

Privatisation and Secularisation

Notes

Nick Campion

This week introduces the two key theoretical concepts which frame this module, Secularisation and Privatisation. These can be defined as follows:

1. Secularisation: the supposed decline of religion in the modern world. Secularisation may occur in two major forms:

a) the decline of religious authority

b) the decline of religious feeling

These two are not the same: the decline of religious authority can occur without the decline of religious feeling.

2. Privatisation: the theory that in the modern west, spiritual or religious affiliation can be constructed by private individuals, choosing from a variety of traditions and practices. Privatisation may exist within the context of the decline of religious authority and is supposedly a feature of New Age culture and modern paganism. It is also said to be a typical symptom of postmodernism (assuming that there is such a thing!) and 'post-modern cosmologies'. If astrology is post-modern, then some scholars also see its alleged rise in popularity in the 20th century as a feature of privatisation.

As to whether the popularity of astrology is a consequence of secularisation or a reaction against it is a matter of debate.

Neither the theories of secularisation nor privatisation need be taken for granted. The debates over secularisation are vigorous as you will see from this week's reading. Early discussions on secularisation were heavily influenced by the application of evolutionary theory to culture and the notion that as modernity develops so religiosity must inevitably decline as human beings realise that science and 'rationalism' are the only true ways to see the universe. This is still the position adhered to by many atheist polemicists. However, sociologists, especially within religious studies, have not realised that the situation is far more complex. The main issues are set out in the draft of chapter 8 of my PhD, for which see 'Nick's Notes', which I suggest you read first.

Reading

To pick out the main names from below, you could prioritise Steve Bruce, Jeffrey Hadden, Rodney Stark and William Swatos.

And a cautionary word: this is one area (of many, perhaps) where the academics have agendas. Maintain your critical overview.

Reading

Nick Campion: Privatisation and Secularisation Notes (extract from draft of PhD)

Bruce, Steve, 'Christianity in Britain, R. I. P.', *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 191-203
JSTOR

Rigney, Daniel, Richard Machalek and Jerry D. Goodman, 'Is Secularization a Discontinuous Process?', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Dec., 1978), pp. 381-387
JSTOR

Tschannen, Olivier, 'The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Dec., 1991), pp. 395-415
JSTOR

Stark, Rodney, 'Secularization, R.I.P.', *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 249-273
JSTOR

Swatos, William H. Jr., Kevin J. Christiano, 'Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept', *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 209-228.
JSTOR

Andersen, Victor, review of Carrette, J. and King, R. (2005) *Selling Spirituality: The Silent Takeover of Religion*. London and New York: Routledge.
Journal of Alternative and New Age
<http://www.asanas.org.uk/files/003Anderson.pdf>

Bruce, Steve, The Truth about Religion in Britain, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 417-430
JSTOR

Carrette, J. and King, R. (2005) *Selling Spirituality: The Silent Takeover of Religion*. London and New York: Routledge.
GOOGLE BOOKS

Carroll, Terrance G., 'Secularization and States of Modernity', *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Apr., 1984), pp. 362-382
JSTOR

Chaves, Mark, 'Secularization as Declining Religious Authority', Vol. 72, No. 3 (Mar., 1994), pp. 749-774
JSTOR

Goodridge, R. Martin, 'Relative Secularization and Religious Practice', *Sociological Analysis*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Autumn, 1968), pp. 122-135
JSTOR

Hadden, Jeffrey K., 'Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory', *Social Forces*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Mar., 1987), pp. 587-611.
JSTOR

King, Mike, Book Review, *The Spirituality Revolution - The Emergence of Contemporary Spirituality* by David Tacey (2004), *JASANAS* Volume 2, February 2006

Lechner, Frank J., 'The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal', *Social Forces*, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Jun., 1991), pp. 1103-1119
JSTOR

Luckmann, Thomas, 'On Religion in Modern Society: Individual Consciousness, World View, Institution', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring, 1963), pp. 147-162.
JSTOR

Lyon, David, 'Rethinking Secularization: Retrospect and Prospect', *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Mar., 1985), pp. 228-243
JSTOR

Mol, J. J., 'Secularization and Cohesion', *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring, 1970), pp. 183-191
JSTOR

The following is a selection from a rough draft of chapter 8 of my PhD dealing with secularisation and privatisation. You can follow any of the references I use but you can't quote my own words in your own writing as it is not published work. You will find an abbreviated version, which is quotable, in chapter 8 of my PhD, on the on-line library page on Moodle. Full versions of all the references are in the bibliography to my PhD, which is also posted up on the on-line library.

There is today a widespread belief that religion in the western world is in state of long-term decline: Robert Wuthnow reports that the proportion of American adults agreeing with the proposition that society is becoming less religious rose from 14% in 1957, to 45% in 1965, and 75% in 1970 (Wuthnow 1976: 41). It is also a matter of record, as Stark and Bainbridge report (1985: 430), that much of the literature on the recent history of religion in the west assumes a decline in religiosity in western countries. For example, Wuthnow (1976: vii), wrote that 'for some years, a gradual, largely imperceptible, yet overwhelmingly profound cultural shift has been taking place in American society' and has 'wrought

changes in our basic conceptions of ourselves and in the meanings we ascribe to our worlds'. This process, known as secularisation has been defined by Stark and Bainbridge (1987: 429) as 'the erosion of belief in the supernatural - a loss of faith in the existence of otherworldly forces'. On a wider level it should be noted, there are also public concerns over the decline of membership in, or respect for, other traditional centres of authority in the UK, such as political parties (Guardian 22 April 2000) and faith in the police (Burell 2001).

Advocates of the idea, those who believe that the process is desirable, take the teleological view that such an intellectual development is the counterpart of biological evolution and argue, in the words of Peter Berger, that 'modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals' (Berger 1999: 2). For example, Bryan Wilson (1979: 11), a leading advocate of the theory, described what he perceived as a long-term trend 'in the nature of human consciousness, towards what might be called a "matter-of-fact" orientation to the world'.

Peter Berger has identified different attitudes to secularisation theory amongst those who support its basic historical proposition; first, those for whom it is merely of academic interest; second, those supporters of modernity for whom it is a 'good thing, and will sweep away reactionary religion and superstition; and, third, those coming from a religious background who agree that it is happening but despair at its implication, the development of a godless society (Berger 1999: 3).

Hill also differentiates six varieties of meaning of the term:

1. The decline of religion in terms of the meaning and prestige of its symbols and its practice, although not necessarily its institutions, an argument particularly associated with Bryan Wilson (1966).
2. The shift of attention within religious groups themselves from 'other-worldly' to 'this-worldly' concerns (Shiner 1967; Berger 19XXX Canopy).
3. The disengagement of religion from the rest of society's political and social structures as religious choice becomes a private matter. This process, known as 'privatisation' and proposed strongly by Wilson (1969, 1979), is particularly associated with developments since the 1960s (Wuthnow 1976: 207-208). As Rice wrote, 'beginning with the counterculture movement of the late 1960s, people have increasingly rejected traditional religions in favor of more personalised belief structures (Rice 2003: 105). According to Orenstein this trend 'emphasises personal choice, is ambivalent about religious authority, focuses in experimental practice and personal growth, and mixes together spiritual stimuli from different traditions (Orenstein 2002: 309). Stark and Bainbridge (1987: 316) write of religion becoming a 'cultural speciality'.
4. The transposition of beliefs and activities that once possessed a divine point of reference to an entirely secular context. An example would be the overarching claims of such modern ideologies as communism, humanism, Marxism, nationalism and scientism (Hill 1973: 243).

5. The gradual loss of the world's sacred character, the disenchantment of the world strongly associated with the theories of Max Weber (1864-1920) and outlined in his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, first published in 1905. Hill (1973: 247) suggests that astrology may be an attempt to re-enchant the world.

6. The shift from a sacred to a secular point of reference in society as a whole, rather than just in the more limited sphere of religious beliefs and practices (Becker 1950)

Although the roots of secularisation may be traced back to the nineteenth-century (Chadwick 1985), to seventeenth-century Puritanism, following Max Weber's arguments (1958) or to earlier stages in the history of western rationalism, including Greek philosophy (Hill 1973: 19-46; Wilson 1979: 11), it is widely assumed that the counter-culture of the 1960s accelerated the process (Wuthnow 1976: 1, 6, 12). Thus, Caird and Law, following Wuthnow, wrote that 'there have been widespread socio-cultural upheavals in Western society during the last two decades, accompanied by increasing experimentation with alternative social and religious forms' (Caird and Law 1982: 152; see also Zinnbauer *et al.* 1997: 51). Wuthnow defined the change in meaning associated with secularisation as being away from theism, a belief in the supernatural, individualism toward science, mysticism, collectivism, a willingness to experiment with new lifestyles and social alternatives (1976: vii, 1-2, 6). Although the trend accelerated in the 1960s, he traces it to the 'Second Great Awakening' which swept religion in the USA in the first half of the nineteenth-century (Wuthnow 1976: 96; see also Pritchard 1976: 328-9).

Wuthnow's argument though, illustrates the extent to which the secularisation thesis is based on arbitrary definitions which take Christianity as representative of religion. Having noted that, between 1971 and 1973, the proportion of respondents in the bay area of San Francisco who knew nothing about Transcendental Meditation and Zen Buddhism dropped from 33% to 3% and 9% respectively, he then defines such practices as 'nonreligion' in order to maintain the thesis that the drop in church attendance indicates a corresponding decline in religiosity (Wuthnow 1976: 37-39). He identified stages in this process in which American adults moved progressively from conservative religion to liberal religion to no religious affiliation, but it is clear that religion is defined as theism, that is traditional Christianity (Wuthnow 1976: 83-6). The significance for the New Age is that its existence be seen as a consequence of secularisation in that it may be seen as a symptom of privatisation, but that, in that the New Age *sense stricto* gives a high significance to supernatural forces, Bruce (2002: 75-105). has argued that its own demise is also inevitable, precisely because such superstition must also be seen as a phase in the secularisation process.

However, as Hill points out, the issue is far from clear cut and depends on one's preferred definition of religion and, given that the argument assumes the existence of long-term trends, it also depends on the period taken into

consideration (Hill 1973: 228-250). That is, decline in religious belief might be apparent from one starting point but not from another. The historical argument is a critical one as part of the secularisation debate depends on the inappropriate comparison of past with present world views. For example, Steve Bruce, noting the claim that in 1976 36% of British adults claimed to have had supernatural experiences (including of horoscopes), acknowledges that this is a large figure but states that it is small compared to the Middle Ages and hence that the secularisation thesis is maintained (Bruce 1995: 55). However, the phenomena which are now defined as supernatural by virtue of their inexplicability within the framework of natural law, were perfectly capable of naturalistic explanation with a medieval Aristotelian framework, as Thorndike has documented in considerable detail (Thorndike 1923-58). The general absence of a historical perspective is a weakness in many sociological texts. For example, Hexham and Poewe (1987: 105), in their potted history of astrology, which was designed to demonstrate its marginal significance, spoke of its revival in the sixteenth-century following its decline in the third-fourth centuries, some four-hundred years after the real date, the twelfth-century (Tester 1987).

In spite of its popular appeal however, secularisation theory is far from universally accepted. A particularly blunt refutation was offered in 1972 by Andrew Greeley (1974: 45), who argued that the theory that that society is moving inexorably towards secularism is itself less a matter of empirical observation than of a religious faith, shared by both secularists and churchmen. A huge amount depends, though, on how the data is collected and interpreted. Glock noted in 1962 that, of three recent studies of religion in the United States, one showed that a revival was occurring, one that there was a continuation of a long-term increase, and the third that secularisation was increasing (Glock 1962: 100). The issue depends largely on the extent to which Christianity is taken as the normative definition of religion. As Clayton and Gladden point out, there was a tendency in the 1950s and 1960s to adopt empirical methods which assumed that Christianity was the principal model for a religion, and that other forms of belief might therefore be mistakenly assumed to be less religious. Herbrechtsmeier (1993: 6) also notes the tendency of western scholars to adopt definitions which suit their ideologies.

Yinger (1969: 88-89) argued that the issue is largely dependent on one's definition of religion and that narrow definitions in particular lend themselves to the notion that religion is declining by emphasising religion's outmoded beliefs and mentions Herbert Spencer, Edward Tylor and James Frazer as particularly influential advocates of this position. The problem was compounded, he added, by the widespread assumption within the sociology of religion that Christianity represents a religious norm in the west, and that departures from it therefore represent a decline in religiosity (1989: 92). Therefore, with a definition of religion which focuses on its intrinsic qualities rather than its social status or institutional framework, Yinger is able to include wider forms of religiosity. In addition he suggested, it may be more useful if researchers ask *how* a person is religious

rather than *if* he or she is religious. The result may be to expose many 'hidden' religions 'which haven't been apparent because we expected all religions to look like the most familiar ones.

Gill, Hadaway and Marler summarised the debate in 1998 and concluded that 'as far as data and theorizing go, the situation is very like that of the proverbial elephant and the blind men: it depends upon what "piece" of the elephant one has hold of as to what interpretation of "elephant-ness" is constructed' (Gill, Hadaway and Marler 1998: 514).

Since the 1980s, therefore, there has been a reaction against the assumption that secularisation is taking place, firstly because the view that declining church attendance necessarily indicates declining religious belief has been questioned, and secondly because it has been realised that definitions of religion which take Christianity as normative exclude other beliefs and practices which may reasonably be defined as religious (Berger 1999). As Ninian Smart noted, 'it is partly a matter of convention as to what is counted under the head of religion and what is not (Smart 1973: 10). Thus three models can now be identified for the impact of modernity on religion.

1. Modernity is characterised by increasing secularisation and a corresponding growth of scepticism about religion which is therefore in decline, perhaps inevitably, as in the six variants discussed above.
2. Modernity has had little effect on religious belief, which persists relatively undiminished, obscured by the decline in official church attendance, an argument proposed influentially by Greeley (1972) and Luckmann (1990), who coined the phrase 'the invisible religion' to describe the religiosity of those who retain traditional beliefs but no longer attend a regular church service. Stark and Bainbridge relate this theory to their view that secularisation not only is not new but is a continuous and natural process within 'religious economies' in which the tendency of religious institutions to become more worldly is both continuous and is automatically countered by tendencies to revival, producing 'sects', and innovation, which results in the development of 'cults' (Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 429-431). The very concept of the decline of the church, the triumph of science and the shift towards a 'religionless' future is therefore, in their view, quite simply wrong. Stark and Bainbridge note that secularisation has had a real impact on the mainstream churches in the sense that the naturalistic explanations proposed by modern science have forced them to withdraw from supernatural ones, but they also observe that, while adults who grew up in religious homes may now declare that they have no religion, the opposite is also true, thus confirming their hypothesis that there is a continuous process of religious decay and renewal.
3. As an extension of point 2, modernity is characterised by increasing fragmentation of established religious forms and greater pluralism, an argument which is, perhaps, most congenial to the inclusion of 'new religious movements';

and new age beliefs within the framework of the contemporary religious world. Davie (1994: 93-116) has coined the phrase 'believing without belonging', a direct reference to Hornsby-Smith's (1991: 4) consideration of the joint questions of 'beliefs and belonging' in relation to modern English Catholics (to describe those individuals for whom religious experience is no longer found in one of the mainstream churches. She adds that 'the sacred does not disappear - indeed in many ways it is becoming more rather than less prevalent in contemporary [British] society' (Davie 1994: 43). In Europe as a whole, she reports, the increase of 'other-faith categories' represents a growth area in religiosity since 1945 (Davie 1994: 27). Wilson's response to this argument (and to point 2) is that, by assuming a fund of 'religiosity' within each person, it speculatively proposes a fixed and universal psychological need which must inevitably find one outlet when another collapses (Wilson 1969: 18), even though he himself proposes evolutionary psychological development as a cause of secularisation (Wilson 1979: 11). His fundamental objection, though, is, again one of definition. As a sociologist, he argues, the social conditions within which religion exists must be the primary focus of inquiry and hence religion must be defined as primarily an institutional phenomenon. 'The religious institutions, organizations, affiliations and practices, and institutionalised belief systems, have been of more social consequence in all societies than are the contemporary beliefs of individuals isolated by an interview schedule' (Wilson 1969: 18-19). Wilson acknowledges such views as Glock and Stark's (1966: 43) opinion that 'the majority of religious experiences seem to consist at the sensory level, of feelings or other emotional states', but ultimately regards such phenomena as sociologically meaningless. Davie though, questions Wilson's, and other secularisation theorists, over reliance on definitions of 'modernity', which essentially equates it with western secular values (Davie 1999: 73-77) much as some definitions of religion equate it primarily with Christianity. Look at the full picture, she argues, and the situation is one of continuing diversity rather than the inevitable process of evolution. For example Tiryakian (1974) covered occultism and Greeley (1975) examined spiritualism and psychism. Callum Brown also considers Steve Bruce's insistence that belief in the supernatural, and hence faith on God, has been in decline since the 1960s but points out that that the real shift might be in terms of firstly the shift in the focus of ethical concern towards such matters as environmentalism and nuclear war, about which the Bible had little to say, and secondly the revolution in social attitudes affecting such matters as marriage which made the church seem conservative and out of touch (Brown 2001: 190). That is, levels of religiosity may have little to do with church attendance, a supposition which supports Adorno's finding that people are quite capable of distinguishing between religion and the church (Adorno 1950: 731; see also Batson and Ventris 1982: 142). The crucial issue is whether the church is perceived as being able to satisfy that religiosity.

It should also be noted that the above three arguments are not water tight compartments. Davie, for example, emphasises persistence of traditional belief within the contemporary framework of institutional fragmentation while Wilson's 'privatisation' thesis is particularly applicable to the diversity found within the

general category of New Age, as demonstrated by Roof (1993: 194-200) by the simple expedient of dropping Wilson's narrow definition of religion. Thus, as Hall (2000: 4), states, 'students of religion now acknowledge what casual observation attests: contrary to the expectations of twentieth-century social theorists...the rise of modern society has failed to bring the thorough going secularisazation that would undermine widespread religious belief. Instead, as in times past, people who need spiritual and social support continue to turn to religion in huge numbers'.

Secularisation and the Spiritual Revolution **Additional Bibliography**

Any of these books or articles will be useful if you wish to take your study of secularisation further.

Arweck, E. (2002) 'New Religious Movements.' *In: Woodhead, L. ed. Religions in the Modern World.* London and New York: Routledge, pp. 264-288.

Barrett, D. V. (2001) *The New Believers: a Survey of Sects, Cults and Alternative Religions.* London: Cassell.

Bailey, E. (1998) *Implicit Religion: an Introduction.* London: Middlesex University Press.

Berger, P. (1999) *The Desecularization of the World: The Resurgence of Religion in World Politics.* Eerdmans Publishing.

Bowman, M. (2000) 'More of the Same? Christianity, Vernacular Religion and Alternative Spirituality in Glastonbury.' *In: Sutcliffe, S. and Bowman, M. eds. Beyond New Age: Exploring Alternative Spirituality..* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 83-104.

Bruce, S. ed. (1992) *Religion and Modernization: sociologists and historians debate the secularization thesis.* Clarendon Press.

Bruce, S. (2000) 'The New Age and Secularisation.' *In: Sutcliffe, S. and Bowman, M. eds. Beyond New Age: Exploring Alternative Spirituality.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 220-236.

Bruce, S. (2002) *God is Dead: Secularization in the West.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Chryssides, G. (1999) *Exploring New Religions.* London: Cassell.

Clark, P. B. (1997) *New Religious Movement in Western Europe: an annotated bibliography*. Greenwood Press.

Davie, G. (1995) *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Erricker, C and J. eds. (2001) *Contemporary Spiritualities*. New York: Continuum.

Galanter, M. (1999) *Cults: Faith, Healing, and Coercion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fox, J. (2005) 'New Religious Movements.' In: Hinnells J. ed. *The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 323-336.

Heelas, P. (2002) 'The Spiritual Revolution: from "Religion" to "Spirituality"' in Woodhead, L. ed. *Religions in the Modern World*. London and New York: Routledge.

Heelas, P. and Woodhead, L. (2005) *The Spiritual Revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hexham, I. And Poewe, K. (1997) *New Religions as Global Cultures: Making the Human Sacred*. Westview.

King, U. (1997) 'Spirituality.' In: Hinnells J. ed. *A New Handbook of Living Religions*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 667-681.

King, R. (2005) 'Mysticism and Spirituality.' In: Hinnells J. ed. *The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 306-323.

Martin, D. (2005) *On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Melton, J. G. (1998) 'Modern Alternative Religions in the West' in Hinnells, J.R. ed. *A New Handbook of Living Religions*. London: Penguin, pp. 594-617.

Melton, J. G. (2004) 'Perspective: Toward a Definition of "New Religion."' *Nova Religio*, 8 (1), pp. 73-87.

Mumm, S. ed. (2002) *Religion Today: A Reader*. Ashgate/Open University.

Partridge, C. ed. (2004) *Encyclopedia of New Religions : new religious movements, sects and alternative spiritualities*. Lion Publishing.

Pearson, J. ed. (2002) *Belief Beyond Boundaries: Wicca, Celtic Spirituality and the New Age*. Ashgate/Open University.

Robbins, T. (2005) 'Perspective New Religions and Alternative Religions.' *Nova Religio*, 8 (3), pp. 104-111.

Tacey, D. (2004) *The Spirituality Revolution*. London & New York: Routledge.

Wilson, B. and Cresswell, J. eds. (1999) *New Religious Movements: Challenge and Response*. London and New York: Routledge.

York, M. (1995) *The Emerging Network: A Sociology of the New Age and Neo-Pagan Movements*. London: Rowman and Littlefield.

Zinnbauer, B. J., Pargament, K. I., and Cole, B. (1997) 'Religion and Spirituality: Unfuzzing the Fuzzy.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 36 (4), pp. 549-564

Terrance G. Carroll, 'Secularization and States of Modernity', *World Politics*, Volume 36, Number 3, (April 1984), pp.362-382

Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: OUP, 1977)

Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, Trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991)

Mark Chaves, 'Secularization as Declining Religious Authority', *Social Forces*, Volume 72, Number 3, (March 1994), pp.749-774

Karel Dobbelaire, *Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2002)

Mary Douglas, 'The effects of Modernization on religious Change', *Daedalus*, Volume 117, Number 3, (Summer 1988), pp. 457-484

Richard K. Fenn, *Toward a Theory of Secularization* (Ellington, CN: SSSR, 1978)

Jeffrey K. Hadden, 'Toward Desacralizing Secularization theory', *Social Forces*, Volume 65, Number 3, (March 1987), pp.587-611

Grace M. Jantzen, 'On Changing the Imaginary', pp.280-293, in: Graham Ward (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001)

Michael Lackey, 'Foucault, Secularization theory, and the theological origins of totalitarianism', pp. 124-145, in: C.G.Prado (ed.), *Foucault's Legacy* (London: Continuum, 2000)

Frank J. Lechner, 'The Case Against Secularization: A Rebuttal', *Social Forces* (June 1991), Volume 69, Number 4, pp. 1103-1119

David Martin. *On Secularization. Towards a Revised General Theory* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005)

C. G. Prado (ed.), *Foucault's Legacy* (London: Continuum, 2000)

Ethan Shagan, 'The battle for indifference in Elizabethan England', in Alec Ryrie and Luc Racaut, eds., *Moderate Voices in the European Reformation* (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 122-44.

C. John Sommerville, *The Secularization of Early Modern England. From Religious Culture to Religious Faith* (Oxford: OUP, 1992)

Pieter Spierenburg, *The Broken Spell: a cultural and anthropological history of preindustrial Europe*, (Basingstoke : Macmillan Education, 1991)

Kevin Stagg, 'The Body' in Walker (eds.), *Writing Early Modern History* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), pp. 205-226

Rodney Stark, 'Secularization, R.I.P.' pp. 41-66, in: Swatos & Olson (eds.), *The Secularization Debate* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000)

William H. Swatos & Kevin J. Christiano, 'Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept', pp. 1-20, in: Swatos & Olson (eds.), *The Secularization Debate* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000)

William H. Swatos & Daniel V.A. Olson (eds.), *The Secularization Debate* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000)

Dean C. Tipps, 'Modernization theory and the comparative study of societies: a critical perspective', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 15 (1973), pp.199-226.

Garthine Walker (eds.), *Writing Early Modern History* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005)

Graham Ward (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001)

