of the endeavor. Bahā' al-Dīn's account supports the burning of Philip's siege tower and the narrative that the 'Franks' had not launched an assault against the Cursed Tower as they were awaiting Richard's arrival.¹¹⁹ Whereas, had Philip exercised a more Machiavellian audacity, perhaps he could have launched the barrage, benefitting from Richard's idling, and garnered the glory. Regardless, it was the perfect backdrop for continued feuding between the monarchs.

The political backstabbing of the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry had nearly shipwrecked the siege of Acre. The rivaling kings transformed Acre into the definitive political tournament in their secular crusade against one another. Whenever one regal reputation was struck down and royal pride wounded, the other met with a similar fate. The *Itinerarium* notes that Philip was 'disgusted at the great delay in launching an assault' but that Richard would not approve an attack as he lay ill to which Philip 'did not think that he should give up his plans for this reason.'¹²⁰ Philip desired to attack Acre immediately while Richard wished to delay assault due to his illness. The subsequent actions taken by the French king further wounded his pride. Philip attempted to sustain the siege unaided by Richard, realizing that his military skills were lacking. Philip was in a desperate situation as he had lost many foot soldiers on account of Richard's offer of higher wages. Additionally, Richard would not allow his troops to aid in Philip's assault

¹¹⁸ Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 176.

¹¹⁹ Bahā' al-Dīn, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, p. 150-1.

¹²⁰ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 205.

as he doubted Philip's competence as a military leader.¹²¹ As a result, the French siege was an unfortunate wreck derailed by the Muslim's leveling of Philip's expensive artillery 'which he had built with such care' via Greek fire.¹²² A heartbreaking scene follows in the *Itinerarium's* narrative 'the king of France was thrown into such furious rage that he fell sick from grief.'¹²³ Richard, harboring petty political grievances, had acted unreasonably in refusing to aid the beleaguered French, fellow crusaders, and Christians in need of his support. Regan argues 'as a military decision this was probably correct, but in the context of a crusade that depended on shared faith and conviction, the decision was questionable.'¹²⁴ The French king was unsuccessful in breaching Richard's impregnable wall of renown, military prowess, and respect of the soldiery. Indeed, Philip's siege, a flagrant disaster, had resulted from Richard's outbidding him for 'the services of many of his own troops, who were supposed to be guarding his siege weapons from just such a threat.'¹²⁵ Richard's lack of cooperation had doomed the enterprise. He did not wish his weaker overlord to gain the upper. Indeed, Richard 'was very anxious to capture the city' and earlier, while delaying at Cyprus, had sighed 'God forbid that Acre should be won in my absence [for] it has been besieged for so long, and the triumph—God willing—will be so glorious.'¹²⁶ Philip stood little chance of garnishing any renown or military prowess in the wake of his competitor's unrelenting stubbornness. Perhaps Richard was keenly aware of this and acted accordingly. If so, he had needlessly endangered the crusade as the Muslim contingent had nearly breached through to the Christian camp.¹²⁷ The Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry and concerns

¹²¹ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 205.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 206.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 206.

¹²⁴ Regan, *Lionhearts*, p. 158.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 158.

¹²⁶ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 196, 213.

¹²⁷ Bahā' al-Dīn, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, p. 152.

over the perceptions of honor, kingship, and respective reputations held an essential place in the hearts of the two monarchs overshadowing the return of Jerusalem into Christian hands.

The *Continuation* contains an insightful anecdote, albeit wanting in the English chronicles, regarding Richard's depths of guile. If the tale's legitimacy is questionable, the story nonetheless is informative on Richard and Philip's character and perceptions of their relationship on crusade. The tale follows: during the siege of Acre, Philip is approached by Muslim envoys pleading for permission to return to their Muslim lands. Philip responded that 'if they would surrender to his mercy he would spare their lives.'¹²⁸ Once again, Philip appears on the crusading scene in the words of Baldwin as a 'peacemaker,' only to have his good intentions suffocated by Richard's impetuosity. The tale echoes the Lombard narrative having Philip attempt peace with the locals only to be upstaged by Richard. The French king then mounts his steed and takes up arms against his rival. The *Continuation* recounts that while the Muslim envoys were speaking with Philip, Richard 'so as to get his own back on the king of France' as the French king would not 'keep him informed of what was going on, had the assault on the city stepped up.'¹²⁹ If the tale is true, Richard is not the only member of the party to deserve blame. As fellow crusaders with the same objective in mind, Philip should have informed his English companion of his movements. Mathews argues that the 'internal friction' which existed between Richard and Philip 'affected military operations around Acre, and the two seemingly did not even always communicate their own maneuvers with one another, an omission that could cost many lives on the battlefield.'¹³⁰ From the outset, the crusade was plagued by a lack of communication between the leaders Philip and Richard, who were uncooperative and placed their petty political desires

¹²⁸ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 105.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 105.

¹³⁰ Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom*, p. 42.

above the enterprise. Tyerman argues ‘such rivalry at times endangered the military operations, as one side or the other failed to coordinate attacks, which consequently failed’¹³¹ as had been the case with the French’s disastrous assault on Acre while Richard lay ill. The *Continuation* provides a colorful illustration on the degradation to which the Third Crusade had arrived at. The Muslim envoys, angered at the French king’s ineffectiveness to halt Richard’s assault on the walls, renege on the truce biting ‘since you lack the authority to forbid the assault.’¹³² Mathews describes the Muslim comments directed at Philip as ‘a jab that must have cut Philip to the quick, given how Richard’s presence and actions on the crusade had already wounded his pride and undermined his authority.’¹³³ The Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry had so plagued crusading ideology that it had come to infect the soldiery, the crusade's overall spirit, creating factionalism and incoherence. In Messina, French and English soldiers, who should have been unified in their religious objective, fought each other as though they were the enemy. A similar situation that, according to the *Continuation*, now festered in Acre. The narrative concludes ‘when the king of France discovered that the king of England was attacking the city despite the safe-conduct that he had given, he was furious’ and he subsequently ‘ordered his men to arm themselves to go and attack the king of England.’¹³⁴ Naturally, Philip does not go through with this reprisal, although he had intended to attack Richard himself. In the end, it is Richard who had earned a mark of shame upon his reputation: ‘the Saracens returned the city and defended themselves so stoutly against King Richard that he gained no honour at all that day and lost many of his men.’¹³⁵ The narrative serves as a retribution tale: just as the French are dishonored from an uncoordinated

¹³¹ Christopher Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades* (Strand, London England: Penguin Books, 2007).

¹³² Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 105.

¹³³ Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom*, 48.

¹³⁴ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 105.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 106.

assault on Acre ending in failure, Richard too has his day of defeat resulting from his lack of cooperation with the French king. Barber laments that ‘later crusades have few of the stories of miracles and religious exaltation that we find in the First Crusade, and in some measure that is the key to their failure.’¹³⁶ Perhaps the lack of religious fervor derived from the lack of cooperation between the French and English kings, racial tensions throughout the soldiery, and the overall spirit of disunity and delay. The squabbling monarchs had transmuted the Third Crusade into a decidedly secular enterprise, a crusade against the Christian body from within, a self-destructing campaign. The peace talks with Philip are corroborated by Bahā’ al-Dīn, who recollects that Sayf al-Dīn al-Mashtūb ‘had gone out in person to meet the king of France’ to surrender the city but that Mashtūb later ‘answered [the king of France] roughly and delivered a tirade’ refusing to surrender.¹³⁷ The chronicle does not explain why al-Mashtūb changed his mind, but given his state of rage, Richard may have indeed intensified the siege. This lends some credence to the *Continuation*’s tale. Mathews concludes ‘a major decision on campaign strategy was being made based on the ambitions and reputations of the commanding monarchs, not on what was best for the Holy Land.’¹³⁸ If the Third Crusade tends to exude a less religious aura, then the presence of Philip and Richard, both secular and rivaling monarchs, are likely to blame.

A second tale weaved its way into the *Continuation* but remains absent from English chronicles. The story appears as a justification for Philip’s abandoning the crusade, vindicating his reputation but delivering a hearty blow to Richard’s character. The text notes ‘King Richard conceived a great crime whereby he would kill the king of France without touching him’ and that “King Richard was accused of many ill deeds against the king of France.”¹³⁹ Richard’s

¹³⁶ Richard W. Barber, *The Reign of Chivalry* (Woodbridge, Suffolk England: The Boydell Press, 2005), p. 109.

¹³⁷ Bahā’ al-Dīn, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, p. 158.

¹³⁸ Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom*, p. 41.

¹³⁹ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 109.

belligerent attitude and uncooperative nature toward the French king did not go unnoticed. Richard then calls upon the bed-ridden Philip and tricks his companion with some distasteful political intrigue. The text notes that Richard asked Philip ‘as for Louis your son, how are you to be comforted [for] he is dead.’¹⁴⁰ Philip expressed great panic at the notion of his kingdom being left without an heir. Considering how quickly Philip healed of his malady, it is unlikely he believed Richard’s falsehood. Rather, he had found a rare occasion to either strike back at his opponent or abandon the unprofitable enterprise and return home to torment Richard’s holdings. This notion is evidenced by the fact that upon Richard’s departure, Philip questions the duke of Burgundy and William of Barres on news of his son’s death. The duke of Burgundy assures Philip that it is a trick devised by Richard ‘to cause you so much distress while you are ill that you would never get up again.’¹⁴¹ However, the French king did not need the justification afforded by such a ‘nasty little story’ in Tyerman’s words.¹⁴² Philip had more than the list of grievances and excuses needed to desert the crusade. Baldwin argues that several factors contributed to Philip’s unforeseen departure:

[Philip’s] precipitous desertion of the crusading cause was undoubtedly motivated by several factors: the frustrating rivalry with Richard, which brought him no glory, recent news of the sickness of his infant heir at Paris [and] the death of the count of Flanders at Acre on 1 June 1191.¹⁴³

Possibly, Philip came to the realization that politics would be better served at home, an endeavor far more valuable than tailing the wily Richard across the Holy Land. Newburgh wrote that Philip ‘appeared to covet the possessions of Flanders thus vacated’ and that ‘it was believed that he falsely condemned the unhealthiness of a foreign atmosphere, in order that he might have a

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 109.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 109.

¹⁴² Christopher Tyerman, *God's War*.

¹⁴³ Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, p. 79.

decent pretext for his departure.’¹⁴⁴ Likewise, Howden railed that Philip seized all the ‘treasures and property’ belonging to the count of Flanders and ‘from that hour sought an excuse for withdrawing from the siege of Acre [so] that he might subjugate the earldom of Flanders.’¹⁴⁵ Newburgh additionally credits Philip’s departure with his inability to ‘behold the resplendent glory of the king of England, whose power, from the great insufficiency of his means, he was incapable of equaling.’¹⁴⁶ Philip’s departure makes little sense from a religious perspective, but the motivation is unmistakable from a political one. Indeed, the county of Flanders proved a valuable and wealthy asset. Therefore, Philip had to move quickly to protect his rights in the Flemish succession against his rival’s potential claims. Naus asserts:

Ultimately, from a political perspective, Philip’s return to France to defend his interests in the Flemish succession proved a smart move; the French King ended up gaining Artois, the Amiénois, and Vermandois as well as much of Beauvais as a consequence of his return.¹⁴⁷

Tyerman agrees that Artois was a ‘strategically and economically important region’ and that Philip ‘would be able to manipulate the contested Flemish succession to his material advantage’ which was ‘vital to Capetian security.’¹⁴⁸ Without immediate action, the issue of Flanders, if not solved in the appropriate time frame, had the potential to destabilize Philip’s kingdom. Baldwin, too, agrees with Naus’s conclusion: the matter of the Flemish succession necessitated Philip’s presence on the continent. Mathews argues that although Philip’s departure may have been informed by his jealousy toward Richard and his desire to confiscate ‘some of the English king’s French holdings’ there is ‘evidence to suggest that Philip’s monarchical responsibilities did legitimately convince him of the necessity of leaving the crusade.’¹⁴⁹ There is undoubtedly a

¹⁴⁴ Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 223.

¹⁴⁵ Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 205.; Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 110.

¹⁴⁶ Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 592.

¹⁴⁷ James Naus, *Constructing Kingship: The Capetian Monarchs of France and the early Crusades*, p. 126.

¹⁴⁸ Christopher Tyerman, *God's War*.

¹⁴⁹ Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom*, p. 49.

degree of truth to this argument; however, if Philip had sincerely valued the crusade, it seems odd that he departed without providing for his French contingents' wages. The *Itinerarium* notes:

[The French] had not received any other payment from the king of France [until] King Richard, on the request of the duke of Burgundy, lent the duke on the security of his hostages 5000 marks of silver to pay his troops.¹⁵⁰

Disregarding the argument that political circumstances necessitated Philip's abrupt departure, the French king seemed all too dismissive and unconcerned with providing for the welfare of his army and financially investing in his portion of the endeavor. Naus's argument that Philip served out his crusading oath by 'protecting the Church at home' is unconvincing. Pope Celestine expressly forbade the French king from invading Richard's territories and passionately denounced the Capetian firebrand in a letter addressed to Philip, the bishop of Beauvais.¹⁵¹ If anything, Philip had persistently disregarded the wishes of the church, instigating disunity between Conrad, the French soldiery, and Richard and committing perfidy with John against the absentee crusader who was attempting to serve the church. Other than imbibing Conrad with his share of Acres' spoils, Philip did not provide for his soldiery. The English king had underestimated his vulpine opponent, and although this 'may not have displeased Richard unduly as it consolidated his control over the enterprise,' Philip had nevertheless forced his rival to pay for the upkeep of the French troops.¹⁵² It was a wicked strategy most unbecoming of a Christian leader, but Philip, understanding that his departure would only elate the vainglorious Lionheart, was at last satiated. Richard would have his wish at a haunting cost. If his rival so desired to head the crusade alone, dominating the military scene, Philip deemed it only fitting that the Angevin windbag assume the cost. It would be difficult to assess who was the wiser in the game of political finagling. Philip's departure speaks to the dilemma, which ultimately doomed the Third

¹⁵⁰ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 225-6.; Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 105.

¹⁵¹ Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 402.

¹⁵² Christopher Tyerman, *God's War*.

Crusade: the problem of kingship and how royal identity shaped and transformed crusading ideology. Under monarchical participation, religious objectives swung lower than political realities. Irrespective of modern attempts to nobly defend Philip's honor, the French king regarded the crusade as a burden upon his political duties. Mathews argues 'Philip saw the crusading effort as a distraction from his duties as king of France and as potentially detrimental to his lineage.'¹⁵³ Crusading ideology gradually lost sight of religious aspirations plagued by the concerns of kingship and how to rule one's realm and maintain sovereignty while confined in the remote Holy Land.

Naus argues that the royal crusade 'had to be weighed constantly against domestic political considerations.'¹⁵⁴ Several Philip apologists argue that political circumstances demanded the French king's immediate return to the continent. Modern historians tend to make the mistake of granting far more legitimacy to Philip's abandonment of the crusade while illogically criticizing Richard's failure to recapture Jerusalem. Markowski thunders:

Richard had taken a large army that had once decided *unanimiter* to fulfil that goal, and he had divided it, delayed it, opposed it, and finally pried it out of the East, diverting it not once but twice from the goal.¹⁵⁵

Unfortunately, Markowski's study fails to implicate Philip in the Third Crusade's overall misdirection and the effect of medieval notions of kingship and personal politics on crusading ideology. Richard deviated from crusade policy for the same reasons as Philip: he valued political objectives and the protection of his kingdom over religious duties. If one is tempted to dismiss the notion that monarchical participation transformed crusading ideology, one need not look further than the response offered by the religious body and soldiery. Indubitably, the royal leaders were not of the same mind and spirit as their subordinate contingents. The *Estoire*

¹⁵³ Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom*, p. 50.

¹⁵⁴ James Naus, *Constructing Kingship: The Capetian Monarchs of France and the early Crusades*, p. 123.

¹⁵⁵ Markowski, 'Richard Lionheart,' p. 361.

perceived ‘the barons of France were filled with anger and rage’ and ‘when they could not change this [they] blamed him, coming little short of denying his kingship and lordship over them, they hated his power over them so much.’¹⁵⁶ Lest it be said that particular English chronicles invented the complaints to disparage Philip’s reputation, the *Continuation*, which leans in Philip’s favor, contains a scene where the Duke of Burgundy conspires with the French nobles as to preserving Philip’s reputation in Outremer. The Duke of Burgundy laments:

Great shame will it be to the king of France and great reproach to the whole kingdom,
and they will say that the king of France had fled and the king of England has won
Jerusalem, and never again will France be without reproach.¹⁵⁷

The text reveals a profound concern for upholding the French king’s reputation in light of abandoning his religious duties before completion. The *Itinerarium* derides Philip as committing a ‘shameful’ act in ‘discharging a vow, when he had hardly entered the country and had such brief triumphs against the Turks!’¹⁵⁸ If medieval society so esteemed the chivalric virtues of honor, renown, and military prowess, the hallmarks of the warrior-king, Philip shamed his country and regality by ‘branding himself with the stigma of cowardice in the hour of battle, determined to return to his own country.’¹⁵⁹ Philip’s status as a crusading king, striving to earn praise ‘worthy of the greatest of men of letters’ as well as military renown, had been threatened by the presence of Richard and that ‘whatever should be achieved in future by the Christian army in the East would rather be attributed to Richard, as the more powerful, than to himself.’¹⁶⁰ Philip’s departure was simply a matter of weighing political versus religious duties. In the end, politics won out as the crusade had done little for his reputation and ‘was understandably a much

¹⁵⁶ Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p.105.; Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 216.; Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 592.; Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 223-4.; Devizes, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, p. 43-4.

¹⁵⁷ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 111.

¹⁵⁸ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 223.

¹⁵⁹ Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 592.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 592.

more inviting prospect than an army camp in the company of a richer and more powerful partner.¹⁶¹ Indeed, he would do better to return home, taking advantage of his rival's absence, to contaminate Richard's reputation with a smear campaign and secure John's allegiance. All the more reason, it seems that politics had played a hand in Philip's decision.

¹⁶¹ Gillingham, *Richard I*, p. 163.

Chapter Four: Fortune in the Ranks: A Well-Commissioned Smear Campaign

Bartlett notes ‘it was considered a shameful act to withdraw from a crusade with vows unfulfilled.’¹⁶² The French king must have felt confident that the pope would absolve him of his crusading vow and seemed unconcerned with the backlash he received from abandoning the crusade before reaching Jerusalem. The *Continuation*, penned in a somewhat cryptic manner, briefly mentions Philip’s layover in Rome, providing as little detail as possible.¹⁶³ Almost immediately, Philip moved to action against his regal opponent, one which has been described as a ‘propaganda offensive’ or otherwise political mudslinging.¹⁶⁴ One may only guess at the true nature of Pope Celestine and the French king’s conversation, and the narrative may have been a ploy to blacken Philip’s name. Given Philip’s actions upon returning, however, the tale lends some credence to the argument. Howden wrote that upon Philip’s arrival at Rome, the French king ‘said many evil things of the king of England, in the presence of our lord the pope’ and that ‘the king of England had forced him to leave the land of Jerusalem, and accusing him of treachery.’¹⁶⁵ Howden maintains that the pope dismissed Philip’s grievances as proceeding from ‘envy than from any bad conduct on the part of the king of England.’¹⁶⁶ Howden and Newburgh indicate that Philip entreated Pope Celestine to relieve him of the oath he had made with Richard in which he vowed neither to attack ‘his people or his land while he was still on pilgrimage.’¹⁶⁷ Fortunately, as a crusader, Richard’s lands were guaranteed protection by the papacy.¹⁶⁸ The

¹⁶² Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 187.

¹⁶³ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 110.

¹⁶⁴ Damian J. Smith and John Doran, *Pope Celestine III (1191–1198): Diplomat and Pastor* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2016).

¹⁶⁵ Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 256.; Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 592-3.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 256.

¹⁶⁷ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 224.; Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 592.; Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 218.; Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p.105.; Devizes, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, p. 44 does not concur.

¹⁶⁸ Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 187.

insinuation is that Philip devised to attack Richard's French holdings as revenge for the English king's distasteful behavior on crusade. Markowski credits the papacy and religious precedents with far more power than they had actually wielded in solely blaming Richard on their failure to control him. Markowski refuses to implicate Philip in the matter, and he fails to consider the degree to which medieval notions of kingship and chivalry shaped crusading ideology. The pope failed to control the direction of the Third Crusade as it had become a secular endeavor monopolized by two intimidating and formidable rivals. Markowski laments that under 'Richard's crusade leadership, we can see just how little control the Church actually had over crusade activity when the secular leadership deviated from set goals.'¹⁶⁹ On that note, however, Markowski omits that the papacy suffered debilitating blows from several royal powerhouses, including Philip, John count of Mortain, and the Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI, all indirectly meddling in matters abroad by threatening the stability of Richard's lands at home. In a letter addressed to the archbishops and bishops of England, Pope Celestine III grieved of the 'discords that arose' on crusade and of 'the quarrels and frequent rancours that had sprung up in the army.'¹⁷⁰ Celestine had been genuinely disturbed by the irreligious direction the Third Crusade had taken under Philip and Richard's guidance. Markowski's reprove stands somewhat misguided as Celestine himself acknowledged the crippling havoc with which Philip's action at home had in wrecking the crusade. A rescript from Pope Celestine to Philip, the bishop of Beauvais, denounced Philip's actions, validating the theory that Philip had intended to attack Richard's lands upon returning from crusade. Celestine reiterates Philip's oath to maintain 'the integrity of [Richard's] territories' and how the French king in 'shamefully contravening his plighted faith and his oath, [came] to the cities of the aforesaid king, [and] violently seized them,

¹⁶⁹ Markowski, 'Richard Lionheart,' p. 365.

¹⁷⁰ Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 284

and, with hostile hands [cruelly] laid waste his territories.¹⁷¹ Ecclesiastical authorities were as upset with Philip's disregard for religious precedents as they were with Richard's indifference towards normative crusading policy. Neither king had successfully divorced the royal title, the identities, and responsibilities innate to the office, from crusading ideology. Instead, kingship defined crusading policy by directing objectives towards that which would most benefit the king's personal and political aspirations. In this respect, both Philip and Richard are to blame. As a newly consecrated king, Richard exploited the crusade to garner his reputation as a military leader, multiply his territorial holdings, and earn respect as a budding king to drive authority into his regal title. Philip too would have done the same had Richard been a less formidable opponent in the political game of tit-for-tat.

Naus and Bartlett argue that medieval chronicles misrepresent Philip in an unfavorable light as the 'reluctant crusader.' It was not so much that Philip was reluctant as he was unsatisfied with his inability to steal the limelight from Richard. For the feuding royals, the Third Crusade's target had little to do with recovering Jerusalem and more with upholding chivalric virtues and aspiring to be the ideal king as propounded in *Policraticus*. If the chroniclers wielded power to shape the perception of kingship, then this speaks to the failure of Philip's chroniclers to redeem their king as the English ones had done, such as Ambroise, in creating a romantic figure reminiscent of the amaranthine heroes of old. Having failed in forging a gallant reputation worthy of the troubadours, as Richard had with Bertran de Born, Philip set out to smear his rival's name. The unforeseen assassination of Conrad of Montferrat afforded such a rare and splendid opportunity.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 402.

Richard had repeatedly locked horns with the marquis who played on the French vs. English sentiment to his advantage: his refusal to participate in the crusade while lodging in Tyre and his encouragement of the French contingent to desert the crusade and return to Tyre.¹⁷² Philip's support of Conrad ensured that Richard, delighted that the French king's departure had consolidated his control of the crusade, would continue to be harangued and undermined. The *Itinerarium* indicates 'the duke of Burgundy and the marquis were burning with jealousy' and that 700 French knights left Richard to return to Tyre with the duke of Burgundy and the marquis.¹⁷³ The text asserts that the marquis:

had been forming his deceitful schemes when he had made his agreement with the king of France and the French, i.e., because after the king's departure the French would support him [so] he intended to withdraw them from the campaign so that King Richard would be left less able to carry on the business of the kingdom.¹⁷⁴

Richard was assaulted on both fronts: from the French and the Muslims in Outremer and from Philip and John on the continent. Kate Norgate observes that the whole body of the French contingent which Philip had left behind excluding Count Henry of Champagne conspired with the 'Germans and the partisans of Conrad in thwarting every scheme that Richard proposed, either for the settlement of the Frank kingdom in Palestine or for the reconquest of its capital.'¹⁷⁵ If that had not suited the marquis's thirst for revenge, he had engaged the Muslims in peace talks behind Richard's back.¹⁷⁶ Richard had made it indisputably evident that he harbored 'extremely angry' sentiments towards the bickering marquis.¹⁷⁷ The aggravated king's emotions were easily betrayed before a growing audience awaiting the outcome of Conrad's scheme. The racial

¹⁷² Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 290-1, 293-4.; Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 218.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 296.

¹⁷⁴ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 295, 299.; Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p. 141, 143, 144, 148.; Devizes, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, p. 44.

¹⁷⁵ Kate Norgate, *England Under the Angevin Kings* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1887), p. 321.

¹⁷⁶ Bahā' al-Dīn, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, p. 182-3, 191-2, 194-5, 199, 200.; Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 303-4.

¹⁷⁷ Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 230.

tensions and in-fighting which plagued the crusading body further hampered cooperation, leaving Richard with no other choice than to forgo a siege on Jerusalem, given such a disunified army.

Philip espied an opportunity to pay Richard back for snubbing Alice. In, what Baldwin has coined an ‘occasional stroke of luck’ and Gillingham ‘a crusade-sent opportunity,’ Philip capitalized on the rumors bolting about concerning Conrad of Montferrat. The latter had been elected the king of Jerusalem, assassinated at Tyre only days before his coronation.¹⁷⁸ The marquis had likely been murdered by the Assassins, apprentices to the Old Man of the Mountain, for capturing ‘a merchant ship from the Saracen lands belonging to the lord of the Assassins’ and refusing to return it.¹⁷⁹ Irrespective, the French contingency held Richard liable for the slaughter. Howden avowed:

on account of [the marquis’s] recent dispute with the king of England, many persons were inclined to censure the king on this subject; and the French, who were on the marquis’s side, were his principal defamers, and raised great obloquy against him, concerning the murder of this illustrious man, nearly throughout the whole of the Western world.¹⁸⁰

Devizes maintained that the bishop of Beauvais, upon returning to the continent, convinced Philip that Richard had sent assassins to France to murder him. Philip promptly hired a bodyguard. The *Chronicon* asserts that Philip bribed the Hohenstaufen emperor, Henry VI, ‘to a hatred of the king of England’ inspiring the German king to authorize an imperial edict requiring that all the ‘princes of the empire should take the king of the English by force [if] he should happen to pass through their countries, and present him to him alive or dead.’¹⁸¹ Subsequently,

¹⁷⁸ Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, p. 88.; Gillingham, *Richard I*, p. 165, 197.

¹⁷⁹ Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 114.

¹⁸⁰ Howden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden*, p. 267.; Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 307-9.; Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 596-7.; Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p.152.; Devizes, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, p. 61.; Bahā' al-Dīn, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, p. 201.; Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 115.

¹⁸¹ Devizes, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, p. 61.

Ambroise associates Richard's capture in Austria with the rumor that he had hired four assassins to kill Philip and 'because of this evil deed the king was later imprisoned.'¹⁸² Philip found mutual allies in Henry VI, the Holy Roman Emperor, and overlord of Leopold V, Duke of Austria, whose German contingent had been equally offended by Richard's antics in the Holy Land.¹⁸³ On Philip's part, it was a gross display of Machiavellian politics, to launch a smear campaign against a crusader, which Pope Celestine would not have endorsed, turning John against his absentee brother, all the while feigning innocence. Bartlett reasons 'some of the mud thrown at Richard's reputation stuck; in this instance, perception was every bit as powerful as reality' and that even if Philip understood the rumors to be false 'it was in his interests to pretend that he did as it put Richard in an even poorer light.'¹⁸⁴ Perhaps Richard had underestimated his Capetian rival in assuming that the French king would not dare to attack a fellow crusader out of respect for the Pope's express forbiddance to invade the English king's lands. Howden remarks that Philip 'joyfully seized the occasion to defame the king of England' by increasing 'prejudice towards him' to 'inflame his people against the king of England.'¹⁸⁵ Intriguingly, neither Naus nor Markowski factor in Philip's smear campaign against Richard as contributing to the Third Crusade's failure and the deviation from crusading policy. Pope Celestine had prohibited the French king from harassing Richard's Angevin holdings, yet Philip disobeyed. How could Richard focus his attention on the reconquest of Jerusalem while fighting a two-front war against the Muslims and rebellious French contingent amidst attempts to obliterate his reputation and seize his territories at home? Philip's political mudslinging, however, had unpleasant

¹⁸² Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p.152.; Nicholson, *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 308; both narratives agree on the number four.

¹⁸³ On Leopold and Emperor Henry VI's support of the marquis Conrad refer to Norgate, *England Under the Angevin Kings*, p. 319-20. On Richard discarding the Austrian banners belonging to Duke Leopold at Acre refer to Devizes, *Chronicles of the Crusades*, p. 42.

¹⁸⁴ Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 242-3.

¹⁸⁵ Newburgh, *The History of William of Newburgh*, p. 596-7.

consequences for the dispirited Richard and on the failure and politicization of the crusade: the abandonment of the crusade, over a year in captivity, the loss of several territories, and an extensive war with Philip that would end in an untimely and tragic death for the seemingly inviolate Lionheart.

Following the divergence of the French and English, Richard began to receive news of disasters at home. The *Estoire* notes that Count John, Richard's conniving brother, had 'caused his chancellor [William of Longchamp] to leave England' and that John 'wished so much harm to the king while he was on pilgrimage.'¹⁸⁶ Faced with the nightmarish prospect of John seizing his kingdom, Richard, in the same manner as Philip, had to balance 'actual participation' in the crusade 'against political circumstances at home.'¹⁸⁷ Contrary to Markowski's verdict that 'Richard was a failure as a crusader leader', the English king's abandonment of the crusade had little to do with religion or a conservative policy preventing him from capturing Jerusalem. The Third Crusade had become a secular endeavor as the royal leaders were more devoted to their respective kingdoms, as this entailed certain personal and political benefits. Mathews argues that Richard's 'attention was always being diverted back to his Angevin lands' and that he 'would base many of his decisions on a timetable that had more to do with what was best for him rather than for what successful long-term operations in the Levant.'¹⁸⁸ As Naus reveals, a king's foremost priority was his kingdom, and it should not come as a surprise that Richard abandoned the notion of Jerusalem in favor of protecting his threatened territories. Modern historians seem very unforgiving on this point; nevertheless, Richard should not bear the blame alone. Regan argues 'if Richard stayed with the crusade, he might lose his lands, both in England and France'

¹⁸⁶ Ailes, *The History of the Holy War*, p.159, 193.

¹⁸⁷ James Naus, *Constructing Kingship: The Capetian Monarchs of France and the early Crusades*, p. 127-8.

¹⁸⁸ Mathews, *The Great Men of Christendom*, p. 61.

and that ‘the actions of his brother and Philip Augustus were against all the teachings of the church and the traditions of chivalry.’¹⁸⁹ Had this been untrue, Pope Celestine would not have scolded the bishop of Beauvais for the French king’s invasion of Richard’s territory, and Philip’s vassals would not have refused his conspiracy to invade the duchy of Normandy or ‘the territory of an absent crusader.’¹⁹⁰ Therefore, if Philip succeeded in securing John’s allegiance, Richard might have gained Jerusalem, but at the price of his own kingdom, a terrible waste given that the persons were not available to govern and maintain the Holy City in the event of capturing it as the crusaders would return home after fulfilling their vow. *The History of William Marshal* reveals ‘the Chancellor sent word that his brother John was conspiring with the king of France against him, and if he didn’t return home quickly he would lose his land.’¹⁹¹ Philip then instigated a propaganda war against the absent Richard, preparing the way for a lengthy detainment in prison following the end of the Third Crusade in 1192. It was not a welcome befitting of a crusading king, but the Third Crusade had been anything but conventional. At last, Philip had backed Richard into a corner from which there was no escape. For all its glory, chivalry was at times a grim and two-edged sword: the ideals that inspired the royals to flock to the Third Crusade would also be the endeavors undoing. Richard’s withdrawal from the Levant ‘went against all the precepts of honour and glory that the Age of Chivalry espoused’ and yet Philip and John’s collusion left him without an alternative so that ‘the demands of England and France had to take precedence (those of France had certainly done so for Philip).’¹⁹² Unfortunately, petty power politics and a propaganda campaign had further secularized the crusade, which was only religious in name. A crusade which had set out with great potential,

¹⁸⁹ Regan, *Lionhearts*, p. 195.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 195.

¹⁹¹ Nigel Bryant, *The History of William Marshal*, p. 130.; Edbury, *The Conquest of Jerusalem*, p. 121.

¹⁹² Bartlett, *Richard the Lionheart: The Crusader King of England*, p. 250.

being led by the two most powerful monarchs in Europe, failed to achieve its religious objective, turning instead into a political feud in which crusading violence, indeed the crusade itself, was redirected back to the continent, a crusade in which Christians fought with Christians, leading to a hundred-year race war between the French and English, a most secular cause indeed.

Conclusion

For Markowski and Mathews, the Third Crusade failed as they assess the outcome of the expedition utilizing religious criteria. Conversely, both Philip and Richard achieved some measure of political success in participating in the crusade. Philip had set the stage for future dealings with England, wielding a political fury that forged a corridor to the Hundred Years' War, and recovered some lost French holdings while Richard was forever revered as the ideal chivalric warrior-king and military commander, the hero of countless legends, romances, and songs down through the ages. Emerging notions of chivalry and conceptions of kingship indirectly influenced the direction of the Third Crusade. The idyllic warrior-king, the hero of the *chanson de geste*, ought to exemplify military prowess, generosity, valor, and immortalize one's kingship with an undying legacy as illustrated in Salisbury's praise of Richard's ancestors in *Policraticus* and Philip's in the *Vita Ludovici Grossi*. In this, both kings had not failed: Philip earned the reputation as the 'lamb' and the reluctant crusader and Richard as the 'lionhearted' warrior whose attempts to recover Jerusalem were thwarted by a conniving brother and overlord. The Third Crusade, a mere parodist of the earlier crusades, had become a battle infused with royal identity, driven by an overwhelming desire to forge an enduring legacy.

So it was that under the leadership of Philip Augustus and Richard I, the Third Crusade witnessed a transformation in crusading ideology that shifted from the religious ideal to a political weapon of warfare. Colored by the quarrels of the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry and influenced by medieval notions of kingship, the Third Crusade was ill-fated from conception. Although medieval monarchs were expected by ecclesiastical authorities to uphold crusading ideology and prioritize the recovery of the Holy Land, this concept was an ideal one that did not accurately imitate reality. In effect, Richard the Lionheart and Philip Augustus almost always prioritized dealings involving their respective territories. The competition for political

dominance on the continent, which fueled the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry, crept into the ideology of the Third Crusade shifting the focus from the religious to the political benefits and magnified reputation the monarchs might acquire in the cause.

Conceived as a religious undertaking, the Third Crusade failed to restore the Holy Land to Christendom. However, manipulated as a political tool by the Angevin king and his Capetian overlord, both monarchs achieved success, regardless of how short-lived the political benefits of this warped endeavor were. For religion had not shaped the crusade, comparatively, secular objectives and political rivalry redefined crusading ideology culminating in later crusades that pitted Christians against each other, rather than against the Muslims. This would be the case with the Albigensian Crusade or the Cathar Crusade, a political crusade, as many Cathars found support from the nobility to thwart the encroaching power of the catholic church, which was fought at home in France against the Gnostic sect from 1209–1229. Similarly, the Fourth Crusade, fought from 1202-1204, witnessed the sack of Constantinople, a Christian city, in what amounted to a political coup by what should have been co-religionists instead of crusading enemies. The later crusades, politically infused at the core, found their origins in the secularized Third Crusade—an enterprise plagued by Christian disunity and in-fighting, the unfortunate opposite of what the ‘holy war’ should have accomplished in theory.

It was not that the Third Crusade was a religious failure; more accurately, it was a secular triumph. Both kings had indeed secured an undying legacy that far exceeded those of their ancestors for better or for worse. With the everchanging passage of time, the Plantagenet-Capetian rivalry infinitely redefined crusading ideology to the chagrin of the church. An age-old feud shifted the sands of time, discoloring and downing the dreams of bygone warriors. Richard forged the paradigm of kingship, the name ‘Lion Heart’ that shudders with apotheosis, imperfect

as it was and yet undying, and Philip, the Machiavellian politician, inaccurately pigeonholed with the title of ‘lamb,’ a jilted overlord who time, and illness, and mediocrity had robbed him of his share of glory. Indeed, the chivalric ideals so lauded by medieval society and the church celebrated in works such as *Policraticus*, *Vita Ludovici Grossi*, and the *chansons de geste*, found their way onto the battlefields in the Holy Land but at the cost of a dying inviolability.

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