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INTRODUCTION

THIS paper is an attempt to deal with certain difficulties of Husserl's thesis that the necessity of the phenomenological reduction is the inescapable fundament for philosophical inquiry and analysis. It proposes to view these difficulties from the standpoint of the "natural attitude,"¹ itself the phenomenological cardinal sin in the way of successful, philosophical endeavor. The intellectual terrain which is to be viewed from the standpoint of the "natural attitude" will be that which, according to Husserl, remains when the entire world (together with the epistemological criteria to which the natural world gives rise in intellectual inquiry and with which criteria that world as "given" interacts in effective logico-empirical cognition) is eliminated (*ausgeschaltet*), together with the *positing subject*. This terrain, which is the domain of the "pure" or "transcendental consciousness," constitutes the content of the "reduction," that is, is the phenomenological residuum which is to be the founding base for *all* inquiry, including the endeavors within the scope of the natural sciences.

Since the achievement of a *common*, phenomenological residuum is a *sine qua non*, if we are to have a currency of intellectual exchange, any difficulties in the way of the achievement of this discursive, philosophical community must be bared. It is to these difficulties that we wish to draw attention. The reader will no doubt discover that everything which is said here has been touched upon elsewhere, in one way or another, in the by-now rich corpus of philosophical inquiry dealing with phenomenology. Our only justification for the collected restatement of these difficulties here is the individual emphasis of the present writer and his own particular organization of the critical considerations involved.

¹ Throughout this paper the phrase the "natural attitude" will be used with the conjoined meanings separately attached in Husserl's writings to the phrases, "the natural attitude" and "the theoretical attitude." This is for convenience only, since some of the criticisms made will sometimes be from the vantage point of the "natural attitude," sometimes from the standpoint of the "theoretical attitude," but usually from the interweaving of both.

In seeking to be critical of the central phenomenological theses from the natural standpoint we are aware that not only has this been done before but also that in Husserl's eyes such an approach was absurd. We are also aware that Husserl has "poisoned the wells" clearly in this respect, by insisting that any such attempt constituted a species of philosophical Original Sin. Those who propose to do so have been told unmistakably by Husserl, "Abandon ye all hope who enter here," as may be seen from the following statement of his:

"But when all is said, this work of mine can help no one who has already fixed his philosophy and his philosophical method, who has thus never learnt to know the despair of one who has the misfortune to be in love with philosophy, and who, at the very outset of his studies, placed amid the chaos of philosophies, with his choice to make, realizes that he has really no choice at all, since no one of these has taken care to free itself from presuppositions, and none has sprung from the radical attitude of autonomous self-responsibility which the meaning of a philosophy demands. He who believes that he can appeal to the 'fruitful *βάθος*' of experience in the current sense of that term, or to the 'assured results' of the exact sciences, or to experimental or physiological psychology, or to a constantly improved logic and mathematics, and so forth, and therein find premises for his philosophy, can not have much susceptibility for the contents of this book. He is unable to bring to his reading an intensive interest, nor can he hold that the time and effort have been well spent which the sympathetic understanding of such a way of beginning demands. Only he who is himself striving to reach a beginning will herein behave otherwise, since he must say to himself: *tua res agitur*.'" ²

Yet in spite of this phenomenological *ipse dixit*, the present writer proposes to make the attempt while readily admitting to the biases which spring from leanings in the direction of logical positivism. It can not be that inter-methodological criticism is a vice nor can one naïvely accept the notion that to approach the main theses of phenomenology, one must do so either by descriptive or transcendental reduction. Apparently what truth or value there is to be found in the central contentions of phenomenology can be discovered without springing forth a full-blown phenomenologist from the brow of Husserl. After all, even Husserl developed and rejected, built and laid aside, over a period in which no one was a phenomenologist in the Husserlian sense. What was legitimate

² Husserl, E. *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. Translated by W. R. B. Gibson. From the author's preface to the English Edition, p. 29.

for the founder is surely legitimate for those who come after and who try to grapple with a philosophy whose great contributions can be acknowledged without having to dedicate oneself in perpetuity to any weaknesses which may be inherent in its method.

Nothing, either in the substance or the tone of our remarks, should be construed as unsympathetic to phenomenology. That discipline truly involves a rich, attractive plenum of epistemological and philosophical labor to whose virtues a fulsome literature bears witness. No devotee of philosophical inquiry can fail to take note of Husserl's constructive theses. The recognition of Husserl's positive contributions has, however, been fully manifested by hundreds of serious students of phenomenology whose erudition and information are intellectual ideals to which the present writer can only aspire in the future, with a better and a fuller grasp of the leading phenomenological theses. In this paper we shall only try to address ourselves to the less happy negative task of criticism, always easier than the positive task of adding bricks to already half-finished but sturdy structures. Whereas most of Husserl's labors were models of Herculean originality, it is not entirely so with respect to the thesis of the phenomenological reduction. The difficulties inherent in this thesis, if not met, can turn the phenomenologist's transcendental analysis into a labor of Sisyphus. That is our only justification for focusing attention upon them.

THE "NATURAL" MECHANISMS OF THE "REDUCTION"

In the attempt to suspend the "natural attitude" and attain a rigorous science of philosophy by means of the consistent and continuous process of phenomenological reduction, an intrinsic hierarchical difficulty will come into play. The phenomenological reduction *together* with the pure essences it yields to consciousness, that is, the basic method and the conceptual termini which its analysis of the "given" yields, are both clearly distinguishable from the "natural mechanism" which subserves them. The products of the reduction are indubitably mediated by biophysical and neuropsychological processes. These processes are the unregulated but correlative instrumentalities by which we arrive at the "reduced contents of consciousness." This phenomenological residuum is, in the last analysis, the concrete product and the psychological deposit of a natural process, in spite of the fact that we can look upon the "epoché" as voluntaristic activity. The results of this natural process are not to be understood entirely apart from that process. The limitations which any natural process puts upon the structuring of analyzed experience, *ipso facto*, prevents the "re-

duced contents of consciousness" from ever achieving that totally independent status from the "world" which is one of the avowed ideals of phenomenology. To be sure, independence of the "naïve attitude" is assured through the logically, and occasionally empirically, corrective procedures which analysis can furnish. Independence, however, of the "unanalyzed given" seems to be an ambiguous if not a meaningless ideal, for the "given" when sufficiently analyzed will not only be dependent in some measure upon the "theoretical attitude" (as witness Husserl's third logical investigation, "The Theory of Wholes and Parts"), but will, as we have said already, be the terminus of intellectual activity subject to such natural processes as are the proper domain for neurological and psychological inquiry. Whatever regularities govern and limit the powers of these processes will impose constraints upon their "end products" and in this relational sense the essences towards which the reduction moves are, themselves, products of the natural order and therefore understandable and conceptually amenable to the attention of the "natural attitude." In this sense the "reductions" become part of the natural order and the attempt to regard the "natural order" as completely excluded from the phenomenological reduction, by bracketing it, is of a piece with the Simian judgment that the spectators outside the cage have been "locked out." It is the cage which is embedded in the milieu and the milieu which makes possible the existence of the cage. It may, of course, be argued that even if the "reduction" is, itself, a process of the "world" which it attempts to shut out, this in nowise invalidates Husserl's emphasis on the need for repeated reduction for philosophical clarity, subtlety, and emphasis. This is not to be denied. There is nothing logically repugnant in the idea of "seeing" turned upon itself, if need be with infinite analytic regress. Nevertheless, from the "dogmatist's" standpoint he may legitimately view this same process of infinite regress as one in which processes of the "natural order" are turned upon each other for self-examination, the outcome of these transitive and reflexive analyses to be subject only to the exigencies of logical constraint, where they are concerned with the *a priori*, and occasionally to possible empirical restatement and confirmation where the essence refers back to singularities of natural experience. The only real difficulty for the "dogmatist" caught within the Laocoön-like trammels of the "theoretical attitude" is to determine by some method, which the observance of formal clarity itself does not help us to discover, which of these manifold, reflexive processes interwoven with each other are, by genesis, the simpler, and which the more complex.

It is this regressive, intellectual capacity constantly "to see" the "seeing" which we have in mind when we assert that a consistent and continuous process of phenomenological reduction gives rise to problems of hierarchical order. Even where a hierarchy of phenomenological "seeing" is established, however, that hierarchy is continuously subserved by "neural mechanisms" in the "natural world." Descriptions which are to be given of this hierarchy, in whole or in part, can not be given by phenomenological analysis, that is to say, can not be given in terms of the termini of these hierarchical processes, turned upon one another. Here the "reduction" must make way for the "natural attitude." Statements about this hierarchy, either with respect to its genesis, its adequacy, or inadequacy as structured, or with respect to "errors" which may occur on any level of "seeing," will have to be made by means of the intellectual devices of natural science methodology, the province of the theoretical attitude. These devices may include, but are not limited to, postulated mechanisms such as the neural diagrams and neural interrelationships, employed by Rashevsky and his coworkers in their studies in biophysics. Once this is done, however, that is to say, once we recognize the "reduced contents of consciousness" as sediments and accretions of natural processes, subject to study by natural methods, we have thereby constituted the "reduction" a proper object of study for the "natural (theoretical) attitude," rather than the reverse. However, this is not to deny that the reversal of this object-method relationship can also be constituted. Either approach will, I feel sure, shed clarity on problems of major interest to the spirit of philosophical inquiry. Each is capable of holding up the analytic mirror to the other, although in different senses, for the theoretical attitude can appeal to criteria from a "world" which must be consistently suspended and shut out in the "reduction." If the cogency of this point of view is recognized then *we do not have to regard* the process of phenomenological reduction as the *first and final fundament* upon which our derivative knowledge of the real or of the world, is to be based.

In the phenomenological reduction the self-reflection of the ego is regarded as constituting the beginning of philosophical inquiry and the dogmatic position is taken that this "ego" is, itself, not a construction. In the light of the foregoing, however, the ego will be nothing other than the sum total of all the self-reflexive processes of consciousness which subserve the attainment of the phenomenological residuum. In Husserl's own terminology the "ego" is the collective totality of present experiences and the "ego" as *definiendum* is these "experiences" or "contents of

consciousness." The contents of this totality of self-reflexive processes, however, presumed to have an inner unity by virtue of their being the termini of the "reduction," are nothing other than a totality of "constructs," each construct having been arrived at by an exhaustive, reflexive process of analysis. These contents as "constructs" are the correlates on the noematic side of the noesis in its broadest scope. These correlates which have to be changed from time to time in the course of the inquiry (as, indeed, they were in Husserl's own writings) must, by their very nature, be intellectual devices of limited longevity to be superseded in the course of time with increasing refinements of analysis or because they have been found to be of inadequate service for inquiry into that "phenomenal world" which was initially suspended. What else could these termini be, these deposits of mechanisms of the "natural world" to be comprehended with the "natural attitude," than "constructs" in the usual sense of that term. In this sense the positing ego is, itself, a construct, being only the aggregate of the intentional contents of consciousness. If, however, the "ego" is taken as "process as given," that is, if it be equated with the modes of phenomenological analysis, rather than as process-termini to be described, it will, of course, *not be a construct*. The orthodox phenomenologist may be tempted to counterpose by saying that all I am doing here is to emphasize the "reflexive predicament," that, in other words, I am overemphasizing the fact that the products of the mechanisms of "seeing" must, themselves, be used in more profoundly examining the nature of cognition. Although the charge that we are emphasizing the "reflexive predicament" would be true, that is not the focal point here. The central point is that the "reflexive predicament" makes it possible to consider (1) the "reduction" as process, (2) the conceptual termini of the reduction, and (3) the unity of the positing ego as "construct," as all of a piece, legitimate objects of inquiry from the standpoint of the "natural attitude." What was barred initially from the philosophical front door, so to speak, comes in again through the philosophical rear-window and, I am afraid, we shall have to share with it the phenomenological mansion.

THE VALIDATION OF ESSENCES

The fundamental task of phenomenology is, in a sense, to complete the eidetic task of determining essential structures which transcend the special interests of time, place, and circumstance. Although all *laws* of essences are *a priori* in character, eidetic descriptions and concepts dealing with individual intentional experiences need not be *a priori* in nature. Eidetic sciences of other

than logical forms are possible. For instance, Husserl postulates the existence of an eidetic psychology of perceptions, judgments, and feelings, *as such*, in their *a priori* nature. In other words eidetic sciences of material (generic and specific) essences, other than the logically formal, are possible, based upon either clear experiencing or clear phantasying. That eidetic sciences of material essences, arrived at through phenomenological analysis, can yield principles which are really *a priori*, is a puzzling notion. It is puzzling because of the ambiguity centering around the adjective "aprioristic." I quote at this point the definition of the "*a priori*" (as derived from Kant) taken from a fairly well-known source.³

A term applied to all judgments and principles whose validity is independent of *all impressions of sense* [italics, the present writer's]. Whatever is pure *a priori* is unmixed with anything empirical. In Kant's doctrine, all the necessary conditions of experience (i.e., forms and categories) are *a priori*. Whatever is *a priori* must possess universal and necessary validity. Sometimes used loosely to designate anything non-empirical, or something which can be known by reason alone.

In what sense of this meaning of *a priori* the eidetic correlates of psychological experiences in the "real world" (to take but one example) are a fulfillment it is hard to see. No matter how far the transcendental reduction of "real" psychological experiences may go, until, perhaps, they are but ideational shadows of ideational shadows, nevertheless, it will not be possible to say of the transcendental residuum, that it "is unmixed with anything empirical." Transcendental essences, no matter how bloodless, from the structuring of analytic refinements, *will never possess* a "validity . . . independent of all impressions of sense" where these are essences of perceptions, judgments, and feelings, which take their very source from impressions of sense. But in a manner of speaking we are kicking a dead horse. Husserl himself recognized the existence of eidetic-empirical parallelism. "To each eidetic or empirical determination on the one side there must correspond a parallel feature on the other,"⁴ to use his own words. Thus, whatever loose sense he intended in his use of the term "*a priori*," it certainly could not have been the one quoted above, so far as psychological essences are concerned. It is Husserl's expositors who unfortunately play fast and loose with the use of the adjective "*a priori*." Husserl himself was honest enough to see the damage and obfuscation brought about by the too frequent, metalyptic

³ *The Dictionary of Philosophy*, 4th edition, p. 16. Edited by Dagobert D. Runes. New York, Philosophical Library, 1942.

⁴ *Ideas*, author's preface to the English Edition, p. 15.

use of this term. In the Introduction to the *Ideas* he warns his readers of the equivocations inherent in this much overworked philosophical adjective. He says:

We bring to a close these introductory words with a short terminological discussion. Following my custom in the *Logical Studies*, I avoid as far as possible the expressions *a priori* and *a posteriori*, partly on account of the confusing obscurities and ambiguities which infect their ordinary use, but also because of the notorious philosophical theories which as an evil heritage from the past are interwoven with them. Only in contexts which lend them singleness of sense, and only as the equivalent of other concomitant terms to which we have assigned clear and univocal meanings, should they be used, especially when we are concerned to note the sympathetic accord with historical parallels.

It is because there seems to be no formal-analytical intention behind Husserl's use of the term "*a priori*," in connection with the laws of essences, that we propose to think of eidetic sciences as requiring validation by some technique other than by formal-logical constructions and postulational interdependencies. Our worry over the use of the term "*a priori*" in the claim for the "Eidos" was a tangential one. On the assumption, then, that eidetic sciences require modes of validation other than formal-logical or, *at least*, not expressly or primarily formal-logical, we shall leave this tangent for more crucial considerations.

If there are to be eidetic sciences of first forms and intentions, to which all intelligent inquirers can give assent, certain questions have to be raised regarding the consequences of the "epoché." (1) Is the transcendental description of any essence to be intersubjective in the sense of the natural standpoint, before it may be declared to have finally been qualitatively and structurally described?⁵ (2) If the answer is in the negative, how are the conflicting descriptions of the essences of the same "real" intentions, upon the part of several transcendental "observers," to be resolved, so as to find the "right" or "most adequate" description? (3) If the answer is in the affirmative, what are to be the techniques of attaining intersubjectivity in the naturalistic sense for experiences essentially "private"? (4) Can there be any meaning to the mandate that intersubjectivity with respect to the nature of essences *should be established*? These essences, belonging as they do in the realm of the "irreal," are by their very nature elements in the analyzed flux of isolated (as contrasted with shared) ego-experiences. In the performance of the phenomenological reduction the "reducing" ego is always finally and irrevocably alone

⁵ Husserl's attempts to deal with the objections raised against a transcendental-phenomenological idealism and its alleged solipsism in his *Cartesischen Meditationen*, by discussing the concept of transcendental intersubjectivity, still make it impossible, we feel, for the natural attitude to come to grips with the "epoché" as a public, philosophical enterprise.

with its essences. (5) In what way can we determine that multiple egos, beginning the reduction on the "same" real and primordial experience, are indeed dealing with the same "pre-given realm" of *Seinsmaterie*? This is the correlate on the empirical side to our concern with how we can determine the achievement of eidetic unity among several phenomenologists. This problem of intersubjectivity raises its ugly head both for the unanalyzed primordial given and for the ideal termini of the reduction itself. Where the "reducing" ego is merely admonished to proceed step by step to bring presentations into increasing clarity until they reach fullest clarity (whatever that may be), do we not have here a self-created, solipsistic dilemma laid down as a precedent condition for general agreement?

With respect to the five questions we have raised above we recognize that it is one of the legitimate enterprises of philosophical analysis to bring judgments from low levels of clarity to higher levels of clarity. Essences of judgments and presentations when these are of structures in the "real world" certainly *refer* to the "*Seinsmaterie*," to the realm of being rather than of cognition. The eidetic reductions may themselves be of the realm of the "irreal," but they certainly point to the fact that "the world is the case." If this were recognized by Husserl naturalistic methods would then be relevant to the problem of the "validation of essences" and a public meaning would exist for the enterprise of determining the "adequacy" of eidetic judgments. But if the notions of "adequate" and "valid" are to be predicates only of judgments of the "irreal," what meaning can such predicates have? How can we be sure that two phenomenologists are actually proceeding from lower to higher levels of clarity where they are presumably concerned with the same intentional domain and where they seek to intend the same meaning-fulfillments, and what communicable interchange can there be if each must refer the predicate of "adequacy" to his own transitional stages of eidetic clarity? Judgments of the "adequacy" of judgments in the phenomenological enterprise, regardless of the level of clarity on which the eidetic judgments repose, can only be made via naturalistic criteria independent of the "irreal" experiences and analyses of the subjects involved. Even the meaning of the phrase "levels of clarity" will be different in the irreal from what it is in the realm of the formal-logical, and this different meaning should be made explicit. One reads and rereads the philosophically esoteric descriptions for obtaining full clearness in the *Ideas*⁶ and emerges

⁶ Entitled "Procedure of Pure Phenomenology in Respect of Methods and Problems."

with the feeling (or should we say the judgment) that via this route no public area can be staked out. Finally the last methodological straw which breaks the philosophical camel's back is the exclusion of formal-logical structure from the body of eidetic experience.

It follows [says Husserl] from what we have said that *all deductive theorizing is excluded from phenomenology*. [Italics, the present writer's.] *Mediate inferences* are not positively denied it; but seeing that all its knowledge is descriptive and must be purely adjusted to immanent requirements [italics ours], it follows that inferences, unintuitable ways and means of every description have only the methodological meaning of leading us towards the facts which it is the function of an *ensuing direct essential insight* [italics, the present writer's] to set before us as given. Analogies which press upon us may, prior to real intuition, supply us with conjectures as to the essential relations of things, and from these may be drawn inferences that lead us farther forward; but in the end the conjectures must be redeemed by the real vision of the essential connexions. So long as this is not done we have no result that we can call phenomenological.

This, from the naturalistic standpoint, seems to be the last straw; but second thought leaves us with a different temper. From the standpoint of the theoretical attitude no domain can be inquired into which, in principle, is not organizable, sooner or later, by logical structure. If we remember, however, that logical structure is applicable only to a corpus of concepts and judgments with unique meanings and if we note that univocality is just what is absent from eidetic judgments, Husserl's exclusion is then seen to be in order. It is, it seems to me, a covert admission that the "Eidos" is not subject, by nature, to public criteria. Notice once again that the "facts" which "it is the function of an ensuing direct essential insight to set before us as given" are items in the real world to which all eidetic judgments, no matter how great their grades of clarity through phenomenological refinements, *must refer*. Sciences of fact are sciences of experience and the "facts" which are the grist for the "reductive" mill, must, in some sense, function as determinants of the "adequacy" of eidetic judgments.

One reads and rereads Chapter I of the Third Section of the *Ideas*,⁷ expecting Husserl to meet head-on the charges levied against the phenomenological sciences by proponents of the natural attitude. There is only a painstaking, labored, and detailed analysis of the elements involved in the "reduction," but never a prescription for determining the unambiguous identity and communicability of the perfectly clear eidetic structures which result

⁷ "Procedure of Pure Phenomenology in Respect of Methods and Problems."

from the reduction itself. It is perplexing to try to figure out how, from the standpoint of the natural attitude, essences at the *higher specific levels* are "susceptible of stable distinction, unbroken self-identity, and strict conceptual apprehension" when these are to be derived from eidetic concreta or singularities for which a conceptual and terminological *fixation* is not to be thought of, and when we have already been told that the passage to the clearest eidetic structures must proceed step by step from concreta of lower order. How can *A* as phenomenologist guide *B* (as phenomenologist or "dogmatist") through the stages of "adequate reduction" in attention to the same intentional-manifold, if these stages are not subject to the intersubjective attitudes of conceptualizing precision and terminological standardization in communication?

It has been said that

it is meaningful to judge any . . . set of its [phenomenology's] statements with respect to the factual content of another system. Thus the activity of phenomenological analysis itself may be made to be the subject of historical, sociological or psychological judgments by being projected upon the historical plane.⁸

This is all to the good if a set of statements can be obtained based upon the universal assent of masters of phenomenological method, the terms of which shall be possessed of univocal meanings. When in logical studies the claim is made that a language possessing a given structure and syntax can be developed for such and such a purpose, and some doubt exists as to the possibility of fulfillment of the claim, the recognized challenge is to demand that the language in question be exhibited in full, formalized dress. Is it presumptuous to make the same demand of phenomenology, to ask it to exhibit a set of statements concerning the same intentional domain, to which all phenomenologists will subscribe, and then permit the "dogmatist" of the natural standpoint to check the univocality of the commitment by the regular procedures for determining the reliability of collective assent—namely, to be free to check on whether the terms of the statements have univocal referents to (1) eidetic singularities, (2) essences, (3) primordial elements of experience, and (4) a common syntax?

In this connection a standard phenomenological glossary would be needed. Some attempts to provide the beginnings of such a glossary have been made. Landgrebe provided one for German philosophical readers and Gibson provided an Analytical Index in the *Ideas*, based on Landgrebe's Index. The phenomenological

⁸ Farber, Marvin, *The Foundation of Phenomenology*. Chapter XVII, p. 566.

vocabulary furnished, however, lends itself to individual and subjective interpretation because its elements, as is to be expected, are defined largely in terms of other verbal (i.e., phenomenological) acts, so that a constant circularity of interpretation is invited because "referents" neither in the "natural order" nor in psychological processes as ground, are provided. The surest grounding for the many differentiated activities of consciousness to which so much of the phenomenological terminology refers would be in an experimental or descriptive psychology of inner experience, but since Husserl has denied that phenomenology is a science of "facts" (taken as modes of consciousness), the modes of the "reduction" are presumably not the modes of psychological perception. This means that if we try to structure logically the primary and derivative "acts of consciousness" in the reduction we can not refer to processes established via the experimental or descriptive techniques of the psychological laboratory. This leaves us again in the subjective predicament from which we wish to escape. Finally, presumably, we can not even impose logical order on the contents of such an index, for deductive theorizing is excluded not only from the contents but also from the modes of the reduction. The standard terminology and glossary we are calling for will evade these difficulties, by grounding "acts of consciousness" in a psychological science of experience precisely because the modes of the reduction are processes of the natural order and, secondly, will find that the posited contents of such processes, rendered intersubjective, lose none of their richness for fundamental philosophical inquiry by being organized into logical structures.

If we fail to develop a standard vocabulary for the essences of precepts, how can we determine the definitive intentions of psychological qualia? Assuming that the lack of a standard vocabulary is no barrier to psychological inquiry in depth, by what means then would we determine that the "experienced" correlates of phenomenological terms (which are "given" for the beginning of "reductive" analysis) will be identical for all users of these terms, so that the derivative intentions of meditating phenomenological egos will coincide, especially with respect to percepts? Since Husserl himself regarded perception as an act determining but not containing meaning, we can see clearly the difficulty of investing the phrase "the adequate intention of a percept" with a meaning which shall be univocal for a corpus of philosophical inquiry.

To the extent that phenomenologists declare themselves for a rigorous science of philosophy which is to be common currency among philosophy's devotees, a science so well-grounded that it

constitutes a matrix out of which, let us concede, may *properly* flow a critique of the presuppositions, methods, and findings of the "natural attitude," to that extent the problem of validating essential structures must be attended to, if the end-products of phenomenological inquiry are not to become separatist standpoints for a new conflict of philosophical schools. The problem raised by one phenomenologist in this connection is worth quoting.

One of the most common and most fundamental criticisms of phenomenology as initiated by Edmund Husserl has always been: What can a science of mere phenomena tell about real things? It may inform us concerning objects which we *take* to be real. But does that in any way guarantee that the *supposedly* real is *really* real? *How will phenomenology decide the truth of our meanings?* [Italics, the present writer's.] Is not this the limit, and a rather premature limit of every phenomenology?⁹

It is worth quoting because we feel the questions raised, particularly the italicized one, still remain unanswered, and in spite of the quoted author's recognition that "phenomenology is by no means restricted to the phenomenal prison to which Husserl's method of reduction seemed to condemn it," nevertheless, so long as the "reductive" method is central to Husserl's inquiries, the question of how eidetic judgments can be validated can always be legitimately raised.

One notes that Husserl was willing to admit that isolated presentations may be unambiguously determined but not essences of a higher order. Says Husserl:

If now there is no question of an unambiguous determination of eidetic singularities in our realm of description, it is quite otherwise with the essences at a *higher specific level*. These are susceptible of stable distinction, unbroken self-identity, and strict conceptual apprehension, likewise of being analyzed into component essences, and accordingly they may very properly be made subject to the conditions of a comprehensive scientific description.¹⁰

The "dogmatist" soaked in the bias of the "natural attitude" would be inclined to reverse Husserl's order of indeterminacy in the hierarchy of eidetic judgment. However, the important consideration here is to note that this sanguine point of view is, it seems to me, unjustified. To realize its claim it would be necessary to develop some intersubjective methodology, peculiar to the *a priori* (that is, formal-logical) sciences so that the validation of eidetic judgments could involve a process invested with public meaning and a precision or exactitude of description as great as

⁹ Spiegelberg, Herbert: "The 'Reality-Phenomenon' And Reality," in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl* (edited by Marvin Farber), Harvard University Press, 1940.

¹⁰ Husserl, Edmund: *Ideas: General Introduction To Pure Phenomenology*, p. 210.

that in the domain of the "theoretical attitude." In fact it could be argued that if phenomenology is to be the founding "science of sciences" its conceptual system should even be more exact than in the domain of the "theoretical attitude," precisely because of the intended subtleties of its own intellectual fabric. But Husserl laid aside this possible difficulty by stating:

It is only a misleading prejudice to suppose that the historical methods of the *a priori* sciences, which are *exact* ideal sciences throughout, must be accepted without question as the pattern for every new method of science, and especially for our transcendental phenomenology—as though all eidetic sciences must show one type of method only, that of "exactness." Transcendental phenomenology as descriptive science of Essential Being belongs in fact to a *main class of eidetic science wholly other* than that to which the mathematical sciences belong.¹¹

Thus in one full swoop by the mere process of an *ad hoc* dichotomy, Husserl disposed of the difficulties most central to his thesis. With so dogmatic a stand I fail to see how intellectually public spadework can even begin on the problem of the validation of essences. If we can give neither operational nor analytic meanings to the process of "validating an essence" then phenomenological analysis in general and the transcendental reduction in particular will threaten to make the "first science" degenerate into a body of esoteric terminology employed by different inquirers for presumably the "same" problem.

Competent custodians of Husserl's doctrine, such as Felix Kaufmann, will point out that there has consistently been much misinterpretation of the doctrine of eidetic intuition upon the part of those afflicted with the empiricistic bias. They have stressed that in the Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl unmistakably left the emphasis of conceptual realism behind in a manner which makes empiricistic objections irrelevant. In a passage quoted by Kaufmann¹² to demonstrate this point, it becomes clear that there are intellectual milieus in which Husserl is willing to be referentially particularistic, but in no sense could the passage quoted, or any other we have seen, constitute a refutation of the more forceful objection this paper has consistently raised so far, namely, that no intersubjective prescription for testing the adequacy of eidetic generalities has been furnished by Husserl. Each transcendental ego is left isolated with its eidetic intuitions in the realm of the "irreal," there to stew forever, so to speak, in its own transcendental juice. Professor Kaufmann seems to think

¹¹ *Ideas*, p. 21.

¹² Kaufmann, Felix: "Phenomenology and Logical Empiricism," pp. 135–137. In *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*.

that if semantical rules for the sentences of the phenomenological language were given, one would then be in a position to assert judgments of the form "the phenomenological language possesses such and such rules" as true or false. If this observation is meant to bolster the formal-logical aspects of the transcendental terminology, then positivists may legitimately demand that these rules be exhibited, formalized or otherwise. If this were done, it could remove our central objection, which is that eidetic judgments, whether of the "natural world" or of "inner experience," must be validated. This would automatically make phenomenology a science of fact.

Another objection raised by Kaufmann to typical empiricistic critiques of phenomenology is the fact that in the "natural attitude" the empiricist stipulates the conditions which must be satisfied before a proposition can be accepted into any scientific corpus, but, at the same time, he accepts as obvious the presuppositions which underlie the rules formulating these conditions. This is "dogmatic" in the sense that these presuppositions become philosophical dogmas. Phenomenologists are free from such "dogmatism" in the context of *any* inquiry. But, it seems to me, this position raises problems of metalanguage, for whenever a language L_2 examines the presuppositions of another language, L_1 , it, too, has its own presuppositions which are subject to examination in a third language L_3 , unless we believe that a self-reflexive language of philosophical inquiry which is its own metalanguage can be developed, an accomplishment which so eminent a logician as Church¹³ is highly dubious about. Lacking such a universal semantical language there will be presuppositions in any ground of inquiry to be undogmatically examined, in infinite regress, so that in this *formalistic sense* there is no *force* to the objective of trying to attain a "presuppositionless philosophy." Philosophical inquiry, including the phenomenological variety, would then have to proceed with the recognition that the "reduction" does not guarantee a "closed circle of analysis." In this sense, then, even phenomenology would require its own "dogmas."

¹³ In a review by Alonzo Church, of the present writer's paper "Metalepsis and Paradox in the Concept of Metalanguage" (*Philosophical Review*, Vol. LIV (1945), pp. 607-610), which appeared in the *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Church says: "What is needed is not general discussion but a concrete proposal of a definite language as universal semantics, one whose claim to universality would at least not be immediately defeated by failure to be adequate for its own semantics. Indeed it may be that no such language is consistently possible. Existing doubt of it is in any case too strong to be overcome by less than a particular example of such a language, given by means of full logistic formalization."

Kaufmann is, in addition, critical of the logical empiricist who feels that protocol experiences are not capable of further analysis and do not require it, for the grounding of successful intellectual inquiry. He says:

The logical empiricist who desires to grasp what Husserl means by "eidetic" or by "categorical intuition" should make clear to himself *what presuppositions are contained in the rules for using names of qualities* [italics, the present writer's], and should bear in mind that these presuppositions enter into every experiential judgment pertaining to the qualities in question. In this sense, the presuppositions are prior to the assertion made in any judgment of experience.¹⁴

He points out that the empiricist *presupposes* intersubjective and intertemporal identifiability for *protocol* experiences. All this is true. It should be pointed out, however, that a positivist can recognize the legitimacy of the request for making clear to oneself the *presuppositions contained in the rules for using names of qualities* and can do so in terms, not of the metalyptic language of the transcendental reduction, but in terms of the "theoretical" language of the "natural attitude." Furthermore, in trying to devise an ontological lemma for proving intersubjective and intertemporal identifiability for qualia experienced by two subjects, he not only becomes aware of the difficulties involved and of the presuppositions employed but he also discovers that he *may be*, in the last analysis, forced back somewhere in the process of proof to *assume* intersubjectivity and intertemporality, and the stage at which this assumption may become necessary would then constitute an inescapable protocol judgment which is incapable of further intrinsic analysis. The difficulties which an ontological lemma in the language of the "natural attitude" carries with it, makes it seem certain that any attempt to prove intersubjectivity and intertemporality of qualia for two experiencing subjects, in the language of the epoché, is fated with even greater certainty to failure. Since, however, the awareness of the "presuppositions contained in the rules for using names of qualities" can also be given by analysis within the "theoretical attitude," there is no point in transferring intellectual effort and allegiance to the method of "eidetic reduction" unless, indeed, the latter can yield some type of knowledge which the "natural attitude" under no conceivable set of circumstances could supply. According to Kaufmann,

The task set for themselves by the logical empiricists in their analysis of scientific procedure has as its goal a most complete and systematically ordered compilation of the rules of procedure. As has already been noted, they be-

¹⁴ Kaufmann, Felix: "Phenomenology And Logical Empiricism," in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, p. 134.

lieve that such compilation exhausts the possibilities of meaningful analysis. *But they overlook the fact that the rules themselves contain presuppositions which are open to further analysis.*¹⁵

If this should be entirely so, it would still have to be shown (1) that such further analysis *can not* be effected by the language of the theoretical attitude, so that the presuppositions therein *can not* be made explicit and (2) that the language of the epoché (and perhaps *only* the language of the epoché) can succeed in doing what the phenomenologist claims the theoretical attitude and the natural standpoint must inevitably fail to do. I feel entirely safe in asserting that no phenomenologist has ever demonstrated these two theorems and furthermore, as a syntactical and semantical irony, I feel certain such demonstration would have to be made in the language and type of terminology which stems irrevocably from an empiricist bias.

It is not to be denied, as Kaufmann points out, that a happy meeting between logical positivism and phenomenology is a consummation devoutly to be wished. It is probably all too true that a terrain for philosophical analysis has been pointed up by Husserl, a terrain which includes problems ordinarily neglected by the current emphases in positivist literature. It may well be and, indeed, it is the belief of the present writer that it is the case, that this terrain can be explored by means of the presuppositions and the methods of the "natural attitude." So long as only phenomenologists devote exclusive attention to such terrain, the preceding attitude may be regarded by phenomenologists as only a pious and rationalizing, positivistic hope. At the same time phenomenologists restrict themselves to what amounts philosophically to a Pyrrhic victory, so long as they remain within the solipsistic dilemmas of the epoché, and fail to promulgate a public method for the *validation of essences*. Until this is done, in terms of the "natural attitude," the proponents of the empiricistic bias can afford to rest their case.

It is with great reluctance that the present writer undertook the task of criticizing these important aspects of phenomenology when there is so much positive and important content to draw from in this first philosophy. This is unquestionably true of much in the Logical Investigations and particularly true of the third investigation "The Theory Of Wholes And Parts." It is the writer's hope to make some modest contribution to this theory in the future along lines which, if not phenomenologically orthodox, will, I am sure, be restatable in eidetic and reductive terminology for those

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

followers of Husserl who find their thinking flows more easily along such lines. In addition I hope, in the future, to redress the balance by a critique of certain aspects of the natural standpoint from a vantage point acceptable to phenomenologists and by means of such limited portion of the phenomenological vocabulary as I think has fairly well-recognized and standard meaning. In so far, however, as the doctrine of essences and the methodology of the reduction are central to the domain of the "irreal," that is, to the realm of transcendently reduced phenomena, and in so far as these two "ways of knowing" (or "seeing" in the phenomenologist's terminology) are opposed to, rather than ancillary to, the reflective, theoretical, and natural attitudes, thereby calling into question the whole world of knowing constituted by time-worn and successfully tested methods, I have chosen to play devil's advocate to phenomenology in this paper. Although this paper adds little to the corpus of naturalistic critiques of phenomenological method which have already been produced, if its organization and emphasis will prompt an attempt upon the part of serious students of phenomenology to try to "intersubjectivize" the most important features of the Eidos and the method of the reduction and, in addition, to prepare a standard dictionary of phenomenological terms, its purpose will have been served.

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NEW YORK CITY

POEMS

THE PLATONIST

From Plato's home of metaphor
 Literal Aristotle took
 Reality, and in a book
 Got all of her accounted for.
 And Oh what years of strife, lies, pain,
 Before she was herself again!

THE ARISTOTELIAN

When myth-befuddled Plato died
 Reality was left so poor
 From dieting on metaphor—
 So thin and starved—she barely cried,
 "Give me solid food! I die!"
 Before the Stagirite came by.

THEODORE SPENCER