
STUDIES IN GLOBAL SOCIAL HISTORY

CONNECTING SEAS AND CONNECTED OCEAN RIMS

INDIAN, ATLANTIC, AND PACIFIC OCEANS AND CHINA SEAS MIGRATIONS FROM THE 1830S TO THE 1930S

EDITED BY DONNA R. GABACCIA AND DIRK HOERDER



BRILL

Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims

Studies in Global Social History

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VOLUME 8

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CONTENTS

List of Maps, Tables, and Figures ix

Editors' Introduction 1
Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder

Crossing the Waters: Historic Developments and Periodizations before the 1830s 12
Dirk Hoerder

A World Made Many: Integration and Segregation in Global Migration, 1840–1940 42
Adam McKeown

PART ONE

THE WORLDS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN

Introduction: Inter-Oceanic Migrations from an Indian Ocean Perspective, 1830s to 1930s 67
Ulrike Freitag

Indian Merchant Networks Outside India in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Preliminary Survey 79
Claude Markovits

Migration—Re-migration—Circulation: South Asian Kulis in the Indian Ocean and Beyond, 1840–1940 108
Michael Mann

Indian Ocean Crossings: Indian Labor Migration and Settlement in Southeast Asia, 1870 to 1940 134
Amarjit Kaur

PART TWO

THE WORLDS OF THE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN SEAS

Introduction: Link-Points in a Half-Ocean 169
Wang Gungwu

From Tribute Trade to Migration Center: The Ryukyu and Hong Kong Maritime Networks within the East and South China Seas in a Long-Term Perspective 172
Takeshi Hamashita

Singapore as a Nineteenth Century Migration Node 198
Carl A. Trocki

Hong Kong as an In-between Place in the Chinese Diaspora, 1849–1939 225
Elizabeth Sinn

PART THREE

THE WORLDS OF THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

Introduction: The Atlantic, Its Migrations, and Their Scholars 251
Donna R. Gabaccia

From One Black Atlantic to Many: Slave Regimes, Creole Societies, and Power Relationships in the Atlantic World 258
Dirk Hoerder

Latin American Perspectives on Migration in the Atlantic World 281
Silke Hensel

Undone by Desire: Migration, Sex across Boundaries, and Collective Destinies in the Greater Caribbean, 1840–1940 302
Lara Putnam

The Dynamics of Labor Migration and Raw Materials Acquisition in the Transatlantic Worsted Trade, 1830–1930 338
Mary H. Blewett

Overseas Migration and the Development of Ocean Navigation: A Europe-Outward Perspective 371
Yrjö Kaukiainen

PART FOUR

THE PACIFIC OCEAN

Introduction: The Rhythms of the Transpacific 389
Henry Yu

The Intermittent Rhythms of the Cantonese Pacific 393
Henry Yu

Remapping a Pre-World War Two Japanese Diaspora: Transpacific Migration as an Articulation of Japan's Colonial Expansionism 415
Eiichiro Azuma

Migration and the Politics of Sovereignty, Settlement, and Belonging in Hawai'i 440
Christine Skwiot

PART FIVE

THE WORLD BEYOND THE 1930S

Disquietude and the Writing of Ethnographic Histories: Portuguese Decolonization and Goan Migration in the Indian Ocean, 1920 to the Present 467
Pamila Gupta

Afterword: Migration and Globalization: Bridging Three Eras in Modern World History 492
Donna R. Gabaccia

Bibliography 507
Contributors 539
Index of Places 545

LIST OF MAPS, TABLES, AND FIGURES

Maps

Map 1	Circuits of the Thirteenth Century Tri-Continental World System	18
Map 2	Maritime Spaces of the East Asian, South East Asian, and South Asian Seas	22
Map 3	Micro-, Meso- and Macro-regions of the Indian Ocean, c. 1800–1950	112
Map 4	Spaces of Circulation	118
Map 5	Areas of Circulants' and Re-Migrants' Settlement in British India c. 1900	122
Map 6	Indian Migration Flows to Malaya and Burma	138
Map 7	Chinese Migration Flows to Southeast Asia	142
Map 8	Transport Networks and the Distribution of Rubber in Malaya	156
Map 9	Trade Routes of Ryukyu Ships to Southeast Asia, China, Korea, and Japan	176
Map 10	Coast, Cross Seas, and Chain of Seas among East China Sea, South China Sea, and Bengal Bay	179
Map 11	Settlements in Southeast Asia	201
Map 12	The Black Atlantic: Oceanic and Continental Extent	261
Map 13	Caribbean migrations, 1830–1880	305
Map 14	Caribbean migrations, 1880–1900	310
Map 15	Caribbean migrations, 1903–1914	313
Map 16	Caribbean migrations, 1915–1930	316
Map 17	Caribbean migrations, 1930–1945	336
Map 18	Yorkshire and surrounding Areas	342
Map 19	Principal Sites of Worsted Production on the East Coast of the U.S.	356
Map 20	Mills in the Providence Area	364
Map 21	Chinese Emigrants from Guangdong Province to Canada between 1910 and 1923	402
Map 22	Destinations of Chinese Immigrants in Canada between 1910 and 1923	403

Tables

Table 1	Indians in Commercial Occupations in Selected Countries of the British Empire, 1931	82
Table 2	Estimates of Number of Indians in Trade and Finance in Selected Countries in the early 1930s	84
Table 3	Major International Trading Networks Operating from India	95
Table 4	The Journey of a Recruited Emigrant, 1914–40	141
Table 5	Estimated Population Outflows from China to Selected Southeast Asian Countries, 1801–1925 (in thousands)	144
Table 6	Land under Rice Cultivation in Lower Burma, Thailand, and Cochin-China 1860–1920 ('000 hectares)	147
Table 7	Natural Rubber Production and Principal Rubber Producing Countries, 1910–40 (percentages)	155
Table 8	Malaya: Racial Composition of FMS Estate Labor Force, 1907–38	161
Table 9	Post-Office Savings/Bank Accounts of Indians in Malaya, 1906–1924 (Selected Years)	165
Table 10	Statement of Chinese Shipped to Peru as Colonists, under Contracts of 5 and 8 years, none of which have as yet expired	189
Table 11	Chinese Emigrants to Singapore and Penang	191
Table 12	Chief Classes of Chinese Laborers for Which Contracts Were Signed in the Straits Settlements, 1904 to 1914	192
Table 13	Junk Trade between China and Singapore, 1829–1845	210
Table 14	Movements of Chinese Migrants 1865–66	212
Table 15	Immigration to Brazil, 1881–1930	290
Table 16	Net-Migration to Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, 1881–1930	291
Table 17	Statistics of Japanese Migration according to the Three Strains of Expansionism, 1885–1942	421

Figures

Figure 1	Zheng He's and Columbus's Ships Compared (400 to 85 feet length)	25
Figure 2	Global Migration, 1846–1990	46
Figure 3	Return Migrants as Proportion of Emigrants, 1870–1937	47
Figure 4	Chinese Migration, 1850–1940	48
Figure 5	Indian Migration, 1842–1937	48
Figure 6	Indian Migrant Populations in Burma and Malaya, 1910–35 (selected years)	139
Figure 7	The Indian Population in Burma, 1872–1941	152
Figure 8	The Indian Population in Lower and Upper Burma, 1872–1931 (percentages)	153
Figure 9	Assisted and Voluntary Indian Migration to Malaya, 1844–1938 (in numbers)	160
Figure 10	Indian Labor Migration to Malaya by Recruitment System, 1844–1938 (percentages)	161
Figure 11	Malaya, Population by Racial Group, 1911–1947	163
Figure 12	Tributary Relations with China at the Center, Fourteenth to Nineteenth Centuries Migration	181
Figure 13	Five Layers of Maritime Governance	182
Figure 14	Home Remittances	196
Figure 15	Trade Intermediary: Hong Kong	196
Figure 16	Financial Intermediaries: Hong Kong and Singapore	197
Figure 17	Singapore Migrations, 1820 to 1914	213
Figure 18	U.S. eugenicists sought to document and quantify the results of "mixing" "B[lack]," "R[ed]," "Y[ellow]," and "W[hite]" "racial stocks" through studies of Caribbean people	332
Figure 19	Letter Written by a Cantonese Migrant in Vancouver	401

EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder

As Adam McKeown notes in his introductory essay to this volume, "the work of integrating world migration into world migration history has still to be done." Both world history and migration studies are exciting, and growing, fields of scholarly inquiry. Yet most specialist readers will agree that migration studies, which is social scientific in its orientation, and world history—while they developed simultaneously over the past three decades—continue to develop in relative isolation from each other. The nineteen contributors to this volume share with McKeown and with the editors the desire to integrate world migration into world history. But good intentions are rarely enough and a very large unanswered question remains. How exactly does one tackle the monumental task of integrating the two? We are not the first, nor the last, to pose or attempt to answer that question.[1] For that reason alone, it seems wise to explain what it is we attempt to do in this thick volume of collected essays.

For much of the twentieth century, histories of migration were written from the perspective of modern nation states and most modern historians developed their expertise within national historiographies. The result has been sizeable scholarly literatures on immigration and smaller ones on emigration, both focused on the years after 1500 when the seas became increasingly connected and crossing the Pacific Ocean became possible and, in fact, a regular practice in the galleon trade between Manila and Acapulco in what might be called a joint venture of the Spanish Empire and Chinese mariners and entrepreneurs. The first cluster of scholarly studies focused on the peopling and making of nations through immigration, especially through a focus on the new nations of North America. The latter cluster more often focused on

[1] Robin Cohen, ed., *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration* (New York, 1995); Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives* (Bern, 1997); Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, 2002); Dirk Hoerder and Christiane Harzig with Donna Gabaccia, *What is Migration History?* (Cambridge, 2009).

European countries and, to a lesser degree, China and Mexico. They have treated emigration as either a form of international influence, or what Italian empire-builders once called "demographic imperialism," or a relationship of dependency and exploitation between the more developed countries that attracted migrants and the poorer ones that lost their populations. The loss to the poorer societies involved the investment in raising and educating (or, at least, training) before migration children and adolescents who, after migration, would invest their human capital and pay their dues to the society, i.e. taxes, in a different country. After 1970, the study of the slave trade, of international labor migrations, and of early modern empires as ocean-and continent-bridging human movements pushed the study of migration backward in time and beyond the confines of any individual national territory, creating the foundation for our own work. At the same time it began to retrace the different experiences of men and women, as well as different generational trajectories.

It constitutes a very swift and bold step to leap from the temporal scales of nation states (which are usually measured in one, two, or three centuries) to world histories characterized by 500 and 1000 year periodizations. It is an equally long leap from the spatial scales of even the largest of nation states (Russia, for example, at 6.6 million square miles) to the global scale, since the land surface of the Earth is measured at about 57 million square miles. Add to this last figure the oceans and seas that provide the analytical units for our book—196 million square miles—and the contrast between global scales becomes even larger. Little wonder, then, that world historians usually analyze or attempt to compare and to connect large spatial units which, while much larger than modern nations, do not always encompass the entire globe. In their earliest works, many world historians focused on civilizations; more recently they have written of cultural areas or world regions, oceans, hemispheres, and continents. Such early world historians traced structures of states and perhaps routes across continents, whether the "silk route" or pilgrim's routes to Mecca or Jerusalem-Yerushalayim-Al Quds. Routes in the seas and across oceans left no trace that historians, not seafarers themselves, could discern. Yet, much of the knowledge about the continents' shape and extent began as "portolan" maps of mariners and, when the Chinese Empire reached across the seas in the 15th century and the European, future, empires, from the 16th century, open-minded and expansive-minded monarchs attached not only geographers to their courts but also

hydrographers. Knowledge of the world was created as much through seafaring and human seaborne mobility and migrations and its scholarly and philosophical analysis as through land-based surveying and interpreting.

Patrick Manning has provided the most recent and radical model for integrating world migrations into world history. His *Migration in World History* is an extremely short and provocative but also highly schematic, birds-eye survey of the peopling of the globe over 200,000 years. He carefully discusses riparian and littoral cultures that emerge when migrants reach the water's edge and face the need for new "vehicles" of transportation.[2] Manning succeeds in integrating world migrations into a temporal frame that more nearly approximates David Christian's "big history"[3]—which emphasizes the recency of human life on Earth by embedding it in the temporalities of natural or geological history—than it does the average, collegiate world history course (at least in the U.S.), which typically devotes one semester to the very long history of the world before 1500 and another semester to the past 500 years. Of Manning's nine chapters, three treat the world after 1500, the period for which the most sizeable scholarly literatures on migration exist. In doing so, however, he succeeds brilliantly in re-casting humans as a migratory species, rather than a sedentary one. Indeed, he makes cross-community migrations one of the main motors of change and conflict in human history. His is the perspective of social evolution—though gender would require more attention—emphasizing the role of mobility in differentiating humans from other animal species and in spurring societal evolution. It recalls the great (if also problematic) thinkers of nineteenth century social science as well as the 15th-century mapmakers who pieced together sailors' and captains accounts of distant worlds and societies to arrive at a view of the world, literally a worldview.[4]

We have tackled the challenge of integrating migration into world history in a very different manner, and one we think historians and teachers will find more familiar. We acknowledge, first, that world

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[2] Patrick Manning, *Migration in World History* (New York, 2005).

[3] David Christian, *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History* (Berkeley, 2004).

[4] Jerry H. Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, Kären Wigen, eds., *Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures and Transoceanic Exchanges* (Honolulu, 2007); Jeremy Black, *Maps and History* (New Haven, 1997); J.B. Harley and David Woodward, eds., *Cartography in Prehistoric, Ancient, and Medieval Europe and the Mediterranean*, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1987 and 1992).

history is still usually written on a much shorter temporal scale than that of "big history." Second, we are convinced that the diversity of human life on earth as it reveals itself over time and space provides much of the fascination of world history for both its researchers and its students; this diversity disappears in the more universalizing models of the social sciences which provided Manning with his inspiration. Finally, we acknowledge that in the teaching of world history, as in the scholarly literature on migration, it is still the modern era that looms largest. Thus, while we were as determined as Manning to tackle migrations on a global scale, we sought to do so by connecting within a relatively limited, and modern, periodization, clusters of regional studies conducted at more modest spatial scales, a scales that permit in-depth analysis and specificity.

Rather than leap from the huge scholarship on migration into or out of nation states, a relative new system of societal organization dating from Enlightenment and the Age of Revolution, directly into global analysis of the very long term of human migration on earth, we decided to invite authors to examine smaller, but still capacious and multi-national or multi-imperial, spatial units over the course of a single century. True, Dirk Hoerder does provide a quick introduction to the longer term of global migrations. Collectively, however, fourteen case studies from four different parts of the world challenge readers, in Adam McKeown's words "to imagine processes of interaction and economic change that were dense and global in scale, yet not homogenous or homogenizing in their effects."

In choosing to organize this volume around migrations within, across, and between four inter-connected bodies of water—the Indian Ocean; the East and Southeast Seas of Asia; the Atlantic; and the Pacific, all with their adjoining coasts and hinterlands—we were well aware that equally compelling, although also quite different, world histories of migration could emerge from a focus on continents, cultural regions, or diasporas. As the reader will note, many of our contributors chose to ponder, and sometimes also to critique, the usefulness of imagining migrations from a perspective privileging primarily moves across waters. In particular, in his introductory essay, Adam McKeown notes that the migrations of the nineteenth century gravitated toward three frontier regions—in the Americas, in northern and eastern Asia, and in a region stretching from Southeast Asia outward through a sequence of islands that reach to Australia—that attracted migrants in equal and surprisingly large numbers. Those moving toward these fron-

tiers traveled on land—and across continents—and not just by water. The trading frontiers of the Indian Ocean World for two millennia on the other hand, as well as those of China's 13th-century seafarers and Europe's long-distance merchants since the 16th century, were ports across the seas. Our oceanic regions are more effective in capturing movements toward the Americas (from Europe, Africa, and Asia) and toward Southeast Asia and Africa (especially from India and China) than they are in capturing the movements that populated the frontiers of northern and eastern Asia. Finally, the longer and more extensive historiography on one of these oceans—the Atlantic—resurfaced in this volume, despite our best efforts to avoid it. It proved far more difficult to find authors writing about Pacific than Atlantic "worlds," at least for the nineteenth century.

Concentrating on the seas may be as limiting as the landlubber's single-minded emphasis on continents. It is littorals with water's edge technologies that connect the two and offer a choice between land- and water-centered modes of transportation. Or they permit utilization of both: historians of empire have often understood the importance of oceans and seas, merchant shipping and an armed navy, of both guns mounted on vessels and globally mobile investment capital. The land-centered and seaborne "gunpowder empires" initiated migration into conquered and colonized regions as well as—often forced—labor migrations and free commercial migrations within them.

In choosing as our temporal focus a single century, loosely defined as the one stretching from around 1830 to around 1940, we consciously challenged the assumption of many of our migration studies colleagues in the social sciences that our own times represent the first great age of truly global migrations.[5] Many of our contributors also point to this century as the moment of thickening connections *among* the longer-existing migration networks of the four oceans and even more seas. In creating the first global migration networks, both imperial and industrial systems of labor recruitment took advantage of new technologies of transport to spark what have been called the "proletarian mass migrations" of a long nineteenth century.[6]

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[5] Stephen Castles, Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (New York, 1993).

[6] Walter Willcox and Imre Ferenczi, *International Migrations* (New York, 1929).

Still, we sought not to constrain our authors too rigorously to a periodization that accommodates events and developments in some oceans (e.g., the Atlantic) far better than others (e.g., the Indian Ocean). Many of our authors found it useful to portray the migrations of the nineteenth century as emerging out of and becoming differentiated from the migration networks of the early modern era. In fact, our choice to begin the volume with sections on the Indian Ocean and China Seas reflects the antiquity of water-based migration circuits in these areas, especially when compared to the relative newness of Atlantic and Pacific migrations that began after 1500.

Our goal of integrating migration into world history resulted in a critique of present-day understandings of global migrations and of globalization itself as new, recent and unprecedented. As historians, we might well note how a focus on migration in world history alters our understanding of both national and world histories. First, the study of migrations at any scale has often forced scholars to recognize the very real constraints of histories of individual nations. National studies of immigration or of emigration fail to capture the wide range of moves in which people regularly engaged in the nineteenth century and before. Not all migrations are easily characterized as either emigrations (out of a single nation state) or immigration (into a nation state). Movements across national borders can be and were temporary, circular, or repeated. Movements within the vast nineteenth century empires proved particularly difficult to understand as emigrations or immigrations; some significant migrations occurred within the territories of single empires yet nevertheless required major cultural adjustment of those on the move. Other migrations seem strictly local or regional yet crossed and sometimes challenged those who guarded imperial borders. Worldwide, furthermore, national identities had not coalesced evenly in the nineteenth century; again, short-distance moves both within national territories and across them could cross cultural and linguistic boundaries. Whether in France or in China, through the 19th century local and regional dialects were often incomprehensible to people living only a few miles or a day's journey away. The relations of power between the mobile and the sedentary, as the essays that follow make very clear, were especially complex and especially contentious in a world of empire-building. In some cases, it was the migrants who held great power; in others, it was the natives, who chose to understand themselves—often in the face of considerable evidence to the contrary—as sedentary and deeply-rooted in a place

and thus entitled to rule. In again others, Southeast Asia for example, the newcomers quickly had the advantage in long-distance trading but never aspired to political rule. Their mental maps were spheres of production and consumption, not territorial empires.

Our point in approaching the study of migration on a global scale is not that nations do not matter or that nations and nation states have no place in world history. On the contrary, a focus on the nineteenth century, which was after all a great era of nation-building worldwide, should instead remind all historians that nations and nation-states emerged within a context of sweeping and sizeable migrations rather than in their absence and they emerged in the context of a global plantation belt, global mining investments, and global searches for raw materials. So-called "national economies" relied on migration and economic resources, and utilization of resources required labor migration, whether forced or free or temporarily bound as in Chinese credit-ticket or European indenture arrangements. Migration challenges nation-state paradigms but does not necessarily undermine nation-building. On the contrary, movement of peoples across cultural boundaries—whether these movements are coerced or chosen—can become the foundation for nation-building. The formations of diasporas, and the movements of peoples and ideas between their earlier homes and the places where their friends, family members, and masters drew or sent then to work and live shaped the imagining and the building of nations everywhere. The—often changing—attitudes to overseas migrants, "nationals abroad" in Meiji Japan, late 19th century Imperial China, the new Italian and German states in Europe, provide only a few examples, as do these migrants' linkages through remittances, return migration, and transfer as well as translations of ideas and experiences between their two homes, the old and the new—nation-state-centered ideology and historiography has never been able to deal with two belongings. Migration currently figures prominently only in the national histories of few self-conscious "nations of immigrants" such as the United States and Canada and, perhaps, Singapore and Malaysia. The essays collected here on a global scale suggest how badly many national histories—more often than not "Western" ones—need to be re-written, since migration worked an influence on nation-building not only in receiving societies with their own independent systems of governance but also in sending societies, including colonized ones, in sum: in societies—whether colonized or independent—throughout the world.

The scattering of peoples through slavery, indenture, as well as macro-regional labor markets and trade has, increasingly in recent years, been understood through the metaphor of diaspora. While nationalist approaches to migrants assumed a one-directional nation-to-ethnic enclave moves, diaspora assumed multidirectional moves as well as return. Rather than separation into Little Germanies or Chinatowns, disaporic migrants retain to connection to the community of origin (or an imaginary homeland) through the generations and between segments of the diaspora. As such territorially unbounded communities, diasporas, too, have often been understood as posing challenges to the formation and consolidation of nation states as the major organizers of human identities, solidarities and loyalties. In our own times, furthermore, diasporas are often understood to generate complex, fluid, and hybrid identities that disrupt or complicate the hegemony of nation states. Many of the essays in this collection hint at and occasionally illustrate in considerable detail just how complex and hybrid were the identities that developed as people choose or were coerced to move about in the nineteenth century. They also suggest, however, how separation from an original homeland can foster anti-imperial and other forms of nation-building campaigns. Nation-building, in short, can occur within diasporas as migrants highlight or foreground differing dimensions of their cultures through interactions with other migrants and with natives. Everyday language and traditional scholarly terminologies cannot but emphasize assumed national identities of migrants: "The Chinese" in North America came from a few localities in one single southern province, "the Germans" defined themselves by religion as Catholics, Protestants or Mennonites, "the slaves" carried many locally specific cultures with them when force-migrated across the Atlantic.

For the world historian, finally, migration emerges in this collection as an important if changing form of connection between nations and among world regions over several centuries. Migration should, we conclude, figure as centrally among the major themes of world history textbooks as do trade, exploration, and empire-building. And: no national history can be understood without incorporation of outbound and inbound migrants' contributions or impact. Even more important, we believe, the essays in this collection suggest how the integration of migration into the global narratives of world histories highlights the lived experiences, dreams, and identities of ordinary men, women, and children of slaves, indentured servants, and waged laborers, and of

ideology and sexuality. To put it simply: social and cultural histories find a more central place in world history when migration is the focus. So does the entanglement—amply illustrated in the chapters that follow—of law, gender ideology, and sexuality. It is through this entanglement, after all, that imperial and national states attempt to attract particular kinds of migrants as desirable (whether white, male or skilled or, instead, racialized, female or docile) while simultaneously guaranteeing that those defined as undesirable be kept off the boats and beyond the borders that states have long created in order to exist.

The seas and oceans thus are made into connecting spaces or by refusal of "pass-ports" into separating spaces. As imperial courts' hydrographers knew, water and land had to be understood as related and integrated. The discrete spaces of the Indian Ocean remained such when the fleets of the British East India Company and the British Empire arrived. Only an empires-only perspective would follow the Portuguese or Dutch competitors' views that the it became a "British lake." Historians of other than imperial perspective, often from the societies bordering the Indian Ocean, have take the vast littoral regions as distinct cultural zones, as spaces connected by traditions of mercantile exchange and seafarers' knowledges. Contrasted to the Atlantic and its littoral societies it might be viewed as one macro-region with common trading languages or translating practices, as a region in which port cities and political rulers accorded self-administration to merchant and sailor communities and accommodated difference. It might also be viewed as an imaginary world both of "locals" of the macro-region who could navigate it as well as by the outsiders who had the power to impose their views as hegemonic (or, it might be suggested—to delude themselves). The discrete activities and spheres—religion, trade, migration, political organization, cultures of everyday life—were intricately linked.

The space of the Atlantic Ocean, once considered a defined geographic space, encompassed regional seas: the Caribbean waters or the North Sea and, appended, the Baltic Sea. Ocean-crossing vessels could penetrate the North American continent by sailing up the St. Lawrence River and into the Great Lakes. Ship-borne human being and goods reached Peru or were carried across the isthmus to be re-embarked on the Pacific side of the continent. The transatlantic fur trade early created a northern belt that circled the globe: from Alaska to Newfoundland, from Scandinavia, and, overland, from Siberia to the investment centers in Moskow, Paris, London, Amsterdam. Culturally

a White and a Black Atlantic emerged—though the latter was expunged from historical memory by most of the historians of white empires. No African man or women within reach of costal slave traders, whether black or white, could ignore the white Atlantic. The power to shape the narrative involves the power to symbolically annihilate the less powerful, to make them invisible, or (again from an oppositional perspective) to carry blindfolds and still never stumble on the high roads of imperial ideology assumed to be factual. Like the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic was not a monolithic unit. The empires' navies fought each other, merchants competed, nation-states, said to be territorially bounded, invested in warships that were conquer access to raw materials and peoples afar.

Only the Pacific Ocean long remained a separating expanse, a forbidding region, because of the sheer size of the water. Thus it has been less studied in terms of either one macro-region or a combination of overlapping spaces. In contrast, the East and Southeast Asian seas have been marginalized in geography because they did not fit the designation "ocean" and in (Western) historiography because their complexities could not be subsumed under one big concept. In this volume, with the help of scholars from the region or specialists on the regions, we have tried to remedy this.

Precisely because this volume ranges rather widely around the globe, introduces oceanic spaces that are inevitably many-cultured and includes so many essays that boldly connect micro, meso-, and macro levels of analysis, we chose to provide readers with more than the usual number of scholarly guides to assist them in their reading. The collection opens with two general introductions—to migration in world history (Hoerder) and to nineteenth century migrations (McKeown). A specialist on each of the oceanic worlds that constitute the heart of the volume then comments on and provides historiographical context for groupings of essays on migration for the Indian Ocean (introduced by Ulrike Freitag), the East and Southeast Asia Seas (introduced by Wang Gangwu), the Atlantic (introduced by Donna Gabaccia), and the Pacific (introduced by Henry Yu). In the concluding section of the volume, both Pamila Gupta's study of Goans' migration during and after the end of Portuguese rule and Donna Gabaccia's Afterword provide readers with ample opportunity to reflect on how an earlier great era of global migrations gave way to the one that social scientists today too often assume to be unprecedented in volume and global reach.

This project began as a collaboration of Dirk Hoerder, Marcel van der Linden, and Donna Gabaccia and it benefited over time from the

financial support of the three research institutions with which we have been most closely affiliated. We are grateful to the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C., and to its directors Christof Mauch and Hartmut Berghoff, for hosting the conference that first brought together many of our contributors and for providing essential support, largely through Bryan Hart, for the work prior to publication. The International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam and the Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota were financial co-sponsors of that conference and, together with Arizona State University, provided critically important support for travel and assistance during the extended period of work on the manuscript. Dirk Hoerder and Donna Gabaccia are grateful for a smooth collaboration. Both thank Marcel van der Linden whose series at Brill and whose knowledge of scholarship on the Indian Ocean facilitated the transformation of conference proceedings into a coherent volume of essays. Both are grateful to Wang Gungwu and Henry Yu for providing excellent introductions to their respective sections. Donna Gabaccia also thanks Sucheta Mazumdar who provided key advice in planning the conference, and Erika Lee, Akram Khater, Matt Guterl, David Cook Marin, Madeline Hsu, and Haiming Liu for their contributions to the December 2007 conference at the GHI. She is especially indebted to the Russell Sage Foundation, which housed, fed, and supported in myriad ways her sabbatical leave with a position as a visiting scholar in 2008–2009.

CROSSING THE WATERS: HISTORIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PERIODIZATIONS BEFORE THE 1830s[1]

Dirk Hoerder

Waterborne transport and voyaging as well as riverine and littoral migrations and ways of living have a long tradition in human history. Most scholars of migration, however, have concentrated on land travel including long-distance routes across the Afro-Euro-Asian tricontinental Worlds. As regards transoceanic migrations, means of transport have often been assumed as self-evident, some studies of emigration and immigration ports as well as of shipping companies notwithstanding. New approaches challenge the land-based view: the history of seafaring technologies, mariners' expertise, and sailors' labor; the emergence of "ocean history" as a field, and the recognition that across deep time human migrations often were water's edge migrations. The term "over-seas" postulated the seas as merely to be traversed, as a time-consuming encumbrance. For land-surrounded waters, like the Mediterranean, this term was never used. With a "transoceanic" perspective researchers began to emphasize linkages rather than distance.[2]

Are expanses of seas and oceans connecting or dividing? For a very large part of human history, enclosed seas like the East and Southeast Asian Seas, the Caribbean Sea, and the Mediterranean provided connecting spaces, while the immensity of the Atlantic and, even more so, of the Pacific Ocean worked to separate. The Indian Ocean, with its

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[1] This section relies strongly, occasionally almost verbatim, on Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, N.C., 2002), and, similarly, in the sections on Asia in Hamashita Takeshi's paper "Remapping Modern East-West Maritime History into Geopolitical North-South Regional Dynamism: Tributary Trade and Chinese Maritime Customs in East China Sea, Nineteenth to Twentieth Century," and on Madeline Y. Hsu's "Chinese Travelers in the Second Millennium: A Sino-centric View of Pacific Migrations," both given at the "Connecting Seas" conference, Washington, D.C., Dec. 2007. I am grateful to the authors for permission and to Donna Gabaccia and Wang Gungwu for a critical reading of this chapter.

[2] Rainer F. Buschmann, *Oceans in World History* (Boston, 2007); Patrick Manning, *Migration in World History* (New York, 2005); Jerry H. Bentley, "Sea and Ocean Basins as Frameworks for Historical Analysis," *Geographical Review* 89.2 (1999), 215–224.

densely settled rims, highly developed societies, and intensive exchange of material goods and cultural products permitted easy connections subject to the seasonal monsoon winds but facilitated by a multiplicity of highly developed port towns and protocols of trade and patterns of cultural cohabitation. Traversal of the Atlantic Ocean in the fifteenth and of the Pacific in the sixteenth century and the seaborne colonizer migrations from Europe outward changed patterns of contact and direction of migrations and trade. The caesura of the fifteenth century also changed power relations in the Eastern Mediterranean-Gulf of Hormuz region and thus patterns of contact and direction of migrations and trade. The new patterns of rule and economics resulted in the forced mass migration of Africans, the only mass migration before the 1830s. A need for a longer perspective and a periodization differentiated by macro regions, both oceanic and continental, is evident. Ocean-side or sea-side and land-side approaches are inseparable and each is a torso without the other.

A focus on the century from the 1830s to the 1930s provides an adequate periodization for connecting the migration systems of several seas. At its beginning, the Atlantic Ocean migrations, interrupted by the Napoleonic wars, had resumed after 1815 and assumed larger proportions by the 1830s. As British Empire authorities abolished slavery, without ending the World of the Black Atlantic, they also began recruiting indentured Asian workers, creating a "second slavery" in British India. The contract as well as free workers moved or were moved across the expanses of the Indian Ocean and beyond. The European colonizer powers also encouraged the expansion of indentured servitude from China, opened during the Opium War of 1839–1842, through the new city of Hong Kong and across the Southeast Asian Seas. In the period's ending decade, the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War Two from 1937 in Asia and 1939 in Europe, interrupted and reversed migrations while also mobilizing soldiers over vast distances and creating several hundred million refugees and displaced persons. This global summary, like any bird's eye view, cannot do justice to all regional differences. This essay discusses continuities by region to uncover specifics of the century under review in which the transition from sail to steam and the opening of the Suez and Panama canals fundamentally changed transport of migrants.

To show, first, how rivers, seas, and oceans either connect or divide (or do both at the same time) and, second, how the nineteenth century seaborne migrations emerged from century-long practices we will first

discuss travelling knowledges and early seafaring and then turn to the most intensely traversed waters, the Indian Ocean and the East and Southeast Asian Seas. Third, beginning in the period of the early 1400s to the 1520s, we discuss how global changes in trade protocols and relations, in power hierarchies and early empire-building shaped macro-regions far earlier than nineteenth century globalization: continuities and adaptations in the South and East Asian Seas before the 1830s' introduction of indentured and free mass migrations, the expansion of the West African-Iberian to a transoceanic Black Atlantic, the emergence of the White Atlantic and, finally, the transpacific routes. The globalization of the nineteenth century did not fundamentally change the coherence of the oceanic regions so much as it re-arranged their connections through the emergence of mass labor migrations.

Travelling Knowledges and Early Seafaring

Human life and movements characterized as "water's edge migration" provided access to both land-side and sea-side foods—of the "aquatic culture" that is the equivalent of land-based subsistence we know much less. Migrating humans developed technologies for travelling on or crossing water—first canoe and kayak, later sailing vessels. Mariners' experiences with winds, currents, and waves, as well as deep or shallow seas, and coastal or over-seas voyaging allowed them to design many types of boats, sails, rigging and steering mechanisms. Town names ending in "-market" denoted places of exchange on land and those ending in "-ford" denoted places where rivers could be crossed. Interstate entry papers are even today called "pass-ports" because, until the second third of the nineteenth century, they were required almost exclusively for entry into ports after long-distance sea voyages. (At the time, land borders could usually be crossed without special papers.)

Early human migrations in a number of cases crossed seas that were considered impassable. The settlement of the Southeast Asian Islands required people to cross long distances in canoes: Migrations from Taiwan outward that crossed the open seas between Near and Remote Oceania (from the Solomon Islands to Vanatu) existed for over six millennia prior to the Common Era (CE). The migrants' descendants continued some 1000 km further to the Easter Islands off the South American coast (c. 400 CE), Hawai'i (first century CE, some 3300 km distant), and—westbound from Java—they sailed across the Indian

Ocean to Madagascar. These navigators used the flight patterns of birds, currents and winds, wave refraction from island shores, and changing water coloring, as well as the stars to chart their courses.[3] Early European visitor-intruders were impressed by such sophisticated navigational skills that permitted "pinpoint navigation" across vast expanses of water. Later historiography juxtaposed these men as "primitive" island peoples to the higher cultures of Europe and Meso- and South America.[4]

In the eighth century CE, shipborne men and women from Europe's Scandinavian north—later labeled "Viking raiders"—migrated westward and, transcontinentally, eastward on or along rivers. Their movements connected a huge arc from "Newfoundland" via Scandinavia to Kiev and Byzantium. In their region of origin, rocky Scandinavia, these peoples had little land for farming but had developed considerable coastal seafaring experience. They sailed and rowed via the northern islands to Iceland, Greenland, and "Vinland" in North America. In Greenland they battled with resident Inuit, who had themselves voyaged eastward by kayak. Travelling eastward, other Norsemen and women traversed the Baltic Sea and Lake Ladoga, settled along the navigable Dnieper River, ruling and intermarrying with locals and trading with Byzantine and Arab merchants of the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. In a third, southerly direction, the Normans crossed the North Sea and occupied England, settled Normandy in France, raided port towns, established a state in Sicily, and participated in 200 years of Christian Holy War, the crusades, to occupy Palestine.[5]

Charting the Pacific and the Arctic seas required striking out into unknown spaces while voyaging the Mediterranean, considered the prototype of a connecting sea since Braudel's *La Mediterranée et le monde*

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[3] Greg M. Dening, "The Geographical Knowledge of the Polynesians and the Nature of Inter-Island Contact," in Jack Golson, ed., *Polynesian Navigation*, 3rd ed. (Wellington, NZ, 1972), 102–153; Anne Salmond, "Archipelagos of History: Humankind and Nature in the Pacific," special lecture at the 20th Intl. Congress of the Historical Sciences, Sydney, Australia, 3–9 July 2005.

[4] The oft-cited expedition of Thor Heyerdahl, 1947, set out to "prove" cultural diffusion occurred from South America to "primitive" Polynesia. Across the Pacific, some Polynesians may, in fact, have reached South Americas Pacific coast in small numbers. However, the evidence is restricted to archeologically retrieved cloth indicating strains of cotton grown in the Indus Valley. There are no genetic or linguistic traces.

[5] For maps of Norse and Polynesian migrations see Jeremy Black, gen. ed., *Dorling Kindersley World History Atlas*, rev. ed., (London, 2005), 60–61.

mediterranéen (1966), involved familiar ones.[6] The Mediterranean,[7] first charted by Phoenician traders, became both supply route for the Roman Empire's grain imports from North Africa and the freeway to transport armies of aggression to distant shores. Over centuries of shipbuilding, expert craftsmen used up the high quality lumber of the proverbial cedars of Lebanon and the woods of the Adriatic mountains, creating denuded hills and parched infertile soils. In this multi-religious region, interfaith protocols of exchange respected the holy days of Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Pilgrimages to the holy places of all three faiths required mass seaborne transport of men and women through organizations resembling modern-day tourist package tours.

The Mediterranean World was connected via the Black Sea to the trans-Asian caravan routes (later called the "silk route"); via the Red Sea and Arab traders with their dhows to the Indian Ocean; and through the "seas of sand" and the camel, sometimes called the ship of the desert, to sub-Saharan Africa's complex societies and gold fields. The routes and regional customs were known: Around 900 CE, ibn Khordadbeh, postmaster of an Arab province in Persia, in his 8-volume *Book of the Roads and Countries* described land and sea routes as far as Korea. By 1050 CE, the Arab geographer al-Biruni, fluent in Sanskrit, compiled a *Book of India*, and in mid-twelfth century, al-Idrisi, sent by Norman-origin Roger II of Sicily, collected information on the eastern world. Informed by Jewish coreligionists and Arab scholars, Abraham Cresques mapped Africa in his *Catalan Atlas* of 1375. A Florentine migrant merchant clerk, operating out of the Genoese Black Sea trading center, prepared a handbook for the China trade in mid-fourteenth century. In the twelfth century, rabbi Benjamin of Tudela, Aragon, travelled across the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean as well as the lands in between to the Malabar Coast. In the East, China's seaborne traders originated from the southern provinces and, in 878 CE, some 120,000 foreign merchants were said to live in Guangzhou (Canton). From the eleventh century, Chinese merchants and shipbuilders increased their role in this trade circuit. What was

[6] Fernand Braudel, *La Mediterranée et le monde mediterranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, second rev. ed. (Paris, 1966), transl. by Siân Reynolds as *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols. (New York, 1972).

[7] The name seems to reflect a view of the world: To Roman geographers this sea was the middle of the world they knew. Similarly, the term Middle Kingdom for China reflects the assumption of rulers and intellectuals that this empire was the center of the known earth.

later termed by European self-styled explorers "their discoveries" were routes and cultures well-known to others.[8]

The ship- and camel-borne trade in this tri-continental macro-region has been conceptualized by Immanuel Wallerstein as an integrated system of capitalist development. His path-breaking analysis has since been differentiated into ten circuits of trade in the thirteenth century world system. Janet Abu-Lughod emphasized indigenous developments in each circuit as well as interrelatedness and thus corrected Wallerstein's Eurocentrism. More than half of the trade circuits involve connecting seas, the land-centered ones included shores and, via ports, access to the seas.[9] Clearly, the long-distance seaborne movements of people were not without precedent.

Those who migrated carried, in Haury's words, "funds of knowledge" that permitted them to chart courses, evaluate options, and establish themselves at the destination in the context of ecologies new to them. If they moved into expanses unknown to them they might "bump" into other peoples already resident. Such "bumping" into each other might result in cooperation and conversion or in conflict and warfare. In this chapter we will, however, focus on movement more than on cultural consequences of migrations.[10]

The World of the Indian Ocean[11]

Next to enclosed but not land-locked seas, the Indian Ocean was the most important connecting waterscape and, for long, the world's only


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[8] Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, 28–38, 168. Bartolomé Bennassar and Pierre Chaunu, eds., *L'ouverture du monde, XIVe–XVIe siècles* (Paris, 1977), spoke of "*l'Europe désenclavante*," a Europe that rather than striking out with heroic explorations tried to get itself out of the corner in which it existed, in particular since the mind-numbing Catholic Church's hierarchy had cut the inter-cultural Mediterranean connections and instituted the Inquisition.

[9] Immanuel M. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, 3 vols. (New York, 1974–1988); Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York, 1989), 3–40. UNESCO, *The Silk Roads. Highways of Culture and Commerce*, introduction by Vadime Elisseeff and Doudou Diène (Oxford, 1999). On cultural exchange see Jerry H. Bentley, *Old World Encounters. Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times* (New York, 1993).

[10] Emil W. Haury, "Thoughts after Sixty Years as a Southwestern Archaeologist," in *Emil W. Haury's Prehistory of the American Southwest*, eds. J. Jefferson Reid and David E. Doyel, (Tucson, 1986), 435–463; Carlos G. Vélez-Ibáñez, *Border Visions. Mexican Cultures of the Southwest United States* (Tucson, 1996), 4–6.

[11] This section is based on Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, Chap. 7.



Source: Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, map. 2.2. Adapted from Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*, 34.

Map 1 Circuits of the Thirteenth Century Tri-Continental World System

traversable ocean. Sailors decoded and thus "domesticated" the seasonal patterns of the monsoon winds with their southerly and northerly phases as early as the first millennium BCE. The uneven distribution of resources from the Swahili-language coasts and later port cities of East Africa via Arabia and Persia to the South Asian port cities, Malayan Peninsula, and Southeast Asian Islands, stimulated seaborne exchanges, specialized production, labor migrations, merchant networks, and family resettlement.

Arab traders of Muslim faith first plied the coastal trade between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and then travelled southward along the East African Coast and eastward via the Malabar Coast to the Malayan Peninsula. They reached China's southern port cities around 800 CE. As trader-missionaries they spread the Islamic faith around the edges of the Indian Ocean littoral. To the lowly conversion offered escape from the rigid caste hierarchy of Hinduism but for women it ended the relative gender equality of Hindu societies. Commercial centers, like multicultural Patna on the Ganges River, accommodated communities of Jews and Armenians, Arabs and Chinese, Muslims and Christians, Hindu and Jain traders from the Gujarat, Turks and Parsees, Abyssinians and people from the Malabar Coast. From northwestern South Asia, Gujarati merchants sailed westward to East Africa's port cities as well as eastward to Malacca. In the eighteenth century and beyond a group of "Turkish" merchants in the cosmopolitan city of Surat connected the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean. Surat was perhaps the most important trading node in the region.

Some merchants transported enslaved men and women from East Africa as far as Southeast Asia. Free Africans manned ships as sailors. Slaves were often laborers but as court retainers or clerks in merchant houses could travel far and wide. The oceans thus separated African societies' rights-in-person bondage from Asian "service slavery" and from chattel slavery in the European-ruled (sub-)tropical plantation belt and the Americas.[12]

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[12] Philip D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge, 1984), Chap. 6; C.G.F. Simkin, *The Traditional Trade of Asia* (Oxford, 1968), 168–170; Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *Asia Before Europe. Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge, 1990); Judith Tucker, "Gender and Islamic History," in *Islamic and European Expansion. The Forging of a Global Order*, ed. Michael Adas, (Philadelphia, 1993), 37–73; Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, Cal., 1982); Ghulam A. Nadri, "The Turkish merchant community of Surat:

Along the coasts of the Malay Straits, South and East Asian merchants exchanged goods, Persian and Arab traders arrived with Mediterranean merchandise, and products from the Southeast Asian islands were traded afar. Diplomatic missions, migrants, and refugees traversed the routes. In the fourteenth century people displaced by warfare founded the city of Tumasik (later renamed Singapore), to become a node of transport of laborers in the nineteenth century (see chapter seven by Carl Trocki in this volume). Chinese migrants settled in Palembang on Sumatra (see chapter five by Amarjit Kaur in this volume). Patterns of voyaging and of hegemony changed over time: Merchants from southern India controlled the early Southeast Asian Island trade, traders from Gujarat and Bengal predominated in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and by the turn to the fifteenth century Chinese merchants' influence grew. Imposition of rule extended to the seas: After the demise of the Srivijaya Empire in the fourteenth century, powerful non-state-based groups, or "pirates," including Japanese fugitives, Chinese outlaws, and escaped African slaves from Portuguese Macao and other Malay and island towns, rendered trade, travel, and migration unsafe.

In the sixteenth century, when migration between the Indonesian islands was intensive, the port of Malacca achieved predominance. The coastal Celates people provided boats, seamen, and nautical expertise. Sojourning merchants and transient sailors came from distant societies and governed themselves by spokesmen (*shabandars*) installed with the respective resident ruler's consent. The four regional groups came from Gujarat in the west; from the Coromandel Coast; from the Southeast Asian Islands; and from southern China and the Ryukyu islands. Malay was the *lingua franca* in the interactive community. Even in smaller ports, such as Pasè and Pidië, merchants from many origins called and traded Chinese craft products, Indian cloths, and local food. Some of the transient sailors and merchants stayed for extended periods of time or settled and intermarried. Local and migrant shipwrights built junks of impressive dimensions, captains charted the inter-island sea-lanes. The societies became ethno-culturally pluralist and spiritually multi-faith through the input of seaborne migrants.[13]

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the dilemma of a merchant diaspora," unpubl. paper given at the Science History Association, Miami, Oct. 2008.

[13] Maria A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630* (The Hague, 1962), 13–26, 89–115;

The East and Southeast Asian Seas

Coastal East and Southeast Asia was a second maritime region. From north to south, the seas separating the eastern coast of the Eurasian continent from the chain of large and small islands extending from the Kamchatka Peninsula via the Japanese islands and Taiwan to the Philippines form a gentle S-curve. These "maritime areas," smaller than an ocean and less closely associated with the land than are bays or inlets, shaped the regions' geopolitical space. From the intersections of its smaller seas, trade networks formed pivoting on places like Nagasaki, Shanghai, Malacca, and Singapore. Because of its bordered connectivity Wang Gungwu has described the South China and Southeast Asian Seas as semi-Mediterranean or "semiterranean."[14]

The intensity of seafaring brought new nautical knowledge and technological innovations. Chinese mariners knew about the magnetic needle, and as early as the eighth century, sea travel increased with Buddhist pilgrims and missionaries joining the traders. Chinese trade and migration, which operated from southern ports such as Guangzhou, became steady during the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) and Hangzhou, in the Yangtze River delta, became the first and only Chinese capital with direct access to the open sea. Under the Southern Song, who recognized the benefits of legalizing—and taxing—maritime trade, the merchant marine increased from 3,000 to more than 50,000 sailors and Chinese gained dominance of coastal sea lanes by displacing Arab traders who had conducted much of the long-distance connecting Indian Ocean trade. Chinese junks journeyed regularly as far as Quilon on the Malabar Coast and Cambay in Gujarat. Their trade extended to Zanzibar and the port cities of East Africa. Settling for long periods, men established families with local women. Janet Abu-Lughod has described Chinese shipping as creating one of the major interlocked subsystems of the thirteenth century world economy. The Southern Song's embrace of maritime trade would not be emulated by its dynastic successors, the 1430s signaled both the apogee and the end of China's outward contacts.

Ashin Das Gupta, *Merchants of Maritime India, 1500–1800* (Aldershot, 1994), VII, 152–55; K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, *South Indian Influences in the Far East* (Bombay, 1949); Widjojo Nitisastro, *Population Trends in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970).

[14] Wang Gungwu, "Semiterranean Southeast Asia: Between the Oceans," unpubl. ms.



Map 2 Maritime Spaces of the East Asian, South East Asian, and South Asian Seas

Global Changes in Trade Protocols and Power Hierarchies, Early 1400s–1520s

Across the globe, the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries witnessed fundamental changes in power relations on the seas and, as would become apparent only later, in terrestrial power hierarchies between the emerging colonizer powers in Europe and the many Asian societies. Heavily armed intruders from Europe disrupted trade protocols in the Indian Ocean, then in Southeast Asia, and finally in the northern Asian seas. The tri-continental World with its surrounding seas of unknown extent expanded when the Atlantic became a connecting expanse of water, incorporating the Americas into existing trading and migration patterns.

Unrelated policy decisions at opposite ends of the Asian-European-African World in the first half of the fifteenth century had momentous consequences. From the land-based Ming Empire, statesmen and seafarer Zheng He undertook seven major expeditions across the Indian Ocean between 1405 and 1433, reaching into and across the Indian or, from a Chinese perspective, "Western" Ocean. He reached Ceylon and the Malabar Coast, the Gulf of Hormuz and, continuing along the East African Coast, the Channel between Madagascar and Africa. His fleets of huge ships that could accommodate up to a thousand passengers with their provisions transported up to about 30,000 soldiers, sailors, and support personnel. His were diplomatic missions to extend the reach of the Empire; of Muslim faith, he often appeared as negotiator. As cultural-religious syncretist he showed respect to other cultures and religions and established good-will by exquisite gifts. However, the sheer size of his fleet was also designed to inspire awe and fear. In the mid-1430s, the Imperial bureaucracy decided to end this outreach, citing both costs and unwanted cultural influence. Imperial China retracted to its vast lands. Merchants of the Empire's two southern provinces, distant from the capital's reach, continued to trade across the seas but without state support and thus without military backing. We might ask, how the history of seafaring and global power relations would have been different, had the Empire with its advanced shipbuilding technology pursued a seaborne trading expansion similar to that of the emergent European states.[15]

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[15] Teobaldo Filesi, *China and Africa in the Middle Ages*, transl. D.L. Morison (London, 1972), 8–65; Jeannette Mirsky, ed., *The Great Chinese Travelers* (Chicago, 1974),

At the time of Zheng He's voyages, the rulers of tiny, coastal, Iberian Portugal, recognizing they were short of resources and land for a growing population, supported seafarers' outreach and militarized mercantile voyaging. Hoping to achieve direct contact with the West African societies that supplied the trans-Saharan gold trade and thus cut out the Arab traders of the trans-Saharan caravan routes with carrier camels, Portugal's state-supported sea entrepreneurs began to chart routes southward. Access to West African gold producers and low shipping cost would massively improve Portugal's position among Europe's powers and economies. The mariners clung to coasts—the view that the world was flat and finite was still current—but finally reached anchor points at the West African coasts. When, in the 1440s, their vessels—often manned by crews of many origins—carried the first bound African men and women to the Iberian Peninsula, bondage was as flexible as it had been under the previous regime of Mediterranean slavery. But the increased presence of Africans led to rigorous color-coding and prohibition of mixed partnerships. This first Black Atlantic was a West African-Iberian space.

"Spain," still a combination of distinct dynastic territories, concentrated on religious conflict and attempted to expel the Muslim rulers form the peninsula's south. By the early 1490s, the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella of the House of Castille, succeeded in expelling all Jews (with their long-distance trade connections) and most Muslims (with their trans-Mediterranean connections). At the same time, mariners from the contracting labor markets of Italy's ports migrated to Iberian Atlantic ports in search of jobs. Among them was one Columbus from Genoa, who—as Icelandic sources indicate—came to search the Norse sagas for nautical information on overseas "Vinland." Fishermen, who had long "worked" the northern seas, perhaps already knew of the fish-rich Newfoundland Banks but kept this knowledge a trade secret. The Iberian "usage" of the seas contrasted with that of peoples along Africa's western coasts. There sufficient quantities

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175–202, 237–242; Louise Levathes, *When China Ruled the Seas. The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–1433* (New York, 1995); Bentley, *Old World Encounters*, 158–163; Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*, 172–173; Wang Gungwu, *The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000); Anthony Reid, "Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia," in Anthony Reid, Kristine Alilunas-Rodgers, and Jennifer Cushman, eds., *Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (London, 1996), 15–50.

of fish could be netted without ventures into distant waters—though African seafarers did reach the islands in the mid-Atlantic and settled them. On the Atlantic's western rim, the peoples of the Caribbean Sea connected islands but did not reach out—no economic need forced them to. Thus, those with an interest in seafood possessed maps of the Atlantic's many spaces in their minds, while the Mediterranean captains striking out from Iberian port had to chart for themselves unknown waters. The Iberian rulers' turn to the Atlantic came later than that of common fishermen.[16]

When Columbus set out to reach "the Indies" by a westerly course, his crew may have included a free African-origin man, El Pietro Negro. His three ships, a carrack and two caravels, were a mere fraction of the size of Zengh He's vessels. He reached the Caribbean Sea for the first time in 1492. Ever since, the islands have been misnamed the "West Indies." Meanwhile Portuguese ships sighted the Atlantic




Illustration by Jan Adkins, 1993. From Louise Levathes, *When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–1433* (Oxford 1994), 21.

Figure 1 Zheng He's and Columbus's Ships Compared (400 to 85 feet length)

[16] Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, 125–133; A.C. de C.M. Saunders, *A Social History of Black Slaves and Freedmen in Portugal, 1441–1555* (Cambridge, 1982); Lee Anne Durham Seminario, *The History of the Blacks, the Jews and the Moors in Spain* (Madrid, 1975).

islands as they traveled southwestward around Africa, used them to re-provision their ships, and somewhat accidentally, reached South America's eastern tip. In the process, the winds and currents of the Atlantic Ocean had to be understood and courses charted to use or avoid them. Climatic conditions and soils on the Atlantic and Caribbean islands permitted sugar cane cultivation, a plant that previously had been transplanted along the sea lanes from the Southeast Asian to the Mediterranean islands. To create a pool of plantation labor, slavery was imposed on island and African peoples. Thus the Atlantic Ocean was being changed from a barrier into a connecting space by the Iberian states when the Chinese state retracted to its land base.

A third major, seemingly land-centered, development occurred where the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Hormuz are separated or joined by short land bridges. This core of exchange was the hinge of Arab-Venetian trade, just as the Black Sea and the Crimean Peninsula were the hinge points of the Central Asian-Genoese trade. The Byzantine (Eastern) Christian Empire, weakened by the antagonistic and aggressive Western Christian or Catholic Church, was replaced by the new Muslim Ottoman Empire. Thus traditional patterns of trading needed to be rearranged at the very time when Portugal's state-backed mariners searching for circum-African routes to achieve the desired access to the (East) Indies (as well as for circum-South American routes and a northern Arctic Seas connecting passage) had reached the Indian Ocean and cut off the flow of supplies at Hormuz. Because new trade structures were slow to emerge, the circum-African and Atlantic routes acquired additional importance. The Portuguese pioneered what all other European powers adapted, the combination of trade and armed aggression thus destroying the century-old protocols of exchange between merchants of the World of the Indian Ocean and the Southeast and East Asian Seas. As regards armament and ruthlessness the intruders were "superior" but they needed to rely on the expertise, linguistic skills, and coastal seafaring of the established many-cultured merchant communities.[17]

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[17] Subhi Y. Labib, *Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter (1171–1517)* (Wiesbaden, 1965), 441–480; Salih Özbaran, "The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1534–1581," *Journ. Asian Hist.* 6 (1972), 45–87; Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*, 19–20; Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600*, trans. by Colin Imber and Norman Itzkowitz (London, 1973), 38, 51–52; Inalcik and Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914* (Cambridge, 1994).

Violence shaped European-Asian relations. In 1498 Vasco da Gama rounded the African Cape and reached the flourishing town of Quelimane, Mozambique, connected through coastal trade to Madagascar and Arabia and by transoceanic trade to India. Unfamiliar with currents, winds, and coasts, rather than "explore" he relied on existing expertise. Da Gama hired a pilot, Ahmed ibn Madjid, who knew the Indo-Arabic sea charts, to guide his convoy to Calicut. Like all European conquistadors, he sailed heavily armed vessels. Chinese junks, in contrast, were built for commercial purposes only and did not have the supporting timbers necessary to bear the weight of cannons.[18] On his second voyage, intending to establish control, da Gama intimidated local rulers and Muslim merchants—Portugal's competitors—along the route. To impress the extent of his power on the minds of the region's people, he seized a ship off the Malabar Coast, had all passengers, wealthy merchants as well as women and children who returned from their pilgrimage to Mecca, confined in the hold and then burned the vessel. By the time he reached the trading node Calicut, the news of his atrocities pressured the port's ruler to agree to Portuguese conditions.[19]

While it took the Portuguese 80 years to learn to navigate the African coasts from Ceuta to the Cape, reliance on Arab, Indian, and Chinese experience and knowledge permitted them to reach Southeast Asia and China in only fifteen years. Through the ruthless usage of arms, the Portuguese established themselves at strategic locations: Mozambique and Mombasa in 1498, Hormuz in 1510, and Goa in 1515. Taking Malacca in 1511, they destroyed the heart of the Malaccan Empire. Beyond this point, to acquire port privileges in Macao, southern China, in 1557, and Nagasaki, Kyūshū Island of southern Japan, in 1452, they needed to negotiate with the local Chinese and Japanese authorities.[20] The European's race to the rich economies of the East was tight: When the Portuguese passed the Strait of Malacca,

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[18] Anthony Reid, "The Unthreatening Alternative: Chinese Shipping in Southeast Asia, 1567–1842," *Review of Indian and Malaysian Affairs* 27 (1993), 13–32; Hans Van Tilburg, *Chinese Junks on the Pacific: Views from a Different Deck* (Miami, 2007).

[19] On European's violence: Jore Canizares-Esguerra, "The Devil in the New World: A Transnational Perspective," in *The Atlantic in Global History 1500–2000*, eds. Canizares-Esguerra and Erik R. Seeman (Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2007), 21–37.

[20] In the Tokugawa reign, the Portuguese were expelled (1638) but, contrary to the Western image of a secluded Japan, the island of Deshima in Nagasaki harbor was grant to the Dutch in order to keep one window of exchange open.

Spanish-financed Magellan anchored at the Philippines after crossing the Pacific. Although historians later imagined these voyages as discoveries, the European-Christian discoverers actually traveled routes well-known to Mediterranean Jewish-Muslim Arab-Indian Ocean cartographers and chroniclers.[21]

Europe's media attributed the cutting-off of Arab merchants and their Venetian partners from the spice trade to the 'infidel and bloodthirsty' Turks of the expanding Ottoman Empire rather than to the Portuguese blockade at Hormuz.[22] Portuguese pricing policies made spices arriving at Lisbon via the Horn of Africa cheaper than those coming through Alexandria. Since, with the expulsion of the Jews from the Iberian Peninsula long-distance trading connection had been disrupted, the spices were sold through the commercial cities of the Spanish-Habsburg Netherlands and Dutch mercantile houses—including expelled Iberian Jews—reaped the profits. Their taxes that accrued to the Spanish Habsburg Crown in the first half of the sixteenth century from this eastern transoceanic trade amounted to seven times the sum derived from the revenues accruing from the legendary South American transatlantic silver fleets.

The ocean crossings have been viewed as European-Christian success stories, their cultures as superior (in the writing of these cultures' scholars). When Magellan, a Portuguese captain in the service of the Spanish Crown, circumnavigated the tip of South America in 1519, he and his crew almost perished because he underestimated the Pacific's size and fell short of food. Through a Malay interpreter, whom he had made his indentured servant in Malacca and who had travelled back with him to Europe, he established contact with Southeast Asian island peoples. But believing in the superiority of his arms and his religion, he "bumped" into resident peoples so harshly that he was killed in 1521. In that year the Portuguese made the Moluccas, the center of spice production, their colony, and Cortez conquered the Mexica (Aztec) state for Spain. The Iberians had established themselves at strategic points across the seas.

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[21] Critical views and collections of documents include Wolfgang Reinhard, *Geschichte der europäischen Expansion*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1983–1985); Eberhard Schmitt, *Die Anfänge der europäischen Expansion* (Idstein, Germany, 1991); Bennassar and Chaunu, *L'ouverture du monde*.

[22] Since landowner-peasant relations were far less onerous in the Ottomans' realm than in the Christian dynasties, a popular sense of "Turkish" liberation needed to be countered by the media's propaganda. Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, 109–110.

In the 1560s, the Spanish established a transpacific "galleon" route from Acapulco, Mexico, to Manila, Philippines, that relied in part on Chinese shipwrights and sailors and on the trading connections of the Southeast Asian Seas' Chinese diaspora. Commerce and rule changed from the protocols of the Indian Ocean and the tribute regime of the East Asian Seas to the gunpowder empires of European dynasties. States and stateless pirates temporarily cooperated: The dynasties of Europe's Atlantic littoral, with the English Tudor one at the forefront, commissioned private ship-borne entrepreneurs, "buccaneers," to wage war and acquire territories and resources. The commissioning dynasty shared the spoils of this privatization of warfare.[23]

One result of Europe's fifteenth and sixteenth century expansion was the development of a worldwide web of colonial migrations from Europe outward. Another was the flight from invaders. Forced, compelled, or free labor migrations to centers of investment also emerged. Plantation-agriculture required forced in-migration of working men and women. Meanwhile, the transoceanic import of foods and stimulants changed patterns of life, agricultural production, and labor requirements in the metropoles of the new empires.

Continuities and Adaptations in the South and East Asian Seas to the Early Nineteenth Century

From the early 1500s to the British Empire's 1840s war-imposed sale of opium to the Chinese Empire's population and during the nineteenth century era of "unequal treaties," the states of East and Southeast Asia had to face the presence of the armed trader-intruders. Under the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) the China Seas were governed by a system of tribute relations. These were, essentially, an expression of the Chinese world order (*Hua-Yi*), a historically evolved hierarchy of "civilized" and "barbarian" peoples. The tribute system established interstate protocols that ensured continuity of trade and safety of sea voyaging. Intellectuals shared the ideal of this hierarchy extending outward from the Middle Kingdom (*Zhonghua*) but also from Japan and Vietnam. Hierarchies were negotiable. Even under European pressure

[23] Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480–1630* (Cambridge, 1984); Josemaria S. Luengo, *A History of the Manila-Acapulco Slave Trade (1565–1815)* (Tubigon, Phil., 1996).

the tribute system's concept of hierarchical mutuality, of subordinate position towards China or Japan in exchange for protection, did not disappear easily or quickly.

The merchants from China's southern provinces continued their southbound voyages, imperial prohibitions since 1435 notwithstanding, and the littorals along the sea lanes had become an arena of economic activity for migrating Chinese. Their diasporic communities consisted at first of sojourners, whose length of stay depended on the monsoons, then of permanent residents. Long-term "head guests," for example in Siam, oversaw or ruled the communities and, before returning home, often placed younger "new guests," bound to them by a loan for cost of passage, to continue their influence. Merchants, from permanent communities in Malacca, Manila, Batavia, and elsewhere, traded with *Nanyang*—in Chinese all of the Southeast Asian World. Miners sailed for the tin lodes in southern Thailand and the Malay Peninsula and for the gold deposits in Borneo. In the 1560s the Imperial Court relaxed its policy of a "Great Wall" towards the seas. Connections increased again and the "Overseas Chinese," a term that came into use only in the later nineteenth century, included miners, merchants, artisans, and pilgrims, from five distinct cultural groups in the Fujian and Guangdong provinces.[24]

Europeans had encountered these communities as they established their own fortified trading headquarters: the Portuguese in Malacca, 1511; the Spanish in Manila, 1570; the Dutch in Batavia (now Jakarta) 1619; and the British in Penang and Singapore, 1786 and 1819.[25] Chinese became the main intermediaries in colonial economies as well as in dealings of colonizers with resident peoples. As tax farmers for local rulers or the colonizers they incurred the wrath of local populations. Given their language knowledge, their familiarity with the region's varying customs, as well as their nautical experience, they handled much of the trade between Europeans and local producers. They took advantage of the widespread market and commercial opportunities of late-imperial China and could pursue and develop economic possibilities. Although Chinese were second-class citizens in European

[24] Pin-tsun Chang, "The Evolution of Chinese Thought on the Maritime Foreign Trade from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century," *Intl. Journal of Maritime History* 1.1 (1989), 51–64.

[25] Hong Kong, a trading place since the Tang period, was occupied by the British only in 1841 and ceded by the Chinese government in 1842.

colonies, they enjoyed privileges compared to indigenous populations. Their overseas bases also provided them with respite from greedy officials in China.[26]

To impose their rule, the colonizers dealt directly with local rulers and preferred the European practices of treaties to regional tribute regimes as the principle of international relations. They imagined international relations to be based on sovereign and territorially defined nation states or colonized entities. Yet most nineteenth century treaties, in flagrant contradiction to the principle of territorial sovereignty, opened to Europeans access to Asian societies and to the purchasing and laboring power of the respective populations.

Only a small number of Europeans migrated into the Indian Ocean or beyond: sailors involved in the trade between Asian ports, missionaries and Jesuit scholars, and a few administrators. The Portuguese never totaled more than 12,000–14,000 male adults, including clerics of other European backgrounds. Europe also remained marginal to Asia's trade. 85 percent of the spice trade remained within Asia and only 14 percent of the ginger and pepper from Sumatra and southwestern India, cinnamon from Ceylon, nutmeg and mace from the Banda islands, and cloves from the Moluccas, were sold to Europe and 1 percent to America.[27] Within Europe, the Portuguese and Spanish states, in a way marginalized themselves. Their ruling nobilities' contempt for both commerce and the merchant class resulted in loss of control over the profitable distribution of imports. The better-financed Dutch merchants, organized as the Dutch East India Company from 1602, assumed control over many Portuguese posts.

The Dutch, in turn were dislocated by the British Empire when it ended reliance on chartered pirates ("buccaneers") and established rule first through chartered merchant associations, the East India Company (after 1600), then by direct rule in what they called "British" India. Traditional intercultural practices continued. In Calicut, merchants from the Malabar Coast traded with Bengalese, Deccans, Chetti, Arabs, Persians, Turks, Somalians, and Maghrebinians. During their long sojourns many intermarried with local women. European traders, in contrast, would avoid marriage and live in concubinal

[26] Philip A. Kuhn, "Why China Historians Should Study the Chinese Diaspora, and Vice-versa," *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 2.2 (Nov. 2006), 163–172.

[27] Schmitt, *Anfänge*, 60–73.

arrangements. The British merchants, like all other private entrepreneurs from Europe, relied on state support—i.e. they had taxpayers cover their risks.[28] Paul Kennedy has emphasized the comparative advantage of great powers and Henri Brunschwig, analyzing the mid-nineteenth century British advocacy of "free trade," bluntly concluded: "*free* trade, if it was to be profitable, assumed the existence of an unchallengeable fleet and points of supply on all world routes." Such power imposed the seventeenth and eighteenth century forced transatlantic mass migrations of Africans and the nineteenth century mass migration of indentured Asian workers and they framed the "free" nineteenth century transatlantic proletarian mass migrations.[29]

From a West African-Iberian to a Transoceanic Black Atlantic

After the first, oft-neglected West African-Iberian phase of the Black Atlantic ended, the second White Euro-North American and Euro-Caribbean Atlantic became central for framing the narrative of intercontinental connections. Conquistadors, investors, and planters moved with capital and firepower to enforce claims to territories belonging to other peoples or states. In terms of number of migrants, until the 1820s Africans and not Europeans were the largest group of migrants across the Atlantic. The profitability of the "New (i.e. Colonized) World" depended on the labor of African captive men and women. Without them no societies and economies would have emerged from the Caribbean to the Carolinas and to Brazil.

Sub-Saharan West Africa, where the Black Atlantic emanated, was internally traversable by north-south flowing rivers. In the interior, the Niger River connected the hinterland to cities as developed as European ones.[30] For centuries West African products and human beings

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[28] Frédéric Mauco, "Merchant Communities, 1350–1750," in James D. Tracy, ed., *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750* (Cambridge, 1990), 278–279; Irfan Habib, "Merchant Communities in Precolonial India," ibid., 371–399.

[29] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York, 1987); Henri Brunschwig, *French Colonialism, 1871–1914: Myths and Realities*, transl. from the French by William G. Brown (London, 1966), quote p. 6 (emphasis added); Jan C. Breman, *Taming the Coolie Beast: Plantation Society and the Colonial Order in Southeast Asia* (Delhi, 1987), 24–36.

[30] Kevin Shillington, *History of Africa* (New York, 1989), 190; Curtin et al., *African History*; John Iliffe, *Africans. The History of a Continent* (Cambridge, 1995).

had also been traded via the trans-Saharan trade to the Mediterranean. (Deserts, like oceans, need not be separating spaces.) With transatlantic routes established from Iberian Europe to the Caribbean Islands and Brazil around 1500 and from Western Europe to North America around 1600, White and Black interacted through seafaring. But once the conquistadors had carried off the loot, investors in plantation production changed the character of the transatlantic connection into distinct Black and White Atlantics.

Human bondage and captivity, the major characteristic of the Black Atlantic, had existed in the tri-continental World for millennia: rights-in-persons bondage in societies of the African savannah and further south, the last vestiges of the Mediterranean slavery, and—unconnected but conceptually similar—in transalpine Europe serfdom and semi-bound servant status.[31] Bondage was not color-coded:[32] poverty, religious conflict, warfare, and power hierarchies between groups of different status (or class), genders, and religions were determining factors. Bound and free status formed two extremes on a continuum. Out of such heterogeneous forces, histories, and regions a sequence of Black Atlantics developed. The dichotomy between a Black, slave Atlantic and a White, so-called free Atlantic of agricultural settlers and, later, proletarian mass migrations obscures the social and sexual interactiveness of the plantation regime.

In the *second* Black Atlantic, Europeans imposed the regime of "chattel slavery," the commodification of human beings, under ideologies justifying White domination of Black or Christian domination of "Heathen" across African regions, the coastal South and West European seafaring states, and the emerging colonial and Creole

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[31] Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff, eds., *Slavery in Africa. Historical and Anthropological Perspectives* (Madison, 1977); Paul E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa* (Cambridge, 1983); Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy, eds., *Pawnship in Africa. Debt Bondage in Historical Perspective* (Boulder, Colo., 1994). For Mediterranean slavery: Charles Verlinden, *L'esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale*, 2 vols. (Bruges, 1955–77); Jacques Heers, *Esclaves et domestiques au Moyen-âge dans le monde méditerranéen* (Paris, 1981). For serfdom: Gerhard Jaritz and Albert Müller, eds., *Migration in der Feudalgesellschaft* (Frankfurt/Main, 1988); Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., *Change in Medieval Society. Europe North of the Alps, 1050–1500* (New York, 1964). In the tradition of the concept of bound servants in England, one Anglo-Caribbean governor called free Africans "unappropriated people." See Jerome S. Handler, *The Unappropriated People. Freedmen in the Slave Society in Barbados* (Baltimore, 1974).

[32] In Europe "black as ebony" was a reference to beauty, as was "black as lacquer work" in China.

societies of both Americas (see map 12). Under the demand for "laboring bodies" Africa's coastal societies were reorganized whenever "a warrior transformed a cohort of young, unmarried men into an armed band." Recognizing economic opportunity, such warrior states commodified their neighbors with the help of weapons provided by Europeans.[33] The transport was then organized by Europeans and Creole Whites.

The ocean-crossing or "Middle Passage" involved issues of shipping technology (discussed by Yrjö Kaukiainen in chapter thirteen in this volume) and several distinct triangular patterns of voyaging depending on where ships were owned—Great Britain, France, New England, Denmark, or other places—and distinct circuits of profit accumulation. On board ship, a triple hierarchy placed captains and officers on top, sailors far below, and the human commodified cargo ever further down the social scale. For the newly enslaved the trip could be deadly. On average 15 to 20 percent did not survive the abominable conditions and psychological strain. Racial denominations between the three strata on board were complex. Officers and sailors were White but divided by a chasm of class and often brutally exerted authority. Sailors were punished by whipping just as they punished the "cargo" by whipping. The White-Black dichotomy between sailors was threatened by any slave "mutiny"—correctly: an attempt at self-liberation—as much the officers were threatened by it. But sailors could be of many colors of skin and White and Black "tars" often worked along side each other in one single crew and one single exploited condition with the same skills and loyalties. Free African-origin sailors were part of Canadian and British shipping. White sailors would mingle with both black slaves and free Africans in the majority of the Atlantic's port cities. Both on board slavers and on board of merchant vessels with mixed crews, the Atlantic World's Black-and-White interaction was particularly intense.[34]

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[33] Janet J. Ewald, *Soldiers, Traders and Slaves: State Formation and Economic Transformation in the Greater Nile Valley, 1700–1885* (Madison, 1990), and, Ewald, "Slavery in Africa and the Slave Trades from Africa," *Am. Hist. Rev.* 97 (1992), 465–485, quote p. 479.

[34] Marcus Rediker, *The Slave Ship: A Human History* (New York, 2007); Emma Christopher, *Slave Ship Sailors and Their Captive Cargoes, 1730–1807* (Cambridge, 2006); W. Jeffrey Bolster, *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).

In the "New World" or, from the beliefs of the enslaved, in the dark world of sorcerers that had torn them out of their homes and social networks, the slave populations on the plantations changed constantly: Ira Berlin has differentiated "*charter generations*, defined as the first arrivals, their children, and in some cases their grandchildren; the *plantation generations* forced to grow the great staples; and the *revolutionary generations*, who grasped the promise of freedom and faced a resurgent slave regime."[35] At first free African translators and middlemen as well as bi-cultural Euro-African *métis*, the children of European—mostly Portuguese—men and African women, played important roles. These Atlantic Creoles (Berlin's term) had the linguistic and negotiating capabilities to make intercultural contact and trade in "bodies" possible. Crossing the Atlantic they continued their roles as brokers and facilitators. Out of this "founding" period emerged the Black Atlantic of slavery with human commodity-trading companies registered in the ports of Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, and Britain to provide mass labor for European-, Creole-, and Mulatto-owned plantations or "factories in the fields."[36]

The slave-supplying spaces expanded inland from Africa's Atlantic littoral and, via the southern Indian Ocean, to East Africa's Mozambique as well as Madagascar. In the early seventeenth century, Black catchers and White traders exported approximately 10,000 men and women annually; and trade more than doubled after 1650. The massive trade of the eighteenth century declined only slowly in the face of prohibitions of slave trading after 1810, and then precipitously after 1850 (see chapter nine by Hoerder in this volume).[37] Over the whole period of around 1500 to 1870, 11–12 million African men and women were embarked, 9–10 million disembarked—two million perished during the voyage. For enslaved Blacks the White-managed Atlantic shipping routes were a graveyard. On the African side, deaths during raids and

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[35] Ira Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge, 1998), 12, and Berlin, "From Creole to African: Atlantic Creoles and the Origins of African-American Society in Mainland North America," *William and Mary Quart*., 3rd ser., 53.2 (April 1996), 251–288; Peter Gerhard, "A Black Conquistador in Mexico," *Hispanic American Hist. Rev*. 58.3 (August 1978), 451–459; Peter Boyd-Bowman, "Negro Slaves in Early Colonial Mexico," *The Americas* 26 (Oct. 1969), 134–151.

[36] Wolf, *Europe and the People without History*.

[37] The designation "illegal" trade for the period after the prohibition of the trade by European powers remains a Euro-centric term. From the point of view of those enslaved "chattel slavery" never had any legality.

the march to the coast increase these mortality figures. On the American side, owner and overseer imposed working conditions and the low cost of a transatlantic shipment of replacement workers led to death rates that, according to Emmer, constituted a demographic catastrophe second only to the decimation of Native Peoples. This depletion changed the sending regions' population development for centuries.[38]

In the course of weeks, months, and sometimes years, men and women in bondage had to learn new languages to communicate with captors, co-captives of other cultures, and new society. They adjusted to changing customs and environments, often repeatedly. They might assume new identities. Those who survived were adaptable and resilient. They needed to observe closely and be circumspect since punishment was always imminent.

In the Americas the slave colonies quickly evolved into Creole societies extending from the Rio de la Plata via the Bahamas to the Carolinas with some slave enclaves along the Pacific Coast. Racism of European slave owners did not preclude carnal relations. Métissage was common where most Europeans were Catholic while rigorous segregation was the practice in Protestant Dutch and Anglo societies.[39]

Slaves were brought to England in the sixteenth century and in eighteenth century France some 4,000–5,000 Africans have been identified.

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[38] Michèle Duchet, "Reactions to the Problem of the Slave Trade: an Historical and Ideological Study," in *The African Slave Trade from the Fifteenth to Nineteenth Century*, ed. Unesco (Paris, 1979), 31–54; Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade. A Census* (Madison, 1969), 47–49, 268, table 77. Piet C. Emmer, "Immigration into the Caribbean: The Introduction of Chinese and East Indian Indentured Laborers between 1839–1917," in *European Expansion and Migration: Essays on the Intercontinental Migration from Africa, Asia, and Europe*, eds. Emmer and Magnus Mörner (New York, 1992), 245–276, esp. 245–247; Patrick Manning, *Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental and African Slave Trades* (Cambridge, 1990); Martin A. Klein, "The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on the Societies of the Western Sudan," in *The Atlantic Slave Trade. Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe*, eds. Joseph E. Inikori and Stanley L. Engerman (Durham, N.C, 1992), 25–47; Robert E. Conrad, *World of Sorrow. The African Slave Trade to Brazil* (Baton Rouge, 1986).

[39] David B. Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966); Nathan I. Huggins, *Black Odyssey. The Afro-American Ordeal in Slavery* (1st ed., 1977; New York, 1979); Martin L. Kilson and Robert I. Rotberg, eds., *The African Diaspora. Interpretive Essays* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976); Herbert S. Klein, *African Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean* (New York, 1986), and Klein, *The Middle Passage. Comparative Studies in the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Princeton, 1978); Kátia M. de Queiros Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil, 1550–1880* 4th ed. (New Brunswick, 1994); Barbara Bush, *Slave Women in Caribbean Society, 1650–1838* (Bloomington, 1990); Darien Davis, *Slavery and Beyond: the African Impact on Latin America and the Caribbean* (Wilmington, Del., 1995); and many others.

A history of "Black Europe" is being recovered. During these centuries, Africans were present in Europe in a variety of functions. African saints, Benedetto il Moro and Mauritius, were venerated as were Black Virgins, reflecting fertility cults transmitted through the Iberian-African connection.[40]

Thus the coda "Black Atlantic," *in the second phase from about 1500 to the early 1800s*, refers to specific regions in three continents rimming the separating as well as connecting ocean and accommodating interconnected arenas of forced mobilization of men and women for distant work sites and, after arrival, equally forced immobilization by the owners (until further sale). The Black Atlantic and the White Atlantic were integral parts of one economic regime.

The White Atlantic

With the exception of the Normans and Basque and Bristol fishing crews, the northern and the southern Atlantic Ocean, stormy in fall and winter, remained uncharted in 1600. Crossings were few, except between Spain and New Spain and between Portugal and Brazil. Outbound voyages to the Indian Ocean and the colonies followed a north-south course, but because of the westerly winds they often crossed to easternmost South America before crossing back to the Cape. Before 1600 the fishing banks off Newfoundland and, around 1600, the fur trade with Native Peoples in Gulf of the St. Lawrence and Hudson Rivers increased the number of northern crossings only slightly. Under poor conditions—storms, adverse winds, or no wind—a crossing could take up to three months. Voyages of settlers remained negligible compared to the Caribbean-bound sailings, not to mention the intense seaborne exchanges of the Indian Ocean and of bounded seas like the South China Sea.

With only limited regard for First Peoples ("Indians" according to Columbus's misnomer) the European powers and the economic

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[40] Selected titles from hundreds of publications include: Erick Noël, *Être Noir en France au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 2006); Sylvie Chalaye, ed., "Traces noires de l'Histoire en Occident," *Africultures* 64 (juillet–septembre 2005), 3–143; Monique Scheer, "From Majesty to Mystery: Change in the Meaning of Black Madonnas from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries," *Am. Hist. Rev.* 107.5 (Dec. 2002), 1412–1440; Folarin Olawale Shyllan, *Black People in Britain, 1555–1833* (Oxford, 1977); James Walvin, *Black and White: The Negro and English Society, 1555–1945* (London, 1973); Alan Cobley, "Black West Indies Seamen in the British Merchant Marine in the Mid-nineteenth Century," *History Workshop Journ.* 58 (2004), 259–274.

interests within them engaged in transatlantic rivalries, first over the northern fisheries, then the fur trade, and finally over possessions in the Caribbean. From 1689 to 1763, warfare between the English (later British) and French Empires extended to the colonies, requiring transatlantic transport of armies and provisions as well as of lumber and mast pines for navy shipyards in Europe. Along the coast from New England to Nova Scotia, shipbuilding for the Atlantic trade and, later, for the clipper-run tea trade to British India flourished. It came to a sudden end when iron hulls replaced wooden ones. In the eighteenth century, the New York and New England merchants inserted themselves in the several triangular trades between the North American, Caribbean, and African ports and between the Caribbean, the North American, and the British ports. A French triangular trade also developed. While the Atlantic was a connecting sphere for commerce, distance complicated the colonizer powers' control over their colonial subjects. Validating a colonial law or executive decision through assent from the respective administration in Europe could take a year or longer. French and English as well as Portuguese and Spanish Creole, i.e. colony-born, people thus felt themselves entitled to act independently.

Monolingual historians of individual nation states implicitly divided study of the Atlantic in unrelated northern and southern parts. Sailings to North America were British and, until 1763, French and thus departed from northwestern Europe; those destined for South America departed from Iberian Europe. Only in the Caribbean did the powers act in proximity. European Wars, extending from the revolutionary and anti-revolutionary phases to Napoleonic imperial aggression and the reactionary countermoves of the Holy Alliance, permitted the colonists in the Americas to gain independence. Beginning with the last quarter of the eighteenth century transatlantic relations in the north linked independent states. At this time, the migrations of indentured servants from Europe (who paid off their passage through bound labor lasting three to seven years), which had accelerated in the mid-eighteenth century, came to an end. Free migrations resumed after 1815 and became ever more voluminous after the 1830s, building toward the age of proletarian mass migrations, 1870–1914.

As narrow state approaches to history have been challenged, the concept of an "Atlantic World" has gained currency. Compared to the Mediterranean or the East and Southeast Asian Seas, the Atlantic was not a "World." Interaction was less intense, cultural mediation by merchants and other interpreters less developed, and conflicts more

accentuated. Nevertheless it is helpful to contrast this entire macro-region (and not just the northern White Atlantic) to the Worlds of the Pacific and those of the Indian Ocean.[41]

The Pacific[42]

Although the Pacific is easier to navigate than the Atlantic, its vastness made it a barrier that discouraged connecting voyages. Magellan's mis-estimate has been mentioned. In the South Pacific, a Tahitian seafarer, Tupaia, navigated James Cook's later voyages, 1768–1779, to distant islands. (He knew of perhaps as many as 130 of them.) Not all peoples of the islands were expert navigators. When those who were came to know the compass they did not use it—they knew directions.

The transpacific migrations and transport of goods began in the sixteenth century when well-armed Iberians from New Spain crossed from Acapulco to the Philippines. After 1570, a regular galleon trade connected the Philippines to the Americas, involving many peoples, labor regimes, and migration systems. The Iberian Atlantic colonizers financed the Asia trade with silver mined by "Indios," compelled into long-distance migrations to the Peruvian Andes. In Southeast Asia they bought luxury goods, produced along the sea lanes, through Chinese diaspora merchants. In this first phase of the Pacific Migration System, the powerful Iberians enslaved native Filipino, Chinese, and some

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[41] Donna Gabaccia, "A Long Atlantic in a Wider World," *Atlantic Studies* 1 (2004), 1–27. For a conceptualization in red-white-black see David Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," in *The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800*, eds. Armitage and M.J. Braddick (New York, 2002), 11–27. "Red" Atlantic refers to the proletarian World of sailors, see Marcus Rediker, "The Red Atlantic; or, 'a terrible blast swept over the heaving sea,'" in *Sea Changes: Historicizing the Ocean*, eds. Bernhard Klein and Gesa Mackenthun (New York, 2004), 111–130. For sailors on slave ships see Emma Christopher, *Slave Ship Sailors and Their Cargoes, 1730–1807* (New York, 2006). Integrated views of the (North) Atlantic include Alan L. Karras, and John R. McNeill, eds., *Atlantic American Societies. From Columbus through Abolition 1492–1888* (London, 1992); Wim Klooster and Alfred Padula, eds., *The Atlantic World: Essays on Slavery, Migration, and Imagination* (Upper Saddle River, N.J., 2005); Carole Shammas and Elizabeth Mancke, eds., *The Creation of the British Atlantic World* (Baltimore, 2005); and Dirk Hoerder, ed., *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies. The European and North American Working Classes During the Period of Industrialization* (Westport, Ct., 1985).

[42] This section is based on Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, Chap. 7, and on an unpublished paper "Men and Women in the Pacific Migration System: the Images and the Data," July 2007.

Japanese men and women and transported them to their American colonies. Chinese merchants, artisans, and laborers migrated voluntarily and Chinese ship carpenters, with skills and technologies superior to those of Europeans, built the Spanish-style galleons in Manila and Acapulco. Thus three regional migration systems extending over three continents and two oceans interacted through the new fourth, transpacific system. By 1600, 1.5 percent of Lima's population was of Asian origin, but few were women so no lasting ethno-cultural enclave emerged.[43]

In the two centuries that followed, small numbers of migrants from Asia continued to arrive in America without permission and free Chinese migrated to the Hawaiian islands. By the 1780s, the British East India Company (engaged in global competition for the northern fur trade with the transatlantic Hudson's Bay Company) relied on Chinese sailors and craftsmen to traverse the Pacific and establish a trading base on Vancouver Island. As European empires began in the early 1800s to debate ending African slavery, indentured Chinese laborers were sent on a trial basis to the plantations in British Trinidad and Portuguese Brazil. As it abolished slavery in the 1830s, Great Britain imposed on British India a regime of indentured labor intended for the British-capitalized plantation belt, thus initiating what would become the second phase of the Pacific Migration system after 1840.

Seaborne migrations are in some ways comparable to landside ones: Routes follow natural environments, whether streams and mountains or currents and winds. Traveling may be determined by seasons. Roads may be impassable in winter snow or summer heat, sea lanes during

[43] The vast literature on transpacific exchanges is hardly used by scholars concentrating on "ethnicity" in the United States and Canada. See for example William L. Schurz, *The Manila Galleon* (New York: Dutton, 1939), 5–50; Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Introduction. The Pacific Rim's Past Deserves a Future," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Pacific Rim*, eds. Sally M. Miller, A.J.H. Latham, and Dennis O. Flynn (London, 1998), 1–18; Evelyn Hu-DeHart, "Latin America in Asia-Pacific Perspective," in *What Is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea*, ed. Arif Dirlik, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md., 1998), 251–282. Studies on migration to Hawai'i have been published by Clarence E. Glick (1980), Ronald Takaki (1983), John M. Liu (1984), Alan T. Moriyama (1985), and others. The early standard work for the U.S. was Lucie Cheng and Edna Bonacich, eds., *Labor Immigration Under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the United States Before World War II* (Berkeley, Cal., 1984), 186–209. A first survey was Ronald T. Takaki's *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (Boston, 1989).

winter storms or seasonally adverse monsoons. While land routes permit stopovers and perhaps unplanned decisions to stay or settle before the intended destination is reached, seas required completion of the voyage. Scholarly approaches to sea and ocean history are unthinkable without consideration of the rims, port cities, and littoral societies in particular. Sea travel, before the coming of the railroads in the 1830s, was faster and cheaper than any kind of land travel. For migrants, who not only have to pay the passage but also cannot earn wages during the voyage, both are important considerations.

Seafaring in the centuries before the changes from the 1830s to the 1930s established and expanded traditional connectivities across vast oceanic expanses. Goods and people were moved over long distances and in many directions. Out of the end of the transatlantic slave trading connection emerged the transoceanic free and indentured Asian labor migrations and, later the European proletarian mass migration. Over-seas connections are not specific to nineteenth century imperial reach or to the age of steamships but, as Adam McKeown analyzes in Chapter 2, numbers of migrants multiplied.

A WORLD MADE MANY: INTEGRATION AND SEGREGATION IN GLOBAL MIGRATION, 1840–1940

Adam McKeown

Oceans connect. They also divide. In other words, oceans have histories: not only technological and environmental histories of distances, currents, and navigation but also social, political, and cultural histories of human intervention into the organization of space. These are histories of both integration and segregation. These histories are often hard to track. The depiction of integration or fragmentation is often relative, dependant on how previous eras are depicted. Moreover, convergence and divergence often take place simultaneously, and the perception of those processes will vary according to what is being analyzed. Most significantly, the representation of convergence or divergence is often entwined with deep intellectual, political, and cultural assumptions.

The global wave of transoceanic mass migration from the 1840s to 1930s exhibited these trends of simultaneous integration and segregation. These migrations were truly global phenomena that left few parts of the world untouched. They were entangled with the economic and political transformations that also spanned the world after the industrial revolution, both as flows of human intercourse generated and channeled by those transformations, and as agents that actively carried those transformations deeper into the urban cores and distant frontiers of the world. The Atlantic and Southeast Asian Seas were important conduits of these increasingly dense, multidirectional connections. Grounded in connections established over the previous half millennium, these flows (with the exception of those leaving Africa and some seafaring groups such as the Malays and Bugis) greatly expanded in terms of numbers, varied origins, new destinations, and diverse peoples over the course of the nineteenth century. The Indian Ocean was also an important space of mobility during the mass migration, although it is hard to distinguish the space of the ocean from that of the British Empire in understanding this mobility. Moreover, as one of the main regions of world oceanic mobility for over two thousand years, the diversity of peoples and destinations may actually have decreased during this more recent phase of migration. Finally,

the Pacific Ocean, despite a brief surge of interaction from the mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, became more of a border to human mobility by the end of the nineteenth century. The same is true for the waterways that connected the major oceans, which increasingly became lines of segregation rather than channels of integration over the course of the century.

These concurrent trends of integration and segregation took place not only in terms of the material distribution of people, but also corresponded to growing discrepancies in material wealth and power, and intensified understandings of social and cultural differences. We now take for granted the macro-divisions of the world into categories such as East and West, the seven continents, or developed and undeveloped as natural historical divisions that increased interaction will overcome. But actually, these are divisions that emerged hand in hand with the great forces of interconnection and integration over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These conceptual macro-divisions, such as that drawn across the Pacific or those that divided Europe from Africa and Asia, were the very same spaces where many of the first institutions of modern border control were pioneered. Cultural and political insistence on difference helped to justify these border institutions, which, in turn, helped make some differences into realities. Perhaps the greatest effect of these borders is that they helped to exclude many parts of the world from inclusion into the grand narratives of world history, even as they were becoming increasingly integrated into the very processes of that history.

I have made the case elsewhere for the global scale and increased segregation of global migration from the 1830s to 1920s.[1] After briefly summarizing that work here, I want to consider its implications for our understanding of migration history.[2] At the very least, it provides more material for the comparative study of migration flows. It can also suggest ways to think more carefully about the effects of human mobility, and even about the causes and nature of inequalities and

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[1] Adam McKeown, "Chinese Emigration in Global Context, 1850-1940," *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010), 95–124; "Global Migration, 1846–1940" *Journal of World History* 15 (2004), 155–189; and *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York, 2008), 43–65.

[2] I am grateful to ideas expressed by the participants at the Connecting Oceans conference, and especially to a conversation over lunch with Dirk Hoerder and Henry Yu. Many ideas in this paper have also emerged from extensive discussions with Tiffany Trimmer. I am solely to blame for any misconstruals of what I heard.

differences in world history. But this is only a first step, using awareness of global migration patterns as new fodder for old questions. The questions of comparative migration studies were themselves shaped by the assumption that the great majority of historical migrations took place across the Atlantic. How has this assumption shaped the questions that we ask and, indeed, our very understanding of what migration is? What kind of histories can we now write that begin to show how past ideas, institutions, and migrants have made it possible to ask those questions and accept those assumptions so easily?

Global Migration in the First Great Wave

Migration has been a part of the human condition at least since *homo erectus* spread across Eurasia. With a few notable exceptions, such as the transatlantic migrations, it is difficult to obtain reliable estimates of migrations before the nineteenth century. But it seems clear that a large increase in long distance mobility across oceans and continents took place in the nineteenth century.[3] Over 160 million long distance voyages can be counted from the 1840s to 1920s. Over time, the number of these voyages increased more rapidly than world population, rising from 0.36 percent of the planet's population in the 1850s to 0.96 percent in the 1880s, 1.67 percent in the 1900s, and then declining to 1.58 percent in the 1920s. These must be augmented by the many millions more migrants who traveled short distances, and across or within land borders where they were difficult to count. It was a world on the move.[4]

Rather than oceans, the most convenient way to categorize the broad patterns of these long distance migrations is in terms of the three major frontier destinations of the Americas, Southeast Asia, and northern Asia. Each frontier received the vast majority of its migrants from different sending regions. Over 55 million migrants moved from Europe and the Middle East to the Americas, along with another 3 million from East Asia and India. Over 50 million migrants from South Asia and South China moved to Southeast Asia, Australia and

[3] Jan and Leo Lucassen, "The Mobility Transition Revisited 1500–1900: What the Case of Europe Can Offer to Global History," *Journal of Global History* 10 (2009), 347–77, shows a very large increase in emigration and urban migration in Europe in the nineteenth century, but not in other kinds of migration.


[4] For sources in this section, see McKeown, "Global Migration," 186–189.

islands throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans, along with another 5 million people from the Middle East and Europe. And over 48 million migrants traveled from North China, Russia, Korea and Japan to Central Asia, Siberia and Manchuria. These migrations contributed to a significant redistribution of the world's population. All three destination frontiers grew at twice the rate of world population (two and a half times in the Americas), accounting for 10 percent of the world's population in 1850 and 24 percent in 1950. Population growth in the sending regions of Europe and South Asia, however, was slightly lower than world rates, and in China it was less than 30 percent of world rates.[5]

Each major sending and receiving region experienced similar per capita migration rates. The perspective of the receiving regions, the approximately 35 million migrants who moved into the 4.1 million square kilometers of Southeast Asia from 1870 to 1930, compares quite favorably to the 39 million migrants that moved into the 9.8 million square kilometers of the United States over the same period. In terms of emigration, peak annual rates from areas of similar size and population, such as Italy and Norway in the 1900s or the emigrant provinces of Guangdong, Hubei and Shandong in China in the 1920s, were quite similar, ranging from 8 to 11 migrants per thousand (although islands, from the South Pacific to the Caribbean to Iceland, sometimes had emigration rates of over 20 per thousand). In terms of broader regional populations, emigration from Europe from 1846 to 1940 amounted to 15.4 percent of the European population in 1900, compared to 11.3 percent in China and 10.4 percent in South Asia. This is a significant difference, but one of degree rather than magnitude.

These migrations followed similar long-term cycles (fig. 2). They all expanded gradually until the 1870s, with the North Asian migrations gaining steam a bit more slowly than the other two. After a brief slowdown in the mid-1870s, they began to pick up again in the 1880s. They exploded in the mid-1890s until World War One, with global migration reaching peaks of over 3 million a year around 1910, during which transatlantic migration reached a spectacular peak of over 2.1 million in 1913, and migration to Southeast and North Asia also reached unprecedented peaks of nearly 1.1 million a year around

[5] Population data is from Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, *Atlas of World Population History* (London, 1978).




Source: Adam McKeown, "Global Migration, 1846–1940" *Journal of World History* 15 (2004), 165.

Figure 2 Global Migration, 1846–1990

1912. In the 1920s, global migration reached new heights of 3.5 million a year in the early 1920s. The U.S. immigration law of 1924 put a brake on the transatlantic migrations, but Asian migration reached new peaks of 1.25 million migrants to Southeast Asia in 1927 and 1.5 million to North Asia in 1929. The Great Depression marked an end to this first great wave, although the coercion and persuasion exerted by the command economies of Japan and the Soviet Union generated new peaks of up to 1.8 million migrants a year into North Asia by the mid-1930s.

These long-term trends give evidence of the broad existence of migration around the world. The most impressive evidence of the increasing integration of global migration can be found in short-term cycles. Rates of return migration correspond well with employment cycles: when employment abroad is high return rates are low, and vice versa. The return rates to Europe from the United States, and to India and to China from all destinations grew increasingly similar after the 1890s, not only in terms of the timing of the cycles, but even in absolute proportions (see fig. 3). Around the world, the economic conditions shaping migration flows were increasingly integrated.




Source: Susan Cater, et al., *Historical Statistics of United States*, vol. 1 (New York, 2006), 547–8; Kingsley Davis, *Population of India and Pakistan* (New York, 1951), 100; Mckeown, "Global Migrations," 186–189.

Figure 3 Return Migrants as Proportion of Emigrants, 1870–1937


Even as migration cycles converged, directions and systems grew increasingly segregated. In the mid-nineteenth century, the systems were much less distinct, with Asians, Europeans, and Africans crossing more frequently to outside oceans and frontiers. By the 1880s, however, the great majority of migrants stayed within these three systems. The patterns of global migration grew more segregated even as the flows increased and the cycles converged. Interaction did not overcome differences. It grew hand in hand with them.

For example, from the 1850s to 1870s, up to 40 percent of migrants from South China traveled to the Americas and Australia (fig. 4). Nearly 250,000 of them were indentured migrants brought mostly to Peru and Cuba, but over twice that number traveled on their own volition and finances—to the extent of chartering their own ships—to North America and Australia by the mid-1880s. By the 1920s, however, as overall Chinese migration increased twenty-fold, migrations beyond Asia had stagnated. The absolute numbers to places beyond Southeast Asia remained steady, but amounted to less than 5 percent of the total by the late 1920s.



Source: Mckeown, "Global Migration," 189–189.

Figure 4 Chinese Migration, 1850–1940



Source: Davis, *Population of India*, 100; with modifications based on Heidemann, *Kanganies in Sri Lanka*, 99–110.

Figure 5 Indian Migration, 1842–1937

Similar changes happened with migration from South Asia. Shifts in the proportions of migrants beyond Asia are not as dramatic as for the Chinese, but their exclusion from non-Asian destinations was much more complete (fig. 5). Nearly 30 percent of Indian overseas migration in the 1840s and 1850s was to non-Asian destinations, most of it under indenture contracts. By the 1880s the proportion of migration beyond Asia declined to about 5 percent of total migration, and then down to an insignificant trickle by the 1910s. Unlike Chinese, most Indians moving beyond Asia had traveled to islands with few economic opportunities beyond the plantations, reducing the attraction for new migrants and making it difficult to build migration networks before the imposition of exclusionary measures. South Africa and colonies in eastern Africa were the only non-Asian destinations with established Indian communities and economic opportunities to attract new migrants in the early twentieth century—and South Africa excluded Asians as rigorously as any white settler nation around the Pacific.

Migration to northeastern Asia was the most segregated of the three systems, with the fewest migrants leaving to or arriving from places outside of the main receiving and sending regions. But rather than the exclusionary policies that constrained migrants from southern Asia, this was a consequence of proactive settlement policies of the three expanding empires of Russia, China, and Japan, all of which promoted (and, in the cases of Russia and Japan, often managed and coerced) migration as a way to consolidate their control over territory and reinforce borders against their neighbors.[6] The relatively closed system created by these states can even be seen in the way they diverged from or overcame market forces that impacted migrations elsewhere. Return rates of Chinese from Manchuria, available after 1891, do not at all correspond with those for migrations from Europe and southern Asia shown in figure 3.[7] Migration to North Asia even reached new peaks during the middle of the Great Depression, while most other migrations around the world declined.

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[6] Thomas Gottschang and Dana Lary, *Swallows and Settlers: The Great Migration from North China to Manchuria* (Ann Arbor, 2000); Donald Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War* (Princeton, 1957); Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan* (London, 1994).

[7] Gottschang and Lary, *Swallows and Settlers*, 171.

Migration systems around the world were different, but not so distinct that we can assume *a priori* distinctions between Asian and Atlantic migrations. All too often assumptions about the qualitative differences between Asian and European migration have caused Asian migrations to be undercounted. The difference is then explained as the result of earthbound mentalities, tyrannical governments, and isolation from the reach of the global economy. And the migration that is counted is attributed to overpopulation, natural disasters, revolts, or direct European penetration—all causes that have been discredited as causes of long-term mass migration in Europe.[8] The work of integrating world migration into world migration history has still to be done.

Of Glue and Chisels

How, then, can we go about understanding these patterns of convergence and divergence? One approach would be to take the differences for granted and ask, "What is the glue that holds all these migrations together?" Another approach would begin by taking the unity of world history for granted and then wondering, "Why do the forces of globalization produce difference instead of convergence? What are the chisels that pried this world apart?" To consolidate these approaches into a single question, we could ask, "Are the dynamic processes of history to be found in the overcoming or in the creation of borders?" Such questions will generate research and knowledge, precisely because they can never be resolved. They are all grounded in *a priori* dichotomies between movement and borders, between global and local. Any attempt to follow the logic of one of these approaches will lead us straight into the lap of the other.

Most historians, with their area studies training, will be more comfortable asking about the glue. This question starts from assumptions of difference and expresses surprise at the similarities found around the world. It may start from a belief that the numbers, organization, and causes of migration were fundamentally different around the world because of culture, political controls, or economic structure. Or it may

[8] See Sucheta Mazumdar, "Chinese and Indian Migration: A Prospectus for Comparative Research," in Wong Siu-lun, ed., *Chinese and Indian Diasporas: Comparative Perspectives* (Hong Kong, 2004), 139–167; and McKeown, "Global Migration," 168–171.

start from the assumption that mass migration is a product of industrial modernity that had yet to impact the world beyond the Atlantic, except through direct interventions such as indenture, slavery, and colonial corvée. All of these assumptions are ultimately grounded in a broader narrative of world history, in which transatlantic migrations are emblematic of the dislocations, individual mobility, and innovations that transformed the Atlantic world in the nineteenth century, and only subsequently spread to engulf the rest of the world. They do not deny that the nineteenth century world was connected, but they conceive of those connections as something thin and uneven, that would not produce essentially similar patterns of migration around the world.

The challenge then becomes to reconceptualize the nature of those connections. None of this evidence necessarily challenges the idea that, by the late nineteenth century, the nations around the North Atlantic were the engine of the global economy, or that they had undergone more intensive transformation and development than the rest of the world. But it does challenge us to imagine processes of interaction and economic change that were dense and global in scale, yet not homogenous or homogenizing in their effects.

The spread of colonial empires could be plausibly linked to much of this migration.[9] The coercive, managerial, and incentive creating work of the Russian/Soviet and Japanese empires—and to a lesser extent the Qing—is obvious in the facilitation and channeling of migration to North Asia. The politics and infrastructure of the British Empire also shaped the destinations of most emigrants from South Asia and many from Britain. In a very different way, the expansion of Russia and dismemberment of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires encouraged the migration of millions who were expelled, fleeing from violence, or searching for more agreeable ethnic or religious environments in which to settle. And the legacy of empires can be felt even after decolonization, when much international migration, especially from the 1950s to 1970s, moved on paths back and forth between the former imperial metropole and its colonies.

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[9] Adam McKeown, "Regionalizing World Migration," *International Review of Social History* 52 (2007), 135–143, part of a forum organized by Leo Lucassen that includes Ulbe Bosma, David Feldman, Sucheta Mazumdar, Leslie Page Moch, and Prabhu Mohapatra.

Already we can see that the effects of empires were very diverse. This diversity continues when we look at how empires also hindered migration. The French, for example, created much less of an infrastructure for intra-imperial mobility than the British. Other than promoting French settlers in North Africa, the French were generally suspicious of migration into and between their colonial possessions that was not managed by the state. The Dutch also sporadically attempted, with mixed success, to regulate and minimize the movement of Chinese and other non-native Asians both to and within its Indonesian possessions.[10] The Japanese largely halted the emigration of imperial subjects in Korea to places outside of the empire.[11] And the United States criss-crossed its nascent empire with Chinese exclusion laws and hastened the Philippine path to independence in part because of its wish to halt Filipino immigration to the United States.

Even in the case of the British Empire, the effects of empire were ambiguous. Although the expanse of empire clearly shaped the destinations of many emigrants from South Asia and Britain, these were actually two different circuits. With the exception of South Africa (where it generated enormous struggles) Indians were rarely allowed in British settler colonies, and British migrants rarely moved in large numbers to places with many Indians. And within the trajectories of Indian migration, the modes of regulation and recruitment were diverse, from the almost complete lack of oversight on migration to Ceylon, to the extensive discussions, regulation, recruitment, and investigations that accompanied indentured migrations to the Caribbean, Mauritius, Natal, and Assam. Even in these latter cases, the extensive reliance on Indian recruitment networks and light hand of intervention meant that the British could rarely override markets in the way that the Japanese, Soviets, or French in West Africa did. Planters often complained of lack of cheap labor and only sporadically found a sympathetic ear among officials in the colonial administration.[12]

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[10] M. Barry Hooker, ed., *Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia* (Singapore, 2002); Huang Tsen-ming. *The Legal Status of the Chinese Abroad* (Taipei, 1954); Norman MacKenzie, ed., *The Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries: An International Survey of Law and Practice Concerning Immigration, Naturalization and Deportation of Aliens and their Legal Rights and Disabilities* (London, 1937).

[11] Wayne Patterson, *The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii 1896–1910* (Honolulu, 1988).

[12] Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson, *Global Migration and the World Economy: Two Centuries of Policy and Performance* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), 127–151;

Empires were clearly part of the fabric of world migration. But they were less of a glue than aspects of the complexity of migration, caught up in diverse ways in the processes of integration and segregation. Indeed, the very act of calling upon empires as a way to link migration beyond the Atlantic to those across the Atlantic recreates the very distinction between Atlantic migrants as free migrants who crossed multiple international borders, and migrants in the rest of the world who would not have moved without European intervention. The fact that migrants from South China probably crossed more international and colonial borders than any other migrant group, except possibly merchants from Sind, is enough to fundamentally question the differences between Atlantic and Asian migrations and the significance of empires.

Many of the forces shaping movement within empires can be equally understood (as can empires themselves, to some extent) as aspects of the rapidly expanding global economy. Migrants to the factories of Chicago, Manchester, and Tokyo were dependent on resources produced by those who traveled to the tin mines and rubber plantations of Malaya, the sheep ranches of Australia, and the iron and coal mines of Manchuria. All of these ate food produced by migrants who opened the cattle and wheat fields of North America, the rice paddies of Southeast Asia, and the soy bean fields of Manchuria, not to mention those recruited to work the sugar plantations of Cuba, the tea plantations of Assam and Sri Lanka, and the coffee plantations of Brazil. These raw materials and manufactures were gathered, transported, and sold by yet more migrants who carried goods and money up and down distant rivers, into and out of dense forests, setting up shop in dusty rural towns and crowded urban ghettos. Many of these goods were used for the creation of an ever-expanding transportation infrastructure of roads, railroads, and steamships that generated more migrant labor for their construction and operation, which in turn facilitated the movement of yet more migrants, resources, and manufactures to more destinations.

Evidence for the economy as a glue can also be found in significant wage gaps between the major receiving and sending regions. The commercialization of the world economy also transformed local rural

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Tiffany Trimmer, "Solving Migration 'Problems': Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Indian Ocean Approaches, 1890–1930" (Ph.D. diss., Boston, Northeastern University), 125–157.

economies in sending regions, by creating new needs and uses for cash and disrupting land holding patterns. And it created the opportunities that could draw migrants abroad in search of that cash. To be sure, economic forces had, at best, an indirect role in the mobility of many migrants, such as those taking up positions as colonial officials, fleeing persecution, or moving as transported convicts or military labor. But these forms of migration do not account for much of the massive boom of long distance migrants in the nineteenth century, the great bulk of whom were settling frontiers and looking for wage labor.

An economic glue also fits with the best evidence of the integration of long and short-term migration cycles, which tend to correlate with wage differentials and business cycles. But at this point we begin to hit the limits of this explanation and have to start asking about the chisels. If migrants were motivated by the same incentives, why did Asians stop going to the Americas, where wages remained higher than in the frontiers of Asia? And if capitalism was encompassing the world, why did American nations and British settler colonies wind down their indenture projects and close their doors to Asians and Africans, despite the cheaper labor they provided? In short, what caused this segregation and why did it arise simultaneously with the processes of integration? How, also, can we understand the rise of coercive state migrations and refugee generating processes over the first three quarters of the twentieth century? The expanding global economy is no longer a sufficient explanation of global patterns of migration.

The quick answers to these questions have to do with the rise of racial ideologies, borders, and restrictive immigration laws, the spaces of empires, and the international system of nation states.[13] Distinctions such as those between civilized and savage, East and West, free and unfree, justified the erection of borders and the creation of different institutions to govern what were believed to be different kinds of

[13] Matthew Guterl and Christine Skwiot, "Atlantic and Pacific Crossings: Race, Empire and 'the Labor Problem' in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Radical History Review* 91 (Winter 2005), 40–61; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge, 2008); Erika Lee "Orientalisms in the Americas: A Hemispheric Approach to Asian American History," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 8 (2005), 235–56; Aristide Zolberg, "Global Movements, Global Walls: Responses to Migration: 1885–1925," in Wang Gungwu, ed., *Global History and Migrations* (Boulder, 1997), 297–307.

peoples. The pioneering institutions of modern migration control were forged across the Mediterranean Sea and Pacific Ocean, the main lines dividing East from West, Europe from Asia, and North from South. Many of the earliest innovations in medical cordons were devised across the line dividing the Ottoman Empire from Europe (with Russia falling alternately on either side). And attempts to regulate the pilgrimage to Mecca and the flow of people through the Suez Canal led to some of the first multijurisdictional attempts at passport control.[14] In the Pacific, attempts to stop Asian migration to the white settler nations led, after the 1880s, to the first diplomatic and legal justification of mobility control in the context of liberal ideology. These included the ideas, now taken for granted, that migration control was best enforced at borders and that it was (unlike trade) a unilateral and sovereign prerogative of the receiving nation that did not need to be negotiated. These receiving nations also developed pioneering technologies to sift through migrants one by one, determine their status, create identities for them, and demand that states around the world produce standardized paperwork that would help lodge those identities in cross-referenced files. All of these controls were inspired and justified by racism and fears of the bad influence of "uncivilized" peoples. These institutions made those differences into reality by bounding the three main systems of long distance migration. They eventually expanded into the technologies that have shaped the entire international system, with its networks of borders and channeled flows.[15] Indeed, these processes and ideologies became so pervasive that they, too, could be conceptualized as a glue, albeit one that worked by fragmenting the world into hundreds of distinct yet entwined isomorphic containers.

It is, of course, impossible to conceptualize the contemporary global economy without taking into account the international system that provides the regulatory contexts and borders that protect and channel its flows. The historical synchronicity between the rise of global capital on one hand, and of the international system and global segregation on the other hand, is also obvious. But the linkages between the two,

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[14] Michael Low, "The Twin Infection: Pilgrims, Plagues and Pan-Islam under British Surveillance, 1865–1924," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40 (2008), 269–290; Daniel Panzac, *Quarantines et lazarets: L'Europe et la peste d'Orient* (Aix-en-Provence, 1986); William Roff, "Sanitation and Security: The Imperial Powers and the Nineteenth Century Hajj," *Arabian Studies* 4 (1982), 143–160.

[15] McKeown, *Melancholy Order*.

if any, often appear contingent or established after the fact. There is no obvious reason why the international system and racial segregation should follow from the logic of global capitalism and industrialization, or vice versa. While nations and racialization were often used to control labor and further economic interests, global capital was arguably at least as committed to free flows and expanded markets. Large capital was even hostile to the labor interests that pioneered the exclusion of Asian migrations. The logic of each approach to understanding the global has deposited us directly into the lap of the other, leaving no hint of how to resolve their basic differences.

Beyond the Atlantic Universal

Assumptions about the unity of world history approximate the universalizing methods of the social sciences. When applied to the understanding of migration, these methods (in the hand of nuanced practitioners) do not insist that all migration was the same, only that migrants should be expected to respond similarly to similar forces. Given the enormous diversity of these forces—work opportunities, occupations structures, transportation costs, family organization, recruitment efforts, access to infrastructure and information, impact of commercialization, mobility controls, and the contingent establishment of successful networks—this assumption ultimately construes each particular migration stream as a unique process, but one that can be understood at the nexus of a distinct conjunction of common forces.[16] Faced with evidence of the broad similarity of migration cycles around the world, this seems like a more reasonable starting point for the understanding of migration than do *a priori* assumptions about the differences between Atlantic and Asian migrations.

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[16] Donna Gabaccia, "Women of the Mass Migrations: From Minority to Majority, 1820–1930," in Dirk Hoerder and Leslie Page Moch, ed., *European Migrants: Global and Local Perspectives* (Boston, 1996), 90–111; James H. Jackson and Leslie Page Moch, "Migration and the Social History of Modern Europe," *Historical Methods* 22 (1989), 27–36; Jose Moya, *Cousins and Strangers: Spanising Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850–1930* (Berkeley, 1998); Alejandro Portes and József Böröcz, "Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation," *International Migration Review* 23 (1989), 606–630. These approaches share much in common with what is sometimes called "meso-level" theory. See Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, 2002).

In practice, however, the similarities of social science methodologies and assumptions about the unity of world history are more superficial than real. Most social science theorizing is developed from the Atlantic experience, and deeply grounded in Atlantocentric histories of migration.[17] Thus the borders between the Atlantic and the world become even more potent and rigid than those erected by area historians precisely because they are so much more taken for granted. The Atlantic experience is projected into a universal even as it is cordoned off as an experience not yet available to the rest of the world. However much the social science methods may be applicable to the study of particular migrant streams, they still leave us with little insight into global patterns of integration and segregation.

The universalizing pretensions of the social sciences have been a main source of debates between connective and regionally particularist explanations of world history and difference at least since Friedrich List squared off against the English free traders in the 1840s. Far from providing any resolution to this dichotomy, social science research and theorizing is inspired by the constant reformulation of these two positions. For example, the connective histories of dependency theory, world systems and world culture approaches, in which differences produced by interactions, are pitted against modernization theory and orthodox economic histories, in which interaction and free trade brings nations out of their historical isolation and difference. Both perspectives still share a common world historical narrative in which processes that began in Western Europe gradually expand to engulf the world. In terms of migration, this narrative is grounded in a shared ignorance of migrations beyond the Atlantic. Any acknowledgement of that migration is usually a discussion of indentured migration impelled by European expansion.[18] In fact, less than 10 percent of Indians and

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[17] Sephen Castles and Mark Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (New York, 2003); Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson, *The Age of Mass Migration: Causes and Economic Impact* (New York, 1998), 249; International Organization for Migration, *World Migration 2003: Managing Migration-Challenges and Responses for People on the Move* (Geneva, 2003), 4; Douglas Massey, "Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis," in Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind, eds., *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience* (New York, 1999), 35; Saskia Sassen, *Guests and Aliens* (New York, 2000).

[18] Edna Bonacich and Lucie Cheng, *Labor Immigration under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the United States before World War One* (Berkeley, 1984); Pieter Emmer, "European Expansion and Migration: The European Colonial Past and Intercontinental

4 percent of Chinese emigrants were ever directly indentured to Europeans. Most migration was organized along lines broadly similar to the transatlantic migrations.[19]

An awareness of Asian migrations provides a starting point from which to question some of the broader generalizations based on the Atlantic histories, and think more carefully about the nature of global connections and differences. For example, even if mass migrations did contribute to wage convergence across the Atlantic (still a controversial argument, although a strong case is made by Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson) we should still think twice before projecting this as basic feature of all migrations, because similarly dense migrations to Southeast Asia created little, if any wage convergence.[20] Awareness of the cycles of Asian migration suggests that the global economy and migration was more integrated than Hatton and Williamson will acknowledge, and yet the effects of that integration and migration worked out differently in different regions. Similarly, the insistence in world systems theory that migrations in the periphery were more likely to be coerced than free are hard to sustain in the face of nearly a hundred million unindentured long-distance migrants outside of Europe. Even research into Indian indenture is uncovering modes of organization and networks that were not dissimilar from European migrations. To accept crude binaries of free and unfree migration is to accept the basic categories that have been used to divide East from West and to obscure non-Western migrations for over one and a half centuries.[21]

Migration; An Overview," in *European Expansion and Migration: Essays on the Intercontinental Migration from Africa, Asia, and Europe*, ed. Pieter Emmer and Magnus Mörner (New York, 1992), 3–11; Hatton and Williamson, *Global Migration*, 127–151; Lydia Potts, *The World Labour Market: A History of Migration* (London, 1990). For a comparative overview of different social science theories on migration, see Douglas Massey, Joaquín Arango, Grame Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor, "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal," *Population and Development Review* 19 (1993), 431–466.

[19] Marina Carter, *Servants, Sirdars and Settlers: Indians in Mauritius 1834–1874* (Delhi, 1995); Frank Heidemann, *Kanganies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia: Tamil Recruiter-cum-foreman as a Sociological Category in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Munich, 1992).

[20] On wage convergence in the Atlantic, see Hatton and Williamson, *Age of Mass Migration*, and on Southeast Asia, Hatton and Williamson *Global Migration*, 146–147.

[21] That said, more nuanced analyses of the co-production of similarity and difference can be found in Immanuel Wallerstein, "Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System," *Theory, Culture and Society* 7 (1990), 31–55, "The

This logic of this critique ultimately points to the very categories that have defined migration and global differences in the first place. How did it come to be that we can so easily accept global histories of migration that focus only on the Atlantic? How did it come to be that we define migrations through the polarities of free and unfree, categories that do not capture the actual obligations and organization of the great majority of world migrants, whether across the Atlantic or otherwise? What are the specific historical processes that have constructed certain kinds of migration—and especially those across the Atlantic—as the "true," "free," or "traditional" forms of migration? How has this developed into understandings and practices of legitimate and illegitimate migrations? How did the process of migration come to be framed as something that can be studied independently from government and other institutional interventions (although not from the more "natural" forces of the economy) and that sees these interventions as disruptive rather than constitutive of migration?

The formulation of these questions will dissolve the old questions about glue and chisels into new questions that more directly address the entwined processes that have made the world into what it is today. This means not only looking at migrants as subjects of study, but also constructing the history of how migrants became the particular subjects that they are. Such histories will be entangled with histories of institutions, discourses, legal processes, businesses, economics, culture, and politics.

Ultimately, the answers to such questions will come from the empirical studies that formulate and justify those questions in the first place. Some recent histories of Asian indenture are examples of such work. Even though indenture was a relatively minor vehicle of Asian mobility, the amount of documentation and historical writing surrounding indenture proliferated in inverse proportion to its actual quantitative significance, and left a lasting impact on the subsequent study of Asian migration and migration in general. The dichotomy of free and unfree migrations, based on the model of African slavery, shaped early debates over indenture. These debates and dichotomies became codified in the investigation commissions, laws, and institutions designed

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Ideological Tensions of Capitalism: Universalism versus Racism and Sexism," in *The Essential Wallerstein* (New York, 2000), 344–352, and "The National and the Universal: Can There Be Such a Thing as World Culture?" in Anthony King, ed., *Culture, Globalization and the World-System* (Minneapolis, 1997), 91–106.

to indenture Indian migrants in the 1830s. Given the fact that most migration actually moved through networks of obligation and limited information that fit neither of these two extremes, the primary evidence and "experiences" documented in these investigations could easily be used to support both sides of the argument. Nonetheless, the structure of these reports and debates informed subsequent investigations and policy to the present, with the government always able to present itself as taking a neutral position between the two extremes.[22]

Both sides in the debates did eventually come to agree that, if left to their own devices, Indian migrants were inherently unfree, mired in ignorance, exploited by Indian middlemen, and victimized by an irrational caste system. They only disagreed on whether big capital and contracts would free them. But even there, they could still agree that some level of government regulation was necessary to protect Indians, whether to preserve the well-being and rights of the migrants or the markets that worked to the interests of planters.

Discussions of Chinese migration also found common agreement in the idea that the corruption and narrow mentalities of the Chinese was the root of most problems. These debates worked out a bit differently, however, because Chinese indenture was an international process that could not be placed under the control of a single empire, and was ultimately suppressed in the 1870s except under highly regulated conditions. In the 1840s, many of the basic assumptions were also quite different than in India. Observers argued that the advantage of Chinese migrants was that they already had much experience organizing emigration, understood contracts well, and were in many ways more free than their European emigrant counterparts.

It turned out, however, that the British were unable to compete in such an environment, and they spent much of the next three decades trying to place the blame. The reasoning behind the blaming was rarely coherent except in the predictable focus on the Chinese themselves, albeit with a healthy dose still reserved for the coercive practices harbored by the Portuguese in Macao. The Chinese government, once praised for its lack of intervention into coastal migration, was now sometimes criticized for its despotic control of the coast (although

[22] Madhavi Kale, *Fragments of Empire: Capital, Slavery and Indian Indentured Labor in the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia, 1999); Radhika Mongia, "Regimes of Truth: Indentured Indian Labour and the Status of the Inquiry," *Cultural Studies* 18 (2004), 749–768.

critics were hard pressed to find actual examples of intervention and punishment) and at other times for its failure to impose regulation that could guarantee smooth emigration. Chinese middlemen, once praised for their organizational skills and market acumen, were now demonized for their exploitation and disruption of free markets. And the migrants themselves, once admired for their diligence and savvy, were now alternately depicted as ignorant, unfree, and unable to act without the help of middlemen; as excessively libertine and uncontrollable once freed from the oppression of the Chinese government; and as motivated by an unbridled commercial greed that made it impossible to enforce a smoothly regulated labor migration that did not reek of slavery. Solutions to the perceived problems were also self-contradictory and yet increasingly consistent over the last decades of the nineteenth century: if free and unabusive markets in Chinese labor are to be preserved, Chinese institutions and networks must be suppressed and replaced by depots, documentation, and channeling under close government supervision.[23]

These trends in the regulation of indenture were part of a broader tendency towards the suppression of the private organization of migration other than that of large transportation companies and philanthropic organizations that worked closely with governments. By the turn of the century, not only was indenture largely a government sponsored operation in many places, but shipping companies often undertook to enforce immigration laws even before departure. Even in the Atlantic world, private recruiters, networks, and independent agents were increasingly demonized as padrones, traffickers, irresponsible immigrant bankers cum saloon keepers, and other evil personages who exploited cultural ties and the ignorance of their countrymen for the sake of profit. The legitimate migrant was increasingly reduced to the somewhat fantastic image of an isolated individual making well-informed choices on the best place to resettle for his own long-term interests and perhaps that of his family.[24]

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[23] Robert Irick, *Ch'ing Policy Toward the Coolie Trade 1847–1878* (Taipei, 1982); McKeown, *Melancholy Order*, 78–88; and "The Social Life of Chinese Labor," in Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-hsin Chen, eds., *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities and Networks in Southeast Asia* (Durham, 2011).

[24] Cindy Hahamovitch, "Creating Perfect Immigrants: Guest Workers of the World in Historical Perspective," *Labor History* 44 (2003), 70–94; McKeown, *Melancholy Order*, 107–118; Gunther Peck, *Reinventing Free Labor: Padrones and Immigrant Workers in the North American West, 1880–1930*, (Cambridge, 2000).

These ideas surrounding Asian indenture helped to justify Asian exclusion laws in white settler nations at the turn of the century. When mobility across the Pacific was curtailed, it then became easier to conceptualize Asians as outside of the processes of mass mobility that characterized the modern and globalizing Atlantic. The transatlantic experience of crossing oceans, continents, and national borders would come to be seen as defining features of modern long distance migration. Such definitions made it easier to exclude much, and perhaps the majority of global migration from consideration as domestic, short distance (although the costs and time may have been much higher than for the transatlantic migrations), or some other kind of mobility that was of a categorically different order than the world historical connectivity of the Atlantic migrations.

To take an single example, in 1913 Henry Pratt Fairchild defined immigration as "a movement of people, individually or in families, acting on their own personal initiative and responsibility, without official support or compulsion, passing from one well-developed country to another well-developed country with the intention of residing there."[25] He distinguished "true" migration from invasion, colonization, and conquest, because in the former, "Both of the two states concerned…are well established, and on approximately the same stage of civilization." It is also "a distinctly individual undertaking" that only takes place within a single culture-area that shares common climactic conditions and circumstances of life. "In fact, practically all immigration, historically speaking, has been between different countries in the temperate zone."[26] Thus Chinese migrations to the Americas and even Southeast Asia were quietly transformed from true migrations to an invasion. Many of Fairchild's specific qualifications for "true" migration would fall out of use after World War Two, but the geographic space defined by those qualifications would remain.

The macro divisions described by analysts such as Fairchild were only one aspect of the globalization of borders that grew hand in hand with increases in global migration. These borders were not only a backlash against migration but also a product of that migration. Ironically, migrations that successfully colonized and transformed the receiving

[25] Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Immigration: A World Movement and Its American Significance* (New York, 1913), 26.
[26] Fairchild, *Immigration*, 20–21.

regions could also be erased as easily as those that were blocked. For example, Manchuria could well be part of Russia, Japan, or an independent nation like Mongolia now if not for the great success of the mass Chinese migrations. Similarly, the North American West and regions such as northeastern Thailand would not be what they are, politically or culturally, without mass migrations. This transformation is lost if we simply categorize the Manchurian migrations as forms of domestic migrations (or erase their memory altogether, as is largely the case in Thailand) that is distinct from international migration.

In a more practical sense, the institutions and paperwork forged at the borders of these great migration macro-systems, designed to exclude Asia and Africa from the international system, ultimately came to define the relationship of all mobility and borders within the international system. This has included a continual proliferation of categories to regulate and define migration. Although such categories are frequently criticized, most debate over policy revolves around the constant refinement of these categories. The fundamental distinctions made by these categories have also seeped into popular and academic understandings as definitions of travelers, temporary workers, and true immigrants; differentiations between refugees and economic migrants; and between legal migrants and illegal threats.[27] For the past one hundred years critics (such as Fairchild, who was an outspoken critic of the institutions of Chinese exclusion) have attacked existing categories and regulation as remnants of xenophobic and "traditional" attitudes towards national sovereignty. But this only obscures the fact that their proposed reforms are often only intensifications of the mechanisms of regulation and category creation that built the system they now attack.[28]

Even the production of migrant "experience" has an historical context. Migrants have often reframed their own stories to fit categories and ideas of migration, not only in legal and administrative proceedings but in public forums, oral interviews, and even private stories and memories. Under different political and social conditions, migrants

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[27] Don Flynn, "New Borders, New Management: The Dilemmas of Modern Immigration Policies," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28 (2005), 463–490; Christian Joppke, *Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State* (Cambridge Mass., 2005); Lydia Morris, *Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants' Rights* (London, 2002); Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, 2004).

[28] McKeown, *Melancholy Order*, 335–344.

will frame their lives as members of a diaspora, sojourners, settlers, participants in transnational networks, or individuals torn between competing cultural demands. With the creation of a world of borders by the twentieth century, and especially with the decline of migration in the 1930s, migrants were increasingly likely to frame their stories within a narrative of resettlement, struggle, and assimilation. These stories then became the basis for much knowledge about migration, which then became the backdrop for interpretations of new migration flows into the West and the rejuvenation of migrant networks as an unprecedented challenge to "classical" migration. Self-representation and political pressures ultimately shape not only the stories, but also the kinds of institutions and networks maintained by migrants, such that the creation of actual practices and discursive contexts become one and the same process.

It can be difficult to persist with these kinds of questions, because contemporary concerns seduce us into addressing those kinds of problems—of assimilation, economic contributions, border control reform, human rights, trafficking, and policymaking—that take these categories and definitions for granted. In contrast, the kinds of critical histories outlined here ultimately ask how it became possible to frame such debates and problems in the first place. How did it come that we understand migration in terms of national containers, networks, families, freedom, borders, particular experiences, and ambitions? Once we understand these histories, we can begin to understand why these debates have remained unresolved for so long (despite repeated claims to the contrary) although this knowledge may be more distressing than inspiring.

PART ONE

THE WORLDS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN

INTRODUCTION: INTER-OCEANIC MIGRATIONS FROM AN INDIAN OCEAN PERSPECTIVE, 1830s TO 1930s[1]

Ulrike Freitag

How does the question of interoceanic migrations pose itself from a perspective which takes the Indian Ocean as its starting point? For one thing, it seems certain from the essays collected here that migration between the Indian Ocean and other regions must be studied together with the inner-oceanic moves.

Through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf (as well as through caravan routes), the Indian Ocean was linked to the Mediterranean, in the East through the South China, Java, and Timor Seas to the Pacific Ocean and, via the route around Cape Horn, the Atlantic could be reached. At least in this region, furthermore, oceanic and international moves are not easily separated from land-based ones, whether internal or international. Translocal perspectives (for example David Feldman's suggestion to link internal and external migrations)[2] also seem particularly relevant for the Indian Ocean, where (trans)oceanic migrational streams and regulations could have repercussions in the regions of origins and transit, leading for example in one case to the relocation of grain production from the hinterland of Kilwa to the hinterland of the southern Benadir ports further north.[3] Empires that stretched well beyond the Indian Ocean influenced the flow of migrations both within and out of the Indian Ocean basin. As a result, the independence of most states around the Indian Ocean, which came mainly after 1940, had significant consequences.

The circulation of peoples, goods, and ideas that took place within the Indian Ocean system (which itself has to be seen as a changing seascape in which different regions were connected through shifting

[1] I would like to thank Leyla von Mende and Sarah Jurkiewicz for their help with accessing and gathering the literature for this paper, and Margrit Pernau and Roland Wenzhuemer for critical comments on the draft.

[2] David Feldman, "Global Movements, Internal Migration and the Importance of Institutions," *International Review of Social History* 52 (2007), 105–109.

[3] Abdul Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar* (Oxford, 1987), 164, 229.

nodal points over time)[4] has prompted Sugata Bose to call it an "inter-regional arena."[5] The three essays collected in this section hint at a typology of migration within that arena that begins historically with its most unfree type, namely the slave trade.[6] Long before the establishment of Western empires, the Indian Ocean had a slave trade, mainly internal to specific regions, but also with exportation of slaves from East Africa to India and possibly also from India to the Arabian Peninsula and from there to the Mediterranean and beyond.[7] Slaves were employed in the areas bordering on the Indian Ocean in a variety of professions. While their use in Muslim armies is well known and, notably on the Arabian Peninsula, comprised slaves from the Horn of Africa and the Swahili coast, they were also employed in agriculture, pearling, and household tasks on the Arabian Peninsula and in Iran. In the latter area, the importance of the slave trade seems to have been boosted by economic expansion and political change in the late eighteenth century. Overall figures for the Persian Gulf area amount to a total of 139,500 to 189,000 imported slaves over the period from 1722 to 1902.[8] Omanis, well known and feared as major slave traders in Zanzibar and coastal East Africa, also employed them on their plantations on Zanzibar and Pemba.[9]

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[4] Brigitte Reinwald, "Space on the Move: Perspectives on the Making of an Indian Ocean Seascape," in Jan-Georg Deutsch and Brigitte Reinwald, eds., *Space on the Move: Transformations of the Indian Ocean Seascape in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century* (Berlin, 2002), 9–20.

[5] Sugata Bose, *A Hundred Horizons. The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* (Cambridge, 2006), 6.

[6] This is excluded, for the most part, in the discussions in Robin Cohen, "Editorial Introduction: Asian Indentured and Colonial Migration," in Robin Cohen, ed., *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration* (Cambridge, 1995), part 3.

[7] Helen Basu, "Slave, Soldier, Trader, Faqir: Fragments of African Histories in Western India (Gujarat)," in *The African Diaspora in the Indian Ocean*, eds. Shihan de Silva Jayasuriya and Richard Pankhurst (Trenton, Asmara, 2003), 223–249; Patricia Risso, *Oman and Muscat: An Early Modern History* (London, Sydney, 1986), 119; Reginald Coupland, *The Exploitation of East Africa 1856–1890: The Slave Trade and the Scramble* (Evanston, 1967), 134–151.

[8] Thomas M. Ricks, "Slaves and Slave Traders in the Persian Gulf, 18th and 19th Centuries: An Assessment," in William Gervase Clarence-Smith, ed., *The Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1989), 67, cf. Suzanne Miers, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in Saudi Arabia and the Arab States on the Persian Gulf, 1921–63," in Gwyn Campbell, ed., *Abolition and its Aftermath in the Indian Ocean: Africa and Asia* (Abingdon, 2005), 120–136.

[9] William Gervase Clarence-Smith, "The Economics of the Indian Ocean and Red Sea Slave Trades in the 19th Century: An Overview," in *The Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade*, 1–20.

European planters later settled slaves in the Seychelles, the Mascarenes, and the Chagos archipelago.[10] Mauritius and Réunion were the destination of about 200,000 slaves who arrived via Madagascar.[11] While most of these slaves probably originated from eastern Africa (or were exported from there), Indian slaves were also exported to the Mascarene Islands and the Cape of Good Hope, as well as to Burma, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. It even seems that some Indonesian slaves were brought to India.[12] Between the 1840s and 1880s, East African slave exports boomed due to the rise in imperial exports from the western Indian Ocean.[13]

Abolition succeeded much later in the Indian Ocean than in the Atlantic Ocean. Slave trade was banned in the Atlantic relatively early in the nineteenth century, starting with a British ban in 1806 and, in 1807, the prohibition against Britons engaging in the trade and the ban on foreign slave traders in its ports.[14] Already in the late eighteenth century, Britain attempted to end the export of slaves from India, starting with Bengal, Bombay, and Madras and extending the ban to Nepal in 1833. Nevertheless, the legal institution of slavery in India was only abolished in 1843, and slave-ownership in 1860.[15] Both in East Africa and Southeast Asia, pressure to abolish slavery and abolition in certain regions can be contrasted with the persistence of the practice elsewhere. Thus, in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, the slave trade between the hinterland and the coast continued throughout the nineteenth century, although export to the islands and beyond became more and more difficult after the 1870s.[16] Following European pressure, the Ottoman Empire also attempted to ban the slave trade, both into the Empire and to North Africa. This met strong local resistance, manifested, for example, in an uprising in the Arabian region

[10] Jean Houbert, "Creolisation and Decolonisation in the Changing Geopolitic of the Indian Ocean," in Shihan de Silva Jayasuriya and Richard Pankhurst, eds., *The African Diaspora in the Indian Ocean* (Trenton, Asmara, 2003), 123.

[11] Janet E. Ewald, "East Africa," in Seymour Drescher and Stanley Engerman, *A Historicial Guide to World Slavery*, 43.

[12] Ralph Shlomowitz, "Slave Trade," in Drescher and Engerman, *A Historicial Guide to World Slavery*, 363.

[13] Clarence-Smith, "Economics of the Indian Ocean," 1.

[14] Chaim D. Kaufmann and Robert A. Pape, "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade," *International Organization* 53.4 (1999), 634.

[15] Shlomowitz, "Slave Trade," 363.

[16] Ewald, "East Africa," 44.

of the Hijaz in 1855 against the Ottoman Empire.[17] Although slavery greatly diminished thereafter, it had not entirely ceased when the Ottoman Empire ended in 1918.[18]

The rather late implementation of the ban on slave trade in the Indian Ocean initially sparked a reorientation of the transatlantic slave trade involving the southern African coasts of the Indian Ocean. First, French planters in the Antilles turned to the importation of East African slaves. Cuba and Brazil followed suit, importing at least 385,000 East African slaves. Much of this slave trade originated from the Afro-Portuguese estates along the Zambezi River.[19] Madagascar served not only as a major importer of African and Indian slaves in its own right, but also as an important entrepot in this trade. When prices for slaves in Réunion and Cuba rose significantly in the mid-nineteenth century, Madagassian slave export re-oriented itself toward these destinations.[20]

Although neither the slave trade nor the plantation economy, where most slaves were employed, were introduced by European powers, it is fairly clear that the growth of demand for certain products, often sparked by resources accumulated in the North Atlantic trade, greatly contributed to the spread of these types of production and labor recruitment. More specifically, the Portuguese, British, Dutch, and French empires greatly increased the plantation economy. A number of island economies, such as the Mascarenes, were completely transformed by the French, whose dire need for plantation labor was a major reason for the continuation of slave trade.[21] The increased expansion of demand for Persian goods is similarly credited with the revival of the Persian Gulf slave trade, as noted above. Yet the relations between empires, the scramble for empire, and the creation of supra-imperial

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[17] William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908* (Columbus, 1984), 138; Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Centre des Archives à Nantes, Constantinople, Ambassade, Série D, Jeddah, reports by French Consul, Jeddah, to Embassy of Constantinople, November 4, 9, 16, and December 1 and 7, 1855.

[18] Ehud R. Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East* (Seattle and London, 1998), 3–19; Y. Hakan Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 1800–1909* (Houndmills, 1996).

[19] Ewald, "East Africa," 43.

[20] Clarence-Smith, "Economics of the Indian Ocean," 1–21.

[21] Gwyn Campbell, "Madagascar and Mozambique in the Slave Trade of the Western Indian Ocean, 1800–1861," in *The Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade*, 166–193.

international law also eventually prompted first the abolition of slavery and then of indentured labor.[22]

The onset of imperial expansion, intensely connected to seaborne trade and mobility of colonial administrators and labor forces, also greatly increased migratory movements of laborers, temporarily bound or free, to replace slave labor. European trading companies, arriving in earnest in the sixteenth century, first inserted themselves into the existing networks of exchange, and slowly started to change them not only by developing a new route of trade but also by establishing different structures of supply and demand.[23] Until the end of the seventeenth century, the major turnover of European companies still occurred within the Indian Ocean basin, while thereafter, new technologies and financial resources attained mostly in the Americas resulted in an increasing redirection of Indian Ocean trade to the outside.[24] Empire building mostly followed on this commercial expansion. Besides the well-known Western cases—in the Indian Ocean the Portuguese, British, and Dutch empires—Oman also benefited from the expansion in demand for spices and slave labor by establishing a small-scale Empire between Muscat, the coast of the Persian Gulf, Beluchistan, and the East African coast. Dynastic infighting and British pressure, however, assured the separation of Zanzibar from Oman and its dependencies after 1856.[25]

The movements of laborers that gradually supplanted the slave trade included both free and indentured workers. Adam McKeown notes that such migratory flows were "as much part of the industrial processes transforming the world as the factories of Manchester and the wheat fields of North America."[26] With regard to India, Michael Pearson estimates that between the 1830s and the 1930s, about 30 million Indians left India for destinations in the Indian Ocean. About 5 percent of these worked in commerce, the overwhelming

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[22] Jörg Fisch, *Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht. Die Auseinandersetzung um den Status der überseeischen Gebiete vom 15. Jh. bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart, 1984).

[23] Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680: Expansion and Crisis* (New Haven, London, 1993), 12.

[24] Kenneth McPherson, *The Indian Ocean. A History of People and the Sea* 2nd ed. (New-Delhi, 1995), 200, 235.

[25] M. Reda Bhacker, *Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar: Roots of British Domination* (Exeter, 1992), 164–193.

[26] Adam McKeown, "Global Migration, 1846–1940," *Journal of World History* 15.2 (2004), 156.

majority as (often indentured) labor. Many of these (about 24 million) returned to India.[27]

The most (in)famous of the labor recruitment systems were the state regulated indenture system (mostly used for India and the focus of Michael Mann's essay in this section) and the coolie system for China, described in the section on the East and Southeast Asian Seas. While these differed considerably from each other in detail, a common factor was the agreement between laborer and agent fixing mutual duties and rights. Usually, a laborer was recruited for a fixed period of time for work overseas, while the agent was responsible for arranging transport and work abroad. This greatly distinguished them from slave labor. Indentured and contractual labor was exported in significant numbers—an estimated half million Indians, and, from beyond the Indian Ocean, approximately 200,000 Chinese and, in smaller numbers, Japanese (ca. 50,000) and Javanese (ca. 30,000)—to the Americas.[28] Contractual labor was, however, not limited to the replacement of slave labor in the Americas and Indian Ocean. Its spread also coincided with the increased demand, after the 1820s, for tropical products, which was accompanied by a major rise in prices. Thus, labor migration spread dramatically; McKeown arrives at estimates of over 29 million Indians and over 19 million Chinese who migrated to overseas territories.[29] For example, the ethnic composition of Mauritius changed dramatically after the 1830s: some 450,000 Indians, mostly under indenture contracts, arrived until 1885 when Indian immigration was stopped.[30] Both in the Indian and the Chinese case, destinations were primarily within the Indian Ocean or—in the Chinese case—Southeast Asia, even if American and other destinations increased in significance.[31] Not all of this was indentured labor; McKeown insists that while most Indians migrated to colonies throughout the British empire less than 10 percent of this was under the indenture system.[32]

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[27] Michael N. Pearson, *The Indian Ocean* (London, New York, 2003), 223.

[28] Pieter Emmer, "Europäische Expansion und interkontinentale Migration," in *Überseegeschichte: Beiträge der jüngeren Forschung*, ed. Thomas Beck (Stuttgart, 1999), 228.

[29] McKeown, "Global Migration," 157.

[30] Houbert, "Creolisation and Decolonisation," 145.

[31] On details of Chinese destinations, see Sen-Dou Chang, "The Distribution and Occupations of Overseas Chinese," *Geographical Review* 58.1 (1968), 89–107; for Indian immigration into the Caribbean, see Steven Vertovec, *Hindu Trinidad: Religion, Ethnicity and Socio-economic Change* (London, 1992).

[32] McKeown, "Global Migration," 157.

In many cases, conditions of life and work of indentured laborers were not too different from those of slaves and return after the initially agreed period was not always foreseen.[33] Thus, in 1839, the British Indian Government temporarily suspended emigration to Mauritius because living and working conditions were considered too harsh. Also, the high demand for labor encouraged agents to use less than lawful means of recruitment, be it in the form of the acquisition of slaves who were then transformed into free contract laborers,[34] be it through kidnapping, as sometimes in the case of China.[35]

Nevertheless, even conditions under "free" migration were not always that much more favorable, due to the need for agents organizing labor immigration, but also due to the fact that the economic well-being of plantation owners often ranked above the interests of the laborers.[36] For example, in the case of Ceylon, it was only in the 1880s that the government started to intervene with regard to medical treatment of plantation labor, and only in the early 20th century did the recruitment system came under closer scrutiny.[37] Overall, indentured labor can be seen as a "bridge between slavery and modern forms of contract labor."[38] Indeed, many laborers whose contracts ended entered the labor markets of the countries to which they had been brought, and eventually competed with other, often more welcome groups of free labor.

Both Britain and China effectively abolished the indenture system by the early twentieth century. As far as the British colonies are concerned, Indian activists, notably Gandhi, played a major role. Thus, the transnational and transoceanic links established through slavery and indenture were also instrumental in bringing about the abolition of

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[33] For a very brief summary of the vast literature, Emmer, "Europäische Expansion und interkontinentale Migration," 228–230; for the Chinese system, Ong Jin Hui, "Chinese Indentured Labour: Coolies and Colonies," in *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*, 51–56; for Indians in the Carribean, Vertovec, *Hindu Trinidad.*

[34] de Silva Jayasuriya and Pankhurst, *The African Diaspora in the Indian Ocean*, 13; Coupland, *The Exploitation of East Africa*, 135–136.

[35] Hui, "Chinese Indentured Labour," 52.

[36] Prabhu P. Mohapatra, "Eurocentrism, Forced Labour, and Local Migration: A Critical Assessment," *IRSH* 52 (2007), 110–115; Ulbe Bosma, "Beyond the Atlantic: Connecting Migration and World History in the Age of Imperialism, 1840–1940," *IRSH* 52 (2007), 116–123.

[37] Roland Wenzlhuemer, "Indian Labour Immigration and British Labour Policy in Nineteenth-Century Ceylon," *Modern Asian Studies* 41.3 (2007), 575–602.

[38] Cohen, "Editorial Introduction," 47; cf. Bose's discussion of mortality rates for slaves, indenture and free labor, Bose, *A Hundred Horizons*, 76.

this practice.[39] Nevertheless, the ensuing "free" labor migration often only brought slight legal and practical improvements for migrant labor, depending very much on the ways in which specific recruitment was organized, as Amarjit Kaur's essay in this volume on Burma suggests. In her work we can see the importance of translocal labor recruitment and the importance of South-South relations in this earlier era of globalization. Interaction between newly created colonial "producers," i.e., those who were brought to plantation economies abroad, and imperial societies (often mainly conceived of as "consumers") could fruitfully be explored further.[40] The exact relations between empire building, capitalist markets, and investment in infrastructure remain a matter of debate and research.[41] In any case, free migrations of labor or others increasingly resulted in attempts at control. In the Ottoman Empire, this was the result of modernization processes, which aimed at extending government control over the population while restraining unwanted European influences.[42] Periodically, Western and eventually also Eastern empires sought to limit population movements, whether to reinforce economic control and exclusion of competition (as in the Dutch East Indies), to prevent the spread of disease, or to limit the influence of dangerous political movements or international alliances between subject peoples and outside powers, such as Pan-Islamic and diasporic movements.[43] Political restrictions, passport laws, the control

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[39] Thomas Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920* (Berkeley, 2007), 12, quoting an unpublished paper by Jan de Vries. Present-day labor migration to the Gulf countries still imposes far-ranging restrictions on the freedom of movement of laborers: Anh Nga Longva, "Keeping Migrant Workers in Check; The *Kafala* System in the Gulf," *Middle East Report* 211 (1999), 20–22.

[40] Fernando Coronil, "Jenseits des Okzidentalismus: Unterwegs zu nichtimperialen geohistorischen Kategorien," in *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria (Frankfurt a.M., 2002), 192–201.

[41] I.e. Mohapatra, "Eurocentrism, Forced Labour, and Global Migration," 110–15.

[42] Ulrike Freitag, "Handelsmetropole und Pilgerort: Djidda in spätosmanischer Zeit," *Comparativ, Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung* 17.2 (2007), 64–79; Christoph Herzog, "Migration and the State: On Ottoman Regulations Concerning Migration since the Age of Mahmud II," paper presented at the workshop: Migration and Urban Institutions in the Late Ottoman Reform Period, Zentrum Moderner Orient, March 10–11, 2007.

[43] Huub de Jonge, "Dutch Colonial Policy Pertaining to Hadhrami Immigrants," in Ulrike Freitag and William Gervase Clarence-Smith, eds., *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars, and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s–1960s* (Leiden, 1997), 94–111; William Roff, "Sanitation and Security: The Imperial Powers and the Nineteenth Century Hajj," *Arabian Studies* VI (1982), 143–160; Ulrike Freitag, "Hadhramis in International Politics

of remittances, and the close monitoring of suspect individuals and groups eventually became typical means of creating modern statehood in this region, too.[44]

Another longstanding, although statistically much smaller mobile group of migrants in the Indian Ocean were the merchant diasporas, such as the Banyans, Armenians, or the Hadhramis, but also groups of scholars and pilgrims who might have settled elsewhere.[45] Even smaller numbers concern the free migration of diasporic communities who sought to make a fortune through employment or trade in other parts of the Indian Ocean. Claude Markovits takes up these issues in his essay in this volume. An interesting case in point is the emigration from the South Arabian region of Hadhramaut, which in some ways fits Christine Dobbin's survey of what she terms "conjoint communities," even if this approach tends to overshadow historical continuities to the pre-imperial age. By the 1930s, the overall size of this Indian Ocean diaspora reached a maximum of 140,000 people, even if many of these might have been descendants of original migrants with no actual migratory history (or intention) of their own.[46] Dobbin claims that "it was certain conjoint communities—members of India's and southeast Asia's sophisticated minority commercial diasporas—which enabled European powers to operate at all in the region."[47]

Also worthy of mention are longstanding, if temporary movements, for example of pilgrims traveling on the annual Hajj to Mecca.[48] In comparison, European (imperial) migrations to the Indian Ocean—whether for settlement or employment—shrink in comparison to the

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c. 1750–1967," in Freitag and Clarence-Smith, eds., *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen*, 124–126; Engseng Ho, "Empire Through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other Boat," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46.2 (2004), 210–246.

[44] Ulrike Freitag and Achim von Oppen, "Translokalität als ein Zugang zur Geschichte globaler Verflechtungen," *Geschichte.transnational* (2005), http://geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net/forum/2005–06–001; Adam McKeown, "Regionalizing World Migration," *International Review of Social History* 52 (2007), 136.

[45] Christine Dobbin, *Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities: Conjoint Communities in the Making of the World Economy 1570–1940* (London, 1996).

[46] For a compilation and discussion of figures, Ulrike Freitag, *Indian Ocean Migrants and State Formation in Hadhramaut: Reforming the Homeland* (Leiden, Boston, 2003), 52.

[47] Dobbin, *Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities*, 199.

[48] Michael N. Pearson, *Pilgrimage to Mecca: The Indian Experience, 1500–1800* (Princeton, 1996), 4.

regional labor and merchant migrations.[49] Figures for 1891 indicate that there were around 100,000 British-born citizens in India, out of a foreign population of roughly 640,000, among them around 61,000 military personnel.[50] The Dutch East India Army attracted some 150,000 men over the period from 1815 to 1910, but only a few thousand civilians settled in the Dutch East Indies.[51]

The emergence of independent nation states in the Indian Ocean falls very much into a period past the 1930s and thus beyond our period of consideration—yet another clue that a global perspective on migration needs a different periodization from that proposed by those giving primacy to Atlantic migrations.[52] Pamila Gupta will take up this period in the concluding section of this volume. While transatlantic migration might have been severely disrupted by World War One, as, indeed, was transatlantic trade, the Indian Ocean economy was far more affected by World War Two and the ensuing period of independence between the late 1940s and 1960s.[53] After 1940, political and economic nationalism became important, curbing the international transfer of hard currency along with easy movements between continents. This has had severe impact on many of the diasporic communities that migrations around the Indian Ocean had created. They were often forced to assimilate, to return to their countries of origin or to redirect their migrations to countries in search of cheap labor. For the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf region became the most important magnet for later labor migrations.[54]

What kinds of identities emerged from this typology of Indian Ocean migrations? Krishan Kumar has pointed to the emergence of an "impe-

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[49] On British overseas migration, see Dudley Baines, *Migration in a Mature Economy: Emigration and Internal Migration in England and Wales, 1861–1900* (Cambridge, 1985).

[50] H.H. Risley and E.A. Gait, *Report on the Census of India, 1901* (Calcutta, 1903), 93, http://www.chaf.lib.latrobe.edu.au/dcd/page.php?title=1901&action=next&record=1232 (accessed November 7, 2007), 93.

[51] Jan Lucassen, "Emigration to the Dutch Colonies and the USA," in *Cambridge Survey of World Migration*, 22.

[52] Jan Lucassen, "Migration and World History: Reaching a New Frontier," *International Review of Social History* 52 (2007), 89–96.

[53] McKeown, "Global Migration," 172; Freitag, *Indian Ocean Migrants and State Formation in Hadhramaut*, 453; on the Atlantic economy, Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, 1999), 29.

[54] Freitag, *Indian Ocean Migrants and State Formation in Hadhramaut*, 452–466.

rial nationalism" among the British.[55] Engseng Ho has contrasted this with another type of universalist mission, namely the religious mission of the Hadhrami diaspora.[56] Any systematic answer to the question of identities would need to take into account such phenomena as the development of Pan-Africanism, which was very much linked to the diasporic experience, or of certain types of Hindu nationalism.[57] Here we can see the promise of understanding nationalism's roots in ocean-connected empires and in the kinds of seaborne migrations that empire encouraged. Did migratory movements counteract later attempts at creating more or less closed national identities, regardless of how these were eventually defined? One would need to compare the globalizing period under consideration in this volume with the current decades of globalization in order to come to a better understanding of the comparative dimension between empire and nation state. After all, it should not be forgotten that the age of nationalism contributed greatly, albeit only temporarily, to a halt in international (and thus also inner- and interoceanic) migration, but that already the imperial powers had seen a need for restricting free labor migration for economic, sanitary, and political reasons, as mentioned above. Thus, empires as well as nation states have to be understood as framing the global labor market.

Collectively, the essays in this section illustrate some advantages of employing a translocal approach to the study of migrations. They address major concerns of the "New Imperial History," namely the investigation of colonial networks, and their role in the shaping of imperial rule,[58] without blurring borders between empires and other forms of networks, as feared by Jürgen Osterhammel:[59] specific

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[55] Krishan Kumar, "Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective," *Theory and Society* 29:5 (2000), 579.

[56] Ho, "Empire Through Diasporic Eyes," 214–215.

[57] See, for example, the contributions in James L. Conyers, ed., *Reevaluating the Pan-Africanism of W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey: Escapist Fantasy or Relevant Reality* (Lewiston, N.Y., 2005); and Peter van der Veer, ed., *Nation and Migration: The Politics of Space in the South Asian Diaspora* (Philadelphia, 1995).

[58] David Lambert and Alan Lester, "Imperial Spaces, Imperial Subjects," in Lambert and Lester, eds., *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 2006), 1–31; Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors* (Cambridge, 2006).

[59] Jürgen Osterhammel, "Imperien im 20. Jahrhundert: Eine Einführung," *Zeithistorische Forschungen* Online Edition 3.1 (2006), http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Osterhammel-1–2006.

hierarchies between centers and peripheries, maintained if need be, by force, remain very visible and characteristic.[60] Translocal historical perspectives might also lead us to connect more effectively the development of empire, infrastructure, and transport and communications technology.[61]

[60] Maier, *Among Empires*, and Herfried Münkler, *Imperien: Die Logik der Weltherrschaft—vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten* (Berlin, 2005).

[61] Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1981).

INDIAN MERCHANT NETWORKS OUTSIDE INDIA IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY[1]

Claude Markovits

In spite of the recent flowering of studies on the South Asian diaspora,[2] we are nevertheless left with many gaps in our knowledge and many unanswered questions. The bulk of existing work is still focused on the migration of agricultural labor and the "Little Indias" it spawned in various corners of the world. The recent migrations of educated professionals to the countries of the "First World," particularly the USA, are also attracting increasing attention. The whole field of migration and diaspora studies remains, however, dominated by a host country perspective which tends to obliterate the general picture from the point of view of South Asian history.

One particularly under-researched area is that of the movements of merchants between India and the rest of the world. There are various reasons for this neglect. Some are of a definitional nature; when merchants travel abroad for purposes of business, they are not generally considered migrants, even if their trip results in prolonged residence abroad, which can become in some cases permanent. Others have to do with the sources: since the colonial authorities did not keep any systematic record of the movements of merchants, government archives, which are such a mine of information on the labor migrations, have little to say on the former. Given the understandable tendency of scholars to rely heavily on official sources, the paucity of official documents on the movements of merchants is in itself a powerful factor of oblivion.

However, in the Indian case, these movements resulted in some cases in a fairly massive relocation, not only of traders, but also of people who were employed by them, such as shop assistants or servants. As a result, the neglect of merchant migrations has also led to the obliteration from the record of some specific kinds of labor migrations.

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[1] Reprinted from *Modern Asian Studies* 33, 4 (1999), 883–911. Permission by the author and Cambridge University Press is gratefully acknowledged.

[2] For a recent synthesis, see *South Asians Overseas. Migration and Ethnicity*, ed. by C. Clarke, C. Peach and S. Vertovec (Cambridge, 1990).

Apart from its sheer numerical importance, which, as I shall show, was far from negligible, merchant migration has been important economically, even if, in the absence of any kind of reliable data regarding capital movements, a global appraisal of its impact on the Indian economy is a difficult task.

Indian Merchant Migrations: A General View

Movements of Indian merchants between India and the rest of the world have a very long history. Merchants from the coastal regions of the subcontinent have been crisscrossing the sea routes of the Indian Ocean for many centuries. Merchants from inland Northern India and the northwestern borderlands have been active in the trade of Central Asia for as long as recorded history goes. However, with the incorporation of India into a British-dominated worldwide network of trade and finance which occurred at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, Indian merchant migrations accelerated and took new forms. The first aim of this essay is therefore to draw attention to the size and geographical spread of these migrations, which touched most of the world, well beyond the few areas of well-known Indian involvement. The second point I wish to make concerns the chronology of those migrations, which accelerated considerably at the end of the nineteenth century. The third fact which deserves emphasis is the need for a disaggregated picture of this vast diaspora, in which various separate networks have to be clearly distinguished one from another.

A serious quantitative study of Indian merchant migrations is a practically impossible task. Movements of passengers from Indian ports can be reconstructed thanks to the lists of ships' passengers which have been kept, but some statistical assumptions have to be made regarding the proportion of passengers who were "merchants." Besides, one supplementary difficulty is that some people who pursued a merchant career outside India were not "merchants" when they left the subcontinent. They departed as indentured or some other kind of labor migrants and, either because they were able to bring some savings with them or because they led a particularly frugal life in their place of migration, they could at some juncture shift from agriculture or some other kind of manual occupation to small-scale trading. For all these reasons, only some very general estimates of the size of these movements can be presented.

As a point of departure, I present here an estimate of the number of Indians engaged in trade and finance in countries outside India around 1930, based primarily on the fairly detailed censuses of the Indian population settled in the major colonial territories of the British Empire (including Burma and Aden, which were still administratively part of British India) which are available. Some very gross estimates of the number of Indians engaged in trade in other British and non-British territories are also appended.

According to my calculations, there were approximately a quarter of a million Indians engaged in trading and finance outside India around 1930. Of course the censuses taken in the colonies at that time cannot be considered a very reliable source. The definition of occupations was often hazy. Thus, under "commercial," were sometimes included occupations such as motor transport, or other ill defined ones. However, as a gross approximation, they seem acceptable.

The total number of Indians outside India must have then been in the neighborhood of 2.5 million, of whom at least 1.5 million were gainfully occupied. Trading and finance would thus have been the occupation of approximately one out of six Indians outside India, i.e. a higher proportion than in India itself (although the censuses are notoriously unreliable in their estimates of the trading population in India). There were of course wide variations in the percentage of the working Indian population engaged in trade and finance. It was particularly low in colonies of massive labor migration: thus in Fiji only a little over 3 percent of active Indian males were in commercial occupations.[3] In colonies like Burma and Malaya, where both labor and commercial migrations had taken place on a fairly massive scale, the share of trade ranged between 5 percent and 6 percent (Malaya)[4] and close to 20 percent (Burma)[5] of the working Indian population. Then there were the territories where trading and finance were the major occupation of the Indian population, like Uganda, where over 50 percent of Indian adult males were in commerce and finance,[6] Nyasaland or Zanzibar.

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[3] Calculated from *Fiji Census*.

[4] K.S. Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya. Some Aspects of their Immigration and Settlement (1786–1957)* (Cambridge, 1969), Table 14, 247. In the Straits Settlements colony, where the Indian population was almost entirely urban, the proportion in commercial occupations reached 14.3 percent (15.3 percent for males). In the Malay States, where most Indians worked in rubber estates, it was much lower.

[5] 18.1 percent. Calculated from *Census of India, 1931, Vol. XI, Part II*.

[6] 3,305 out of 6,395. *Uganda Census Returns, 1931*.

Table 1 Indians in Commercial Occupations in Selected Countries of the British Empire, 1931

Country	Indians engaged in trade and finance		
	Males	Females	Total
Burma	90,657	5,554	96,211
Malaya	29,592	622	30,214
Ceylon (1921)	23,704	1,119	24,823
South Africa (1921)	11,849	525	12,374
British Guiana	6,316	1,182	7,498
Tanganyika	n.a.	n.a.	6,124
Mauritius (1921)	5,059	888	5,947
Kenya (1926)	5,176	28	5,204
Zanzibar (1921)	4,980	n.a.	4,980
Trinidad (late 1930s)	2,629	946	3,575
Uganda	3,305	14	3,319
Hong Kong	n.a.	n.a.	1,294
Nyasaland	1,256	n.a.	1,256
Fiji (1921)	812	42	854
Southern Rhodesia	343	4	347
New Zealand (1926)	n.a.	n.a.	179
Total			204,199

Sources:

Burma: Census of India, 1931, vol. XI, Burma, Part II, Tables, by J.J. Bennison, Rangoon, 1933, Imperial Table XI, Part II, 192–193. I have added up the numbers for "Indians born in Burma" and "Indians born outside Burma." The table covers earners and working dependants.

Malaya: British Malaya. A Report on the 1931 Census and on certain problems of vital statistics, by C.A. Vlieband, s.d., s.1., Tables 127, 273–276, 135, 298–301, 143, 322–324.

Ceylon: Census Publications, Ceylon, 1921, vol. IV, General Tables, by L.J.B. Turner, Colombo, 1926, Table XVII, 280–321. I have added up the numbers for "Indian Tamils," "Indian Moors," and "Others" (who were almost exclusively other Indians). Earners only are covered.

South Africa: Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa…1920–1930, no. 12, Pretoria, 1931, 851.

British Guiana: British Guiana. Report on the results of the Census of the population, 1931, by C.H. Norton, Georgetown, 1932, XLI.

Tanganyika: Report by Sir Sydney Armitage-Smith, on a Financial mission to Tanganyika, 26 September 1932, cmd 4182, 6.

Mauritius: Final Report on the Census enumeration made in the Colony of Mauritius and its dependencies on the night of the 21st of May 1921, by A. Walter, Port-Louis, 1926, Appendix I, Table VII, CX and CXI. I have added up the numbers for the "Indo-Mauritian population" and the "Indian population."

Kenya: Report on the non-native census enumeration made in the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya on the night of the 21st February 1926, by A.G. Baker, ed. by A. Walter, Nairobi, 1927, Table XXIII, 69.

Zanzibar: Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire, Vol. II, East Africa…by D.R. Kuczynski, London, 1949, 654, "non-native population of Zanzibar, 1921

Census." The number is that of British Indian adult males, most of whom were in trading occupations. It is therefore an overestimate.
Trinidad: J.D. Tyson, Memorandum of Evidence for the Royal Commission to the West Indies, New Delhi, 1939, 44.
Uganda: Uganda Protectorate. Census Returns, 1931, Entebbe, 1933, Table XXI, 27.
Hong Kong: K.N. Vaid, The Overseas Indian Community in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 1972, 23.
Nyasaland: F. and L. Dotson, The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi, New Haven, London, 1968, 47, note 41. The number is that of economically active males. Practically all of them were in trade.
Fiji: Legislative Council, Fiji, 1922, Council Paper no. 2. Fiji Census, 1921, Suva, 1922, Table 28, 164–165.
South Rhodesia: South African Indian Who's Who and Commercial Directory, 1940, incorporating Southern and Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Portuguese East Africa, Pietermaritzburg, 1939, 34.
New Zealand: Indians Abroad Directory, Bombay, 1934, 174–175.

Those Indians engaged in trade and finance were overwhelmingly male, generally 95 percent or more so (Mauritius and British Guiana being the only territories where females accounted for more than 10 percent of the trading Indian population). This reflects partly a reality, but also a statistical bias: wives and daughters of shopkeepers who gave a helping hand in the shop were generally not recognized as being gainfully employed. However, Indian trading communities outside India, especially the non-Muslim ones, were characterized by a markedly unbalanced sex ratio. Thus in Uganda, among Hindus (amongst whom were also many non-traders), the sex ratio was 47 women to 100 men in 1931.[7] In Kenya in 1926 it was even less favorable, being only 39.[8] Indian traders who went abroad often tended to leave their womenfolk and children in India, bringing them over only when they had been away for many years and presumably successful enough. An unbalanced sex ratio is of course a characteristic of most migrations, especially those from India, but it did not generate among merchants the same degree of hardship as among laborers, since very often the traders had a wife in India whom they visited at regular intervals. A peculiarity of trading communities was that some merchants, especially those who lived in "isolated" locations, had a tendency to make local arrangements of a quasi-matrimonial nature, a possibility which was rarely open to laborers.

[7] Calculated from *Uganda Census Returns*, Table XXX, 39.
[8] Calculated from *Kenya, Report on the Non-native Census Enumeration*, Table XII, 53.

As regards the religious composition of the merchant population outside India, the available data do not confirm the widely-held belief that Muslims were in a great majority. For Ceylon data from the 1921 Census suggest that the number of Hindus was more or less equal to that of Muslims.[9] For Burma, data from the 1921 Census give the following ratio: 55 percent of Muslims and 45 percent of Hindus.[10] Muslims appear to have been in a clear majority only in places like Portuguese East Africa, Malagasy or Zanzibar. Many Hindu traders did obviously have no qualms about crossing the *kala pani*, or if they had any (which we do not necessarily know about), they overcame them for the sake of profit (or at least the lure of it).

Table 2 Estimates of Number of Indians in Trade and Finance in Selected Countries in the early 1930s

Country	Estimated Number of Indians in trade
Asia	
China	A few hundreds
Japan	200
Philippines	200–300
Dutch East Indies	A few thousands
Thailand	A few thousands
French Indochina	A few thousands
Tibet	A few thousands
Afghanistan	A few thousands
Persia	A few thousands
Iraq	A few thousands
Bahrein	100
Trucial Oman and Qatar	200–300
Oman and Muscate	400–500
Yemen	A few hundreds
Aden	3,000

[9] There were 10,491 "Indian Tamil" (as distinct from "Ceylon Tamil") male earners in trade and finance, presumably Chettiars and other Hindus from the Madras Presidency, as against 10,417 "Indian Moors" (as distinct from "Ceylon Moors"), mostly Tamilian-speaking Muslim immigrants from India. As for the 2,796 "other" male earners in trade and finance, there are no precise indications as to their religion. From *Census Publications, Ceylon, 1921*.

[10] There were 38,371 "Non-Burmese Mahomedans" employed in trade, finance and insurance, who can safely be assumed to have been Indian Muslims, and 30,973 Hindus, Sikhs and others (there were very few Sikh, Jain and Parsi traders in Burma). *Census of India, 1921, Vol. X, Burma, Part II, Tables*, by S.G. Grantham (Rangoon, 1923), Imperial Table XX, 440–1.

Table 2 (*cont.*)

Country	Estimated Number of Indians in trade
Africa	
Egypt	200
Sudan	200
British Somaliland	100
Ethiopia	2,000
Italian Somalia	A few hundreds
Portuguese East Africa	3,000–4,000
Malagasy	2,661
Réunion	710
Seychelles	100–200
Morocco (Incl. Spanish Morocco and Tangier)	500–1,000
Algeria	A few hundreds
Europe	
Gibraltar	100
Spain	A few hundreds
UK	1,000–2,000
America	
Panama	300
Jamaica	A few hundreds
Surinam	A few hundreds
Total (including others)	30,000–40,000

Sources: The estimates are mine, based on a variety of sources, mostly Indians Abroad Directory, passim. The numbers for Malagasy and Réunion are those of British Indian adult males (who were practically all in trade). For Aden, the estimate is derived from Census of India, 1931, Vol. VIII, Part III, Aden, Report and tables, by M.S. Johnson, Bombay, 1933, Table X, 25, which gives the total number employed in trade in Aden as 3,320 males and 156 females. I have assumed that 85 percent of them were Indian, which might be an overestimate.

The idea that Hindus were reluctant to engage in maritime trade for fear of breaking a religious taboo on overseas voyages is one of the most enduring legends bequeathed to us by the Portuguese. When the latter made their appearance in the Indian Ocean, there were already important colonies of Hindu *banias* in many ports of the ocean, such as Muscat.[11] It could be, of course, that this kind of religious taboo

[11] For testimonies of the presence of Hindu merchants in Muscat at the end of the fifteenth century, see C.H. Allen, "The Indian Merchant Community of Masqat," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 44 (1981), 39.

was enforced more strictly at later periods. There is evidence that in the eighteenth century North Indian banias considered the crossing, not only of the seas, but even of the Indus at Attock, a violation of religious norms[12] necessitating, on the return, the undergoing of purification rituals. These rules were still enforced in the late nineteenth century in Porbandar, a port in Kathiawar which had intense commercial relations with the Middle East and Africa, judging from Gandhi's own testimony. However, all this did not prevent Hindu merchants in coastal regions as well as in the northwestern borderlands from travelling extensively all over the world and from establishing residence for many years in far away lands. The most adventurous of all Indian merchants in modern times, the Sindworkies of Hyderabad (Sind) who went as far as Japan, South Africa, and the Straits of Magellan, were Hindus, albeit of a peculiar persuasion (being generally Shaivaite as well as Nanakpanthis, i.e. non-Khalsa Sikhs), and there is no evidence that they underwent purification rituals when they returned to Hyderabad.

Religion does not seem to have been the determining factor in the more or less inward or outward orientation of Indian merchant communities. Some of these communities, Hindu as well as Muslim, seem to have been outward-oriented for centuries, and the advent of steam navigation and the telegraph in the second half of the nineteenth century only further accentuated this trend. Other communities, such as the Marwaris, remained India-bound. It is doubtful that religious orthodoxy was their main motivation in forsaking opportunities outside India. The truth is that they established such a powerful domination over most of India's internal trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that there was no need for them to seek outlets outside the country. Conversely, those communities which were in a more precarious position in regard to internal trade and already had a foothold in trade outside India tended to develop their interests abroad. Of course this leaves unanswered the question as to why some communities, like the Bengali traders, who were largely squeezed out by the Marwaris on their home ground, did not seek compensations elsewhere. The answer is probably that they did not have the connections and the "know how" which would have allowed them such a breakthrough.

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[12] C.A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars. North Indian society in the age of British expansion, 1770–1870* (Cambridge, 1983), 386.

Indian traders abroad originated mainly from a few regions of the subcontinent. Gujarat and Tamilnadu are clearly the two regions from where the largest number of merchants migrated. Other regions which supplied a fair amount of migrants are Sind, the Punjab, and Kerala. On the other hand, few merchants from the Hindi heartland went abroad. The leading role played by the coastal regions of the subcontinent comes as no surprise, since those regions, and in particular Gujarat and Coromandel, were those through which most of India's foreign sea trade had been conducted. However, it has already been mentioned that few traders from Bengal, another coastal region active in maritime trade, left India. In the same way, relatively few traders from the Konkan emigrated. Therefore no strict correlation can be derived between coastal location and size of merchant migration. If one looks more closely at the data on Sind, one will notice that most Sindhi merchant migrants originated from two inland towns in the province, Hyderabad and Shikarpur and that few hailed from its main seaport Karachi. In the same way, more merchants migrated from Kutch, an area with only one proper seaport (Mandvi), than from Kathiawar, which had many. Surat continued to be the focus of large merchant diasporas long after it ceased to be an active seaport.

Indian Trading Migrations: The Time Sequence

Although merchant migrations from India have had a very long history, they undoubtedly took a new dimension in the nineteenth century. Reconstructing a detailed chronology of these migrations is impossible, due to the lack of official statistics. The most one can do is to draw a very impressionistic picture, based on scattered evidence. Looking at the situation one century earlier than 1930, i.e. around 1830, one is aware of the existence of small communities of Indian merchants in practically all the ports of the Indian Ocean, from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. Among ports where sizeable communities of Indian merchants resided, were, in the Western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, Aden (even before its annexation by the British in 1839), Mocha in Yemen,[13] Berbera, and Massawa. In the Persian Gulf, Hindu

[13] According to the British traveler, Valentia, there were in Mocha around 1810 some two hundred and fifty resident Banyans (Hindu merchants). Quoted in R. Pankhurst, "Indian Trade with Ethiopia, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa in

banias had been operating at Bahrein since the beginning of the eighteenth century.[14] The largest Indian merchant community was probably that in Muscat, which numbered around 2,000 in 1840.[15] Around the same date, when Sultan Sayid moved his headquarters from Muscat to Zanzibar, there were already at least three or four hundred Indian merchants in the latter port.[16] The first Indian traders reached Mauritius in 1829,[17] even before indentured labor migration to the island started. East of India, there were Indian traders and moneylenders in Burma, where Chettiars started going from 1826 onwards,[18] and in the Straits Settlements, which were a dependency of India until 1867.

Although no precise estimate is possible, the Indian merchant diaspora in the Indian Ocean by the 1830s was several thousand strong, of whom a majority appear to have been Hindus. In one century its growth was therefore spectacular and its composition underwent some change, with the emergence of a sizeable Muslim element. The demographic history of these migrations, impossible to reconstruct in any detail, appears to fall into two distinct periods, with 1880 as an important cut-point. Between 1830 and 1880, the growth of the Indian merchant diaspora was slow and haphazard. The greatest expansion occurred in East Africa, where by 1860 there were five to six thousand Indian traders in the dominions of the sultan of Zanzibar.[19] The Indian merchant presence became also more noticeable in Burma, following the British annexation of Lower Burma in 1852, and in the Straits Settlements. It is also around 1860 that the Hindu merchants hailing from Hyderabad (Sind), the Sindworkies, started their voyages to Egypt and further West.[20] The opening of China after

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the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 55 XIV/3 (1974), 455.

[14] In a petition addressed to the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, dated 2 November 1903, ten prominent British Indian merchants of Bahrein wrote: "May it be known to Your Lordship that we came up the Persian Gulf about two hundred years ago…" Enclosed in India Office Records (IOR), Politics and Secret Department Records L/P& S/7/134.

[15] Allen, "The Indian Merchant Community of Masqat," 45.

[16] R.G. Gregory, *India and East Africa. A History of Race Relations within the British Empire 1890–1939* (Oxford, 1971), 18.

[17] B. Benedict, *Indians in a Plural Society. A Report on Mauritius* (London, 1961), 26.

[18] N.R. Chakravarti, *The Indian Minority in Burma* (London, 1971), 56.

[19] J.S. Mangat, *A History of the Asians in East Africa c. 1886 to 1945* (Oxford, 1969), 7.

[20] *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*, compiled by E.H. Aitken (Karachi, 1907), 395.

the First Opium War resulted in some Indian merchants, particularly Bombay Parsis who had been active in the China trade since the late eighteenth century, taking up residence in the Treaty Ports. The range of Indian merchant migrations thus increased as well as their size, as Indian merchants started travelling and residing in the Mediterranean and the China seas.

From the early 1880s, there was a sudden acceleration in the pace and volume of Indian merchant migrations. Indian merchants started appearing in localities where they had never been seen, often in the wake of the indentured labor migrants. Thus in Durban, where in 1880 there were only seven "Arab" (local name for the Gujarati Muslims) shopkeepers, the 1891 Census listed 598 Indian storekeepers and 172 "designated traders."[21] Fairly detailed statistical evidence on migration from India to Malaya from the late 1870s tends to show that "non-labor" migration, which was largely (although not exclusively) a commercial migration, suddenly accelerated around the mid-1880s.[22] The 1880s were also a decade of very fast growth in the Indian population of Burma[23] and presumably in the numbers of Indian traders. These "free" migrations of mostly trading people, as opposed to indentured or *kangani* labor migrations, became fairly massive in the first decade of the twentieth century. During 1906–08, more than 12,000 "free" migrants left Bombay for East Africa.[24] In 1907 and 1908, 30,000 "non-labor" immigrants landed in Malaya.[25] "Free" migration to several destinations remained at a high level until 1914, and, after slowing down considerably during the First World War and its immediate aftermath, started with renewed vigor in the 1920s. It continued to be high in the 1930s, in spite of the world depression and was durably interrupted only by the Second World War.

The sudden acceleration in the pace of merchant migrations after 1880 is not easy to explain. It is true that the 1880s and 1890s were not a period of great commercial prosperity in India, while many colonial

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[21] R.A. Huttenback, *Gandhi in South Africa, British Imperialism and the Indian Question, 1860–1914* (London, 1971), 41.

[22] In the first half of the 1880s, yearly non-labor migration was on average 2,000–3,000. In the second half of the decade, it rose to an average of 5,000–6,000 and in the 1890s reached 7,000–8,000. Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya*, Appendix 3, 312–313.

[23] It rose from 129,566 in 1881 to 282,908 in 1891, according to the revised estimates of Chakravarti, *Indian Minority in Burma*, Table 2.6, 22.

[24] G. Prunier, *l'Ouganda et la question indienne (1896–1972)* (Paris, 1990), 25.

[25] Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya*.

territories, such as Burma and Malaya, went through a phase of rapid development. However, with the return of a relative prosperity in India from the late 1890s onwards, the trend was not reversed, on the contrary. By then, merchant migration appeared to have acquired a dynamics of its own, which made it relatively independent from the fluctuations of the economic conjuncture in India. Economic prospects and conditions in the various countries of destination seem to have exercised greater influence on the process than the state of the Indian economy. This implies that information on conditions abroad was widely available in India and that Indian businessmen, at least in some areas, had become widely mobile and responsive to opportunities in foreign countries.

Was the spurt in merchant migration directly related to the growth of large Indian communities in some territories as a result of decades of labor migrations on a fairly large scale? Some correlation obviously existed between the two migration streams, but it was probably less than has been sometimes assumed. There is no clear evidence that most Indian traders abroad specialized in the sale of Indian goods to Indian laborers. Given the low purchasing power of the laborers, that market in any case could not have sustained over time the expansion of Indian business. Supplying the Indian laborers was often only the first step in a process. Thus in South Africa Indian traders increasingly specialized in selling goods to the natives, a field in which their low operating costs and knowledge of the market allowed them to make rapid inroads to the detriment of European competitors, mostly Jewish merchants. The same was true of East Africa, where the dukawalla, the Indian general country merchant, became the backbone of the local Indian trading community. However, some Indian trading communities specialized in the sale of "European" goods mostly to European customers. This was the case in particular of the Parsis, who often were specialized in the liquor trade, and of the Sindworkies who traded in silk and curios.

One essential feature of this migration is that it was generally of a non-permanent nature. Rarely did commercial migrants leave India with the avowed intention of settling abroad for good. Those who left as employees of commercial firms had contracts for a period of two or three years at most. Others who went on their own just hoped to make good in a few years so as to be able to come back to India in a better economic position. However, many of those who left never came back, either, one can presume, because their business prospered so much that India held no more attraction for them, or, on the contrary, because

they were complete failures and did not dare show their face again in their native place. Others returned to India after a few years, or only to retire, often, but not always, wealthier than when they had departed. There is of course no way of knowing even approximately the number of migrants who belonged to those various categories. However, one can draw a distinction between two kinds of destinations: those which were easily accessible from India, because ship passage was relatively cheap, and those which were not. In the first category were in particular Burma, Ceylon, and Malaya. It was possible for a small trader to try his luck there and come back if prospects proved disappointing. Therefore migration to these countries was characterized by a very high rate of turnover. The only complete series available concerns Malaya, where, from 1844 onwards, it is possible to differentiate between labor and non-labor migration. In the period from 1844 to 1931, the total number of non-labor migrants who reached Malaya from India is 643,000.[26] Assuming that half of these arrivals were "commercial" migrants, one could conclude that more than 300,000 traders migrated from India to Malaya during that period. Similarly high figures could be derived for Ceylon and Burma, which were even more easily accessible than Malaya from the Indian ports. It is therefore possible to estimate the volume of gross Indian trading migration to those three territories, where more than 60 percent of all Indians engaged in trade resided around 1930, to have been in the neighborhood of one million or more between 1840 and 1930. In other territories, which were less easily accessible from India, the turnover was much lower. In South Africa the 12–13,000-strong Indian trading population counted by the 1921 Census was the result of the migration of 14,000 "free" migrants between 1860 and 1911,[27] most of which took place between 1880 and 1900. Comparable ratios between the actual number of Indians in trade around 1930 and trading migrations can be inferred for most other territories. Therefore, outside Burma, Ceylon, and Malay, a total of 200 or 300,000 trading migrants in the period from 1840 to 1930 period seems a reasonable estimate. This would put the total number of commercial migrants from India during this period at 1.5 million. This represents over 5 percent of the total of approximately 27 million

[26] Calculated from Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya*.

[27] See A. Lemon, "The political position of Indians in South Africa," in Clarke, Peach, and Vertovec, eds., *South Asians Overseas*, 131.

migrants computed by Kingsley Davis for the same period.[28] However, since most of this migration took place between 1880 and 1930, it accounted for a slightly higher percentage of the overall migrant flows during that period.

The difference between the percentage of commercial people among migrants, i.e. around 6 or 7 percent, and that of people engaged in trade among Indians residing abroad, i.e. around 15 or 16 percent, can be explained (apart from inevitable statistical inaccuracies) by a combination of two factors. Firstly, the turnover was probably even higher among laborers than among traders, and this point is supported by much of the statistical evidence available on labor migrations to Burma, Ceylon, and Malaya. Secondly, the shift in occupation, from labor to small-scale trading, may have occurred on a fairly important scale.

By 1930, the vast majority of Indians engaged in trade outside India were immigrants from India. Only in Mauritius[29] and South Africa were the majority of Indian traders locally-born. In Burma, Indians born in the country were less than 10 percent of the total of Indians engaged in trade.[30]

It has already been mentioned that, contrary to the case of labor migration, the state took no part in organizing or even regulating movements of traders. Provided they obtained a passport, which does not appear to have been particularly difficult (and which was not even necessary for Burma), British Indian merchants and subjects of the Indian States could freely leave India. However, it is well known that they faced many obstacles when it came to disembarking. An increasing number of countries, both within and outside the British Empire, took exclusion measures against "Asiatic" immigrants, amongst whom Indians were as much a target as Chinese. Many countries passed discriminatory legislation against foreign merchants, and often specifically targeted the Indian traders. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, such laws were passed by countries as diverse as South Africa, Kenya, Gibraltar, the Philippines, Panama, and protests by Indian trading interests forced the India Office to intervene on their behalf, although with little effect. Doing business abroad was becoming increasingly tricky for Indian merchants. Paradoxically, they enjoyed

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[28] K. Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton, 1951), Table 35, 99.

[29] Where, in 1921, there were 5,065 "Indo-Mauritians" (Indians born in Mauritius) in commerce and finance, as against 882 "Indians" (Indians born in India). *Census of 1921*.

[30] Calculated from *Census of India, 1931, Vol. XI*.

better protection from being British subjects in foreign countries than in many countries of the British Empire where anti-Indian hysteria was often raging and the Imperial Government unable or unwilling to do anything against it.

In spite of all these obstacles, Indian merchants succeeded in gaining a foothold in trade in many countries of the world. This they could achieve mainly thanks to the strength of various networks. For, in spite of being generally labeled "free" or even "spontaneous" migration, to distinguish it from indentured labor migration, the migration of commercial people was a highly organized process.

South Asian Trading Networks

A crucial concept for analyzing merchant migrations is that of network. It seems preferable to the concept of trading diaspora popularized by Africanists.[31] A trading network can be defined as a spatially discontinuous structure, linking with each other several nodal points, across which different kinds of "objects" circulate: capital, credit, goods, information, men, women. Two of these "objects" have a tendency to circulate exclusively within the network: information and women. As a rule, a particular trading network does not trade inside information and does not exchange women with another trading network. Inversely, all members of a specific trading network are sharers of certain kind of information ("the secrets of the trade") and, within certain limits prescribed by religious law and social custom, potential partners in marriage alliances. As regards the circulation of capital, the general rule is that members of the network are preferred partners in business and get preferential rates and conditions as regards repayment of loans (longer delays, less collateral, etc.). However, many traders borrow capital at least partly outside the network, generally from specialized banking communities. Some trading communities include both bankers and traders but this is the exception rather than the rule. Preference in employment as managers, brokers, shop assistants, etc., is also given to (male) members of the network though exclusive pref-

[31] The term seems to have been first used by Abner Cohen in his "Cultural Strategies in the Organization of Trading Diasporas," in C. Meillassoux, ed. *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa* (London, 1971), 267. For a discussion, see Philip D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge, 1984), 1–14.

erence for them can rarely remain in the long term when distances are very great. Goods circulate also within a given trading network, but the specific patterns of circulation can greatly vary, according to the kind of business engaged in. One major difference is between those networks which include both wholesalers and retailers and those which are specialized in only one of these operations. In the latter case, an institutionalized relationship with one or several other trading networks is a necessity. Only those networks spanning the whole spectrum of trading operations can afford to be self-contained.

In the Indian case, a specific trading network is generally congruent with either a specific "caste" or "subcaste" (including Muslim "quasi-castes") or with a cluster of castes, or with a localized section of a given caste or subcaste. I present here a table of the major international trading networks operating from India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which I have identified. It will be seen that the majority of these networks originated from a few regions, particularly Kutch, Kathiawar, Sind, Kerala and Tamilnadu. The place occupied by the small Indian state of Kutch is particularly remarkable. Traders from that region, both Muslim (Memons who were Sunni and Khojas who were Shia, divided since the 1840s between Ismaili and Itna'ashari) and Hindu (Lohana and Bhattia) have been exceptionally active in the Indian Ocean since the end of the eighteenth century. Kutchi Bhattias played a crucial role in Oman from the 1820s onwards when they supplanted the Sindhi Bhattias who had been dominant in the trade of Muscat for many centuries.[32] Kutchi Bhattias were the major financiers of the slave trading network centered on Zanzibar and, as such, a prime target of British onslaughts against the trade, although they did not themselves trade in slaves. Thanks to their status as subjects of a native state, they managed for a while to resist British attempts to prevent them from continuing their activities, but in 1869 the ruler of Kutch was eventually persuaded to issue a proclamation to the effect that his subjects in Zanzibar would be considered as British subjects and therefore forbidden to take part in the slave trade.[33] In

[32] See Allen, "The Indian Merchant Community of Masqat."

[33] M. Rheda Bhacker, *Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar. Roots of British Domination* (London, 1992), 172. However, Kutchis continued to be involved in the slave trade in Portuguese territory. A memorandum dated 3 January 1876 concluded that the Government of India had no jurisdiction over Kutchis in Mozambique and referred the question to the Foreign Office. IOR, Political & Secret Memorials *c.* 1840–1947 L/ P& S/18, Memorandum B 12.

spite of this blow, Kutchi Bhattias remained prominent in the trade of the Western Indian Ocean till far into the twentieth century. Another group of Hindus from Kutch, the Kutchi Lohanas, became dominant in East African trade, particularly in Uganda,[34] during the first half of the twentieth century. Muslims from Kutch were also extremely active: The Khojas, particularly the Ismaili section, played almost as great a role in East Africa as the Lohanas. As for the Kutchi Memons, who, contrary to the Khojas, were Sunni Muslims, they established a powerful trading network extending from Burma to the interior of Central Africa.

Table 3 Major International Trading Networks Operating from India

Caste	Region of origin	Areas of operation
Patidar	Central Gujarat	East and Central Africa
Lohana	Kutch	East and Central Africa
Bhatia	Kutch	Oman, East Africa
Memon	Kutch	East Africa, Burma, Ceylon, Mauritius
Khoja Ismaili	Kutch	East Africa
Khoja Itna'ashari	Kutch	East Africa
Bohra	Surat	Maldives, Ceylon, Temen, Réunion, Malagasy
Halai Memon	Kathiawar	Suth and East Africa
Vania	Kathiawar	Horn of Africa
Marwari	Rajasthan	Burma, Japan
Arora	Punjab	Central Asia, Malaya
Khatri	Punjab	Central Asia
Mappillai	Kerala	Ceylon, Burma
Chettiar	Tamilnadu	SE Asia, Burma, Ceylon, South Africa, Mauritius
Marakkayar	Tamilnadu	Burma, SE Asia
Bhaiband	Hyderabad (Sind)	The whole world
Bhaiband	Shikarpur (Sind)	Central Asia, Burma
Bhattia	Thatta (Sind)	Persian Gulf
Khoja	Hyderabad (Sind)	Oman
Parsi	Bombay	Far East, Aden, UK

[34] According to a survey of holders of trading licenses in Uganda done in 1954, there were 1,300 Lohana amongst the 5,809 Indian license holders. Although they were a little less numerous than the Patidars, they were economically the most powerful community in Uganda. See H.S. Morris, *The Indians in Uganda* (London, 1966), Table 6, 184–185.

Thus the small native state of Kutch, with barely half a million people in 1931, provided a disproportionate share of the total number of commercial migrants from India in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. As for an explanation, apart from its geographical location close to the major maritime routes between Western India and the Western Indian Ocean, one is often referred to a terrible famine which took place in 1817, which seems to have been a local equivalent of the Irish potato famine. However, it remains to be understood why the different merchant communities from Kutch were so uniformly successful in their commercial and financial ventures abroad. A possible line of explanation lies in the attitude of the rulers who maintained a large degree of independence from British interference in their domestic affairs and seem to have systematically given their support to the traders. However, further enquiries into the "Kutchi miracle" are obviously needed.

Merchants from Kathiawar, both Muslim and Hindu, figure also prominently in the history of the Indian merchant diasporas. Traders from Porbandar, Memons as well as Vanias, seem to have been particularly active in Mauritius and South Africa, and it is through that network that Gandhi entered South Africa. The area was divided into many petty states, but they also seemed to have succeeded, in spite of their small size, to preserve some degree of independence from the British, which was probably a help to their traders. The Kathiawar ports were the only ports outside British India which maintained a significant overseas maritime trade, mainly with the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa and East Africa.

Central Gujarat, the home of some of India's most powerful merchant families, figures less prominently in the saga of the Indian merchant diasporas. However, traders from Surat and Broach, particularly Muslims belonging to the Daudi (Shia) Bohra community, played an important role from Thailand to Malagasy. The Patidars (Patels) are a special case: This community of relatively well-off peasants started acquiring a more urban and commercial orientation in its home ground of Kheda district in the first decades of the twentieth century. The Patidars have also been very successful in trade in East Africa, where they did not go originally as traders.

North of Gujarat, the province of Sind made a considerable, if often unrecognized, contribution to the Indian merchant diaspora. Several merchant networks originated from that region. The oldest one appears to have been that of the Bhattias of Thatta (not to be confused with

the Kutchi Bhattias). They formed, from the late fifteenth to the early nineteenth century, the bulk of the large Indian trading community in Muscat. Some then moved to Zanzibar while the majority appear to have made their way to the Persian Gulf where they played a major role in the pearling trade of Bahrein, Kuwait, and Dubai till the middle of the twentieth century.[35] From the late eighteenth century onwards, Sindhi Khojas established in the recently-founded capital of Hyderabad started making their way to Muscat where they were known as Luwatiyya and played a fairly important role in the trade of that emporium of the Western Indian Ocean.[36] However, the two most important networks from Sind were Hindu networks centered around the two major inland trading cities of the province, Shikarpur and Hyderabad. The Shikarpuri *shroffs*, belonging to the Bhaiband sub-caste of the great Lohana merchant caste, established a powerful international banking network extending from Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea to the Straits of Malacca. Their *hundis* were the major currency all along the caravan routes of Central Asia and in India, where they were known, outside Sind, as Multanis, as well as in Burma, they specialized in the rediscount of *hundis*.[37] Another group of Bhaiband, based in Hyderabad, the capital of pre-British Sind, established the most extensive of all Indian merchant networks abroad, which around 1905 stretched from Kobe in Japan to Panama, with several firms having branches in all the major ports along the two main sea-routes, Bombay-Kobe (via Colombo, Singapore, Surabaya, Saigon, Canton, Shanghai, Manila) and Bombay-Panama (via Port-Sudan, Port Said, Alexandria, Valletta, Gibraltar, Teneriffe, or alternatively via Lourenco-Marques, Capetown, Freetown). By 1907 it was estimated that there were five thousand of these Sindworkies, who specialized in the sale of silk and curios, scattered across the world.[38]

Punjab was also home to some adventurous merchant communities, whose members did not hesitate to cross deserts and high mountain passes to pursue trade in Central Asia. Thus Hindu Khatri merchants from the town of Hoshiarpur were active in the trade between India

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[35] See Allen, "The Indian Merchant Community of Masqat."

[36] See ibid.

[37] L.C. Jain, *Indigenous Banking in India* (London, 1929), 83. For the Shikarpuris, I have drawn on my personal research on the history of Sindhi merchant networks, based on a variety of primary sources.

[38] *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*. I am preparing a history of the Sindworkies.

and Chinese Turkestan at the time when Macartney was the British Consul in Kashgar.[39] Others followed the maritime routes East of Calcutta: Sikh merchants from Rawalpindi, Lahore, Ludhiana, Jullundur and Amritsar, were found in Malaya in the 1920s, some having moved directly from India, others having first spent time in Rangoon or Bangkok.[40]

However adventurous and far-ranging the merchants from Western and Northern India were, the majority of commercial migrants appear to have been South Indians. Merchants from present-day Kerala and Tamilnadu formed the bulk of the Indian trading diaspora in Burma, Ceylon and Malaya. Three communities have been particularly prominent. Of greatest economic importance has been the community of the Nattukottai Chettiars, who, from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, emerged as the main providers of rural credit to the peasants of Burma, Ceylon and Malaya. Their network extended also to French Indochina, Northern Sumatra and probably Thailand in Southeast Asia, while they also operated, apparently on a smaller scale, in Mauritius and South Africa. These Shaivaite Hindus, who used their temples as clearing houses, played a major role in financing commercial agriculture in Southeast Asia, particularly in the rice deltas of the Irrawaddy and the Mekong.[41] Of lesser importance in economic terms than these powerful bankers, but fairly ubiquitous, were two Muslim groups, the so-called "Chulia," who were Tamil-speaking Muslims of whom the Marakkayar were a branch. Both communities were prominent in retail trade in the three territories. In Burma, the Chulias "owned shops even in remote villages, in addition to those located in towns and cities."[42] The Marakkayar, who numbered over 40,000 in Malaya in 1939, mostly settled in the Straits Settlements,

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[39] See Macartney's diary for November 1913, enclosed in Macartney to Deputy Secretary, Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 9 December 1913, in which he reports having registered at Yarkand "20 Hoshiarpuri Hindus." IOR, Political & Secret Separate (or Subject) Files 1902–1931 L/ P& S/10/330.

[40] Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya*, 119.

[41] There is a vast literature on the Chettiars, to which I shall not refer in detail. However, mention should be made of D.W. Rudner, *Caste and Capitalism in Colonial India. The Nattukottai Chettiars* (Berkeley, 1994), the most recent and most complete work on the question.

[42] Chakravarti, *Indian Minority in Burma*, 79. See also M. Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma* (Wiesbaden, 1972).

were general merchants as well as shopkeepers.[43] There were also Mappillai (Moplah) merchants from Kerala in Ceylon as well as in Burma. In Ceylon, the "Indian Tamil" traders constituted a broad category which, besides Chettiars, must have included merchants, mostly small-scale, from diverse Tamil Hindu castes.

This rapid survey of the major Indian trading networks has no other purpose than to underline how diverse and how deeply segmented the Indian merchant diaspora was. This segmentation, at an institutional level, manifested itself in the mushrooming of commercial associations, generally community-based. Practically in no country was there only one Indian merchant association in which traders belonging to different communities were represented. There were Nattukottai Chettiars Associations, Sindhi Associations, Malabar Merchants Associations, and efforts at creating umbrella organizations were rarely very successful. This seems to confirm that Indian merchants abroad tended to think of themselves as Chettiars, Memons, Khojas or Sindworkies rather than "Indian." This segmentation prevented the emergence of powerful Indian business lobbies, even in countries where Indian capital played a major economic role. However, it need not be seen as a failure: Indian merchants had no compelling reason to unite in defense of economic interests which were extremely diverse. Most networks occupied specific economic niches (the rice trade for the Kutchi Memons, the silk and curios trade for the Sindworkies, rural credit for the Chettiars, etc.) and had no overall picture of a global "Indian" interest.

Patterns of Merchant Migration

The networks, once established, after the pioneering phase was over (it was generally over for all but a few destinations by the early twentieth century), offered the basic structure through which the movements of merchants and commercial employees were organized. It was not really possible for a merchant, except if he was exceptionally rich, to move alone. At every stage he needed the help that could only be provided by an existing network. Most merchants did not live in any of the big seaports from which they had to sail. Just to survive for a short

[43] U. Mahajani, *The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaya* (Bombay, 1960), 98.

period in Bombay, Calcutta or Madras, while waiting for their passage, they used the lodging and boarding facilities often provided by their communities, which were the equivalent (though probably more comfortable) of the emigrants' hostels maintained by the government for the departing indentured laborers. Thus Nattukottai Chettiar financial houses maintained "lodges" at all the major sea-ports in Tamilnadu from where passengers departed for Burma, Ceylon and the Straits Settlements, and South Indian Muslim communities had similar facilities, while in Calcutta, the main port of embarkation for North Indian merchants going to the Straits, Sikhs and Sindhis had *gurdwaras* and *dharamsalas* catering to the needs of the travelers.[44] Once they landed, the merchants needed also help to get going: cheap accommodation, cheap loans, which they could only get through an existing network. Of course the extended family was the basic structure of the merchant community, but its resources were not sufficient, except in the cases of very wealthy families, to cater to all the needs of the commercial migrant.

Although the migrant came generally through a network, the modalities varied. Most Indian commercial migrants were probably self-employed small-scale traders who had little capital and were therefore very dependent on credit to start in business in a new location. Having little or no collateral, they could not get it from European banks and had therefore to rely on informal, community-based, credit networks. So, presumably, most commercial migration was "chain migration"; a small merchant went to a place where merchants from his area in India were already settled (once again, leaving aside the case of the first pioneers), about which he had heard through oral or written channels; he went with some accumulated savings, but they were not enough to launch him into the business and he had to borrow from fellow merchants from his area at rates which were probably preferential but could nevertheless be high.

There were, however, other possibilities. Part of the commercial migration from India occurred through the expansion of firms which opened branches in foreign localities. There were thus many Indian firms which became "international" in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, while remaining family firms. The process entailed sometimes the physical migration of some family members. Thus the Parsi

[44] Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya*, 119–120.

firm of Dadabhai & Co., founded by Dorabji Maneckji Vacha, had in 1917 two overseas branches in London and Tuléar (Malagasy) which were respectively managed by two sons of the founder.[45] However, the most common arrangement was for the principals of a firm to entrust the creation of a branch to a manager, who could be either an employee, or a partner of the firm. Shop assistants were also recruited in India and sent abroad on contracts which were generally for a duration of two-and-a-half years. These could be very close to indenture contracts, although the state was not involved in them. Once firms had established a network, smaller operators belonging to the same community could then move on their own. This is very much the mechanism through which the Sindworkie community expanded from Hyderabad (Sind) into many countries. The migration of shop assistants on short-term contracts, which were sometimes renewed, not always for the same destination, represented an important, although rarely mentioned, component of the commercial migration from India. Commercial employees accounted for a significant share of the Indian trading population in the few territories for which detailed statistical data are available: in Malaya, for more than 25 percent,[46] in Kenya for a little over 50 percent.[47] Some Indian shop assistants were probably recruited by British firms in India, but the vast majority went abroad with Indian firms. They were generally recruited in the town where the firm had its headquarters or its immediate surroundings and belonged to the same community as the owners of the firm. This was a form of semi-skilled labor migration entirely organized by private firms, without any state intervention.

Some Indian commercial firms had a widespread network of branches abroad. This was the case in particular of the major Sindworkie firms, with their headquarters at Hyderabad (Sind), such as Pohoomull Bros, D. Chellaram, J.T. Chanrai & Co., K.A.J. Chotirmall and Co., M. Dialdas & Sons, K. Chellaram & Sons. The major Nattukottai Chettiar financial houses had often more than a hundred branches, situated

[45] Mentioned in letter dated 26 May 1917 from J.E.C. Jakes, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Foreign Secretary, Government of India, in the Foreign and Political Department. The letter was enclosed in a file concerning demands by Indian merchants for the opening of a British Consulate in Tuléar, a port in Southwest Malagasy, where there were hundreds of British Indians engaged in trade. IOR, India Foreign Proceedings (External), 1917.

[46] Calculated from *British Malaya, a Report on the 1931 Census.*

[47] Calculated from *Report on the non-native enumeration . . . in . . . Kenya, 1926.*

in many localities in Burma, Ceylon, Malaya and French Indochina. These firms were controlled from their headquarters in India, although local managers had a large autonomy in the day-to-day running of the business. In the Sindworkie firms, the accounting of all the branches was done yearly at Hyderabad, and most profits remitted to India on a regular basis. In such a system, tension between centralizing and centrifugal tendencies was inevitable. If the telegraph became the major channel of communication between the headquarters and the different branches, the physical presence of the principals was nevertheless felt to be necessary at fairly regular intervals. In the big Sindworkie firms, the principals made regular "inspection tours" of the branches, which took them many months to complete.

A third possibility was the pure and simple relocation abroad of an Indian firm. Thus, in the years prior to the First World War, a big Tamil merchant, V.M. Pillay, came with capital from South India to Fiji and established a chain of general stores in the islands.[48] A Sindhi firm from Karachi, Kirpalani & Sons, relocated itself in Trinidad in 1927. Cases of migration of big capitalists from India nevertheless appear to have been rare before 1947. Even when most of their profits came from foreign operations, as was the case for the principals of the big Sindworkie firms or of the major Nattukottai Chettiar financial houses, capitalists preferred to reside in India. Cultural factors have probably a lot to do with it: It was difficult, especially for Hindus, to live the "right life" outside India. But this kind of arrangement was also facilitated by the existence of certain loopholes in the Indian taxation law, which in effect permitted avoidance of taxation on profits earned outside India.[49]

However, most of the Indian immigrants who succeeded in business outside India had not left India with capital. They generally started as small-scale traders and gradually enlarged the scale of their operations. East Africa, where Indian businessmen were particularly successful, is a good case in point. None of the business families which made it

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[48] Mentioned in K.A. Gillion, *Fiji's Indian Migrants* (Melbourne, 1964), 134.

[49] "Profits and gains of a business accruing or arising without British India were not chargeable, even if received or brought within British India, provided they were not received or brought in within three years of the end of the year in which they accrued or arose." *Report of the Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee of 1924–1925,* vol. I (Madras, 1926), 191. The same report candidly acknowledged that "administrative difficulties are experienced in ascertaining whether income has actually been received in British India" and that "much fraud occurs."

big there had had a previous history of business success in India, be it the Madvhanis or Mehtas in Uganda, Karimji Jivanji in Zanzibar and Tanganyika, or A.M. Jeevanjee in Kenya. The most successful Indian businessmen in East Africa tended gradually to diversify from trade into manufacturing (or rather processing of agricultural products) and transport, and some acquired land. On the whole, however, Indian businessmen abroad, prior to the 1950s, remained a trading class and the big shift towards industry occurred at a later stage.

On the basis of the evidence available, it can be safely assumed that the outmigration of traders was not sustained by a large-scale outflow of capital from India. Some capital was undoubtedly exported from India, especially by banking communities such as the Nattukottai Chettiars or the Shikarpuris, because the countries where they operated did not have a developed banking system and they could not therefore have borrowed the initial capital for their operations from banks. However, once the system had got started, given the high rates of interest obtained on loans, it was largely self-sustaining and did not need a regular injection of funds from India. The major problem for the Indian moneylenders was, as much as in India, to obtain the actual repayment of their loans. In normal conditions they seem to have managed it, but when the great depression of the early 1930s depressed peasant incomes, the Chettiars in particular had no option but to foreclose: they found themselves in possession of large tracts of land which were worth very little, and that was their undoing. However, for decades they had been able to transfer large amounts to India and it is doubtful that in the end they really lost out. No estimate of the economic balance sheet of the outside ventures of Indian capitalists in the pre-1947 period is even remotely computable, but there is reason to think that, even if one was able to take it into account, it would not change much to the existing estimates of India's balance of payments. It is only at a micro-level that such analysis could bring rewarding results. It would thus be interesting to be able to evaluate the impact on the regional economy of Gujarat, Sind or Tamilnadu, of the outside ventures of some of the local business communities.

Indian Trading Migrations: The Wider Context

To come back to a macro-perspective, some questions of a fairly general nature have to be asked, even if one cannot provide really

satisfactory answers. The first one concerns the causes of these migrations. Is it possible to reason in terms of "push" and "pull" factors, as is still often done in migration studies? More precisely, can one identify, at a regional or micro-regional level, sets of socio-economic variables which would favor or hamper trading migrations? It seems fairly difficult. In the course of my own research on the Sindworkies, I tried to identify socio-economic transformations which could explain the sudden surge in outward ventures by Hyderabad firms which took place from 1860 onwards, and which led in less than fifty years to the setting up of a worldwide trading network centered on this inland city, situated in one of India's poorest provinces. One hopeful line of enquiry was in the direction of changes in the agrarian economy. Some years ago, David Washbrook argued that, in the late nineteenth century, the British failed to provide the legal and institutional framework necessary for proper "capitalist" development in agriculture, and he related the growing tendency by mercantile capitalists to seek opportunities outside India to this state of affairs.[50] In the case of Sind, respondents to the Indian Banking Enquiry of 1929–30 tended to ascribe the outmigration of bankers from the province to the operation of the Sind Encumbered Estates Acts, the first of which was passed in 1877, which sought to protect big landholders in the province from seeing their estates dismembered.[51] However, this sounds like a fairly dubious ex-post-facto rationalization. Moneylending remained a profitable activity in Sind even after the passing of these Acts,[52] and the development of irrigated agriculture in the twentieth century opened new avenues of opportunity to enterprising banias: They came from Gujarat in fairly large numbers to Karachi and other localities of Sind to capitalize on that mini-boom. Therefore it is difficult to pinpoint a precise set of circumstances pushing Hyderabad merchants out of Sind to try their luck in the wide world. "Pull" factors appear to have been

[50] He wrote: "mercantile capitalists, such as the Nattukottai Chetties of South India, began to vote on the issue with their feet and to take their capital out of India in protest at legal insecurities and frustrations." D.A. Washbrook, "Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India," in *Power, Profit and Politics: Essays on Imperialism, Nationalism and Change in Twentieth-Century India*, ed. C. Baker, G. Johnson and A. Seal (Cambridge, 1981), 676.

[51] *Report of the Bombay Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee 1929–30*, vol. 4 (Bombay, 1930), Evidence of the Shikarpuri Shroffs' Association, 351.

[52] See David Cheesman, "'The Omnipresent Bania': Rural Moneylenders in Nineteenth-Century Sind," *Modern Asian Studies* 16.3 (1982), 445–462.

more decisive, as the craft productions of Hyderabad and neighboring towns found a ready-made market among Europeans in Bombay, which inspired some merchants to try and sell them to European tourists in Egypt and elsewhere. But there remains the question as to why some communities were better than others at exploiting opportunities of that kind abroad: the answer has probably partly to do with the way in which information on foreign markets circulated in India, a subject on which very little is known.

Attempts at identifying specific "causes" for the migration abroad of given business communities are bound to run into great difficulties. Except in the case of economic disasters like the famines in Gujarat in the early nineteenth century, correlations between economic conjunctures at a micro-regional level and movements of traders are practically impossible to establish. An alternative and plausible hypothesis is that some groups developed a rather exclusive "outward-orientation" which led them gradually to insulate themselves from local conditions. I offer this as a tentative explanation, on the basis of my research on the Sindworkies. Among some trading groups, which could not be called "marginal" in any significant sense, there seems to have developed a kind of "migratory habitus," in some cases bred by centuries of participation in overseas or overland trade, but in other cases developed in a short period (undoubtedly the most puzzling case). Similar phenomena have been observed in the case of Lebanese, Jewish, and Chinese merchant groups, and it seems that we have there a trend which cannot be explained in a purely South Asian context but needs a broader comparative perspective.

Turning now to the obverse of the coin, i.e. to the functions fulfilled by Indian traders in their places of business outside India, we are faced with a similar kind of questioning. It has somewhat become part of received wisdom that Indian traders abroad were typical "middlemen" doing "most of the spadework" for British capital in newly colonized territories.[53] Chettiars in Burma and Indians in general in East Africa have been considered among the most characteristic examples of middleman minorities. But not all Indian traders conformed to this model, which in any case appears too functionalist, leading to a complete obliteration of the agency of the merchants. The "fit" between British

[53] See E. Bonacich, "A Theory of Middleman Minorities," *American Sociological Review* 38 (October 1973), 583–594.

imperial aims and the operations of the Indian traders and moneylenders assumed by most authors is a bit too neat to be entirely convincing. How can we be sure, for instance, that Chettiars were really the most economic agency for advancing money to the rice-growing peasants of Lower Burma?[54] And of what crucial importance to British interests in any case was the development of rice cultivation in Burma? Most of its rice found its way to India, Ceylon or Mauritius, but it could have been bought elsewhere as well. Some British trading houses benefited by this development, but the Burma rice trade was increasingly dominated by Indian traders, in particular Kutchi Memons. So actually there was some "fit" between Chettiars and Memons, but the British did not derive much benefit from the development of rice cultivation in Burma. Similarly the development of cotton cultivation in Uganda was of greater interest to Indian than to British mill owners, and the ginneries established in Uganda by the Patidars and the Lohanas sold an increasing share of their production to the big Bombay cotton trading firms. British capital was not very much involved either.

Does it mean that the operations of Indian traders abroad are best understood within a separate Indian "imperialist" or "sub-imperialist" paradigm? One argument in favor of that view is that profits made outside India were sometimes reinvested in business ventures in India. Thus Chettiars, who had been practically inactive in the regional economy of Tamilnadu for decades, came back as investors in the 1930s and 1940s on the strength of gains repatriated from Burma and elsewhere. As a general proposition, however, it appears doubtful, because it implies the existence of identifiable "Indian" interests operating as such in some kind of unified manner, which was never the case, as already mentioned.

Looking at whatever little reliable statistical evidence on the activities of Indian traders abroad is available, one is struck by the lack of an obvious pattern. Burma is an interesting case in point. In the Burma Census of 1931, over 40 percent of all Indians engaged in trade and finance are described as engaged in "other trade in foodstuffs," a largely residual category which includes big rice merchants as well as small shopkeepers. The second largest category, with some 20 percent

[54] Rudner, in *Caste and Capitalism*, 80–81, quotes figures for 1935–1942 tending to show that Chettiars in Burma could charge lower rates of interest than their Burmese and Chinese competitors, but admits that no figures are available to him that "allow for a precise reconstruction of the Burmese credit market between 1870 and 1930."

of all earners and working dependants, is "hotels, cafés, restaurants." Trade in textiles, which one associates typically with Indians in Southeast Asia, mobilizes 7 to 8 percent of the total active Indian trading population, the same proportion as "bank and credit" (in which are included both Chettiar bankers and Indian employees of British and other European-type banks).[55] It is obvious that nothing of significance can be derived from such figures. The search for an overall logic in the activities of Indian traders in Burma is bound to end up in failure. There are only network logics and they can be reconstructed only from sources internal to the various networks: Chettiar, Chulia, Mappillai, Kutchi Memon, Marwari, Sindworkie, Shikarpuri, etc. Not that the various networks did not intersect at some point: thus Shikarpuri bankers were mainly engaged in discounting bills from Chettiar firms which they rediscounted with bankers in Bombay;[56] Kutchi Memons exported rice grown by Burmese farmers with advances from Chettiar moneylenders, etc., but all this does not form a system of "Indian" domination of the Burmese economy, in spite of the perceptions to the contrary by both British administrators and Burmese nationalists.

Therefore I can conclude this chapter only by calling attention to the need for more in-depth analysis of the various and diverse merchant networks which originated from India and linked the subcontinent with many countries of the world. It is only by shifting the focus of enquiry away from such abstract entities as "India" and "Indians" on the one hand, or "the British imperial system" on the other hand, towards actually operational networks through which flowed capital, goods and human beings, that we can hope for a meaningful reconstruction of the rich history of the multifarious Indian trading diaspora.

[55] All figures calculated from *Census of India, 1931, Vol. XI,* 192–193.
[56] Mahajani, *The Role of Indian Minorities*, 17.

MIGRATION—RE-MIGRATION—CIRCULATION: SOUTH ASIAN KULIS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND BEYOND, 1840–1940

Michael Mann

This paper aims to set a new agenda for research on Indian migration. So far, migration history has concentrated almost exclusively on *emigration* or *immigration*. Statistics present migration as a one-way process, ignoring the fact that many "emigrants" returned after relatively short periods of time abroad. Indentured laborers, who are the focus of this paper, often migrated multiple times for short periods. The result was a constantly circulating regime of migration, based on village and familial units, which requires focus not on the land of destination, but on the social and economic transformations within the regions of migrant origin. This novel approach is particularly important for studies of South Asia, where migration has only recently become an historical subject.[1]

Adam McKeown has pointed out that migration from South Asia and coastal China was part of a global migration gaining momentum all over the world from the middle of the nineteenth century onward. Although many refer to Chinese and Indian migrants as "indentured laborers," McKeown compares the South Asian and southern Chinese migration, which amounted to about 52 million, to European migration to the Americas (58 million people) and to northeastern Asia and Russia (51 million migrants). These numbers indicate that migration was an evenly shared global phenomenon and not restricted to the transatlantic migrations which dominated research until the end of the twentieth century.[2] But indentured servitude is insufficient grounds for linking South Asian migrants and migrants from southern China, for temporal labor contracts were common throughout the Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans.

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[1] Many thanks to Sadia Bajwa for critical comments.

[2] Adam McKeown, "Global Migration, 1846–1940," *Journal of World History* 15.2 (2004), 155–189, esp. 156–158.

The destinations of indentured laborers from China and India also differed extremely. More Chinese migrants went to work at the eastern rim of the Pacific in North and South America whilst Indian migrants sometimes travelled as far as the Caribbean, although the other way around the globe. Chinese indentured laborers also worked on the sugar plantations of Cuba where no Indians were employed. Roughly one-third of both migratory groups "met" in the Indo-Malayan Archipelago. However, here the majority of Indian "kulis"[3] was indentured, while Chinese migrants came as merchants, traders, and peddlers, although also as "kulis." In comparison to other world regions, migration from South Asia was fairly high and reflected the incorporation of the Indian labor force into globally expanding and shifting markets. That British India was not simply some sort of colonial periphery but a major player in the process of globalization from the 1860s until the end of World War Two has been pointed out convincingly in Thomas Metcalf's latest book on India and the Indian Ocean.[4]

Although books on Indian migration appeared on the academic market already in the 1970s,[5] only in the 1990s did Indian migrations and diasporas move to the top of South Asia's economic, social, and labor history agenda. Scholars from all over the world now contribute to the emerging field of mobility and migration studies of "indentured laborers," the juridical term for the "kuli" in the century between 1840 and 1940.[6] Although studies of transatlantic migration from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries still dominate academic research, a unique archive of sources—far more detailed than what exists for the transatlantic migrations in general and for the slave trade in particular—is available for those interested in mobility in South Asia.[7]

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[3] For a definition and discussion of the linguistic origins of "kuli" as well as the term, "indentured laborer," see n. 16 and n. 17.

[4] Thomas Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India and the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920* (Berkeley, 2007).

[5] The first massive monograph dealing with the kuli system was written by Hugh Tinker, *A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830–1920* (London, New York, Bombay, 1974). This book was followed by his *Separate and Unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920–1950* (London, 1976).

[6] See the monograph by Marina Carter, *Servants, Sirdars and Settlers: Indians in Mauritius 1834–1874* (Delhi, 1995) and the important edited volume by Crispin Bates, *Community, Empire and Migration: South Asian Diaspora* (Basingstoke, 2001).

[7] Herbert S. Klein, "Bibliographic Essay," *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, 8th ed. (Cambridge, 2005), 213–224.

Sources and Geography

More than any other world region, the Indian Ocean possesses a formidable and fairly comprehensive archive on migration compiled by the personnel of European imperial powers and Indian contractors. Bureaucratic registration, medical inspection, and shipping lists as well as court sentences contribute to this unique collection of individual names, places, times, and destinations. Letters from indentured laborers to family members back home, letters of complaint, and individual and collective petitions document the agency of the kulis.[8] No other group of migrant laborers has been listed so meticulously as the Indian kuli laborer, making study of Indian migration a cutting edge academic enterprise. Recent studies focus on the forging of the Sikh community in Canada, Muslim communities in Mauritius, miner-kulis and merchant-settlers in South Africa and many other subjects.[9] But the majority of migrants—the 80 percent who in fact returned to South Asia to re-settle the valleys and villages where they had been recruited and from where they had set off to look for wage labor—have still not been studied.[10]

People had been migrating within the Indian subcontinent and around the Indian Ocean rim at least since the twelfth century. For centuries merchants, traders, seamen, and travelers from South Asia and other regions bordering the Indian Ocean, particularly East Africa, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf on the western side and Sumatra and Malaya on the eastern side, developed intercontinental, translocal macro areas that have been depicted as a distinctive Indian Ocean civilization.[11] This transoceanic region emerged through tightly knit

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[8] Marina Carter, *Voices from Indenture: Experiences of Indian Migrants in the British Empire* (London, 1996). Some lists, like those for Netherlands Surinam, have recently been made available as a database by the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.

[9] For the Sikh community of Canada, see among many publications Radhika Seshan and Sushma J. Varma, eds., *Fractured Identities: The Indian Diaspora in Canada* (Jaipur and New Delhi, 2003). For kulis in South Africa see, for example, Vishnu Padayachee and Robert Morrell, "Indian Merchants and Dukawallahs in the Natal Economy, c.1875–1914," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 17 (1991), 71–102.

[10] The fact of re-migration and circulation has been stated by Sugata Bose, *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), 73, 76–77. However, Bose fails to elaborate on the social and economic dimensions of re-migration and circulation.

[11] Kirti N. Chaudhury, *Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge, 1990). See also Ravi A. Palat, "From

networks and reached, at least from the eighteenth century onward, from the southern parts of Africa via the Mascarenes, to East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, South Asia, and the western fringe of what is known as Southeast Asia, and sometimes even mainland and insular Southeast Asia. Within the macro-region existed many meso- and micro-regions.[12]


As Map 3 shows, a multitude of micro- and meso-regions constituted the World of the Indian Ocean at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Local and translocal connections along the coasts and close economic and social contacts created meso-regions of the Mascarenes and East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. They were also characteristic for the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Straits. Micro regions included the Gujarat, Konkan, and Malabar coast along the western fringe of the Indian peninsula, and the Ceylon-Tamil region. Regions were never self sufficient entities but interconnected with neighboring and far away regions. For example, Surat, the great emporium on the west coast of India, was part of a transcontinental trading and migrating system reaching out as far as Sofala and Jeddah, and the same counted for Zanzibar via Arabia towards Gujarat, as well as Tamilnad of southern India from where traders developed commercial and cultural connections with Southeast Asian port cities.[13]

With the passage of time, flows of migration and spaces created by the circulation of people, capital, goods, and ideas developed and increased, changed and re-oriented within the Indian Ocean. Seasonal agricultural migrations were long established as part of South Asia's harvests and even temporary indentured labor was not entirely new.

World-Empire to World-Economy: Southeastern India and the Emergence of the Indian Ocean World-Economy (1350–1650)," Unpublished Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1988.

[12] Basic literature is provided by Kenneth McPherson, *The Indian Ocean: A History of People and the Sea* (Delhi, 1993); Michael N. Pearson, *The Indian Ocean* (London, 2003); Sugata Bose, *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006).

[13] Literature on the subject fills many library shelves. Starting places would include books would be Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Political Economy of Commerce: Southern India 1500–1650* (Cambridge, 1990); Roderich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund, eds., *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400–1750* (Stuttgart, 1991); Rudranghshu Mukherjee and Lakshmi Subramanian, eds., *Politics and Trade in the Indian Ocean World* (Delhi, 1998). Denys Lombard and Jean Aubin, eds., *Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea* (Delhi, 2000); Ulrike Freitag, *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750–1960* (Leiden, 1997).



Map 3 Micro-, Meso- and Macro-regions of the Indian Ocean, c. 1800–1950

The French introduced the plantation labor regime—white European planters, black African slaves, and monoculture cash crop economy based on foreign capital, foreign labor, and the natural resources of the Tropics—on the Isle de France, on the former Dutch and later British Mauritius, as well as on the neighboring Reunion in 1735. A hundred years later "free" Indian wage laborers were supposed to replace "freed" black African slaves. Within a couple of decades Indian indentured laborers created a new meso-region connecting South India and the southern African insular fringe by migration and circulation.

The term "kuli" (or, in its contemporary pejorative spelling: "cooly") originated most probably from the Tamil word "kuli" designating a hired or wage laborer.[14] This suggests that the colonial system of indentured labor developed in the Tamilnad region of southern India. In England, indentured labor was known as a contractually terminated period of labor service from the fourteenth century onward. It emerged as a system of organized migration to the North American colonies in the seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries when approximately 70 percent of all settlers were so-called indentured servants for periods ranging from four to seven years.[15] The main purpose of indentured labor was to restrict movement of laborers and fix their labor services, facilitating the organization of a globally expanding yet ever more flexible labor market comprising the Indian Ocean and Caribbean. As in the Atlantic Ocean world, slavery and indentured labor coexisted in the Indian Ocean world too. Both labor regimes became part of the emerging modern capitalistic economy making mass migration, either brutally enforced or forcefully induced and stimulated, in any case organized, a necessary precondition for an emerging global market.

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[14] Henry Yule and A.C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson: A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases, And of Kindred Terms, Etymological, Historical and Discursive*, 2nd ed. (1903; rprt. London, 1989), see esp. "cooly," 249–250. It seems not very likely that the term derives from the "Kol" society (originally settled in western India), which at some earlier point in history had migrated to Chota Nagpur where it still is regarded, like the neighboring "Munda," as a "savage tribe" and, therefore, basically bound to bondage and servitude.

[15] John Wareing, "Migration to London and Transatlantic Emigration of Indentured Servants, 1663–1775," *Journal of Historical Geography* 7 (1981), 356–378; David W. Galenson, "The Rise and Fall of Indentured Servitude in the Americas; An Economic Analysis," *Journal of Economic History* 44 (1984), 1–26; Henry A. Gemery, "Markets for Migrants: English Indentured Servitude and Emigration in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in Pieter C. Emmer, ed., *Colonialism and Migration: Indentured Labour Before and After Slavery* (Dordrecht, 1986), 33–54.

Transformation of Migration Patterns in the Nineteenth Century

Temporal and seasonal migrations of Indian laborers became part of the agro-industrial and, later on, factory-industrial development of British India already in the 1830s and gained momentum after the middle of the nineteenth century. Statistics of industrial and agricultural "development" indicate acceleration on the Indian subcontinent and in the Indian Ocean arena. Seasonal migrants preferred nearby plantations—as in Assam, where tea plantations were established in the 1830s—or nearby cities like Calcutta. Under colonial rule, seasonal migrations became even more common in western India Khandesh and the sub-Himalayan plains, as colonial fiscal regimes promoted an agricultural revolution during the first three decades of the nineteenth century. To some degree, this was also true for the South Indian plains of Tamilnad.[16] It was not overpopulation of these regions but rather the destruction of peasants' and agricultural laborers' subsistence that forced them to look for sources of additional income.[17]

When the indentured labor system was introduced in the 1840s, overseas migration was for many migrants an additional but also familiar form of temporal migration. Since many migrants had little knowledge of South Asia, the British Raj, or the British Empire, let alone of the globe, it was the kind and duration as well as the payment, and not the place of labor which seems to have influenced their decisions. Even when returning kulis spread news and information about distances and destinations, overseas migration remained an additional option for those accustomed to doing temporal labor. Landside and seaside migrations may not have seemed very different although only overseas migration expanded the global labor market. Existing plantation islands in the western Indian Ocean and the Caribbean began to

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[16] Anand A. Yang, *The Limited Raj: Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran District, 1793–1920* (Delhi, 1989); Michael Mann, *British Rule on Indian Soil: North India in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*, 2nd ed. (Delhi, 2002); Maurus Staubli, *Reich und arm mit Baumwolle: Exportorientierte Landwirtschaft und soziale Stratifikation in Khandesh, 1850–1914* (Stuttgart, 1994); Konrad Specker, *Weber im Wettbewerb: Das Schicksal des südindischen Textilhandwerks im 19. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1984).

[17] See the "demographic argument" about densely settled areas like the Gangetic Plains and the environs of Madras made by David Northrup, "Migration from Africa, Asia ,and the South Pacific," in Andrew Porter, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. III: The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1999), 88–100, esp. 93. For the recruitment-cum-settlement areas of indentured laborers, see Map 3.

be supplemented by new plantation regimes in South Africa, Malaya, and Fiji. At the same time, returning migrants began to play an important role in the economic and social development of their villages and families.

Recruiting kulis in the nineteenth century followed established local and regional migration and recruitment patterns, particularly for migrants from Tamilnad to Ceylon.[18] It is only the scale of migration which dramatically increased after 1840. In the beginning, most migrants originated from established itinerant regions like the southern parts of Malabar and Tamilnad from where the majority of all indentured laborers emigrated and circulated to Ceylon, Burma, and Malaya, deeply transforming the existing meso-region around the Bay of Bengal.[19] In addition to the South Indian recruitment areas the eastern Indian region of Chota Nagpur situated in the present day states Jharkhand and Chattisgarh of the Indian Union was gradually drawn into the orbit of overseas recruitment agencies.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the region was inhabited by Munda-speaking societies (*adivasi*) whom colonial administrators regarded as savages (as did their predecessors, the Mughal state; the Indian Union also still regards them in this way). In Calcutta, the capital of British India, kulis were concentrated in depots for further distribution up country to Assam or abroad. Having the Munda in their urban environs, Indian middle-class and elite notions matched contemporary British notions of the kuli recruit as the "scum" of an imagined all-Indian society. Munda-speaking societies lived as small-scale agriculturists in the hilly and sometimes densely wooded areas of Chota Nagpur.[20] From the middle of the nineteenth century, when imperial forest regulations transformed woodlands into protected state forests, many tribal societies became dispossessed vagrant people and

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[18] Eric Meyer, "Labour Circulation between Sri Lanka and South India in Historical Perspective," in Claude Markovits, Jaques Pouchepadass, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., *Society in Circulation: Mobile People and Itinerant Cultures in South Asia, 1750–1950* (Delhi, 2003), 55–88.

[19] Michael Adas, *The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1852–1947* (Madison, 1974); Amarjit Kaur, *Wage Labour in Southeast Asia since 1840: Globalisation, the International Division of Labour and Labour Transformations* (Houndmills, 2004).

[20] Karma Oraon, *Dimension of Religion, Magic, and Festivals of Indian Tribe the Munda* (New Delhi, 2002); Robert Parkin, *The Munda of Central India: An Account of their Social Organization* (Delhi, 1992).

constituted the human reservoir for recruitment agencies.[21] Many a Munda was recruited for the recently established tea plantations in Assam. Many others may have circulated and some even emigrated to Mauritius and other parts of the Indian Ocean.[22]

During the second half of the nineteenth century and particularly around 1900, new plantation regimes were established in the European colonies along the rim of the Indian Ocean. Malaya became famous for its rubber plantations demanding millions of indentured laborers from British India. The shift from coffee to tea in Ceylon after 1885 (when fungi destroyed the coffee bushes), and the subsequent rapid expansion of the plantation area caused an additional demand for cheap agro-industrial laborers as did railway construction in Malaya, East Africa, and mining in South Africa. To supply the ever-increasing demand, recruiting agencies continuously extended their catchment areas. Recruiters soon worked in the United Provinces—the country along the Jamuna and the Ganga between Delhi and Banaras and the Punjab, situated even further northeast. Since labor was scarce in South Asia until the 1930s, recruitment caused competition among various agencies and their "men on the spot." Local landlords and British officials (receivers of rents and revenues, respectively) did not appreciate this outflow of agricultural labor force.[23]

As most of the indentured laborers signed temporary contracts binding them from three to five years to a plantation (after which the kuli could prolong his contract for another term), it would be misleading to view the demarcated regions in Map 4 simply as recruitment areas.[24] To do so acknowledges only the agency of the colonial state and its claims to organize the labor market, making the kulis into mere objects of recruiters, bureaucrats, medicals, and planters. Taking into account the agency of migrants and circulants as individual or collective subjects reveals these regions as the settlements of people

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[21] Michael Mann, *Geschichte Indiens. Vom 18. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert* (Paderborn, 2005), 232.

[22] Tultul Baruah, *Mundas in Tea Plantation: A Study in Their Health Behaviour* (Dibrugarh, Assam, 2000); Marina Carter, ed., *Across the Kalapani: The Bihari Presence in Mauritius* (Port Louis, 2000).

[23] Pieter C. Emmer, "The Meek Hindu: The Recruitment of Indian Indentured Labourers for Service Overseas, 1870–1916," in Emmer, ed. *Colonialism and Migration: Indentured Labour Before and After Slavery* (Dordrecht, 1983), 187–207.

[24] Map 5 is based on Tinker, *A New System of Slavery*, 40, where the demarcated areas are named "recruitment areas."


who decided to emigrate or circulate. After a long and often difficult process of decision-making, people migrated because they envisaged economic and social improvement. Emigrants directed their hopes towards the country of destination. Circulants, by contrast, concentrated on the region of their origin, looking to improve the economic lot of their families and the social status within the village. It is against this background that one must take a fresh look at migration statistics on indentured labor from South Asia.

Transforming and Reorganizing the Global Labor Market

Recruitment of indentured laborers became necessary after the slave trade and slavery were abolished in the British Empire in 1807 and 1834, in the Dutch colonies in 1818, and by France in 1848. Since ex-slaves did not desire, for obvious reasons, to work as wage laborers on the sugar and cotton plantations of their former masters, they had to be replaced on the islands of the Caribbean as well as on the Mascarenes of the western Indian Ocean. In the 1830s came into existence what Hugh Tinker, an early scholar of Indian contract labor, called "a new system of slavery," referring to contemporary British political agitation against the system. Most contemporary colonial administrators termed the kuli either "cooly" or "indentured laborer," to indicate the changing organization and conditions of the labor market; they did not discuss indentured servitude.[25]

The indentured labor system cannot easily be compared to slavery. It certainly was a form of forced, or at least strictly controlled, labor regime since legislation for indentured laborers restricted their mobility on the plantations, and allowed corporal punishments like whipping at the discretion of the plantation owners. Both were, of course, unmistakable characteristics of the master-and-slave regime. After the stipulated period of labor, however, kulis had the option to return, to extend the contract, or to settle on a plot of land which had to be offered by plantation owners to compensate return-tickets—options that slaves never had. Likewise, indentured Indian laborers could complain about the harsh and sometimes brutal labor conditions, as suggested by some of the documents of complaint to the British protector

[25] Tinker, *A New System of Slavery*.



Map 4 Spaces of Circulation

of emigrants.[26] Unlike kulis, slaves, as private property, were beyond the government's protection of contractual rights.

Early experiments on Mauritius, where long-residing French planters had already imported Indian contract laborers from French Mahé on the west coast of the Indian subcontinent in the late 1820s and early 1830s, laid the foundation for the new system of labor recruitment. Until 1842, the British Indian government and the imperial government in London, together with the British government of Mauritius and those of several islands in the Caribbean, as well as the representatives of the plantocratic regimes, elaborated a sequence of laws to organize recruitment, transport, and shipment of kuli wage laborers. Ten years later almost 78,000 indentured laborers from India had arrived in Mauritius; 21 percent of them female. [27] The official recruitment system operated until 1917 and was finally abolished in 1922–23 after the Indian National Congress had protested and publicly agitated against any prolongation of the oppressive labor regime.[28]

According to the latest estimates and calculations more than 32 million Indian migrants left the subcontinent between 1840 and 1940. Of these migrants about 14 million went to Burma, up to 8 million to Ceylon, some 3 million to the islands of the Caribbean, and maybe the same number to Mauritius and eastern Africa. Approximately 2 million Indians went as indentured laborers to Malaya. Additionally, up to 2 million traders, merchants and lawyers—including "Mahatma" Gandhi who lived in South Africa for more than 20 years—lived abroad.[29] Like all migration numbers, these are neither exact nor complete; statistics only refer to official numbers. The amount of "informal migration" by private recruitment organizations, along with plenty of individual migration, remains obscure. Even a moderate estimate would be misleading as no numbers at all are available. Although migration numbers may have been far higher, the existing statistics document high

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[26] Carter, *Voices from Indenture*, 106–116.

[27] Carter, *Servants, Sirdars and Settlers*, 16.

[28] Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi watched from South Africa the proceedings which ended the kuli system, see Mahatma Gandhi, *The Story of My Experiments with Truth* (Ahmedabad, 1968), Book Two, Part V, Chapter XI, "Abolition of Indentured Emigration," 597–603.

[29] Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton, 1951), Table 35, "Estimated Total Migration to and from India, 1834 to 1937," 99; K.S. Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 373–380; Ian van den Driesen, *The Long Walk: Indian Plantation Labour in Sri Lanka in the Nineteenth Century* (New Delhi, 1997); Carter, *Voices from Indenture,* 22–23. See also Claude Markovits in this volume.

mobility among Indians. This new labor force included shifting agriculturists, poor and middling peasants, as well as demobilized soldiers, and even some from brahmin backgrounds.[30]

Even more misleading, these numbers count simply embarkations. Migration does not, *per se*, mean emigration, and the same person may have embarked multiple times. This is particularly true for migrants from South Asia. Out of the 32 million at least 24 million re-migrated. As contracts stipulated a temporary labor relationship, most kulis went back to the regions of their origin. Only 6 million or so kuli laborers in fact emigrated and settled in the countries where they had been sent to work. So far, research on South Asian migration has chiefly been concerned with these emigrants, their integration into local societies, their culture, their economic progress, and social careers up to the present time. [31] The development on Mauritius, where roughly 60 percent of the population consisted of South Asian immigrants by the fourth decade of the twentieth century, especially became the focus of international academic research.[32] In other parts and islands of the globe Indian migrants also constituted a large part of the population. In Trinidad they were roughly 30 percent, in Jamaica about 34, and in British Guiana also 42 percent. In Ceylon, 23 percent of the population came from South India, and on Fiji Indian settlers were 44 percent.[33]

Nevertheless, the high numbers migrating to nearby Burma and Ceylon and high numbers of returnees suggest circulation, not emigration, was by far the main pattern of migration. Circulation may be understood as movements of men and goods, of information and ideas, techniques and knowledge, skills, cultural productions (texts and songs), and religious practices. According to Claude Markovits, "Circulation is different from simple mobility inasmuch as it implies a double movement of going forth and coming back, which can be repeated indefinitely. In circulating, things, man and notions often

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[30] Carter, *Voices from Indenture*, 42–44; Ravindra K. Jain, *Indian Communities Abroad: Themes and Literature* (Delhi, 1993, 23–27).

[31] For a complete overview of the articles and also some important monographs see bibliography included in "Migration und Diaspora," in Mann, *Geschichte Indiens*, 268–275.

[32] Marina Carter is the most prominent among these scholars who started her research in the 1970s. See *Servants, Sirdars and Settlers* and *Voices from Indenture*. See also the excellent collection of articles in the special volume of *Internationales Asienforum* 33 (2002).

[33] Carter, *Voices from Indenture*, 22–23; Joseph E. Schwartzberg, ed., *A Historical Atlas of South Asia* rev. ed. (New York, 1992), 115, map b.

transform themselves [...]. The totality of a circulation in a given society and their outcomes could be viewed as a defining 'circulatory regime', susceptible of changes over time."[34] This definition can be applied to most of South Asia's indentured laborers. Contracts for tea pluckers in Ceylon, for example, were only given for the plucking season, defining circulants as seasonal workers. Likewise, many of the contracts for Burma were given for one year. Hence, quite a lot of the seasonal and temporary laborers migrated multiple times, raising the total number of migrants overall from British India.

A circulatory regime seems to have been well established in the Gulf of Bengal at the beginning of the twentieth century where, if only official numbers are taken, two-thirds of the aggregate number of indentured laborers circulated. Burma absorbed nearly half of the circulants which came from the southern and the eastern South Asian peninsula. Circulants to and from Ceylon most likely amounted up to one-fourth of the overall migrants, all of them coming from the southern part of the peninsula. Hardly any academic research exists on this remarkable circulatory regime. One exception is the so-called "long walk" of more than 200km distance from the shores of northern Ceylon, up the mountains at the beginning and back at the end of the agricultural season. Experiences of overseas transport have been scrutinized as well. Together they hint at the multiple modernities emerging simultaneously in different places of the world.[35]

Spaces of Circulation: The Long Walk and Sea Voyages


Map 5 introduces important sites of recruitment and circulation of temporary labor. Somewhat different modes of transportation facilitated each.

Emigration, temporary migration, and circulation of traders, merchants, monks, and laborers to and from the Sri Lanka highlands had existed since the tenth century. Migration was organized by the likewise long and well established system of South Indian Kangany

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[34] Claude Markovits et al., "Introduction, in Markovits et al, *Society in Circulation*, 1–22, quote 2–3.

[35] Aspects of multiple modernities and cultures of circulation have been highlighted by Benjamen Lee and Edward Li Puma, "Cultures of Circulation: The Imaginary of Modernity," *Public Culture* 14.1 (2002), 191–214.



Map 5 Areas of Circulants' and Re-Migrants' Settlement in British India c. 1900

recruitment of individuals, financed by Chettiyar merchants.[36] The British at first simply took over the system but directed the flow of migrants in a different direction and focused on the recruitment only of agro-industrial laborers. Constantly growing pressure on the Tamil and Malabar labor markets during the first decades of the nineteenth century had caused an increase of migrants to Ceylon looking for seasonal, short-term, and permanent work.[37] The beginning of "coffee-mania" in Ceylon in the 1830s absorbed growing numbers of South Indian landless laborers. (The volume of coffee exported from Ceylon rose with the breakdown of the West Indian coffee market between 1827 and 1847.)[38] Lack of labor in the West Indies after slavery's abolition was followed by a shift of plants to environmentally appropriate Ceylon, where a seemingly abundant number of people sought work in response to changing economic conditions in South India.[39]

When tea bushes replaced coffee bushes and the area under tea tremendously expanded turning highland Ceylon into "Tea Gardens," still more laborers migrated there.[40] Rapidly increasing numbers of migrants and circulants soon sparked political, economic, and humanitarian questions: was migration to be organized by the state or was it to be left to private enterprise? Years of debate followed. Planters demanded a healthy and sufficient labor force while a liberal government preferred self regulating mechanisms of the market. Most

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[36] An excellent description of the Kangany system is in Frank Heidemann, *Kanganies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia: Tamil Recruiter-cum-Foreman as a Sociological Category in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century* (München, 1992). The Kangany-system helped to prolong and to intensify the indentured labor system after public recruitment was abolished in British India, particularly to Malaya. The overall number of indentured laborers peaked on an unprecedented level–despite global economic depression—in the middle of the 1930s. For living and working conditions in Malaya see Amarjit Kaur, "Indian Labour, Labour Standard, and Worker's Health in Burma and Malaya, 1900–1940," *Modern Asian Studies* 40,2 (2006), 425–475, and her chapter in this volume.

[37] Dharmapriya Wesumperuma, *Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers in Sri Lanka: A Historical Perspective, 1880–1910* (Nugegoda, 1986), 15–16. For a social background of the circulants, see Oddvar Hollup, *Bonded Labour: Caste and Cultural Identity Among Tamil Plantation Workers in Sri Lanka* (New Delhi,1994), 24–28.

[38] van den Driesen, *The Long Walk*, 11.

[39] Konrad Specker, *Weber im Wettbewerb: Das Schicksal des südindischen Textilhandwerks im 19. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1984).

[40] For the plantocratic regime and changing cash crop patterns, see the excellent study of Asoka Bandarage, *Colonialism in Sri Lanka: The Political Economy of the Kandyan Highlands, 1833–1886* (Berlin, New York, Amsterdam, 1983), Part 2: The Plantation Impact, 65–86.

appalling were the high mortality rates among circulants walking the 200–kilometer route from coastal to upland Ceylon. Despite urgent demand for regulation of this "long walk," government remained hesitant for more than a half century to interfere in the labor market through immigration rules and labor standards.

Hardly any wells, nutrition stations, rest-houses, or medical aid existed along the road from Mannar on the northwestern coast to the mountains of 1,000 to 2,000 meters until well into the 1860s. As the Kangany was responsible only for recruitment but not for feeding his recruits, hundreds of men, women, and children died on their way due to dehydration, typhus, dropsy, and various other diseases induced by malnutrition. Rest and food facilities were in such bad condition that a report of 1847 found "but two sheds on this line of the road fit for the accommodation of the great number of coolies daily passing and repassing to and from their country."[41] Only in 1862–3 did the government sink eighteen additional wells along the road. The number and condition of hospitals were likewise appalling. No more than four hospitals were situated along the road to aid migrant kulis. Two general hospitals in Colombo and Kandy were hardly used by migrants as they were literally off the road and, even in planters' eyes, totally neglected.[42]

Medical aid on the plantation was poor as well. During the plucking season, laborers had to work a minimum of 10 hours per day and live and sleep in badly ventilated, humid barracks with no sanitation facilities. Food was not particularly healthy. Evidence suggests that some planters occasionally offered amateurish doctoring to ill kulis while a few others made arrangements with medical men. General practice, however, was to ignore the sick or to drive them off the plantation, charging them with idleness. At the end of the season, most tea-pluckers started their way down the mountains exhausted and undernourished. The road through the northern hot and dry plains of Sri Lanka turned into a deadly march of weak laborers: more people died on their way back home than going to work. As planters demanded more Indian laborers, the problem of the "long walk" became more visible.[43]

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[41] C.O.54.235. 21 April 1847, as quoted in van den Driesen, *The Long Walk*, 27.
[42] Ibid., 122; 27–28.
[43] Ibid., 31–32, 47, 126.

The system improved only after 1865 when large sums of government money were spent on medical support and hospital facilities.[44]

As can be imagined easily, the situation on board the ships plying between northern Ceylon and various ports on the Malabar and Coromandel Coast of southern India was also lamentable. With no regulation of immigrants returning to India, passenger ships were completely overcrowded. In 1853, British Indian authorities at Madras suggested applying the terms of the British Passenger's Act of 1852 which limited ships in the tropics to carrying no more than one passenger per 15 square feet. The British authorities in Colombo opposed the change, arguing that the strict regulations were not applicable to the short distance between Ceylon and mainland India. The government supported planters' demands for cheap labor, which could only be provided by cheap transport. On the other hand British officials reported that onboard conditions weakened recruits already in poor health, exacerbating disease and death on the ships. The 1853 legislation was circumvented largely; overcrowded kuli ships in Palk Street remained the rule.[45]

The situation had but slowly improved by the end of the nineteenth century. A large number of Tamil tea-pluckers had stopped circulating and migrating and preferred to stay in the mountains. When the recruitment of indentured laborers for Ceylon began to be regulated by the colonial governments of British India and Ceylon in 1922, circulation continuously decreased and the number of re-migrants increased. However, only in 1938 was indentured labor recruitment for Ceylon finally abolished. By that time nearly 2 million Tamils and Malabarians had settled permanently in the mountain areas.[46] Living and working conditions were not necessarily improved but settlement eliminated the arduous and often deadly walk back home. After independence from colonial rule in 1947 (British India) and 1948 (Ceylon), settled Tamils and Malabarians became stateless people. Problems of repatriation, resettlement, and re-integration overshadowed the rela-

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[44] Roland Wenzlhuemer, "Indian Labour Immigration and British Labour Policy in Nineteenth Century Ceylon," *Modern Asian Studies* 41.3 (2007), 575–602, esp. 591–596; van den Driesen, *The Long Walk*, 49 and 144. Between 1843 and 1846 altogether £11,800 was spent on hospitals and medical aid for the Malabar immigrants, which amount had risen to £150,000 between 1865 and 1870.

[45] van den Driesen, *The Long Walk*, 91–94.

[46] Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, Table 37, "Rank of Countries of Indian Immigration in Terms of Immigrants and Descendants of Indians," 101.

tionship between the governments of Ceylon and the Indian Union for decades.[47] Even today nearly half a million former tea-pluckers and their descendants live rather isolated in the mountains of Sri Lanka.

In British India kulis had particularly bad experiences in being recruited, collected, transported, and finally concentrated in the depots of Madras and Calcutta. The depots where kulis waited for embarkation were hopelessly congested. Due to congestion, disease was also omnipresent, which caused recruits to doubt their decision to enter indenture. Many kulis met returnees and took the opportunity to collect information about working and living conditions abroad. Only then did recruited kulis learn about travelling distances and the duration of transport to plantation islands like Mauritius, Trinidad, or Fiji. It is estimated that from the point of recruitment until embarkation about one third of the kulis deserted, most of them on their way from the depot to the ship.[48] The major reasons for desertion can be guessed—conditions on board the ships and the recognition by kulis from the hilly "tribal" regions of Chota Nagpur and southern India that embarkation meant travel across the *kalapani* "black water." Many believed that traversing the ocean caused immediate exclusion from *jati* and *varna* (the social, economic, and familial organization of South Asian societies that the British administratively subsumed under the rubric "caste").

This myth about *kalapani* travel was constructed by middle and upper class Indians for ideological reasons. After all, people of various Hindu beliefs had been travelling around the Indian Ocean from time immemorial and rites of purification enabled their reintegration in *jati/varna*. Public discussions of crossing the *kalapani* started only toward the end of the nineteenth century after indentured laborers were shipped *en masse* across the Indian Ocean and beyond. Yet the debate mainly concentrated on members of the higher *varna* like *kshatriya* and *brahmin*. Hindu nationalists then started to complain about elite Indians traveling to Europe for educational and commercial purposes. Crossing the *kalapani*, they maintained, made it impossible to obey the rules of pure Hinduism; they attempted to define Hinduism as a homogeneous religion. Yet the *adivasi* from the hill tracts,

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[47] Frank Heidemann, *Die Hochland-Tamilen in Sri Lanka und ihre Repatriierung nach Indie: Ethnologische Überlegungen zur selbstbestimmten Entwicklung von Tagelöhnern* (Göttingen, 1986).

[48] Emmer, "The Meek Hindu," 189.

were not, by definition, even members of the *varna* system and lower *varna* were never the object of debates about travel. Both groups had been instrumentalized for ideological and political purposes.[49] Still, the debate may have aroused fears among *adivasi* or lower *varna* kulis.

Travel on a seagoing vessel did indeed traumatize kulis. Many must have realized for the first time that they were actually leaving their villages and their families and, even more, their country as it disappeared behind the horizon. Despite information circulating in the depots, some kulis may also have first realized only during their journeys how far off their destinations were. The experience of leaving behind a familiar environment was accompanied with the feeling of an insecure future. Some were frightened to cross the *kalapani*; for many just being onboard a ship was frightening. Food—two meals of fish and rice daily—was bad and insufficient. Drinking rations consisted of foul water. Malnutrition increased the danger of infection and disease on board. Seasickness weakened already drained kulis. Quite a few died enroute.[50]

Despite regulations concerning hygiene and sanitation onboard kuli-vessels, the number of kulis transported at times exceeded by 20 percent the legal limit. Expecting deaths would diminish their cargos, ship owners crammed kulis under and on deck of the ships. The results were epidemics of cholera and other diseases and an exorbitant death rate of 5 percent.[51] Drunken crew and officers often brutally beat the kulis. Particularly striking were the ships' doctors who misused their position to sexually harass and even rape indentured women. Women also became victims of seamen who used the separate women compartments on the lower decks to rape kuli women. Such crimes were hardly ever punished. Court records prove that contemporary bourgeois men understood sexual harassment and even rape of an Indian woman to be impossible since dark skinned Indians, like all "Orientals" (including Africans), were stereotyped as permanently willing if not

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[49] Susmita Arp, *Kalapani: Zum Streit über die Zulässigkeit von Seereisen im kolonialzeitlichen Indien* (Stuttgart, 2000).

[50] Marina Carter and Khal Thorabully, *Coolitude: An Anthology of the Indian Labour Diaspora* (London, 2002), 37–44.

[51] On an average about 3 percent of the passenger kulis died *en route*. This mortality rate is about half the amount of the infamous "middle passage" of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Peaking numbers of 5 percent during kuli transport reminded many contemporary British politicians and philanthropic evangelicals of that transportation system, comparing it with the former slave trade and leading them to agitate against indentured labor. For comparative mortality rates see Northrup, "Migration from Africa, Asia, and the South Pacific," 98.

eager to have sex.[52] Generally, British officials stigmatized and stereotyped Indian indentured woman, like urban industrial labor women, as prostitutes understood to be starving widows and deserted or run away women. Characterizing single women as prostitutes matched the more or less overall Indian notion of such women as prostitutes. (In many South Asian languages "widow" also means "prostitute.") Their bad reputation as prostitutes hurried ahead of them. Due to the experiences onboard and during the early months on the plantation, many women decided to temporarily engage with overseers to avoid further harassment. Wages for women were usually half those of male laborers since Europeans also understood female labor as providing "pin money." Many women thus offered not only their labor, to survive, but their bodies as well.[53]

Being recruited, collected, concentrated, transported, physically exploited until exhaustion, and corporally punished were all characteristic of the indentured labor system. Many laborers decided not to return to their home country because they were afraid of the stress and strains onboard returning ships. Some may have decided to stay overseas because the economic situation there was, after all, better than at home. Some returned simply to collect members of their families or asked returnee recruiters to set in motion what sociologists call chain migrations of relatives and village inhabitants. However, most indentured laborers did in fact return after one or two contract periods. Statistics for Mauritius suggest that most Indian kulis stayed from six up to ten years in the plantation colony before they returned to India for good.[54] As the vast majority of indentured laborers returned to India it seems only appropriate to ponder their fates, too.[55]

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[52] Verene A. Shepherd, *Maharani's Misery: Narratives of a Passage from India to the Caribbean* (Kingston, 2002). Differences between "Oriental" men and women only exists with respect to sexually aggressive male "Orientals" threatening European women and lascivious female "Orientals" seducing European men. Both sexual behaviors of "Orientals" were, however, uncivilized if not savage in the eyes of Victorian Britons. For that reason, equal treatment in courts had to be ruled out.

[53] Carter, *Voices from Indenture*, 51–52; Sumita Chatterjee, "Communitarian Identities and the Private Sphere: A Gender Dialogue amongst Indo-Trinidadians (1845–1917)," in Bates, *Community, Empire and Migration*, 206–223, esp. 209–212; 215. For an urban industrial context see Samita Sen, *Women and Labour in Late Colonial India: The Bengal Jute Industry* (Cambridge, 1999), chapter V, 177–212.

[54] Carter, *Servants, Sirdars and Settlers*, Table. 8.3, 280.

[55] It seems that only in Mauritius did the majority of indentured laborers decide to settle as small farmers, peddlers and shopkeepers after their labor contracts had

Re-Migration and Translocality: Coming Home

The frontispiece printed in Marina Carter's brilliant study on the indentured laborers of Mauritius is a contemporary illustration entitled "Bengal Coolies: Before and After Emigration." It first appeared in a book called *Rough Notes of a Trip to Reunion, Mauritius & Ceylon*, published in Calcutta in 1852. The picture shows a group of four fairly slim Indians on the left and three better clothed and rather well fed Indians on the right.[56] The picture reflects Europeans' belief that they "gave" work to indentured laborers, bringing prosperity to otherwise poor Indians. In contrast to this colonial view, Marina Carter describes a post-colonial picture of desperate and destitute Indian kulis whose situation changed in Mauritius from bad to worse. We do not know how often this was the case. Sometimes Indians settled in Mauritius because they could improve their economic lot. However, in most cases Indian kulis returned home, as their savings invested at home suggested was their original goal. See Map 5.

Migrants and circulants returning from Mauritius in 1842 after completing a five year contract possessed sums between 10 and 50 Rupees. At the end of the nineteenth century many kulis had saved between 150 and 250 Rupees.[57] In comparison, annual wages for laborers in the cotton mills of Bombay at the beginning of the twentieth century ranged between 95 and 108 Rupees. Kulis' savings thus seem fairly high although the number returning without any savings was also considerable.[58] For example, in 1876, out of 3,271 re-migrants 713, or 22 percent, had no savings at all. 1885 turned out to be the worst year when 57 per cent of the re-migrants claimed to possess no money at the time of embarkation. Various reasons explain these rather high numbers. In many cases money had already been remitted by banks, local recruiters, or previously returning family members. Some claimed to have been robbed on their way to the harbor. Others said they spent all their money on food and medicine during the time

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expired. Out of 612,000 kulis 455,000 settled in the island whereas 157,000 kulis returned home, see Bose, *A Hundred Horizons*, 77.

[56] Ibid., frontispiece.

[57] Ibid., 281. Average numbers are calculated according to the numbers listed in Table 8.4 "Departing Indians and Declared Savings, 1874–81," 282.

[58] Morris D. Morris, *The Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force in India: A Study of the Bombay Cotton Mills, 1854–1947* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965), Table V, "Index of Average Annual Income per Worker Employed, 1905–1914," 50.

of indenture while others had repaid debts to the recruiters who often acted as money lenders to the kuli.[59]

Research on present day circulants suggests that the impact of savings and remittances for those left behind and for the home societies are considerable.[60] So far only one case study of the economic consequences of remittances in pre-independence British India has been mentioned.[61] At the beginning of the twentieth century Sikhs began circulating and emigrating to Canada. Within a few decades they had duplicated the family structures and village societies of a few districts of the Punjab. Punjabi migrants were not indentured laborers, however. Their wages were significantly higher and savings as well as remittances were also higher. Remittances changed the outer appearances of village houses as families with emigrants and returnees from Canada bought land and built masonry houses, thus investing in primary and secondary agro-economic values. In some villages, annual remittances ranged from 42,000 to 2,000,000 Rupees between 1910 and 1914. This sum was further enhanced by the amount of money returnees brought back home—which for selected Punjabi villages amounted to 230,000 Rupees. As a consequence, prices for land increased fourfold between 1914 and 1926, making them significantly higher than in other districts of the province.[62]

A few examples indicate that not all Punjabi migrants in the early twentieth century were willing to send money back home as long as it was not needed desperately.[63] In the case of the kulis, small amounts of savings and remittances either prevented social and economic depredation of families and clans or induced a social and economic

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[59] Carter, *Servants, Sirdars and Settlers*, 281–283. For modes of remittances and the correspondence of kulis referring to remittances see also Carter, *Voices from Indenture*, 183–201.

[60] Faiz Biquees and Shahnaz Hamid, *Impact of International Migration on Women and Children Left Behind: A Case Study on a Punjabi Village* (Islamabad, 1981); Shahzada M. Akram and Khandaker R. Karim, *Security and Empowerment. The Case of Left Behind Wives of Bangladeshi Migrant Workers* (Dhaka, 2005). For the problems of those left behind in the "western world", see Nancy L. Green and Francois Weil, eds., *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation* (Urbana, 2007).

[61] A second incident of Tamils from Ceylon migrating and circulating to Malaya supporting their relatives at home with remittances and probably contributing to the prosperity of Jaffna is briefly mentioned in Metcalf, *Imperial Connections*, 85.

[62] Archanna B. Verma, *The Making of Little Punjab in Canada: Patterns of Immigration* (New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London, 2002), 182–203.

[63] Carter, *Voices from Indenture*, 185–186.

transformation, particularly in the wooded hills of Chota Nagpur and the mountains of southern India.[64] Sporadic evidence suggests that British rule seriously threatened the Munda speaking people's subsistence after the middle of the nineteenth century. Pre-colonial and colonial revenue policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries robbed many Munda families of their ancestral lands while others tried to avoid that fate or to re-buy their lost land by inscribing as indentured laborers. Early numbers show that between 1864 and 1867 as many as 12,369 people emigrated from the Lohardaga District alone, the main settlement area of the Munda, and other tribal societies. At least half of them stemmed from such societies. Information from returnees about the harsh labor regime in the Assam tea plantations as well as horrible transport conditions may have caused decreasing emigration numbers, which fell from 877 in 1868 to 542 in 1871. However, in the latter year about 3,000 indentured laborers were recruited by *sardars*, local recruiters commissioned by the colonial state. Altogether some 18,000 people may have been recruited as kulis from this one district between 1864 and 1871. In addition, hundreds, and maybe even thousands of peasants circulated to Calcutta for seasonal industrial work or to the coal mines of Jharia only to return again to familial agriculture.[65]

The overall population of Lohardaga District in 1871 has been estimated at 1,237,029, meaning that about 2 percent of the total population emigrated and circulated. Munda migrations of approximately 9,000 constituted about 3 percent of a tribal population of 300,000, indicating worse economic conditions for the region's tribal societies. Yet only a few scholarly articles consider the recruitment, migration, or circulation of people from Chota Nagpur.[66] Further research must

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[64] Kumar S. Singh, *Birsa Munda and His Movement, 1872–1901: A Study of a Millenarian Movement in Chotanagpur* (Calcutta, 2002). For a conventional history of the Munda, see Robert Parkin, *The Munda of Central India: An Account of their Social Organization* (Delhi, 1992); Kumar A. Jana, *The Ethnohistory of the Koras in Bengal (Diversification of the Hor Group)* (Kolkata, 2002).

[65] William W. Hunter, *The Statistical Account of Bengal, Hazaribag and Lohardaga Districts* (London, 1877), 299–300.

[66] Detlef Schwerin, "The Control of Land and Labour in Chota Nagpur, 1858–1908," in Dietmar Rothermund and D.C. Wadhwa, eds., *Zamindars, Mines and Peasants: Studies in the History of an Indian Coalfield and its Rural Hinterland* (Delhi, 1978), 21–67. The role of the returnee as recruiter in Chota Nagpur is depicted by Crispin Bates and Marina Carter, "Tribal and Indentured Migrants in Colonial India: Modes of Recruitment and Incorporation," in Peter Robb, ed., *Dalit Movements and the Meanings of Labour in India* (Delhi, 1993), 159–185.

explore the cultural as well as the economic and social impact of circulants on their indigenous societies. Additional sources like Munda songs and ballads may provide new evidence about that impact and may give reason to rewrite their history.[67]

So far only limited historical evidence addresses the fate of returning and circulating indentured laborers. In some cases it seems that returnees were not welcomed home. Re-migrants hoping to improve their social situation by marrying a woman and resettling could find their expectations disappointed. Village chiefs would not always welcome the returnees, and none wanted to give them daughters or sons to marry. Some returnees were not even allowed to touch the village well for fear of pollution, or to smoke the common huqqa in the evening. Thus, having been abroad for a long time may in some instances have caused social banishment from the village community. On the other hand, some re-migrants may have found a changed social environment with which they could not cope. Some of them may then have decided to look again for labor in a plantation colony and finally to become an overseas settler. For simple economic reasons, too, an unknown number of returnees decided to migrate for a second term of indentured labor, not having been able to better their financial situation in the home village.[68]

Conclusion

Rather than present new findings about the overseas migration of Indian indentured laborers, this article has described a new agenda for research on returnees' and circulating migrants' expectations and effects on indigenous South Asian families and societies. An important part of this circulatory regime, yet by far not the most important, was the recruitment, collection and transport to the depots; the medical inspections and overseas shipments; and the experiences of the kuli laborers and the labor regimes on far-away plantations, including those at the end of the long walk to highland Ceylon.

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[67] For songs and ballads of the Munda as historical source material see Suresh Singh, *Dust-Storm and the Hanging Mist: A Study of Birsa Munda and his Movement in Chhotanagpur (1874–1901)* (Calcutta, 1966), Appendix H, 98–144.

[68] Carter, *Voices from Indenture*, 207–208.

Writing, travelling, laboring, settling, and resettling of indentured laborers from South Asia created and maintained a circulatory regime. Sporadic letters of migrants demonstrate that many indentured laborers were able to maintain social contact with family relatives at home.[69] Communication has to be seen as an integral part of the circulatory regime: it connected the Indian, Pacific, and Atlantic Oceans. Now it is time to take a closer look at the re-migrants returning home after indentured labor. Second, it is important—if sources allow—to start research on kulis who migrated multiple times, interrupted by periods at home. Circulatory regimes are not constituted only by repeated individual migration but also, and more importantly, by repeated migrations of familial and village society members. Constant migratory movements created enduring connections between the seas and their extended hinterland. Hinterland, in this context, is taken to mean not just the narrow strip of land adjacent to the coastal area, but a wider area, situated upcountry and connected by means of modern transportation and communication to selected Indian harbors, a network manifesting as an emerging imperial infrastructure. Such a perspective will enable future research to connect the development of empire and its infrastructure more closely.

According to Ulrike Freitag in this volume, the extent of relations between empire building, capitalist markets, and investment in infrastructure remains a matter of debate. The study of the empire is not simply about the development of imperial or macro-infrastructures, but also about capital invested by circulants and returnees as they sought to improve or maintain local meso- and micro-infrastructures such as landed property, masonry houses, irrigation facilities, and agricultural implements. Such investment may have promoted social uplift or, at least, prevented economic disaster and social deprivation. Once the Indian indentured laborers' circulatory regime heads our research agendas, parts of South Asia's history may have to be rewritten or written anew.

[69] Ibid., esp. 187–188.

INDIAN OCEAN CROSSINGS: INDIAN LABOR MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1870 TO 1940

Amarjit Kaur

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Southeast Asia was one of two main destinations of mass migration (the other being the United States) and Indian and Chinese labor migrants dominated migration flows. This movement was a defining feature of Asian globalization and Chinese and Indian immigration rates were comparable to transatlantic immigration rates during the same period. While the transatlantic migration flows are acknowledged as voluntary and resulting from economic, demographic, and technological transformations, Asian voluntary migration has largely been misrepresented as coerced and circular migration only. Asian immigrants' experiences, their considerable impact on Southeast Asian economies and societies, and permanent overseas settlements must thus be seen through the lens of an integrated labor market, connections, and movement. This paper analyses the important pathways linking the British Empire, the complex exchanges, and opportunities associated with the global trade in commodities, and labor crossings in the region. It also examines the forces that shaped Indian emigration to Southeast Asia against the backdrop of India's pivotal role in the region and the interconnections between different societies in Asia. The focus is on Indian Ocean crossings and Indian labor migration to Burma and Malaya[1] to establish and explain these imperial and global connections.

Introduction: Britain, Metropole-Colony Connections and Indian Ocean Crossings

European political expansion in Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century provided the conditions for major economic transformations in the region. The growth of the international economy and related demand for Asian commodities for the world market coincided

[1] Prior to 1948 Malaya included the Malay Peninsula and Singapore.

with the region's greater integration into the new globalised system of production, trade, and investment. Concurrently, the circulation of commodities within and beyond the region shaped colonial labor policies and migration across national and international boundaries.

The establishment of European administrative structures also led to the redrawing of the political map of the continent and the organization of expanded connections between the different states. In Southeast Asia the resulting modern geographical frame comprised six major states—Burma, Malaya, Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. With India as the nexus of Britain's imperial power in Asia, the British expanded into Burma and Malaya. In Burma, the English East India Company had obtained Upper Burma from the Burmese rulers following the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–6) and the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852–3). Following a third War (1885–6), the British extended their jurisdiction over Lower Burma and effective control over the whole of Burma was achieved in 1895. Thereafter, Burma was administered from India as an adjunct of the British Indian empire until 1937, when it became a separate crown colony. In the Malacca Strait, Britain took over the East India Company's Straits Settlements possessions (secured between 1786 and 1824) and brought the Malay states under formal protectorate status between 1874 and 1914. The Malay states were effectively governed as colonies, though they were labeled protectorates and still nominally under their own rulers.

British control of Burma and Malaya facilitated their transformation into important production sites for empire industrial commodities (tin, rubber, petroleum) and foodstuffs such as sugar and rice. In turn the two states became important commodity and investment markets for metropole manufacturers, contributing to Britain's ongoing industrial revolution. The British also established modern bureaucratic, administrative and legal codes that facilitated creation of spaces and networks in the new empire. These interconnected political and economic structures provide new frames for conceptualizing and investigating the considerable flows of trade, investment and population movements in the region.

Indian Migrants—Crossings and Magnitude

Trans-Asian migration was a key component of an imperial labor policy that was intended to provide workers on a temporary basis to

augment the labor forces of colonial territories. Migrant workers from India were channeled to Malaya and Burma since both colonies had labor shortages and the specific ways in which the commodity trade developed in these states was also determined by local conditions such as the availability of natural resources and vast tracts of land. Mass migration thus linked these states' histories with those of Asia, Britain, and other parts of the world; brought vast spatial, economic, social, and cultural changes; and laid the foundations for migrant diasporas.[2]

The fact that this migration owed its origins to the labor regimes under which migrants travelled allows it to be distinguished from other previous movements of people. It entailed the organization of travel arrangements, shipment, and employment of Indians in Burma and Malaya under voluntary indentured labor conditions. It also involved various groups in the migration process including private labor recruiters and intermediaries, employers, and the state machinery. Although the early indentured labor system closely resembled "forced" servitude,[3] there were vital differences. First, Indian migrants travelled voluntarily to Burma and Malaya, whether as settlers, migrant workers, or auxiliaries. Their pecuniary and social circumstances and their desire to improve their status were important motives in their decision to migrate. The construction of better internal transportation systems, particularly railroads, also connected rural areas to ports and cities and enabled and facilitated internal migration and subsequent movement overseas. Thus the Indians left behind famine and economic destitution, social and caste discrimination, and political disconnection in the hope of better economic opportunities and futures.[4] In return for passage, organized travel arrangements, guaranteed employment and payment, and accommodation at their destinations, they signed contracts for fixed employment periods. Moreover, although the specific labor regimes utilized intermediaries and sanctions to enforce labor agreements, these had their limits, especially when demand for labor outstripped supply.

Second, although there were cyclical migrations, many migrants established permanent settlements across the Indian Ocean. In Burma,

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[2] Amarjit Kaur, *Wage Labor in Southeast Asia: Globalisation. The International Division of Labor and Labor Transformations* (Basingstoke, 2004), and Kaur, "Malaysia," in *Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora* (Singapore, 2006), 156–168.

[3] Hugh Tinker, *A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labor Overseas, 1830–1920* (London, 1974).

[4] David Northrup, *Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism* (Cambridge, 1995); K.S. Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya. Some Aspects of their Immigration and Settlement* (Cambridge, 1969).

Bengalis from eastern Bengal went as settlers to Arakan (now Rakhine) to start agricultural enterprises. Tamils and Telegus from southern India went to work as agricultural and factory workers. Indians from South and North India went to Malaya to work on plantations, public projects and as auxiliaries. The greater distance from India meant that cyclical migration to Malaya became less common, particularly in the 1930s. Indian migration flows to Burma and Malaya are shown in Map 6.

Third, improved transport technologies, shorter travel times, and new shipping regulations aimed at improving living conditions during voyages also ensured that mortality rates were not a deterrent to migration. As the colonial state instituted fresh policies to ensure a continuous supply of labor, medical checks prior to disembarkation, the presence of medical officers on board ships and quarantine measures at labor depots in Malaya and Burma also provided a greater sense of security to migrants.[5] Fourth, the abolition of indenture in the second decade of the twentieth century also meant that free migrants became the norm, consistent with the new labor policies and rising demand for labor. Importantly, the specific political and economic relationships between the Colonial Office in London, the India Office, and the Malayan administration influenced immigration matters and employment relations and impacted on demographic and settlement patterns. Moreover, although the British largely viewed Indian (and Chinese) migrants as sojourners, colonial *laissez faire* policy meant that a plural society had become evident in both countries by the 1930s.[6] Thus Indians in Burma and Malaya had formed sizeable communities between 1910 and 1935, as shown in Figure 6.


Hence Indian migrant numbers in both countries during this period were quite significant. According to estimates by Huff and Caggiano, between 1911 and 1929, Indian (and Chinese) gross migration into Burma, Malaya, and Thailand was twice as high as gross migration into the United States.[7] Overall, there was an integrated labor market

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[5] Amarjit Kaur, "Indian Labor, Labor Standards, and Workers' Health in Burma and Malaya, 1900–1940," *Modern Asian Studies* 40.2 (May 2006), 393–444.


[6] J.S. Furnivall, *Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia, A Comparison of Colonial Policy and Practice* (New York, 1941), 24–47, and Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (Cambridge, 1948), 305–05.

[7] Gregg Huff and Giovanni Caggiano, "Globalization, Immigration, and Lewisian Elastic Labor in Pre–World War II Southeast Asia," *Journal of Economic History* 67.1 (March 2007), 33–68, Table 1.



Source: Amarjit Kaur, *Wage Labor in Southeast Asia: Globalisation. The International Division of Labor and Labor Transformations* (Basingstoke, 2004), 67.

Map 6 Indian Migration Flows to Malaya and Burma



Source: K.S. Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of their Immigration and Settlement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 157.

Figure 6 Indian Migrant Populations in Burma and Malaya, 1910–35 (selected years)

extending from India and southeastern China to Southeast Asia, consistent with globalization and mass long-distance migrations.

Before analyzing the specific outcomes of the encounters between Britain, India, and indigenous and migrant communities in Burma and Malaya, it is pertinent to include a short account of Chinese migration to the region. The following account broadens the scope of labor market integration, the workings of empire, and the global trade in commodities and underlines the contrasts between the migration experiences of the two groups (see the essays by Elizabeth Sinn and Carl Trocki in this volume).

Chinese Labor Migration in Southeast Asia

Since the early eighteenth century Southeast Asian rulers had encouraged Chinese migration to alleviate labor shortages in their territories and the Chinese pioneered tin and gold mining in Kalimantan, Bangka and Belitung, Malaya, and southern Thailand. A number of factors accounted for Chinese dominance and success in this sector. One was

the adaptation of traditional Chinese farming technologies, such as the bucket-chain, which led to greater efficiencies in the Chinese-operated tin mines. The second was their distinctive form of communal organization (*kongsi*), which functioned as a business co-operative. The *kongsi* head maintained social control and fostered social solidarity. The third was the influence of clan associations or secret societies, which often organized and controlled migration, facilitated the provision of capital, and regulated relations with local rulers. Trocki has argued for the classification of both the secret societies and clan associations (which combined dialect, regional and occupational groupings) under the general category of *kongsi*.[8]

Labor Recruitment

The Chinese government's opposition to emigration by its nationals made it impossible to utilize open, regulated recruitment methods and it was not until 1893 that the ban was lifted on Chinese emigration. Chinese labor recruitment was thus essentially a personal system of recruitment. There were two main recruitment methods—kinship-based and a credit-ticket system. Free Chinese migrants could either pay their own travel costs; or they could seek assistance from a sponsor (either a kinsman or local Chinese broker) who paid their travel and related costs under the credit-ticket system (see below) in return for repayment with interest upon arrival at their destination; or they could be transported as assisted migrants under the indenture contract (the *coolie* contract) that bound them to employers for a fixed period.

Workers bound for Malaya, Indonesia, and Thailand were recruited through the only channel of the Straits Settlements (mainly Singapore) where British firms and Baba (*peranakan*) Chinese coolie brokers handled the trade. These brokers' networks extended from Singapore to the South China port cities and even to the villages of the Chinese sub-brokers. This system of personal recruitment later gave way to a direct recruitment system whereby labor agencies, foremen, and other middlemen in Malaya, such as Chinese officials closely associated with the Malayan mining industry, were entrusted with the job of recruitment. In Indonesia, Dutch recruitment firms entered the labor market in the early twentieth century to ensure that the migration business

[8] Yen Ching-hwang, *A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911* (Singapore, 1986), 117–118; Carl Trocki, *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore 1800–1910* (Ithaca, 1990), 11.

was not monopolized by the Chinese. This led to the recruitment of people from different regions and the breaking down of traditional bonds of kinship and brotherhood.[9] A description and cost of the approximately two-week journey of a labor recruit from China to Singapore is provided in Table 4 below.

In China, the *coolie* trade was controlled by both Chinese and foreign British, American, and Dutch agencies. Prior to 1876, there were at least six agencies operating in the treaty ports that supplied *coolies* bound for Singapore. Three of these were Chinese-owned, namely Hee Kee, Yeong Seng What, and Ty Chaong and Company. The first two were based at Swatow in Guangdong Province (supplying Teochew and Hakka migrants) and the third was based in Amoy in Fujien Province and provided southern Hokkien migrants. Both Hee Kee and Yeong


Table 4 The Journey of a Recruited Emigrant, 1914–40[1]

Day	Journey	Items	Expenses (Yuan)
Jul-01	Fuqing-Fuzhou (by foot)	Pillow	1.50
		Grass Mat	0.30
		Food	0.30
Jul-02	Staying in Fuzhou	Food and rent	1.50
		Sundries	0.30
Jul-03	Boat ride to Amoy	Sampan ride	0.10
		Fare to Amoy	3.00
Jul-04	Arriving in Amoy	Sampan Ride	0.10
		Rent	1.20
Jul-05	Staying in Amoy	Food (2 days)	0.50
		Sundries and boat fare	0.40
Jul-06	Boat ride to Singapore Tickets may cost 8–15 yuan	Boat Ticket	10.00
Jul-13	Arriving in Singapore	Sundries on boat	1.00
		Sampan ride	0.15
Jul-14–15	Staying in Singapore	Rent and food (2 days)	1.30
Total			21.65[2]

Notes:
1. No reference is made as to whether there was any change in the cost of the journey between 1914 and 1940.
2. In the original table, the figure given for the total is (*sic*) 14.55.
Source: G. Hicks, ed., *Overseas Chinese Remittances from Southeast Asia, 1910–1940* (Singapore, 1993), cited in Lynn Pan, "Western Expansion into China and Southeast Asia," in *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, Lynn Pan (General Editor) (Singapore, 2000), 57.

[9] Kaur, *Wage Labor in Southeast Asia*, Chap. 3.

Seng What had branches in Singapore for receiving *coolies*. The main ports of embarkation were Amoy, Shantou, and Hong Kong. Amoy was the first "hub of the coolie business," followed later by Macao. The private western companies such as Messrs Tait & Co. and Messrs Syme, Muir and Co. operated agencies to recruit labor in alliance with Chinese brokers (known as *ketou* in Chinese). These brokers relied on local crimps or press-gangers to supply migrant workers.[10] (See Map 7 for Chinese migration flows to Southeast Asia).



Source: Based on G. William Skinner, "Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia" in Anthony Reid, ed., *Sojourners and Settlers. Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (St. Leonards, 1996), 50.

Map 7 Chinese Migration Flows to Southeast Asia

[10] Yen, *A Social History of the Chinese*, 7; Pan, *Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas* (Singapore, 2000), 61.

Arrival and Indenture

Chinese migrants who travelled under the credit-ticket recruitment system were indebted either to ship owners or *coolie*-brokers. Both parties detained the migrants until prospective employers who had paid their travel costs (including a small margin of profit for the ship owner or *coolie*-broker) redeemed them. The new migrant (*xinke*) was bound by a contract to serve for a specified period—usually three years—until he had paid off his debt. He was not allowed to change employers until he had repaid the cost of his steamer-passage ticket or allowance. Effectively, this meant that the employer had a contractual obligation on the *xinke*'s services for a specified period only.

The peculiarities of the recruitment system and the absence of government regulation often led to exploitation of workers. There were repeated calls for supervision by the colonial authorities in Malaya and in 1877 the Straits Settlement (SS) government implemented two laws. The first, the *Chinese Immigrants Ordinance,* provided for the appointment of "a Protector of Chinese Immigrants…the establishment and regulation of Depots for the reception of Immigrants on arrival; for written engagements between employers and employed…"[11] Immigrants were permitted to land or were transshipped at only the three SS ports. Colonial medical staff conducted medical examinations of the migrant workers either on board ships or at the wharves. The Chinese Protectorates also curbed labor abuse by introducing legislation for the licensing of recruiting agents and the registration of labor contracts. The second code was the *Crimping Ordinance* (1877), which was intended to deal with the "kidnapping" of Chinese laborers for service in the Dutch East Indies.

These laws were followed by the enactment of the Immigrants' Ordinance in 1880. Under this legislation workers received a discharge ticket and could leave the *kongsi* house upon completion of their contract (and settlement of dues). The details of these arrangements need not detain us here—suffice it to say that the subsequent abolition of the indenture contract for Chinese in 1914, the banning of secret societies, and the lessening of the degree of control exerted by mine owners and Chinese headmen over workers made movement of Chinese labor easier. The entry of heavily capitalised European firms, new technologies and allocation of mining leases that favoured big business

[11] R.N. Jackson, *Immigrant Labor and the Development of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur, 1961).

resulted in the decline of the smaller labor-intensive production units. Crucially, while the colonial government initially did not intervene greatly in Chinese labor recruitment, by the early twentieth century the great demand for labor both in Malaya and in the region meant that the British gradually came to play a bigger role in its supervision. Estimates of Chinese migration flows to major destination countries in Southeast Asia are shown in Table 5.

Briefly, Chinese migrants entered a much more diversified and open labor market in Southeast Asia either as free immigrants who paid their own passage, or as non-paying passengers under the credit-ticket system. Once they had paid off their debts, the Chinese were free to seek employment elsewhere. The urban location of mines (many mining areas became townships) also made movement easier and consequently Chinese migrants were highly mobile, moving constantly through the various states in search of higher wages and better working conditions.

Imperial Hegemonies, Indian Migration Roots and Routes

Early Migration Trends

Prior to the sixteenth century, Indian migratory movements within the Southeast Asian region were relatively minor and limited in geographical scope. However, there was significant Indian mercantile or religious travel that predated the arrival of European commercial interests. Indian traders were also prominent in Southeast Asian regional entrepôts and although trade volumes were small, trade was an important source for the transmission of ideas, new products and technologies and migrants. The Indians (like the Chinese) came from a country with a long history of manufacturing, a monetized economy,

Table 5 Estimated Population Outflows from China to Selected Southeast Asian Countries, 1801–1925 (in thousands)

Year	Malaya	Indonesia	Philippines
1851–75	350	250	45
1876–1900	360	320	20
1901–25	125	300	n.a.

Source: Adapted from Lynn Pan, "Patterns of Migration" in Lynn Pan (General Editor), *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas* (Singapore, 2000), 62.

and sophisticated commerce. Gujerati and Chulia merchants in particular had been trading with Southeast Asian states, exchanging Indian-made textiles for Southeast Asian spices, in a trading network that linked the ports of the Indian subcontinent with ports on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal, in Burma, Thailand, and the Malay states. Indian political institutions, specifically Hindu-Buddhist traditions of kingship, were introduced into Southeast Asia by the seventh century CE, and Indian culture was the dominant external influence in the region in the form of Hindu-Buddhist religious-cultural systems.

Labor Migration

Indian labor migration to Burma and Malaya and migrants' experiences under different political hegemonies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were shaped by these states' relations with Britain, connections with imperial India and their specific economic roles in the greater British empire. In both territories the most profitable lines of development included the mobilization of commodities that were already available, and the introduction and production of industrial crops to fuel ongoing industrialization in the West. Law codes and administrative reforms were modeled on Indian precedents.

Control over Burma enabled Britain to secure the eastern defenses of India and the state was administratively and politically governed as part of India. The rising demand for Burma's rice in India and overseas coincided with the disruption of rice supplies from the United States during the American Civil War. Additionally, improvements in steam shipping technologies and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 lowered transport costs, making Burmese rice exports more competitive in the global rice market. Colonial interventions in land and labor policies (Indian labor migration was viewed as an internal movement from one territory to another), led to Burma's emergence as the world's largest rice producer and rice cultivation took on an industrial character. Moreover, Burma's great reliance on Indian labor shaped economic and communal structures in the country.

Malaya had a very small population, there were ample supplies of land and tin deposits and it was close to important trade routes. The British also viewed it as a strategic gateway to the Pacific and administered it from Britain, while perpetuating the myth that they governed the Malay states on behalf of the Malay rulers. Malaya subsequently became the world's largest producer of tin and rubber and

migrant Indian (and Chinese) labor's role in their production cannot be overstated. Indians dominated the plantation workforce as rubber soon surpassed tin as the main export commodity. Unlike Burma, the recruitment of Indian labor for Malayan plantations and other sectors involved two separate political entities and necessitated a certain degree of control and regulation by the colonial government in India (India Office). Thus while there were similarities in the geographical origins of the Indian workforce, methods of recruitment, and duration of contracts, there were important differences as well.

Indians in Burma

The East India Company's acquisition of Lower Burma in 1852–3 resulted in the addition of a "potentially rich but uncultivated land" to Company possessions. Rice was mainly a subsistence crop and by the mid-1850s a small trade in rice had emerged. Rice exports in 1865–6 were estimated at around 400,000 tons.[12] Subsequently, the growth of the Europe-Far Eastern trade and a significant lowering of shipping freight rates after 1880 stimulated rice production and exports. Rice farmers and traders depended on Indian labor and brought in an Indian workforce under government auspices with fares paid and accommodation provided. Hence while international trade provided an outlet for Burma's rice exports, Indian labor made it possible to produce this commodity on an increasingly larger scale. Between 1900 and 1930, Burma's total trade increased from Rs.300,000 to Rs.1,100,000,000 (rupees), "an indication of Burma's great prosperity" and its globalization.[13] The demand for Burmese rice exports in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came largely from India, Europe and then increasingly from Southeast Asian markets such as Malaya.

Acreage under rice cultivation in Burma soon surpassed that of the other two major rice producers in Southeast Asia, Thailand and Cochin-China, as shown in Table 6.

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[12] Russell Andrus, *Burmese Economic Life* (Calcutta, 1957), 14.

[13] John L. Christian, *Modern Burma: A Survey of Political and Economic Development* (Berkeley, 1942), 124–142.

Table 6 Land under Rice Cultivation in Lower Burma, Thailand and Cochin-China 1860–1920 ('000 hectares)

Year	Lower Burma	Thailand	Cochin-China
1860	539	813	n.a.
1870	702	907	274[1]
1880	1 255	995	753
1890	1 780	1 192	854
1900	2 662	1 293	1 528
1910	3 160	1 755	1 528
1920	3 476	2 295[2]	1 752

Notes:
1. 1873.
2. 1916–20.
Sources: Cheng Siok-Hwa, *The Rice Industry of Burma, 1852–1940* (Kuala Lumpur, 1968), 241–242; Sompop Manarungsan, *Economic Development of Thailand, 1850–1950: Response to the Challenge of the World Economy* (Bangkok, 1989), 51; Martin J. Murray, *The Development of Capitalism in Colonial Indochina 1870–1940* (Berkeley, 1980), 417.

The development of the Burmese rice industry during the period 1870 to 1940 may usefully be divided into three phases: 1870–1900, the open frontier; 1900–29, maturity and internal change; and 1930–40, depression and social problems. These phases corresponded with the fluctuating fortunes of the industry and Burma's increasing dependence on world markets. British land and labor policy and the transformation of rice production into "industrial agriculture," also resulted in a separation between cultivation and processing activities and further specialization in the cultivation, financing, processing and exporting of rice.[14] Three main parties were involved in the rice industry, namely Burmese cultivators and middlemen who also processed some of the rice; Indian financiers, field workers, and rice mill workers; and European firms that dominated the processing of rice and its export. An evaluation of Britain's role, the Burmese rice industry and Indian labor migration are crucial to an understanding of the linkages between empire and global trade.

When labor shortages first emerged in rice cultivation, Burmese cultivators hired Indian workers for the construction and repair of

[14] Michael Adas, *The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1852–1941* (Madison, 1974); Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 116.

bunds and tasks such as ploughing, transplanting of seedlings, harvesting, and threshing. They also increasingly turned to either Burmese or Indian Chettiar moneylenders to finance their planting enterprises. Indian agricultural workers' employment was seasonal and regulated by the different phases of the rice season. The workers arrived in Burma between September and March to carry out a range of tasks associated with the cultivation and harvesting of rice. Between March and the following September, the workers either departed for India, or sought casual work in the towns in the rice mills or on the docks. The rice production cycle thus determined the seasonal character of most Indians' employment, but not wholly. Although some of these workers made a return trip to India annually, they normally worked for a minimum of three years in Burma.[15]

The expansion in rice cultivation was followed by a growth in the number of rice mills, which were established at the main ports of Rangoon, Bassein, Akyab and Moulmein. Traders in these ports also handled the rice trade. While a proportion of the padi was processed locally for domestic use, Indian brokers and contractors purchased large quantities that they transported to the rice mills. The manufacture of the finished product was dominated by Europeans while the mill labor force comprised mainly Indian workers, who were hired out to the European- and Indian-owned mills by labor contractors.[16]

Roots, Networks, and Indian Migration Methods

The British encouraged Indians to emigrate as colonists to Burma soon after the annexation of Lower Burma. In the mid-1870s, following the expansion of the rice industry, Indians were again persuaded to emigrate voluntarily both as agricultural workers and laborers. Then in 1876 the Indian Government enacted a Labor Act that provided for the appointment of an Emigration Agent and a Medical Inspector of Emigrants to "regulate the methods of recruitment, transport and employment and to safeguard the welfare" of emigrants bound for Burma.[17]

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[15] P.P. Pillai, *Labor in Southeast Asia* (New Delhi, 1947), 101.

[16] Andrus, *Burmese Economic Life*, 14–16; Adas, *The Burma Delta*, 30; O.H.K. Spate, "Beginnings of Industrialization in Burma," *Economic Geography* 17 (1941), 75–92, esp. 79; Cheng Siok-Hwa, *The Rice Industry of Burma. 1852–1940* (Kuala Lumpur, 1968), 132–133.

[17] Cheng Siok-Hwa, *The Rice Industry of Burma, 1852–1940* (Kuala Lumpur, 1968), 119.

Mill owners found some provisions of the Labor Act onerous, preferring to obtain workers directly through labor recruiters, rather than relying on the workers to come of their own accord. Also, although migrants were free men and presumed to arrive in Burma without any debt, the actual circumstances for most of them were quite different.[18]

Since poverty was an important barrier to voluntary migration, recruitment through professional recruiters subsequently became the major migration method. Consequently, emigrants came to rely on two groups of intermediaries—the recruiting agent (who acted on behalf of the labor contractor) and the labor contractor, known as *maistry* in the Telegu districts of South India. The recruiting agents toured the villages to recruit workers who were then turned over to the labor contractors. The latter transported them to the emigration depot where they underwent official migration procedures (including basic health checks) and attested that they were migrating of their own free will. They were then taken to their place of employment in Burma, and remained under the *maistry's* charge. Emigration with a *maistry* secured both employment and the necessary funds for travel. In most cases the *maistry* also arranged employment in advance thus ensuring that there were no hold-ups in production.

The *maistry* system gradually evolved into a multi-tiered labor recruitment method and authority system. Although it was not formal indenture, the labor contractors manipulated the system to ensure a hold over workers. Kondapi argues that the *maistry* system comprised several levels of intermediary contractors, namely the labor contractor, the head *maistry*, the charge *maistry*, and the gang *maistry*.[19] The labor contractor, who had substantial funds at his disposal, contracted with a company or mill owner to supply and maintain the required workforce for the mill. Under him was the head *maistry*, who had responsibility for the entire labor organization of a particular firm or company. Below him came the charge *maistry* who managed several gangs of labor. Next came the gang *maistry* who supervised a gang of laborers varying from 10 to 20 men. The gang *maistry* also organized the labor gangs that moved through the rice districts, contracting and completing jobs before moving on to a new rice district. The *maistry* exercised strong control over the Indian workers at all stages and

[18] Burma Office Police & Judiciary 1067/38, cited in Kaur, "Indian Labor."
[19] C. Kondapi, *Indians Overseas, 1838–1949* (New Delhi, 1951), 46.

his earnings derived from three sources: the interest charged on his advances to his labor gangs; the commission paid by the recruiting firms to which he supplied labor; and from his manipulation of bulk purchases of steamship tickets. The relationship was of "mutual but unequal interdependence" and relied on patronage networks.

There was another migration method whereby emigrants paid their own travel costs through arrangements made with shipping companies (for example, the British Indian Steam Navigation Company) that also functioned as labor recruiters. The shipping companies deployed a network of middlemen/ intermediaries who were positioned at port towns in South India to persuade men to migrate. A large percentage of Indians recruited under this method were free migrants who either paid their own travel costs or borrowed funds from village moneylenders or recruiting agents to cover their costs. Nevertheless, these workers could only obtain employment through the *maistry* at their destination. Though regarded as free workers, they became indebted to the *maistry*, and the *maistry* system "both curtailed and restricted" the workers' ability to negotiate better working and living conditions.[20]

Although the *maistry* system closely resembled the *kangani* system in Malaya (see below), there were major differences between the two. The *maistry* functioned as the *de facto* employer of Indian labor in Burma. He contracted for the entire responsibility and carriage of a commodity. He also made all the arrangements for emigration, accommodation, and travel and paid the workers himself. Since the number of workers required for job was often unspecified, the *maistry's* contract with a firm consisted of an agreement to supply "those needed." He also had to provide a deposit as security to the firm with whom he had contracted to supply workers, and relied on the gang *maistries* to both supply and manage the workers.[21] This expanded function of the *maistry* in Burma may be attributed to the seasonal nature of employment in most occupations there, unlike the more permanent employment of Indians on Malayan plantations.

Did emigration lead to self-improvement? Indian immigrants' main motive was to remit money home. Pillai states that Indian immigrants were able to save and remit money to India. Agricultural workers had

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[20] Adapa Satyanarayana, "'Birds of Passage': Migration of South Indian Laborers to Southeast Asia," *Critical Asian Studies* 34.1 (March 2002), 89–115, esp. 101–102.

[21] V.T. Thompson, *Labor Problems in Southeast Asia* (New Haven, 1947), 43.

a large proportion of their wages paid in kind which were "well above the subsistence level," averaging from between 100 to 140 baskets of padi a year (1 basket = 46 lbs = 20.9 kg). Moreover, although the work was seasonal, it was customary for the worker to be hired by the year, even if he did not stay the whole year. Additionally, he received free board and (rough) lodging for a period of 10 months out of the year. Also, although workers made a return trip to India annually, they normally worked for a minimum of three years after which they could afford "to buy a yoke of cattle and set…[themselves] up as…independent farmer[s]."[22]

Pillai further notes that while reliable wage data for rice factory workers prior to the Second World War are scarce, wage rates were definitely higher than those earned in India. Prior to the onset of the Depression, workers employed on a regular basis for manual work in factories (that is, establishments using power-driven machinery and employing more than 20 workers), earned about 25 rupees a month. In smaller rice mills, mill workers' pay ranged from Rs.18 to Rs.40 per month, with the average pay being about Rs.25 a month.[23]

Baxter also provides evidence of (average) wages for Indian workers employed in Burmese rice mills in 1940. Noting their ability to live on "exceedingly small sums," he found that a "considerable" proportion of rice mill wages were remitted to India:

> Two Indian rice mill owners, for example, agree that the Oriya laborer earns in their mills about Rs.25 per month out of which he 'spends only Rs.5 to Rs.7 a month, and saves something like Rs.15 to Rs.20.' An Indian contractor reports that his unskilled workers received from Rs.14 to Rs.22 per month as against a monthly expenditure of from Rs.10 to Rs.12 and remitted the balance to India by post.[24]

According to another source, emigration for Telegu and Tamil migrants provided "economic opportunities and potential social mobility that were invariably denied to them in their home districts in India." They were also able to buy land and purchase consumer goods. He estimated that in the 1930s "remittances by money order alone averaged nearly 3 million rupees annually."[25]

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
[22] Pillai, *Labor in Southeast Asia*, 101–102.
[23] Pillai, *Labor in Southeast Asia*, 103.
[24] James Baxter, *Report on Indian Immigration* (Rangoon, 1941), 91.
[25] Uma Shankar Singh, "Indians in Burma-I," in I.J. Bahadur Singh, ed., *Indians in Southeast Asia* (New Delhi, 1982), 103.

Settlement

The composition of Burmese society gradually changed with the arrival of Indian immigrants. The number of Indians increased from 136,504 (or 4.9 percent) to 1,017,825 persons (or 6.9 percent) of Burma's population in the period 1872–1931 as shown in Figure 7.


The percentage of Indians was higher in Lower Burma where most of them were in urban occupations. Indeed, their occupational status and settlement largely derived from, and was entwined with the colonial and foreign economy. The greater percentage of Indians in Lower Burma compared with Upper Burma is shown in Figure 8.

The majority of the Indians in Burma were a part of the laboring and trading communities. As menial workers they were employed in the mills, on the docks, worked as gardeners, rickshaw pullers, and cleaners/ sweepers. They also dominated retail trade and monopolized the subordinate positions in administration. The breakdown of the population by race in 1931 in Burma's capital city, Rangoon, was as follows: Indians—212,929; Burmese—121,998; Chinese—30,626 (*Census*



Note: Prior to 1921, Indians were enumerated on the basis of language group, not race.
Source: James Baxter, *Report on Indian Immigration* (Rangoon, 1941), 5.

Figure 7 The Indian Population in Burma, 1872–1941



Note: Data for Upper Burma is not available for 1872 and 1881.
Source: James Baxter, *Report on Indian Immigration* (Rangoon, 1941), 6.

Figure 8 The Indian Population in Lower and Upper Burma, 1872–1931 (percentages)

of Burma 1931). Prior to the Second World War, the *lingua franca* in Rangoon was Hindustani, not Burmese.

Despite the large numbers of Indians in Burma, by 1931 only 38.1 percent of Indians were locally born. The preference for male migrants, the varied occupations of the Indians, and seasonality of employment thus impacted on Indian gender ratios and fertility in Burma. Kondapi states that the gender ratio varied from 8.2 males for every female to as high as 250 males for every female. This wide divergence was due to occupational and caste (or class) differentiation. High caste/ class men left their families behind in India since they circulated frequently between the two countries. Workers (principally Chittagonians and Oriyas) employed on ships as engine room and deck crew also left their families behind due to the nature of their occupation. Moreover, the living conditions of urban factory workers—cramped quarters and a lack of privacy—discouraged workers on short-term contracts from bringing their spouses. Indian birth rates in Burma were also low. Mortality rates among Indian workers in Burma were high,

arising from their poverty, poor working conditions, and industrial hazards.[26]

The Depression and social collapse in Burma precipitated anti-Indian and anti-Chinese riots in southern Burma between 1930 and 1932. Partly as a result of this unrest and also due to the general economic stagnation in the country, the number of Indians entering Burma dropped sharply, falling from 777,000 in 1929 to an annual average of 483,000 between 1933 and 1938. The Japanese occupation of Burma also led to an Indian exodus.[27] After the Second World War, Indians were no longer welcome in independent Burma and became even more marginalized. Indians who had settled in Arakan (Rakhine) province, known as the Rohingyas, were also disenfranchised by the Burmese government in the 1970s and fled Burma to live in Burmese refugee camps in Thailand and Malaysia.[28]

Indians in Malaya

In the second half of the nineteenth century Britain expanded on the former East India Company's possessions and by 1914 British Malaya comprised three administrative entities: the original Straits Settlements ports/colonies (SS—Penang, Malacca, and Singapore), the Federated Malay States (FMS—Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang) and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS—Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu).[29] The British created modern bureaucratic structures and introduced administrative and legal reforms for commodity trade expansion. The new structures facilitated rail and road development, the emergence of a unified transportation system and uniformity in land legislation, fiscal organization, legal codes, and immigration matters. Increased trade and revenue were regarded as synonymous with

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[26] Usha Mahajani, *The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malay* (Bombay, 1960); Kondapi, *Indians Overseas*, 92; Kaur, "Indian Labor."

[27] See for example Amitav Ghosh, *The Glass Palace* (London, 2000).

[28] Amarjit Kaur, "Refugees and refugee policy in Malaysia" in Kaur and Ian Metcalfe, eds., *UNEAC Asia Papers* 18 (2007), Special Issue "Refugees and Refugee Policies in the Asia-Pacific region," 77–90, published online at http://www.une.edu.au/asiacenter/UNEAC_Asia_Papers_12–19.html.

[29] Amarjit Kaur, *Historical Dictionary of Malaysia*, 2nd rev. ed. (New Jersey, 2001), "Chronology."

progress and prosperity and rubber and tin development coincided with mass Chinese and Indian immigration to Malaya.

Indians and the Rubber Industry


The expansion of the rubber industry was consistent with evolving connections between commodities and empire, new industries and changing production technologies, and the emergence of new markets in the West. Plantations were primarily established in areas of sparse population in western Malaya and Western (particularly British), capital interests dominated the industry. Much of the development was concentrated in the western half of Malaya, in areas already well served by road and railway systems (see Map 8), and facilitated Malaya's export orientation and specialization.[30] Malaya emerged as the world's largest rubber producer, as listed in Table 7.

Table 7 Natural Rubber Production and Principal Rubber Producing Countries, 1910–40 (percentages)[1]

Country	1910 (%)	1920 (%)	1930 (%)	1940 (%)
Malaya[2]	6.7	51.0	53.6	38.7
Indonesia	2.9	22.1	29.2	38.4
Indochina	0.2	0.9	1.2	4.5
Sarawak	0.001	0.5	1.2	2.5
Thailand	0.001	0.1	0.5	3.1
North Borneo	0.03	1.2	0.9	1.2
Ceylon	1.7	8.6	9.2	6.4
India	0.2	1.9	0.2	1.2
Brazil	40.3	6.8	1.4	1.3
Africa	21.4	1.6	0.6	1.1
Others	26.0	1.2	2.0	1.6
Total (long tons)	94,100	341,900	825,400	1,415,000

Notes:
1. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest figure.
2. Malaya includes Singapore, though Singapore's rubber production throughout was very small.
Source: Lim Chong Yah, *Economic Development of Modern Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur, 1967), 94.

[30] Amarjit Kaur, *Bridge and Barrier. Transport and Communications in Colonial Malaya* (Singapore, 1985), Chap. 5.



Source: Amarjit Kaur, "Economy and Society" in Amarjit Kaur and Ian Metcalfe (Eds), *The Shaping of Malaysia* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 147.

Map 8 Transport Networks and the Distribution of Rubber in Malaya

Chinese capital and labor had dominated the development of the tin industry and Chinese had well-established networks for labor recruitment. Thus when the issue of labor mobilization for the rubber industry arose, one suggestion was to avoid over-dependence on any one foreign racial group and promote a diversified workforce recruitment policy comprising Indian, Chinese and Javanese migrants. Of the three, Indians were the preferred workforce. According to Sandhu, the South Indian laborer was preferred because "he was malleable, worked well under supervision, and was easily manageable. He was not as ambitious as most of his northern Indian compatriots and certainly nothing like the Chinese . . . he was the most amenable to the comparatively lowly paid and rather regimented life of estates and government departments. He . . . also cost less in feeding and maintenance."[31]

It was also convenient to recruit South Indian labor because India was under the same imperial government, and its proximity to Malaya was an additional bonus.

Roots, Networks, and Migration Methods

The usage of Indian labor in Malaya was not a new phenomenon. In the first half of the nineteenth century, free South Indian migrants had gone to Malaya on a spontaneous and voluntary basis to work for periods of one to two years on European-owned sugar and other plantations. When Britain assumed control over India in 1857, the India Office instituted procedures to regulate emigration and improve conditions of travel. These regulations led to rising transport costs, restricting labor supply, and necessitating assistance with migration. Thus an indentured labor migration method under government auspices, with fares paid and accommodation provided at the destination, was already in existence. Since workers had to pay off their travel costs, the labor contract was extended from one year to eighteen months and then to two years.[32] Nevertheless, migration was voluntary. The SS government also compiled its own labor code in 1876 to regulate indentured labor emigration to Malaya. The ordinance set out the principal terms of the labor contract and emigrants' labor conditions to ensure a higher degree of voluntariness and a lower level of mortality during the voyage. Although Tinker equates this move to greater

[31] Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya*, 56.
[32] Jackson, *Immigrant Labor*, 57–58.

"servitude" (Indian labor emigrants arriving in Malaya were burdened with a debt of $17 to cover their passage costs and advance of pay, later recoverable from their wages), it is undeniable that these regulations also ensured that migration was not forced and that travel conditions were improved.[33]

The Indian Government subsequently introduced new legislation in 1884, which resulted in a loosening of some controls over emigrants since they were not required to sign a contract until their arrival in the SS. In 1887 the SS and several Malay states governments agreed to provide a steamship subsidy to cover the travel expenses of Indians to Malaya. The Indian government also established labor depots for receiving and processing Indian emigrants in southeastern India.[34] For a short period, then, Indian legislation aimed at ensuring that Indian emigrants were not forced into servitude and went to Malaya as voluntary migrants.

Towards the end of the century, planters used the *kangani* system, an alternative recruitment/ migration method, to ensure a continuous supply of labor to Malaya. The *kangani* was an experienced Indian worker acting as a labor recruiter on behalf of his employer and was sent to India to recruit workers from his own village. He assisted migrants with emigration procedures and paid their travel costs. As the system developed several conditions were introduced, including the licensing of *kanganies* (1901) to minimize potential abuse of migrants and the stipulation that migrants were to be employed on a monthly basis only. This ensured that labor recruits were no longer contract bound to a particular plantation. This migration method was less costly than recruitment through agents. Additionally, the likelihood of workers absconding was reduced since the *kangani* recruited primarily from his own village. The *kangani* was not only a powerful intermediary, but also received "head money" for every day worked by each worker, which he stood to forfeit if the worker absconded. Although this method was also open to abuse, the *kangani* was not the employer of the workers, but only their supervisor, unlike the *maistry*.[35]

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[33] Tinker, *A New System of Slavery*, 112; Northrup, *Indentured Labor*, 83–85.
[34] Jackson, *Immigrant Labor*, 62–69.
[35] Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya*, 101; Kaur, "Malaysia."

The government's own requirements for a cheap and plentiful labor supply for its public works projects and the growing competition for labor foreshadowed centralization of Indian labor recruitment. In 1907 a central quasi-official body, the Indian Immigration Committee (IIC), was formed to facilitate and supervise South Indian labor emigration to Malaya. An accompanying fund, the Tamil (later, Indian) Immigration Fund was established to provide free passage for Indian emigrants. All employers of Indian labor were charged a quarterly levy to cover the travel and related costs of free Indian labor emigrants to Malaya. The IIC came under the Controller of Labor who represented all official (government) and private interests in Malaya (excepting Trerengganu). Apart from transporting Indian immigrants to Malaya, the Fund covered the expense of repatriating unemployed Indians (the distressed) during depressed periods. Its responsibilities also included maintenance of a home for "decrepit" Indians, an orphanage for Indian children whose parents had died, and in the 1930s an asylum for those suffering from melancholia brought about by the Depression.[36]

The workings of the IIC not only resulted in better regulation of voluntary migration to Malaya but also promoted greater migration into the country. Since the *kangani* was only allowed to legally recruit twenty workers, he also brought with him other voluntary emigrants. The IIC encouraged this voluntary movement through payments of a $2.00 bonus to each adult voluntary immigrant and $1.00 to each of his minor dependents. The open labor market and the need to suppress upward wage pressures played an important role in this development. Indian workers in Malaya also enjoyed a standard wage. The standard wage was established to introduce a minimum standard of living, and reduce movement between estates and urban areas.


Assisted emigration was suspended in 1930 owing to the slump in the tin and rubber industries; it resumed in 1934; and was finally banned in 1938. However, the decline in *kangani* recruitment had begun before the Depression and in the early 1930s government assistance for labor recruitment was regarded as inappropriate. The Indian Immigration Fund was subsequently utilized to repatriate unemployed workers. After the Great Depression too there was less pressure from planters for a centrally managed recruitment system since

[36] Pillai, *Labor in Southeast Asia*, 146.

government-assisted migration was well publicized and most repatriated workers could finance their own return trips.

Magnitudes


Thousands of Indian emigrants arrived annually in Malaya under the major migration methods. Between 1844 and 1910, about 250,000 indentured laborers came to Malaya.[37] The peak of *kangani*-assisted recruitment occurred in the 1910s, when about 50,000 to 80,000 Indian workers arrived per annum. During the period 1844–1938, *kangani*-assisted emigration accounted for 62.2 percent of total Indian labor migration compared with 13.0 percent of indentured labor migration. Moreover, whereas in 1920, only 12 percent of Indian workers were voluntary emigrants, this proportion had increased to over 91 percent by the 1930s.[38] The changing recruitment patterns and breakdown of Indian migrants by migration method are shown in Figures 9 and 10.



Source: Based on KS Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya* (Cambridge, 1969), Appendix 2, 306–9.

Figure 9 Assisted and Voluntary Indian Migration to Malaya, 1844–1938 (in numbers)

[37] Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya*, 81.
[38] Thompson, *Labor Problems*, 123.



Source: Based on KS Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya* (Cambridge, 1969), Appendix 2, 306–309.

Figure 10 Indian Labor Migration to Malaya by Recruitment System, 1844–1938 (percentages)

Settlement

In the first four decades of the twentieth century, Indians formed between 70 to 80 percent of the FMS plantation labor force, as shown in Table 8.

Table 8 Malaya: Racial Composition of FMS Estate Labor Force, 1907–38

Year	Indians	Chinese	Javanese	Others	Total	Indians as % of labor	No. of Estates
1907	43 824	5 348	6 029	2 872	58 073	75.5	287
1911	109 633	31 460	12 795	12 127	166 015	66	711
1915	126 347	27 446	8 356	8 592	170 741	74	719
1920	160 966	40 866	8 918	5 808	216 588	74.3	1105
1925	137 761	37 879	4 165	4 549	184 354	74.7	1206
1930	132 745	30 860	3 665	2 411	169 681	78.2	1757
1935	118 591	29 950	1 941	2 658	153 140	77.4	2345
1938	137 353	28 925	1 762	2 892	170 932	80.4	2388

Source: J.N. Parmer, *Colonial Labor Policy and Administration*: *A History of Labor in the Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya* (Locust Valley, N.Y., 1960), 273.

For about every 100 acres under Western rubber cultivation, there were approximately 15 to 20 workers, of whom between 12 and 17 were Indians.


The Indian plantation workforce originally comprised predominantly single adult males. Married men were discouraged from emigrating because they could not afford to bring their families since wages were low. The norm of payment was for a single wage earner, working conditions were harsh, and accommodation was available for single men only. In its 1864 legislation (Act XIII), the Indian government had stipulated that women emigrants be included in all labor shipments in the proportion 25 women to 100 men. However, Malaya was repeatedly exempted from this gender ratio provision. Nevertheless, a striking feature of the *kangani* system was the emigration of families. Moreover, female emigration was promoted to improve the gender ratio and encouraged through a reduction on the assessment paid on women workers. The *kangani* also earned a higher commission for women migrant workers as well as for married couples. In late 1908 employers of new adult labor recruits were paid an allowance of 7s each for males and 8s 2d each for females recruited through a *kangani* and 4s 8d per adult recruited under the aegis of the Indian Immigration Fund. Moreover, with the passage of the *Indian Emigration Act* (Act VII of 1922), Rule 23 of the Act stipulated that unaccompanied males were not to exceed one in five of the emigrants: thus two out of every three male emigrants had to be accompanied by their spouses. The differentiation in payment for tasks on plantations—tapping, weeding, factory work—also facilitated movement of women and children.[39]

Increased female recruitment and the migration of families are reflected in the census figures for 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, and 1947. The proportion of Indian women in these census years for every 1,000 Indian men was: 171 in 1901; 308 in 1911; 406 in 1921; 482 in 1931, and 637 in 1947. These statistics also explain the growing trend towards permanent settlement by Indians by the 1930s. Increased female migration also led to more children arriving in Malaya, and by the 1920s women accounted for 30 percent of all arrivals from India. More children were also born in Malaya and raised locally, contributing to

[39] Voon Phin Keong. *Western Rubber Planting Enterprise in Southeast Asia 1876–1921* (Kuala Lumpur, 1976), 244–245; Kaur, *Wage Labor in Southeast Asia*, ch. 4.

the transition towards permanent settlement and the availability of a pool of workers. Hence, job possibilities for women on plantations and elsewhere, the provisions of the 1922 *Emigration Act*, the *Emigration Rules 1923*, and the establishment and reconstitution of families led to greater permanent Indian settlement in Malaya. The mutually reinforcing relationships between the British Empire and the global trade in commodities provided the vital connections between poverty-stricken rural southern India and the frontier regions of Malaya, but colonial regulations and organization of labor recruitment facilitated emigration and settlement.

The growth in the Indian population is reflected in the census figures. Indians comprised between 10 to 14 percent of the Malayan population between 1911 and 1947, as shown in Figure 11, and together with the Chinese, had outnumbered the "Malaysians" by 1940.



Notes:
1. 'Malaysians' include Malays and Indonesians.
2. Indians includes Pakistanis after 1947.
3. The Table excludes 'other' races.
Source: Malaya, *Census Reports 1911–1947*.

Figure 11 Malaya, Population by Racial Group, 1911–1947

Nevertheless, Indians had a lesser impact on economic and communal structures in Malaya. About 90 percent of them were unskilled workers and a very large number lived in isolated plantation communities. With the plantation as the boundary of their existence, they had fewer contacts with the indigenous Malays.

Did emigration lead to self-improvement for South Indian plantation workers? No official indexes of wage workers' cost of living were compiled in Malaya. Parmer also states that Indian wages bore "no real or sustained relationship to the actual demand" for estate labor since the immigration machinery was devised to meet labor demands quickly and blunt tendencies for wages to rise. Additionally, during periods of economic downturn, wages were lowered and work was spread to prevent mass repatriation.[40]

According to Drabble's preliminary calculations, national income growth (GDP) in Malaya for the first three decades of the twentieth century was on average 4.1 percent, "well above population growth at 2.5 percent." He cautions however that per capita GDP is not "an entirely reliable guide to changes in the standard of living" since Malaya had a high ratio of exports to GDP. Although rubber and tin accounted for nearly 38 percent of GDP in 1920 neither the mining nor plantation workers shared proportionately in the big rises in labor productivity, especially in the second decade of the twentieth century. Interestingly, while the annual tin output per worker rose from 0.25 tons to 0.32 tons between 1910 and 1920 (equivalent to a 28 percent rise), the monthly wage per capita fell from $13.37 in 1913 to $7.25 in 1920. On the rubber estates, annual output per worker rose from 0.05 tons in 1910 to 0.84 tons in 1920 and this was due to higher yields, not from technological change. Although the average monthly wage rose from $6.00 in 1910 to $12.40 in 1920 (with dips in between), it was "in no way proportional to the rise in productivity." Thus largely unrestricted migration policies and the steady flows of migrant workers enabled the colonial state and Western (and Chinese enterprise) to keep wages down.[41]

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[40] Norman J. Parmer, *Colonial Labor Policy and Administration: A History of Labor in the Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya* (Locust Valley, N.Y., 1960), 254.

[41] John Drabble, *An Economic History of Malaysia, c.1800–1990* (Basingstoke, 2000), 113, 115.

Satyanarayana contends that the average daily wage of an adult Indian male in Malaya (42 cents) worked out to 10.5 annas per day in South India. Also, although agricultural work in South India was not available on a continuous basis (compared to 25 days per month in Malaya) the cost of living was about 40 percent higher in Malaya and thus the average monthly income of a plantation worker only ranged between 12 and 15 rupees. Nevertheless, inflationary factors in the cost of living were also reduced or eliminated by the provision of housing and other amenities and subsidizing of the cost of rice by planters.[42] Moreover, Indians were able to save and send remittances home on a regular basis as evidenced by the following data provided in Table 9.

Additionally, the amount remitted by Indians (all occupational categories) to India by money order totaled Rs.4.61 million between 1906 and 1907 and Rs.30.28 million for the period 1909 to 1924. The prospect of returning with more wealth than he could possibly acquire in his home village was thus a major incentive to emigrate.[43]

Table 9 Post-Office Savings/Bank Accounts of Indians in Malaya, 1906–1924 (Selected Years)

Year	Amount (in Malayan/ Straits Dollars)
1906	199 048
1907	208 504
1909	278 508
1910	342 856
1911	400 848
1912	461 917
1922	476 182
1923	894 704
1924	1166 443

Source: Adapa Satyanarayana. "'Birds of Passage': Migration of South Indian Laborers to Southeast Asia," *Critical Asian Studies* 34.1 (March 2002), 10.

[42] Satyanarayana, "Birds of Passage," 105–106; Kaur, "Indian Labor."

[43] Satyanarayana, "Birds of Passage," 105; S. Arasaratnam, *Indians in Malaysia and Singapore* rev. ed. (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), 14.

Afterthoughts

Indian immigrants' remittances and the beneficial impacts of overseas employment on families and households have provided evidence on the developmental impacts of migration beyond the household level. The relevance of transnationalism and transregionalism in the Asian context and the experiences of settlement are now providing some clarification of the wider impacts of migration and development.[44]

[44] See for example Kaur, "Indian Labor."

PART TWO

THE WORLDS OF THE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN SEAS

INTRODUCTION: LINK-POINTS IN A HALF-OCEAN

Wang Gungwu

The British navy ruled the waves by the end of the eighteenth century. In the Indian Ocean and beyond to the China Seas, it provided support for British and other European merchant houses to connect all the lands that they could reach with the production centers at home. The tea clippers to and from China were safe and the trade in opium stabilized. The industrial revolution in Britain sought new markets and demanded new sources for the commodities needed for their factories. By the early nineteenth century, the campaigns against the slave trade began to take effect, and the open seas enabled the British to open up markets for unskilled labor. As faraway plantations in tropical lands were organized to produce the materials that Britain and then Europe needed, the process of colonization itself underwent a major change. What had primarily been the movement of settlers from Europe to new colonized lands was turned into a massive flow of labor from India and China to replace the slaves they could no longer obtain from Africa. In all this, the oceans provided efficient and increasingly safe transportation routes. Clearly, whoever dominated the seas that linked the colonies to the metropolitan cities in Europe held an enormous advantage in world trade.

In Asia, the two key link-points between the Indian and Pacific Oceans were Singapore and Hong Kong. With the Indian coasts under their control, the British reached for the rich markets of the China coasts. The control of the Straits of Malacca was the key and the two steps in enabling that control came with the settlement in Penang in 1786 followed by that in Singapore in 1819. All that was needed thereafter was a safe port they could control in China. It was not enough to depend on the Portuguese in Macao and the Co-hong merchants assigned by the Qing government to deal with them at Guangzhou (Canton). As British business ambitions grew and naval power offered them full protection, it was only a matter of time before a major challenge to the Qing court's closed-door policy would be made.

British victory in the "Opium" War of 1840–1842 settled the issue for the next hundred years. China was opened up, pressure was put on Japan and Korea, and the oceanic links with British lands on the

Pacific coasts, from Australia to Canada were further extended. This development finally completed the historic thrust of the original Mediterranean power complex to the rest of the world. This was the complex wrought by several thousands of years of trade and war across the Mediterranean Sea. The intense interactions reached a climax when the Muslim powers barred the West Europeans from access to India and China after the failures of the Crusades. The pressure to break out led the Iberian powers to extend their maritime skills across the Atlantic Ocean and eventually turn that ocean into a larger version of the Mediterranean they understood. The British and the French followed in their wake and the fierce competition in the Americas for gold and territory quickly replicated another Mediterranean complex. The Portuguese pushed in another direction and, during the sixteenth century, created the conditions for a third such complex, this time by successively dominating the key Indian Ocean trading ports. The Spanish in turn had made a beginning across the Pacific Ocean after Magellan's ships circumnavigated the globe, the first step towards connecting Acapulco to Manila. But that was a slim link in the chain, and it was really left to the British to turn the trading networks of that ocean into a fourth Mediterranean in the eighteenth century.[1] After that, and especially for the hundred years after the 1840s, it was maritime globalization that provided the main thrust for modern economic development everywhere.

In this context, British control of the routes through the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea sealed the links between the two Mediterraneans of the Indian and Pacific Oceans that encircled the Asian continent. Hamashita Takeshi's survey of the emergence of the powerful economic and financial nexus that tied the East and South China Seas together captures the story of continuities and changes involving European and East Asian trading systems. The European powers built colonial structures on top of what Asian merchants had established earlier and, first, the Chinese and then the Japanese business classes wove their transactions into the institutions that the Europeans introduced into the region. By the turn of the twentieth century, the failure of the Chinese to respond successfully to the new challenges

[1] Wang Gungwu, "The China Seas: Becoming an Enlarged Mediterranean," in Angela Schottenhammer, ed., *The East Asian Mediterranean—Maritime Crossroads of Culture, Commerce, and Human Migration* (Wiesbaden, 2008), and Wang, "A Two-Ocean Mediterranean," in Geoff Wade and Tana Li, eds., *Anthony Reid and the Study of the Southeast Asian Past, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies* (Singapore, forthcoming 2011).

gave Japan an excellent opportunity to re-invent itself as a naval power that could stand up to the West. Their transformative acts vitalized an Asian response to Western dominance and determined the fate of the East Asian Seas for most of the first half of the twentieth century.

Both Singapore and Hong Kong played a pivotal role as anchors for British power in the South and East China Seas. The monsoonal conditions had earlier prevented intense political relationships from developing between countries that faced both those seas. Trade, largely along the coasts, did grow and that eventually brought the states into regular contact. Nothing like the power complex that sustained rival empires in the Mediterranean emerged. Nevertheless, the maritime networks that were created may be said to have operated in semi-Mediterranean conditions, or what might be called Semiterranean. The growth of those two ports into the global trading cities that they have become today has been the subject of many studies. The essays here by Carl Trocki and Elizabeth Sinn highlight the key role they played a century earlier, as distribution centers where both free and contract labor went from China to Southeast Asia and across the Pacific in unprecedented large numbers. Singapore's establishment as an entrepot in 1819 was backed by liberal commercial policies that rapidly turned it into an attractive centre for trade, not least for recruiting workers needed in the mines and plantations that proliferated all over the region (as Amarjit Kaur previously notes in her essay in this volume). Two decades later, Hong Kong became the dragon-head of all the outlets for Chinese labor. This coincided with the opening of the West in North America and the British colonies in Australasia. The discovery of gold and the building of intercontinental railways intensified the links between the oceans. For the first time, people's movement across the Pacific became an important feature of tying the continents together. Ultimately, it was the technology that telescoped distances and the institutions that made ambitions and imaginations soar that conquered the oceans. In that way, the creative energy generated from centuries of economic, political and religious pressures that burst out of the first Mediterranean over 500 years ago came to destroy the continental power complexes and replaced them with a new power distribution that circled the world of oceans. The half-ocean of the China Seas provided the key ports of East and Southeast Asia to complete that replacement process. As it turned out, the ports also laid the foundations for a future revival on the edges of the Asian continent, something that the peoples who lived along those coasts had never thought possible before the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

FROM TRIBUTE TRADE TO MIGRATION CENTER: THE RYUKYU AND HONG KONG MARITIME NETWORKS WITHIN THE EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS IN A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE

Takeshi Hamashita

The region of the East and South China Seas is often studied either from a regional or from a colonial perspective. This essay argues that different patterns of trading and power relations formed overlays that changed slowly over the centuries and influenced each other. Thus understanding the changes of 1839 and after requires a long-term perspective. Such a perspective is possible through the Lidai baoan, a compilation of manuscripts written in Chinese relating to Ryukyuan contacts with China, Korea, and eight Southeast Asian countries (or more precisely, port towns), covering the period for 444 years from 1424 to 1867. The countries are Siam, Malacca, Palembang, Java, Sumatra, Sunda-Karapa, Patani, and Annam. Lidai baoan documents shed new light on historical events and developments in this region and supplement and correct historical accounts relating to South Sea countries, where the activities of Ryukyu merchants have been entirely ignored in existing chronicles and historical records.[1] The documents relate principally to the diplomatic relationship between the Ryukyu Kingdom and China, which developed from contacts initiated by Emperor Taizu in 1372. These initial contacts led to the subsequent development of an envoy-tribute relationship in which Ryukyu administrations offered loyalty and goods to the Chinese imperium in exchange for diplomatic recognition and external protection. As a result, the kingdom became a subordinate member of a regional security and trading alliance dependent upon Chinese military and economic hegemony. A first trading region emerged.

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[1] Structure of Lidai baoan are composed of the following three collections and one supplement collection. First Collection: 49 volumes, 42 volumes extant (1424–1696), sorted according to style and nation; Second Collection: 200 volumes, 187 volumes extant (1697–1858) chronologically arranged; Third Collection: 13 volumes, 13 volumes extant (1859–1867) chronologically arranged; (Fourth) Supplement; information on France, the UK and the USA.

Early Developments I: Relations between Ryukyu and Korea since the Fourteenth Century

After the establishment of the Ming dynasty in China, Emperor Taizu sent an envoy to Ryukyu in 1372 and demanded tribute. King Satto of Chūzan immediately dispatched his brother Taiki in the same year, entrusting him with a memorial to the emperor and tributary goods. Tribute offering by the kings of Chūzan continued thereafter. The two other Ryukyuan principalities, Sannan and Hokuzan, also began sending tribute to the Ming before long.

It should be noted that among the tributary goods brought by Utchi to Koryô in 1389 were sappanwood and pepper, which were also tributary goods from Koryô to China, in addition to sulphur and horses and other local products from Ryukyu and Japan. Ryukyuan tribute to China in the earliest days included horses and sulphur from Ryukyu, but in 1390 products of South Sea origin like pepper, sappanwood, and olibanum were added to the tribute cargoes for China. From this time on, goods of the South Sea region came to constitute part of the tribute. It is conjectured that the communication and trade of the king of Chūzan with Siam began about this time. Ryukyuan contact with Japan had been established before this time and some ten years after the opening of formal tributary relations with the Ming, Ryukyu is presumed to have expanded its overseas activity from Korea in the North to Siam in the South.

From the early days of the fifteenth century, Korea-bound ships of daimyō, merchants, and others of Kyushu began to carry in their cargoes products of the South Sea region, like sappanwood, pepper, cinnabar wood, ivory, cloves, sandalwood, garu-wood, rhinoceros horns, and Baroos camphor, together with such native products such as copper, sulphur, and swords. The Southern products were in the main imported into Kyushu from Ryukyu. Not a few Ryukyuan ships made their way to Japan, but Japanese ships in even greater numbers began coming to Ryukyu in order to buy Southern products.

Ryukyuan communication with Korea after the reign of Sejong was handled, in most cases, by men aboard the ships of Hakata and other northern Kyushu districts that voyaged to and from Ryukyu. Although some Ryukyuans boarded these ships as envoys, it gradually became a more common practice for the Ryukyuan government to entrust official dispatches and presents intended for Korea to Japanese merchants acting as Ryukyu's envoys. Korean envoys, for their part,

appear to have boarded Ryukyuan ships in the beginning, but their letters and presents to Ryukyu, too, began to be entrusted to Ryukyuan envoys first and later to the Japanese who called themselves envoys of Ryukyu.

Private trade was more advantageous than public or official trade, but there were frequent prohibitions and/or restrictions on private trade, and the missions to China dispatched by the Japanese "kings" were mainly accorded the best treatment of all. The Ryukyuan king was treated as equal of the Japanese king, and it was advantageous to Japanese ship-owners to make their ships available to the Ryukyuan king or assume duties as his envoys. The mission of Fusuku and Sai Kei, dispatched to Korea by the Ryukyuan king in 1461, is a rare example in which the voyage was made on a Ryukyuan ship. They carried trade goods on board the ship. In a memorial submitted by the Korean Board of Revenue to King Sejo, it was stated that the prices of the trade goods brought by Fusuku and others were high, but compared with what the Japanese brought, they were quite cheap.[2]

The volume and variety of goods exchanged between Ryukyu and Korea were much greater than those between Ryukyu and South Sea countries. Particularly, Ryukyu regularly received from Korea large quantities of cotton cloth and cotton thread. Korea also sent many Buddhist sutras; among them, the Koryô edition of the Great Collection of Buddhist Sutras (called Daizōkyō in Japanese, Dazangjing in Chinese) was most highly valued by the Ryukyuans. From the time of Shō Taikyū and Shō Toku of the First Shō Dynasty of Ryukyu through the reigns of Shō En and Shō Shin of the Second Shō Dynasty, that is, from the mid-fifteenth to the early sixteenth century, the building and repair of Buddhist temples were highly esteemed, and Buddhism flourished under royal patronage. A major motive for Ryukyuan trade with Korea was the acquisition of Buddhist sutras.

From the end of the fifteenth century, however, the Japanese merchants acting for Ryukyuan kings adopted a practice of altering the contents of official dispatches issued by the kings and also by Korean kings and officials, or, in the worst cases, falsely claiming status as Ryukyuan envoys. In the early sixteenth century, with the decline of Ryukyuan overseas activity in general, contact with Korea ceased.

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[2] *Sejo sillok*, XXVII, under the date Sejo 8/1/15 (February 3, 1463).

Toward the end of the sixteenth century, however, Ryukyuan-Korean contact revived. This seems to have been occasioned by Korea's repatriation of some Ryukyuan castaways via Ming China in 1590. From this time till 1637, when Korea was completely subjugated by the Qing, the exchange of documents and presents between Korea and Ryukyu took place at Huitongguan (the "Residence Hall") in Beijing, where their respective envoys met. In other words, the contact between the two countries was now made through a route different from the previous one; the previous contact involved Japan, and the new contact brought China into the picture.

In the middle of the fifteenth century the bakufu gave the Shimazu clan of Satsuma the right to demand that Ryukyu-bound Japanese ships carry a pass (seal) issued by the clan. The Shimazu had established special relations with Ryukyu, and in the sixteenth century it began obliging the Ryukyuans to send their ships (called Bunsen) to Satsuma to offer felicitations on the occasion of an heir's succession to the headship of the clan, or to send letters and presents to Satsuma on every possible pretext. The Ryukyuans, for their part, began to cooperate in enforcing Satsuma's control of all Japanese voyages to Ryukyu.

As Ryukyu's trade with the South Sea region declined, trade between Japan and Ryukyu lost its attraction for merchants of Hakata and Sakai, who had so often ventured on voyages to Ryukyu. Ryukyuan trade with Japan increasingly came under control of men from Satsuma. After the pacification of Kyushu in the late sixteenth century, Toyotomi Hideyoshi ordered Shimazu Yoshihisa to urge the Ryukyuans to send their tribute envoys to him. Hideyoshi thereby signified that he regarded Ryukyu as part of his domain, and in demanding men and supplies for the building of Nagoya Castle (Kyushu) and for the invasion of Korea, he made no distinction between the Ryukyuan king and feudal daimyo of Japan. Shimazu, in meeting all these demands, offered his own men for military and labor services, limiting Ryukyu's obligations to the contribution of provisions and cash, and thus, while complying with Hideyoshi's demands, took care to maintain intact his own rights and privileges with respect to Ryukyu. From this time, Ryukyu began to feel acutely the political pressure of Japan. Contact with Korea could no longer be made through Japan as it had been, as Japan was cut off from Korea after Hideyoshi's demise.



Map 9 Trade Routes of Ryukyu Ships to Southeast Asia, China, Korea, and Japan

Early Developments II: Relations between Ryukyu and Siam from the Fourteenth Century

Merchant ships (manaban) from Southeast Asia became a familiar sight in the Ryukyu Kingdom during the latter half of the fourteenth century. In response, Ryukyuan traders began to engage in return expeditions. Records of these began to appear in the Lidai baoan in the fifteenth century, during which abundant references were made to contacts with Siam, Patani, Malacca, Palembang, Java, Sumatra, Vietnam, and Sunda. Pioneers of this trade were also accompanied on their voyages by letters containing the King's seal and gifts in anticipation of establishing formal trade relations with sister ports.

The entrepot trade that subsequently developed involved the export of goods such as Japanese swords and gold, which were traded for ivory, tin, jewels, pepper, spices, and caesalpinia sappan (sappanwood) for medicine or dyes, many of which were subsequently re-exported to China, Japan, or Korea. Many of the Ryukyu Kingdom's Southeast Asian trading partners shared a similar tributary relationship with the Ming Dynasty and as a result Chinese became a lingua franca for official communication and trade negotiations.

Siamese involvement with Ryukyu must have begun about the same time that Siam established relations with Japan and Korea. For some time after King Satto of Chūzan began paying tribute to Ming China, sulphur and horses were taken as tribute, but in 1390 and afterwards, the tribute cargo included pepper, sappanwood, and other products of South Sea origin. It is presumed that these were introduced as a result of Ryukyuan contact with Siam.

Judging from the documents in the Lidai baoan, it appears that while Ryukyuan ships went to Siam, no Siamese ships came to Ryukyu during this period of early Ryukyuan-Siamese contact. The Siamese entrusted their messages to the Ryukyuan envoys coming to their country, and there was no envoy dispatched from Siam to Ryukyu. A Siamese ship came to Ryukyu in 1479, but this was under special circumstances and did not constitute a case of official relations.

Prior to the earliest Lidai baoan documents, i.e. the third decade of the fifteenth century, however, there is evidence of a slightly different Ryukyuan-Siamese relationship. In 1404, the Provincial Government of Fujian recounted to the Chinese emperor about the accidental arrival of a Ryukyu-bound Siamese ship, whereupon Emperor Yongle replied that Siamese involvement with Ryukyu was praiseworthy in relations among the barbarian countries. He ordered the Provincial

Government to have the ship repaired and provided food for the Siamese, so that they could proceed to their own country or to Ryukyu, whichever they wished to do, after waiting for a favorable wind.[3] The above episode shows that Siamese ships were coming to Ryukyu early on, and as was the case in Siamese contact with Japan and Korea, that with Ryukyu began as a result of the commercial activities of migrant and diasporic Chinese merchants living in Siam and other countries in the South Sea region. The influence of Chinese merchants living in these areas declined temporarily during the first half of the fifteenth century. With this decline, as ships from the South ceased coming, Ryukyuans took to the sea heading toward the South Seas. The decline of Chinese influence seems to have been a potent factor in the beginning of Ryukyuan seafaring in eastern waters.


Both sides, Ryukyu king and Siam king, recognized each other very clearly and understood the purposes of trade. They mutually expected trading activities under tributary relations with Ming China. These correspondences were regular and formal between two kings. Ryukyu ships searching tributary commodities such as pepper and sappanwood in the South China Sea had to understand the changing networks of trade and had to find more lucrative and safer trade partners and trading ports.

Maritime Society: Tribute, Trade, Migration, and the Zone of a Sea-Goddess

In the tribute-envoy relationship, a tributary state sent periodic tribute missions to the Chinese capital, and each time rulers of tributary states changed, the Chinese emperor dispatched an envoy to officially recognize the new ruler. This tributary relationship was at the same time a political, economic, and trade relationship. Other than the exchange

[3] Huang Ming shilu [Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty], Yongle 2/9/day of renyin (1404). Yoneo Ishii, ed., *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translation from the Tosen Fusetsu-gaki, 1674–1723* (Singapore, 1998); Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680*, vol. 2 "*Expansion and Crisis*" (New Haven, 1993); Hungguk Cho, "Early Contact between Korea and Thailand," *Korea Journal* 35.1 (Spring 1995), 106–118; Sigeru Ikuta, *The Early History of the Kingdom of Ayuthya based on Foreign Sources with Special Reference to the Rekidai Hoan*, Sodai Ajia kenkyu—Asia Studies on Soka University, no. 15 (March 1994); Piyada Chonlaworn, "Relations between Ayutthaya and Ryukyu," *Journal of the Siam Society* 92 (2004), 43–64; Sarasin Viraphol, *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652–1853* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).

of tributes for silk products from the emperor, specially licensed traders accompanying the envoy engaged in commercial transactions at the Beijing Huitongguan (Residence for Tributary Envoys). In addition, more than ten times as many merchants as these special traders were allowed to trade at the country's borders or at the ports of call. Seen from the maritime zone perspective, the specific direction and points on the sea routes for Ryukyuan tribute envoys were established; thus confirming their position in the maritime zone. A maritime zone, making use of seasonal winds, was able to establish points and lines through navigational charts and by monitoring the coasts and the movements of the stars.



Map 10 Coast, Cross Seas, and Chain of Seas among East China Sea, South China Sea, and Bengal Bay

This tribute trade was not limited to Chinese merchants from East and Southeast Asia. Indian, Muslim, and European merchants also participated, confirming the link between maritime zones.

A maritime zone, therefore, was both a tribute and trade zone. Moreover, such zones broadly defined flows of human migration. In Tokugawa Japan, stories about castaways were often told to inspire fear, discouraging people from attempting to leave the land. In fact, however, when these castaways were discovered, they were to be taken along the tribute route back to their home country at the expense of the country in which they were discovered. Along the coast of Kyushu, private Chinese ships often took advantage of this rule, intentionally drifting up along the coast, engaging in a brisk illegal trade before officials arrived to do their duty.

Zones overlap with "castaway zones" for which few records exist. However, over long periods and with the accumulation of knowledge from various places "castaway zones" may be outlined. By defining the boundaries of this "castaway zone," we can determine the scale, directions, motivations, and character of migrations.

In contrast to the various written sources on tributary trade, a different method allows one to investigate the scale of migrations in East Asia. The extent of migrations may be gauged by tracing the distribution of temples which worship the sea-goddess Ma-zu and forming what may be referred to as "Ma-zu believers' zone." Ma-zu worship had its origins in Putian, Fujian province. It spread to southern Fujian, Taiwan, and was later carried further inland and into Southeast Asia by migrants. Ma-zu is an example of a commoner who became goddess. Born in Sung dynasty 960 year (first year of Jianru), Ma-zu was a daughter of a Lin family from Putian, Meizhou of Fujian province. When she became widely worshipped as a goddess, many legends tell of her brief life before her death at the age of twenty-seven. For instance, some say she had superior knowledge of medicine and that she cured many people; or that she was knowledgeable about sea conditions and saved many seafarers from storms; or that she had supernatural powers to predict weather conditions; and that she provided forecasts for sailings. She was variously referred to as Shen-nu (lit. "Goddess") or Long-nu (lit. "Dragon Lady") and, for her role in rescuing trading ships or fishing boats which encountered pirates or natural disasters at sea, she was worshipped as goddess and given titles like Mazu or Niangzu.




Figure 12 Tributary Relations with China at the Center, Fourteenth to Nineteenth Centuries Migration

The spread of Ma-zu believers implies an incentive to worship a sea deity. Such incentive came from a desire to be safe at sea. Traders and fishermen worshipped their respective sea deities but Ma-zu became accepted as their sea guardian. Thus, on the one hand, a Ma-zu zone indicates the destinations of coastal fishermen and merchants, while at the same time, it also indicates the migration zones of the Minnan (south Fujian) Chinese. The name "Macao" is derived from the MaKok temple dedicated to Ma-zu. By elevating Ma-zu to imperial status, a balance was achieved between the dynasty that governed the seas and the peoples who lived there. In this way, maritime areas became a society in which people's daily lives were loosely controlled. A maritime zone was therefore a tribute and trade zone, a zone of human migration, and a religious zone, a world distinct from the land.

As outlined above, a distinguishing feature of the Ryukyu Kingdom is the tributary trade in East and South China Seas from the Ming to the Qing dynasties. The Ryukyuans obtained pepper and sappanwood which were not produced locally from Southeast Asia and presented them as tributes to China. This intermediary trade strengthened her relationship with Fuzhou on the opposite shore while at the same time permitting involvement in the migration network of southern Chinese to Southeast Asia. Ships taking advantage of duty-free trading, permitted under the tributary system, were interconnected important trading ports via coastal routes or pan-oceanic long distance routes. This trade was able to assert official influence by making use of the maritime order of the locals. Such was a five-tiered rule over the maritime zone.




Figure 13 Five Layers of Maritime Governance

At the top of Figure 13, on the peoples' side, is Ma-zu belief. Below it are the trade and migration levels followed by castaways. At the lowest level is the daily negotiation and clashes between people of the sea and coastal folk, or what may be referred to as the world of the "wakou." On the other side, under the rule of the officials, the tributary order is at the top, followed by trade at the Huitongguan in Beijing, followed by management of trade at sea. Below that, the realm of the "castaways" is also used on the peoples' side. However, on the official side, the rule that castaways be repatriated is in force. Usage of the traditional term "castaway" by the officials notwithstanding enforcement of the rule to repatriate asserts and maintains official influence on the sea. Official influence is also extended by bestowing court titles such as "Empress" or "Heavenly, Saintly Mother" to the sea-goddess Ma-zu.

The five-tiered structure indicates that the maritime zone is not a unilateral layer of sea; rather that negotiation between land and sea peoples, between officials and commoners in the political, trade, and cultural arenas is locally conducted on a daily basis.

Tribute Trade and Ryukyu Networks

The trade network, or what may be called the Ryukyu network, was founded upon the Ryukyu tribute trade with China. Moreover, its trade with Southeast Asia was aimed to obtain pepper and sappanwood, which were presented as tributes to China. This trade network had two distinctive features. One was that trade with Siam and other Southeast Asian countries was vigorous between the early fifteenth and mid-sixteenth century. The other was that, as far as we know from the records of Lidai baoan, the trade with Southeast Asia seemed to decline while the trade with China and Japan increased.

This phenomenon prompts two questions: First, what happened to the trade with Southeast Asia after mid-sixteenth century? And second, what was the nature of the trade with Manila and Luzon in the context of Ryukyu trade with Southeast Asia?

In examining these questions, we note that the Ryukyus were involved in two trade routes between South China and Southeast Asia. One route ran along the island chains on the eastern side of the South China Sea from Luzon to Sulu and the other stretched along the coast of the continent on the western side of the South China Sea from Siam to Malacca.

The eastern route started from Quanzhou (or Fuzhou), and connected the Ryukyus, Taiwan and Sulu. This route not only carried the trade with Southeast Asian tributary states but also, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward, the trade with Spain centered at Manila—exchanging silk for silver—and the Dutch East India Company centered on Taiwan. At the same time, the route ran farther north from Fuzhou connecting with soybean and soybean meal trade from North China; thus the Ryukyus mediated in the North-South trade in China's eastern coast.

Ryukyu—Manila Relations

In 1571 an expeditionary force led by Spanish General Miguel Lopez de Legazpi entered Manila and made it the seat of government. At that time Luzon and Sulu were already bound in tributary relationship with China and each with their own China- and Japanese-towns. When Spanish galleons connected Manila with the "New World," large amounts of silver flowed into Asia. In return, the New World obtained Chinese raw silk, pepper, and other special products from Southeast Asia.

In 1494, as stipulated in the Treaty of Tordesillas, Spain and Portugal split the world in half. The whole of central South America, not including Brazil came under Spanish influence, while Asia was basically given to Portugal. After setting up base in Manila, Spain could not trade directly with Asia, but it recruited Chinese merchants to participate in China-Manila trade exchanging silver for raw silk. It is assumed that Ryukyu merchants also participated in this trade; transporting into China not the usual products from Southeast Asia, but silver transiting from Luzon.

The Spanish extended their influence (in competition with the Portuguese) by spreading Christianity, also targeting the wealth of China, Ryukyu, Java, and Japan. Ryukyu became rich by selling Japanese silver for Chinese raw silk. But it also suggests that since Ryukyu was a small country it could not possibly have a vigorous external trade.

In the latter half of sixteenth century, Ryukyu secured the conditions to expand trade from one which was hitherto restricted to procuring tributary goods from Southeast Asia to much a bigger network with silver in Manila. Such conditions were created when large amounts of silver were supplied by Japan and the Americas, making East Asia

a silver currency zone focused on China. The price ratio between gold and silver at that time was: Spain 1:13; China 1:6; Japan 1:9. It was thus profitable not only to trade with the Chinese for raw silk, but it was also profitable to trade silver for gold.

In such a way, when Ryukyu expanded to a more widely popular, silver-based exchange system, its trade network was no longer limited to the framework determined by the tributary system. Trade activities of Ryukyu became more versatile: at times getting closer to the network of the Chinese traders, at other times specializing in Japanese trade. However, it is true that such expansion was not necessarily premeditated by the Ryukyu kingdom.

From the Ryukyu Network to Macao-Guangzhou-Hong Kong Networks

In 1839 the Imperial Court in China decided to reduce the frequency of tributes by Siam, Burma, and Ryukyu to once every four years, but this was not enforced in practice. An imperial edict issued by Emperor Daoguang on the 7th day of the fifth moon, 1839 states:

> Up until now, Vietnam has continued with biennial tribute missions and dispatched an envoy to Beijing once every four years. These two were conducted concurrently. Ryukyu sent tribute missions once every two years; while Siam once every three years. These countries submitted their good faith sincerely without complaining. Regardless of the long distances they had to travel or the bad weather that they have encountered, they have made great contributions showing their loyalty. From now on, Vietnam, Ryukyu, Siam will send each dispatch tribute envoys once every four years. By so doing, they will demonstrate their will to be a vassal state.[4]

This was a major change imposed on Vietnam which was, besides Korea, the closest to China politically, and on Siam, China's stable source of imported rice, as well as on Ryukyu which had continued with biennial tribute missions. The Ryukyu king opposed and petitioned repeatedly to continue traditional tributary relations. For reasons related to the jurisdiction of the LiBu, tributes seem to have continued in the case of Ryukyu.

What could have triggered such a change in tribute policy? The year 1839 was a significant date just before the start of the opium war.

[4] Xuan zong shi-lu, vol. 320.

Traditional studies have emphasized that the Opium War was a result of the West's (Europe and America) need to fulfill their trade interests by forcing Asian nations to open up their markets. However, as seen in the above change in tributary policy, the Qing court had become more sensible in its relations with the traditional tributary states and was attempting to adopt a mercantilist policy in order to increase the financial power at the center. In other words, the central government had, by changing tributary regulations, re-focused attention on Guangdong as to reap the profits from trade there.

In a further measure, in 1880, the Chinese Zongli Yamen (Foreign Affairs Office) took over all matters related to foreign relations. Thus, through consular offices, rather than the traditional imperial tributary state, Qing foreign policy shifted to direct, cost/benefit relations with the parties concerned: overseas Chinese (huaqiao), overseas Chinese workers (huagong), and overseas Chinese merchant (huashang).

One example is the cession of the port of Hong Kong to the British at the end of the Opium War in 1842. At the crossroads connecting the East and South China Seas it was an important port of call and did not adopt the policy of repatriating castaways.

Hong Kong and Migration: A Waystation

Termination of the slave trade exacerbated labor shortages in parts of the British Empire and led to the recruitment of Indians and Chinese for the sugar plantations of the West Indies and the new rubber and sugar plantations of Southeast Asia. In addition, from the mid-nineteenth century tens of thousands of Chinese migrated to the United States to work in mines and build railroads, and to Australia and Southeast Asia. The Hong Kong colony became an entrepot for Chinese migrants bound for Southeast Asia, a stable source of the labor Western powers needed to develop their colonies.

Chinese out-migration to Southeast Asia dates from the seventh and eighth centuries.[5] Economic, political, and social reasons included the low productivity of the South China coastal region, political upheavals that brought waves of newcomers from the North like the Hakka, and conflict between social classes and organizations (families and clans).[6]

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[5] W.L. Mathieson, *Great Britain and The Slave Trade, 1839–1865* (London, 1929).
[6] Li Changfu, *Zhongguo zhimin-shi* [China's colonial history] (Shanghai, 1937).

Traditional studies of the overseas Chinese emphasize "push" factors like population pressure, the shortage of arable land, and poverty. The interplay of "push" and "pull" factors in this outflow deserves attention, for example, a comparison of the agricultural output in South China and in the areas where the migrants settled. Adding the "pull" dimension would also require research on migration in the context of colonialism. However, scholars of immigration and colonialism treat the Chinese as having permanently relocated and have not been interested in the networks created when a people move between regions and return to their home country.

Against this backdrop of centuries-old Chinese migration, after the abolition of the African slave trade the British authorities in Hong Kong began to prepare for the transshipment of laborers. On June 5, 1854, John Bowring, the high commissioner of Hong Kong, wrote to the Colonial Minister:

> I am persuaded that Hong Kong can be made a place attractive to male emigrants, and a source whence large supplies of labor may be provided for the colonies, but it must be by freeing it from the abuses which prevail elsewhere, and not by giving encouragement and patronage to such abuses. I think it is not impossible that a few women might now and then be induced to accompany their husbands, but such is the apprehension, not without opprobrium, which attaches to the abandonment of the soil by any Chinese female, and such the power of confederated clanships to punish the relations of any willing emigrant, that I see no reason to expect that China will ever furnish any considerable supply of women for emigration, unless they are kidnapped, bought, or by some means made victims of fraud or force.[7]

Bowring saw Hong Kong as a reliable supplier of male laborers who would go abroad for a period of years, but of few females because of the Chinese family system.[8]

The "abuses" he alluded to referred to a slave trade in coolies. The victims were "Shanghaied," i.e. taken against their will, a high percentage died en route, and others were cruelly exploited after arrival. Partly for humanitarian reasons, but more importantly because the high death rate made slaves unprofitable, a contract labor system was

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[7] Chen Da, *Nanyang Huaqiao yu Min-Yue shehui* [The Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and Fujian and Guangdong society] (Changsha, 1938) and Fukuda Shōzō, *Kakyō keizai-ron* [The Overseas Chinese: an economic treatise] (Tokyo, 1942).

[8] British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), *Correspondence upon the Subject of Emigration from China* (1855), 33.

adopted for Chinese recruited to work in the West Indies and elsewhere. As the case of Cuba-bound ships shows, the passage was still fraught with danger.

On one-third of the vessels the Chinese mutinied or an epidemic broke out. A serious diplomatic incident occurred in 1872 when the "Maria Luz," a Peruvian ship carrying Chinese coolies to Peru, was in Yokohama harbor for repairs. When the Chinese complained of abysmal conditions, a Japanese court ruled they were being illegally confined and could not be compelled to continue the trip.

Hong Kong became a full-fledged point of departure for emigrants in 1860. Chinese workers were shipped to San Francisco, Australia, Vancouver Island, the British West Indies, Bombay, the Dutch West Indies, Honolulu, Borneo, and Java. For example, in 1857 twenty-four employers contracted with a Thomas Gerard to procure 2,990 Chinese immigrants for British Guiana and Trinidad. In addition to his fee, Gerard was authorized expenses not to exceed 25 pounds per head to recruit and deliver the migrant workers. The standard contracts covered wages, provisions, clothing, meals, and housing.[9] However, the workers had to repay the employer or agent who had advanced them passage money and they also sent some of their earnings home (See essay by Elizabeth Sinn in the volume.)

A British official explained why employers preferred Chinese over Indians: "In comparing the immigration with that from India, I think there can be little doubt as to its superior advantages. The Indians are certainly more docile, and more easily managed than the Chinese, but the latter possess physical strength, industry, and an eager desire to obtain money and to better their position."[10]

Migration from both India and China sharply increased in the late nineteenth century when plantations and mining operations expanded in Southeast Asia. Many Chinese settled in Singapore with numbers reaching a peak in 1915. (See essay by Carl Trocki in this volume.)

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[9] Ibid. Bowring appended a paper entitled "Marriage, Affinity, and Inheritance in China" by W.H. Medhurst, Junior, who had read it to the Asiatic Society on February 8, 1853.

[10] BPP, *Papers Relating to Coolie Emigration*, 1868, 14.

Table 10 Statement of Chinese Shipped to Peru as Colonists, under Contracts of 5 and 8 years, none of which have as yet expired

Date of Departure	Ship's Name	Flag	Captain's Name and Nationality		Ship's Tonnage	Destination	No. of Chinese Shipped	No. of Chinese Landed	Deaths	Place of Shipment	Shippers	Notes
17-Feb-1850	Lady Montague	British	J.R. Smith	British	763	Callao	440	241	199	Cumsingmoon	Don Elias	Caused by ill treatment and drunkeness of officers and captains.
13-Jun	Empress	Peruvian	J. White	British	446	Callao	300	252	48	Cumsingmoon	Don Elias	
24-Sep	Albert	French	J. Paine	French	292	Callao	246	…	…	Cumsingmoon	Don Elias	Captain cut their tails; they killed them, and landed back in China.
31-Jan-1851	Mariner	British	Harland	British	685	Callao	409	400	9	Macao	Sevilla & Co.	
21-Feb	Coromandel	British	Brown	British	663	Callao	404	400	4	Macao	Sevilla & Co.	
5-Dec	Victory	British	Mullins	British	579	Callao	350	…	…	Cumsingmoon	Sevilla & Co.	Mutinied and killed the Captain, and landed in China Seas.
2-Feb-1852	Susannah	Peruvian	Lukey	British	514	Callao	325	319	6	Cumsingmoon	Sevilla & Co.	
2-Feb-1852	Beatrix	Peruvian	Edwards	British	376	Callao and Panama	300	…	…	Cumsingmoon	W.M. Robinet	Ship wrecked at Singapore; all men deserted.
12-Jul	Empresa	Peruvian	White	British	446	Callao and Panama	420	393	27	Cumsingmoon	Sevilla & Co.	
24-Nov	Ohio	American	Raupach	Danish	373	Callao and Panama	300	228	72	Cumsingmoon	Alson	

Table 10 (*cont.*)

Date of Departure	Ship's Name	Flag	Captain's Name and Nationality		Ship's Tonnage	Destination	No. of Chinese Shipped	No. of Chinese Landed	Deaths	Place of Shipment	Shippers	Notes
12-Jan-1853	Eliza Morrison	British	McCulloch	British	797	Callao and Panama	420	404	16	Cumsingmoon	Sevilla & Co.	
26-Jan	Isabel Quintana	Peruvian	Beazley	British	514	Callao and Panama	325	316	9	Cumsingmoon	Sevilla & Co.	
11-Feb	Yaqué	Mexican	Lazaniga	Spanish	237	Callao and Panama	200	198	2	Macao	Alson	
11-Feb	Nepaul	British	Neil	British	1,006	Callao and Panama	500	492	8	Cumsingmoon	Sevilla & Co.	
8-Mar	Rosa Eilias	Peruvian	G. Wheatley	British	233	Callao and Panama	200	…	…	Cumsingmoon	Sevilla & Co.	Mutinied and killed the Captain, and landed near Singapore.
19-Mar	Empress	Peruvian	White	British	446	Callao and Panama	425	329	96	Cumsingmoon	Sevilla & Co.	Ship fever on board
20-Feb-1854	Isabel Quintana	Peruvian	Beazley	British	54	Callao and Panama	325	278	47	Cumsingmoon	Sevilla & Co.	
20-Feb-1854	Amazon	British	Vincent	British	340	Callao and Panama	250	248	2	Swatow	W.M. Robinet	Guaranteed not to work in Guano.
Mar	Grimineza	Peruvian	Penny	British	700	Callao and Panama	600	…	…	Swatow	Sevilla & Co.	Lost on Brampton shoal.

Table 11 Chinese Emigrants to Singapore and Penang

	Emigrants to Singapore		Chinese leaving Singapore	Emigrants to Penang		Chinese leaving Penang	Labor contracts
Year	Total	Females		Total	Females		
1890	96,230	3,820	31,706	36,044	1,726	5,921	26,204
1891	93,843	4,710	32,245	49,066	2,416	383	17,538
1892	93,339	4,804	–	45,227	2,529	–	–
1893	144,558	6,387	–	68,251	3,868	–	38,326
1894	106,612	5,007	31,083	46,230	2,425	371	22,302
1895	150,157	6,997	–	60,559	3,653	–	–
1896	142,358	6,451	–	57,055	3,216	–	29,825
1897	90,828	5,247	24,150	41,124	3,224	2,333	17,268
1898	106,983	6,192	26,575	44,811	3,301	1,890	20,459
1899	117,794	5,514	31,903	51,299	2,594	2,764	22,233
1900	159,571	8,482	41,376	72,821	3,847	4,026	27,033
1901	157,657	11,822	39,512	66,411	4,128	4,594	22,408
1903	172,770	14,539	47,551	75,401	5,346	4,450	18,768
1904	163,079	10,163	41,717	39,215	4,156	1,260	17,045
1905	136,001	13,714	37,130	35,645	4,833	1,475	14,864
1906	–	–	–	–	–	–	18,675
1907	179,756	13,785	47,580	44,495	5,682	1,809	24,089
1908	121,639	11,147	31,813	29,387	4,295	2,296	13,604
1909	120,954	9,602	30,798	27,529	3,901	3,540	13,379
1910	173,423	14,121	42,898	37,955	5,333	867	23,935
1911	215,036	19,754	54,818	49,875	7,302	4,516	24,345
1912	203,124	21,779	48,520	44,284	6,384	4,236	13,600
1913	240,979	28,547	41,018	37,161	5,611	3,862	14,198
1914	124,032	13,096	13,118	41,988	2,714	3,345	2,648
1915	80,352	10,632	15,382	26,698	4,123	1,743	–

Many of the migrants were not contract workers but relied on contacts in the Chinese community for jobs and support. Flourishing Singapore needed labor. A breakdown of contract workers by occupation shows an increase in tin miners in 1907–08 and in rubber plantation workers in 1910–11.

Table 12 Chief Classes of Chinese Laborers for Which Contracts Were Signed in the Straits Settlements, 1904 to 1914

Occupation Group	Number of Labor Contracts 1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912
Miners	4,474	9,738	13,304	12,359	7,601	4,805	4,974	2,717
Agricultural Laborers	5,200	5,454	8,137	4,497	5,820	18,862	17,064	7,574
General unskilled labor	2,912	1,790	2,330	1,667	1,320	1,221	710	2,920
Sawyers, timber, and firewood cutters	871	1,462	1,037	766	610	626	764	1,205
Mechanics and artisans	503	574	637	719	243	450	23	410
Domestic and ship coolies	305	245	403	167	123	59	1,933	35
Sailors, fisherman, etc.	127	48	228	268	239	196	314	143
Miscellaneous	182	53	83	74	115	96	40	30
Total	14,574	19,364	26,159	20,517	16,071	26,315	25,822	15,034

Western steamship companies and trading houses became more active in Asia, supplementing junk transportation and opening the way to large-scale immigration. To foreign merchants, particularly the shipping companies, the large numbers of migrant workers were a lucrative "cargo." Regulations enacted in 1901 and subsequent revisions show the Hong Kong government's concern to keep the migrants flowing smoothly overseas, though Chinese recruiting agencies criticized some of the provisions as too strict. To identify and remove individuals who embarked involuntarily, British officials required a stopover in Hong Kong of at least 48 hours. Chinese agents complained about the extra cost this entailed, warning that Macao or Guangdong would take over the business and foreign firms would lose out too. The agents also objected to such British "red tape" as a $1,000 security bond and two guarantors for each transient. The Hong Kong government relented, removing the forty-eight-hour stopover rule.[11]

[11] BPP, *Papers Relating to Emigration from China to the Colonies of British Guiana and Trinidad, 1858*, 17, and Kani Hiroaki, *Kindai Chūgoku no kuri to "choka"* [Coolies and prostitutes in modern China] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979).

The British strategy was to regulate the migrants by controlling the recruiting agencies. While in the colony, the migrants were looked after by contract-labor brokers who hailed from the same village in China. Hong Kong's status as a pass-through port for emigrants increased its importance as a financial entrepot.

Remittances by Overseas Chinese

Chinese went abroad to earn money and send it home, not to settle permanently in a new land. The migrant individual's wages were considered part of household income. They also remitted funds to agents for their passage.[12] Overwhelmingly from Fujian and Guangdong, the immigrants' funds helped to finance transactions across the South China-Southeast Asia trade zone.[13] In addition, some money was remitted for investment purposes.[14]

Remittances did not disappear into household expenditures. Recycled for commercial payments and investment capital, this money became a vital element in China's international financial ties. As will be described below, England, France, the United States, and Japan developed important interests in Southeast Asia and utilized this financial network.

Chinese immigrants could send money back to China in five ways: mail, hand-carried, private remittance agents, remittance houses, and foreign banks.[15] (1) Mail: The Universal Postal Union was created in 1878, but China did not sign the convention until 1917. Foreign countries set up branch post offices in China that handled international mail. However, few overseas Chinese used them.[16] (2) Hand-carried: As H.B. Morse described, workers personally brought back gold/

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[12] BPP, *Papers Relating to Chinese Immigrants Recently Introduced into British Guiana and Trinidad* (1853), 81.

[13] The major foreign trading companies serving as agents for foreign steamship firms were: David Sassoon, Sons & Co. (Agents, Appear Line of Steamers); H.A. Ritchie (Superintendent, & O.S.N. Co.); Jardine, Matheson & Co. (General Managers, Indo-China S.N. Co. Limited); Butterfield & Swire (Agents, Ocean S.S. Co., China Navigation Co., N.E.L. Orient Line, Taikoo Sugar Refinery); Bradley & Co. (Agents, Shan Steamers); Melchers & Co., (Agents, Norddeutscher Lloyd, East Asiatic Co.). Source: Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, *Annual Report* (1901), 97.

[14] Fukuda Shōzō, *Kakyō keizai-ron*, Chap. 2.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Lin Jinzhi, *Jindai Huaqiao touzi guonei qiye-shi yanjiu* [A history of modern Chinese investment in domestic enterprises] (Fuzhou, 1983).

silver, foreign drafts, and local paper currency, or entrusted funds to a returnee. (3) Private remittance agents: The agents provided various services: recruited settlers, loaned passage money, booked passage, and also handled commercial transactions. They stayed in close touch with the immigrants, visiting each Chinese community every few months. The newcomers invariably dealt with an agent from the same hometown in China to send money as well as personal letters. In areas not serviced by remittance houses, agents were the main conduit.

Migration to Southeast Asia had reached significant proportions as early as the fifteenth century, steadily increasing despite the Ming dynasty's ban on overseas settlement. Chinese merchants abroad sold rice, sugar, raw cotton, foodstuffs, and handicraft products to China, and imported sundries, handicrafts, and tea. In addition, Siam, Vietnam, and Burma made a profit on the tributary trade with China. In the seventeenth century, the European powers moved into the region in search of certain Asian products. Thanks to the well-established commerce, Western merchants were able for the first time to buy highly prized goods like tea, silk, pepper, and cotton with profits from the entrepot trade.

(4) Remittance houses: The remittance house, the principal instrument by which Chinese sent money home, was the financial linchpin of trade between South China and Southeast Asia. Called "silver remittance houses," "Canton and Fujian silver houses," and by other names, remittance houses were a combination of post office and foreign exchange bank.[17] Many also engaged in trade, financed trade deals, and dealt in gold and silver. This exchange/remittance network predated the arrival of (5) foreign banks, which also competed for the business as a source of capital. Tian Yi Ju, one of the large remittance houses in the early twentieth century, was based in Amoy and had branches or agents in Manila, Saigon, Penang, Singapore, Medan, Batavia, Bandon, Samaran, and Rangoon. With subunits throughout Fujian, including Quanzhou, Tongan, Anxi, Quemoy, and Huian, Tian Yi Ju handled most of the remittances sent by people from the province.

There were many remittance houses in Southeast Asia. Headquartered in Singapore, Bangkok, Malacca, Batavia, or Manila, they had

[17] "Xing-Ma Qiaohui yu minxinye" [Overseas Chinese remittances and private remittance agencies in Singapore and Malaysia] in *Xing-Ma tongjian* [Encyclopedia of Singapore and Malaysia] (Singapore, 1960), 624–633.

branches or agents in Hong Kong, Guangdong, Hainan, and across Fujian. The approximately four million Chinese living in Southeast Asia early in the twentieth century sent about $57 million annually to their homeland.[18]

Remittance houses transferred money in several ways—cash, drafts, and as commercial goods. A customer purchased a draft for a certain amount in Chinese dollars. Rather than immediately send the money, the houses waited until individual transactions amounted to a fairly large sum or until the exchange rate was favorable. In lieu of actual transfers, they also purchased goods for sale in China or bought gold and silver. Some transactions were Yuan denominated, while others via Hong Kong were in Hong Kong dollars. The Hong Kong dollar was the settlement currency for much of the commercial activity between China and Southeast Asia. Although typically the final destination of a remittance was a family in a rural village, in variegated forms the money was used for trade, finance capital, and investment.[19] Figure 14–16 shows the remittance flow structures.

Conclusion: Maritime Networks between Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai

The huge volume of drafts through Hong Kong involved double conversions—first to Hong Kong dollars and then to Chinese dollars. Remittance houses also used the money to offset bills paid in Hong Kong for export/import transactions; some turned a profit on the price differential in gold and silver bullion between Singapore and Hong Kong. There was a synergistic interplay of trade and foreign exchange dealing.

The huge one-way flow of remittances by overseas Chinese to South China could have affected exchange rates. A fall in Southeast Asian exchange rates was prevented by offsetting the receipts of gold/silver and imports, i.e., liabilities to Shanghai and Hong Kong. This trade pattern solidified ties, through foreign banks, between the region and Japan, Europe, and the United States. Great Britain's financial interests

[18] China's modern postal system began in 1896 and operated through the customs network.

[19] Hamashita Takeshi, "Chōkō bōeki shisutemu to kindai Ajia" [The tributary trade system and modern Asia], *Kokusai seiji* 82 (May 1986).




Figure 14 Home Remittances




Figure 15 Trade Intermediary: Hong Kong




Figure 16 Financial Intermediaries: Hong Kong and Singapore

in Asia, anchored on Singapore and Hong Kong, depended on trends in the region—China, Southeast Asia, and India. British colonial banks were a vital cog, extending the financial grid to Japan and Europe. Figure 14 shows the remittance-related exchange flows.

Shanghai's commercial ties increased the capital availability and strengthened its connections between East Asia and Southeast Asia. Hong Kong, an important player in trade, increasingly became a financial entrepot for account settlements and remittance transactions.[20]

Thus, across the East China Sea and the South China Sea, different historical combinations of maritime ports formed the different maritime networks on trade, migration, and remittances by changing the network center in it. Naha port of Ryukyu kingdom and Hong Kong in the crossroad of China Seas in East and Southeast Asia, played an intermediary role in different periods of time.

[20] Taiwan Ginkō (Bank of Taiwan), *Nanyō ni okeru Kakyō: Shina ijūmin; fu kawase kankei* [Overseas Chinese in the Southern Seas: Chinese migrants; relating to the foreign exchange business] (Taipei, 1914), Chap. 4.

SINGAPORE AS A NINETEENTH CENTURY MIGRATION NODE

Carl A. Trocki

This essay looks at the emergence of Singapore as a key migration node for Chinese. In addition to being a major destination for Chinese leaving China during the nineteenth century, Singapore itself became a major staging area for further Chinese migrations, both labor and otherwise. The first aim of this paper is to look at the port's function as a labor market. In addition to acting as an entrepot for goods, it was also an entrepot for labor—importing "coolies" from China and exporting them to other destinations both in the Archipelago and the western parts of Southeast Asia, and also to points beyond such as Western Australia, Mauritius, etc. In addition to Singapore, the other Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca, to some extent, had acquired a similar function. Nevertheless, Singapore emerged as the main migration node in the region feeding the flow of humanity to the other two settlements as well as the rest of the region.

The second aim is to examine the other migratory stream that flowed out of Singapore: that of the "Baba" or Straits-born Chinese. They represented the opposite end of the social and economic scale from the coolies. Born in Singapore or the other Straits Settlements, they were generally from the well-established, often well-to-do families that had already found a measure of success in the Singapore economy. Many even traced their roots back to Malacca and Java where their ancestors had lived since as early as the seventeenth century. The coolies were new-comers or *sinkeh* and were often first-generation migrants. The Straits Chinese were the old timers in Singapore, often the children of generations of serial migrants. The coolies were the bottom of the economy and the Straits-born were often close to the top. The Straits Chinese migration was also one driven by economic motivations, but in their case it was to extend their businesses and to develop family networks.

The Water Frontier

The beginnings of these migrant streams had come into existence nearly a century before the foundation of Singapore by the British in 1819. It was located on the strategic site of the Srivijaya Empire's Temasek that had declined in the fourtheenth century. For several decades it was not at all certain that Singapore would assume the role it did by mid-century. As a number of recent works have shown, the foundations for Singapore's success as an entrepot for both goods and labor, were fashioned in the mid-eighteenth century. It was a direct beneficiary of the "water frontier,"[1] the new Chinese economy in Southeast Asia which was based on the production of commodities for shipment back to China. One of the unique aspects of this new economic system was the fact that the commodities (initially tin, gold, pepper, gambier,[2] and sugar) were produced by Chinese labor.

A number of factors seem to have fed into the development of this economic system. First, a number of fairly large settlements of Chinese had been established in parts of what is today southern Vietnam, the area then known to Europeans as Cochinchina. The most significant of these seem to have been the towns of Mytho, Bien Hoa, and Hatien, all established by fairly large groups of Ming refugees. A second factor, related to these, was continuing and active presence of significant numbers of maritime Chinese following the defeat of the forces of Cheng Cheng-gung, or Koxinga, by the Qing in 1661. Reports of Chinese "pirates" in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Gulf of Siam during the eighteenth century suggest that many Chinese sea-farers had moved off the China coast and sought their fortunes in Southeast Asia.[3] A third factor, related to the above trends, was the emergence of Hatien as an important entrepot serving Cochinchina and the Gulf of Siam and linking the region to Canton. During the eighteenth century

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[1] Nola Cooke and Tana Li, eds., *Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region 1750–1880* (Singapore, 2004).

[2] Gambier is a plant needed for tanning. If grown with pepper, the different harvesting cycles permit year-round employment of labor and the pepper plants' leaves serve as fertilizer for the gambier plants.

[3] Robert J. Anthony, *Like Froth Floating on the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seafarers in Late Imperial South China* (Berkeley, Cal., 2003); Adisorn Muakpimai, "Chantaburi: A Gateway for the Coastal Trade of Ayudhya in the Eighteenth Century" (paper presented at the Proceedings for the International Workshop: "Ayudhya and Asia," Bangkok, Dec. 1995); Dian H. Murray, *Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790–1810* (Stanford, Cal., 1987).

Hatien, under the rule of its founder, Mac Cuu and his son Mac Tien Tu, flourished as a virtually independent state furnishing China with timber, tin, pepper, rice, and other Straits produce.[4]

A fourth factor was the increase in demand in China for the goods of Southeast Asia. The growth in population and prosperity in China that characterized the "Qing Boom" led to a demand for luxury imports from the Nanyang—the Southeast Asian realm of the maritime Chinese. Europeans also played a role in this demand since they were responsible for the flow of silver into China which helped to finance Chinese demands. An important reason for the influx of silver was the increased demand for tea by the Europeans which itself created an extraordinary demand for tin, rattan, lead, timber, and other Straits produce which was needed for packaging the tea. Recent work by Paul Van Dyke shows that European traders based in Canton were often instrumental in providing the capital to finance these purchases.[5]

The result of the water frontier growth was the establishment of a considerable number of colonies of Chinese laborers scattered throughout Southeast Asia. By about 1780, settlements of working-class Chinese, engaged primarily in commodity production for export back to China, could be found in Borneo, the Malay Peninsula, around the shores of the Gulf of Siam and in Sumatra and Java. These included gold-mining settlements Sambas and Pontianak, Trengganu and Kelantan; tin-mining settlements in Bangka, Perak, Songkla, and Phuket; and pepper-planting colonies at Riau, Chantaburi, Trat, Brunei, to name just a few (see map 11). Settlements such as these, focussed on the production of one key commodity and populated by sojourning laborers from China, were a new phenomenon in the region.

The production of these settlements gave rise to an active trade between China and Southeast Asia. Not only did the laborer settlements produce, they also consumed. They had to be supplied with

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[4] James K. Chin, "The Junk Trade between South China and Nguyen Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," in *Water Frontier*, 53–70; Tana Li, "The Late-Eighteenth- and Early-Nineteenth Century Mekong Delta in the Regional Trade System," ibid., 71–84; Yumio Sakurai, "Eighteenth Century Chinese Pioneers on the Water Frontier of Indochina," ibid., 35–52; Puangthong Rungswasdisab, "Monopolise Cambodian Trade: Siamese Invasion of Hatien in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," in Thanet Aphomsuvan, ed., *Thailand and Her Neighbors: Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia* (Bangkok, 1994), 83–120.

[5] Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong, 2005).



Map 11 Settlements in Southeast Asia

cloth, tools, food, and all the necessities as well as the few luxuries of life that they could afford. A commercial economy had been created. The high point of this economy came in the 1770s and 1780s when both Hatien and Riau emerged as important entrepots.[6] It is difficult to say whether these ports also served as points of labor exchange and distribution for the settlements in the hinterlands. Certainly, the laborers on the pepper and gambier plantations of Bentan Island would have come via the port in Riau, but we have no information on other flows of immigrants. Heidhues suggests that most of the labor force in Bangka came directly from China, either from Canton, Shantou, or Xiamen, and the other ports of Fujian.[7]

A variety of Chinese junks were commonly used in this traffic. Each Chinese port (e.g., Hong Kong, Xaimen, Chaozhou, Fuzhou) was known for its own particular style of junk. Both fishing and trading vessels were adapted to local conditions. The traders varied in size between 100 and 400 tons by the early twentieth century, although in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries they were larger.[8]

Chinese vessels generally owed little to western shipping models. Most were flat-bottomed and lacked keels. This made them easier to pull up on shore in many Chinese or Southeast Asian ports and to travel up rivers with ease—this permitted landing of laborers close to their destination. They were constructed of pine or other light woods with hardwood structural timbers. They all had water-tight bulkheads and ironwood masts with battened lugsails which were initially made with matting, but by the early twentieth century were made from canvas. To compensate for the flat bottoms, they had large rudders, often weighing tons, which were lowered on a shaft when the vessel was at sea.

The only Chinese vessel that was patterned after a western model was the *lorcha*, which was built in Macao from around the mid-nineteenth century and was initially intended to combat piracy. These had a western-style hull, with a sharp bow and a straight keel, however, they carried the usual Chinese style of masts and battened lugsails.[9]

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[6] Rungswasdisab, "Monopolise Cambodian Trade"; Carl A. Trocki, *Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore, 1784–1885* (Singapore, 1979).

[7] Mary F. Somers Heidhues, *Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper: Chinese Settlement on an Indonesian Island* (Singapore, 1992), 41–43.

[8] Ivon A. Donnelly, *Chinese Junks and Other Native Craft* (Singapore, 1924, repr. 1988), 85–129.

[9] Donnelly, *Chinese Junks*, 55–56.

From the late seventeenth century through the nineteenth century many Chinese vessels were actually built in Southeast Asia by migrant or long-term resident Chinese ship carpenters. Plentiful and easily available supplies of high quality timber in Southeast Asia made it far more economical to bring labor to the raw materials for ship construction. On the return to China, both the cargo and the ship could be sold at a good profit.

Initially, the region near Bien Hoa in what is today southern Vietnam in the Mekong Delta (then known as Cochinchina or Dang Trong) was an important shipbuilding center. Later in the nineteenth century, Siamese ports such as Chantaburi, Chonburi, and Bangkok itself were centers for Chaozhou shipbuilders. Some of these were built and owned by Siamese nobles. The Chinese shipbuilding industry in Cochinchina existed alongside an active Vietnamese industry. Chinese authorities tended to view Vietnamese ships as based on western models, but western observers considered them to be similar to Chinese. According to Li Tana, Bien Hoa became a major ship-building center around the middle of the eighteenth century. In order to encourage the rice trade from the Mekong Delta to China, the Qing government agreed to allow Chinese merchants to build ships overseas and then to sell them in China. This traffic in rice and ships spurred the growth of trade in both Saigon and Bangkok.[10]

This was initially a largely Chinese enterprise, but in the years after 1790 its resources were commandeered by Nguyen Anh (later the Vietnamese emperor, Gia Long) for support in his wars against the Tay Son rebels and to restore the Nguyen imperium in Vietnam. Li reports: "…between 1778 and 1810 Nguyen Anh/Gia Long built 1,482 ships of various sorts. They included 235 *gai bau* (Cham-Malay-style prahu), 460 *sai thuyen* (bigger galleys), 490 *chien thuyen* (war boats), 77 *dai chien thuyen* (large war junks), and 60 big and small Western-style vessels or schooners, 100 *o thuyen* (black junks) and 60 *le thuyen* (carved and decorated galleys)."[11] The Tay Son also built numerous ships in this war and often gave them to Chinese pirates whom they recruited to oppose the Nguyen navy. According to Dian Murray,

[10] Tana Li, "Ships and Shipbuilding in the Mekong Delta, c. 1750–1840," in *Water Frontier*, 119–135, esp. 122–123; Donnelly, *Chinese Junks*, 115.

[11] Li, "Ships and Shipbuilding," 121.

these two factions at times mobilized naval forces of more than 500 ships, many of them as large as 1,000 tons.[12]

Crews of Chinese ships were large: Often as many as 40 to 60 men were used to man the average junk. Many of the crew would have owned a share of the cargo or been entitled to a certain amount of cargo space in the hold which they could use themselves or sell to someone else.

The advent of square-rigged ships in Asian waters reduced reliance on junks by wealthier Chinese merchants in Southeast Asian ports and the Chinese treaty ports. The square-riggers were better armed and piloted by Europeans and their cargoes could be insured by Western firms. Wong Lin Ken's study of Singapore's trade indicates that the amounts of cargo carried by junks to Singapore began to decline relative to that carried by square-riggers during the 1830s. While junk traffic continued to expand for a number of years, they steadily lost their predominant role in the trade. The junks' share of the tonnage declined even more sharply with the advent of regular steamer traffic in Southeast Asia in the early 1870s. By the 1880s, most of the immigrants coming to Singapore were carried in steamers although some still traveled in junks. For passengers, the cost of passage on a junk from China to Singapore was about half the cost of a steamer voyage.[13]

By the early twentieth century junks were in decline even along the China coast and writers like Donnelly could regret their passing. He was, however, deeply impressed by the sea-worthiness of Chinese vessels and with the superior seamanship of the Chinese who built and sailed them. Several writers in the past have adversely criticized the Chinese junk. It has been said to be slow and unwieldy, and absolutely unfit as a sea boat "…it has been put down to his natural vanity that he [the Chinese] has not learnt to copy the fine ships of the west which visit his coasts. The writer emphatically disagrees with these opinions…Actually, in this respect they have little to learn from the Western hemisphere. Western Nations on the other hand have learnt and copied a great deal from the Chinese."[14]

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[12] Murray, *Pirates of the South China Coast*, 9.
[13] Wong, "The Trade of Singapore."
[14] Donnelly, *Chinese Junks*, 4.

The flourishing Chinese commodity economy came to be linked with other regional commercial networks within Southeast Asia. These included that of the Bugis traders who were active throughout the Java Sea, the Straits of Malacca, the Gulf of Siam and the coasts of Borneo. Originating in Makassar and south Sulawesi, they had come to dominate the Johor Sultanate and the Straits entrepot at Riau.[15] They were particularly important in bringing cargoes of rice from Java and forest and maritime products from Borneo and the islands of the Sulu Archipelago. They helped supply the labor settlements as well as providing additional products for shipment to China.

The further important trading flow was that of the English "country" traders who had come to dominate much of the trade between India and China. Based in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, they brought important cargoes of cloth, cotton, salt-petre, and most importantly, opium, from the subcontinent. From Europe, they brought weapons and iron goods. They had come to form an important complement to the tea trade of the East India Company (EIC) in Canton. As they moved from port to port through Southeast Asia, they exchanged portions of their cargoes for tin, pepper, and Straits produce which could be sold for a profit in China.[16]

If they were successful in disposing of their cargoes of Indian and Southeast Asian produce, the country traders found it convenient to deposit their profits, usually silver bullion, in the EIC's treasury in Canton. In return, they took Bills of Exchange which could be cashed in India, London, and even New York. Thus the silver trade, the tea trade, the opium trade, and the Chinese junk trade to Southeast Asia were all linked in a global economic system.[17]

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[15] Trocki, *Prince of Pirates*, 32–33.

[16] The opium, much of which was produced under the East India Company's (EIC) monopoly, was purchased at auction in India by independent merchants and then left to the country traders to bring to China and Southeast Asia. They too, at least in theory, were independent of the Company. Since the opium trade was illegal in China, the Company was unwilling to risk its tea monopoly by involving itself directly in the drug traffic.

[17] Carl A. Trocki, *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade* (London, 1999).

Singapore as the Major Southeast Asia Entrepot

The eighteenth century economy of Southeast Asia was, in some ways, an ephemeral phenomenon. The port-polities of Hatien and Riau, while significant maritime powers, were vulnerable to more powerful neighbours. After 1767, Hatien fell victim first to a resurgent Siamese polity in Thonburi and Bangkok. In the 1770s it was caught in the Tayson rebellion in Vietnam, and finally it fell victim to wars between Siam and Vietnam. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was overshadowed as a power in the northern Gulf of Siam by Saigon and Bangkok.[18]

After 1784 the Riau entrepot was destroyed by Dutch attacks. Following two major assaults, one in 1784 and another 1786, the Johor Sultan and his Bugis allies were forced to flee to the east coast of the peninsula and to the islands in the South China Sea. There was a rise in Malay and Illanun piracy as the authority of the Sultan became a dead letter. The Dutch had little ability of their own to revive the trade and many of the Chinese settlements were left isolated and were forced to defend themselves.[19] The economy of the region continued to stagnate until the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars and people like Thomas Stamford Raffles and William Farquar began to look around for a port that would serve British trading interests in Southeast Asia. In 1819, after being forced to hand Malacca back to the Dutch and failing to reach a successful agreement for the occupation of Riau, Raffles and Farquhar were able to establish a settlement at Singapore.

Although the British quickly acknowledged Singapore's success as a trading port, its advantages as a labor market do not seem to have been immediately apparent to the colonial administrators in the early nineteenth century. As late as the 1830s Singapore authorities saw the levels of Chinese migration into the colony as a problem. In 1830, Thomas Church, the Superintendent of Police, reported with alarm that nearly 7,000 "destitute and worthless" Chinese immigrants had landed at Singapore during the current junk season [June–October].

> It is, in truth, want and destitution not necessarily combined with depravity, which drive these thousands annually out of China. In general, they have not wherewithal to pay the mere trifle demanded for their

[18] Rungswasdisab, "Monopolise Cambodian Trade."
[19] Trocki, *Prince of Pirates*, 41–42.

> passage, until proposed employers will arrange them…there will yet remain a body of men, formidable to society from its number, destitution, depravity and recklessness. It moreover continues the physical and moral evil of an overwhelming numerical superiority of the male over the female sex. Of these immigrants some are provided for by the European and Native Agriculturalists, Merchants, and Mechanics. A large portion of the whole is abandoned to its own resources and ingenuity. During such periods when the price of grain is moderate and that of gambier remunerative, these immigrants will squat in the Jungles and cultivate the gambier plant. Failing of this resource, houseless, destitute and unprincipled, they are thrown back upon the wealthier and more peaceable portion of the Community, under deplorable circumstances, and with fearful effect.[20]

At this time Singapore was plagued by the presence of large numbers of unemployed, destitute, and often infirm or diseased Chinese. A trade depression had struck Singapore in the 1830s and there were many unemployed coolies in the Straits. There had also been a series of rather spectacular gang robberies by large bodies of Chinese. It was also alleged that the Dutch authorities in Riau had rounded up the Chinese paupers in their settlement and taken them to Singapore and dumped them.[21]

Fifty years later, this immigration trend was still seen as a "problem," but it had become one of a very different sort. No longer were the destitute immigrants scorned. On the contrary, they had become a valuable commodity. Wong Lin Ken noted in his ground-breaking study of Singapore's trade that the traffic in human beings had become one of the colony's major export industries.

Even though it does not seem to have occurred to Church in the difficult days of the 1830s, the floods of impoverished Chinese laborers were in fact an important resource for the colony's economy. Wong makes the point in his discussion of the junk trade:

> Besides a brisk trade in commodities, there were also transactions in human beings. The latter were, perhaps, the most valuable cargoes the junks had brought to Singapore. These were Chinese emigrants, principally from the maritime provinces of Kwantung and Fukien, where

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[20] Straits Settlements, "Enclosed Letter from Thomas Church, 17 Sept. 1830," in *Straits Ssettlement Records* (hereafter *SSR*) R9; *"Immigration," 3 April 1843* (Singapore, 1843), 5–7.

[21] Charles Burton Buckley, *An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore* (1902, reprint Singapore, 1965).

> the increase in population arising from the peace and order of Manchu rule had, by the early nineteenth century, aggravated the miseries and hardships of the floods and droughts which afflicted recurrently these areas for centuries. There was, therefore, pressure to emigrate overseas, especially southwards to, first, Hainan, then Siam, and, finally, to the Malay Archipelago. In later years, other forces were added in stimulating emigration.[22]

He goes on to note that:

> At the time when over-population was becoming grave in the Fukien and Kwantung Provinces, there developed a demand for Chinese labor in the Malay Archipelago as a result of the development of a new economic order there under Western powers.[23]
>
> From the Straits Settlements "the Chinese began to penetrate into the Malay states".

These included first Johor for gambier, Pahang for gold and tin, then Selangor, Perak, and Sungei Ujong for tin. They also moved into Borneo, particularly the gold-mining areas of Pontianak, Sambas, and the Kapuas River; and to Bangka for tin. This demand for Chinese labor in these settlements resulted in the growth of the "coolie trade." Wong comments:

> It was a matter of course that the junks should be the first to take part in the emigration trade. Some of the emigrants paid their own passage from China, but the majority of them were too poor to do this. Consequently, there developed a speculative trade in immigrants or *sinkhehs* [new guests], as they were called in the Straits. In bare essentials, the trade was conducted in the following manner. Unwary Chinese would be induced, by fair means or foul, to enter into agreement with some one in the trade—usually the junk master or person who chartered the junk—to convey them from China to the Straits on the understanding that, on arrival, they would bind themselves, for a period of time, to work for some employer. During this period they would receive a little pocket money but no wages, and would be fed by their employer, who, in exchange for their future services on these terms, would pay the cost of the passage. The 'cost of the passage' was not in any way the expenses incurred in bringing the *sinkhehs* to the Straits but was really the prevailing price of *sinkheh* labor. It was, therefore, usual for an employer to require his *sinkhehs* to work for him until he thought he had obtained at least enough work for the price he had originally paid for them. When

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[22] Lin Ken Wong, "The Trade of Singapore, 1819–1869," *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 33.4 (1960), 111.

[23] Wong, "The Trade of Singapore," 112.

> the *sinkhehs* had completed their term of service, they became *laukhehs* [old guests], and were free to choose their own employers or to seek an alternative livelihood elsewhere. It is evident that the emigrants' trade had the colouring of the slave trade, and was bound to have abuses. But the problem of checking these abuses and regulating the trade in the Straits Settlements did not arise until the late 1870s.[24]

In 1870s, alarmed at the "abuses" that had arisen in the "coolie trade," the Singapore government established a commission to investigate the traffic in human beings that had become a mainstay of the local economy. Each year, tens of thousands of Chinese laborers came to Singapore. In 1880, 78,196 immigrants arrived in Singapore, and the following year there were 90,271.[25] Between 1880 and 1901, the number of coolies arriving annually at Singapore fluctuated between 50,000 and 200,000.[26]

Why Singapore?

Wong notes that the junk season was during the northeast monsoon. That is, the first junks arrived "a little before Christmas" and then continued to arrive through the first three months of the next year until March.[27] The junks would return to China with the onset of the southwest monsoon, i.e., June to September. It is difficult to tell exactly when the trade described by Wong actually got underway. As we know, the flow of laborers to Southeast Asia had begun well before the foundation of any of the Straits Settlements. Numerous sites of Chinese agricultural and mining enterprise had been established in the Gulf of Siam and in the Archipelago during the century before Singapore was founded. Indeed, from the very time of its foundation, much of Singapore's trade came to involve the servicing of these settlements. Once established, Singapore was the entrepot where traders from these centers brought their goods. Tin, gold, pepper, gambier, sugar, sago, timber, and other forms of "Straits produce," much of it destined for China, was taken up by the junks that frequented Singapore's harbor.

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[24] Wong, "The Trade of Singapore," 113.

[25] Straits Settlements, "Annual Report on the Chinese Protectorate, Singapore and Penang for the Year 1881," in *Paper laid before the Legislative Council by Command of His Excellency the Governor* (Singapore, 1882), 77.

[26] Jan Ryan, *Ancestors: Chinese in Colonial Australia* (Fremantle, Australia, 1995), 21.

[27] Wong, "The Trade of Singapore," 110.

On the other hand, goods from China to supply these settlements often came to Singapore before being trans-shipped to the outlying settlements. Much of this traffic was in cheap consumables to provision the laborers: rice, cheap cloth, tools, cheap crockery, and the whole range of everyday items such as fans, umbrellas, hats, shoes, boots, dried fruits, vegetables, fish, and condiments. It would seem natural for the coolies, who were to populate these more distant centers and produce the goods in question, to come along with the flow of goods. It was not quite such a simple development, however.

Wong makes it clear that even in the early 1820s and 1830s Singapore had not yet established itself as the primary entrepot of the region. He notes that in 1824, something like 222 junks of over 200 tons each left China for Southeast Asia. Of these, only 8 stopped at Singapore. Most of them seem to have gone directly to the sites of their particular trade. By contrast, 89 visited Siam, and even Cambodia had 10.[28] And even during the next decade, junk traffic between China and Singapore increased only gradually. Wong gives the following figures:

Table 13 Junk Trade between China and Singapore, 1829–1845

Year	No. of Junks	Tonnage
1829–30	23	4,835
1832–33	20	3,922
1838–39	35	5,315
1841–42	84	14,588
1844–45	247	30,545

Source: Lin Ken Wong, "The Trade of Singapore, 1819–1869." *JMBRAS* 33.4 (1960), 122.

As the figures show, the junk trade to Singapore was quite modest until the 1840s. After that, though the junk trade tended to increase at a slower rate and actually seemed to decline, this made little difference to the level of trade with China or the number of passengers. Most junks now came to Singapore and, beyond that, other maritime traffic flowed to Singapore. The passenger traffic was now increasingly taken over by European-style shipping, first by square-rigged ships and later, in the 1870s, by steamers. It was the regularity in the movement of ships between China and Singapore that made possible the increasing

[28] Wong, "The Trade of Singapore," 109–110.

numbers of coolies arriving in Singapore. The coolie trade prospered. In fact, by the 1880s, it had become a sellers' market.

It is useful to look at the actual numbers of people (mostly men) leaving China during these years. If we follow Church's estimate, the number of Chinese coming to Singapore even as early as 1830 was actually quite considerable. In that year alone, some 7,000 Chinese arrived. Let us recall that this was at a time when the entire population of Singapore was 16,634 and the entire Chinese population of the settlement was only 6,555. If we look at other figures, despite the relatively small proportion of Chinese junks reaching Singapore from China, the annual flow of coolies for the next decade averaged between 5,000 and 7,000. As the years passed the numbers would rise and fall, but mostly they tended to rise, decade after decade, so that by the 1870s yearly arrivals were around 50,000. At that time the total Singapore population was 96,566 including 54,098 Chinese of which only 7,467 were women. Singapore was a coolie town and there were thousands more arriving every year: virtually enough to double the Chinese population in any given year. Looking at the overall scale of the migration over the three decades between the mid-1880s and the beginning of World War I, we can see that more than something like 5 million people, most of the men, passed through Singapore.

Singapore's Development as a Migration Node

What were the factors that made Singapore and the other Straits Settlements centers of the coolie trade? While it is clear that there were demands for labor throughout the archipelago, at a certain point Singapore came to interpose itself in all of the transactions between China and the other Southeast Asian destinations. A clue to the answer may lie in Church's initial comments. Unlike many other entrepots in Southeast Asia, Singapore was both an entrepot and a labor destination. The establishment and growth of the gambier cultivation on Singapore Island in the years between 1819 and the 1850s was a clear incentive for impoverished laborers from China. It offered an immediate and convenient form of employment. They could get off the boat, walk into the town and find work only a few miles distant. Alternatively, a short boat ride in a *tongkang* (one of the locally-built Chinese coasting vessels) around the island would take them to gambier plantations either in Singapore, Riau, or later in Johor.

The fact that the gambier cultivation had already been established at the nearby island of Bentan, generally known as Riau, was a further encouragement for the merchants to open new plantations in Singapore. Chinese laborers had been frequenting Riau since the middle of the eighteenth century and it must have already been a place of some repute in the districts of northeastern Guangdong. The hinterland of Shantou (or Swatow) was where the Chinese of the Chaozhou (or Teochew) language group originated. They were considered to be the laborers most appropriately suited to agricultural labor.

We get an idea of the overall movements of one of these annual cohorts from the breakdown given of the 1865–6 season in Table 14.


Table 14 Movements of Chinese Migrants 1865–66

Arrivals	
Singapore	14,279 (including 655 women)
Penang	3,008
Malacca	152
Total	17,439
Departures	
China	3,252 (all males)
Mauritius	4,187
Penang	105 (all women)
Malay Peninsula	2,761 (men) 41 (women)

Source: Robert L. Jarman, ed. *Annual Reports of the Straits Settlements 1855–1941*, vol. 1: "1855–1867" (Chippenham, Wiltshire, 1998), 44.[29]

There was something of a two-way traffic. The vast majority are men coming as coolies to find work in and around Singapore.

[29] This is the first reference to immigrant arrival numbers in the *Straits Settlement Annual Reports* from 1855 to 1865.



Source: Jarman, *Annual Reports of the Straits Settlements*, various volumes.

Figure 17 Singapore Migrations, 1820 to 1914

The "Credit-Ticket" System

One of the key aspects of Singapore's function as a migrant hub is shown in the population dynamics. In particular, during the two decades between 1890 and 1910, the number of new arrivals each year nearly equaled the current Chinese population of the colony. If those people, mostly men, had remained in Singapore, they could have doubled the Chinese population in just one year and subsequent increases would have been equal in the succeeding years. What is extraordinary is the fact that the labor brokerage businesses of Singapore regularly found it possible to successfully find employment for these large numbers of transient Chinese.

In the half-century between Church's note and the 1880s, Singapore had become a center for the coolie trade. The traffic in human beings had become a major source of the colony's business; however, it is impossible to put an accurate figure on the overall value of the trade since the coolies were not counted as goods that arrived for re-export. Still, they were commodities, just as were tin, pepper, gambier, and the other products which their labor produced. Every year tens of thousands of young men arrived from the ports of southern China looking for a chance to earn enough money to bankroll their return home as men of substance. Despite the high demand for their labor, not many of the coolies would see their dreams come true. There were too many others who had already come to see them as a source of profit and a field for exploitation.

A substantial infrastructure had been created in Singapore which extended back to China and outward to all the labor destinations in its vast network. It consisted of coolie brokers, labor recruiters, moneylenders, shipping companies, ships, sailors, secret society thugs, and boarding house keepers—all engaged in bringing these men from China to the mines, plantations, and other enterprises that depended on steady supplies of Chinese labor. Migration was one of the key businesses of Singapore.

It is obvious that the vast majority of the yearly arrivals did not stay long in Singapore. Other sources show that nearly half of the arrivals during the years after 1870 went on to Penang. Some did not even land at Singapore but were kept on board their ships while stopping there. Most of these were destined for the west coast tin-mining states of the Malay Peninsula or for the provinces of southern Siam. Also,

a large number (the unlucky ones) were shipped to Deli or Medan in Sumatra where the Dutch had begun to open their "plantation belt" in the 1860s.

Sumatra had a reputation as a death trap, and although contemporary discussions in British colonial records tended to play this down, there is evidence that conditions there were far worse than in the British settlements.[30] Contractors often had to pay two or three times the usual amount to procure coolies for Deli than for places in Malaya. This often included advances of as much as $25 to $30.[31] As a result coolies often went there with an initial debt of $40 or $50. Even the British officials noted that it took longer for coolies there to clear their debts.

The restrictions placed by the Sumatra authorities on the movements of Chinese from one place to another, and the great power placed in the hands of Chinese "Kapitans" and headmen, render it difficult to get much authentic information from coolies who had worked in Deli and other districts, but in Penang, the general impression amongst the respectable Chinese was that few of their countrymen got free from servitude in less than the legal period of three years.[32]

Despite the apparently large numbers of Chinese coming to Singapore, the demand for labor remained high. Ryan's study of the attempts to get laborers from Singapore to come to western Australia show that it was often no easy matter to find recruits. "[Singapore Governor Frederick] Weld commented on the difficulty of contracting Chinese to go to Western Australia—the employment notice published in the *Gazette* had failed to attract any attention, and only with the enticement of three months' wages in advance was recruitment possible."[33]

As commodities, coolies were worth somewhere between $30 and $50 per head, depending on where they were sent and whether or not they had paid for their passage themselves. According to reliable contemporary sources in the early 1870s, about one-third of the arrivals

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[30] Ann Laura Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt, 1870–1979* (New Haven, 1985); James S. Lee, *The Underworld of the East, Being Eighteen Years' Actual Experiences of the Underworlds, Drug Haunts and Jungles of India, China and the Malay Archipelago* (London, 1935).

[31] All references to dollars ($) are to Spanish or Mexican silver dollars minted in Acapulco. A monthly wage for a mine or plantation laborer in Singapore or Malaya was about $3 to $4 per month until the 1890s.

[32] Straits Settlements, "Annual Report on the Chinese Protectorate…1881," 79.

[33] Ryan, *Ancestors: Chinese in Colonial Australia*, 27.

did not. They were too poor to afford the $4 to $10 for their passage and were required to sign contracts which bound them to pay for their passage after they had found employment. Unfortunately, the system was not as straightforward. Once electing to accept a "credit-ticket," as the system came to be called, they were commodities or, as they were known in the trade, "piglets." By the time they arrived in Perak, or Riau, or Deli, or Ranong (they often had no control over their destination) their individual debts would have risen to about $40 or $50. These figures indicate that, say, 30,000 credit-ticket coolies at $40 each would have been worth about $1,200,000 annually.

On arrival in Singapore, these coolies were quickly identified and held as virtual prisoners until some contractor had agreed to take on their debt. Often they were held on board the ship on which they had arrived. Some were transferred to hulks in the Singapore harbor and held there while still others were moved to "rooming houses" in the town and confined until their contracts were "purchased" by brokers for the mines or plantations. As Wong Lin Ken suggested, there was much about the traffic that seemed like an actual slave trade. On the other hand, those who had paid their own fares were free to go where they wished, provided they were not captured or deceived by secret society thugs working for unscrupulous brokers.

Once the British began to regulate the traffic, the number of coolies arriving on credit tickets tended to decrease. By the 1890s, colonial sources suggest that only about 10 percent had not paid their own passage. These were required to sign contacts under the scrutiny of the Chinese Protectorate which had been given the responsibility of interviewing and counting the new arrivals.

Who Were the Migrants?

The other great migration node, Hong Kong, also at least technically outside of China at this time, differed from Singapore in a number of ways (see essay by Elizabeth Sinn in this volume). Hong Kong primarily drew its immigrant population from the Pearl River delta and south China. Therefore, the majority of its emigrants were either Cantonese or Hakka. Later in the nineteenth century, these were joined by Hainanese. Also, the majority of emigrants from Hong Kong tended to move toward the east and south. Thus, California, Hawai'i, east and

southeastern Australia, and South America were almost exclusively areas of Cantonese settlement.

On the other hand, migrants to Singapore tended to be far more mixed. The bulk of its immigrants came from the ports of Fujian and northeastern Guangdong. Migrants were mainly from Xiamen and Changzhou in Fujian and from Shantou in Guangdong. Thus, they were of the Fujian and Chaozhou speech groups, currently known as Min-nan-hua in Taiwan. In later years, migrants from Fuzhou (yet another speech group) joined these migrants. From the beginning, these ports also supplied Hakka migrants and a certain number of Cantonese and Hainanese found their way to Singapore by way of Hong Kong. By the late nineteenth century, Singapore's Chinese population was seen to be made up of the "five kinds of Chinese": In descending numbers these were the Fujianese (locally known as Hokkien), the Chaozhou (or Teochew), Hakka, Cantonese, and Hainanese (Hailam). There was also a scattering of the various other speech and regional groups of southern China.

The various ethno-linguistic groups of Chinese tended to be stereotyped in Singapore and in the places to which they travelled onward. Teochews, for instance, were seen as good agricultural coolies. Thus, they dominated the pepper and gambier industry in and around Singapore and the sugar industry in Province Wellesly (the British territory on the Malay Peninsula opposite Penang). Hakkas were considered to be good mining coolies and thus tended to congregate in places such as Sambas, Pontianak, and the goldfields of western Borneo, as well as the tin mines of Bangka and the states of the Malay Peninsula. Cantonese were seen as craftsmen—carpenters, mechanics, and builders. Hokkiens were merchants and the Hailam were coffee shop workers and food suppliers. Obviously, there were many variations in these characterizations, but even today people will speak in terms of such images.

In fact, all such stereotypes break down under close examination. There were wealthy merchants of all types. Many Hokkiens in Singapore worked as pepper and gambier coolies and, since they came to make up a majority of Singapore's Chinese population, they were found in virtually every other type of work. Cantonese made up a very large proportion of the miners in the Malay states.

Another twist on ethnicity was the fact that certain towns and regions came to be dominated by one or another ethnic group. Singapore and Penang were Hokkien towns, while Kuala Lumpur was

dominated by Cantonese. Johor Bahru was a Teochew town, as was Bangkok and most of central Siam, but Songklah was Hokkien and the mining districts of Phuket, Ranong, and elsewhere in the south were Cantonese and Hakka. In Borneo, Hokkiens dominated Kuching, while Sibu was a Foochow town. In Sabah, Kota Kinabalu on the west coast was dominated by Hakkas and east coast Sandakan was Cantonese. In the case of these last two, the ethnic differences reflected completely different economic and commercial links. Kota Kinabalu's economic and family networks focussed on Singapore and most of its trade was with that port. On the other hand, Sandakan's links were mainly with Hong Kong, the Cantonese "Mecca."

Labor Migration and the Straits Chinese

The movement of coolies to Singapore seemed unending and ever-increasing. The extraordinary fact is not that Singapore's population grew so fast, rather that it grew so slowly. Singapore was a conduit which transmitted this important resource to most of the developing colonial world. Control of this resource was the key to wealth and power in nineteenth century Singapore. The structures of wealth and power were not only the shipping industry, the coolie brokers, the secret societies, and the mines and plantations. Behind them lay the provisions industry and most importantly, the revenue farms. The provisioners fed and clothed the migrant workers and the revenue farmers (particularly the purveyors of opium, spirits, and gambling) ensured that they stayed indebted and collected the government's cut. The goods which the migrant laborers produced made up an important portion of Singapore's imports and exports. These included large amounts of forest produce, gambier, pepper, sugar, tobacco, indigo, tapioca, tin, gold, and some of the fish.

The issue of provisioning is an important one. A fair proportion of Singapore's trade was intended for the consumption of the coolies. It was run, both in Singapore and in other settlements in Southeast Asia, by the Baba or Straits Chinese merchants of Singapore and Malacca. It seems likely that they were largely responsible for creating the Chinese economic system (if we can separate it out) of Southeast Asia during this period. They also ran the revenue farms and seemed to be closely involved with the coolie broking business and with the secret societies. This group was also involved in its own diaspora from Singapore. That

is, as they were drawing migrants to Singapore and managing the local economic system, they too were conducting their own migration with Singapore as a base. Thus, if we are to understand the nature of the Chinese economy of colonial Asia in the nineteenth century, it is necessary to look at both migrations, that of the laborers from China, through Singapore, and that of the Straits Chinese, also through Singapore.

In a recent article, Claudine Salmon has called attention to this Straits Chinese diaspora. Sources indicate that this movement began as early as the 1840s or 1850s and that it continued throughout the century. It probably started earlier, but there is no firm evidence. Salmon points to the journal of a voyage to eastern Asia by a Straits Chinese from Singapore, Li Qinghui, in 1889.[34] The diary was published in Singapore in the *Lat Pao*, the Straits Chinese newspaper. Li described his journey from Singapore to Hong Kong, Shanghai, Kobe, Osaka, Kyoto, Nagasaki, and then back to Shanghai, and on to Fuzhou, Xiamen, Hong Kong and Canton, Saigon and finally his return to Singapore. The voyage took place between 11 May and 17 July 1889.

In his travels through these ports of east Asia, Li rarely had need to search for a place to stay or for friendly company. In every town he found important merchants, migrants from Singapore or even Malacca, with whom he could stay or be hosted to a fine dinner. These were often relatives or the relatives of close friends or business associates. Li was the son of a prominent Singapore Baba family with connections to Malacca. He was a brother-in-law of the wealthy and prominent Singapore merchant, Tan Kim Seng.[35] The account of his trip virtually details the range and extent of the Singapore/Baba network in Asia as of the last decade of the nineteenth century.

If we take Saigon for an example, the Singapore Babas had established themselves quite effectively in the French colony. While it is not clear when the most prominent of these men arrived in Saigon, we know that a number of Singapore-born Babas were already well-situated by 1860. During the 1860s and 1870s one Gan Wee Tin (usually known by his trademark "Banhap"), together with his partners, the three Tan brothers, Tan Keng Seng, Tan Keng Hoon, and Tan Keng

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[34] Claudine Salmon, "Sur les traces de la diaspora ses Baba des détroits: Li Qinghui et son <<Récit Sommaire d'un voyage vers l'est>> (1889)," *L'Horizon Nousantarien* 1.56 (1998), 71–120.

[35] Ong Siang Song, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore* (Singapore, 1923; repr. 1967).

Ho, had taken over the opium farms of Saigon and those of French Cochinchina in 1867. In result they had become extremely wealthy and powerful.

While in Saigon, Li Qinghui had the opportunity to meet the son of Tan Keng Seng, whom Salmon described as a dealer in timber. Keng Seng, referred to as "the late," had obviously passed away; nevertheless his son Tan Hin Long was still in business. It is not clear if the Tan brothers and Banhap had already been opium farmers for the Vietnamese government prior to the French arrival. What we do know is that at about the time, or shortly before they received the Saigon/Cochinchina opium and spirit farms, they had also gotten the farms of Vinh Long which included the three Vietnamese provinces to the west of the original French possessions. The point is that Saigon, like Hong Kong, Batavia, and other major cities in Asia, had been colonized by a small but powerful group of migrants from Singapore.

Even though these individuals, by their activities, only came to light in the 1870s and 1880s, it is clear that some Straits Chinese were already moving back to the China coast not long after the first Opium War and the Treaty of Nanking which opened the first Treaty ports and created the British colony of Hong Kong. The Treaty also gave consular jurisdiction over British subjects.

The Small Sword rebellion, which began in China in about 1849, was at least partially the work of Singapore-born Chinese, some of whom had also been working with foreign firms in Shanghai and Xiamen. A number of secret society leaders were arrested by Chinese authorities in the 1840s and 1850s and one was executed. What is also intriguing is that they shared the same surname (Tan) and generational given names (Keng) with the Tan brothers who later achieved prominence in Saigon. While it is hard to demonstrate a family link, the names at least suggest that they belonged to the same clan group or temple. It would be interesting to see if there was a closer family connection. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the Three United Society (*Sanhehui*) and Small Sword Society (*Xiaodaohui*) leaders and the Saigon opium farmers were all Singapore expatriates.

Yen's report indicates that the Singapore-born leaders of the *Xiaodaohui* were involved in a variety of activities. In addition to working as translators for foreign firms (one of which was Jardine Matheson) they also engaged in opium smuggling, coolie brokering

and secret society activity.[36] Carl Smith, in his study of the emergence of the Hong Kong elite, calls attention to the Singapore taukehs (merchants) who settled there.[37]

It may be argued that the Straits Chinese were already moving to seek opportunities in the ports doing business with Singapore as early as the 1840s. The result of this quiet, second-stage diaspora from Singapore was the creation of a network of Straits Chinese that stretched, according to Salmon, from Japan to the China coast, to all the main ports of Southeast Asia, and on to Rangoon and Calcutta. Salmon notes that the establishment of networks of Fujian merchants had been going on since the early eighteenth century.[38] It is now well established that the Singapore Baba community, which had its roots in Malacca, also had links stretching back to Batavia in the early eighteenth century. The author of the manuscript which Salmon translated may have been descended from the seventeenth-century "Kapitan China" (the Dutch-appointed leader of the Chinese community) of Malacca, Li Weijing (1614–1688).

Straits Chinese were quick to take advantage of their unique situation in the middle of the nineteenth century. Not only were they familiar with the colonial environment, but their educations in English-medium schools in the Straits gave them the requisite skills and knowledge to make their way in the developing colonial trade patterns as partners and as compradores of European merchants. They had an additional advantage in that as Straits-born Chinese they were eligible for status as British subjects. They thus enjoyed the same legal protections and consular jurisdiction as did Europeans in the treaty ports of China, Japan, Siam, and the colonies of Southeast Asia.

In a place like Saigon, they also offered the skills and connections required to assist in the management of the local economy. After attempting to allow French citizens to run the opium farms, the new colonial rulers in Cochinchina ultimately fell back on the model

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[36] Ching-Hwang Yen, *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch'ing Period (1851–1911)* (Singapore, 1985), 28–30.

[37] Carl T. Smith, *Chinese Christians: Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong—To Mark the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Founding of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (Hong Kong, 1985).

[38] Salmon, "Sur les traces," 72–73.

followed by the British in Singapore, which had been adapted from the Dutch in Malacca and Java. In Singapore, farmers had typically been chosen from among the Straits Chinese. They were the ones who had capital and because they could speak some English and had wives and families resident in the Straits Settlements (usually Malacca), they found it easy to win the confidence of the Europeans. Also, it appears that a number of Straits Chinese had experience as opium farmers under the Dutch. Individuals such as Choa Chong Long, reputed to be one of the earliest opium farmers of Singapore, had formerly lived in Batavia.[39] It thus made sense for the French too, to seek the experience of the Straits Chinese who had settled in their new colony.

The first contract giving the Saigon opium farms to a Chinese group was to the Cantonese "Wang Tai" syndicate in 1864. Dumarest reports that in April 1864 the French colonial government accepted a bid from "Wang Tay" (otherwise known as Wang Tai). The syndicate got the farm for a fixed rate and apparently made such large profit that it tempted the Hokkiens, "ces Cantonnais avaient-ils réalise de si beau benéfices que, jaloux d'eux, les Chinois de la congrégation de Fockien fonderent une societé, la societé Banhap, pour obtenir la ferme de l'opium qui tomba ainsi dans leurs mains."[40] It is important to understand, however, that they were not just any Hokkiens, but that they were Singapore Hokkiens. Indications are that Straits Chinese enjoyed a fairly high status in Saigon at that time. Thus, when the French were ready to let the farms to Chinese, the resident Straits Chinese were among the first in line and Banhap and his friends continued to hold the farms for the next decade and a half. They also used the Cochinchinese farm to extend their influence into parts of Vietnamese-controlled Annam and into Cambodia.

In 1867, Banhap petitioned the Colonial Council to guarantee that he could continue to control the farms of the three provinces around Vinh Long when the French took possession of them in 1869. He wanted to make sure that they were not given to one of his competitors since he feared they would be in a position to smuggle into his territory.[41] In 1879, however, Banhap, together with Cheang Hong Lim

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Jacques Dumarest, "Les monopoles de l'opium et du sel en Indochine" (Doctorat en Droit, l'Université de Lyon, 1938), 44–45.

[41] Etienne Denis, *Bordeaux et la Cochinchine sous la restauration et le Second Empire* (n.p., 1966), 196.

(one of the trio of Singapore opium farmers who made up the "Great Syndicate") launched a daring attempt to seize control of the entire Asian opium trade.[42] When Banhap and Cheang Hong Lim acquired the Hong Kong opium farm, it was not simply an attempt to extend their control over yet another colonial port. The Wo Hang and Yan Wo, the two major opium syndicates in Hong Kong, also controlled the coolie trade of Hong Kong, especially its linkages to California and Australia. In addition to dominating the flow of opium in Hong Kong and Macao, the two firms also sold prepared opium to the Chinese immigrants on the American Pacific coast and to Australia. This traffic amounted to some 2,000 chests of opium annually, each of which produced about 1,000 taels of chandu, or prepared opium, which was currently valued at about $2.00 per tael. The goal of Banhap and Cheang Hong Lim was to take control of this trade in prepared opium which would have been worth about $3.5 to $4 million per year.[43]

Although the project collapsed within a year or two, it demonstrates that individuals such as Banhap and Cheang had a clear idea of the world in which they lived and an audacious grasp of the possibilities open to them. They were among the wealthiest men in Asia at the time and were linked to a vast network of kin, business associates, clansmen, and dependents that stretched throughout Asia and touched the New World and Australia. This network of Singapore's Straits Chinese was a major presence in the region at the time.

Li Qinghui's itinerary shows that the Straits Chinese had established their networks throughout Southeast Asia, China, and Japan. Although Salmon's map of Li's itinerary suggests that the networks of Singapore Babas mainly extended to Vietnam, China, and Japan, another of her articles shows links to Batavia.[44] Other evidence shows that the Straits Chinese networks extended to Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and other parts of the region. By the 1890s the Straits Chinese had moved beyond opium and labor crimping to industrial development. They had expanded their shipping interests and moved into property, banking, and insurance. Singapore had absorbed the heritage of the

[42] Carl A. Trocki, *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore 1800–1910*, *Asia East by South* (Ithaca, New York, 1990).

[43] Christopher Munn, "The Hong Kong Opium Revenue, 1845–1885," in Timothy Brooke and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi Brook, eds., *Opium Regimes: China, Britain and Japan, 1839–1952* (Berkeley, Cal., 2000), 105–126.

[44] Claudine Salmon and Ta Trong Hiep, "De Batavia à Saigon: Notes de voyages d'un marchand Chinois," *Archipel* 47 (1994), 155–184.

old water frontier and returned to conquer it with the next generation of Straits Chinese who had originated from the water frontier.

On a final note, based on recent research by Mark Frost and by Claudine Salmon, it is also clear that they had established a literary and cultural presence in the Southeast Asian countries where they lived. They saw themselves as a part of "a distinct maritime-based culture" rooted in colonial Asia. They were western-educated and, far from being isolated from the new-comers, they found themselves at the forefront of both Western-style modernization as well as of the political and cultural reforms then taking place in China.[45]

[45] Mark Ravinder Frost, "Emporium in Imperio: Nanyang Networks and the Straits Chinese in Singapore, 1819–1914," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36.1 (2005), 29–66.

HONG KONG AS AN IN-BETWEEN PLACE IN THE CHINESE DIASPORA, 1849–1939*

Elizabeth Sinn

Hong Kong is often mentioned in relation to Chinese migration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but its full role in the process is seldom seriously explored.[1] This paper puts forward the concept of the "in-between place" to highlight Hong Kong's role as a transit point for migrants and, on another level, as a transit and intermediary place for migrants' things—letters, goods, information, remittances, and their bones after death. A study of the different functions Hong Kong performed to meet the Chinese migrant's special economic, social, and cultural needs offers a fuller picture of the migration process. More broadly, the concept of the "in-between place" is offered as a possible paradigm for the comparative study of migration movements across time and space.

Embarkation Port for Migrants

Outbound Traffic

Though Chinese had migrated to foreign countries for centuries, Hong Kong, which officially became a British colony in 1843, began its career as an emigrant port with the California Gold Rush, when thousands of Chinese from the Pearl River Delta embarked for San Francisco after 1848. Being a shipping center in the region was partly why Hong Kong could react so quickly to the news of gold discovery. Busy shipping traffic was assured by the large opium trade centered

* I am grateful to Dirk Hoerder and Paul Cohen for their comments.

[1] Adam McKeown makes insightful observations on Hong Kong's role in "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842–1949," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 58.2 (May 1999), 306–337 and "Transnational Chinese Families and Chinese Exclusion, 1875–1943," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 18.2 (Winter 1999), 73–110. See Elizabeth Sinn, "Moving Bones: Hong Kong's Role as an 'In-between Place' in the Chinese Diaspora" in David Strand and Sherman Cochran, eds., *Cities in Motion: Interior, Coast and Diaspora in Transnational China* (Berkeley, 2008), 247–271.

there; in addition, some trading companies, including the powerful Jardine, Matheson & Co., were also ship owners or ships' agents, with the result that many ships frequented the port for instructions, provisions, repairs, and change of crews. A fine harbor, a duty free port open to ships of all nations, easy access to information, the presence of insurance agencies, port facilities, provisioning services, simplicity of port procedures, and relatively little official interference, the rule of law and protection of contracts, not to mention taverns and brothels, combined to make the port attractive. Thus when the news of gold arrived in 1848, there was no lack of ships ready to cross the Pacific at short notice; even those that normally only carried freight were quickly refitted and provisioned for passenger cargoes. Situated near densely populated regions in China where migration offered welcome relief from population pressure Hong Kong soon developed into a bustling port of embarkation for the tens and thousands who sought opportunities abroad.

As the flow of emigrants expanded, the destinations became more diverse. After concentrating initially on California, Chinese sailed from Hong Kong to all parts of the world. They crossed the Pacific to the west coast of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, all countries where gold was also discovered; to Peru and later, Panama and Mexico, and to Hawai'i, and in smaller numbers to French Tahiti, Nauru and Fiji. They migrated in large numbers into all parts of Southeast Asia, and some even went beyond, across the Indian Ocean to Mauritius and South Africa. For the Caribbean, ships took Chinese to the British West Indies—Guiana, Trinidad and Jamaica, Dutch Surinam, and Havana, Cuba. Voyages to Cuba in the 1850s, first wove their way through Southeast Asia, across the Indian Ocean, around the Cape of Good Hope before crossing the Atlantic, taking some 200 days, often with tremendous loss of life.

Between 1868 and 1939, over 6.3 million Chinese migrants left China through Hong Kong.[2] Chinese migrants originated mostly from the coastal districts of Fujian Province and the Chaozhou-speaking

[2] Unless otherwise stated, all Hong Kong emigrant figures used in this chapter are taken from Hong Kong "Harbor Master's Report" of various years. For an overview of Hong Kong and Chinese emigration, see Elizabeth Sinn, "Emigration from Hong Kong Before 1941: General Trends" in Ronald Skeldon, ed., *Emigration From Hong Kong* (Hong Kong, 1995), 11–34; and "Emigration from Hong Kong Before 1941: Organization and Impact," ibid., 35–50.

districts in northeastern Guangdong Province, two regions which had long sent migrants to Southeast Asia.[3] Broadly speaking, Fujianese dominated migration to the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies while Chaozhou speakers were predominant in Siam. Migrants also came from the Hakka (putonghua, Kejia)-speaking areas further to the south, and the Cantonese-speaking counties in the Pearl River Delta region in Southern Guangdong. The latter formed the main Chinese communities in the gold rush countries, and in Southeast Asia, they concentrated in French Indochina and the Malay states.

Besides Hong Kong, the other major emigrant ports were Xiamen in Fujian, Shantou in the Chaozhou-speaking district and Macao, a Portuguese enclave with a long history of international trade. Macao, the main port for Cuba and Peru from the 1850s to 1870s, declined in the twentieth century. Hong Kong soon surpassed Xiamen and Shantou on two counts: diversity and numbers. While migrants embarking at these two ports went almost exclusively to Southeast Asia, from Hong Kong they sailed everywhere, and even in terms of the numbers of migrants to Southeast Asia, Hong Kong overtook Xiamen and Shantou from the 1870s right through to 1939.[4]

Hong Kong's passenger trade with Southeast Asia increased dramatically with the passing of an ordinance in 1871, which, by relaxing certain conditions in the 1855 Chinese Passengers Act, in effect allowed vessels to carry more passengers to destinations within 30 days' voyage, which included all of Southeast Asia. However, steamers, not subject to the monsoons, were allowed by the ordinance to carry more passengers all year round while sailing ships could do so only seasonally.[5] This prompted a thriving deck passenger trade for steamers, and Singapore alone received over 2.9 million migrants from Hong Kong between 1872 and 1939, Singapore being a distributing hub further "down stream" where passengers could transship easily to different

[3] Many books have been written on the history of Chinese migration but the most comprehensive picture is given in Philip Kuhn, *Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times* (Lanham, Md., 2008).

[4] Kaoru Sugihara, using a different way of calculation from my own, shows that between 1869 and 1939, the total number of emigrants from Xiamen, Shantou and Hong Kong were 3.6 million, 4.9 million and 6.1 million respectively. Kaoru Sugihara, "Patterns of Chinese Emigration to Southeast Asia, 1869–1939", in Kaoru Sugihara, ed., *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy 1850–1949* (Oxford, 2005), 244–274, esp. 247–248.

[5] Ordinance no. 8 of 1871, *Hong Kong Government Gazette 1871*, 400–404.

parts of peninsular and island Southeast Asia (see the essay by Carl Trocki in this volume). The deck passenger traffic, a cheap and light way to travel, made it more economical for passengers to embark from Hong Kong than other ports, thus greatly augmenting its competitiveness.[6]

Inbound Traffic

Equally important was the large number of Chinese returning from overseas: 7.7 million returned through Hong Kong between 1868 and 1939, 3.9 million from Singapore alone. With migration studies generally focused on the outbound rather than the return movement, much less attention has been paid to returnees and the return process.[7] Even with Chinese migration, where the impact of return and returnees is well known, few works are devoted to them.

The large number of Chinese returnees highlights the cyclical and repetitive nature of their migration in this period.[8] Chinese tended not to settle but aspired to return to their native places, a fundamental feature to be discussed below. For Hong Kong as a port of embarkation, the return passage with its immense social and economic implications was especially significant.

Several reasons account for why the returning figures exceeded outgoing ones. One might lie in the peculiar way statistics were collected: the Hong Kong Emigration Officer did not record vessels carrying fewer than 20 passengers, which means the figures are more valuable for indicating trends than scientific precision. Nor did he count those traveling on junks which had transported many Chinese emigrants to and from Southeast Asia directly before the 1870s. After that date, junk traffic was largely overtaken by European sailing ships and steamers which almost inevitably stopped at Hong Kong, so that many migrants who had not embarked at Hong Kong on their outbound journey would be transshipping there on their return trip in later years. Even allowing for some statistical distortions, however, it is safe to assume that in reality, more migrants returned to China through Hong Kong

[6] "Harbor Master's Report," *Hong Kong Government Gazette 1872*, 484.

[7] An interesting example is Claudio Bolzman, Rosita Fibbi and Marie Vial, "What to do after Retirement? Elderly Migrants and the Question of Return," *Journal of Migration and Ethnic Studies* 32.8 (Nov. 2008), 1359–1375.

[8] Migration studies generally focus on the outward rather than the return movement; even with Chinese migration where the impact of return and returnees is well studied, the actual retuning process is generally overlooked.

than those leaving through it. Shipping routes, naturally, determined how passengers traveled but it was also true that many returning migrants specifically chose to stop over in Hong Kong. A main attraction was the foreign exchange facilities, to be discussed below. Others stopped to take care of family or business matters. Some, having lived abroad for some years, decided to settle in Hong Kong, even if only temporarily, making Hong Kong a "third home." In addition, repatriation schemes set up by some big companies employing Chinese labor overseas used Hong Kong as the terminal point, leaving laborers to make their way home from there.[9]

Shipping and Emigration

Despite the rising importance of steamships for other purposes, for two decades or so after 1850, the majority of Chinese passengers were carried across the Pacific, Indian or Atlantic Oceans on European-style sailing vessels while Chinese junks continued to carry migrants in the China Seas.

Things began to change on the transpacific routes in 1867 when the Pacific Mail Steam Ship Co. (PMSSC) ran the first passenger liner between San Francisco and Hong Kong. Their fleet included the *Great Republic* which could accommodate 1200 passengers in steerage, the class in which most Chinese traveled. In 1869 four PMSSC liners carried a total of 8,797 passengers to San Francisco on 11 voyages. Other companies soon appeared to offer travelers in Hong Kong more choice: besides PMSSC, they could travel to San Francisco with the Occidental and Oriental Company, the Japanese Toyo Kisen Kaisha (TKK), or a handful of short-lived Chinese-owned companies. For Vancouver and Victoria, British Columbia, there were the luxurious liners of the Canadian Pacific Railways (steamship line) and for Seattle, Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK)'s monthly service via Kobe and Yokohama. Alternatively, passengers could always fall back on chartered vessels which continued to cross the Pacific for at least two more decades. In 1869, for example, almost 5,000 passengers sailed on chartered vessels to San Francisco.[10]

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[9] See Sinn, "Emigration from Hong Kong before 1941: Organization and Impact," 46–49.

[10] Data from *Hong Kong Blue Book 1870*, *Hong Kong Daily Press* (Hong Kong), and *Alta California* (San Francisco). The PMSSC was absorbed by the Dollar Line (the

Hong Kong's shipping/emigrant trade to Southeast Asia took a great leap in the early 1870s as mentioned, with volumes far exceeding those to other destinations and boosting the overall port throughput. In 1900, the total tonnage of ships engaged in international trade that entered and cleared Hong Kong was 17 million tons (compare Liverpool, with total tonnage of 15 million tons), firmly establishing its position as a world-class seaport.[11] On almost any day, several tens of ships would be in the harbor waiting to depart with cargo and passengers in different directions. Short-haul liners shuttling between Hong Kong and ports on the China coast as well as an excellent ferry service between Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Macao, acted as feeders enabling passengers to make all kinds of connections at Hong Kong.

A major player in this profitable field, crowded with the ships of many nations, was Butterfield & Swire which operated a plethora of short-haul and long-haul vessels. Founded in Shanghai and headquartered in London, the company opened an increasingly important office in Hong Kong in 1870. By the turn of the century, their subsidiary, the China Navigation Company (CNC, founded in 1872) had a substantial fleet that covered a complex network of "Far Eastern" trades. These included weekly services with four ships from Shantou and Xiamen to Bangkok and Singapore respectively,[12] and another four ships on a weekly service between Shanghai and Haiphong, all calling at Hong Kong. Moreover, for several decades their steamer, the *Taiyuan*, sailed to Brisbane, Sydney, and Melbourne, via Manila, Sandakan, and the Thursday Islands, thus keeping a firm grip on the southern networks. CNC were moreover agents for the British Blue Funnel Line whose many ships sailed from Hong Kong in all directions.

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direct predecessor of the American President Line) in the 1910s. Robert Eric Barde, *Immigration at Golden Gate: Passenger Ships, Exclusion, and Angel Island* (Westport, Ct., 2008), 143–179.

[11] For Hong Kong statistics, see "Harbor Master's Report" for 1900, *Hong Kong Sessional Papers, 1901*, 453–479, 453–454; for Liverpool statistics, see "Liverpool, trade population and geographical growth" in British History Online (http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=41371). We can also compare the port of London's total tonnage of vessels entering in 1900—9.3 million tons—with Hong Kong's 8.6 million (Abbott Payson Usher, "The growth of English shipping 1572–1922," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 42.3 (May 1928), 465–475, 471.

[12] A.D. Blue, "Chinese Emigration and the Deck Passenger Trade," *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 10 (1970), 79–93, 90; *New York Times*, 13 Feb. 1900.

By the end of the twentieth century, the Dutch East Indies became the second largest destination of Chinese embarking from Hong Kong after Singapore.[13] German shipping dominated this trade initially, but with the First World War German trade passed to Dutch companies, in particular the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM)[14] and Java China Japan Lijn (JCJL).[15] In 1911 JCJL opened the Java-Hong Kong route and by 1930, had five steamers running on the Hong Kong-Java, or Xiamen-Hong Kong-Java routes.[16] Routes to Haiphong and Saigon in French Indochina were also well served, especially by vessels of the French company, the Messageries Maritimes.

Passengers could travel not only on liners but also on the many chartered vessels and vagrant vessels roaming the China Seas ready to take on a cargo of Chinese at short notice. These included vessels of the famous Ben Line which typically, having sailed out from Britain with a full cargo for East Asian ports, spent months roaming in these waters, taking on short assignments until there was sufficient payload for a homebound voyage. It was easy enough, once the cargo was offloaded, to prepare the ship for deck passengers by laying wooden floors on the irons decks and slinging awning overhead. This way port passenger trade must have been profitable as the Ben Line took tens of thousands of migrants from Shantau and Xiamen to Hong Kong and Singapore in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 200 per voyage.[17]

Chinese migration, and shipping along with it, reached its peak at the beginning of the 1930s. It declined during the Depression, but afterwards managed to recover quickly in the two or three years before the outbreak of the Second World War. But regardless of the fluctuation, Hong Kong maintained its position as a major shipping

[13] In 1930, for instance, 121,385 emigrants departed Hong Kong for Singapore, 36,822 for Indonesia, and 7,711 for the United States.

[14] A.J.J. Mulder "Koninkijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij; Wel en wee van een Indische Reederij." *1991, De Alk, Alkmaar. Jarig Bakker*, 13 October 2003 (http://flagspot.net/flags/nl~kpm.html).

[15] Blue, "Chinese Emigration", 91; "Java China Japan Lijn 1902–1947/ Koninklijke Java China Paketvaart Lijnen 1847–1977" (http://www.theshipslist.com/ships/lines/java.htm).

[16] *Hong Kong Daily Press*, 8 January 1930.

[17] George Blake, *The Ben Line. The History of Wm Thomson & Co of Leith and Edinburgh, and of the Ships owned and managed by them 1825–1955* (London, 1956), 72–79.

hub as the convergence of ever increasing shipping routes multiplied its connectivity and diversity.

Intermediary Point for Migrants' Things

Ships carried not only migrants but also migrants' things. The aspiration to return was a major factor conditioning migrants' behavior. As Philip Kuhn claims, the Chinese migration processes did not create Chinese communities overseas. Rather, it resulted in the emergence of countless "corridors" that linked Chinese migrants in the destination countries with their native homes: "*the essence of the matter is not the separation but the connection*."[18] The corridor was a social space kept alive by the constant flow of people and things and Hong Kong was the nexus of tens of thousands of such corridors, operating on different levels to meet the migrant's profound need to stay connected.

For the Chinese, two of the most meaningful ways of maintaining ties were remittances and, to a lesser extent, the repatriation of migrants' bones for reburial. While clearly migrants from other countries also remitted money for various purposes, the degree and scale of Chinese remittance practices were quite exceptional. For the majority of Chinese migrants in this period, sending money home was a primary duty, and a closer examination of the social and cultural context of migration explains why. Most Chinese emigrants in this period left home as single men, but far from being bachelors, they were married men with wives and children—and parents—all of whom were left behind. For a variety of reasons, Chinese women rarely migrated with their husbands.[19] Unlike other contemporary migrants such as British men in the nineteenth century who first went overseas and later sent for their families, the Chinese migrant did not leave his home village in order to strike out in a new world. Nor did he remit money in

[18] Kuhn, *Chinese among Others*, 4.

[19] See McKeown, "Transnational Chinese Families;" Sucheta Mazumdar, "What Happened to the Women? Chinese and Indian Male Migration to the United States in Global Perspective," in Shirley Hune and Gail Nomura, ed., *Asian Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology* (New York, 2003), 58–74; Chan Sucheng, "The Exclusion of Women, 1870–1943," in Chan Sucheng, ed., *Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882–1943* (Philadelphia, 1991), 94–146; Kerry Abrams, "Polygamy, Prostitution, and Federalization of Immigration Law," *Columbia Law Review* 105.3 (April 2005), 641–716.

order to pay the passage for his wife and children to join him abroad.[20] Rather, the Chinese migrant's goal was, typically, to make money abroad in the hope of eventually rejoining the family in China where he would grow old, die, and be buried among his ancestors. Again as Kuhn claims, many emigrants were not definitively "leaving China" as much as they were expanding the spatial dimension of the ties between migrant worker and family.[21]

The decision to emigrate in many cases was a collective not individual one, executed as an investment strategy designed to keep the family line solvent or to consolidate the family's business networks. Thus the emigrant had obligations to his own immediate family as well as to the extended family, the lineage and the hometown community, and sending home his income was aimed at fulfilling these multi-level obligations.

Household remittances, the most common form of remittances, ranged hugely in amounts. At one end of the spectrum, a migrant might send as little as a few dollars at a time—just enough to keep the family from starvation. Better off migrants sent enough to sustain a reasonably comfortable living, even to build a larger family house, purchase a few acres of farmland, or start a small business. At the other end of the spectrum, wealthy migrants remitted huge amounts to construct ancestral halls, accumulate large land holding estates, and build gargantuan houses that often incorporated flamboyant architectural features that transformed the landscape of the district.[22] These successful migrants, held up as models, became the best advertisement for migration as a sure avenue to wealth. Myths about how easy it was to make money "out there" enticed many to take great risks. By the same token the pressure on migrants to meet the obligations by constant remittances increased in proportion, and not surprisingly, the burden sometimes became a source of resentment.

In addition, money was remitted as donations to charities, public works, and war relief, all of which would assure the wealthy migrant a special status among the local social and even political elite when he returned. In some regions, funds for starting or improving schools,

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[20] Cf. Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, "The Global and Local: Explaining Migrant Remittance Flows in the English-speaking World 1880–1914," *The Journal of Economic History* 66.1 (March 2006), 177–202.

[21] Kuhn, *Chinese among Others*, 4.

[22] See, for example, the Kaiping Diaolou: http://www.kaipingdiaolou.com.

libraries, temples, and public amenities in the native village took some 15 to 20 percent of total remittances. There were regions that became greatly dependent on the "remittance economy." Money was also remitted for investment purposes. In fact data for the years 1871 to 1931 show that of all China's resources for keeping its international balance of payment in balance, overseas Chinese remittances were the most important, accounting for 41 percent of all receipts.[23]

If remittances by Chinese migrants were exceptionally important among migration practices of this period, the repatriation of migrants' bones for reburial must appear even more extraordinary. The ideal to be buried in one's native village where descendents could make offerings at one's grave for generations to come was almost universally held by Chinese people. The process transformed individuals into the privileged role of ancestors and symbolized the continuity of the family while the family's offerings of food, clothing, and affection also prevented the deceased from becoming a lonely and hungry ghost. To this end, very wealthy migrants' bodies were sent in coffins for burial in the ancestral village. Migrants from the Pearl River Delta region, where secondary burial was customary, sent home the bones of fellow-villagers who had died abroad for reinterment, usually five to seven years after the primary burial.[24]

Social Institutional Framework

While Hong Kong was a conduit for remittances, bones, and countless other things, it is important not to visualize it as a vacuum or a wide open space; rather it was a space with a complex infrastructure of social, economic, and commercial organizations and activities that enabled the mobility and flow.

This infrastructure consisted of a variety of voluntary associations such as native-place associations, charitable societies such as the Tung Wah Hospital and Po Leung Kuk, and commercial institutions such as trading firms and shipping companies. Together, these institutions tended to a wide range of social, economic, and cultural needs, their roles often overlapping and complementing each other. To illustrate

[23] Leo Douw, in Lynn Pan, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Chinese Overseas* (Richmond, 1999), 109–110.

[24] For secondary burials practiced by Chinese, see Wan Jianzhong, *Zhongguo lidai cangli* [Chinese burial rituals through the Ages] (Beijing, 1998), 163–170.

the multi-level functions of these networks, and the vital intermediary role of Hong Kong, we will examine the workings of some of these institutions, beginning with the fascinating partnership between two native place associations, the Jishantang in Hong Kong and the Changhoutang in San Francisco.

The Changhoutang (literally, "Hall for bringing good fortune to posterity") was set up in San Francisco in 1863 by natives of Panyu county (in Guangdong province) specifically to collect the bones of Chinese migrants who had died in California and arrange for their repatriation. It was one of many associations founded to help Chinese migrants fulfill the ideal of permanent rest in the native place. To facilitate the Changhoutang's task, the Jishantang (lit., "Hall for the continuation of charitable deeds") was set up in Hong Kong by fellow Panyu natives, to receive the bones in transit and forward them to the proper recipients in the home village, or otherwise to arrange for their reinterment in communal graveyards. In 1863 the Changhoutang sent back 258 coffins/bone boxes, along with 59 spirit boxes.[25] Two more such exercises took place in 1874 and 1884; in all a total of 1,741 bone boxes/coffins and 86 spirit boxes were returned to Panyu through Hong Kong.[26]

The relationship between the two associations was not confined to the physical transfer of bones and coffins, nor was it ad hoc. Instead, they maintained an on-going relationship for several decades that involved many different levels of activities. With the first batch of bone boxes in 1863, the Changhoutang remitted funds to Hong Kong, partly

[25] When a migrant was known to have died but his remains could not be located, his spirit would be summoned in a ritual and stored in a spirit box. See J.J.M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China, In Ancient Forms, Evolution, History and Present Aspect, Manners, Customs and Social Institutions Concerned Therewith*, 6 vols. (1892, repr.: Taipei, 1964), vol. 3, 847–854, for the "interment of evoked souls."

[26] Most of the information regarding the Changhoutang and Jishantang used in this paper comes from four documents: *Jinshan Changhoutang yunjiu lu* [A record of the coffin repatriation of the Changhantang of California] (Hong Kong [?], c. 1865 [?]); *Xianggang Jishantang xujuan beilie* [A list of the continued donations of the Jishantang of Hong Kong] (Hong Kong [?], c. 1865); *Panyi Jinshan yunjiu lu* [A record of coffin repatriation of the Changhoutang] (Hong Kong [?], c. 1887); *Jielu Xianggang Jishantang Jinshan Panyu di sanjie yunjiu zhengxinlu* [An extract of the account of the Jishantang's work related to the third coffin repatriation exercise and annual report] (Hong Kong [?], c. 1893). I am grateful to Wang Ling-chi and Poon Wei-chi at UC Berkeley for drawing my attention to a microfilm copy of the materials in the Ethnic Studies Library, UC Berkeley. For a general discussion of native place associations in the Diaspora, see Elizabeth Sinn, "Xin xi guxiang: A study of Regional Associations as a Bonding Mechanism in the Chinese Diaspora. The Hong Kong Experience," *Modern Asian Studies* 31.2 (May, 1997), 375–397.

in silver and partly in gold, to pay for various expenses. The financial relationship between the two societies became increasingly complicated. In 1877, the Changhoutang sent US$10,000 to the Jishantang, instructing it to buy property on its behalf; accordingly, a shophouse was bought. Other funds from the Changhoutang were loaned out to individuals and firms to earn interest, and significantly, the borrowers were managers of the Jishantang. Significantly too, the shophouse was purchased from one of the leading managers of the Jishantang, and was managed by the committee of managers. With the income from this rental property and loan interests, the committee bought several agricultural lots in Panyu county in the Changhoutang's name in 1893 and acted as signatories. Also, understanding the vulnerability of absentee landowners they took steps to ensure the security of the transaction by extracting from the local magistrate a proclamation that the Changhoutang, properly registered as a *hukou* (a household unit), was a legal corporate entity with legitimate title to the property. They then had the proclamation engraved on a stone stele erected on the property. Such actions helped to secure the economic and social position of the migrants while they were abroad, and paved the way for them to re-establish themselves smoothly in the home village when they returned at some future point of time.

The Jishantang was only one of numerous Hong Kong associations engaged in investing and managing communal property for their corresponding associations in China and overseas, and in the process, these organizations performed many different functions that helped to strengthen the migrants' connections with the native place. The properties were held for different purposes, including generating dividends to finance communal activities, such as the education of village/lineage members, the transportation of bones and burials, local religious and communal activities, famine relief, the building of roads and bridges, etc. From quite early on, Hong Kong was recognized as a good place for investments because of the easy flow of money, greater social stability and stronger legal protection for property and person under British law than in China. Voluntary associations in Hong Kong managed funds coming from the home village, Hong Kong and abroad, to make different kinds of investments, including property, import and export trade, shipping, and interest-bearing loans.[27]

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[27] *Xianggang Chao Shang huzhu she shekan* [Publication of the Chiu Chow [Chaozhou] Merchants Assistance Society of Hong Kong] (Hong Kong, 1949), 7–8.

Given the large number of Taishan natives among emigrants, it is no wonder that we find many joint investments among Taishan associations.[28] The Taishan Chamber of Commerce was, and is, one of the richest landholding native place organizations in Hong Kong and over the years has managed many different funds remitted by migrants. A 1960s publication of the Chamber of Commerce describes how such property holding came about and how the Chamber handled the funds and properties:

> Most of the funds came from fellow-villagers residing overseas. The funds were remitted to us for arranging the repatriation and reburial of fellow-villagers' bones; or they were intended for distribution to various districts within the county for flood and famine relief, and for the prevention of bandits. Our fellow-villagers abroad raised donations and transferred the money to us to process and transmit. Some of the funds also came from wealthy Taishan merchants in Hong Kong. For each remittance exercise, there was always a surplus. If the surplus was large, it was deposited in a bank; if small, it would be deposited with *yinhao* (native banks). This way, we earned interest, and as the interest grew and became compounded, the gross amount would be used to buy shophouse property. If there was a shortfall, we would raise loans from Taishan merchants in Hong Kong at a low interest rate in order to complete the purchase. Rents received from these properties would be used to repay the loans.[29]

Besides those stated above, such communal funds were also used for other purposes. In the 1920s, a county school for Taishan was planned. As the project was very expensive, donations were raised among Taishan natives in Britain, the United States, and Southeast Asia, as well as Hong Kong. Shortly afterwards, HK$30,000–40,000 was also taken out toward the construction of a Taishan huiguan (association building) in Beijing and another in Guangzhou. Thus we see the Hong Kong association collecting and distributing funds from around the world, and coordinating activities arising from them, thus helping to sustain the ties between Taishan natives abroad with those in the native place as well as different parts of China.[30]

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[28] A good overview of the different uses for the funds is given in *Xianggang Taishan shanghui huikan* [Publication of the Hong Kong Toishan [Taishan] Chamber of Commerce] (Hong Kong, 1963–1964), 9.

[29] *Xianggang Taishan shanghui huikan*, 9.

[30] Ibid.

Raising, collecting, distributing, and managing funds for disaster and war relief, which took place on numerous occasions, was another major type of transnational activity undertaken by native place and other associations in Hong Kong. One of the largest scale relief exercises was organized by the Chaozhou association in 1922 when the coastal areas of Chaozhou and Fujian were devastated by one of the worst typhoons in history. Money was raised in Hong Kong and abroad and the Hong Kong Chaozhou Chamber of Commerce undertook the disbursement of the funds as well as the supervision of relief work.[31] The Chamber of Commerce raised HK$300,000 while the Tung Wah Hospital, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, other associations in Hong Kong, and Chaozhou natives overseas raised another HK$300,000. The money was partly spent on emergency rescue measures and partly on providing clothing, medicine, rice and shelter for the victims, and on distributing farming oxen, repairing embankments, building houses and revitalizing the economy of the disaster areas.[32]

In 1938 during the Japanese invasion of China, the Sanshui Natives Association in Hong Kong organized the Sanshui Natives Relief Society to mobilize support from Singapore and other Southeast Asian localities, seeking funds to relieve suffering in the home village.[33] Such wartime fundraising activity was undertaken by native place associations with particular zeal, and among some of them at least, so was the dissemination of anti-Japanese propaganda. What needs to be stressed is that, while these activities involved associations around the world, it was the associations in Hong Kong which often initiated the projects, acted as the main channel of communication and coordinated action among different groups and administered the funds, playing the pivotal role of the in-between place as it interfaced between China and Chinese overseas.

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[31] *Lu Gang Chaozhou shanghui sanshi zhounian jinian tekan* [30th Anniversary Publication of the Chiu Chow [Chaozhou] Chamber of Commerce of Hong Kong] (Hong Kong, 1951), 4–6.

[32] Ibid., 11.

[33] For the transnational work of the Sanshui native place association, see Elizabeth Sinn, "Cohesion and fragmentation: A County-Level Perspective on Chinese Transnationalism in the 1940s", in Leo Douw, Cen Huang, and Michael R. Godley, eds., *Qiaoxiang Ties: Interdisciplinary Approaches to 'Cultural Capital' in South China* (London, New York, and Amsterdam, 1999), 67–86.

The Tung Wah Hospital

The density and multi-directionality of Hong Kong's overseas Chinese networks is epitomized by the Tung Wah Hospital.[34] Founded by leading Chinese merchants in 1869, the Hospital was a community-wide organization rather than based on any specific native-place or dialect group, so that the scope of its activities was more comprehensive. Its original purpose was to care for indigent Chinese in Hong Kong, but it soon grew into a huge transnational machinery that also served Chinese migrants on many levels. At least in the nineteenth century, its board members were nominated by the leading trade guilds, including those of international trading firms known as *Jinshanzhuang* (lit., "Gold Mountain trading firms") and *nanbeihang* (lit., "south and north trading firms") which will be discussed below, compradores and operators of Chinese native banks, etc., thus benefiting from far-flung personal and business networks. Its directors over the years also included many returnees from overseas.

As a charitable organization in a major port of embarkation, the hospital protected migrants in transit by providing medicine for the sick, shelter for the homeless, coffins and burials for the deceased—including those who had died at sea. Working with numerous organizations in all parts of the world, it facilitated the repatriation of thousands of disabled emigrants—the blind, the sick, the lame, victims of shipwrecks, and mutinies—as well as Chinese women who had been sold into prostitution abroad. The women-related work was later absorbed by a sister institution, the Po Leung Kuk (the Society for the Protection of Women and Girls). The Tung Wah Hospital also initiated a system by which coffins were placed on ocean going vessels for those who might die en route. Either on its own or in collaboration with native-place associations and other agents, the Tung Wah facilitated the repatriation of tens of thousands of coffins and bone boxes from all directions. Up to 1949 it operated a coffin depository which provided storage for the endless flow of coffins and bone boxes; this depository has been recognized by UNESCO as a World Heritage site

[34] Elizabeth Sinn, *Power and Charity Power and Charity: the Early History of the Tung Wah Hospital, Hong Kong* (Hong Kong, 1989), reprinted as *Power and Charity: A Chinese Merchant Elite in Colonial Hong Kong*, with a new preface (Hong Kong, 2004).

and its over 20,000 documents are a treasure trove for the study of Chinese emigration to all places.[35]

In the absence of a Chinese consul in Hong Kong, the Hospital took it upon itself to look after the interest of Chinese migrants by protecting them from abuse and fraud. In fact, in addition to persons and human remains, it also transmitted money, letters, and other personal effects of emigrants. In 1882, when Chen Lanbin, former Chinese Minister to the United States, Spain, and Peru, set up a bureau in Guangzhou to help people establish contact with members of their families abroad, particularly those who had been kidnapped, the Tung Wah was appointed to transmit letters to major cities around the world where native-place associations and Chinese consuls would distribute them. The Tonghui zongju, (lit. bureau of mutual benefit) in Lima, an organization established in 1884 by the Chinese Consul-general to oversee the welfare of Chinese in Peru, was particularly dependent on the Tung Wah. Many of the Chinese in Peru had been kidnapped or tricked into emigration in the 1850s and 60s, suffered grave abuses, and were cut off from contact with their families. The Tonghui zongju regularly forwarded migrants' letters and money to the Tung Wah for transmission to their families; conversely, letters from their families were relayed to them by the Tung Wah. The remittances arrived in Hong Kong in Peruvian sols which Tung Wah sold for silver taels, the currency used in South China till the early twentieth century, or for Hong Kong dollars which also circulated freely in South China. When migrants died, their belongings would be sent to Tung Wah which saw to it that the legitimate party would come forward to claim them.[36]

In addition, Chinese overseas, including Chinese consular officials, used the Hospital as an essential channel for disseminating information: e.g. warning prospective emigrants not to proceed because of anti-Chinese violence or changes in immigration legislation and policy.[37]

In short, there existed a network of people and institutions which linked the two worlds of the Chinese—the native village and the overseas Chinese community—with Tung Wah as the pivot. Hong Kong's strategic position made it possible for Tung Wah and other institutions

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[35] "The Tung Wah Coffin Home" (http://www.lcsd.gov.hk/CE/Museum/History/download/coffin_home.pdf).

[36] Tung Wah Hospital to Tunghui zongju, 6 June, 1899; Tung Wah to Tunghui zongju, 11 Dec 1900: Tung Wah Hospital Archive, "Album of outbound letters 1900–1907".

[37] Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 109–110.

to play this pivotal role, and they in turn consolidated Hong Kong's central, and at the same time, in-between position in the Chinese diaspora.

Financial and Commercial Institutions

The remittance-related work of the institutions discussed above reflects a dynamic exchange market in Hong Kong. Since the earliest days, the colony had been a currency exchange hub, with, in particular, large amounts of silver coming from China from the sale of opium. Carrying specie to London was an important source of profit for British shipping companies such as the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company which established a line from London to Hong Kong as early as 1845.[38] In addition, Chinese returning from California, and later Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, brought with them enormous amounts for gold which they sold for silver, the currency in China. In the 1860s, Hong Kong's Harbor Master reported on the gold carried on select vessels arriving with emigrants. In 1863 he reported approximately 36,000 ounces of gold on eight vessels arriving from Australia. The following year, he reported nine from Australia bringing approximately 36,000 ounces of gold and 9,100 gold sovereigns in addition to six from San Francisco bringing $1,181,500.[39] In the absence of customs and immigration control, silver and gold moved freely in and out of Hong Kong. People in Hong Kong navigated comfortably among different currencies. The colonial government kept its local accounts in dollars (which for most of the nineteenth century meant the Mexican dollar and the Hong Kong dollar which was equivalent to it)[40] while reporting its accounts to London in British pounds. The Tung Wah Hospital kept its accounts partly in silver taels, partly in Hong Kong dollars, and it is likely that many firms did likewise. Foreign businesses readily bought silver to trade with China. Exchange

[38] Andrew Pope, "The P & O and the Asian Specie network 1850–1920," *Modern Asian Studies* 30.1 (1996), 145–172.

[39] *Hong Kong Blue Book* (1863), 331; (1864), 314. Since many vessels were not reported for the treasures they carried, what the Harbor Master reported might be only a fraction of the total.

[40] Besides the Mexican dollar, "trade dollars" were minted during the 1870s by other countries—Hong Kong dollar from 1866 to 1868, the US trade dollar from 1873 to 1885 and the British dollar from 1895 to 1935. See Takeshi Hamashita, "Overseas Chinese Remittance and Asian Banking History," in Olive Checkland, Shizuya Nishimura and Norio Tamaki, eds. *Pacific Banking, 1859–1959* (London, 1994), 52–60, 56–57.

shops and banks had the capacity to deal with a wide range of currencies, from gold coins or gold nuggets from California and Australia, silver from India and China, to the sol from Peru.

When migrants remitted money to China—whether in large or small amounts, in cash, bank checks or specie, hand-carried across the ocean by couriers, through the network of remittance houses, transferred through banks, or through firms settling accounts—much of it passed through Hong Kong.[41] Foreign banks and Chinese-run exchange houses combined to energize the money market, with exchange houses selling the foreign currencies they bought from migrants to foreign banks which offered the highest rate. Perhaps because of the high level of activities, international exposure and the sophisticated infrastructure developed over the years, Hong Kong's many banks and money exchangers were able to offer comparatively fairer prices than those elsewhere. Thus even remittances destined for Guangdong province were channeled through Hong Kong despite the presence of foreign banks in Guangzhou, the provincial capital. Moreover, even though remittances from Southeast Asia could be sent directly to Xiamen, some of them still made their way through Hong Kong (and Shanghai) where it was more convenient to sell foreign currencies for Chinese *yuan* and at a better price. This also explains why Chinese returning from overseas often stopped first in Hong Kong where they could exchange the foreign currencies they carried with them, or the funds they had earlier transferred through banks, for the particular currency used in their home villages. Gold coins would be sold to jewelry shops. It was observed in the early twentieth century that, on days when boats from Southeast Asia arrived, the small exchange shops would be jammed with people selling and buying different currencies and precious metals. It was claimed that one shipload of returning Chinese in the 1930s might bring in anywhere from a few thousand to $50,000.[42]

It should also be mentioned that Hong Kong bank notes were often preferred over other currencies. By the end of the nineteenth century,

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[41] A detailed account of the channels of remittances is given by Tomoko Shiroyama in "Structure and Dynamics of Overseas Chinese Remittances in the Mid-Twentieth Century," paper presented at the XIV International Economic History Congress Helsinki 2006. (http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers2/Shiroy.pdf). She also describes in detail the remittance transactions of a Hong Kong merchant, Ma Tsui Chew [Ma Xuchao]. I am grateful to the author for permission to cite her work.

[42] George L. Hicks, *Overseas Chinese Remittances from Southeast Asia, 1910–1940* (Singapore, 1993), 90, 100–101.

the confusion of the currency in China led to a demand for foreign coin, mainly the Mexican dollar, but the deterioration of the Mexican dollar led to further confusion, and Hong Kong banknotes, backed by a relatively stable currency and strict government regulations on reserves and issuance, were considered the safest. Hong Kong notes, especially those issued by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, were in high demand among Chinese everywhere. It was said that the sole line of business of Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank's San Francisco Branch (opened in 1875) was the purchase and export of Mexican dollars and bar silver to China and the selling of Hong Kong dollars to the thousands of Chinese residing in the Western States of America, either for remitting or for saving.[43] The Bank estimated in the 1920s that some 70 percent of its Hong Kong issued notes were actually circulated across the border in China.[44] The majority of overseas Chinese remittances in the 1930s were in Hong Kong dollars and 80 percent of them entered China via Hong Kong.[45]

It is no surprise that Hong Kong was recognized as the "economic capital of the overseas Chinese"[46] playing a vital intermediary role between the migrant—be he the laundryman in San Francisco, the shopkeeper in Saigon, the railroad worker in the Rockies, the guano miner on the Chincha Islands (Peru), or the rice magnate in Bangkok—and his beneficiaries at home.

Besides banks and exchange houses, trading firms too formed an indispensable link in the enormous and intricate network of migrant-related activities. One enduring consequence of the emigration traffic, in fact, was the emergence of firms that traded with particular countries based on close connections to the migrant communities there. In a 1915 directory, at least 23 such geographically-specific Chinese trading groups are listed, including: California and Honolulu [including Australia], Singapore, Penang, Calcutta, Cambodia, Peru, Havana, Java, South Africa, Panama, Sandakan, Manila, Annam,

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[43] Massimo Beber, "Italian Banking in California, 1904–1931," in *Pacific Banking, 1859–1959*, 114–138, 134.

[44] Frank H.H. King, "Hong Kong's Private Note Issue" in Y.C. Jao and Frank H.H. King, eds., *Money in Hong Kong: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis* (Hong Kong, 1990) 6–50, esp. 8, 26.

[45] Hicks, *Overseas Chinese Remittances*, 184.

[46] C.F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China* (New York, 1933) quoted in Wu Chun-his, *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittance to Communist China*. (Stanford, 1967), 6.

Siam, Haiphong, and different ports in China.[47] These trading companies were primarily organized along native-place or family lines. For instance, most of firms trading to Siam, where there was an enormous and long-established Chaozhou-speaking community, were owned and operated by Chaozhou merchants dealing with correspondent firms in Siam which were also owned and operated by Chaozhou natives, often by members of the same family. On the other hand, firms with Fujianese owners tended to concentrate on the Dutch Indies and the Philippines where Fujianese migrants predominated.

While many trading companies in Hong Kong were connected with migration in one way or another, none were more so than the *nanbeihang* and *jinshanzhuang*. The *nanbeihang*, firms which imported goods from North China and Japan in the north and re-exported them to South China and Southeast Asia in the south, and vice versa, formed a powerful trading nexus dominating important commodities such as rice, soybeans, dried goods, herbal medicines, and marine produce. Besides import/ export trade, some of the *nanbeihang* were also remittance agents and ships' brokers; they were also closely related to the insurance business. An outstanding example was the Chaozhou-owned Yuen Fat Hong (in putonghua, Yuanfahang), which, while specializing in the distribution of rice from Siam, was also the agent for the Norddeutscher Lloyd which operated a Bangkok-Hong Kong line of steamers, and later, for Butterfield & Swire. Overseas remittances were another of Yuen Fat Hong's major activities,[48] thus combining many migration-related business operations. Likewise, Kin Tye Lung (putonghua, Qiantailong), another Chaozhou-owned *nanbeihang*, a leading rice and sugar importer/exporter, had a big remittance business

[47] *Xianggang Zhonghua shangye jiaotong renming zhinan lu* [The Anglo-Chinese Commercial Directory] (Hong Kong, 1915[?]) 1–2. For a brief discussion of Hong Kong's export-import trade, see Economic Information & Agency, *Xianggang shangye zhinan* [Hong Kong Commercial Directory] (Hong Kong, 1960) Section 1, 32–57.

[48] W. Feldwick, *Present Day Impressions of the Far East and Prominent and Progressive Chinese at Home and Abroad: the History, People, Commerce, Industries and Resources of China, Hong Kong, Indo-China, Malaya and Netherlands India* (London, 1917), 586; Gao Boyu, "Cong Yuanfahang sheng shuai kan nanbeihang" [Tracing the development of the south-north trade from the rise and fall of Yuanfahang], in Gao Boyu, *Ting yu lou sui bi* [Casual Writings from the mansion for listening to the rain] (Hong Kong, 1991), 277–292, 284–285.

as well as its own shipping company operating several Shantou-Hong Kong-Bangkok lines.[49]

From Hong Kong, goods were transshipped to different continents. Most noteworthy in this respect were the *jinshanzhuang*, or Gold Mountain firms which traded to the United States (known as "Gold Mountain"), Australia ("New Gold Mountain"), Canada and New Zealand. They redirected the trade on an east-west axis, thus complementing the north-south axis followed by the *nanbeihang* and accentuating the radial nature of Hong Kong's multi-directional networks. Hong Kong merchants began trading with California in conjunction with the gold rush migration but soon extended their activities to other countries, largely on the heels of Chinese migrants. *Jinshanzhuang* provided customers abroad with an enormous array of consumer goods. In the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a ship's cargo from Hong Kong to North America typically contained patent medicines, rice, rattan, sugar, and joss sticks, and, occasionally, gourmet foodstuffs such as bird's nest and shark's fin which came largely from the "South", i.e. Southeast Asia, and teas, silks, nut oil for cooking, mushrooms, vermicelli, preserved ginger and herbal medicines from the "North", i.e. China or Japan. In return, Hong Kong redistributed to China and Southeast Asia flour from Australia and North America, and ginseng from America. In many cases, though not all, both suppliers and consumers were Chinese. Bulk cargo such as flour, wheat, and timber were sent to Hong Kong from North America and Australia on ships which could offer cheaper freight rates because they made their main profit from passengers.[50] In addition, from these places came large amounts of silver and gold.

In the early days, some of the *jinshanzhuang* owners chartered ships for passengers but by the twentieth century, they acted more often as passage brokers or ship's agents for large foreign-owned companies that operated liners. *Jinshanzhuang* also acted as banks. Through a wide network of correspondent firms, they transferred funds for Chinese abroad to their families in the remotest villages in China. It was

[49] Choi Chi Cheung, "Competition among brothers: the Kin Tye Lung Company and its Associate Companies," in Rajeswary A Brown, ed., *Chinese Business Enterprises in Asia*, (London, 1995), 96–110; *Gongshang ribao* (Kung Sheung Daily News, Hong Kong), 7 January 1930.

[50] Daniel Meissner, "Bridging the Pacific: California and the China Flour Trade," *California History* 76.4 (Winter 1997–1998), 82–93. Also see, Thomas R. Cox, *Mills and Markets: A History of the Pacific Lumber Industry to 1900* (Seattle, 1974).

common in this period to find in San Francisco's Chinese-language newspapers advertisements by shops that, while promoting their stock of oil, rice, sugar, tea, opium, wine, socks, and shoes, also advertised their remittance service, emphasizing speed and reliability. Many shops served specific native-place groups only, remitting only to a few specific villages in China, and always in such instances, Hong Kong was mentioned as the intermediate collecting point and some *jinshanzhuang* named as the corresponding firm.[51]

Far from simply transferring funds *jinshanzhuang* offered a wide range of banking services that catered to individual needs. Migrants' savings were accepted for safe keeping and as interest-bearing deposits; on special instructions from the sender, the firms could hold the remitted money and send it by installment to the recipient rather than in one lump sum. They even, occasionally, advanced money to the families on credit. They moreover engaged in activities far beyond the purely commercial. Prospective emigrants were offered a place to stay at the shop during the two or three weeks they had to spend in Hong Kong waiting for paperwork to be processed and for their boats to arrive. Large firms had offices complete with living rooms and bedrooms for their clients. In 1928 the Hong Kong government even had to give special dispensation to *jinshanzhuang* for providing accommodations on their premises to clients without registering as inns.[52] They also helped migrants—and their wives, sons, daughters, nephews—negotiate the complicated process of emigrating overseas by buying tickets, arranging health examinations, preparing evidence of identity, and filling out forms at the US consulate. Given such service—flexible, intimate and generally trustworthy—it is no wonder that migrants preferred to continue patronizing *jinshanzhuang* rather than turn to government and commercial banks that also vied for their business.[53] It would seem that some of the *jinshanzhuang* were actively involved in the thriving market for forged papers that enabled "paper sons" to enter the United States during the Exclusion period, but this would require a separate study.[54]

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[51] E.g. *Chung Sai Yat Po* (San Francisco), 31 May 1901 (Online Archive of California http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb2z09p000/?order=2&brand=oac), 23 Feb. 1904; *Tai Tung Yat Po* (San Francisco) 31 January, 1906.

[52] *Gongshang ribao*, 14 July 1928.

[53] Madeline Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration Between the United States and South China, 1882–1943* (Stanford, 2000), 33–40.

[54] Chin Tung Pok, *Paper Son. One Man's Story* (Philadelphia, 2000).

There was much overlapping in the personnel behind the various social, financial, and commercial institutions engaged in migration-related activities. Owners and managers of the *nanbeihang* and *jinshanzhuang*, of jewelry shops and exchange houses, of insurance agencies and shipping companies sat on the Boards of the Tung Wah Hospital and Po Leung Kuk as well as on the managing committees of their respective native place associations and chambers of commerce, offering their money, time, management skills, and entrepreneurial acumen. At the same time, their philanthropic and community work elevated their status in the social and business arenas in Hong Kong, China and overseas.

Conclusion

This paper emphasizes Hong Kong's in-between status as a place of transit for migrants and their things in the global Chinese migration process and offers insights into the nature and dynamics of this process. While one may visualize Hong Kong as a wide-open space for people and things to flow through, this space was in fact filled by numerous institutions, mechanisms, and individuals that fueled mobility and facilitated connection between the migrant and his ancestral village: in other words, to keep in good order the vital "corridors" of migration.

I also offer Hong Kong as in-between place to alert scholars to the possibility that in-between places exist in other migration movements as well—although perhaps not functioning in exactly the same ways as Hong Kong. Perhaps they could explore other types of "in-betweenness". The idea of the in-between place, in any case, stands as a corrective to over-emphasis on either end of the migration process, i.e. the sending and receiving countries. The migration trajectory was seldom a bee-line from point A to point B; in reality, there were many detours and delays, diversions, and dead ends, and what lay in between inevitably affected the migration experience in profound ways and colored the migrant's material, emotional, and psychological worlds. Scholars might be stimulated by this paradigm to reexamine their subject in new lights, and achieve a richer and more nuanced understanding of migration processes.

PART THREE

THE WORLDS OF THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

INTRODUCTION: THE ATLANTIC, ITS MIGRATIONS, AND THEIR SCHOLARS

Donna R. Gabaccia

English-speakers have been writing about an Atlantic "World" as if it were a self-contained space since at least the end of the eighteenth century.[1] Of course, the Atlantic even then was in no way disconnected from the other oceans and seas that have been the focus of the first sections of this volume. And neither were the European empires of the age that has (until recently) defined the "Atlantic World" as an early modern phenomenon confined to the littorals of Europe, North America, South America, and Africa. England had its India and Portugal its Goa; Holland had its Batavia and Spain its Philippines. Many of these imperial and ocean-bridging worlds persisted well into the nineteenth and, in some cases, the twentieth centuries.

Nevertheless, the conceit of the Atlantic as a distinctive "world" unto itself has proved to be a very powerful one. Even as scholars became fascinated with increasing global interconnectedness, in the aftermath of the Second World War, they re-discovered and began to study intensively the early modern Atlantic World. Studies of the modern Atlantic and especially of its migrations—which began to emerge somewhat later, in the 1970s—just as often focused on the years after 1800, however. These Atlantic migrations, too, were apparently assumed to be so large, so instrumental in the formation of the most powerful nations of the twentieth century, and thus so unique, that they easily captured the preponderance of scholarly attention until the past decade. Only rarely in fact—and only quite recently—do we find scholars writing of the "World of the China Seas" or about the "Indian Ocean World."[2] Both the scholarly reluctance to claim too much in the latter scholarship and the grander if often unexamined assumptions of early studies

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[1] See George Adams, *Lecture on Natural and Experimental Philosophy* (London, 1794), 570.

[2] By contrast, references to a "Mediterranean World" are almost as old, and precede Braudel's work by well over a century. Discussions of the "Mediterranean World" (484,000 "hits") are also considerably more common than references to the "Atlantic world," (374,000 "hits") as measured by a Google search on December 20, 2008.

of the former bespeaks the pervasive power of the Atlantic. Worldly and scholar power usually encourages readers to expect essays on the Atlantic to open any volume of essays such as this one, rather than to begin, as this section does, only in mid-volume. But now that Adam McKeown has pointed to the fallacy of treating the Atlantic migrations as either exceptional or as models for the study of all other regional migrations, the placement of the Atlantic chosen by the editors may seem less provocative than merely appropriate.[3]

The Atlantic is an oceanic region much like others; chronologically and geographically its importance, like that of the years between 1830 and 1930, might best be understood as occupying a kind of central but middling ground in modern history of world migrations. In the Atlantic, and especially in the Caribbean—as Lara Putnam notes in her essay—travelers across the other oceans often converge, meet, and interact. Slaves from Africa continued to arrive in the Caribbean until late in the nineteenth century and their descendants dominated among the natives greeting later migrants. Migrations in the nineteenth century came to the Caribbean not only across the Atlantic from Europe but also from China and India. As Putnam demonstrates, migrations helped to construct the racial and national categories that we take for granted in the modern world. Contemporaries recognized how migrations made possible intimate relations and scientific racists easily imagined the sexual amalgamations and mixed descent common to the Caribbean as the future of all American nations did not control and restrict the migration, especially of "blacks" and "yellows." In understanding how racial categories and racial fears figured in the passage of restrictive laws, Putnam suggests the Caribbean must be central to any explanation for the demise of global migrations after 1930.

All the authors who write about the Atlantic in the pages that follow grasp the importance of understanding what I have elsewhere called "a [chronologically] longer Atlantic in a [geographically] wider world."[4] Much like the authors of essays in earlier sections, they have not always felt themselves constrained by the periodization of the volume or by this geographically defined section. In particular, all illustrate, albeit in differing ways, the difficulties of discussing the Atlantic migrations of

[3] Adam McKeown, "Global Migration, 1846–1940," *Journal of World History* 15.2 (2004), 155–189.

[4] Donna Gabaccia, "A Longer Atlantic in a Wider World," *Atlantic Studies* 1.1 (April 2004), 1–24.

the century between 1830 and 1930 without extensive reference to or knowledge of the formative years of the early-modern Atlantic "world" that preceded it.

Both Dirk Hoerder (in his exploration of the "Black Atlantic") and Silke Hensel (with her focus on migrations to Latin America) easily demonstrate the perils for nineteenth century studies of ignoring the early modern slave trade that scattered the many peoples of Africa around Europe and, especially, the Caribbean, South America and, to a lesser degree, North America. For Yrjö Kaukiainen, with his "Europe-outward" perspective on Atlantic navigation, the so-called "mass" migrations of the nineteenth century are unthinkable without a much longer and earlier history of evolving technologies that responded to incentives for exploration and Atlantic trade—whether in slaves or in colonial goods—reaching back to the seventeenth century. Even Mary Blewett, with her temporally narrower focus on the movements of workers, raw materials, and products of the North Atlantic worsted trade, acknowledges the origins of her story in the onset of industrialization in the eighteenth century.

Still, most readers will, I believe, conclude along with the authors that there was something distinctive about the nineteenth century and its migratory peoples, in the Atlantic perhaps even more than in other oceanic spaces. For Dirk Hoerder, the anti-imperial revolutions of the Americas (occurring between 1776 and 1824) ushered in a new era, in which continuation of the commerce in living, sentient beings became ever harder to defend or continue. The formation of American national states, the very varied timing of slaves' emancipation, diverging understandings of race and color, searches for new workers, and very diverse mechanisms for excluding or incorporating the emancipated slaves, along with new opportunities for reverse migrations produced a far more fragmented and diverse Black Atlantic in the years between 1830 and 1890. Hensel's treatment of Latin American migrations suggests, as does Hoerder, that for Cuba and Brazil (far more than for Mexico or Argentina), coerced migrations of Africans and then indentured Chinese and Indians workers persisted until later in Latin America, distinguishing it increasingly from North America.

Ultimately, both Hensel and Hoerder describe a century that emerges in two distinctive migratory phases. Hoerder emphasizes how, by the turn of the twentieth century, increased travel, in many directions, by emancipated, colonized, and post-colonial Blacks began to create a distinctive "intellectual world" that generated its own critiques and

theories of the democracy and capitalism and white supremacy of the Atlantic world. Hensel notes the transition from coerced migrations from Africa and Asia to voluntary migrations from Europe during this same period. The thickening ties of trade, migration, and investment between Latin America and Europe that Hensel describes also produced a distinctive geography of intellectual economic exchanges that was paralleled although often differed somewhat in content from those of the Black Atlantic.

For Kaukiainen it is the massive scale of Atlantic movements after 1820, linking the countries of the North Atlantic, and resting on a "huge growth in transport efficiency" that distinguishes the century between 1830 and 1930. When compared to the tonnage of freight transported back and forth across the Atlantic during these years, the "mass migrations" begin to appear a bit less massive than they are generally imagined to be. The perfection of bigger, faster, sailing ships and the subsequent gradual transition to steamships were also, according to Kaukiainen, not as abrupt or decisive as others have portrayed it. It was, however, the foundation for a profound cultural change that made migration ever more plausible for growing numbers, for it diminished what Kaukiainen calls the "terror of distance," an interesting variation on what geographer David Harvey, studying our own times, has labelled "time-space compression."[5] While the growing size of Atlantic steamers certainly provided one of the more important symbols of the modernist industrial age, especially after 1900, Kaukiainen's long nineteenth century ends earlier than do the others, as migrations diminished after 1920 and as the focus of Atlantic navigation shifted inexorably toward military ends.

Mary Blewett's essay on the worsted trade takes labor migration seriously as a social and cultural phenomenon. At the same time, she situates her analysis of human lives within the complexly entwined Atlantic circuits of labor, capital, investment, and raw materials that made industrialization possible. The expansion of worsted production occurred across the Atlantic, and British workers continued to migrate (or, as some might say, to "follow capital invested") even as Britain's industries reached their peak and attracted other workers from abroad. Blewett tackles the complex issue of what constitutes "free" or voluntary

[5] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity An Enquiry: Into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 240.

migration, which is generally viewed as one of the defining characteristics of the nineteenth century migrations and of the Atlantic, in particular. In the process, she also dismisses notions that all English immigrants to the United States came early, or as settlers on the land; Yorkshire textile workers closely resembled other "new immigrant" workers from southern and eastern Europe, right down to their propensity to return home again. In her account, the intellectual exchanges fostered by migration can be found not just among investors, factory owners, and managers but among an emerging transatlantic working class. They are the equivalent of the intellectual "Black international" that Hoerder references in his own work.

More than the other authors in this section, Blewett is concerned to offer an explanation for the ending of the century that is the focus of this volume. While the other authors suggest the historical watersheds that began a distinctive century of migration in 1830, Blewett asks readers to ponder how and why change marks the years around 1930 as decisive. As increasing imperial competition pushed the nations of Europe toward war, heightened nationalism, militarism, restrictions on immigration, and economic warfare both ended the era of the mass migrations and disrupted the trading circuits that had facilitated it. The circuits of the global economy of the nineteenth century were unravelling by 1930 and the new international and trade alliances that a renewed period of warfare would foster between 1934 and 1945 were only beginning to emerge. If mass migrations had characterized the British-dominated Atlantic of the nineteenth century, restrictions on movement would persist into the "American century" of Cold War, G.A.T.T., and anti-communist Atlantic alliances such as N.A.T.O. Blewett's attention to how a distinctive era of migration, trade and investment ended stands in sharp contrast to the other essays. It is indeed striking that students of the Atlantic, unlike those, for example, of the Indian Ocean, have not as often felt it necessary or important to venture beyond the early years of the twentieth century in order to explore the significance of the times, places, and phenomena they explore.

As Blewett's analysis of the world wool market suggests, the Atlantic was not an isolated or separate world in the century between 1830 and 1930. Indeed, all the essays of this section suggest how the migrations, shipping, trade, and intellectual exchanges within the Atlantic not only had consequences and significance well beyond the imaginary limits of the Atlantic "World" but also literally extended into most other

regions of the world. Hoerder's study of the Black Atlantic reminds us that the abolition of slavery in the Caribbean, Latin America, North America, and finally in Brazil and Cuba, set off a worldwide search for new sources of labor. The so-called "coolie" trade—which figures in essays in earlier sections of this volume—was a mechanism of labor recruitment that linked Atlantic, China Seas, Pacific, and Indian Ocean. Both Hoerder and Hensel also point to the indentured and often coerced servants of Asia as constituent elements in the intensifying cultural differentiation of North and South American populations and the rather different understandings of race and of nation that emerged in English—and Spanish—or Portuguese-speaking portions of the Atlantic. In Kaukiainen's study, the same "transport efficiencies" that facilitated mass migrations in the Atlantic held the promise of altering transport to Australia and to the other oceans too, especially once the Suez Canal opened up new shipping routes from the Atlantic and Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean and wider Pacific. Blewett repeatedly reminds readers of the global circuits of trade which made possible both the Yorkshire-based worsted industry, and its extension across the Atlantic to New England, in the United States. The factories in Yorkshire depended on fleece from Australia, "light, silky alpaca" from Peru, and mohair from Turkey. The British soon sent mohair goats to South Africa to foster an imperial supply. The collapse of the worsted trade occurred not just in the North Atlantic, but in the South Pacific, and South Atlantic, too.

The essays in this section continue to point to patterns of migration and exchange that were characteristic of the Atlantic, and that arguably mark the years between 1830 and 1930 as distinctive. In doing so, they are bold in documenting how some of those characteristics, and many of those distinctions, emerged not within the watery confines of the Atlantic itself but through its myriad connections to the wider world of which it was only one part. The authors of these essays do not need to assert, nor should they, that distinctive characteristics make the Atlantic in any way the logical or best model for understanding events or migrations elsewhere. Neither do the particularities of the Atlantic necessarily represent the "beginning" of the circuits of "modern" globalization.

On the contrary, the essays in this section make a different and more important scholarly intervention. Scholars who focus on that part of the modern world that has, at various times, been labeled as "the West," the "First World," or "the North" are still overwhelmingly historians

of individual nation states. Precisely because we have learned so much about immigration, emigration, trade, the consequences of slavery and emancipation, and the dynamics of race and ethnicity within the confines of particularist and often exceptionalist national historiographies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the task of connecting the dozens of national pieces of an Atlantic history is especially daunting, and still rarely attempted. By changing the geographical scale of their research on one important century of nation-building, the contributors to this section have gone a long way toward bringing the Atlantic into the center or mainstream of world history.

FROM ONE BLACK ATLANTIC TO MANY: SLAVE REGIMES, CREOLE SOCIETIES, AND POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD

Dirk Hoerder

"Black Atlantic"—a concise, easily citable label—gained sudden prominence with the publication of Paul Gilroy's 1993 book, which was subtitled "Modernity and Double Consciousness" and thus fit well into the Cultural Studies surge of that decade. His innovative intellectual history, arguably written from the bottom up, was however limited by its male-centered view of predominantly English-language discourse. Of course, African-origin and European-origin people in the Atlantic used many languages and occupied sharply gendered versions of the Black Atlantic. Just before Gilroy's book appeared, John K. Thornton's far more comprehensive *Africa and the Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680* (1992; extended to cover 1400 to 1800 in a later edition) provided a meticulously detailed social history of the Black Atlantic. He emphasized unidirectional moves from Africa to the Americas while Gilroy analyzed the connections between abolitionist thought of Americans of African background and White Europeans. The Atlantic World was of course much larger and included African, American, Caribbean, and British as well as French, Dutch, and other peoples, largely through connections between continental Europe and the Caribbean islands.[1] Since the 1970s, social, labor, and economic historians have explored the transatlantic cultures created by Africa-born slaves, the few free migrants, and manumitted men and women, and by the Creoles of African, "Indian," and European background.[2]

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[1] Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993); John K. Thornton, *Africa and the Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800*, rev. ed. (New York, 1998). See also Michael L. Conniff and Thomas J. Davis, *Africans in the Americas. A History of the Black Diaspora* (New York, 1994).

[2] José C. Curto and Renée Soulodre-La France, "Introduction: Interconnections between Africa and the Americas during the Era of the Slave Trade," in Curto and Soulodre-La France, eds. *Africa and the Americas: Interconnections during the Slave Trade* (Trenton, N.J., 2005), 1–11, provide a critique of scholarship centered on the White Atlantic and a bibliographic summary of the work on the Black Atlantic.

This ocean-wide and transcontinental research has worked to correct an imbalanced emphasis on slavery and race in British North America and in the U.S., where only about 0.4 million African men and women were landed. The field now also encompasses studies of the British, French, Dutch, and Danish Caribbean where 3.8 million were landed, Brazil with its 3.6 million arrivals, and the 1.6 million who reached other destinations in Spanish America.[3]

The Worlds the slaves built and those the slave owners framed were inextricably entwined. They emerged in new ecological environments through intercultural exchanges, albeit ones deeply marked by unequal relations of power. The result was societies and cultures that differed sharply from the original homes of slaves and slave-owners alike. In this sense, there was no New England, New France, New Spain, or New Africa in the Americas.[4]

To better understand these sites of unequal exchange, it is helpful to remember that the slave-owners were as much migrants or n-th generation creole ethnics as were the slaves. We also need to remind ourselves that, up until the 1820s, more Africans than Europeans arrived in the Americas, and that from European men and women more than one half to perhaps as many as two thirds came as indentured servants rather than as free persons. Migrations in the many-colored Atlantic World were interdependent, and Creole societies emerged from adaptations from cultural backgrounds as widely diverse as Scots and Moçambiques, or Christians, Animists, and Muslims. Such Worlds were never generically either African- or European-origin nor were they limited to the Americas but instead encompassed an Atlantic-wide and even global sub-tropical and tropical plantation belt. Migrants,

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[3] Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade. A Census* (Madison, 1969), since refined but not substantially changed by Paul Lovejoy, "The Volume of the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Synthesis," *Journal of African History* 23 (1982), 473–502, and by David Eltis, Stephen Behrendt, and David Richardson, "National Participation in the Transatlantic Slave Trade: New Evidence," in *Africa and the Americas*, 13–41. See also Paul E. Lovejoy and Nicholas Rogers, eds., *Unfree Labour in the Development of the Atlantic World* (Ilford, 1994); David Eltis et. al., *The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD-ROM* (New York, 1999). Early comparative approaches include Rolando Mellafe, *Negro Slavery in Latin America* (Berkeley, 1975), and Carl N. Degler, *Neither Black nor White. Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (New York, 1971).

[4] Eugene D. Genovese, *The World the Slaveholders Made: Two Essays in Interpretation* (New York, 1969), and Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll. The World the Slaves Made* (New York, 1976); David Scott, "That Event, This Memory: Notes on an Anthropology of African Diasporas in the New World," *Diaspora* 1 (1991), 261–284, and Scott, *Refashioning Futures: Criticism After Postcoloniality* (Princeton, 1999).


regardless of color, were ethno-culturally differentiated. Even in societies where advocates of pure whiteness attempted to impose borderlines to segregate Whites from others, love and reproduction, if not always officially-sanctioned marriages, occurred. A Black(er) Atlantic and a White(er) Atlantic—both with many graduated shades—emerged and interacted in multiple and complex ways, ensuring that their geographies shifted over time.[5]

Transitions: The Age of Revolution and Changing Global Labor Regimes

A periodization that acknowledges changes and differentiation within the Black Atlantic shows several distinct eras. The first Black Atlantic was composed of a West African-Iberian coastal realm of exchange and different kinds of bondage in the fifteenth century. The second transatlantic realm of European-imposed chattel slavery lasted from the early sixteenth century to the Age of Revolution. During the latter period this unitary Black Atlantic became increasingly differentiated by region and culture of origin, by specific regimes of slavery and race relations, and by the many regions of destination in which slaves and owners jointly built societies. The latter came with capital and concepts; the former did the work and, from their own views of social relations and societal structures, subverted the power-imposed White concept whenever possible. A third, transitional period began in the 1770s, encompassing the revolutions around the Atlantic, and continued until the 1820s or 1830s. While the outer geographic contours of the Black Atlantic did not change during this period, political, and social realities were often fundamentally restructured and labor regimes and economies dramatically changed.

One source of change was Enlightenment thought, with its concepts of human rights, religious dissent in Christian societies that postulated individuals' personal relationships to God, and debates about the political order. In this climate of opinion human rights philosophers first entertained the possibility of slave emancipation in the colonized segments of the globe (and of Jewish emancipation from discriminatory status in colonizing Europe). It is important to recall that slaves'

[5] Eurocentric scholars still overlook or negate this. See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn, "The Idea of Atlantic History," *Itinerario* 20 (1996), 19–44, and Paul Butel, *The Atlantic*, transl. Iain H. Grant (London, 1999).



Source: Adapted from José C. Curto and Renée Soulodre-La France, eds., *Africa and the Americas: Interconnections during the Slave Trade* (Trenton, N.J., 2005), 42, and from Philip Curtin et al., *African History* (London, 1978), 186.

Map 12 The Black Atlantic: Oceanic and Continental Extent

African cultures had their own, perhaps longer, genealogy of concepts for self-determined lives, located within the frame of traditional belief systems and hierarchies. What received language has called slave "mutinies" or "rebellions" were also forceful (or "violent") struggles for some notion of rights. Some slaves fled, armed themselves, and fought the local incarnations of the European colonizer powers. It is unlikely that they responded only to European ideals of Enlightenment in doing so. The self-governing Maroon societies in the Americas that emerged from escape or rebellion drew on other sources for their notions of justice.[6]

Such African-origin and European-origin concepts were neither straightforwardly humanitarian nor individualist. In Brazil, where some slaves were better educated than their owner-masters, Africans could purchase their freedom and that of family members. But Africans, free or slave, could in turn own (African) slaves. Concepts of fundamental rights—life, liberty, and the pursuit of particular life projects—were often realized or practiced locally but conceived with a claim of universal reach. The Black and the White Atlantic, bound together by human trafficking and exploitation, thus began an early Atlantic intellectual exchange that we still do not understand well. As Gilroy has demonstrated so persuasively for a later period, African-background or mixed-ancestry people in the Americas developed such ideas in an Atlantic context. Like the labor movement and the women's movements a century later, early abolitionists in the Atlantic acted within statewide (or national) frames, because that is where laws were made and habitusses changed. They also worked transnationally because the support of a larger Atlantic World could be obtained to achieve change in specific local sites. Across national and transnational realms color of skin (or race, or ethno-cultural belonging, or nation) was at issue since, among European and Euro-Creoles, human rights

[6] Herbert Aptheker, *American Negro Slave Revolts* (New York, 1943); Eugene D. Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World* (Baton Rouge, 1970); João José Reis, *Slave Rebellions in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia* (Baltimore, 1993); Richard Price, ed., *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (Baltimore, 1979). Jane Landers, "Cimarrón Ethnicity and Cultural Adaptation in the Spanish Domains of the Circum-Caribbean, 1503–1763," in Paul E. Lovejoy, ed. *Identity in the Shadow of Slavery* (London, 2000), 30–54; Gad Heuman, ed., *Out of the House of Bondage: Runaways, Resistance and Marronage in Africa and the New World* (London, 1986).

were as implicitly assumed to be White as they were assumed to be male and adult.

Revolutionary practice between 1770 and 1830 changed the constellation of states within the Atlantic, as—for example in the Americas—revolutions altered the familiar hierarchy of colonizer and colonized. Europe's dynastic states' counter-revolutionary warfare and Napoleon's imperialist wars prevented the colonizer core states from asserting control in their peripheral American "colonies." In the view of many Euro-Creoles of the Americas, this made them quasi-self-governing societies. All societies on the mainlands of North and South America (with the exception of the Guyanas in South America, a few circum-Caribbean colonies, as well as the northernmost British colonies that would become Canada) achieved independence. Of the Caribbean island societies, in contrast, only Haiti succeeded. By the mid-1820s, the American rim of the Atlantic World had decolonized itself, while in Europe the combined forces of those who profited from the old order had contained revolutionary change. Societies in Africa seemed little touched by these changes and would again become the target of further imperial acquisitiveness of European states later in the century.[7]

Within the interacting Afro-European Atlantic, new concepts of government by social contract encouraged Mulattos and Negroes in French Saint Domingue/ Haiti to cast off their yoke. The Revolution in France brought older class distinctions—e.g., between *grands blancs*, *petits blancs*, and *gens de couleur*—into crisis. Since people in these categories accounted for less then 10 percent of the population, the revolution did not affect the majority population of 500,000 slaves or encourage them to become involved or to act on their own behalf. Still, those Africans who lived at the interface between the White and the Black Worlds became conversant with both cultures and acquired the ability to negotiate lives in either. Whites in France agitated against the extension of the declaration of human rights to the colonies; Mulattos, with the support of the French *Amis des Noirs*—a group overlooked by anglophone scholars such as Gilroy—demanded it. When the French National Assembly in May 1791 placed all colonial *free*

[7] Anglo-Creoles in North America called themselves Englishmen and Spanish-Creoles in Latin America saw themselves as Spaniards. In general see Lester D. Langley, *The Americas in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1850* (New Haven, 1996).

persons on an equal footing, regardless of color, the Whites responded by massacring free Mulattos.[8] African-origin slaves began their own self-liberation in August 1791, but the National Assembly in France abolished slavery only in 1793. When Napoleon came under the influence of the French-Caribbean planter class and reinstituted slavery, the self-emancipated slaves defeated his invading army of 40,000.[9] This segment of the Black Atlantic may also have connected to Native Peoples' traditions of resistance. After Afro-Haitian independence, antagonism between Mulattos and Blacks, *grands gens de couleur* v. *petits noirs*, continued to wrack the Haitian polity. Free families engaged in agriculture, allowing them to determine much of their own working lives. This, however, limited tax revenues available to the new state and deprived the national economy of products for export. The end of the plantation regime, ironically, resulted in long-term marginalization of Haiti from other Atlantic economies.[10]

Most debates about the abolition of Atlantic slavery that had created an easily segregatable working class marked physiologically by skin color, focused on peripheral plantation economies which raised single products for export to markets centered in and controlled by Europe. In Europe, initiated by the diversifying impact of early industrialization, a parallel debate about capital-labor relations challenged rural serfdom and bound servant status. Given the volatility of markets and raw material supplies, as well as the impact of new technology, more and more entrepreneurs and capitalists, especially in Great Britain, came to question the utility of bondage of any kind. Workers and working families, who had to fend for themselves when no jobs were available, began to seem preferable to temporarily or permanently bound workers who had to be fed during brief slack times or lasting recessions. Industrial mass production in Europe thus generated a

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[8] Similarly, Cuban Whites massacred much of the island's Afro-Caribbean leadership in 1844 to forestall independent political action by Free Colored people.

[9] In the Atlantic World this military victory of Black over White caused as much concern as, on a global scale, the so-called Yellow over White victory of Japan over Russia in 1905.

[10] David Geggus, "The Haitian Revolution," in Franklin W. Knight and Colin A. Palmer, eds., *The Modern Caribbean* (Chapel Hill, 1989), 21–50; Yves Bénot, *La Révolution française et la fin des colonies* (Paris, 1988); C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (London, 1938); Gwendolyn M. Hall, *Social Control in Slave Plantation Societies: A Comparison of St Domingue and Cuba* (Baltimore, 1971); T.O. Ott, *The Haitian Revolution, 1789–1804* (Knoxville, 1973).

social order different from that of agricultural mass production in the colonies. In the Russian Empire debates about serfdom, serf migrations to industrial labor (*obrok*-system), and emancipation indicated this relationship clearly. In view of the possibility of abolition, the migrant investor-planters also extended their search for labor forces beyond Africa to Europe's Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts and to Asia's colonized or easily accessible societies, especially to the densely populated and British-controlled India and treaty-fettered China. A global restructuring of labor regimes had begun.[11] Any analysis of this global mobilization of laboring men and women cannot be confined to individual nation-states, or empires, and even analysis of the Atlantic spaces, with the countries around its rim, is too limiting.

The Segmented Black Atlantic since the 1830s

In a fourth, segmented phase, of the Black or interactive Black-White Atlantic, major change continued. The slave trade was ended in a series of steps that continued until the 1870s. It was a drawn-out process characterized by country-by-country abolition of slavery. As slavery ended, each of the newly independent emerging nation-states, as well as those societies remaining under colonial rule, developed quite specific labor and race relations regimes. Thus, in this fourth phase the Black Atlantic fragmented into multiple language segments, numerous statewide legal entities as well as self-governing maroon societies, many economic regions, and innumerable cultural communities. Except for the rigorously segregated U.S., ethnogenesis in mulatto societies created nations that viewed themselves as Euro-American but that were, in fact, Native-African-European (with some Asian contributions).[12]

While abolition of the slave trade began in 1807–08 in Europe and the United States, Brazil, under British pressure, accepted the policy only in the mid-1850s with the de facto ending of the trade as late as the 1870s. In these decades a further 1.9 million men and women

[11] The classic early statement is Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, 1944); the best recent summary is Tom Brass and Marcel van der Linden, eds., *Free and Unfree Labour: The Debate Continues* (Bern, 1997), esp. the essays on the Caribbean and Latin America by Joan Casanovas, Lyman L. Johnson, José de Souza Martins, David McCreery, and Mario Pastor, 249–349.

[12] In this essay, focusing on transatlantic connections, the important contributions of First Peoples, the majority of society in Mexico for example, will not be discussed.

were force-migrated out of Africa. The enslaved experienced socialization in one of the many African cultures, commodification through capture and sale, transatlantic voyage and resale, and transport to final destination (with possible re-socializations in long intermediate stays). They sought to create or recreate their own cultures in particular regions of Brazil, Jamaica, or Cuba where they interacted through existing power hierarchies with Euro-American or Mulatto owners, who could not always completely control the social and cultural forms that developed. The newly arrived continuously added new African elements to existing Afro-American Creole cultures. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, some 80,000 slaves made up almost 40 percent of the population and two-thirds of these had been born in Africa.[13] In the U.S., by contrast, the ban on the trade was enforced and, since Afro-U.S. population increase resulted from procreation rather than importation, the culture of slaves in the U.S. South was the most creolized in the Black Atlantic.

After the European powers' ban of the slave trade, the continuously high demand for plantation laborers led owners to transatlantic experiments with recruitment in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Emancipation and seizure of some of the slave-trading ships by the British or French Navy led to both labor under indenture and to reverse migrations to Sierra Leone and Liberia. The slaves' former owners looked for new sources of labor under indenture. Shifting demand for cotton, sugar, coffee, and other products resulted in shifting areas of cultivation and consequent migration-through-sale of slaves. Afro-Americans continued to create spaces in which they could develop their own cultural, spiritual, and work experiences, although always forced to act within limitations set by state power hierarchies. Under especially rigid control in the U.S., slaves' control over their own lives extended only from sun-down to sun-up; in all other societies, however, they developed more open and extensive religious and associational practices.[14]

Already in 1776, Adam Smith, in his classic exposition of new middle-class—not capitalist—economic doctrines, *The Wealth of Nations*, had called slavery an anachronism. Slavery came to an end

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[13] Dale T. Graden, "African Responses to the End of the International Slave Trade and Abolitionist Initiatives in Bahia, Brazil, 1850–1865," in Curto and Soulodre-La France, eds., *Africa and the Americas*, 127–139, esp. 129.

[14] George P. Rawick, *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community* (Westport, 1972).

in the British Empire in 1834 with "apprenticeship" imposed till 1838; in the French colonies, where Napoleon had reinstituted it, in 1846; in the Dutch possessions in 1873; and in the remnants of the Spanish Empire in 1880 with a six-year "apprenticeship" tacked on. Two of the most important independent states with economies based heavily on slave labor, Brazil and the United States, extended the regime to 1888 and 1863–65 respectively. From abolition in the British Empire on, workers bound for life were replaced by Asian contract labor migrants, European labor migrants—"free" in the frame of severe economic constraints, and African-origin labor migrating within the Americas.[15]

Not all Africans and Afro-Creoles waited for legislative liberation. They understood the system of power that expropriated their labor and the system of rhetoric that veiled how thieving planters stole the rewards of their toil. In the U.S., they unmasked such phraseology by calling flight "stealing oneself," an act in which they re-appropriated to themselves both the fruits of their labor and control over their lives. Planters understood this doublethink. When a slave purchased his or her own freedom, French-language owners called this "vendre un nègre à lui-même." The ideology of slavery may have been pervasive but both owners and captives understood its internal contradictions. African spiritual beliefs even provided answers to the question of "why are we enslaved?" Traders and owners appeared as demons or sorcerers whose witchcraft transported men and women "to the other side" of "the water." Some believed such evil persons ate human flesh. Traders and owners certainly consumed human lives, purchased bodies, and discarded carcasses of worn-out workers with their own

[15] Franklin W. Knight, "The Atlantic Slave Trade and the Development of Afro-American Culture," in David Eltis and James Walvin, eds., *The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Origins and Effects in Europe, Africa, and the Americas* (Madison, 1981), 287–300; Herbert S. Klein, *African Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean* (New York, 1986), 243–271; David Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New York, 1987); Martin A. Klein, "Slavery, the International Labour Market and the Emancipation of Slaves in the Nineteenth Century," in *Unfree Labour*, 197–220; Seymour Drescher, "Brasilian Abolition in Comparative Perspective," *Hispanic American Hist. Review* 68 (1988), 429–460, and Drescher, "The Ending of the Slave Trade and the Evolution of European Scientific Racism," in *The Atlantic Slave Trade. Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe*, eds. Joseph E. Inikori and Stanley L. Engerman (Durham, N.C., 1992), 361–396; Peter Blanchard, *Slavery and Abolition in Early Republican Peru* (Wilmington, Del., 1992); Robin Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848* (London, 1988).

belief in a rationale of cost and profit. Since Christian rhetoric discouraged planters from stealing Africans' labor, planters sanctimoniously claimed they wanted "to transform masses of African and creole slaves into law-abiding, thrifty, hard-working, Christianized wage laborers." Their "Protestant work ethic" meant that Whites propounded the rules while Blacks did the work.

The use of commodified slave bodies for labor, like other worker-capitalist relations, was openly debated by Europeans. While parental emotions and children's identities seemed of no interest to planters, costs of reproduction were. In early 1830s Jamaica, it cost twice as much to rear a locally-born slave child than to import a new slave of working age. The low birth rates of African women, partly due to the planters' cost calculations, may also be connected to traditions of extended breast-feeding and to deliberate birth control in view of the dismal life prospects of children. When abolition transformed property into human labor, the costs of caring for children and the elderly were reallocated from the slaveholder class to the victimized working class. In Brazil, the *Lei do Ventre Libre* and the *Lei dos Sexagenários* "freed" unborn children and those over sixty years of age, i.e., it deprived babies and the elderly from the right to sustenance. In the U.S., slave-state legislators discussed the breakeven point between raising and exploiting slaves in order to determine a cost-neutral age for liberation. Slaves were to work off the "investment" owners had made in raising them. Similarly, in Europe serfs bore the cost of abolition of serfdom through land cessions they were required to make to their former owners. Payments by the exploited made to the exploiters transferred the cost of modernization to the workers.[16]

Post-slavery developments varied from island to island in the Caribbean and from country to country on the mainland. Planters frantically recruited labor wherever they could find it: They considered poor Europeans, Asians that could be indentured, free or semi-bound Africans. Labor's price counted more than color of skin. Euro-Caribbean

[16] Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, NC., 2002), 244; Monica Schuler, "Enslavement, the Slave Voyage, and Astral and Aquatic Journeys in African Diaspora Discourse," in *Africa and the Americas*, 185–213; Richard B. Sheridan, "Slave Demography in the British West Indies and the Abolition of the Slave Trade," in *Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade*, 259–285; Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, 167–168; Stanley L. Engerman and Robert W. Fogel, *Time on the Cross. The Economics of American Negro Slavery* (New York, 1989), 29–37, 155–157.

and Mulatto planters, first, experimented with continuing the bondage of African-origin men and women through apprenticeships or indentures. Second, they tried to hire local free labor which, in terms of cost of migration, was cheapest. In places that allowed freed Afro-Caribbean families to migrate to (marginal) agricultural land, many eschewed wage labor in order to raise their own food. In Caribbean inter-island migrations, tens of thousands moved in search of higher wages, better working conditions, or improved legal status. In British Guiana alone, some 40,500 voluntary migrants, mostly from Barbados, arrived before 1893. Third, planters tried to enlarge their labor reservoir with Africans freed from slave ships; about 40,000 were debarked in the British Caribbean and Guiana before 1866. Allegedly to earn their keep, they were indentured, at first for one, later for three years. Many subsequently fled to join free Afro-Caribbean communities. Fourth, planters attempted to recruit free U.S. Afro-Creoles and small numbers did migrate to the less racist island societies. Fifth, planters recruited free Kru people from Sierra Leone, but once the first migrants returned and reported on working conditions no further enlistments could be obtained.[17] Trial shipments of Chinese indentured laborers from Portuguese Macao were ordered by planters in British Trinidad in 1806 and Portuguese Brazil in 1810. From the 1840s, some 270,000 Chinese reached Cuba, Peru, and other Latin American economies and c.500,000 South Asians went to the Caribbean colonies and the Guyanas. Amerindian prisoners from the Yucatan and their wives, as well as peons sold by Euro-Creole *hacendados*, were carried to Cuba as forced laborers from 1848 to 1861. Experiments with "White" labor began in the mid-1830s and—like Asian indenture—became more important in the 1840s with the recruitment of Irish and English, French, Germans, Maltese, and Portuguese (many of them "Black" Cape Verdeans). Most Cape Verdeans abandoned plantation labor as soon as possible and turned to small trading, often in competition and conflict with local Afro-Caribbeans. Through intermarriage, however, a "new

[17] The Kru developed patterns of mobility as intermediary traders between Europeans and Africans. Bringing their canoes, they would travel on board European merchants' ships along the coasts and would paddle to the shore for trading wherever needed. Finally, they would return home. As laborers Kru migrated intra-regionally to plantations, across the Atlantic to the Caribbean Islands, and to the constructions sites of the Suez and Panama canals. Monica Schuler, "Kru Emigration to British and French Guiana, 1841–1857," in Paul E. Lovejoy, ed., *Africans in Bondage. Studies in Slavery and Slave Trade* (Madison, 1986), 155–201.

polyglot society of free peoples" emerged. Such peoples developed a sense of belonging on each island but a trans-Caribbean regional sense of identity emerged at the same time. Across color lines class solidarities were also forged. The Caribbean segment of the Black Atlantic had become a many-colored segmented World.[18]

The Black Atlantic's always fuzzy land borders in the Americas expanded as plantation regimes shifted to more fertile soils inland, new mining districts opened, and new crops, requiring different soils and climates, were introduced. The U.S.'s cotton economy shifted westward and southward after 1830. In the same decade, Jamaica's sugar economy lost its price advantage in world markets when slavery was abolished in the British Empire but not in the remnants of the Spanish one: Cuban plantation owners underbid their Jamaican peers and ruthlessly exploited White and "Yellow" labor—to continue to use the color schemes of the times—alongside their Black labor. In Brazil, the Minas Gerais mining region and the new coffee-based plantation economy relocated African laborers and attracted poor southern European ones from across the Atlantic.[19]

In Africa, a few cultural areas changed considerably in result of the reverse crossings of the Atlantic[20] by Creole Afro-Americans and Africans liberated from captured slave-trading vessels. They were small in numbers compared to the 1.9 million shipped in the other direction. The British Sierra Leone Company had founded Freetown in 1787 in order to settle freed African slaves who, with a promise of liberty,

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[18] Bridget Brereton, "Society and Culture in the Caribbean: The British and French West Indies, 1870–1980," in Wright and Palmer, *Modern Caribbean*, 85–110, quote 86; Francisco A. Scarano, "Labor and Society in the Nineteenth Century," ibid., 51–84; Carl H. Senior, "*Robert Kerr* Emigrants of 1840: Irish 'Slaves' for Jamaica," *Jamaica Journal* 42 (1978), 104–116; Walton L. Lai, *Indentured Labor, Caribbean Sugar: Chinese and Indian Migrants to the British West Indies* (Baltimore, 1993), 1–18; Keith O. Laurence, *Immigration into the West Indies in the 19th Century* (Barbados, 1971); Monica Schuler, *"Alas, Alas, Kongo." A Social History of Indentured African Immigration into Jamaica, 1841–1865* (Baltimore, 1980), and Schuler, "The Recruitment of African Indentured Labourers for European Colonies in the Nineteenth Century," in Piet C. Emmer, ed., *Colonialism and Migration. Indentured Labour before and after Slavery* (Dordrecht, 1986), 125–161; David Northrup, *Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 1834–1922* (Cambridge, 1995), 20–21, 33.

[19] See Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, Chap. 10, 15.4, 16.2.

[20] "Return" migrations involve people going back to their society of origin, "reverse" migrations are counter-directional moves of people who have never known the region of origin of their ancestors. Here, the term is also used for Africa-bound voyaging of slaves liberated from slave ships since these men and women were not returned to the cultures of origin but, in a way, to permanent holding areas.

had fought on the British side during the American War for Independence. These "Black Poor" purchased land from the local Temne peoples but, as had been true of Europeans arriving on the early Virginia Plantation and the Pilgrim settlers, many died from malnutrition shortly after arrival. Between 1792 and 1800, some 1,100 Afro-Creoles sponsored by abolitionists and 500 freed slaves from Jamaica also arrived. English-speaking, literate, and Christian they remained separate from local Africans. The British state then landed about 50,000 liberated Africans in the six decades after 1808. From Europe, White Protestant missionaries came to educate and train Black merchants, traders, and civil servants, as well as further missionaries who were to spread Christianity in the coastal regions, esp. among the Yoruba. From Africa's East and Interior, Muslim traders brought Islam, which spread through the rest of the country. The majority of inhabitants, however, remained Animist.

After 1820, the American Colonization Society sent slaves freed in the U.S. to a colony, named Liberia in 1822. Originating mainly in the antebellum U.S. South, the 16,500 or so reverse migrants considered themselves to be Americo-Liberians. Perhaps 6,000 Africans of many cultures freed from slave ships, and generically labeled "Congoes," also came. The freed peoples' independence, declared in 1847, meant little to France and Britain during their subsequent "scramble" for ever more of Africa. Although the Americo-Liberian newcomers did not integrate with "the Natives," they can be compared to Old-Testament and Jewish diasporas for they considered Africa, the country of their assumed roots, to be their "promised land." This Afro-American diaspora's strong connections to the U.S. are reflected in the constitution of 1847, the educational system, politics, business, and race relations. Convinced of its superiority, this particular segment of the people of the Black Atlantic assumed leadership over indigenous Africans, thus adapting to African usage racial-ethnic hierarchies from the U.S. slave states where they had been socialized. During the long worldwide depression of the 1870s, British and German economic interests, and after 1926, the U.S. Firestone Company, opened rubber plantations and set in motion local and regional migrations.[21]

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[21] From among many studies see J.J. Crooks, *A History of the Colony of Sierra Leone in Western Africa* (London, 1903); Mary L. Clifford, *From Slavery to Freedom. Black Loyalists after the American Revolution* (Jefferson, N.C., 1999); Mavis C. Campbell, *Back to Africa. George Ross & the Maroons. From Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone* (Trenton,

Reverse migrations from nineteenth-century Brazil to Africa also permitted use of human capital in a socio-economic space that allocated privileged status to the "Brazilians." The Afro-Brazilian diaspora, after some reverse acculturation, became cultural-commercial brokers, engaging in trade with Brazil, teaching their African-born children the Portuguese language, and organizing Catholic parishes to emphasize their distinctive status. Some of these West Africa-Brazil connections endured to the end of the twentieth century.[22]

While the impact of the reverse migrants remained limited, the cultural transfer to the Americas from African societies was massive. This was true even along the northern littoral of the Caribbean, usually known as the U.S. South. Despite an often-rhapsodized White culture, it became a bi-cultural African-European region.[23] In other societies around the Caribbean, the impact of Africans, and thus the reach of the Black Atlantic, was more limited by the presence and persistence of large native populations. The Caribbean Islands themselves were heavily influenced by Africans who often spoke their native tongue, a new generically African Creole language, and some version of English, French, Spanish, or Danish. Portuguese-speaking Brazil is perhaps the most intensively studied of these Afro-European societies. By the early nineteenth century it had the largest free "colored" population of any of the slave societies in the Americas even though its slave-labor based plantation economy of coffee production was still expanding. Slave estates, small or large, were thus embedded in a free labor economy and the lives and work of the free colored men and women largely resembled those of the Luso-Brazilians. They could enter most occupations, develop their own social organizations, and own their own

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N.J., 1993). Tom W. Shick, *Behold the Promised Land. A History of Afro-American Settler Society in Nineteenth-Century Liberia* (Baltimore, 1977); Yekutiel Gershoni, *Black Colonialism. The America-Liberian Scramble for the Hinterland* (Boulder, 1985); Amos J. Beyan, *The American Colonization Society and the Creation of the Liberian State* (Lanham, Md., 1991).

[22] Pierre Verger, *Flux et reflux de la traite des nègres entre le Golfe de Bénin et Bahia de Todos Os Santos du XVIIe au XIVe siècle* (Paris, 1968), 532–533, and the chapter titled "Formation d'une société brésilienne au Golfe de Benin," 599–635; Robert E. Conrad, *World of Sorrow. The African Slave Trade to Brazil* (Baton Rouge, 1986), 126–153.

[23] Other bi-cultural regions in the U.S. include the Hispanic-European Greater Southwest that connects to the northern Mexican states, several fragments of larger regions that are still bicultural First Peoples/ Second Arrivals, and a German-Scandinavian northwestern belt, as well as the Anglo-Franco New England states. Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, map 14.3, 353.

slaves. Still, Luso-Brazilians were overall wealthier and more likely to own slaves. Membership in Brazil's elite was limited to those of several shades of whiteness, ranging from pure paleness to light- or even medium-brown. At the time of the first national census in 1872, 1.5 million Afro-Brazilians remained enslaved in a population of 10.1 million (15.3 percent). The rest of the society was of mixed and White origin in a ratio of 6 to 4. Reminding us that all categories are constructions, some Brazilian population statistics designated only slaves as "Black."[24]

Latin American cultures created far more complex categories of genetic origin and color, based on who had children with whom, than did the U.S. with its "one-drop" rule. But no categorization could truly do justice to the variety of cultures on the Atlantic's western rims. The Africans and their descendants formed brotherhoods and *candomblé*s to combat the alienation and displacement, to find "remedies against isolation […] and the insidious witchcraft that had caused the misfortune of the slave condition." Such collectivities or larger communities were organized by nation, color, gender, and status. They pursued material as well as spiritual goals. To Africans, cultural differences between people of different origins were clear and Portuguese-origin Brazilians recognized the different African "nations." For African-origin men and women, diversity of origin sometimes demanded negotiation and search for a common language. Self-described "nations" and Portuguese-ascribed names for groups differed, overlapped, or might be congruent. In scholarship, however, the generic designation "slave" with its connotation of (imposed) passivity and (alleged) depraved status and primitive background often prevented analysis of differentiation between, for example, the West African Savaru, Ardas, Hausa, Tapa, Jeje, DaGome, and Nagô. Some rituals copied or mocked Portuguese practices but were sanctioned by authorities whether local dignitaries or ranking office-holders.[25]

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[24] See Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, 244–56, for literature.

[25] This discussion of culture relies on Edward A. Alpers, "'Moçambiques' in Brazil: Another Dimension of the African Diaspora in the Atlantic World," in *Africa and the Americas*, 43–68; Elizabeth W. Kiddy, "Kings, Queens, and Judges: Hierarchy in Lay Religious Brotherhoods of Blacks, 1750–1830 [in Brazil]," ibid., 95–125, quote 95. See also, more generally, Philip Morgan, "The Cultural Implications of the African Slave Trade: African Regional Origins, American Destinations and New World Developments," *Slavery and Abolition* 18.1 (1997), 122–145. For an African-background

African languages altered European ones. One linguist has identified 2500 Brazilian-Portuguese words of possible sub-Saharan African origin—the name for the now widely known percussion instrument, *marimba*, among them. Language usage and associated custom, or vice versa, influenced Portuguese-origin Brazilians; cultures mixed in some segments of everyday lives but not in others.[26] The demand for slaves and continuing importation which continued into early nineteenth century Bahia led to re-formation of African "nations" (or in U.S. usage, "ethnic groups") under conditions of both bondage and changed social environment. In religion, flexible "pantheons" of Gods emerged, and priests—both male and female—occupied positions of authority that were recognized as such by the Luso-Brazilians. While the *candomblé* institution became "a genuine New World creation, resulting from the socio-cultural conditions of slavery, [it] reproduced and adapted the basic principle of multi-divinity cultivation and serial form of performance characteristic of the vodun religious system."[27]

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, working-class organizations in Bahia—the *cantos* of the *ganhadores*—were ethnically-based and popular among mainly Yoruba-speaking Nagôs but also combined slave and free street workers. Most were porters but skilled tradesmen such as blacksmiths, masons, carpenters, joiners, and others also became members. They organized strikes, resisted government regulation and interference, controlled the quality of their work, and emphasized self-governance. Many were African-born, others were internal migrants from declining sugar regions. Some, in old age, reembarked for Africa like European-origin workers of North America who also at retirement returned to their societies of birth where the cost of living was low. Though living and working in Brazil, they had remained "foreigners" all their (forced) working lives, as one observer

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religion, *Abakuá*, in Cuba see Stephan Palmié, "The Circulation of Africanity: A View from Itia Ororo Kande," unpubl paper, 2004.

[26] John T. Schneider, *Dictionary of African Borrowings in Brazilian Portuguese* (Hamburg, 1991), cited in Alpers, "'Moçambiques' in Brazil"; Gregory Guy, "Muitas Linguas: The Linguistic Impact of Africans in Colonial Brazil," in *Enslaving Connections: Western Africa and Brazil during the Era of Slavery*, eds. José C. Curto and Paul E. Lovejoy (Amherst, NY, 2004), 125–137.

[27] Luis N. Parés, "Transformations of the Sea and Thunder Voduns in the Gbe-speaking Are and in the Bahian Jeje Candomblé," in *Africa and the Americas*, 69–93, quote 86.

thought.[28] While these Africans were returning, however, European powers embarked on a last attack on Africa, dividing most of what remained of the continent among themselves. They no longer sought human labor but rather mineral deposits and industrial raw materials like rubber. Again the oceanic waterways of the Atlantic provided travel connections as well as routes for aggression.

Multiple Transatlantic Interactions 1914–1930s: Workers and Intellectuals Re-conceptualize Black-White-Native Interactions

The first four decades of the twentieth century mark a further period of transition in the Black Atlantic. New and distinct migration regions emerged: Workers and soldiers moved from the African colonies to the metropoles of Britain and France. From the Caribbean colonies, as well as from West and North Africa, Black intellectuals moved to London and Paris; Caribbean businesspeople and intellectuals also moved to Harlem, New York. Workers moved northward along the Atlantic's littoral as far as Montreal and Toronto. Finally, fleeing U.S. racism, Afro-U.S. intellectuals, musicians, and artists migrated to Paris as well as in very small numbers to other European cities.

With the beginning of World War One, the colonial centers needed the support and "menpower" (sic) of their colonies. France and Britain relied on hundreds of thousands of Asian contract workers and, France in particular, on African soldiers, the *tirailleurs sénégalais*.[29] A century earlier, European self-paralysis during dynastic, anti-revolutionary and Napoleonic-imperialist warfaring had permitted the many-colored peoples of the Americas to gain independence. This time, Europe's self-destruction between 1914 and 1918 permitted (British) India's nationalist leaders to negotiate an end to the system of labor indenture for plantations across the Empire. It also permitted soldiers and workers to gain a foothold in the cities and labor markets of the core. A new Afro-European connection emerged. In the 1920s and 1930s, West African workers were recruited for French industries and African

[28] João J. Reis, "Street Labor in Bahia on the Eve of Abolition," in Curto and Soulodre-LaFrance, eds., *Africa and the Americas*, 141–172.

[29] Some of the indentured laborers were highly skilled artisans. Vietnamese specialists in application of varnish improved the dynamic qualities of wooden aircraft propellers in France and, after the war, stayed in Paris as lacquerers for renowned artists.

sailors manned both French and British ships.[30] The West-African and Afro-Caribbean migrations to France and to Britain, in a way, provided a twentieth century mirror image of the Black Atlantic's first phase, the West African-Iberian connection.

Global power relations and racial barriers also began to change. While France expressed an ambivalent gratitude to its soldiers, Germans still decried the *Rassenschande* of Black soldiers fighting against other White Europeans and White German women falling in love with them and conceiving "bastard" children.[31] While Empires collapsed or threatened to collapse in 1918, the smaller nations of Europe and colonized societies demanded self-government. The human rights of the Age of Revolution (and of total warfare) justified the colonies' right to self-government in the Age of Imperialism (and of total warfare). While Japan demanded equality of peoples at the founding of the League of Nations and a Vietnamese student, later known under the name of Ho Chi Minh, demanded self-government for French Indochina, African peoples' leaders tried to influence the French government to change colonial rule. Afro-U.S. scholar W.E.B. DuBois led the delegation concerned with African issues to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1918–19 and he became a driving force behind several of the five Pan-African congresses held between 1918 and 1945. What had once been the White-dominated Black Atlantic and Empire-controlled Indian Ocean and the East and Southeast Asian Seas now became a joint arena for Afro-Asian migrations to the imperial cores and for struggles to end exploitation and oppression in the colonies.

A further development of the 1920s and 1930s was the arrival in France of student and other intellectual migrants from France's African and Afro-Caribbean colonies. (From India and from the Afro-British Caribbean students also arrived in Great Britain). Many of

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[30] Marc Michel, *L'Appel à l'Afrique: contributions et réactions à l'effort de guerre en A[frique] O[rientale] F[rançaise], 1914–1919* (Paris, 1982); François Manchuelle, *Willing Migrants: Soninke Labor Diasporas, 1848–1960* (Athens, 1997).

[31] Hospitals and mosques for Muslim Africans were built; the Grand Mosquée de Paris, for example, in 1925. From the many studies see: Philippe Dewitte, *Les Mouvements nègres en France 1919–1939* (Paris, 1985); Marc Michel, *L'Appel à l'Afrique: contributions et réactions à l'effort de guerre en A.O.F., 1914–1919* (Paris, 1982); Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, "'Tirailleurs sénégalais'" und 'Schwarze Schande'," in János Riesz and Joachim Schultz, eds., "*'Tirailleurs Sénégalais'. Zur bildlichen und literarischen Darstellung afrikanischer Soldaten im Dienste Frankreichs* (Frankfurt/M., 1989), 57–75; Sally Marks, "Black Watch on the Rhine: A Study in Propaganda, Prejudice and Prurience," *European Studies Review* 13 (1983), 297–334.

these students conceptualized intercultural fusion and resistance in terms of colonizer power, migrations between metropoles and colonies, interactions, and colonized subalterns' strategies of subversion. In Paris, Leopold Senghor from Sénégal and Aimé Césaire from Martinique tried to dissolve White-Black antagonism through the concept of integration among equals, *negritude*. After World War Two Alioune Diop, in his influential journal *Présence Africaine*, asserted the value of African expressions in a dialogue with French ethnologists and intellectuals. This occurred at a time when new generations of West African labor migrants were being recruited for French industry. When later White scholars reread the travel accounts of early Dutch and Portuguese traders in West Africa or of Jesuits in China, they realized that these travellers, too, had been deeply impressed by the sophistication of their host societies and that the dichotomizing of primitive and civilized peoples was an invention of sixteenth century apologists of slavery, perpetuated by the racializing scientists and nationalist historians of the nineteenth century. African art, in the first four decades of the twentieth century, became an inspiration to French artists and the Art Deco movement. French ethnologists, collecting artefacts in French West Africa in the 1930s, realized that they could perpetrate such scholarship only under the protection of the French colonizer regime. Instead, Marcel Griaule and Michel Leiris developed a critique of European Africanists' approaches.[32] The dual migrations of workers and intellectuals thus challenged Europe's self-proclaimed superiority and news of the changes in Europe reverberated back through remittances and return migration.[33]

The Black Atlantic assumed another new shape when Afro-U.S. writers and artists escaped U.S. racial hierarchies to travel to Paris. A northern Afro-Atlantic exchange emerged with Harlem and Montmartre as its two ends.[34] Another connection, the Caribbean-U.S./Canada

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[32] Ariane Audouin-Dubreuil, ed., *La Croisière noire: Sure la trace des explorateurs du XIXe siècle* (Grenoble, 2004); Claude Blanckaert, ed., *Les Politiques de l'anthropologie. Discours et pratiques en France (1860–1940)* (Paris, 2001). Charlotte Benton, Tim Benton, Ghislaine Wood, *Art Deco 1910–1939* (London, 2003), Chap. 7.

[33] Bernd-Peter Lange and Mala Pandurang, "Dialectics of Empire and Complexities of Culture: British Men in India, Indian Experiences of Britain," in Dirk Hoerder with Christiane Harzig and Adrian Shubert, eds., *The Historical Practice of Diversity: Transcultural Interactions from the Early Modern Mediterranean to the Postcolonial World* (New York, 2003), 177–200.

[34] Jules-Rosette Bennetta, *Black Paris. The African Writers' Landscape* (Urbana, 1998); Pascal Blanchard, Eric Deroo, Gilles Manceron, *Le Paris Noir* (Paris, 2001);

one, brought activists and scholars from the English-language Caribbean—Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados—like Marcus Garvey and Amy E. Jacques, Claude McKay and George Padmore, Richard B. Moore and Cyril V. Briggs, to the U.S. and Eric Williams and C.L.R. James to London.[35] Moving within the Afro-Americas, Zora Neale Hurston began her ethnological research in Florida and the Caribbean.[36] The result is what Lara Putnam has termed a transatlantic "Black International." Scholars, in other words, had begun to revise their attitudes to Africa and Africans in the Atlantic World decades before a new politics of racial reform developed. This movement ended the era of "scientific racism" in the White Atlantic (and beyond) that had first been countered by the abolitionist intellectual Black Atlantic in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It did not end racializations.[37]

In the 1930s, intercultural and inter-colored Worlds were also theorized by Gilberto Freyre in Brazil and Fernando Ortiz in Cuba. Both were aware of the Native Americans' or First Peoples' presence and impact on the Atlantic. Scholarly development in the United States at first lagged because of pervasive racism there.[38] Sociologist Freyre,

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Tyler Stovall, *Paris Noir: African Americans in the City of Lights* (New York, 1996); Petrine Archer-Straw, *Negrophilia: Avant-garde Paris and Black Culture in the 1920s* (New York, 2000).

[35] In Trinidad and Tobago historian and statesman Eric Williams studied the relations between British capitalist development and abolition of slavery (see n. 11 above) and Trinidadian C.L.R. James, journalist and Afro-Caribbean activist, published major research on the Haitian revolution (see n. 10 above).

[36] Winston James, *Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism in Early Twentieth-Century America* (London, 1998). I am grateful to Lara Putnam for sharing her unpublished manuscript "'Nothing Matters But Color': Transnational Circuits, the Interwar Caribbean, and the Black International" in Michael D. West and William G. Martin, eds., *From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International and the Struggle for Liberation* (Chapel Hill, forthcoming).

[37] Seymour Drescher, "The Ending of the Slave Trade and the Evolution of European Scientific Racism," in *Atlantic Slave Trade*, 361–396; Jacques Barzun, *Race: A Study in Modern Superstition* (New York, 1937); George M. Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind* (New York, 1971); Robert Miles, *Racism* (London, 1989); James Walvin, *England, Slaves, and Freedom, 1776–1838* (London, 1986).

[38] Critical research in the U.S. began late and was influenced from the outside through Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, who with Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose published the seminal *An American Dilemma. The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York, 1944). Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen. The Negro in the Americas* (New York, 1946); Melville Herskovits, *The Myth of the Negro Past* (New York, 1941); Frances S. Herskovits, *An Outline of Dahomean Religious Belief*, Memoirs of the American Anthropological Assoc. 41 (Menasha, WI, 1933). Serious research began only at the time of the beginning of the civil rights movement with the work by Kenneth M. Stampp and Stanley Elkins, later much criticized, but at the time a major

influenced by anthropologist Franz Boas, argued that the mixing (*mestiçagem*) of migrants from Europe and Africa with Natives Peoples, in a process of ethnogenesis, established a new, culturally richer, people. Within power relationships, the lives of the Afro-Brazilian slaves and Portuguese-Brazilian masters were inextricably linked. Population planners and believers in "race hygiene," in much of Latin America demanded policies to attract European migrants to "whiten" their societies through intermarriage with natives. Freyre's positive view of the Portuguese's capability to establish harmonious multi-racial societies and of paternalism has since been widely criticized, for in preventing the formation of Black or other fixed identities, it also limited the foundations for political mobilization against discrimination. Still, his concept of a frontier society built by both the powerless and the powerful of the immigrants was a major theoretical innovation.[39]

In Cuba's many-cultured society, Fernando Ortiz developed a concept of the transculturation of all members of the society regardless of their position in the frames of power and in schemes of scientific racism. Transculturation described the economic, institutional, legal, ethical, religious, artistic, linguistic, psychological, sexual, and all other aspects of people's lives and of society as a whole. Ortiz differentiated Native Peoples, Iberian and other Europeans, and Africans into their components—Wolof, Catalonian, Genoese, Jewish, Ciboney, Cantonese—to arrive at an empirically sound concept of fusion within power hierarchies. Like Freyre, he saw the Iberian Peninsula as a bridge between Europe and Africa, as a space where cultures interacted. He pointed to the first Black Atlantic, that existed long before that of the English-language abolitionists, and to its long-term impact on cultural fusion.[40] The concept of transculturation, explored also by Bronisław

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step out of the backwaters of racist scholarship. An early summary of approaches is Sidney Mintz and Richard Price, *An Anthropological Approach to the Afro-American Past: A Caribbean Perspective* (Philadelphia, 1976), reprinted as *The Birth of African-American Culture: An Anthropological Perspective*, Boston, 1992). Early U.S. research on African culture is discussed in Colleen Kriger, "The Conundrum of Culture in Atlantic History," in *Africa and the Americas*, 259–278.

[39] Gilberto Freyre, *Casa-Grande e senzala* (1933), Engl. transl. by Samuel Putnam, *The Masters and the Slaves. A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization* (1946), rev. ed. (Berkeley, 1986); Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought*, rev. ed. (Durham, 1993), 206–218, 272–275.

[40] Fernando Ortiz, "Del fenómeno de la transculturación y su importancia en Cuba," *Revista Bimestre Cubana* 27 (1940), 273–278, transl. as *Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar* by Harriet de Onís (1947); repr. (Durham, 1995). Sylvie Chalaye,

Malinowski,[41] emphasized the creation of new cultures that included selected aspects of all its contributors' pre-migration cultural socializations rather than copied the cultures of any one Old World.[42] Freyre's and Ortiz's studies, available in English by 1946 and 1947, however, did not become part of North Atlantic scholarship until reread after 1970.[43]

For centuries, then, multiple and distinct but still related Black Atlantics had evolved, producing this newest Black Atlantic of the twentieth century. The study of the Black Atlantic(s) requires a systems approach just as does the study of all migratory social spaces and scapes. While the label "Black Atlantic" helped to insert African transatlantic migrations—whether involuntary or voluntary-into public memory, its analytical value is limited. The Worlds of Africans in the many regions of the Atlantic's littoral were far too differentiated and varied over time to exist comfortably within a single Black Atlantic. Although low-cost ship travel certainly facilitated the moving of bodies and the voyaging of people across the Atlantic, the history of the "Black Atlantic" is a history of its coastal societies rather than of the ocean itself.

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ed., "Traces noires de l'Histoire en Occident," *Africultures* 64 (juillet–septembre 2005), 3–143.

[41] Malinowski was a transmigrant himself, of Polish-origin in the Habsburg Empire, then University of Leipzig and London School of Economics-educated, and later teaching at LSE and at Yale. Franz Boas, at Columbia University, was Jewish, German, and American.

[42] Similar but more gendered approaches have later been used to understand the Native-French and Native-Scottish métissage in eighteenth and nineteenth century Canada's fur trade as well as the intermingled Portuguese-African and -Asian families in the Indian Ocean trading enclaves. Sylvia Van Kirk, *"Many Tender Ties:" Women in Fur Trade Society in Western Canada, 1670–1870* (Winnipeg, 1980); Allen F. Isaacman, *Mozambique. The Africanization of a European Institution: The Zambezi Prazos, 1750–1902* (Madison, 1972).

[43] In Canada's bi-cultural Montreal, Everett Hughes and Helen MacGill Hughes also argued that receiving societies provide no single model of acculturation. Everett C. Hughes, "The Study of Ethnic Relations," *Dalhousie Review* 27 (1948), 477–482, and Hughes and Helen MacGill Hughes, *Where Peoples Meet: Racial and Ethnic Frontiers* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952).

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD

Silke Hensel

Introduction

With the beginning of European colonization in America, the continent of South America became a constitutive part of the developing Atlantic World. In addition to trade and empire building, migrations played an important role in the entanglement of Europe, the Americas, and Africa. Free population movements to the Spanish and Portuguese parts of the New World were relatively small. Approximately 2,700,000 Spanish and Portuguese migrants made their way to the Americas from 1500 until 1800.[1] Coercion delivered the bulk of new inhabitants from Africa to different parts of the Americas. African slaves outnumbered European immigrants to the Americas by three to one and between 1760 and 1820; almost six Africans set out for the Americas for every European.[2] Thus, in the Atlantic from 1500 onward for more than three hundred years, the dominant migratory regime became the slave trade from Africa.[3] This changed in the nineteenth century after the abolition of slave trade and the emancipation of slaves—a process that lasted until the end of the nineteenth century in the most important slave societies, Cuba and Brazil. Both coerced and free migrations to the Iberian colonies contributed to the formation of the new societies. Transculturation[4] resulted when the three

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[1] Ida Altman and James Horn, *To Make America: European Emigration in the Early Modern Period* (Berkeley, 1991), 3.

[2] David Eltis, "Free and Coerced Migrations from the Old World to the New," in David Eltis, ed., *Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives* (Stanford, Cal., 2002), 33–74, esp. 36.

[3] David Eltis, "Introduction: Migration and Agency in Global History," in *Coerced and Free Migration*, 1–31, esp. 8.

[4] The term transculturation was coined by Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz, who conceptualized cultural change in the Americas as an active and transformative process of all individuals and groups involved. In addition, transculturation goes further than the notion of *mestizaje* (fusion of cultures) because of its emphasis on new cultural creations. Fernando Ortiz, *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y azúcar* (Havana, 1991).

major groups—Americans, Europeans, and Africans—had to make and re-make their lives under the new circumstances in the colonies. New ethnicities also developed among the African- and European-derived populations, a process that curiously is probably better understood for Africans than it is for Europeans. Although Latin American populations today are often imagined as the product of *mestizaje* (in the sense of cultural fusions) which took place during the colonial era, it is important to note that many of the people who contributed to the pluralization of Latin American societies and cultures came after most countries achieved their independence from Spain and Portugal, that is, after 1820.[5]

During the period from 1830 to 1930, which is the focus of this article, migratory regimes in Latin America changed substantially from those of the colonial era. Following a phase of almost no European migration in the first decades, immigration became a major process from the 1880s onward. In addition, the slave trade, which continued to rise to unprecedented highs in Brazil and Cuba until the middle of the nineteenth century, finally came to a halt. Both processes, as well as the migration of Asians as contract and free laborers, were intertwined. To make sense of these changes in the migratory flows to Latin America, it is best to view the century from 1830 to 1930 as divided into two different periods. Finally, the impacts of the trans-atlantic mass migration of these two eras on the integration of Latin America into the Atlantic World needs to be assessed.

Migration to Latin America: The Preponderance of Coerced Migration until the 1870s

As in the colonial period, migration to Latin America until the 1870s was dominated by the coerced movement of Africans, and then also Asians to the continent. African slaves remained the largest group. Between 15 and 20 percent of the Africans who were sent out for the Americas as slaves came during the period from 1811–1870. Almost one million Africans were taken to Brazil; 600,000 reached Cuban shores, and the rest were brought to the French Caribbean.[6] The

[5] Samuel Baily and Eduardo José Míguez, eds., *Mass Migration to Modern Latin America* (Wilmington, Del., 2003), xv.

[6] Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison, 1969), 234.

ongoing importation of slaves led to an unprecedented growth in Cuban sugar and Brazilian coffee production. When Brazil ceded to British pressure in 1850 and finally terminated its transatlantic slave trade, prices for slaves rose sharply. Because of the growth of the coffee sector in São Paulo and the decline of sugar production in the northeast, slaves were now often traded internally. Almost 200,000 slaves were moved from the sugar plantations in Bahia in the northeast to the coffee *fazendas* (plantations) in the South of the country.[7] The transatlantic slave trade to Cuba continued for even longer, until 1865–66. Well before its final termination, Cuban slave owners started already in 1853 to look for alternative supplies of labor and found it in the so-called coolie trade of Chinese workers. Spanish and British ships brought the first workers to Cuba. Soon, Portuguese Macao became the main port from where Chinese "coolies" were taken to Latin America. Even though this migration regime did not belong exclusively to the Atlantic system its inception cannot be separated from developments in the Atlantic.

By 1874, 124,000 Chinese had been brought to Cuba as contract laborers and 80 percent worked on the sugar plantations. In 1876, Chinese accounted for up to three percent of the Cuban population.[8] Their migrations too were coerced migration because some Chinese contract laborers had been tricked or forced into signing contracts in China. More important, they were neither free to choose their workplace for the period under contract, nor were they free to move or to influence the conditions of their daily work. For the vast majority working on sugar plantations, work and living conditions differed only slightly from that of slaves.[9] But, once the contract ended, they could at least decide on their destiny, even though the Cuban state tried to undermine that freedom by ordering in 1860 that those whose contract had expired had to indenture themselves again or leave the country.[10]

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[7] Herbert S. Klein, *African Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Oxford, 1986), 126; Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, "The Population of Latin America, 1850–1930," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, 12 vols. (Cambridge, 1986), 4:127.

[8] Manuel R. Moreno Fraginals, "Migraciones chinas a Cuba, 1848–1959," in Birgitta Leander, ed., *Europa, Asia y Africa en América Latina y el Caribe* (Paris, 1989), 225–246, esp. 235.

[9] Evelyn Hu-DeHart, "Chinese Coolie Labour in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century: Free Labour or Neo-Slavery?" *Slavery and Abolition* 14.1 (1993), 67–86.

[10] Ibid., 73.

Cuba was not the only country that sought Chinese contract laborers. Almost 100,000 Chinese were transported as contract laborers to Peru between 1853 and 1874.[11] According to the Peruvian census of 1876 two percent of the population was of Chinese ancestry.[12] In addition, Panama and Mexico received Chinese workers who built the Panama Canal and worked in Mexican railroad construction and the production of *henequen* in Yucatán. Chinese migration to Mexico rose in the 1880s when the U.S. passed legislation excluding all laborers from China in 1882. Although the majority of Chinese migrants came as contract laborers to Latin America, a much smaller group came as free migrants. Of these a small portion belonged to the middle class (but this type of migration occurred more in the period after 1870).

The trade in Chinese contract workers from the 1850s until the 1870s led to the integration of Latin American regions into a large Pacific migration system. Nevertheless, due to its characteristics, the impact of this migration remained smaller than the Atlantic migrations of the same period. Unlike African and European migrations, Chinese contract laborers were almost 100 percent male, which discouraged reproduction. This was one reason why a Chinese community in the sense of a persistent and distinguishable ethnic group, living for generations in Chinese families and settling in "Chinatowns," did not develop in the countries of reception. A second was that trade in the commodities produced by the Chinese did not follow the trade in laborers: on the contrary, the produce they raised was exported to Europe and not to Asia. Thus, after the end of the "coolie" trade, transportation and trade opportunities that might have encouraged the development of ongoing chain migration and the development of Chinese communities were relatively scarce. A direct ship line between Hong Kong and Callao was only established in 1904, which stimulated Chinese migration to Peru in the following years. Thus, Chinese communities in Peru were not the immediate result of the "coolie" trade but of later origin.

The first decades after Latin American independence not only reduced immigration from Spain and Portugal but also led to return migration by some Spaniards. Some left voluntarily because of the political change and turmoil, others were forced to leave, as occurred,

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[11] Adam McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900–1936* (Chicago, 2001), 44.

[12] Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, *La población de América Latina. Desde los tiempos precolombinos al año 2025*, 2nd rev. ed. (Madrid, 1994), 125.

for example, in Mexico, when Mexicans became irritated due to gossip on Spanish plans to invade and reconquer their only recently independent country.[13] From the inception of the national period in 1820 until the 1870s, political instability and economic downturns did not make Latin America especially attractive to prospective European migrants. A few early British and Irish migrants fought in Simon Bolivar's army during the independence movement, but they were a minority. In addition, in Brazil and Cuba, two countries that would become major recipients of European migration at the end of the nineteenth century, slavery persisted until 1888 and 1886, respectively. European workers were reluctant to migrate to countries or regions where slaves worked in plantation agriculture, thus European migration up to the 1880s remained relatively small to Brazil's main slave areas. Cuba, instead, received high numbers of Spanish immigrants in the first half of the nineteenth century due to its colonial status until 1898. Of those Europeans who did settle in Latin American countries, most belonged to the middle or upper classes and settled in cities. They came as merchants or entrepreneurs who established businesses. Most often, these people did not think of their migration as permanent but rather wanted to return to their country of origin. British, French, and also German businessmen who settled in Mexico, Argentina, and Chile were prominent among those migrants.[14] In addition to this elite migration, the establishment of agrarian communities became important for encouraging German migration into the countries of the Southern Cone very early in the nineteenth century; most of these agrarian communities were in southern Brazil.[15] Often counted as German, 2,000 Swiss agrarian settlers came to Brazil. And between 1846 and 1858, 3,000 Germans arrived in Chile. Still, these were atypical movements and most European emigrants did not consider Latin American countries as an attractive destination relative to the United States. Another exception from this pattern were Italians, who chose Latin American destinations, i.e., Argentina and Brazil, in larger numbers

[13] Harold D. Sims, *La expulsión de los españoles de México (1821–1828)* (México City, 1974).

[14] Hermann Kellenbenz, "Deutsche Kaufleute in Valparaiso," in Titus Heydenreich, ed., *Chile: Geschichte, Wirtschaft und Kultur der Gegenwart* (Frankfurt, 1990); Walther Bernecker and Thomas Fischer, "Deutsche in Lateinamerika," in Klaus Bade, ed., *Deutsche im Ausland—Fremde im Ausland* (München, 1992), 200.

[15] Bernecker and Fischer "Deutsche in Lateinamerika," 197–198.

than the United States until the 1880s.[16] During this early period Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay received the bulk of European migrants heading to Latin America, to a total number of up to 200,000 persons.[17] In relation to national populations, Uruguay received the highest proportion of immigrants. Already in 1843 foreigners constituted 63 percent of that country's inhabitants (at the time, the proportion of foreigners in the much larger population of the United States was under 10 percent).[18] At mid-century Buenos Aires already had a 36 percent foreign population, Italians forming the largest group with 11 percent of the total population and 31 percent of the foreign population living in the city.[19]

The Dominance of Free Migration to Latin America since the 1860s

Only in the second half of the nineteenth century did migration to Latin America become predominantly free in the sense that migrants now had some say in their destinations and modes of travel, rather than being forced by contract or trickery to leave their countries without much control over the nature of their work or their countries of destination. Several developments contributed to the changes in migratory regimes that occurred in Latin America from the 1860s onward. First, changes in Europe, such as further industrialization and its impact on the labor market, but also the full integration of more European regions into the transatlantic migration system, spurred emigration. Second, revolutionary changes in transportation and communication made emigration to the Americas cheaper and easier. Since the founding of the first transatlantic steamship line in 1840, 64 major companies served the routes between Europe and South America,

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[16] In 1879, of the 37,000 Italians leaving their country for overseas destinations 32 percent went to Argentina, 16 to Brazil, and 13 to the United States. Dino Cinel, *From Italy to San Francisco. The Immigrant Experience* (Stanford, Cal., 1982), 36–37.

[17] Magnus Mörner, "Immigration into Latin America: especially Argentina and Chile," in Pieter Emmer and Magnus Mörner, eds., *European Expansion and Migration. Essays on the International Migration from Africa, Asia, and Europe* (Oxford, 1992), 211–243, esp. 218.

[18] Sánchez-Albornoz, "The Population of Latin America," 126.

[19] Fernando J. Devoto, "Los origenes de un barrio italiano en Buenos Aires a mediados del siglo XIX," *Boletín del instituto de historia argentina y americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani* 3.1 (1989), 93–114, esp. 94–95.

i.e. Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.[20] The length of trips to Buenos Aires for migrants from Spanish Galicia declined from 58 to 61 days at the middle of the nineteenth century to only 17 days at the turn of the century.[21] For Italians leaving from Naples to the Americas the journey shortened in similar degrees. In a sailing ship the ocean voyage to Buenos Aires could take more or less two months while a steamship at the turn of the nineteenth century needed only eighteen to twenty days and the traveling time was much more predictable than it had been for sailing ships.[22]

David Eltis has suggested, however, that the decline in transportation costs alone could not explain the extraordinary rise of transatlantic migration from Europe to the Americas. According to him, psychological change was important, too. With the improvement in ocean-borne transportation migrants could expect to return home if they wanted to. This perception of being closer to home made the decision to emigrate that much easier.[23] Third, free migration from Europe (if we choose not to consider economic necessity a form of coercion) only became important for a few Latin American countries when they achieved a greater degree of political stability and economic growth. Finally, emigration from Europe rose in the final decades of the nineteenth and the first of the twentieth century. Higher numbers of European migrants in Latin American countries reflected this trend (see tables 15 and 16).

Official policies passed by the new countries of Latin America significantly influenced increases in transatlantic migrations. Only when Brazil and Cuba abolished slavery and the Chinese government intervened to end the trade in Chinese contract laborers did more Europeans consider migration to those countries. But the Brazilian and the Argentine governments went further than that, and actually subsidized European immigration. The Brazilian state of São Paulo established at the beginning of the 1880s a station where migrants were welcomed and helped in finding work. A decade earlier, in 1871 and 1872, the government of São Paulo—dominated by *fazendeiros* (coffee

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[20] José C. Moya, *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigration in Buenos Aires, 1850–1930* (Berkeley, Cal., 1998), 439, n. 96 and n. 97.

[21] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 38.

[22] Samuel L. Baily, *Immigrants in the Lands of Promise: Italians in Buenos Aires and New York City, 1870–1914*, (Ithaca, 1999), 32.

[23] Eltis, "Introduction," 10.

plantation owners)—had legislated financial support for the recruitment of European laborers. In 1884, four years before slavery was finally abolished, São Paulo charged slave owners with a new tax that was destined to subsidize the attraction of free laborers to the state. Finally, the Brazilian state entered into contracts with shipping companies in 1894 and paid directly for the passage of European migrants. As long as they contracted with a coffee planter, the migrants' fares to the nearest railroad station of their final destination were also paid for. This system of state-sponsored immigration persisted until 1927 and the state of São Paulo paid for it with nine percent of its tax income. Under such policies, the state institutions could influence the characteristics of the migrants recruited. Brazilian plantation owners wanted families to come because they thought of family units as more stable than single men or women and they counted work that women and children would do as unpaid or free labor. Between 80 and 100 percent of the migrants who came on a subsidized passage spent their first days in Brazil at the migration station where they were provided food and shelter, medical treatment, and helped to find a job. Of course, this description may create an overly positive portrait, for migrants also complained of hopeless overcrowding in the migration station.[24]

In Argentina, the state also actively supported European immigration. In order to attract immigrants, some Argentine provinces provided between 30 and 40 acres of land, in addition to tools, animals, and seeds. In 1880 about 695 agrarian colonies with more than 53,000 farms operated by European migrants existed in the provinces of Santa Fé, Córdoba, and Entre Ríos.[25] But in Argentina the high season of official support for immigrants came in the 1880s. The Argentine state provided for nearly 135,000 free passages, mainly from Italy and Spain. Compared to the total number of immigrants, this number was not particularly high. José Moya estimates that roughly 2 percent of all immigrants who entered Argentina in the period from 1840–1930 came on state sponsored tickets.[26] Thus, he suggests that factors other than state politics exerted more influence on migration decisions and he especially emphasizes the importance of chain migration and

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[24] Thomas H. Holloway, *Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in São Paulo, 1886–1934* (Chapel Hill, 1980).

[25] David Rock, *Argentina 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* (Berkeley, 1987), 137.

[26] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 51–52.

migrants' own social networks. Through these networks, potential migrants got information on the destination and received support from relatives, friends, or former neighbors who had already made the journey. Nevertheless, it remains true that somebody had to take the first step before such networks could come into existence and state-sponsored passages and state-sponsored advertising in the countries of origin of migrants played a role for the pioneer migrant. Besides relatives and friends who spread the news on Argentina, the state itself did so by establishing consulates in Spain that advertised the country.[27]

From the 1850s onward European emigration rose considerably and became a mass exodus. Most of the 55 million European emigrants to the Americas traveled to the United States, but approximately 13 million people instead chose different Latin American countries as their destination (this number does not include the so-called "golondrinas," that is, those Italian workers who went for a season to Argentina and returned to Europe in the summer, often repeating this journey the next year).[28] Most of the European migrants set out for Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay, and Chile. Almost 4 million immigrants settled in Argentina and 2 million in Brazil. Approximately 600,000 went to Cuba and Uruguay, while 200,000 chose Chile as destination.[29] Even though the Latin American governments would have preferred migrants of northern European provenance, most immigrants came from Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Eastern Europeans, among them many Jews who fled prosecution in their homelands, also came to South America.[30] In addition to these European immigrants the so-called "turcos" constituted another relatively important group of immigrants.[31] Under the label of "turcos," immigrants originating in the Ottoman Empire and Syria, with very diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds, were lumped together. At the turn of the twentieth century, more than 162,000 Lebanese migrants were estimated to live in Brazil and almost 150,000 in Argentina.[32] In Mexico, fewer Middle Easterners arrived, amounting to 36,000 in the period from

[27] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 60–120 *passim*.
[28] Sánchez-Albornoz, *La población de América Latina*, 133.
[29] Sánchez-Albornoz, "The Population of Latin America," 126.
[30] Judith Laikin Elkin, *150 Jahre Einsamkeit. Die Geschichte der Juden in Lateinamerika* (Hamburg, 1996).
[31] Special Issue "Turcos," *The Americas*, 53.1 (1996).
[32] Michael Humphrey, "Lebanese Identities: Between Cities, Nations and Transnations," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 4 (2004), 1–17, esp. 1.

1895–1940.[33] Thus, transatlantic migration included not only Africans and Europeans but also people coming from West Asia.

Besides structural reasons such as industrialization and the connected growing transatlantic economic networks that influenced transatlantic migration, the ebbs and flows in migratory movements followed the economic boom and bust periods of particular national and regional economies. Conditions in transportation also led to ups and downs in the number of migrants coming to Latin America. Economic crises during the 1890s lessened migration and during World War One shipping almost came to a standstill, as did immigration. For some countries, official policies also resulted in declining numbers of migrants. In 1902, for example, fewer Italians went to Brazil due to an Italian law temporarily suspending state sponsored migration in response to concerns about debt peonage among earlier migrants.[34] This law was one of the first efforts by Italy to protect the welfare of Italian migrants from the often abusive situations under which they had to work and live in Brazil.[35] These ups and downs of European migration to the main receiving countries are shown in Tables 15 and 16.

Table 15 Immigration to Brazil, 1881–1930

Period	Entering Brazil for the first time	Portugal	Italy	Spain	Germany	Japan
		(percentages)				
1881–1885	133,400	32	47	8	8	–
1885–1890	391,600	19	59	8	3	–
1891–1895	659,700	20	57	14	1	–
1896–1900	470,300	15	64	13	1	–
1901–1905	279,700	26	48	16	1	–
1906–1910	391,600	37	21	22	4	1
1911–1915	611,400	40	17	21	3	2
1916–1920	186,400	42	15	22	3	7
1921–1925	386,600	32	16	12	13	5
1926–1930	453,600	36	9	7	6	13
Total	3,964,300	29	36	14	5	3

Source: Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, *La población de América Latina. Desde los tiempos precolombinos al año 2025*, 2nd. rev. ed. (Madrid, 1994), 135.

[33] Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp, "Immigrant Positioning in Twentieth-Century Mexico: Middle Easterners, Foreign Citizens, and Multiculturalism," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 86.1 (2006), 61–91, esp. 68.

[34] Holloway, *Immigrants on the Land*, 42.

[35] Donna R. Gabaccia, *Italy's Many Diasporas* (Seattle, 2000), 136–137.

Table 16 Net-Migration to Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, 1881–1930

Period	Argentina	Uruguay	Chile	Total
1881–1885	19,100	26,700	4,300	222,000
1885–1890	489,400	42,100	23,900	555,400
1891–1895	156,100	13,800	2,800	172,700
1896–1900	303,900	33,900	4,100	341,900
1901–1905	329,300	43,800	3,600	376,700
1906–1910	859,300	92,800	35,600	987,700
1911–1915	490,400	101,000	53,300	344,700
1916–1920	2,400	53,100	14,800	70,300
1921–1925	510,200	70,000	34,300	615,500
1926–1930	481,600	102,300	6,300	590,500
Total	3,813,600	579,800	183,000	4,576,400

Source: Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, *La población de América Latina. Desde los tiempos precolombinos al año 2025*, 2nd rev. ed. (Madrid, 1994), 136.

Latin America as Part of the Atlantic World

Migration regimes changed Latin America's position in the Atlantic World considerably in the fifty years from 1880 to 1930. While migration flows in the South Atlantic (that is, especially between Africa and Brazil and Africa and the Caribbean) had been strongest before 1870, Europe and to a lesser extent West Asia became the main sending regions of migrants to Latin America in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Italy's migrants—who traveled in large numbers to both Latin and North America—connected the migration regimes of the North and South Atlantic. In addition to this geographical shift, the character of population transfer changed from coerced to free migrations. First, I will elaborate on the question of how both types of migration contributed to intensified connections within the Atlantic World and how large-scale working class migration influenced societies on both sides of the Atlantic. Second, the importance of migration from Africa and Europe to America and its relative unimportance in other migration systems shows that globalization of this era was not a uniform or consistent process spanning the globe equally, but rather one that resulted in polarizations between regions. This aspect of globalization can also be seen on a sub-regional level in Latin America. Migration was inextricably intertwined with economic developments that also created polarization within the region. Third, and finally, ideological similarities among the elite helped to create an Atlantic community united around a few shared assumptions.

The Atlantic as a Connecting Space

Different from earlier population movements, the migration that took place after 1500 was new in that those who migrated could maintain contact with the region of their origin.[36] This was especially true for Europeans and colonizers. Additionally by the first half of the nineteenth century even Africans who had been manumitted and could make enough money to pay for the passage to Africa and did in fact return to the continent of their origin—but seldom to the place they or their ancestors had come from. In addition, in 1835, slaves who had participated in a major slave revolt in Bahia, were deported to Africa by Brazilian authorities. They were brought back to the spot from which they had most likely been shipped to Brazil—to Ouidah on the African west coast in Benin. Here the returned former slaves established communities that soon would be known as "Brazilian".[37] Those returning former slaves engaged in trade with the country of their enslavement; some of them even participated in the slave trade. Those merchants who could afford it sent their children to Brazil to get a better education. So it would seem that social as well as economic connections persisted. Returned slaves influenced African culture in several ways, including helping to create new social group identities. A growing recent literature suggests that Yoruba ethnicity was not just reshaped by the experience of enslavement but rather created in America and by returning migrants.[38]

Return migration from Latin America to Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was considerably higher than return migration to Africa (Jews who fled racism and persecution in Europe may have been the single exception since from the beginning most did not plan to return to their countries of origin). Almost half of all migrants leaving the continent for Latin America returned to Europe after a more or less extended time period. Although back and forth movement between Europe and Latin America was rather high, there is comparatively little literature on the influences of return

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[36] Eltis, "Introduction," 2.

[37] Robin Law, "The Evolution of the Brazilian Community in Ouidah," in Kristin Mann and Edna G. Bay, eds., *Rethinking the African Diaspora: The Making of a Black Atlantic World in the Bight of Benin and Brazil* (London, 2001), 22–41.

[38] Robin Law, "Ethnicity and the Slave Trade: 'Lucumi' and 'Nago' as Ethnonyms in West Africa," *History in Africa* 23 (1997), 1–16.

migrants on Europe.[39] This is regretful because they could contribute to the recent call to provincialize European history.[40] Thus, the assumption to be tested is not only that the New World became "hybrid" by receiving migrants from Europe and Africa, but that the Old World too was influenced by cultural traits that had developed on American soil and brought back by returners.

Compared to the emphasis on the significance of remittances for Latin American countries in the second half of the twentieth century, studies on European migration to Latin America seldom consider the economic and social impact of such remittances sent by European migrants to their home countries.[41] Between 1905 and 1912, for example, Spaniards and Portuguese transferred between 50 and 80 million gold pesos from Argentina to their respective countries. These remittances probably amounted to half of the value of all Argentine exports, which in 1900 consisted of approximately 157 million gold pesos.[42] With those remittances migrants contributed to the well being of their families. But, in addition, they supported institutions in their communities of origin. Thus, Spaniards financed public works projects in infrastructure such as sewage water systems or church buildings. The most important institutions that received funds from migrants, though, were schools.[43]

In contrast to the few works examining changes due to migration to America, influences of European immigrants on the culture and social order in the host countries are investigated extensively. The bulk of European workers and businessmen migrated to Latin American regions that had been relatively unimportant for the colonial powers. Argentina, the southern part of Brazil, and Uruguay were the main recipients of migrants. Here, immigrants contributed in various

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[39] Examples of these influences include new words Italians brought back to their home country, such as "bakhousa" (outhouse) or "bier." See Gabaccia, *Italy's Many Diasporas*, 73.

[40] Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, 2000).

[41] The studies of Dino Cinel constitute an early exception. Even though he focuses on Italian migration to the United States, he provides information on Argentina and Brazil in comparison. See his *From Italy to San Francisco: The Immigrant Experience*, (Stanford, 1982), esp. chapter 3 and *The National Integration of Italian Return Migration, 1870–1929*, (Cambridge, 1991), esp. chapter 6.

[42] Mörner, "Immigration into Latin America," 238.

[43] José C. Moya, "Immigrants and Associations: A Global and Historical Perspective," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31.5 (2005), 833–864, esp. 848.

ways to the social order of their host societies. Migrants, for example, formed mutual aid societies and other associations, and workers contributed to the establishment of trade unions.[44] In addition, members of the migrant middle class established newspapers and tried to influence public discourse via these media.[45] Moya implicitly suggests that the migrants' activity in forming so many free associations contributed to democratic currents in the host societies.[46] The most important type of migrant association was the mutual aid society. In Uruguay, a third or more of the male migrant population belonged to a mutual aid society at the beginning of the twentieth century.[47] At the same time, in Argentina more Spaniards and Italians were organized in mutual aid societies than in trade unions.[48] These social associations insured migrants against major social risks and contributed in important ways to the establishment of the welfare state in Latin American countries with large migrant populations. In Buenos Aires, for example, the hospital of the Spanish community not only catered to their members but the population in general benefited from its services. Over time, the membership of the mutual aid societies grew and the insurances provided by the organizations rose in number and diversified. Thus, the associations became precursors of modern welfare states. In addition to the influences exerted by mutual aid societies, the labor movements of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil are usually seen as the products of migrants' efforts to organize for better work conditions. The important role migrant workers played in the labor movements of the host countries was due to the fact that the rise of immigration and of industries coincided in the second half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, migrants dominated the workforce in different branches. In 1895, 60 percent of all industrial workers were foreigners in Argentina.[49] The two labor federations founded in 1901 and in 1902 had large numbers of Italian members and organizers.[50] In Chile, the presence of foreigners was even more important considering their small rep-

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[44] Ibid.

[45] Mirta Zaida Lobato, "La Patria degli Italiani and Social Conflict in Early-Twentieth-Century Argentina," in Donna R. Gabaccia, Fraser M. Ottanelli, eds., *Italian Workers of the World: Labor Migration and the Formation of Multiethnic States* (Urbana, 2001), 63–78.

[46] Moya, "Immigrants and Associations," 836–837.

[47] Ibid., 842.

[48] Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 295.

[49] Mörner, "Immigration into Latin America," 237.

[50] Gabaccia, *Italy's Many Diasporas*, 116.

resentation in the population at large.[51] The role of Italian and Spanish workers in the labor movement also had direct repercussions in ideology. In Argentina especially, but also in other countries with a large migrant population, anarchism and socialism became the most influential ideological currents during the first decades of the labor movement.[52]

European migrants contributed to the growth of cities in the Southern Cone that reached a first stage of urbanization at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, research on the impact their presence had on urban planning, on architecture, and on the design of town districts is scarce. Studies on city planning and the changes occurring at the end of the nineteenth century that have been inspired by European ideals usually focus on the Latin American elites and their orientation toward Europe. A focus on the contribution of migrants belonging to the working or the middle classes might instead provide further understanding of the world they built in Latin America. Some hints on the impact immigrants had on urban building is provided by Samuel Baily, who found that Italians in Buenos Aires more readily invested in housing than did Italians in New York and constituted the largest national group among homeowners in 1904.[53]

What to my understanding also needs more exploration is the question of ethnic change among European migrants in Latin America from the nineteenth century onward. The literature on Europeans remains basically within national confines with respect to their place of origin. It might be interesting especially for the urban environment to look for various processes of transculturation among European immigrants but also among foreigners and the local population. Nevertheless, ethnicity should probably not be overemphasized as Baily shows, referring to intra-group conflicts among Italians in Buenos Aires due to class conflict.[54] The one group for which ethnic re-constructions are discussed more broadly is the group of the so-called "turcos," also named Lebanese, who shared a regional origin in the Near East, but who came from different countries and had somewhat different cultural backgrounds if, for example, language and religion are considered. Under the condition of being perceived as members of the same group and

[51] Mörner, "Immigration into Latin America," 237–238.
[52] Gabaccia, *Italy's Many Diasporas*, 109–110 and 116–117.
[53] Baily, *Immigrants in the Lands of Promise*, 116 and 141.
[54] Ibid., 202–203.

because of their small numbers they began to integrate and identify themselves as members of a single group, religious and other differences notwithstanding. The main rallying point became a perceived shared history of Phoenician ancestry.[55] In addition, success in the economic niches of trade contributed to the group identity of Middle Easterners in Mexico. Those immigrants from the same region of origin who were less successful "melted" into the mestizo culture of Mexico.[56]

Economic Ties

The direction of most coerced and free migrations to Latin America was to a large degree determined by economic forces. The raison d'être of African slavery was the quest for cheap and abundant workers in the plantation economies. Equally determined by a demand for cheap laborers was the trade in Chinese contract workers who replaced freed slaves. But free migration from Europe was also to a great extent dependent on economic forces. Population growth and industrialization in Europe had the known effects of pauperization and Europeans began to consider migration to Latin American countries in larger numbers when slavery was abolished and labor conditions changed respectively. In addition, population and economic growth in Europe had direct repercussions on economic growth in America. Demand for agrarian products grew and thus commerce and migration became directly intertwined. Ninety percent of all migrants set out for regions where grain and later meat were produced and sometimes processed for export to European markets. In addition, industrialization led to a growing demand for raw materials, such as grease and leather for machines provided by the large Argentine livestock, wool from Argentine sheep, lumber and copper from Chile, or rubber from the Amazon.[57] Most of those products in demand in Europe were not produced in the old colonial centers but in new areas with small populations. Therefore, wages rose considerably while the cost of living remained comparatively low. In Argentina a worker had to spend a quarter of his

[55] Jeffrey Lesser, *Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil* (Durham, 1999), 39–43.
[56] Alfaro-Velcamp, "Immigrant Positioning," 70–71.
[57] José C. Moya, "A Continent of Immigrants: Postcolonial Shifts in the Western Hemisphere," in *Hispanic American Historical Review* 86.1 (2006), 1–27.

wage for living expenses, compared to 66 percent in Spain, one-third in the United States, and 28 percent in Australia. In addition, it took a worker from southern Europe only two weeks to earn his transatlantic passage. These conditions made migration attractive. From 1869 to 1914, the population of Argentina rose from 1.9 million inhabitants to 7.9 million. No other country in the Western Hemisphere had such a large percentage of foreigners of the total population. In 1914 (when 15 percent of the U.S. population was foreign-born), 58 percent of the total population of Argentina were immigrants or children of immigrants. Thus, a region that had been marginal in Spanish America until the end of the eighteenth century, with even its capital city of Buenos Aires little more than a provincial backwater, became within a century one of the richest countries in the world. Buenos Aires now belonged to the most vibrant cities in the Western Hemisphere, a product of its full integration into the Atlantic economy.[58]

A similar shift in regional importance took place in Brazil. During most of the colonial period the northeast, with its slave economy focused on sugar plantations, was the economic and population center of the colony. But, in the nineteenth century the southern province of São Paulo became the undisputed center of the country. The province produced most Brazilian wealth and its capital city became the main industrial center of the country. The province received 60 percent of European migrants coming to Brazil. As in other countries, migrants were attracted by the most dynamic regions where they profited from economic opportunities and rising wages. Many of those who started as laborers became landowners or businessmen. At the same time, the regions that had formerly led the economy were now left behind. These regions were densely inhabited by former slaves (in Brazil) or by Indians in other Latin American countries. Groups, already socially disadvantaged because of discrimination, were further marginalized by a declining economy, decreasing wages, and unemployment.[59]

Thus, even though the developments referred to here can be described as part of the globalization process, they led to polarization and greater regional differentiation within Latin America and within those Latin American countries that received most of the migrants, leaving some regions at the margin while others benefited.

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[58] Moya, "Continent of Immigrants," 13.
[59] Ibid., 16–17.

The Atlantic as a Space of Circulating Ideas

Working toward a certain level of homogeneity within the Atlantic community was a level of elite communication about scientific ideas, and public discourses that circulated and became hegemonic within the Atlantic World. Of these ideas, racial thinking may have been the most important and gained in importance throughout the entire Atlantic during the nineteenth century. Discourses on population and migration were highly racialized and similar ideas about desirable and undesirable migrants emerged everywhere. This contradicts the thesis in migration theory that economic rationalizations, i.e., per capita income differentials and falling transportation costs alone can explain migrations. Cultural values also influence population movements, although in different ways. Often immigration policies became biased and certain populations were considered more desirable than others. These perceptions did not always impede migration but they influenced the prospects of migrants in the receiving countries. African slaves and Chinese contract laborers were brought to many countries but they were never considered as prospective citizens. Even when manumitted, former slaves were not conceived of automatically as part of the national community.[60] The Chinese suffered severe racism in many countries and were forced out of the country by governments and the public. Besides the already mentioned law in Cuba that ordered laborers whose contract had expired to sign another contract or leave the country, in Mexico Chinese were expelled in 1931 after violent disturbances.[61] In Peru, Chinese immigrants were not deported but after anti-Chinese riots in 1909 their entrance to the country was restricted, even though this restriction seemed to be without results.[62]

Further free immigrations of Africans and Chinese also struck Latin American governments as undesirable. Even at the end time period covered in this essay, when a re-formulated racial thinking began to take hold in many Latin American countries, the Brazilian government maneuvered to prevent African-Americans from immigrating.

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[60] See for example Richard Graham, "Ciudadanía y jerarquía en el Brasil esclavista," in Hilda Sabato, ed., *Ciudadanía política y formación de las naciones* (Mexico City, 1999), 345–369.

[61] Alan Knight, "Racism, Revolution and Indigenismo in Mexico, 1910–1940," in *The Idea of Race in Latin America*, ed. Richard Graham (Austin, 1990), 71–114, esp. 97.

[62] Adam McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, and Hawaii, 1900–1936* (Chicago, 2001), 45.

In the 1920s, the country styled itself as a racial democracy where no discrimination because of skin color took place, and especially contrasted its ideology to the racial system in the USA. There, knowledge of Brazil's self-proclaimed racial democracy[63] inspired some African-Americans to think of emigration not to Africa but to Brazil, where a brighter future without discrimination seemed possible. Even though African-Americans promoting this idea belonged to the middle classes, the Brazilian government was not willing to accept migrants of African ancestry. Instead, it worked behind the scenes to prevent African-Americans from getting visas.[64]

While Africans and Asians were seen as racial others who should not become part of the nation, Europeans, and especially northern Europeans, were considered by political elites and members of the scientific community alike as racial superiors and therefore desirable as immigrants. All Latin American governments during the nineteenth century considered European immigration as a strategy for racial betterment of their populations but not all were successful in attracting many European migrants, Mexico constituted such a case. Colonial thinking was virulent and persistent among postcolonial Latin American elites. Europe and Europeans were seen as bearers of civilization and contrasted with the supposedly barbarous indigenous population. According to this racist thinking the only way to achieve modernism and economic development lay in the whitening of the population.

By the second and third decades of the twentieth century, this discourse began to be modified. *Indigenismo* in Mexico and *modernismo* in Brazil redefined the "race" of Latin Americans as they also redefined the nation. Populations were no longer perceived as separate groups of Indigenous, African, or European ancestry. Instead mixture or *mestizaje*, with the final end of assimilating Indians and blacks in the national culture determined by European influences, was declared as

[63] The notion of a racial democracy in Brazil did not mean equality for all different racial groups but favored mixing and ultimately the whitening of the Brazilian population. Whitening according to progressive intellectuals as for example Gilberto Freyre, and public officials implied the uplift of Indian, black, and colored people. See Thomas Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought*, 2nd ed., (Durham, 1993) and Jerry Dávila, *Diploma of Whiteness: Race and Social Policy in Brazil* (Durham, 2003).

[64] Jeffrey Lesser, "Are African-Americans African or American? Brazilian Immigration Policy in the 1920s," *Review of Latin American Studies* 4.1 (1991), 115–137.

the bright future of Latin America. José Vasconcelos (1925) in Mexico[65] and Gilberto Freyre (1933) in Brazil[66] were the main protagonists of those ideas, which were well received by Latin American populations and became official doctrines in some countries. Thus, at the end of the period under study, Latin Americans saw *mestizaje* as leading to a better future. This prospectively more inclusive understanding of the nation coincided with growing skepticism about European immigrants as responsible for anarchist and socialist agitation. Such new perspectives on European migrants and Latin American populations encouraged the passage of laws restricting immigration during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Shortly afterward, European migration to Latin America declined.

Conclusion

During the century following Latin American independence the main migratory regimes of the continent changed from coerced to free migration. In addition, there was a geographical shift in the provenance of immigrants. While most of them had come from Africa during the colonial era and the first decades of independent life, Europe became the main source of immigration in the second half of the nineteenth century. This shift coincided with profound economic transformations. With the end of the transatlantic slave trade, Africa became less important in the Atlantic economy while, due to European industrialization, the connection between the Old continent and Latin America gained in importance. For a short time span, the production of food and raw materials for European markets brought economic fortunes to some societies that went beyond the prevalent enrichment of small elites. One might speculate this was due to the large European immigration because it happened in Argentina and Uruguay, two countries where European immigration was most important. By pointing to this interdependence I am not suggesting Europeans were culturally superior but only that European immigrants enjoyed negotiating power not available to the members of the lower classes in other countries. Be this as it may, what is clear is the impact European migration to

[65] José Vasconcelos, *La raza cósmica*, (Mexico City, 1925).
[66] Gilberto Freyre, *Casa grande y senzala* (Rio de Janeiro, 1933).

Latin America had on the diversification of the continent. While Latin America never has been known for its regional homogeneity it became even more heterogeneous as a result of the entwined impact of population movements and economic development. Nevertheless, at the end of the period under review a new search for "Latin Americaness" can be detected in ideas about *mestizaje* propagated especially in Mexico and Brazil.

UNDONE BY DESIRE: MIGRATION, SEX ACROSS BOUNDARIES, AND COLLECTIVE DESTINIES IN THE GREATER CARIBBEAN, 1840–1940

Lara Putnam

The populations and social systems of the Caribbean basin have been shaped by each of the great global migrations of the modern era. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, forced migration carried some 4.6 million Africans into this region. In the generations after emancipation in 1838, over 400,000 South Asian indentured migrants traveled to the British Caribbean. Nearly 180,000 Chinese immigrants reached the region in the same era.[1] Meanwhile, the last decades of the nineteenth century saw the creation of a system of circular migration in which hundreds of thousands of Afro-Caribbeans left the British territories for work in the booming export economies of the Spanish-speaking rimlands and islands, a movement that reached its heyday after World War One. Caribbean migration to the U.S.—to Harlem, above all else—soared in the same era.

These migrations were followed in the 1920s and 1930s by unprecedented attempts by the hemisphere's receiving societies to exclude potential migrants on the basis of racial "assimilability." Interracial sex became a key topic for experts and activists writing about the Caribbean, both on the islands and beyond. Some sought to abstract the lessons that the science of racial difference held for Caribbean peoples; others aimed to use Caribbean examples to push debates within the international science of race. This essay places those learned and political debates over race-mixture alongside the traces of actual boundary-crossing sexual contact preserved in judicial testimony, allowing us to observe the everyday interactions through which expressions of intimate desire sometimes underlined, sometimes undermined, group boundaries in the Greater Caribbean. Immigrant group trajectories differed across the region. Some immigrant group identities became

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[1] Walton Look Lai, "The Chinese Indenture System in the British West Indies and its Aftermath," in Andrew Wilson, ed., *The Chinese in the Caribbean* (Princeton, 2004), 4.

folded into others; others acquired a retroactive stability they had never known in the era of migration. Both in rhetoric and in practice, collective destinies were everywhere shaped by the contours of intimate desire.

Population and Migration in the Gran Caribe, 1800–1900

Across the centuries in the Greater Caribbean, imperial aims and rivalries and shifting labor regimes have created an ever-changing landscape of differential opportunity. With low barriers to travel across archipelagos and littorals, human movement was continuous. Migrations to and across the Caribbean are often researched within the boundaries of a single empire or language (British Caribbean, Spanish Caribbean, French Caribbean) or by tracing those of a single origin, "race," or claimed ethnicity (African, Indian, Chinese). But a broader optic reveals a unified landscape in which shifts of investment dictated demand for labor and evolving geopolitics shaped the limits of state power. Within each locality, those who wished to employ others and those who sought some control over the conditions of their own employment negotiated terms with each other, sometimes lobbying local officials or distant rulers for laws, subsidies, or protective interventions. And rather often, would-be workers voted with their feet.

At the eve of the era of Atlantic revolutions, largely autonomous black, part-black, and indigenous populations dotted the fringes of empire, along the continent's coastline from Veracruz east to the peninsula of Yucatán, south to Portobello, and east to the Guianas. Over the preceding centuries Spanish, British, French, and Dutch rivalries had provided these heterogeneous populations with useful allies and prevented any colonial state from asserting control over vast stretches of land between the imperial powers' essential ports. Meanwhile the ports themselves were peopled in the majority by *negros, mulatos*, and *pardos*, mostly freepeople working as artisans, shipbuilders, muleteers, or militia members.[2] Euro-mestizo settlement, in contrast, centered on cities and towns in the fertile valleys of the inland mountain ranges. In the highlands from central Nicaragua northward and the cordilleras from Colombia southward creole Spaniards and *mestizos* were

[2] See Justin Wolfe and Lowell Gudmundson, eds., *Between Race and Place: Blacks and Blackness in Central America* (Durham, 2010).

far outnumbered by indigenous populations. The demographic catastrophe of European disease and dislocations had finally abated, and indigenous communities had seen steady growth since the early 1700s. Plantations growing cacao in Venezuela and eastern Costa Rica and sugar in southern Mexico, Guatemala, and Demerara employed Afro-descended slaves—thousands in Venezuela and Demerara; a few hundred in Costa Rica.

News of the slave revolt launched in 1789 in French Saint Domingue reverberated across this vast region. Fears of a similar African-led conflagration on the British sugar colonies encouraged parliamentary passage of the Amelioration Acts in 1798 and abolition of slave trade aboard British ships in 1807. The refusal of the enslaved on British islands to acquiesce to the fiction that "amelioration" made slavery tolerable and ongoing abolitionist pressures within Great Britain led to passage of apprenticeship legislation in 1833 and to final emancipation in 1838. This did not end the arrival of Africans. For sixty years after British slave trade abolition, scores of thousands of enslaved Africans en route to Cuba, Brazil, and elsewhere were seized by British ships; some 10,000 were shipped under contract of indenture to Jamaica, 14,000 to British Guiana, and 8,000 to Trinidad.[3] The colored population of Jamaica (those claiming mixed African and European ancestry) was 68,000 in 1844 and had surpassed 120,000 by 1891; the white population hovered between 15,000 and 13,000 over the same half-century.[4] Trinidad's population of 85,000 in 1861 included a large minority of French creoles whose residence predated British acquisition of the territory; arrivals from Venezuela and Portugal as well as Britain continued over the nineteenth century.[5] In 1858 there were some 35,000 Portuguese in British Guiana.[6]

In Spain's remaining insular possessions, a new infusion of capital fueled technological shifts that allowed Cuban sugar production


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[3] George W. Roberts, *The Population of Jamaica* (Cambridge, 1957), 109–110.

[4] Roberts, *Population of Jamaica*, 65.

[5] Bridget Brereton, *Race Relations in Colonial Trinidad, 1870–1900* (Cambridge, 1979), 12. Nearly half the island's population in 1891 had been born elsewhere.

[6] Sr. M. Noel Menezes, "The Madeiran Portguese and the Establishment of the Catholic Church in British Guiana, 1835–98," in Howard Johnson, ed., *After the Crossing: Immigrants and Minorities in Caribbean Creole Society* (London, 1988), 62. Over 32,000 Madeirans were introduced to Guiana under contract of indenture between 1835 and 1881. G.W. Roberts and J. Byrne, "Summary Statistics on Indenture and Associated Migration Affecting the West Indies, 1834–1918," *Population Studies* 20.1 (July, 1966): 125–134.



Map 13 Caribbean migrations, 1830–1880

to expand rapidly to fill demand left by Saint Domingue's drop in production. Some 550,000 Africans were transported to Cuba as slaves between 1811 and 1865.[7] Wary of Saint Domingue's fate, Havana's *Junta de Fomento* insisted in 1796 that "the first precaution to be taken is without doubt the promotion with prudence and discernment of white colonization in the rural districts" as a balance to the growth in numbers of the enslaved.[8] Hundreds of thousands of Galicians and Canary Islanders arrived with government encouragement over the following two generations; the 1861 census found that 116,000 of them had chosen to stay on the island.[9] Transport of indentured workers from China to Cuba began in 1847; some 142,000 men arrived over the following quarter-century, most from southern Guangdong province. Forced recontracting meant that most served out two consecutive eight-year terms of indenture on the sugar plantation before they were able to move into more profitable occupations in cities or other regions.[10] Responding to pressure from abolitionists within Spain and vying for the support (or at least quiescence) of the enslaved population in the face of armed independence movements on the island, Spain passed the Moret Law of 1870, promising gradual abolition and imposing restrictions on owners' authority over those left in their "care." Ongoing pressure by the *patrocinados* (apprentices) rendered the system unsustainable; the *patronato*—and with it, unfree labor for those of African ancestry—ended in Puerto Rico in 1873, Cuba in 1886.[11] Spanish efforts to subsidize emigration and thus increase the numbers of loyalists on the island were hardly successful: Between 1882 and 1894, 224,000 Spaniards traveled to Cuba, 142,000 Spaniards returned home, and in 1894 Cuban insurgents launched their ultimately successful war to end Spanish imperial control.[12]

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[7] Francisco Scarano, "Labor and Society in the Nineteenth Century," in Franklin Knight and Colin Palmer, eds., *The Modern Caribbean* (Chapel Hill, 1989), 76.

[8] Duvon Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 22.2 (1942), 280–308; quote on 286.

[9] Rebecca Scott, *Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860–1899* (Pittsburgh, 2000), 217.

[10] Kathleen Lopez, "'One Brings Another': The Formation of Early Twentieth-Century Chinese Migrant Communities in Cuba," in *Chinese in the Caribbean*, 94–95.

[11] Slavery was ended in Spanish Hispaniola in the context of Haitian invasion in 1821; after being site of struggle between Haitians, French, Spanish, and British, the lands east of Haiti attained definitive independence as the Dominican Republic in 1865.

[12] Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba," 304.

Indentured South Asian migration from British-controlled India to the British Caribbean began simultaneously with the migration of indentured Chinese into Cuba. British colonial bureaucrats saw indentured Indian emigration to the Caribbean as solving two problems simultaneously: the "surplus" of landless peasants in the Indian subcontinent, and the dearth of Afro-Caribbean freed people willing to remain dependant on plantations where land for subsistence was available. Thus although some 18,000 indentured Chinese "coolies" reached the British Caribbean in the late nineteenth century, the label would soon be appropriated for a far larger stream of migrants from British India.

More than 36,000 indentured Indian "coolies" reached Jamaica before the system was finally abolished in 1917. But it was the southeastern rimland colonies that most eagerly subsidized the arrival of indentured Asian workers in these years. Acquired by Great Britain from its European rivals in the waning years of the eighteenth century, these were lands where the soil was still fertile and the expanding plantation frontier demanded many arms. Nearly 240,000 Indians traveled under contracts of indenture to British Guiana, another 145,000 to Trinidad.[13] By 1885 some 87,000 Indians were serving terms of indenture in the nearby French islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana, where slavery had been abolished in 1848. Another 35,000 would travel from India to Surinam over the following generation, alongside some 22,000 indentured Javanese.[14] By the start of the twentieth century the population of Trinidad included some 150,000 of African or part-African origin, 90,000 East Indians, 5,000 Chinese, and around 50,000 whites of British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and other descent.[15]

In the same years, the descendants of enslaved Africans were taking advantage of their newfound freedom of movement in far shorter hops around the southeastern Caribbean. Sojourners from the Virgin Islands, St. Kitts, Nevis, and Antigua traveled to Puerto Rico and Dominican Republic in small but ongoing migration after 1880, harvesting sugar and creating distinctive creole-speaking barrios within capitals and major ports. Barbadians circulated to Trinidad and

[13] Roberts, *Population of Jamaica*, 128.

[14] Bonham Richardson, "Caribbean Migrations, 1838–1985," in *The Modern Caribbean*, 208.

[15] Harry Johnston, *Negro in the New World* (New York, 1910) 317.

Guiana, Brazil, and beyond: departures totaled over 15,000 from 1863 to 1870 alone.[16] Bustling Port of Spain had whole neighborhoods filled with immigrants from Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, and Dominica. Other Windward Islanders crossed the seven-mile-wide channel that separated Trinidad from Venezuela's Paria peninsula and established themselves as provision farmers and small traders in coastal towns or around Orinoco River ports, most importantly Ciudad Bolivar. Many thousands labored on the gold fields and rubber gathering camps deep in the southern rainforest before heading on or heading home.[17]

A parallel pattern developed in the western Caribbean, where the first two generations after British abolition saw increasing temporary and longer term movements between British islands and from British islands to nearby rimlands where British and Spanish territorial claims had long overlapped. Circulation of turtlemen and traders from small English-speaking islands like San Andres and Providencia strengthened the longstanding links between the British holdings in the Western Caribbean and Mesoamerica's rainforested eastern lowlands, still not effectively under the control of the now-independent Central American republics. When the California Gold Rush created an isthmian transport boom in 1849, hundreds of Jamaicans rushed to Panama. Over a thousand Jamaicans were contracted by the U.S. company to build a railroad across the isthmus, working alongside a similar number of indentured Chinese laborers.

Panama by 1855 had acquired a cosmopolitan population, arranged in a clear occupational hierarchy according to race and national origin. "The railroad officials, steamboat agents, foreign consuls, and a score of Yankee traders, hotel-keepers, billiard markers and bar-tenders comprise all the whites, who are the exclusive few," wrote one visitor. "The better class of shop-keepers are Mulattos from Jamaica, St. Domingo, and the other West Indian islands, while the dispensers of cheap grog, and hucksters of fruit and small wares are chiefly negroes. The main body of the population is made up of laborers, negroes from Jamaica, yellow natives of mixed African and Indian blood, and sad, sedate,

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[16] Basil Maughan, "Some Aspects of Barbadian Emigration to Cuba, 1919–1935," *The Journal of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society* 37 (1985), 263.

[17] Winthrop R. Wright, *Cafe con leche: Race, Class and National Image in Venezuela* (Austin, 1990), 77–78; National Archives of the United Kingdom [PRO], Colonial Office [CO] 295/423: Correspondence [re: Venezuela] with Foreign Office, 1903.

turbaned Hindoos, the poor exiled Coolies from the Ganges."[18] Those Chinese workers who survived the horrendous conditions of railroad construction usually moved on to Pacific destinations drawing large numbers of their countrymen in the same years (Peru to the south or California to the north), or headed from Panama's Atlantic railroad terminus to the main ports of the Western Caribbean: Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and Kingston (where they were among the first Chinese arrivals).[19] Afro-Jamaican workers too were more likely to move on than to head home, but they traveled shorter distances on coastal lighters rather than longer distances under group contracts.

A Western Caribbean labor market emerged as projects like the *Ferrocarril al Atlántico* in Costa Rica drew thousands of English-speaking black migrants, some to labor along the line, others to seek profit by providing for the boomtime labor force's needs. Meanwhile, steamer routes from the Panama Railroad's Pacific terminus connected Central America to Pacific migratory circuits and labor markets as well. A thousand indentured Chinese, contracted by railroad boss Minor Keith in California, Honduras, and Macao in 1872–73, labored on the Costa Rican railroad project alongside several thousand Afro-Caribbeans and nearly two thousand Italians (the latter's arrival arranged by Keith and subsidized by a Costa Rican state eager to introduce, in Keith's phrase, "select breeding stock").[20] Over the following generation a few thousand Spaniards, Italians, and Germans would dock at Central America's Caribbean ports and head to the highlands, where their eugenic cachet and their personal connections to European markets facilitated their establishment as overseers, managers, and merchants in the burgeoning coffee sector.


The efforts of Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps to build a sea level canal across the isthmus of Panama from 1881 to 1889 drew on

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[18] Cited in Elizabeth Maclean Petras *Jamaican Labor Migration*: *White Capital and Black Labor, 1850–1930* (Boulder, 1988), 77.

[19] Roberts, *Population of Jamaica*, 132; Li Anshan, "Survival, Adaptation, and Integration: Origins and Evolution of the Chinese Community in Jamaica (1854–1962)," in *Chinese in the Caribbean*, 42.

[20] Moisés León Azofeifa, "Chinese Immigrants on the Atlantic Coast of Costa Rica: The Economic Adaptation of an Asian Minority in a Pluralistic Society," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1988, 65–78; Watt Stewart, *Keith y Costa Rica*, trans. José B. Acuña (San José, Costa Rica, 1991), Ch. 6; Carmen Murillo Chaverri, *Identidades de hierro y humo: La construcción del Ferrocarril al Atlántico, 1870–1890* (San José, Costa Rica, 1995), quote 85; Steven Palmer, "Racismo intelectual en Costa Rica y Guatemala, 1870–1920," *Mesoamérica* 31 (June 1996), 99–121.



Map 14 Caribbean migrations, 1880–1900

these well-established migratory connections and created new ones. Thousands of men and women from French-speaking islands of the eastern Caribbean sailed west to seek work on the diggings or in the boomtown port of Colón. Labor recruiters advertised in the Jamaican press and hired on the docks of Kingston. Still, most British Caribbeans headed to Colón without contract: from Port Limon (Puerto Limón), from Bocas, or from Montego Bay.[21] Recruiters aimed to sign on workers who would stay put but Western Caribbeans preferred to cycle through. Jamaican departures for Panama topped 24,000 in 1883; over 11,000 returned in the same year. Such was the demand generated by the massive influx of mostly male workers—and such was the integration of Western Caribbean port economies by this time—that Kingston washerwomen picked up laundry in Colón to wash, starch, and press on the island and return on the next steamer.[22] In all some 50,000 British islanders reached Panama in these years.[23] The new cycle of isthmian prosperity also drew Chinese immigrants whose second eight-year term of indenture in Cuba was just ending.[24] By 1890, the Chinese population of Panama numbered around 3,000.[25]

The Heyday of U.S. Investment and Intraregional Migration, 1900–1930

As the U.S. emerged from its post-Civil War reconstruction to seek markets, investments, and territory abroad, the small republics to its south seemed appropriate targets for Yankee ingenuity of all sorts. U.S. intervention in the Cuban War of Independence in 1898 brought Puerto Rico into permanent colonial status and Cuba into a more partial and punctuated situation of political subordination. U.S. aid to

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[21] David McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870–1914* (New York, 1977), 161, 191–235; Petras, *Jamaican Labor Migration*, 97–100; Omar Jáen Suárez, *La población del istmo de Panamá del siglo XVI al siglo XX* (Panamá, 1979), 451–458; Lara Putnam, *The Company They Kept: Migrants and the Politics of Gender in Caribbean Costa Rica, 1870–1960* (Chapel Hill, 2002), Ch. 2.

[22] Olive Senior, "The Colon People," *Jamaica Journal* 11.3–4 (1978), 62.

[23] Richardson, "Caribbean Migrations," 209.

[24] Indentured Chinese emigration to Cuba was cut off in 1874 in response to repeated abuses; 142,000 Chinese men had reached the island under indenture over the course of the preceding quarter century. See López, "One Brings Another," 94.

[25] Ramón Mon, "Procesos de Integración de la Comunidad China a la Nación Panameña," in Ileana Gólcher, ed., *Este País, Un Canal: Encuentro de Culturas* (Panama, 1999), 83.

Panamanian elites seeking independence from Colombia in 1903 was rewarded by the new state's concession "in perpetuity" of a 10-mile wide strip of land to complete the canal abandoned by the French. Workers arriving under contract to the U.S. government's Isthmian Canal Commission included 20,000 Barbadians, 7,500 from the French colonies of Guadeloupe and Martinique, and others from farther afield: 8,000 Spaniards, 2,000 Italians, 1,000 Greeks.[26]

Again personal networks mobilized many more migrants than labor recruiters did. By 1907 the number of potential workers reaching the docks of Colón on their own was more than double the number arriving under contract.[27] Independent arrivals were in their great majority British West Indians. The 20,000 Barbadian contract workers would ultimately be matched by another 25,000 men and women who paid their own passage from Barbados. Tens of thousands from smaller islands of the eastern Caribbean traveled alongside them. But as before, it was Jamaicans who dwarfed all other migrants to Panama. Some 80 to 90,000 made the journey in the era of construction, all undertaking the journey on their own since island authorities had banned the I.C.C. from recruiting on the island.[28] Scores of small gangs of South Asian workers arrived from the British Caribbean, sparking the concern of resident British officials. The 1912 census found 389 men (and one woman) born in India residing in the Canal Zone, but several times that number surely resided outside of U.S. territory, in the Republic of Panama.[29] Chinese immigration, putatively illegal, continued apace.[30] A new program of forced registration of Chinese men in 1913 found some 7,300 in residence on the isthmus.[31]

Beyond Panama agricultural and extractive exports expanded across the Greater Caribbean as U.S. direct foreign investment, already

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[26] Jáen Suárez, *Población del Istmo*, 459.


[27] Michael Conniff, *Black Labor on a White Canal: West Indians in Panama, 1904–1980* (Pittsburgh, 1985), 27.

[28] Velma Newton, *The Silver Men: West Indian Labour Migration to Panama, 1850–1914* (Jamaica, 1984); Bonham Richardson, *Panama Money in Barbados, 1900–1920* (Knoxville, 1985), 125.

[29] United States, Isthmian Canal Commission, *Census of the Canal Zone*, February 1, 1912 (Mount Hope, C.Z., 1912), 40–41.

[30] Kingston continued to be a crucial way station. For instance, in 1908 it was reported that "of the last two batches of Chinese who arrived here there are not three left in Jamaica now.… [T]hey have all left for Bocas del Toro, Colon and Bluefields." "Chinese Depart?" *Kingston Daily Gleaner* Friday, June 1–2, 1908, 3.

[31] Mon, "Procesos de Integracion," 85.



Map 15 Caribbean migrations, 1903–1914

well-established in Cuba, spread. The iconic crop of the era remained the banana, although as plant pathogens devastated successive banana zones after 1910, other export crops like cacao, manila hemp, and citrus became important. United Fruit, born in 1898 of the fusion of Lorenzo Dow Baker's Jamaican interests with Minor Keith's Central American holdings, was by far the region's largest single employer of men (and, on the islands, women); its ability to exert pressure on governments was notorious. UFCo plantation expansion followed a hopscotch pattern determined first by the spread of infectious plant disease, and then by the company's strategic response to the nationalist governments and labor movements that began, in slow succession, to make operations more uncertain and profits less secure from the 1920s onward. Along the coastal lowlands of eastern Guatemala, northern Honduras, and northern Colombia, United Fruit took over existing regional systems of smallholder production; in British Honduras, northern Nicaragua, southeast Costa Rica, and western Panama, it claimed and cut vast tracts of tropical rainforest. The arrival of foreign investment in the form of rail lines, port facilities, gringo managers, and workers from afar may not have seemed everywhere as sudden as the arrival of the railroad to Macondo in Gabriel Garcia Marquez's memorable rendering—"It's coming," gasped the woman who had run screaming up from the riverbank, "Something frightful, like a kitchen dragging a village behind it"[32]—but it meant, on the rimlands, a sudden and substantial shift.

Expansion of U.S. investment meant not a radical shift but the addition of weighty new players to a long-established game in which overseas capital underwrote dense populations of coerced workers and intensive production. United Fruit Company banana and citrus plantations in Jamaica employed thousands by the 1920s. U.S. capital and trade preferences fueled a steady expansion of sugar plantations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic, which became a vertiginous boom when the disruption of European beet-sugar production during World War I sent prices sky-high. At the height of migration in 1920, over 27,000 Jamaicans and 36,000 Haitians reached Cuban ports in a single year.[33] The weight of preexisting social networks in guiding


[32] Gabriel García Márquez, *One Hundred Years of Solitude* (New York, 1970), 210.

[33] Cuba, Secretaría de Hacienda, Sección de Estadística, *Informe y movimiento de pasajeros*… (Havana, 1921).

migrants' travels is underlined by the fact that labor supply routes to these two adjacent islands remained quite separate over the course of the boom years: Cuba tied to the Jamaica-Panama-Central America circuit of the Western Caribbean, the Dominican Republic tied to Barbados-Leeward-Windward circuit of the Eastern Caribbean. All told, sugar plantations in eastern Cuba drew hundreds of thousands of workers from Jamaica and Haiti; plantations in the western Dominican Republic relied on some Haitian seasonal migrants, while those in the south of that country employed tens of thousands of migrants from the eastern British Caribbean. In early 1930s roughly 1,000 to 1,500 British West Indians and like numbers of Haitians entered the Dominican Republic for each harvest.[34] In this heyday of circulation, migrant streams could cross and overlap in ways push-pull models would never predict. Some 10,000 British West Indians reached Haiti in the interwar years, and 1932 found three to four thousand British West Indians resident there, hungry and unemployed.[35]

Often migrants arrived from a previous destination rather than a place of origin. As the Isthmian Canal Commission attempted to "demobilize" workers beginning in 1913, and as banana exports from Limon plummeted with UFCo's shift of investments elsewhere, both Panama and Costa Rica saw thousands of British West Indians leave for new destinations. By 1927 the Afro-Caribbean population of Costa Rica showed the classic demographic profile of a sending society, with an overrepresentation of the aging and of women and distinct lack of working-age young men. Thousands had sailed for Cuba's cane fields, some under contract to the United Fruit Company, others on their own.[36] Meanwhile Chinese entry to Cuba, restricted in 1899, was permitted again as sugar production boomed. Cuba's Chinese population had dropped from over 40,000 in 1877 to just over 10,000 in 1919, but rose to nearly 25,000 by 1931.[37] Dwarfing all other migrant streams, immigration from Spain accelerated continuously, barely dipping at the height of the European war and exploding afterward. More than 800,000 Spaniards entered Cuba between 1902 and 1931, over 94,000

[34] PRO, CO 318/413/1: Immigration of British West Indians into Central America.
[35] PRO, CO 318/406/2: Immigration of British West Indians to Central and South America.
[36] Putnam, *Company They Kept*, 65–70.
[37] Lopez, "One Brings Another," 94–95.



Map 16 Caribbean migrations, 1915–1930

of them in 1920 alone.[38] The majority were young men coming to earn during the sugar harvest and return home. Still, in 1931 the population of Cuba included 250,000 souls born in Spain.[39] The same census registered 102,000 blacks born outside of Cuba.[40]

Export production also expanded in the Eastern Caribbean, although British rather than U.S. capital remained the predominant force there. Trinidad's 120,000-strong East Indian population remained the mainstay of that island's sugar labor force.[41] Meanwhile, hard-up neighborhoods of Port of Spain swelled with migrants from nearby small islands where economic opportunities were even scarcer. By 1946 the population of Trinidad included 12,000 Barbadians and 36,000 Windward Islanders.[42] The first commercial oil well began producing in Trinidad in 1902, and by the 1920s more than ten thousand men, both Trinidadians and small islanders, had traveled to work on the fields. Their experience positioned them well in the regional labor market as the industry spread. Some 10,000 Eastern Caribbeans found work on the oil fields of Maracaibo, Venezuela after production began there in 1916; a generation later the population of Trinidad would include over 3,000 people born in Venezuela in this era.[43] In turn, new refineries in Curacao and Aruba drew thousands from Trinidad and Barbados beginning in the interwar years. Venezuela's ports and cities continued to attract traders and tradesmen, and Afro-Antillean entries into Venezuela totaled from six to eleven thousand annually throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century.[44]

In sum, the expansion of export production on the islands and rimlands of the greater Caribbean had created both new opportunities and new constraints for the region's working people. On the one hand,

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[38] Imre Ferenczi and Walter Willcox, eds., *International Migrations*, vol. I: *Statistics* (New York, 1929), 525–527; Alejandro de la Fuente, *A Nation for All: Race, Inequality and Politics in Twentieth—Century Cuba* (Chapel Hill, 2001), 101.

[39] By 1941 that number had dropped to 150,000, in part through the aging and death of early immigrants, in part through the departure of more recent arrivals during the lean years of the 1930s. de la Fuente, *Nation for All*, 104.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Roberts, *Population of Jamaica*, 131.

[42] Malcolm J. Proudfoot, *Population Movements in the Caribbean*, rpt. (Westport, Conn., 1970), 101, 94–96.

[43] Miguel Tinker Salas, "Relaciones de poder y raza en los campos petroleros venezolanos, 1920–1940," *Asuntos* (Caracas, CIED) 5.10 (2001), 77–103; Proudfoot, *Population Movements*, 96.

[44] Wright, *Cafe con leche*, 77–78.

new plantations and extractive enterprises offered new wage sources from which remittances could be sent home, whether home was a few parishes or many islands away. Ports grew and with them service economies and attendant opportunities for independent entrepreneurship, often in women's hands: boarding houses, sidewalk vending, laundry, prostitution. Banana plantation expansion in areas not previously under intensive cultivation (like northeast Honduras, eastern Nicaragua, southern Costa Rica, and western Panama) encroached on lands crucial to indigenous populations' subsistence. But as locals lost autonomy along the rimlands, newcomers gained it. Smallholder production by Spanish-speaking migrants from the highlands or English-speaking migrants from the islands sometimes preceded and often followed the rimland banana plantations' brief heydays. In contrast, on the far more densely populated islands fruit plantation expansion made peasant smallholds ever harder to sustain, increasing land pressure and driving up taxes.

The heyday of the circum-Caribbean migratory system in the first decades of the twentieth century drew the grandchildren of British Caribbean freedmen and freedwomen out of rural island communities into Central American jungles and docks and then spun those migrants' children and grandchildren on to city employment, be it in cities on the islands of their grandparents' birth, in the Spanish American republics of their birth, or in the industrialized economies of North America and Europe. It is not coincidental that large-scale migration from the British Caribbean to the United States began as canal construction cycled Yankee dollars and ships through the Western Caribbean in unprecedented numbers. Once created, these circuits carried ever-greater numbers northward. Some seven thousand black immigrants to the US in the first three decades of the twentieth century gave Central America as their last region of residence.[45] The number of British West Indians who reached the U.S. via Cuba was doubtless many times greater. Black immigration from the Caribbean to the U.S. averaged 3,500 per year from 1903 to 1913, climbed to 5,000 per year from 1914 to 1923, and surpassed 10,000 in 1924 alone. All told over 100,000 Afro-Caribbeans entered the United States in the first quarter

[45] From statistics in Winston James, *Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism in Early Twentieth-Century America* (New York, 1998), 356–357.

of the twentieth century, and many stayed. The 1930 census recorded 74,500 "Negroes" of West Indian birth.[46]

Breachable Boundaries in a Heterogeneous World

Using the broadest strokes contemporary authors described collective migrant flows with reference to their territories of origin, continental ancestry, color, and imperial filiation. Yet these broad collectives were both crossed by individuals and redrawn over time. Fundamental to both the maintenance and the remaking of social boundaries were matters of sex. Ultimately it was the patterning of intimate encounters between migratory men and women that determined the contours of collective identities over time. In this sense, any analysis of Caribbean migration demands attention to both the micro- and macro-politics of desire.

One factor shaping patterns of kinship and sexuality within and between groups in the Caribbean was the demographic composition of migrant streams, which varied widely. The overall patterns will be familiar to students of migration anywhere. The larger the distance between origin and destination, the greater the predominance of men. Women were fewest in the earliest years of a stream; numbers of women and children then increased over time. More women migrated to cities than to rural areas. The exceptions occurred when employers or public officials dictated specific gender criteria. Migrants contracted to labor in the Panama Canal were exclusively male. East Indian migrants traveling under indenture to Trinidad, Guyana, and Jamaica included a relatively high proportion of women because British imperial officials went to great effort to recruit women, hoping to increase the numbers of South Asian migrants who remained past their term of indenture to provide an ongoing supply of labor, thus saving imperial agents the cost of promised repatriation. Because of the strictures of indenture, East Indian women's patterns of residence were just as rural as East Indian men's, and even after indenture ended they were significantly more likely than Afro-Caribbean women to be

[46] James, *Holding Aloft the Banner*, 356–357; Bonham Richardson, *The Caribbean in Wider World, 1492–1992* (New York, 1992), 140; Proudfoot, *Population Movements*, 89.

directly employed on plantations (sugar plantations in Trinidad, rice in Guiana, banana plantations in Jamaica).[47]

In the early years of migration to Panama, Central America, and Cuba, British West Indian settlements might include eight or ten times as many men as women. Conversely, the migrant streams that were largest in volume, most urban in destination, least governed by official recruitment, and most enduring included the largest number of women. One can see the impact of recruitment, for instance, in the fact that Barbadians living in the Canal Zone in 1912 numbered 7,400 men and only 1,500 women, while Jamaicans in the same census had 12,000 men and 8,000 women. The same dynamic dictated that the Chinese population of Cuba was almost exclusively male, while Chinese populations elsewhere (the product of surreptitious individual migration rather than indentured contracting), though still heavily male, contained a few more women. Cuba's Chinese population was from 97 to 99 percent male in every census from the start of indenture through 1943.[48] Guatemala's total Chinese population in 1940 comprised 629 men and 41 women; in Honduras in 1930 the numbers were 265 men and 13 women; in Costa Rica in 1927 it was 580 men and 153 women.[49]

The 1930 population of the Republic of Panama included 9,900 foreign whites, 26,900 foreign blacks, 4,900 foreign *mestizos*, 1,300 foreign *mulatos*, and 3,000 foreigners of "yellow" race. Men outnumbered women 10 to 1 among "yellow," but only 1.5 to 1 among whites and only 1.3 to one among blacks.[50] Costa Rica's 29,000 foreign-born in 1927 included 11,000 whites, 11,000 blacks, 5,800 *mestizos*,

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[47] Lara Putnam, "Migración y género en la organización de la producción: Una comparación de la industria bananera en Costa Rica y Jamaica (1880–1935)," in *Memoria del IV Simposio Panamericano de Historia del Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia* (México D.F., 2001). The official target for indentured departures from India was set at 40 women per 100 emigrants in 1913. It was rarely met. Still, by the end of indentureship in 1921, Indians in Jamaica, for instance, numbered 10,203 men and 8,407 women.

[48] Lopez, "One Brings Another," 95.

[49] Guatemala, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Dirección general de Estadística, *Quinto Censo General de Población, levantado del 7 de abril de 1940* (Guatemala, 1942), 862; Honduras, Direccion General de Estadistica, *Resumen del Censo General de Poblacion levantado el 29 de junio de 1930* (Tegucigalpa, 1932), 31; Costa Rican 1927 census data analyzed through Centro Centroamericano de Poblacion: censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr.

[50] Panama, Secretaria de Agricultura y Obras Publicas, Direccion general del Censo, *Censo Demografico de 1930* (Panama, 1931), 17. Total population was total 467,000.

800 *mulatos*, and 480 of "yellow" race. Foreign-born men outnumbered women by 1.8 to 1 among whites, 1.7 to 1 among blacks, 1.5 to 1 among *mestizos*, and over 10 to 1 among "yellow."[51] But these national figures masked huge regional variations. British West Indian women were most numerous, and highly visible, in Colón, Panama City, the Canal Zone, Santiago de Cuba, Havana, and Port Limon. The same ports drew Spanish-speaking women from small towns and countryside farther inland, beyond the plantation zone.[52]

In the banana zones and bustling ports of Central America, sex was structured by a wide array of arrangements: some involving long-term expectations of support, many not; some involving immediate exchange of cash, many not; some preceded by formal church or state sanction, many not; some involving outright violence, many not. Categories in use at the time termed these relations prostitution, rape, consensual partnership, marriage. One can find examples of each of these enacted between men and women of the same origin, and between men and women separated by gulfs of language, nationality, ancestry, wealth, and power. "Things was rugged in them days," reminisced one Yankee old-timer in 1933, describing life a quarter-century earlier when United Fruit was just opening operations in Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, "but you could get a gal for a fish hook, and fish hooks was two for a nickel in the commissary."[53] U.S. banana men's reminiscences from the 1920s and 1930s also reference established couples: a "white Jamaican" overseer named Bob and his partner Amy, a "good-looking and very pleasant black Jamaican, also born in Costa Rica," in Chiriqui, Panama; a German overseer and his partner, "Maria, at best half Indian who had had other protectors before she acquired [him]," on a Honduran plantation.[54]

Other tales, and the manner in which they are told, leave no doubt that in the *zona bananera* forced sex was common and female consent a fungible concept. A certain Jack Bates persuaded a girl off a train in

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[51] Data analyzed through Centro Centroamericano de Poblacion: censos.ccp.ucr.ac.cr

[52] Douglas W. Trefzger, "Making West Indians Unwelcome: Bananas, Race & the Immigrant Question in Izabal, Guatemala, 1900–1929," Unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Miami, 2006.

[53] Clyde Stephens, comp., *Bananeros in Central America: True Stories of the Tropics, History and Anecdotes of a Bygone Era* (self-published by Clyde Stephens, Fort Meyers, Fl., 1989), 37.

[54] Stephens, *Bananeros*, 107–108; 60–63.

Progreso, Honduras, to come back to his room. "Obviously she was not a virgin, or her mother or protector would not have let her out of their sight," our narrator reassures us. According to his friend, Jack reported her to be "a "a little shy," so he "put on the garden hose from outside to help her make up her mind… Just a little shy…but she'll change her mind or sleep on the wet floor."[55]

Women were not automatically or inherently disempowered in heavily-male settings: to the contrary, the very fact of male demographic predominance created a sellers' market for traditionally female services, including laundry, meals, and sex. British author Winifred James, living in Bocas de Toro in 1913, wrote with amusement that her husband "picked up a letter one day which turned out to be from one of the best known ladies of pleasure in the town. Every week a contingent of them go up the line in the pay train. It was to her 'sweetman' telling him about her profits that week-end and adjuring him not to fret for she was 'thinking of him all the time.' The world is a quaint place."[56] James smiles archly at the notion that sex-work could be compatible with an ongoing conjugal partnership, but the historical record makes clear that romance was integral to the lives of women working in prostitution in Caribbean Central America.[57]

Just what a given intimate partnership entailed in terms of economic and extended family obligations could be a matter of contention. Therese Jones, from Trinidad, traveled to Panama on her own some time around 1908 and set up a *cantina* in Portobello. She moved in with Barbadian George Springer in 1910, and later agreed to marry him. In February 1913 Springer went to Barbados to visit his ailing mother; Therese gave him 230 *pesos* in silver for the roundtrip passage. When he ran through that money before buying passage home, Therese sent along another 30 *pesos* in gold. Once back in Colón, Springer refused to seek work. He told Therese to open another *cantina* like she had in Portobello; she replied that he should try to get hired at the Canal Commission. When he ignored her and continued to expect her to

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[55] Stephens, *Bananeros*, 61–62. He claimed the "gal" was "all smiles as she helped the cook prepare breakfast" the next morning. See also discussion of sexual abuse of indigenous women in the context of UFCo expansion in Lara Putnam, "Work, Sex, and Power in a Central American Export Economy at the Turn of the Twentieth Century," in Katherine Bliss and William French, eds., *Gender, Sexuality, and Power in Latin America* (Lanham, Md., 2006).

[56] Winifred James, *Out of the Shadows* (London, 1924), 57.

[57] See Putnam, *Company They Kept*, Ch. 3.

cover their rent and expenses she decided to separate, start a new business in Bocas del Toro, and find a new (Trinidadian) man.[58]

Actors on the ground in places like Limon, Colón, and Bocas clearly thought about sex in terms of race: to be accused of "whoring with Chinese" was a commonly hurled insult among Spanish-speakers and English-speakers alike in Port Limon, and occasioned no end of civil suits over "damaged reputation" and injured pride.[59] In a typical 1900 case, a sublessor behind on her rent told her landlady to "pull the money out of her ass" and castigated her for her Chinese lovers.[60] Sexual intimacy with Chinese was regarded as particularly transgressive and particularly degrading.[61] But while racial boundaries mattered in thinking about sex, the boundaries counted as racial were never fixed.

Discussing "sex across boundaries" in the context of migration, risks reifying the very divides we wish to question. Divisions between Hindu and Muslim South Asians, between French creole- and English creole-speaking islands within the British Caribbean were vitally important but never as eternal as those who insisted on them supposed. As Aisha Khan points out, there was never an original moment of unmixed purity for any migrant group in the Caribbean. Categories acquired retroactive homogeneity only as certain differences were silenced or redefined as insignificant.[62]

In order to narrate the story of migration and settlement in the Caribbean, it is necessary to use categories, and simplest to use categories of collective identity that appear most basic in the present. But the resulting tautology obscures from our sight the fact that current lines of division are the *result* of past choices regarding alliance, avoidance,

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[58] Archivo Nacional de Panamá, Archivo Judicial, Caja Primero Municipal de Colon, Juzgado Primero de Colon, No. 95, 28–5–1915.

[59] See Putnam, *Company They Kept*, Ch. 5.

[60] Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica [ANCR], Limón Alcaldía Unica 477 (injurias, 1900). As translated and recorded in the court office, the testimony read: "que le sacara del culo la plata porque no la tenia—coño podrido—puta—que la mujer que como yo (la exponente), ha vivido con chinos, no sirve para otros hombres;—que la plata que ella me debe no me la pagaria porque yo se la habia robado a un chino, querido mio. Es decir refiriendose a la declarante—que a la misma le habian cortado el pelo en Jamaica, en una prision por haberle robado a un caballero una suma."

[61] See also Lara Putnam, "Contact Zones: Heterogeneity and Boundaries in Caribbean Central America at the Start of the Twentieth Century," *Iberoamericana* [Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut, Berlin] 6, (September 2006), 113–125.

[62] Aisha Khan, *Callaloo Nation: Metaphors of Race and Religious Identity among South Asians in Trinidad* (Durham, 2004).

and self-definition, rather than the *cause* or explanation of them. Even divisions based on continent of origin, for which we use labels thought of as racial (black, white, East Indian, Chinese) are results. Over the first half of the twentieth century Caribbean Jews went from being routinely categorized as Oriental to being routinely categorized as white.[63] The division between French-speaking islanders and English-speaking islanders was jealously guarded at some migrant destinations only to be erased not only from practice but from memory a few generations later.[64] And in some places, East Indians started off "black" and became *afrodescendientes*.

With our perceptions guided by late-twentieth-century racial constructs, it seems obvious that Afro-Caribbeans were black, because African, and East Indians were brown. Yet Costa Rican journalist Antonio Zambrano, describing the rail line just south of Port Limon in 1895 noted "the laughing crops of the *coolíes*, the yucca clusters, the plantings of yam and beans, of sugar cane and of the many other things that the East Indian black [*el negrito de las Indias Orientales*] cultivates to supply the Limon market" and went on to describe "the girls of brilliant ebony in whose breasts nubility trembles. . . ."[65]

Nor was Zambrano the only one having a hard time distinguishing South Asians from other migrants in Limon. Across the British Caribbean the term "coolie" (also "cooley-man," "cooley-gal") was applied to South Asian migrants; "chinaman" or "chiney" to the Chinese. In 1912, in response to requests from the governor of the province of Limon, future entry into Costa Rica by "individuals of the 'cooli' class" was outlawed by executive decree. But whose arrival, exactly, had been forbidden? The central government consulted local medical professors and the published works of German ethnographers. The governor replied "By their special physiognomy they are easily recognized at first sight: of copper color, they speak not English but a dialect; they are filthy in their dress to the extreme that they exhale an unsupportable stench; it is their custom not to bathe, but instead grease their

[63] Cf. "Rambles in Jamaica," *Sunday Inter-Ocean* [Chicago, Ill.], Jan. 13, 1895, 31; "Jewish Race" *Daily Gleaner* April 28, 1914, 14.

[64] On "patua" negroes see Archivo Nacional de Panama, Caja Primero Municipal de Colon, juzgado Primero Municipal de Colon, 6–9–1917.

[65] Antonio Zambrano, "Crónica de la visita del señor presidente Rafael Iglesia al Puerto de Limón," El Heraldo de Costa Rica, 14 July–2 August 1895, rpt. in Fernando González Vásquez and Elias Zeledon Cartín, comps., *Cronicas y relatos para la historia de Puerto Limón* (San José, Costa Rica, 1999), 200.

whole body with coconut oil." They arrived in small groups, under the command of a boss who translated and signed contracts; sometimes they all wore a towel wrapped around their heads; other arrived separately wore velvet caps and dedicated themselves to peddling. They refused to work with either machete or axe, preferring to live from theft and arson.[66]

Despite their supposedly bodily, sartorial, and characterological markers, coolies did not form a group apart in Limon. References to "*culis*" appear occasionally in judicial testimonies from the first decades of the twentieth century in Limon, but so do references to "*jamaicanos.*" Jamaica-born "Jhon Gupi (culi)" was accused in 1911 of causing one "Mari Hall, Culi" to die of fright in Cieneguita (where Zambrano had located the center of East Indian settlement fifteen years earlier). The witnesses against Gupi included fifty-year-old Joseph Nish Foley, born in "Indostan," and Foley's son Charles Bennet, "jamaicano."[67] "Coolies" and "Jamaicans" overlapped at the level of daily life as well as at the level of rhetoric. In 1906 Afro-Jamaican Joaquin Thompson Porkins killed his consensual partner, a "mujer cooli" various identified as Aurora Dlls [sic], Mariana Thompson, or Aurora Marian Dals, in Boca del Rio Banano (again, a community adjacent to Cieneguita).[68] References to "coolies" also appear occasionally in the English language press of Port Limon as late as the 1930s, when an irate letter from "Mr. Ramsay Dosha, an East India planter" long established in the region, explained that the label "coolie" was "detestably insulting" to his people.[69] Every indication from the glancing newspaper references is that East Indians were fully integrated into the heavily Jamaican social world of English-speaking black Limon, attending weddings and parties alongside other members of the port's fiercely respectable middle class. Today Costa Ricans profess no knowledge that immigrants from South Asia ever reached their shores; no academic account of Limon's

[66] ANCR, Policia 06112 (correspondence with the governor of Limon, 1912).

[67] ANCR, Limon Juzgado del Crimen 218 (homicidio, 1911).

[68] ANCR, Limon Juzgado del Crimen 150 (homicidio, 1906). See also Limon Juzgado del Crimen 409 (homicidio, 1911), in which an Afro-Jamaican man killed his Afro-Jamaican former female partner, supposedly because he was jealous of her new relationship with a "culi". For a work partnership including Afro-Jamaican men and a Jamaican identified by some as a *culi*, see Limon Juzgado del Crimen 613 (homicidio, 1912).

[69] National Library of Costa Rica, microfilm "Periodicos de Limon," Roll 1, *Limon Searchlight*, November 15, 1930, "What is a Coolie?"

past mentions their presence; and the tag *negro culí* is identified by some aging highlanders as referring to "a really dark-skinned negro; you know, the ones who are almost blue-black."

In Panama in the first years of the twentieth century "Babú" rather than the "Coolie" became standard slang for South Asian immigrants, perhaps because there were here larger numbers of Chinese migrants, to whom the numerous North Americans on the isthmus applied the label "coolie" as a common-sense tag. The ways North American residents' preexisting images of Chinese migrants in other Pacific ports provided the framework within which Panama's population was perceived can be seen, for instance, in erstwhile Canal Zone census-taker Harry Franck's 1913 account: "Almost every known race mingles in Panama city, even to Chinese coolies in their umbrella hats and rolled up cotton trousers, delving in rich market gardens on the edges of the town or dog-trotting through the streets under two baskets dancing on the ends of a bamboo pole, till one fancies oneself at times in Singapore or Shanghai."[70] Notably larger than Costa Rica's South Asian population from the start, Panama's self-described *hindostanos* founded temples and mosques; Hindu, Muslim, and mixed cricket clubs; and a Sociedad Hindostana de Panama, inaugurated on the occasion of Indian Independence in 1947, which remains active to this day—a stark contrast to the "negritos de las Indias Orientales" just up the coast in Port Limon, whose choice of Afro-Antillean partners both reflected and hastened the dissolution of the line separating East from West Indian.[71]

In the era when export economies were booming and immigrants welcome across the region, it was possible to embrace an optimistic vision of the role that difference and desire would play in shaping the Americas. "Now that the emigration of our people is creating so much attention," wrote the pseudonymous "Mountain Man" to the Kingston *Daily Gleaner* in 1917, "It would seem as if there must eventually be a fusion of all the races in America, and a race of super-man evolved. The Jamaican young women in emigrating in such large numbers to the States, may be obeying an instinct which we do not at present

[70] Harry A. Franck, *Zone Policeman 88: A Close Range Study of The Panama Canal and Its Workers* (New York, 1913).

[71] Rosita Shahani, "La Comunidad Hindostana de Panamá," in Ileana Gólcher, ed., *Este Pais, un Canal: Encuentro de Culturas* (Panama, 1999), 167–168.

understand, and the effects of which will be powerfully felt in the centuries to come. Who knows?"[72]

By the 1930s this hopeful vision of the fusion of immigrants into a single "race of super-man" would find scant public support whether on the islands or the rimlands, in Whitehall or in Washington. The zeitgeist of the coming years was captured instead in a letter adjacent to "Mountain Man's" missive, a letter that attacked "Oriental" immigration to Jamaica. The pseudonymous "AUSTRALIAN" concluded, "We must turn the flood of Chinese into another channel. Let them try Cuba or Puerto Rico, so that we may see and get an object lesson as to how the Americans handle such problems. For the sake of our future population we might pass a law requiring every Chinaman coming here in future to bring his Chinese wife with him. This would avoid another 'colour problem' in the future."[73]

The Science of Difference and Desire and its Policy Implications

For contemporary observers, the claim that racial groupings reflect cultural constructs rather than biological entities would have seemed patently absurd. The early twentieth century Atlantic world saw the zenith of scientific racism as a paradigm for understanding collective difference. For observers of the time, then, sex across boundaries was not evidence of or occasion for the cultural redrawing of group boundaries. Group boundaries reflected biological divides that sexual intimacy breached literally and irreversibly. And while some early-twentieth century authorities agreed with "Mountain Man" that the biological fusion of races as a result of migration and sex was a good thing, other (increasingly powerful) voices insisted along with "AUSTRALIAN" that breeding and interbreeding by immigrants threatened receiving societies at their very core. Thus debates over the contours and consequences of sexual intimacy became central to policy debates in the interwar Atlantic, in particular with regard to immigration policy. The Caribbean became a privileged place to observe the impacts of race crossing. In 1908 statistician Karl Pearson of University College, London began an eager correspondence with Isaac Costa, doctor of

[72] "Migration to America," *Daily Gleaner*, Nov. 6, 1917, 13.
[73] "The Chinese Traders," *Daily Gleaner*, Nov. 6, 1917, 13.

Jamaica.[74] Pearson sought empirical evidence to reconcile the Mendelian model of plant hybridity to the world of humankind, where the unitariness of black and white races seemed self-evident but outcomes refused to conform to expectations. Pearson's questions poured forth. "Mulatto + white gives a quadroon. Is this again a blend? Our theorists would say it must consist of half whites and half mulattos in number. I should have thought that the quadroon was lighter in skin than the mulatto.... and that pure white skins did not occur in 50 percent of quadroons." "Mulatto + mulatto. Is this usually a mulatto in colour? Our theorists say 25 percent are pure white skins, 25 percent pure black skins, and only 50 percent mulattos." Dr. Costa replied with the disdain of an elevated insider who called the ideas of the theorists "ridiculously incorrect." "There are now and then slight variations from the usual mulatto brown or mulatto-yellow," he reported, "but you may be quite certain that no pure black skins or pure white skins come from mulatto + mulatto. You can state this dogmatically."[75] When Pearson published "A Note on the Skin-Colour of Negro and White Crosses from Information Received from the West Indies" in *Biometrika* the following year, photos and letters from Costa were his only data.[76]

The societal implications of race-mixing likewise could be read from the Caribbean past and present. Thus British imperial cheerleader Harry Johnston rejoiced in 1910 for the influx of Spaniards into Cuba, without which the island "had a considerable chance in the near future of developing into another Haiti or a San Domingo." Were it not for Spaniards' arrival and enfranchisement, "the 'coloured' vote would soon have amounted to a third of the total, and before long to a half, and finally have preponderated over the white element—with what effect on public order or efficiency it is difficult to say, since the Cuban negro differs in many characteristics from the dark race in the United States and Haiti, and yet has not yet been sufficiently tried in

[74] The last name Costa suggests Sephardic Jewish ancestry. Correspondence makes clear that this wealthy and well-educated doctor considered himself both European and white.

[75] "Isaac Costa letter to Karl Pearson, 10/3/1908." Image consulted at http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/eugenics/image_header.pl?id=1949.

[76] "Abstracts of Papers in Biometrika," *Biometrika* 4, 6 (1909): n.p. Image consulted at http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/static/images/1999.html.

positions of responsibility and public trust to have established a racial character, good or bad."[77]

A contrasting set of claims about the outcome of interracial sex in the British Caribbean animated one of the most widely debated works on imperial rule in its day, Sydney Olivier's 1910 *White Capital and Coloured Labour.* Olivier was an Oxford-educated Fabian Socialist, close friend to Beatrice and Sydney Webb and George Bernard Shaw, longtime Colonial Office official in the British West Indies, and Governor of Jamaica from 1907 to 1913. The book is an extended brief against "colour-prejudice and race antagonism" and the "negrophobist theory of exclusion."[78] Yet Olivier's is an anti-racism that manages to further the reification of race, as he attributes political and social processes of all kinds to the ancestral inheritance of those involved. Hence "the future of the relations between White Capital and Coloured Labor depends so largely on the possibility of Race-fusion either by the bodily process of blending by intermarriage, or by some alternative psychical process of establishing sympathetic understanding, that we must establish what…has been done in this direction in those communities in which people of European and African races have been forced into social contact."[79] In other words, the future of modern capitalism and colonialism depended on lessons drawn from a past of sex across boundaries in the Caribbean.

For Olivier, relying on the West Indies as his constant example, it was indisputable that "a colony of black, colored, and whites has far more organic efficiency and far more promise in it than a colony of black and white alone."[80] Other observers drew opposite conclusions. Adventure traveler A. Hyatt Verrill informed his readers that within the Jamaican middle class, those of "both races and all colors…are all socially equal and…freely intermarry." For Verill this arrangement must be inherently unstable, given that "the primitive negro strain is far more virile than the white, and there is a constant tendency for offspring of mixed blood to revert to the African rather than to the Anglo-Saxon type. Even where there is a very small percentage of

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[77] Harry Johnston, *The Negro in the New World* (New York, 1969; repr. London, 1910), 59.

[78] Sydney Olivier, *White Capital and Coloured Labour* (Westport, Conn., 1970; repr. London, 1910), 19.

[79] Olivier, *White Capital*, 29.

[80] Olivier, *White Capital*, 38.

colored blood—where both parents may be, apparently, pure white—the children frequently are decidedly coloured or even black. And it is an established biological fact that, should the intermarriage of the two races continue, the result would be, not the absorption of the negro race by the Caucasian, but the annihilation of the Caucasian by the negro, with a wholly colored community as the ultimate result."[81] As Verrill's passage reminds us, questions about the individual biological consequences of "interracial" unions and the society-wide political consequences of race-mixing were inextricably linked. The essence of race in the eugenicist paradigm was that it represented the point of fusion of individual and collective destinies.

Thus as demography and population dynamics came to the fore in prescriptions for national progress, the question of who might have sex with whom and with what results was always at issue—implicitly, explicitly—in debates over migration control. This is evident in the testimony by Princeton economist Robert Foerster before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization in March 1925. The topic was "The Racial Problems Involved in Immigration from Latin America, the West Indies, and Canada," an exploration of the implications of the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act's decision to leave immigrants to the U.S. from all "American republics" within the category of "non-quota" migrants, that is, their volume of entry subject to no numerical cap. Most worrisome was that although "The provisions drastically limiting the immigration of oriental peoples prevent the immigration into the United States of Chinese, Japanese, and some other peoples possibly desiring to enter this country after residence in the other American countries . . . no law has been enacted imposing any similar restriction upon the immigration of the races which constitute the dominant stocks in the Latin American countries"—that is, Indians, Negroes, and "Mixed Stocks."[82] Like many before him, Foerster found that "the most notable racial aspect of Latin America doubtless has been the crossing of races. In no comparable are of the earth's surface has there

[81] A. Hyatt Verrill, *Jamaica of Today* (New York, 1931), 135–136.

[82] Robert F. Foerster, "The Racial Problems involved in Immigration from Latin America and the West Indies to the United States," in *Hearings of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, March 3, 1925* (Washington, 1925), 304. Cf. Mae Ngai, "The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924," *Journal of American History* 86.1 (1999), 67–92.


been so extensive a crossing of diverse or distant races.... Nor is there anything to suggest that the mixture of types has terminated."[83]

Where Sydney Olivier had seen in sexual contact the possibility of blending and harmony, Foerster saw disharmony, asymmetry, unknowns, and a need for utmost caution. "The effects of race mixture are still far from being understood. Exact knowledge on the subject remains scanty and despite the fact that important studies are today being pursued in various parts of the world, the difficulties in ascertaining race elements in parentage and of distinguishing environmental or social influences from hereditary or physical influences are such that exact knowledge, except of limited aspects, is likely to remain scanty." Yet there was no need to let this state of scholarly ignorance put the brakes on policy advising. Scientific literature left no doubt: hybrids at best would be inferior to the superior strain and at worst, even less fit than the inferior strain, for "intermarriage between persons of distantly related races is likely to breed stock subject to various disharmonic or asymmetrical developments which prevent a normal and balanced life."[84] Radical restriction of immigration from Latin America and the Caribbean was essential to the future stability and harmony of the United States.

Among the "important studies" of the impact of race mixing underway, none would be more influential among U.S. eugenicists than one conducted in Jamaica, financed by the Carnegie Institution and conducted by Charles Davenport, head of the Eugenics Record Office, and his research associate Dr. Morris Steggerda. Published in 1929, *Race Crossing in Jamaica* was based on anthropometric surveys, intelligence testing, and psychological evaluations conducted on adolescent students at Mico College, Jamaica. Steggerda and Davenport reported that the "mulattos" among their subjects suffered obvious and dangerous physical disharmonies, and insisted that statistics showing success by colored subjects on intelligence tests masked the unusually frequency of "muzzle-headedness" they had observed among these experimental subjects.[85]

Even at the time such views were contested. W.E. Castle mocked Davenport and Steggerda's Jamaican research in *Science* in 1930, in

[83] Foerster, "Racial Problems," 329.
[84] Foerster, "Racial Problems," 330.
[85] Charles B. Davenport and Morris Steggerda, *Race Crossing in Jamaica* (Washington, 1929).



Source: the Harry H. Laughlin Papers, Truman State University, Lantern Slides, Black Case, Section 7,1736; Dolan DNA Learning Center Image #943. Original title: "Mixed race Jamaican school children."

Figure 18 U.S. eugenicists sought to document and quantify the results of "mixing" "B[lack]," "R[ed]," "Y[ellow]," and "W[hite]" "racial stocks" through studies of Caribbean people

particular his stress on a half-centimeter differential in mean leg length minus mean arm length, and concluded "We like to think of the Negro as inferior. We like to think of Negro-white crosses as a degradation of the white race. We look for evidence in support of the idea and try to persuade ourselves that we have found it even when the resemblance is very slight. The honestly made records of Davenport and Steggerda tell a very different story about hybrid Jamaicans from that which Davenport and Jennings tell about them in broad sweeping statements. The former will never reach the ears of eugenics propagandists and Congressional committees; the latter will be with us as the bogey men of pure-race enthusiasts for the next hundred years."[86]

Davenport fired back a fierce defense of the significance of their statistical findings and of the biological reality of race.[87] Hybrids do not harmonize; stock determines psyche; demography is destiny. These were the messages Davenport and his deputy Harry Laughlin carried to the Pan American Conferences of Eugenics and Homiculture in Cuba in 1927 and in Buenos Aires in 1934, along with new "Model Immigration Law" templates and an implicit threat of future U.S. restrictions on immigration from Spanish American republics. Representatives from some of the larger South American nations called such diagnoses and prescriptions into question. In contrast, many Spanish-speaking republics of the circum-Caribbean accepted the northern eugenicists' promotion of new bureaucracies, standards, and criteria of immigration control. Representatives from Panama and Cuba spoke vehemently in favor of Davenport's proposals, insisting on a distinction between their nations' "own" populations of partial African ancestry—unfortunate legacies of colonial avarice now felicitously on the way towards absorption into the national "stock"—and the undesirable recent immigrants of color who could not and should not be assimilated.[88] Davenport's proposals regarding premarital screening

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[86] W.E. Castle, "Race Mixture and Physical Disharmonies," *Science* 71.1850 (June 13, 1930), 605–606.

[87] C.B. Davenport, "Some Criticisms of 'Race Crossing in Jamaica,'" *Science* 72.1872 (Nov. 14, 1930), 501–502.

[88] *Actas de la Primera Conferencia Panamericana de Eugenesia y Homicultura de las Repúblicas Americanas, celebrada en la Habana, Cuba, desde el 21 hasta el 23 de diciembre de 1927* (Habana, 1928); Harry Laughlin, "The Codification and Analysis of the Immigration-Control Law of Each of the Several Countries of Pan America, as expressed by their National Constitutions, Statute Laws, International Treaties, and Administrative Regulations, as of January 1, 1936" (mimeo, Eugenics Record Office, Carnegie Institution of Washington, October 1936); Nancy Leys Stepan, *The Hour of*

and control over reproduction by the "unfit" proved too controversial for the Latin American delegates to countenance but his language regarding immigration restriction was adopted—and made patent that the issue at stake was reproductive crossing, that is, sex with natives. "The nations of America will issue and apply laws of immigration with intention to bar the entry into their territory of individuals from races whose association with the natives may be considered biologically undesirable."[89]

Implicit in the declarations of circum-Caribbean delegates at the Pan American Conference, and in speeches of populist politicians back home, was a remonstrance that ignored the long history of circulation around the Caribbean: it was U.S. actors, public and private, who had supposedly "introduced" these "undesirable" populations into their territories in the first place.[90] Muckraking progressive journalist Carleton Beals published an account of "The Black Belt of the Caribbean" in 1931 that echoed the anti-imperialist arguments made by these *mestizo* populists: The "Negroes who swarm out of over-populated Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad…are the breeders of this vast circle of ocean, island, and sky. Spaniards, Frenchmen, Englishmen, Dutchmen—they came, they conquered, they faded away in the poisonous sweet arms of the Carib and the Chibcha girl. But the Negro brought even greater love and lust than the natives.… So his kind have multiplied and continue to multiply in a frenzy of fertility and magic which has matched the lavish reproductive powers of steaming earth, hot sun and warm syrupy water of rain, river and sea."[91] Beals's feverish encomium to black sexual power continues on for several pages of references to "the Negro['s]…fertile loins" and "the Haitian and Jamaican breeding

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Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America (Ithaca, 1991), Chapter 6; Lara Putnam, "Eventually Alien: The Multigenerational Saga of British West Indians in Central America, 1870–1940," in *Between Race and Place*.

[89] *Actas*, 323.

[90] Aviva Chomsky, "'Barbados or Canada?' Race, Immigration, and Nation in Early-Twentieth-Century Cuba," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 80. 3 (2000), 415–462; Aviva Chomsky, "West Indian Workers in Costa Rican Radical and Nationalist Ideology: 1900–1950," *The Americas* 51 (1994), 11–40; Lara Putnam, "'Nothing Matters But Color': Transnational Circuits, the Interwar Caribbean, and the Black International," in *From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International and the Struggle for Liberation*, eds. Michael D. West and William G. Martin (Chapel Hill, 2009); Putnam, "Eventually Alien."

[91] Carleton Beals, "The Black Belt of the Caribbean," in *The Fortnightly Review*, September 1, 1931, 357.


grounds."[92] Ultimately "The Caribbean is an enormous black incubator," whose swarming offspring have been harnessed to the interests of U.S. companies. Corporate activities "disseminat[ed] the Negro race" ever more widely in a process that brings "growing denationalization and cultural chaos," pushing islands "to fall under self-perpetuating tyrannies completely servile to American interests."[93]

In sum, the late 1920s and 1930s saw Spanish American republics drawn into dialogue with northern eugenicism precisely as populist nativism intensified in response to regional economic crisis. As reformist middle-class politicians struggled to wrest control of national states from the old oligarchies whose interests export agriculture had long served, non-white immigrants and their descendents became the targets of racist invective and legislative exclusion across the Greater Caribbean. New laws restricted black entry, employment, or naturalization at site after site in the 1920s and 1930s. They also added new penalties to the restrictions on "Asiatic," "yellow," "Mongolian," and Middle Eastern immigration that had been legislated a generation earlier. New anti-black legislation passed in Honduras in 1923 and 1926; El Salvador in 1925; Guatemala in 1936; Panama in 1926, 1928, and 1941; Costa Rica in 1942; Cuba in 1933; Venezuela in 1929. Extra-legal violence by police and other officials towards non-white non-citizens rose markedly as well, especially in Cuba, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic—where the scapegoating of black migrants reached its nadir with the slaughter of some 15,000 Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian ancestry in the border region on the orders of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in 1937.[94] As doors slammed shut across the region, once-proud working-class emigrants hunkered down in ethnic enclaves within increasingly hostile lands, or headed back to their islands of origin, some penniless, some physically disabled by hard labor or abuse. The multigenerational saga of migrants creating

[92] Beals, "The Black Belt," 359.

[93] Beals, "The Black Belt," 366–367.

[94] See Putnam, "Eventually Alien"; Laughlin, "Codification and Analysis"; Jorge L. Giovannetti, "Black British Subjects in Cuba: Race, Ethnicity, Nation, and Identity in the Migratory Experience, 1898–1938," Unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of North London, 2001; PRO, CO 318/417/6: Treatment of British West Indians in Venezuela: Claims for Compensation; PRO, CO 318/436/10: Venezuelan Affairs: Deportation of Foreigners; Richard Lee Turits, "A World Destroyed, A Nation Imposed: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the Dominican Republic," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 82.3 (2002), 589–635.



Map 17 Caribbean migrations, 1930–1945

transnational kin networks to wrest a precarious prosperity from the expanding export economy had reached a grim denouement of stagnation, state racism, and bitter frustration. Returnees' first-hand experiences of the internationalism of modern white supremacy would shape a generation of challenges to British rule, from the "Labour Rebellions" of 1937–38 to decolonization two decades later. But the new nations thus created, like their circum-Caribbean counterparts, were riven by internal frontiers, products of the most intimate encounters and public harangues of the heyday of regional migration.

THE DYNAMICS OF LABOR MIGRATION AND RAW MATERIALS ACQUISITION IN THE TRANSATLANTIC WORSTED TRADE, 1830–1930

Mary H. Blewett

Worsted wool cloth woven from tightly twisted long-staple yarn, which produces a smoother finish than the softer surface of woolens, became popular for both men and women's clothing during the period between 1830 and 1930. Sites of its production and markets, of capital investment and the acquisition of raw materials in the transatlantic worsted trade shifted periodically. These shifts prompted mass proletarian labor migrations to changing worsted centers. Textile mills in Yorkshire, England; France; Belgium; Germany; and the American Northeast received labor migrants from sending areas including Great Britain, southern, western, and eastern Europe, and the Middle East. These regional worsted textile industries became essential building blocks of national economies.[1] Finance and industrial capitalists regarded regional marketing strategies as vital interests. Investment and marketing strategies in turn shaped labor migrations. Thus, the corporation is yet another transnational agent for migration historians to analyze.[2] The acquisition of raw materials for the transatlantic worsted industry required a global oceanic reach protected by imperial systems. Regional industrial production with transoceanic ties proves an appropriate subject for understanding both the Atlantic World and the other oceans to which industry connected it.

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[1] Celia Applegate, "A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times," *American Historical Review* 104 (1999), 1157–1183.

[2] Matthew Frye Jacobson, "More 'Trans-, Less National," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 25 (2006), 74–84. Corporate records, if they survive, trade journals, and the commercial press all offer insights into transatlantic investment decisions and marketing strategies. Of the three major worsted firms in the West Riding, only the records of the Black Dyke Mills, Queensbury, survived, see Eric M. Sigsworth, *The Black Dyke Mills: A History* (Liverpool, 1958).

Marketing Strategies and Labor Migration

Regional economic development organized a transatlantic worsted industry during the nineteenth century. France, Belgium, England, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Russia had imported and exported raw materials, partially finished materials, and piece goods largely among themselves.[3] Decentralization and specialization marked this production until the rise of international tariff protection encouraged centralization. Two basic systems of worsted manufacture—the Bradford [Yorkshire] hard-twist yarn system and the French soft-spun yarn system—were both used in European mills that exported to the Americas. Some of these producing nations responded to the challenge of extreme American protectionism by 1890 by investing in branch factories in the American Northeast and encouraging labor migration there. This was a bold move by transatlantic capital to continue to profit from the expanding U.S. domestic market under new limits on trade.

The United States McKinley tariff of 50 percent *ad valorum* on worsted cloth and dress goods, preceded by the 1883 tariff of 40 percent, was designed to close off the lucrative American domestic market to worsted producers in Yorkshire as well as in France, Belgium, and Germany.[4] Carl Strikwerda has argued that state policy trumped national economic interests in the nineteenth century by easing laws on international trade, finance, and commerce and promoting freedom of trade, navigation, and communication, thus opening the way for global migrations.[5] I suggest instead that American tariff protection, *the* vital political issue in the late nineteenth century United States, was the result of intense lobbying by the emergent post-Civil War Republican Party on behalf of textile manufacturers, bankers, and investors in the Northeast to mention *only* a few.

Overproduction and high profits resulting from Civil War demands for military cloth ushered in the first tariffs on woolen goods in 1867. The protectionist debates had begun.[6] The politics of tariff schedules were oceanic in their compass if bogglingly complex in their details.

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[3] Gary Herrigel, *Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power* (Cambridge, 1996), 1–32, esp. 15–19.

[4] Arthur H. Cole, *The American Wool Manufacture*, 2 vols. (New York, 1969), 2:9–26; on lobbying activities, 28–32.

[5] Carl Strikwerda, "Tides of Migration, Currents of History: The State, Economy, and the Transatlantic Movement of Labor in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," *International Review of Social History* 44 (1999), 367–394.

[6] Cole, *American Wool Manufacture*, 1:380–88.

In this case, state policy, responsive to and shaped by industrial and finance capitalism, resulted in new state bureaucracies and regulations. The state also responded, as David Cook Martin shows, by developing capacities to regulate the movements of migrants and their membership in the nation.[7] The economic power of industrial interests exercised through the majority Republican Party had by 1896 motivated changes in state policy and infrastructure intended to encourage textile manufacture in the American Northeast. The McKinley tariff and the even more stringent protectionism that followed clearly reflected a policy to stimulate national manufacture by cutting off transatlantic imports. Yorkshire production was hit hard.

The Yorkshire Worsted Industry

From the beginning, Yorkshire worsted manufacturers had a clear perception of regional and transatlantic competition, the markets for their products, and their use of labor migrants.[8] Their shifting needs for raw materials by 1870 required an oceanic reach protected by an imperial system.

Regional sources of capital for West Riding industrialization between 1750 and 1850 came from mortgages on land and in capital raised from farming, the rural putting-out system, and wool selling rather than from urban merchants.[9] Eighteenth century Yorkshire woolen towns shifted to making worsted cloth. By the early nineteenth century, the mills of the West Riding dominated English worsted production. Important advances in wool spinning technology run by water power, in addition to easy access to coal to run more dependable steam engines, helped shift the center of worsted production by 1850 from "the flatlands of East Anglia to hilly West Yorkshire."[10]

Internal and external migration proved crucial to assembling the infrastructure and the workforce. The worsted center of Bradford, Yorkshire, with only one sizeable beck (stream) for waterpower

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[7] David Cook Martin, "Rules, Red Tape, and Paperwork: The Archeology of State Control Over Migrants, 1850–1930" *Journal of Historical Sociology* 21 (March 2008), 82–118.

[8] This subject forms the economic background for *The Yankee Yorkshireman: Migration Lived and Imagined* (Urbana, 2009).

[9] Pat Hudson, *The Genesis of Industrial Capital: A Study of the West Riding Wool Textile Industry c. 1750–1850* (Cambridge, 1986), 259–262.

[10] J.H. Clapham 1910 quote in Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 1–10, 63.

depended on coal mines in nearby Barnsley for its steam engines. Internal migrants from the Midlands, Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire worked the deep pits.[11] Others from Lancashire and Lincolnshire traveled on the railroad lines in the 1840s connecting Bradford to Manchester. Although many worsted workers were internal migrants, they joined streams of other migrants from across the Irish Sea, and from Germany.[12] Displaced male weavers and men from rural areas and from Ireland plus woolcombers from East Anglia flocked into West Riding until the complete mechanization of this work.[13] Together they represented part of the "proletarian mass migration" within the nineteenth century Atlantic economies.[14]

Industrial change in West Yorkshire altered both distant and local agrarian economies. Rural East Yorkshire farmers provided beef, milk, and other foodstuffs for the developing textile centers. The fleeces necessary for the tightly-twisted worsted yarn were obtained from long-haired Lincoln sheep raised in the Cotswolds, Kent, and Leicestershire or imported across the Pacific, Indian, and South Atlantic oceans from Australasia.[15] One result of increasing centralization and mechanization was the decline of the rural mill village. The subsequent end to this system of rural production in Yorkshire reflected similar developments in other European textile cities, such as woolen centers in France. Leslie Page Moch has argued that rural deindustrialization in Europe, which withdrew capital from countryside manufacture and prompted labor migration, became fully as important a component of the nineteenth century society as the urban factory system.[16] These economic and social changes accompanied industrialization across the North Sea in Yorkshire.

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[11] A.G. Walker, "Migration into a South Yorkshire Colliery District, 1861–81," *Northern History* 29 (1993), 165–184.

[12] Leslie Page Moch, *Moving Europeans: Migrations in Western Europe since 1650* (Bloomington, 1992), 142–143.

[13] Theodore Koditschek, *Class Formation and Urban Industrial Society: Bradford, 1750–1850* (Cambridge, 1990), 85.

[14] Dirk Hoerder, "Introduction," in Dirk Hoerder, ed., *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies: The European and American Working Classes in the Period of Industrialization* (Westport, CT, 1985), 4–7.

[15] Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 60–2.

[16] Moch, *Moving Europeans*, cited the examples of early nineteenth century deindustrialization in English and Scottish handloom cotton and in Irish and Flemish handloom linen production as well as in the woolen centers of Auffray and Roubaix in France, 115–136, esp. 115–120.



Courtesy of P. Coppens

Map 18 Yorkshire and surrounding Areas

The Yorkshire factory system, according to Theodore Koditscheck, came to be divided between a minority of skilled adult men and a "largely silent, unorganized, and increasingly feminized mass of industrial operatives isolated within the confines of the factory's walls."[17]

[17] Koditschek, *Class Formation and Urban Industrial Society*, 475–482, esp. 482.

These mechanized operations would characterize most transatlantic worsted production. Bradford more than doubled in size between 1831 and 1851, boasting 206 mills in 1861, while the number of woolen mills in nearby Leeds rapidly declined.[18]

Labor Migrations and Yorkshire Worsteds

By 1850, West Yorkshire contained 90 percent of all worsted operatives in England and 50 percent of their number resided in Bradford parish.[19] The workforce was part of a larger, mobile labor force, such as the Irish who entered the cotton factories of Lancashire, England, and Belgian migrants who worked in the woolen mills of Roubaix, France.[20] Rural people, adults and children, from Devon and Cornwall in the English West Country and Irish migrants arrived in large numbers.[21] In 1851 Irish migrants in Bradford represented 21 percent of all Irish-born persons in the West Riding.[22] One-third of these people, especially in the peak years of migration, 1841–1851, came from Queen's County, Ireland, where the woolen and linen textile industry had employed many.[23] Irish textile workers and manual laborers in construction who ended up in Bradford came in stages through Lancashire or other towns in Yorkshire. Bradford led the other major textile centers in percentage of residents born outside of Yorkshire.[24]

Young single females from English towns and from Ireland made up about a quarter of the local migrants.[25] These factory women formed part of a temporary labor migration system, who unless they married

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[18] Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 63–64, 73; Ittmann, *Work, Gender and Family*, 102–103.

[19] Bradford Parish then included the townships of Horton, Manningham, and Bowling, Gary Firth, "The Bradford Trade," in D.G. Wright and J.A. Jowitt, eds., *Victorian Bradford: Essays in Honour of Jack Reynolds* (Bradford, 1982), 8, 14. Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 34, 62–68; Ittmann, *Work, Gender and Family*, 14.

[20] Moch, *Moving Europeans*, 133.

[21] Foreword, J.W. Jowett, "Bradford Seventy Years Ago," in Fenner Brockway, ed., *Socialism Over Sixty Years: The Life of Jowett of Bradford (1864–1944)* (London, 1946), 13, 17, 26.

[22] Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 67–68.

[23] C. Richardson, "Irish Settlement in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Bradford," *Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research* 20, (May 1968), 40–57.

[24] Hudson, *Genesis of Industrial Capital*, table 3.8, 83.

[25] Ittmann, *Work, Gender and Family*, 149–152.

probably became return migrants.[26] Except for supervisory and mechanical work, adult men found few jobs in steam-powered worsted factories.[27] Women and children dominated spinning and weaving. This great reservoir of cheap labor was replenished with migrants, a rising birth rate, and early marriage. Working-class family income depended on the pooled wages of low-paid children, adolescents, and married women with children who often returned to the mills.[28]

As industrialization continued, Yorkshire worsted merchants congregated in Bradford. Among these traders were several hundred Jews from Germany and Central Europe. They formed a "foreign colony" in Bradford.[29] Financed by German banks, they made decisions about the quality and quantities of worsted goods for Continental markets. These commercial migrants reflected a traditional merchant diaspora in the developing Atlantic economy in textiles.[30] Other German Jews worked as wool staplers or wool sellers.[31] German working-class residents of Bradford, mostly from Halle, Germany, worked as dyers.[32]

Technical education also stimulated Yorkshire contacts with Germany. Born in 1830, Bradford manufacturer Joseph Benn got a chance to learn his trade as a young man in Germany. Relative technical superiority within the Atlantic economies often prompted temporary British migration to Western Europe.[33] Benn also sent his promising son Harrison to Germany for his education, probably in the arts of dyeing worsted yarn.[34] Harrison Benn was the energetic textile capitalist who

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[26] Hoerder, "Introduction," *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies*, 9, 19.

[27] Ittmann, *Work, Gender and Family*, 44–45.

[28] Koditschek, *Class Formation and Urban Industrial Society*, 353–363; Mary Blewett, "Yorkshire Lasses and Their Lads: Sexuality, Sexual Customs, and Gender Antagonisms in an Anglo-American Working-Class Culture," *Journal of Social History* 40 (2006), 317–336.

[29] A.R. Rollins, "The Jewish Contribution to the British Textile Industry: Builders of Bradford," *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England* 42 (1951–52), 45–51.

[30] Adam McKeown, "Global Migration, 1846–1940," *Journal of World History* 15 (2004), 163.

[31] One was Julius Delius, the father of the composer Frederick Delius, who migrated to Yorkshire in 1855 from the Westphalian town of Bielefeld and became an English citizen, Clare Delius, *Frederick Delius: Memories of My Brother* (London, 1935), 13–69, 196–197.

[32] Hedley Smith, "The Tongue-Tied Town," and "The Lion and The Eagle," typescripts of unpublished novels cited in Blewett, *The Yankee Yorkshireman*.

[33] Hoerder, "Introduction," in *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies*, 22.

[34] Obituaries, Joseph Benn, *Bradford Observer*, August 23, 1897; Harrison Benn, *Bradford Telegraph*, *Yorkshire Observer*, July 25, 1921.

in 1903 built a branch factory of the Bradford works at Greystone village, North Providence, Rhode Island. This became one of the successful sites of post-McKinley tariff investment and transatlantic labor migration for worsted production in the American Northeast.

Product Decisions, Raw Materials, and Oceans to Cross

Internal and external migration shaped the worsted industry in Yorkshire and made it an integral part of the Atlantic labor economy. So did its products and trading policies. During the mid-1830s, Bradford area manufacturers led by the firm of Titus Salt and Sons decided to produce mass quantities of worsted dress cloth called "mixed" goods using strong, cheap cotton warp and worsted weft.[35] The mill owners intended to sell their mass production of women's "lustre" goods to the English, European, and American middle classes and the respectable working classes. They would compete with all-cotton dress goods in price but surpass them in gloss and style.[36] Bradford capitalists ceded the production of all-wool worsted manufacture for the upper-class luxury market to French technical and aesthetic superiority. These decisions to concentrate on hard-twist goods as the staple product and the resulting heavy investment in throstle spinning machinery would become a financial liability when ladies' fashion inevitably changed. Between 1830 and 1860, however, great success in the mass selling of mixed goods banished caution.

The combination of strong cotton warp yarn, obtained from local and Lancashire spinning mills, with yarns of light silky alpaca from Peru or mohair obtained from Turkey through Greek merchants yielded an inexpensive fabric suitable for use over crinolines and hoopskirts.[37] Obtaining these raw materials required an oceanic reach by wool buyers and merchants. Alpacas, smaller cousins to llamas, failed to thrive in the Scottish Highlands or in Australia. Indian herdsmen in Peru collected the clip at their own pace, while frantic native

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[35] Jack Reynolds, *The Great Paternalist: Titus Salt and the Growth of Nineteenth-Century Bradford* (New York, 1983), 50–54.

[36] Firth, "The Bradford Trade," *Victorian Bradford*, 15.

[37] Arthur Cole describe this fabric as woolen muslin or "Mousseline-de-laine," often referred to simply as delaine, cheap, and durable, *American Wool Manufacture* 1 (1969), 326; "The Affairs of Sir Titus Salt, Bart., Sons and Co. Limited," in *Textile Manufacturer* (Manchester) hereafter *TM*, September 15, 1892, 397.

wool buyers scoured the interior offering cash from horseback. The clip then took the Cape Horn route to Liverpool before the opening of the Suez Canal. The three largest Bradford area manufacturers, Titus Salt and Sons of the industrial complex at Saltaire, John Foster's Black Dyke Mills at Queensbury, and G. & J. Turner of Great Horton, bought 90 percent on the docks.[38]

Mohair acquisition took a different, shorter Mediterranean route but was just as hard to dominate as alpaca. Mohair goats grazed in the Turkish interior. Greek traders bought their fleeces and took them to London where the same three Bradford worsted manufacturers lined up to buy the clip. By 1865 the Ottoman government reluctantly allowed the British to buy mohair goats to send to South Africa. But what did English flockmasters know about goat breeds? They accepted the most inferior stock, undoubtedly accompanied by laughter in Bosporus ports and suggesting the vulnerabilities of economic colonialism.[39] Even if inferior, the goats flourished, and the mohair clip grew larger. Still Yorkshire wool buyers set up their own agents in Istanbul to get the best mohair from Anatolian herds. Andean herdsmen continue to control the alpaca clip.[40]

Yorkshire's Transatlantic Connections and Troubles

The district of Bradford, which by 1850 manufactured 80 percent of English worsted goods, continued to sell its mixed goods with profit, until events in transatlantic trade and politics intruded and upset nearly thirty years of prosperity. The American Civil War disrupted the sources of Bradford's supplies for cotton warp, which depended on bales of raw cotton shipped from the American South. The United States naval blockade of southern seaports during the Civil War, 1861–1865 cut off the flow, while wartime ravages to the Cotton South's agricultural system reduced the postwar cotton supply. In England, this cotton "famine" in the 1860s depressed the Lancashire industry, while cotton warp nearly disappeared.[41] Bradford firms returned to

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[38] Economic historian Eric Sigsworth provided detailed analysis, *Black Dyke Mills*, 235–238, on wool-buying, 243–283.

[39] Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 239–240; Clapham, *Woolen and Worsted*, 118–119.

[40] The contemporary clip is from well over 10,000 alpacas.

[41] This represents one additional casualty of the American Civil War, see Sven Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton

all-wool worsted cloth, now cheaper than scarce cotton fabrics. They successfully competed even with the French but only after the Cobden Treaty of 1860 allowed English piece goods into France and especially during the market upheavals of the Franco-Prussian War, 1870–71.[42] Positioning themselves within the transatlantic raw cotton and worsted trade led to serious challenges for Yorkshire mills.

In the 1870s the transatlantic aesthetics of women's fashion centered in Paris also forced changes in Yorkshire products. Designers abandoned the crinoline for softly draped costumes arranged to fall backward over the bustle, a padded, wired cushion tied around the corseted female waist. French production of all-wool worsted cloth, using yarns, for example of cashmere, spun in varying light "counts" [a measure of fineness] on mule spinning machines and inspired by Gallic coloration and design made Bradford manufacturers increasingly sick with envy. Wool combing by machine in Yorkshire, unlike French methods, required oiling the wool, making the even dyeing of worsted fabric difficult, while a shift to mule spinning frames was far too expensive in costs and wages. Expensive French all-wool worsted cloth made at Roubaix penetrated the English home market.[43] Thus began the long period of Yorkshire's depressed trade in the late 1870s and early 1880s.

Years of poor markets forced Bradford manufacturers to diversify. Led by the sons of Titus Salt, the Black Dyke Mills, and G. & J. Turner of Great Horton, West Riding goods shifted away from women's fabrics to worsted coatings, coat linings, and suitings for men's wear which proved very successful.[44] Salt and Sons and Samuel C. Lister's operations at Manningham in Bradford also began to make silk plush and artificial sealskin.[45] By the 1880s, both fabrics were selling well in American and European markets. Tariffs, however, to protect the growing textile industries in Germany and the worsted and silk plush industries in the United States, both key export markets for Yorkshire, cut into this trade. Support for "free trade" ideology waned as

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Production in the Age of the Civil War," *American Historical Review* 109 (2004), 1405–1438, esp. 1409–1410, 1420.

[42] Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 73–76.

[43] Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 77–88, 93, 325; Firth, "The Bradford Trade," *Victorian Bradford*, 13, 24.

[44] Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 240–243; William Cudworth, *Rambles Round Horton* (Bradford, 1886), 1–2.

[45] Mark Keighley, *A Fabric Huge: The Story of the Listers*, (London, 1989), 21–22.

Yorkshire manufacturers demanded tariff retaliation and sought new markets at home and within the British Empire.[46]

The "infamous" McKinley tariff in 1890 cut in half worsted imports into the United States, followed by three years of only slightly more relaxed tariffs under Democratic control during the economic depression of the 1890s.[47] With the election of Republican William McKinley as President and a Republican Congress in 1896, the Dingley tariffs with rates at 55 percent further slashed Bradford worsteds for American markets.[48] McKinley's name became anathema throughout the West Riding. State protectionist policies that reflected partisan domestic political contests in the 1890s deeply undercut Yorkshire manufacturing and created widespread unemployment, serious strikes in Bradford, and the rise in Yorkshire of the Independent Labour Party.[49] The transatlantic trading system had collapsed with economic, political, and social consequences of great importance.

"[A] chronic state of dullness" continued to plague Bradford firms and their workers at the turn of the twentieth century.[50] But costs in materials had been cut, and new products tried. Coat linings, finely woven of cotton warp and Peruvian alpaca or Turkish mohair, became one successful line, as did tightly woven mackintoshes for men's and women's wear in the English rain. Waterproofed worsted flannels became the emblems of English sporting clothes. Coatings required wider looms and new processes of waterproofing but not a shift to expensive mule spinning machinery. By the early twentieth century, the export of all wool manufactures followed cotton goods, iron and steel, machinery, and coal to compose the basics of English foreign trade.[51] Not until the British cornered the world market in raw wool before the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, did Yorkshire fortunes truly

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[46] For similar shifts by the British cotton industry, Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire," 1431–1432.

[47] Tony Jowitt, "Late Victorian and Edwardian Bradford," in David James, Tony Jowitt, Keith Laybourn, eds., *The Centennial History of the Independent Labour Party* (Halifax, 1992), 97–98.

[48] Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 100 and 102–110.

[49] Blewett, "Diversities of Class and Gender Experience and the Shaping of Labor Politics: Yorkshire's Manningham Mills Strike, 1890–91 and the Independent Labour Party," *Labor History* 47.4 (November 2006), 511–535.

[50] *TM*, December 15, 1893, 551; January 15, 1894, 22–23; September 15, 1894, 373; January 15, 1895, 2; August 15, 1897, 309–310; November 15, 1897, 425–427; July 15, 1898, 242; July 15, 1901, 218.

[51] J.H. Clapham, *The Woolen and Worsted Industries* (London, 1907), 272–273.

revive. This long-term industrial depression in the Yorkshire worsted and silk trades prompted transatlantic labor migrations of both silk plush and worsted workers. Large numbers of Lancashire cotton textile workers and Yorkshire worsted workers had already begun leaving their districts for the United States in the late 1860s.[52]

English Immigration to the United States

Although quantitative measurements indicate that English, Scots, and Welsh people had arrived in the United States in significant numbers prior to 1850, the peak periods of English migration actually occurred between 1851 and 1913.[53] Beginning in 1869 English "immigrants" [many of whom were labor migrants] to the United States began to outnumber even those from Ireland: in 1880 by two to one. So many English returned home however that net emigration from England scarcely changed during the 1870s and 1880s.[54] Late nineteenth century English migration included high proportions of single men and women migrants, "largely temporary and transient." This "impermanence" among English migrants differed little from the "new immigration" from southern and eastern Europe, an argument supported by the research of Dudley Baines.[55]

By the 1880s English migration seemed to be transforming into a movement of wage-seeking "birds of passage."[56] But as early as 1850,

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[52] Mary Blewett, *Constant Turmoil: The Politics of Industrial Life in Nineteenth-Century New England* (Amherst, 2000), Chapters 3, 4; Donald B. Cole, *Immigrant City: Lawrence Massachusetts, 1845–1921* (Chapel Hill, 1963), 43; *Yorkshire Factory Times*, February 6, 20, 27, March 6, 20, 27, April 3, June 5, 1891; *Bradford Observer*, April 28, 1891.

[53] Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History* (New York, 1964; repr. New York, 1940), 168–172.

[54] Maldwyn Jones, "The Background to Emigration from Great Britain in the Nineteenth Century," in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds., *Perspectives in American History, Dislocations and Emigrations: The Social Background of American Immigration*, 12 vols. (Cambridge, 1974), 3:53–54, 90–91; Dirk Hoerder, "Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies," 79–80. For the data used by Jones, which excluded Scottish emigration and Irish residents in England, see Stanley C. Johnson, *A History of Emigration From the United Kingdom to North America, 1763–1912* (London, 1913), 344–348.

[55] Jones, "The Background to Emigration" in *Dislocations and Emigration*, 53–54, 90–91; Dudley Baines, *Migration in a Mature Economy: Emigration and Internal Migration in England and Wales, 1861–1900* (Cambridge, 1985).

[56] Walter Nugent, *Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870–1914* (Bloomington, 1992), 48. Dirk Hoerder relied on Nugent's work for *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, 2002), 336–338.

numbers of skilled English male workers, especially in the building trades: masons, plumbers, carpenters, interior painters, wall paperers, and stone quarry workers had been employed seasonally mostly in and around New York City. English birds of passage migrants came in larger numbers between 1879 and 1893.[57] Dirk Hoerder has argued that British and German emigrations during the transatlantic proletarian mass migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were comparable in terms of absolute numbers. Both streams of migrants included large numbers of skilled and unskilled urban workers who shared among themselves a sense of superiority to the receiving culture.[58]

Between 1906 and 1911 British immigration shifted away from the U.S. to British North America, some to settle the wheat-growing areas of western Canada, along with rising numbers to Australia and New Zealand.[59] By 1911, 69 percent of British emigrants headed for destinations other than the United States. Dudley Baines concluded that large-scale migration of the English in the 1880s and early 1900s matched similar mass proletarian migration from other parts of Europe, especially southern and eastern areas.[60] If these English migrants came largely from a few important regions, then the comparison with other European nations was even more apt. He surmised, however, that between 1854 and 1900 "relatively few emigrants came from the rapidly changing industries, like textiles. . . ."[61]

English migration fluctuated with the ups and downs of the American economy.[62] Data on occupations from the manifests of American ships, especially in 1885–1888, indicated that among English adult males the percentage of textile workers fell from 17 percent in 1846–1854 to 8 percent in 1885–1888, while percentages of white collar and construction workers increased.[63] After the 1860s, the long-term rate of returns by British migrants from the United States "was always high," regardless of American economic conditions but never represented

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[57] Roger Davis Simon, "The Birds of Passage in America, 1865–1914," M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1966, 4–5.
[58] Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, 336–339.
[59] Johnson, *A History of Emigration From the United Kingdom*, 346.
[60] Baines, *Migration in a Mature Economy*, 2–3, 47–52, 88–89; Nugent, *Crossings*, 44–48.
[61] Baines, *Migration*, 45–46, 59, 77.
[62] Ibid., 80.
[63] Ibid., 82–83.

a majority.[64] Still, Baines argued, it was possible that some migrants returned because a "*particular*" [emphasis his] overseas industry, such as cotton or woolen textiles had disappointed them.[65] In the 1880s, however, emigration from urban areas in England, including Yorkshire and Lancashire, greatly increased over rural areas and proved exceptional in comparison with other urban counties.[66]

Brinley Thomas has analyzed nineteenth and early twentieth century British migration cycles in the context of economic changes in the Atlantic economy, primarily the United States, Britain, and Germany.[67] Lags occurred in the direct correlation between economic growth and transatlantic migration. His measures of American development while quite general are indirectly related to textile production: railroad construction, and the production of bituminous coal. The availability of British investment capital for this U.S. growth is calculated by data on building construction in England and on London share prices.[68] Increased numbers of inexperienced European migrants, who became cotton textile workers, reflected automated machinery and the consequent decline in skills required for textile production.[69] Thomas also noted the impact of restrictions on migration patterns between the two world wars. By 1928 the tendency for English migrants to shift from the United States to the Dominions strengthened until the depression of the 1930s proved a turning point. British people then ceased emigration, while British society received return migrants from the U.S., Canada, and Australia.[70]

Patterns in the Nineteenth Century European Worsted Industry

France like Yorkshire exported much of its worsted dress goods, spun on expensive mule spinning machinery acquired in Alsace, a center of textile machinery production in Germany. Looms came from England

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[64] Baines, *Migration*, chapter 5, "Return Migration to Britain, 1860–1914," 134, 139.

[65] Ibid., 139.

[66] Ibid., 205–206, 263–264, 280, 282.

[67] Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, 1954), 30–31, 35–55, 118–122.

[68] Ibid., 92–113.

[69] Thomas cited the findings of the 1911 Immigration Commission on the "racial" shift in the U.S. textile workforce, *Migration and Economic Growth*, 146–147.

[70] Ibid., 68–72.

and Belgium. England imported more French worsted goods than from any other country. The biggest mills and the strongest competitors were in Roubaix-Tourcoing and in Reims. Production depended on fine merino wool purchased direct from South America via French ports. Twenty million sheep grazing in France also provided a fine clip. Belgium, Austria, and Italy bought most of the fine mule-spun yarns from various decentralized spinning mills throughout France.[71]

Belgian worsted mills at Veviers and Lièges, near Brussels and Antwerp, specialized in preparatory work on wool and spinning yarns for England, France, and Germany. Cleaning raw wool imported via Antwerp fouled the local streams but reduced the shipping weight by 30 to 60 percent. The German company Leipziger Wollkammerei opened a branch operation in Belgium to produce spun yarns wound in packages called "tops" to be sent to German mills.[72] French mills envied the lower costs of production in Belgium and often threatened to relocate. Belgian workers crossed the border to work in French worsted mills at Roubaix-Tourcoing. England and Germany bought up much of Belgium's yarn production.

The German woolen and worsted industry, according to 1895 figures, also organized regionally.[73] Only the American worsted industry grew faster after 1880 than the German. The acquisition of Alsace and its industrial base after the Franco-Prussian War stimulated the growth of spinning and combing which were usually separate from weaving operations. Instead of importing English worsted yarns of long fiber wool, alpaca, and mohair, German spinning operations ran new ring frames to provide their own hard-twist yarn to weave both mixed and fine worsted cloth.[74] Direct buying via Bremen provided raw wool from South American and Australasia. The German worsted industry had become fully mechanized. In comparison, the American worsted industry by 1900 had much larger factories and was more integrated in production than its transatlantic rivals.

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[71] Clapham, *Woolen and Worsted*, 222–234.
[72] Ibid., 236–238.
[73] For the regional nature of German textile manufactures, Herrigel, *Industrial Constructions*, 34–58.
[74] Sigsworth, *Black Dyke Mills*, 284–317.

Raw Materials and the British Empire

After 1870 Yorkshire worsted manufacturers increasingly relied on imperial connections to acquire raw wool. This gathering-in of raw wool required migration.[75] Mohair wool from South Africa freed Yorkshire factories from their total dependence on Greek and Turkish traders. White settlers in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa now raised crossbred Lincoln/merino sheep to feed the English appetites for both mutton and long staple wool. Periodically, however, war, disease, and drought ravaged the herds.[76] Imperial solutions did not always deliver the goods. For some Latin American nations, as Silke Hensel argues in this volume, Europe became an important source of free white immigrants to develop the production of food and other raw materials for transatlantic industrialization.[77] Argentina encouraged the migration not only of new breeds of sheep but of experienced Basque, Scots, and Irish shepherds.[78] This White Atlantic migration paralleled the more racially diverse, earlier coerced migration to Brazil and the Caribbean analyzed by Dirk Hoerder.[79] American woolen and worsted manufacturers joined their Anglo-Saxon brothers by depending on the British merchant marine to carry shipments, thus intensifying the British imperial reach into the Indian, Pacific, and South Atlantic oceans as usable space.

Before 1880 European nations often purchased Australasian wool at the bimonthly sales held at the London Wool Exchange. These sales were so crucial to transatlantic production that heavy London fogs could postpone them. Six "low wool" sales a year were conducted at Liverpool for alpaca, mohair, cashmere, vicuna, and camel's hair.[80] After 1880 Europeans buying directly in Australasia and using European transit to Bremen, Hamburg, Antwerp, and, Marseilles became the pattern.[81]

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[75] Cole, *American Wool Manufacture*, 2:22–23, 33, 75; McKeown, "Global Migration," 155.

[76] Clapham, *Woolen and Worsted*, 76–120.

[77] Silke Hensel, "Latin-American Perspectives on Migration in the Atlantic World."

[78] Jose Moya, *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850–1930*, (Berkeley, 1998) 53–54, 110.

[79] Dirk Hoerder, "The Black Atlantic in the Context of Free and Forced Transoceanic Migration Systems."

[80] Clapham, *Woolen and Worsted*, 100, 115, 117–119.

[81] Ibid., 93, 94–96.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Japanese woolen production benefited from regular steamship service across the Pacific between Yokohama and Australasian ports and the enrollment of Japanese students in textile schools in Europe and America. The "Tokio" War Office bought more English woolen and worsted cloth than any other country both before and after the Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905.[82] The British War Office took notice not only of the naval engagements but the needs of modern warfare for woolen supplies. The Anglo-Japanese naval treaty in 1902 had already formalized these interests.

Establishing Transatlantic Branches and Labor Migration Patterns

Facing the reality of the McKinley tariffs, some Yorkshire worsted and plush firms sent agents in 1891 and 1892 to survey the prospects for opening branch factories in the American Northeast.[83] In 1891 American jobs still beckoned experienced English worsted workers, as they had since the 1860s.[84] The industrial depression beginning in late 1893 ended the export of international capital and labor but only temporarily. As the American industrial depression eased by 1896, the passage of the 1897 Dingley tariffs under the first McKinley Administration ended all hope of the resumption of Yorkshire worsted exports to the United States.[85] American capitalists, counting on years of high protective tariffs under the new majority Republican Party, hastened to invest money in worsted expansion in Lawrence, Providence, and other sites. Trade journals insisted that worsted cloth made from hard-twisted yarns would dominate the future of men's wear.[86]

Some English and West European firms frozen out of the American worsted market in 1890 established branch factories equipped with their own textile machinery in the American Northeast. Belgian and French capitalists developed the French-style all-wool worsted

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[82] Ibid., 262–264.

[83] *TM*, February 15, 1891, 81; March 15, 1891, 134; May 15, 1892, 194.

[84] William Smith, *A Yorkshireman's Trip to the United States and Canada* (London, 1892), 5, 129–132, 169–171.

[85] For Sigsworth's comments, Derek Aldcroft, *The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875–1914* (Toronto, 1968), 134–139.

[86] *Wool and Cotton Reporter*, June 29, 1905, 16–17; *Wade's Fibre and Fabric*, January 7, 1905, 5.

industry in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, in the early twentieth century.[87] Presumably their market would be in fine French-style, all-wool worsted dress goods. Earlier in the 1880s, English investors and experienced immigrant workers from Macclesfield had built a thriving silk textile industry in Paterson, New Jersey, while in the 1890s German companies began to invest even more heavily in worsted mills in Passaic, New Jersey, drawing their skilled German workers across the Atlantic to join a workforce of unskilled migrants from eastern Europe.[88]


Using transatlantic political contacts, Belgian immigrant Joseph Guerin, who had set up a small local worsted mill at Woonsocket in 1892, attracted French capital from textile manufacturers in Roubaix and Tourcoing for investment in new mills. Woonsocket was located near the Massachusetts border in the mill-laden Blackstone River Valley. Based on Guerin's experience as a worker and a foreman in French, Belgian, and Italian textile mills, he put together a workforce of 2,000 skilled Franco-Belgian workers, mostly mule spinners, with the vast majority of French-Canadian immigrants. In comparison with other worsted centers, Woonsocket's workforce was not ethnically complex. All workers spoke French, and the Québécois had plenty of experience in textile mills in New England before the arrival of transatlantic capital. These circumstances plus Guerin's personal mill floor experiences explains the integration of these experienced French-Canadian workers into the production of fine French-style worsted goods. The foremen, however, were French-born. Mill floor conflicts in Woonsocket mills came from immigrant mule spinners and reflected transatlantic class resentments well into the 1920s.[89] Likewise, the resentments of union wool sorters from Bradford, Yorkshire reemerged in North Providence, Rhode Island, worsted mills.

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[87] Gary Gerstle, *Working-class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 1914–1960* (Cambridge, 1989).

[88] Richard Dobson Margrave, *The Emigration of Silk Workers from England to the United States in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1986); David J. Goldberg, *A Tale of Three Cities: Labor Organization and Protest in Paterson, Passaic, and Lawrence, 1916–1921* (New Brunswick, 1989); Sven Beckert, "Migration, Ethnicity, and Working-Class Formation: Passaic, New Jersey, 1889–1926," in Dirk Hoerder and Jorg Nagler, eds., *People in Transit: German Migrations in Comparative Perspective, 1820–1930* (Cambridge, 1995), 347–377.

[89] The French investors from Roubaix and Tourcoing remained absentee mill owners, but Guerin became an American citizen, community leader, and paternalist manager, Gerstle, *Working-class Americanism*, 61–78, 20–41, 72–78.



Courtesy of P. Coppens

Map 19 Principal Sites of Worsted Production on the East Coast of the U.S.

Even before the Congressional passage in 1889 of the first McKinley tariffs, the Kammgarnspinnerei Stöhr & Company, headquartered in Leipzig, Germany and long involved in international trade, decided to open a branch factory, the Botany Worsted Mills, in Passaic, New Jersey. This location, close to the garment-making districts of New York City, indicated where the firm planned to sell its fine worsted dress goods. The firm used German-made machinery, recruited managers and skilled workers to emigrate, and obtained cheap but inexperienced eastern European immigrant workers from the port of New York.[90] Bright prospects drew other German firms to Passaic,

[90] Beckert, "Migration, Ethnicity, and Working-Class Formation," 347–377, esp. 348–354.

most importantly the Forstmann & Huffmann Company of Weiden in 1904. Managers were confident that worsted manufacture needed only a "few skilled workers" to run a fine goods mill employing thousands.[91] Presumably in their German operations, local women, youngsters or migrant labor, probably from eastern Europe, had run the looms and spinning frames as in Yorkshire.[92]

By 1910 the Passaic firms especially employed women migrants from Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ruthenia, and later Italy, recruited through a New York City "labor agency."[93] Many of these migrants were single women living in boardinghouses sponsored by local churches.[94] Earlier immigrants to Passaic provided links in chain migrations. But many questions remain. Where were their potential market rivals?[95] Certainly some of the largest integrated mills in Lawrence: the Arlington and the Pacific with many skilled English workers, produced huge quantities of the "highest-grade fabrics."[96] How did market strategy shape the mixed workforce in Passaic, which were much *less* ethnically diverse than the workforce in Lawrence?[97]

Indeed at the turn of the twentieth century, skilled textile workers, including experienced French and Belgian worsted workers and

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[91] Ibid., 351, 353.

[92] On out-migration and in-migration, Horst Rössler, "Labor, Culture, and Migration in Germany, 1848–1914," in Dirk Hoerder, Inge Blank, Horst Rössler, eds., *Roots of the Transplanted*, 2 vols. (Boulder, 1994), 2, 85–107, esp. 100–103. Industries mentioned employing eastern Europeans include construction, mining, and textiles.

[93] Beckert, "Migration, Ethnicity," 353–354.

[94] Goldberg, *Tale of Three Cities*, 50.

[95] Goldberg's comparison of three textile centers includes some interest in the products marketed by Passaic and Lawrence mills.

[96] Cole, *American Woolen Manufacture*, 2:215–217.

[97] For Lawrence, the established "races" in the worsted industry, according to the Immigration Commission study, were being displaced by new migrants. The study of Community A—quite obviously Lawrence, Massachusetts—demonstrated this shift. The pre- and post-Civil War expansion of the [Lawrence] textile mills attracted a "heavy immigration" of English workers from Lancashire and Yorkshire to join others from Scotland. Irish immigrant construction workers plus waves of French Canadians and Germans joined the post-Civil War workforce. By 1890 new groups of workers from Poland, Portugal, "Hebrew" Russia, South Italy, Syria, Armenia, Lithuania, and from Belgium and France complicated the structure of an already culturally mixed workforce. The 1911 study listed "the English and South Italian races" as the most important among the total of 73.2 percent foreign-born workers in the city, see "Racial Displacements," Reports of the Immigration Commission, *Immigrants in Industries*, Part 4: Woolen and Worsted Goods Manufacturing (New York, 1970; repr. New York, 1911), 639–641. Data from the Lawrence Worsted Mills in 1909 also indicated that English and South Italian immigrant workers dominated this company's workforce, Ardis Cameron, *Radicals of the Worst Sort: Laboring Women in Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1860–1912* (Urbana, 1993), 120.

northern Italian silk workers from Lombardy and Piedmont, migrated *simultaneously* with rural migrants from southern and eastern Europe and the Middle East seeking jobs in American worsted and silk mills. Capital movements prompted a complicated labor migration to these growing textile centers that defies classification as either "old" or "new" immigrants. Better described as a mixture or medley of people from diverse nations of origin, these migrants came from widely varying cultural and industrial/rural/village backgrounds. They formed a workforce for worsted production in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Jersey that was far more culturally complicated than those in English, French, German, or Italian textile centers.[98] The mélange of migrants with their transatlantic connections and multiple political perspectives shaped community building, mill floor organization, ethnic conflict, acculturation, and multi-cultural radical labor politics in early twentieth century New England worsted centers.[99]

Not even the transfer in 1904 by Harrison Benn of Bradford, Yorkshire, of small numbers of experienced Yorkshire worsted workers with homogeneous backgrounds (84 percent English-born persons in 1910) to a purpose-built mill center in Greystone village in North Providence, could isolate them from these complexities.[100] Nor could it isolate the plant from the regional movement of wage rates, the cloth markets, the region-wide support developing among workers in the 1910s for the radical Industrial Workers of the World [IWW], or the concerted opposition the IWW provoked from textile capitalists to stop its spread.[101]

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[98] For example, the workforce of the worsted industry in Roubaix, France was regional and largely from nearby Belgium, Moch, *Moving Europeans*, 132–136.

[99] The mills of Providence, Rhode Island, not Greystone, employed 4,701 operatives in 1900 of whom 55 percent were foreign-born, much higher than Philadelphia and second to the Lawrence percentage, *Immigrants in Industry*, 640–641.

[100] Rhode Island Yankees constituted the next largest group. The total number employed in the Greystone mill in 1911 was 1,400, indicating that the firm hired part of their labor force, probably weavers, spinners, and less skilled workers, from adjacent communities. Greystone village was surrounded by neighborhoods in adjacent villages, such as Centredale with a mixture of English, English Canadian, French Canadian, Belgian, and Italian families. Male-headed nuclear families with or without children dominated household structures in 1910, while the dates of immigration within families suggest an abundance of chain migration, U.S. Population Census manuscripts for Rhode Island, 1910.

[101] Blewett, *Yankee Yorkshireman*, Chapter 2.

The Experience of Transatlantic Travel

Labor migration proved crucial to the expansion of worsted production and took many different forms. A relatively short voyage across the Irish Sea brought workers to join internal migrants in the Yorkshire factories. Likewise, Belgian workers crossed the land border to French mills, while German centers of production received workers in the same fashion overland. Similarly, French Canadians crossed the United States border in large numbers, entering mills in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

Transatlantic travel differed for skilled and unskilled workers. English emigrants, who possessed experience and knew where they were headed, used the well-used routes from Liverpool to Boston or New York City. If they could not afford better, they endured the smells, crowding, and bad food of steerage. As skilled worsted workers they were welcomed throughout the Northeast. German workers, recruited for skilled jobs in the Passaic mills, used the passenger lines between the docks of Hamburg and New York, and then proceeded to New Jersey overland. Belgian mule spinners bound for Woonsocket probably knew in which mill they would be employed, either through their French-based employers or by chain migration.

Unskilled migrants with few contacts in American worsted centers faced long transatlantic journeys and needed help to find their way to jobs. Chain migration could resolve many problems. Eastern and southern European rural people took the fastest, cheapest route possible to New York City where some found work via job agencies. Middle Eastern migrants, traveling from ports as distant as Greece or the Bosporus and Black Sea areas, arrived with little money or direction. Relief at finding countrymen and women in a worsted center, or even a familiar church with a recommended boarding place for single women, might exceed their small hopes. The complex cultural makeup of this labor migration added to the exhausting journey and disorientation at a new job in a strange city.

Labor Migration and the Work Process

The multi-cultural nature of these labor migrations to the Northeast and the complex ethnic communities in which they lived has attracted the attention of labor and social historians, ethnic and immigration

historians, and historians of gender relations, migration, and transnationalism.[102] Most have concentrated on the community/city study linked to a transatlantic world of capital investment and multi-cultural immigrants/migrants, probing regional labor activity and transatlantic cultural and political experiences comparatively.[103] However, those historians who have studied labor protest in the American worsted industry have largely ignored regional markets. One exception is Philip Scranton's *Figured Tapestry* (1989), a study in part of Philadelphia's worsted industry whose managers scrutinized rival regional economic markets and decided to shape their distinct "batch" system of production.[104] Philadelphia relied on an experienced, largely English male immigrant workforce, who were used to high wages and seasonal layoffs.

Except for Michael Topp, labor historians who deal with worsted workers have generally regarded ethnic complexities, separate community institutions, gender and racial differences, and skill hierarchies as potentially fragmenting class unity. Transnational (not transethnic) ties and return migration are assumed to have had an even more negative effect. Assimilation and acculturation generally seemed to bring an end to protests against American capitalist power and encourage structures for the sake of advancing the next generation, while the first generation remained divided by homeland religions and politics.[105] Historians of labor and migration need to renew their close connections. For global labor migrants, free or coerced, work was the reason for their migratory lives.

Perhaps the great unasked question is how these unskilled, multicultural labor migrants, male and female, became integrated into the

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[102] Donna Gabaccia firmly linked labor militancy to labor migration in "Migration and Militancy among Italy's Laborers," in *Roots of The Transplanted*, 2:245–267.

[103] See the recent work of Gerstle, Goldberg, Beckert, Cameron, and Michael Miller Topp, *Those Without A Country: The Political Culture of Italian American Syndicalists* (Minneapolis, 2001), 92–134.

[104] "Batch" production, in contrast with bulk, was small in quantity, high in quality, and capable of quick changes in design, Philip Scranton, *Figured Tapestry: Production. Markets, and Power in Philadelphia Textiles, 1885–1941* (Cambridge, 1989).

[105] James R. Barrett, "Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration and the Remaking of the Working Class in the United States, 1880–1930," *Journal of American History* 79 (1992), 996–1020 and Gary Gerstle, "Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans," *Journal of American History* 84 (1997), 524–558 both emphasize the uneven, contested process of acculturation.

production of fine worsted goods in highly mechanized factories.[106] How were the multi-language, rural/village workforce of men, women, and children from eastern and southern Europe, and the Middle East taught to become part of the mechanized worsted trade in a factory system where experienced skilled workers also spoke different languages? It is often breathtakingly assumed that they simply entered the factory, and they learned. Class relations remain primary for migrants in textile mills. If workers became integrated or became alienated it was a result of what happened on the mill floor. In addition, intercultural female networks *among* Lawrence's ethnic neighborhoods built around family needs, provided crucial support for the 1912 Lawrence strike.[107] Without understanding or even asking how, historian Arthur Cole concluded that the overall impact of the "importation of foreign capital and the immigration of foreign manufacturers" as well as the adaptation of labor migrants to new work resulted in the quickly-rising quality of American worsted fabric between 1890 and 1920.[108]

Market Niches and Regional Competition

With his eye fixed on his competitors, Harrison Benn, head of Joseph Benn Ltd. of Great Horton, Bradford, Yorkshire, had a clear sense of his market niche in the United States. In 1903 he began to rebuild the decayed Rhode Island mill village of Greystone in the town of North Providence to manufacture English-style worsteds: goods "equal, if not superior to the same goods made in our mills at Bradford, England."[109] Initial capital investment in the new Greystone mill far exceeded any worsted operation established by French and Belgian investors in Woonsocket between 1899 and 1904.[110] Benn also appreciated well the industrial power of the Lawrence operations.

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[106] The best guides to the mechanics of English worsted production, fabrics, and marketing with many references to Western Europe are Arthur H. Cole and J.H. Clapham.

[107] Cameron, *Radicals of the Worst Sort*, 117–169.

[108] Even the eminent textile historian Arthur H. Cole, who had access to interviews with mill owners in the 1920s on this vexing managerial question, dodged the issue, *American Wool Manufacture*, 2:176–177.

[109] *American Wool and Cotton Reporter*, July 31, 1911, 31.

[110] *Board of Trade Journal*, (Providence, Rhode Island) March 1907, 27–28.

Between 1905 and 1911, the huge American Woolen Company in Lawrence, Massachusetts, specializing in Bradford-style worsted cloth, established its dominance in New England worsted production. Employing 14,000 workers in 1912, American Woolen, in combination with the Arlington and Pacific worsted mills in Lawrence, set regional wage rates. During those years, American Woolen owned a total of twenty-nine worsted mills in New England. Nine of them were in Rhode Island.[111]

Since the 1850s Lawrence mills had produced a variety of fabrics. In the 1880s, worsted cloth had become the staple, drawing a mix of experienced labor migrants from Yorkshire, Belgium, and Germany. Tariff protection and mill expansion made Lawrence the largest worsted center in the United States. Some large and small mills produced fine worsted fabric for the ready-to-wear men's trade. The giant American Woolen Company specialized in the mass production of blue serge worsted cloth, paid high wages for textile work, and flooded the market until its product dominated.[112] Meanwhile the German investors in five large worsted mills in Passaic had the potential to challenge the position of other Lawrence firms in the fine worsted market.

To avoid this withering competition, the Harrison Benn operation in Greystone, Rhode Island, produced only black mohair and alpaca coat linings, using its established commission house in New York City to sell the fabric. Shareholders and banks in Bradford and Providence provided the investment capital, while the town of North Providence assured tax exemption status for ten years.[113] In comparison to Benn's assets of $1 million, the neighboring American-owned worsted spinning mill in Centredale, even with its own tax exemption, had capital assets of a mere $100,000 in 1905. Harrison Benn maintained tight control over the operations, both in Great Horton, Bradford and in Greystone. Three English-born managers ran the mill with a textile designer, two bookkeepers, a timekeeper, a paymaster, a cashier, and

[111] On the American Woolen Company's presence in Rhode Island, *Wades Fibre & Fabric*, Dec. 10, 23, 1905, 9 and 8, respectively and *Providence Board of Trade Journal*, 23 (June 1911), 285–292.

[112] Goldberg, *Tale of Three Cities*, 83–85; Cole, *American Wool Manufacture*, v. 2, 229–250.

[113] "An English Village in Rhode Island," *Providence Sunday Tribune*, December 15, 1912.

a shipping clerk, all English-born. The overseers of the various major divisions of work were likewise experienced men of English birth, most arriving in 1904 and 1905.

Introducing steel beams into local brick mill construction, concrete foundations of up to ten feet thick, and state-of-the-art electrification technology, the Greystone mill managers organized production to duplicate, and even better, the technical standards in Yorkshire.[114] A branch track of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad ran a spur line to the boiler room to deliver coal. The Rhode Island Company extended its trolley line from nearby Centredale to provide freight cars to deliver merchandise to Providence for shipment across Long Island Sound to New York City. Those trolley cars carried back imported mohair and alpaca and later would provide a commuting service for Providence workers.[115] These decisions, made by telegraphed correspondence between Bradford and Providence on bank loans, mill construction, and transportation links, turned Harrison Benn into one of Rhode Island's most energetic and well-connected industrial capitalists.


The decisions paid off. By 1905, capital assets in the Benn mills of Greystone increased from $1 million to $1.5 million, rising after the profits of World War I to $2 million and to $3 million in 1924 after which they declined until the family sold the mill in 1939.[116] The Benn marketing strategy also allowed them to avoid hiring the mixture of experienced and inexperienced ethnic groups in the huge workforces of most large worsted operations, as in Lawrence and Passaic.

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[114] *Wool and Cotton Reporter*, Feb. 18, Oct. 27, 1904, 17, 15; *Fibre and Fabric*, June 18, 1904, 6–7; Nov. 19, 1904, 12; Feb. 25, 1905, 12, March 15, 1905, 12.

[115] Judith E. Smith, *Family Connections* (Albany, 1985), 38.

[116] For comparative data on capital assets, *The Blue Book, United States and Canada* (New York, 1905–1939). The Benn Company closed its Rhode Island operations in 1939 and left no business records except for those in the trust documents of William Harrison Benn, Bradford Archives, United Kingdom. During World War Two English business paper was often recycled for other uses.



Courtesy of P. Coppens

Map 20 Mills in the Providence Area

English-born men performed the skilled work in the Benn mill in Greystone including engineers, steam fitters, and firemen for the steam engines, dyers except for one experienced French Canadian dyer [possibly from Lawrence], cloth inspectors and finishers, loom fixers, machinists, electricians, carpenters, masons, and warehousemen. In one of the three Italian immigrant families resident in the village, the father shoveled coal into the steam boiler's furnace, while his son wove

cloth. The small village of Greystone with its overwhelmingly Yorkshire workforce in 1910 did not reflect the multi-cultural worsted industry in Lawrence or Passaic, but neither was it isolated from regional wage rates or strikes. When Yorkshire immigrant weavers, male and female, in Greystone went out on strike in the early 1912 and 1913, their key allies were southern Italian immigrant worsted weavers in nearby mill villages. The weavers proved the most active and volatile, winning most of those strikes. And they organized locals of the IWW.[117]

Free Labor, Whiteness, and Transnational Activism

Did the skilled textile workers, such as the Franco-Belgian and Lancashire mule spinners, German dyers and spinners, the Yorkshire wool sorters and menders, and the more skilled weavers, regard themselves as "free" labor? If given the choice of remaining in their homelands or transporting to the American branch factories or U.S. enterprises with their mixed labor forces, many in Yorkshire would have remained where they were. Social networks seemed less important in the early twentieth century than crowded homeland labor markets, union encouragement, offers by employers perhaps too attractive to refuse, and pessimism about the industry's future. Between 1905 and 1913 the numbers of British migrants to the U.S. both declined and shifted toward skilled workers and middle-class professionals. Harrison Benn had no trouble hiring experienced worsted workers from Bradford.[118] If the skilled elite among union woolsorters considered themselves coerced, this was "status coercion" to maintain their trade. Those weavers who waited missed out. Once in the branch factory in Greystone, however, the Benn Company played off the closely connected workforces of Rhode Island and Bradford against each other over issues of pay and working conditions. Skilled free workers did feel coerced and organized to defend their rights and work rules. Coercion was culturally contextual but played itself out in the workplace.[119]

By 1890 new groups of workers from Poland, Portugal, "Hebrew" Russia, South Italy, Syria, Armenia, Lithuania, and elsewhere complicated the ethnically mixed workforce in Lawrence, Providence,

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[117] Blewett, *The Yankee Yorkshireman*, Chapter 2.
[118] Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth*, 64–67.
[119] Prabhu P. Mohapatra, "Eurocentrism, Forced Labour, and Global Migration: A Critical Assessment," *International Review of Social History* 52 (April 2007), 110–115.

and Passaic. Culturally distinct, different in appearance, and religiously diverse, these groups, especially the southern Italians, were racialized by New England society which classified them as less than white. Some transnational radical groups, who acted as carriers of syndicalism and socialist ideology, also were excluded from whiteness.[120] Others, such as the French Canadians and Syrians, claimed whiteness in association with Christianity and settlement.[121] As in-between people, they belonged neither to the Black Atlantic nor the White Atlantic.[122]

Not only the much-studied Italian men and women in the Northeastern textile centers but also the Lancashire cotton workers, the Yorkshire worsted workers, the English silk workers, and the Franco-Belgian worsted workers became transnational labor activists.[123] Lancashire cotton weavers and mule spinners, fighting among themselves throughout the late nineteenth century over radical or conservative organizational and ideological strategies, ended up in craft unions in the United Textile Workers-American Federation of Labor [UTW-AFL].[124]

Shipping Lanes and Labor Migration

The sea and the land, as Hamashita Takeshi argues in his essay in this volume, are inseparable and thus can provide a road for communication and flows of migrants and materials.[125] Transoceanic labor migration as well as internal migration accompanied the developing shipping lanes

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[120] Klaus J. Bade, "German Emigration to the United States and Continental Immigration in the Late Nineteenth Century and Early Twentieth Century," in Hoerder, ed., *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies*, 117–142.

[121] On French Canadians responding to the charge of being "The Chinese of the Eastern States," Blewett, *Constant Turmoil*, 297–299; Akram Khater, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle-class in Lebanon, 1870–1920* (Berkeley, 2001).

[122] James R. Barrett and David Roediger, "Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the 'New Immigrant' Working Class," *Journal of American Ethnic History* (Spring 1997), 3–44, 22.

[123] John T. Cumbler, "Transatlantic Working-Class Institutions," *Journal of Historical Geography* 6 (1980): 275–290; Horst Rössler, "English Labor, Working-Class Culture and Migration," in *Roots of the Transplanted*, 2:59–84. Also see the essays on Italian women migrants in Donna Gabaccia and Franca Iacovetta, eds., *Women, Gender, and Transnational Lives: Italian Workers of the World* (Toronto, 2002).

[124] Blewett, *Constant Turmoil*, Chapters 8, 9, 10.

[125] Takeshi Hamashita, "Remapping Modern East-West Maritime History into Geopolitical North-South Regional Dynamism: Maritime China, Hong Kong, and the British Empire, 19–20th Century."

that carried raw materials to industrial sites, whether in the United States or Western Europe. Amarjit Kaur points out the impact of Indian Ocean labor migrations to Burma and Malaya that built export production on which European industrialization came to depend.[126] Imperial flagships and settlers to colonies soon followed commerce and overseas investments. But using the concept of translocality, Ulrike Freitag suggests that colonial networks and infrastructure embedded in the landscape, as in Southeast Asia, helped to shape imperial rule and thereby maritime connections.[127] Shipping lanes between Portuguese colonies in East Africa and India created conduits for labor migration and settlement from Mozambique to Goa via the Indian Ocean.[128]

Open warfare sometimes followed the growing military protection by the modern navies of rising imperial powers who guarded these shipping routes. Hong Kong merchants, who, according to Elizabeth Sinn, facilitated global labor migration in their own merchant ships, must have carefully watched Western investment and economic expansion in Australasia and in South America as opportunities for labor migrants.[129] They and their counterparts in Singapore could not overlook the clash of naval powers in the western Pacific in 1898 between the declining imperial power of Spain and the rising naval power of the United States.[130] Imperial Japan, another rising center of worsted production with a modern navy, defeated the fleet of Imperial Russia in 1905, while the powerful navies of Great Britain and Imperial Germany jockeyed over access to raw wool in the waters surrounding South America.

Cornering the World's Wool Market and the Great War

Even regional industrial systems with connecting oceanic ties proved no match for military efforts to control the movements of raw materials in global war. During World War I battles between fast, well-armed

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[126] Amerjit Kaur, "Indian Ocean Crossings: Indian Labour Migration and Settlement in Southeast Asia, 1870s to 1930."

[127] Ulrike Freitag, "Interoceanic Migrations from an Indian Ocean Perspective, 1830s to 1930s."

[128] Pamila Gupta, "The Disquieting of History: Portuguese Decolonization and Goan Migration in the Indian Ocean."

[129] Elizabeth Sinn, "Hong Kong the In-Between Place: The Chinese Diaspora across Two Oceans."

[130] Carl A. Trocki, "Singapore as a Nineteenth Century Migration Node."

German heavy and light cruisers and British and Australasian navies tried to control the flow of raw wool from South America and Australasia, of troops from Australia and New Zealand to the Western Front, and of frozen/tinned meat from Argentina to London. In the Pacific, the British Navy planned to rely on its Japanese ally to blockade Germany's only port in China and defend the North and Central Pacific. The combined Australian and New Zealand forces, small but modern, would neutralize movements around Germany's colonial possessions/coaling stations in the southern Pacific. The Royal Navy assumed the Indian Ocean was theirs. When war was declared in early August, the German navy deployed its assets in the Caribbean and the Mediterranean, and the Indian, Pacific, Atlantic Oceans, while using its passenger liners and other vessels to back up the cruiser fleet with coal and ammunition. By October, the German cruisers had captured or sunk more than forty Allied merchant ships.[131] So successful had been the German cruiser threat in the fall of 1914 that the collapsing Western Front almost took second place to protecting the ocean lines to raw materials and recruits.

The results were one stunning British defeat in the southern Pacific and one decisive victory in the southern Atlantic. The first was the humiliating loss of the British cruiser fleet stationed at the small Chilean port of Coronel in November. Admiral Maximilian von Spee claimed the victory and became an even more aggressive hunter. In an astonishing move, the First British Sea Lord, John Fisher, ordered a battle cruiser squadron away from the unexpectedly disastrous land battles in 1914 to the South Atlantic, where at the sheep-raising British Falkland Islands off Argentina, Spee's forces attacked in December. All but one of Spee's ships were sunk, and the brave Admiral died. German cruiser warfare against Allied shipping on the oceans between South America and Australasia thus ended.[132] Naval battles shifted to the North Sea area.

All of this excitement on the high seas had been preceded by efforts to corner the raw wool market by the London Wool Exchange.

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[131] The British Navy had built battleships (dreadnoughts) and battle cruisers, neglecting to update their old, slow, and under-gunned cruisers, Anne MacLean and Suzanne Poole, compilers, *Fighting Ships of World Wars One and Two* (New York, 1976), 39–41.

[132] John Keegan, *The First World War* (New York, 1999), 212–215; *Fighting Ships*, 39–44, 45–60.

American buyers waited during the tension-filled summer of 1914. English buyers at the July 1914 sales in London bought everything in sight regardless of quality or price. Americans held off, deterred by high prices and expected insurance and interest costs for shipping during wartime. By September they began to buy again in Liverpool. Then both the German and the British government published their lists of contraband goods on the high seas, including all fabrics and clothing "for use in war."[133] No company would insure them. Perhaps even more ominous, the Wool Exchange in London postponed its September sales for a week, while Australasian ports announced that sales had been indefinitely postponed.[134] In less than a month, oceanic trade in wool had been halted.

Still the American worsted industry remained optimistic with expectations of a return to full production once access to fine merino wool from Australasian and South American ports had been secured. Silently cheering on the British battle cruisers, long before the Falkland Islands victory, worsted manufacturers expected the American industry to fill orders for British military cloth and blankets in exchange for fine merino wool for worsted production. Meanwhile the Pan-American Union, backed by New York banks, lobbied vigorously in mid-August for a U.S. imperial takeover of the markets of South America for all manufactured goods, while the European powers were blowing each other to bits.[135]

The wool manufacturers' optimism ended when the English government embargoed raw wool, requiring that all sales pass through London to obtain a license. Furthermore, U.S. manufacturers had relied solely on the British merchant marine to ship raw wool. Trade journal editors blustered about subsidies for shipbuilding programs and sending the U.S. navy to convoy raw wool to Boston.[136] Official protests produced little but a conditional proposal from British Ambassador Cecil Spring-Rice in Washington that the "the embargo…will last until the present pressing needs for the armies are met, but that as soon as there is a surplus over these needs, exportation to the United

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[133] *Fibre and Fabric*, July 25, Aug. 1, 8, 15, Sept. 5, 12, 1914.
[134] *Fibre and Fabric*, Sept. 12, 1914.
[135] *New York Times*, Aug. 23, 1914; *Fibre and Fabric*, Aug. 8, 1914.
[136] *Fibre and Fabric*, Sept. 19, Oct. 10; embargo, Oct. 17, 24, 31, Nov. 7, 14, 21; bluster, Nov. 14, Dec. 19, 1914. For the official protests, *Bulletin of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers* (Boston) 45 (1915), 61–76.

States will be permitted. . . ."[137] In hindsight, this promise—made in December 1914—proved a bleak one.

Global war had disrupted transoceanic trading in raw materials as well as the production of fine worsted fabric. It also destroyed French and Belgium textile infrastructure and its labor force. The connecting oceans served as conduits for the needs of the Western Front, while the British and German navies dueled on the North Sea. The reconnecting of those oceanic trading ties for transatlantic worsted production during the interwar years favored the intact naval powers, but the struggle would continue during the following global war.

The need for wool to feed the developing worsted mills of Western Europe, the United States, and Japan between 1830 and 1930 propelled a multi-oceanic reach for raw materials that shaped new connections for merchant marines and their shipping routes, for transatlantic capital investment, for labor migrants to work in mills and as herders, and for imperial systems and their navies. These industrial needs organized the Pacific, the Indian, and the South Atlantic oceans as usable space for development of and access to raw materials. Merchant ships also transferred a transatlantic labor force with multiple origins from Europe and the Middle East to the principal sites of industrial production. Regional industrial systems with transoceanic ties provide insights into the ways in which the Atlantic world was shaped in the interests of the worsted industry between 1830 and 1930.

[137] *Bulletin*, 69–70.

OVERSEAS MIGRATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF OCEAN NAVIGATION: A EUROPE-OUTWARD PERSPECTIVE

Yrjö Kaukiainen

European overseas migration grew massively between the middle of the nineteenth century and the First World War. As this also was the period when ocean shipping experienced both fast growth and technological change, it seems reasonable to suppose that these two developments were not only contemporary but that there even was some sort of causal connection between them. Indeed, maritime history should be able to contribute additional elements to our understanding of long-distance migration. While it is not possible here to analyze the primary forces of demand (for labor) or supply (so-called surplus population) this essay will identify and describe one important counter-force on the supply side, a factor which explains why demand and supply did not meet before the late nineteenth century. The "terror of distance" was for long a major obstacle, and the price and effort to overcome that obstacle influenced the costs of migration.

Pre-modern Bulk Passenger Trades

Already three centuries before the migration boom of the nineteenth century, the West European increase in ocean navigation had initiated seaborne connections with other continents. Subsequently, they increased in intensity and regularity during the whole early modern era. Yet as long as ships depended solely on sail, and were hardly able to move against contrary winds, such long voyages were bound to be relatively slow, unpredictable, and arduous. Moving large numbers of people long ocean distances presented considerable logistic challenges. An important constraint, of course, was that typical ship sizes were modest by modern standards; and on long voyages the number of passengers (and crew) was effectively limited by the fact that ships should also be able to carry all the food and water required for them. Standard naval ratios suggest that normal adult voyagers consumed close

to 40 kilos (c.80 pounds) food and water in a week.[1] This means that on voyages such as ones from West Europe to the east coast of North America, which typically lasted over 50 days,[2] provisions amounted to about three times the weight of passengers and crew. On longer voyages, such as those to the East Indies, which still in the eighteenth century took around 200 days,[3] the ratio was, of course, much higher and provisioning problems exacerbated by food and water going bad and by the lack of fresh fruits, which caused scurvy.[4] Therefore, East India ships regularly stopped to replenish their stores at the Cape, or on Atlantic islands (Cape Verde, Ascension, or St. Helena). This, however, led to a kind of vicious circle because the overall duration of the voyage increased substantially. In the nineteenth century, when nonstop sailing became the rule, voyages were shortened by at least a third (or even more, when clipper ships were involved).

Human cargoes themselves also required shipping capacity. While relatively light, they could not be packed in as tightly as were bags of grain. Even on naval ships, such as Nelson's *Victory*, where ordinary sailors lived in extremely close quarters, each of them were allotted a space—almost two cubic meters—in which up to two tons of bulk cargo could have been loaded.[5] On the worst slaver vessels the space may have been only a half of this, on sailing emigrant-ships somewhat larger, and cabin passengers on East India ships enjoyed even much

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[1] See e.g., Brian Lavery, *Nelson's Navy* (Conway, 1989), 204–205. By weight, three-quarters of this amount consisted of water (or other beverages), which also includes water used for cooking.

[2] 50 days was an average westward passage time of Falmouth (sailing) packets in the 1810s, while eastward passages (which normally enjoyed more favorable winds) averaged about 35 days; see Seija Riitta Laakso, *Across the Oceans: Development of Overseas Business Information Transmission, 1815–1875* (Helsinki, 2006), 49–52.

[3] Plenty of data on voyage durations can be found in Jaap R. Bruijn and Femme S. Gaastra, eds., *Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and Their Shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries* (Amsterdam, 1993).

[4] Although fresh lemons were used as antiscorbutics in the Swedish navy already in the 1620s, the disease remained common until the end of the eighteenth century, see James Watt, "Scurvy," and J.D. Davies, "Shipboard Life: Naval Vessels," in John B. Hattendorf, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History*, 4 vols (Oxford, 2007), 3:505–506 and 540–545, 541.

[5] On the other hand, the *weight* of the crew did not present any major problem: for example, on the HMS *Victory* the overall weight of her 820 strong complement (as in the battle of Trafalgar) only amounted to about 60 tons, which was a trifling fraction of her 2000 ton displacement (overall weight). Lavery, *Nelson's Navy*, 43–44, 206–207; for the *Victory* see also John McKay, *The 100-gun Ship Victory* (Conway, 2002), 6–15.

wider quarters. In any case, on a merchant ship passengers always involved a substantial opportunity cost: they and their packages and food diminished the space available for the "real" cargo. This opportunity cost was increased by the high level of long-distance commodity freights: For example, freight costs recorded in the account-books of the British East India Company represented 31 percent of the value of their imports in the 1670s and 1680s, about 35 percent in the 1740s and 1750s; they could exceed 100 percent in riskier times.[6]

In spite of these physical and economic constraints, European shipping was able to transport quite impressive masses of people across the oceans already before the Napoleonic wars. The biggest of these movements was, of course, the Atlantic slave trade: Before 1800, about nine million Africans were transported to the Americas, above all to Brazil and the Caribbean; during its heydays in the eighteenth century, almost 100,000 slaves on average were discharged from ships each year.[7]

Compared with these huge figures, the more or less voluntary migrations from West Europe before 1800 remained modest. It has been estimated that between 600,000 and 1 million people, 3,000–5,000 per year, left Spain for its New World possessions until 1750, while English emigration to North America in the seventeenth century amounted to an average of 7,000 people a year. Net emigration from the Dutch republic to East Indies, again, has been estimated to about half a million people in two centuries (or 2,500 a year), of which about a half originated in Germany; in addition, the Netherlands lost a total of 25,000 emigrants to North and South America. Overseas migrations from France and Portugal were definitely smaller, but even they affected permanently scattered areas such as Brazil (in South America), Goa (in India), Macao (in the China Seas), eastern Canada and Louisiana (in North America), and the Caribbean Islands.[8] Logistically, too,

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[6] K.N. Chaudhuri, "The English East India Company's Shipping (c.1660–1760)," in *Ships, Sailors and Spices*, 78–80.

[7] For a concise summary and a representative bibliography, see Ivana Elbl, "Slave Trade: An Overview," in *Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History*, 4:7–11. Note that some two million died en route, which means that about eleven million were removed from Africa.

[8] Massimo Livi-Bacci, *A Concise History of World Population*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1997), 104–105; Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815* (Cambridge, 1997), 74–75.

these migrations—in particular the Spanish—also involved massive transports of horses to the New World, the memory of which still lives in the concept of the "horse latitudes."[9]

In some degree, such mass movements were favored by the structure of pre-modern European ocean trades. Their main objective was to bring to Europe various "colonial goods," such as spices and coffee from the Far East, sugar from Brazil and the Caribbean, gold and silver from western South America, plus tobacco, furs, timber and other raw materials from North America. Cargoes from Europe mainly consisted of finished goods and bullion or specie, which required much less space. Accordingly, the ships sailed to colonial destinations only partly loaded, and the opportunity cost of carrying passengers was lower than in the opposite direction.[10] At first sight, the Atlantic slave trade seems different, because the ships in question (which often sailed in the Atlantic "triangle trade" between the Caribbean, North America, and Europe) were fully dedicated to carrying human cargoes westward; yet, even their profitability was substantially improved by the availability of cargoes travelling from the West Indies to Europe. (There, cargoes to West Africa also diminished the "outward surplus.")

To put things into perspective, it must, however, be remembered that typical colonial imports to Europe consisted of fairly valuable and non-bulky commodities. This meant that overall demand for shipping was not very high, limiting the amount of outward surplus. This further increased the opportunity costs of passenger trades, which is reflected in fairly high charges for paying travelers which effectively limited the number of voluntary migrants, as well as the expansion of indentured systems of labor recruiting.[11] Thus, it is no surprise that

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[9] The term refers to the latitudes between 30 and 35 degrees north, a high-pressure area with calm and variable winds. According to popular legend, the name was given by Spanish migrants or soldiers who had to kill their horses when fodder and water had been used up.

[10] Cf. Ralph Shlomowitz, "Passenger Trades: Bulk Passenger Trades," in *Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History*, vol. 3, 269–270, 269.

[11] Still in the 1820s, contract prices for carrying convicts to Australia amounted to c. £20 per head (John McDonald and Ralph Shlomowitz, "Contract Prices for the Bulk Shipping of Passengers in Sailing Vessels, 1816–1904: An Overview," *International Journal of Maritime History* 5.1 (1993), 65–93, 69. While steerage passengers on North Atlantic packets paid £5–8 per head (both excluding food), Atlantic cabin passengers paid £30, including food and wine. See Kelly K. Chaves, "Travelers and Traveling at Sea," in *Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History*, 4:198. Compared with prices (GDP deflator), £20 would now correspond with about £1800; if compared with average

compared with the overall volumes of West European shipping, the pre-modern overseas migrations were of a rather moderate scale. If we allow two tons of shipping space per migrant, the British emigration to America around 1700 would have compared with commodity transports of some 15,000–20,000 tons a year, and the average Spanish less than a half of that. In the 1730s some 2,000 ships carried cargo though the Danish Sound, from the Baltic Sea to various West European destinations. Supposing that their average tonnage amounted to about 200, this flow of commodities can be estimated to about 400,000 tons;[12] accordingly, British and Spanish migrations only amounted to less than five and two percent, respectively, of the westward shipping from the Baltic area. It was only the slave trade which involved shipping on a major scale: Allowing one ton per slave plus a quarter ton for food and water during an Atlantic crossing, the average eighteenth century traffic (90,000–100,000 slaves a year) would have equaled some 125,000 tons of shipping. Still, around 1750, the westward shipping through the Sound can be estimated at over half a million tons a year—four times larger than slave trade.

Modest migration flows fully explain the fact that, with the exception of slavers, no specialized ocean-going passenger vessels developed before the nineteenth century. Normal cargo-carrying ships catered to occasional passengers: West Indian packets and East Indiamen as well as Baltic general-cargo vessels often had a separate deckhouse for upper and middle class passengers, while more numerous human cargo, such as British convicts and indentured labor to North America (and later to Australia), were accommodated on the tweendecks (the upper cargo hold) of ordinary sailing vessels.[13]

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earnings at the times it would amount to eight times more (see, www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/).

[12] Number of ships: Nina Ellinger Bang and Knut Korst, *Tabeller over skibsfart og varetransport gennem Öresund 1661–1783 og gennem Storebaelt 1701–1748*, vol. 1 (Köbenhavn, 1930); average tonnage (ships from the Baltic Sea to Amsterdam): Jake V.T. Knoppers, *Dutch Trade with Russia from the Times of Peter I to Alexander I* (Montréal, 1976), 265–267. In this context, ton refers the British "old measurement" ton which either equaled a little over 1000 kilos or 1.7 cubic meters (60 cubic feet).

[13] See e.g., Chaves, "Travelers and Traveling at Sea," 195–198; Shlomowitz, "Bulk Passenger Trades," 269.

The Transformation of Passenger Shipping in the Nineteenth Century

The European nineteenth century overseas emigration surpassed all earlier mass movements, even the Atlantic slave trade, by a huge margin. Already in the period 1846–76 the average number of emigrants amounted to about 300,000 a year, doubled to 600,000 in 1876–96, and exceeded one million a year in the beginning of the twentieth century. During the ten decades after 1820, about 55 million Europeans left their homes for a number of "new" (at least to them) continents.[14] This suggests that demand and supply of labor corresponded better than ever before. To a notable degree, this must have depended on the rapid development of communications which made it possible to spread information of the New World among the rural and urban proletarians of Europe.[15] However, quite a proportion of those who received such information would never have left for America if the cost and effort of travelling had not declined so significantly that crossing the ocean no longer seemed as prohibitive as it had been before the French Revolution. And since about a third of emigrants ultimately returned to Europe—and they, of course, too travelled by sea—the accumulated volume of bulk passenger trades was still higher than 55 million.

This massive change of scale can be illustrated by looking at the development of North Atlantic passenger-carrying vessels. A late eighteenth century Falmouth packet carried passengers (and mail) to New York via Halifax in about 50 days; a good hundred years later Atlantic luxury liners (such as the *Mauretania*, which accommodated up to

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[14] See e.g., Livi-Bacci, *World Population*, 135–142; Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* 3rd ed., (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), 119–120; Wolfram Fischer, "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Europas 1850–1914," in *Europäische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* (Handbuch der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte) 5 (Heilbronn, 1985), 10–207, 27–40.

[15] Flows of information occupied a central role in the theoretical framework of the Swedish emigration project in the 1970s; see e.g., Sune Åkerman, "Theories of Migration Research," in *From Sweden to America: A History of the Migration*, eds. H. Rundblom and H. Norman (Minneapolis, 1976), 19–75. Recently the letters by pioneer migrants to home have received special attention (see. e.g., Annemarie Steidl, "The 'Relatives and Friends Effect': Migration Networks of Transatlantic Migrants from the Late Habsburg Monarchy," in *Maritime Transport and Migration: The Connections between Maritime and Migration Networks*, eds. T. Feys, L.R. Fischer, S. Hoste and S. Vanfraechem, Research in Maritime History, No. 33, (St. John's, Newfoundland, 2007), 75–96). Such data support almost ideally the theory of "chain migration." However, the role of public media (newspapers) should neither be forgotten.

2,500 passengers) crossed the Atlantic in five or six days. In a year, the former managed three or four round voyages while the latter recorded 20–25.[16]

This example demonstrates a huge growth in transport efficiency. In the first place, the effective speed (direct distance divided by the overall duration of the voyage) from the west coast of England to New York improved from less than 2.5 knots (or 4.5 km/h, in the case of Falmouth packets) to 20–25 knots, or almost ten times as fast. The huge gain not only resulted from higher speeds through the water but also from the fact that steamers were able to ply the shortest possible route over the Atlantic almost irrespective of prevailing winds, while sailing vessels normally, in order to avoid contrary winds, had sailed along a southward curving route to Azores and approached the North American coast from the direction of Bermuda; which compared with the shortest (great circle) route, increased the distance of transatlantic travel by up to 1200 nautical miles, or over 40 percent.[17] (Going eastward, the speed difference was smaller because then even sailing vessels could follow the shortest route.)

Of course, transport efficiency also increased with the construction of bigger ships. The late eighteenth century Falmouth packets—typical passenger-carrying vessels of the period—seldomly measured over 200 tons. Unfortunately, no systematic data exist on the number of passengers they carried, but they rarely took anyone but cabin passengers. The fact that much bigger American sailing packets of the 1830s (see below) carried no more than 50–60 cabin passengers also suggests a fairly modest scale.[18] Accordingly, we may suppose that a British packet, with three or four voyages, was able to transport no more than perhaps a hundred passengers to North America in a year, while big liners in the beginning of the twentieth century carried 20–30,000 emigrants from Europe each year (and had a potential for almost an

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[16] For Falmouth packets, see David R. MacGregor, *Fast Sailing Ships, Their Design and Construction, 1774–1875* (Conway, 1988), 48–50, 59–62; for Atlantic liners, Ambrose Greenway, "Passenger Vessels," in *The Golden Age of Shipping: The Classic Merchant Ship, 1900–1960*, ed. Robert Gardiner (Bath, 1994), 14–37.

[17] For example, from Plymouth to New York, the great-circle route is (according to the well-known *Reed's Tables of Distances*) 2959 nautical miles while the route via the Azores amounts to between 3700 and 4200 nautical miles, depending on how far south the ship is sailing.

[18] David R. MacGregor, *Merchant Sailing Ships, 1815–1850* (Conway, 1984), 164. For convict vessels, see John McDonald and Ralph Shlomowitz, "The Cost of Shipping Convicts to Australia," *International Journal of Maritime History* 2.2 (1990), 1–32, 21.

equal number of first- and second-class passengers). This meant that the supply of passenger services grew at an impressive scale during the nineteenth century. Even the quality of travelling improved quite a lot, with decent third-class cabins—with central heating and toilets in the corridor—replacing the crowded, damp, and cold tweendecks with toilet buckets or primitive "heads" under the forecastle. A voyage of six days instead of fifty through the average difficult weather of the North Atlantic was a great improvement in the quality of passenger life. Moreover, both better understanding of the importance of fresh food and hygiene plus the shortening of voyage durations dramatically diminished sickness and mortality.

The revolution in passenger transport is usually associated with steam shipping. In broad outlines, this holds true but it must still be pointed out that a definite increase in transatlantic passengers began already in the era of the sailing ships. The new trend was effectively started in 1818 with the scheduled monthly sailings between New York and Liverpool by the American Black Ball Line; by the middle of the 1820s, three packet lines already provided weekly departures on this route. They all carried mail, passengers, and specie, in addition to conventional cargo and in all relevant features they were the first examples of regular liner trade. They also employed bigger vessels than the Falmouth packet service—first measuring around 400–500, then by the 1830s up to 1000 tons, and they regularly made faster passages across the Atlantic than Falmouth packets: average westward voyages in the 1830 were made in about 40 days.[19]

Although regular steamer services on the North Atlantic started at the end of the 1830s, sailing vessel services at first continued to expand: Around 1850, 24 American packets sailed between New York and Liverpool, 16 between New York and London, and 16 between New York and Havre. As cabin passengers started to move to steamers, sailing packets increasingly concentrated in carrying westward steerage passengers, as did a great number of ordinary cargo sailors. On the European continent Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Bremen, in particular, emerged as ports in which emigrants embarked aboard sailing vessels. According to contemporary testimonies, vessels of no more than 200 tons might carry 300 emigrants, which suggests almost slaver

[19] Laakso, *Across the Oceans*, 55–66; MacGregor, *Merchant Sailing Ships*, 163–168.

standards—and it was also claimed that mortality rates were appallingly high on such crowded passages.[20]

In any case, there are no doubts that the first boom of American emigration, before the 1860s, occurred on sailing vessels. Their primary role continued for even longer on other ocean routes, particularly to Australia and New Zealand. All ships which conveyed British convicts to Australia before the 1850s were sailing vessels, as were most of those which were chartered for government-assisted emigrant transports to South Africa in 1846–1862 and to Australia in 1847–1885.[21] This, of course, was connected with the fact that, before the late 1860s, steamships consumed so much fuel that they were not able to participate in such long trades unless they sailed the best part of the voyages. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 changed the scales and opened many Far East trades to steamers; however, it still took quite some time to establish regular connections to Australia via the Canal. In part this reflected the fact that the Suez alternative shortened the passage "down under" only slightly, while sailing vessels around the Cape could exploit the strong westerlies of the Southern Ocean. The speed and efficiency of Australian voyages greatly improved during the first half of the nineteenth century through use of better and bigger ships and nonstop voyages with optimal utilization of prevailing wind. Typical voyages in 1840s took 100–120 days—about 100 days less than a century earlier—and, in 1852, the Canadian-built 1600–ton ship *Marco Polo* recorded a passage of only 78 days from Liverpool to Melbourne. On that voyage, the ship carried over 900 emigrants, thus participating in real bulk passenger trade.[22]

The opening of the Suez Canal also indirectly affected South Atlantic passenger trades. It moved the focus from this area to the direct Far East route and lessened the interest in starting steamer lines to South Africa and South America, or establishing coaling stations on Atlantic islands.[23] Accordingly, emigration to South America depended on sail much longer than that over the North Atlantic.

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[20] Laakso, *Across the Oceans*, 68; MacGregor, *Merchant Sailing Ships*, 168–170.

[21] For these transports, see McDonald and Shlomowitz, "Contract Prices for the Bulk Shipping of Passengers."

[22] MacGregor, *Fast Sailing Ships*, 187–189.

[23] Yrjö Kaukiainen, "Shrinking the World: Improvements in the Speed of Information Transmission, c. 1820–1870," *European Review of Economic History* 4.1 (2001), 1–28, 16–17.

Steam Captures the Emigrant Trade

The first regular Atlantic steam-liners, the *Great Western, Britannia, Columbia*, and *Cambria*, were able to cross from Liverpool to New York or Boston in about 15 days—and back even faster—thus clearly surpassing the performance of all sailing packets.[24] None of them, however, sought the emigrant trades: the Cunard sisters were designed to carry 115 and the *Great Western* 148 passengers, most of which sailed in the first class.[25] Probably the first of the pioneer liners to participate in emigrant transport was Brunel's big iron ship, the 1,460–ton *Great Britain*, which in the early 1850s was converted for Australian traffic with a capacity for 730 passengers. Incidentally, she made her first voyage in 1852 and arrived in Melbourne after a voyage of 81 days (that is, a few days longer than that of the *Marco Polo*—later, however, she covered the distance in 65 and 66 days).[26] Brunel's mammoth 30,000–ton *Great Eastern* was also designed for Australian emigrant trade with accommodation for no less than 4,000 passengers. However, she never made an Australian voyage—instead, she was deployed in North Atlantic traffic where her best passenger record—2,700 in 1863—remained much below the maximum capacity.[27]

In the 1850s, regular steamship lines to North America were also started in both Hamburg and Bremen and these—as well as the British Inman Line—also tried to attract emigrants.[28] Most passenger liners, however, still concentrated on the transport of first- and second-class passengers. These consisted of businessmen and wealthy tourists who could afford the high fares of steam liners. As their numbers had steadily increased with the rapid economic growth in Britain and North America, the market looked promising and—what was particularly important—the demand was fairly balanced in both directions. In comparison, emigrant trade did not at first seem equally attrac-

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[24] Laakso, *Across the Oceans*, 55–74.

[25] See e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RMS_Britannia,…/SS_Great_Western (accessed September 2008).

[26] Ewan Corlett, *The Iron Ship: The Story of Brunels SS Great Britain* (Conway, 1990), 124–128, 214–215.

[27] Corlett, *The Iron Ship*, 197; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_Great_Eastern (accessed September 2008).

[28] For German, Dutch, and Belgian development, see Torsten Feys, "The Battle for the Migrants: The Evolution from Port to Company Competition, 1840–1914," in *Maritime Transport and Migration: The Connections between Maritime and Migration Networks*, 27–47.

tive, because the people in question looked for cheap transport and the overwhelming majority travelled westward. However, there also was another major and rapidly growing trade with an equally strong eastward bias: exports of American grain to Europe increased rapidly in the 1860s and 1870s, and most of them went to Britain and western Europe. A number of passenger liners with emigrant class berths started now to load grain in the tweendecks which were empty when returning to Europe (so-called "berth grain"). This combination again made emigrant trade more profitable than the carrying of first-class passengers (while the latter guaranteed a fair and predictable revenue both west- and eastwards they also involved much higher catering expenses per head). Cotton and frozen meat (ships with refrigerated compartments appeared in this market around the turn of the 1870s and 1880s) also provided substantial eastward cargo for liners. Already by the end of the 1870s, passenger liners had captured most of the North American immigrant trade and pushed sailing vessels from the North Atlantic grain trade as well. Subsequently, British, German, and French liner companies, in more or less open competition, built increasingly big liners to exploit these possibilities, and while most of the public attention concentrated in their luxurious first-class departments, they also expanded their emigrant classes. In a more modest scale, quite the same also happened in the South Atlantic and Far East trades.[29]

A few complementary factors also improved the efficiency of shipping. Big lighthouses which could be seen from a distance of ten or more miles plus the marking of fairways with light buoys not only made shipping safer but even faster; as the position of a ship could be accurately determined even by night without time-consuming sounding by lead and line—which in the case of fast and high-sided luxury liners would have involved quite a lot of work and slowing of the ship—or waiting outside the port until morning. Improvements in meteorological knowledge and oceanography also made possible better planning of shipping routes in relation to prevailing winds and currents, as well

[29] C. Knick Harley, "North Atlantic Shipping in the Late Nineteenth Century: Freight Rates and the Interrelationship of Cargoes," in L.R. Fischer and H.W. Nordvik, eds., *Shipping and Trade, 1750–1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic History* (Pontefract, 1990), 149–162; Yrjö Kaukiainen, *Sailing into Twilight: Finnish Shipping in an Age of Transport Revolution, 1860–1914* (Jyväskylä, 1991), 162–167.

as producing more reliable storm warnings.[30] However, these developments can rather be seen as indigenous elements in the general growth of shipping than as autonomous catalyzers to that growth.

Did the Price of Ocean Traveling Decline?

Improving efficiency and achieving economies of scale normally result in lower unit costs. Thus, it might be expected that the prices of passenger transportation declined. Such a hypothesis seems especially natural since before the nineteenth century, the cost of carrying passengers could be regarded as an opportunity cost connected with commodity freights. Since the shipping costs for bulk cargoes (such as grain, coal, or timber) sank by almost a half between the late 1870s and beginning of the twentieth century,[31] opportunity cost for passengers should also have sunk.

Very interesting data about bulk passenger prices are found of the British transports of convicts and government-aided emigrants to Australia. In both cases, freight agreements resulted from official bids with the lowest bid regularly chosen; they reflect a similar competitive market as the so-called tramp shipping. Interestingly, the overall cost of convict transports (which, in addition to freight also included provisioning, medical, etc. costs) sank quite substantially before the 1840s: From the 1790s to the end of 1820s, the cost per head fluctuated around £40 but sank to £12–13 in 1830–34, which implies a drop of no

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[30] As for these developments, see e.g., Stephan Cramer, *Riskanter segeln: Innovative Sicherheitssysteme im 19. Jahrhundert und ihre unbeabsichtigten Folgen am Beispiel der nordwestdeutschen Segelschifffahrt* (Bremen, 2007).

[31] This trend was identified already in the 1930s by L. Isserlis, "Tramp Shipping Cargoes, and Freights," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, CI (1938), 53–134. Subsequently, Douglass C. North claimed that the decline already started in the early nineteenth century, "Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development 1750–1913," *Journal of Economic History* 18 (1958), 537–555, but this was challenged by C. Knick Harley, "Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740–1913: The Primacy of Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed," *Journal of Economic History* 48 (1988), 851–876. Recently two independent estimations have concluded that the freight decline of the late nineteenth century was even somewhat bigger than Isserlis' figures suggested: Saif I. Shah Mohammed and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Freight Rates and Productivity Gains in British Tramp Shipping 1869–1950," *Explorations in Economic History* 41.2 (April 2004), 172–203; Yrjö Kaukiainen, "Journey Costs, Terminal Costs and Ocean Tramp Freights: How the Price of Distance Declined from the 1870s to 2000," *International Journal of Maritime History* 18.2 (December 2006), 17–64.

less than two-thirds (in real terms).[32] The data for government-assisted emigrant voyages, which started in 1839, also suggest a modest decline in the 1840s but after that, until 1885, no clear trend is visible. This series, however, mainly documented voyages under sail—it was only in 1884 that steamers gained majority in this traffic. On the other hand, when the government resumed such assisted voyages in 1906, contract prices on steamers fluctuated around £12–13, which compared with almost £15 in 1885–87. As the post-1906 emigrants travelled in third-class instead of open-berth steerage, there was, in addition to a 25 percent decline of prices (in real terms) also a substantial quality improvement.[33]

For the North Atlantic no equally comprehensive data exist. In American packets, the fares of £5–8 for steerage passengers (excluding food) have been quoted as typical, but it has also been claimed that smaller sailing vessels carried emigrants for as cheap as ten shillings per head.[34] Incidentally, the most expensive emigrant-class tickets on the Titanic also cost £8 while the cheapest places were only £3[35]—and it must be noted that these fares also included three meals a day and, with the exception of the lowest category, emigrants were lodged in two to ten-bed cabins.

More systematic data exist for the steerage passengers of the German HAPAG-line from 1860 onward and for Cunard since the early 1880s.[36] They suggest that, from the 1860s to the 1880s, the average fares per head diminished from £10 to £5 but then increased again to close to £7. The fluctuations were clearly connected with the buying power of the British pound sterling: in real terms, they were quite modest.[37]

If we add the value of food provisions to the steerage fares of sailing packets, the passengers' overall costs increase quite a lot, in particular as the westward voyage took about 40 days (on Australian convict voyages

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[32] McDonald and Shlomowitz, "The Cost of Shipping," 28.

[33] McDonald and Shlomowitz, "Contract Prices," 80, 91.

[34] Chaves, "Travelers and Traveling at Sea," 198; MacGregor, *Merchant Sailing Ships*, 195.

[35] See www.euronet.nl/users/keesree/palace.htm#Third (accessed September 2008). The buying power of the pound was roughly the same around 1830 and 1913.

[36] Harley, "North Atlantic Shipping," 164, 171.

[37] If the wholesale price level of 1913 is 100, the index for the 1860s fluctuated around 120, for the mid-1880s around 92, and for 1890 around 78. Accordingly, there was hardly any real decline between 1860 and 1900 and even the real increases after 1906 only amounted to a couple of percent.

the cost for food—which was of very modest quality—amounted to almost 20 percent of total costs). Accordingly, it is evident that actual prices sank sometime between the 1830s and 1860, although the source material does not allow any precise estimation of the decline. On the other hand, no substantial real decline can be observed during the late nineteenth century, not at least when compared with Australian emigrant charges and still less when compared to changes in bulk freight rates during the same period. In some degree, the difference in freight and passenger costs reflected differences in the two types of cargoes: carrying grain or coal did not involve similar overhead and marketing costs as passenger trades. However, still more important was the fact that the North Atlantic liner market was far from competitive: Despite competition, major shipping companies had formed cartels (e.g., North Atlantic Passenger Conference and Conference of North European Steamship Lines) and pools that agreed on uniform tariffs and/ or the division of markets. Indeed, it seems that on certain "feeder" trades, particularly in the Mediterranean, the market was more competitive and, accordingly, fares did sink substantially even in real terms.[38]

Because of a steadily growing demand after the 1880s, North Atlantic conference rates were fairly easy to maintain. It even seems that emigrants themselves were not too sensitive to prices: On the one hand, they became better informed of opportunities abroad, and, on the other, the quality of travelling had improved enormously: on many Atlantic liners individual third-class spaces increased to well over two or three cubic meters per head. Finally, an important immaterial factor was the shortening of the time at sea from over a month to just a week. In popular imagination the ocean lost most of its effect as a major deterrent and became comparable to a long train passage.

Conclusion

In the introduction, it was proposed that the "terror of distance," in particular overseas distance, was an important hindrance for long-distance labor movements. The subsequent discussion tried to show

[38] See e.g., Nicolas Manitakis, "Transatlantic Emigration and Maritime Transport from Greece to the US: A Major Area of European Steamship Company Competition for Migrant Traffic," in *Maritime Transport and Migration: The Connections between Maritime and Migration Networks*, 63–74.

that the supply of shipping services increased to such a degree during the nineteenth century that truly massive overseas migration became possible. It has also been claimed that this increase of supply cannot be explained solely as a technological change; already before the Napoleonic wars, the most crucial migration-promoting factor was the availability of surplus capacity, which kept the opportunity costs of passenger transports at a tolerable level. The same economic formula acted even in the era of steam-driven ocean liners: had there not been demand for eastward cargoes to balance the one-sided migration flows, the liner companies probably would have continued to concentrate in upper- and middle-class passengers. The migration flows to South America and to Australia too were balanced by returning cargoes of grain, meat, and wool.

This essay has treated shipping as an independent variable, a factor of supply that developed irrespective, or almost irrespective, of the forces of migration. Such an approach should not, of course, ignore important feedbacks in the form of increasing demand for passenger transport. Still, the big background factor was the general growth of worldwide ocean shipping, not just that of passenger trades. The relative importance of the latter was fairly moderate even at its peak around 1913; although a major sector, the passengers trades were by no means the mainstream. According to the available estimations, the volume of world maritime transport at that date amounted to about 350 million tons.[39] If we suppose that one passenger on average occupied a space in which four tons of cargo could have been carried, the volume of emigrant trade just before the World War One (about 1.8 million people a year) can be compared with a cargo transport of some seven million tons—just about 2 percent of commodity cargoes. Neither does it seem that this sector would have grown faster than maritime trade in general: while the current estimations indicate that the annual number of emigrants increased about six-fold between 1870 and 1913, the overall carrying capacity of global merchant shipping grew at a similar pace, probably even a little faster.[40] Thus, it seems

[39] The estimation for 1913 is based on the estimated relative growth of world trade between 1913 and 1937, published in e.g., Tomohei Chida and Peter N. Davis, *The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries* (London, 1990), Table G, 204.

[40] The theoretical carrying capacity has here been estimated in the conventional way, by multiplying the tonnage of steamships by three (as a recognition of their greater efficiency) and added to the actual tonnage of sailing vessels. For relevant data, see e.g., Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik, "Maritime Transport and the

that the plentiful supply of maritime transport can be understood as an independent variable that connects the growth of migration with factors that the current "chain-migration" theory does not observe.

Presenting the development of shipping as the big background factor does not mean that it should be regarded in isolation. The companies that built Atlantic liners were fully aware of what was happening in their business environment and based their decision on what they saw or thought they were seeing. Nor did they just patiently wait for the demand to grow but also tried to encourage it: thus, they advertised their lines in countries of good prospects for emigration, engaged local agents to sell their tickets, and even built barracks or emigrant hotels to accommodate passengers waiting for the next departure. But of course their prospects also depended on developments over which they had little or no influence. In addition to ocean shipping, there were even other supply-side economic forces promoting migration. Just to take one example, the development of railway networks in the European continent—as well as "feeder" shipping lines from more peripheral ports—became an important catalyst during the latter stages of American migration, with increasing numbers coming from eastern and southern Europe.

Integration of the North Atlantic Economy, 1850–1914," in *The Emergence of a World Economy 1500–1914* (Beiträge zur Wirthschafts- und Sozialgeschichte) 33.2 (Wiesbaden, 1986), 519–544, 526 (table III).

PART FOUR

THE PACIFIC OCEAN

INTRODUCTION: THE RHYTHMS OF THE TRANSPACIFIC

Henry Yu

Before the nineteenth century, the major seafaring migrants crossing the vast stretches of water were Pacific Islanders who had explored the open ocean in large enough numbers to settle islands all the way across to the Hawaiian Islands (and very likely had reached other sites close to and along the Pacific Coast of the Americas). Transpacific migrations grew from these courageous voyages and those of the various sailors, traders, craftsmen, and laborers who had travelled the Spanish galleon route between Acapulco and Manila since the sixteenth century, into a tenuous network of mass migration routes. The nineteenth century was the first great period of mass migrations across the Pacific, but paradoxically this period was also marked by the virtual elimination of these new migration patterns by 1930.

The first essay in this section uses the example of Cantonese-speaking migrants to illustrate how Pacific crossings between 1830 and 1930 were marked by intermittent rhythms, an unsteady beat of movement and stoppage. This arrhythmia reflected the interaction between the aspirations of migrants and the timing of laws designed to curtail transpacific moves. As migrants from southern China traveled the Pacific in search of their fortunes, they crossed paths with migrants from the transatlantic world who created ideologies of white supremacy to exclude both Asian migrants and indigenous peoples from settler colonies such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. These politics of racial exclusion framed the lives of almost all of the migrants and the native peoples they encountered in the Pacific, even as migrants and indigenous peoples had their own ideas about what they were doing.

Eiichiro Azuma explains how Japanese migrants understood their migration eastward to the Americas in the context of the broader colonial expansion of Japanese settlement southwards into Micronesia and westwards into Korea and Manchuria. Escaping national narratives of inclusion and exclusion within U.S. and Canadian scholarship that only interpret Japanese migrants within immigrant paradigms of belonging, Azuma analyzes how Japanese migration was understood

as part of a global process of empire building and colonial expansion that paralleled and competed with the ambitions of U.S. empire builders. By listening to the voices of migrants in Japanese, Azuma is able to hear justifications for migration and settlement that echo narratives of U.S. expansion, describing such migrants at the forward edges of Japan's "frontier." By the 1920s rising anti-Japanese agitation on the Pacific coast of Canada and the United States helped undergird concepts of white supremacy among the growing numbers of transcontinental migrants from the eastern coast of North America who had crossed by railroad. This resulted in exclusionary policies and discriminatory legislation that virtually ended transpacific migration to North America. Transpacific Japanese migration, however, continued with a new network of Japanese migrations directed instead to Brazil. Within Azuma's essay we hear the voices of the migrants, but also understand how imperial contests and white settler nationalisms affected the rhythms and routes of their movements.

Christine Skwiot's essay, in contrast, describes how native Hawaiians dealt in the nineteenth century with the challenges posed by migrants from all around the globe. Heirs to a millennium of open ocean exploration that had brought their ancestors across the Pacific Islands from Polynesia to Hawai'i, Skwiot explores how native Hawaiians found themselves dealing with both European and Asian migrants to their shores. Faced with a decimation of their population by diseases brought by ever increasing numbers of these migrants, Hawaiian leaders tried various policies to restrengthen their sovereignty and control, aligning at various times with Chinese migrants from the southern provinces and with American migrants from New England, trying to shape the shifting dynamics of the population as it changed. Hawaiians also continued to be migrants themselves in this period, catching rides along the same transpacific routes that others took to the Americas, taking advantage of new pathways to extend the seafaring journeys that once had moved them across the Pacific. But with the rising number of others crowding into their lands, Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders were faced with unprecedented challenges.

All three essays pay close attention to the various levels at which migrations register as historical processes, ranging from the aspirations of individuals that aggregate into migration patterns, to the changes in state policies that abruptly shift the lives of thousands, but also to how our scholarly understandings of the past have been shaped and reshaped by the changing analytical perspectives of academic research.

Each essay allows us to see in concrete ways the complexity of the transpacific migrations that began in large numbers for the first time during the nineteenth century. Each also advances historiographic approaches to migration that build upon and move beyond existing scholarship. In their own way, all three engage with the scholarship of Asian American studies, Asian area studies, and Pacific Islander studies, taking insights from these fields that allow them to see historical actors as having intentions and effects that have not been captured by national historiographies. Both Asian American studies and Pacific Islander studies arose as challenges to existing scholarship that either ignored or marginalized transpacific migrants, and so the essays of this section reflect a scholarly intervention that emphasizes listening to the historical voices of Asian migrants silenced from history and Pacific Islanders displaced from their lands by colonialism.

In introducing this set of essays, it should be noted that both in volume of migrants and in the duration through time of the networks that these migrants created, transpacific migration networks were smaller in scale and more intermittent than those that characterized the other seaborne migrations in this volume. The century between 1830 and 1930 might be characterized as marking both the beginning of mass migrations of laborers across and within the Pacific, and the creation and spread around the Pacific region of states who enacted policies designed to curtail or end such migrations. Rather than experiencing a steady increase in numbers of migrants over time, the century is marked by the intermittent rhythm of migrants following routes that are suddenly cut off, leading to the creation of other routes to new destinations that recharted the pathways and networks.

Syncopated rhythms, enforced silences, the sounds of human travel across the Pacific start and stop. If it is difficult to hear within historical records the stories of migrants who crossed the Pacific in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it is partially because they are often the narratives of the excluded, the utterances of migrants whom keepers of historical memory ultimately did not include within state-sanctioned myths of belonging created by settler nations such as the Australia, Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Listening to the stories of those who crossed the Pacific Ocean involves following them across multiple journeys from one place to another, and then on to yet another. We strain to hear the stops and restarts created by the changing terms of contract labor. Peripatetic wanderings in search of a higher wage, a better opportunity, following tips and intelligence

gathered and passed along gossip chains by family relatives and village mates. Hearing their stories requires listening to them in the languages they used, often village or regional dialects that were tied to the local spaces from where they came and often returned.

Some restarts in other locations were forced—exile by violence or decree as incipient political states adopted legislation designed to ethnically cleanse regions of non-whites. Indigenous inhabitants in Australasia, in the Pacific Islands, and on the Pacific Coast of the Americas were systematically cleared from their lands, and transpacific migrants originating from Asia became the targets of new forms of governmental surveillance and control, marking the rise of legal regimes whose purpose was to reengineer composition of populations by controlling the movement of migrants.

It is an underlying theme of this section—as of Lara Putnum's essay on the Caribbean World in this volume—that scholarly studies of transpacific migration have had to pay particular attention to how white supremacy operated in its manifest political forms across the Pacific region, and how discourses of anti-Chinese agitation and anti-Asian legislation themselves migrated along with laborers and political organizers of European origin. There are two dichotomous and yet interlocked migrations that marked the rhythms of the transpacific—that of migrants originating from specific regions of Asia (in particular southern China and Japan, along with smaller numbers from South Asia and Korea), and that of migrants coming into the Pacific region from the Atlantic World. Any periodization of migration patterns in the Pacific between 1830 and 1930 must take into account the rhythm of their interacting networks, and how each played out on the lands of indigenous peoples and Pacific Islanders whom they encountered in their migrations.

The soft voices of Asian migrants journeying across the Pacific are inseparable from the drumbeats of a migrating set of ideas about white supremacy that systematically cut off these newly established networks one after another. The story of the Pacific between 1830 and 1930, then, is to be found by both hearing the voices of new migrants and by listening for the enforced silences of journeys eclipsed and ended. This complex rhythm created by voices and silences can only be heard if we take the Pacific as a whole into account across the 100 years, so that the starts and stops of migratory networks can be understood as interlocked beats, with the cutting off of migrations along one route leading to the rise of migrants along another route to another place.

THE INTERMITTENT RHYTHMS OF THE CANTONESE PACIFIC[1]

Henry Yu

Between 1830 and 1930, migrants speaking various dialects of Chinese originating in a small number of regions in Guangdong province dominated transpacific labor migrations. When significant numbers of migrants began to move in the 1850s, it was initially on routes that extended the existing trade and migration networks that linked ports on the southern Chinese coast with Southeast Asia. Throughout the century, the total numbers of Chinese migrants to Southeast Asia dwarfed those of migrants to the Americas and Australasia. For instance, in the first half of the nineteenth century, Zhu Guohong speculates that the balance of out-migration to Southeast Asia and to the Americas was fairly even—200,000 out of 320,000 migrants from southern China went to Southeast Asia; with an estimated 17,000 to Cuba, 10,000 to Peru, 10,000 to Australia, 18,000 to the U.S., and 15,000 to West Indies.

By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, migration had quadrupled. Zhu estimates that out of a total of 1.28 million out-migrants, 350,000 went to the Malay Peninsula, 45,000 to Philippines, and 250,000 to the East Indies—compared to 25,000 to Hawai'i, 55,000 to Australia, 30,000 to Canada, 160,000 to the U.S., 135,000 to Cuba, 30,000 to West Indies, 20,000 to British Guyana, and 110,000 to Peru. Then, in

[1] Variations of some of the arguments made in this essay were presented to the "Inside and Outside the Nation" workshop at the University of Manitoba in April 2009, to the "Pacific Worlds in Motion II" conference at the National University of Singapore in March 2009, at the Center for the Study of the Pacific Northwest at the University of Washington in February 2009, to the "Deconstructing Empire II" conference at the University of Victoria in June 2007, to the "Visualizing the Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and North America" conference at the University of British Columbia in March 2007, and to the Institute for Pacific Northwest Studies at the University of Idaho in November 2006. My thanks to the attendees for their helpful questions and comments, in particular for the useful suggestions from Eiichiro Azuma, Greg Blue, Gordon Chang, Ann Curthoys, Penelope Edwards, Catherine Hall, Moon-Ho Jung, Abidin Kusno, Renisa Mawani, Adele Perry, John Price, Vicente Rafael, Adam Sowards, Anand Yang, and my late mentor Edgar Wickberg, to whom this essay is dedicated.

the last quarter of the nineteenth century, transpacific migration to the white settler colonies in the Americas and Australasia dropped precipitously because of anti-Chinese legislation. Only 12,000 went to the U.S., 5,000 to Hawai'i, 4,000 to Canada, and 8,000 to Australia—compared with 360,000 to the Malay Peninsula, 320,000 to the East Indies, and 20,000 to Philippines. In other words, in the final decades of the nineteenth century, nearly all of the estimated total of 750,000 out-migrants went to Southeast Asia. For Southeast Asia this pattern continued into the first quarter of the twentieth century (125,000 to the Malay Peninsula and 300,000 to the East Indies), assumed a new World War One induced migration to continental Europe, Britain, and North Africa (150,000) and another 55,000 to South Africa-Transvaal. Thus, of the estimated total of 650,000 out-migrants (Zhu), the number going to the Americas and Australasia had dropped to an insignificant fraction.[2]

As pointed out in the essays by Elizabeth Sinn and Karl Trocki (in this volume), the ports of Hong Kong and Singapore became the major nodes of migration from Guangdong and Fujian province into the Nanyang (i.e. Southeast Asia). Migrants followed the routes of the junk trade across the South China Seas. However, while "Chinese" transpacific networks were extensions of the existing migration networks between southern China and Southeast Asia, they only extended the Cantonese-speaking network. Virtually no Hokkien-speaking migrants crossed the Pacific, a surprising absence since migrations of Hokkien and Cantonese to Southeast Asia were split nearly evenly (along with smaller Teochow, Hainanese, and Hakka-speaking networks). Almost every location in Southeast Asia that had Chinese migrants had both Hokkien and Cantonese-speaking migrants, each of whom formed fairly separate linguistic and familial networks.

How did the Pacific become so dominated by migrants speaking various dialects of Cantonese? The answer lies in the fact that the nineteenth century transpacific began as a British project, centered upon their newly acquired port of Hong Kong (granted to the British in

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[2] Guohong Zhu, *Zhongguo de haiwai yimin: Yi xiang guoji qianyi de lishi yanjiu* [Overseas Emigration from China: A Historical Study of International Migration] (Shanghai, 1994). Numbers from Zhu contained in Table 2, in Lynn Pan, gen. ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas* (Singapore, 2006), 62. My figures for Canada differ from his estimates for last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, as discussed below.

1842 as part of the settlement of conflicts with the Qing Empire over the opium trade). By anchoring transpacific routes on Hong Kong and linking it with Canton (*Guangzhou*) and (Portuguese) Macao, the main ports for Cantonese out-migration, the British effectively cut the transpacific off to departures from coastal ports such as Amoy (*Xiamen*) that were the main out-migration nodes for Hokkien and Teochiu-speaking migrants from Fujian province. The Guangzhou (Canton) based British Consul observed in 1852 this incipient Cantonese Pacific:

> Emigration has within the last few years taken place from the port to a considerable extent; but although the emigrants are shipped at Whampoa, Cumsing, Macao and Hong Kong, I shall consider them as belonging to Canton and the surrounding districts. In 1848 about 10 Chinese emigrated to California; in 1849 about 900; in 1850 about 3,118; in 1851 about 3,508; and during the first six months of 1852, 15,000 left Whampoa, Cumsing, Macao and Hong Kong for California. In addition to these, about 2,025 coolies have emigrated to South America, where, on arrival, they are generally hired out to the Peruvian government, and employed on various government works.[3]

By the 1880s the Cantonese Pacific was firmly established, and Hong Kong was its main port of origination.

Transpacific shipping routes financed by British capital extended from the networks that centered on Hong Kong from the 1850s onward, connecting the flows of goods and human bodies that passed through that harbor across the Pacific as well as around the Indian and Atlantic oceans to British colonies in the Caribbean. New routes transformed Honolulu into the crossroads for Pacific traffic, replacing the route that the sixteenth century Spanish galleons which, following the ocean currents up around the north Pacific Rim, sailed past Japan and down the western coast of North America. By the last half of the nineteenth century, Japanese, Canadian, and American shipping lines crossed the Pacific along with those established by British ships earlier,

[3] Walton Look Lai, *The Chinese in the West Indies, 1806–1995* (Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, 1998), 71, excerpted from a series of answers made by the Canton-based Consul A. Elmslie, 25 August 1852, to inquires about the desirability of increasing the recruitment of Cantonese labor in British Caribbean colonies in the West Indies. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1852–1853, LXVIII (1686): The Earl of Malmesbury to Dr. Bowring, 12 June 1852. Questions for Circulation among the Consuls in China.

connecting ports such as Yokohama, Hong Kong, Sydney, Honolulu, Victoria, Vancouver, and San Francisco.

But if the routes were navigated by sail and then, from the 1860s on, steam ships built with British, Japanese, Canadian, and U.S. capital, the transpacific migrants were motivated by ambitions for monetary returns of a different order. The aspirations of individual migrants emerged out of the intelligence that passed back along familial networks in the process of being created along the shipping and mail routes. As Madeline Hsu so poignantly illustrated in her study of migrants who circulated back and forth between Taishan County in Guangdong and the United States, these migration networks relied on good intelligence about wages, available jobs, local economies, and the value of goods that could be moved.[4]

The networks, based upon kinship and shared origins in the clusters of villages from which the migrants came, stretched all around the Pacific and into the Caribbean and the Atlantic coasts of the Americas.[5] One illustrative story shows how global the networks could be: John Lee Lum, as he became known at the end of his life in Trinidad, was born in 1842 in Sun Wei (*Xinhui* in Mandarin) County in Guangdong province and travelled to California in the 1870s to work in the gold mines. He then accompanied the 15,000 or so Chinese hired to build the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia, Canada, before moving on to Brazil, then British Guiana, and then Trinidad in the 1880s, where he worked in a trading firm run by fellow Sun Wei migrants. In 1885, with savings from his years of work and with loans from relatives and the extended network of fellow villagers and others who spoke the same dialect, he established his own general store which sold liquor, hardware, food, and imported items that passed along the global networks set up by the Chinese to move goods. In the 1890s he returned to China to marry and father a boy and a girl, leav-

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[4] Madeline Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration Between the United States and South China, 1882–1943* (Stanford, 2000). Also Michael Williams, "Destination Qiaoxiang: Pearl River Delta Villages and Pacific Ports 1849–1949" (PhD diss., University of Hong Kong, 2002).

[5] For examples of studies of family lineage organization in outmigration villages, see Yuen-fong Woon, *Social Organization in South China, 1911–1949: The Case of the Kuan Lineage in K'ai-p'ing County* (Ann Arbor, 1984); James L. Watson, *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage: The Mans in Hong Kong and London* (Berkeley, 1975). For a study of how such regional migration networks could be reflected in a Hong Kong institution, see Elizabeth Sinn, *Power and Charity: The Early History of the Tung Wah Hospital* (Hong Kong, 1989).

ing them with his village wife before travelling back to marry a Trinidad-born Chinese, with whom he had three sons and two daughters. After extending his chain of Trinidad general stores to 20 branches, he retired in 1908 to Hong Kong with his youngest son, living out his days in comfort before passing away in 1921. A story such as Lum's would have passed along gossip chains as a heroic success, fueling the aspirations of others to emulate, just as Lum himself must have heard similar stories about those who had gone before him to California and Canada. Starting with nothing as a common laborer; watching and learning as he worked his way up within a network of compatriots; and then striking out on his own with the financial support of those from whom he could gain trust.[6]

Relentlessly upwardly mobile, the aspirations of individual migrants might be dashed by circumstance and by their own failings, but hard work and ambition fueled long distance travels. Lum's story might not have been typical for its success, but it was the kind of exemplar that traveled along the same pathways as the migrants, emboldening others to follow. A British observer of the Chinese overseas remarked in 1852 upon this incredible ambition, comparing other laborers used by the British in Southeast Asia and the Americas unfavorably to the Chinese:

> The absorbing aim of the Chinese emigrant is to better his condition. Of this object he never loses sight; and…it frequently follows that he finally adopts as his permanent home the locality in which he reaped his profits…Unlike the negro, who works and denies himself for a time, and with a view only to gain the means of maintaining himself for a corresponding interval in ease and idleness, the labour of the Chinese knows no cessation, and his savings are formed into a stock, which he is always endeavouring to increase, but never to exhaust. Different again from the coolie of Hindoostan, the Chinese is ignorant of the blighting effects of caste, and is as strongly bent on raising himself to a higher position as he is on acquiring wealth. It is curious, that whilst in their own land they seldom quit the particular calling they adopt in early life…the Chinese evince, when abroad, a remarkable talent…of adapting themselves to any circumstances, readily quitting one trade or occupation, if they find it does not yield the remuneration they had expected, for another of a wholly different nature. A strong commercial spirit rules all their

[6] Story of John Lee Lum from Lai, *The Chinese in the West Indies*, 299.

> proceedings… From husbandmen they become planters, and often change this vocation for that of the merchant, or perhaps combine the two.[7]

A British official who was similarly expert on Chinese labor saw the same burning aspirations in 1844, stating that "My notion of the Chinese is, that they are industrious and diligent only when they are working for themselves, and see profit in the face at every hour of their labour."[8]

One of the most common strategies for upward mobility for the overwhelmingly male migrants was to establish multiple households, one in the home village with a wife selected from a nearby village, and another somewhere else along his journeys where he saw an opportunity to establish a small business. Exporting a set of practices developed in Southeast Asia, at first to Australia and the Hawaiian Islands in the last half of the nineteenth century, ambitious Cantonese migrants aspired to enter local "native" community networks by marrying into local families. The British Consul in Canton observed in 1852 about the skewed gender ratios of Cantonese migration practices that "Chinese women never emigrate… There is not a China woman in the Straits Settlements, nor an honest one in Hong Kong." Predicting what the Cantonese would do if they were brought to British colonies in the Americas and followed the patterns in Southeast Asia, he wrote that "The emigrants, would, I presume, cohabit with or marry the native females… as they do in the Straits, and educate their children according to Chinese usages."[9] Another British official observed that

> The Chinese setters form matrimonial connexions wherever they go, and whenever they can, and in those countries to which they have been long accustomed to resort. In Java, Siam, and Cochin China, a very considerable mixed population has been the result.[10]

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[7] Quoted in Lai, *The Chinese in the West Indies*, 81, excerpted from a Parliamentary discussion about the possibility of using more Chinese labor in British colonies. "General Remarks on Chinese Emigration: Report by Harry Parkes, British Interpreter September 1852," Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1852–1853, LXVIII (1686), 23–28

[8] Lai, *The Chinese in the West Indies*, 54, excerpted from Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1844, XXXV (530): Papers re Emigration of Chinese Laborers to the West Indies, Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners to G.W. Hope, 8 September 1843, enclosure No. 2.

[9] Lai, *The Chinese in the West Indies*, 72, excerpted from Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1852–1853, LXVIII (1686): Dr. Bowring to Earl of Malmesbury, Despatch No. 8, 25 September 1852, enclosures No. 1, 3.

[10] Lai, *The Chinese in the West Indies*, 52, excerpted from Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1844, XXXV (530): Papers re Emigration of Chinese Laborers to the West

In Hawai'i the Chinese-Hawaiian mixed family running a grocery store became a staple by the 1880s, and Chinese-Aboriginal marriages were commonplace in Australia whether in Darwin on the northwest coast, in rural areas of New South Wales, or other colonies on the south coast. This practice was an extension of Chinese migrations into the Malay Peninsula and the East Indies.[11] Marrying into native families offered the ambitious male migrant an entry point into local societies to acquire the status and privileges of the wife's family within the community. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, such unions were common up and down the Fraser River in British Columbia and, as in other parts of the Cantonese Pacific, signaled a transition from being a peripatetic laborer to a man with some savings and an ambition to run a small business. It is harder for us to recover in their own voices what motivated the indigenous women to marry Chinese men, but certainly the global network of goods for which such men served as the contact point must have been part of the reason. These Cantonese men also brought with them healing techniques and technological practices that were foreign to the native communities, and thus marriage alliances with Cantonese men expanded local horizons into a larger world of possibilities. It should not be discounted, as well, that migrant males offered a widened set of potential mates beyond the limited set of local families already well known.

If the Cantonese-speaking migrants who crossed the Pacific in the 1850s used a single name for much of the Americas and Australia—"Gum San" ("Gold Mountain" or *jinshan* in Mandarin)—they were referring ultimately not to the gold they could wash out of the gravel in streambeds, but to a life cycle of upward mobility built out of labor and mutual investments in each others' aspirations of wealth. Successful migrants at the end of their lives loaned money to the young seekers of fortune in whom they saw their own ambitions echoed. "Gold Mountain" named a geographic imaginary, a field of aspirations over

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Indies, Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners to G.W. Hope, 8 September 1843, enclosure No. 2.

[11] Henry Chan, Ann Curthoys, and Nora Chiang, eds., *The Overseas Chinese in Australasia: History, Settlement and Interactions* (Taipei, 2001); Shirley Fitzgerald, *Red Tape—Gold Scissors: The Story of Sydney's Chinese* (Sydney, 1996); Julia Martinez, "Ethnic Policy and Practice in Darwin," in Regina Gantner, ed., *Mixed Relations* (Claremont, Western Australia, 2006); Jan Ryan, *Ancestors: Chinese in Colonial Australia* (Freemantle, 1995); Jan Ryan, ed., *Chinese in Australia and New Zealand: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (New Delhi, 1995).

time and space that named the New World for their own purposes, different from that of Europeans. They cared little for the petty political disputes and boundary maintenance of European migrants and settlers, except when they impacted upon their own mobility, both geographically and economically.

The name "Gum San" collapsed the geography of the Americas and Australasia into a single term, reflected their own aspirations, and the amazing profitability of these regions for many reinforced the continuing power of that name to capture desires. According to Madeline Hsu's estimates based upon the account books of companies that specialized in remittances from Overseas Chinese through Hong Kong, in the late 1920's, over 50 percent of the nearly HK$272 million overseas remittances came from Canada and the United States, even though Chinese in Canada and the United States only accounted for 1.7 percent of those who had left southern China.[12]

We may find the voices of these migrants in letters sent back and forth across the Pacific between husbands and sons and the families in Guangdong'a small rural villages who depended upon the remittances. For instance, in the City of Vancouver Archives, a collection of undelivered letters found at the Wing Sang Co., which served as a transpacific postal delivery service for Cantonese migrants, reveals the dominant topic of conversation in such long distance correspondence—money. The sample letter (Figure 19) is typical of many of the letters, detailing for workers overseas how money they had remitted has been spent in the home village, or conversely letters from the same workers giving instructions on how money just sent should be spent.[13]

That it was a Cantonese-speaking Pacific is clear in the term that the migrants used to name the enclaves of businesses that served as nodes for their mobility. What in English were known almost immediately as "Chinatowns," in Cantonese were "Tong yun gai" (*tangrenjie* in Mandarin) which translated into "street of the people of the Tang Dynasty." This reference to the Tang Dynasty was unique to the inhabitants of Guangdong and other southern regions of China, who saw themselves as having a different historical trajectory than those in other parts of the Qing Empire. They were not the "people of the

[12] Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home*, 195.


[13] Letter 430, Additional Manuscripts, 1108–1430, Yip Sang Correspondence, City of Vancouver Archives, <http://vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/archives/digitized/Yip_Sang/index.htm>.



Figure 19 Letter Written by a Cantonese Migrant in Vancouver

Han" (*hanren* in Mandarin, the common term now used for the ethnic majority people in China) or people from "*zhongguo*" (Middle Kingdom), a national term adopted later with the rise of Chinese nationalism in the late nineteenth century. They were "tongyun"—a Cantonese moniker for themselves used for their distinctive urban enclaves all over the Americas.

Some recent research conducted by at the University of British Columbia by the author and Peter Ward on Cantonese migrants who entered Canada between 1885 and 1923 provides the quantitative data. Almost all of the nearly 100,000 Chinese who entered Canada during this period came from just a handful of counties in Guangdong (Map 21), and although the dominant image of Chinese in North America is one of "Chinatown" enclaves in Pacific Coast cities, they in fact spread quickly into almost every small town across the continent (Map 22). This spatial pattern of urban commercial nodes combined with wide rural dispersion (often with just one or two Chinese migrants running a restaurant or general store in a small town) replicated earlier practices all around the Pacific.



County/city	Count	Percentage
Buluo	1	0.0028 %
Yingde	1	0.0028 %
Macao	2	0.0056 %
Gaoyao	3	0.0084 %
Huizhou	3	0.0084 %
Yangjiang	3	0.0084 %
Qingyuan	4	0.0112 %
Sanshui	9	0.0252 %
Chaozhou	14	0.0392 %
Xinan	15	0.0420 %
Guangzhou	24	0.0672 %
Dongguan	28	0.0784 %
Hong Kong	40	0.1120 %
Huaxian	55	0.1540 %
Nanhai	59	0.1652 %
Shunde	95	0.2660 %
Zengcheng	217	0.6076 %
Heshan	971	2.7187 %
Enping	1593	4.4602 %
Panyu	2603	7.2881 %
Zhongshan	2712	7.5932 %
Xinhui	4718	13.2098 %
Kaiping	5795	16.2252 %
Taishan	15731	44.0447 %

Map 21 Chinese Emigrants from Guangdong Province to Canada between 1910 and 1923



Map 22 Destinations of Chinese Immigrants in Canada between 1910 and 1923

In aggregate, the life cycles of these tens of thousands of individual male migrants created a vast rhythm of transpacific movement. Created out of their aspirations for wealth, a network of circular movements tied small villages to port cities and urban enclaves on both sides of the ocean. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, a new set of migrants of different culture, outlook, and power reached North America's Pacific Coast and began to interrupt the steady rhythm of these migrants' moves and work to fulfill their aspirations for wealth.

The Rising Discord of the White Pacific

It is a great historical irony of the nineteenth century Pacific World that from the west coast of North America eastward the Cantonese built the very means of transportation that was to produce the demise of the World they had created for themselves. Beginning in California in the 1860s, and up the coast through Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia through the 1880s, the Cantonese completed the western ends of the transcontinental railroad network that allowed the landborne mass migration of laborers who had come seaborne from the Atlantic World's Europe. The Cantonese were there when railroad labor was needed, having travelled transpacific shipping routes that could bring them to the West Coast of the Americas much more efficiently and cheaply than overland travel across the continent—until there were transcontinental railroads.

Investments from the same economic elites that had built transpacific shipping lines fueled the railroad boom. British capital, for instance, built both the Canadian Pacific Railway steamships and the transcontinental railway that took goods straight off the ships in Vancouver and raced them on "Silk Express" trains to Halifax, where they would be reloaded on ships and taken to Liverpool, Glasgow, and other ports across the Atlantic. Goods could be moved more efficiently across the Pacific and Atlantic using this new means of crossing the Americas. Before the transcontinental railroads in North America, the two main paths for goods from the "Orient" to Europe involved long journeys by ship either around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa or around Cape Horn at the southern tip of South America.

When British officials first began contemplating importing Chinese laborers into the Empire's Caribbean colonies in the early nineteenth century, they assumed that these would be shipped across the Pacific

and around Cape Horn. But it proved to be more efficient to ship them through the Indian Ocean, around the Cape of Good Hope, and across the Atlantic. The journey took around the same amount of time, but on the transatlantic routes larger ships were in use and therefore more cargo capacity available. The opinion of the Amoy-based British Consul Charles Winchester in 1852 was echoed by all of those surveyed about the possibilities of Chinese labor to the British West Indies:

> The expense of chartering a ship to go round Cape Horn would be pretty much the same as if the voyage were round the Cape of Good Hope; but a vessel could not possibly take so many passengers as by the latter route, and would probably not land them in so good a condition… The average length of passage would be much the same; but… it is not to be anticipated that the Horn route will be generally adopted.[14]

Railroads provided a revolutionary means of eliminating the barriers of land, shifting the dynamic of global traffic from almost purely seaborne connections between ports to ones supplemented by railroad networks that crossed land and whole continents. Built to move goods, they also moved human bodies. As Map 22 shows, the Cantonese used the rails to spread across the continent. Passing them on trains in the other direction were large numbers of white laborers eager to take the jobs of Chinese in the mines, forests, and factories of the Pacific coast.

The arriving Atlantic migrants stepping off the Cantonese-built tracks saw "Chinese" working everywhere. In California in the 1870s, Chinese made up one tenth of the population but one quarter of the total available workforce. Similar proportions marked all societies of the Cantonese Pacific along the west coast of the Americas before the railroads changed the demography.[15] In British Columbia Chinese accounted for 20 percent of the non-Aboriginal population in 1881 and even as late as 1901 for one tenth of the non-Aboriginal population. As in California, the mostly male Cantonese population was the

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[14] Lai, *The Chinese in the West Indies*, 77, excerpted from Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1852–1853, LXVIII (1686): Dr. Bowring to Earl of Malmesbury, Despatch No. 8, 25 September 1852, enclosures No. 1, 3.

[15] Alexander Saxton, "The Army of Canton in the High Sierra," *Pacific Historical Review* 35 (1966), 114–152. Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Berkeley, 1971). Charles A. Pierce, *The Great White Walls are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australasia 1836–1888* (Canberra, 1974).

backbone of the labor force. However, as—like the sound of a heavy drumbeat—increasing numbers of new migrants from the Atlantic entered into the Pacific Coast territories claimed by the United States and Canada, a transformation occurred. Areas that had virtually no presence of state officials turned into colonies and then provinces and states of faraway governments.[16] These new migrants organized with intent to control the incipient new political states, inventing new forms of white supremacy built around anti-Chinese and then anti-Asian agitation.

In the disparate locations that were being incorporated into the new dominions of Australia and Canada, colonial regimes—still part of the broad British Empire—shifted from doing the business of empire, with appointed governors protecting the interests of merchants and colonial officials, to new modes of democratic politics that answered to the growing numbers of new Atlantic migrants. Three essential political strategies developed: 1) Distributing white supremacist rhetoric and imagery to demonize Chinese and "Asiatics" and to organize new migrants under the banner of being "white;" 2) expanding the right to vote to "white working men" and disenfranchising Chinese workers; and 3) using vigilante violence to achieve political ends.

If the geographic imaginaries of Cantonese migrants encompassed a transpacific World beyond any individual nation-state, so too did the imaginaries of many of the transplants from the transatlantic World who came to displace them from the west coast of North America. At the level of individuals and families, the aspirations of these migrants were not so different from their Cantonese counterparts, but if the Cantonese learned to imagine the field of possibilities around the Pacific as "Gum San," the organizing principle of white supremacy was to convince the transatlantic migrants that they were part of a greater movement of white civilization ordained to displace the "colored" peoples of the world.

In British imperial colonies such as British Columbia, New South Wales, and Queensland, the Chinese had been welcome as essential laborers, farmers, and merchants. But as colonies turned into states

[16] Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples In Between in North American History," *American Historical Review* 104.3 (June 1999), 814–841.

or provinces of new white settler nations at the end of the nineteenth century, a new imaginary arose, which narrated Chinese as outsiders to the new nations. "White Australia" and "White Canada" became the banner for the exclusion of Asians as well as indigenous peoples from the new body politic. Though the timing varied, depending upon when transportation routes created enough new migrants who could be organized into an exclusionary polity, the pattern was repeated within the new settler nations of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In the territories of Oregon and California political organizers used the same tactics to create new states that could be incorporated into the existing United States.

White supremacy as a set of political tools and rhetorical strategies travelled along the same routes as the migrants did, accompanying them as they wandered from one site to the next. If the Cantonese moved from one location to another in search of wealth, so did the migrants from Great Britain, Europe, and the Atlantic coasts of the Americas. However, the rhetoric of settler white supremacy differed in one distinctive regard—the migrants from the Atlantic world claimed ownership and belonging to the land in ways that the Cantonese almost never did. Even if a migrant from a small village outside Aberdeen, Scotland, might go through Glasgow to Halifax or New York, and perhaps on to Vancouver or Sydney or San Francisco or Auckland, he or she carried with them and participated within a settlement scheme that claimed belonging and ownership wherever he or she happened to be at that moment.

The justifications and political strategies for achieving white dominance travelled far and wide, and the effects upon the existing world of the Cantonese Pacific were corrosive and widespread. As aboriginal peoples were cleared from land into reserves to make room for white settlement, the social status and community privileges into which young male Cantonese migrants sought to marry were steadily eroded. In Australia and Canada, indigenous children were removed from families and sent to boarding schools, where a systematic cultural genocide was enacted in the name of civilization. The rhythms of life and migration that made the Cantonese Pacific an extension of the Chinese in Southeast Asia were broken. Facing an onslaught of anti-Chinese legislation that curbed their ability to enter and leave the new settler nations, eliminated their right to own land, and drove them from the best-paying jobs, Cantonese migrants adapted to a new

pattern of mobility that either emphasized the ultimate return to home villages or futile attempts to be included as equals in the new white supremacist states.

A World in which Cantonese men saw opportunities in marrying into aboriginal families was eliminated by the rise of white settler state policies. As the status of indigenous peoples dropped, so too did the opportunities for upward mobility through marriage and for creating local communities for Cantonese men. This extinction of economic mobility through marriage alliances with native women had profound effects. Existing families were broken, and children learned neither Chinese language and practices nor those of their native societies, and the possibilities for complex mixed Chinese/native societies such as the Peranakan of the Malay Peninsula never developed, even as many local native communities in Australia, New Zealand, Hawai'i, and Canada contained significant proportions of partial Chinese ancestry. In one particularly poignant example, the children of a Chinese farmer on the banks of the Fraser River and his Musqueam wife were torn apart because new laws prevented the Chinese father, as a non-native, from having legal status on the Musqueam reserve. The children went back and forth between the reserve of their mother and Chinese language school across town in Chinatown, increasingly alienated from their father. Ironically, going to Chinese school helped one of the sons retain his ability to speak the Musqueam Hunquminum language by keeping him out of the B.C. residential school system that was eliminating native language use among other children of his generation.[17]

The drumbeat of white supremacy tracked the movement of European workers from the Atlantic World. Where only soldiers, clerks, missionaries, and colonial officials migrated, an imperial order that gave a prominent place to Cantonese workers and merchants remained functional. But where settlers arrived, their politics of nationalism relied on an expanding democracy of the new white workers. To this day the national historiographies of all four of the white settler nations in the Pacific have had difficulty in reconciling their triumphant national

[17] Jean Barman, *The West Beyond the West: A History of British Columbia* (Toronto, 1991); "Chinese Canadians and First Nations: 150 Years of Shared Experiences," a project of the Chinese Canadian Historical Society of British Columbia <http://www.chinese-firstnations-relations.ca/cchsbc.html>. The example of the Grant family was generously shared by elder Larry Grant in his lecture, "Musqueam-First People of Vancouver," 28 February 2008, Vancouver Historical Society Speaker Series, Vancouver Museum.

narratives of the spread of democracy and freedom with their reliance on ugly racist policies that denied and deprived others of the very same political rights. Exclusion and demonization of the Chinese and eventually other Asian migrants were essential strategies of nation building.[18]

A quick survey of two main waves of anti-Chinese and then broader anti-Asian legislation in the four white settler nations bordering the Pacific Ocean reveals the syncopated rhythms of white supremacy:

Anti-Chinese Legislation, 1880–1900

1881	Chinese Immigrants Act (restriction of numbers and poll tax), New Zealand
1882	Chinese Exclusion Act (no new laborers), United States
1885	Chinese Head Tax (tax on new migrants), Canada
1880–1900	Anti-Chinese legislation in various Australian colonies

Broad Extension of Anti-Chinese to Anti-Asian Legislation, 1900–1930

1899	Immigration Act (Immigrant Application in English), New Zealand
1901	Immigration Restriction Act (Dictation Test), Australia
1907	Chinese Immigrants Amendment (English language reading test and poll tax), New Zealand
1908	Gentlemen's Agreement to curb Japanese migration, United States
1908	Hayashi-Lemieux Agreement to curb Japanese migration, Canada
1908	Continuous Passage regulation to curb South Asian migration, Canada
1924	National Origins Act blocks Asian migration except from the Philippines, United States

The first downbeat of anti-Chinese legislation coincided with the arrivals of large numbers of European migrants to each of the four colonies in the 1870s and 1880s. Chinese migration to the United States, for

[18] Henry Yu, "Then and Now: Trans-Pacific Ethnic Chinese Migrants in Historical Context," in Daizaburo Yui, ed., *The World of Transnational Asian Americans* (Tokyo, 2006), for an argument about the links between Southeast Asian post-colonial nationalism and white settler nationalisms from the late 19th through the end of the 20th century.

instance, virtually stalled after the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. However, because Canada's Head Tax of 1885 merely put a price on entry ($50—equivalent to a year's salary), Cantonese migration to Canada continued and with it the rise of smuggling into the United States through its northern borders. The Head Tax slowed down Cantonese migration to Canada and without it perhaps many more than the actual 100,000 Chinese would have entered between 1885 and 1923. But even after the Head Tax was raised to $500 in 1904, more than a third of the Cantonese migrants entered Canada after 1910. The rhythms of Cantonese migration could be dulled but not cut off, at least until 1923, when the euphemistically named "Chinese Immigration Act" legally ended Chinese migration to Canada other than that of a small number of merchants.

The clearest example of how anti-Chinese legislation changed patterns and rhythms of migration can be discerned when comparing the different Asian transpacific migrations. As Cantonese migration to the United States was curtailed in 1882, for instance, other Asian migrants crossed the Pacific to fulfill the continuing demands for labor. Japanese, Koreans, and South Asians began taking some of the same jobs in agriculture, mining, logging, and fishing that the Chinese had performed before them, although sometimes with very different aspirations than the Cantonese. From the 1890s through to the first decades of the twentieth century, Japanese migration to North America in particular grew in numbers, although with different characteristics than the Chinese before them. While initially young males dominated, the Gentlemen's Agreements signed between Japan and Canada and the United States voluntarily restricted the passage of male laborers but not of women, allowing Japanese migrants to bring over brides to join them and create families.

As Eiichiro Azuma describes in his essay in this volume, the second round of anti-Asian legislation that culminated in the Gentlemen's Agreements of 1908 also helped push Japanese migrants to Latin America, another example of how the rhythms of transpacific migration were altered by the transatlantic workers' white supremacy transported to the Pacific coast from the Atlantic seaboard. The southward shift of destination for transpacific migration also marked the rhythm of the Cantonese as Mexico and Trinidad became popular destinations when the United States became ever more difficult to enter.

A pair of riots on the Pacific coast of North America during the fall of 1907 that directly preceded the conclusion of the 1908 Gentlemen's

Agreements illustrate the ways in which transpacific Asian and transatlantic European migrations intersected. An anti-Punjabi Sikh riot in Bellingham, Washington, preceded violence that targeted Chinese and Japanese businesses in Vancouver, British Columbia, several days later.[19] The tactics and strategies for rallying politically around anti-Asian white supremacy ideologies travelled far and wide. Just as among the Cantonese, global migration networks passed other intelligence across vast distances along far flung journeys with multiple stops. The leader of the Asiatic Exclusion League in Seattle, Arthur E. Fowler, had thorough knowledge of how anti-Chinese organizing had worked in California before arriving in Washington State, and he advised both the Bellingham rioters and spoke in Vancouver at a rally that preceded the riot. Another speaker, J.E. Wilson, had travelled from New Zealand and spoke about the effectiveness of anti-Chinese agitation there. Other speakers were local labor leaders who had themselves migrated from other parts of the British Empire.

Vancouver in 1907 was just two decades old and, as in most of the new transportation nodes on the Pacific, almost everyone in the city was a migrant from somewhere else. However, the rhetoric of the anti-Asian organizers was one of belonging—ascribing outsider status to the Chinese, Japanese, and South Asians in the city. The "Oriental Invasion" that had built roads, railroad, and sectors of the economies threatened the "Anglo-Saxon blood" that had built the expanding British and American empires. If white labor leaders and workers were themselves recent migrants along imperial routes, their rhetorical device of accusing Asian workers of coming to take away white jobs worked perfectly well with the nationalist project of a "White Canada Forever" that belonged to white workers, no matter when they arrived. Nationalism and imperial belonging could co-exist in harmony—local

[19] Patricia Roy, *A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858–1914* (Vancouver, 1989); Peter Ward, *White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Towards Orientals in British Columbia* (Montreal, 1990); Henry Yu, guest editor, "Refracting Pacific Canada," *BC Studies: The British Columbia Quarterly* 156–157 (Winter/Spring 2007/2008); Gerald Horne, *The White Pacific: U.S. Imperialism and Black Slavery in the South Seas after the Civil War* (Honolulu, 2007); Adele Perry, *On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849–1871* (Toronto, 2001); Erika Lee, "Hemispheric Orientalism and the 1907 Pacific Coast Race Riots," *Amerasia Journal* 33.2 (2007), 19–47; and Lee, "Orientalisms in the Americas: A Hemispheric Approach to Asian American History," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 8.3 (October 2005), 235–256.

racial practices and global imaginaries striking different notes in the same melody.[20]

A posting in Chinese on the day after the Vancouver riot by the Chinese Benevolent Association revealed a very different voice. It asked Cantonese workers to report any incidents of harassment and violence in their workplaces and to let the Association know if they were forced from their jobs by white workers:

> If any of you go back to your original work places and your employers are not willing to hire you and hire others instead, please report to the CBA and we will negotiate for you. [translation by Woan-Jen Wang][21]

The very different perspective on anti-Asian violence evinced by those speaking and writing in Asian languages is still relatively missing from many accounts of anti-Asian political organizing, oddly reiterating the erasure of their voices that the initial anti-Asian movements accomplished.

The Silencing of the Transpacific

One of the most subtle and effective distortions effected by anti-Asian rhetoric was the alteration of the status of Asian workers. They were no longer akin to those with whom they worked side by side in canneries, mines, and logging camps. Moon-ho Jung describes how anti-Asian activists in the United States borrowed much of the rhetoric used in the Caribbean and Latin America to demonize Chinese as "coolie" labor, describing them as a form of indentured labor that was a new form of slavery. This categorization of both Chinese and South Asian labor as essentially "unfree" was a product of debates in the aftermath of the end of the transatlantic slave trade and the emancipation of enslaved Africans in the Caribbean and Latin America (see essay by Lara Putnam in this volume). In the United States and Canada, however, this depiction of the "coolie" as a threat to the "free" white workers whom they supposedly displaced did more than just the rhetorical work of white supremacy. It was meant to destroy.[22]

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[20] See Perry, *On the Edge of Empire*.

[21] From work on Chinese language newspaper perspectives on the 1907 Riot, by Woan-Jen Wang, found at <http://www.instrcc.ubc.ca/1907_riot>.

[22] Walton Look Lai, *Indentured Labor, Caribbean Sugar: Chinese and Indian Migrants to the British West Indies, 1838–1918* (Baltimore, 1993); Moon-Ho Jung,

National histories in Canada and the United States generally continued to portray Asian migrants with rhetoric adopted from the anti-Asian agitation as "cheap," "coolie" labor that undercut the later-coming "whites" and took away "white" jobs. The misleading distinction between "free" and "unfree" labor continued to distort understandings of how and why Cantonese migrants crossed the Pacific. False dichotomies were drawn between the transatlantic labor migrations that brought Cantonese to Cuba, Trinidad, Guyana, and the Caribbean, and those of transpacific Cantonese migrations analyzed in this essay. The routes may have been different, but the motivations were not as categorically different as so much of scholarship still continues to imply.

The exclusion of Chinese and other Asians from mythic national histories created a common response in the latter half of the twentieth century, a retroactive inclusion of them into national imaginaries that had originally thrived on their exclusion. But this reincorporation of the missing voices of Chinese and other Asian migrants ironically accepted one of the fundamental tenets of the excluding white settler nationalisms, the assumption that the Chinese were the "late arrivers" while, in fact, the Chinese had arrived on transpacific ships to the west coast of North America long before the vast majority of white laborers arrived on the railroads that the Chinese had built.

In reincorporating the long excluded voices of Chinese and other Asian migrants into existing national historiographies, many historians unreflectively accept "Americans" or "Canadians" or "Australians" as belonging to every part of the abstract space claimed to be part of these recently founded nations and for all time. When, in 1907, recent European newcomers proclaimed "White Canada Forever" in a popular bar song they implied not only an unbounded future without Chinese, Japanese, and South Asians. Their "forever" also claimed historical time, as if they had always belonged, as if the aboriginal peoples they were displacing and the Chinese old sojourner-settlers could simply be erased from historical memory. National mythologies of white settler colonialism continue to veil that the white "Canadians" and

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Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation (Baltimore, 2006); Adam McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900–1936* (Chicago, 2001); and an older study that accepted the distinction between "coolie" and "free labor," Watt Stewart, *Chinese Bondage in Peru: A History of the Chinese Coolie in Peru, 1949–1874* (Durham, N.C., 1951).

"Australians" were mere recent arrivals in the transpacific World and its rims.

This essay posits that to understand the complex history of the Pacific's rim societies it is necessary to reimagine the transpacific migrations as a unitary process, a chorus of voices that shifted in location and whose sounds and silences reflected an interconnected rhythm. In the 1970s, Chinese American histories that invoked the silenced stories of early Cantonese pioneers pointed to the old concept of "Gum San"—as Chinese Canadian histories and Chinese Australian histories did at the same time. Each of these national historiographies was partially correct and that both Canada and the United States had the same name in Cantonese was not a contradiction. The larger point missed by white-forever historians was that in the imaginaries of the migrants the crossing of the Pacific was a unitary process. Only if we recover the lost voices of the nineteenth century Cantonese Pacific will we understand that the rhythms of their lives must be understood not merely as a result of inclusion and exclusion but as their own conscious agency and their advance to their own tunes.

REMAPPING A PRE-WORLD WAR TWO JAPANESE DIASPORA: TRANSPACIFIC MIGRATION AS AN ARTICULATION OF JAPAN'S COLONIAL EXPANSIONISM

Eiichiro Azuma

Traditionally, the study of transpacific Japanese migration has suffered from the conventional, spatially organized way of learning in academia, which artificially divides the Asia-Pacific basin into the domains of Asian American Studies and Asian Area Studies. Since the 1970s, the former has monopolized studies of transpacific "immigration" into the United States (or the Western Hemisphere in general) with little regard for its sustained connections to Asian origins and histories.[1] The latter has created its own realm of research by disowning transpacific migrants, since they left the physical boundaries of the "area" it is supposed to study.[2] Consequently, in existing scholarly

[1] Japanese Americanists and other ethnic studies scholars have not yet looked at migration as intrinsic to colonialism, or vice versa. Even when they adopt a "diasporic" perspective, it usually means they extend their gaze from the United States to the Western Hemisphere as a whole. Asia is still simply the origin—the beginning of the domestic ethnicization of migrants and their descendants in the Americas. On examples of these hemispheric ethnic studies, see Lane Ryo Hirabayashi, Akemi Kikumira-Yano, and James A. Hirabayashi, eds., *New Worlds, New Lives: Globalization and People of Japanese Descent in the Americas and from Latin America to Japan* (Stanford, 2002); and Wanni W. Anderson and Robert G. Lee, eds., *Displacements and Diasporas: Asians in the Americas* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2005). Bringing together the Americas, Asia, and the Oceania, some scholars try to envision the entire "Pacific Rim" as an integrated space for research and conceptualization. Heavily influenced by globalization theories, however, this movement tends to focus on the present articulations of "late capitalism" and lacks substantive historical analysis. The pre-World War Two era is thus largely absent in these "Rim" studies. See essays in Arif Dirlik, ed., *What Is In a Rim?: Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea* (Lanham, Md, 1998); and Evelyn Hu-DeHart, ed., *Across the Pacific: Asian Americans and Globalization* (Philadelphia, 1999).

[2] A notable exception is Louise Young, a historian of Japan, who has shed light, albeit briefly, on the nexus between "emigration and expansionism," which encompasses labor migration to the Americas and Manchurian colonization. See her *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1998), 310–321. Recently, historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki has also published an internet-based article that links transpacific migration with Japan's colonial expansion in terms of its nationality policy: "Migrants, Subjects, Citizens: Comparative Perspectives on Nationality in the Prewar Japanese Empire," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* (http://www.japanfocus.org/-Tessa-Morris_Suzuki/2862) accessed on September 30, 2008.

works, the intersecting trajectories of global Japanese migration have been compartmentalized discretely and studied as two ostensibly unrelated streams of human movements: primarily a labor movement to the Americas on the one hand and a by-product of colonial expansion within imperial Japan's sphere of influence, on the other.[3] Given this arbitrary dichotomization, the re-mapping of global Japanese migration requires more than new research or spatial reorganization. It first and foremost demands a paradigm shift and cross-disciplinary efforts on the part of researchers. If not for these intellectual moves, the overlapping nature of labor migration and colonialism in the prewar Japanese diaspora is hard to grasp. In an attempt to re-vision the interconnectedness of the Pacific Ocean and the Asian continent through migration, I will first discuss what can be termed a "two-empire paradigm." The rest of this essay will tell a story of Japanese migration as a varied but unified human experience within that interconnected space.

New Paradigm for a Study of Transpacific Japanese Migration before 1941

In English-language scholarship, discussions of transpacific migration have generally unfolded in the context of understanding the historical development of North America as "nations of immigrants." According to this perspective, whether from China, Japan, or the Philippines, Asian migrants participated in national formation in the United States (or Canada) through their contributions to economy and society—including their resistance to exclusion, which allegedly compelled these nations to subsequently confront and overcome perilous internal racism. In helping to multiculturalize the host societies, the immigrants became the very backbone of the kind of inclusive democracies that the "Old World" would never have. In this view, the exceptional and

[3] On the compartmentalization of migration studies and colonial studies between U.S. Ethnic Studies and Asian Area Studies, see Eiichiro Azuma, "Pioneers of Overseas Japanese Development: Japanese American History and the Making of Expansionist Orthodoxy in Imperial Japan," *Journal of Asian Studies* 67 (2008), 1187–1226. For representative studies of Japanese colonialism and resultant migration to Manchukuo and Micronesia, see Young, *Japan's Total Empire*; and Mark R. Peattie, *Nan'yo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu, 1988).

superior qualities of North American societies are predicated upon the notion of immigrant contributions.

Recently, in order to counter the reduction of migrant lives to this "immigrant paradigm"—and the national sense of exceptionalism based on it—a new paradigm of "empire" has become popular. It focuses on the oppressive power of the hegemonic white regime(s). Not only does it demystify the celebratory ideas associated with "immigration" in U.S. (and Canadian) national history, but it also helps us to construct an analysis of slanted migration processes, racial formation, and community-making among Asian migrants in relation to Euro-American westward expansion and conquest between the 1850s and the 1930s.[4] Deriving from the general context of U.S. imperial engagement with and subjugation of Asian nations, the eastward movement of working-class Asian masses played an integral role in the circulation of ideas, goods, monies, and human bodies, as well as the complex webs of new relationships in the transpacific space that privileged the United States and its white citizens.[5] Hence, seen from an empire paradigm, the problems of immigrant labor exploitation and institutionalized racial discrimination in a domestic context were closely intertwined with the broader articulation of American imperialist thinking and practices.

All this is not to say that an emergent empire perspective is without its limitation, because it holds the United States as *the* focal point of analysis. Although the visions of empire-based studies extend beyond formal national boundaries to parts of the Pacific (and the Caribbean), "America" still occupies the pivotal place in their problematization and interpretations, thereby often rendering such studies complicit in the national(ist) discourses they aspire to resist. Though transnational in orientation, the reframing of United States history as imperial history can still be seen as a *version* of national history. Whether it is a variation of the immigrant paradigm or a more nuanced empire narrative, national history fundamentally sees Asian immigrants as objects—either of Eurocentric America's desire to incorporate or reject, or as another oppressed racial element under white supremacy. Either

[4] On a succinct critique of the immigrant paradigm of United States history and American exceptionalism, see Donna R. Gabaccia, "Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Immigrant Historians," *Journal of American History* 84 (1997), 570–575, and Gabaccia, "Is Everywhere Nowhere? Nomads, Nations, and the Immigrant Paradigm of United States History," *Journal of American History* 86 (1999), 1115–1134.

[5] See Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917* (New York, 2000), 13–97, esp. 58–73.

way, immigrants enter into historical narrations only after their bodies reach the U.S. shores or the realm of its hegemonic control.[6] The nationalized immigrant narrative has neglected the complexities and continuities of their life experiences pre- and post-migration in a space larger than one country.

In light of this problem, a study of transpacific Japanese migrants would benefit from another step of transnationalization. In order to rescue an analysis of Japanese migrant thinking and practices from the confines and prerogatives of U.S. national history, the author proposes to insert "imperial Japan" into an existing interpretive frame of a U.S. empire. This "two-empire" paradigm looks at the migrants' homeland as an equally important background for historical developments surrounding them before and after their journeys. Methodologically speaking, such a new framework would allow us to take into account the dual influences of the national expansionisms from Japan and the United States upon the bodies and minds of Japanese migrants, regardless of their destinations.[7] Furthermore, as the following section details, the clashes of U.S. and Japanese imperialism also helped set a basic pattern of mass migration from Japan to the greater Asia-Pacific basin between 1885 and 1941. That imperialist clash also explains the emergence of the Asian continent and the Pacific Ocean as one integrated region of multidirectional Japanese migration where hegemonic intervention met popular maneuvering in the interrelated phenomena of

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[6] While benefiting from an empire paradigm, Asian American Studies has also been an accomplice in nationalizing migrant experiences through it. Because they tend to focus on the oppressive power that the white racialist regime held over various migrant groups from Asia, many Asian Americanists treat Asian residents as undifferentiated victims of, or resistors to, domestic articulations of U.S. imperialism. Yet, even though white America similarly racialized them, Japanese and Filipino migrants, for example, had contrasting backgrounds, differing experiences, and conflicting identities, because the former came from a powerful empire rivaling the United States, and the latter from a U.S. colony. For the same reason of its nationalizing tendency, existing historical analyses in Asian American Studies also disallow the recognition of close linkages between Japanese migration and colonialism in the Pacific (and beyond) before 1941.

[7] This paradigm resembles the "inter-National" perspective that I employ in my analysis of Japanese immigrant experiences in the United States. Both approaches emphasize the hegemonic structures of state control that discipline the popular views and behaviors. In this essay, I make use of the term "empire" instead of "national" in order to illuminate the centrality of hegemonic expansionist and colonialist thought, as well as bilateral geopolitical rivalry, relative to migration processes. On the "inter-National perspective, see Eiichiro Azuma, *Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America* (New York, 2005), 5–6.

control and mobility. Finally, by offering a corrective to the divorcing of migration from its constitutive context of Japanese expansionism, the two-empire paradigm can shed light on why and how transpacific labor migration was inseparable from Japan's colonial invasions into Micronesia and Manchuria—the two major migrant destinations rivaling the United States and Brazil before the war. Put differently, the new approach can facilitate the link between America-bound transpacific migrants and their counterparts who crossed the East and Southeast Asian seas to the Asian continent and the southwestern Pacific.

"Discourse on Overseas Development" and Early Transpacific Migration

Popularized during the 1880s, what was termed a "discourse on overseas development" (*kaigai hattenron*) formed a locus of intersections between Japanese and U.S. imperialism, as well as an ideological basis of modern Japanese migration. Often accompanied by pseudoscientific theories that stressed the overseas origins of the ancient Japanese, this popular discourse posited the "expansionist traits" of the nation and race, which presumably still remained in their blood. It also extolled the maritime destiny of the island empire and its people not only as a colonizing power but also as a nation "racially endowed" for expanding to frontiers all over the world.[8] In this formulation, many ideologues and pundits—including migrant intellectuals—also drew inspiration from the American popular discourse on frontier and manifest destiny, which subsequently brought the indigenous discourse on overseas development in harmony with "New-World"-style settler colonialism of the United States. In this way, America's expansionist ideology corroborated its Japanese counterpart from the outset, playing an indispensable role in shaping a common mindset among many prewar Japanese migrants.[9]

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[8] Azuma, *Between Two Empires*, 91–92, and Azuma, "Interstitial Lives: Race, Community, and History among Japanese Immigrants Caught Between Japan and the United States, 1885–1941," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles), 30–40.

[9] As some historians of modern Japan point out, Japanese colonial thought drew from various branches of Euro-American imperialist ideologies. See, for example, Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* (Berkeley, 1995), 1–23. According to my research, while maritime and commercial dimensions of Japanese colonialism tended to be closely associated with the British

The discourse on overseas development obtained the nation's initial acceptance when the earliest groups of Japanese labor migrants left for Hawai'i and then for the United States and Canada. During the 1880s, barely two decades after the scrapping of feudalism, Japan encountered its first major politico-economic crises in the context of state-led modernization efforts. While displaced farmers violently protested the government's economic policy, young intellectuals criticized Tokyo's conciliatory diplomacy toward imperious Western powers. They demanded that Japan take a more aggressive, expansionistic course of action in dealing with these domestic and diplomatic problems. Should the government embark on its own imperialist venture as a colonizing power, the pundits argued, the West would hold modern Japan in respect as a civilized equal. Moreover, they added, imperial expansion would create new opportunities and sources of livelihood overseas for distressed rural populations.

Combining an advocacy for a proactive imperialist policy with a call for mass migration, the intellectuals drew no distinction between colonialism and labor migration. Rather, they considered mass migration as a prerequisite for imperial expansion, or "overseas Japanese development."[10] On the basis of a shared vision, this idea subsequently converged with the pragmatic thinking of government brass, who thought that labor migration to Hawai'i would not only be an effective solution to rural unrest but also as a convenient means to "enrich the nation and strengthen the military"—the national mandate of the time—through emigrant remittances.

Hence, in 1885, the Japanese government suddenly reversed its longstanding policy against mass migration, allowing over 29,000 men and women for the next nine years to work on Hawaiian sugar plantations under a bilateral agreement with the Kingdom of Hawai'i. While

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tradition (or its historical example), an American-style "frontier" discourse lent strong support for agricultural colonization through mass migration. The frontier myth first played an important role in the development of hitherto sparsely inhabited Hokkaido in the 1870s, and culminated in the conquest of Manchuria in the 1930s. I consider that transpacific migration to the United States and Brazil falls somewhere in-between.

[10] On these intellectuals who comprised the important backbone of early Japanese imperialism and migration, see Kenneth Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems in Cultural Identity, 1885–1895* (Stanford, 1969), 99–102; Nakanome Toru, *Seikyosha no kenkyu* [A study in Seikyosha] (Kyoto, 1993), 101–145; Sato Yoshimaru, *Meiji Nashonarizumu no kenkyu* [A study in Meiji nationalism] (Tokyo, 1998), 11–38; and Azuma, "Interstitial Lives," 30–32.

more and more rural Japanese traveled to the islands even after the termination of the treaty in 1894, many others began to migrate to North America in search of better opportunities for work and overseas development.[11] While the United States and Canada disallowed further influxes of Japanese after 1924 and 1928, respectively, over 330,000 and 35,000 migrants had entered the two countries before the war. The origin of transpacific migration was therefore deeply rooted in a colonialist tradition of imperial Japan.

Table 17 Statistics of Japanese Migration according to the Three Strains of Expansionism, 1885–1942

Transpacific (Eastward) Migration	620,202	
North America	*374,236*	
United States	338,459	
Canada	35,777	
Latin America	*245,966*	
Brazil	188,985	
Peru	33,070	
Mexico	14,667	
Argentina	5,398	
Paraguay	709	
Cuba	616	
Chile	538	
Panama	456	
Bolivia	222	
Others	1,305	
Continental (Northward) Migration	2,401,167	
Japanese Controlled Areas	*2,248,838**	*(1942)*
Korea	753,000*	(1942)
South Sakhalin	398,838*	(1942)
Manchuria	874,348*	(1942)
Kwangtung	222,652*	(1942)
Areas Outside Japanese Control	*152,329***	
China	95,508*	(1938)
Siberia/USSR	56,821	
Southward Migration	571,436	
Southeast Asia & Oceania	*90,436*	
Philippines/Guam (U.S.)	53,115	

[11] Azuma, "Interstitial Lives," 57–59; Yuji Ichioka, *The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–1924* (New York, 1988), 40–52.

Table 17 (*cont.*)

Malay/Singapore (UK)	11,809	
Dutch East Indies (Holland)	7,095	
New Caledonia (France)	5,074	
Hong Kong/Macao (UK & Portugal)	3,815	
Australia	3,773	
Northern Borneo (UK)	2,829	
New Zealand	1,046	
Others	1,880	
Japanese Controlled Areas	*481,000*	
Taiwan	385,000*	(1942)
Micronesia	96,000*	(1942)

Notes:
Migration figures were recorded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Colonial Ministry, based on the numbers of passports issued to legally sanctioned "emigrants." Many other people went to the Americans and other destinations with "non-emigrant" passports, or even without one. Those were unaccounted for in these statistics. Actual numbers of emigrants therefore must have been significantly higher than those shown above.

* An asterisk indicates the number of Japanese living in a given locale in the year in a parenthesis, rather than the actual number of emigrants. Because the Japanese government did not take the statistics of Japanese departure for its formal territories and *de facto* colonies, the populations of Japanese residents in such locations are given for the purpose of comparison relative to the emigration figures outside the Japanese empire.
** Double asterisks refer to the aggregate figure that conflates the statistics taken in different years. The data should be used only for a purpose of comparison.

Sources:
Mark R. Peattie, *Nan'yo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu, 1988), 334, n6.
Wakatsuki Yasuo, *Sengo hikiage no kiroku* [Record of postwar repatriations] (Tokyo, 1995), 16–17, 85.
Kokusai Kyoryoku Jigyodan, *Kaigai iju tokei* [Statistics pertaining to overseas emigration] (Tokyo, 1994), 122, 126–127.

During the 1890s, the discourse on overseas development branched off into three major schools of thought: northward, southward, and eastward expansion. Each school displayed differing characteristics in terms of its relationship to state role and sovereignty, as well as its preferred locations of Japanese development. Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that these groups never broke away from one another in terms of their common interest in mass migration. In fact, despite the disagreements regarding locations and other details, their ideas and assertions were always intertwined and mutually reinforced on

the ground of their enthusiastic support for overseas migration. As such, the three groups of national expansionism constituted a cohesive public discourse that dictated the mindset of politicians, the social elite, and the masses in prewar Japan. Established in 1893, the Colonization Society of Japan (Shokumin Kyokai) was the first nationwide expansionist organization which exemplified an overall unity of vision and common influence over the national minds. Encompassing major advocates of all three schools, the Colonization Society offered a public forum for lively discussions about Japan's future as a migration-led colonial power.[12]

First becoming vocal on the eve of the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, proponents of northward expansion across the Sea of Japan represented imperialistic ambitions on the Asian continent, which eventually merged into official state endeavors of military-supported colonialism. With its particular influence over army strategists and Pan-Asianist ideologues, this position paved the way to another successful war against Russia—and the subsequent influx, between the turn of the century and the 1930s, of Japanese migrant settlers into Korea, Manchuria, China, and the Russian Far East; their tallies exceeded 753,000, 874,000, 95,000, and 56,000, respectively, by 1942. (See table 17 above.)

A harbinger of Japan's naval operations during the First and Second World Wars, southward expansionism derived from a prevailing interest in extending maritime trade through mass migration into the southwestern Pacific, especially Micronesia, parts of Southeast Asia, and Japan's first colony of Taiwan. Over 571,000 Japanese migrants moved to these regions from the late 1890s through 1942.[13] Whereas European and insular U.S. imperialists tended not to encourage the settlement of the domestic populaces in their administrative colonies, the southward expansionists viewed the emigration and transplantation of the masses as integral to colonial endeavors.

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[12] Azuma, "Interstitial Lives," 39–40.

[13] See Peattie, *Nan'yo*, 1–61; Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 310–318; and Azuma, "Interstitial Lives," 32–33. Importantly, advocates of migration-based expansionism, such as owners of emigration companies and members of the Colonization Society, were very flexible in their affiliations with, and support for, a particular position. It was not unusual that supporters of one position re-emerged as an advocate of another at a different time.

Although it differed from the northward and southward varieties that eventually buoyed official state imperialist projects, transpacific eastward expansionism focused solely on migration-based colonization without intervention of Japan's sovereign control. Both proponents and migrants fancied the Euro-American-style conquest of uncivilized hinterlands through settlement and agricultural development. Indeed, in the era of massive Japanese exodus to North America between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, what historian Akira Iriye characterizes as "peaceful expansionism" captivated the imagination of many America-bound migrants and their domestic supporters. They idealized a faraway land across the Pacific as "a second Japan," "a new home," or "an imperial beginning." These men and women commonly regarded the "second Japans" they would establish in the Americas as "centers of economic and social activities closely linked to the mother country," as Iriye observes.[14]

Given the seemingly unlimited opportunities for migration and money-making until the turn of the twentieth century, the U.S. West was envisaged especially as a cornerstone for further Japanese expansion into other parts of the New World. The aborted project of transpacific migration to Guatemala illustrates this perception. Around 1894, expansionist Japanese migrants in Washington State organized a "Colonization League" (Shokumin Domei), which obtained a charter status from the Colonization Society of Japan. One of the founders volunteered to go on an "expedition" to the Central American country in order to evaluate the feasibility of mass working-class migration from Japan. Relying on his personal ties to the Japanese government, including the former and current foreign ministers, this emissary personally negotiated with Guatemalan officials and local plantation owners. Convinced of its colonial potentials and the profits to be made in labor transporting enterprises that they would start with the funds from their compatriots in the American West, members of the Colonization League returned to Japan to seek the Colonization Society's formal endorsement for their plan to turn Guatemala into a "new Japan" through controlled migration. Their detailed reports about the country stressed its ample commercial and agricultural opportunities,

[14] Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897–1911* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 131. Iriye speaks primarily of the post-Russo-Japanese War period, but as I discuss, this current of thought had been powerful since the late 1880s.

good climate, easy accessibility from Japan, and what they characterized as a "racial advantage."[15]

Here, too, one can detect strong echoes of the U.S. frontier discourse. Just as white America reduced indigenous people to an object of conquest, the Japanese immigrant expansionists depicted Guatemalan people as a target of inevitable Japanese domination. In the contemporary language of Social Darwinism, they argued that Japanese migrants, even manual laborers, would be able to "overwhelm" the local "mestizo race" and eventually seize economic, if not sovereign, control of Guatemala through peaceful "racial competition." As long as mass migration resulted in the settling of the Latin American country with a sufficient number of Japanese, they reasoned, their higher level of "enlightenment and civilization" would guarantee their ascendancy over the indigenous population of "lower cultural standard."[16]

Many homeland expansionists were quite intrigued by this racist prediction, which tacitly drew a parallel between the current state of white domination in the U.S. West and the future rise of Japanese Guatemala as an imperative of history. Because most educated Japanese considered that the New World, except for the United States and Canada, was full of "racially inferior" peoples, the idea of migration-based peaceful colonization in the Americas reigned over other schools before the 1920s.[17] Although the Sino-Japanese conflict spoiled the Guatemalan scheme, the idea persisted. In 1897, the Colonization Society sponsored the transplantation of Japanese colonists in Mexico's southern state of Chiapas (along Guatemalan borders) to set up a self-sustaining coffee colony. Not only did it mark the beginning of transpacific Japanese migration to Mexico—one of the "outposts of…Japanese commercial and political expansion"—but it also crystallized a prevailing interest among the Japanese in greater Latin America.[18]

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[15] Azuma, "Interstitial Lives," 42–43.

[16] Ito Yonejiro, "Chubei Guatemara Kyowakoku tankenroku" [Report on an expedition to the Guatemalan republic in Central America], *Shokumin Kyokai hokoku* [Report of the Colonization Society] 21 (Jan. 9, 1895), 1–12; and Ito Yonejiro, "Guatemara jikkenroku" [What I actually saw in Guatemala], *Shokumin Kyokai hokoku* 22 (Feb. 20, 1895), 1–16.

[17] On similar ideas conceived by some homeland expansionists and migrants in other locations, see Azuma, "Interstitial Lives," 34–36, and 43–44; and Peattie, *Nan'yo*, 111–117.

[18] The quote is from Daniel L. Masterson with Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America* (Urbana, 2004), 27–28. On the so-called "Enomoto Colony," see

As exemplified in the Guatemalan and Mexican schemes, the discourse on overseas development had the built-in tendencies to intertwine labor migration with colonial expansion. Labor migration was viewed as indispensable for colonization, especially agriculture-based ventures. However, while it is clear that most intellectuals and social leaders of Japan saw no meaningful distinctions between them, one may still wonder to what extent the discourse could influence ordinary working-class men and women. Primarily interested in temporary work for personal financial gains, these so-called *dekasegi* migrants offered cheap labor for plantation operations, agricultural developments, and construction projects in the United States and other parts of the Western Hemisphere. Understandably, in pursuit of their own individual gains, these laboring masses did not hold the collectivist ideal of overseas Japanese development as a central concern. Yet, as my research has unveiled, seldom did working-class migrants insist that their self-centered goals be incompatible with national expansionist orthodoxies, either. On the contrary, especially after the 1910s, many adopted—and often deliberately took advantage of—the idea of overseas development to portray themselves as agents of national expansion, that is, honorable patriots who not only promoted Japan's national interests abroad but also served as grassroots transmitters of civilization to these frontiers. Although this practice of self-misrepresentation accounted for an attempt to elevate their social image and status vis-à-vis the homeland public and rectify its often disparaging view of migrants, it still made the colonialist idea of overseas development relevant, if not essential, to the mental world of labor migrants.[19]

Furthermore, architects of labor migration helped obscure critical distinctions between the processes of labor migration and colonial expansion, as well as between the mental orientations of the practitioners. Operators of emigration companies and steamship companies that recruited manual laborers and carried them to foreign destinations partook in all schools of expansionism and many were affiliated with expansionist organizations like the Colonization Society. These individuals held strong stakes in supporting a specific expansionist

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also Iriye Traji, *Hojin Kaigai hattenshi* [History of overseas Japanese development], 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1942), 1: 245–279.

[19] See Azuma, *Between Two Empires*, 24–26, 91–110.

position, because doing so would increase revenues for their own companies. For example, massive labor migration to Latin America—Peru (1899), Mexico (1901), and Brazil (1908)—and to the Southwestern Pacific—New Caledonia (1892), Fiji (1894), and the Philippines (1903)—were all spearheaded by emigration companies, which convinced the Japanese government to authorize their human-trafficking endeavors in the language of Japanese manifest destiny, racial superiority, and overseas development in those regions. Emigration brokers who worked for the companies employed the same vocabulary in the recruitment of rural migrants, which they cleverly fused with discussion of individual material benefits of emigration.[20] Regular transpacific (and trans-Indian Ocean) steamship services to Hawai'i, North America, and South America commenced with the exoduses to these destinations of working-class migrants whose movements were subsequently represented and understood as instances of national expansion.[21] Just as Japanese government brass had justified the first Hawaiian labor migration scheme in 1885, the emigration and steamship companies provided the uneducated masses with a convenient rhetoric to dress them in a patriotic cloth—that is, to rationalize their

[20] On emigration companies and the activities of their owners, benefactors, and agents, see Iriye, *Hojin Kaigai Hattenshi*., 1: 101–113, 339–345, 420–427, and 445–449, 2: 1–55; Ichioka, *The Issei*, 47–51; and Alan Takeo Moriyama, *Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii, 1894–1908* (Honolulu, 1985).

[21] See Yamada Michio, *Fune ni miru Nihon iminshi* [Japanese migration history through the lens of steamships] (Tokyo, 1998). Though competing with American-owned and Canadian-owned shipping concerns, Japanese steamship companies benefited enormously from the growth of transpacific migration. Shortly after the Japanese government decided to send manual laborers to Hawaiian sugar plantations in 1885, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) was established with a full backing of the state to help ship portions of migrants to the islands in the subsequent years. Eleven years later, NYK became responsible for the first regular steamship service between Yokohama (later extended to Hong Kong) and Seattle, when a number of Japanese migrants to the U.S. Pacific Coast suddenly surged. In 1898, another Japanese shipping concern named the Oriental Steamship Company (Toyo Kisen) started its regular service between Hong Kong and San Francisco—the service taken over by NYK in 1926. After the beginning of Peru-bound migration, in 1905, the Oriental Steamship Company extended its service to the Pacific Coast of South America via Los Angeles, which subsequently carried many migrants to Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. With the rise of Brazil as a major migrant destination during the period of U.S. Japanese exclusion, the Osaka Merchant Shipping Company (Osaka Shosen) and NYK also established the regular services from Yokohama to Saõ Paulo and other Brazilian ports through the Indian Ocean and the south Atlantic in 1916 and 1917, respectively. Therefore, some Japanese migrants who went to Latin America took the trans-Indian Ocean routes, although they were still seen as a part of "eastward" expansion from Japan.

self-centered goal of money-making in terms of their role in enriching the homeland and erecting a new Japan abroad. Therefore, whether they were colonial settlers or temporary workers in their actual social standing, Japanese migrants generally operated under the far-reaching clutches of migration-based expansionism and material interests associated with it, which allowed many individuals to imagine and behave as agents of global Japanese development.[22]

The Impact of U.S. Imperialism on Japanese Migration Processes and Trajectories

The turn of the twentieth century marked a new phase of wider diffusion in Japanese migration history, which still revolved around the combined effects of entangling imperialisms. America continued to offer the Japanese the frontier ideology to justify the correlations between migration and overseas development, but U.S. influence was by no means limited to its role in discursive formation. The specific manifestations of multidirectional migration flows after 1908 reveal the profound consequences of U.S. imperialist intervention, which not only deterred the incoming transpacific migration of Japanese, but subsequently distorted their general migration trajectories elsewhere.

Before 1941, there were three pivotal moments illustrating such U.S. intervention. Strongly influencing Canadian Anglo-Saxonists, American racial exclusionism reared its ugly head around 1900 and sought to eradicate the Japanese presence.[23] Inevitably, it clashed with eastward Japanese expansion—first around 1908, then in the mid-1920s, and finally in the mid-1930s. By 1940, transpacific migration to the entire Western Hemisphere was no longer viable; the other forms of migration-based expansionism had become popular instead, often with the direct backing of the Japanese government that was now intent on building a larger Asia-Pacific empire. Compounded by America's determination to keep the Western Hemisphere Japanese-free, the decline of transpacific migration served to valorize Japan's

[22] Azuma, *Between Two Empires*, 22–25, 89–110.

[23] Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley, 1968), 1–30; and Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement*, 151–168.

other "frontiers" without the peril of white supremacy, like Manchuria across the Sea of Japan, and Micronesia to the south in the Pacific.

Around 1908, an initial shift in transpacific migration from North America to South America resulted directly from America's populist cry for the exclusion of working-class Japanese from "White California." In order to preserve the divided rule of the Asia-Pacific region that came into being after the United States and Japan established sole control over the Philippines (1898) and Korea (1905) respectively, the two Pacific empires shared a common interest in keeping at bay the racial-nationalist discourses associated with the Japanese immigration controversy in the Golden State. The resultant "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907–1908 between the two governments suddenly created massive new streams of Japanese to other parts of the Americas while diminishing the volume of their influx into the United States and, shortly thereafter, Canada.[24] After 1908, Brazil absorbed a majority of transpacific Japanese migrants in lieu of exclusionist North America. The recruitment of plantation contract laborers to Peru, which happened only haphazardly between 1901 and 1906, also resumed and intensified after 1907.[25]

The termination of direct *labor* migration to the United States in 1908 created the secondary flows of Japanese people within the Western Hemisphere, extending the network of migrant settlements to other countries than the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. Following their initial arrival, hundreds of post-1908 Japanese migrants subsequently moved from Peru to Chile and Bolivia; the first group of Japanese settlers to Argentina came from Brazil in 1909.[26] Meanwhile, in light of better economic opportunities and the lure of frontier myth, the United States still remained most desirable in the eyes of many transpacific migrants, despite the rise of racial exclusionism there. While family members of *bona fide* immigrant residents, such as "picture brides," could still legally enter the United States under the "Gentlemen's Agreement," other Japanese used Mexico and Peru

[24] On a geopolitical background for the first instance of U.S.-Japan imperialist conflicts, see Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History* (New York, 1997), 65–98. On the "Gentlemen's Agreement," see Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice*, 31–45; and Ichioka, *The Issei*, 71–72.

[25] Masterson, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 51–85; and Toake Endoh, *Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration to Latin America* (Urbana and Chicago, 2009), 20–29.

[26] Ibid., 87–101.

as steppingstones to enter the country as undocumented immigrants.[27] Until the mid-1920s, post-1908 transpacific migration was thus gravitated toward two centers: Brazil and the United States.

In Japan's public discourse and policy formulation, America's exclusionary politics elevated the other schools of migration-based expansionism. Shortly after the bilateral agreement, the Japanese foreign minister advocated the re-direction of migration flows from the Americas to the Asian continent out of diplomatic concerns. After 1905, with the acquisition of Manchuria's Kwangtung leaseholds and the anticipated annexation of Korea following the military victory over Russia, imperial Japan stretched its sphere of influence to the north. Since these regions—now under Japan's *de facto* rule—presented no possibility of U.S. meddling, the minister elucidated the desirable qualities of Manchuria and Korea, characterizing them as more suitable frontiers for large-scale Japanese migration. Thereafter, as historian Shunpei Okamoto contends, "continental expansionism" across the Sea of Japan began to take precedence over "Pacific emigration"—especially in the minds of pragmatic military men and diplomats, even though anticipated large-scale agricultural colonization in those regions did not materialize until Japan's seizure of Manchuria in the 1930s.[28] Meanwhile, after Germany lost control over the islands in 1914, Japan's new mandate of Micronesia also came to carry greater weight in the public discourse on national expansion and migration.[29] The decade henceforth saw a rapid increase in the northward

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[27] See Eiichiro Azuma, "Historical Overview of Japanese Emigration, 1868–2000," in Akemi Kikumura-Yano, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Japanese in the Americas: An Illustrated History of the Nikkei* (Walnut Creek, Cal., 2002), 32–48, and Azuma, "Community Formation across the National Border: The Japanese of the U.S.-Mexican Californias," *Review: Literature and Arts of the Americas* 39 (2006), 33–39. The system of "picture bride" migration allowed many Japanese bachelors to form a household and pursue a settled life in the United States—a luxury that most other Asian immigrants did not have before the war. In 1920, however, the Japanese government voluntarily stopped issuing America-bound passports to the brides unaccompanied by their husbands due to the rise of anti-Japanese agitation that attacked the picture marriage as barbaric and un-American. Although California exclusionists labeled such a practice as peculiar to the Japanese, many European immigrants resorted to a similar letter-exchange method to bring "mail-order" brides to America around the same time.

[28] Shumpei Okamoto, "Meiji Imperialism: Pacific Emigration or Continental Expansionism?," in Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy, eds., *Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History* (Honolulu, 1983), 141–148. On Japanese migration to the Kwangtung and Korean Peninsulas, see Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 317; and Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 289–323.

[29] Peattie, *Nan'yo*, 118–197.

and southward movements of Japanese settler-colonists and labor migrants, although transpacific migration remained no less prevalent for the time being.

During the mid-1920s, there was another notable instance of U.S. intervention, which set the basic pattern of global Japanese migration for the ensuing decade. Following the victory in 1920 of white exclusionists in institutionalizing an anti-Japanese legal structure, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the "alien land laws" were constitutional, making it legally impossible for Japanese immigrants to lease or own farmlands in many western states. Only several months later, the U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924, which prohibited the entry of all Japanese migrants—workers and family members of *bona fide* residents alike. Symbolizing the monopoly of the North American frontier by the United States and its white citizens, which Canada emulated in 1928, these instances of racial exclusion and border closure prompted the redefinition of the meaning of the "United States" in the Japanese frontier thought. Decisively, the gravities of Japanese movements shifted from North America to Latin America, and to imperial Japan's existing sphere of influence, although people still could—and did—make their own decisions as regards destinations despite the narrowing options, especially in the sites across the Pacific. Whereas Manchuria and Micronesia comprised major destinations of the latter, their Latin American counterparts included new countries, such as Cuba (1924), Panama (1928), Colombia (1929), and Paraguay (1936).[30] As an object of eastward expansionist fantasies, Brazil still dominated, and a large majority of the prewar aggregate of 189,000 Japanese migrants came to that country after the mid-1920s.

Simultaneously, albeit not as sizable as these outward streams from Japan, white American racism produced a notable exodus—reverse movement—of Japanese migrants from the United States in search of overseas development elsewhere. In the latter half of the 1920s, Mexico and Brazil began to draw significant numbers of California's Japanese agriculturalists. They wished to trade the life of a persecuted minority in a racist country for that of colonists in these new frontiers—which, in their eyes, presented neither the meddling of Anglo-American supremacy nor racial competition with them. Manchuria and parts of

[30] Masterson, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 101–109; and Azuma, "Historical Overview of Japanese Emigration, 1868–2000," 36–41.

the formal Japanese empire also emerged as alternative sites for relocation, where resettlers from the United States hoped to live as colonial masters under the protection of Japan's military might.[31] Seen from the standpoint of migration-based expansionism, the rising Japanese interest in Brazil and Manchuria had much to do with the closing of North America at the hands of the imperial United States.

Around the mid-1920s, the Japanese government began to take greater initiative in the matter of emigration, paying particular attention to the direction and composition of its flows. Given Brazil's willingness to accept Japanese masses for domestic agricultural development, Tokyo elites first devoted their energy to the streamlining of migration processes to that country. After ordering the merger of existing emigration companies into a single "Overseas Development Company" (Kaigai Kogyo Kaisha), the Japanese government attempted to shore up the operation of the firm through official annual subsidies. Following the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, Tokyo sponsored the travel of the displaced victims to Brazil free of charge—a policy that became applicable to all migrants to the Latin American country after 1925. Furthermore, two years later, Japan enacted a special law to facilitate the transplantation to Brazilian frontiers of Japanese families as agricultural colonists. While the Overseas Development Company turned into the Overseas Emigration Cooperative under that law, transpacific migration became linked intimately with the state effort to dot South America's hinterlands with large-scale Japanese farm settlements.[32] Thereafter, the basic unit of migration was no longer the individual, but the family, especially families of farming origin who were the best candidates for organized agricultural colonization.

These developments foreshadowed what would unfold after Japan seized sole control of the entire Manchurian region in 1932. With the establishment of a puppet "Manchukuo," the government officially made mass migration a center of its general colonialist policy. Except for the initial government-contract labor migration to Hawai'i and the travel subsidy for emigrants to South America, Tokyo had never before been directly involved in the recruitment and management of emigrants. That was a service usually provided by private emigration

[31] See Azuma, *Between Two Empires*, 79–82; and Azuma, "Community Formation across the National Border," 36–39.

[32] Masterson, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 73–85; Endoh, *Exporting Japan*, 67–77; and Azuma, "Historical Overview of Japanese Emigration, 1868–2000," 36–38.

companies, albeit under official supervision. Yet, the colonization of Manchuria in the 1930s entailed the state-sponsored emigration of impoverished farm families in a highly systematic fashion. In 1932, Japan's Colonial Ministry sent the first contingent of armed agricultural migrants to the region. These were followed by several other groups, including "continental brides" to be wed to single male settlers there. Four years later, the Japanese government announced a plan to ship one million Japanese families (or five million people) to Manchukuo in the ensuing two decades. In 1937 alone, a total of 6,000 families entered Manchuria as agricultural colonialists, many of whom might have well opted for transpacific migration to Brazilian sites of Japanese development had there not been a third case of meddling due to U.S. hemispheric exclusionism.[33] Between 1932 and 1945, the number of Japanese emigrants to Manchukuo amounted to as many as 270,000.[34]

In the mid-1930s, as imperial Japan turned Manchuria into its virtual colony, the United States again flexed its political muscle. Not only did the U.S. attempt to contain Japanese expansion take the form of support for Chinese nationalists fighting against the imperial forces, it further facilitated the definition of the Americas as a "Japanese-free zone." Since North America had effectively shut out the Japanese since the mid-1920s, Latin America, especially Brazil and Peru, became a central focus of this hemispheric Japanese exclusionism.[35]

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[33] Azuma, "Historical Overview of Japanese Emigration, 1868–2000," 39–41; and also Young, *Japan's Total Empire*. On discussion of how Manchurian colonization became closely associated with earlier transpacific migration in Japan's policy-making and public discourse of the 1930s, see Azuma, "Pioneers of Overseas Development."

[34] Wakatsuki Yasuo, *Sengo hikiage no kiroku* [Record of postwar repatriations] (Tokyo, 1995), 16–17, 85.

[35] On the impact of U.S. hemispheric exclusionism on Canada and Mexico in particular, see Erika Lee, "Orientalisms in the Americas: A Hemispheric Approach to Asian American History," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 8 (2005), 235–256. In my opinion, as far as the hemispheric "Japanese problem" was concerned, the United States also actively extended its reach to Panama, Brazil, and Peru by the late 1930s. In addition to the clandestine work of U.S. military intelligence officers and FBI agents, the Conference of American States in Lima (1938) provided a crucial forum for discussions of the Japanese problem and political imposition of U.S. will on Latin American countries. These efforts culminated in the internment and/or mass deportation of Japanese residents to the United States during the war. See C. Harvey Gardiner, *Pawns in a Triangle of Hate: the Peruvian Japanese and the United States* (Seattle, 1981); John K. Emmerson, *The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service* (New York, 1978), 127–135; Masterson, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 115–174; and Brian Masaru Hayashi, *Democratizing the Enemy: Japanese American Internment* (Princeton, N.J., 2004), 82.

Having been remotely influenced by U.S. racism, Brazilians held ambivalent attitudes toward Japanese immigration. Some viewed it as a boom to Brazil's agricultural economy, frequently emphasizing desirable racial attributes of the Japanese as well. This position tended to prevail in the earlier years, as crystallized by Brazil's policy of welcoming thousands of agricultural colonists from Japan. Under the influence of U.S. discourse on the "Yellow Peril," however, many white Brazilians had cautioned against a boomeranging effect of massive Japanese settlement in the midst of their land. Starting in the mid-1930s, this negative discourse intensified as U.S.-produced anti-Japanese agitation increasingly fed the domestic media of the Latin American country, as well as the racial-nationalist consciousness of many people there. Thus, in its new constitution of 1934, Brazil inserted a clause that allowed the government to limit the annual entry of Japanese immigrants to a mere 2,849. This would be an eightfold reduction from that year's total Japanese arrivals (22,960). Two years later, Japanese land rights in Amazonia were repealed and all Japanese schools were soon ordered to shut down. Finally, in 1938, one year after the beginning of the full-scale Sino-Japanese War in Asia, the Brazilian government enacted a new immigration law that rendered the country no longer desirable for Japanese development.[36] Similarly, due largely to U.S. agitation, Peru came to harbor a strong abhorrence of Japanese, thereby ceasing to admit no more than a few hundred migrants annually from 1937. Three years later, the capital city of Lima experienced a race riot against Japanese residents and businesses followed by a systematic deportation program.[37] Even before the wartime closing of the Pacific for flexible human mobility, migration-based eastern expansionism was already untenable.

Constructing a Formal Infrastructure of the Global Japanese Diaspora and the Continuing Legacies of Transpacific Migration

The virtual demise of eastbound transpacific migration in the late 1930s did not mean that the Americas were completely cut out from

[36] Jeffery Lesser, *Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil* (Durham, N.C., 1999), 93–94 and 116–132.

[37] Masterson, *The Japanese in Latin America*, 156–66; and C. Harvey Gardiner, *The Japanese and Peru, 1873–1973* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1975), 39 and 52–53.

the mapping of expansionist Japan. Despite the rigidity of U.S.-led hemispheric exclusion, prewar Japanese migrants and homeland public alike continued to view the settlements across the Pacific as related to the ongoing colonialist ventures, especially in Manchukuo. On the basis of the shared frontier consciousness, many residents in the United States stayed connected to Manchuria and other sites of overseas Japanese development as resettlers and investors in agricultural and commercial enterprises. Facing severe racial discrimination in their land of birth, hundreds of American-born Japanese also moved from the United States to the "bosom" of their racial home to pursue better work opportunities.[38] Whether immigrant-generation resettlers or American-born youths, these individuals formed a new group of transpacific migration, albeit in an opposite westward direction. Ironically, as a major cause of these reverse migration flows, the U.S. imperialist desire to eliminate Japanese influence served to preserve the material links and human movements between the two sides of the Pacific Ocean through the 1930s.

Even more significant, however, was imperial Japan's formal incorporation of transpacific "new Japans" into the greater colonial empire it had been building in Asia. In 1940, according to a new colonialist policy of *hakko ichiu* ("unifying every corner of the world under one roof [Japanese leadership]"), the Japanese government sponsored the Tokyo Conference of Overseas Japanese and attempted to assemble all segments of Japanese society—elites and commoners, domestic and overseas—in glamorization of the nation's expansionist past, present, and future. Apparently inspired by Hitler's rallying of worldwide *Volksdeutsche*, leaders of imperial Japan rested the basis of this national mobilization on the indestructible ties of blood among overseas ethnic comrades (*kaigai doho*) that cut across differences in class, gender, ideological, geographic, and even citizenship backgrounds. In order to

[38] The Japanese American press of the 1930s published many stories of U.S. immigrant investment in China and Manchuria. They included: large-scale cotton farming in central China and the operation of a luxury hotel in Beijing. Also, two immigrant "rice kings" in the United States, Saibara Seito of Texas and Koda Keisaburo of California, purchased large tracts of land in Brazil for Japanese colonies during the 1930s. Sumida Daizo of Hawai'i had a major share in a coffee plantation in a Japanese colony of Taiwan. On the migration of U.S.-born Japanese Americans to Manchuria and Japan proper, see John J. Stephan, "Hijacked by Utopia: American Nikkei in Manchuria." *Amerasia Journal* 23 (1997–98), 1–42; and Azuma, *Between Two Empires*, 135–159.

"unite and solidify the bonds between the homeland and the organizations of overseas Japanese," the government invited nearly 1,500 delegates from Japanese settlements in China and Manchukuo, Southeast Asia and Micronesia, as well as the Americas. While these "frontline fighters of overseas development" enthusiastically reaffirmed their ties and relevance to the doctrine of *hakko ichiu* and ongoing empire-making based on it, the five-day mass rally led to the official inception of the Central Association for Overseas Japanese (Kaigai Doho Chuokai) in Tokyo as the nucleus of the "expanding Yamato race" all over the world.[39]

The networking of worldwide migrant settlements around the racial home took place with the theatrical display of Japan's contrived colonialist history, which generated an even greater muddling of emigration with colonization in the Japanese public consciousness. On the first day of the conference, overseas invitees paraded through central Tokyo, accompanied by musical bands and domestic participants. Following the Rising Sun flag came the first overseas delegates, two elderly pioneers from northern California. Conference officials in Tokyo picked them to head the procession, because their frail but dignified bodies offered two interrelated symbolisms that propped up the new expansionist banner of *hakko ichiu*. First, the transpacific pioneers crystallized the "frontier spirit" of the era of state-mandated Manchurian migration. For more than a past half-century, they had withstood insurmountable obstacles, like white racism, to erect a thriving Japanese community and agricultural economy in the New World. Manchurian settler-colonialists were expected to model themselves after these U.S. immigrant pioneers in their own colonization venture—now a matter of "life and death" for the home empire.[40]

Second, the elderly men also embodied the official starting point of Japan's "70 years" of external growth that was still progressing chiefly in the direction of Manchukuo. Indeed, personified and choreographed by actual migrants, the parade was a concrete expression of the nation's history of overseas development, which brought together disparate paths of emigration and colonization into a monolithic, unilinear trajectory. After the two North American pioneers came the entire Hawai'i delegation, then the continental United States, the Canadians, the Micronesians and the Southeast Asians, the Latin Americans, and

[39] Azuma, "Pioneers of Overseas Japanese Development."
[40] Ibid.

finally the delegates from China and Manchukuo. The order marked the simplified chronology of Japanese emigration and colonial history. The end of the unilinear parade consisted of some 3,000 domestic high school and college students, who aspired to join the ranks of their overseas compatriots as future settler-colonialists in Manchuria.[41] The visualized narration of modern Japan's expansionist past, present, and future completed the making of a state-sponsored network of overseas residents—one where transpacific migration was the historical beginning, and Manchurian colonization its ultimate consequence. It was integral to Japan's ongoing effort to construct a greater Asian-Pacific empire. Contrary to what an existing ethnic-studies scholarship claims, transpacific migrants did not simply become "Japanese Americans" or "Japanese Brazilians" after their "immigration." Rather, they remained a part and parcel of the emergent infrastructure of the imperial diaspora as its self-conscious members. At the crossroads of migration and colonialism, Japanese communities of the Western Hemisphere continued to occupy a pivotal place in Japan's "overseas development"—until the Pacific War forced them to dismantle all ties to their racial home.

Conclusion

With a focus on the critical nexus between the bi-national expansionist discourse and migration processes, this essay delved into intricate entanglements of a global Japanese diaspora and Japan's colonial expansion. The trajectories of prewar Japanese migration were very convoluted and multi-directional, but the three major streams (eastward, northward, and southward) were frequently intertwined due to U.S. intervention. My two-empire perspective paid special attention to how migration-based expansionism of imperial Japan came into conflict with the U.S. desire to cleanse the Western Hemisphere of Japanese influence and presence from 1908 through the 1930s. Revolving around the problem of Japanese influxes into America's hegemonic

[41] Ibid. Delegates from the continental United States, Hawai'i, and Canada combined (794 in total) constituted more than a half of the total invitees from the overseas. Micronesia and Southeast Asia sent 314 representatives, while Manchukuo and China sent 198. Perhaps, due partially to the longer distance, Latin America produced merely 193 official participants. These figures suggest how much transpacific migrants—especially those in North America—still mattered to Japan's colonial agenda and the program of Manchurian migration.

realm, this imperialist clash caused the ebbs and flows of northbound and southbound migration while distorting patterns of eastbound migration from Japan. Moreover, because of the conflict between the expansive state powers, prewar Japanese migration did not merely take place in the manner of radiation from the homeland core. Practitioners of eastward expansionism frequently switched to join the northward expansionism into the Asian continent. Imagined as interconnected sites of global Japanese development, the United States, Brazil, and Manchuria were linked through the transoceanic exchanges of human bodies, capital, and colonialist ideas—despite tremendous differences in their geopolitical relationships to imperial Japan. And wherever they went, many ordinary migrants shared a similar mentality, traveling essentially in pursuit of better work opportunities and personal gains. Yet it is also crucial to note that the migrants themselves often justified, or had their government justify for them, their journeys using the language of overseas national expansion and frontier conquest. These historical examples defy the conventional definitions of "colonialist" and "migrant" as separate political and sociological categories.

Fundamentally, the muddling and conflation of state colonialism and mass migration resulted from dialectical conditions of prewar Japan—imperial success without and economic underdevelopment within. Striving to achieve the status of a first-class nation in the era of the empire, Japan adopted political, economic, and ideological systems of Western powers. It imitated Western practices of diplomacy and warfare and pursued the general policy of colonial expansion in the context of modernization.[42] It is for this reason that northward and southward outflows of Japanese masses often unfolded in tandem with Japan's empire-building in the Asia-Pacific region. Contrary to transpacific migrants or those in the U.S. colony of the Philippines, who tended to suffer from political persecution and discrimination at the hands of American exclusionists, Japanese commoners in Manchuria and Micronesia could enjoy Japan's sovereign protection and a higher social status—if only nominally—relative to the native populations or

[42] On how Japan "mimicked" Western imperialism in the context of its modernization, see Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 1–23. Many other studies of Japanese colonialism implicitly underscore the learned and imitated nature of Japanese imperial practices. See Alexis Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu, 2004); Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton, 1984); Peattie, *Nan'yo*, and Young, *Japan's Total Empire*.

colonized migrants, like Koreans and Okinawans.[43] Japan's emergence as an imperial power was indispensable to the rise of migration-based expansionism, especially in the direction of the Asian continent and the southwestern Pacific.

Despite its exceptional political and military successes, however, the economy of prewar Japan continued to lag behind those of Western powers. In particular, advanced U.S. capitalism always influenced Japan (especially the nation's silk-producing regions) as its economic periphery, thereby generating the type of hierarchical relationship and resultant transfer of subjugated labor that world-systems theorists would presuppose.[44] Seen from this perspective, it is no surprise that major flows of Japanese migration before 1941 consistently took the form of working-class migration—a source of cheap labor—from economically disadvantaged rural areas to overseas core economies, including North America, European colonies, or heavily capitalized Manchukuo. From the first transpacific labor migration of the late nineteenth century to the state-led Brazilian and Manchuria colonization of the late 1920s and 1930s, typical participants shared similar class backgrounds and materialistic mindsets. Under the prevailing condition of underdevelopment within, the ascent of imperial Japan in geopolitics did not translate into sufficient opportunities or sustainable livelihoods for many domestic residents. Hence, overseas labor emigration as a measure of economic relief or in search of better opportunities was rampant, just as in the cases of other underdeveloped Asian economies, such as China, the Philippines, or India, before the war. But it is also important to point out that Japanese migrants, unlike their Asian counterparts, had a unique option of resettling in the domain of their home empire to live as members of the colonial master-class through northward and southward (re)migration. Therefore, recognizing the dialectics of imperial success and underdevelopment is key to understanding the interconnectedness of colonialism and migration in the prewar history of the global Japanese diaspora.

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[43] On the hierarchization of Japanese, Okinawan, and Korean migrants in Micronesia, see Peattie, *Nan'yo*, 216–222.

[44] On a useful discussion of rural Japan as an economic periphery in the context of prewar global capitalism, see Kären Wigen, *The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750–1920* (Berkeley, 1995), 65–66. One can argue that Italy, and possibly Germany, had similar dialectical conditions, which might have well influenced their respective migration processes in tandem with their expansionisms.

MIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF SOVEREIGNTY, SETTLEMENT, AND BELONGING IN HAWAIʻI

Christine Skwiot

This essay explores ways that migrations to and from Hawaiʻi shaped and were shaped by the Atlantic and Pacific contexts and questions of "who was to keep sovereignty, who was to rule, and who was to be ruled" in Hawaiʻi.[1] The first section focuses on the history of migration and politics of sovereignty, settlement, and belonging in between the 1780s, when Hawaiʻi became a key crossroads to and through which peoples from around the Atlantic and Pacific circulated, and the 1930s, when most migration to and from Hawaiʻi came to a virtual standstill. The second presents preliminary findings on how ideas about the potential of Portuguese and Japanese immigrants to become settlers and citizens of Hawaiʻi and Brazil circulated in the Atlantic and Pacific between the 1870s and 1910s. It situates local struggles between agents of Hawaiian nationhood and U.S. imperialism in the context of global processes of emancipation, high imperialism, mass migration, and industrialization of manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. The final section suggests how current debates over sovereignty, settlement, and belonging are transforming Hawaiian historiography and its potential contributions to studies of the Atlantic and Pacific worlds that Hawaiʻi and Hawaiians helped connect.

Atlantic and Pacific Crossings: The Circulation and Settlement of People, 1780s–1930s

During the first sizable migration between the 1780s and the 1860s, Hawaiʻi developed into a key node of the emergent global capitalist economy and a sovereign nation. It did so both because of and despite post-contact transformations, most famously and tragically, demographic devastation. Mass death and infertility resulting from

[1] John P. Rosa, "Beyond the Plantation: Teaching About Hawaiʻi before 1900," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 7.3 (2004), 223–240, quote 232.

introduced diseases, the attendant socio-economic dislocations and politico-cultural upheavals, and missionary-led efforts at cultural erasure reduced the pre-contact population of upwards of 300,000 by fifty percent by the mid-nineteenth century and ninety percent at that century's end.[2] Contrary to fatal impact accounts, native aliʻi (chiefs) and makaʻāinana (commoners) decidedly and decisively shaped Hawaii's development into a modern nation state and linked it to Atlantic and Pacific worlds.[3]

During this period, diverse peoples from the Americas, Asia, Europe, Oceania, and elsewhere circulated around and across Hawaiʻi and the Pacific, but only a few settled. Euro-American captains traded furs from the Pacific Northwest and sandalwood from Hawaiʻi to China. Sailors from all over the world manned ships, which re-provisioned and re-created their crews in Hawaiʻi. Captains of mostly New England whalers relied on Hawaiians for upwards of one-fifth of their sailors, and Hawaiʻi was a winter haven for six-sevenths of the fleet.[4] Euro-Americans valued Hawaiians for their navigation, sailing, and swimming skills. From Alaska to California, they relied on Hawaiians to conduct trade with native Americans, conquer territory, defend white colonists, and perform drudge labor. Some Hawaiians stayed and married native Americans and Alaskans, wherein lie the roots of the popular Hawaiian dish, lomi salmon, made from salt salmon, tomatoes, and onions that reached Hawaiʻi as a result of the fur trade. U.S. missionaries recruited Hawaiians to win converts in Micronesia, Polynesia, and the Pacific West. Hawaiian-grown provisions fed the miners who rushed to California's gold fields from all parts of the Atlantic and Pacific.[5] Of the almost 2,100 foreigners in Hawaiʻi in

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[2] Although the size of the Hawaiian population on the eve of Western contact remains disputed, there is less disagreement that it declined by ninety percent between 1778 and 1900. Alfred W. Crosby, "Hawaiian Depopulation as a Model for the Amerindian Experience," in Terence Ranger and Paul Slack, eds., *Epidemics and Ideas: Essays on the Historical Perception of Pestilence* (New York, 1992); David E. Stannard: *Before the Horror: The Population of Hawaiʻi on the Eve of Western Contact* (Honolulu, 1988); Robert C. Schmitt, *Demographic Statistics of Hawaii, 1778–1965* (Honolulu, 1968), 3–7, 14–26; Noenoe K. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, N.C., 2004).

[3] Gary Y. Okihiro, *Island World: A History of Hawaiʻi and the United States* (Berkeley, 2008).

[4] David A. Chappell, *Double Ghosts: Oceanian Voyagers on Euroamerican Ships* (Armonk, N.Y., 1997), xiii; Rosa, "Beyond the Plantation," 227.

[5] Daviana Pomaikaʻi McGregor, "Engaging Hawaiians in the Expansion of the U.S. Empire," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 7.4 (2004), 209–222.

1853, nearly 1,500 were from China, Great Britain, and the U.S.[6] Fifteen years later, there were up to 3,000 more Hawaiians in California than there were foreigners in Hawai'i. Emigration so contributed to native population decline that the King banned Hawaiians from travel abroad without permission in 1850; subsequently, he labored to attract cognate peoples to repopulate the lahūi (nation and people).[7]

Hawaiian Christian converts in Connecticut inspired the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions (ABCFM) to send missionaries to Hawai'i in 1819. They arrived after Kamehameha unified the Hawaiian Islands but died before establishing a system of governance for this new geopolitical entity. With the backing of Kamehameha's consort and her allies, the missionaries converted most Hawaiians to at least nominal Christianity. Intrigued by the power of the written word, natives educated in mission schools made Hawaiians one of the most literate people of the nineteenth-century world. Missionaries, lawyers, and judges advised Hawaiians in state-building, governance, and law. Keen observers of Western colonialism in Oceania who were determined to retain Hawaii's independence, the mō'ī (highest ali'i) and ali'i nui (high-ranking ali'i) labored to remake themselves into monarchs and royals, Hawai'i into a constitutional monarchy, and Hawaiians into modern citizens of a sovereign nation.[8]

In the 1850s, the environmentally disastrous whaling industry followed the environmentally disastrous sandalwood and fur industries into decline, and the ABCFM terminated its support of the Hawai'i mission. Some haole (originally, stranger; by mid-nineteenth century, Anglo-Saxons) looked to transform themselves into planters and sugar into Hawaii's leading industry. But they lacked sufficient capital, labor, and expertise. Chinese then controlled a sugar industry that free Hawaiians worked. Not until Hawai'i and the United States negotiated a reciprocity treaty in 1875 did wholesale expansion of the sugar industry become feasible, this time by haole with ample capital,

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[6] Andrew W. Lind, *An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii* (Chicago, 1938), 105.

[7] Edward D. Beechert, *Working in Hawaii: A Labor History* (Honolulu, 1985), 76.

[8] Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* (Honolulu, 2002); Sally Engle Merry, *Colonizing Hawai'i: The Cultural Power of Law* (Princeton, 2000); Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778–1893*, 3 vols. (Honolulu, 1938–1968), v. 1.

knowledge, technology, and the right to recruit contract laborers from Asia and Europe.[9]

By the mid-century haole secured many of the rights that, over time, they used to take formal colonial control. The Mahele divided the land and apportioned it regressively to mōʻī, aliʻi, and makaʻāinana in 1848. By then, haole men held the franchise, the right to hold elected positions, and all rights of Hawaiian citizenship without having to swear allegiance to the King or forfeit citizenship elsewhere. The makaʻāinana protested their dispossession from the land and the granting of citizenship and other rights to foreigners to no avail. In 1850 the government opened land to purchase by foreigners and legalized contract labor, and haole secured more legislative power and seats.[10]

But conflicts between haole and Hawaiians did not then translate into irreconcilable interests. Both backed efforts to recruit Chinese as laborers and as a cognate people of Hawaiians. Some haole regarded the Chinese as a people ideally suited to revitalize the Hawaiian people; others, as a corrupting influence on natives. Some Hawaiians regarded the Chinese as potentially better citizens than haole, likely because the former proved willing to accommodate themselves to Hawaiian modes of governance rather than the other way around. Demands for laborers to modernize the economy complemented desires for cognate groups to revitalize the people.[11]

Asian and Euro-American laborers dominated the second large-scale migration to and from Hawaiʻi between the 1870s and 1930s. The major inflows were: 46,000 Chinese (1876–1885 and 1890–1899), 20,000 Portuguese (1878–1887 and 1906–1913), 180,000 Japanese (1885–1924), 5,600 Puerto Ricans (1901–1902, 1921), 8,000 Koreans (1904–1905), 8,000 Spaniards (1907–1913), and 126,000 Filipinos (1906–1932). Smaller numbers from Oceania and other parts of Europe attest to wide-ranging efforts by Hawaiians to find a cognate people to renew the Hawaiian population and preserve the sovereignty of the Kingdom and haole to enlarge a white population that some hoped would pave the way for U.S. annexation.[12]

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[9] Clarence E. Glick, *Sojourners and Settlers: Chinese Migrants in Hawaii* (Honolulu, 1980), 2–7; Beechert, *Working in Hawaii*, 58–60.

[10] Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, 61–67.

[11] Glick, *Sojourners and Settlers*, 13; Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, 178.

[12] Eileen H. Tamura, *Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity: The Nisei Generation of Hawaii* (Urbana, Ill., 1994), 4–5; Eleanor C. Nordyke, *The Peopling of*

Most workers labored in cane, rice, or pineapple fields for wages or on contract, then returned home or moved to the Americas. Those who did not leave Hawai'i left the plantation as soon as possible. Contrary to widespread belief, Asian and contract worker were not synonymous.[13] Nor did Asians come only from Asia. Between 1879 and 1886, 38 percent of Chinese immigrants came to Hawai'i from the U.S.[14] The Civil War created a growing U.S. market for sugar; then, the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 raised sugar's price by over 50 percent, thereby enabling planters to accumulate capital for expansion.[15]

Reciprocity made insatiable planters' demands for a workforce divided by language, nationality, and race. On its eve, Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians comprised over 80 percent of the plantation workforce of 3,846 and the Chinese about 12 percent (466). Within a decade, Hawaiians declined to 25 percent (2,575) of the workforce, while the Chinese rose to 49 percent (5,037). In the 1880s, Japanese laborers came to outnumber the Chinese, rising from a total of 15 in 1882 to 63 percent (13,019) in 1892 to 73 percent (31,029) in 1902. The Portuguese workforce rose from 647 in 1882 to 12 percent (2,526) of the workforce in 1892 and 6 percent (2,669) in 1902. The next year, Koreans arrived; in five years, they represented almost 5 percent of the workforce (2,125). After a 1909 strike, planters recruited Filipinos, who represented nearly 10 percent of plantation laborers by 1912 and 30 percent (13,061) by 1920.[16]

Questions of immigration and labor were entangled with questions of belonging, citizenship, and nationhood. The potential of immigrant settlers to revitalize the native population became of great import to the sovereignty of a Kingdom increasingly desired by rival colonial powers, including a few haole who desired U.S. annexation. As a haole newspaper contemptuously told the king who negotiated reciprocity:

Hawai'i, 2nd ed. (Honolulu, 1989), 42–91; Andrew W. Lind, *Hawaii's People*, 4th ed. (Honolulu, 1980), 31–37.

[13] In 1886 among men, there were 1,846 Portuguese contract laborers and 609 free; 1,319 Hawaiian contract laborers and 817 free; 863 Chinese contract laborers and 4,736 free; and 1,691 Japanese contract laborers, and 24 free. Katharine Conan, *The History of Contract Labor in the Hawaiian Islands* (New York, 1903), 64.

[14] Beechert, *Working in Hawaii*, 88.

[15] Thomas Kemper Hitch, *Islands in Transition: The Past, Present, and Future of Hawaii's Economy* (Honolulu, 1992), Ch. 3; Noel J. Kent, *Hawaii: Islands under the Influence* (Honolulu, 1983), Ch. 4.

[16] Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835–1920* (Honolulu, 1983), 28.

"Should your people continue to decline,…the present courtesy of foreign recognition will be withdrawn."[17] To King David Kalākaua (r. 1874–1891) fell the unenviable tasks of serving competing constituencies of haole and Hawaiians. Kalākaua attempted to capitalize on planters' demands for cheap labor, desires for native repopulation, and Japan's ambitions for overseas settlements "that would match the neo-Europes in the Americas and the Pacific."[18] Determined to thwart U.S. imperial ambitions, the king's diplomatic overtures to Japan and nationalist projects to revitalize Hawaiian culture and politics and serve native interests convinced most haole that Kalākaua threatened their interests and Anglo-Saxon civilization in Hawaiʻi. In 1887, haole forced the king to sign the Bayonet Constitution. It stripped him of the right to rule.[19]

Haole constituted suffrage on racial lines for the first time in Hawaiʻi history. They excluded most Asian and many Hawaiian citizens from the franchise and expanded it for white residents, including those just off ship. Control of government did not produce consensus among haole. It instead exacerbated a split between planters and non-planters. Non-planter haole wanted to transform Hawaiʻi into a U.S. colony governed by and for free whites, devoid of natives who presumably would die out or otherwise disappear, and drained of Asians, who would presumably leave. Contrary to received wisdom, most planters opposed annexation, for the monarchy guaranteed Chinese immigration and contract labor, both illegal in the United States.[20] This split persisted after non-planter haole overthrew Queen and Kingdom in 1893, U.S annexation in 1898, and the incorporation of Hawaiʻi as a U.S. territory in 1900. Only after Japanese workers struck in 1909 did haole unite to secure the white hegemony upon which their wealth, power, and privilege depended.

U.S. law defined all foreign-born Asians as "aliens ineligible for citizenship." It could not prevent them from making other claims as "Americans." Ironically, the executive order of 1907 and Gentlemen's

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[17] *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, June 3, 1876, cited in Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, 178.

[18] Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1998), 313.

[19] Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, Ch. 6; Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, Ch. 3.

[20] William Adam Russ, Jr., *The Hawaiian Revolution, 1893–1894* (Selinsgrove, Pa., 1959).

Agreement of 1908 that prohibited Japanese laborers from U.S. possessions and foreign nations from entering the U.S. provided Hawaii's Japanese with an incentive to stake claims as Americans.[21] Those who imagined using Hawai'i as a way-station to the U.S. mainland (as 38,000 did between 1902 and 1907) may have agreed that the executive order "enslaves us permanently to Hawaii's capitalists."[22] They refused to accept this condition. Supported by Honolulu's Japanese elite, 7,000 workers from O'ahu's plantations struck for higher wages and an end to racial pay scales and the "present undemocratic, un-American condition of Hawaii." They averred, "We have decided to permanently settle here, to incorporate ourselves with the body politique [sic]." In the "Great Strike," Hawaii's most numerous and poorly paid workers demanded the right and wages needed to become "a thriving and contented middle class—the realization of the high ideal of Americanism."[23]

Haole rejected Japanese claims that they were American settlers and cast the strike as a struggle between haole and aliens for control of Hawai'i. Planters refused to negotiate with workers but after the strike 'voluntarily' raised wages and claimed to eliminate racial pay scales.[24] In 1909 a territorial legislature comprised of haole and Hawaiians passed a law making U.S. citizenship a condition of public employment. It followed the lead of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association's (HSPA) in restricting skilled plantation positions to U.S. citizens and persons eligible for naturalization. Whereas haole operated according to racial logic, Hawaiians appear to have operated according to a situational logic conditioned by land alienation and colonial rule. Hawaiians supported the haole-dominated Republican Party. It rewarded them with patronage jobs, again following planters and ranchers who granted Hawaiians privileged positions in agri-business.[25]

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[21] Designed to halt Japanese migration from Hawai'i to the mainland, the executive order prohibited aliens with passports authorizing travel to U.S. territories, the Panama Canal Zone, or foreign nations from entering the United States; in the Gentlemen's Agreement, Japan agreed not to issue passports to laborers for travel to the U.S.

[22] Yuji Ichioka, *Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–1924* (New York, 1988), 64–65; Gary Y. Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865–1945* (Philadelphia, 1984), Ch. 5, quote 37.

[23] Takaki, *Pau Hana*, 153–158.

[24] Takaki, *Pau Hana*, 163.

[25] Jeff Chang, "Local Knowledge(s): Notes on Race Relations, Panethnicity, and History in Hawai'i," *Amerasia Journal* 22.2 (1996), 1–29, esp. 11.

Immigrants' claims to belonging to Hawaiʻi and the United States accelerated as restrictive Asian immigration policies came to a culmination in the 1930s. Most Filipino migration ended before the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1935 took effect, completing a process of Asian exclusion from Hawaiʻi that began with the Chinese (1900) and followed with the Japanese (1924).[26] As immigrants staked claims to belonging in Hawaiʻi as "locals" and to the U.S. as "Americans," haole denied their claims. Haole adopted for their own purposes Jack London's panegyrics on Hawaiʻi as a "great experimental laboratory" of "ethnology" in which a decidedly feudal "owning class" was "so conscious of its social responsibility" as to "work for the general good."[27] U.S. sociologists, many students of the University of Chicago's Robert Park, criticized plantation governance but still found Hawaiʻi a racial laboratory in which the global future of harmonious race relations was undergoing refinement and a racial democracy fostered by high rates of interracial marriage and miscegenation.[28]

In 1920, haole responded to challenges from below to maintain their unfettered access to cheap land and cheap labor. Hawaiian legislators proposed to the U.S. Congress an act giving them rights to the 1.75 million acres of Crown Lands haole seized after overthrowing the Kingdom and ceded to the U.S. after annexation. Haole convinced Congress to limit the right to land-claims to Hawaiians of at least fifty percent blood-quantum. So, an act proposed to return Hawaiians to the land instead protected the leases of planters and put natives on a path toward legal extinction.[29] Haole fought challenges to their dominance by workers, acting on the dictum of an HSPA President, "As

[26] On the interwar period as the culmination rather than beginning of a global era of immigration restriction and exclusion, Adam McKeown, "Global Migration, 1846–1940," *Journal of World History*, 15.2 (2004), 155–189, esp. 173.

[27] Jack London, "My Hawaiian Aloha," reprinted in Charmain London, *The New Hawaii* (London, 1923), 43, 48–52.

[28] Lori Pierce, "Creating a Racial Paradise: Citizenship and Sociology in Hawaiʻi," in Paul Spickard, ed., *Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World* (New York, 2005), 69–86; Henry Yu, *Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America* (New York, 2001), 80–90; Eileen H. Tamura, "Using the Past to Inform the Future: An Historiography of Hawaiʻi's Asian and Pacific Islander Americans," *Amerasia Journal* 26.1 (2000), 55–85.

[29] J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, "'For Get' Hawaiian Entitlement: Configurations of Land, 'Blood,' and Americanization in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920," *Social Text* 17.2 (1999), 123–141 esp. 134–137.

has been emphasized again and again, the primary function of our plantations is not to produce sugar, but to pay dividends."[30]

The 1920 "dual" or "blood" union strike orchestrated by Japanese and Filipinos but later joined or supported by Spanish, Portuguese, and Chinese opened a new era. Workers began to forge an interracial movement rooted in "local" culture and language (Hawaiian Creole English or pidgin) and a pan-ethnic local identity that has relied on accommodation rather than blending, a toleration for inequality as well as difference, and a dominant or outsider group against which to articulate a collective identity.[31] The haole elite responded to the 1920 strike with a mixture of repression and paternalism. It expanded partnerships with the U.S. military to contain "radical" and "alien" threats from within and without. Haole implemented aggressive Americanization projects.[32] They repressed Asian language schools, barred Asian immigrants from teaching by making U.S. citizenship a condition of employment, and established English-Standard schools that based admission on proficiency in this language. Fewer than eight percent of Hawaii's people had this proficiency in 1920. English-standard schools trained mostly urban haole for careers in business, government, and the professions. Rural schools sought to train the non-white majority for subservience and plantation work. Some haole teachers joined parents and community leaders in teaching U.S. citizens of Chinese and Japanese ancestry how to pursue dreams of upward mobility and democracy.[33]

On and around the plantations, Hawaiian pidgin helped workers, farmers, and others articulate a sense of themselves as locals united against haole hegemony. Pidgin became a marker and conduit of an emergent local solidarity among workers struggling to organize across

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[30] HSPA Annual Report for 1929, cited by Beechert, *Working In Hawaii*, 221.

[31] Jonathan Y. Okamura, "Aloha Kanaka Me Ke Aloha ʻAina; Local Culture and Society in Hawaiʻi," *Amerasia Journal* 7.2 (1980), 119–137; Okamura, "The Illusion of Paradise: Privileging Multiculturalism in Hawaiʻi," in Dru C. Gladney, ed., *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States* (Stanford, 1998), 264–284.

[32] Okihiro, *Cane Fires*, 108–128, 138–146; Tamura, *Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity*, 110–113.

[33] Chang, "Local Knowledge(s)," 11–13; Eileen H. Tamura, "Power, Status, and Hawaiʻi Creole English: An Example of Linguistic Intolerance in American History," *Pacific Historical Review* 65.3 (August 1996), 431–454; John E. Reinecke and Stanley M. Tsuzaki, *Language and Dialect in Hawaii: A Sociological History to 1933* (Honolulu, 1969).

language, nation, and race and against a planter class that had long used divide-and-rule tactics and "dictatorial powers to eradicate any semblance of organization among island workers." In the 1930s, the National Labor Relations Board forced haole to allow workers to organize, recognize unions, and negotiate with them for the first time in Hawaii's history. Laborers sought to transform a vision of themselves as workers and locals into a labor movement built on interracialism. But in the late 1930s, the movement remained plagued by workers' anti-Filipino and anti-Japanese racism and planter opposition. Under martial law during World War II, the U.S. outlawed strikes and unions. Nonetheless, workers' wholesale unionization and stunning victories after the war were "in essence, the union's prewar story…writ large and rapid."[34]

Haole Americanization projects were not just contested from below but also, as it were, from the middle. By 1930, three-quarters of Chinese were Hawaiian-born, lived in Honolulu, and were increasingly English-speaking and middle-class. They drew upon their history as among Hawaii's earliest merchants and original sugar planters to write themselves into narratives of American exceptionalism. Adam McKeown shows how the Chinese cast themselves as "pioneering immigrants dedicated to the building of America" and "avid Americanizers" from the moment of their arrival. They drew on sociologists' theories of Hawaiʻi as a "racial laboratory" and "final racial frontier" to demonstrate their success at amalgamation *and* racial succession.[35] The Japanese also staked claims to belonging as Japanese *and* American pioneers and settlers, although there is not yet a book comparable to Eiichiro Azuma's brilliant study of the ways that U.S. mainland Japanese lived "between two empires."[36]

The Japanese and nearly everyone else in late-nineteenth century Hawaiʻi understood that they lived between the two empires of Japan and the United States and within the conjoined worlds of the Atlantic and Pacific. Hawaiʻi's place as a crossroads of the "sea of islands" of Oceania confounds the Pacific Rim division of the Asian and American

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[34] Chang, "Local Knowledge(s)," 13; Moon-Kie Jung, *Reworking Race: The Making of Hawaii's Interracial Labor Movement* (New York, 2006), Ch. 4, quotes 106 and 141.

[35] Adam McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, and Hawaii, 1900–1936* (Chicago, 2001), 235–236 and 260–270.

[36] Eiichiro Azuma, *Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America* (New York, 2005).

continents on the edges of the world's largest ocean.[37] Struggles between agents of native nationalism and nationhood and U.S. annexationism and empire were part of Atlantic and Pacific history. To wit, at the broad turn of the twentieth century, a nationalist Hawaiian government sought to thwart U.S. imperial ambitions in Hawai'i by seeking assistance from Japan in revitalizing and strengthening the native people and independent Kingdom. At the same time, a small group of non-planter haole adapted policies from Brazil for use in their efforts to whiten Hawai'i and to expedite its annexation to the U.S.

Atlantic and Pacific Crossings: The Circulation of Ideas on Sovereignty, Settlement, and Belonging, 1870s–1910s

Non-planter haole looked to Brazil as a model to emulate in their efforts to whiten Hawai'i, diversify its economy, and strengthen their case for U.S. annexation. Fortunately for annexationists, news of their Brazilian borrowings never made the U.S. mainland press. At the time, many U.S. and Brazilian observers regarded each other's racial systems as opposites, and many U.S. citizens believed that differences between them explained Brazil's "backwardness."[38] Yet non-planter haole found in Brazil a model for whitening tropical and semi-tropical lands and making Hawai'i more like the imaginary white U.S. republic. They hoped that whitening would undermine Kalākaua's efforts to thwart U.S. imperial ambitions by increasing Japanese immigration and forging closer ties with Japan. After the U.S. banned Japanese immigration, Brazilian elites embraced it and selectively emulated Japan to pursue civilizational parity with the U.S.[39]

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[37] Epeli Hau'ofa, "Our Sea of Islands," in Epeli Hau'ofa, Eric Waddell, and Vijay Naidu, eds., *A New Oceania: Rediscovering Our Sea of Islands* (Suva, 1993), 2–16; Vicente M. Diaz and J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, "Native Pacific Cultural Studies on the Edge," *The Contemporary Pacific* 13.2 (2001), 315–342.

[38] Overviews include Michol Siegel, "Beyond Compare: Comparative Method after the Transnational Turn," *Radical History Review* 91 (2005), 62–90; Howard Winant, "Racial Democracy and Racial Identity: Comparing the United States and Brazil," in Michael Hanchard, ed., *Racial Politics in Contemporary Brazil* (Durham, N.C., 1999); George Reid Andrews, "Brazilian Racial Democracy, 1900–1990: An American Counterpoint," *Journal of Contemporary History* 31.3 (1996), 483–507; Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black Into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (New York, 1974).

[39] Jeffrey Lesser, *Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil* (Durham, N.C., 1999), Ch. 6.

Coming to the throne in a contested election in 1874, Kalākaua lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many haole and Hawaiians. His government fostered native nationalism, demographic renewal, and cultural renaissance under the banner Hoʻoulu Lāhui (Increase the Nation and People). In reviving indigenous cultural and political practices, the king sought to legitimate his kingship according to Hawaiian customs, govern Hawaiians in resistance to Euro-American colonial incursions, and defend native interests and sovereignty. His government also advanced the interests of the haole who helped bring him to power, expending vast sums on public works for the sugar industry and public monies to recruit laborers.[40]

Kalākaua's need for the support of haole and the continued recognition of the Kingdom by the world's family of nations also led him to validate his kingship through Western traditions. In 1881, on the first around-the-world tour made by any reigning monarch, Kalākaua and his advisors studied European monarchical traditions. They incorporated their findings into the building of ʻIolani Palace, coronation of the king, and fiftieth-birthday jubilee. Intended to inspire pride among Hawaiians and demonstrate to haole the civilized standing of a government modeled on those of Europe, coronation and jubilee were hybrid affairs. At the coronation, the King was invested with a feather cloak of Kamehameha I and a gold crown. The Royal Hawaiian Band marched and played. The king's hula dancers performed at a high-state affair for the first time in half a century.[41]

Immigration seemed a realm in which Kalākaua could serve varied and various haole and Hawaiian interests. His government endeavored to satisfy planters' demand for laborers while attracting cognate peoples. Most seemed satisfied by the government decision to limit direct subsidies of immigration not to the largest group, Chinese men, but to Portuguese families from Azores and Madeira, whom haole viewed as future white settlers, and Pacific Islanders from Vanuatu (New Hebrides) and Kiribati (Gilbert Islands), whom the government viewed as future citizens. Planters appreciated that these policies kept the labor force mixed, the better to keep workers from organizing.[42]

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[40] Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, Ch. 6.
[41] Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, 199–205; Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, 108–112.
[42] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom*, v. 3.

Tensions surfaced in 1883, when the Hawaiian government moved to exert greater control over immigration and restrict Chinese immigration. Its efforts to do so followed the arrival of a ship from China that carried smallpox (which had decimated Hawaiians) and reflected its determination to restrict the immigration of mostly Chinese men on the grounds that re-population efforts required more women and children.[43] This dismayed planters who relied on the Chinese as their leading labor source. It elated non-planter haole, among whom anti-Chinese activism had risen sharply. Planter and non-planter haole criticized the government for ending its subsidy of Portuguese immigration, citing prohibitive transportation costs. Haole complained that the Portuguese left because the government did not offer them homesteads from the Crown Lands.[44]

Many haole and Hawaiians welcomed the King's efforts to recruit the Japanese to work the cane and repopulate the Kingdom. Unbeknownst to most of them, he hoped to convince Japan to commit to the defense of Hawaiian sovereignty. To promote this goal, Kalākaua privately proposed to the emperor a marriage between the Hawaiian and Japanese royal families and the formation by Japan of a "Union and Federation of the Asiatic nations and sovereigns." In negotiations over immigration, the king's agents stressed Hawaii's need for citizens from this emergent imperial and industrial power to "repeople our Island Home" and "produce a new and vigorous nation."[45] When Japanese immigration commenced in 1885, planters expressed delight. But they grumbled about how the Hawaiian government subsidized Japanese immigration. From 1885 to 1894, the government guaranteed payment of passage only for the wives and female relatives of men. Yet even disgruntled planters acknowledged that in some fashion they, the government, and immigrants split transportation costs. In 1885, many haole could concur with the pro-government *Pacific*

[43] Jacob Adler and Robert M. Kamins, *The Fantastic Life of Walter Murray Gibson, Hawaii's Minister of Everything* (Honolulu, 1986), 142; Merze Tate, "Decadence of the Hawaiian Nation and Proposals to Import a Negro Labor Force," *Journal of Negro History* 47.4 (1962), 248–263.

[44] Conan, *History of Contract Laborers in the Hawaiian Islands*, 35–42; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom*, 3: 142–144, 172–185; "Report of the Labor Commission on the Coffee Industry," *Hawaiian Planters' Monthly* 14 (July 1895), 304; *Hawaiian Planters' Monthly* 16 (1897), 644–645.

[45] Gerald Horne, *The White Pacific: U.S. Imperialism and Black Slavery in the South Seas* (Honolulu, 2007), 103–105; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom*, 3: 156–160.

Commercial Advertiser that Hawaiʻi should "depend in the future upon family immigration from Japan, Europe, and the United States," for they correctly ascertained that most Japanese immigrants would be men seeking to earn a competence and move on.[46]

Resentments about Kalākaua's willingness to put the interests of the Hawaiian people and nation above those of haole erupted into backlash during the coronation in 1883 and jubilee in 1886. Haole did not object to Kalākaua's massive government expenditures for projects that served their interests, but they opposed his expenditures aimed at revitalizing Hawaiian culture, practices, and institutions. They labeled his coronation and jubilee extravagant wastes of state funds and the performance of hula at them as proof of a resurgence of barbarism that called into question the King's fitness for rule and Hawaiians' fitness for self-government. Princess and future Queen Liliʻuokalani presciently commented of the coronation, "Naturally those among us who did not desire to have us remain a nation would look on an expenditure of this kind as worse than wasted."[47] Haole used both occasions to tie their claims of resurgent barbarism to their dissatisfaction over Kalākaua's governance on behalf of Hawaiians. They used the jubilee to escalate criticisms of his recent refusal to open his Crown Lands to white settlement or cede Pearl Harbor to the United States in exchange for the renewal of reciprocity. Haole mocked the King's efforts to form a Polynesian alliance in which remaining nations would support each other's independence and his diplomats' negotiations with Britain, Germany, and the U.S. over Samoa's future political status.[48] Kalākaua's efforts to "play" *realpolitik* with "real" nations prompted rising numbers of haole to disavow what they had come to regard as a "comic" King and "toy" Kingdom.[49]

The king's actions galvanized haole to unite to defend their material interests in Hawaiʻi and racial honor in the eyes of white colonials and nationals everywhere. After the jubilee, a few haole organized the Hawaiian League. Its stated objective was "constitutional, representative government." Members interpreted this goal differently.

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[46] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom*, 3, 171, *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, July 13, 1885, and July 16, 1885, quote 174.

[47] Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, 110–115; Liliuʻokalani, *Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen* (orig. 1898, Honoululu, 1990), 105.

[48] Horne, *The White Pacific*, 114–124.

[49] Osorio, *Dismembering Lāhui*, 224–232.

The faction led by planters favored transferring political power to an elected cabinet. The faction led by non-planters favored abolishing the monarchy and founding a republic many hoped would lead to U.S. annexation. In 1887, planter royalists prevailed.[50]

But in 1893 non-planter haole annexationists prevailed. With the unauthorized support of the U.S. Navy, a group of them overthrew Queen Liliʻuokalani and the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi. They proclaimed a Provisional Government that the U.S. Minister to Hawaiʻi who backed the coup recognized. However, support for the Republic founded in 1894, annexed by the U.S. in 1898, and incorporated by the U.S. as its only overseas territory eligible for statehood in 1900 derived in no small part from the belief that Hawaiʻi could be made into a white republic.[51] Yet whether "Occidental or Oriental civilization" would prevail there was debated by whites in Hawaiʻi and the U.S., especially after Japan's military victories against China in 1894 and 1895 and Russia in 1904 confirmed Japan's status as a rising global power.

Between the founding of the Hawaiian Republic in 1894 and Great Strike of 1909, non-planter haole worked to promote immigration from the United States and Europe, open lands to white settlement, and diversify the economy.[52] Although they advocated a dual "Latin" and "Nordic" approach, they believed that raising the white population by first attracting Portuguese peasant-laborers would later lead to an increase of immigration by more desirable middle-class Anglo-Saxon settlers.[53] This belief was based on past performance. Most recent "progress" toward whitening had resulted from Portuguese immigration. In 1900, as in previous censuses, haole remained about 5 percent of the population. But the Portuguese had grown from 400 in 1872 to 18,000 in 1900, raising the Caucasian population to 17 percent.[54]

In 1895, the Republic's Laborer Commission drew on the past to predict the future. Noting that over "200 intelligent, enterprising white men" were growing coffee in Hawaiʻi, the report asserted that there was tremendous opportunity for growth. In the Kona district, 80,000 acres were ideally suited for coffee, not to mention the unknown potential

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[50] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom*, 3:347–366, quote 348.

[51] Christine Skwiot, *The Purpose of Paradise. U.S. Tourism and Empire in Cuba and Hawaiʻi* (Philadelphia, 2010), Ch. 1.

[52] Skwiot, *The Purpose of Paradise*, Ch. 2.

[53] Baron Goto, "Ethnic Groups and the Coffee Industry in Hawaiʻi," *Hawaiian Journal of History* 16 (1982), 112–124, esp. 117.

[54] Schmitt, *Historical Statistics of Hawaii*, 25.

for coffee and diversified agriculture contained within the Crown Lands. Coffee presented no threat to sugar planters for it needed cooler temperatures on high lands unsuitable for cane. Coffee was in other ways compatible with sugar. Many lands suitable for coffee were adjacent to cane fields and hence tied to existing transportation networks.[55] The coffee industry seemed to offer the perfect opportunity to bring "campaigns for small landed proprietorships" and needs of the "sugar interests" into the "closest conjunction."[56] Haole lamented that the Japanese had made some "inroads" into the industry and predicted that in the absence of action, the Japanese would take over coffee as the Chinese had done with rice. They searched for models across the Atlantic and Pacific before settling on the Atlantic. Drawing on studies of diversified agriculture in Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Venezuela, non-planter haole asserted that Hawaiʻi should emulate Brazil in promoting coffee as "a white man's industry."[57]

Why did haole hold up Brazil and its coffee industry as the model for Hawaiʻi to replicate in their efforts to transform it into a white republic?[58] For one, Brazil was not the U.S. South where abolitionist haole had fought slavery and the Civil War. Haole professed abhorrence for the Jim-Crow regime then under construction, although they drew on Southern racial strategies in selective ways. (The constitution of the Hawaiian Republic borrowed from that of Mississippi to deny the franchise to most Asians and Hawaiians).[59] In the U.S. South postbellum whitening projects failed.[60] But long before emancipation, Brazilian elites made significant strides toward whitening. Haole offered negative contrasts between the U.S. South and Hawaiʻi to highlight the

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[55] "Report of the Labor Commission on the Coffee Industry," *Hawaiian Planters' Monthly* (July 1895), 303–306.

[56] Governor Frear's Inaugural Address, *Hawaiian Planters' Monthly* (August 1907), 276.

[57] "Report of the Labor Commission on the Coffee Industry," *Hawaiian Planters' Monthly* (July 1895), 303–307, 320.

[58] See especially Sales Augusto de Santos and Laurence Hallewell, "Historical Roots of the 'Whitening' of Brazil," *Latin American Perspectives* 29.1 (2002), 61–82; Herbert S. Klein, "The Social and Economic Integration of Portuguese Immigrants in Brazil in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 23.2 (1991), 309–337; Thomas M. Holloway, *Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in São Paulo, 1886–1934* (Chapel Hill, 1980).

[59] Tom Coffman, *Nation Within: The Story of America's Annexation of the Nation of Hawaiʻi* (Kāneʻohe, Hawaiʻi, 1998), 156.

[60] Matthew Pratt Guterl, *American Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008).

latter's potential to become an "integral part" of the imaginary white U.S. republic. But Brazil also offered positive points of comparison and a blueprint for whitening.

The promulgation of republics in Brazil in 1889 and Hawai'i in 1894 fueled demands to pursue whitening by breaking up large plantations into small-holdings and promoting the economic independence they equated with political independence. Haole appreciated that planters and government officials in São Paulo had joined forces to displace blacks from coffee plantations and install on them white families, primarily from Italy but small numbers from Spain and Portugal as well. These families raised not only coffee, food for sustenance and market, but white children, whom haole regarded as "the most desirable crop of all."[61] Haole were impressed that Brazilian elites' understood that unlike temperate Australia, Canada, and United States, their society "invite[d] very little voluntary migration."[62] To convince whites to settle the tropics and semi-tropics required recruitment programs, payment of passage, and provision of land, livestock, and other resources on terms that favored the settler.[63] Whitening was expensive, but with the fate of the polity at stake, expenditures on it constituted not a luxury but a necessity.

Hawai'i seemed to possess an advantage in this regard. São Paulo could compete on the global coffee market despite the fact that the Italian families it imported cost *four* times more in gold than non-white laborers imported from Ceylon and India.[64] But Hawai'i could import Portuguese families from Madeira and Azores at *only three* times more than it cost to import laborers from China and Japan.[65] Hawai'i seemed to hold a recipe for success. Led by President Theodore Roosevelt, key metropolitan actors committed to preventing Hawai'i from becoming more like the U.S. South by supporting diversification and whitening. In 1906, Roosevelt heralded the arrival of 1,300 Portuguese men,

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[61] Department of Commerce and Labor, *Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor* 8.47 (July 1903), 700.

[62] *First Report of the Board of Immigration to the Governor of Hawaii, for the period beginning April 29, 1905 and ending January 31, 1907* (Honolulu, 1907), 4; Department of Commerce and Labor, "Report of the Commissioner of Labor of Hawaii," *Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor* 8.47 (1903), 796–797.

[63] William D. Alexander, "History of Immigration to Hawaii," *Thrum's Hawaiian Annual for 1898*, 124.

[64] "Coffee Planting in Brazil," reprinted from *Tropical Agriculturalist* in the *Hawaiian Planters' Monthly* 17 (June 1898), 278.

[65] *Hawaiian Planters' Monthly* 26 (Feb. 1907), 55.

women, and children as a step toward "turning Hawaiʻi into the right kind of island," the sort of white settler society that T.R. imagined the U.S. West and temperate Australia to be.[66]

Non-planter haole found their projects frustrated at local, imperial, and global levels. The sugar planters who owned and leased most of Hawaii's good fee-simple land had no intention of relinquishing the wealth, power, or aristocratic lifestyles that they cultivated along with cane. Most rejected calls to emulate the planters in Cuba, Louisiana, and Queensland who sought to break up large estates and redistribute them to white farmers raising cane for a central mill. Some reformist planters tried. All soon failed.[67] Second, planters opposed investment and competition from "outsiders."[68] They worked to prevent non-planter haole from opening the ceded Crown Lands to "bona fide" settlers. Planters secured the electoral and legislative support of Hawaiians that they used to consolidate the power to control their leases. They employed carrot-and-stick tactics to convince homesteaders to re-lease their land to planters. Third, annexation ended a privilege enjoyed by competitors. The illegalization of contract labor ended the ability of the territory to use public and soon, private funds to pay for immigrants' passage. Finally, competition from the Americas and Oceania compounded other problems. In 1905 or 1906, Hawaii's Board of Immigration lamented that that the territory was so far behind "Brazil, Argentine Republic, Chili [sic], Peru, the Central American countries, and in fact all tropical or semi-tropical countries [in] bidding for immigrants to settle their lands."[69] Because Hawaiʻi could not offer whites paid passage, land, and other incentives, potential migrants had little reason to choose Hawaiʻi over societies that did.

Between 1906 and 1909, the Bureau of Immigration managed to recruit an additional 5,600 Portuguese and 2,300 Spaniards. They did not produce the desired whitening effect, for they represented only about 16 percent of the over 48,000 immigrants, predominantly

[66] Theodore Roosevelt cited in Katherine Bjork, "Incorporating an Empire: From Deregulating Labor to Regulating Leisure in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, 1898–1909," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998, 139.

[67] "Report of the Commissioner of Labor of Hawaii," 1903, 723.

[68] Theon Wright, *The Disenchanted Isles: The Story of the Second Revolution in Hawaii* (New York, 1972), 37.

[69] *First Report of the Board of Immigration to the Governor of Hawaii*, 1–6.

Japanese and Koreans, who arrived in Hawai'i during this time.[70] The government made 1,500 homesteads available to Portuguese and Spanish families. Fewer than 200 took up the offer. Small wonder, for sugar planters provided them with cottages and gardens on the plantations, rent-free. Planters offered $24 a month for work without a homestead or $22 with one; in either case, planters required 26 days of service a month, rendering farming and plantation work nigh impossible to combine.[71] After 1898 planters subsidized whitening but largely as a strategy for avoiding the political interventions and direct rule that the U.S. government practiced in Cuba and the Philippines. Few planters had any interest in making Hawai'i a white republic. Planters backed non-planter haole whitening schemes insofar as they served planters and until consolidating a monopoly of Hawaii's political economy and influence in Washington.

Projects to whiten Hawai'i via immigration came to an end between the Executive Order and the Great Strike, although somewhat ironically some 5,000 Portuguese and 8,000 Spaniards migrated to the territory in the four years after 1909. The strike made Hawaii's planters more determined to recruit Filipinos. But given anti-Asian and anti-immigrant proclivities in the U.S. Congress, planters accepted that most future plantation workers would have to come from within Hawai'i. Because the Gentlemen's Agreement permitted travel from Japan to Hawai'i by family members, relatives, and picture brides, it worked to reduce gender imbalances, foster family growth, and commit the Japanese to making themselves American settlers, and their children, first-class U.S. citizens.

Because the strike made clear to haole that "what was at stake" was "the economic, political, and cultural supremacy of whites/ 'Americans' over Japanese/ foreigners," it helped sugar planters to convince non-planter haole to abandon their exorbitantly expensive and largely ineffective whitening schemes.[72] Planters raised wage and salary differentials so as to increase already vast economic and social chasms between whites and Hawaiians, on the one hand, and Asians, on the

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[70] Beverly Lazono, "The Andalucia-Hawaii-California Migration: A Study in Macrostructure and Microhistory," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26.2 (April 1984), 305–327, esp. 315; Schmitt, *Historical Statistics of Hawaii*, 100–104.

[71] *Hawaiian Planters' Monthly* 26 (Feb. 1907), 60, (March 1907), 159–161; Beechert, *Working in Hawaii*, 125–127.

[72] Okihiro, *Cane Fires*, 45.

other hand. By 1910, haole managers earned as much as a thousand dollars a month; Portuguese and Hawaiian overseers up to three hundred, and Asian field hands less than thirty.[73] Off the plantations, planters enlarged opportunities for employment for the haole managerial and professional class, using accumulated capital to expand into new sectors like tourism. Haole used this industry to sell the mainland on the idea that Hawaiʻi was a racial democracy on a slow and safe road to eventual political democracy and a stable polity that did not require metropolitan intervention or, worse yet, direct rule. The cost of white supremacy remained high, but haole had finally agreed how to finance it.[74]

The implementation of the Gentlemen's Agreement and Canada's similar Hayashi-Lemieux Agreement of 1908 better positioned Brazil to compete with other nations for Japanese immigrant families. By 1930 Brazil joined the United States and Hawaiʻi as the three most important receiving areas of Japanese outside Japan's empire.[75] Brazilian elites tapped into Japanese's elites' expansionist desire not just for overseas settlements in the Americas but, for the first time in its history, in the Atlantic as well. Like Kalākaua, they valued the Japanese for their perceived ability to compete with the peoples and nations of the West and improve Hawaiʻi's and Brazil's standing vis-à-vis the United States. There were important differences: The former sought to make Hawaiʻi modern and strong enough to maintain its independence in the face of U.S. imperial ambitions and the latter, to make Brazil modern and strong enough to assert civilizational parity with the U.S. nation. Before recruiting Japanese to São Paulo, Brazilians studied the potential of Japanese as workers and settlers in the U.S., including Hawaiʻi, the only part of the U.S. where the Japanese were engaged in coffee production. It is likely that Brazilian planters were acquainted with haole whitening projects, given the international readings and travels of a global planter class and thoroughness with which local journals on tropical agriculture reprinted articles of interest from

[73] Beechert, *Working in Hawaii*, 169–176; Lawrence Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono: Hawaii the Excellent* (Honolulu, 1961), 62.

[74] Skwiot, *The Purpose of Paradise*, Ch. 2.

[75] Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 314–315; J.F. Normano, "Japanese Emigration to Brazil," *Pacific Affairs* 7.1 (March 1934), 42–61, esp. 44.

around the world. Shipping routes also suggest that Brazilians visited Hawai'i on their travels to and from Japan.[76]

Despite the fact that haole did not set out to write sound history but persuasive white supremacist arguments, scholars may have something to learn from them. The determination of haole to learn how to whiten the tropics and semi-tropics led them to compare Hawai'i and Brazil decades before the interwar period. Then, the embrace of the notion that Hawai'i and Brazil were racial democracies resulted, in no small part, from the demise of whitening ideologies and the immigration policies that made Brazil and Hawai'i into even more multicultural and hyphen-less societies.[77] Gilberto Freyre of Brazil and Andrew Lind and Romanzo Adams in Hawai'i cemented the local, regional, and global reputations of both as racial democracies and racial laboratories. In the process, they provided white elites with a key ideological underpinning of dictatorship in Brazil and authoritarian governance in Hawai'i.[78]

Atlantic and Pacific Crossings: The Circulation of People and Convergence of Ideas Past and Present

Since the 1970s and 1980s, academics and activists have demonstrated that Brazil and Hawai'i were and are not racial democracies. Yet, Hawai'i's and Brazil's extra-legal systems of racial and national oppression have proven remarkably effective at containing political challenges to racial and national injustices. The struggles of Hawaiian sovereignty academics and activists have led some of them to seek to reframe the relationships between Pacific-Islander and Asian-American studies and between "locals" and natives. Many locals experienced

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[76] Daniel M. Masterson with Sayaka Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America* (Urbana, 2004), 43–44; Lesser, *Negotiating National Identity*, Ch. 6; Normano, "Japanese Emigration to Brazil," 42–61.

[77] Lesser, *Negotiating National Identity*; Jonathan Y. Okamura, "Why There Are No Asian Americans in Hawai'i: The Continuing Significance of Local Identity," *Social Process in Hawaii* 34 (1994), 161–178.

[78] Excellent overviews include G. Reginald Daniel, "White into Black: Race and National Identity in Contemporary Brazil," in Spickard, ed., *Race and Nation*, 87–108; Gail D. Triner, "Race, With or Without Color? Reconciling Brazilian Historiography," *History Compass* 3.1 (Dec. 2005), 1–21 and Michael Hanchard's introduction to his collection, *Racial Politics in Contemporary Brazil*, 1–29; Thomas E. Skidmore, "Racial Ideas and Social Policy in Brazil, 1870–1940," in Richard Graham, ed., *The Idea of Race in Latin America* (Austin, 1990), 7–36.

U.S. statehood in 1959 as decolonization, empowerment, and material improvement, especially a majority of Chinese and many Japanese. Hawaiians especially, but also other U.S. colonials like Filipinos and Samoans, experienced statehood as a new phase of a long imperial history of dispossession and marginalization. Hawaiians have led other groups searching economic viability on the mainland, where 40 percent of Hawaiians resident in the U.S. lived as of 2000.[79]

In a society that for half-a-century knew relatively few tourists and virtually no outside investment, most people experienced the waves of "outside" immigrants, investments, and tourists that began washing over Hawaiʻi in the 1960s as unsettling at best. Overseas investment, immigration, and tourism led to a reassertion of "local" identity and culture. In cultural and literary spheres, locals espoused an ethos rooted in a shared sense of place and shared plantation and colonial history.[80] In political and economic realms, locals protested Hawaii's subordination to outsiders and declining position in the world economy. Yet a local "tradition of tolerance" combined with a new belief in "aloha spirit" as the basis of harmonious social relations enabled a refusal to acknowledge or confront deepening inequalities and access to jobs, housing, education, etc. This access improved for most haole and many Chinese and Japanese, improved less and only recently for Filipinos, and declined dramatically for Hawaiians. After statehood, key leaders of the Japanese-led Democratic Party blunted their reformist impulses and committed to profiting from tourism, generating a racist backlash against the Japanese in general.[81] This deepened local elites' use of "aloha" to appeal to the interracial harmony that helped maintain the status quo. The enshrinement of "aloha spirit" as state ideology has worked to "contain and dissipate political resistance."[82]

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[79] J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, "Diasporic Deracination and 'Off-Island' Hawaiians," *Contemporary Pacific* 19.1 (2007), 144–145.

[80] Rob Wilson, *Reimagining the American Pacific: From South Pacific to Bamboo Ridge and Beyond* (Durham, N.C., 2000), 144–145.

[81] Okamura, "Why There Are No Asian Americans in Hawaiʻi," 161–164; Noel J. Kent, "Myth of the Golden Men: Ethnic Elites and Dependent Development in the 50th State, in *Ethnicity and Nation-Building in the Pacific*, ed. Michael C. Howard (Tokyo, 1989), 98–117.

[82] Seri Luangphinith, "Homeward Bound: Settler Aesthetics in Hawaiʻi's Literature," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 48.1 (2006), 54–76, esp. 67; Keiko Ohnuma, "'Aloha Spirit' and the Cultural Politics of Sentiment as National Belonging," *Contemporary Pacific* 20.2 (2008), 365–394, esp. 369–374, Jocelyn Linnekin, "Consuming Cultures: Tourism and the Commoditization of Cultural Identity in the Island Pacific," in

Hawaiian rights and sovereignty activists know this well. Since, and in crucial ways because of, statehood, native standards of living have declined precipitously. Hawaiians suffer the highest rates of unemployment, land alienation, incarceration, preventable disease, and suicide, as well as the lowest rates of education, access to social services, and upward mobility of any group in Hawai'i.[83] Critics and opponents of native sovereignty have employed aloha as a weapon against struggles for the land and nation which the U.S. government acknowledged in a 1993 apology that Hawaiians never relinquished. For example, a *Honolulu Advertiser* editorial argued that the failure to handle sovereignty "wisely" and for the benefit of "all people" (rather than Hawaiians) "could destroy our spirit of aloha."[84] Indeed, the politicization of the "local" in the 1970s and 1980s constituted, in part, a reaction against native struggles for cultural revitalization, "meaningful autonomy," and rights as the indigenous people of Hawai'i, the only people with a genealogical relationship to the land. Land is the material basis of the lāhui, not as many "locals" have it, just a collective space or shared place.[85]

Struggles for land and sovereignty have led some scholars and activists to re-examine interactions and relationships among natives, immigrants, and settlers past and present. They seek to re-conceptualize interactions between natives and Asians in ways that remain attuned to their paradigmatic experiences as indigenous and immigrant peoples with shared but crucially different relationships to American imperial projects in the islands and on the continent.[86] Amy Ku'leialoha Stillman urges scholars to "acknowledge that encounters among Asian and Pacific Islander peoples are very much a part of the entire process of

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Michael Picard and Robert E. Wood, eds., *Tourism, Ethnicity, and the State in Asian and Pacific Societies*, (Honolulu, 1997), 215–250.

[83] Overviews include John Casken, "Improved Health Status for Native Hawaiians Not Just What the Doctor Ordered," *wicazo sa review: A Journal of Native American Studies* 16.1 (2001), 75–89; Ulla Hasager and Jonathan Friedman, *Hawai'i: Return to Nationhood*, IWGIA Document 75 (Copenhagen, 1994); Haunani-Kay Trask, *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai'i* (Monroe, Me., 1993).

[84] *Honolulu Advertiser*, April 24, 1994, cited in Okamura, "The Illusion of Paradise," 284.

[85] J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, "The Multiplicity of Hawaiian Sovereignty Claims and the Struggle for Meaningful Autonomy," *Comparative American Studies* 3.3 (2005), 283–299.

[86] For an important set of essays on Pacific Islander Studies and its relationship to Asian American Studies, see the *Journal of Asian American Studies* 7.3 (2004).

Asian peoples moving into American spaces and spheres of cultural influence, and that those encounters took place not only on continental American lands but in American-controlled Pacific Island locations as well." Stillman criticizes the Pacific Rim orientation and tendency of Asian American scholars to skip over Pacific Islands and islanders, for Pacific Islands and islanders made travel between the Pacific's rims possible, including the migrations that are the bedrock of Asian American studies.[87]

Much of this emergent Hawaiian historiography moves beyond the either Asian-white or native-white focus that has characterized so much recent comparative and transnational scholarship of the so-called white settler societies of the Pacific (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States). It has the potential to bring into provocative dialogue recent literature on hemispheric American Studies and Atlantic history and Pacific studies and Pacific Islander American and Asian American Studies that returns questions of indigeneity to immigration *and* imperial history. Moreover, the similar tracks and findings that scholars of race in Brazil and Hawaiʻi have taken and made suggests the need for comparative and global studies of multiracial societies and their success in making and maintaining beliefs in "racial democracy" and extra-legal systems of racial oppression and dominance. Such racial systems have proved better at containing resistance and enduring for even longer and perhaps more thoroughly than societies with racial regimes rooted in law (apartheid and segregation, for example). Histories of extralegal, as well as legal racial regimes, and of alleged racial democracies remain critically important: the past continues to shape questions of sovereignty and belonging, the granting or withholding of rights, and access to power and resources in Hawaiʻi and Brazil, around the Atlantic and Pacific, and across the world.

[87] Amy Kuʻleialoha Stillman, "Pacific-ing Asian Pacific American History," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 7.3 (2004), 241–270, quote 242.

PART FIVE

THE WORLD BEYOND THE 1930S

DISQUIETUDE AND THE WRITING OF ETHNOGRAPHIC HISTORIES: PORTUGUESE DECOLONIZATION AND GOAN MIGRATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, 1920 TO THE PRESENT[1]

Pamila Gupta

> The diaspora is a society in which the absent are a constant incitement to discourse about things moving. We call the diaspora 'the society of the absent' as a convenience and a theoretical position because in it, discourses of mobility appear as both cause and effect and are inseparable from diasporic life, saturating its internal social space.[2]

Despite the fact that archival records suggest the presence of isolated Goans (from Portuguese India) in African Mozambique already in 1560, the Goan community of Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques) occupied a position of "disquiet"—a state of uneasiness[3]—within the Portuguese colonial hierarchy.

Long ago, a system of *prazos* or "leased properties" was initiated in 1675 as part of Portugal's expansion into the interior of Mozambique. With few women among the Portuguese, intermarriage and the general withdrawal of Portuguese settlers from Mozambique started in the eighteenth century, and sparked an immigration of Goans into the colony. Intermarriage of Goans and Portuguese was common and the two formed a community of *prazeiros*. The first phase of large scale Goan immigration to Mozambique took place only after 1800. For some elite Goan families during the nineteenth century, the first son typically became a priest and the second a doctor, while the third sought his fortune in Portuguese Africa. In some ways, such Goans occupied an even more elite status than many Portuguese for they were well-educated when they arrived in Maputo, unlike the often-illiterate

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[1] This paper is a much revised version of an article published in the *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 44.1 (2009). I thank the editors Nigel Gibson and David Mainwaring for their reprint permission on behalf of JAAS.

[2] Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility Across the Indian Ocean* (Berkeley, 2006), 19.

[3] J.B. Sykes, ed., *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, 7th ed. (Oxford, 1984), 276.

Portuguese peasants who arrived in Mozambique as part of a state-sponsored campaign to bring "whites" to the colonies.

However, the largest group of Goans came from Portuguese India across the Indian Ocean to Mozambique only after 1920. The first migrants sought economic betterment; later, during the 1950s–1960s, migrants foresaw the beginning of the end of Goa's decolonization. Lastly, emigration from Maputo was a direct response to Portuguese decolonization in 1975.

Each phase of migration was "disquieting" in its own way. Goans occupied a precarious position—one viewed with uncertainty by both colonizer and colonized—within Mozambican society. In the 1920s, it was considered one's colonial duty as a "good" Portuguese citizen to emigrate from Goa to help out in the "Africa cause." This was largely a male migration—many of whom were trained medical doctors. With very few women enduring the journey, Goans took full advantage of the instabilities of colonial rule and its "ambiguities of difference;"[4] they were almost transformed from colonial subjects to colonial officers through migration. The source of "disquiet" in this case was the ease with which many colonized subjects adapted to their new, relative, positions of power.

During the 1950s and 1960s many Goans chose emigration to another Portuguese colony in response to Goa's imminent decolonization and absorption into a culturally different Indian nation-state. (Of course there were many Goans, Hindu and Catholic, who embraced Goa's integration into India. There was a large Goan diaspora community in Bombay at this time; the roots of the Goan independence movement came from this group.) The migration of the 1950s and 1960s was largely female—many wives-to-be of Goans already settled in Mozambique. Migration in the face of decolonization can be understood as a disquieting form of neocolonialism.

After 1975, many Goans chose to leave—or rather, were persuaded to leave Maputo—by outgoing colonial officials seeking to prove Portugal's point that independent Mozambique would devolve into "chaos," that Africans were incapable of ruling themselves without a colonial administration—a point conveniently employed by many

[4] Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper. "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda" in Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997), 4.

Goans in key positions of authority. That the majority of Goans left was in turn seen as a source of betrayal by the newly independent Mozambican government. That this same government had simultaneously pushed for the departure of all Asians, including Goans, is another source of disquiet. Those Goans who chose to stay and who remain today as part of a "society of the absent"[5] still live with a sense of disquiet in the face of Mozambique's troubled postcolonial history.[6]

In this paper, I explore the many facets of disquieting Goans' history, a disquieting that is reinforced on an analytical level by a lack of historiography associated with this series of Goan migrations.[7] Through an ethnographic approach—specifically through the collection of life histories—I access distinct phases of migration through the perspective of different Goan imaginaries of Portuguese Mozambique.[8] Goan Mozambicans were colonial elites of a specific kind, moving between sites located within the Indian Ocean at the same time

[5] Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim*, 19.

[6] During my fieldwork in March 2007, I too experienced that "disquiet" when a warehouse of old armaments leftover from the war exploded unnecessarily, that is, due to a lack of preventive measures, killing over 100 people, and injuring more than 300 in Maputo. According to my informants, this was the third time that this had happened since the end of the civil war in 1992.

[7] See Pamila Gupta, "Mapping Portuguese Decolonization in the Indian Ocean: A Research Agenda," *South African Historical Journal* 57 (2007), 93–112.

[8] Much of the data presented here comes from interviews and the recording of life histories with a multitude of Goans living in Maputo, during the month of March 2007. This research is restricted to the (middle and upper-class) Goans of Maputo, and does not include the Goan fishing community of Catembe or the Goan community of Beira, both of which are also sizeable and have very different histories. This ethnographic research was made possible through a Humanities Research Grant from the Graduate School at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dirce, Brigitte, and Celso for putting me in contact with members of the Goan community in Maputo. In the capital itself, I found a social network of Goans, many of whom were inter-related through marriage. Invariably, each person I interviewed would ask whom else I had interviewed, and would supply me with a few additional names. Others would call their relatives in front of me to set up an interview on my behalf. They, in a sense, guided whom I would speak to; that is, who was an appropriate "Goan" to interview. Most of these interviews took place in either public spaces—restaurants and hotel lobbies—or inside people's homes. Most of the Goans I interviewed were passionate about their subject at hand, and had very strong viewpoints about this disparate community, colonial racism, their in-between status between colonizer and colonized, leftist politics, generational ideological shifts, and their identification of "being Portuguese but without a concept of race" as one informant described it. I thank them for their generosity and candidness. I have changed the (first) names of my informants to protect their privacy, excepting public and published figures.

that they occupied positions as "local cosmopolitans."[9] This, in turn, allowed them to sustain contacts simultaneously with Mozambique, Goa, and Portugal. I offer an "ethnographic history" of Goans, looking at the "longings and belongings" of many different individuals living in postcolonial Maputo, recounting testimonies that give voice to the three different phases of migration. I examine their fragility and resilience as a historical community that was created out of the itinerant quality characterizing Portuguese colonialism more generally.[10] Lastly, in my conclusion, I allude to the next generation of Goans living in Maputo, suggesting both their continuing sense of disquiet in the face of Mozambican postcoloniality and the ways in which they very much continue patterns of "local cosmopolitanisms" practiced by their ancestors, who experienced not only migration from one Portuguese colony to another but two different moments of decolonization—Goan, in 1961, and Mozambican in 1975. This next generation of Goans is both deeply attached to Mozambique and looking elsewhere, creating new kinds of postcolonial subjectivities.

Ambiguities of Difference in the Indian Ocean

> The Manichaean world of high colonialism that we have etched so deeply in our historiographies was thus nothing of the sort.[11]

The anthropology of empire and the anthropology of elites helps us to see the Goans of Mozambique as colonial elites. A biographical or life history approach may be the only way to write this elite's historical ethnography. Research on the Goan diasporic community in Maputo also raises new questions about empire and elites because of its complicated history of migration, the lack of source materials to access its history, the many cases of exceptionalism that characterize Portuguese colonialism, and finally, its intertwining through migration of two distinct but connected colonial contexts.[12] I thus draw on the innovative works of both the historian, Thomas Metcalf (especially his discussion of "webs of empire" for tracing horizontal movements

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[9] Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim*, 31.
[10] See Pamila Gupta, "Mapping Portuguese Decolonization" for a fuller discussion.
[11] Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 8.
[12] See Pamila Gupta, "Mapping Portuguese Decolonization," for an extended discussion.

of colonial migrations within the Indian Ocean), and the anthropologist Engseng Ho (especially his recent diaspora scholarship on "local cosmopolitans").

One of the most significant findings of the anthropology of empire literature has been the breakdown of the hegemonic power of colonialism, and exploration of vulnerabilities, including the fact that power was always a process of negotiation.[13] The next step in this focus on the instabilities of colonialism has been to study the colonizer/colonized relationship in specific historical contexts. As anthropologist Ann Stoler writes, "Colonial authority was constructed on two powerful, but false premises. The first was the notion that Europeans in the colonies made up an easily identifiable and discrete biological and social entity: a natural community of common class interests, racial attributes, political affinities, and superior culture. The second was the related notion that the boundaries separating colonizer from colonized were thus self evident and easily drawn. Neither premise reflected colonial realities."[14]

Just as the "colonizer" was not a uniform or stable group, neither was the "colonized." Instead, the reality was that different categories of persons ("European," "native," "creole," "mestizo," etc.) operating in specific colonial contexts were always in-process and changing in relation to other qualities, both biological and social, in order to suit differing colonial agendas at different moments in time. Nor were these categories of "colonizer" and "colonized" inherent. Rather, "difference had to be defined and maintained,"[15] often by way of discourses of race and culture, for each "served to buttress one another in crucial ways."[16] While in Portuguese India, the Goans occupied, more or less, the position of "colonized," in their migration to a second Portuguese colonial outpost, in this case Mozambique, the Goans took on a very different status within the colonial hierarchy, a positioning that had everything to do with colonial categories of race, that is, the difference between "Indians" and "Africans." These racial distinctions were often disguised through an emphasis on cultural distinctions of "breeding,

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[13] Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 1–56.

[14] Ann Stoler, "Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in 20th Century Colonial Cultures," *American Ethnologist* 16 (November 1989), 635.

[15] Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 7.

[16] Ibid., 34.

character, and civility."[17] In other words, markers of class (here standing in for race and culture) played a key role in positioning the Goans of Mozambique as more closely aligned with their Portuguese colonizers than with their colonized counterparts, the African Mozambicans, even as individual Goans experienced racism at the hands of their Portuguese colonizers. I can push Stoler's and Cooper's emphasis on the "ambiguities of difference" one step further, and as relevant for my historical ethnography of the Goans of Mozambique.

In their class positioning within the Portuguese colonial structure of Mozambique, these immigrant Goans were elites of a certain type. The anthropological literature on colonial elites reminds us to ask in what everyday and exact ways each group is perceived or defined as "elite" in any given moment.[18] As Cris Shore points out, "the proper study of elite cultures is the habitus, networks, and culture of elites themselves, including their informal and everyday practices and intimate spaces."[19] This is a crucial point—that we look at what Bourdieu calls the "habitus"[20] of elite individuals in their daily practices and spaces, which requires an ethnographic approach. Moreover, following Shore, we must also attend over time to the ways in which elites remain elites: they are dynamic groups with changing membership, not bounded entities.[21] This allows us to recognize the power and "endurance of old elite families," which shape the colonial context in which next generations of proto-nationalist elites—largely their sons—still had "privileged access to the machinery of the colonial state" while reproducing themselves in a newly independent context, as Jonathan Spencer has shown for the case of colonial elites in Sri Lanka.[22] Spencer's Sri Lankan elites resemble Goans in Mozambique, with their roots in the nineteenth century.[23] Goans of Mozambique have not only endured but also prospered over time, and reproduced themselves as elites over generations

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Thanks to Stefanie Lotter who called my attention to this point.

[19] Cris Shore, "Introduction" in Cris Shore and Stephen Nugent, eds., *Elite Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives* (London, 2002), 6.

[20] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of A Theory of Practice*, Richard Nice, transl. (Cambridge, 1995), 78–87.

[21] Cris Shore, "Introduction," 13.

[22] Jonathan Spencer, "The Vanishing Elite, the Political and Cultural Work of the Nationalist Revolution in Sri Lanka," in *Elite Cultures*, 95.

[23] For more details on the history of this earlier wave of Goan migration see Sharmila Karnik, "Goans in Mozambique," *Africa Quarterly* 38.3 (1998), 96–118 and Pamila Gupta, "Mapping Portuguese Decolonization."

with cultural, symbolic, and real capital, and in relation to other segments of postcolonial Mozambican society. Such elites are very much dependent on wider affiliations with elites abroad, as Stephen Nugent shows for Amazonian elites.[24] For the Goans of Mozambique, much of their elite status during colonialism and in the postcolonial context is predicated on continuing ties with elites in Goa, Portugal, Angola, and even Brazil and South Africa.[25]

Faced with a dearth of written historical sources, scholars can treat collections of life histories as a historical ethnographic method.[26] As Luise White aptly remarks, the issue is not whether life histories can be used as historical evidence but their *interpretive* value.[27] Within anthropology, the life history has been a popular methodology since the 1970s. In his study of an illiterate Moroccan Arab tile maker, Vincent Crapanzano allows his subject to "articulate his world and situate himself within it."[28] Next generations of anthropologists have since relied on life histories orally recorded, not only to access the past, but also memories and larger social patterns. When there is a disjuncture between historical and oral sources, as there is among the Goans of Mozambique,[29] life histories take on even more importance for social history: they attest to events and occurrences that left no visible written records but only "ethnographic traces."

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[24] Stephen Nugent, "Gente Boa, Elites in and of Amazonia" in Shore and Nugent, eds., *Elite Cultures*, 72.

[25] The Portuguese state explicitly promoted migrations among these places through ideological incentives and motivations; the legal context differs for those migrating across different state (colonial and national) boundaries. See Jessica Kuper's research on the Goans of Uganda: "The Goan Community in Kampala," in Michael Twaddle, ed., *Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians* (London, 1975).

[26] Goans appeared as a somewhat liminal category in my first forays into the archives in both Goa (January 2007) and Mozambique (March 2007).

[27] Luise White, "Cars Out of Place: Vampires, Technology, and Labor in East and Central Africa," in Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997), 438.

[28] Vincent Crapanzano, *Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan* (Chicago, 1980); Vincent Crapanzano, "The Life History in Anthropological Fieldwork," *Anthropology and Humanism Quarterly* 2 (1977), 3–7. For more recent ethnographies that use life histories successfully see Ruth Behar's *Translated Woman: Crossing the Border with Esperanza's Story* (Boston, 1994).

[29] Based on historical references, I went to Maputo expecting to find out about the expulsion of Goans from Mozambique in 1961, in the immediate aftermath of Goa's independence, but instead I found other migrations that did not appear in the historical sources.

I not only explore "landscapes of the sea,"[30] but I also look at how degrees and experiences of "otherness" among a specific group of colonized individuals shifted as they migrated from one Portuguese colony to another across the Indian Ocean. Such movements have not been central to anthropological studies of empire or colonial elites literatures,[31] or in histories of colonial migrations or Indian Ocean diasporic communities, until historian Sugata Bose invigorated Indian Ocean studies from varying disciplinary perspectives.[32]

Particularly helpful is historian Thomas Metcalf's compelling argument for looking at "webs of empire." Too often, he asserts, the history of a colony is written in isolation from its colonial neighbors—remaining within the limits of state archives.[33] Taking into account horizontal movements between colonies (and not just vertical movements between metropole and colony) reveals alternative and lesser-known colonial narratives, experiences, and subjectivities. As Metcalf connects British India and British Africa through migration within the Indian Ocean during the early twentieth century, he makes visible Indians caught up in this colonial matrix and their imaginings of new identities in the African context. They conceived of themselves not merely as colonial subjects but as "imperial citizens,"[34] an important distinction.

Similarly, anthropologist Engseng Ho identifies "local cosmopolitans" in a lesser-known and older diasporic community in the Indian Ocean. His study of the *Hadrami* diaspora defines "local cosmopolitans"

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[30] Michael Pearson, "Studying the Indian Ocean World: Problems and Opportunities," in H.P. Ray and E. Alpers, eds., *Cross Currents and Community Networks: The History of the Indian Ocean World* (Oxford, 2007), 16; Michael Pearson, "Littoral Society: The Concept and the Problems," *Journal of World History* 17.4 (2006), 367.

[31] The Goans of Mozambique are an exceptional case that points to the exceptionalisms of Portuguese colonialism generally. Within the extant anthropology of empire, studies are largely focused on creole elites (or mestizo communities) who are of mixed parentage (typically the product of a European father and colonized mother); very rarely are there examples of colonial elites who are migrants from another colonial context and under the same colonial power and whose positionality shifts dramatically in this new context, as is the case with the Goan Mozambicans. One such exception, however, is the work of Elizabeth Tonkin who has studied the Indian settler elite community in Kenya, and how they were integrated into the British colonial structure, below the English but above the Africans. See her "Settlers and the Elites in Kenya and Liberia" in *Elite Cultures*, 129–139.

[32] Sugata Bose, *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* (Cambridge, 2006).

[33] Thomas Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920.* (Berkeley, 2007), 9.

[34] Ibid., 2.

as "persons who, while imbedded in local relations, also maintain connections with distant places. They thus articulate a relation between different geographical scales."[35] Ho examines this diasporic community diachronically and his local cosmopolitans escape the binary of being defined either by attachments to a homeland or to a host country. Instead they are motivated by travel and mobility, interpolating minimally between at least two different contexts, and remaining "itinerant across the oceanic space."[36] They are deeply local and transnational at the same time, and without necessarily being in conflict over these "structures of feelings."[37] By using a wide variety of source materials (gravestones, textiles, biographies, genealogies, legal documents, poetry, novels, and prayers), Ho suggests the potential of accessing historical narratives in more creative, and perhaps, personalized ways.

On Longing and Belonging

> Migration has ambiguities of its own, based on what I would call the dialectics of "belonging" and "longing." The theme of belonging opposes rootedness to uprootedness, establishment to marginality. The theme of longing harps on the desire for change and movement, but relates this to the enigma of arrival, which brings a similar desire to return to what one has left. These themes are often regarded as typically modern predicaments, but I am not so sure.[38]

I take my title for this section from diaspora theorist Peter van der Veer, whose theme of "longing and belonging" fittingly encapsulates my focus on the "ambiguities of difference" of a specific migration, as opposed to its certainties. Van der Veer's development of "longing and belonging" as a dialectical process over time provides an analytical framework for understanding the sentiments of individual Goans living in Maputo, accessed through their life histories. Finally, his point that "change and movement" are part of all diasporic experiences over time, and not just a "modern predicament," echoes Ho's

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[35] Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim*, 31.
[36] Ibid., 189.
[37] Raymond Williams, "Structures of Feeling," in Raymond Williams, ed., *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford, 1977), 128–135.
[38] Peter van der Veer, "Introduction," in Peter van der Veer, ed., *and Migration: the Politics of Space in the South Asian Diaspora* (Philadelphia, 1995), 4.

focus on travel, mobility, and the "long duration" of diaspora.[39] The Goans of Maputo, too, are best understood as "local cosmopolitans" for whom colonial migrations shape but do not necessarily determine postcolonial mobilities.

Oddly, the Goans of Mozambique have attracted little scholarly attention precisely because they are so well integrated into Mozambican society, as opposed to, for example, the Goan diasporas of the U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom[40] or the Goan diasporas of (East) Africa. These latter studies often lump Goans together with other Asian and Indian migrants as "stranger communities," or as "the hyphen between Africans and Europeans,"[41] when in fact Goans were a distinct group with their own cultural patterns of migration, patterns that were very much imbricated in their history of colonial subjectivity over the *longue durée* of Portuguese rule. Sociologist Jessica Kuper, for example, makes a case for the uniqueness and separateness of the Goan community living in 1970s Uganda. These Ugandan Goans, largely working class clerks, cooks, and tailors, regarded themselves as "culturally European" rather than as Indian.[42] They also tended to see themselves as different from all other "Asians;" as a result, they largely kept to themselves within Ugandan society and maintained strong ties with Goa. This idea of distinctiveness emerges in the Mozambican case, too, but among a higher status group of elite Goans doctors and bankers, and with very unexpected and complicated effects, making "longing and belonging" complicated in this particular diasporic case.[43]

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[39] Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim*, 3.

[40] M. Cahen, D. Couto, R. de Souza, L. Marrou, and A. Siqueira, "Introduction: Issues of Asian Portuguese-Speaking Spaces and *Lusotopias*," *Lusotopie* (2000), 138.

[41] Jessica Kuper, "'Goan' and 'Asian' in Uganda: An Analysis of Racial Identity and Cultural Categories," in William Shack and Elliott Skinner, eds., *Strangers in African Societies* (Berkeley, 1979), 243.

[42] Jessica Kuper, "The Goan Community in Kampala," 58.

[43] Here it is fitting to keep in mind the point made by Délia Maciel's daughter, that the Portuguese purposely dispersed newly arrived Goan migrants throughout Mozambique so as to not allow for the creation of a Goan community in any one place. Interview with Carla Maciel, March 21, 2007. She also her recently completed dissertation: Carla Maciel, "Bantu Oral Narratives in the Training of EFL Teachers in Mozambique," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Linguistics, Illinois State University, 2007.

The 1920s: Empire Builders, Agency, and the Spirit of the Times

> Tropical doctors were best suited to treat tropical diseases among tropical peoples in tropical places.[44]

The speaker is Rafael Pereira, the first Goan director of the Goa Medical School, appointed in the 1880s. Since its inception in 1847, directors of this prestigious center for the teaching and learning of medicine were of Portuguese origin.[45] Pereira urged other doctors of Goan or "tropical" origin to immigrate to Portuguese Africa to help out with the larger Africa cause.[46] As Cristiana Bastos asserts in her case study of two Goan doctors—Arthur Gama and Germano Correia—who in fact did immigrate to the tropics of Mozambique during the late nineteenth century, these diasporic Goans occupied a peculiar and interesting position within the colonial hierarchy in Mozambique:

> Like the many Indo-Portuguese who served as colonial officers and doctors, Gama and Correia occupied an ambiguous, floating position in the hierarchies they described. Invited to participate in the inner circles of power and ideological formation, they were at the same time excluded from those circles as second-class citizens. As a group, they epitomized a feature of Portuguese colonialism: the production and segregation of particular groups that were allocated a key role in the colonial administration and at the same time banned from its upper echelons. Goan physicians illustrate the complex mutual constitution of colonizers and colonized, as the latter embrace the colonizers' political project and refine its ideology while serving as subordinate 'colonials,' producing and reproducing from their limbo the racialized views of the world needed to govern empire.[47]

Bastos points to several key points for understanding the Goans of Mozambique, notably their liminal position within the Portuguese colonial hierarchy. Even as they occupied an "ambiguous floating position," they were alternately invited into the inner circles of power

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[44] Rafael Pereira quoted in Cristiana Bastos, "Race, Medicine, and the late Portuguese Empire: the Role of Goan Colonial Physicians," *Journal of Romance Studies* 5.1 (2005), 27.

[45] Cristiana Bastos, "Race, Medicine, and the late Portuguese Empire," 26. According to Bastos, the Goa Medical School was started in 1842, recognized by the Portuguese colonial authorities in 1847, and operated until 1961, closing only with the demise of Portuguese control in Goa.

[46] This was the "third wave" of Portuguese colonialism (first Brazil, then India, finally Africa): Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (London, 1995).

[47] Cristiana Bastos, "Race, Medicine, and the late Portuguese Empire," 25.

and purposely kept out. At the same time, ideologically, as subordinate colonials, they promoted the ideology of colonialism, and were part of its apparatus of colonial governmentality.[48] Historian Sharmila Karnik also suggests these Goan immigrants did in fact "consolidate the administrative machinery of Portugal in Mozambique."[49] Bastos's suggestion that Goan physicians could be interpreted as "colonial handmaidens" of a larger Portuguese system is a fitting one, confirmed also in the life histories I collected.[50]

I first met Esmeralda, an anthropologist herself, on a sunny afternoon in Maputo in March 2007. After meeting outside a well-marked popular grocery store, we walked to her apartment located on the sixth floor of a non-descript cement building block. Ensconced in her apartment, surrounded by books, and with her newborn daughter sleeping in a back room, she recounted for me the history of her father's migration to Mozambique from Goa.[51] Her father had been one of a handful of Goan doctors who had come to work and live in Mozambique after 1920. Born in 1900 in Loutilim (Goa) to a Catholic Brahmin Portuguese-speaking family, he had chosen to first go to Portugal to continue his studies in medicine, in 1920. After qualifying as a doctor in the metropole, he had worked in the north of the country before deciding to continue his studies further in Paris. Newly married to a French woman, he arrived in Mozambique in 1928 to take up a prestigious medical post in Inhambane; according to Esmeralda, he was this region's first doctor. After his wife's sudden death five years later, he returned to Portugal to once again take up a post there. However, according to Esmeralda, by the 1950s he had found the "Salazar culture" intolerable so he returned to Mozambique, together with his new second Portuguese wife. It was in Lourenço Marques [present day Maputo] that he created a life for himself; working as a medical doctor, he produced a family of five children. Esmeralda recalled her father did not feel part of the "Goan community" in Maputo, but did go to the *Goa Club* regularly on Sundays to play chess.

Another son of a Goan arriving in the 1920s, Fernandes, a father of two, and married to a Portuguese Mozambican, recalled how his

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[48] David Scott, "Colonial Governmentality," *Social Text* 43 (Autumn 1995), 191–220.
[49] Sharmila Karnik, "Goans in Mozambique," 99.
[50] Cristiana Bastos, "Race, Medicine, and the late Portuguese Empire," 26.
[51] Interview with Esmeralda, March 22, 2007, Maputo, Mozambique.

father came to Mozambique in 1927, at age twenty.[52] He was part of the colonial drive, the so-called "spirit of the times" that encouraged Goan men to look to the sea, to seek their fortunes, and to improve their economic situation in Africa.[53] Fernandes's father was one of the many immigrants who had come to work as managers [*prazeiros*] of the landed estates located in the interior of Mozambique,[54] just as had been the case for the fathers of Raul, Cesar, and Filipe, three other Goan Mozambicans I met.[55] This group of Goans was different from the upper class privileged group that Esmeralda's father mingled with; they enjoyed a middle class standing, were practicing Catholics, both Portuguese and Konkani speaking, and with much closer familial ties to Goa. After having established himself in Mozambique, Fernandes's father returned to Goa in the 1950s to find a Goan wife able and willing to live in Mozambique, a typical pattern of diasporic communities. Raul's father instead married the daughter of a close family friend also of Goan origin; not coincidently, their respective families had known each other in Goa prior to emigration. Cesar's father, even as he returned to Goa every four years on a regular basis—a practice also not uncommon for diasporic members—met and married a Mozambican-born Goan from Beira. Meanwhile, Filipe's father followed the pattern of Fernandes's father, establishing himself in Mozambique before returning to Goa in the 1940s to find a wife. Interestingly, upon retirement, Filipe's father had chosen to return to Goa; the year was 1960, one year before Goa's decolonization. However, finding a suitable wife was never straightforward: Filipe openly admitted to me that many of these same Goan men had, in the period between arrival in Mozambique and their return to Goa, lived with African Mozambican women in relationships of concubinage, often producing children in the process. Typically, however, neither mother nor child was acknowledged after each man's return to Mozambique with his Goan wife. This was

[52] Interview with Fernandes, March 19, 2007, Maputo, Mozambique.

[53] Naresh Fernandes, "Tomb Raider: Looking for St. Francis Xavier," in Jerry Pinto, ed., *Reflected in Water, Writings on Goa* (New Delhi, 2006), 77.

[54] Manfred Prinz, "Intercultural Links between Goa and Mozambique in their Colonial and Contemporary History," in C. Borges and H. Feldmann, eds., *Goa and Portugal: Their Cultural Links* (New Delhi, 1997), 112–115.

[55] Interview with Raul March 21, 2007, Maputo, Mozambique. Interview with Filipe, March 20, 2007, Maputo, Mozambique.

just one of the many ways of "making empire respectable," to quote Ann Stoler.[56]

The story of Sandra's mother is a very different and perhaps unusual one.[57] Sandra herself, now in her eighties, has difficulties moving about, so I went to interview her in the family home that she shares with her daughter, Goan son-in-law, and their children in a prosperous tree-lined avenue in Maputo not far from Fernandes's house. Her African Mozambican mother, at the age of four years old, had gone to Goa with the wealthy Goan family that employed her grandmother as a servant. After living in Goa for twenty years, Sandra's mother returned to Mozambique in the 1920s at the age of twenty-four; she first married another African who had also lived in Goa as a child of servants; as Sandra recalled to me, it was their love of the Konkani language and their shared experiences as Africans in Goa that brought them together. However, the marriage eventually ended, producing no children during its short-lived tenure.[58] Her mother next met and married a Goan man, Sandra's father. Sandra, having never visited Goa, only Lisbon, grew up speaking Konkani and Portuguese, and learning all the proper Goan dishes such as *sorpatel*,[59] Goan family recipes that had been passed down to her by her (African) mother. She married the son of a mixed African and Portuguese couple, producing a daughter Carla who was now married to Raul, whose father had also emigrated from Goa to Mozambique in the 1920s. Sandra's and Esmeralda's life histories reflect opposite ends of the spectrum, suggesting no simple way to categorize the movements of the 1920s.

These Goans seem very much like Ho's "local cosmopolitans;" they very much occupied what Bastos called "ambiguous floating positions" within the colonial hierarchy, with the potential to go either way, as the cases of Esmeralda's father and Sandra herself suggest. That many Goan men of this generation chose to intermarry with Goan women reinforces Bastos's point that this same "floating position also risked being ranked lower than the members of his ethnic group considered proper,"[60] hence the practice of abandoning one's African concubine

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[56] Ann Stoler, "Making Empire Respectable," 635.

[57] Interview with Sandra, March 22, 2007, in Maputo, Mozambique.

[58] It was unclear if he had died or if they divorced.

[59] *Sorpatel* is one of the most typically "Goan" specialties—a spicy pork curry served over rice; it serves as a defining identity marker for Catholic cuisine in Goa.

[60] Cristiana Bastos, "Race, Medicine, and the late Portuguese Empire," 32.

and illegitimate child in order to continue "making empire respectable" through sexual unions and reproduction exclusively with Goans.[61] The majority of them were working in the service of the state—they had been "invited to build an empire" in the words of Fernandes—but their respective individual ideological positionings within the empire were less clearly demarcated, a point that is salient for the next generation of migrants who arrived during the period of Goa's decolonization.

The 1950s–1960s: Goan Decolonization, Resistance, and Neocolonialism

> The practice of ambivalence, interdependence, and hybridity was a necessity of the Portuguese colonial relation.[62]

The period between the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a renewed phase of Goan migration to Mozambique, continuing the trend started in the 1920s. Many came as the "wives" and "children" of Goans already settled in Mozambique, as was the case for Filipe who came with his mother in the year 1954, at the age of fourteen, to join his father who had arrived thirty years earlier.[63] Others arrived in the port city of Lourenço Marques [present day Maputo] via steamships as they sought to flee Portuguese decolonization in Goa. Specifically, as India gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947 and during its violent partition into the Indian and Pakistani nation-states, the "Goa question" continually loomed on the horizon.[64] Just as the French had Pondicherry, the Portuguese had Goa, Daman, and Diu, all functioning as "colonial enclaves" amidst a larger British India and alongside several princely states. For newly elected Indian Prime Minister Nehru, however, the "Goa question" was first put on a backburner in order to deal with what were considered more pressing issues, namely the bloody aftermath of Partition. It was only in 1954 with the peaceful and quiet removal of the French by their own volition from Pondicherry that Goa's colonial future became a more pressing issue both

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[61] Ann Stoler, "Making Empire Respectable," 635–637.

[62] Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Between Prospero and Caliban: Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Inter-Identity," Special Issue, *"Portuguese Cultural Studies," Luso-Brazilian Review* 39, 2 (Winter, 2002), 16.

[63] Filipe interview, March 20, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique.

[64] Pamila Gupta, "What About Goa? The Role of the Press in the Politics of Goan Independence, 1947–1961" (unpublished paper, 1997).

within India and on the international scene.[65] From 1954 until Portugal's forced removal from Goa by Indian troops in 1961—a moment still regarded as an "invasion" by many embittered Portuguese and Goans alike[66]—some Goans began to foresee that Goa would inevitably become part of India. They chose to immigrate to another Portuguese colony—in this case Mozambique—for reasons of culture, language, and religion. Thus, while many Goans located both inside and outside of Goa itself had very strong political views regarding Goa's future, vehemently refusing to believe that it could possibly be integrated into India, others living in Goa at the time saw that it was a real likelihood and chose emigration as a direct response.

The life of Délia very much reflects this tumultuous period in Goa's history. I had been told earlier that I had to meet Délia, for she was considered a real source on "all things Goan" by many of my other Goan informants. An elderly lady who had just turned eighty years old, she agreed to meet me in the early evening at her home, shortly after her afternoon nap.[67] As she recounted the story of her life to me, I realized that, through her writing, she was one of the few connecting "slender threads across the ocean."[68] She had in fact written her own life history, entitled *Fragmentos da Minha Vida* [Fragments of My Life].[69] As we sat at her Indo-Portuguese-styled wooden dining table sipping coffee, Délia stressed the importance of recording this unwritten history for the other Goans living in Maputo, in order to give future generations of Goans a better sense of "community."[70] Délia herself was born in Goa in 1927 in a small *aldeia* [village] where her parents had been teachers in a Portuguese-speaking primary school.

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[65] Ibid.

[66] Evidenced in interviews with Portuguese citizens in Lisbon, Portugal in 1998 and with Goans in Goa, India in 1999. More recently, in the context of conducting research on the Goan Mozambicans of Maputo, I had a phone interview with Carlos in March 23, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique. He expressed this same response of embittered and impassioned defiance, a response that will also come up with Mozambique's 1975 independence even as its decolonization was a very different process.

[67] Interview with Délia Maciel, March 21, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique.

[68] Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim*, 29.

[69] Délia das Dores Ataide Lobo Maciel, *Fragmentos da Minha Vida*, (Maputo, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 2003). At the beginning of the interview she tentatively and somewhat guardedly showed me her manuscript. By the end of our discussion two hours later, she had lent me one of her few precious copies so that I could make a photocopy. Included in her manuscript are also poems written by her, another form of history writing according to Engseng Ho. I thank Délia for her generosity.

[70] Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim*, 94.

At this point in our interview, she recounted for me an incident from childhood that had indelibly marked her. She had been a small child, no older than ten years old, when she had been walking with her parents through the streets of Panjim—then the capital of Portuguese India. They had walked past what she realized only afterward was a demonstration protesting British colonial rule in India. She innocently started to join in, raising her right arm and crying out the popular slogan of *Jai Hind* [Victory to India], the well-known phrase that captured the hearts and minds of most Gandhian-inspired Indians fighting for self-rule. Instead of joining in, Délia's parents quickly slapped her, saying that her actions would get all of them in trouble. This "ethnographic trace" recalls not only the palpable tensions surrounding Indian independence, but the extent to which Goa was affected during these tumultuous times. Délia's story shows that Goans as a group were deeply divided (and sometimes ambivalent) in their state loyalties (Portugal vs. India), and that British India's future was closely monitored by the Portuguese, as perhaps setting a precedent for their own future. Testimonies of other Goan Mozambicans echoed similar points and positionings.

Délia's story also recounts the innocence of a child and the inculcation of political attitudes by her parents. By the year 1954, the situation had worsened in Goa, at least for those who supported Portugal's continued colonial hold. Délia decided to follow in the footsteps of her two elder brothers—one of whom had been trained as a doctor at the Goa Medical School—by immigrating to Mozambique. Délia arrived by boat in the port city of Lourenço Marques at the age of twenty-six, a degree in nursing in hand. By 1960, on the eve of "Goa's independence,"[71] she had met and married a Goan Mozambican who had been born in Mozambique and who was a banker, a popular middle class profession among many Goans of Maputo. Eventually they set up house in Maputo and had four daughters. Délia remembered Goans being "poorly treated" by the Portuguese in Mozambique, although she could not recall a particular incident for me. At this point in the retelling of her life history, Délia paused to mention that if she had

[71] Depending on ideological positioning and the fact that Goa became a Union Territory of India rather than an independent nation, different Goans refer to 1961 either as the year of Goa's "liberation" or its "invasion" by the Indian government. I prefer to use the more ideologically neutral term of "independence" to suggest its decolonization from Portuguese colonial rule.

been single at the time of Goa's liberation, she would have definitely returned to her homeland since her parents and her ties remained with Goa, and less so with Mozambique. This last detail is a telling one for it suggests migration both as a form of neocolonialism, and as a complicated form of resistance, even if it was not put into practice by Délia.

The story of Edith who, like Délia, came to Mozambique as a young woman, differs little from others;[72] however, it contains "ethnographic traces" that open up different research questions and point to different Goan genealogies and ideologies. Edith was twenty-seven when she first arrived in Mozambique. The year was 1964, three years after Goa's integration into the Indian nation-state. As she remarked to me during our very brief interview, she remembered very well Goa's independence, calling it a "tragic" event in Goa's history. While her reasons for emigration to Mozambique were never clearly stated, I sensed this "tragedy" had much to do with her choice to emigrate.[73] After one year living in the north of Mozambique, she left for Portugal where she attended art school in Lisbon. One year later she returned to Mozambique. Very soon afterward she met and married a Goan Mozambican, produced three sons, got involved in Mozambique's independence movement, and continued to live between Portugal and Mozambique. It is interesting that on the subject of Goa's "invasion" (her word choice) she aligned herself with its Portuguese colonizers, but was simultaneously a strong defender of India, but in a different context. She told me that while living in Portugal, she had been identified as being Indian; her response had been to defend India saying that it had an older civilization than Portugal itself. Similarly, she was also a staunch defender of Mozambique's independence from Portuguese colonial rule. That her statements seem ideologically inconsistent (both pro- and anti-Portuguese) suggest the complexity of the issues at hand, particularly the exceptional case of Goa. As Edith recounted her life story, I could not help but notice that her apartment was a shrine to art by Lusophones; included on her walls were many of her own beautiful pieces of artwork. Interestingly, Edith does not today consider herself exclusively Goan, Mozambican, or Portuguese even though she lives in Maputo. Instead, she describes herself as a "citizen

[72] Interview with Edith, March 22, 2007, in Maputo, Mozambique.

[73] Once again, I suggest that we cannot forget forms of neocolonialism that are part and parcel of postcoloniality. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Between Prospero and Caliban," 16.

of the world," with deep attachments to three continents: India, Africa, and Europe.

My interviews with Délia and Edith suggest that political attitudes change not only with contexts and life experiences, but with maturity. Moreover, both their testimonies suggest that the cultural effects of colonization did not end with physical decolonization; instead they live on and give birth to overlapping and sometimes contradictory practices (such as migration) and ideologies (including neocolonialism) in the postcolonial period, sometimes even within one individual.[74]

Délia's daughter, Carla (whom I met quite by accident as she was leaving her mother's apartment) was also a historian in her own right, giving me insights into the path of her ancestors and migration to Mozambique more generally. Newly arrived from the U.S. after having completed a PhD in Linguistics, she had come "home" for a visit, her future location uncertain.[75] As she pointed out to me, it was during the period that her mother came to Mozambique—the 1950s—that the largest number of Portuguese peasants also arrived in Mozambique and Angola, as part of a wider state-sponsored campaign to enlarge the number of "white" Europeans resident in overseas colonies. That they were simultaneously escaping (post-World War Two) poverty and dictatorial Salazarism made the African colonies desirable sites for immigration and improved living conditions.[76] That the majority of these peasants were illiterate in a land where Goan immigrants were highly educated and skilled was not lost on the Portuguese colonial administration of Mozambique.[77] They, in turn, purposely kept individual Goans apart from each other, isolating them upon arrival, in order to prevent the development of a politicized Goan community that could potentially resist colonialism and allow Mozambique to go the way of Goa.[78]

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[74] See Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 33.

[75] Interview with Carla Maciel, March 21, 2007; Maciel, "Bantu Oral Narratives."

[76] Ibid.

[77] Interview with Carla Maciel. March 21, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique.

[78] Ibid. Here it is important to remember that individual Goans did experience forms of racism as Cesar recounted for me. As a child growing up between the late 1950s and early 1960s, he remembers being one of the best students in his school, yet he never received any of the annual school prizes since, as he recalled, they were reserved for the Portuguese students.

Mozambican Independence, Chaos, and Dreams (1975)

> They had had enough of the country, which was supposed to be the promised land but had brought them disenchantment and abasement. They said farewell to their African homes, with mixed despair and rage, sorrow and impotence, with the feeling of leaving for ever. All they wanted was to get out with their lives and to take their possessions with them.[79]

Historian Fred Cooper has argued that "patterns of decolonization are particularly difficult to unravel because we know the end point: the emergence of the independent state from colonial rule… What is lost in such a reading are the ways in which different groups within colonies mobilized for concrete ends and used as well as opposed the institutions of the colonial… Whether such efforts fed into the attempts of nationalist parties to build anti-colonial coalitions needs to be *investigated, not assumed.*"[80] Goans responded in very different ways to decolonization, some reinforcing ideologies of colonialism through migration to the metropole, while others opened up niches for themselves by aligning themselves with the newly elected authority, even as they faced the future with a sense of "disquiet."

"It was chaos but we had such dreams."[81] That is the way Fernandes described the tumultuous events surrounding Mozambique's independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975. Fernandes and his Portuguese Mozambican wife, Maria, both described how it felt, as young Mozambicans barely twenty years old at the time, to get caught up in the politics of independence. Both Fernandes and Maria stated they decided to stay in Maputo for reasons of "love," as they had just met in 1975. They remembered feeling like they had a purpose, a reason for staying, although for Maria, it had been a more difficult choice to make given that the rest of her family had chosen to emigrate to Portugal. For Fernandes, however, it had been a far easier decision to stay as the majority of his family also remained in Maputo after decolonization. In describing his positionality within Mozambican society both today and in the past, he poignantly described how he continues to

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[79] Ryszard Kapuscinksi, *Another Day of Life* (London, 1987), 13.

[80] Frederick Cooper, "The Dialectics of Decolonization: Nationalism and Labor Movements in Postwar French Africa" in Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper, eds. *Tensions of Empire*, 406, emphasis mine.

[81] Interview with Fernandes and Maria, March 19, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique.

feel "Portuguese without a concept of race."[82] Perhaps Fernandes and Maria represent a hopeful postcolonial Mozambique with all its complicated histories of migration. However, they, like many other Goans I met, now face the future with increased uncertainty, as they both keep changing their minds about whether or not to stay or go. They have purposely sent their three children to South Africa for schooling to escape the poor conditions of living in Maputo.

For other Goans living in Mozambique, the choice to stay or to leave was informed less by politics than by age. As many of the Goans—including Fernandes—informed me, those who left were largely elderly Goans leaving Maputo to retire (and in some sense die) in Portugal, a country and culture that for some was just as familiar as Mozambique. Fewer Goans chose to return to their so-called "homeland," perhaps because they felt even further displaced from it than from Portugal. Délia, for example, chose to stay in Mozambique in the aftermath of 1975. She acutely described the situation, suggesting that those who left did so out of "fear," whereas for those who stayed (including herself), it was a choice made out of "strength," a commitment to deal with the unknown and the "new" Mozambique. Délia perhaps oversimplified the decision to stay or go by eliding age, class, race, and gender politics, removing these as crucial factors in the decision-making process,[83] but the pride with which she made this declaration suggests the resoluteness of many Goans like herself to commit themselves to life in postcolonial Mozambique. Interestingly, the brother she had followed in the 1950s decided to leave Mozambique for nearby Angola even as it too was experiencing its own chaotic decolonization from Portuguese colonial rule.[84]

Other Goan Mozambicans, including Raul, explained to me that the divide between those who stayed and those who left reflected race and class patterns of marriage. Simply put, Goans married to a Portuguese

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[82] As Engseng Ho notes, names that circulate beyond nations allow "local cosmopolitans" to remain comfortably within many nations. Since Goans are not marked through their Portuguese names, they can comfortably fit in Mozambique, Goa, Portugal, and even Brazil. See Ho, *The Graves of Tarim*, 190.

[83] Interview with Esmeralda, March 22, 2007, in Maputo, Mozambique.

[84] Délia's brother was not the only one to follow this pattern of migration from Mozambique to Angola. According to Ana van Eck (Portuguese Angolan herself, Portuguese language teacher at Wits University, conversation with her March 7, 2007) there was a small exodus of Goans who in fact moved from Mozambique to Angola, joining the already established Goan community in Luanda.

left. Goans married to African Mozambicans more than likely stayed. Raul based his summary on his own life experiences, for he, a Mozambican-born Goan, and his wife, who was of mixed Portuguese, African, and Goan parentage, had actively decided to stay in Maputo for these very ideological and practical reasons.[85] Fernandes echoed Raul's point, suggesting that decolonization created even more serious cleavages within families, again based on marriage patterns.[86] That is, more often than not, older generations chose to emigrate, leaving behind the next generation of Goan Mozambicans; however, in some extreme cases, Goan parents left, cutting off all ties with their host country and purposely not recognizing the (impending) marriages of their children to African Mozambicans. According to my informants, the same splits sometimes occurred among siblings.[87] In other words, "race" was always a fraught, if generational, category for Goans caught between Portuguese and African Mozambicans.

Of course these generalizations do not necessarily hold up for all Goans; in the case of Goan Mozambican Fernandes and his Portuguese Mozambican wife and in that of Cesar and his Portuguese wife, politics trumped race in their decision to stay in Maputo after decolonization.[88] The case of Esmeralda's parents is an interesting one which suggests there existed ideological divides within families, even between husbands and wives. With Mozambican independence in 1975, Esmeralda's elderly Goan father wanted to take the family and return to Portugal whereas her much younger Portuguese mother wanted to stay out of a political commitment to seeing Mozambique through its political transition. In the end, Esmeralda's father died shortly afterward in Maputo, "a sad and broken man" who had lost all his fortunes with Mozambican nationalization.[89] Esmeralda's mother quietly returned to Portugal after the start of Mozambique's civil war, and still lives there today.[90] Of course, other Goans, like Edith, initially

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[85] Interview with Raul and Carla, March 21, 2007, in Maputo, Mozambique.

[86] Interview with Fernandes, March 19, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique.

[87] This had happened in her own family. Interview with Esmeralda, March 22, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique.

[88] Interview with Cesar, March 20, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique.

[89] Interview with Esmeralda, March 22, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique. According to Esmeralda, her father, an extremely wealthy man at the time of decolonization, lost all his properties with nationalization. Similarly, the Goan clubs that he had frequented were also closed down; there were no longer allocated space for Goan sociality. See Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim*, 3.

[90] Interview with Esmeralda, May 22, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique.

rejected political commitments to Mozambican independence but then changed their minds once there. While living in Portugal during the transition to independence, she returned to Maputo with her family soon thereafter in 1983. Her husband had been actively involved in Mozambique's post independence politics, tragically dying for his political beliefs three years later. Just as Edith's apartment had been a shrine to her art, it was also a shrine to her late husband, and thus to the history of Mozambique.[91]

Of course, one must also take into account that the conditions of travel have also changed dramatically since the 1920s when Esmeralda's father immigrated by sea to Mozambique from Goa via Portugal and France, or even since the 1950s when middle class individuals like Délia first crossed the Indian Ocean in a steamship. The choice of whether to stay or go (and where to specifically) are now more feasible, more imaginary, and far more open-ended in this era of air transport. This is a point not lost on the next generation of cosmopolitan Goan Mozambicans.

Goans occupied a position of "disquiet" on the eve of decolonization. They were very much caught between the outgoing Portuguese colonial administration and the incoming Mozambican government. On the one side, Goans were never forcibly told to leave by the Portuguese; instead, they were given incentives to immigrate to Portugal, in much the same way that they had earlier been given incentives to move to Portuguese Africa, in a bid to prove Mozambique incapable of self-rule in their absence. They were as embittered on the eve of Mozambique's decolonization, as they had been in facing decolonization in Goa. In Africa, the incoming post-independence government promoted the slogan of "go back to Goa," suggesting that they had no place in the new Mozambique; it was now an "Africa for Africans." But even as the newly elected government made the claim that Goans had no place in postcolonial Mozambique, they saw each Goan migration to Portugal as a betrayal and collective Goan collusion with the Portuguese colonial government.[92] Goans became pawns in a large game of chess, each side claiming them as their own or as allies. The details of their moves then were lost in the political struggles of decolonization

[91] Interview with Edith, March 22, 2007 in Maputo, Mozambique.

[92] For a comparable example of the complicated position of Goans in Uganda, see Jessica Kuper, "'Goan' and 'Asian' in Uganda: An Analysis of Racial Identity and Cultural Categories," 243.

and postcolonial transition. As was the case of the Hadrami studied by Ho, "in the aftermath of decolonization, the identification of the new states with single nations made the creole transnational commitments of diasporic communities untenable. The new independent nation-states broke the diasporas straddling them into two: citizens and aliens."[93] In other words, individual members of these creole, transnational diasporic communities had to make difficult choices, choices that had everything to do with history, culture, and power.

Conclusion: The Disquieting of History

If we think about diaspora at its etymological level as a "scattering of seed"[94] then the Goans of Mozambique formed a diaspora. They scattered their seeds in multiple directions—Mozambique, Goa, Portugal—at different moments in time—the 1920s, 1950s–1960s, and after 1975—creating diasporic communities with numerous ties elsewhere—in Goa, India, Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, the U.S., etc. By employing Thomas Metcalf's concept of "webs of empire" and Engseng Ho's analytic of "local cosmopolitanism" to understand the Goan diaspora in Maputo as part of a larger Indian Ocean narrative, we are not only allowed access to complicated life histories and fractured identities, but also to rethink colonial and postcolonial migrations as they are tied to interconnected decolonization experiences.[95] This case study has focused on the "ambiguities of difference," opening up a space for looking at the unexpected ways in which colonial categories of race and culture shift in the act of migration, and with varying results in the postcolonial era.[96] For the next generation of Goan Mozambicans, however, it will be a very different story, albeit one of both continuity and change. Thus, while some of the children of this generation of Goan Mozambicans born after independence are following in the footsteps of their ancestors by emigrating to Portugal, others are renewing attachments to old places (Goa and Portugal) and/or creating attachments to new places (South Africa, the United

[93] Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim*, 305.
[94] Ibid., xxiii.
[95] Ibid., 314.
[96] Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 8.

Kingdom, Brazil, Macau),[97] while still other "local cosmopolitans" are choosing to remain in Maputo, embracing their Goan-ness, Portuguese-ness, and Mozambican-ness simultaneously. Many of these Goan Mozambicans visit Goa and Portugal to re-establish ties with ancestral homes and long lost relatives, often through new forms of travel and experience such as heritage tourism. There has also been a revival in celebrating one's Goan-ness through such events as "Goa Day" which takes place annually on 20 August in Maputo, and coincides with other "Goa Days" celebrated in the U.S., U.K., Portugal, and Brazil. Thus, I leave the reader with the "disquieting" reflections of Paula, a Goan Mozambican born on the eve of Mozambique's independence, and presently living in Maputo who writes:

> I've never had enough to travel to Goa in order to know what belongs to me from that past.... I'm thinking about write [*sic*] a story for a film on my family and some other family stories that cross the oceans and look after who they are.... and I think I'm closer to a kind [of] answer, that moves me from the concept of not really having rotes [*sic*] to a place where I'm feeling comfortable with who I am, no matter from where it cames [*sic*].[98]

[97] In my interviews with Goan Mozambicans, these were the country names that came up as places that their children were either moving to or already living in.

[98] Email exchange with Paula March 7, 2007.

AFTERWORD: MIGRATION AND GLOBALIZATION: BRIDGING THREE ERAS IN MODERN WORLD HISTORY

Donna R. Gabaccia

Since it was the editors who somewhat peremptorily carved out temporal and geographical slices of the world for authors to explore, it seems only fair in concluding this volume to assess how effectively those slices now fill the world historian's plate. My purpose in this final chapter is to call readers' attention to the myriad ways that authors specializing on migrations in a particular time but a wide variety of interconnected locations have approached the integration of migration into world history. That integration provided the rationale for collecting their essays in the first place.

Much like seas and continents, historians' periodizations of the past both connect and divide. It is my assumption that the choice of appropriate large-scale spatial and temporal units will ultimately determine how, and how successfully, histories of migration can be integrated into the much larger and longer temporal and geographical scales of world history.

Scholars across disciplines have responded to exciting new theorizations of space in the past decade and world history, along with many other historical subfields, including the study of migration, have responded by re-imagining how space interacts with human movements of many kinds. I am convinced, however, that it will be careful attention to the periodization of migrations and related global connections (notably trade and the circulation of ideas) that will become historians' most valuable contribution to contemporary and interdisciplinary debates about globalization. Thus, although I begin by acknowledging how contributors to this volume help us to assess the main spatial units of world history, my main focus will be the challenges of bringing the temporality of migration and the temporality of world history into a mutually beneficial synchronization.

Migration, Spatiality, and World History: A Few Thoughts

This volume's attention to seas, water routes, and ports is neither new nor revolutionary.[1] Nevertheless, a focus on migrations across water can produce a different understanding of migration's place in world history than a focus on continents, intercontinental routes and roads, land borders, empires, civilizations, hemispheres, or analytical units like "the global north" or "the global south." It was, after all, across water that the seas became connected, marking the years around 1500 as a significant moment in the re-organization of global space.

As Dirk Hoerder's overview of a temporally-still-longer global history of migration suggests, readers should not see in the volume's focus on the modern world an implicit brief for treating humans before 1500 as less mobile than they would be after 1500. At most, this volume's focus on the modern world asks readers to consider whether or not humans before and after that date have been mobile in differing ways. Part of that difference is spatial. Many historians would agree that migrations contributed to the creation of a globally interconnected, modern world that did not exist at any other previous moment in human history. Even Patrick Manning's thoroughly global account of the early peopling of the earth assumes that the humans who reached Australia and North America 60,000 years after they left Africa were not socially or culturally connected across space to those living in the African or Asian sites through which their distant ancestors had migrated tens of thousands of years earlier.[2] Indeed, most studies of human migration prior to 1492 focus on complex and sometimes even intercontinental and many-cultured but still separate and not yet globally interconnected "worlds," e.g., the Afro-Eurasian "ecumene" of William O'Neill,[3] the huge but separated land empires of the years before 1500, and the land-encircled Mediterranean world described by Wang Gungwu in his introduction.

The interconnection of *all* world regions through migration, marriage, trade, conquest, or conversion became possible only after 1500,

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[1] Its origins can be traced to Duke University's "Oceans Connect" project of the 1990s. For an introduction see Martin W. Lewis and Karen Wigen, "A Maritime Response to the Crisis in Area Studies," *The Geographical Review* 89.2 (April 1999), 162–168.

[2] Patrick Manning, *Migration in World History* (New York, 2005).

[3] William H. McNeill, *The Ecumene: Story of Humanity* (New York, 1973).

as occupants of the Mediterranean, the China Seas, and the Indian Ocean came to know of the Caribbean and the Americas and began to explore the large Atlantic and even vaster Pacific that surrounded the Americas, separating them from the eastern and western margins of the "Old World" ecumene. Migrations helped to make the world global and modern at the same time.

The authors in this volume draw a map of the world that is quite different from the usual land-based one of discrete and bounded civilizations, continents, and nation states. In doing so, some important phenomena of both world history and migration history are lost: to name just one example, the peopling of land frontiers could not earn as central a place in this volume as it has in regional, national, and continental histories.[4] Focused on the ports and seas, the vast continental hinterlands occupied by indigenes also shrink from view. The exception here is, of course, the islands of Hawai'i explored by Christine Skwiot. For those who wish to write a history of continuity or change in the history of racialized labor relations, a land-based analysis offers greater promise for understanding interactions of colonization, labor recruitment, and indigenous life.[5]

Authors studying the seas and oceans, and their travelers, are increasingly substituting for a land-based map of the world a global mapping of networks, with urban nodes, typically in port cities like Hong Kong, Amsterdam, or Liverpool, with their grounded hinterlands and their long networks of sea-based sea routes. The contributors studying the seas around China, notably Carl Trocki, Elisabeth Sinn, and Takeshi Hamashita are particularly effective in showing how individual trading and migratory sub-regions were gradually connected through new sea routes, encouraging rapid growth in some cities, and extending trade routes that eventually connect to far-off oceans and seas. The overlapping subregions and merchant diasporas (as described by Markovits) that developed around the shores of the Indian Ocean share much in common with the organization of watery spaces east of Asia. Nodal places such as Hawai'i or Hong Kong then emerge, in the work of Christine Skwiot and Elizabeth Sinn, to connect not only the far-flung

[4] Richard W. Slatta, "The Whys and Wherefores of Comparative Frontier History," *Journal of the West* 42.1 (Winter 2003), 8–13.

[5] Martin J. Daunton and Rick Halpern, eds., *Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850* (Philadelphia, 1999).

shores of the huge Pacific, but also the naval trade routes of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans and the Caribbean. Before we can begin to grasp the contours of an accurate periodiziation for the modern work, this kind of careful, and contextualized mapping of how sea-based connections become networks, and how they are both nodes and circuits in existing networks, was essential.

How spatial connections between old and new worlds and between widely-separated corners of the old world developed over time can, on the basis of the essays connected here, can be viewed in at least two ways. In the first view, webs of connection between oceans developed fairly continuously and progressively over time. In a second view, a series of moments of globalization (understood here as thickening global connections and increasing volumes of movements of one or more kinds from one node to others) alternated with periods of collapse, or at least of interregional or interoceanic "thinning." Evaluating the power of these two somewhat contradictory scenarios constitutes the central challenge for those seeking a workable periodization for teaching and research in modern world history.

Migration, Temporality, and World History: The Main Challenges

The essays collected here suggest that movements of people have fairly continuously connected all regions of the world since the sixteenth century. The years between 1750 and 1820 and again between the 1920s and 1950 (in the Atlantic) and the 1870s, 1880s and 1940s worldwide can be singled out as temporary periods of substantially diminished migrations. The essays of *Connecting Seas* provide considerable evidence that it is continuities of migratory linkages among the oceanic worlds rather than the ruptures that are most impressive. Several essays, however, also point to the middle years of the twentieth century as a moment of significant reorganization of global space.

Consider first—as evidence of long-term continuity—the simple quantitative measure of mobile populations across time. Today, according to U.N. estimates, slightly over 3 percent of the world's residents live outside the *country* of their birth. In 1930 Adam McKeown notes in his essay, 2 percent lived outside the *continent* of their birth. It is not unreasonable to hypothesize that in 1750, when the population of the world was about 700 million, the proportions of those who had crossed a significant cultural boundary through travel and subsequent

residence would fall within the same range (e.g. 14–21 million). The data provided somewhat haphazardly by our contributors do suggest that a diligent and quantitatively inclined historian—familiar with the Indian Ocean and China Seas circuits, the silk route, the early modern empires, and the Atlantic slave trade—might, with no particularly heroic investment of effort, perform the required calculations.

A mobility rate of 2–3 percent of world populations over three centuries seems laughingly trivial and may explain why world historians have not long made migration a central theme in their accounts. Had migration or mobile humans ever seemed as ubiquitous and inevitable as, say, the development and practice of agriculture, trade, or religious faith, it would have been "present at the creation" of world history, and the current challenge of integrating scholarship on human migrations into world history simply would not exist. Yet, there may still be good reason for readers to ponder Patrick Manning's portrait of humans as a mobile species. So firmly have scholars regarded humans (including themselves?) as normally or naturally *sedentary* or, at most, as preferring to move only over relatively short distances that the vehemence of societal responses to migrations have been harder to ignore than the migrations themselves. Migrants as a group have neither emerged evenly from sending regions around the world nor have they worked or settled in evenly distributed numbers. In 2005 when only 3 percent of the world's population lived outside the country of their birth, the resident population of the United Arab Emirates was 71 percent foreign-born, trailed by—to list only a few of the largest countries of immigration—Singapore (42.6 percent), Israel (39.6 percent), Switzerland (22.9 percent), Australia (20.3 percent), and Canada (18.9 percent). With less than 15 percent foreign-born, the United States experienced three periods of heated debate over immigration between 1986 and 2006.

As this suggests, scholars, governing elites, and ordinary men and women in each of these three eras have regarded global mobility rates of 2–3 percent, even when distributed across the population of the entire world, as problematic. Fairly continuously, those who write about migrations, past and present, have treated rates of *emigration* ranging from 2 to 8 percent of local populations or rates of foreign *residents* of 10 percent or more as problems, or even as crises that demand both scholarly explanation and political intervention.

The editors did assume that the century they selected for intensive study constituted an arguably distinctive temporal slice of global

history. Contributors were asked to explore a somewhat idiosyncratically demarcated century, beginning belatedly only in 1830 and ending in 1940. We are by no means the first historians to write about a "long" nineteenth century, although ours is shorter than some, and although this concept has appealed mainly to students of Europe, and to a lesser extent of the Americas and the Atlantic. In focusing on long nineteenth centuries, other scholars have typically begun their analyses considerably earlier than we did—most often with the American or French revolutions of the late eighteenth century.[6] Other historians have also ended their long nineteenth centuries either earlier—1914 is an obvious and commonly chosen rupture for Europeanists—or more occasionally as late as 1950. As this suggests, much remains uncertain about the appropriate periodization for the modern world, especially once we leave Europe, North America and the Atlantic, to consider other parts of the world. Indeed, throughout this volume, it is specialists on the Pacific and Indian Oceans, along with the China Seas, who raise the most serious objections to the periodization chosen by the editors. All efforts to integrate migration into world history will grapple with those objections.

The editors' long-standing interests in analyzing migration in relationship to the entwined histories of capitalism and labor, and resulting class dynamics, certainly influenced their choice of 1830 rather than 1776 as the start date for their nineteenth century. Many of the essays in *Connecting Seas* trace the labor migrations of the nineteenth century to the abolition of slavery, beginning in the 1830s in the British Empire. Revolt and self-emancipation by slaves in Sainte Domingue in the Caribbean of course preceded Britain's abolition of slavery, and this earlier abolition might have justified an earlier start for a labor-driven periodization. Nevertheless, volumes of migration worldwide shot upwards only in the second, third, and fourth decades of the century and not in the immediate aftermath of the Haitian, French, or American revolutions. Furthermore, these revolutions had no immediate impact on migrations in the Indian Ocean or China Seas. The anti-imperial revolutions in the Caribbean, North America, and South America certainly did contribute to raising migration volumes across

[6] See, e.g., Eric Hobsbawm's trilogy on the long nineteenth century: *The Age of Revolution 1789–1848* (1962), *The Age of Capital 1848–1875* (1975), *The Age of Empire 1875–1914* (1987), followed by *The Age of Extremes*: *The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (1994).

the Atlantic in the nineteenth century, especially as the revolutionary new "settler nations" sought new population to replace the indigenous and to populate their frontiers. Finally, while the mass migrations of the Atlantic fell off noticeably after the 1920s, the drop was less pronounced elsewhere, and the 1940s or even the 1950s might be a more appropriate caesura for the other oceans and seas.

In making the nineteenth century the focus of this volume, the editors also inevitably encouraged authors to divide the past into at least three loosely defined eras—the years before 1830, the century of focus between 1830 and the 1930s, and the years after 1940. Most contributors preferred a longer-term perspective that highlighted continuities between an early modern era of globalization and the particular characteristics of the long nineteenth century of industrial and imperial globalization. The importance of discussing long regional histories of migration seemed particularly salient to scholars writing about the merchant, trade, labor, and slave circuits of the Indian Ocean and China Seas for these were highly developed and complex "Worlds" long before the development of similar movements around the Atlantic, in the 1500s, and around the Pacific somewhat later. (Our introductory essays' long perspectives even suggest that before 1500, the Indian Ocean may have been the only truly navigable ocean.)

The list of social relations, widely shared cultural assumption, and technologies revealed by contributors as connecting the early-modern world to the nineteenth century is a long one, and I cannot do it justice here. I would point, however, first to gendered assumptions about subsistence, labor, reproduction, and sexuality that were so widely shared in the world's otherwise quite diverse regions that most early modern and nineteenth century movements of slaves, colonizers, merchants, soldiers, pirates, seamen, servants, and laborers alike were overwhelmingly male no matter which oceans or seas they traveled. Our contributors do point to variations in the "gender ratio" among migrants, especially in the nineteenth century. Some have argued that African slaves transported to western Asia included more women than those pushed out into the middle passage across the Atlantic; the British became particularly concerned about social pathologies that might emerge among indentured laborers were women's representation not fixed, as it soon was, by law. Whether free or less free, migrations of male workers responded to labor markets that institutionalized deeply gendered assumptions about appropriate work for men and for women. There was no general demand for labor but rather for women's labor

or for men's. Worldwide, women's immobility relative to men reinforced an association of subsistence production and of laboring without wages with women. Whether in Singapore or Jamaica the relative absence of women made marriage and reproduction a class privilege or a comfort associated with subsistence and immobility. Although our authors have not consistently attended to the question, the evidence they provide on migrant gender ratios provides at least some support for Patrick Manning's assertion that men have dominated among the migrations he labels as most distinctive of the human species, that is, "cross-community" moves. Even on this point, however, our authors raise a note of caution for as Amarjit Kaur documents, some laborers were recruited in family groups. Women, too, crossed cultural and language borders as migrants.

Racialized assumptions (about which men of what color could and should perform menial labor) emerged—as best we can tell from the evidence made available by our authors—in the Atlantic and in connection to Africa, and then traveled with Europeans to other regions of the world. These too persisted from the early modern era into nineteenth century debates. Generally, Europeans agreed that men with darker skins worked best when hard labor was required in "tropical" climes. The exact understandings of race, however, changed over time in almost every corner of the world as differing groups of migrants met, contested, accommodated, and increasingly differentiated themselves: whether in the southern Atlantic described by Silke Hensel, in the sequence of Black Atlantics that Dirk Hoerder describes, in the constantly mutating Caribbean dynamics of race and ethnicity delineated in Lara Putnam's essay, or in the complex differentiations based on religion, culture, and physiognomy emerging in the Indian Ocean of Michael Mann's portrait. With the exception of the Munda-speaking peoples in Mann's discussion of India and the native Africans who figure in Pamila Gupta's analysis of Goans in Mozambique, few of the indigenous inhabitants of Asia, Africa, or the Americas figure prominently in this volume's many descriptions of ethno- and racial genesis. By contrast, a focus on recruitment of enslaved and indentured labor, along with its influence on racialized practices and the kind of thinking that emerged as scientific racism, emerges with considerable clarity in the essays collected here.

Whether their focus is the China Seas or the Atlantic, essays by Trocki, Sinn, Kaur, Putnam, and Blewett provide a rather long sweeping view of how industrialization in specific corners of the world

transformed the search for labor under conditions of first early modern and then nineteenth century empires. Mass industrial production is probably impossible without both mobile capital and mobile workers. Almost every essay in this volume refers to the long distance transportation of foodstuffs, raw materials, or mass-produced products that the relocation of massive numbers of workers made possible. While some traveled long distances to work in factories transforming raw materials from far-off places, others traveled from areas of subsistence agriculture to plantations developing to export, on an equally massive scale, the foodstuffs that would feed industrial workers. Both the savings ("remittances") of migrated laborers and the capital of imperial or corporate investors often traveled along trade routes of very long-standing, however. Especially in the Indian Ocean and China Seas, those routes had been created many centuries earlier by seafaring cultural groups, the merchants, merchant families, merchant diasporas, and the state agents that Trocki and Markovits describe. Indeed, neither Europe's early modern and nineteenth century empire-builders nor Japan's modern ones (as described by Eiichiro Azuma) could have extended their global reach or built the circuits of industry and labor recruitment without working through and often with middle-men with deep local knowledge of local peoples, languages, naval technologies, and trading customs. Many of those middle-men, too, were migrants.

Connecting Seas also makes it possible to specify more precisely how migrations contributed to making the nineteenth century an era of globalization that was in some ways distinctive from the early modern globalization and from the global era of the latter years of the twentieth century. Repeatedly, for example, contributors to this volume note how the nineteenth century saw the rearrangement, the intensification, and, most critically, the *increased volumes* of migrations that may have emerged under much older structures but that expanded exponentially as their management by capitalists and empire-builders changed and as workers sought improved opportunities to choose between earning, settling, and reproducing in more than one spot on earth. Indeed, almost all the essays that feature circulatory migrations highlight how even very poor, highly exploited, laborers could use mobility to their own ends. They were willing to take high risks in traveling to distant places because they were dissatisfied with sedentary or short-distance options for survival and reproduction.

Essential to understanding the increases in volumes of migrants of the nineteenth century is an understanding of the naval technologies that Wang Gungwu views as the foundation for "maritime globalization." Nautical instruments and shipbuilding and design became globally available and accumulated fairly rapidly during the early modern era, but Yrjö Kaukiainen argues that real gains in efficiencies in transportation of migrants across wide differences were realized only in the nineteenth century. Traditionally, these increases have been associated with the advent of the steamship or with falling ticket prices. Kaukiainen tells a more complex story. He points to significant changes for both commodity and "living" freight during the era of the sailing ship, which extended into the second half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, there is not a single essay in this volume that completely ignores the ship as a mechanism of transport. (References to land-based transportation innovations—important themselves as consolidators of large, new nations, and as routes to frontier areas in North and South America and in Southeast and Northeast Asia—appear in *Connecting Seas* more often as "feeders" of ports and shipping companies, a portrait that undoubtedly underestimates their importance). Important too is the continued role of the steamship for global migrations well beyond 1940. Others have suggested that air travel did not replace sea travel for migrants until the 1960s. The numbers of migrants that still stumble from the seaborne vessels and small craft onto the shores of the Mediterranean, the Caribbean Sea, and the Atlantic in southern Europe, Florida, and North America, the Atlantic Islands, and other places is a reminder of how the least empowered migrants even in today's world revert to and depend upon casual, often highly risky, water transport and outmoded naval technologies.

While all the oceanic regions of the globe were already connected in the early modern period, the migrations of the nineteenth century also peopled each of the oceanic "Worlds" with more diverse populations than ever before, transforming cultural interactions in each. True, large numbers of Africans did not travel the Pacific, nor did large numbers of Asians travel the Atlantic, even in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, both the Caribbean Sea and the Indian Ocean became places where Europeans, Asians, and Africans all met.

While most of our contributors have preferred a longer periodization that emphasizes continuities between the early modern era and the nineteenth century, most also hesitated as they reached the end

of their explorations of the nineteenth century, not seeming to know whether it was important to think about the world beyond the 1930s or how to go about doing that thinking. When exactly the mass migrations of the nineteenth century ended and when those of our own times began remains unsettled, as are the interpretive advantages for characterizing and connecting the obviously global events after the 1930s to those of the past. For that reason, readers will especially appreciate Pamila Gupta's essay that carries the discussion of Indian Ocean movements between Goa and Africa into the 1960s. Gupta's essay opens up complex issues that must be tackled if migration is to be integrated satisfactorily into modern world history. Air travel, decolonization, the post-World War Two proliferation of national states, and the refugees and stateless people created by their formation, not to mention the post-World War Two financial structures and Cold War fundamentally changed empires, global capitalism, and workers' options. Yet most appear as mere traces, shadows, or hints in the other essays.

Less concerned (or perhaps simply more puzzled) by the years after the 1930s, the authors in this volume have left open two rather different options for periodization, each of which carries very different implications for our own global age. Were the years after 1940, universally ones of declining migrations and a retreat from globalization or did they instead build the foundation for the globalization of the late twentieth century? A few contributors—most notably Adam McKeown who specifically asserts that the nineteenth century made our own world "what it is today"—prefer the second possibility and suggest important continuities unfolding from the nineteenth into our own times in the twenty-first century.

These too are worth enumerating, albeit briefly. I have already mentioned the roughly comparable, and quite small, global rates of foreign residency across three eras as an important continuity. The essays in this volume, with their mapping of nodes, networks, circuits, and diasporas also suggest that many of the global cities of the present—certainly New York, Los Angeles, Hong Kong, Vancouver, Singapore fall into this category—arguably had attained that status before the long nineteenth century ended; their origins can be sought in the "nodes and networks" of the past. Refugees—who today make up as many as 10 percent of all migrants worldwide—also began to appear prominently alongside labor migrants already in the early years of the twentieth century especially in Europe. Migrant remittances, too, pro-

vide an important continuity in the economics of nineteenth century and contemporary migrations; those remittances often underwrote the survival of subsistence production and the reproduction of peasant families in Europe and in Asia in the nineteenth century whereas in today's world, theorists in the World Bank more often theorize them to be drivers of economic development.

By structuring our volume around connections among several world regions, furthermore, continuities emerge in our understanding of the construction of an international regime of restriction and control of migration that is more often understood to introduce a sharp break with the past. Relatively free, if sometimes clandestine, movements of merchants were central to almost all the essays collected here. But the usual portrait of a free and unfettered world during the nineteenth century—one that contrasts sharply to the mercantilist empires of the early modern period and the draconic restrictions on human movement in our own times—seems to need at least some revision. China continuously prohibited emigration until 1893; the British Empire became intimately involved in the mobilization and transfer of workers under contract and indenture from colonies in one part of the empire to another. In fact, it may be the state-initiated and controlled nature of migrations out of India, rather than the juridical conditions of their labor, that makes indentured work in the nineteenth century seem less free than contemporary movements of industrial workers across the Atlantic, or of Chinese merchants and laborers into Southeast Asia. These were regulated and controlled not by states but by steam companies and the complex profit-making system that scholars sometimes neutrally label "the business of migration" and activists more often decry as "trafficking." Because the migrations they sparked did not involve oceanic moves, furthermore, the very central role of the Japanese and Russian empires and the Soviet Union in populating northern and eastern Asia could not emerge from our analysis. In the case of the Japanese Empire it also required a navy and a crossing of the northern Asian Seas. These provide important case studies of how intensively managed, controlled and even coerced nineteenth century imperial migrations often were. Viewed in this way, our own world has simply replaced national restrictions and controls of the numbers of migrants allowed to enter for nineteenth century imperial efforts to guarantee that sufficient numbers of migrants shifted from one site of production to another.

Whether these continuities outweigh the differences and ruptures more often attributed to the years between 1930 and 1960 remains to be seen. Those scholars who see today's migrations as more gender balanced, more likely to involve highly-trained as well as unskilled laborers, and less likely to result in permanent settlement than those of the past bear the responsibility for working backward to pinpoint the global structures and processes that produced each of these supposedly distinctive characteristics of our own global age. When after all, does the present "age of migration" actually begin?[7] Neither historians nor social scientists have provided a satisfactory answer to that question.

The strongest arguments for a sharp break between the mass migrations of the nineteenth century and high levels of international migration that again characterized the world by the end of the twentieth century come from studies of restrictions increasingly imposed by the growing number of national states upon migrants. Collectively it is an international regime of restriction that makes migrants in today's world more likely to be refugees, more likely to be "unauthorized," "clandestine" or "illegal" workers, more likely to be female, and more likely to face large barriers to permanent settlement in the countries where they live and work than was the case in the past. Considerable attention has focused on how changes in national and international regimes for the control of human migrations have differentiated early modern, industrial or nineteenth century and contemporary patterns of globalization. The mercantilist restrictions, passports, slavery, and indentured servitude of the early modern era are generally understood to have given way to freer movements of people and trade with industrialization and with the extension of the British Empire and its commitments to classical liberal political economy into a vast global network. In the essays collected here, and especially in essays by Azuma and Skwiot that touch on the Pacific migrations, the imposition of new restrictions in the form of identity "papers," temporary indentured, contract, or guest workers, and outright exclusions (once called "the great white walls") emerged first in white settler republics in the 1870s and 1880s, became more popular with the rise of welfare states in Europe, and then provided arguably more humane alternatives to ethnic cleansing and genocide during fifty years of interna-

[7] Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (New York, 2003).

tional warfare, decolonization, and nation-building and civil war in many post-colonial new nations.

The racialized barriers created and imposed through restrictions on migration by national states and European empires between 1870 and 1940 also worked to create a decided temporal caesura, dampening the massive migrations of the nineteenth century. These, it may be important to emphasize, also began a fundamental reorganization of global space. With them, the world of empires and trans-oceanic circuits gave way during Cold War, decolonization, and nation-state building first to a notion of "three worlds" (a first world of prosperous, capitalist democracies; a second world of developing communist economies; and a third world of non-aligned, post-colonial and still relatively impoverished new nations), to a world divided between a prosperous "global north" and an impoverished "global south." Racial barriers and the "great white walls" neatly divided Atlantic and Pacific and worked to transform Caribbean and Indian Ocean circuits in ways that do seem distinctive to the twentieth century.

Conclusion

Read together, the essays collected here provide hope, if no easy answers, for those wishing to integrate migration into world history without following the example of Patrick Manning's birds-eye and evolutionary "big history" of human migration over the long term. Ours is not a universal or universalizing history focused on humans as a biological species but a history of changing human interactions that repeatedly generated new and changing understandings of cultural, national, and racial difference. The four oceans became connected already in the sixteenth century. The Atlantic has particularly intrigued scholars not merely because of western historians' Eurocentric preferences but because Atlantic interactions of Africans, indigenous Americans and Europeans generated dynamics of cultural, racial, ethnic, and national differentiation that eventually had global consequences. Here authors have demonstrated further that parallel if not exactly similar racial dynamics developed almost simultaneously, in every ocean, every sea by the nineteenth century.

It was not until the nineteenth century, with its mass migrations of merchants, workers, and investors to frontiers, imperial plantations and industrial work places scattered around the world that the differentiations generated by human social contact became both truly global

and identifiably modern. The results were however not homogeneity, as some theorists or opponents of globalization fretted in the 1990s, but rather a long history of scientific racism (and mobilization against it), anti-imperial nationalist movements, international warfare and global conflicts between differently premised systems of governance and economy best summed up in the label "Cold War" and the emergence of what once were called the First, Second, and Third worlds. Readers will see in each of the regions explored in *Connecting Seas* examples of how globalization encouraged rather than destroyed cultural diversity within the human species. What transnationalist theorists once took to be globalization's challenge to national states—resulting in rather dramatic early predictions of their waning and even demise—does not easily survive scrutiny from the perspective of world history. When globalization is understood not as a theoretical abstraction but the interactions of particular mobile people, exercising agency in particular ways and facing particular constraints, we can see how globalization has repeatedly created and re-created social segmentation, and new, if often broadly shared, understandings of difference among humans.

Collectively, then, *Connecting Seas* authors emphasize a point that has been made repeatedly by historians, although without having as much impact as they might want on social scientists writing about contemporary globalization. The present is not the first global era. It is the product of a global history that began to unfold more than 500 hundred years ago. Even if social scientists wish to describe, understand or analyze *only* those characteristics of the current global era that are distinctive, they would be well advised to note how history, as a discipline, and how historians, as in this volume, continuously probe and revise their understandings of the characteristics of the past in order to identify significant ruptures and trace long-term continuities. If the present is unique then at the very least we must begin to specify when, and where, and through which human behaviors, the present began.

It is perfectly possible to describe the distinctiveness of any particular time and place without ignoring the ways in which the past generates the present and the present remains connected to the past. Indeed, that is how the essays collected here seek to integrate histories of migration into the history of the modern world.

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INDEX OF PLACES

Aberdeen, Scotland 407
Acapulco 1, 29, 39–40, 170, 215 n. 31, 389
Aden 81, 85, 87
Adriatic Sea 16
Africa 5, 16, 23, 26, 28, 42–43, 63, 86, 95, 111, 169, 251–254, 258, 265–266, 270–272, 274–275, 278–279, 281, 291–293, 299–300, 477, 479, 485, 489, 493, 499, 502
Alexandria 28, 97
Alsace 351–352
Amazonia 434
American South 346
Amritsar 98
Anatolia 346
Angola 473, 485, 487, 490
Anji 194
Annam 172, 222, 243
Antigua 307
Antilles 70
Antwerp 352–353, 378
Arabia 19, 27, 68 n. 8, 110–111
Arabian Peninsula 68, 111
Arakan 137, 154
Arctic Sea 15, 26
Argentina 253, 285–289, 293–297, 300, 353, 368, 429
Arlington, Massachusetts 357, 362
Armenia 357 n. 97, 365
Aruba 317
Ascension 372
Asia 4–5, 13, 31, 39–40, 43, 47, 49, 54–55, 63, 114 n. 17, 127 n. 51, 134–136, 169, 184, 192, 197, 219–220, 223–224, 254, 256, 266, 284, 286 n. 17, 392, 415 n. 1, 418 n. 6, 434–435, 441, 443–444, 494, 499, 503
Assam 52–53, 114–116, 131
Atlantic Ocean 9, 13, 26, 37, 69, 113, 170
Attock 86
Auckland 407
Australia 4, 15 n. 3, 44, 47, 53, 170, 186, 188, 209 n. 26, 223, 226, 241–243, 245, 256, 297, 345, 350–351
Austria 339, 352
Austro-Hungarian Empire 51
Azores 377, 451, 456
Bahia 262 n. 6, 266 n. 13, 274, 283, 292
Bahrain 88, 97
Baltic Sea 9, 15, 375
Banaras 116
Bandon 194
Bangka 139, 20, 202, 208, 217
Bangkok 98, 194, 199–200, 203, 206, 218, 230, 243–245
Barbados 269, 270 n. 18, 278, 308, 312, 315–317, 322, 395
Barnsley 341
Batavia (Jakarta) 30, 194, 220–223, 251
Bay of Bengal 111, 115, 145
Beijing 175, 139, 183, 185, 284 n. 24, 237, 435 n. 38
Bien Hoa 199, 203
Beira 442 n. 8, 479
Belitung 139
Bellingham, Washington 411
Belochistan 71
Benadir 67
Bengal 20, 69, 87, 111, 115, 121, 137
Benin 292
Bentan Island 202
Berbera 87
Bermuda 377
Black Sea 15–16, 26, 359
Blackstone River 355
Boca del Rio Banano 325
Bocas 311, 323
Bocas de Toro 312 n. 30, 322–323
Bolivia 429
Bombay 21 n. 13, 69, 83, 89, 99 n. 42, 100, 104 n. 50, 105–107, 109 n. 5, 129, 154 n. 26, 188, 205, 432
Borneo 30, 188, 200, 205, 208, 217–218, 223
Bosporus 346, 359
Boston 12 n. 2, 40 n. 43, 53 n. 12, 56 n. 16, 75 n. 46, 279 n. 38, 359, 380, 473 n. 28
Bradford 339–341, 343–348, 355, 358, 361–363, 365
Brazil 32–33, 37, 40, 53, 70, 184, 253, 256, 259, 262, 265–270, 272, 273 n. 25, 274, 278, 281–283, 285–294, 297, 299, 301, 304, 308, 353, 373–374, 390, 396,

419, 420 n. 9, 427, 429–434, 435 n. 38, 438, 440, 450, 455–457, 459–460, 463, 473, 477 n. 46, 487 n. 82, 491
Bremen 352–353, 378, 380, 382 n. 30
Brisbane 230
British Columbia 229, 393 n. 1, 396, 399, 401, 404–406, 411
British Guiana 83, 120, 188, 269, 304, 307, 396
British Honduras 314
British West Indies 188, 226, 329, 345
Broach 96
Brunei 200
Brussels 352
Buenos Aires 286–287, 294–295, 297, 333
Burma 69, 74, 81, 84, 88, 90–92, 95, 97–100, 102, 105–107, 115, 119–121, 134–139, 145–146, 148–150, 152–154, 185, 194, 161
Byzantium 15

Calcutta 76 n. 50, 98, 100, 114–115, 126, 129, 131, 132 n. 67, 146 n. 12, 205, 221, 243
Calicut 27, 31
California 216, 223, 225–226, 235, 241–243, 245, 309, 395–397, 404–405, 407, 411, 436, 441–442
Callao 284
Cambay 21
Cambodia 200 n. 4, 210, 222, 243
Canada 7, 40 n. 43, 110, 130, 170, 226, 241, 245, 263, 277, 330, 350–351, 373, 389–391, 393–394, 396–397, 400–401, 100–410, 412–414, 416, 420–421, 425, 429, 431, 437 n. 41, 456, 463, 476, 496
Canary Islands 306
Cape Horn 37, 346, 404–405
Cape of Good Hope 69, 226, 404–405
Cape Town 27, 37
Cape Verde 269, 372,
Caribbean Sea 12, 25, 501
Central Asia 45, 80, 97
Centredale, Rhode Island 363
Ceuta 27
Ceylon 23, 31, 52, 73, 84, 91–92, 98–100, 102, 106, 115–116, 119–121, 123–126, 132, 456
Chagos archipelago 69
Chantaburi 200, 203
Chaozhou 194, 202–203, 212, 217, 227, 236 n. 27, 238, 244
Chattisgarh 115
Chicago 3 n. 4, 23 n. 15, 53, 284 n. 11, 298 n. 62, 324 n. 63, 413 n. 22, 442 n. 6, 449 nn. 34–35, 457 n. 66, 473 n. 28
Chile 285, 289, 294, 296, 429
China 2, 5–7, 13, 16, 23, 27, 29–31, 33 n. 32, 45–46, 49, 72–73, 88–89, 108–109, 141, 169–175, 177–178, 182–185, 208–211, 214, 216, 219–221, 223–224, 226, 228–231, 233, 236–238, 241–247, 252, 256, 265, 277, 283–284, 306, 368, 373, 389, 396, 398, 400–401, 416, 423, 498 n. 38, 436–437, 439, 441–442, 452, 454, 456, 494, 496–500, 503
Chiriqui 321
Chonburi 203
Chota Nagpur 113 n. 14, 115, 126, 131
Chūzan 173, 177
Cieneguita 325
Ciudad Bolivar 308
Cochinchina 199, 203, 220–221
Colombia 303, 312–314, 431
Colombo 97, 124–125
Colón 311–312, 321–323
Córdoba 288
Cornwall 343
Coromandel Coast 20, 125
Coronel 368
Costa Rica 304, 309, 314–315, 318, 320–321, 324, 335, 455
Cotswold 341
Crimean Peninsula 26
Cuba 47, 53, 70, 109, 188, 226–227, 253, 256, 266, 269, 278–279, 281–285, 287, 289, 298, 304–307, 309–311, 314–318, 320–321, 327–328, 333, 335, 393, 413, 431, 455, 457–458
Cumsing 395
Curacao 317

Daman 481
Dang Trong 203
Danish Sound 375
Delhi 32 n. 29, 58 n. 19, 71 n. 24, 83, 109 n. 6, 111 nn. 12–13, 114 n. 16, 115 nn. 18, 20, 116
Demerara 304
Derbyshire 341
Devon 343
Diu 481
Dominica 308
Dominican Republic 306 n. 11, 307, 314–315, 335

Dubai 97
Durban 89
Dutch West Indies 188

East Africa 19, 31, 33, 35, 68–69, 81 nn. 11, 16, 82 n. 19, 83–85, 88–90, 95–96, 102–103, 105, 110–111, 116, 367, 476
East Anglia 340–341
East Asian Sea 14, 26, 29, 171
East Indies 26, 74, 76, 84, 143, 227, 231, 372–373, 393–394, 399, 422
East Timor Sea 67
Easter Islands 14
Egypt 85, 88, 105
England 15, 33 n. 31, 34, 36, 38, 113, 193, 251, 256, 259, 272 n. 23, 338–339, 343, 346, 349, 351–352, 355, 358, 361–362, 366, 377, 390, 441
Entre Ríos 288
Eurasia 44
Europe 5, 7, 13, 15, 17 n. 8, 23–24, 28–29, 31–33, 37–38, 43–46, 49–50, 55, 57–58, 85, 126, 146, 169, 186, 195, 197, 205, 251–255, 258, 260, 263–266, 268, 271, 275–277, 279, 281, 284, 286–287, 289, 291–293, 295–297, 299–300, 318, 338, 341, 344, 349–350, 353–355, 357–358, 361, 367, 370, 372–374, 376–377, 381, 386, 394, 404, 407, 441, 443, 445, 451, 453–454, 485, 497, 500, 501–504

Falkland Islands 368–369
Fiji 81–83, 102, 115, 120, 126, 226, 427
France 6, 15, 34–36, 113, 117, 172 n. 1, 193, 258 n. 2, 259, 263–264, 266 n. 13, 271, 275–276, 338–339, 341, 343, 347, 351–352, 357 n. 97, 358 n. 98, 373, 422, 489
Fraser River 399, 408
Freetown 97, 270
French Guiana 269 n. 17, 307
French Indochina 84, 98, 102, 227, 231, 276
Fujian 30, 177, 180–181, 187 n. 7, 193–195, 202, 217, 221, 226–227, 238, 394–395
Fuzhou 141, 182, 184, 193 n. 16, 202, 217, 219

Galicia (Spain) 287
Ganges River 19
Genoa 24
Germany 28 n. 21, 290, 338–339, 341, 344, 347, 351–352, 356, 357 n. 92, 362, 367–368, 373, 430, 439 n. 44, 453
Gibraltar 85, 92, 97
Glasgow 404, 407
Goa 27, 251, 367, 373, 468, 470, 473, 476–485, 487 n. 82, 489–491, 502
Great Britain 34, 40, 195, 264, 276, 304, 307, 338, 349 n. 54, 367, 380, 395 n. 3, 398 nn. 7–10, 405 n. 14, 407, 442
Greece 359, 384 n. 38
Greenland 15
Grenada 308
Greystone 345, 358, 361–365
Guadeloupe 307, 312
Guangzhou (Canton) 16, 21, 169, 230, 237, 240, 242, 395
Guatemala 304, 309 n. 20, 314, 320–321, 335, 424–425
Gujarat 19–21, 68 n. 7, 87, 95–96, 103–105, 111
Gulf of Hormuz 13, 23, 26
Gulf of Siam 199–200, 205–206, 209
Gulf of Tonkin 199
Gum San (Gold Mountain) 399–400, 406, 414

Haiphong 230–231, 244
Haiti 263–264, 306 n. 11, 315, 328, 334
Hakata 173, 175
Halifax 348 n. 47, 376, 404, 407
Halle 344
Hamburg 274 n. 26, 289 n. 30, 353, 359, 380
Hangzhou 21
Harlem, New York 275, 277, 302
Hartford 363
Hatien 199–202, 206
Havana 226, 243, 281 n. 4, 306, 309, 314 n. 33, 321
Havre 378
Hawai'i 14, 40 n. 43, 216, 226, 390, 393–394, 399, 408, 420, 427, 432, 435 n. 38, 436, 437 n. 41, 440–447, 449–450, 453–463, 494
Hokuzan 173
Honduras 309, 314, 318, 320, 322, 335
Hong Kong 13, 30 n. 25, 50 n. 8, 82–83, 142, 169, 171, 186–188, 192–193, 195, 197, 200 n. 5, 202, 216–221, 223, 225–232, 234–247, 284, 366 n. 125, 367, 394–398, 400, 422, 427 n. 21, 494, 502

Honolulu 3 n. 4, 52 n. 11, 188, 243, 395–396, 411 n. 19, 416 n. 3, 427 n. 20, 430 n. 28, 438 n. 42, 441 n. 2, 442 nn. 7–8, 443 n. 9, 444 nn. 12, 15–16, 446, 448 n. 33, 449, 452 nn. 43, 45, 456 n. 62, 459 n. 73, 462
Hormuz 13, 23, 26–28
Huian 194
Hungary 357

Iceland 15, 45
India 13, 16, 20, 27, 31, 38, 40, 44, 46, 60, 68–69, 71–72, 75–76, 79–84, 86–92, 94 n. 32, 95–98, 100–107, 109, 111, 113–116, 119–121, 123, 125–126, 128, 130–131, 134–137, 139, 145–146, 148–151, 153–155, 157–159, 162–163, 165, 169–170, 184, 188, 197, 205, 242, 251–252, 265, 275–276, 277 n. 33, 307, 312, 320 n. 47, 325, 367, 372–373, 439, 456, 467–468, 471, 474, 477 n. 46, 481–485, 490, 499, 503
Indian Ocean 4–6, 9–14, 16–17, 19, 21, 23, 26, 28–29, 31, 35, 37, 39, 42, 53 n. 12, 67–72, 75–76, 80, 85, 87–88, 94–97, 109–111, 113–114, 116–117, 126, 134, 136, 169–170, 226, 251, 255–256, 276, 280 n. 42, 367–368, 405, 427, 468–469, 471, 474, 489–490, 494, 496–502, 505
Indonesia 69, 135, 140, 144, 155, 231 n. 13, 393 n. 1
Inhambane 478
Iran 68
Ireland 341, 343, 349
Irish Sea 341, 359
Isle de France 113
Istanbul 346
Italy 24, 45, 288–291, 339, 352, 357, 360 n. 102, 365, 439 n. 44, 456

Jamaica 85, 120, 226, 266, 268, 270, 271, 278, 304, 307–308, 309 n. 19, 312 nn. 28, 30, 314–315, 319–320, 323 n. 60, 325, 327–329, 331, 334, 395 n. 3, 499
Japan 7, 27, 29–30, 45–46, 49, 63, 84, 86, 95, 97, 169, 171, 173, 175, 177–178, 180, 183–185, 193, 195, 197, 221, 223, 231, 244–245, 264 n. 9, 276, 290, 367, 370, 390, 392, 395, 410, 415 n. 2, 416, 418–421, 423–426, 427 n. 21, 428–439, 445, 446 n. 21, 449–450, 452–454, 456, 458–460, 500
Java 14, 67, 172, 177, 184, 188, 198, 200, 205, 222–223, 231, 243, 398
Java Sea 205
Jeddah 70 n. 17, 111
Jharkhand 115
Johor Bahru 218
Jullundur 98

Kalimantan 139
Kamchatka Peninsula 21
Kandy 124
Karachi 87, 88 n. 19, 102, 104
Kashgar 98
Kathiawar 86–87, 94–96
Kedah 154
Kelantan 154, 200
Kent 341, 444 n. 15, 461 n. 81
Kenya 82–83, 92, 101, 103, 474 n. 31
Kerala 87, 94–95, 98–99
Kiev 15
Kilwa 67
Kingston 128 n. 52, 309–311, 312 n. 30, 326
Kobe 97, 219, 229
Konkan 87, 111
Korea 16, 45, 52, 169, 172–175, 177–178, 185, 389, 392, 421, 423, 429–430
Koryô 173–174
Kota Kinabalu 218
Kuala Lumpur 143 n. 11, 148 nn. 16–17, 162 n. 39, 165 n. 43, 217
Kuching 218
Kutch 87, 94–96
Kuwait 97
Kyoto 219, 420 n. 10
Kyushu 173, 175, 180

Lahore 98
Lake Ladoga 15
Lancashire 341, 343, 345–346, 349, 351, 357 n. 97, 365–366
Latin America 253–254, 256, 263 n. 7, 265 n. 11, 269, 273, 279, 282–287, 290–292, 295–297, 300–301, 330–331, 410, 412, 421, 425, 427, 431, 433, 437 n. 41
Lawrence 9, 37, 354, 357, 357 nn. 95, 97, 358 n. 99, 361–365, 459 n. 73
Lebanon 16
Leeds 343
Leicestershire 341
Leipzig 280 n. 41, 356
Liberia 266, 271
Lièges 352

Lima 40, 240, 433 n. 35, 434
Lincolnshire 342
Lisbon 28, 480, 482 n. 66, 484
Lithuania 357 n. 97, 365
Lohardaga 131
Lombardy 358
London 9, 15 n. 5, 23 n. 15, 24 n. 15, 26 n. 17, 32 n. 29, 37 n. 40, 39 n. 41, 40 n. 43, 45 n. 5, 49 n. 6, 52 n. 10, 58 n. 18, 63 n. 27, 68 nn. 7–8, 70 n. 18, 71 n. 23, 72 nn. 27, 31, 75 n. 45
Long Island Sound 363
Louisiana 373, 457
Loutilim 478
Ludhiana 98
Luzon 183–184

Macao 20, 27, 60, 142, 169, 181, 189–190, 192, 202, 223, 227, 230, 269, 283, 309, 373, 395, 422
Macclesfield 355
Madagascar 15, 23, 27, 35, 69, 70
Madras 69, 84 n. 8, 100, 102 n. 48, 114 n. 17, 125–126, 205
Mahé 119
Makassar 205
Malabar Coast 16, 19, 21, 23, 27, 31, 111
Malacca 19–21, 27–28, 30, 87, 97, 111, 135, 169–170, 172, 177, 183, 194, 198, 205–206, 212, 218–219, 221–222
Malacca Straits 111, 170
Malagasy 84, 96, 101
Malaya 53, 81, 89–92, 98, 101–102, 110, 116, 119, 123 n. 36, 130 n. 61, 134 n. 1, 135–137, 139–140, 143–146, 150, 154–165, 215, 244 n. 48, 367
Malayan Peninsula 19
Manchester 53, 71, 341
Manchuria 45, 49, 53, 63, 389, 415 n. 2, 419–423, 429–433, 435, 437–439
Mandvi 87
Manila 1, 29–30, 40, 97, 170, 183–184, 194, 230, 243, 389
Manningham 343 n. 19, 347, 348 n. 49
Maputo (Lourenco-Marques) 467–468, 469 nn. 6–8, 470, 473 n. 29, 475–476, 478, 479 n. 52, 479 n. 55, 480–484, 485 n. 77, 486–491
Maracaibo 317
Marseilles 353
Martinique 277, 307, 312
Mascarene Islands 69
Massachusetts 349 n. 52, 355, 357 n. 97, 358–359, 362
Massawa 87
Mauritius 37, 52, 58 n. 19, 69, 72–73, 83, 88, 92 n. 28, 96, 98, 106, 110, 113, 116, 119–120, 126, 128–129, 198, 226
Mecca 2, 27, 55, 75, 218
Medan 194, 215
Mediterranean 3 n. 4, 12, 15–16, 17 n. 8, 19–20, 24–26, 28, 33, 38, 55, 67–68, 89, 170–171, 251 n. 2, 256, 265, 346, 368, 384, 493–494, 501
Meizhou 180
Mekong Delta 203
Melbourne 230, 379–380
Mexico 2, 29, 226, 253, 265 n. 12, 284–285, 289, 296, 298–301, 304, 391, 410, 425, 427, 429, 431, 433 n. 35
Micronesia 389, 416 n. 3, 419, 423, 429–431, 436, 437 n. 41, 438, 441
Middle East 44–45, 86, 338, 358, 361, 370
Mocha 87
Moluccas 28, 31
Mombasa 27
Mongolia 63
Montego Bay 311
Montmartre 277
Morocco 85
Mozambique 27, 35, 94 n. 32, 367, 467–473, 474 n. 31, 476–485, 486 n. 81, 487–490, 499
Muscat 71, 85, 88, 94, 97

Nagasaki 21, 27, 219
Naha 197
Nanyang 30, 200, 394
Naples 287
Natal 52
Nauru 226
Negri Sembilan 154
Nevis 307
New Caledonia 427
New England 34, 38, 256, 259, 272 n. 23, 355, 358, 362, 366, 390, 441
New Haven 363
New Jersey 355–356, 358–359
New York City 350, 356–357, 359, 362–363
New Zealand 226, 241, 245, 350, 353, 368, 379, 389, 407–409, 411, 463
Newfoundland 9, 15, 24, 37, 376 n. 15
Nicaragua 303, 314, 318
Normandy 15

North Africa 16, 52, 69, 275, 394
North America 1, 8, 15, 33, 38, 47, 53, 71, 171, 245, 251, 253, 256, 259, 263 n. 7, 274, 291, 318, 350, 372–375, 377, 380, 390, 393 n. 1, 395, 401, 404, 406, 410, 413, 416, 421, 424, 427, 429, 431–433, 437 n. 41, 439, 493, 497, 501
North Atlantic 39 n. 41, 51, 70, 253–254, 256, 280, 374, 376, 378, 379, 380–381, 383–384, 386 n. 40
North China 45, 184, 244
North Sea 9, 15, 341, 368, 370
Norway 45
Nottinghamshire 341
Nyasaland 81–83

Oman 71, 94
Oregon 404, 407
Orinoco River 308
Osaka 219, 427 n. 21
Ottoman Empire 26, 28, 55, 69–70, 74, 289
Ouidah 292

Pacific Ocean 1, 10, 12, 43, 55, 67, 170, 391, 409, 416, 418, 435
Pahang 154, 208
Palembang 20, 172, 177
Palestine 15
Panama 13, 92, 97, 226, 243, 269 n. 17, 284, 308–322, 326, 333, 335, 431, 433 n. 35, 446 n. 21
Panama Canal 284, 319, 446 n. 21
Panama City 321
Panjim 483
Panyu County 235–236
Paraguay 431
Paris 9, 275, 277, 347, 478
Pasè 20
Passaic, New Jersey 355–356
Patani 172, 177
Paterson, New Jersey 355
Patna 19
Pearl River 216, 225–227, 234, 396 n. 4
Penang 30, 154, 169, 194, 198, 209 n. 25, 214–215, 217, 243
Perak 154, 200, 208, 216
Perlis 154
Persia 16, 19
Persian Gulf 19, 67–68, 70–71, 76, 87, 88 n. 13, 96–97, 110–111
Peru 9, 47, 188, 226–227, 240, 242–243, 256, 269, 284, 298, 309, 345, 393, 413 n. 22, 427 n. 21, 429, 433, 434, 457
Philadelphia 358 n. 99, 360
Philippines 21, 28–29, 39, 92, 135, 227, 244, 251, 393, 394, 409, 416, 427, 429, 438–439, 457 n. 66, 458
Phuket 200, 218
Pidie 20
Piedmont 358
Plymouth 377 n. 17
Poland 357, 365
Polynesia 15 n. 4, 390, 441
Pondicherry 481
Pontianak 200, 208, 217
Porbandar 86, 96
Port Limon (Puerto Limón) 311, 321, 323–326
Port of Spain 308, 317
Port Said 97
Port Sudan 97
Portobello 303, 322
Portugal 24, 35, 37, 184, 251, 282, 284, 289, 304, 357 n. 97, 365, 373, 456, 470, 473, 478, 482 n. 66, 483–484, 486–491
Progreso 322
Providence, Rhode Island 345, 355, 358 n. 99
Providencia 308
Province Wellesley 217
Puerto Barrios 321
Puerto Rico 306–307, 311, 327
Punjab 87, 97, 116, 130, 411
Putian 180

Quanzhou 184, 194
Quebec 355
Queensbury 338 n. 2, 346
Queensland 406, 457, 537
Quelimane 27
Quemoy 194
Quilon 21

Rangoon 98, 148, 152–153, 194–221
Ranong 216, 218
Rawalpindi 98
Red Sea 16, 19, 26, 67, 87, 111
Reims 352
Réunion 69–70, 113, 129
Riau 200, 202, 205–207, 211–212, 216
Rio de Janeiro 266, 300 n. 66
Roubaix 341 n. 16, 343, 347, 355, 358 n. 98
Russia 2, 45, 49, 51, 55, 63, 108, 264 n. 9, 339, 357 n. 47, 365, 367, 423, 430, 454

Ruthenia 357
Ryukyu Islands 20

Sabah 218
Saigon 97, 194, 203, 206, 219–222, 231, 243
Saint Dominque (Haiti) 263, 304–306
Sakai 175
Saltaire 346
Samaran 194
Sambas 200, 208, 217
Samoa 453, 461
San Andres 308
San Francisco 188, 225, 229, 235, 241, 243, 246, 396, 407, 427 n. 21
Sandakan 218, 230, 243
Sannan 173
Santa Fé 288
Santiago de Cuba 309, 321
Sao Paulo 283, 287–288, 297, 427 n. 21, 455 n. 58, 456, 459
Scandinavia 9, 15, 272 n. 23
Scotland 357 n. 97, 407
Scottish Highlands 345
Sea of Japan 423, 429–430
Seattle 229, 411, 427 n. 21
Selangor 154, 208
Senegal 277
Seychelles 69
Shanghai 21, 97, 195, 219–220, 230, 242–243, 326
Shantou 142, 202, 212, 217, 227, 230, 245
Shikarpur 87, 97
Siberia 9, 45
Sibu 218
Sicily 15–16
Sierra Leone 266, 269–270
Sind (Hyderabad) 53, 86–88, 94, 96–97, 101, 103–104
Singapore 7, 20–21, 30, 97, 134 n. 1, 140–142, 154, 169, 171, 188, 191, 194–195, 197–199, 204, 206–207, 209–212, 214–222, 227–228, 230–231, 238, 243, 326, 367, 393 n. 1, 394, 496, 499, 502
Slovakia 357
Sofala 111
Solomon Islands 14
Songkla 200
South Africa 49, 52, 86, 89–92, 96, 98, 110, 115–116, 119, 226, 243, 256, 346, 353, 379, 394, 469 n. 8, 473, 487, 490
South America 15, 28, 37–38, 109, 184, 217, 251, 253, 263, 281, 286, 289, 352, 367–369, 373–374, 379, 385, 395, 404, 427, 429, 432, 497, 501
South Asia 19, 44–45, 49, 51–52, 108–111, 114, 116–117, 120, 133, 325, 392
South China 21, 44, 47, 53, 67, 140, 183, 186–187, 194–195, 216, 240, 244
South China Sea 37, 170, 172, 178, 182–183, 186, 197, 206, 394
South Pacific 39, 45, 256
Southeast Asia 4, 5, 7, 10, 12–14, 19–21, 23, 26–30, 38–39, 42, 44–47, 53, 58, 62, 69, 72–73, 75, 98, 107, 111, 134–135, 139, 144–146, 171–172, 177, 180, 182–184, 186, 188, 193–195, 197–200, 202–206, 209–211, 218, 221, 223–224, 226–228, 230, 237–238, 242, 244–245, 276, 367, 393–394, 397–398, 407, 409 n. 18, 419, 423, 436, 437 n. 41, 503
Southern Ocean 379
Soviet Union 46, 503
Spain 24, 28, 35, 37, 39, 184–185, 240, 251, 259, 282, 284, 288–289, 297, 304–306, 308, 315–317, 367, 373, 456
Sri Lanka 53, 69, 121, 124, 126, 472
St. Domingo 308
St. Helena 372
St. Kitts 307
St. Vincent 308
Straits of Magellan 86
Straits Settlements 81 n. 3, 88, 98, 100, 135, 140, 154, 198, 207 n. 20, 208–209, 211, 319 n. 32, 222, 398
Suez Canal 55, 145, 256, 346, 379
Sulawesi 205
Sulu 183–184, 205
Sulu Archipelago 205
Sumatra 20, 31, 98, 110, 172, 177, 200, 215, 223
Sun Wei 396
Sunda-Karapa 172
Surat 19, 87, 96, 111
Surinam 110 n. 8, 226, 307
Sydney 15 n. 3, 230, 329, 331, 396, 407
Syria 289, 357 n. 97, 365, 533

Tahiti 39, 226
Taishan County, Guangdong 30, 141, 186, 192–193, 195, 212, 217, 227, 253, 242, 306, 393–394, 396, 400–401
Taiwan 14, 21, 180, 184, 217, 423, 435 n. 30
Tamilnadu 87, 94, 98, 100, 103, 106
Teneriffe 97

Terengganu 154
Thailand 30, 63, 96, 98, 135, 137, 139–140, 145–146, 154
The Midlands 341
The Netherlands 35, 373
Thursday Islands 230
Tokyo 53, 420, 432, 435–436
Tongan 194
Toronto 275
Tourcoing 355
Trat 200
Trengganu 200
Trinidad 40, 102, 120, 126, 188, 226, 269, 278, 304, 307–308, 317, 319–320, 322, 334, 396–397, 410, 413
Temasek (Singapore) 199
Turkestan 98
Turkey 256, 345

Uganda 81, 83, 95, 103, 106, 476, 489 n. 92
United States of America 7, 40 n. 43, 45–46, 52, 134, 137, 145, 186, 193, 195, 231 n. 13, 232 n. 19, 237, 240, 245–246, 255–256, 265, 267, 278, 285–286, 289, 293 n. 41, 297, 312 n. 29, 318, 328, 330–331, 339, 346–351, 354, 359, 361–362, 367, 369–370, 389–391, 396, 400, 406, 407, 409–410, 412–421, 425–426, 429–433, 435–436, 437 n. 41, 438, 442, 445, 446 n. 21, 447, 449, 450 n. 38, 453–454, 456, 459, 463, 496
Uruguay 286–287, 289, 293–294, 300

Valletta 97
Vanatu 14
Vancouver 40, 188, 229, 396, 400, 404, 407, 408 n. 17, 411–412, 502
Venezuela 304, 308, 317, 335, 455
Veracruz 303
Veviers 352
Victoria 128 n. 52, 229, 393 n. 1, 396
Vietnam 29, 177, 185, 194, 199, 203, 206, 223
Vinh Long 220, 222
Virgin Islands 307

Washington 11, 12 n. 1, 327, 369, 393 n. 1, 404, 411, 424, 458
Washington, D.C. 11, 12 n. 1
West Africa 32, 52, 272, 277, 292 n. 38, 374
West Riding 338 n. 2, 340–341, 343, 347–348
Whampoa 395
Windward Islanders 308, 317
Woonsocket, Rhode Island 355, 359, 361

Xiamen (Amoy) 217, 219–220, 227, 230–231, 242, 289

Yangtze River 21
Yemen 87
Yokohama 188, 229, 354, 396, 427 n. 21
Yorkshire 255–256, 338–349, 351, 353–355, 357–359, 361–363, 365–366
Yucatan 269, 284, 303

Zambezi River 70
Zanzibar 21, 68, 71, 81, 84, 88, 94, 97, 103, 111